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92–845 PDF 2015

REBUILDING AFTER THE STORM: LESSENING 

IMPACTS AND SPEEDING RECOVERY 

(114–2) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JANUARY 27, 2015 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

TOM RICE, South Carolina 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

CRESENT HARDY, Nevada 

RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon (Ex Officio) 

VACANCY 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

WITNESSES 

PANEL 1 

Hon. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Responses to questions for the record from Hon. Lou Barletta, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania .......................... 59 

PANEL 2 

Francis X. McCarthy, Analyst in Emergency Management Policy, Government 

Finance Division, Congressional Research Service: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 71 

Hon. Robert David Paulison, Former Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 80 

Bryan Koon, Director, Florida Division of Emergency Management, on behalf 

of the National Emergency Management Association: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 90 

Brian Fennessy, Assistant Fire Chief for Emergency Operations, San Diego 

Fire-Rescue Department, on behalf of the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 97 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Hon. Andre ́ Carson, of Indiana ............................................................................... 50 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Hon. Lou Barletta, a Representative in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, submission of the following documents: 

Interlocking Concrete Pavement Institute, written testimony ..................... 42 

National Concrete Masonry Association, written testimony ......................... 45 

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(1) 

REBUILDING AFTER THE STORM: LESSENING 

IMPACTS AND SPEEDING RECOVERY 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in Room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lou Barletta (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. BARLETTA. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I would like to thank Chairman Shuster for the opportunity to 

serve again as chairman of this subcommittee. 

Ranking Member Carson, welcome back. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. BARLETTA. I look forward to building on our bipartisan 

record of accomplishments from last Congress. 

Mr. CARSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Let me welcome the new and returning members 

of the subcommittee to our first hearing. 

Last Congress, we saved $2.2 billion on GSA projects and passed 

the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act. These were major accomplishments, and I thank everyone who was involved in them. 

This Congress, my two top priorities are going to be public buildings reform and disaster legislation. 

I think that we can exceed the GSA savings from last Congress, 

and we have some important reforms to tackle in the emergency 

management world. I hope that we can have disaster legislation 

and a GSA reform bill ready for the committee to consider in the 

first half of this year. 

Now, the purpose of today’s hearing is to launch a public policy 

debate about the growing human and financial costs of disasters 

and to review if we, as a Nation, are responding in the most appropriate and cost-effective way. 

The private sector and Government are spending an ever-increasing amount of money on disasters. FEMA alone has obligated more 

than $178 billion since 1989, over 1,300 Presidential disaster declarations. Those numbers are going up, and I don’t believe we fully 

understand why or what can be done to reduce those losses and 

protect our citizens. 

Over the past 8 years, Chairman Shuster and this committee 

made critical emergency management reforms through the PostKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act and the Sandy RecovVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Jun 25, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\ED\1-27-1~1\92845.TXT JEAN
2 

ery Improvement Act. These bills and the hard work of FEMA and 

our State and local partners have made tremendous improvements 

to our disaster response capabilities since Hurricane Katrina. Now 

is the time to take a look at how the Nation responds to disasters 

and where we want to head in the future. 

There has not been a comprehensive assessment of disaster aid 

and trends in at least 20 years. In recent years, specifically in reaction to Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, significant disaster aid has 

been provided outside the standard disaster relief programs. 

There are many questions we should try and answer. For example, how much do we really spend on disasters? Where is the 

money going, and what are the key drivers of those cost increases? 

How have disaster programs evolved over time? Are they still targeted at the greatest need, and are they cost beneficial? What are 

the principles guiding Federal assistance, and how is it used to rebuild in the wake of a disaster? How can we bend the growing cost 

curve and ensure there is less damage and fewer people hurt in the 

future? 

Some of the answers may surprise you, as they have surprised 

me. I noticed in Mr. McCarthy’s testimony, only a handful of disasters account for over 90 percent of all disaster spending since 1989. 

So if we want to understand why Federal disaster costs are growing, we need to understand why a handful of mega-disasters cost 

so much. 

Right after I became a Member of Congress, my district was hit 

hard by Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee. I remember in 

Bloomsburg, a family stayed in their home and tried to move their 

possessions to an upper floor, but Fishing Creek rose too quickly. 

The house next to theirs was knocked from its foundation. Water 

started gushing through their front windows as they called for 

help. They had to be saved by a helicopter. The woman there told 

me that she can never live in that home again. 

I will never forget that preparing for natural disasters is about 

more than the loss of possessions. It is our friends’ and neighbors’ 

lives that could be at stake if we do not plan in advance. 

As we were rebuilding, I was amazed that much of the Federal 

assistance was to rebuild in the same place in the same way, leaving people vulnerable to the next storm. We have to be compassionate and responsive to our citizens, but we also have a duty to 

be good stewards of the taxpayer dollar. 

I am committed to establishing a framework to tackle these 

issues and come up with solutions that are driven by facts and 

data rather than the emotion that inevitably follows a disaster. I 

don’t have all the answers, but we will put together the right people to get them. 

The first step is this hearing, where we have brought together 

some key people to launch this discussion. I am also excited to announce that following this hearing, on February 26, we will host 

the first of several roundtables on this topic. The first roundtable 

will look at disaster losses from all levels of Government and the 

private sector. I look forward to the ongoing conversations starting 

with hearing from our witnesses here today, and I want to thank 

you all for being here. 

3 

I ask unanimous consent that members of the full committee not 

on the subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 

today’s hearing and ask questions. Without objection, so ordered. 

I now call on the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Carson, for a brief opening statement. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Good morning, and welcome to the first subcommittee hearing of 

the 114th Congress. 

I am very pleased to return as ranking member of the subcommittee and, like Chairman Barletta, I look forward to continuing the good working relationship that we both share. As my 

friend Chairman Barletta stated, we were able to partner on several items before the subcommittee in the last Congress. 

And on a very personal note, I am deeply thankful that the 

chairman is back and ready for warfare. He is looking good and he 

is looking fit as always. 

And also, I would be remiss if I didn’t mention a legend and a 

true American icon in our midst, and that is the Honorable Eleanor 

Holmes Norton. 

So among the many issues we will consider this Congress, I am 

very interested in examining the training programs available to our 

first responders. Ensuring timely and efficient emergency response 

whenever and wherever disaster strikes is critical. 

Now, some of the emergency managers in the great Hoosier State 

of Indiana have reached out to me regarding the limited accessibility of FEMA’s training centers. In order to ensure ready responders, we must make certain that adequate programs are available 

and that sufficient access is available to those training programs. 

Further, after a disaster, we very sadly hear stories about elderly 

and disabled individuals having to fend for themselves because 

they were not adequately informed prior to the storm or they were 

unable to access resources after the storm. This was particularly 

the case after Hurricane Sandy. We must ensure that emergency 

preparedness and response systems are inclusive of vulnerable populations and those with language barriers. 

Moreover, in their written testimony, NEMA discusses concerns 

about the level of support services that States should be required 

to provide. I understand their concern, but it is 2015 and no one 

should be left behind, especially our most vulnerable neighbors. So 

I think it is very imperative that we revisit some of those same 

issues in this Congress to ensure that everyone has access to the 

same information and resources. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with 

you. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Ranking Member Carson. 

Now, we will have two panels of witnesses today. 

On our first panel we have Administrator Fugate, the current 

Administrator of FEMA, who brings tremendous emergency management experience as well as successes in implementing key reforms and driving progress at FEMA. 

On our second panel we will be joined by Mr. Francis McCarthy, 

an expert at CRS, that will show us the trends in disaster assistance and how assistance has evolved over time. 

4 

Mr. Bryan Koon, the Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management, is here to talk with us about his experience, 

as well as help us see things from a State perspective. 

Administrator David Paulison who led FEMA in the wake of 

Hurricane Katrina and through the implementation of the PostKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act. He will discuss the 

changes he has seen in disasters and provide some thoughts on 

ways to address the rising cost of disasters. 

Finally, we are joined by Chief Brian Fennessy, Assistant Fire 

Chief for the Emergency Operations in San Diego, who will share 

his experience in emergency management, specifically the alarming 

trends in wild fire activity in this country. 

I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses’ full statements be 

included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

Since your written testimony has been made a part of the record, 

this subcommittee would request that you limit your oral testimony 

to 5 minutes. 

Administrator Fugate, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. W. CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, thank you, Chairman Barletta and Ranking 

Member Carson and other members of the committee. In my written statements, I talked about some of the things we have been 

working on since the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act passed. Mr. 

Chairman of this committee, I have to say, you helped us address 

many issues that have come up repeatedly. 

First off, I have to recognize the fact that you provided us the 

authority to recognize the tribal governments as an entity that 

could deal directly with the President in requesting disaster declarations, something they had sought for a long time. This committee ensured that became part of the legislation, and we have 

implemented it. 

You have also given us tools that we had identified through pilots and lessons learned in managing debris, but also in making 

sure that as we begin the process of rebuilding, we are able to 

speed up the process of identifying those large projects, obligating 

monies, and allowing more discretion to State and local officials on 

how to build back better. That was an important tool that we 

began using as far back as some damage from Hurricane Irene 

with the State of Vermont, and it has given us flexibility that 

States and local governments have asked for in building back better and building back to the future. 

The trends and disasters are not surprising to me. With an aging 

infrastructure, a concentration of populations in highly vulnerable 

areas that fortunately don’t have a lot of disasters, but when they 

do occur, the costs are substantial. Particularly, when you look at 

what happens when the number of public buildings that are under 

or uninsured are damaged or destroyed. I think things such as 

dealing with individual losses that weren’t insured, dealing with 

debris cost, dealing with response cost are always going to be part 

of the formula. 

But when you look at, most recently in Sandy, the billion dollars 

and more in some projects we are having to pay to rebuild strucVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Jun 25, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\ED\1-27-1~1\92845.TXT JEAN
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tures, it is important for us to make sure that in the future we 

have built back those structures to where they are insurable and 

look at making sure that the insurance provisions are more strenuously applied and less opportunities to allow structures to come 

back for repeated assistance because they weren’t insured. 

We firmly believe that we should do more diligent work with our 

State and local partners to ensure that when we build back we just 

don’t look at old data, we just don’t use cost-benefit analysis, that 

don’t account for the future. But we also think we need to engage 

the private sector more strongly in ensuring risk. And in those 

areas where the private sector cannot insure that risk, ask hard 

questions, as you have pointed out, should we build back where we 

were, should we build back the way it was, or do we need to 

change? Because if anything, we know that many areas are subject 

to repeated disasters. 

I personally went into Arkansas last year to see damage from a 

tornado. I saw a school, fortunately not occupied, nearly completed, 

that was destroyed. I was informed by our staff from the regional 

office that that school was being rebuilt from a 2010 tornado where 

it had been destroyed. It was destroyed again. 

What really troubled me was we did not have an opportunity or 

did not seek the opportunity to make sure that school had safe 

rooms in it. And we have committed to and have now established 

that in tornado-prone areas, when we are dealing with schools and 

other public structures, that we will find a way to make sure that 

we fund safe rooms to protect children during tornadoes. 

So you have given us a lot of tools, many of which are still in 

the implementation phase. Some of them have not gone as fast as 

I would like. Part of it was the implementation and getting buyin from our partners at the State and local level, but I am seeing 

early success. And I think it will be a good discussion to have with 

you and the committee over our findings, our challenges, and 

where success is taking place. 

I firmly believe that the role of the Federal Government is to 

support and not supplant our local officials, that FEMA is a support agency, and the cost of disasters is a shared responsibility. 

But I do think it is appropriate that when disasters exceed the capabilities of State and local governments that we must be there to 

support them, not only the initial response but to ensure successful 

recovery. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, for your testimony Administrator 

Fugate. 

I will now begin the first round of questions limited to 5 minutes 

for each Member. If there are additional questions following the 

first round, we will have additional rounds of questions as needed. 

We all know disaster costs are going up dramatically. What do 

you think are driving those costs, and can we do anything about 

them? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, one way that people have said to look at disaster cost is reduce eligibility or erase thresholds for declaring disasters. But as I think you see, the smaller disasters are not what 

drives the majority of the big-ticket items; it is these larger events. 

6 

And I think it comes back to the many cases in which we have 

aging infrastructure; dense, populated areas in vulnerable zones, 

whether it is from hurricanes, flooding, earthquakes; and those 

costs, I think historically, were things that we looked at, such as 

insurance and other tools to manage that risk. But that risk has 

now, I think, moved more towards the Federal taxpayer in the 

FEMA programs. 

I think over time it was the unintended consequences of these 

programs that again were seen as, instead of being a support of 

last resort, oftentimes the first resort for the coverage of insurable 

property that was not insured and those losses. Again, it is really 

a decision that we have to look at, how do we best ensure communities are able to rebuild, but at the same time, don’t support or 

continue growing the risk? 

I think we have to understand there is a certain amount of risk 

out there right now. We have modeled some of these disasters and 

they are actually bigger than Sandy. The exposure for just south 

Florida for a repeat of the Great Miami Hurricane would be in the 

hundreds of billions of dollars in Federal cost, exceeding both 

Sandy and Katrina. So it is, I think, something we need to look at. 

But I think more importantly, we have to make sure that as we 

go in after disaster, we are setting the stage for the future not to 

come back and repeat it over and over again. 

Mr. BARLETTA. We continue to see new disaster aid programs 

emerge ad hoc in reaction to disasters. They all seem to have different rules and requirements and do not seem well coordinated or 

focused on obtaining the best outcomes. Is this something Congress 

should take a look at so that we can streamline these programs 

and ensure that they are cost effective? 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, I would go back to the Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act. 

One of the things you directed FEMA to do—we were slow in 

doing it, but it is now in place—is to build a national recovery 

framework to take all of those various programs and look at it 

more holistically when working with our State and local partners. 

I think Congress needs to know what the total cost of disasters 

are. There shouldn’t be hidden costs buried in other appropriations. 

But I will also caution that the flexibility of those programs and 

the fact that we deal so oftentimes with preexisting conditions that 

FEMA’s programs aren’t going to deal with, that flexibility is oftentimes accessory building. 

And let me give you one example of community block development grant dollars. When we deal with housing issues in a disaster, it is generally the affordable housing base that was heavily 

damaged, not insured, but we are not the program that rebuilds 

permanent housing. We deal with a temporary response. 

So if we are not able to partner with HUD, the risk you run into 

is a rebound effect. We meet immediate needs but there is no solution long-term. 

This is why you saw in Hurricane Katrina people in travel trailers for years after that disaster because we did not approach this 

in the beginning holistically. For example, if we have these many 

houses, we are going to have to start looking at affordable housing. 

7 

We need to start these programs almost simultaneously to the recovery programs. 

So I would say the flexibility and the ability to take these different programs are important tools we should not just discard. But 

I do think it is important to have a total accounting of what the 

real costs of disasters are, not just what the Stafford Act under the 

disaster relief fund may be providing. 

Mr. BARLETTA. What incentives do you think the Federal Government could provide the States to encourage better disaster preparation planning, budgeting, and smarter rebuilding to reduce future 

losses and costs? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the State, NEMA will present to you—and I 

think again if I put my State hat on, I would look for more Federal 

participation early in that process. 

One of the things that I have heard from both the Government 

Accountability Office and from the IG is we ought to be raising the 

thresholds for disasters. I am against that for several reasons: One 

is, I think it penalizes large population States because it puts them 

into almost intolerable levels of disaster to get assistance; at the 

same time, smaller States would have little impact on them. 

Many States have developed their own public assistance and individual assistance programs, but they only apply them generally 

after they have been denied for Federal assistance. There is almost 

a disincentive for a State to manage smaller disasters for fear that 

if they do that it may not make them eligible for a FEMA disaster 

declaration under the President’s authorities. 

So what we have been looking at is—our current model—once 

you reach the threshold the President has declared a disaster, we 

cost share back to the first dollar. We have been exploring what if 

you didn’t raise the threshold but you looked at how far back do 

we go and give States more predictability about how much they are 

responsible for before we do come in with Federal assistance and 

base it just on per-capita factors but look at the exact State, the 

economy, the budget reserves, the capacity of the State. 

But I think some States have been very progressive in this area. 

However, other States and their State legislators have oftentimes 

seen that the Federal Government will come in, go back to that 

first dollar, and having resistance to building their own capacity. 

And I think, again, if we could build more capacity for the recurring routine disasters at the State and local level, it would allow 

us to focus on those large disasters. 

I don’t think it necessarily brings the big-dollar ticket items 

down, but it does start growing and building more capacity across 

the States for a lot of the recurring events that we find ourselves 

involved in. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

I will now recognize each Member for 5 minutes of questions, and 

I will start with Ranking Member Carson. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Thank you, Administrator Fugate. The International Association 

of Fire Chiefs notes that FEMA does not fully reimburse fire departments for their firefighting efforts when called to service. In 

addition, FEMA does not cover full wages required by the Fair 

8 

Labor Standards Act or the back-filled costs of replacing a firefighter dispatch on a mutual-aid agreement. 

Sir, is FEMA prohibited by statute from fully reimbursing fire 

departments for these costs? If not, why is FEMA not fully reimbursing the fire departments? 

Mr. FUGATE. I would need, Congressman, specific information. I 

would have to look at the cases. FEMA funds those extraordinary 

costs above and beyond what was budgeted. So if you were already 

budgeted to respond to fires and you do get declared, that does not 

necessarily become eligible. 

But overtime cost, cost of backfill, where you are supporting mutual aid under the emergency management assistance compact 

going across State lines, and it really comes back to what the mutual-aid agreements are ahead of time. 

One of our challenges has been, unless there is an obligation to 

pay just because you have a disaster declaration doesn’t make it eligible. So we do try to look at the nonbudgeted extraordinary costs. 

We try to be very aggressive in identifying those costs. They are 

right; we don’t go back and do 100 percent. Our cost share is 75/ 

25 percent and then the State and locals determine how to do that. 

Under fire management assistant grant cost, we, again, do not 

go back to the first dollar because each State has an annualized 

budget for wildland fire fighting. And so, again, we look to determine if there is an extraordinary cost. So if your office will share 

with us the specific details, we will go back and research that. 

But my position has always been if it is eligible, it is eligible, and 

we look at all those extraordinary costs above what they budgeted 

for the day-to-day activities should be reimbursable, but specifically 

to what case and how much. If they can give me examples, we will 

look at it and try to make sure that we were doing the right thing 

during that timeframe. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BARLETTA. I will now recognize Mr. Curbelo. 

Mr. CURBELO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Fugate, thank you for your presence here this 

morning, and thank you for your service to the people of Florida 

over so many years. We remember you very fondly and we miss 

you at times, so thank you very much. 

I represent south Florida where a large portion of my district 

lives on or near the coast. One of the constant worries I hear from 

my constituents back home, especially in the Florida Keys, is the 

need to reform the National Flood Insurance Program. I am a cosponsor of the Flood Insurance Premium Parody Act, a bill which 

would extend the recent NFIP reforms to business properties and 

owner-occupied second homes. And I feel it is critical these properties receive the same relief already provided to residential properties and single-family homes afforded to them under the BiggertWaters Act of 2012. 

Can you share your thoughts on what best can be done to provide affordable flood insurance for my constituents? Do you feel 

that we should apply to commercial properties and second homes 

the same formula for yearly rate increases received by residential 

properties? 

9 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, first of all, you all may miss me, but you have 

got a great guy in Bryan Koon, so the State is in good hands. 

You just opened up a very good philosophical debate and a can 

of worms of how far the flood insurance program should go. Here 

is my question: If the private insurance companies can’t insure it, 

is it something that the Federal Government should assume the 

risk? Because we are doing risk transference. 

Any time the private sector can’t cover the risk and we take on 

that responsibility, you, the taxpayers, are backing it. That may be 

good policy. That may be the desire and the intent of Congress, 

which I would support if that is the desire, but I must always caution that in transferring that risk back to the flood insurance program, which is over $20 billion in debt, we have to understand that 

it is not an actuarially sound program. It will not be able to pay 

back its debt. And growing that exposure may be good policy, but 

I think it is one we need to go forward and understand what that 

risk is. 

The challenge is, understanding the built infrastructure and how 

we protect that, but also, how we enforce the future and ensure 

that we don’t continue to grow that risk. And that does not mean 

we cannot build in coastal areas. It does mean we have to build differently. 

So I think the question that I would narrow back down to is, we 

have got a lot of businesses. We have a lot of homes. We have a 

lot of property that is exposed. Insurance is not available or not affordable. 

It will be a huge economic loss to local jurisdictions from taxbased losses, business losses, jobs loss. If it makes sense to insure 

that, then we will implement it. But I also caution that we have 

to make sure we don’t set up an unfair system that continues to 

grow risk by allowing people then to build in areas without taking 

the steps, which can be more costly but then transfer that risk 

back to us, the Federal taxpayer. 

It is a shared responsibility. It is an interesting debate, we will 

be more than willing to engage in it, but I think we have to be upfront that there are many people, both in Congress and outside, 

that do not want to grow the flood insurance program and that exposure and others who think they do. We would be interested in 

participating in that debate, but we really think this is the sense 

of Congress when we really need the guidance from Congress on 

what this should be. 

Mr. CURBELO. Thank you, Mr. Fugate. 

And the State of Florida has learned a lot since 1992 and has 

changed a lot. Do you feel that the State is adequately prepared 

today for a potential storm? You referred to one earlier, a Great 

Miami Storm. Do you feel that we have done enough, from your 

perspective, to prepare and to mitigate potential damages? 

Mr. FUGATE. I will leave it to Bryan to talk about what under 

leadership he and Governor Scott have been able to achieve. But 

I want to point out one thing that Florida did. It was a hard, painful lesson. It was hard fought. And there is always attempts to take 

and walk back. But under Governor Bush, it was the establishment 

of statewide mandatory building codes, learning the lessons of 

south Florida but across the State. 

10 

Probably the one thing that is saving taxpayers more money and 

making sure that you still have commercially available insurance 

for the wind pools is the fact that Florida did strengthen its building codes and the State does enforce it across all counties and cities. It was a courageous step given that many people said it would 

make homes unaffordable. The reality was, without that building 

code they would have been uninsurable. 

And as we continue to see more people buy into the Florida market, I think that’s a testament to better built homes for the environment they are in, and this is a lesson I think all States should 

pay attention to. When you have the right building codes and land 

use to manage risk, that risk can come down to the point where 

it is insurable, and the private sector can do a better job of managing future risk without it defaulting back to Federal programs. 

Mr. CURBELO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Curbelo. 

And I would like to recognize Ms. Norton for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Barletta. I am glad to 

see you back in the chair. 

Mr. Fugate, the Nation’s Capital barely escaped Sandy. We were 

very grateful, just like we escaped the snowfall this time. All the 

scientists tell us that we are headed for major disasters. They tell 

us that there is no longer debate about whether there is climate 

change but only about how to manage climate change. And so I am 

interested in issues, and I will be talking to the next panel about 

predisaster mitigation. The Member was asking about Florida. I 

noticed that they are building right in the ocean virtually but trying to do some predisaster mitigation as they do. 

FEMA has been helpful here in what we have been trying to do 

with the so-called 17th Street levee on the Mall. Without that 

levee, the Washington Monument and indeed the entire monumental core would be exposed to horrific flooding. Rebuilding downtown Washington and the monumental core, and those steps would 

have been taken. I certainly hope, since steps have been taken— 

and that levee was done before the final word was in on climate 

change—I would be interested in your view as to whether or not 

you think that levee could forestall a seriously Sandy-like storm. 

But I am also, because it has taken so long, interested in the 

drawing of the flood maps. As I understand, and this is what gives 

Government a bad name, the work of the Army Corps of Engineers 

for certification is done separately from FEMA or from other agencies. Why can’t that work be done concurrently so that they look 

to see that the levee is constructed properly and they go get on 

with the next step, rather than in some sequential fashion which 

assures it will be delayed? 

Mr. FUGATE. As far as that, I will take that back to staff. I know 

we have been going round and round trying to get this thing built 

and get those maps updated. Part of what you gave us with the 

Sandy Recovery Improvement Act was at least things like the environmental historical reviews, which agencies used to do independently, we now do concurrently, so we are taking some small steps 

to try to look at these projects. 

11 

And the President has given some pretty good direction on this. 

He said, you know, when we were doing some of these capital improvements we shouldn’t be spending years doing the studies, we 

should do our studies together. We are not going to change the requirements, but it doesn’t mean we should do each study and wait 

for the next study. So we are moving in that direction but not as 

fast as we should. 

As far as the protection for the future, none of these designs are 

the 100-percent solution to future risk. What they are really designed for are risk and the 1 percent or more. And I think you just 

identified one of our challenges. We have always looked at mitigating back to a 1-percent or less risk. Unfortunately, we saw this 

in Sandy. Some of the mitigation work done after Hurricane Irene 

was done to that standard, and Sandy went over it and we lost a 

structure anyway. 

So we are asking a different question. Maybe 1 percent makes 

sense for a lot of things, but for critical infrastructure like hospitals, fire stations, maybe we should build to a higher standard. 

We are currently working with the interagency on the Federal side 

to come up with a more stringent standard, not just building 1 foot 

above our base flood elevation, which is the 1-percent risk, perhaps 

even building higher. Not because we have data to drive that per 

se, but because of the uncertainty of the future data and these investments of literally tens to hundreds to billions of dollars of our 

future, but making sure we are building to that future with that 

uncertainty. 

Ms. NORTON. I really appreciate what you are saying. The monumental core is irreplaceable. I wonder if, and I would ask you to 

look into this, whether or not one could—and realize this would 

mean further delay—whether you could look into the 17th Street 

levee and see whether it should be altered now, right in the beginning to make sure that it meets the standard you have just indicated may be necessary. 

Could I ask one more question in light of a recent tragedy that 

occurred here, and that was the WMATA tragedy where we lost a 

human life and more than 80 people went to the hospital. It was, 

sadly, reported, at least initially it looks like coordination in terms 

of communication underground and aboveground was lacking. Now, 

this is, what is it, 13 years after 9/11, and, of course, FEMA is 

there for natural as well as terrorist disasters. 

Has FEMA considered this apparent failure what it could mean 

not only in a real natural disaster but, heaven forbid, in a terrorist 

disaster? Are you involved in this disaster and helping WMATA 

and the various agencies, city and Federal, involved to right this 

situation so that we are sure, particularly underground, there is 

the kind of communication that could enable rescue to occur? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, ma’am. Looking at this—first of all, I have a 

personal equity in this. That is the subway that I ride home on. 

I was not in town. It went a little bit earlier than I normally depart, but I am on that train Monday through Friday, both coming 

in and going home. I know that very spot in the tunnel. I can tell 

you, anytime a train stops in a tunnel now people start looking 

around, where before it was just kind of like the normal pause, 

people are now looking around going, why are we stopped? 

12 

Our Office of National Capital Region Coordination does work 

with all those entities. I would ask that we wait until we get more 

from the investigations to find out what did happen, but we will 

pledge our support through our Office of National Capital Region 

Coordination both to the district and to Metro for any assistance 

they require from us, from planning, training, and exercising to be 

better prepared for future incidents. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. Is the Office of National Capital Region 

Coordination currently involved with this investigation and with 

this work? 

Mr. FUGATE. We are not involved in the investigation, but we are 

there to support all the parties if they request us. And I think what 

will happen when we do get some of the details and look at some 

of the recommendations of what to do better, we would be in a position to support both the district and Metro if they request our assistance. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Ms. Norton. 

Chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Graves. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fugate, thank you very much for being here today. I appreciate your testimony and certainly share a lot of friends of yours, 

Paul Rainwater and Kevin Davis and others. 

In your testimony, I noticed that you made reference to the study 

that was done by the Congressional Budget Office noting that 

every $1 invested in mitigation activities saves $3, and, of course, 

the FEMA study National Institute of Building Science that shows 

that there is $4 in savings. I noticed last year in FEMA’s budget, 

as I recall, they were zeroing out of the predisaster mitigation. 

Just curious, you made reference in your testimony, curious 

about your, I guess, how FEMA has responded to the findings of 

those studies. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the challenge with the predisaster mitigation 

fund has been it has diminished over time and was increasingly 

being directed to where it would go. You asked us to cut our budgets each year. We had to make decisions where those cuts took 

place. We think mitigation is important, but we also knew the capacity to respond, recover, and manage all the other programs were 

important too. 

There has been a lot of talk about the predisaster mitigation and 

its role and the cost savings. I would also be pragmatic in saying 

those savings are realized if the structure you mitigated gets hit 

again. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Sure. I will give an example. Hurricane Katrina, I think if you add everything up from the 2005 hurricanes you get somewhere around $150 billion in total spending. 

Based on some back-of-the-envelope calculations we did in Louisiana, I think we had spent about $8 billion in the front end. We 

probably could have saved about $80 to $90 billion in recovery. 

Ms. Holmes Norton made, I think, a very appropriate connection 

between the Corps of Engineers and FEMA. And you and I have 

had this discussion in the past. In numerous instances the Corps 

of Engineers has been directed by Congress to carry out mitigation 

or resilience projects. And some of those projects, in the case of 

13 

Louisiana, had been in the development phase in excess of 20 

years. During that same period of time FEMA has expended over 

$1 billion in response of recovery claims in these same projects 

areas. And in one case, I remember the total, where FEMA exceeded $1 billion in payouts, the entire project was estimated to cost 

$586 million. 

Can you talk a little about your coordination with the Corps of 

Engineers to ensure that some of these mitigation measures, if 

predisaster mitigation is off the table, which personally I believe 

may be penny wise and pound foolish, can you talk about some of 

the coordination there to ensure the resiliency of some of these 

communities and of course cost savings for your agency. 

Mr. FUGATE. You know, we work very closely with the Army 

Corps of Engineers, both in the flood insurance mitigation response 

and recovery. I also have to point out, you could authorize a lot of 

projects. If you don’t fund them, they don’t get built. If you go back 

and you pull the budget and you look at how many projects that 

the Corps has been authorized for and you look at the funding, 

there is a significant mismatch. 

Again, if we were able to foretell the future and know exactly 

where disasters would happen, I think we would probably be better 

at strategizing where to make those investments. But we have potential risk in places that are not seeing a lot of disasters, yet the 

exposure is tremendous. 

And so, again, we do work with the Corps, but I think it again 

comes back to making very hard choices. I mean you have to make 

appropriations decisions. There is no doubt about it. There is not 

enough money to do everything. 

And again, for the Corps, there are oftentimes more projects 

identified than they have funding and they are having to make decisions across the States, the territories of where to make those investments. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Well, look, personally in regard to the 

Corps of Engineers, I think the cut in funding is largely in response to their performance, or inability to perform in many cases, 

which you may not share that opinion based on my personal experience. 

But one thing we had posed to FEMA years ago was the idea of 

having some flexibility in HMGP when these Corps projects weren’t 

funded, yet they yielded high benefits to the taxpayers in terms of 

resilience and cost savings for disaster mitigation, yet FEMA, we 

were unable to work that out. Could you perhaps talk about that 

a little bit. As I recall, I believe there was a prohibition in using 

HMGP dollars in cases where you had a federally authorized 

project in place regardless of whether there was funding or not. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, this kind of goes back to authorization language and appropriations language where we do have prohibitions 

against duplicating underfunding sources. When we don’t we try to. 

And again, what we try to do, and we have had some success, 

where a project was not originally authorized by the Corps and we 

were able to fund it but the Corps was able to fund it, we were able 

to get good outcomes. 

But I think it comes back to when we have nonduplication of 

Federal efforts, one program is already authorized, maybe didn’t 

14 

have the funds to do it, is—again, this is something the committee 

has looked at—is there additional language you want us to have in 

the Stafford Act? We don’t want to routinely supplant or get into 

augmenting other Federal budgets if you are not funding it. We 

don’t want to look at the disaster fund to sidestep the appropriations of Congress, but obviously, it is something that the committee 

could look at and give us guidance on. 

And if we are not interpreting it correctly, I am willing to go 

back and look at it. But generally if it is already authorized in another program, there are limitations on what we are able to do. It 

would actually be exceeding Congress’ intent and authorization for 

us. 

So we will work with the committee on it. I don’t really have a 

real issue with that. But I also caution that, you know, some of the 

feedback I have gotten is we don’t want to open up a can of worms 

where suddenly the disaster relief fund is bypassing Congress’ intent by funding things Congress had chosen not to fund that year. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Costello. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Administrator Fugate, I recall, as a county commissioner, following either before or just following a storm of a significant magnitude, speaking with my emergency services department and them 

describing the various obligations that they needed to undertake to 

apply for and ultimately process an application for FEMA disaster 

assistance grants or grant. 

The question is, in looking at the recent GAO report, FEMA was 

criticized for the significant costs they incurred to administer disaster assistant grants. My question, what is FEMA doing to reduce 

its own administrative costs as well as the administrative burden 

often placed on States and locals who are trying to get the assistance to where it is needed for recovery? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, first up, one tool that we have used aggressively has been moving away from putting in a lot of staff and renting temporary facilities on a smaller disaster when we can work it 

from the region, so that is driving down cost. 

But probably the other one is the tool you gave us in the Sandy 

Recovery Improvement Act and that is allowing us to do these alternative projects and being able to use an estimated cost and come 

to a resolution on a project cost without doing actual cost. 

You know, I would like to get rid of a lot of the oversight. I like 

to get rid of a lot of the burden. I would like to simplify the programs to where we are able to make those determinations and get 

funds to people appropriately. You have given us those tools. On 

the other hand, you also hold us extremely accountable for any 

overpayments or any ineligible costs. That requires a bit of oversight. So there is a balance there. 

I think the committee struck an extremely important balance 

with the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act by allowing us to move 

away from all the actual costs, where we have to continue to audit 

and review and survey the progress of the project to being able to 

come to a resolution on the front end, make a determination, agree 

to that, and make the payout. 

15 

I think we are doing this with the understanding that we have 

accountability both to this committee but to the taxpayers to make 

sure that we are only approving what was eligible, but at the same 

time it significantly reduces our cost in overhead of managing that, 

and it is giving more flexibilities to the local jurisdictions. 

Now, this is a new tool. Not every State has embraced it. New 

Jersey has not been as aggressive as New York. It could be because 

the projects in New York lent them to the project, but we have also 

seen, particularly in debris, Oklahoma was able to take advantage 

of these tools and it vastly sped up their experience with debris 

and cost reimbursement. 

So knowing what we have had in the past and what we have 

going forward, I have seen improvements. We have gotten feedback. We need to constantly work on that to get it better, but there 

is a balance there between too much burden and not being accountable to the taxpayer. 

Mr. COSTELLO. I can certainly appreciate that balance. 

Following up on the Sandy Recovery Act, which you mentioned, 

the increase in small-project thresholds to $120,000 I think is one 

of the things you were alluding to in terms of simplified procedures, without suggesting that it should be increased or decreased. 

Could you share your observations on if further efficiencies or expedited recoveries could be realized if that threshold were modified? 

Or are you comfortable with where that is? I think that covers 95 

percent. 

Mr. FUGATE. No, I am not comfortable. I let staff talk me out of 

where I wanted to go. I thought that number should have been 

higher. We were looking at the percentage of projects that would 

fall in that, and the majority of them do. But I still think there is 

room to move it up. We have a lot of other Federal programs that 

administer much larger dollar figures with simpler grant processes. 

I am comfortable that, through the IG’s oversight and our ability 

to really focus in on what is eligible, that we can move that higher. 

I would also like to encourage input from our colleagues at the 

State and local level through their organizations. 

But I think it is something the committee should look at too as 

we don’t want to just raise that threshold so that we don’t have 

any accountability. But I think there are a lot of things that we 

could do with that that would simplify the oversight, would not significantly grow the risk in exposure for uneligible work, and would 

drive down the cost and speed up recovery. 

So what that number should be, I would like to work with the 

committee. I think we can go higher than $120,000. I thought we 

should have when we started this. But staff was able to pull the 

data, and, as the chairman says, we want to be data driven. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Right. 

Mr. FUGATE. We looked at data. And the majority of the projects 

that were falling in this category fall into that. 

Mr. COSTELLO. Like 95 percent or something like that? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes. But I still think there is room to move it higher. My ideal world is we have small projects up to the threshold 

of the alternative projects and we speed up all of the disasters. 

Currently our threshold for the alternative projects is $1 million. 

16 

I don’t know if small projects goes to $1 million, but I think, again, 

we give States the flexibility to choose how they want to do that. 

But if we can maintain fiscal accountability, I am not opposed to 

raising the minimum threshold for small projects. I would defer to 

my State colleagues how high they think it should be and what 

they can manage. But I think as long as we can be accountable, 

it speeds up the process, drives down the cost to the taxpayer, and 

it doesn’t change eligibility, so it would have been paid anyway, but 

at substantially less overhead cost to administer. 

Mr. BARLETTA. I would like to work with you on that. I think 

there is something that we can do. Time is money when it comes 

to rebuilding. 

I would like to recognize each Member for an additional 5 minutes for questions, and I will start. 

We saw firsthand the tremendous progress already being made 

to rebuild and protect NYU Langone Medical Center in New York 

City, particularly when compared to the significant delays experienced by Charity Hospital in New Orleans. Can you attribute the 

expedited recovery to the new authorities granted to FEMA in the 

Sandy Recovery Improvement Act? And what other benefits are 

being experienced? 

Mr. FUGATE. As far as the benefits of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, it is absolutely an important tool. 

The other lesson we learned from the events of Katrina is there 

are certain types of projects that are technically difficult that exceed the average capacity for people to manage, you need to have 

subject matter experts. So we engaged very early, we identified 

where these projects were going to be, whether they were hospitals 

or other large public infrastructures and we brought in a lot of experts. 

But it wasn’t until you passed the Sandy Recovery Improvement 

Act that we really had a tool to allow us to come to resolution. I 

think if we had been using the old program and only doing actual 

cost, there would have been more uncertainty for the applicant on 

what they could and couldn’t do, it would have been more overhead 

in making those decisions, and they would not have had the ability 

to get what they were going to get from us and move forward. As 

it is, we have obligated the majority of those funds. They are now 

engaged in repair and construction. We still have projects from 

Katrina that have not even been resolved yet. 

So I think, one, better understanding of the complexities of these 

projects on the front end. But, two, you gave us a tool we did not 

have before to more engage the applicants in getting a better resolution on what the project involved, getting a figure agreed to, and 

obligating those dollars on the front end versus waiting for construction to start and then constantly coming back for revisions 

and updates. 

Mr. BARLETTA. What are some of the most alarming trends you 

have observed in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery? 

Mr. FUGATE. I think it was alluded to by Representative Carson. 

When we talk about vulnerable populations, as we have built our 

programs, it is something that—and I have some disagreement 

with my State colleagues on this—nobody disagrees on the importance of getting this right. One of the things I observed is we alVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Jun 25, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\ED\1-27-1~1\92845.TXT JEAN
17 

ways tend to treat the hard-to-do as an annex in our planning, our 

funding, and our programs. Instead of looking at the communities 

as they are in building our programs, so that they don’t say, well, 

we need to have an annex for kids or we need to have an annex 

for people with animals or we need to have an annex for the elderly, they are part of the community, we need to plan more holistically, we need to plan for what is there and not exclude it. 

And when you look at the vulnerable populations—and I will be 

honest with you, one of the growing challenges to disaster response 

is the increase in poverty and many in the middle class who have 

no safety net, who a disaster will wipe out all of their savings and 

wipe out their most important equity, generally their homes. We 

saw this in the 2004 hurricanes—I don’t think people quite understand how big a role that poverty and lack of safety nets in the 

middle class who are just one payment away from losing it all 

makes them extremely vulnerable to disasters and very difficult to 

recover. 

And I think this is one of the things, if we look at our programs, 

we cannot forget there are many parts of our community that are 

extremely vulnerable. Those numbers are growing. And it has a lot 

to do with the economy, the distribution of wealth, and the lack of 

resources among many people who consider themselves middle 

class but one disaster wipes them out and they suddenly find that 

those safety nets are not there for them either. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Chair will now recognize Ranking Member Carson for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Administrator Fugate, NEMA’s written testimony talks about the 

need for clarification, for functional needs, support for general population shelters, and that FEMA and the DOJ have provided conflicting information. What is your sense, sir, about when will joint 

guidance be issued from FEMA and the DOJ? 

Mr. FUGATE. There has been a lot of guidance issues. I am not 

sure, I will have to get back with NEMA on what more guidance 

is needed. I know there are ongoing discussions. But let me tell you 

what the outcome should look like, because I think if we don’t 

know what the outcome looks like, we are going to talk a lot of 

process. And as a State director, I was very sensitive to this issue. 

As a local emergency manager, I was very sensitive to this issue. 

But a perfect—I won’t say perfect, it shouldn’t be perfect, it should 

be the expectation—you arrive at a shelter, you should not be 

turned away. If you arrive because you have got a pet, people have 

pets, we have to plan for it. If you show up with an oxygen tank. 

If you show up with a family member on a ventilator. 

Now, it may not always be the best place, there may be other options. But I think what you want is, in a crisis, people don’t really 

have the luxury of picking and choosing where they are going to 

go, so we would like to get to where most people, the majority of 

the population, can choose their shelter based upon what is convenient for them, not what we have only been willing or able to provide. 

We are not there. And it is unfair to say that States and local 

governments should be there immediately. We are not where we 

are at because of lack of effort. It is that States and locals have 

18 

to deal with existing buildings, many of which were not designed 

for people with disabilities. There are requirements to upgrade 

them, but many times it is minimal. The level of care, the type of 

equipment, and durable goods. 

So this is a goal I think most of us agree to work towards: People 

should not be turned away from shelters because they are not easy 

to accommodate. But we also have to understand that is a lot easier to say than do. And there are some real challenges, both financially and the practicality of what can be done to get there. 

And so we will continue to work with our partners at NEMA, 

with the Department of Justice, and with the disabled community 

who advocates for that right. And I think that is probably the thing 

that drives me passionately, is this is a civil right. 

Mr. CARSON. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. FUGATE. So we have to do everything to ensure that we are 

maintaining that, while understanding this is not easy. If it was, 

nobody would be saying we have questions. But there are a lot of 

questions asked. What is a reasonable accommodation? To what degree should they be prepared for that? To what level should they 

implement that care? And probably the hard question is always, 

where is the money going to come from? Oftentimes in local governments, who have seen tremendous reductions in their staff and 

funding base, yet still expected to provide the service in a crisis, 

many of which will not be declared by the Federal Government, 

would not receive Federal dollars. 

Mr. CARSON. Lastly, sir, I have heard from some of my constituents about the long waits to attend FEMA’s training center in Alabama, and as well as the I guess you could say insufficient funding 

for emergency response training programs in general. Could you 

provide for us, sir—because your last statement was so phenomenal and deeply insightful, we appreciate that—could you provide the subcommittee, sir, with some description of each of 

FEMA’s training programs and an overview quickly of the budget 

for the last 5 years? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, the Center for Domestic Preparedness is a 

hard place to get into because there is high demand. It is the only 

non-DOD facility in the United States that offers live-agent training, meaning that your HAZMAT team will actually go in and experience what it is like to handle lethal nerve agents and biological 

agents in a controlled environment. It is priceless training for those 

teams. 

Our National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg is a capstone program for many fire executives, as well as training many specialized 

programs across the country, where people come in both for training there, but also training that is delivered at the State and programs that are developed jointly with the National Fire Academy. 

And then the Emergency Management Institute, co-located in Emmitsburg, providing training for State and local emergency managers, bringing together many of them outside of their normal work 

environment to share their experiences, but also get the latest updates. 

It is both a capacity issue and staying current in these programs. 

So, again, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, we have funded 

for so many seats, we maximize that. The staff continues to look 

19 

at how we can increase capacity. But it is a finite resource with 

high demand, and we try to accommodate those that have applied. 

But it is, again, a premier facility with capabilities not found elsewhere, with a very high demand for that resource. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Carson. 

The Chair recognizes Ms. Norton for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have just one question. I would like to take advantage of the 

long experience that Mr. Fugate has had in disaster mitigation and 

ask for his candid views. 

And here I am not asking you about funding. That is not something you control. I want to contrast the difference between the 

way Congress behaved after the terrorist attack and the way it behaved after Katrina and Sandy. 

After the terrorist attack, it scared the dickens out of the country, and I must say that it scared us so badly that after the fact 

we actually threw money at every jurisdiction. There isn’t a State 

that didn’t get funds to prepare for the next disaster attack, including States that Al Qaeda never heard of, never would venture to 

care about. But every State got some funds. I was on Homeland Security at the time and saw it happen. 

Again, I am not asking you about funding. I recognize and appreciate that predisaster funding, we have over and again found by 

this subcommittee and committee, saves us enormously, $4 savings 

from $1 invested. As we look at Katrina and Sandy, I recall that 

in order to get funds for Sandy even after New York and New Jersey were laid low, it took two votes to get funding for you to begin 

to do your work after Sandy. 

Now, what I really want to know is, as an agency which has 

looked at disasters now, terrorist and natural disasters, for decades, whether or not the agency needs revisions, whether in law or 

structure. I mean, can you sit there in the face of Katrina and 

Sandy and not envision, when you see hurricanes occurring where 

they are not supposed to occur, when you see climate not only 

changes, but disasters in parts of the country that have never 

known them, is the FEMA of today, structured decades ago, the 

FEMA that can handle the unknown that we now see before us? 

And here I am looking for how the agency, whether it needs to 

ask for revisions in law or in its own structure, rather than what 

you encountered after Sandy. And after Sandy, the finger was 

pointed right at you. It didn’t matter whether we gave money or 

how you were structured, you just had to take it. 

Instead of just taking it, it does seem to me that the agency with 

the expertise should come before this panel and tell us whether you 

are prepared for a disaster, for an earthquake to occur in California 

of the kind it has never seen before, or shall we just sit here and 

think that it will never happen and just wait for it to come after 

us? 

Is the FEMA of the 21st century prepared for what we know 

now, from our own experience with Katrina and Sandy, is surely 

to come in parts of the country where we never expected? And if 

so, if you think it is prepared, you should tell us. If it is not fully 

prepared, I should ask you then, is the agency looking at how it 

20 

could make recommendations for what appears to be an entirely 

new era in both terrorist disasters and, for that matter, now we 

know natural disasters? Are you looking at the future? 

Mr. FUGATE. I learned a long time ago the person that says that 

we are fully prepared and we know exactly what is going to happen 

is a fool who will soon be—— 

Ms. NORTON. Precisely you don’t know what is going to happen. 

I want to make clear, you know that they have hurricanes in Florida, you know that they have earthquakes in California. I bet you 

didn’t know that we would have an earthquake here in the Nation’s 

Capital. So I am talking about what you don’t know and what you 

will be held responsible for notwithstanding the fact that you don’t 

know. Is your agency structured so it can handle what you don’t 

know? 

Mr. FUGATE. That is where we are going. What we changed in 

the question was, traditionally what was FEMA capable of responding to? As you point out, that is a fool’s errand, because if you 

are only prepared to handle a certain level of disaster and something happens you don’t expect, you fail. 

So we went back and started looking at where was the risk in 

population, and not looking at what FEMA was capable of responding to, but what is the worst case that could happen. And we started asking questions that weren’t easy to answer because the questions started generating response levels greater than the Federal 

Government. It forced us to really take a different look at how we 

fund—as you point out, the Homeland Security dollars—each jurisdiction, many of which were not likely to have a terrorist attack, 

but they are also a resource to the rest of the Nation when a big 

disaster happens. We saw this in Sandy where many responders 

from outside the area were able to respond because of the capabilities built with those Homeland Security dollars. 

So we are following what you are pointing out. We cannot prepare for what we expect or what we are prepared to handle. We 

have to prepare for what could happen. This is driving our strategic planning, this is driving how we are looking at how we are 

structured, not to what we can respond to, but what could happen. 

And that is, again, driving a lot of our decisions. 

We don’t think the resources are necessarily the first answer, but 

it does require resources and sustained funding. It requires a budget. As you well know, operating under continuing resolutions is not 

how you prepare for catastrophic disasters. And in my term here, 

I have been under more continuing resolutions than I have under 

budgets. 

So I would love to have staff, if necessary, if you are available 

to sit down and talk about this. But we are definitely trying to look 

at the future, looking at what could happen, looking at how you 

build that response. 

Can I tell you it is built today? No, it is a work in progress. But 

I think we have moved past the barriers of only planning for what 

we know or what we are prepared to respond to and asking a much 

harder question: How bad could it be? And the President said this 

in an early meeting that I was attending, he said we can’t protect 

everything, so we need to know what we can live without and what 

21 

we can’t. And if we can’t live without as a Nation, that is where 

we need to really focus on. 

And so when we start looking at disasters and where they could 

happen and where they are expected versus what could happen 

based upon the modeling, the data from various organizations and 

populations at risk, we are looking at how do you build. And it is 

not just FEMA, we call it whole Government because we have come 

back to it is going to take local, State, mutual aid, it is going to 

take the Federal Government, our Department of Defense, it is 

going to take our private sector, and it is going to take a lot of the 

public to respond to that scale of a disaster. 

Ms. NORTON. I would just ask that at an appropriate time it 

would be interesting to have a briefing as to how they are looking 

at the unknown that we now know to expect but don’t know what 

it is that could bring calamity to us, as Congress would be asked 

to do what it doesn’t have the funds to do and never expected 

would happen. If they could pinpoint how they go about that, I 

think it would certainly educate me and I think it would help the 

subcommittee and the full committee. 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman and for the Delegate, I think we 

have some examples we have been doing; we call this catastrophic 

planning, but some of the work we have done in the Cascadia fault 

zone and subduction zone off the coast of the northwest U.S., the 

New Madrid earthquake risk which is, again, a very large risk over 

large areas. And I think we can show where we are going and tell 

you what we think is the path to get us there, and then that will 

give you an opportunity to look at are there additional tools that 

you can give us. 

The last thing I would like to end with this is the Stafford Act 

was oftentimes a constraint seen as what FEMA was capable of 

doing. In the past year since I have been at FEMA, we have responded to Haiti, which is traditionally the role of USAID, but we 

were asked to support USAID and we did it. Last year we were 

asked to support unaccompanied children and the mass care issues 

of children in detention facilities, so we supported that. We were 

asked to support the Ebola response. 

Many of these things may not be in the papers, but they are capabilities you built, and you gave us the tools under the Homeland 

Security Act as amended. The Stafford Act, however, is limited to 

oftentimes only those natural hazards with limited flexibility. 

I think the Delegate brings up an important point. When you 

look at growing hazards such as cyber and others, what is the role 

of the Disaster Relief Fund in the consequence world? And if it is 

not in rebuilding in the emergency response costs and the ability 

to use the emergency declaration to mobilize and bring resources 

to bear, is it worthwhile looking at such things which—it is kind 

of a question—what is the role in a pandemic? It is not specifically 

excluded in the emergency declarations, but it is not mentioned. 

Cyber. Again, we don’t look to have the role in the prevention or 

the law enforcement or even the response to the technical aspects 

of it, but States and locals will be dealing with consequences of it, 

many of which will follow similar patterns of other types of hazards. We saw this in Deepwater Horizon. Again, the Coast Guard 

is the lead agency for that, had many of the tools to deal with the 

22 

response. But much of the coordination with local and State governments had to be built. 

And, again, FEMA is not looking to grow our role, but we think 

a better understanding of what the intent of Congress is, as you 

pointed out in the Homeland Security Act as amended, as the principal adviser to the President and to Congress on emergency management, but also our role and capabilities we have built for a lot 

of disasters, not limiting the applicability to other lead Federal 

agencies to support them or Governors when they fall outside traditional known disasters. 

Mr. BARLETTA. The Chair would recognize Mr. Graves for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fugate, I wanted to go back on a few things that followed 

up on Congressman Curbelo’s questioning, one of which is the National Flood Insurance Program. And certainly we can go back over 

Biggert-Waters at length. 

In south Louisiana, we have lost about 1,900 square miles of wetlands, I would say about 90 percent of the coastal wetlands lost in 

the United States, in the continental U.S. And what that does is 

it makes the Gulf of Mexico that much closer to our costal communities, thereby increasing their vulnerability. 

Under Biggert-Waters, before the changes that were enacted, the 

actuarial rates in some cases increased rates 20, 30, 40 times what 

they were previously. This increase in vulnerability, whether it is 

real or not, is not the fault of these people. It is largely, based on 

studies, actually the result of Federal actions tied to the Mississippi River and Tributaries Project dating back to 1928. 

When you add on top of that some of the V Zone restrictions that 

were put in place, when you add on top of that some of the challenges that I noted earlier with regard to these Corps of Engineers 

projects that were noted to have a positive cost-to-benefit ratio, yet 

stuck in project development processes for decades literally, we are 

missing opportunities to save taxpayer dollars by being proactive 

rather than being reactive, which is always more expensive, as the 

two studies we noted before show. 

There are opportunities here to make communities more resilient 

and to save taxpayer dollars. And I understand that not all of those 

are within the purview of your agency. But I just want to urge, 

and, again, going back to the comments of Ms. Holmes Norton, the 

better coordination between FEMA and the Corps of Engineers, 

there are opportunities here, there are projects here where these 

communities can be made more resilient, to where hurricanes and 

other disasters are rainy days as opposed to catastrophic losses, as 

we have seen in recent years. 

I wanted to perhaps correct the record on a comment you made 

or just provide a little bit more context on the National Flood Insurance Program. You made a comment that the program was $20 

billion in debt. And I know that you have seen the studies. When 

you go back and look at it, you can justify that the program is in 

the black anywhere from $9 billion to $16 billion. And you and I 

may not agree on that, but I think it is noteworthy. You also have 

seen the GAO study indicating that up to 66 percent of the preVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Jun 25, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\ED\1-27-1~1\92845.TXT JEAN
23 

miums that have been retained by the Write-Your-Owns in the 

form of commissions not going into the fund. 

And, lastly, as I recall from the 2005 storms, the NFIP program borrowed $17 billion, which obviously is the majority of the debt 

that you referenced. But you have General Strock, who was the 

Corps of Engineers, who indicated that Katrina was an engineering 

failure of the Corps of Engineers, yet the NFIP ratepayers are the 

ones left holding the bag in this case. And so I just wanted to make 

sure that that was also included in the record to not distort the solvency of the NFIP program. 

I also wanted to be clear that Louisiana is perhaps somewhat of 

an anomaly and that the vulnerability is not as a result of decisions communities have made in most cases, it is a result of the 

changing landscape, largely a result of Federal actions that have 

had adverse consequences on these communities and the environment in south Louisiana. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, my sister lives in Marrero and she is on the 

wrong side of the Mississippi River levee system. So when the 

storms come, she is going to get flooded. 

I also know that we did a lot of good work, Dave Paulison overseeing this in his term, of building back better. Plaquemines Parish 

made some very key decisions. When the latest storm hit, I believe 

it was Isaac, their EOC was elevated. They didn’t have to shut 

down. I was with Governor Jindal driving through that hurricane 

getting down there. And they were able to maintain a full response. 

They evacuated. Where they had put in their levees—and much of 

this was their decisions—they were able to protect many parts of 

their community. They were also making decisions about what is 

not going to be defensible anymore and about buying out and relocating communities. 

So we know this area. We have worked in it. But the numbers 

there and how you get to the numbers, the fact is the National 

Flood Insurance Program still owes and has borrowed from the 

Treasury to pay out—and, again, two of the very large payouts was 

Katrina but also Sandy—and it is not able to pay that debt down. 

It was paying it down slowly after Katrina. 

And, again, this is a sense of Congress, is do we want to have 

an actuarially sound program? I think the answer is, for parts yes, 

but other parts we actually would bring people out of their homes, 

which I don’t think was the intent, and I think that is why Congress came back and made that change in Biggert-Waters. 

But we have got to make sure that we set an appropriate level 

that we can’t run it as an insurance company and say it is going 

to be actuarially sound. We are going to have to understand we are 

going to underwrite risk because there is no other way to keep people in their homes. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. And, Administrator, in closing, I just 

want to say that I agree that taxpayers shouldn’t be footing the bill 

in this case. However, we at the same time shouldn’t call actuarial 

a program that is being run incredibly inefficiently, and the $17 

billion Katrina expense that the Corps of Engineers admitted was 

actually their liability or their fault. Thank you. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Fugate, for your testimony today. 

Your comments have been helpful to today’s discussion. And I look 

24 

forward to working with you on our legislation. Your input and 

support is vital to getting it right and getting it signed into law. 

So thank you. 

We will now call our second panel. And I remind you of the subcommittee’s request to limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes. And 

we will let our panel get in place. 

Mr. McCarthy, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS X. MCCARTHY, ANALYST IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT POLICY, GOVERNMENT FINANCE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE; HON. ROBERT DAVID PAULISON, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; BRYAN KOON, DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, ON 

BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION; AND BRIAN FENNESSY, ASSISTANT FIRE CHIEF 

FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, SAN DIEGO FIRE-RESCUE 

DEPARTMENT, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am privileged to 

appear before you today—— 

Mr. BARLETTA. Is your microphone on? 

[Audio malfunction in hearing room.] 

Mr. MCCARTHY [continuing]. To discuss the increasing number of 

disaster declarations and their relationship to increasing disaster 

costs. 

Today I will first discuss how we count disasters; second, offer 

some explanations for the increase in major disaster declarations; 

third, identify the primary source of increased disaster costs; and 

fourth, touch on some ways to begin to control those costs—most 

prominently through mitigation. 

How do we count disasters? Any discussion of increased numbers 

of declarations should define the terms carefully: major disasters, 

emergencies and fire management assistance grants—FMAGs—are 

all listed on fema.gov’s declarations page and they are all funded 

out of the Disaster Relief Fund. But they are distinct, and the overwhelming amount of spending comes from major disaster declarations. Occasionally, people tend to conflate all of these together and 

say we have many more declarations. But really that is imprecise 

and it is not very helpful. 

There has been a steady increase in major disaster declarations 

during our lifetimes. It has increased fourfold from the 1960s to 

now. But with that increase, though, I would also acknowledge that 

last year was the lowest number since 2001. I mention that to reinforce one fact that often gets lost when we start talking or at least 

discussing theories about why a disaster declaration occurs, and 

that is that they begin with actual physical events. 

How do we explain an increased number of disaster declarations? 

In addition to an increased number of extreme weather events over 

the last 50 years, for example, during the last seven decades the 

population of the Nation has nearly doubled, and it could be argued 

that the population density has increased not just in already existing communities, but it has spurred a lot of increased development 

in areas that are very vulnerable to natural disasters. 

25 

We have also observed recent commentary regarding the marginal major disasters, to think of these events as if they are actually within any State’s capacity to respond. But the central point 

of the declaration process, particularly the use of the oft-criticized 

per capita amount, is that all States are not equal and that larger 

States do have more resources and should be able to offer more aid 

on their own. 

What is the primary source of increased disaster costs? More declarations result in more costs, but it is important to understand 

that the greatest amount of disaster spending is attributable to the 

large major disasters, not to these marginal events. As an example, 

we reviewed data from 1989 to 2014 of declarations and obligations. If we eliminated half of the disasters over those years we 

would save approximately 3 percent in disaster costs. Not only do 

the top half of disasters account for 97 percent of the spending, but 

the top quarter of disaster costs account for 93 percent. 

So how can we begin to control costs? There are a number of options to reduce Federal disaster spending, including cost-share adjustments, changes in rules, that might have an effect on shifting 

a greater share of disaster-related costs not only to States and communities, but also to families and individuals. While some of these 

ideas may be worthy of consideration, it remains to be seen if such 

a shift would severely disrupt a State’s ability to adequately respond to a disaster. 

An alternative to those options is to continue to emphasize mitigation, that is, taking steps prior to a disaster to lessen the impact 

of those events and save lives and protect resources. Mr. Chairman, 

your statement last spring on the dissonance in current mitigation 

policy by the administration was apt. At a time when a bipartisan 

consensus seemed to be developed on the efficacy of mitigation and 

how it could work, the last budget zeroed out the funding for the 

Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program at FEMA. And later in the year, 

the administration announced a nationwide resilience competition 

with nearly a billion dollars that remained from the CD appropriations for Sandy. 

It is noteworthy that the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, fully 

15 years ago now, was premised on the idea of doing things before 

disasters. And it looks now as if we have circled back, so that all 

mitigation dollars are now following disasters and not giving States 

and communities a chance to do the work before they occur. 

The new resilience program is based at HUD, but is directed toward States that have experienced disasters. It is not clear how it 

links to other mitigation programs. It does not appear to have the 

same cost-benefit requirements as the FEMA mitigation program, 

nor is there any reported collaboration among them. 

Now, mitigation is not a panacea for all the problems created by 

natural disasters, but it does offer the possibility of future longterm savings in Federal expenditures, safer States and communities, and a process that can involve a partnership at all levels of 

Government and also with the nonprofit sector and with the private sector. Fewer disaster declarations would result in less spending, but avoiding or continuing to lessen the impact of future catastrophic disaster events may arguably hold a lot more promise in 

long-term savings and protecting our citizens. 

26 

Thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I 

would be happy to respond to any of your questions. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you for your testimony. 

And we apologize for the sound system. That was painful for us 

as well. 

Administrator Paulison, you may proceed, and hopefully your 

microphone will work properly. 

[Audio malfunction in hearing room.] 

Mr. BARLETTA. Unfortunately, we are going to have to pass that 

one over there. Thank you. 

Mr. PAULISON. Now we will see if we can get this one to work. 

Anyway, the leadership this subcommittee and Chairman Shuster have shown on these tough issues is critical. Your mission is 

clear: We must find a way to bend the cost curve of disasters for 

American taxpayers. In pursuit of this mission, I believe we can 

save additional lives and do a much better job of protecting property. 

My name is David Paulison. I am the senior partner of Global 

Emergency Solutions. I was proud to have spent 7 years in the 

Federal service of our Nation, and I served as the FEMA Administrator from 2005 to 2009. I began my 30-year career as a rescue 

firefighter and rose through the ranks to become the chief of the 

Miami-Dade Fire Department. As a result, I have had a front-row 

seat as to how we as a Nation prepare for and deal with disasters. 

While I have seen many tremendous public servants at work, I 

have also witnessed unfortunate policy errors and wasted taxpayer 

dollars. In most cases, this waste was a result of insufficient investment in mitigation before the disaster hit. Not enough resources 

are being allocated in predisaster mitigation. 

I believe this new Congress has a golden opportunity to advance 

a bipartisan natural disaster strategy that would better protect the 

American people, property, and save taxpayer dollars. With the 

Senate and the House of Representatives working together across 

party lines, now is the time to address the failed status quo of 

waiting for storms to hit and then passing massive supplemental 

appropriation bills. 

Director Fugate has done a tremendous job of fostering resiliency 

and a community-oriented approach to emergency management 

since he took the reins of FEMA. However, I am sure even Director 

Fugate would admit there is still much work to be done to build 

a more resilient country by shifting more money to predisaster Federal incentive programs. Hopefully, understanding the realities of 

the exploding costs can serve as a motivator. 

Mr. Chairman, any attempt to change the status quo must ultimately begin with an understanding of the nature of the problem. 

This is why I believe your subcommittee’s work can play a major 

role. First, let me describe the nature of the problem we face. And 

I brought just two slides along. 

According to FEMA, Federal major disaster declarations have 

jumped from a yearly average of 23 under President Reagan to an 

average of 65 under President Obama. The trend is undeniable but 

also nonpartisan, as the average number of disaster declarations 

per year has risen under President George H.W. Bush, President 

Clinton, and President George W. Bush. 

27 

Mr. PAULISON. The second slide is a representation of the average overall and insured losses over the last three decades. As you 

can see, the spike in overall costs is dramatic over the last two decades, increasing from an average of $33 billion per year from 1995 

to 2004 to doubling to $65 billion a year in the next decade. 

[The slides referenced by Mr. Paulison are included in his written statement on page 80.] 

The Federal Government and insurers have borne the overwhelming majority of these losses. Since 2011, $137 billion has 

been spent, really $400 a household annually, with over $60 billion 

spent on Superstorm Sandy alone. Sadly, the Federal Government 

invested only $1 in preventive measures for every $6 spent on recovery. This low predisaster investment is an important factor 

when we consider that FEMA studies have shown—and you heard 

this—that for every dollar invested in mitigation, it saves the taxpayers $4 in recovery. 

Ironically, the losses from these types of disasters are the most 

preventable with proper predisaster mitigation and resiliency tools 

like modern building codes. Studies have shown that building codes 

are the most effective mitigation measure we have. Yet only 11 

States across this country have adequate building codes and enforcement mechanisms in place. Most of the States without proper 

building codes are directly in harm’s way when it comes to hurricanes and other natural disasters. 

It seems to me that the critical question is, what can the Congress do to bend the runaway cost curve? As a former firefighter, 

I am always reminded of the advice given by America’s most famous firefighter, Ben Franklin: An ounce of preservation is worth 

a pound of cure. In my view, providing incentives for States and 

localities to adopt and enforce modern building codes is the most 

cost-effective mitigation tool we have. 

The BuildStrong Coalition urges the enactment of the Safe Building Code Incentive Act, a bill to provide an additional 4-percent incentive in post-disaster grants to States that adopt and enforce 

strong building codes. Any future savings that result from the 

elimination of wasteful post-disaster spending should be reinvested 

in predisaster incentives like the Safe Building Code Incentive Act 

to facilitate modern building codes in States and communities 

across this country. 

Chairman Barletta, I applaud you, I really applaud you for the 

announcement of a congressional roundtable to begin the dialogue 

on how to identify and quantify factors driving disaster costs and 

how to use that information to ultimately study and find solutions. 

It is my recommendation that the new Congress pass legislation in 

short order to commission a blue ribbon panel to explore why disaster declarations are at an all-time high and what is really behind 

the dramatic increase in disaster spending. 

Some questions the panel could explore include: Are the increases in spending related to population increases, like you heard 

earlier? Are they related to changes in spending, poor construction 

of homes, or mistakes in Federal policy? What changes in policy 

could be made to enhance building resiliency and reduce disaster 

costs? 

28 

The panel could also make recommendations concerning the 

proper role of Federal, State and local governments in solving this 

problem. Specific attention should be given to the roles of FEMA, 

HUD, DOT to minimize the duplication of effort and waste that we 

often see now. I believe Congress should authorize this blue ribbon 

panel and use the findings to put in place a comprehensive national disaster strategy that aims to save lives and ultimately taxpayer dollars. 

I want to thank you again for allowing me to testify before the 

subcommittee today, and I will be looking forward to your questions. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Paulison. 

Mr. Koon, you may proceed. 

Mr. KOON. Thank you, Chairman Barletta, Ranking Member 

Carson, and members of the subcommittee, for holding this hearing 

today. 

The statement for the record we submitted goes into specific details on many issues regarding how to lessen the impacts and costs 

of disasters. But for now I will cover the current state of disasters, 

efforts we are working on with FEMA, and ongoing concerns with 

the systems of management costs and deobligations. 

As you have already heard, the number and nature of presidentially declared disasters has varied widely over time. Of course, 

examining Presidential declarations provides only a glimpse of the 

true disaster response activity in this country. The majority of 

events are handled at the State or local level and do not warrant 

Federal assistance. In fiscal year 2013, there were 205 gubernatorial declarations and over 18,000 events requiring State assets. 

In addition to that, local and tribal governments responded to nearly 31,000 additional events that year. Without a strong emergency 

management system at the State, local and tribal levels, many of 

the nearly 50,000 State and local responses would falter or require 

Federal support. 

That Federal support comes in the form of public assistance, 

which amounts to half of the total funds allocated to the Disaster 

Relief Fund. In order to ensure the most effective use of those 

funds and in response to numerous Government audits, last year 

FEMA initiated an internal study of its PA program. In the coming 

weeks, the agency will share data from the study with the States, 

with the desired goal of an agreed-upon, redesigned PA program 

that meets the needs of all stakeholders. 

A redesigned PA program which streamlines efforts will also assist in reducing and appropriately allocating those administrative 

costs identified by GAO in a report last month. The report highlights the continuing increase of FEMA’s administrative costs as a 

percentage of the DRF, which averaged 13 percent over the last 10 

fiscal years, while less than 2 percent was apportioned for grantees 

and subgrantees. This has been an area of great frustration and 

concern to the States and certainly needs further examination. 

We hope that an improved PA process will also reduce the opportunity for future audits and deobligations by simplifying and standardizing efforts across the country and reducing the time necessary 

to close disasters. The current rate of deobligations causes significant economic hardship to the States and communities that have 

29 

expended those funds long ago and requires significant staff time 

that would be better spent preparing for future disasters. 

Reducing administrative expenditures from the DRF would also 

allow the Nation to explore alternative uses for these funds, such 

as increasing resiliency by identifying, incentivizing, and funding 

additional mitigation opportunities across the country. These resiliency efforts will ultimately reduce our disaster costs in the long 

term. 

NEMA intends to continue conversations on all of these issues at 

our midyear forum in March, utilizing the combined efforts of our 

Legislative and Response and Recovery Committees to explore alternatives and make recommendations to you. 

The subcommittee and Congress as a whole have gone to great 

lengths to continually try and improve disaster response processes. 

Efforts such as the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act and H.R. 

3300, which supported programs like EMAC, USAR teams, and 

IPAWS, provide opportunities to drive down the cost of disasters. 

But without a comprehensive look at some of our administrative 

issues as well, we will continue to falter in our mission. 

Only through an effective response and subsequent recovery can 

we work toward building more resilient communities, reducing the 

overall cost of disasters to States and the Federal Government, and 

ultimately save more lives and property from damage. 

I look forward to our continued partnership in these efforts and 

welcome any questions you have for me. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Koon. 

Mr. Fennessy, you may proceed. 

Mr. FENNESSY. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Barletta, 

Ranking Member Carson, and members of the subcommittee. 

I am Brian Fennessy, assistant fire chief of emergency operations 

of the San Diego Fire-Rescue Department. Today, I am testifying 

on behalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, where I 

serve on their Wildland Fire Policy Committee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss FEMA’s role in helping communities respond 

to and recover from wildland fires. 

In 2013, wildland fires impacted every State in the Nation. There 

were more than 47,500 wildland fires in the United States. They 

burned roughly 4.3 million acres. These fires cost the Federal Government over $1.7 billion to extinguish. 

Local fire departments respond to most wildland fire incident. 

For fires on Federal lands, they cooperate with the U.S. Department of Interior and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s U.S. Forest Service. Nearly 97 percent of all wildland fires are extinguished 

during initial attack, a majority of them by local fire departments. 

The U.S. Forest Service estimates that local fire departments provide more than $36 billion per year in wildland fire suppression assistance. 

The city and county of San Diego are no strangers to the threat 

of wildland fire. In 2003, 2007, and again in 2014, San Diego experienced fire sieges that resulted in hundreds of thousands of acres 

being burned, thousands of structures being destroyed, and tens of 

millions of dollars in damage. 

The primary Federal agencies for wildland fire response are the 

Department of Interior and the U.S. Forest Service, which are reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:16 Jun 25, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\ED\1-27-1~1\92845.TXT JEAN
30 

sponsible for fires on Federal lands. However, FEMA plays an important role in helping State and local agencies prepare, respond 

to, and recover from wildland fires on non-Federal land. Under 

FEMA’s Fire Management Assistance Grant, FMAG, FEMA provides assistance in the form of 75 percent matching funds to help 

offset the cost to communities for the control of any fire on public 

or private forest land or grassland that threatens such destruction 

as would constitute a major disaster. 

FEMA also provides hazard mitigation assistance through the 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. This funding can help States 

and local communities protect the public and property in advance 

of wildland fires occurring. Today, FEMA plays an important role 

in helping States and local communities address the threat of 

wildland fires. It does not duplicate nor replace wildland fire suppressions of the Department of Interior or U.S. Forest Service. 

However, we would like to recommend some policy changes to help 

FEMA play an even more beneficial role in the fight against 

wildland fires. 

Number one, in a dynamic wildland fire environment, FEMA 

must use more flexibility when evaluating FMAG applications. 

FMAG applications must be submitted while a wildland fire is 

burning uncontrolled in a rapidly changing environment. 

Last May, the city of San Diego submitted an FMAG application 

6 hours into an uncontrolled wildland fire incident that met FMAG 

program criteria. The application was rejected due to it being submitted at a point when the fire’s growth had slowed and was perceived by FEMA as less of a threat of a major disaster. Had it been 

received 2 hours sooner, approval was likely. 

In the future, FEMA must take into consideration special circumstances that could compromise the timely submittal of FMAG 

applications when a threat to the community continues to exist. To 

do otherwise may unfairly burden local and State taxpayers. 

Number two, Congress should allow FEMA funding to be used to 

mitigate the risks of post-wildland fire flooding. Long after a 

wildland fire is extinguished, the destruction of vegetation and the 

severity of the burned ground leaves communities vulnerable to the 

threat of mudslides and flash flooding. The IAFC has supported 

previous legislation that would allow States to receive post-fire 

mitigation assistance along with FMAG grants. 

Three, FEMA should fully reimburse fire departments for interstate mutual aid deployments. When fire departments are deployed 

on intrastate or interstate mutual aid missions to wildland fires, 

they expect to be made whole. Unfortunately, this currently is not 

the case. For example, when a local fire department apparatus is 

committed to an emergency incident it is no longer available to 

that department. FEMA will only reimburse the department for 16 

hours of that 24-hour day for this equipment after the first 48 

hours. If fire departments are not fully reimbursed for their expenses, local government policymakers may not be as willing to 

send them to assist other communities in future situations. 

Number four, Congress should stabilize funding for wildland fire 

prevention and suppression. In recent years, Federal fire agencies 

have seen wildland fire suppression costs exceed their budgets. The 

Department of Interior and U.S. Forest Service have been forced to 

31 

transfer funding from other accounts to continue fighting wildland 

fires. This fire borrowing has depleted accounts aimed at activities 

like reducing hazardous fuels and prevent wildfires. 

The IAFC supports Congress’ efforts to address the wildland fire 

problem through the creation of the FLAME Fund and the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy. We also have 

been supportive of legislation like H.R. 167, proposed by Representatives Simpson and Schrader, which would allocate the cost of suppressing the largest 1 percent of the Nation’s wildland fires to the 

Disaster Relief Fund. Efforts to adequately cover the cost of Federal wildland suppression will allow the Department of Interior 

and U.S. Forest Service to also fund other programs designed to 

prevent future wildland fires. 

In closing, I thank the committee for the opportunity to address 

the issue of FEMA’s support of local and State governments and 

wildland fire response and recovery. The threat of wildland fire 

continues to grow more severe. FEMA plays an important role in 

helping communities prepare, respond to, and recover from that 

threat. 

The IAFC looks forward to working with the committee to address these issues. I look forward to answering any questions that 

you may have. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you for your testimony, Chief Fennessy. 

We will now begin the first round of questions limited to 5 minutes for each Member. If there are any additional questions following the first round, we will have additional rounds of questions 

as needed. 

If we can pass the microphone down to Mr. McCarthy. 

Mr. McCarthy, you have analyzed the history of our Nation’s disaster assistance authorities and the creation of FEMA. Can you explain some of the basic principles that are fundamental to FEMA’s 

assistance programs and the Nation’s approach to disaster recovery? 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Fundamentally it begins as 

a partnership between the Federal Government and the State governments. And I think it is written, the Stafford Act is written in 

a way that is of interest because it is extremely flexible. I know 

Mr. Fugate was talking about some of the ways it works, some of 

the ways it doesn’t work. What always struck me is that I have occasionally heard it referred to as the kind of act you could drive 

a truck through. And then I also heard it referred to as a straightjacket. Perhaps both people are right. But I think it is a matter of 

interpretation. 

But essentially FEMA is looking at the States as their partners. 

And I think that in that way it works fairly effectively. And you 

have State agencies, by the way, the State emergency management 

agencies, that have grown in sophistication and ability through the 

years and are really able to work well with FEMA and make it 

work. 

But one of the things that I think that is important is knowing 

that the States and locals can do well in working together to repair 

infrastructure, repair buildings, repair water services, and things 

like that. But one point I want to stress that I think is difficult is 

that when we say good things about what a good job FEMA is 

32 

doing or how great the disaster piece is working, there is one problem on that, and that is creating expectations for families and individuals. The Stafford Act doesn’t come close to bringing people back 

to where they were before a disaster. In fact, the total amount that 

can be spent currently by FEMA on any family is $32,400. 

Now, that can’t replace a flood insurance policy. It can’t replace 

a homeowners policy. And I think at times perhaps—and I don’t 

think anyone is directly responsible for that—but there is kind of 

an image created that, ‘‘don’t worry, the FEMA dollars are coming 

and we will all be taken care of.’’ Well, to an extent, I think for 

State and local governments, there is some truth in that. But certainly for families and individuals, nothing replaces solid insurance 

and a real kind of culture of preparedness. 

But overall I would say, though, that in what I have observed— 

and I did start at FEMA before it was FEMA, I confess, in 1979— 

is you have seen a really growing and maturing program that does 

address a lot of the toughest problems that communities face. I 

think it does it faster. It certainly responds much better than it 

ever did before. 

But I think we are left with the question then: What is next? 

And we can get better and better at responding. We can be faster 

at responding. But, again, as one who has also written on the PreDisaster Mitigation Program, I think absent that, you are going to 

be repeating the same work over and over again in the same places 

until you do try to reduce the overall risk. 

Mr. BARLETTA. As you testified, the cost of natural disasters are 

driven by just a few events. If we are to look for solutions to reduce 

the costs, we are going to have to understand what factors are resulting in the few events being so expensive. Do you have a sense 

of what some of those factors may be? 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Actually, as Mr. Fugate mentioned and in my 

testimony, I think the biggest factor is we have had a series of 

events now where it has become—and I think this is partly what 

Ms. Norton was talking about—at FEMA we always used to think 

about what is unthinkable. And back in the 1990s, we think, well, 

what is unthinkable is a hurricane going directly into New Orleans, or what is unthinkable is really strong hurricanes hitting the 

New York City and New Jersey areas. We have started to have 

those events occur. The density of the population and the actual 

value of the resources being hit has driven these costs this high. 

Some of the things we can do is to begin to take steps that begin 

to protect these structures, to do elevation, to move some areas out 

of where rivers want to go or where coastal surges want to go. 

But overall I have to say, some of the biggest disasters we have 

had, it would be hard to take a big chunk out of that because they 

went where the people were and where the valuable real estate 

was, and that ends up costing us a great deal. But there is still 

much we can do. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Carson for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Koon, I understand the States’ concerns about liability for 

failing to provide adequate sheltering during disasters. But at the 

33 

very same time, sir, how do you suggest that we provide the same 

kind of access to shelters for those with functional need support 

services? 

Mr. KOON. Thank you, Representative Carson, for the question. 

Dealing with the vulnerable population in shelters is an issue 

that we in Florida and all other States have been working on for 

a number of years in close coordination with FEMA. And as Administrator Fugate, it is an extreme priority for us. 

The issue comes down to how is it do we achieve the vision that 

Administrator Fugate laid out, given the fiscal constraints and the 

resource constraints that we have at the State and local level, to 

ensure that we are able to provide that ability for anyone to seek 

shelter in any location during those times when we will be severely 

resource constrained. 

We continue to make good progress on that. In Florida and in 

other places across the country, that is coming in the form of increased cooperation between municipalities, between counties, and 

within the State itself, helping us to make sure that we are able 

to apply those resources that may be in another jurisdiction in an 

area that needs them in that moment. We will never be able to afford to have all of the potential durable medical equipment at every 

shelter location all the time, but we do have the ability to transport 

those in short order. The same thing for the human capital necessary in those kinds of situations. 

In one hurricane, in 2005, the State of Florida had approximately 

380 shelters open. We did not have the resources able to get, for 

example, 380 sign language interpreters to those shelters. But if we 

have the network in place, if we have the partnership and cooperation in place ahead of time, as those needs arise we can deploy 

them quickly. So that is the tack we are taking now, is to make 

sure that we can get the resources available to be shared appropriately. And we want to make sure that we have got the conversation ahead of time with FEMA, with the Department of Justice, 

with the disabled community to make sure that that, in fact, is 

going to meet the need and it is an appropriate solution to the situation. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you. 

And to that point, Mr. McCarthy, you mentioned the difficulty of 

measuring State readiness and their capabilities when reviewing 

disaster declaration applications. What options have been considered? And do you have any recommendations for determining readiness and capabilities, for that matter? 

Mr. MCCARTHY. It is something that FEMA has worked on a few 

times doing capability assessment reports, trying to look at what 

the States themselves think they are strongest at, what they could 

probably take on themselves. There are a number of pieces that 

have to be looked at, and I would go to the GAO report that mentions there are certainly a lot of other ways of measuring a State’s 

ability beyond the per capita amount. That can be rainy day funds. 

And also the State’s capacity. I think it has been an interesting 

conversation here today about what discourages States from building that capacity and what encourages it. 

Now, I think a lot of States are simply responsible and know 

they have to do, as Bryan Koon is pointing out, they are the ones 

34 

that have to respond first and do a lot of response work absent 

Federal help. But still it is interesting to think that there are some 

States that do a wonderful job because they get hit frequently and 

know they better be good at it. But there are other States that, because this is a very episodic business, they might not get hit with 

something substantial for years. You might find that they are no 

longer budgeting towards it, and then it makes it all the more difficult when they are hit. 

I am not being really responsive to you except to say, I think it 

is something we really would have to study and think about a 

checklist that maybe FEMA could go down looking at beyond per 

capita. And I think GAO has made a couple of suggestions on that 

that would likely be a better measurement of State resources. 

Mr. CARSON. Yes, sir. 

Chief Paulison, some have indicated that too many small disasters tie up FEMA’s resources and inhibit FEMA’s ability to respond 

to larger disasters. As a former FEMA Administrator, sir, what are 

your thoughts on this position? 

Mr. PAULISON. Regardless of the size of the disaster, where I see 

the same damage in every event, whether it is a tornado or hurricane or superstorm, we are seeing the same type of damage. I firmly believe that if we look at premitigation issues, particularly with 

our building codes and how we are putting our houses together, we 

can reduce our costs on the other end significantly. Fifteen percent 

of the population of this country lives on 3 percent of the land, and 

we are talking about $10 trillion—$10 trillion—in property that we 

continue to rebuild back the same way we did. 

Hurricane Andrew, we lost a lot of homes, almost 90,000 homes 

severely damaged in Hurricane Andrew. And we looked very carefully at what damage was caused, what happened, what caused 

them to fail, what caused the roofs to fail, what caused the windows to blow out, and we changed our building codes to deal with 

all of those issues. And it was tough. It was not easy to do. We had 

homebuilders fighting us. But we had a lot of political will to make 

those changes and we did that. 

So we looked out across the country, like I said earlier, it was 

only 11 States that have building codes. So regardless of whether 

it is a small disaster that even the State handles by itself or it is 

a big catastrophic event like a Katrina, it is the same type of damage. And, yeah, it may be bigger and cost more money, but really 

the damage to each individual is identical. 

So I think we need to step back and look very clearly at what 

we are doing to our building codes and how we are building these 

things back again. And I think that is what is going to reduce 

costs. 

Mr. CARSON. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Carson. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Graves for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you. 

I was reading some of the testimony earlier, and going back on 

the same things, questions to Administrator Fugate. Could you talk 

perhaps, Mr. Paulison, a little bit about some of your experiences 

with predisaster mitigation as opposed to post-disaster response 

and cost savings associated with those activities? 

35 

Mr. PAULISON. I think a couple things. One, obviously being on 

the ground as a firefighter and fire chief, and I ran emergency 

management for Miami-Dade County, coming in as a fire administrator and then taking over FEMA in the middle of Katrina, I 

think we saw very clearly—very clearly—that we were not putting 

enough money in predisaster mitigation. Again, we are seeing the 

same things over and over again, and we rebuild back in the same 

place. 

Now, we are not going to evacuate Florida because it is in Hurricane Alley, that is not going to happen. So we know that that is 

not an option for us. So the other option has to be, OK, now that 

we are here and we know we are going to have hurricanes, what 

are we going to do about it? We can’t just sit there and fold our 

hands or sit on our hands and wait for it to come. 

So I firmly believe, and that is why I appreciate so much what 

this committee is doing, to step back and look at what are we 

spending our money. Again, the roundtable issue you talked about, 

we don’t even know how much we are spending on disasters. We 

have got HUD spending money, we have got FEMA spending 

money, we have got DOT spending money, we have got Agriculture 

spending money. We don’t have a clue of what we are spending totally. But we do know that if we do things upfront to protect our 

businesses, protect our houses, and making sure our governments, 

our local governments, our State governments have good plans in 

place, it has got to reduce the cost significantly. So I think Mr. 

Fugate recognizes that also. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Do you have any just quick observations over the perhaps different approach to response in Hurricane 

Sandy as compared to previous disasters? 

Mr. PAULISON. I am sorry, could you repeat that? 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Sure. Do you have any reaction to the 

perhaps different approach to response in Hurricane Sandy as compared to previous disasters? 

Mr. PAULISON. We made changes in FEMA after Katrina, waiting 

for the storm to make landfall. The way the Stafford Act is set up, 

and I—— 

[Inaudible] 

If I am reaching, but we wait for the local community to become 

overwhelmed before the State steps in, we wait for the State to become overwhelmed before the Federal Government steps in. I call 

it a system of sequential failure. It doesn’t work in a catastrophic 

event. We saw that very clearly. 

So we had changed our philosophy from a reactive to a proactive 

system. It worked extremely well in Gustav and Ike. Gustav went 

right into New Orleans, but not one fatality, because working with 

the locals and the State, we had evacuated the entire city. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. 2 million people. 

Mr. PAULISON. Now, we had to spend a lot of money to do that, 

but the budget office and President Bush at the time agreed that 

we would do a predisaster declaration. Administrator Fugate, he 

has carried on that same philosophy. You saw a lot of resources on 

the ground in Hurricane Sandy prior to the storm making landfall. 

Even though it wasn’t a huge hurricane, it wasn’t like an Andrew 

or a Katrina, it still had a significant impact. 

36 

So as far as changing the response, I think I would have done 

the same thing Administrator Fugate did. Some of the other issues 

in the aftermath, I am not involved in those so I can’t respond to 

that. But I can tell you that spending money on the ground prior 

to landfall makes a lot of sense and it works. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Mr. Koon, I mentioned earlier, when 

you look at the aggregate of all these changes in policies, everything from the new Corps of Engineering standards, you look at the 

V Zone policies that have come in place, you look at the NFIP rate 

changes, and many, many other regulatory changes and policies 

that have been put in place in recent years, you are beginning to 

price communities out of being able to live where they are. 

Can you react to that statement and perhaps some of the impacts 

you have seen in Florida? 

Mr. KOON. Yes. Thank you for the question. 

In Florida, obviously, Florida has more flood insurance policies 

than any other State in the country. We have got about 37 percent 

of the flood policies. So we are acutely aware of the issues surrounding it. And we also saw some of the price increases that you 

referenced in your question earlier. 

It has impacted the communities, but it is also giving us an opportunity to consider alternatives and ways to improve for the future. In the State there is continuing consideration about ways to 

perhaps privatize flood insurance and encourage that market. That 

is something that the State legislature is considering. 

We are also looking at investing more in the community rating 

system portion of the National Flood Insurance Program, taking 

advantage of that program to achieve discounts for our policyholders by improving the readiness and resilience of our communities. And so it definitely is something that is top of mind for leaders in the State of Florida, but it is also an opportunity for us to 

make sure that we better prepare for those future disasters by taking advantage of existing Federal programs as they are today and 

fully taking advantage of everything that they offer us to help get 

ready for the next storm. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Graves. 

Chair recognizes Ms. Norton. 

Ms. NORTON. I have just one question for Mr. McCarthy. 

We were given an almost impossible task to talk about reducing 

impacts. Essentially what you were asked to testify was about reducing impacts and reducing costs, and you have gone through the 

various options. You say in the conclusion of your testimony, you 

mention in the conclusion of your testimony something I am particularly interested in, ‘‘Fewer disaster declarations would likely result in less spending. But avoiding or continuing to mitigate or 

lessen the impact of future catastrophic disaster events may arguably hold the most promise in reducing disaster expenditures.’’ 

Now, you said that in 2014, you say on page 2 there were fewer 

disasters, but of course we understand trends by looking over a period of years, and you cite over 25 years, when there has been an 

acceleration. 

Mr. Paulison offered us a graph which was helpful, which 

showed that this is reflected through Democratic and Republican 

37 

administrations. There probably was a reason for the greatest rise 

between Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, probably had 

to do with some hurricane, even less than the rise between Katrina 

and Sandy. 

I also note, especially in light of Mr. Fennessy’s testimony, that 

you say, Mr. McCarthy, that fire management assistance grants 

often obviate the need for a major disaster declaration because they 

provide funding that helps States to control wild fires. So that is 

something practical we could do. It would mean that the funds 

would go one place rather than another, but it would probably be 

less than what happens when you have one of those huge fires, for 

example, in California. 

When you get to defining declarations, I say good luck. That is 

basically Presidential, it is the Governor coming to the President. 

And I think Congress might be able to pass something that tries 

to reduce it, but I don’t think I would advise it. 

Then there is a question I asked to Mr. Fugate about changes in 

the Stafford Act or other ways to look at how we ran disaster relief 

before and now in what looks like a new era. You indicate that 

there were a number of sections we could repeal. You did what you 

were asked to do. For example, you said that there was a suggestion that would have applied—and here I am quoting from you— 

‘‘a strict formula to the declarations process and also would have 

reduced the Federal share for disaster assistance from 75 percent 

to 50 percent.’’ Then you quickly add, ‘‘Through section 320, Congress insisted that a formula not be the sole determinant on declarations.’’ And I submit that as long as this is a union of States, 

that probably is going to be handled on a case-by-case basis. 

The only real hope I see is in an area where you cite some confusion, but also some hope. You quote extensively from the chairman, 

who talked about real confusion between various programs for mitigating disaster, and you call them mixed messages. One mixed 

message or one that would have caused some uncertainty is one 

from the administration, that introduced what you call a nationwide resilience competition with resources of just over a billion dollars through the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

You said it would boost future disaster mitigation savings but it 

wasn’t clear that this program linked to other programs. You said 

it didn’t have the same cost-benefit requirements as the FEMA 

mitigation programs, for example. 

Well, my question for you is, if what the administration was 

doing was saying you have to compete for these funds in a competition, wouldn’t the competition build in those various notions that 

we now use on a basis of whichever program you apply for and get 

some kind of regularized notion of forcing efficiency, moving to real 

mitigation, and giving funds based on that competition to who 

could do mitigation, who needs to do mitigation most, because you 

would have to compete for funds? Why doesn’t the very fact of a 

competition build in the very factors that today are resulting in 

confusion among the various programs that are now used to reduce 

mitigation? 

Mr. MCCARTHY. That is an excellent point. And I think what I 

would say really is that I think the competition ends in March and 

we will be able to look at it. In fairness, when I say that they don’t 

38 

appear to have the same cost-benefit ratio in there, well, it is something that could get built in and it may be that some applicants 

are building it in. And in fairness to HUD, as they put it out, they 

mentioned what they were looking for was innovation. And at 

times, I think probably some people would look at some of FEMA’s 

mitigation programs and think that it didn’t encourage enough innovation. 

So I don’t mean to say it is not possible. It is a competition. I 

guess what is difficult, though, is that—and I apologize, I should 

note I spent a career at FEMA before my past 8 years at CRS— 

but FEMA has been doing mitigation since 1988 and that doesn’t 

mean that is where all mitigation money must go. But it is something that has been a theme throughout, I think, the hearing today 

is, how much coordination is there among agencies? How much do 

they really talk to each other, unless they are told they have to do 

that? 

And so I guess with the resilience program we will learn a lot 

more when it is done and when they are making the awards. We 

will find out whether it has been innovative and also whether they 

have built in some of the cost-benefit pieces into it. It is just that 

it has just been hard to see this and not know whether or not some 

of the people that have done a lot of mitigation across the country, 

both in predisaster programs and post-disaster programs, have 

been a part of what HUD has undertaken now or if it is all new. 

Ms. NORTON. Yeah, what I would suggest if you follow the 

money, if the largest amount of money was given for competition, 

imagine, I bet one of the factors in competition would be, I think 

it was Mr. Paulison who testified about the common notion of 

building codes. Well, if you apply for mitigation funds and you are 

sitting there with no building code, I wonder if you could win that 

competition as against another jurisdiction who might have an 

equally good application but also had taken some self-help initiative on its own to have building codes throughout the State. 

That is the kind of thing I think that would bring together what 

now are what you call mixed messages. I agree, because you have 

several different programs trying to do the same thing, and I might 

add all each with a little bit of money. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARLETTA. I now recognize each Member for an additional 5 

minutes. 

This question is to Mr. McCarthy and Mr. Paulison. Both of you 

have testified to increasing costs and losses associated with disasters. Where do you see these trends going absent a shift in public 

policy? 

Mr. McCarthy. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. I would just say briefly that, as I mentioned in 

my testimony, seeing predisaster mitigation withering away seems 

to me to be the wrong message. I am not even sure I understand, 

I don’t know if it is a difference in philosophy, and I don’t know 

how it got to this point. But it seems to me, you really do have to 

get it upfront. You do have a lot of enthusiasm after a disaster to 

do mitigation work after you have already spent hundreds of millions repairing things, then people want to do mitigation. But I 

39 

think the important part really is to at least consider getting it on 

the front end. 

And I will turn to the chief. 

Mr. PAULISON. You heard Mr. Koon say that we have had years 

up and down, but if you look at the trends over the last 15, 20 

years, actually, it has continued to rise and continued to rise and 

continued to rise. The number of disaster declarations are rising. 

Costs are astronomically rising. So we have to do something. We 

know we have limited dollars. And Mr. Fugate made a comment, 

said we have got to respond, we know we have to respond. So he 

didn’t have the money upfront to do the mitigation stuff, but he 

had to have money to do the response side. 

So somewhere along the lines, and, again, that is why I appreciate your blue ribbon panel to step back and look at this, but having a third party takes the politics out of it and to come up with 

some good solid recommendations that allows us to really get a 

handle on this. If we don’t do anything, if we do nothing, I see it 

continue to rise and rise, and it may be beyond the capacity to deal 

with the response side. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Paulison, given your extensive background in 

disaster response and recovery, what are your thoughts on ways 

that the Federal Government could help reduce costs and losses related to disasters? 

Mr. PAULISON. I think it is a partnership, and it is not just a 

partnership between the Federal Government and the States, it is 

the State and the locals, it is the locals and individuals, and it is 

the private sector working together. How are we going to protect 

our businesses? How are we going to protect our homes? How are 

we going to protect our communities from disasters we know we 

are going to have? And we haven’t done that. We have had an extremely difficult time, and I am sure Mr. Koon will tell you this, 

convincing the public to prepare themselves for a catastrophic 

event. 

We saw Hurricane Wilma, not a catastrophic hurricane, it went 

across the top of my house, but yet we had tens of thousands of 

people the hour the storms died down in line for food and water 

because they hadn’t prepared themselves. That cost the Federal 

Government millions and millions of dollars to do that. 

So it is not only the predisaster mitigation, it is the planning, it 

is the training, it is educating the public of what we expect for 

them, and getting the private sector to protect their businesses 

also. We lose about 40 percent of our small businesses in every catastrophic event. They just don’t have the wherewithal to come 

back. That is a huge hit on the economy. We saw in Hurricane Andrew going through Homestead, it took 20 years for that community to recover because the small businesses failed, there were no 

jobs, and people bailed. 

So it is a partnership, and it is something we have to work together. We have got a great FEMA Administrator that recognizes 

that, and we just have to give him the resources to make it happen. 

Mr. BARLETTA. To all witnesses briefly, if any of you, we will 

start with Mr. McCarthy, are you aware of examples where States 

have used Federal programs to invest in a way that has already 

shown to have avoided additional damage and loss? 

40 

Mr. MCCARTHY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. There are a lot of wonderful 

examples, a lot of best practices that we can see across the country, 

from Kinston, North Carolina, to St. Charles County, Missouri, a 

lot of examples where there is flooding every year except there 

aren’t people there anymore and there aren’t businesses there anymore and we are saving money each time. It is the dog that doesn’t 

bark and it doesn’t get headlines, but a lot of that has really 

worked. And I think too those are just a few examples. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Koon. 

Mr. KOON. Mr. Chairman, we have already discussed some of the 

HUD resiliency program. In addition to that, I think some of the 

programs offered by the Small Business Administration do tremendous work across the country and are a great resource to the State 

of Florida. Also our cooperation with the National VOAD programs, 

again, help us really do a good job of meeting the needs of our citizens using Federal and other dollars as well. 

Mr. BARLETTA. And, Mr. Fennessy. 

Mr. FENNESSY. FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has 

been hugely successful within the State of California. It allows 

agencies and the community to fund defensible space, the creation 

of defensible space, that allows us as firefighters to go in and protect those homes, and when we are not in front of their homes allows fires to pass those homes without doing any damage or very 

little damage. It also allows communities to invest in noncombustible building materials. 

What we have experienced—and not just in California, you see 

it all over the western U.S.—is that, whether it be new construction and the building codes dictating certain types of materials, 

that is all well and good for the new construction or those communities that maybe have suffered through a fire and have been rebuilt, it is the existing nonconforming structures and the owners 

that we really have the challenges with and really urging them to 

get involved in some of these grant opportunities and allow us to 

protect them in a better way. But certainly FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program has been a huge success. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Carson. 

Mr. CARSON. Just one last question, Chairman, for Chief 

Fennessy. 

Sir, what role can the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program 

play in helping communities prepare for the threat of wildfires? 

That was my only question. 

Mr. FENNESSY. Sure. That program has been hugely beneficial, 

not only for large fire departments, but certainly the smaller and 

volunteer fire departments, not only by way of creating grant opportunities for fire equipment, but also training. The Assistance to 

Firefighters Grant, the Fire Act grant has benefitted not only our 

agencies, but our agencies all over this country in providing a 

wealth of equipment that we would not be able to afford on our 

own. 

The SAFER Grant, which is a staffing grant that is also an Assistance to Firefighters Grants, has provided staffing, much-needed 

staffing for large and small departments. So that program has been 

hugely beneficial, and just in California alone there are a number 

41 

of training programs that would not have been possible had that 

grant funding not been available. So we appreciate the opportunity 

for those grants. 

Mr. CARSON. Thank you. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Before closing, I have one final question to all witnesses. What 

do you think of our proposal to conduct a comprehensive review of 

disaster assistance and perhaps create a task force or a blue ribbon 

commission to lead this study and develop solutions? And would 

this effort be helpful to reducing future disaster costs and better 

protect our communities? 

Mr. PAULISON. I will comment because I have already commented on it a couple times. But I just want to reemphasize I think 

how important that would be. Like I said, we don’t understand 

what all the costs are. I do think having a third-party review like 

that is definitely going to help get some good, solid answers without the politics in it, and, again, I applaud you for taking that on. 

Mr. MCCARTHY. I will just mention, as you mentioned in your 

opening statement, it has been at least 20 years since any of this 

kind of work has been done and we at CRS would be happy to support you on this. 

Mr. KOON. Yes, we do, and we are eager to participate. 

Mr. FENNESSY. Certainly, the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs stands ready to assist and participate. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. I look forward to working with each 

and every one of you and welcome your input as we move forward 

on this initiative. And I want to thank you all for your testimony. 

Your comments have been very helpful to today’s discussion. 

I have also received written statements for the record from the 

Interlocking Concrete Pavement Institute and the National Concrete Masonry Association. I thank these organizations for their 

input on these important topics, and I ask unanimous consent that 

these two statements be included in the record. Without objection, 

so ordered. 

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Mr. BARLETTA. If there are no further questions, I would ask 

unanimous consent that the record of today’s hearing remain open 

until such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any 

questions that may be submitted to them in writing, and unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 days for any additional comments and information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today’s hearing. Without objection. 

I would like to again thank our witnesses for their testimony 

today. This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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