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S. HRG. 113–656 

IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS: 

OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 24, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Barbero, Michael D., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army [Retired], Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 51

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee .................................................. 2 

Jeffrey, Hon. James F., Philip Solondz Distinguished Visiting Fellow, the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC .......................... 47 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

McGurk, Brett, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State for Iraq and Iran, U.S. 

Department of State, Washington, DC ............................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Response to question submitted by Senator Tim Kaine ................................ 72 

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Jeff Flake ............................. 72 

Responses to questions submitted by Senator John Barrasso ...................... 76 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey ...................................... 1 

Pollack, Kenneth M., senior fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, 

Brookings Institute, Washington, DC ................................................................ 56 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 58 

Slotkin, Elissa, performing the duties of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department Of Defense, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15 

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Jeff Flake ............................. 75 

Responses to questions submitted by Senator John Barrasso ...................... 78 

(III)

(1) 

IRAQ AT A CROSSROADS: 

OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 

THURSDAY, JULY 24, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, 

Durbin, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, 

Flake, McCain, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This hearing will come to order. 

Today we focus on Iraq and U.S. policy options, but to fully examine the crisis in Iraq we must acknowledge the broader context of 

developments across the region. Earlier this year I held a hearing 

on the spillover from the Syria conflict to examine the implications 

of continued violence in Syria and how it would impact the stability 

and security of neighboring countries. Now we are seeing the very 

dangerous results of that spillover with the advancement of ISIS, 

the increase in sectarian violence, underscored by the dissolution 

of any real border between Iraq and Syria, and the designation by 

ISIS of a caliphate across Syria and Iraq that is threatening to create a security vacuum in the heart of the Middle East. 

While today’s hearing will not focus specifically on the regional 

threat posed by ISIS or on United States-Syria policy, I want to 

take this opportunity to restate my long-held position that we must 

enhance our support to the moderate Syrian opposition, the only 

ones willing to challenge ISIS and other al-Qaeda affiliates in 

Syria. It seems to me at the end of the day supporting these moderate forces must be one pillar of a broader U.S. policy in the 

region. 

No one should be surprised that Iraq is the victim of this spillover, but we should be extremely concerned by the rapid expansion 

of ISIS and alarmed by Iran’s clear involvement in Iraq. And we 

should be dismayed by the convenient alignment of Iranian, Russian, and Syrian interests in response to recent developments, 

especially in Iraq. At its core, this alignment is about self-preservation of rogue actors that seek to maintain power by destabilizing 

others and keeping weak governments susceptible to malign 

influence. 

2 

In my view, Iraq does not have to proceed down this path and 

it is up to Iraq’s leaders to chart a different course for their 

country. 

I am deeply disappointed that, after years of United States investment in time and resources, the loss of thousands of American 

lives, and the commitment of billions of dollars to support Iraq’s political development and the creation of a responsible, capable Iraqi 

Security Force, that they deserted the communities they were responsible for protecting, abandoned United States military equipment, and fled from ISIS fighters. 

At the same time, ISIS’s expansion across Iraq and its reception 

by Iraq’s Sunni communities and tribes would not have been possible except for the accumulation of years of destructive sectarian, 

corrupt policies by the central government in Baghdad. Iraq has 

the potential to be an economically prosperous, diverse, and politically representative model for others in the region, but Iraqi leaders have focused on their own sectarian and ethnic interests for too 

long, at the expense of building an Iraq for all Iraqis. 

The time is now for Iraq’s elected leaders to form a national 

unity government that is truly representative. I applaud the recent 

progress in nominating a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers for 

Iraq’s Parliament and today’s promising news that a President has 

been named. I encourage Iraq’s leaders to continue this critical 

work and finalize the government with leaders committed to leading an Iraq for all Iraqis. 

While Iraq’s leaders continue negotiations to form the next government, the Department of Defense has completed the assessment 

of Iraqi Security Forces. I look forward to hearing from our administration witness on the findings and recommendations provided by 

U.S. advisers and plans going forward to counter the threat from 

ISIS and Congress’ role in this effort. 

Let me take a moment to highlight the particularly dangerous 

situation of minority communities in Iraq and particularly Iraqi 

Christians. I recently joined Senator Stabenow in a meeting with 

Archbishop Bashar Warda from the Chaldean Diocese of Erbil. His 

description of the terror that ISIS has inflicted in Iraqi Christian 

communities is truly horrifying, and I hope that our witnesses 

today will share with us steps the administration is taking to address the urgent and unique situation of Iraqi Christians. 

I hope to hear from our administration witnesses today whether 

or not they believe Iraqi leaders are capable, or able, I should say, 

to form a more representative government, what is required to turn 

the tide against ISIS, and if there is a new national unity government in Baghdad what should we do to demonstrate support. 

With that, Senator Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 

witnesses for being here. 

Iraq seems to be disintegrating as the terrorist organization ISIS 

now controls Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, Fallujah, and much 

of Ramadi, parts of Baiji, Tikrit. Though significantly outnumbered, ISIS managed to overwhelm entire divisions of the Iraqi 

3 

Army, many of whom removed their uniforms and ran. ISIS also 

has claimed credit for a recent string of bombings in Baghdad, is 

responsible for systemic persecution of Christians, thousands of 

whom are being forced to flee their homes under penalty of death 

if they do not convert and pay a tax. 

The U.N. reports that last month was the deadliest in Iraq since 

2008, with 2,400 Iraqis killed, two-thirds of which were civilians. 

For those of us who were here during the debate over the hardwon gains of the surge, this is hardly an outcome that would have 

been imagined back then. Though our intelligence picture in Iraq 

is woefully inadequate, the situation should not surprise us, for two 

reasons. The crisis is connected to the disaster in Syria, which our 

country has largely ignored. Sunni militants have long enjoyed 

freedom of movement across the porous border in Anbar province 

and had been in control of Fallujah and key parts of Ramadi for 

months prior to the takeover of Mosul. 

Since 2009, Maliki has systematically shredded and politicized 

the entire structure of the Iraqi Security Forces, replacing competent commanders with incompetent, yet loyal, commanders and 

creating a more sectarian institution that scares the average Iraqi 

as much as ISIS. 

Despite the connection to Syria, it is important to note that this 

is not just an invasion from foreign fighters. ISIS simply cannot 

hold this much territory in Iraq while maintaining operations in 

Syria without help on the ground. Whether we can look—rather, 

we can look at this as a civil and sectarian war being exacerbated 

and exploited by a growing terrorist threat. This is yet another signal of how badly Prime Minister Maliki has alienated the Sunni 

population. 

Even if Maliki leaves, without political reconciliation among 

Iraq’s key communities no amount of military support can make a 

difference. But on the other hand, if we do not help the Iraqi Government survive and hold territory now, there is a possibility we 

will not be discussing political reconciliation in a few months because the country could break apart. 

Today in this hearing I hope we can confront this dilemma head 

on. I hope we can start to identify the right mix of security assistance and political steps that will help get the country back on the 

right track. I am open to working with the administration to determine what we can do as a nation to help shore up the defenses 

of the Iraqis and encourage political reconciliation among Iraqi 

leaders. 

I want to thank you for being here today. I look forward to this 

hearing and I look forward to us weighing in on what we believe 

are the most appropriate steps forward. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

Let me introduce our first panel. With us today is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iraq and Iran, Brett McGurk, who has 

just returned from a 6-week trip to Iraq, where he was assisting 

the Embassy team; and Ms. Elissa Slotkin, performing the duties 

of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 

whose experience on Iraq ranges from the intelligence community 

to the National Security Council to the State Department, and now 

to the Defense Department. 

4 

Let me remind both of you that your full statements will be included in the record without objection. I would ask you to summarize in about 5 minutes or so, so that the members of the committee can engage with you in a dialogue. With that, we will start 

with you, Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF BRETT MCGURK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IRAQ AND IRAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you. Good morning. Chairman Menendez, 

Ranking Member Corker, members of this committee, I thank you 

for inviting us to discuss the situation in Iraq, with a focus on U.S. 

response since the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant attacked 

Mosul nearly 7 weeks ago. 

Let me first review the bidding on why this matters. ISIL is alQaeda. It may have changed its name, it may have broken with 

senior al-Qaeda leadership such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, but it is alQaeda in its doctrine, ambition, and increasingly in its threat to 

U.S. interests. Should there be any question about the intentions 

of this group, simply read what its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 

says. And it is important to pay attention to what he says because 

we cannot risk underestimating the goals, capacity, and reach of 

this organization. 

Baghdadi in May 2011 eulogized the death of Osama bin Laden 

and promised a violent response. ISIL training camps in Syria are 

named after Osama bin Laden. In his audio statements Baghdadi 

regularly issues veiled threats against the United States, promising 

a direct confrontation. And, in his feud with al-Zawahiri. Baghdadi 

is clearly seeking to lead the global jihad. 

Additionally, ISIL is no longer simply a terrorist organization. It 

is now a full-blown army, seeking to establish a self-governing 

state through the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys in what is now 

Syria and Iraq. It now controls much of eastern Syria. In January 

in Iraq it moved into Anbar province, taking control of Fallujah, 

and on June 10 it moved on Mosul. 

I arrived in Erbil, 80 kilometers east of Mosul, on June 7 and 

I will begin there. In meetings with local officials from Mosul and 

with Kurdish officials on June 7, we received early indications that 

ISIL was moving in force from Syria into Iraq and staging forces 

in western Mosul. We immediately asked and received permission 

from Kurdish leaders to deploy Peshmerga forces on the eastern 

side of the city, but the Government of Baghdad did not share the 

same sense of urgency and refused the deployments. 

Iraqi military commanders promised to send nine brigades of 

force to Mosul in response to our warnings. We stressed, however, 

that the forces might not arrive in time. 

On June 9, the situation remained extremely tense and we continued to urge the immediate deployment of additional security 

forces to protect against an ISIL attack from west to east. In the 

early hours of June 10, ISIL launched a complex suicide bomb attack across a strategic bridge and poured forces into the eastern 

part of the city. Iraqi resistance totally collapsed, which led to a 

panic and a snowballing effect southward through the Tigris Valley 

and to the cities of Tikrit, Samarra, and Bilad. 

5 

The result was catastrophic. Five divisions nearly dissolved and 

the approaches to Baghdad were immediately under threat. I flew 

to Baghdad first thing that morning with a focus on ensuring our 

people were safe, working with Ambassador Beecroft and our team, 

and working with the Iraqis to ensure the northern approaches to 

Baghdad were bolstered. 

My written testimony sets forth in detail the critical elements of 

our crisis response. We first made certain that our people would be 

safe, including contractors working on bases outside of Baghdad, 

who were evacuated with the help of the Iraqi Air Force. At the 

Embassy and at the airport, we rebalanced staff to manage the crisis and brought in additional Department of Defense resources to 

ensure the security of our facilities. 

In parallel, at the President’s direction, we worked to urgently 

improve our intelligence pictures throughout western and 

northcentral Iraq, surging surveillance flights, establishing joint 

operations centers, and deploying Special Operations Forces to assist Iraqi units around the capital. These intelligence and security 

initiatives were undertaken in parallel with regional diplomacy led 

by Secretary Kerry to better focus attention on the serious threat. 

We finally sought to stabilize the Iraqi political process, recognizing that this attack took place at the most vulnerable moment, 

following national elections that were held on April 30 in which 14 

million Iraqis voted, but prior to the formation of a new government. This process remains extremely challenging, but now has 

some traction. A new Speaker of Parliament was chosen last week. 

He is a moderate Sunni Arab named Salim Jabouri, elected with 

the overwhelming support from all major components in the new 

Iraqi Parliament. 

Today, just about 2 hours ago, the new Iraqi Parliament elected 

Fuad Masum, a distinguished Kurdish statesman, to serve as the 

new President of Iraq. He, too, was elected overwhelmingly, with 

support from all major components in the newly elected Parliament. Iraqis are now proceeding along their constitutional 

timeline to choose a Prime Minister, which must happen within 15 

days. 

As the President has said, it is not the place of the United States 

to choose Iraq’s leaders. It is clear, though, that only leaders who 

can govern with an inclusive agenda are going to be able to pull 

the country together and guide the Iraqi people through this crisis. 

The current situation today in Iraq remains extremely, extremely, serious. ISIL remains in control of Mosul and it is targeting all Iraqis—Sunni, Shia, Christian, Kurds, Turkoman, Yazidi, 

Shaveks—who disagree with its twisted vision of a seventh century 

caliphate. It has also joined in an unholy alliance with militant 

wings of the former Baath Party, known as the Naqshbandi Network, and with some former insurgent groups, such as the Islamic 

Army of Iraq. 

Going forward, the Iraqis, with our support, must seek to split 

these latter groups from ISIL and to isolate ISIL and the hard-core 

militant groups from the population. The platforms we have established through the immediate crisis response are now providing additional information to inform the President and our national security team as we develop options to protect our interests in Iraq. 

6 

Any further decisions in this regard will be made in full consultation with this committee and with the Congress. 

Any efforts we take, moreover, must be in conjunction with Iraqi 

efforts to isolate ISIL from the population. This is because, while 

we have a serious counterterrorism challenge in Iraq, Iraq has a 

serious counterinsurgency challenge, and the two are inextricably 

linked. 

Based on my last 7 weeks on the ground in Iraq, there is now 

a clear recognition by Iraqis from all communities that substantial 

reforms must be undertaken. This will require the formation of a 

new government, together with restructuring of the security services. An emerging consensus in Iraq, which we can fully support, 

is a functioning federalism consistent with Iraq’s Constitution, 

based on the new realities on the ground, and focused on the following five principles. 

First, local citizens must be in the lead in securing local areas. 

Second, these local citizens defending their communities must be 

provided state benefits and state resources, perhaps modeled along 

the lines of a National Guard-type force structure. 

Third, the Iraq Army must be restructured. Commanders who 

failed in Mosul have since been fired and they have been replaced 

with new commanders, who we are working very closely with. The 

federal army should also focus on federal functions, such as protecting borders, and rarely deploy inside cities, while providing 

overwatch support when necessary. 

Fourth principle: There must be close cooperation between local, 

regional, and national security services to gradually reduce operational space for ISIL, particularly in Nineveh province. 

And, finally, the Federal Government, through its new Parliament and a new Cabinet, must work diligently on a package of 

reforms that can address legitimate grievances from all communities and ensure adequate resources to these restructured security 

services. 

These five principles can begin to address many of the core grievances in the Sunni majority areas of Iraq while also, importantly, 

denying space for ISIL to operate and thereby protect the Shia majority and other vulnerable groups from ISIL attack. Restoring stability and degrading ISIL will require a smart, integrated central, 

regional, and provincial approach led by a new Iraq Government, 

with an appropriate level of United States support and assistance. 

Iraqi leaders from all communities have asked for assistance 

in implementing this program and General Austin, our Commander of CENTCOM, is on the ground today to further assess the 

situation and discuss concrete ways in which our assistance might 

be effective. 

This model of a functioning federalism is achievable and it is essential if we hope to deny space for ISIL within the borders of Iraq. 

I look forward once again to discussing more details in the answers to your questions, and I thank you again for the opportunity 

to testify this morning. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McGurk follows:] 

7 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRETT MCGURK

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to discuss the U.S. response to the crisis in Iraq. I just 

returned from Iraq after spending the past 7 weeks in Baghdad and Erbil helping 

to manage our crisis response with Ambassador Beecroft and our diplomatic and 

military team on the ground, which is serving with courage and dedication. We were 

assisted by the tireless efforts of Secretary Kerry, including a visit to Iraq at a critical moment, and the entire national security team, including the daily attention of 

the President and Vice President. 

My testimony today will provide a firsthand account of the U.S. response In Iraq 

to date, and the foundations we are building to protect U.S. interests over the 

months ahead. 

I. THE FALL OF MOSUL

I arrived in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region, on June 7, 3 days before 

Mosul fell to militants led by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). We 

had been concerned about Mosul for the past year, as it had become the primary 

financial hub for ISIL, generating nearly $12 million per month in revenues through 

extortion and smuggling rackets. From all of our contacts in Mosul, including Iraqi 

security and local officials, the city by day would appear normal, but at night, ISIL 

controlled the streets. 

One of my first meetings in Erbil on the morning of June 8th was with the Governor of Ninewa province, Atheel Nujaifi. His news was alarming. Over the past 72 

hours, he told me, hundreds of ISIL gun trucks, carrying fighters and heavy weapons, had crossed the Iraq-Syria border near the town of Rabiya, then passed north 

of Tal Afar, before staging on the outskirts of west Mosul. The Iraqi Army agreed 

to provide assistance to Mosul, but Iraqi commanders did not seem to appreciate 

the urgency of the situation, and stated that reinforcements might not arrive for a 

week. 

We checked this information with sources in western Ninewa near the Syrian border crossings, and confirmed that ISIL appeared to be coming across in force. We 

also met immediately with Karim Sinjari, the Minister of Interior of the Kurdistan 

Regional Government (KRG), who confirmed with real-time information that neighborhoods in western Mosul were under immediate threat, as well as reports from 

the border regions about a steady stream of ISIL reinforcements crossing into Iraq 

from Syria. During this meeting, Minister Sinjari spoke to President Masoud 

Barzani and received authorization to deploy Kurdish Peshmerga units into eastern 

Mosul to help reinforce Iraqi Forces and deter any ISIL advance east across the 

Tigris. He said the Peshmerga were ready to help, but under the constitution, first 

required authority from the Government of Iraq. 

We sent an immediate and urgent message to Baghdad, including to the Acting 

Minister of Defense, and directly to Prime Minister Maliki through his chief of staff. 

They responded that the situation was under control, and that nine Iraqi Army brigades would soon be relocated to Mosul. We questioned that information, and encouraged Baghdad to request assistance from Peshmerga forces immediately, as the 

Peshmerga was able to reinforce the city rapidly, and there was precedent for their 

helping to protect Mosul, including many years ago against ISIL’s earlier incarnation, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The Minister of Defense ultimately agreed, but the 

Prime Minister asked for a confirmation from Erbil that any deployed Peshmerga 

units would withdraw after army units arrived. 

On June 9, the situation remained static, and the Government in Iraq expressed 

confidence that Mosul was not under a serious threat. Throughout the day, however, 

Mosul’s western-most neighborhoods began to fall to ISIL. Its fighters began attacking checkpoints and killing resisters, seeking to establish psychological dominance 

over Iraqi security units in the city. Together with the United Nations team in 

Baghdad, we worked to help establish a mechanism whereby Peshmerga units 

would be authorized to reinforce the eastern half of the city pending the arrival of 

Iraqi units from the south, and then withdraw after the situation stabilized. Baghdad asked to further review the proposal. 

In the early morning hours of June 10, ISIL detonated a suicide truck bomb at 

a checkpoint across a strategic bridge and began to flow forces into the eastern side 

of the city. The next few hours would prove fateful. Iraqi units abandoned their 

posts, and ISIL swept through the city, seizing control of the provincial council 

building, the airport, and then, ultimately, Iraqi military bases. Nearly 500,000— 

out of a total population of 2 million Iraqis—fled, seeking refuge in Kurdishcontrolled areas. Around 3 a.m., we received distressed messages from Iraqi officials 

8 

in Baghdad, requesting the Kurdish Peshmerga to move into Mosul as soon as possible. The Iraqi request came too late. 

The fall of Iraq’s second-largest city to ISIL was combined with a social media 

campaign indicating that ISIL columns would soon be heading down the Tigris 

River Valley to Baghdad with no mercy for anyone who resisted. The result was a 

devastating collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces from Mosul to Tikrit. Nearly five 

Iraqi Army and Federal Police divisions (out of 18 total) would disintegrate over the 

next 48 hours. This snowballing effect immediately threatened Baghdad, with serious concern that Iraqi Forces guarding its northern approaches might also collapse. 

Over the next 3 days, in meetings with our Embassy team and videoconferences 

with President Obama and the National Security Council, we immediately prepared 

and executed our crisis response. We also worked closely with Iraqi officials to organize the defenses of Baghdad and restore some of the confidence that had been 

battered. 

II. U.S. RESPONSE

Our response to the immediate crisis proceeded along three parallel tracks. First, 

and most importantly, we worked to ensure the security of our own personnel and 

facilities. Second, in parallel, we both relocated and surged U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military resources to develop strategic options for the President with 

real-time and accurate information. Third, we worked with Iraqi officials to 

strengthen their defenses of strategic locations, and set the political process on 

track, with a focus on forming a new government following national elections. 

The key elements of this response plan included the following eight steps, which, 

taken as a whole, encompassed security, intelligence, political, and diplomatic 

measures: 

(1) Ensuring the Safety of U.S. Personnel and U.S. Citizens 

Our first priority was ensuring the safety of U.S. personnel. This required relocating some personnel and adding additional security capabilities at the Embassy 

compound and the airport. Additionally, there were a number of American contractors at Balad Air Base working on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases. Reports from 

near Balad, which later proved false, suggested the base faced an imminent ISIL 

attack. After the contractors encountered delays securing their own charter aircraft, 

the Iraqi Air Force helped evacuate nearly 500 U.S. citizens and third-country 

nationals on June 14 aboard Iraqi C–130 aircraft. All contractors left safely, and we 

are grateful to the Iraqi Government and its pilots, most of whom we trained, for 

their assistance during this crisis period, particularly given their own competing 

demands.1

At the same time, we took extraordinary measures to ensure the safety of our 

Baghdad-based personnel. The entire National Security Council team, from the 

President on down, focused intensively to deploy Department of Defense security 

assets from elsewhere in the region while the Country Team worked intensively 

with Washington to relocate some personnel to safer areas. Within 72 hours we 

brought significant defensive capacity into our facilities and rebalanced staff to help 

manage the crisis. These early moves proved essential to ensuring that U.S. diplomats could continue to do their jobs and protect U.S. interests. 

Today, even as the immediate crisis has passed, we are constantly reviewing our 

footprint to ensure the safety and security of our personnel and facilities. 

(2) Improving Intelligence Picture on ISIL 

Another immediate need was to get a better intelligence picture. From Erbil, even 

before Mosul fell, I was in touch with General Austin who recognized the urgency 

of the situation and prepared to deploy additional intelligence assets. In the earliest 

days, however, when asked about the situation, we had to acknowledge that we 

were operating in a fog. Rumors of ISIL convoys approaching Baghdad could not be 

discounted and there were tense moments as we sought to separate rumor and propaganda from fact without immediate eyes on the ground. Today, this fog has lifted— 

quite dramatically—thanks to immediate decisions taken by the President. 

In response to these early developments, we dedicated a substantial amount of 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to fly over Iraq. These missions 

have enhanced our intelligence picture and provided critical information to Iraqi 

Forces defending strategic locations, while at the same time helping to establish a 

foundation from which the President can assess the merit of additional measures. 

(3) Assessing the Capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces 

In the early hours of the crisis, we worked quickly to reverse the collapsing 

morale of Iraqi Security Forces, reconstitute key units, and ensure the units deVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:40 Jun 05, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\113TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION\2014 ISSUE TE
9 

ployed around Baghdad could adequately defend the capital. Our sight picture was 

imprecise, and the prerequisite to concrete action was acquiring a firsthand, eyeson accounting of the situation. In my meetings with Iraqi officials, they said they 

would welcome U.S. Special Operations Forces to assess Iraqi force capabilities. 

The President authorized the deployment of six Special Operations Forces ‘‘assessment teams’’ to augment efforts that were previously underway through our Office 

of Security Cooperation. These teams have recently completed an initial, 2-week 

assessment of Iraqi units in and around the greater Baghdad area, examining each 

unit’s capabilities and potential for a closer U.S. partnership. This mission has 

already provided greater visibility into the situation on the ground, and will help 

the national security team calibrate additional and tailored measures. 

The Department of Defense is currently reviewing this comprehensive assessment, 

which, as the President has said, is designed help determine ‘‘how we can best train, 

advise, and support Iraqi Security Forces going forward.’’ 

(4) Establishing Joint Operations Centers in Baghdad and Erbil 

To harness an improving intelligence picture, we have stood up two combined 

Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) in Baghdad and Erbil. These JOCs help ensure a 

constant 24/7 flow of real-time intelligence information from across Iraq. We are 

now able to coordinate closely with Iraqi Security Forces, the Ministry of Defense, 

and the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC). 

The Baghdad JOC is fully functional and has dramatically improved our ability 

to understand and assess the situation on the ground. I visited the JOC shortly 

before departing Baghdad last week, and it is an impressive operation, which began 

from scratch only 6 weeks ago. Most of our military personnel operating the facility 

have extensive experience and relationships inside Iraq. They report that their Iraqi 

counterparts have fully embraced our assistance and are asking for more, hoping 

that the United States will serve as their essential partner in the fight against ISIL. 

The Government of Iraq has also made some welcome decisions in recent 

weeks to improve this bilateral coordination, including appointment of new commanders, many with longstanding ties and relationships with their U.S. military 

counterparts. 

(5) Positioning U.S. Military Assets in the Region 

In the immediate wake of the crisis, the Department of Defense reinforced assets 

in the region to prepare for multiple contingencies, including the possibility of targeted and precise military action against targets associated with ISIL. On June 16, 

Secretary Hagel ordered the USS Mesa Verde, carrying a complement of MV–22 

Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, into the gulf. Its presence added to that of other U.S. 

naval ships in the Gulf—including the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, a 

cruiser, and three destroyers. These assets will provide our senior leaders with additional options in the event military action is deemed necessary to protect U.S. interests as the situation develops. They also complement the substantial defensive capabilities now on the ground to ensure the safety and security of our personnel and 

facilities. 

(6) Getting the Political Process on Track 

ISIL attacked Mosul at a time of extreme political volatility. On April 30, 2 

months before the crisis, Iraq conducted credible national elections, in which 62 percent of Iraq’s eligible voters participated. This high turnout included Ninewa, where 

Mosul is the capital, with nearly 1.1 million voters turning out (54.4 percent), despite explicit ISIL threats to kill anyone who participates in the political process. 

When ISIL moved in force into Mosul on June 10, the votes had been counted but 

not yet certified. The 4-year Parliament’s term had ended, and a new Parliament, 

with its 328 Members chosen in the election, had yet to convene. The attack, thus, 

took place during a political vacuum, and purposefully so. ISIL clearly took a play 

from its earlier incarnation, AQI, which led the devastating Samarra mosque attack 

shortly after December 2005 elections, triggering years of sectarian conflict. Their 

long-stated aim has always been to spark a collapse of the political process.2

We worked immediately to ensure ISIL could not succeed in destroying the Iraqi 

political process. First, we urged Iraq’s Government to finalize the election results, 

which would set in place a series of timelines for forming a new government. This 

required judges who had fled Baghdad to return. They did so, and ratified the election, on June 16. The next day, Iraqi religious and political leaders from all major 

communities declared ISIL ‘‘an enemy of all Iraqis’’ and requested international 

assistance to combat the threat. Second, we worked with the U.N. to press Iraqi 

leaders to convene the Parliament on time, no later than July 1, which it did. Third, 

we pressed all newly elected political blocs to choose their leaders for key posts, pursuant to the constitutional timeline for forming a new government. 

10 

This process now has some traction. On July 15, the Parliament confirmed a new 

Speaker, which is the first position to be named pursuant to the constitutional steps 

required to form a new government. The moderate Sunni leader, Salim al-Jabouri, 

received votes from all major political blocs and was confirmed overwhelmingly, 

together with two deputies. The next step is confirming a President, which may happen as early as this coming week. Once there is a President, there will be a 15- 

day deadline to charge a Prime Minister nominee to form a government. 

It is not the job of the United States to choose Iraq’s leaders. We neither want 

to, nor have the power to do so. Iraq has a parliamentary system, and the next 

Prime Minister of Iraq must secure a 165-seat majority to form a new government. 

We do have an obligation, however, pursuant to our Strategic Framework Agreement, to ‘‘support and strengthen Iraq’s democracy.’’ Thus, from the moment this 

crisis began, we have actively prodded the process forward, serving as a neutral 

broker, and encouraging all Iraqi leaders to form a new government with leaders 

who reflect a broad national consensus between component communities. 

The administration has been engaged on this issue from the outset, including the 

visit from Secretary Kerry to Baghdad on June 23, and to Erbil on June 24. The 

Secretary and the Vice President have also made regular phone calls to Iraqi leaders and to our regional partners to discuss the emerging situation and to help 

broker compromises where necessary to advance the political process and keep the 

system on track. 

As President Obama has made clear, the Iraqi people deserve a government that 

represents the legitimate interests of all Iraqis. We are cautiously hopeful that 

Iraq’s newly elected leaders are on their way to forming such a government, and 

as they do, they will find a committed partner in the United States. 

(7) Building Regional Coalescence Against ISIL 

At its root, ISIL is not strictly an Iraq problem. It is a regional and international 

problem. The Government of Iraq has requested international assistance, and it has 

stated clearly that it cannot manage this problem on its own, particularly with an 

open border and ISIL safe havens and staging areas in Syria. Accordingly, we have 

been regularly engaged with Iraq’s neighbors and our key partners. The U.N. Security Council, European Union, Arab League, and NATO have strongly condemned 

ISIL’s actions and expressed strong support for the people of Iraq. 

Secretary Kerry’s extensive trip to the region, capped by a quadrilateral meeting 

in Paris with the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and UAE, and then 

a visit to Riyadh for a meeting with King Abdullah, led to a new commonality of 

effort against ISIL. Shortly after Secretary Kerry visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 

pledged $500 million to U.N. relief agencies managing the humanitarian response 

in Iraq. In parallel, we are working with all of our regional partners to close down 

foreign fighter networks that continue to send thousands of terrorists into Syria, 

many of whom make their way to Iraq, with up to 50 per-month becoming suicide 

bombers. 

We are also mindful of Iran’s influence in Iraq and have seen Iran and Russia 

work to fill a security vacuum in the early weeks of the crisis. These activities are 

part of our daily conversations with Iraqi political and military officials, and we are 

confident that most Iraqi leaders want to retain strategic independence, while also 

grappling desperately with the serious threats to the Iraqi capital and the Iraqi 

people. 

(8) Coordinating Humanitarian Relief Efforts and Protecting Religious Minorities 

Finally, ISIL’s advances have exacerbated a humanitarian crisis. The U.N. estimates that more than 1.2 million Iraqis have been displaced in fighting since ISIL 

moved into major cities in Anbar earlier this year. More than 300,000 Iraqis have 

fled to the Iraqi Kurdistan region since the fall of Mosul on June 10. We have 

praised the efforts of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in dealing with the 

situation, and call on the KRG to continue these efforts, as well as the Government 

of Iraq to assist the KRG with additional resources. 

As noted, numerous countries have come forward and donated to the U.N.’s 

appeal for humanitarian assistance. In addition to Saudi Arabia, other contributors 

include Kuwait, Japan, New Zealand, and a number of others. The United States 

to date has contributed $13.8 million in humanitarian assistance in response to this 

crisis, and we are working closely with the U.N. team in Iraq to coordinate the 

response. 

We are also particularly concerned about the state of the Christian community in 

Iraq, including in Mosul where this ancient community is being expelled by ISIL 

on threat of execution. There are now reports of the community’s full scale departure, which saddens us deeply. We have also seen reporting of ISIL blinding and 

11 

killing 13 Yezidi men when they refused to convert to Islam and the kidnapping of 

two Chaldean nuns and three teenage orphans in Mosul. We denounce these brutal 

actions vigorously. These actions by ISIL in Mosul—killing Christians, burning 

churches, killing moderate Sunnis, destroying Islamic tombs—prove to the world the 

barbarity of their objectives and why they must be stopped before their roots 

deepen. 

Over the past 2 weeks alone, I met with the Christian leadership in Iraq, including Chaldean Patriarch Louis Raphael Sako in Baghdad, and Archbishop Bashar 

Warda in Erbil. I am always impressed by the deep faith and resilience of these 

leaders. In Baghdad, Patriarch Sako, shortly before my visit, presided over a mass 

with nearly 500 worshipers from across the capital. Both leaders also expressed 

detailed concerns about the plight of Christians in northern Iraq, and we are working with them and KRG leaders to ensure new Christian enclaves are protected and 

secured. 

Finally, we are deeply troubled by ISIL’s treatment of women as we receive a 

steady stream of reporting regarding women being deprived of their basic rights and 

subjected to gross violations of their freedom. 

III. CURRENT SITUATION

It is now 7 weeks since this crisis began. Mosul remains in the hands of ISIL. 

Its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, gave a sermon on July 4, at one of Mosul’s oldest 

mosques, an act made possible after ISIL executed its moderate Imam and 13 other 

leading clerics in the city. The Iraq-Syria border, hundreds of miles between the 

Kurdish region and Jordan, is controlled on both sides by ISIL. Weapons and fighters now flow freely between Iraq and Syria, resupplying ISIL units fighting on both 

fronts. To say this situation is extremely serious would be an understatement. The 

situation is dire, and it presents a direct threat to all the Iraqi people, the region, 

and to U.S. interests. 

Our immediate response, however, helped provide a barrier against further deterioration, and may offer a new foundation on which to begin fighting back. Since 

the first week of the crisis, the Iraqis—working closely with us—managed to absorb 

the shock, restore some morale, and began to push back, albeit with halting and 

uneven steps. 

On the security front, an immediate focus was restoring control of portions of 

Highway One, which runs parallel to the Tigris River from Baghdad to Mosul. Iraqi 

Forces during the third week of the crisis managed to clear the highway from Baghdad to Samarra, ensuring a steady resupply for the historic shrine city. During the 

fourth week of the crisis, they cleared most of the highway from Samarra to Tikrit, 

although sophisticated IED emplacements, ISIL snipers, and repeated suicide 

attacks have halted progress.3

These operations remain extremely challenging, and we have differed with the 

Iraqis on some of their tactical objectives, such as moving into the city of Tikrit, 

which did not seem militarily essential given the need to focus on supply routes. 

They have, however, gradually allowed the Iraqis to move out of a defensive crouch 

and pressure the ISIL networks north of Baghdad, which had been poised to 

advance further to the south toward the capital. We are also urging the Iraqis to 

immediately focus security efforts to the west, where tribes continue to hold out 

against ISIL near Haditha, blunting what had been a rapid ISIL advance following 

the fall of Al Qaim, on the Syria border, on June 21. 

The tribal situation in western and north-central Iraq remains fluid. Many tribes 

are now actively fighting ISIL—but lack the resources to do so effectively. According 

to our regular contacts in these areas ISIL is able to overmatch any lightly armed 

tribal force. The complete withdrawal of the Iraqi Army from these areas, together 

with the lack of coverage by Iraqi aviation in the border regions, provides ISIL free 

rein to move manpower and heavy weapons to areas where tribes resist. 

The result has been many long-standing enemies of ISIL and its earlier incarnation AQI—such as Albu Mahal tribe in western Anbar; Shammar in western 

Ninewa; Obeidi south of Kirkuk; and Jabbouri in central Salah ad-Din—risk making 

accommodations to ISIL due primarily to the reality of battlefield dynamics. These 

tribes may have issues with the central government, but that alone is not why ISIL 

infiltrated their areas. In Al Qaim, for example, the Albu Mahal resisted ISIL for 

months, before the town ultimately fell after waves of attacks from across the Syrian border weakened Iraqi defense forces. 

A tangible example of this dynamic is the Sunni town of Zowiya, near Tikrit in 

north-central Iraq. The residents there, a mix of Jabbouri and other tribes, resisted 

ISIL and would not accept their presence in the town. The result, as reported in 

the media and confirmed by our own contacts, was an ISIL military assault to kill 

12 

all the residents of the village, starting with an hour-long artillery barrage. ISIL 

fighters then swept into the village, forcing surviving residents to flee, and sending 

the message to surrounding areas that any tribal resistance to their movement 

would be futile—and crushed. 

As a result, absent some military pressure on ISIL, we are unlikely to see a 

broad-based tribal uprising against the movement, as happened between 2007 and 

2008. This tribal uprising was enabled by U.S. military forces, which applied consistent and relentless pressure on then-AQI leadership networks, staging areas, and 

supply routes. While the Iraqis will never match this level of pressure, we must help 

enable their forces to better deny safe haven to ISIL within Iraqi territory. The 

Iraqis must also focus on training and equipping locally grown units to secure local 

areas. As the President said in his June 19 statement on the situation in Iraq, ‘‘the 

best and most effective response to a threat like ISIL will ultimately involve partnerships where local forces, like Iraqis, take the lead.’’ 

The Iraqis recognize this principle, as well, and they have undertaken a reassessment of how their security forces are structured and might be reconstituted. Based 

on our most recent meetings with Iraqi security commanders, this effort will proceed 

in three phases. First, the Iraqis have begun to recall soldiers from dissolved units 

for retraining at two sites north of Baghdad. They report that nearly 10,000 have 

answered this call. Second, they are recruiting from existing units and from new 

volunteers for elite counterterrorism forces, similar to those we train through our 

Office of Security Cooperation. Third, they are looking to dramatically restructure 

their security services, with units recruited locally to secure local areas, while the 

national army provides overwatch support. 

Such a program may take many months to demonstrate results, and years to provide a lasting foundation for sustainable security. It will also be linked to the process of forming a new government, requiring a full national commitment and 

national resource base to ensure effective execution. It remains in our interest, 

together with such a national commitment from a new government, to provide 

appropriate assistance and help this process unfold in a manner that can eliminate 

space for ISIL over the long term. 

IV. EMERGING WAY FORWARD—A FUNCTIONING FEDERALISM

The crisis response described above, together with Iraqi efforts over the past 

month, contain the elements of a longer term strategy to deny space for ISIL. Any 

such strategy, to be effective, must be deliberate, long term, and multifaceted. In 

my discussions with Iraqi leaders from all communities over the past 6 weeks, there 

is an emerging political-military approach that might begin to address the root 

causes of the current crisis. 

First, it is important to focus at the outset on why this matters. The situation 

we confront is not simply about stabilizing Iraq, though that alone is an important 

interest. Rather, it is about ensuring that a movement with ambitions and capabilities greater than the al-Qaeda that we knew over the past decade does not grow 

permanent roots in the heart of the Middle East. Flush with thousands of foreign 

fighters and suicide bombers, ISIL in Syria and Iraq increasingly represents a serious threat to U.S. interests. 

Indeed, ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, seeks to follow in the footsteps of 

Osama bin Laden as the leader of a global jihad, but with further reach—from his 

own terrorist state in the heart of the Middle East. After Osama bin Laden was 

killed in May 2011, Baghdadi eulogized his death and promised ‘‘violent retaliation.’’ 

His audio messages routinely contain thinly veiled threats against the United 

States, and he has promised in a ‘‘message to the Americans’’ that ‘‘we will be in 

direct confrontation.’’ The ISIL suicide bombers—still averaging 30 to 50 per 

month—are increasingly Western passport holders. Days ago, ISIL boasted that an 

Australian and a German blew themselves up in Baghdad, and it is a matter of time 

before these suicide bombers are directed elsewhere. 

To combat this threat, we must proceed along three tracks. First, ISIL must be 

starved of resources, manpower, and foreign fighters. This requires working with 

our partners around the globe and especially with Turkey to seal the Syrian border 

from ISIL recruits. Second, the safe havens and training camps in Syria must be 

isolated and disrupted, preferably by the moderate opposition, enabled by U.S. 

training. Third, Iraqis must be enabled to control their sovereign space and reconstitute their western border with Syria, through capacity development, tribal engagement, and targeted military pressure. 

This third element is essential, and achievable. It will require commitments from 

Iraq and support from the United States. Our perspectives may not always be the 

same, but our efforts must be mutually reinforcing. This is because, while ISIL 

13 

presents a serious counterterrorism challenge to the United States, the Government 

of Iraq also faces a serious counterinsurgency challenge, and the two are inextricably linked. Our combined focus must be on isolating ISIL from the broader population and empowering tribes and other local actors to effectively combat it. This 

will require a combination of political and security measures, based on the principle 

of a ‘‘functioning federalism’’ as defined in the Iraqi Constitution—but never fully 

and effectively implemented. 

In our view, a functioning federalism would empower local populations to secure 

their own areas with the full resources of the state in terms of benefits, salaries, 

and equipment. The national army, under this concept, would focus on securing 

international borders and providing overwatch support where necessary to combat 

hardened terrorist networks. Other critical reforms, such as an amnesty for those 

detained without trial, amendments to the criminal procedure laws, and addressing 

other legitimate grievances from the Iraqi people including those related to deBa’athification, will also be necessary elements to strengthen and empower local 

actors to stand and fight ISIL.4

While these concepts remain embryonic, and ultimately will require a new government to flesh out and develop, the five core principles can be summarized as follows: 

1. Local citizens must be in the lead in securing local areas; 

2. Local citizens defending their communities must be provided state benefits 

and resources (modeled along the lines of a National Guard type force 

structure); 

3. The Iraqi Army will rarely deploy inside cities, but will remain outside 

in an overwatch posture and to carry out federal functions (such as protecting 

borders); 

4. There must be close cooperation between local, regional (KRG), and 

national security services to gradually reduce operational space for ISIL; 

5. The Federal Government must work diligently on a package of reforms that 

can address legitimate grievances and deny any pretext for ISIL activities. 

These five principles can begin to address many of the core grievances in the 

Sunni-majority areas of Iraq, while also, importantly, denying space for ISIL to 

operate and thereby protect the Shia majority and other groups from ISIL attacks. 

Cooperation will be essential. The Government of Iraq from the center cannot 

restore stability in many areas that ISIL now controls, nor can local actors do so— 

without support and national-level resources—given ISIL’s demonstrated capacity. 

Restoring stability and degrading ISIL will require a smart, integrated (centralregional-provincial) approach, led by a new Iraqi Government with an appropriate 

level of U.S. support and assistance. 

Conclusion 

The situation in Iraq remains extremely serious. While our immediate crisis response may have blunted the initial security crisis, ISIL represents a growing threat 

to U.S. interests in the region, local populations, and the homeland. Countering this 

threat will require close coordination between the administration and the Congress, 

and between the U.S. and our regional partners. I look forward to working closely 

with this committee to ensure that we are doing all we can to address this vital 

national security challenge. 

———————— 

Notes 

1This cooperation is one of many examples of why it remains a vital interest for the United 

States to maintain our relationships with the Iraqi Security Forces, whether through our foreign 

military sales programs or training and advisory missions. The Iraqi Security Forces today face 

an existential threat, yet the quality of units varies widely from the highly proficient and professional to the incompetent and corrupt. The Iraqis recognize the serious work they must do to 

further professionalize the force, and they have asked for our assistance. It is in our interest 

to provide such assistance where we assess it can be effective, both to help confront the immediate crisis more effectively, and to build the long-term partnerships that are essential to maintaining strategic influence. 2The AQI attack on Samarra came at precisely the same moment in the political process as 

the 2014 ISIL move into Mosul: 2 months after national elections, after the expiration of fullterm institutions, and before the selection of new leadership. The pace of signature AQI (now 

ISIL) attacks—measured by suicide and vehicle bombs—were also nearly identical in the 

months before the 2006 and 2010 elections, running at nearly 80 per month. In the 30 days 

prior to the April 2014 elections, ISIL launched over 50 suicide attacks inside Iraq with nearly 

all of the suicide bombers, according to our assessments and ISIL’s own statements, foreign 

fighters who enter Iraq from Syria. 3During this period of crisis, Iraqi forces have increasingly relied on volunteers from southern 

Iraq to hold stretches of the highway cleared by security forces. Many of these volunteers have 

affiliations with Shia militia groups, and in the earliest weeks of the crisis, they operated in 

14 

the open for the first time in years. Since then, Grand Ayatollah Sistani has stated clearly that 

any volunteers should only join established state security services, and emphasized that militias 

or individual gunmen should not be accepted on the streets. The United States will continue 

to encourage Iraqi leaders to establish legal and practical mechanisms to incorporate volunteers, 

including tribal fighters, into the state security structures, where they can be trained to protect 

the population consistent with the rule of law. 4There are three fighting groups in the Sunni areas of Iraq. To be effective, any political-military initiative must focus on each of them. First, and most prominently, is ISIL. While there 

is no political solution to ISIL, political initiatives can help isolate ISIL from other associated 

groups. The second group is Jaysh al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandi (JRTN). JRTN is a militant wing 

of the former Ba’ath Party, now led by Saddam’s former Vice President, Izzat al-Douri. While 

the most militant core of JRTN will remain nonresponsive to political initiatives, such initiatives 

can help minimize that core and degrade the network. The third group includes national insurgent movements, such as the Islamic Army, with some associated tribes. These groups mostly 

want local security control, and rarely launch offensive operations outside of their local areas. 

For them, there is a political solution, and through some of the reforms discussed above, these 

groups can probably be harnessed to protect local areas from ISIL infiltration over time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Slotkin. 

STATEMENT OF ELISSA SLOTKIN, PERFORMING THE DUTIES 

OF THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 

Corker, and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate 

the opportunity to discuss the administration’s response to the current security situation. My remarks will focus on what the Department of Defense is particularly doing. 

I just want to foot-stomp some of the things that Brett just said. 

The United States does have a vital national security interest in 

ensuring that Iraq or any other country does not become a safe 

haven for terrorists who could threaten the United States homeland, our United States citizens, or our interests abroad. 

As the President has said, ISIL’s advance across Iraqi territory 

in recent weeks, and particularly its ability to establish safe haven 

in the region, poses a threat to United States interests and the 

Middle East. I do not restrict my views and my comments today 

just to Iraq, the geographic borders of Iraq. I do believe we have 

a real regional problem on our hands. 

As Brett has said, the situation on the ground is complex and 

fluid. We are therefore taking a responsible, deliberate, and flexible 

approach to the crisis. But I do want to be clear: There is no exclusively military solution to the threat posed by ISIL. The Iraqis 

must do the heavy lifting. In the meantime, the Department of Defense remains postured should the President decide to use military 

force as part of a broader strategy. 

Our immediate goals, as announced on June 19, are to: one, protect the people and property, our people and property in Iraq; two, 

to gain a better understanding of how we might train, advise, and 

support the Iraqi Security Forces should we decide to do that; and 

number three, to expand our understanding, particularly via intelligence, of ISIL. All three are critical to any future U.S. strategy 

vis-a-vis Iraq. 

To that end, we have done four things in the Department of Defense. We have added forces to protect our people. The safety of our 

citizens obviously is our highest priority. The Department has met 

the requests of the Department of State. As described in the 

war powers notification we have transmitted, the Department of 

15 

Defense has sent what is called a Fleet Antiterrorism Security 

Team, what we call a FAST Team, a crisis response element, and 

additional military assets and personnel to reinforce security both 

at our diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and at the Baghdad International Airport. 

The Secretary of Defense has also ordered the amphibious transport ship USS Mesa Verde into the Arabian Gulf. Its presence in 

the gulf is added to other naval ships, including the U.S. aircraft 

carrier USS George H.W. Bush, and provides the President additional options to protect American citizens and interests in Iraq 

should he choose to use them. 

Number two, we have vastly increased our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, ISR, assets. At the request of the Government of Iraq, we have surged ISR over Iraq since the fall of 

Mosul and increased our information-sharing activities. These ISR 

sorties, which are up to 50-plus per day, give us a much better understanding of ISIL operations and disposition and allow us to help 

the ISF counter ISIL. We are now capable of around-the-clock coverage of Iraq and have been focusing our efforts on ISIL-controlled 

territory as well as Baghdad. We have also sent in U.S. assessment 

teams and stood up joint operations centers. 

On June 19 the President announced these additional measures, 

including the deployment of just about 300 additional U.S. military 

advisers to evaluate how we might best train, advise, and support 

the ISF. These small teams of Special Forces are working to evaluate the ISF in and around Baghdad in particular. The teams are 

armed for self-defense, but they do not have an offensive mission. 

And then the two joint operations centers, one in Baghdad, one in 

Erbil in northern Iraq. They have both been established to help 

support our efforts on the ground. 

A quick word about the assessments. I know that is of interest. 

Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey received the draft assessment of the ISF last week from Central Command. Department 

leaders are undertaking a deliberate and rigorous review of the assessment, which will inform recommendations to the President. 

Meanwhile, additional assessment work continues. As you heard, 

General Austin is on the ground today with respect to the developing situation on the ground. 

In closing, I just want to reiterate that we have a vital security 

interest in ensuring that Iraq or any other country not become a 

safe haven for terrorists. We do need a regional approach, and I 

look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Slotkin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELISSA SLOTKIN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the administration’s response 

to the current security situation in Iraq. My remarks today will focus on two areas: 

(1) An overview of our national security interests in Iraq, and (2) a review of President Obama’s current policy toward Iraq. 

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

The U.S. has a vital national interest in ensuring that Iraq, or any other country, 

does not become a destabilized safe haven for terrorists who could threaten our 

homeland or U.S. interests and citizens abroad. As the President has said, ISIL’s 

advance across Iraqi territory in recent weeks, and particularly its ability to 

16 

continue to establish a safe haven in the region, poses a threat to both U.S. interests and the Middle East. In considering the ISIL threat, we don’t restrict our view 

of the threat to specific geographic boundaries. 

CURRENT U.S. EFFORTS IN IRAQ

Despite this complex and fluid situation, we are taking a responsible, deliberate, 

and flexible approach to this crisis. I want to be clear that there is no exclusively 

military solution to the threats posed by ISIL in Iraq. However, DOD remains postured should the President decide to use military force as part of a broader strategy. 

Our immediate goals, as announced on June 19, are to (1) protect our people and 

property in Iraq; (2) gain a better understanding of how we might best train, advise, 

and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capabilities should we decide to support 

the ISF going forward; and (3) expand our understanding—particularly via intelligence—of ISIL. All three are critical to any future U.S. strategy vis-a-vis Iraq. To 

that end we have done the following four things. 

Added Forces to Protect our People 

First, we have added forces to protect U.S. personnel in Iraq. The safety of U.S. 

citizens and personnel in Baghdad and throughout Iraq is our highest priority. The 

Department of Defense is meeting all requests from the Department of State for 

security support to U.S. Embassy Baghdad. As described in the War Powers notifications we transmitted to Congress on June 16 and 26, DOD has sent a Fleet 

Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST), a Crisis Response Element (CRE), and additional military assets and personnel to reinforce security at our diplomatic facilities 

in Baghdad and the Baghdad International Airport. 

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also ordered the amphibious transport ship 

USS Mesa Verde into the Arabian Gulf. Its presence in the gulf adds to that of other 

U.S. naval ships—including the aircraft carrier USS George HW Bush—and provides the President additional options to protect American citizens and interests in 

Iraq, should he choose to use them. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

Second, as part of this effort, we have surged intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in Iraq. At the request of the Government of Iraq, we 

surged ISR over Iraq after the fall of Mosul and also increased information-sharing 

initiatives. These ISR sorties provide us a better understanding of ISIL operations 

and disposition and allow us to help the ISF counter ISIL. We are now capable of 

around-the-clock coverage over Iraq and have been focusing our efforts on ISILcontrolled territory as well as Baghdad. 

U.S. Assessment Teams and Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) 

Third, we continue to assess the capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). 

On June 19, the President announced additional measures—including the deployment of up to 300 additional U.S. military advisors to evaluate how we might best 

train, advise, and support the ISF. These small teams of special forces are working 

to evaluate the Iraqi Security Forces in and around Baghdad. They are armed for 

self-defense—but do not have an offensive mission. 

And fourth, following the President’s direction, two Joint Operation Centers 

(JOCs), one in Baghdad and one in northern Iraq, have been established to help 

support our efforts on the ground. 

The initial assessment mission is not unlike many others that DOD performs 

around the world. We currently maintain special operators in more than 70 countries, in Africa, the Americas, and Asia. Furthermore, since the U.S. troop 

drawdown in December 2011, a small presence of military personnel has been located at the Embassy in Baghdad, consistent with the 2008 Strategic Framework 

Agreement. 

Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey received the draft assessment of the ISF 

last week from Central Command. Department leaders are undertaking a deliberate 

and rigorous review of the assessment, which will inform recommendations to the 

President. Meanwhile, additional assessment work continues with respect to the 

developing situation on the ground. 

In closing, I want to reiterate that there is no exclusively military solution to the 

threats posed by ISIL. However, we do have a vital security interest in ensuring 

that Iraq, nor any other country, becomes a safe haven for terrorists who could 

threaten our homeland or U.S. interests and citizens abroad. 

17 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Yesterday, during yesterday’s hearing with the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee, you both argued that the policy of the United 

States should be for a unified Iraq with a strong Baghdad-based 

Federal Government. But many look and say that what is happening on the ground is accelerating toward a breakup of Iraq because too many of Iraq’s communities no longer trust the Maliki 

government, and the question is whether there is anything we can 

do to prevent it. 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we testified 

clearly and in my written statement, as well, that the model is a 

functioning federalism under the Iraqi Constitution. So nobody is 

trying to fit a square peg into a round hole that simply will not 

work. There is a model within the constitution for this functioning 

federalism, in which you recognize a very substantial devolution of 

authorities, the principles of local security control. That is something that I found in my last 7 weeks: there is an emerging consensus around. 

Through the process of forming a new government, I think the 

details will be fleshed out. I know General Austin is discussing 

some of these concepts as we speak, particularly when it comes to 

restructuring the security forces. 

So I do not think anyone is trying to create a strong central government that is going to retain control all over the country. In fact, 

I think everybody recognizes now that from the center out you are 

not going to be able to retain control in all parts of the country, 

but also, most importantly, locals and tribes on their own will not 

be able to deny space for ISIL, because of ISIL’s very significant 

military capability. So you need a principle of local security control, 

but with a national resource base, and that is all within the federalist model of the constitution. 

The CHAIRMAN. The question is, though, can you even get to a 

federalist model the way things are evolving in Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. I think you can, because of—— 

The CHAIRMAN. What needs to happen? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, first we have to get a new government 

formed, and that is very important because the new government 

will obviously be the body that directs where the resources go. 

The CHAIRMAN. What do we envision the timeframe of that 

being? It is past due, right? 

Mr. MCGURK. Under the constitutional framework and the time 

lines, as soon as there is a new President, which just happened, 

there is now a 15-day timeline to charge a Prime Minister to form 

a government. So, we will know within 15 days the Prime Minister 

nominee. Whoever that is, he then has 30 days to name a Cabinet 

and present the Cabinet to Parliament for a vote. 

Those timelines, however, can be substantially accelerated. For 

example, under the constitution, once there is a Speaker, there are 

30 days to name a President. They did that in, I think, about 8 

days. We are working very hard to accelerate those timelines. 

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if it ends up being Prime Minister Maliki, 

how do you think that you keep this government together, this nation together? 

18 

Mr. MCGURK. As I mentioned in my statement, as the President 

has said, it is not our job to pick the leaders, but the leaders do 

have to have a very inclusive agenda and pull the country together. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am not asking you to pick, nor do I suggest we 

should. The question is that if that is the result by their own choice 

it seems to me that it is very difficult, based upon what has happened so far, based upon Sunni responses to ISIS, at least in the 

context of their grievances with the present national government, 

that—is not the likely outcome that we may see a divided Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. The Prime Minister will be chosen from the Shia 

political blocs, and Grand Ayatollah Sistani, interestingly, over the 

last month has been very active, and he has laid down some guideposts for how to form the next government: first, it has to correct 

the mistakes of the past, meaning it cannot look anything like the 

current government; second, you need new leaders that reflect a 

national consensus. We have had that now with the Speaker and 

the President, and so the Prime Minister will also have to reflect 

that emerging national consensus. It remains to be seen whether 

the existing Prime Minister could build such a consensus, but that 

remains very much in question. 

The CHAIRMAN. You commented in the House hearing yesterday 

that options being developed for the President are more concrete 

and specific as a result of the U.S. military advisers on the ground 

and increased intelligence collection. What guidance have you received in terms of timing for these decisions and how will the political and security conditions on the ground influence the President’s 

decisions? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Well, as I said, the assessments came in last week. 

They are dense, they are significant. So we are still working 

through those. After we have done that, the Secretary and the 

Chairman will make informed recommendations to the President. 

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to be able to tell us anything more 

than I read in the New York Times, which is more than I knew 

before you came here? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I understand. I would caution against using a 

leaked half-report in the New York Times as your basis for understanding it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the absence of having information leads me 

to only publicly reported resources. So when do you intend to come 

to us, in whatever setting, to advise the Congress? You know, this 

committee has jurisdiction over arms sales, and my reticence to 

arms sales to Iraq has in some respects been proven true when, in 

fact, we have had much of our equipment abandoned and now in 

the hands of ISIS. 

So unless you are going to give us a sense of where the security 

forces are at moving forward, this Chair is not going to be willing 

to approve more arms sales so they can be abandoned to go to the 

hands of those who we are seriously concerned about in terms of 

our own national security interests. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I understand and our intent is to come and 

brief Congress at the time when we have piled through it 

ourselves. We have kept the Congress very informed. I know I 

have been up at least twice a week for our committees. We are 

19 

committed to remaining in close contact with you and there is no 

attempt to hide it from you. 

Mr. MCGURK. I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that I think we 

are in a race against time, there is no question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is my point. 

Mr. MCGURK. And one thing that we have found, first of all, by 

surging Special Forces teams, by surging intelligence assets, as you 

mentioned, we do know an awful lot more than we knew even 6 

weeks ago. 

Security forces around Baghdad and particularly north of Baghdad—I described this in some of my written testimony—are trying 

to do some things to fight back. They have taken nearly a thousand 

casualties in the last month. These units, particularly units that 

we have relationships with, are fighting, they are capable. And 

those are the types of units that we are looking at ways to further 

assist. 

But again, this is all being discussed by the national security 

team. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have influences here. My understanding is Assad has been part of bombing ISIS in Iraq. Of course, 

you have Iran here. How is that going to complicate or instruct 

what you might be willing to do? 

Mr. MCGURK. It is part of the overall assessment, and I can only 

speak from my own firsthand experience in the initial days of this 

crisis as ISIL, it looked like, was moving down the Tigris Valley; 

our information was very sketchy, there was a bit of a panic 

throughout the Iraqi Security Forces, and we had to bolster them 

and try to create a circuit breaker so that that advance halted. 

There was a security vacuum, that there is no question that our 

strategic competitors sought to step in and fill. Iraq lacks any capacity to do deep strikes in their border regions. Countries show up 

at their door and say, hey, we can help you with that. The Iraqis 

have pushed back in some regards, but in some respects they have 

accepted support. 

The CHAIRMAN. They have accepted Assad bombing, have they 

not? 

Mr. MCGURK. No, no. We have no indication that there is any 

coordination with the Assad regime when it comes to security cooperation. But they are very concerned about the collapse of their 

border, particularly the collapse of Al-Qaim, which was a strategic 

border town which fell about 3 weeks ago. 

The CHAIRMAN. They have accepted Iranian support? 

Mr. MCGURK. They have accepted low-level Iranian support; 

there is no question, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just along those lines, how do you assess U.S. influence right 

now? I know there are a number of other regional interests that 

are playing a role. I know that those of us who have visited recently know that before this all occurred U.S. influence was at an 

all-time low and really almost not present. I know that has 

changed some, but where would you assess our influence to be in 

Iraq right now? 

20 

Mr. MCGURK. Senator, since this crisis, particularly in Mosul, we 

have been embraced, particularly our military personnel who have 

come in. I was at the joint operations center, which we have set 

up now. I was there on Thursday speaking with all of our military 

personnel there, all of whom have years of experience in relationships in Iraq. We have been embraced by their military, particularly the Special Forces assessment team. 

The Iraqis have given us full access to their air space for our intelligence flights we want to do. They have given us the legal requirements we need to be there. So we have been embraced, and 

I think there is an opportunity because they certainly want our assistance. They want our equipment, they want our training. Our 

FMS package is about $15 billion total. They have paid about $11 

billion of that. They put $193 million in the Federal Reserve into 

that account just last week. 

So the Iraqis are very eager, under our strategic framework 

agreement, for U.S. assistance to be the backbone of their response. 

But, of course, there are things that they need to do as well and 

that is the conversation we are having with them. 

Senator CORKER. Are there competing interests? I mean, as you 

are deepening the relationship again and helping in the way that 

we are, are there conflicts or competing interests that you are dealing with there on the ground? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes, and in fact some of the tactics that the Iraqis 

pursue we totally do not agree with. In fact, I think by moving in 

aggressively as we have over the last 6 weeks, we will increasingly 

increase our influence over some of those tactics. 

We have advised the Iraqis, for example, not go to into urban 

areas—lessons that we learned. The Iraqis made a decision to go 

into Tikrit. We did not really support that decision. We have advised the Iraqis since January not to go into Fallujah. They have 

not gone into Fallujah. But there is a military conversation, which 

is a little bit outside of my expertise and that is why General Austin is on the ground as we speak, talking to their new military 

commanders. 

Just a point on our influence: I have had a number of conversations with the Prime Minister on down since January and have 

said: Your generals, Mr. Prime Minister, are not telling you the 

truth about the situation. That clearly was true, particularly in 

Mosul. Those commanders are now gone and they have appointed 

a series of new commanders, who we happen to work very closely 

with, and we hope that that type of relationship can continue. 

Senator CORKER. I think that kind of involvement that we had 

and then we lost, where we were able to have the shuttle diplomacy and have the kind of activity that is now taking place, has 

helped create the situation that is on the ground, no doubt. On the 

other hand, Prime Minister Maliki has not been the kind of Prime 

Minister to create any kind of sense that a central government can 

resolve the ethnic and civil issues that exist there. 

Do you really believe, bottom of your heart, there is somebody in 

Iraq of the Shia sect that can do that as Prime Minister if we move 

through this process? 

Mr. MCGURK. Senator, we have had extreme frustrations with 

the Iraqi Government, particularly over the last year, and that is 

21 

one reason we have focused most decisively on making sure elections happen, they happen on time, and they were credible. And 

they did happen. They happened on April 30. They have created a 

new Parliament and through that Parliament new leaders will 

emerge. 

There are a handful of very capable leaders who may emerge as 

the next Prime Minister of Iraq, but we are going to have to see. 

This will unfold fairly rapidly over the coming days. 

Senator CORKER. Ms. Slotkin, I know there was a little discussion between you and the chairman relative to the assessment that 

is taking place. Can you just broadly tell us of anything that you 

have learned over the last 3 weeks that you did not know prior to 

the assessment? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. I think the thing when we put the assessors 

on the ground that was the biggest open question, given the march 

ISIL had had across and into Mosul and down, was what was the 

status of Baghdad? Would the ISF be able to successfully defend 

Baghdad? That was our critical first question, especially given the 

size of our mission there. 

I think one of the early things that we saw as we got on the 

ground was that there was a stiffening of the Iraqi Security Forces 

in and around Baghdad to protect the capital, which we thought 

was critically important. So we certainly were not aware until we 

got on the ground. 

I do think some of the early indications are, frankly, mixed. 

There are some very capable units that have high morale and that 

are willing and capable of fighting, and there are other units where 

morale is lower, where there may not be as much capability and 

willingness to actually fight. It is sorting out the details of that 

that we are working on right now. 

Senator CORKER. If you were to surmise after you do this assessment, what do you think the range of options will be that will be 

presented to the President relative to our activities militarily in 

Iraq? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think, without crowding any decision space, all 

the military options we could possibly consider have to fit into a 

much wider regional strategy that is not a lead by the military. 

Senator CORKER. Tell me what that means? I know you have 

said that in your opening comments. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. 

Senator CORKER. I think most people in this committee have 

been concerned. We had very, very strong support for efforts in 

Syria. Are you referring to Syria and Iraq? Is that basically the 

region? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. It is Syria and Iraq, given ISIL’s march. But then 

in particular it is making sure that we do not see a further spread. 

I mean, I know everyone was concerned—— 

Senator CORKER. Jordan. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Exactly. Jordan has been particularly a focus for 

us, given the border area right there with Iraq. But this is part of 

the administration’s attempt to try and create this counterterrorism partnership fund to shore up particularly the neighbors of 

Iraq and Syria, to make sure that they have a flexible way to respond to the threats, to make sure we do not see that spread, and 

22 

then to ask for funding for training the vetted Syrian moderate opposition so we have some sort of attempt from the inside of Syria 

to secure up those areas as well. 

So it is impossible to just look at the ISIL threat at Iraq only because, as I said yesterday, it is kind of like air in a balloon; you 

squeeze on one end, it just goes somewhere else. We need a comprehensive approach outside in and inside out. 

Senator CORKER. It is interesting you say that. I think people on 

this committee have been saying for like a year and a half that 

when the time was right, when we could have taken steps in Syria 

that could have prevented this, they were not taken. So now it is 

interesting that the administration is looking at a regional approach. Is that solely because now there is this counterterrorism 

issue, that the situation has gotten so bad—it did not have to, but 

it has gotten so bad now that it is a threat to the homeland and 

that is the reason you are looking at a regional approach? 

What do you think it is that has taken so long, with so many 

people crying out on both sides of the aisle to, please do something 

relative to the moderate opposition in Syria, knowing that there is 

no border there, knowing that it was destabilizing Iraq? Is it this 

counterterrorism issue solely that has now caused the administration to look at it regionally? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the administration has been looking at this 

regionally for a while. 

Senator CORKER. But it has been looking at it. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Well, I actually do not think that is fair. I think 

that we have invested heavily in some serious border security work 

with Jordan. We have done programs with Lebanon, we have done 

programs with Turkey. This is not beginning from anew here. 

But I do think that the thing that surprised us, frankly, was the 

collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces in and around Mosul and four 

divisions essentially melting away. If you would have asked me 

that a year ago, I would have not assessed that. I think that the 

spread of ISIL, given the number of foreign passport holders that 

we know have traveled back and forth to Syria, Western passport 

holders, it does focus the mind. 

Senator CORKER. If I could just ask one last question, or make 

a statement. We had a really, really strong vote here and a great 

debate on supporting the moderate opposition, and I was glad to 

get the call that the White House is now looking at I guess $500 

million in actual Defense Department support for these moderates. 

I have to say—and the first time I have said it out loud—I have 

now gotten to the point where I question—I hate to say it—how effective that is going to be at this point. I think there was a point 

in time when it could have been really effective. I now question 

whether now at this point, with all that has happened, knowing 

that ISIS has taken such a large part of the territory in Syria, I 

now question the effectiveness. And yet the administration really 

feels like that small amount at this late date still has the possibility to do real good in Syria. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I think you cannot fight something with nothing. So I think that it is important to start. 

Senator CORKER. Well, we have been doing that for a long time. 

So it is interesting. So I agree with you and I think everybody here 

23 

does. I guess the question is, can you fight something with almost 

nothing at this point, when it has festered into this type of 

situation? 

The CHAIRMAN. And then we will have to move to Senator Boxer. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I do think it is important. We have put together 

a program that is scaleable. You can start small and move up significantly in the numbers and scale of the program, and we think 

it is critical that we start. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

I look at things just a little bit differently than a lot of folks here. 

I think the Iraqis had a chance of a lifetime and America’s blood 

and treasure gave them that chance of a lifetime, a chance at 

unity, a chance at peace, and with their natural resources a chance 

at a growing economy. And clearly those of us, a minority of 23, 

who predicted this if we went to war, we did not prevail and that 

is life. You do not prevail, so you move on. 

And then later when then-Senator Biden, who was the chairman 

of this committee, proposed more autonomy for the Sunnis and for 

the Kurds—and by the way—more than 70 Senators voted for that. 

The then-Bush administration laughed at it, kind of like people 

laugh right now. That is a lot of laughing. And that was turned 

away. 

So the situation in Iraq I think is dire now, and I am not about 

to reinvest more lives and treasure. The United States has sacrificed too much. The war cost us $2 trillion. People predicted it 

would be over in weeks, months. More than 4,400 Americans were 

killed, their families never the same, 32,000 wounded during the 

course of the war. And we all know, and I praise Senators Sanders 

and McCain for battling to get help for those who are suffering 

from physical and mental injuries. 

So I am pleased that President Obama said unequivocally ‘‘American Forces will not be returning to combat in Iraq,’’ and I want 

to record to show that I will never vote to send more combat forces 

in. You know, you get so many chances in a lifetime. 

I want to ask you about the Kurds, both of you. I do not know 

which one. Either of you could answer. The Kurds in northern Iraq 

have long been a strong ally of the United States, and they have 

played an important role in countering the rapid advance of ISIS. 

When I went to Iraq a very long time ago, the bullets were flying. 

The Kurds, I found them to get what this was all about. 

There is so much prejudice against the Kurds. The Kurdish militia offered to support Iraqi Security Forces when ISIS began its 

offensive in Mosul. Kurdish forces have kept much of northern 

Iraq out of terrorist hands. Iraqi Kurdistan has become a destination for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing from ISIS-controlled territory. 

I have to say, as I watch Mr. Maliki, I do not think he appreciates it. As the Iraqis continue to work to determine their future, 

I am asking you, what role can the Kurds continue to play, and 

should the United States acknowledge that the Kurds should have 

a significant amount of autonomy in a future Iraq? I think they 

have earned it, and I wondered what the administration’s position 

is vis-a-vis the Kurds and more autonomy for the Kurds. 

24 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Senator. We are in a very active conversation with all the Kurdish leaders about their future. There are 

some realities that they are grappling with, the geostrategic realities and geographic realities, also their economic realities. They 

need about $14 billion to sustain themselves operationally. Their 

share of the budget this year, which is pending in Baghdad, is 

about $17 billion. We think there is a deal there within the constitutional framework that is in the best interests of the Kurds and 

also our interests both in northern Iraq and Iraq as a whole. 

However, since this crisis began—and we recognize we are dealing with new realities on the ground that we have to recognize and 

deal with. We have established a joint operations center in Erbil 

to work with the Kurdish forces and with the Peshmerga to make 

sure, because they have about 1,000 kilometers now with ISIS on 

a good chunk of their border and they are going to need some help. 

But that will work most effectively if it is done in cooperation 

and coordination with Baghdad, of course with us providing a mediating role where necessary. So we are in a very active conversation with them. They have a good deal of autonomy now and I am 

sure that they will ask for more through the government formation 

process, and that will all be done under the constitution. 

President Barzani has been on the phone a number of times with 

our Vice President Biden to talk about these issues. Barzani has 

made it clear to us he wants to act through the constitutional 

framework for resolving some of the disputed boundaries in which 

the Peshmerga have moved by necessity over the last 6 weeks. 

So the short answer to your question, we are in a very active conversation with the Kurds about this, and I am happy to follow up 

with you as it unfolds over the coming months. 

Senator BOXER. And the United States will support more autonomy for the Kurds then, I assume? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, through the government formation process 

there will be an active debate. I will just say we very much support 

the Kurds on particular critical issues. Baghdad about 4 or 5 

months ago cut funding for salaries of workers in the Kurdish region. We have made very clear that is completely, totally, unacceptable and that has to be reversed. 

The Kurds have also done some things in some cases in which 

we have said that might exacerbate tensions in a way that would 

not be particularly constructive. That is why we are in a very active conversation. But, we support autonomy within the constitutional framework, certainly. 

Senator BOXER. I am just saying, I do not know what the future 

is of that constitutional framework, but we all hope it works. 

The last question is: Are you confident we have adequate personnel on the ground to truly protect our Embassy and the Americans in Baghdad? 

Mr. MCGURK. Senator, yes. We have moved in substantial assets 

both to the airport and also into the Embassy. I was just there as 

late as Thursday and we are confident that our defensive perimeters and everything, that our people will be safe. Our Assistant 

Secretary for Diplomatic Security just visited Baghdad last week 

to do his own assessment and we have also had teams on the 

ground from CENTCOM. This is an ongoing assessment. And our 

25 

intelligence assets have the entire, everything, all around the 

perimeter of the city of Baghdad, the airport, and our Embassy 

very well covered. So we are confident. 

Senator BOXER. Can you tell us how many people we have at the 

Embassy, or is that something that you do not want to discuss in 

open session? 

Mr. MCGURK. We have a total in Baghdad of about 2,500 now. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. McGurk, let us quickly go back to the Kurds. I have been 

made aware of the fact that the Baghdad Government is basically 

in arrears on the Kurds’ budget by about $6 billion. Is that pretty 

accurate? 

Mr. MCGURK. There are a lot of ways to do the accounting and 

the math. Baghdad claims the Kurds owe them money, the Kurds 

claim that Baghdad owes them money, and in that space is where 

a deal lies. I think that is going to be part of the conversation in 

forming a new government. 

Senator JOHNSON. If it is true that Baghdad owes them as much 

as $6 billion, would the United States support the Kurds’ ability to 

export oil and obtain that revenue so they can keep themselves 

going? 

Mr. MCGURK. We want to get as much oil onto international 

markets as possible from all parts of Iraq, and that is something 

that we very strongly support. We worked very hard over the last 

6 months to get a deal on the table by which the Kurds would have 

exported as much oil as they possibly could through some of the existing arrangements, with the revenue-sharing allocations that 

exist. And that deal almost succeeded, but it ran up against the 

election timeframe, and once you had an election it was very difficult to close the deal. 

But I think we will be able to get that back on the table. But 

we want as much oil from Iraq north to south onto international 

markets as soon as possible. 

Senator JOHNSON. Now, I appreciate the fact that we are going 

through assessments and we are studying the problem. You have 

to recognize reality before you really develop a strategy. But, I really do want to just compare where we are now versus where we 

were prior to the 2007 surge. 

Mr. McGurk, you have been involved in this for quite some time. 

What was the level of the Iraqi Forces back in 2007? I really want 

some relatively quick answers here because I want to get some 

data points. 

Mr. MCGURK. How do you measure the level? 

Senator JOHNSON. How many people were in the Iraqi Security 

Forces back in 2007? 

Mr. MCGURK. I do not have the figure, but it was not a highly 

effective force in early 2007. 

Senator JOHNSON. America, we had about 132,000 at the start of 

the surge and we surged to about 168,000, correct? 

Mr. MCGURK. That is right. 

26 

Senator JOHNSON. What were we up against in terms of enemy 

fighters back in 2007? 

Mr. MCGURK. We assess that the main enemy then was al-Qaeda 

in Iraq, which is ISIL. It is the same organization. 

Senator JOHNSON. And about how many people were we up 

against? 

Mr. MCGURK. These figures are always very difficult. 

Senator JOHNSON. I understand. 

Mr. MCGURK. We had assessments of 6 to 8,000 at the time, but 

probably more. 

Senator JOHNSON. So what do we think current ISIL forces are? 

Mr. MCGURK. Currently, the assessments we have seen—but 

again they are very difficult to measure—15,000 or so, in Iraq far 

less. 

Senator JOHNSON. But basically double of what we had in 2007? 

Mr. MCGURK. ISIL today, according to our assessments, is far 

more capable in manpower resources and fighting effectiveness 

than the AQI that we fought, yes. 

Senator JOHNSON. That is my point. U.S. troop levels right now 

in Iraq are how many? 

Mr. MCGURK. Total now about—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. We have inserted 775 or so and we have about 100 

that were associated with our Office of Security Cooperation. 

Senator JOHNSON. So less than a thousand? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Less than a thousand. 

Senator JOHNSON. Less than a thousand now. Back in 2007, prior 

to a pretty difficult battle, in terms of the surge, we had 168,000 

at the height of that. And ISIL now is double the size that it was 

back in 2007 and they have some of our weapons; their capabilities 

are much higher. 

Mr. MCGURK. That is right. 

Senator JOHNSON. What was the size of the Iraqi military force 

in June 2014, prior to ISIL’s move into Iraq? What was our estimate there? 

Mr. MCGURK. I do not have that figure, but I can get it for you. 

Senator JOHNSON. Are we talking hundreds of thousands? 

Mr. MCGURK. Hundreds of thousands, but we try to look at capable and effective forces, and one of the purposes of the assessment 

was to determine which units are effective, which are ineffective. 

There are some units, quite frankly, that are totally ineffective and 

there are some units that are highly capable and effective. 

Senator JOHNSON. Ms. Slotkin, do you have that information? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think it is just shy of 200,000. 

Senator JOHNSON. Two hundred thousand prior to the intrusion, 

the invasion? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I believe so. 

Senator JOHNSON. How many now do you think there are? You 

said that they lost four divisions. How many would that represent 

that have just melted into the background? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Again, I do not have the exact number, but it is 

probably closer to 160-ish. 

Senator JOHNSON. Do you have any sense of what percentage of 

that force would have any effectiveness in terms of fighting? 

27 

Mr. MCGURK. In terms of the dissolved units, it was about 

30,000. The Iraqis have since recalled about 10,000 and, according 

to our OSCI assessments, there are about 10,000 who have come 

back and are going through about a 3-week training course now. 

Senator JOHNSON. The effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces 

versus U.S. fighting forces? Not even comparable, right? 

Mr. MCGURK. You cannot even compare them, no. 

Senator JOHNSON. We have got a real problem on our hands. 

We talked a little bit about the threat to our homeland that ISIL 

in Syria and Iraq represent. Can you describe what the threat to 

the homeland is because of the situation? Can you make the American people aware of why this matters? 

Mr. MCGURK. What really concerns our counterterrorism experts 

and also concerns us is this rise in very dedicated global jihadist 

fighters coming from all over the world, many with Western passports. In Baghdad, just this week there was a suicide bomber. 

There was a German, there was an Australian. ISIL is able to funnel about 30 to 50 suicide bombers a month into Iraq. These are, 

we assess, almost all foreign fighters. 

It would be very easy for ISIL to decide to funnel that cadre of 

dedicated suicide bombers, global jihadis, into other capitals 

around the region, or Europe or, worse, here. So that is a very significant, significant concern. They have training bases in Syria and 

they are recruiting on social media and the Internet, and it is 

something that we have never seen before. 

Senator JOHNSON. A year ago the President declared the war on 

terror was over. Do you believe the war on terror is over? 

Mr. MCGURK. I think we have a very significant fight on our 

hands with ISIL, which we have to manage. 

Senator JOHNSON. I have no further questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank both of you for your appearance here today and for 

your service to our country. I certainly agree that the United 

States has a vital interest in containing ISIS’ growth and its threat 

to our homeland and to our allies. I also agree that we have a direct interest in dealing with a Government in Iraq that represents 

all the ethnic communities fairly with an effective government that 

gives confidence to moderates that their voices can be heard within 

the Iraqi Government. 

But it was interesting. I was listening to Senator Johnson go 

through some of the comparisons on the strength of the terrorist 

networks. He was drawing a comparison over the last 7 years. But 

if you go back to before the U.S. troop invasion in 2001, at least 

my understanding was there was virtually no al-Qaeda, no terrorist 

network that was a direct threat to our homeland, in Iraq. So it 

does raise a lot of the questions that Senator Boxer raised initially, 

that our use of military force back in 2001 was ill-advised. 

We do not want to repeat the mistakes that we have made in the 

past. That is the reason I bring it up. But I started with the fact 

that we have a vital interest in dealing with the current circumstances that are on the ground in Iraq. 

I know this hearing is focused on Iraq, but I want to move a little 

bit to Syria and what impact ISIS is having on the opposition 

28 

effectiveness in Syria and whether we are finding that any of the 

support for the opposition is strengthening ISIS’ capacity within 

Iraq. The network between the moderate Gulf States and the opposition in Syria, are we confident that that equipment is not finding 

its way to the terrorist networks now operating in Iraq? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Obviously, the connection between ISIL—between 

the threat in Iraq and Syria is pretty significant. I do not personally know of any reports of opposition support then being funneled 

to ISIL. I think they are in a pretty bitter fight against both the 

regime and the terrorists, who have taken over territory particularly in eastern and northern Syria. So I do not have any reports 

of that equipment and that support that has been provided getting 

into their hands, but it is always a risk. 

Senator CARDIN. What precautions have we taken with moderate 

Arab States and with our own support for the opposition in Syria 

to make sure that we are not finding American support or moderate Arab State support ending up encouraging terrorist activities 

now moving into Iraq? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. This is something obviously we talk to our gulf 

partners about quite a bit, certainly over the period of the past couple of years, and we just urge them to make sure, similar to the 

way we do end use monitoring, that they have some way of telling 

who they are providing things to, in what capacity, et cetera, et 

cetera. We urge them to follow up the way we would want them 

to follow up. 

Senator CARDIN. Mr. McGurk, how is the impasse in Syria, the 

failure to be able to have a workable plan in Syria, impacting stability in Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. It is a very good question, Senator. The Iraqis, 

since the beginning of the Syria crisis—and this is really all 

Iraqis—have had a different conception of the Syria crisis than we 

have had. They have been very concerned that, based upon their 

own experience, that were you to see the fall of the Assad regime, 

that it would unleash just chaos on their borders. And they take 

what is happening within that frame. 

There is a Kurdish dimension to the Syria crisis. There is a central government in Iraq dimension to the Syria crisis. There is a 

tribal dimension to the Syria crisis. And it has just accelerated the 

centrifugal forces that are tearing at the fabric of Iraq. So it is very 

hard to even state the impact that the Syria crisis has had in Iraq, 

in particular the rise of the suicide bombings and car bombings, all 

of which we assess are ISIL. They come month after month and 

they are targeted—and this is ISIL’s doctrine and ideology; you can 

go back to the writings of Zarqawi in 2004—to tear at the fabric 

of Iraq, to attack Shia civilians in their marketplaces, their playgrounds, their mosques, repeatedly, to attack Sunni tribal leaders 

who disagree with them. And that is why, in February, almost 86 

percent of the suicide bombings that ISIL brought into Iraq were 

all focused on the Euphrates Valley and Anbar province, attacking 

Sunnis who disagreed with their ideology, and then to attack the 

Kurds in the disputed boundary territories in the north. That is 

what ISIL is trying to do. 

We got that suicide bomber number down to about 5 to 10 a 

month in 2011–2012 and last year and this year it went up to 30 

29 

to 50 a month, and it has a devastating effect on the entire psychology of the country. 

Senator CARDIN. Do we have any numbers on how many Iraqis 

have been displaced, either within Iraq or outside in other countries since June? 

Mr. MCGURK. Immediately, in Mosul there are about 500,000 

IDP’s, and since this crisis really started earlier this year, the IDP 

number is over a million. 

Senator CARDIN. Are they in Iraq or are they in Iran or are they 

in other countries? 

Mr. MCGURK. Most of them are in Iraq and most of them have 

fled to the Kurdish region in the north. We have worked very closely with our regional partners and with our U.N. partners in Iraq 

to manage this crisis. Secretary Kerry, after he was in Baghdad, 

went to Paris to meet the Foreign Ministers of UAE, Saudi Arabia, 

and Jordan, and then went to Riyadh to see King Abdullah, and 

the Saudis right after that meeting very generously contributed 

$500 million to the U.N. agencies working in Iraq, which was a 

much-needed contribution. 

We have contributed since the crisis began in Mosul, about $18 

million, and we are working very closely, particularly with our 

Kurdish partners, to manage the crisis. 

Senator CARDIN. I take it that very few of these people have returned because it is not safe at this moment? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes, that is right. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAINE [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

How long have we known that ISIL was a threat to the extent 

that they are now? How long has the State Department assessed 

it as a threat? 

Mr. MCGURK. We have known this organization since 2003. It is 

Zarqawi, Al Qaeda in Iraq. We have known it. We have watched 

it. 

Senator FLAKE. I know we have known it, but at what point did 

we think that there was a threat that they would take over Mosul? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, in Mosul they have had this modus vivendi 

in which they run racketeering schemes and they self-generate 

funding for about $12 million a month in Mosul. We have known 

that has been going on. Their open assault into Mosul, we did not 

have indications of that until a few days beforehand. 

Senator FLAKE. Just a few days before that. When did we give 

warning to the Iraqi Government that this was a threat, or did 

they—has their intelligence network been sufficient to know this 

before it was a problem? 

Mr. MCGURK. It is a very good question, Senator. In fact, we 

have been giving warnings and expressing concern to the Iraqi 

Government about the security environment, not just in Mosul but 

in northern Ninewah, going back about the last year. And it was 

a part of the conversation that I know our Vice President had with 

Prime Minister Maliki, when Maliki was here in November. 

We have been very concerned about it and are trying to work 

with the Kurds and with the Iraqi Security Forces in those areas 

30 

to have some coordination, because ISIL comes through that border 

crossing south of a town called Rabia, and they have filled that 

space gradually over the last year. 

Senator FLAKE. Without our military there actually conducting 

ground operations, our efforts have been in the diplomatic field, 

one, to try to convince the Iraqis to be more inclusive and to not 

give rise to this kind of activity or space for that kind of activity 

to happen, but, two, to warn them and help them combat this. 

It seems to me we have been spectacularly unsuccessful in the 

diplomatic arena in that regard. Do you have any response to that? 

Or how hard are we working there? What intelligence do we have? 

Are we passing it on? Is the Iraqi Government simply unresponsive? What has been the issue here? 

Mr. MCGURK. In terms of intelligence cooperation, sharing with 

Iraqi Forces and cooperation with Iraqi Forces, right now, as we 

speak, it is at a level we have not seen since our troops left in 

2011. So there are some opportunities there for us. 

Since we really started focusing on the al-Qaeda-ISIL threat in 

Iraq, really going back to last summer, you can see some statements that the State Department issued about Baghdadi, the fact 

that he is the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, he is now in Syria, and 

ISIL is an increasing threat to Iraq. We have developed platforms 

with the Iraqis to try to develop a better intelligence picture. But 

a lot of it was slow going. 

On the political side, we were very focused when the crisis began 

in Anbar to make clear, very clear, that any tribal fighters rising 

up to fight this group will get full benefits and resources of the 

state. The Iraqis also agreed to train about 1,000 native Fallujans. 

They gave them 3 months of training and then they actually mobilized and there was an operation in northern Fallujah and, quite 

frankly, those fighters lost, and they lost because the ISIL networks, particularly in Fallujah, with snipers, with IED’s, with their 

military sophistication, are able to overmatch any tribal force that 

comes to confront it. That is the situation right now. 

It was also the situation in northern Ninewah, because we do 

have tribal contacts up there with the Shamar Tribe, which is the 

main tribe up there. And over time, given the infiltrations from 

Syria, given the amount of force that ISIL can bring to bear, it was 

very difficult for locals to stand up to them. 

Senator FLAKE. You say cooperation with the Iraqi Government 

was slow in coming. Where does the fault lie with that? Were we 

slow to recognize the threat of ISIS or was the Iraqi Government 

simply slow to heed the warnings that we were giving or the cooperation that we offered? 

Mr. MCGURK. I think we started moving fairly aggressively in 

the summer. The Iraqis wanted to do things on their own. They did 

not really formally request direct U.S. military assistance until 

May, although there was a conversation about the possibility of 

such assistance earlier than May. But the formal request came in 

May. 

The Iraqis are very proud of their sovereignty. We have a strategic framework agreement with them, which allows us to do an 

awful lot. But the notion of flying surveillance drones over Iraqi 

skies, quite frankly, was something that was controversial at first. 

31 

So we had to develop the mechanisms and the procedures for doing 

these things, and we have those now well in place. 

Senator FLAKE. Our role in Congress, one of our main roles, obviously is to provide funding for these conflicts, for intelligence, for 

diplomatic efforts. Aside from thousands of lives lost, we have 

spent about $800 billion at last count in Iraq, just in Iraq. What 

can we tell our constituents that we have gotten out of that? Where 

are we now that we would not be had we not spent $800 billion? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think, as Senator Boxer said, we gave them an 

opportunity and we hope that this is not the end of the story in 

Iraq. We believe that there is still an opportunity for the Iraqis to 

form a government and do something about this problem, and we 

are urging them to get on with it. 

I think that we still believe in a way forward in Iraq. They just 

have to take the opportunity. 

Senator FLAKE. Is it possible at all in the State Department’s 

view to move ahead with Maliki in charge? Will there be sufficient 

trust, any trust, in the Sunni population that he will be inclusive 

enough, his government? Or does our strategy rely on somebody 

else coming in? 

Mr. MCGURK. Again, it is going to be very difficult for him to 

form a government, and so they are facing that question now, now 

that the President has been elected, to face the question of the 

Prime Minister. Any Prime Minister, in order to form a government, is going to have to pull the country together. So whoever the 

leader is is someone that is going to have to demonstrate that, just 

to get the votes he needs to remain or to be sworn into office. 

So that is something that is going to evolve fairly rapidly over 

the coming days. Again, there is a 15-day timeline to nominate 

a Prime Minister, and then whoever the nominee is still has to 

then form a Cabinet and present it to the Parliament to form a 

government. 

The Speaker of the Parliament, again, was elected overwhelmingly with support from all major groups, as was the President, 

and we would anticipate the Prime Minister. As we have said, as 

the President has said, it has to be somebody that has a very inclusive agenda and that can bring all the component groups together. 

Otherwise he will not be able to govern. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

Senator Coons. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. I want to thank Senator Menendez 

for chairing this hearing, and Senator Kaine and Senator Corker 

for your leadership on this committee as well, and thank our witnesses for your testimony today. I will follow on Senator Flake’s 

questioning in a moment. 

I share the administration’s ultimate goal as you have just been 

testifying to of encouraging the creation of an inclusive Iraqi Government that is supported by all of Iraq’s different sectarian 

groups, that has some hope of a secure and stable Iraq going forward, given how much has been sacrificed over how many years. 

But I will also renew a theme you have heard from several Senators, that I do not support a return of active U.S. combat troop 

presence in Iraq. I am concerned about the security of our Embassy 

32 

and our personnel and I am very concerned about the region and 

about some of our vital regional allies. So first I think we do need 

to deal with defeating ISIS and the regional threat here in the regional context, as you testified. And I think it is imperative that 

we have to find a way to move forward that has some reasonable 

chance of resolving the ongoing crisis in both Iraq and Syria to the 

best interests of the United States, of Israel, of Jordan, of Turkey, 

of all of our regional allies. 

First, on the point you were just discussing, what do you see as 

the prospects, the path forward for a political solution here in these 

next 15 days? Have you met with anyone who strikes you as a 

promising potential Prime Minister, who really could bridge these 

divides? Given reports of high-level delegations of Iranian military 

officials and diplomats meeting in Baghdad and in Najaf, I am concerned that there are fewer and fewer realistic chances of a broadbased, inclusive government being formed, given active interference 

and engagement from Iran. 

Mr. MCGURK. I can speak a little bit to the process. This was 

Iraq’s third national election they held on April 30. It was one of 

the best elections they have held in terms of the turnout. In 2006 

it took about 7 months to form a government and was an extremely 

difficult process, and what they did was they built this very bloated 

government with every seat filled and then voted it into office. 

In 2010 it wound up being the same thing. It took 9 months, and 

again they built a very bloated structure and then swore it into 

office. 

This year, this time, they are proceeding quite differently. They 

are moving through their constitutional timeline: Speaker, President, now Prime Minister. It is moving much faster than ever 

before. Nine months in 2010. We are less than 3 months out from 

the April elections and we are now on the step for the prime 

ministership. 

I would be hesitant to put timelines on it because it is a very 

complicated process. The 328 members in the Iraqi Parliament represent the entire spectrum of political thought in Iraq, and so it is 

very difficult to get full unity on any one person or any one issue. 

So there will be a very strong debate. It is not beanbag, 

the political process there. Now they are starting to focus on the 

most critical question of who is going to lead the coiunty as the 

chief executive. 

Senator COONS. Your riveting description of the fall of Mosul 

suggests that a lack of urgency, a lack of reality, about the situation on the ground was outcome determinative, led to a failure to 

act in a timely way and to ISIS sweeping across much of the center 

of the country. Do you think there is a sense of urgency, a sense 

of reality, both as to the defense posture that ISF now faces and 

to the political challenges that they face? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. There is a culture in Iraq that sometimes 

folks do not want to give their leaders bad news, and sometimes 

we are the ones who have to deliver the bad news and say ‘‘you 

face a very urgent situation.’’ Mosul was a good example of that. 

The generals up there were not saying that it was particularly urgent. So we are often the ones that have to do that. 

33 

Now, given the information we have, given the relationships we 

have on the ground, military relationships, we are able to give 

them a very clear picture of the situation they face. The relative 

tactical success they have had in clearing some of the highways 

north of Baghdad—and relative because it remains very difficult, 

but the highway—it is Highway 1 that goes all the way, up north 

through the Tigris Valley from Baghdad to Samarra. They did clear 

that. That was partially on their own, but partially because we 

helped them with some information. Then, the next stretch, from 

Samarra to Tikrit, the same thing. As I mentioned, we did not advise them to go into Tikrit City itself because that is a very difficult 

military environment to operate in. 

But, again, that is why General Austin is on the ground, to discuss with their new commanders, who we have very good relationships with, and with the Iraqi political leaders, how we can better 

approach this going forward in a more cooperative way. 

Senator COONS. Ms. Slotkin, there has been widespread reports 

of Sunnis sort of bristling under ISIS rule. They are extreme, they 

conduct not just terror attacks and suicide bombings and targeted 

assassinations, but they also are imposing a particularly harsh 

form of sharia. What prospects are there for outreach, for reengagement with elements of the Sunni community that might assist the 

Iraqi Security Forces, might play some role in rising up against 

ISIS in a replay of what happened previously? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think we have seen this story before in our own 

experience in Iraq, that many of these groups who may give tacit 

support to terrorist organizations in their neighborhoods, as soon 

as there is some prospect of turning against them and they know 

they have some support from their central government to do it, 

then they will turn on them. They do not like living under sometimes the sharia law that has been imposed on them. 

So I think the prospects are still there. But I think ultimately 

it will come down to whether they feel like they have a partner in 

the central government of Iraq, there is something to break away 

for. And that is up to the Iraqi Government. The new government 

will have to attract the Sunnis away from ISIS and ISIL and toward them. The security forces have to be a part of that, but at 

the end of the day it is about a political compromise that they 

strike in Baghdad and lure those Sunnis away. 

Senator COONS. I am particularly concerned about our vital ally 

in the region Jordan, about their both military and economic and 

strategic stability, given the flood of refugees that they have already been taking in as a result of the Syrian crisis, and about the 

open, increasingly porous borders. What concrete steps are we taking to reinforce and to ensure the stability and vibrancy of Jordan, 

and how does the announced intent to deliver support to the vetted 

moderate Syrian resistance strengthen that? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the most important thing is that the Jordanian military is a very capable military force. So we are very focused on the threat right on their border, but so are they. They 

have reinforced their troops on their border with Iraq, and we have 

a very close relationship, military to military relationship, with the 

Jordanians and talk with them on a daily basis. 

34 

Again, because of the Syria crisis the United States already had 

a robust presence in the country. We have F–16’s there, we have 

a Patriot battery there. We have a $300 million FMF program. We 

do education with them. It is a strong relationship, one of the 

strongest in the region. So I feel confident that we are doing everything we can in response to any request that they have to help 

them with their situation on the border. 

I think the idea of supporting moderate, vetted opposition in 

Syria is only more positive. The United States needs capable partners and platforms in the region to deal with this very fluid threat. 

The Jordanians are a big part of that and so will the Syrian moderate opposition. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Senator Coons. 

Senator Risch defers his questioning for now to Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

Let me begin with my—I think our priority for everyone here is 

the safety and security of our personnel, including Department of 

Defense personnel and certainly the State Department personnel at 

the embassy, given recent events. So there has been increased reporting that the ISF is increasingly linked or intermingled with 

Shia militia forces, that some of these Shia militia forces are actually now wearing ISF uniforms, but it is becoming increasingly 

difficult to distinguish between a Shia militia fighter and an ISF 

personnel. 

We have seen open source reporting that the Shia militia could 

pose a threat to our personnel, including potentially our military 

trainers and others. Can you briefly describe, number one, how we 

assess the threat of these militia and what are we doing to mitigate the risks that they could pose to our personnel, given the fact 

that they are now basically embedded and intermingled with the 

Iraqi Security Force personnel that we are working side by side potentially with? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. This is exactly what we were trying to assess 

by going over there and looking unit by unit in and around Baghdad at things like command and control, morale, and in particular 

infiltration of Shia militias. Grand Ayatollah Sistani put out a very 

public call for volunteers to join the military, so one thing we 

watched very closely was as all these new folks came in where 

would their allegiances be? Would they respond to the commanders 

of their unit or someone else? 

I think that is what we have been trying to figure out, and I 

think the picture, honestly, is mixed. In some areas we have good 

morale, strong adherence to command and control through the military channels, and in other places it is more of an open question. 

Those are the kinds of units that we do not want to be working 

with and why we are taking this very sort of deliberate approach. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, but there is the real risk, is there not, that 

Shia militia that are there could just as easily be the ones firing 

on our Embassy and on our personnel as ISIL personnel could be, 

unless they are somehow otherwise constrained? 

Mr. MCGURK. Senator, the Shia militias are something we watch 

very closely. There has been a cease-fire. The Shia militias have 

35 

had a cease-fire in place since 2009 against their own government 

forces, a cease-fire. We have not had any attacks from Shia militias 

since 2011. But it is something that we watch extremely closely. 

The assessment assessed every unit around Baghdad and, without getting into the details, some units are infiltrated and dangerous. Some of them, however, are very capable, very effective, 

and have close relationships with us. 

Senator RUBIO. I wanted to get to a broader question, and you 

touched upon it in your statement and you do even more so in the 

written statement that you have submitted. But here is the question that we get from people, and that is people are outraged by 

what is happening, especially the reports coming out about the different things that ISIL is doing. By no means is this a group that 

is popular and I think Americans understand this is a terrible, radical group of violent individuals. 

That being said, public opinion polls and just from the phone 

calls we get in our offices, the attitude of much of the American 

public is it is a mess, but it is their problem, let them figure it out. 

I have personally said that this is not even about Iraq at this point; 

it is about the long-term security of the United States, and that the 

threat that ISIL poses to the United States, especially if they are 

able to establish a safe haven of operations similar to what alQaeda did, in fact, even worse than what al-Qaeda was able to do 

in Afghanistan. 

But I was hoping that from the administration’s point of view 

and from the State Department and the Department of Defense’s 

point of view you could perhaps use this as an opportunity to explain to my constituents in Florida why this matters to America, 

why something happening halfway around the world, in a country 

that people, quite frankly, think increasingly perhaps we should 

not have gotten involved in? Why does this matter? Why should 

people care about what is happening in Iraq, given the problems 

we have here at home? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Senator. Let me say a couple of things. 

I, of course, address the ISIL threat in my written and opening 

statement, and that is a very serious counterterrorism threat, and 

that is number one. 

But these are vital, vita,l United States interests in Iraq. Number one: the counterterrorism, the al-Qaeda threat. Number two: 

just the supply of energy resources to global markets. Iraq through 

2035 will account for 45 percent of all of the growth in oil energy 

exports. If Iraq were to collapse in a major civil war and sectarian 

war, the effects to our own economy here at home would be quite 

serious. 

Every single faultline crossing through the Middle East—ArabPersian, moderate, extremist, Shia-Sunni, Arab-Kurd—everything 

meets in Iraq. So were ISIL to get into, for example, the mosque 

city of Samarra, which it wanted to do, and to unleash a cauldron 

of sectarian violence, it would spread throughout the Middle East, 

with devastating effects for our economy here at home. 

So vital interests, from al-Qaeda to energy resources and our own 

economy, are at stake. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Did you want to add something? 

36 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I would just foot-stomp the ISIL threat. They are 

self-funded. They have control of significant territory. They are 

tested in battle. They are a serious threat. And while we do not assess right now that they are doing distinct homeland plotting, they 

have certainly said rhetorically—they are open about it—that they 

are coming for the United States. 

In my experience as a Defense official, I do not want that to fester. I want to do something about that. 

Senator RUBIO. I thank you for that. I think you have done a 

good job of outlining the reason why we should care and why this 

matters. This is not simply about Iraq. This is about the United 

States. 

Could you then briefly—if I brought some people in here from 

Florida or they are watching or I were to share this video, could 

you explain to them what our plan is? What are we doing? What 

are the two or three things that we are doing to address this 

threat, which as you have described is a very significant one to our 

country? What is the plan? 

Mr. MCGURK. Let me focus on ISIL. We need to do three things. 

We need to strangle their entire network. That means their foreign 

fighter flow in particular. We just had a meeting all day yesterday 

with the Turks to focus on that. We have to strangle their foreign 

fighter flow network into Syria. 

Number two, we have to begin to deny space and safe haven and 

sanctuary, which they have in Syria, which gets into why we are 

training, planning on, hoping to train the moderate opposition with 

a train and equip program. 

Number three, we have to help the Iraqis take control of their 

sovereign space. To do that, as I explained in my testimony, a functioning federal system in which we do recruit locally, with local 

tribal structures, but with the resources of the central government, 

because there was a conversation about recruiting tribes, which is 

what we want to do. But we have to recognize that unless the local 

people and local tribes have the resources of the central government or national-based resources, they are not going to be able to 

defeat this organization. 

Senator RUBIO. What are we specifically doing and going to be 

doing to crush their networks and prevent them from having safe 

havens? Operationally, what are we going to do to accomplish those 

goals that you have outlined as part of our plan? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, I can speak to the Iraq portion of this, and 

this is why, since this crisis began in early June, we immediately 

surged in a significant surge of intelligence assets into Iraq, to get 

a better picture of the situation. We put special forces on the 

ground to get eyes on. We are now at the point where we have collected all the information and we have a fairly concrete, precise, 

picture and we are coming up with options for doing just that. So 

this will be an ongoing conversation with this committee and the 

Congress over the days and weeks ahead. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. I want to follow up a little bit on 

the line of questioning that Senator Rubio was following and your 

response, because you mentioned in your testimony, Mr. McGurk, 

37 

that we need to work with our partners in the region, especially 

Turkey, to seal the border to Syria from foreign fighters and ISL 

recruits. So can you talk a little bit more—I know you are limited 

to some extent—about how this is proceeding and what other partners we might engage to address this concern? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Senator. We have some experience in 

doing this in the late 2006, 2007 timeframe, where it was the same 

foreign fighter network. At the time they were all flying into Damascus, going to Aleppo, and following a rat line into Iraq. We 

squeezed it. We did an anaconda strategy to squeeze the entire network from the source capitals, where they were getting on airplanes, to get them off the airplanes. 

We are now doing a similar effort, and Ambassador Bradtke is 

Senior Adviser at the State Department under the CT Bureau, focused on the foreign fighter network. It is two parts: Turkey has 

a very long border. It is very hard to control. Turkey is doing some 

things to strengthen its own border and focus on this problem; also, 

the source capitals in which young military-age males are getting 

on airplanes and going to certain airports in Turkey. 

So we are working very carefully through our entire interagency 

and the folks that are really expert in this, with the source capitals 

in which people are getting on airplanes and coming into Syria, 

and with the Turks. It is Europe, it is North Africa, and it is the 

gulf region. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Can you talk about how long we have been 

doing that and whether we are seeing any results as a result of 

that effort? 

Mr. MCGURK. Senator, we have been doing it for some time now. 

I can follow up with you after speaking with the experts dealing 

with this and have a written response. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I would appreciate that, and probably sharing 

it with the committee would be very helpful as well. 

You also talk about the tremendous effort on the part of the 

Kurdistan government to accommodate the internally displaced 

people fleeing from other parts of Iraq. I wonder if you could talk 

about the extent to which the Government in Baghdad recognizes 

the strain this is causing and has been willing to work with the 

Kurds at all to help address this. 

Mr. MCGURK. One promising sign, Senator, in what is a very 

dark landscape—I want to be very clear. This humanitarian situation is extremely serious and it is heartbreaking, particularly when 

it comes to the Christian minorities and other vulnerable groups. 

I met with the Christian leadership in Erbil and Baghdad, 

throughout my last trip, about how we can do a better job helping 

these people, who are under a very serious threat. 

The Iraqi Government could do more to help the Kurdish Regional Government, particularly with state resources and state 

funding. The Iraqi Parliament, which is just meeting because it 

just convened for the first time, it is a brand-new Parliament. It 

has a brand-new Speaker. The first session really was yesterday, 

and one of the first things they did, first they all united in condemnation of what is happening to Christians in northern Nineveh 

province. And they also formed a very broad committee from all the 

major groups to figure out how to direct state resources—and, 

38 

remember, Iraq has significant resources. There is a budget pending in the Parliament for $140 billion, and that is something that 

the government has to tap into to help these people. 

So they just formed a committee yesterday to figure out some 

things to do, and we are obviously actively engaged with them to 

try to influence that process. 

Senator SHAHEEN. So does the selection of a Kurdish President 

help with this effort? 

Mr. MCGURK. Certainly. We look forward to working with the 

new President, with President Fuad Masum, on these issues. 

Again, he won an overwhelming victory on the vote today on the 

floor of the Iraqi Parliament. So it is a good step forward. But we 

work with all the Kurdish leadership in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, 

and also in Baghdad. 

Senator SHAHEEN. But I would assume that, given his election, 

that he might have some influence in the Parliament that could be 

very helpful. Has he made statements about the need to help address what has happened to Christians? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, he was just elected as I was coming over 

here in the car. So I have not seen the statements that he has 

made yet. But we will be immediately working with him and, 

again, all the leaders to get the resources up to the north that the 

Kurds need to deal with the humanitarian crisis. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Finally, again I think this is for you, Mr. 

McGurk, but, Ms. Slotkin, if you would like to weigh in, please do. 

One of the things that has not gotten a whole lot of attention, but 

has—you mention it in your testimony and certainly we have seen 

it in other places where extremist Islam has been in charge—the 

plight of Iraqi women and girls has borne the brunt of a lot of the 

violence as they have advanced through Iraq. 

Can you talk about what we can do and what is being done to 

help address this? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, first, Senator, the fact that you are asking 

the question is number one, because we have to put international 

focus and attention on this very serious problem. In Mosul the situation with ISIL goes from bad to worst. They have first gone after 

the Christians, then they have gone after Kurds. They are now 

going after women and, particularly, young women. 

This is a serious international problem. The Government of Iraq, 

the Foreign Minister of Iraq, wrote a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations asking for international assistance 

against this threat to their people. So it is something that we need 

the entire efforts of the entire world to focus on, because, frankly, 

the Iraqis cannot deal with it on their own. 

So, first we have to give it international attention. Then we have 

to find a way to really address it. But in my testimony, particularly 

in Mosul, where ISIL is setting up really its capital of its caliphate—that is what it is trying to do—we have to find a way to work 

effectively with local tribal forces to be able to make sure that they 

can stand effectively against ISIL, which right now, frankly, they 

cannot, and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, because Mosul is in a 

pocket in the Kurdish region, and eventually federal forces, to be 

able to slowly squeeze and take back these areas. 

39 

This is going to be a long-term effort, but, especially for the sake 

of the people living in these areas, we have to give it everything 

we have. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Finally, I am almost out of time, but this may 

have been asked and I apologize if you have already answered it. 

But there was a report in the New York Times on July 13 that suggested that only about half of Iraq’s operational units are capable 

enough for us to advise them. Can either of you speak to whether— 

without revealing classified information—whether we are concerned about this, the substance of this report being accurate? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sure. It was mentioned briefly and I just cautioned 

against relying solely on a leak in the New York Times. That was 

a critical thing that we were looking at in these assessments. They 

are still in draft. I think what is accurate is that the picture is 

mixed. I do not know if it is exactly half, but I think that we are 

finding units where that is a real problem and units where it is not 

a problem. 

And we are trying to understand how to process that. What does 

it mean if certain units we can work with and they are ambitious 

and they want to do things to take back their territory and others 

are not the right units for us to be working with. What should our 

policy be in that case? That is complicated and that is why we are 

taking our time to think about it. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Slotkin, we learn more from the New York Times and from 

the Wall Street Journal than we do from any briefing that we have 

ever had with you. I do not agree with you very often, but I certainly do agree with your statement you cannot fight something 

with nothing, because that is what we have been doing, nothing. 

This situation in Iraq was predicted by us and predictable, and 

now we find ourselves in a situation where, Mr. McGurk, the Director of Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General have all stated publicly 

that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS or ISIL, whichever 

one you want to call it, pose a direct threat to the United States. 

Do you agree? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. You do agree. Well, would you agree that Iraq 

and Syria are now effectively one conflict, that we cannot address 

ISIS in Iraq without also addressing it in Syria, and vice versa, 

particularly with reports that we see, published reports of equipment that was captured in Iraq now showing up in Syria? 

Mr. MCGURK. I think it is one theater. It is the Tigris and Euphrates Valley theater, yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you do believe that this caliphate, the richest and largest base of terrorism that I know of, is both Iraq and 

Syria, this enclave? 

Mr. MCGURK. That is exactly what it is trying to do. It is trying 

to establish that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Have they achieved it pretty well so far? 

40 

Mr. MCGURK. Since June, the Iraq-Syria border has more or less 

collapsed. 

Senator MCCAIN. So that means really then, if we are going to 

take action in Iraq we should also take action in Syria; would you 

agree? 

Mr. MCGURK. Again, these are all options that are being looked 

at, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. I am just wondering if you would agree with 

that. I am not asking whether you are examining options or not. 

Mr. MCGURK. I think, Senator, as I mentioned, in order to really 

get at this network and learning from the past with Al Qaeda in 

Iraq, we have to squeeze the entire network. That is the foreign 

fighter flow, that is denying safe haven in Syria, and helping the 

Iraqis control their sovereign territory. 

Senator MCCAIN. So if we did initiate an air-to-ground campaign 

without including Syria, they would have a sanctuary in Syria. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. MCGURK. One of the reasons—and again, I would defer to 

my colleague Elissa—but we are focused on training the moderate 

opposition, to have a force that is able to deny safe haven and deny 

space to the ISL networks in Syria. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, probably so. But the Secretary of Defense 

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have both stated 

publicly that the Iraqi Security Forces are not capable of regaining 

the territory they have lost to ISIS on their own without external 

assistance. Do you agree with the Secretary of Defense and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? 

Mr. MCGURK. The Iraqi Security Forces have moved a little bit 

out of—we had the snowballing effect—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I am again asking if you agree or disagree with 

the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

who both stated publicly that the Iraq Security Forces are not capable of regaining the territory they have lost to ISIS on their own 

without external assistance. Do you agree or disagree? 

Mr. MCGURK. They cannot conduct combined arms-type operations, which is what it would take, without some enabling 

support. 

Senator MCCAIN. So since we all rule out boots on the ground, 

that might mean use of air power as a way of assisting them. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. MCGURK. Senator, all of these options and potential options 

for the President are being looked at and, as Elissa said, we are 

not going to crowd the decision space. 

Senator MCCAIN. How long have we been ‘‘looking at’’ them now, 

Mr. McGurk? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well—— 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, the assessments came in last week. 

Senator MCCAIN. So the assessments came in last week. How 

long have we been assessing? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think we assessed for two solid weeks. 

Senator MCCAIN. Oh, I think it has been longer than that since 

the collapse of the Iraqi military, Ms. Slotkin. 

41 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think the President made his announcement on 

June 19 and then he instructed that assessors go to Baghdad. They 

flew there and began their assessments immediately. 

Senator MCCAIN. I see. And so far we have launched no air 

strikes in any part of Iraq, right? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. That is correct. 

Senator MCCAIN. And you stated before that we did not have sufficient information to know which targets to hit, is that correct? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think we have radically improved our intelligence 

picture. 

Senator MCCAIN. But at the time in your view we did not have 

sufficient information capability in order to launch air strikes? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think that, given our extremely deliberate process 

about launching any air strike, we would— 

Senator MCCAIN. You know, it is interesting. I asked do you 

think at that time we did not have sufficient information to launch 

air strikes against ISIS. 

Ms. SLOTKIN. I think, given the standards the United States has 

for dropping ordnance, no, we did not have the intelligence we 

would ever want at that time. 

Senator MCCAIN. I find that interesting because none of the military that I have talked to that served there and even those who 

flew there—they are absolutely convinced, as I am, that when you 

have convoys moving across the desert in open terrain you can 

identify them and strike them. We know that they were operating 

out of bases in Syria, out in the open in the desert. So those of us 

who have some military experience in the efficacy of air power, we 

heartily disagree. And that is not just me. It comes from military 

leaders who served there. 

Mr. McGurk, published media reports indicate that the Islamic 

State has an estimated 10,000 foreign fighters, 7,000 in Syria and 

3,000 in Iraq. Does that sound right? 

Mr. MCGURK. These estimates are very difficult to discern, but 

that is an estimate that we routinely see, yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. And of those foreign fighters, many of them are 

from European countries, right? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Who when returning to their countries do not 

require a visa to come to this country, which is why, as I say, the 

Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and 

the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General have 

all stated that this poses a direct threat to the United States of 

America. 

In light of that, do you think we are—so far, that we have had 

a proportionate response to that threat? 

Mr. MCGURK. I just want to say on the direct threat, if that is 

a direct quote from them, I obviously defer to them on the quote. 

One thing that we have done, I want to—in your questioning of Ms. 

Slotkin. When this crisis started the Iraqis had zero Hellfire missiles in their arsenal. We have delivered to them, since this crisis 

began in June, hundreds of Hellfire missiles. And with our new intelligence, with the joint operations center, the Iraqis have deployed those missiles with precision and accuracy. It has made a 

difference, and I would be happy to follow up to—— 

42 

Senator MCCAIN. Excuse me. What difference has it made? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, it blunted some of—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Certainly not in the areas of Iraq that the ISIS 

has been able to gain control over. 

Mr. MCGURK. It began to blunt some of the momentum. Seriously, we certainly have a lot more—— 

Senator MCCAIN. You did not really believe that they could take 

Baghdad, did you? No one in their right mind would. 

Mr. MCGURK. In the initial days of this crisis, there was a very 

deep concern that Iraqi Security Forces could, in the approaches to 

Baghdad, substantially weaken and that was a real concern of 

ours. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, there might have been on your part, but 

it certainly was not on those of us who understand Iraq and population and Shia and Sunni. 

Well, Mr. Chairman, I have overstayed my time. I thank you, but 

I really agree with you, Ms. Slotkin, when you said you cannot 

fight something with nothing. You are exactly right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Odds and ends because most of my questions have been asked 

already by my colleagues. But give me the status on the safety of 

the American Embassy in Baghdad and our consuls in Iraq? 

Mr. MCGURK. Senator, thank you. It is our foremost priority. It 

is something we watch every day very closely. That is why we have 

rebalanced our security apparatus at the Embassy. We have 

brought in substantial Department of Defense capabilities into the 

Embassy and into the airport. Our Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security was there last week, and we feel very confident 

about the protection of our people. But it is something that we 

watch literally every second of every day. 

Our knowledge and our understanding of the defense of Baghdad, in particular, is night and day different from where it was just 

6 weeks ago. 

Senator KAINE. Because of the deployment of the advisers, as you 

were discussing? 

Mr. MCGURK. Yes. 

Senator KAINE. Let me ask about this, the Iranian influence in 

Iraq. Beyond political influence, how about Iranian expenditures in 

Iraq, whether it is to back up the military or provide training and 

assistance? What is Iran doing in Iraq right now that is costing 

them money? 

Mr. MCGURK. I do not have a figure on the expenditures. All I 

can say is that the Iraqis again, they want the United States to be 

the backbone of their military force, and that is why they have 

looked to the FMS program to be that backbone. Where we have 

developed relationships with Iraqi military officers, even in times 

of extreme crisis, it has proven essential. An example in my testimony is that when we had to get about 500 contractors out of 

Bilad, it was the Iraqi Air Force, even despite the extreme crisis 

they were dealing with, that flew their own C–130s with their own 

pilots to get our people out. That is the kind of relationship that 

we need to continue to invest in. 

43 

Senator KAINE. I just want to, because I am going in a particular 

direction with this. You do not have an expenditure figure on what 

Iran is spending in Iraq, but are they likely spending significant 

resources or is the influence just more kind of more on the political 

and relationship side? 

Mr. MCGURK. They are expending resources. They were particularly concerned about the defense of Samarra, where the Golden 

Dome Al-Askari Mosque is. And in the early weeks of the crisis, 

they did invest resources to try to protect that area of Samarra. 

Senator KAINE. The reason I am asking this question is separately we are having this intense discussion about the Iranian nuclear negotiation and what is the effect of the sanctions on Iran 

and to what extent any sanctions relief is giving them breathing 

room. And we are being told from many quarters that the Iranian 

economy is still suffering very greatly. They seem to be pretty 

deeply in, in terms of expenditures in Syria and they seem to be 

pretty deeply in in terms of expenditures in Iraq, and that makes 

me think either they are incredibly stretched or maybe their economy and resources are a little bit stronger than some of the reports 

to us suggest. And that is relevant in terms of the negotiations that 

are underway with respect to the nuclear program. I will follow 

that up with others. 

This is a question that you might not be able to answer on the 

record, and if so I will submit it—or in public—I will submit it for 

the record. What are the efforts under way by the United States 

to disrupt ISIL financing? 

Ms. SLOTKIN. Sir, I think we should take it off the record if you 

do not mind, just in a classified session. I would be happy to provide that to you. 

Senator KAINE. We have had testimony in these hearings before 

about some kinds of financing that I think can be talked about publicly. They do extortion, they do kidnapping. They go to merchants 

and say: Pay us X. That has been discussed publicly. But there has 

also been reports about others who are funding ISIL operations, 

often others—maybe not the government, but people who are connected with governments that are allies of ours. And I would like 

to know in a classified setting—and we will submit a written question—what are we doing to disrupt ISIL financing? 

The persecution of the Christian minority in Iraq, like the persecution of any religious minority, is of significance. Could you talk 

about your recent discussions on the persecution of Christians 

when you were in Baghdad, Mr. McGurk? 

Mr. MCGURK. Thank you, Senator. I went to the home of the 

Chaldean patriarch, Archbishop Sako in Mansour in Baghdad, to 

discuss this directly with him, and then also in Erbil with Bishop 

Warda. It is an extremely serious situation. What is so inspiring 

when you visit them is that Archbishop Sako, shortly before I saw 

him, had just had a service with about 500 worshippers from across 

the city of Baghdad in his church. This past Sunday he had a service in which Muslims and Christians came together in his church 

to say: ‘‘We are all Christians, we all stand for the Christians, we 

are all Iraqis, these are all our people, to stand against ISIL.’’ 

Bishop Warda in Erbil is focused on the refugees that have left 

Mosul and he has asked us for some specific help with the Kurdish 

44 

Regional Government to ensure they have the protection they need, 

and that is something that we followed up with President Barzani 

immediately after that meeting, to ensure that they do have that 

protection. And it is something we are working on every day. 

But it is a very serious situation, and it reveals what is happening to the Christians in Mosul, it reveals what ISIL is all about 

and why it is such a threat to the region and to us. 

Senator KAINE. Again, we should feel deeply—since the United 

States stands so strongly for religious liberty, we should feel deeply 

about the persecution of any religious minority. Mass has been said 

in Mosul for more than 1,800 years, but for the first time that has 

been broken. Weekly mass is not being celebrated there. That is a 

pretty significant thing. 

I have been critical of us, the Senate, for slowness in ambassadorial approvals, but I will just put one on the administration. You 

also have got to get us names. And I will just say this for the 

record: The Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom post has been vacant since October 2013. The White House 

has not sent us a name, at a time in the world, whether it might 

be Christians or Ahmadiyya Muslims or Jews in some nations that 

are suffering because of the persecution of religious minorities. And 

sadly, while the United States is an example of religious diversity, 

we see these persecution of minorities probably on the increase in 

the world. 

It is a core value of ours. We have such a good story to tell. That 

should not be a position that is vacant. I encourage the administration to send us a nominee promptly. 

With that, Mr. Chair, I have no more questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

I would like to focus on the role of energy resources in the conflict with ISIS and in the Iraqi leadership’s struggle to maintain a 

workable political system. ISIS has taken over the oil fields near 

Mosul and Tikrit and continues to have its sights set on the Baiji 

oil refinery, Iraq’s largest. The group continues to control oil fields 

in northeast Syria. Smuggling this oil into the black market has reportedly brought ISIS millions in revenues, perhaps a million dollars a day it is being reported. 

With the group’s ambition to take on the trappings of an actual 

state, how does capturing energy resources and infrastructure fit 

into their broader strategy? 

Mr. MCGURK. They need the resources to survive. One reason 

they are coming with everything they have at the Baiji refinery is 

because they need the energy resources that are stored in those 

tanks in order to keep Mosul running. The Baiji refinery battle has 

now been going on for a month. There is a unit of Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service Forces there, people that we know and that we 

have trained, who have been fighting incredibly heroically. 

ISIL has sent waves of car bombs and suicide bombers at the refinery. So far the Iraqis continue to hold it, although it is a very 

desperate struggle. But strategically it desperately needs these resources to, as you said, be able to build—— 

Senator MARKEY. What further steps need to be taken in order 

to protect against ISIS taking over the Baiji refinery? That is a 

45 

critical moment in the whole struggle if they are successful in 

doing that, the largest single refinery in the country. What can 

be done, what needs to be done, in order to prevent that from 

happening? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, in fact, as I mentioned briefly in the answer 

to some of Senator McCain’s questions, when we did get the 

Hellfire missiles into the country, one of the first places they were 

deployed was around the Baiji refinery, to begin to clear out some 

of the attacking ISL fighters. So that is one example. 

As we continue to assess the situation in Iraq, we have identified 

particular strategic sites that we are concerned about and that we 

want to make sure the Iraqis have whatever capabilities they 

might need to be able to defend them. 

Senator MARKEY. Let me move on to the Kurdish Regional Government in the north. The Kurds are sitting on an estimated reserve of 45 billion barrels of oil and have now captured the oil 

fields around Kirkuk as well. They appear to be more and more intent on selling their own oil abroad without coordinating those exports through the central authorities in Baghdad, and Baghdad 

seems unwilling to equitably distribute the country’s oil resources. 

How can we help the Iraqi Government to better manage its energy resources and preserve a federal system that works for all 

Iraqis? Right now that seems to be collapsing and the collapse is 

over the oil revenue issue. How can we play a bigger role? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, this is something where we can play a direct 

role, and it is one reason we had to get through the election and 

start to get a new government formed, so we can get some traction 

on this issue. Again, the numbers really tell the story. The Kurds 

need about $14 billion in order to really sustain themselves. Their 

own exports right now, they approach a little less than half of that 

probably. That will change over the future. 

The budget that is pending in Baghdad, that is before the Parliament, is a $140 billion budget. The Kurdish share of that would 

be a little more than $17 billion. So the numbers really tell the 

story and the numbers give the trade space for how we can work 

out a deal. 

Again, there are new realities on the ground that we have to deal 

with, but it is in the interest of all Iraqis to export as much oil as 

possible under a revenue-sharing framework, particularly for the 

Sunni areas of Iraq, which do not have any of these natural resources. And that is the type of compact that I think a new Government, and particularly the new Parliament, which has proven to be 

very effective—and they just set up a committee to try to resolve 

this—can get some traction on. 

But we have to be actively engaged because we are the one neutral broker between all of these parties, and without us they will 

not get there. 

Senator MARKEY. Again, oil is always at the core of this? 

Cherchez the oil, that is pretty much what it is all about. That is 

why the British wanted the country constructed the way it was. 

They wanted those oil resources, especially up in the north, added, 

even though it was going to cause longer term instability. But that 

is what they were fighting for. That is what they were demanding 

46 

in those negotiations 80 years ago, 90 years ago. And we are still 

living with the consequences of those decisions. 

Let me just move on then and ask, what is the current relationship between ISIS and al-Qaeda? What has happened to that relationship in the course of especially the last 3 or 4 months? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, it is my understanding Al Qaeda in Iraq, of 

course, was Zarqawi’s group and it had pledged adherence and allegiance to al-Qaeda central in Pakistan and Afghanistan. When it 

moved into Syria it split into two groups, the al-Nusra Front and 

what has become the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant had ambitions across 

borders between Iraq and Syria and that is something that senior 

al-Qaeda leaders such as Zawahiri did not agree with and he 

issued an edict saying: I do not agree with that; you should all 

work as one, or ISIS should work in Iraq and Nusra works in 

Syria. And Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said: I do not agree with you on 

that, so I am going to go my own way. And that is what led to the 

split. 

But ISIL is proving to be in many ways even more effective in 

terms of organizing and developing a state structure than even core 

al-Qaeda, and that is why it is more than just a terrorist organization. It certainly does not have the global reach in terms of terrorist capacity as core al-Qaeda, but it has the sophistication to develop what is really becoming a state-like sanctuary for a global 

jihadist movement. And Baghdadi has now made clear he is reaching for the mantle of the global jihad, and trying to recruit those 

who share that ideology from all around the world. 

Senator MARKEY. So what does that competitive dynamic between the leaders of both groups ultimately potentially lead to? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, the risk is that, in terms of that competition, 

they will look to external attack plotting in order to do spectacular 

type attacks to further draw worldwide recruits. That is the risk. 

Senator MARKEY. I think you have already answered the questions about recruiting. Let me just ask a final question and that 

is about Iraqi Forces’ capacity to defend their own civilians. Could 

you just give us a brief summary of where you believe they are 

right now in accomplishing that goal? 

Mr. MCGURK. Well, one reason I said in my testimony, we have 

a counterterrorism challenge; Iraq has a counterinsurgency challenge. A counterinsurgency challenge means they have to be able 

to control their own population and that is why they have to recruit locally and work with tribes that control local areas. 

Right now that has really broken apart, and it has broken apart 

for a number of reasons, but primarily the force that ISIL is able 

to bring to bear in some of the Sunni areas of Iraq. They go after 

anybody that disagrees with them. They have a bit of an alliance 

with the Naqshbandi and the Baath Party networks, but even 

that is starting to fray. So this is why we have to work with the 

Iraqis to be able to protect their population against the most violent groups and then work on the political compact to make sure 

that all areas of Iraq have the resources they need to sustain 

themselves. 

Senator MARKEY. Again, I want to commend you for your focus 

on diplomacy. I agree with Ryan Crocker that it is not too late for 

47 

diplomacy, but we just have to be intervening in a very, very aggressive way to make sure that diplomacy is truly given a chance 

to be successful. 

Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator KAINE [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Markey. 

Thank you to the witnesses. We will leave the record open until 

5 o’clock tomorrow for the submission of questions. We would appreciate your prompt responses. Thank you for your testimony. 

We have a superb second panel and I would ask them to come 

forward now. As we are setting up for the second panel, let me just 

let all know who we will have. We are fortunate to have: former 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffrey, who is currently at the Washington Institute on Near East Policy; Lieutenant General Michael 

Barbero, who served nearly 4 years in Iraq over three tours. General Barbero has traveled to Iraq six times in the last year while 

serving as the Director of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device 

Defeat Organization. Finally, no stranger to the committee, Dr. 

Ken Pollack, who has been a respected voice on Iraq and the gulf 

from his time in the CIA, the National Security Council, now at the 

Brookings Institute. 

This is a superb panel and we are glad to have everyone here. 

Let me just, to the panel and the audience, I apologize. The challenge of being on the second panel, everybody comes and has a million questions and then about lunch time races off, and it is unfortunate that all will not be here to hear you live. But we really do 

appreciate you being here today because your experiences each give 

you something very important to add. 

Your written statements, which were very strong, will be obviously included in the entire record. We would like to ask each to 

take about 5 minutes to summarize, and I will have you speak in 

the order I introduced you, beginning with Ambassador Jeffrey and 

moving from my right to left. Ambassador Jeffrey, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES F. JEFFREY, PHILIP SOLONDZ 

DISTINGUISHED VISITING FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON 

INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Acting Chairman. 

To follow up on what we heard this morning, the establishment 

of the Islamic State by the ISIL in Iraq and in parts of Syria is 

changing the geostrategy of the entire Middle East and represents 

a dramatic setback to United States policy and interests and requires an immediate response from Washington. The situation is 

complicated by the fact that in the fix we are presently in in the 

Middle East we have not one, but two, hegemonic radical forces in 

the region, from Gaza to Iran, that are trying to upset the established order throughout the Middle East, and we have to deal with 

all of them in a comprehensive way. 

The President’s plan to support a unified Iraq in this crisis as 

laid out on June 19 is reasonable, but over a month has gone by, 

as we discussed earlier today, and very little has happened. In government formation, we have had two important but secondary 

steps, the selection of the Speaker and the selection of a President 

from the Kurdish community. Those are important, but those are 

48 

basically the preliminaries. The key issue is the selection of a 

Prime Minister and a new Government. 

Meanwhile, on the ground, while the initial ISIL drive on Baghdad and on the strategic areas has been slowed, we are seeing new 

offensive capabilities by that organization. The Institute for the 

Study of War came out yesterday with a survey of attacks, both 

suicide and what we call VBIEDs, vehicle bombs, inside Baghdad 

and efforts to try to cut off the city. Senator McCain was right that 

you cannot take Baghdad, but, as almost happened to us with over 

100,000 troops in 2004, you can isolate the city, and they seem to 

be trying to do that. 

Meanwhile, they are pushing against the Kurds all along the 

400-mile front from the Iranian border to north of Mosul and they 

are trying to seize strategic infrastructure. Baiji we talked about, 

but also the Haditha Dam west of Ramadi and the Mosul Dam on 

the Tigris River to the northeast of Mosul. These are extraordinarily important infrastructure targets for them. So we do have 

an offensive threat from that organization. 

The President’s plan is based upon, above all, a new inclusive 

government. As I said, while we have done the preliminaries with 

the Speaker and with the President, we have not gotten to the key 

issue of who is going to govern the country, because the Prime Minister essentially governs the country. In my view the inclusive government that the President has correctly said is a prerequisite to 

any real action cannot be a government headed by Prime Minister 

Maliki. He simply has not shown the ability to bring in the Kurdish and the Sunni communities, and that is needed right now because there is a huge division of both trust and geographic division 

in the country today. 

We also need to encourage the Kurds, as Mr. McGurk described 

in some detail, to remain within the republic and try to regain 

trust among the Sunnis. Again, I see this as only possible if we 

have a new Prime Minister and a new Government. 

Simultaneously, I think that, while the President is right that we 

cannot do a major campaign until we get an inclusive government 

that can provide essentially people on the ground, local forces, we 

need to do limited strikes. General Dempsey talked about some of 

the possibilities, going after key leaders and strategic infrastructure. We need to do a little bit of that now, in part to encourage 

everybody to come together. 

Mr. McGurk talked about the Sunni tribes that are trying to 

fight ISIS, but they are outgunned. Helping them would not be undercutting a new government. The Kurds are fighting all along the 

front and they need help. We heard about some of these highly 

trained, effective Iraqi units that are still in the fight, particularly 

north of Baghdad. They could benefit from help, too. 

We are striking al-Qaeda right now in Pakistan, Yemen, and 

with direct actions at times in Somalia and Libya. I see no reason 

why we could not—if we have the targets and we are getting the 

data now—start doing some strikes both in Iraq and in Syria. 

Meanwhile, we have to be ready, though. If this does not work 

out, if the Iranians remain influential in Baghdad, if Mr. Maliki remains in power, if the groups cannot come together, we have to 

start thinking about how are we going to deal if we do have three 

49 

separate entities—a Kurdistan that will be a magnet for Kurds 

throughout the region; effectively a Taliban-like Islamic State in 

the middle of the Levant; and a rump Iraq that is ever more under 

the control or under the influence of Iran. That is a huge new problem for us if we do not act very, very quickly. 

So my bottom line here today, sir, is that we need to act as 

quickly as we can. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jeffrey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JAMES FRANKLIN JEFFREY

The establishment of the Islamic State (IS) by the Al Qaeda in Iraq offshoot group 

Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) changes the geostrategy of the entire Middle 

East, represents a dramatic setback to U.S. policy and interests, and requires an 

immediate response from Washington. The creation of an extremist quasi-state, 

analogous to Afghanistan under the Taliban, carries the risk of further escalation 

including a regional Sunni-Shia conflict, and an irreparable loss in U.S. influence. 

But the rise of the ISIL first in Syria and now in Iraq reflects in part the nefarious 

effort by Iran to exploit sectarian divides to achieve regional hegemony. The U.S. 

Government must counter both the IS threat and Iran’s quest for domination, bearing in mind that Iran is not our ally in the campaign against al-Qaeda terror. Above 

all, the U.S. must recognize that we are in a full blown crisis that requires action, 

even if politically risky. 

THE SITUATION

The rise of the IS, with control over up to 5 million people and massive military 

equipment and funding, in close proximity to some of the largest oil fields in the 

world, and bordering our NATO ally Turkey and security partners Jordan, Saudi 

Arabia, and Kuwait, threatens three of the four vital interests President Obama laid 

out in his U.N. General Assembly speech last September: threats to or allies and 

partners, rise of terrorist organizations, and threats to international flow of oil. The 

situation if it deteriorates further will likely threaten the fourth, development of 

weapons of mass destruction, as Iran, in part influenced by events in Iraq, is balking at a compromise outcome of the nuclear negotiations with the P5+1. 

A traditional approach to IS based on maintaining a unified Iraq, while building 

up the Iraqi Government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Sunni 

elements willing to resist ISIL, is the best option, but it may not long be attainable. 

Despite the election of a moderate Sunni Arab speaker of the Iraqi Parliament 2 

weeks ago, there is no certainty that Iraqi political leaders and Parliament can overcome their deep divisions to create an inclusive new government as rightly 

demanded by the U.S. Government. For starters, any such government must not be 

headed by PM Maliki. He has lost the trust of many of his citizens, including a 

great many Shia Arabs, yet is still trying to hold on to power. In this uncertain situation, while pushing the traditional approach, we must simultaneously prepare to 

deal with an Iraq semipermanently split into three separate political entities, and 

to shape our approach to the Sunni Arab, Shia Arab, and Kurdish populations and 

to the central government on that basis. 

But with either the traditional or this possible new approach, American military 

force under certain circumstances must be used against ISIL, for political as well 

as military and counterterrorism reasons, and everyone in the U.S. must understand that we are in an emergency. The costs of doing little or nothing now are 

greater than the risks of most actions short of committing ground troops. 

CONTINUING OUR TRADITIONAL POLICIES

The President’s course of action outlined in his Iraq speech of June 19 is reasonable: protect our Baghdad Embassy, strengthen our intelligence and military presence in and around Iraq, increase assistance to the Iraqi military, and press the 

Iraqi political system to support a new, inclusive government which can reach out 

to estranged Sunni Arabs and Kurds and maintain the country’s unity; only then 

with our help can it begin to retake areas held by the IS. This approach, reflecting 

our traditional policy toward a united Iraq, remains the best option, but over a 

month has passed since the President laid out this policy, and we have had little 

followthrough beyond better intelligence collection and on-the-ground coordination. 

That is important but not sufficient, and now it is not clear if we still have time 

to carry out this course of action. 

50 

To maximize the chances of a unified, inclusive Iraq to which we can provide significant new military assistance including air strikes, the following needs to occur 

in the days ahead: 

—The Iraqi Parliament, charged with forming a new government after the March 

elections, must decide on a Prime Minister other than Nuri al-Maliki. Few Sunni 

Arabs or Kurds will believe that any Iraqi Government is inclusive and would 

consider their interests if Maliki remains its leader. Promises to be inclusive and 

nonsectarian are cheap in Baghdad, but followthrough usually lacking. The most 

convincing proof that politicians have gotten the ‘‘be inclusive’’ message is for 

Maliki to step down, or be forced out by his own and other Shia parties. Removing 

Maliki is not a direct U.S. responsibility, and too obvious a U.S. push would be 

counterproductive. But we must make clear to all parties that decisive American 

support can only come with an inclusive government and buy-in by all major sectarian groups, and that this is not possible with Maliki. 

—The Kurdistan Regional Government must forgo its threats of independence in return for a government that will consider their interests. Finding a replacement 

for Maliki is necessary but not sufficient to win the Kurds back. This will require 

compromises on Kurdish oil exports building on a December 2013 agreement on 

calculating oil shares, and renewed payment by Baghdad of the Kurds’ 17 percent 

share of southern oil exports. The Kurds in turn will have to share their oil proceeds 17–83 percent between themselves and Baghdad, which they claim they will 

do, and exercise restraint on the status of the Kirkuk field, which they have not 

committed to do. The U.S. should push for such a solution by pressing both the 

Kurds directly and through their informal partner, Turkey, to engage fully the 

central government. Kurdish thirst for independence is understandable, but under 

current circumstances it is a recipe for reduced hydrocarbons income to the KRG 

for years, turmoil with the rest of Iraq, and resistance from regional states. It is 

thus a last option, not a first choice. 

—Any new Iraqi leadership must also win over Sunni Arabs. A commitment to provide significant oil revenue earnings to individual provinces (as has occurred 

already with the KRG, Basra, Najaf, and Kirkuk provinces) would provide concrete evidence of outreach to Sunni Arabs, and promote Iraq’s federal system and 

probably government efficiency at the same time. 

—A new Defense Minister from the Sunni Arab community, with very strong commitments by all parties to lead the military in fact, must be quickly selected once 

a new Prime Minister is chosen. 

—As noted above, the U.S. cannot consider decisive U.S. strikes until Iraq has an 

inclusive government which will resonate with many Sunni Arabs. The administration, in line with the President’s June 19 remarks, clearly is using possible 

U.S. military action as leverage to ensure such a government. That makes sense, 

but it is not incompatible with limited U.S. strikes for objectives similar to those 

General Dempsey spelled out recently—to protect population centers and strategic 

infrastructure and target ISIL leadership. Limited strikes now for such strategic 

purposes make sense. Any day is a good day to strike an al-Qaeda offshoot as dangerous as this one. People to whom we have given commitments, not just the Iraqi 

military but many Sunni Arabs and the Kurdish Peshmerga, are today locked in 

combat with ISIL, and need help. Especially given the recent record of American 

reticence in using force, limited strikes avoiding civilian areas now would 

increase, not decrease, our political leverage. 

—The U.S. should rapidly deploy its $500 million committed to train and equip the 

Syrian opposition. The U.S. should also strike against IS in Syria. 

—Once these steps have been taken, the U.S. can plan with the Iraqi Government, 

KRG, friendly Iraqi Sunni Arabs, and regional partners, to retake those Iraqi 

areas now held by the IS. Such a counterinsurgency plan would include aggressive 

U.S. training, equipping, and coordinating, intelligence, and air strikes, along 

with action by Sunni Arabs willing with our help to take on IS. 

A DIVIDED IRAQ?

While the above is aligned with administration policy, and in theory offers the 

best way forward, it may be too late to implement it, as the divisions between the 

various Iraqi groups deepen, sectarian slaughter especially of Sunni Arabs in and 

around Baghdad continues, and the KRG moves toward virtual independence, all 

with Maliki still in office. 

Were this to occur, the U.S. must deal with three separate entities, all posing significant problems for American interests: an IS threatening us, as well as our allies 

and partners, and a magnet for jihadist supporters world-wide; a KRG moving 

toward a de jure breakup with Baghdad, raising the specter of a Near East-wide 

51 

quest for a Kurdish nation-state which would undermine existing borders; and a 

rump Iraq, dominated by Shia religious parties heavily influenced by Iran, and controlling what the International Energy Agency believes could well be exports of 6 

million barrels of oil by 2020—almost two-thirds of Saudi Arabia’s exports. 

If this materializes, the U.S. must de facto abandon a policy prioritizing Iraqi 

unity. The first priority rather should be to deter and if necessary defeat IS attacks 

on Jordan, the KRG, and other partners and allies. Policy coordination with Turkey, 

Jordan, Israel, the KRG, and the Gulf States, important in any scenario, would be 

vital in this one, first as a shield for vulnerable states and groups, and then as a 

platform to destroy the IS. Such coordination would require much greater U.S. support for the Syrian opposition, caution with outreach to the KRG, whose independent status is anathema not just to Baghdad but to Arab States, and continued 

containment of Iran. It would also require U.S. strikes against IS in both Iraq and 

Syria. 

In such a scenario, U.S. policy toward Baghdad would inevitably evolve. To the 

extent the rump central government is willing to cooperate with us, and avoid provoking the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs further, then limited U.S. military support 

under the FMS program should continue, as should direct U.S. military action 

against IS attacks against Shia population centers. This policy will require constant 

review depending upon how influential Iran is in Baghdad, and how Baghdad treats 

its Kurdish and Sunni Arab citizens. The experience with Maliki in the past several 

months gives little hope that such treatment would improve as long as he remains 

in power. 

IRAN

The U.S. can talk with Iran about Iraq, emphasizing common interests such as 

unity of the state and the fight against IS, but we do not share common goals. In 

the fix we are presently in we have not one but two hegemonic Islamic radical forces 

intent on overthrowing the prevailing nation-state order in the region—al-Qaeda 

especially IS, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. And our allies in the common struggle for stability—Turkey, Israel, and the Sunni Arab States—see Iran as at least 

an equal threat to their survival as al-Qaeda. 

But we also must do everything possible to avoid a regional ‘‘Sunni versus Shia’’ 

conflict. Such a conflict would tear the region apart, and any U.S. involvement 

would have us violating our ‘‘we fight for liberal principles, not sectarian interests’’ 

policy that we have been able to maintain in the region and elsewhere, such as in 

the Balkans. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Ambassador Jeffrey. 

General Barbero. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. BARBERO, LIEUTENANT 

GENERAL, U.S. ARMY [RETIRED], WASHINGTON, DC 

General BARBERO. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Chairman, Ranking 

Member Corker. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the situation in Iraq and some options moving forward. I will focus my 

comments on the security sector, the Iraqi Security Forces, and 

some recommendations therein. 

But first I would like to start with several observations on the 

current situation. Time accrues to the benefit of ISIS. While we assess, they maintain the momentum, they grow stronger, and their 

hold on the population intensifies. ISIS has established control 

across a contiguous area in both Syria and Iraq and, as we discussed in the previous panel, it must be considered as an IraqSyria front. 

ISIS poses a formidable regional threat. What is most frightening 

is as they swept into Iraq they continued their expansion into 

Syria. They did not have to thin the lines to do that. 

The Iraqi Security Forces have regrouped. However, these forces 

have serious fundamental flaws and will require significant assistance to be able to undertake counteroffensives to dislodge and roll 

back ISIS control. 

52 

Finally, ISIS is an existential threat to both Baghdad and the 

Kurds. The Kurds have a 1,000-plus kilometer border or front with 

ISIS and they are largely on their own. 

Chairman Menendez asked at the outset, what is required to 

turn back the tide of ISIS? Well, it is clearly the Iraqi Security 

Forces. But my estimation is in their present state they cannot successfully meet this ISIS threat, let alone mount a major and effective counteroffensive without significant assistance. The capabilities necessary to counter ISIS do not exist today in Iraq and they 

will not likely materialize on their own. 

I am not talking in the future about ground combat forces from 

the United States. I am talking about advising and assisting in certain key areas. Let me cover those. The first is intelligence, and we 

have started that, developing tactical intelligence and targetable, 

actionable intelligence on the ground. We have started that. Now 

we need to turn that into action. 

But the second intelligence component is the ISIS network in 

Iraq, Syria, and their regional supporters must be a national collection and analysis priority for our entire intelligence community. 

Second, we should establish a training program for the ISF to develop sufficient combined arms capability in order to effectively 

conduct offensive operations to dislodge ISIS from the areas they 

now control. The ISF has been largely a checkpoint army. Since 

2011 their operations have been defensive in nature, static in disposition, and disjointed in execution. They need training. 

Third, they need assistance in establishing an effective wartime 

sustainment structure and process. Their existing one is a peacetime system and they have experienced significant decline in equipment readiness over the years, and this will be a daunting process, 

but it can be done. 

Fourth, they require changes to their command and control network. As we know, the system now in place is one put in by Prime 

Minister Maliki of area commands directly reporting to him. As we 

have seen, there needs to be changes in commanders and changes 

to develop an effective combat command and control capability. 

Fifth, the ISF continues to need weapons and equipment. We 

have done some good work to rush some equipment there, but we 

need to do more. Just this week Iraq’s Ambassador to the United 

States lamented the slow pace of our support when compared to 

the rapid support from Iran and Russia. We should quickly approve, ship, and enable material support to Iraq. 

Sixth, we should support the ISF with air strikes in order to degrade ISIS capabilities. But let me be clear. You cannot air strike 

or drone strike your way out of this. Air strikes must be part of 

a cohesive and coherent counteroffensive in order to attack ISIS. 

Seventh, we should support the Kurds and enable them to defend 

against this existential threat from ISIS. The Pesh Merga are an 

effective, determined, well-led force. However, they are lightly 

armed and underequipped. They are stretched very thin, and when 

ISIS turns on them they will be outgunned and overmatched. 

Now, there is a complex relationship between Baghdad and 

Erbil. I understand that. But why would we not, from a purely tactical and security perspective, why would we not rapidly enable the 

Kurds to defend northern Iraq from ISIS, prevent the oil-rich north 

53 

from falling into ISIS hands, and force ISIS to fight on two fronts 

in Iraq? 

Finally, this all depends on two things: a willing partner in 

Baghdad that is willing to accept these changes and to help develop 

an effective ISF; and second, as we all discussed, there must be a 

political climate where the Sunni and Kurds feel accommodation 

for them and they could join in a unified military action. 

In conclusion, it is an existential threat to Iraq. The longer we 

wait to decide on our response to Iraq’s request for support, the 

stronger they become. Finally, if the prevention of an ISIS-controlled Iraq is in the national interest of the United States, then 

we should act to aid and enable Iraq and the Kurds to defeat this 

threat as quickly as possible. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of General Barbero follows:] 

STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. BARBERO

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to discuss the situation in Iraq and options for U.S. policy there. 

One year ago I retired following 38 years of Active Duty, during which I spent 

three tours of duty in Iraq, spending a total of 46 months in Iraq. Since my retirement, over the past year, I have been back to Iraq—in Erbil, Baghdad, and Basra— 

6 times, maintaining close contact with many Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders. So, 

Iraq and its future is a subject of great personal importance to me. 

I am especially honored to appear with these two distinguished fellow panelists 

who are respected experts on the subject of today’s hearing. And given the broad 

and deep expertise of Ambassador Jeffrey and Doctor Pollack, I will focus my remarks on the security sector—the current security situation and recommendations 

on options for our security policy moving forward. 

I would like begin with several overall observations on the current security situation; followed by an assessment of the ISIS threat, and finishing with recommendations on assistance to Iraq’s security needs. 

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION

• Time accrues to the benefit of ISIS; while we ‘‘assess’’ they maintain the 

momentum, they grow stronger, and their hold on the population intensifies. 

ISIS continues to exert its control, consolidate gains, and build a state. 

• ISIS has established control across a contiguous area in both Syria and Iraq 

and we must realize it is the Iraq-Syria front, not just think in terms of Iraq. 

• ISIS poses a formidable regional threat. As it executed its sweeping campaign 

in Iraq, ISIS simultaneously continued its campaign expansion in Eastern Syria 

and has the strategy and capabilities to continue the offensive. 

• The Iraqi Security Forces have regrouped and stopped the ISIS advance. However these forces have serious, fundamental flaws and will require significant 

assistance to be able to undertake a counteroffensive to dislodge and roll back 

ISIS control. 

• ISIS is an existential threat to both Baghdad and the Kurds. The Kurds have 

a 1,000+ KM border/front with ISIS and they are largely on their own. It is time 

to assist and enable the Kurds in their fight with ISIS. 

Now, I would like to elaborate on these points and discuss the security situation 

in Iraq. 

ISIS and the Syria-Iraq Front 

ISIS seeks to create an Islamic Caliphate extending across Syria and Iraq by first 

destroying the existing state boundaries of Iraq and Syria and expanding the territory under their control. It is a mistake to consider ISIS actions in Iraq in isolation. 

Rather, ISIS must be viewed in the new reality that it has established control over 

major, contiguous areas of Syria and Iraq. 

In Syria, following the declaration of a caliphate by ISIS leader Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, a cascade of surrenders by rebel and tribal brigades in Syria’s Deir ezZour province conferred large swaths of territorial control to ISIS. Beginning on 

July 2, these advances dramatically changed the balance of power within the 

54 

province and provided ISIS the opportunity to achieve territorial continuity along 

the Euphrates River into Iraq’s al-Anbar province. ISIS has successfully linked its 

territorial control between its ar-Raqqa stronghold and Deir ez-Zour City, solidifying 

an ISIS control zone that stretches from ar-Raqqa into Iraq’s al-Anbar province. 

ISIS seized control of eight towns located northwest of Deir ez-Zour city from the 

al-Bosarya tribe on July 18. This advance comes as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and Ahrar 

al-Sham forces surrendered control of the towns of as-Shametia and Jabal Kabous 

to ISIS, abandoned their local headquarters and withdrawing from the province. 

The surrender of a large number of local rebel and tribal brigades to ISIS in Syria’s Deir ez-Zour province was a reflection and result of ISIS success in Iraq. Driven 

by apprehension in the wake of ISIS’s success in Iraq, a number of local leaders 

sought to avoid an armed takeover by reinvigorated ISIS forces and agreed to a set 

of ISIS-imposed conditions for the peaceful surrender of rebel forces. These agreements allowed ISIS to quickly and efficiently assert full control over a large swath 

of territory whose armed takeover would have otherwise required a significant and 

costly ISIS ground offensive. Critically, further surrenders have occurred as ISIS 

began to consolidate. In addition to providing an additional windfall of weaponry, 

these surrenders have expanded ISIS’s zones of control and sustained the current 

ISIS momentum within the province. 

According to some reports ISIS now controls 35 percent of Syrian territory and 

the Syrian regime has been unable to meaningfully challenge the ISIS advance. 

In Iraq, as evidence that actions in Syria and in Iraq are closely linked, ISIS completed its military operation to connect its line of communication between its strongholds in ar-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zour and Mosul, Iraq. For example, ISIS has extended 

its campaign against primarily Kurdish-protected areas by attacking in Sinjar. 

Sinjar, which has been quiet since Tal Afar fell, may become a more significant 

focus for ISIS. 

In Baghdad, ISIS’s Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) campaign 

is active again, relaunching its signature wave of VBIEDs attacks. Multiple, nearsimultaneous attacks are the signature strategy that ISIS pursued as it gained 

strength in 2012 and 2013. In the first significant use of VBIEDs since a wave of 

attacks occurred on May 13, 2014, last Saturday on 19 July, multiple VBIEDs detonated in Baghdad’s Shia neighborhoods. I believe these actions portend an ISIS 

campaign to attack Baghdad as part of its strategic campaign the secure Baghdad. 

Spectacular attacks in the form of VBIED and indirect fire attacks against Shia and 

Government targets in Baghdad, including Baghdad International Airport will be 

accompanied by ‘‘conventional’’ ground attacks to turn Baghdad into a war zone. 

Across the Syria-Iraq front, ISIS possesses the momentum in all areas and will 

continue its operations to assert control over occupied territories, continue its 

assault in Iraq to secure its lines of communication and expand its control over strategic objectives. 

Iraqi Security Forces 

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in their present state, cannot successfully meet this 

ISIS threat, let alone mount a major and effective counteroffensive, without significant assistance. Preparing ISF for an effective counteroffensive operation requires 

extensive preparation; it cannot be thrown together in days or weeks. The capabilities necessary to counter ISIS do not exist today in Iraq and they will not likely 

materialize on their own anytime soon. 

Let me be clear—I am not talking about a direct ground combat role for U.S. 

Forces. However, enabling the ISF to be successful against ISIS will require robust 

advising and enabling by American Forces, and this effort must be started immediately and executed simultaneously in several critical areas. 

First, the decisive way to defeat an ISIS force is to attack its entire network: its 

leaders, financiers, suppliers and key operators, combat capabilities and front line 

fighters. However, generating targetable intelligence to attack ISIS requires a deep 

understanding of the network, which is only gained through a robust and effective 

intelligence effort over time. This intelligence support has two components. First, 

this requires an investment of personnel and technical intelligence capabilities in 

Iraq to develop an intelligence system that integrates all types of intelligence from 

all sources. The ISF need support in tactical intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination in order to understand the ISIS structure and develop targets. In the 

absence of this actionable intelligence, independent ground operations or isolated 

airstrikes, as we have seen from the ISF in recent days and weeks, will remain ineffective in producing the desired effect of seriously degrading the ISIS network. 

To support operations in Iraq, there must be a second intelligence component— 

the collection and analysis effort of ISIS and their external support network must 

be made a priority for our National Intelligence Community. The ISIS network in 

55 

Iraq, Syria, and the regional support network external to the Iraq-Syria front must 

be a national collection and analysis priority. And one of the prime objectives of this 

collection is to identify and target ISIS finances and financial support. While ISIS 

is reported to be very well resourced from their recent asset seizures in Iraq, these 

resources must be replenished. We must identify all sources of income and employ 

all of the Counter Threat Finance tools that our Interagency brings to this fight in 

order to target and limit the free flow of funding to ISIS. This targeting must 

include any regional government and nongovernment entities. 

Second, we should establish a training program for ISF to improve their basic 

combat skills to develop modest combined arms capability in order to effectively conduct offensive operations by conventional forces to dislodge ISIS from the occupied 

areas under ISIS control. The ISF are largely a ‘‘checkpoint army.’’ Since 2011 their 

operations have been defensive in nature, static in disposition and disjointed in execution. They need training to develop the skills required to fight this ISIS army, 

as recent tactical failures against ISIS clearly indicate. We also need to enhance the 

capabilities of ISF Special Operations Forces. While these are the most competent 

and most effective of the ISF, they will need to greatly improve their capabilities 

in order to conduct the unrelenting, precise strike operations against critical ISIS 

targets. 

Third, the ISF need assistance in establishing effective wartime sustainment 

structure and process. The existing sustainment system of the ISF is a peacetime 

system, designed to support fielding of military systems while dealing with a lowlevel insurgency. In 2010, we identified ISF sustainment as being a significant 

shortfall and that if it was not addressed, the readiness of ISF equipment would 

soon be in a ‘‘death spiral’’ where the backlog of deferred maintenance would overwhelm their abilities to field effective, modern forces. Reversing years of decline in 

equipment readiness will be a daunting, but not impossible process. 

Fourth, The ISF require a decentralized command and control system that can 

rapidly process information and enable tactical decisions. The system that is in 

place in Iraq, one of Area Operations Commands emplaced by, and reporting 

directly to, Prime Minister Maliki, is a peacetime structure to ensure centralized 

control, with leaders chosen by the Prime Minister for loyalty over combat competence. The ISF require a command and control structure for sustained combat 

operations against a capable enemy. 

Fifth, the ISF need the weaponry and equipment necessary for sustained combat 

operations. We have rushed some weapons and armaments to Iraq, however we 

need to do more. Most of our military aid to Iraq is moving at the glacial pace of 

our Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. Iraq’s Ambassador to the United States 

has lamented that the slow pace of our support when compared to the rapid support 

from Iran and Russia. We should quickly approve, ship, and enable material support 

to Iraq. 

Sixth, we should support the ISF with airstrikes in order to degrade ISIS capabilities. But, let me be clear—isolated drone and air strikes in the absence of these 

other capabilities will be marginally effective. One cannot drone-strike or airstrike 

one’s way out of this. These strikes will serve as an important part of a coordinated 

approach to this ISIS threat, but in isolation they will achieve fleeting effects. They 

must be integrated into the overall counteroffensive. Also, to produce effective airstrikes, especially against an enemy among the population, one needs to have air 

controllers on the ground to call in precise strikes and to control the effects. The 

Iraqis do not possess the capability to serve in this role. And no amount of isolated 

airstrikes will turn the current tactical situation in Iraq and produce decisive effects 

on their own. 

Seventh, we should support the Kurds and enable them to defend against this existential threat of ISIS. The Peshmerga are an effective, determined and well-led 

force. However, they are lightly armed, inadequately equipped and insufficiently 

trained to counter the better-equipped ISIS force. They are stretched very thin over 

their 1,050-kilometer front with ISIS and, when ISIS turns on them, they will be 

outgunned and overmatched. The Kurds have proven to be loyal friends and allies 

to the United States and they have recently asked for material and nonmaterial 

support from us and we should expedite this support to them. 

Understanding the complex relationship between Erbil and Baghdad, our ‘‘one 

Iraq’’ policy, and the arguments against aiding the Kurdish Region apart from the 

central government, the realities on the ground make this an exigent requirement. 

From a purely tactical and security perspective, why wouldn’t we enable the Kurds 

to defend northern Iraq from ISIS, prevent the oil-rich north from falling into ISIS 

hands, and force ISIS to fight on two fronts in Iraq? 

56 

Security Depends on a Political Arrangement That Includes Sunnis and Kurds 

However, for this security support to succeed, we need two things from Baghdad. 

First, we need a willing partner, one that is committed to accepting this assistance 

and to making the systemic and structural changes necessary to the Iraqi security 

structure in order to build the ISF into an effective force. Second, underpinning 

these military operations is the most critical requirement, a political accommodation 

of the Sunnis and the Kurds. In order to separate ISIS from their greatest advantage, an acquiescent Sunni population, there needs to be a political arrangement in 

Baghdad that the Sunnis can broadly accept. This political arrangement must also 

accommodate the Kurds and create the proper conditions for the Kurds to participate. However, as the recent political activities in Baghdad prove, a political agreement that satisfies all parties of Iraq could be the toughest impediment to reversing 

this existential threat to Iraq. But, in order for any hope of success, there must be 

some sort of political accommodation and an acceptable arrangement, which allows 

the Sunnis and Kurds to join in a unified military action. 

CONCLUSION

ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq and a significant threat to the region. Iraq 

and its security forces have proven unable to defeat this threat in their present condition and with their present capabilities. The longer we wait to decide on our response to Iraq’s requests for support, the stronger ISIS becomes. If the prevention 

of an ISIS-controlled Iraq is in the interest of the United States, then we should 

act to aid and enable Iraq and the Kurds to defeat this threat as quickly as possible. 

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and distinguished members of the 

committee, again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look 

forward to your questions. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, General Barbero. 

Dr. Pollack. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK, SENIOR FELLOW, 

SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, BROOKINGS 

INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. POLLACK. Mr. Chairman, Senator, it is always a great honor 

to appear before this committee. 

I want to start by talking a little bit about some of the realities 

that we face in Iraq, because I think they are critical in understanding where we are and what the possibilities are moving forward. I want to just talk about two. First, we need to recognize 

that American influence in Iraq has attenuated very significantly, 

to the point where I would argue that at this point the United 

States interests exceed our influence. 

Second, we need to come to grips with the fact that what we face 

in Iraq today is a civil war. Iraq is not on the brink, it is not sliding 

into it. It is a civil war, and the dynamics of intercommunal civil 

wars now apply, and those make intervention by third powers very 

difficult. 

With that in mind, I think that the current approach of the administration, with a few tweaks, is probably the best one plausible. 

It is the only one, and that is the idea of forging a new political 

leadership and reforming Iraq’s political system. It is the only option that we have that does offer the prospect of ending Iraq’s civil 

war in a matter of months rather than years, and of preserving 

American interests in a whole variety of other ways. 

But nevertheless, we need to recognize that it will be very difficult, and it goes well beyond merely replacing the current Iraqi 

political leadership. It is going to mean restructuring Iraq’s politics 

in a way that will encompass the desires and aspirations and the 

fears of all of Iraq’s communities, and that is not going to be easy. 

57 

If it fails, Iraq’s civil war is going to roll on and, as I have already suggested, the dynamics of an intercommunal civil war were 

to take hold and those are very hard to break. 

But we will have some options. Unfortunately, those options are 

all awful. I think the first one is to recognize, as any number of 

us and some of the Senators have made the point earlier, that Iraq 

and Syria are now a single civil war. And the problem that we will 

face in Iraq is that we will have a very complex situation. We will 

be looking to support both moderate Sunnis and moderate Shia 

against their extremists and hoping to forge a new peace between 

them. That is very hard. 

Syria offers a little bit of clarity, in that we hate the regime, are 

not looking to support them in any way, and that at least opens 

up the prospect of developing a Syria-first policy, by which we 

would build a new Syrian opposition army that might be able to 

defeat both the regime and the extremists, stabilize the country, 

and serve as both a bridge and a model to Sunni moderates inside 

Iraq. 

I see that option as entirely feasible, but it is not guaranteed to 

work and it is several steps beyond what the United States has 

been willing to consider so far. In fact, it will take years if it works 

at all and it will require a commitment of resources, probably including air power, that the United States has so far been unwilling 

to make. 

If we are not willing to commit that level of resources to actually 

bring the civil war to a close, another option is partition, something 

that has been talked about very frequently. I will say that I think 

that if we do not bring this to a rapid close we will find that partition is the de facto outcome in Iraq. It will be divided up into a 

Sunnistan and a Shiastan and the Kurds will undoubtedly go their 

own way. 

The question for us would be, can we find ways to turn de facto 

partition into de jure partition and somehow use it to bring about 

peace. Again, I think that is possible, but nevertheless it will be extremely difficult, far more difficult than I think many of its pundits 

and partisans around town are making it out to be. In fact, I would 

say that there is a dangerous mythology suggesting that partition 

of Iraq could be quick and easy and relatively bloodless. 

In fact, Iraq’s communities remain deeply intermingled. The different militias have made claims on territory currently held by the 

others. The fear that overwhelms Iraqis will remain and, what is 

more, dividing up Iraq’s water, oil, and other resources will be 

enormously difficult. So the likelihood is that trying to bring about 

partition will take years and hundreds of thousands of lives lost. 

The last alternative that we will have will be to follow a policy 

of containment, of trying to prevent the spillover from the IraqiSyrian civil war onto Iraq’s other neighbors and from harming 

American interests in the region in that way. Again, this is certainly a possible alternative for the United States, but we need to 

remember that containment is exceptionally difficult. It has rarely 

succeeded in the past, and I think that the fall of Mosul is perhaps 

the most graphic illustration of just how hard it is to contain the 

spillover from one civil war from affecting another. 

58 

The last point I would make is simply that to do nothing would 

be the worst choice of all. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Pollack follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. POLLACK

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators, I am honored to be able to appear 

before you to discuss possible options to address the grave situation in Iraq. 

I think it important to start any such conversation with an acknowledgement of 

the realities we face. First, it is painful, but necessary, to recognize that the United 

States has only very limited influence in Iraq today. The George W. Bush administration, by its many disastrous mistakes, squandered a great deal of the influence 

we once had there. The Obama administration, by its misguided neglect, surrendered most of what we had left. Indeed, Iraq now constitutes the hardest of situations for Americans to confront: it is a crisis in which our interests exceed our influence. Consequently, the options we consider moving forward must include methods 

to help increase U.S. influence to improve our ability to defend our interests. 

Second, it is equally critical that we accept the reality that Iraq has fallen once 

more into civil war. It is not ‘‘on the brink of civil war.’’ It is not ‘‘sliding into civil 

war.’’ It is not ‘‘at risk of a new civil war.’’ It is in a civil war. This is what civil 

war looks like. And civil wars have certain dynamics that need to be understood if 

they are to be ended, or even merely survived. 

Iraq’s current situation is the recurrence of the civil war of 2006–2008. In 2007– 

2008, the United States committed tremendous military and economic resources to 

pull Iraq out of that first instance of civil war. This time around, Washington has 

made clear that it will not devote anything like the same resources and there is no 

other country that can. 

This second point is important because intercommunal civil wars like Iraq’s are 

difficult for external powers to end without either a significant commitment of resources or a terrible slaughter by one or more of the combatants. Given the American public’s understandable unwillingness to recommit the kind of resources we did 

in 2007–2008, we are unlikely to bring the Iraqi civil war to a speedy end with minimal bloodshed and still safeguard the range of American interests engaged there. 

For those reasons, the hard truth we face is that, in the circumstances we currently 

find ourselves in, our options range from bad to awful. 

Nevertheless, doing nothing because all of the options are unpalatable would be 

the worst choice of all. Civil wars do not just go away if they are ignored. They burn 

on and on. They also have a bad habit of infecting neighboring states—just as the 

Syrian civil war has helped reignite the Iraqi civil war. If we try to turn our back 

on Iraq once again, it will affect its neighbors. It could easily affect the international 

oil market (and through it, the U.S. economy, which remains heavily dependent on 

the price of oil no matter how much we may frack). It will also generate terrorists 

who will seek to kill Americans. So our option may be awful, but we have no choice 

but to try to make them work. 

PLAN A: REBUILDING A (SOMEWHAT) UNIFIED IRAQ

Although I believe that the Obama administration’s Iraq policy has been disastrous, and a critical factor in the rekindling of Iraq’s civil war,1 I find myself largely 

in agreement with the approach they have adopted to deal with the revived civil 

war. Our first priority should be to try to engineer a new Iraqi Government that 

Kurds, Shia and moderate Sunnis can all embrace, so that they can then wage a 

unified military campaign (with American support) against ISIS and the other 

Sunni militant groups.2

That needs to remain Washington’s priority until it fails because it is the best outcome for all concerned, including the United States. Doing so would be the most 

likely way to dampen or eliminate the current conflict, and create the fewest causes 

for future violence. It could also succeed relatively quickly—in a matter of months 

rather than years like all of the other options. However, it will be extremely difficult 

to pull off. 

The keys to this strategy will be to convince the Kurds not to break from Iraq 

and convince moderate Sunnis to remain part of the Iraqi political process—and to 

turn on ISIS and the other Sunni militant groups. As I and other experts on Iraq 

have written, this will require both a new political leadership and a drastic overhaul 

of Iraq’s political system. With regard to the former condition, at this point, it seems 

highly unlikely that Nuri al-Maliki can remain Prime Minister and retain either the 

Kurds or meaningful Sunni representation in his government. However, even if he 

59 

were removed and new, more acceptable leaders chosen, there would still be a long 

way to go.3

Even moderate Sunni leaders are not going to go back to the status quo ante. 

They now insist on decentralizing power from the center to the periphery, a redistribution of power within the Federal Government, and a thorough depoliticization 

of the Iraqi security services so that they cannot be used as a source of repression 

by what will inevitably be a Shia-dominated central government. They are likely to 

demand to be allowed to form a federal region like the Kurdistan Regional Government, complete with a separate budget and their own military forces akin to the 

Kurdish Peshmerga. 

For their part, the Kurds will want even more than that. At this point, given the 

extensive autonomy that the KRG already enjoys, coupled with the territorial and 

administrative gains it has won in the wake of the ISIS offensive, greater federalism 

probably won’t be an adequate alternative to independence for the Kurds. If the 

Kurds can be prevented from seceding, it will probably require Baghdad to accept 

a confederal arrangement with Erbil. 

The difference here is that in a typical federal system, resources and authorities 

are generated from the center and delegated to the periphery for all but a limited 

number of constrained functions. However, keeping the Kurds on board will likely 

necessitate a shift to one in which resources and authority begin in the periphery 

and then are shared with the center for specific purposes and under specific 

constraints. 

The Kurds are likely to insist that the KRG maintain the current lines of control 

in disputed territories unchanged until a referendum can be conducted in accordance with article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. Baghdad will have to recognize 

Erbil’s right to develop and market the oil it produces as the new status quo. As 

for oil revenues, Erbil will demand that it be allowed to keep the Kirkuk oil fields 

it has now secured, and agree that Baghdad and Erbil each be allowed to pump as 

much oil as they like and pay all of their own expenses from those revenues. 

Assuming that moderate Sunnis, Kurds and moderate Shia can all agree on these 

various changes, we could see the resurrection of a unified Iraqi polity. It is reasonable to assume that in those happy circumstances, many Sunni tribes will be ready 

to fight ISIS and the other Sunni militant groups—and to accept assistance from 

the United States to do so. (Although they have made clear that they will not accept 

assistance from the Iraqi Security Forces until they have been thoroughly depoliticized.) Moreover, these are really the only circumstances in which the United States 

should be willing to provide large-scale military assistance to the Iraqi Government 

to fight ISIS and the other militant groups. Only in those circumstances will such 

assistance be seen as nonpartisan, meant to help all Iraqis and not just the Shia 

(and their Iranian allies). 

However, what is important to note about this scenario is that replacing Prime 

Minister Maliki, if that can be accomplished at all, is a necessary but not sufficient 

condition to end the conflict on the best terms imaginable for the United States (and 

Iraq). Even after Maliki is removed, the Iraqis will have to sort out far-reaching reforms and redistributions of power and wealth. As hard as all of that will be, there 

is the added danger that given the overwhelming distrust among all of the Iraqi 

parties, the Sunnis tribes will refuse to take any action against the Sunni militants 

until all of the political negotiations have been concluded. Having been burned so 

many times in the past, that will be a reasonable inclination on their part. However, 

if they do so, it could be months or years before they work things out and are ready 

to turn on ISIS and the other militants. By then it would be much harder to rid 

the country of the Sunni militants and those groups may well have done a great 

deal of damage already, including possibly mounting terrorist attacks abroad. 

One area in which I think that the Obama administration could be doing a better 

job to foster this approach to the revived Iraqi civil war would be to lean in, rather 

than leaning back. What I mean by this is that moderate Iraqis from across the political and ethnosectarian spectrum have complained that while the administration 

is loudly demanding a wide range of changes in Iraq’s political leadership and reforms of the Iraqi political process, they have so far been vague and equivocal in 

describing what the United States would do to help a new and reformed Iraqi Government. Given how many Iraqis already believe that President Obama wants nothing to do with Iraq and will never provide meaningful assistance, such reserve only 

undercuts what little influence the United States has left in Iraq. 

Instead, the only way to increase American leverage with the Iraqis is to enumerate plainly the kinds of support that the United States would be willing to provide to a reformed, reunified Iraqi Government. This support should include drone 

strikes, the provision of weapons and reconnaissance assets, greater intelligence 

support and targeting assistance, improved and expanded training for Iraqi forces, 

60 

and potentially even manned airstrikes. Better still, it could include a commitment 

to make the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement into the kind of across-the-board 

bilateral assistance relationship always envisioned, but never actually implemented 

by the Obama administration. This would entail technical, administrative, and possibly even financial assistance for the full panoply of Iraqis needs—military, agriculture, education, energy, telecommunications, transportation, diplomatic, and virtually anything else the Iraqis might need. An American commitment to provide 

such assistance would be enormously popular among average Iraqis, and therefore 

would buy Washington considerable influence with their leaders. It would also galvanize Iraq’s economy and help knit its fractured society back together—two more 

keys to preventing yet another outbreak of civil war. 

PLAN B: SYRIA FIRST

If the United States, working in conjunction with our regional allies, the Iraqis 

themselves and (necessarily) the Iranians cannot forge a new Iraqi national consensus and power-sharing arrangement, the civil war will worsen. 

Intercommunal civil wars like Iraq’s share a number of unhelpful qualities. First, 

they tend to stalemate along the internal ethnosectarian dividing lines of the country. Those divides become the front lines, and they tend to be very, very bloody. Second, they tend to empower the worst elements in every society. It is the radicals 

who take advantage of the chaos and the fear, using it to kill off or drown out moderate rivals who are typically not ruthless enough to retain power. Of course, the 

radicals typically prosper from the conflict and have little interest in seeing it end 

except in complete victory. 

Third, in part for that reason, intercommunal civil wars tend to burn on for years, 

sometimes even decades. The Algerian civil war ran from 1991 to 2002. The Lebanese civil war lasted from 1975–1991 and ended only because of Syrian intervention. 

The Congolese civil war has been roiling on since 1994. Somalia since 1991. Afghanistan has arguably careened from civil war to civil war since 1979, or more conventionally since 1989. 

And fourth, they always produce spillover.4 Spillover typically takes six different 

forms: terrorism, refugees, secessionism, radicalization of neighboring populations, 

economic downturns, and intervention by neighboring states. At its worst, spillover 

from an intercommunal civil war can help cause a civil war in another state (as 

spillover from Lebanon caused the 1976–1982 Syrian civil war, and the current Syrian civil war helped reignite the Iraqi civil war). Or it can metastasize into a regional war as neighboring states intervene to halt the other manifestations of spillover and/or to secure their interests against the predations of other states. That’s 

how Israel and Syria came to blows over Lebanon in the 1980s and why seven different African states intervened in Congo, producing what is often referred to as 

‘‘Africa’s world war.’’ For a variety of reasons, spillover from a protracted Iraqi civil 

war could be very bad, threatening U.S. allies like Turkey and Jordan and critical 

oil producers like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran. 

For all of these reasons, I believe that even if the current gambit fails, the United 

States will have a strong interest in seeing the civil war there ended. The problem, 

once again, is that doing so will be even harder with the limited resources that the 

U.S. is willing to employ. It will mean finding ways to appeal to both moderate Shia 

and moderate Sunnis in Iraq, help them to defeat their own radicals and then convince them to make peace with one another—and ideally forge a new power-sharing 

arrangement that would preserve a relatively unified Iraq. (Or a relatively unified 

Arab Iraq since it is highly unlikely the Kurds will refrain from independence under 

conditions of all-out civil war in Arab Iraq.) 

Doing so in Iraq would probably mean starting in Syria. That may seem counterintuitive, but Syria offers an important clarity lacking in current Iraq. If Iraq is engulfed in full-scale civil war with no hope that political change in Baghdad could 

end the conflict, the United States will have a particularly problematic dilemma: we 

will have mixed feelings about both the Shia-dominated government and the Sunnidominated opposition. We will hate ISIS and the Sunni radicals, but not the Sunni 

tribes and moderates allied with them. We will hate the Shia radicals and mistrust 

their Iranian allies, but not the Shia moderates who will inevitably have to join 

their coreligionists. Supplying both sides in any civil war is a nonstarter, but in Iraq 

those circumstances will make it (or should make it) impossible to decide which side 

to back. In that one respect, Syria is much easier. There the United States 

unequivocally backs the Sunni-dominated opposition against the Shia-dominated 

regime. 

That situation would enable the United States to make a significantly greater 

effort to build a new, conventionally trained, armed, and organized Syrian 

61 

opposition army. One that could defeat the forces of both the regime and the Sunni 

Islamist radicals.5 Although such an effort would likely take anywhere from 2–5 

years, it has a number of important advantages. First, it is entirely feasible—especially if coupled with Western air power. It would create the best conditions for a 

stable Syria, which would eliminate the spillover into Iraq, including the ability of 

ISIS and other radical groups to employ Syria as a base and recruiting ground to 

support operations in Iraq. Moreover, it would create a moderate, nonpartisan but 

largely Sunni force that could appeal to moderate Sunni tribesmen in Iraq. Indeed, 

a moderate, mostly Sunni, opposition army triumphing in Syria would be a tremendous draw for the Sunnis of Iraq—a model of what they might become if they rid 

themselves of ISIS, as well as an ally in that fight. 

Finally, if the United States were to help create such a new model Syrian opposition army, one that could then serve as a conduit for American assistance to Iraqi 

Sunnis as well, Washington would then be ideally placed to reach out to moderate 

Shia groups in Iraq. The defeat of the Assad regime in Syria would doubtless terrify 

many Iraqi Shia that the Syrian opposition army planned to turn on them as well. 

As their trainers, advisors, paymasters, and weapons suppliers, the United States 

could then offer to rein in the new Syrian Army and even to provide similar assistance to moderate Iraqi Shia groups to enable them to defeat their own radicals. If 

they accepted, and they would have strong incentives to do so, they too would be 

beholden to the United States, creating the best circumstances possible for the U.S. 

to broker a deal between the moderate Sunnis and the moderate Shia (of both Iraq 

and Syria). 

PLAN C: SEEKING A STABLE PARTITION

Building a new Syrian Army and helping it to defeat both the Assad regime and 

the Sunni militants would be time-consuming and require more resources than the 

U.S. has so far committed there, but it is hardly impossible. If we succeeded, then 

using that force to help Iraqi Sunnis turn on their own militants would also be a 

realistic aspiration. And if that too succeeded, then it is reasonable to believe that 

those circumstances could then be employed to convince Iraq’s Shia to do the same. 

Finally making possible a negotiated settlement in Iraq. 

Certainly there is no reason that any of this is impossible. But none of it will be 

easy. And each additional step adds degrees of time, cost, and difficulty. Even if we 

were willing to invest the time and resources to give this strategy the greatest likelihood of succeeding, it could take many years to seal the final deal. And there is 

no guarantee that every link in the chain would succeed enough to make the next 

link plausible. 

With that in mind, I believe that the U.S. should also consider a more straightforward alternative, namely to try to end the fighting by convincing all sides to recognize the de facto division of the country that is likely to take place. As noted, the 

battle lines between Sunni and Shia militias are likely to run roughly along the 

blurry dividing lines between their communities. Tragically, those lines are likely 

to sharpen as a result of the widespread ethnic cleansing that will accompany the 

fighting and that has already begun again. The Kurds, will almost certainly opt for 

independence under these circumstances, and even if they refrain from a formal declaration, they will be independent in all but name. 

In theory, a simpler alternative to trying to put Iraq back together again, would 

be to recognize its partition and convince the parties to accept that reality and stop 

fighting. Of course, what seems simple and obvious in theory often proves anything 

but that in practice. 

Indeed, there is a dangerous mythology taking hold in Washington that partition 

might be easy because Iraq has since been sorted out into neat, easily divided cantonments. That is simply false. While there are far fewer mixed towns and neighborhoods, they still exist, and even the homogeneous towns and neighborhoods remain 

heavily intermingled across central Iraq, including in Baghdad. Moreover, both the 

Sunni and the Shia militias are claiming territory largely inhabited by the sects of 

the other. All of that indicates that it would probably take years of horrible bloodshed to convince both the Sunni and Shia leaderships to agree to partition, let alone 

on where to divide the country. 

Thus, the challenge for the United States would be how to assist a process by 

which the various Iraqi factions recognized that continued fighting was fruitless and 

they should agree to a cease-fire and a functional division of the country to end the 

war altogether. That too will not be easy. Again, the key will be to empower moderates on both sides (Sunni and Shia) to enable them to defeat the radicals and then 

strike a workable deal with one another. (By definition, a moderate in an intercommunal civil war is someone willing to work with the other side.) 

62 

In theory, (there’s that phrase again), the United States might provide military 

support to both Sunni and Shia moderates to help them triumph over their respective extremists in their respective cantonments. In practice, they are just as likely 

to try to use that assistance against each other as against the extremists. And if 

military assistance is not the right way to influence such groups waging an all-out 

civil war, it is even harder to imagine that any other form of assistance would have 

greater sway with them. Historically, only the threat of punishment has carried that 

kind of weight in such circumstances, but that would require a willingness on the 

part of the United States to become very heavily involved in the Iraqi civil war, 

quite possibly including with combat troops, which makes it a nonstarter. 

Thus, the reality of a partition strategy is that, absent a willingness on the part 

of the U.S. to impose it by cracking heads, we will probably find ourselves on the 

sidelines, waiting and hoping that the Iraqi militia leaders will eventually recognize 

the futility of their combat and agree to accept Americans (or others) to step in as 

mediators and broker a disengagement and partition. That’s not impossible. But 

typically, it is a long time coming, and in the meantime Iraqis will die while the 

region will suffer all of the effects of spillover. Partition may ultimately be the outcome in Iraq, but absent a plausible mechanism for the United States to convince 

the militias to agree to it in the near term, it will be difficult to adopt it is an actual 

strategy. As Colin Powell famously remarked, ‘‘Hope is not a strategy,’’ and hoping 

that Iraqi militia leaders recognize the error of their ways is not a good way to safeguard American interests in the region. 

PLAN D: CONTAINMENT

Inevitably, America’s last option would be containment.6 We could simply opt to 

leave Iraq to its fate and try as best we might to block or mitigate the spillover 

onto its neighbors. In fact, unless and until we could find a way to convince the militias to stop fighting, the ‘‘partition’’ approach described above would have to rely on 

containment. To some extent, so too would a strategy of remaking Iraqi politics by 

building a new Syrian opposition army that could stabilize Syria and then help stabilize Iraq since that would be a long time in the making if it succeeded at all. In 

short, the United States is probably going to rely on at least some aspects of a containment strategy toward Iraq under any circumstances unless we are able to help 

forge a new Iraqi political leadership and power-sharing agreement that stops the 

civil war in its tracks. 

The problem with containment is that it does not work very well. Historically, few 

nations have been able to stave off the worst aspects of spillover from an intercommunal civil war for very long. Most countries find themselves suffering worse and 

worse, and often getting drawn into the civil wars the longer they drag on. It is 

harder to find good cases of neighboring countries that successfully minimized the 

impact of spillover on themselves. 

In many cases states have simply tried to weather the storm and paid a heavy 

price for doing so. Others have been driven to do what they could to end the conflict 

instead. Syria spent at least 8 years trying to end the Lebanese civil war before the 

1989 Ta’if accords and the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War gave it the opportunity to 

finally do so. Israel’s 1982 invasion was also a bid to end the Lebanese civil war 

after its previous efforts to contain it had failed, and when this too failed Jerusalem 

tried to go back to managing spillover. By 2000, it was clear that this was again 

ineffective and so Israel simply pulled out of Lebanon altogether in a vain effort to 

prevent further spillover. Withdrawing from Lebanon was smart for Israel for many 

reasons, but it has not put an end to its Lebanon problem. In the Balkans, the 

United States and its NATO Allies realized that it was impossible to manage the 

Bosnian or Kosovar civil wars and so in both cases they employed coercion—including the deployment of massive ground forces—to bring them to an end. Pakistan 

opted to try to end the Afghan civil war by building and encouraging the Taliban, 

an effort that, 20 years later, has left Pakistan riven by internal conflict of its own. 

Nevertheless, we may well have nothing left but to try to contain the spillover 

from an Iraqi civil war. From America’s perspective that will require pursuing a 

number of critical courses of action. 

Provide Whatever Assistance We Can to Iraqi Civilians and Refugees. In this scenario Iraq’s civil war will rage on, fueled by its militias and, unfortunately, its 

neighbors. The biggest losers will be the people of Iraq themselves. Hundreds of 

thousands are likely to die. Millions will be forced to flee their homes and suffer 

other tragedies. Those people represent both a moral responsibility and a strategic 

threat since they constitute ideal recruitment pools for militias and terrorists. Especially if the United States opts not to do anything to try to bring the civil war to 

a rapid end, but also if we are merely forced to wait for other aspects of our strategy 

63 

to gain traction, we should and must provide what support we can to the people 

of Iraq, both those who remain and those who flee. Undoubtedly various international NGOs and U.N. agencies will do what they can, but without the resources 

of nation-states, they will not be able to do much. 

Provide Support to Iraq’s Neighbors. The historical evidence from other intercommunal civil war suggests that the United States should provide assistance to Iraq’s 

neighbors to reduce the likelihood that their own deprivation will create sympathy 

for, or incite emulation of, the actions of their compatriots in Iraq. The more content 

the people of neighboring states, the less likely they will be to want to get involved 

in someone else’s civil war. Aid also provides some leverage with the government 

in question, making them more likely to hesitate before going against U.S. wishes. 

Generous aid packages can be explicitly provided with the proviso that they will be 

stopped (and sanctions possibly applied instead) if the receiving country intervenes 

in the Iraqi conflict. That would mean continuing and even expanding the roughly $660 million in aid 

the United States is providing Jordan this year. It will probably mean increased 

assistance to Turkey to help it deal with both refugees and terrorism emanating 

from the intertwined Iraqi-Syrian civil wars. 

The more difficult questions will be how to help Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Neither Kuwait nor Saudi Arabia need American financial assistance, although both 

might need greater security cooperation to deal with terrorists and militiamen spilling over their borders in search of either targets or sanctuary. 

However, the bigger problem that both Kuwait and Saudi are likely to face will 

be the radicalization of their populations, a problem both were beginning to face in 

2006 before the U.S. ‘‘Surge’’ shut down the first manifestation of civil war in Iraq. 

Saudi and Kuwaiti Shia minorities will doubtless sympathize with—and be galvanized by—the Shia of Iraq and Syria. Their Sunni majorities will side with the 

Sunni oppositions in both and will demand that their governments do ever more to 

support the Sunni fighters. It will almost certainly lead to widespread gulf covert 

support to the Sunni militias in Iraq and Syria, potentially including ISIS and the 

other militant groups. Historically, such covert support can backfire against the 

country providing the support, as Pakistani support for the Taliban, Jordanian support for the PLO, and Turkish support for the Syrian opposition has. It can also 

lead to conventional interventions into the civil war when the covert support proves 

inadequate to the task. That’s how Syria and Israel got sucked into Lebanon. 

Dissuade Intervention. Consequently, the United States, hopefully along with its 

European and Asian allies, will have to make a major effort to convince Iraq’s 

neighbors not to intervene in an Iraqi civil war. Given the extent of their involvement already, this will be difficult to do. Our efforts should include the economic 

aid described above, as well as specific benefits tailored to the needs of individual 

countries. For Jordan and Saudi Arabia it might be yet another quixotic tilt at an 

Israeli-Palestinian peace, thereby addressing another of their major concerns. For 

Turkey, it might be financial aid or NATO security assistance. Again, Saudi Arabia 

and Kuwait would be the biggest challenges and the best Washington might do 

would be merely to try to convince them that it would be counterproductive and 

unnecessary to intervene—unnecessary because the U.S. and its allies will make a 

major effort to keep Iran from intervening, which will be their greatest worry. 

Preventing Iran from intervening, especially given how much it is already 

involved in Iraqi affairs, is going to be the biggest headache of all. Given Iran’s 

immense interests in Iraq, deepening Iranian intervention is likely to go hand in 

hand with a worsening civil war. And that is a foregone conclusion in a scenario 

of containment. For Tehran, the United States may have to lay down ‘‘redlines’’ 

regarding what is absolutely impermissible—like sending uniformed Iranian military units into Iraq or annexing Iraqi territory, both of which could prompt the 

Sunni Arab states to do the same. Of course, the U.S. and its allies would also have 

to lay out what they would do to Iran if it were to cross any of those redlines and 

that will inevitably be complicated by the status of nuclear negotiations with 

Tehran, regardless of the status of those negotiations. 

Direct Strikes at the Terrorist Infrastructure in Iraq. If the United States opts 

merely to contain an Iraqi civil war, we will have to accept some level of terrorist 

activity there. However, we would have to try to limit the ability of terrorists (Sunni 

and possibly Shia as well) to use Iraq as a haven for attacks outside the country. 

That will mean reliance on the kind of approach that Vice President Biden purportedly favored in Afghanistan rather than the ‘‘surge’’ of troops that President Obama 

opted for instead. It would mean employing air assets (manned and unmanned), 

special operations forces, and all manner of intelligence and reconnaissance systems 

to identify and strike key terrorists and their infrastructure (training camps, bomb 

factories, arms caches, etc.) before they could pose a danger to Americans. Thus, the 

64 

U.S. would continue to make intelligence collection in Iraq a high priority, and 

whenever such a facility was identified, Shia or Sunni, American forces would move 

in quickly to destroy it. 

Of course, such an effort would need bases to operate. Jordan and Kuwait are 

obvious candidates. However, in this scenario, Iraqi Kurdistan would probably be 

the best of all. Indeed, the United States could tie its willingness to recognize an 

independent Kurdistan (and provide them with the kind of military support they 

will need to hold off Iran as well as ISIS and the Sunni Arab militant groups) to 

Erbil’s willingness to host American counterterrorism (CT) forces. It seems highly 

likely that the Kurds would jump at that opportunity, making it far more palatable 

to run a discrete CT campaign from independent Iraqi Kurdistan than anywhere 

else. 

LEARNING THE LESSON OF IRAQ

Mr. Chairman, as I reflect on the list of options I have described above, I find 

myself deeply depressed. This is a miserable set of choices. But they reflect the 

reality of our circumstances in Iraq. 

Whatever options we choose to pursue there, I find myself hoping that at the very 

least, we will recognize that the best option of all was to have never allowed ourselves and the Iraqis to get to this point. They have been sucked into a civil war 

that feeds upon itself, and we are left with almost nothing we can do, either to save 

them or prevent that maelstrom from wrecking vital American interests. The mistakes of both the Bush ’43 and Obama administrations led us to this point because 

neither was willing to acknowledge that we cannot break a country in a vital part 

of the world and then walk away from it. And neither was willing to practice the 

sage aphorism that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Today we have 

but an ounce of cure for a malady raging out of control, one that could easily kill 

the patient and who knows what else. Perhaps the best that might come of it would 

be if we learn not to do so again. 

———————— 

Notes 

1This should not be taken to imply that I believe Iraq’s current problems are entirely the fault 

of the Obama administration. Quite the contrary. I believe that the George W. Bush administration is at least equally to blame, and arguably more so. 2Full disclosure: I proposed that the United States adopt this policy the day after Mosul fell 

and before the administration embraced it. See Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘‘How to Pull Iraq Back 

from the Abyss,’’ The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2014. 3For a fuller description of the political reforms that would be required to make this scenario 

work, see Zalmay Khalilzad and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘‘How to Save Iraq,’’ The New Republic 

Online, July 22, 2014. 4On spillover from intercommunal civil wars, its causes, manifestations and efforts to stem 

it, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘‘Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover 

from an Iraqi Civil War’’ (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006). 5For a fuller description of this strategy, see Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘‘An Army to Defeat Assad: 

How to Turn Syria’s Opposition into a Real Fighting Force,’’ forthcoming, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

93, No. 5 (September/October 2014). Also see, Daniel L. Byman, Michael Doran, Kenneth M. Pollack and Salman Shaikh, ‘‘Saving Syria: Assessing Options for Regime Change,’’ Middle East 

Memo No. 21, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, March 15, 

2012. 6For more on the methodologies of containment, see Byman and Pollack, ‘‘Things Fall Apart,’’ 

op. cit. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Well, thank you all for your testimony. I am sorry I had to step out, but we had the benefit of having your testimony in advance. 

Let me ask you, Ambassador Jeffrey, if Maliki is the problem and 

Maliki somehow rises to be Prime Minister again, what is the 

course of events for us? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. First of all, it is not going to be easy for 

him to hang on as Prime Minister, because he will need the votes, 

as Mr. McGurk said, of at least part of the Sunni community and 

part of the Kurdish community to get above the 165 that is needed. 

What I fear is that there will be a long delay, and that is what we 

had in 2010, where he will be the Acting Prime Minister for many 

months and people will get more discouraged. 

65 

So I think the first thing is for us to press for this process to go 

forward, because I think that most Iraqis, including many of the 

Shia parties, do believe that they need a new leader. If he does 

stay in power, then our options are far more along the lines that 

Dr. Pollack has suggested at the end, of containing the problem 

and dealing with Iraq and Syria from Jordan, from Kurdistan, with 

Turkey to the extent that is possible, to try to both contain the 

danger and go after some of these ISIL elements that we think are 

threatening us or threatening the stability of the region. 

It will be very hard to work with a government in Baghdad that 

does not have the buy-in of the Sunnis and the Kurds, and it will 

not be possible to assist in any retakeover of those Sunni areas by 

an army that does not represent the people of the region. 

The CHAIRMAN. And if the flip side of that happens, that in fact 

he does not continue as Prime Minister, what are the immediate 

things that the next government will have to do in order to create 

the type of national unity that can fight ISIS and not have the 

country disintegrate? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. I have my own list. We all have lists, and 

frankly the Iraqis have their lists as well, Mr. Chairman. But a few 

things are crucial. First of all, to keep the Kurds in there has to 

be a deal. Brett McGurk—on oil. Brett McGurk talked about some 

of the options. He has negotiated a lot of them—they are ready, 

they are on the shelf—that would give them a bigger slice of overall resources while bringing them back into the system. That is 

very important. 

There needs to be real revenue-sharing. They already have tried 

this. Up until recently, the Kurds were getting 17 percent. Some 

of the either oil-producing provinces—Basra, Kirkuk—or those with 

a lot of pilgrims—Najaf—were getting slices of the Iraqi central 

government budget to execute their own programs, and they were 

very, very successful, particularly in Najaf and Kirkuk. So there is 

a model also on the shelf to have more economic federalism. 

So it is not just lists of things. If you want inclusiveness you get 

rid of the guy who represents a lack of inclusiveness. That will do 

more than any action plan. If you want to have economic federalism, then you introduce financial and energy policies that will 

see to that. And if you want to have a security force that is capable 

of doing what General Barbero said, let us have a new Defense 

Minister who actually does have command and control over his 

forces, which is not the case now. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Pollack, do you have anything to add? 

Dr. POLLACK. I would just add one point to, I think, the excellent 

points that Ambassador Jeffrey just raised, which is that I think 

the United States needs to do a lot more to put on offer to the 

Iraqis, to make clear what we would do to help them if they actually took the steps that we are looking for. Right now my sense 

from Iraqis is we are demanding a great deal from them, but we 

are not actually letting them know what we would do for them if 

they took what are actually very difficult steps for them. 

That gets to Ambassador Jeffrey’s point about how we need to be 

pressuring them, how we need to be pushing this process forward. 

Getting rid of Prime Minister Maliki is going to be very difficult 

and I think the Iraqis need to understand in much more concrete 

66 

terms, rather than the more vague promises that they seem to be 

hearing, at least that they are hearing, from the administration 

about what they would get if they did it. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Barbero, I am really hesitant to continue to authorize sales or to approve sales—it is up to the administration to authorize them, but to approve sales—when I have 

seen what has happened so far with some very critical armament 

that has fallen to the hands of ISIS as a result of it being abandoned on the battlefield. So how, in light of your comments that we 

need to respond to Iraqis’ requests for help, which I assume in part 

is possibly air strikes, but also they are looking for equipment, how 

do we create the safeguards so that if we are going to help we do 

not end up having our weaponry fall in the hands of ISIS and used 

against the very forces that we want to defeat them? 

General BARBERO. Mr. Chairman, as you look at every conflict 

there has been—it is not an antiseptic environment where—you 

will have loss of equipment. It just will happen. 

The CHAIRMAN. But not to the tune that—— 

General BARBERO. Not to the tune that we had, not with the rout 

in Mosul, I agree, and I share your concern and dismay over that. 

I think from this assessment we look at which are the good units 

of the Iraqi Security Forces and we invest heavily in them with advice, training, whatever they need, and then take a hard look at 

what they have asked for and what we are willing to share with 

them and make some decisions. 

But a senior Iraqi military leader last week said to me: Where 

is America? The Russians are performing and supporting us. The 

Iranians are here. We want the Americans. You are our friends. 

They are frustrated. We can ship all the Hellfires we want. They 

have three fixed-wing aircraft to fire Hellfires. It sounds great, 

briefs well. You cannot, as I said, air strike your way out of this. 

So I would pick the right units from this assessment and I would 

invest in them with the weapons and equipment that we feel that 

would help. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would say to the Iraqis, billions of dollars, 

hundreds of lives, that is where America has been. And I would 

also remind them that they were unwilling to pursue a status of 

forces agreement which might have created the wherewithal to continue to solidify the Iraqi Security Forces. So I think they have to 

think about the decisions that they have made, not to relive them, 

but to instruct them moving forward. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you for being here. I think a lot of times our second 

panels are actually better than the first, but by that time people 

have other business. You are more independent voices, and again 

we thank you so much for your help. 

Dr. Pollack, you responded, facially anyway, when Senator 

Menendez just mentioned that they were unwilling to pursue a status of forces agreement. I was just wondering what you were hoping to say, but did it instead with an expression? 

Dr. POLLACK. I think that what was going through my head, Senator, was that that was a moment when I think both the United 

States and Iraq both failed each other and themselves. It was a 

67 

moment when I think that Prime Minister Maliki was at best ambivalent about whether or not he wanted an American presence, 

which history has proven would have been beneficial to him. And 

I think that it was a time when the United States was ambivalent 

at best about whether or not it wanted to stay, and I think that 

history has once again proven that it would have been better had 

we done so. 

Senator CORKER. I know our focus needs to be on the future, but 

I know Ambassador Jeffrey had sort of a give and take publicly in 

writing with folks regarding this. Is that your impression of what 

happened during that time, just very briefly? I want to move on to 

some other things. 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Very briefly, the administration, following 

the recommendation of its military leaders and my recommendation, in 2010 offered to keep troops on. In essence, the Maliki government and most of the political parties except the Sadrists 

agreed to have troops. We got hung up on the question of a status 

of forces agreement. Maliki was reluctant to do this. Iyad Allawi, 

who controlled the Sunnis in Parliament, said that he would not 

move any further than Maliki would move. That undercut how we 

had done the deal back in 2008 when we had gotten the earlier 

agreement, and, frankly, time ran out. 

In terms of how enthusiastic the administration was about it, I 

had my instructions, which were to try to get an agreement. 

Senator CORKER. I notice—thank you both for that clarification— 

that there has been sort of a discussion of the order of steps that 

need to take place, and there has been a heavy emphasis on getting 

the right political situation. I think all of you agree with that. 

Some of you would like to see us go ahead and take some steps 

now. 

Let me ask you, General, what do you think—what are some of 

the elements of debate that are taking place now relative to, if you 

were guessing—and my guess is you actually talk with some of 

these people from time to time—prior to us knowing if they are 

going to have an inclusive government, someone other than Maliki, 

what do you think are some of the elements of the debate that are 

taking place inside the administration relative to taking some 

small steps, not something sustained, but some of those small steps 

that I think you have mentioned might build morale at a minimum 

and maybe stave off some of the steps that ISIL is taking? 

General BARBERO. I think there has been a reliance on this, as 

Ms. Slotkin said, a very deliberate process, in a very exigent situation. This process has in my view become a way to not take action, 

and we are in a situation where ISIS, as I said, is an existential 

threat to Baghdad, the Kurds, and in the region, and they are gaining strength. 

I think there has been discussion of air strikes, and you can take 

air strikes on targets without having precision if you see these entities out in the desert. That will only be for fleeting effects. It must 

be part of a sustained effort. So just doing air strikes or drone 

strikes can have some effect, but it will not be lasting or decisive. 

I think there is great reluctance to reintroduce American Forces. 

I get that. I understand. But if this is an existential threat, if, as 

we have heard, it is in the national interest of the United States, 

68 

this situation, and if the Iraqi Security Forces are the way to deal 

with this, and these Iraqi Security Forces are not prepared or capable of dealing with it, then it is a dichotomous situation. You cannot close that circle without some external assistance to these 

forces. 

So I hope it is not a question of if we should support the Iraqi 

Security Forces and introduce the steps that I said; it is a question 

of when and, now that we have had this assessment, how quickly. 

Senator CORKER. So the fear would be paralysis through purposeful long-term analysis. That would be the fear, just analyzing this 

forever and not taking action. 

I also agree with you there is some reticence to get back involved 

too militarily. But things are dissipating quickly. 

Let me ask you this. Maliki obviously, he may not have been a 

good Prime Minister, but he understands the debate that is taking 

place in our country and knows that him being gone, while we 

might not have laid out as clearly—and I think it is a great comment from you for us to share with them specifically what we 

would do if they had this inclusive government. I think that is a 

great point. 

But can you tell if there is any leveraging taking place by Maliki 

right now, knowing that we are not going to get involved in any 

kind of big way if he is still there? Is there any activity that is occurring there relative to him trying to leverage us in other ways? 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Dr. Pollack might have information as 

well. I think that, first of all, he points out correctly that he did 

very well in the last elections several months ago, winning personally 700,000 votes, which was even more than he did in 2010. His 

party came in first. Under the constitution, he should be given by 

the new President selected today within 15 days an opportunity to 

form a government. And under the constitutional process, if he cannot form it—and I think it will be hard for him to form it—after 

30 days the mandate has to pass to another party. 

Now, that is a lot of time to consume doing this. I think that as 

a minimum he is going to want to play this out. He also may feel 

that in the end the Americans, having sent, what was it, 775 additional forces to Iraq, are ready to help them out regardless of what 

happens. Again, I think I and many others have said under certain 

circumstances right now striking ISIL where they pose a danger is 

important, but we cannot provide the whole gamut, the whole 

breadth of support that they need absolutely unless we have an inclusive government that can bring in the Sunnis and bring in the 

Kurds, and it will not happen with him, sir. 

Senator CORKER. Just one last question. I know my time is up 

and I know all of us probably have to be places. But I know there 

is discussion—and you have said this—about this being a regional 

approach and Syria and Iraq obviously having no border between 

them any more. What are some of the dynamics on the Syrian side 

that as we look at this regionally—I know you are just focused on 

Iraq now—that complicate, with Assad being in power there, complicate our ability to look at it regionally? 

Dr. POLLACK. I am glad to start, Senator. I think one of the most 

obvious problems is the one that I have already mentioned, which 

is that when you look only at Syria we look at it and we say, we 

69 

do not like the Assad regime, we want it gone, therefore the question is simply how best to help the opposition. When we look at 

Iraq we have a situation where you have a Shia group in charge 

of the government, they are likely to remain in charge of the government, and we are going to want to maintain good ties with 

them. Simultaneously, we have got a Sunni opposition that includes some people we really dislike—ISIS and the militants—and 

others who we very much like. So there is a complexity that is involved, and therefore any support to one of these groups becomes 

complicated by the opposite effect that it has with the other. 

So if we are providing enormous support to Sunni oppositionists 

in Syria, inevitably some of that support is going to flow to opposition—to Sunni groups in Iraq, some of whom we may not like. The 

more that we are helping the Maliki government in Baghdad, the 

more it is going to be seen by folks in the region as supporting the 

wider Shia cause, which also encompasses the Assad government. 

Obviously, that is only the tip of the iceberg. There is a lot more 

to talk about. But we do need to recognize the complexity that has 

now been introduced into this situation by having simultaneously 

civil wars in Iraq and Syria that are by and large merged, which 

the region sees in a very simple way as a Sunni-Shia fight, but 

which we see in a much more complex way. 

Senator CORKER. Would anybody like to add to that? 

General BARBERO. If I could, Senator. As far as a regional approach, we know that ISIS is—they are awash in money. But the 

way to choke these organizations is to go after their financing. 

Now, for the near term they have got plenty of that. However, we 

know there are regional actors supporting them, supporting ISIS, 

and we should employ, as I said in my statement, our intelligence 

community to identify those actors and then use every tool we have 

in the interagency—Department of Commerce, Department of 

Treasury—to go after those actors and these sources of funding. 

We know, have a good idea, where it is coming from. Let us identify them and target them as part of a regional approach to this 

growing problem. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

The CHAIRMAN. One last set of questions. General, you served in 

Iraq. You led our mission to train and equip Iraqi Forces. When 

U.S. Forces left Iraq it seemed that Iraqi Forces were on their way 

to becoming a capable force. So that begs the question: What happened? Why did the ISF’s capability and capacity erode so quickly? 

General BARBERO. Senator, tough question, and it is tough to see 

what has happened, and it is tough to see what has been happening over the last few years. I have been back to Iraq many 

times over the last year since I left active duty. 

But the ISF was built to handle a low-level insurgency and our 

goal was to get them to a state where they were good enough. 

Frankly, when I was there in 2009 and 2010 and into 2011, the assumption we had as we did our development plan, there would be 

a residual force of advisers and trainers to continue this development. I did an assessment in the summer of 2010 for then-General 

Odierno, which we briefed to everyone in Iraq and every Iraqi leader, saying: Here is where your forces are going to be in December 

70 

2011. We wanted to convince them and show them the capabilities 

and the shortfalls of their forces. 

The shortfalls we identified, some were very obvious. They could 

not control their own air space nor defend it. But we said: You 

have a sustainment problem, your military readiness of your equipment is in a death spiral. Unless you do something very seriously, 

you will not be able to field an army. Your command and control 

structure is not workable. This peacetime for command and control 

of the population directly to the Prime Minister, it has to change. 

You do not have an NCO corps. 

What I think most fundamentally is, we told the Iraqis: You 

must invest in training. Good armies train continuously. And we 

did not see that before we left and I have not seen any evidence 

of that since then. 

So the short answer is the development that needed to take place 

with the Iraqi Security Forces from December 2011 to July 2014 

has not taken place. We can go back and forth about advisers and 

trainers, but they just have not developed as they should. 

The CHAIRMAN. So if that is the case, then what will advisers 

now be able to do at this stage that will make a difference on the 

ground with Iraqi Forces? 

General BARBERO. Well, when we were on the ground with them 

and advising and training, it did make a difference. I think first 

we can stop the bleeding. They are under severe duress with the 

VBIED campaign that has started in Baghdad. Indirect fire is coming. ISIS is not going to let up. So if this is in our interest, then 

we need to get something in there to help them, A, stop the bleeding, and then start building these forces. 

But this will not take weeks or months. This is going to take a 

while to get them to a state—as I said in my comments, unless we 

have an Iraqi Government that is willing to accept these changes 

and willing to emplace these changes into their structure and the 

way they do business, then I would question whether we should 

do it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Two last questions. Can air strikes alone—I 

think you alluded to this in your answer to one of Senator Corker’s 

questions. But can air strikes alone make a difference in pushing 

back ISIS, or would doing them now just be in essence giving the 

Iraqis a boost? 

General BARBERO. Air strikes can make a difference, tactical 

difference. They can help enable Iraqi Forces. They can help relieve 

pressure. They can help degrade ISIS capabilities. But my point is 

we cannot think that just through air strikes and drone strikes we 

can solve this problem or, I would argue, even hold it in abeyance. They would make a difference. It would not be a decisive 

difference. 

The CHAIRMAN. So the flip, the other side of this, then is training 

and assisting Iraqi Forces, can they possibly recover the country, 

even with the training and assisting? 

General BARBERO. I think they could. 

The CHAIRMAN. You think they could? 

General BARBERO. I think they could. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are talking about what period of time? 

General BARBERO. Months. It is not going to happen overnight. 

71 

Ambassador JEFFREY. Senator, if I could support General 

Barbero. I have seen it myself. I was in Vietnam as an Army officer 

in 1972. The South Vietnamese Army, when the North Vietnamese 

regular army invaded for the first time, they started melting worse 

than Mosul. Millions, billions of dollars of U.S. equipment was lost 

within days. Then when we started air strikes it changed the psychology of those forces almost overnight, and within 3 months they 

had recovered almost the entire country. 

We saw in Libya, we saw in Kosovo, and we saw in Bosnia where 

air strikes can provide lightly equipped, sometimes not too well 

trained forces the difference in taking on better equipped forces. As 

Brett McGurk I think three times described earlier today, dealing 

with the Shamar Tribe up near Mosul, dealing with the people, and 

I know Governor Delami is still holding out in Ramadi, a Sunni 

governor, against ISIL, they are outgunned. He described how they 

had volunteers to go into northern Fallujah, but they lost in a battle to ISIL because the ISIL people were better equipped and better 

trained. 

So a combination of air strikes and advisers, not boots on the 

ground, can make a huge difference, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. One last question for you, General. Are you surprised by the alarming reports of Iraqi Security Forces’ abuses, infiltration by Shia militias, and lack of accountability? And how do 

we engage with the Iraqi Forces to deal with those challenges? 

General BARBERO. Senator, I was in Erbil and Baghdad in late 

May, so the developments in Mosul and what has happened after 

that I think was a shock in Mosul and Baghdad and Washington. 

I was shocked by it. 

But as I drive around Baghdad or Basra or other places over the 

last year, it is a checkpoint army. I have said that. You cannot take 

on an ISIS if you have been in static positions on the defense and 

not trained for offensive operations. 

What is troubling is as you ride up to these army checkpoints 

there are Shia religious banners almost at every one across Baghdad, certainly in Basra. So there must be a fundamental change in 

the nature of these forces, not only the government, but the forces, 

to allow participation by Sunni and Kurds in this unified effort 

that it would require. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate your insights. I am not a military guy, but I will say that when an American soldier volunteers, 

he fights for a cause, for a principle, for a set of values, and he 

fights for his nation, he or she fights for their nation. If the job is 

just a job, then it does not turn out the same way. And it is difficult to get an Iraqi Army if you do not feel you are fighting for 

the totality of a country—Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. And that is a real 

problem. 

Anyhow, I appreciate all of your insights as we grapple with the 

choices we have to make. 

This record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow. With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

72 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF BRETT MCGURK TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

Question. The Islamic State (formerly ISIS) is among the most well-financed terrorist organizations in the world, with financial flows running into tens of millions 

of dollars. Please describe the status of Islamic State finances, including internal 

sources (oil revenue, taxes, smuggling) as well as any external flows and what the 

U.S is doing to counter IS financing. 

Answer. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) derives the majority of 

its financing from criminal activities including smuggling, robberies, extortion, and 

kidnapping for ransom, as well as raiding villages and towns. ISIL controls some 

smaller oil and gas fields, pipelines, and related infrastructure in Iraq, but not 

Iraq’s major oil fields, which are in territory under the control of the Government 

of Iraq in the south and the Kurdish Regional Government forces in the north. ISIL 

receives some money from outside donors, but that pales in comparison to its selffunding through criminal and terrorist activities. 

The issue of preventing private financing of violent extremists remains an important priority in our discussions with all states in the region. We are working closely 

with our partners in the region to halt the sale of ISIL-sourced oil, and prevent 

external financial support for terrorists from crossing their borders. 

The United States and other key players in the international financial system pay 

extremely close attention to the risks associated with terrorist financing. We 

approach these issues with partners in the global financial system, such as the 

intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force, with financial regulators, and with 

financial institutions and their compliance officers. 

RESPONSES OF BRETT MCGURK TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

Question. The administration has blamed Baghdad for not heeding U.S. warnings 

about ISIL’s impending advance into Mosul. 

♦ (a) Was it a surprise when ISIL took control over Fallujah earlier this year? 

Answer. We have maintained a close watch on Iraq’s security situation since the 

stand-up of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in 2004. The threat of the Islamic State 

of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its effect on Iraq’s overall security situation was 

neither a surprise nor a sudden event. We have watched and warned of ISIL’s growing strength and its threat to Iraq and U.S. interests in the region—and now to 

Europe and the U.S. homeland—since the group’s resurgence in 2012, largely due 

to the escalating conflict in Syria. 

♦ (b) Did the administration warn Baghdad or share intelligence with officials 

there preceding the ISIL takeover of Fallujah? 

Answer. The Government of Iraq has long been aware of the threat that ISIL 

poses, and during Prime Minister Maliki’s meetings in Washington last fall the need 

to develop a holistic strategy to counter its rise was a topic of discussion at several 

of PM Maliki’s meetings with USG officials. As the ISIL threat increased, we took 

several steps to increase counterterrorism assistance with Iraq and to build a foundation for future, expanded cooperation. We enhanced information-sharing relationships, expanded training in Iraq and Jordan, provided military advice, and sought 

opportunities to increase border security. After the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in 

2011, we maintained a close partnership with Iraq’s military intelligence, Directorate General for Intelligence and Security, and other intelligence agencies across 

the government and Ministry of Defense. Information and intelligence-sharing has 

been and remains crucial to the fight against ISIL. 

♦ (c) How long has ISIL been of concern to the administration? 

Answer. From the moment this administration took office, ISIL—formerly Al 

Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—has been a concern. This organization has posed a threat 

since the Bush administration when it was known as Al Qaeda in Iraq under the 

direction of Zarqawi. Since the start of the Syrian conflict, we watched with growing 

concern as ISIL took advantage of the escalating war to establish a safe-haven in 

Syria’s eastern desert. With ample resources, recruits, weapons, and training, ISIL 

slowly began to execute its strategy to create an Islamic caliphate across the Syrian 

border into Iraq. Violence in Iraq began to increase toward the end of 2012, but did 

not gain momentum until early 2013, with a marked rise in ISIL suicide bombings. 

Taking advantage of the instability it was causing, ISIL then seized parts of Anbar 

73 

province, including the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah, in early January 2014. The 

Government of Iraq then initiated a concerted counterterrorism campaign against 

ISIL, which has continued to this day. Although ISIL has long operated in Mosul 

and northern Iraq, its sudden, large-scale offensive there in June escalated the 

fight, dramatically demonstrating the existential threat to Iraq posed by ISIL. 

Question. The United States has sat back and watched while ISIL took control 

of Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit, and moved into Diyala province. The U.S. has sent 300 

advisors to Iraq and air strikes remain an option still under review. According to 

CRS, ‘‘U.S. officials express increasing confidence that the IS-led offensive will not 

be able to capture [Baghdad] outright, although the ISF might yet lose parts of the 

city.’’ 

♦ (a) What are the administration’s goals in Iraq? What does it hope to achieve 

with the sending of advisors to aid the ISF? 

♦ (b) Are we content with letting ISIL maintain control over the territory it’s 

already claimed? 

Answer. Our goals in Iraq remain promoting the emergence of a safe, peaceful, 

and politically inclusive state, which supports our approach for regional security. 

Iraq needs to move forward quickly to assemble a new government that will respect 

the rights, aspirations, and legitimate concerns of all Iraqis. We are in constant 

communication with Iraq’s leaders, urging them to come together and take a united 

stand against violent extremism. 

We also are exploring more ways to assist the Iraqi Security Forces in the battle 

against ISIL. Over the last 6 months, we surged U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and 

military resources to develop strategic options supported by real-time and accurate 

information. More recently, a team of U.S. military advisors conducted an assessment of the Iraqi Security Forces, which we will use to determine of how we can 

best assist the Iraqis in the ongoing fight. 

As Secretary Kerry remarked in June, supporting Iraq in its struggle against violent extremism supports our strategic interests and responsibilities, including providing security for the American people, fighting terrorism, and standing by our 

allies. We will do what is necessary and what is in our national interest to confront 

ISIL and the threat that it poses to the security of the region, to our allies in 

Europe, and to our own security here in the United States. 

Question. After the withdrawal from Iraq of U.S. forces at the end of 2011, sectarian strife grew stronger as Prime Minister Maliki targeted his Sunni adversaries 

who, in turn began talking about Maliki’s ‘‘power grab.’’ President Obama has made 

it clear that he views the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces as a failure of Iraqi 

leaders to build an inclusive government. 

♦ (a) How hard did the administration work after the withdrawal of U.S. forces 

to help Maliki maintain an inclusive government? 

Answer. Advancing Iraq’s democracy is a key component of our relationship under 

the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, and we continue to work with Iraqis 

across the political spectrum and civil society to advance that agenda. We have repeatedly urged the Iraqi Government to uphold its commitments to due process and 

the rule of law as enshrined in its constitution and to avoid any actions that exacerbate sectarian tensions. 

♦ (b) How long did this diplomatic effort remain a priority for the administration? 

Answer. The need for inclusive government and political reconciliation has been 

a focus of our conversations with Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders 

since PM Maliki’s government was first formed, and we have used high-level meeting, including Prime Minister Maliki’s visits to Washington in January 2012 and 

November 2013, to reinforce that message. 

♦ (c) Who specifically is the administration working with now in the Sunni community to restore credibility to the central government? 

Answer. We believe that the only way to restore credibility to the central government in Iraq is through the formation of an inclusive government, and to this end 

we have been fully engaged with Iraqi officials, politicians, civil society leaders, and 

religious leaders from all components of Iraqi society. Following Iraq’s successful 

parliamentary elections on April 30, our priority has been to ensure that the government formation process stays on track, especially in light of the threat that the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses to Iraq. To support this goal, Vice 

President Biden and former Speaker Nujaifi spoke over the telephone in June about 

the continued need for political reconciliation and an inclusive government, and 

Deputy Assistant Secretary McGurk met repeatedly with Iraqi leaders in June and 

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July to ensure that the government formation process followed the constitutionally 

mandated timeline. 

Within the Iraqi Sunni community we continue to engage with national and local 

Sunni officials and tribal leaders to promote the formation of an inclusive government that would address Sunni grievances. That message has been reinforced, in 

coordination with international partners, by encouraging Iraq’s Sunni neighbors to 

support Iraqi Sunni participation in the government formation process. 

Question. The void created by the withdrawal of American troops at the end of 

2011 was supposed to be filled by a robust diplomatic presence at our state-of-theart Embassy in Baghdad, and two consulates in Basrah and Erbil. In 2012, personnel numbered above 12,000. In 2013, we were at 10,500, and current reports suggest that there are 5,500 personnel there, including contractors, though the State 

Department has apparently declined to disclose the official numbers of diplomatic 

personnel in Iraq. 

♦ (a) What are the official numbers of diplomatic personnel—including contractors—in Iraq for 2012, 2013 and at present? 

Answer. In January 2012, at the time of the transition, the number of all personnel (U.S., third country national, and local staff—both direct hire and contractor) 

under Chief of Mission authority was about 16,000. This decreased to about 10,500 

by September 2013 and further to about 5,500 in May 2014. After the relocation of 

personnel from Baghdad over the past 6 weeks, as of July 24 our on-the-ground 

staffing for Chief of Mission personnel countrywide is about 4,700, including 740 

direct hires and 3,960 contractors. Of these 4,700, about 1,860 are Americans. 

♦ (b) What effort was made by this diplomatic corps to work with the central government to remain an inclusive body? 

Answer. Our mission is fully engaged with Iraqi officials, politicians, and religious 

and social leaders at all levels and across the political spectrum. U.S. engagement 

remains focused on supporting the constitutional system and strengthening institutions which transcend the interests of individuals, political parties, or sectarian components of Iraqi society. Despite the dangers, over the past few months our diplomatic staff on the ground in Iraq have been focused on first ensuring that the April 

elections were timely, transparent, and secure, and now continue to play a crucial 

role in keeping the process for forming a new, inclusive Iraqi Government on track. 

I personally spent 7 weeks on the ground during the early stages of the ISIL incursion into Ninewah province and worked with leaders on all sides to ensure swift and 

inclusive government formation. As a result of our collective efforts, the Iraqi Government remains on track to choose a Prime Minister and continue the constitutionally driven government formation process. 

More broadly, the United States continues to play an important role by encouraging direct dialogue between Iraq’s leaders and political parties. Our political role 

in Iraq is as a trusted party that provides advice, facilitates communication within 

and between the various factions, and urges all sides to work together for constructive change. Under the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, we cooperate 

with Iraqis across a broad range of issues, including security and defense, economics/trade, and education/culture. 

♦ (c) Why did the numbers of personnel in Iraq decline so quickly, particularly 

after the amount of money that was spent to construct our diplomatic facilities 

there? 

Answer. From January 2012 to January 2014, we made significant strides in 

reducing Chief of Mission personnel throughout Iraq. We reduced our footprint from 

13 sites, including those for Office of Security Cooperation and Foreign Military 

Sales operations, to 4. We streamlined programs and right-sized our staff. In the 

summer of 2013, we switched from a DOD-legacy life support contractor to a Statesponsored contractor, significantly reducing the number of contractors countrywide. 

Although we have significantly reduced overall numbers of personnel, all of our diplomatic facilities remain fully utilized since we have pulled personnel in to operate 

from these sites as peripheral sites have been closed. 

RESPONSES OF ELISSA SLOTKIN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

ISIL ADVANCE INTO MOSUL

Question. The administration has blamed Baghdad for not heeding U.S. warnings 

about ISIL’s impending advance into Mosul. 

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♦ Was it a surprise when ISIL took control over Fallujah earlier this year? 

♦ Did the administration warn Baghdad or share intelligence with officials there 

preceding the ISIL takeover of Fallujah? 

♦ How long has ISIL been of concern to the administration? 

Answer. We were surprised by the speed at which four Iraqi divisions melted 

away in some areas, and some areas where they simply did not fight, in contrast 

to western Iraq where Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) put up a serious fight. Rather 

than a lack of capability, these actions revealed that some units within the ISF lack 

either the will or the direction to fight. Understanding these matters better is critical in deciding on any future plans to pursue in Iraq. That is why we have U.S. 

Forces on the ground right now trying to figure that out. Regarding whether we 

shared intelligence with Baghdad, I defer to my State colleague. We have long considered ISIL a concern, and we began working with the Government of Iraq in early 

January to bolster their ability to counter ISIL through increased security cooperation and expedited sales of defense articles. 

U.S. GOALS IN IRAQ

Question. The United States has sat back and watched while ISIL took control 

of Fallujah, Mosul, Tikrit, and moved into Diyala province. The U.S. has sent 300 

advisors to Iraq and air strikes remain an option still under review. According to 

CRS, ‘‘U.S. officials express increasing confidence that the IS-led offensive will not 

be able to capture [Baghdad] outright, although the ISF might yet lose parts of the 

city.’’ 

♦ What are the administration’s goals in Iraq? 

♦ What does it hope to achieve with the sending of advisors to aid the ISF? 

♦ Are we content with letting ISIL maintain control over the territory it’s already 

claimed? 

Answer. As the President said on July 19, the administration is focused on maintaining and ensuring the security of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. personnel operating 

inside of Iraq; increasing the U.S. intelligence picture of the situation in Iraq; and 

setting up the infrastructure to support the Iraqis through shared intelligence and 

coordinating planning to counter ISIL. The U.S. Central Command assessment team 

is working to identify and evaluate viable partners within the Iraqi Security Forces. 

The assessment team will identify viable partners for the United States to support 

in their fight against this threat. 

The intelligence community has assessed that ISIL currently poses a threat to our 

regional interests and allies. If left unchecked, ISIL may eventually threaten the 

homeland. It is not in the interest of the United States to allow ISIL to maintain 

the territory it seized. A safe haven will allow ISIL to consolidate further and continue to threaten the United States and its allies. 

U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ

Question. After the withdrawal from Iraq of U.S. forces at the end of 2011, sectarian strife grew stronger as Prime Minister Maliki targeted his Sunni adversaries 

who, in turn began talking about Maliki’s ‘‘power grab.’’ President Obama has made 

it clear that he views the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces as a failure of Iraqi 

leaders to build an inclusive government. 

♦ How hard did the administration work after the withdrawal of U.S. forces to 

help Maliki maintain an inclusive government? 

♦ For how long did this diplomatic effort remain a priority for the administration? 

♦ Who specifically is the administration working with now in the Sunni community to restore credibility to the central government? 

Answer. These are primarily diplomatic matters, and I defer to my State Department colleagues to provide more information. 

Question. The void created by the withdrawal of American troops at the end of 

2011 was supposed to be filled by a robust diplomatic presence at our state-of-theart Embassy in Baghdad, and two consulates in Basrah and Erbil. In 2012, personnel numbered above 12,000. In 2013, we were at 10,500, and current reports suggest that there are 5,500 personnel there, including contractors, though the State 

Department has apparently declined to disclose the official numbers of diplomatic 

personnel in Iraq. 

♦ What are the official numbers of diplomatic personnel—including contractors— 

in Iraq for 2012, 2013, and at present? 

♦ What effort was made by this diplomatic corps to work with the central government to remain an inclusive body? 

76 

♦ Why did the numbers of personnel in Iraq decline so quickly, particularly after 

the amount of money that was spent to construct our diplomatic facilities there? 

Answer. These are primarily diplomatic matters, and I defer to my State Department colleagues to provide more information. 

RESPONSES OF BRETT MCGURK TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

POLITICAL SITUATION

On July 15, the Iraqi Parliament elected a moderate Sunni to the Speaker of 

Parliament. 

In the coming days, we expect the Parliament to elect a President that will 

replace Talibani. 

It appears to me that the security situation in Iraq will not improve until a new 

Prime Minister is elected. 

The Iraq Constitution requires the Parliament to pick a Prime Minister within 

75 days from when date of when it convenes. 

The last time Parliament met to pick a Prime Minister, it took nearly 10 months. 

Question. What timeline are we looking at for a new Prime Minister? 

Answer. Iraq’s Constitution lays out a brisk set of timeline for the country’s government formation process, including selection of a new Prime Minister. Those constitutional were not adhered too closely by Iraqi leaders following Iraq’s general 

elections in 2010. In contrast with 2010 and in part reflecting our robust diplomatic 

engagement with top leaders across Iraq’s political spectrum, Iraq’s new Council of 

Representatives (COR) has been meeting its constitutional timelines—for example, 

by convening its first session on July 1 and electing new COR Speaker Salim alJabouri, a widely respected Sunni leader, on July 16. 

On July 24, the same day as this hearing and well within constitutional timelines, 

the COR elected senior Kurdish political leader Fuad Masum to succeed Jelal 

Talabani as President of Iraq. Masum’s election represents another key milestone 

in Iraq’s Government formation process and an important compromise among Iraq’s 

ethnosectarian political blocs. We fully expect President Masum to execute his constitutional responsibilities by directing the largest bloc in the COR to form a new 

Cabinet, including a new Prime Minister, for the COR’s approval by September 8 

in accordance with Iraq’s constitutional timelines. 

Question. As long as President al-Maliki is in power, what is your assessment of 

the chances to reconstitute the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)? 

Answer. There continues to be significant opposition to electing Nuri al-Maliki for 

a third term as Prime Minister, which could complicate efforts to build broad-based 

political support for the ISF’s reconstitution. However, Maliki will remain Iraq’s 

Prime Minister until newly elected President of Iraq Fuad Masum directs the largest bloc in Iraq’s Council of Representatives (COR) to nominate a new Prime Minister for the COR’s approval, under Iraq’s Constitution by September 8, and the 

COR confirms the nominee. We continue to engage with Iraqi leaders from all 

ethnoreligious blocs to come together around a candidate for Prime Minister who 

can unify Iraq against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Until a new 

Prime Minister is elected, we must and will continue working with Prime Minister 

Maliki to ensure the ISF’s swift reconstitution, which is supported by all major 

political parties inside and outside Prime Minister Maliki’s coalition. 

Question. In your assessment, what are the chances of Maliki stepping down? 

Answer. Nuri al-Maliki will remain Iraq’s Prime Minister until newly elected 

President of Iraq Fuad Massum directs the largest bloc in Iraq’s Council of Representatives (COR) to nominate a new Prime Minister for the COR’s approval, by 

September 8 under Iraq’s Constitution, and the COR confirms that nominee. Buoyed 

by a record 721,000 personal votes in Iraq’s historic general elections on April 30, 

Prime Minister Maliki continues to insist publicly that he will seek another term 

as Prime Minister. Meanwhile, there appears to be growing sentiment within all of 

Iraq’s societal components that Iraq would be more unified with new leadership— 

a sentiment Maliki at times seems to acknowledge to some extent. 

We continue to engage with top Iraqi political, civic, and religious leaders from 

all blocs to come together around a candidate for Prime Minister who can unify Iraq 

against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Until a new Prime Minister 

is elected, we must and will continue working with Prime Minister Maliki in aiding 

the Government of Iraq in defending Iraq’s territorial integrity against ISIL, which 

77 

is supported by all major political parties inside and outside Prime Minister Maliki’s 

coalition. If Iraqis’ duly elected representatives choose another Prime Minister, the 

United States will continue its support for Iraq to that same end. 

Question. Are we seeing any efforts within Iraq and the Shiite population to pressure the President Maliki to step down? 

Answer. There appears to be growing sentiment within all of Iraq’s societal components, including Iraq’s Shia population, that Iraq would be more unified with new 

leadership. For example, Grand Ayatollah Ali Husayni al-Sistani, Iraq’s most senior 

Shia cleric, has repeatedly called for the formation of a new Iraqi Government and 

in a recent sermon admonished Iraqi leaders against sacrificing the country’s future 

for their own political interests—sentiments echoed in a statement from Maliki’s 

Islamic Dawa Party that same day. Despite pressure from many in Iraq’s Shia community, Maliki seemingly remains buoyed by his record 721,000 personal votes in 

Iraq’s historic general elections on April 30 and continues to insist publicly that he 

will seek another term as Prime Minister. 

We continue to engage with top Iraqi political, civic, and religious leaders from 

all blocs, including Iraq’s Shia community, to come together around a candidate for 

Prime Minister who can unify Iraq against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 

(ISIL). However, that decision must be made by Iraqi lawmakers. Until a new Prime 

Minister is elected, we must and will continue working with Prime Minister Maliki 

in aiding the Government of Iraq in defending Iraq’s territorial integrity against 

ISIL. 

Question. Should Maliki step down, who are the likely successors to take over? 

Answer. When newly elected President of Iraq Fuad Masum directs the largest 

bloc within Iraq’s Council of Representatives (COR) to form a new Cabinet, that bloc 

will almost certainly be composed of primarily Shia parties, which can be expected 

to nominate a Shia leader for the COR to confirm as Iraq’s Prime Minister. Should 

current Prime Minister Maliki decline his renomination or the largest COR bloc 

identifies another candidate, there a number of frequently mentioned alternatives— 

including several senior leaders within Prime Minister Maliki’s State of Law coalition—which performed well in Iraq’s historic general elections on April 30. 

Regardless of party or ethnoreligious affiliation, we will continue to press all political blocs to support a candidate for Prime Minister who can govern inclusively and 

thereby unify all Iraqis against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. 

AIR STRIKES

Question. For years the Iraqis have been asking for our assistance in providing 

military aircraft to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS fighters throughout Iraq. This year 

and reportedly in 2013, the Iraqis have requested our assistance to launch air 

strikes against ISIS. 

Recently, Mr. McGurk stated before House Foreign Affairs Committee that Iraq 

did not formally request air support until May 2013. 

♦ Did the Iraqis request air support to combat ISIS forces in 2013? 

♦ Can you please differentiate between formal and informal requests for air 

support? 

♦ What are the current options for airstrikes on ISIS forces? 

♦ How do we plan on differentiating Iraq Security Forces, Kurdish Security 

Forces, and Iran Security Forces from the ISIS? 

♦ With the United States, Iraq, Iran, and Russia currently operating in Iraq airspace, how are we currently deconflicting our Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (ISR) operations? 

Answer. The Iraqis formally requested air support in May 2014. Prior to the 

formal requests, Iraqi officials made informal inquiries regarding capabilities, to include airstrikes, but these conversations never escalated to the requisite level of coordination necessary within the GOI. With the formal request, airspace permissions, 

coordination and GOI political support, the President authorized prompt action, to 

include combat operations by U.S. aircraft, and CENTCOM surged ISR flights over 

the region. 

Since that time, President Obama has made it clear that he will take action, 

including military action, at a time and place of our choosing, if and when it is necessary to defend our national security interests. We are continuing to improve our 

intelligence picture of the situation on the ground so we can assess potential 

options. The two Joint Operations Centers in Baghdad and Erbil are augmenting 

this effort as they enhance information-sharing relationships. Airstrikes without the 

78 

necessary intelligence would be irresponsible and would not make any operational 

impact on the ground. 

We would defer to DOD for specifics for airspace deconfliction. 

RESPONSES OF ELISSA SLOTKIN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ SECURITY FORCES

Question. How long do we assess that it will take to recruit, train, and equip new 

forces to reconstitute the four divisions that have been reduced? 

Answer. The U.S. Central Command assessment team is still in the process of 

identifying and assessing potential partners within the Iraqi Security Forces. We 

continue to update the initial assessment that the team provided the week of July 

14, and developing options, but it is too early in that process to provide more detail. 

Question. Please outline President al Maliki’s actions that led to the crumbling 

of the Iraqi Security Forces under his leadership? 

Answer. The Iraq Security Forces’ (ISF) losses are the result of Iraqi political divisions and leadership challenges. As the President said on June 19, it’s not any 

secret that there are deep divisions between Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders, and 

those divisions made it difficult for the Government of Iraq (GOI) to command the 

ISF directly in its efforts to combat ISIL. We are focused now on encouraging the 

GOI to move forward with the government formation process, and in ensuring that 

competent military leaders are put in place in key posts. 

Question. Does the Pentagon have a timeline on when it will make its recommendations to the President on how to proceed in Iraq? 

Answer. The Secretary of Defense has provided his views regularly to the President on how to proceed in Iraq. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 

provided his best military advice. This advice informs the options available to the 

President on future action in Iraq. The National Security Council will make recommendations to the President. 

AIR STRIKES

Question. For years the Iraqis have been asking for our assistance in providing 

military aircraft to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS fighters throughout Iraq. This year 

and reportedly in 2013, the Iraqis have requested our assistance to launch air 

strikes against ISIS. Recently, Mr. McGurk stated before House Foreign Affairs 

Committee that Iraq did not formally request air support until May 2013. 

♦ Did the Iraqis request air support to combat ISIS forces in 2013? 

♦ Can you please differentiate between formal and informal requests for air support? 

♦ What are the current options for airstrikes on ISIS forces? 

♦ How do we plan on differentiating Iraq Security Forces, Kurdish Security 

Forces, and Iran Security Forces from the ISIS? 

♦ With the U.S., Iraq, Iran, and Russia currently operating in Iraq airspace, how 

we are currently de-conflicting our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations? 

79 

Answer. The Iraqis did not request air support in 2013. U.S. Government representatives had regular conversations with GOI counterparts on how best to 

counter ISIL. As the security situation in Iraq deteriorated, the Government of Iraq 

(GOI) requested expedited defense equipment and increased training, which the 

United States provided. 

But the GOI did not formally request air strikes until recently. As directed by the 

President, we are looking at the full range of options on future action in Iraq, to 

include air support. 

We are in continuous contact with the Iraqis to ensure close coordination on our 

activities. But to be clear, we are not coordinating military activity with Iran or 

Russia. 

Æ