Filed 7/12/21 P. v. Alvarez CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BROOK MICHAEL ALVAREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B305462

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. VA056865)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.

Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Matthew Rodriguez, Acting Attorney General, Lance E. 

Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan 
2

Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and 

Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________________________

INTRODUCTION

In 2000, appellant Brook Michael Alvarez (AKA Brook 

Michael Blankenship) was convicted of unlawful driving and 

evading the police with willful disregard for the safety of 

persons or property. Because he had suffered two prior 

strike convictions under the Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, 

§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), appellant 

received a third-strike sentence: two concurrent terms of 25 

years to life in prison.

1 In 2012, appellant filed a petition for 

resentencing under section 1170.126, which had recently 

been enacted by Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform

Act of 2012. He contended his commitment offenses were 

not violent or serious, and thus that he should be 

resentenced as a second-strike offender. 

Following an order to show cause and an evidentiary 

hearing, the superior court denied appellant’s petition. 

While it was undisputed that appellant was eligible for 

resentencing under section 1170.126, the court concluded 

that based on his criminal history, disciplinary record, and 

inadequate release plans, appellant’s resentencing would

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.2 On 

appeal, appellant contends the trial court’s conclusion 

constituted an abuse of discretion. Finding no such abuse, 

we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

A. The Commitment Offenses and Appellant’s 

Petition

In 1999, a police officer spotted appellant driving a 

stolen car. When the officer activated his lights and sirens, 

appellant accelerated and attempted to flee, exceeding 70 

miles per hour in a 25-miles-per-hour residential area. 

Appellant later slowed down and attempted to jump out of 

the car while it was still in motion, but the car hit a curb, 

throwing appellant out of the vehicle. Appellant attempted 

to flee on foot but was apprehended. 

The following year, appellant was convicted of unlawful 

driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and 

evading the police with willful disregard for the safety of 

persons or property (id., § 2800.2). Having suffered two 

prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law, 

appellant was sentenced as a third-strike offender to two 

concurrent terms of 25 years to life in state prison. 

2 As discussed below, the superior court may deny a petition 

under section 1170.126 if it determines that resentencing the 

petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public 

safety. (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)
4

In 2012, appellant filed a petition under newly enacted 

section 1170.126, seeking recall of his sentence and 

resentencing as a second-strike offender, and the superior 

court issued an order to show cause. The prosecution filed 

an opposition to the petition, conceding that appellant was 

eligible for relief under the statute, but asserting he was 

unsuitable for relief because his resentencing would pose an 

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The matter 

proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s 

suitability for resentencing in August 2019. 

B. The Suitability Hearing

1. The Prosecution’s Evidence

At the suitability hearing, the prosecution called no 

witnesses but submitted numerous exhibits detailing, among 

other things, appellant’s criminal history and his 

disciplinary record in prison.

a. Appellant’s Prior Convictions

Appellant’s criminal history was extensive and began 

at a young age. In 1985, when he was 16 years old, 

appellant suffered a sustained juvenile petition for grand 

theft. In 1987, as an adult, appellant was convicted of 

trespassing and two counts of battery. In 1990, he was 

convicted of burglary and evading a peace officer with willful 

disregard for the safety of persons or property. Appellant 

suffered another burglary conviction in 1991 (though he 

committed the offense in 1989). In 1992, he was convicted of 
5

driving under the influence and two counts of assault with a 

deadly weapon. In 1994, he was convicted of resisting 

arrest. And in 1997, appellant was convicted of inflicting 

corporal injury on a spouse, with a great bodily injury 

finding. Appellant’s record also showed he violated 

probation or parole in 1989, 1992, 1993, and 1994. 

b. Appellant’s Disciplinary Record in 

Prison

In prison, appellant was associated with the Nazi Low 

Riders prison gang. California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (CDCR) records indicated he was an 

active associate at the time of the suitability hearing. 

During his current incarceration, appellant committed 

numerous disciplinary violations. 

In 2001, appellant participated in a racial riot, during 

which he engaged in mutual combat with Black inmates. In 

2003, he was found guilty of possession of a deadly weapon

after correctional officers found a razor blade hidden in his 

cellmate’s locker. That same year, he sustained a violation 

for willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace 

officer. In 2004, officers intercepted a letter addressed to 

appellant, containing a greeting card soaked in 

methamphetamine. Also in 2004, appellant was found guilty 

of fermentation or distillation of materials consistent with 

the production of alcohol. In 2007, appellant pleaded guilty 

to possession of alcohol. In 2008, appellant again 

participated in a racial riot. In 2009, he was again found 
6

guilty of fermentation or distillation of materials consistent 

with the production of alcohol. Later that same year, 

appellant was found guilty of conspiracy to commit battery 

on an inmate, after prison authorities confiscated a note 

indicating that appellant had relayed orders from leaders of 

the Aryan Brotherhood and Nazi Low Riders to attack Black 

inmates. A Black inmate was assaulted as a result of these 

orders. Based on this evidence, prison authorities concluded 

that appellant held a leadership position within the White 

prison-gang system. 

In 2011, appellant was found guilty of participating in 

a mass disturbance, due to his participation in a hunger 

strike while in solitary confinement. He again participated 

in a hunger strike in 2013. Finally, in 2016, appellant tested 

positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, morphine, 

and codeine. 

2. Appellant’s Evidence

a. Rehabilitative Programs

In 2014, appellant obtained his GED, and in 2016, he 

completed 48 units of correspondence courses. Appellant 

was in solitary confinement for six years and had no work 

assignment during that time, but he began working as a 

prison barber following his transition into general 

population in 2015. He participated in Narcotics

Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous and became involved 

in the Going Out by Going In program, which teaches 

inmates to understand their personality defects and 
7

instructs them on how to cope with difficulties without 

resorting to substance abuse. He also participated in the 

PREP Turning Point program, and planned to complete the 

program at a PREP residential facility upon his release. 

b. Release Plans

Upon release from prison, appellant intended to enter 

PREP Turning Point’s residential program, which would 

provide housing at a program facility, drug counseling, job 

preparation assistance, and other services intended to 

increase the chances of his successful reentry into society. 

In response to the court’s inquiry, appellant also expressed 

willingness to serve a year in the Male Community Reentry 

Program (MCRP). This program allows eligible inmates to 

serve the last year of their sentence in the community rather 

than a prison, and provides rehabilitative services in areas 

such as substance abuse treatment, mental health care, 

employment services, and education. (CDCR, Male

Community Reentry Program

<https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/rehabilitation/mcrp/> [as of July 9, 

2021].) Appellant would have the support of his wife, who is 

employed and owns a home. Additionally, appellant had a 

job offer in construction. 

c. Testimony of Richard Subia

Appellant called Richard Subia, a former acting 

director of the CDCR, as an expert on prison operations and 

risk assessment in custody and in the community. Subia 
8

reviewed appellant’s file and interviewed him before the 

hearing. Subia testified about the evidence and 

circumstance relating to appellant’s disciplinary violations 

based on CDCR records. He also testified about appellant’s 

rehabilitative efforts in prison and his release plan, as 

detailed above. 

According to Subia, appellant disavowed his connection 

with the Nazi Low Riders in 2009, and his current placement 

in general population suggested that authorities believed he 

was an inactive associate. Subia opined that CDCR records 

indicating appellant remained an active associate resulted 

from an “input error.” 

Based on appellant’s records, Subia testified that 

appellant had managed to remain free of drug use for years, 

and that appellant’s use of drugs in 2016 constituted a single 

relapse, which is common for recovering substance abusers. 

He stated that appellant’s continued participation in

recovery programs and the lack of subsequent positive drug 

tests were encouraging signs. Based on the information 

available to him, Subia opined that appellant’s resentencing 

would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public 

safety. 

d. Testimony of Dr. Goodwin

Dr. Ronette Goodwin, a psychologist specializing in 

forensic mental health, also testified on behalf of appellant. 

Dr. Goodwin reviewed appellant’s records, interviewed him

in February and March 2018, and conducted several tests to 
9

assess his risk levels. She testified that appellant’s 

assessment indicated the presence of “criminal thinking” and 

reflected an impulsive and impetuous thinking style. She 

opined that appellant’s thinking style, together with his drug 

use, likely contributed to his past criminal behavior. 

Regarding appellant’s drug use, Dr. Goodwin revealed that 

appellant had told her he had been drug free for six months 

at the time of their interview. Dr. Goodwin did not recall if 

appellant said this in February or March 2018. 

Dr. Goodwin identified appellant’s coping skills and his 

ability to handle stress as areas of concern. According to Dr. 

Goodwin, appellant attributed his drug use in 2016 to his 

difficulty in adjusting to being around other inmates after 

his release from solitary confinement. In response to 

questioning by the prosecutor, Dr. Goodwin agreed that 

release from prison and reintegration into society also 

required an adjustment and caused stress. 

Dr. Goodwin testified that appellant’s assessments

indicated he represented a medium risk for recidivism and 

violence, primarily due to his early history and criminal 

lifestyle. She explained that appellant’s assessment score of 

19 was the highest within the medium-risk range and was 

associated with a 28 percent chance of recidivism within one 

year. 

Based on her assessment of appellant, Dr. Goodwin 

opined he was suitable for resentencing, but this conclusion 

was conditioned on a more structured discharge plan that 

addressed areas of concern. She characterized appellant’s 
10

current transitional plan as “weak.” Dr. Goodwin opined 

that appellant needed at least six months to a year of 

treatment and intervention relating to his thinking styles 

and drug addiction, prior to release. She explained he 

needed training to develop his skills in areas such as 

patience and emotional control, critical reasoning skills, and 

goal setting. According to Dr. Goodwin, excluding 

appellant’s criminal history from consideration would result 

in a low-risk assessment, assuming implementation of her 

recommendations for a better release plan. 

C. The Superior Court’s Ruling

Following the suitability hearing, the superior court 

denied appellant’s petition, concluding his resentencing 

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. 

The court reasoned: (1) appellant’s extensive criminal 

history indicated a propensity for violence; (2) his prison 

misconduct, which also included violent conduct, showed he 

continued to struggle with substance abuse, which was 

particularly concerning given Dr. Goodwin’s opinion that 

drug use contributed to his criminal behavior in the past; 

and (3) based on Dr. Goodwin’s testimony, appellant’s 

release plan was inadequate. Appellant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the superior court abused its 

discretion in determining that resentencing him would pose 

an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and thus 
11

that he was unsuitable for resentencing under section 

1170.126. We disagree.

A. Principles

In 2012, the electorate approved Proposition 36, 

amending the Three Strikes law to provide that absent 

specified exceptions, an offender with two or more prior 

strikes is to be sentenced as a two-strike offender unless the 

new offense is itself a serious or violent felony. (People v. 

Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 169-170.) Proposition 

36 also added section 1170.126, creating a postconviction 

resentencing proceeding for specified inmates sentenced 

under the prior version of the Three Strikes law. (People v.

Yearwood, at 170-171.) Under that statute, a defendant 

sentenced as a three-strike offender may petition for recall of 

the sentence and for resentencing, subject to certain 

eligibility criteria. (§ 1170.126, subd. (e).) 

If a petitioner is eligible for resentencing under 

Proposition 36, the superior court may still deny his or her

petition if the court, “in its discretion, determines that 

resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk 

of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) In 

exercising this discretion, the court may consider: (1) the 

petitioner’s criminal conviction history; (2) the petitioner’s 

“disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while 

incarcerated”; and (3) any other evidence the court, in its 

discretion, determines to be relevant. (§ 1170.126, subd. (g).) 

“The proper focus is on whether the petitioner currently 
12

poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” 

(People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 913 (Buford).) In 

assessing the petitioner’s criminal and disciplinary history, 

“‘“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether . . . , when considered in 

light of other facts in the record, [they] are such that they 

continue to be predictive of current dangerousness many 

years [later].”’” (Id. at 914.) “‘“[T]he facts upon which the 

court’s finding of unreasonable risk is based must be proven 

by the People by a preponderance of the evidence.”’” (People 

v. Piper (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1016.) 

On appeal, the court’s determination that resentencing 

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Buford, supra, 4 

Cal.App.5th at 895.) We will find such an abuse only if the 

court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or 

patently absurd manner. (Id. at 895, 901.)

B. Analysis

The superior court did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that appellant’s resentencing would pose an 

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Appellant’s 

criminal history, his disciplinary record, and other factors 

supported the court’s decision. 

Appellant’s criminal history was extensive and his 

criminality persistent, stretching from 1985, when he was 16 

years old, to his commitment offenses in 1999. His prior 

convictions included violent and other dangerous offenses, 

including two batteries (in 1987), two burglaries (1990 and 
13

1991), evading a peace officer with willful disregard for the 

safety of persons or property (1990), two assaults with a 

deadly weapon (1992), and inflicting corporal injury on a 

spouse, resulting in great bodily injury (1997). Appellant 

also violated probation and parole on multiple occasions. 

Appellant’s 1999 commitment offenses, unlawful driving and 

evading the police with willful disregard for the safety of 

persons or property, involved driving more than 70 miles per

hour in a 25-miles-per-hour residential area and ultimately 

attempting to jump out of the moving vehicle.

Appellant’s record during his current incarceration

exhibited a continuation of rule-breaking behavior, even in 

the controlled environment of a prison. Appellant was long

associated with the Nazi Low Riders. CDCR records 

indicated he remained an active associate, although Subia, 

appellant’s prison-operations expert, testified that 

appellant’s current placement suggested authorities believed

he was inactive. Appellant committed numerous

disciplinary violations, including violations related to racial

violence. His record included participating in two racial 

riots in 2001 and 2008. In 2009, appellant was found guilty 

of conspiracy to commit battery on an inmate, after prison 

authorities confiscated a note indicating that appellant had 

sent out orders for White inmates to attack Black inmates on 

behalf of White prison gangs. These orders resulted in the 

assault of a Black inmate. Based on this evidence, prison 

authorities concluded that appellant held a leadership 

position within the White prison-gang system. 
14

Appellant’s disciplinary record additionally indicated 

that appellant continued to abuse drugs and alcohol in 

prison. He sustained three violations relating to the 

production or possession of alcohol in 2004, 2007, and 2009. 

In 2004, officers intercepted a letter addressed to appellant 

containing a greeting card soaked in methamphetamine. In 

2016, appellant tested positive for amphetamines, 

methamphetamine, morphine, and codeine. Moreover, 

according to the testimony of Dr. Goodwin, appellant 

admitted using drugs in 2017, but his drug use went 

undetected. 

Dr. Goodwin’s testimony showed that appellant’s 

criminal and disciplinary history reflected a continuing risk. 

Testifying on appellant’s behalf, Dr. Goodwin opined that 

appellant represented a medium risk for recidivism and 

violence. She explained that appellant’s risk-assessment 

score was the highest within the medium-risk range and was 

associated with a 28 percent chance of recidivism within one 

year. Dr. Goodwin stated that appellant’s assessment 

indicated the presence of “criminal thinking” and reflected 

an impulsive and impetuous thinking style. She opined that 

appellant’s thinking style, together with his drug use, likely 

contributed to his criminal behavior. Dr. Goodwin expressed 

concern regarding appellant’s coping skills and his ability to 

handle stress. According to Dr. Goodwin, appellant 

attributed his drug use in 2016 to his difficulty in adjusting 

to being around others after being released from solitary 

confinement. In response to questioning, she agreed that 
15

release from prison and reintegration into society also 

required an adjustment and caused stress. 

Based on her assessment of appellant, Dr. Goodwin 

opined he was suitable for resentencing, but conditioned her 

conclusion on a more structured discharge plan that 

addressed areas of concern. She testified that appellant 

needed at least six months to a year of treatment dealing 

with his thinking styles and drug addiction, prior to release. 

She further testified that appellant needed training aimed at 

developing his skills in areas such as patience and emotional 

control, critical reasoning skills, and goal setting. Dr. 

Goodwin characterized appellant’s current transitional plan 

as “weak.” 

Dr. Goodwin’s testimony contextualized appellant’s 

criminal and disciplinary misconduct and established its 

roots in appellant’s personal characteristics and drug abuse. 

Together, this evidence supported the finding appellant

posed a current unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. 

(See Buford, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at 913-914.) Given 

appellant’s troubling criminal and disciplinary history and

Dr. Goodwin’s testimony about the inadequacy of his release 

plan in relation to his risk factors, the superior court’s denial 

of his petition was eminently reasonable. 

Appellant contends his record contained only isolated 

evidence of past dangerousness that, in view of the totality of 

his circumstances, did not support the superior court’s 

finding of current dangerousness. He notes that he was 51 

years old at the time of the hearing and had been free of any 
16

gang-related activity or violent violations for about ten 

years. He also contends that “[w]ith the exception of a single 

relapse in 2016, [he] ha[d] successfully overcome his drug 

and alcohol abuse for at least 11 years.” 

Contrary to appellant’s characterization, the record 

supports a persistent pattern of criminal and disciplinary

misconduct, including violent behavior, both before and 

during his current incarceration. This pattern was, 

according to appellant’s own expert, linked to his criminal

and impulsive thinking styles, as well as to his substance 

abuse. And although appellant’s record shows a reduction in 

serious rule-breaking behavior in prison during the years 

preceding the suitability hearing, it also suggests that 

appellant has not sufficiently addressed the root causes of 

his conduct. While appellant points to positive markers --

and we hope that his trend of improvement in his conduct 

continues -- the superior court was not bound to find them 

dispositive in the face of significant evidence of appellant’s 

dangerousness. (See Buford, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at 895, 

901.) We note, moreover, that by appellant’s own admission 

to Dr. Goodwin, his drug use continued beyond 2016, without 

being detected by prison authorities, and it is not apparent 

that he had in fact “overcome” his drug-abuse issues by the 

time of the suitability hearing. 

Appellant claims the superior court failed to consider 

his youth at the time he committed most of his violent 

conduct: “The record shows most of appellant’s acts of 

violence . . . occurred when he was 25 years old or younger. 
17

The one exception is appellant’s conviction for physically 

abusing his former wife at the age of 26. [¶] In finding that 

appellant’s criminal history as a youth made him a current 

risk of danger 25 years later[, the court] fail[ed] to consider 

the impact of his minority in assessing his culpability.” 

However, appellant’s argument omits his significant violent 

or otherwise dangerous conduct well beyond the age of 25, 

both before and during his present incarceration. He 

committed his offenses of commitment -- involving a reckless 

attempt to flee from police at a high speed through a 

residential area -- at age 29. He then participated in racial 

riots in prison at ages 32 and 39, and at age 40, he relayed 

orders for White inmates to attack Black inmates. 

Finally, appellant maintains the court erred in 

deeming his release plan insufficient. He cites caselaw 

dealing with parole decisions, holding that an inmate need 

not provide ironclad post-release plans, only realistic ones. 

(See In re Twinn (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 447, 465; In re 

Andrade (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 807, 817.) Appellant argues 

he indeed proffered a realistic plan, noting his admission to a 

residential transition program, the job offer he received, and 

the support of his spouse. He repeats his contention that he 

has been drug free since his 2016 relapse and contends that

the superior court could have addressed any remaining

concerns about his continued drug use through MCRP, in 

which he agreed to participate, or by requiring frequent drug 

tests as a condition of parole. We are unpersuaded.
18

By appellant’s own expert’s account, his release plan 

was “weak,” and it failed to address the core reasons for his 

past criminality and rule-breaking behavior. His plan did 

not include lengthy pre-release intervention relating to his 

problematic thinking styles and drug addiction, which Dr. 

Goodwin opined was necessary for him to be suitable for 

resentencing. The mandatory drug testing suggested by 

appellant would serve as no substitute for this kind of 

intervention, as it fails to address his thinking patterns and 

coping skills. Moreover, appellant has used drugs without 

detection even in the controlled prison environment, and 

random drug testing following release would not ensure that 

he would be detected before recidivating. As to MCRP, the 

record contains insufficient information about this program,

and it does not appear that Dr. Goodwin assessed its 

suitability to reduce appellant’s risk profile. Moreover, while 

appellant agreed to participate in the program, he makes no 

attempt to show that he would have been eligible to 

participate. In short, the superior court was well within its 

discretion in determining that appellant’s resentencing 

would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
19

DISPOSITION

The superior court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 MANELLA, P. J.

We concur:

WILLHITE, J.

COLLINS, J.