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*********************************************** 
STEFANA PECHER ET AL. v. RHEA

DISTEFANO ET AL.

(AC 38287)

Prescott, Mullins and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff P sought to recover damages for personal injuries she sustained

while taking horseback riding lessons at a horse stable owned and

operated by the defendant D, claiming that her injuries were caused

by, inter alia, D’s negligence in failing to warn her concerning certain

dangerous conditions at the stable and the inherent risks of horseback

riding. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of D. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict,

and P appealed to this court. She claimed that the trial court committed

harmful error by admitting into evidence a written agreement between

the parties and a photograph of a sign on the stable’s premises, both

of which purported to release D from all liability for injuries arising

out of horse related activities at the stable. Held that the record was

inadequate to review P’s claim that the trial court committed harmful

error by admitting into evidence the subject agreement and photograph;

P failed to provide this court with various transcripts of the trial proceedings, and without a complete record of the trial, this court could not

make an informed assessment of P’s claim of harmful error pursuant

to the relevant factors for evaluating a claim of evidentiary impropriety,

including an evaluation of the relationship of the agreement and the

photograph to the issue of D’s alleged negligence, whether the trial court

gave any additional curative instructions to the jury that mitigated the

effect of the challenged evidentiary ruling, whether the subject evidence

was cumulative of other validly admitted evidence, and whether the

trial court’s allegedly improper ruling affected the jury’s perception of

the remaining evidence.

Argued January 31—officially released September 26, 2017

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New

London, where the complaint was withdrawn in part;

thereafter, the court, Cole-Chu, J., denied the named

plaintiff’s motion to preclude certain evidence; subsequently, the matter was tried to the jury; verdict for

the named defendant; thereafter, the court denied the

named plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and

for a new trial, and rendered judgment in accordance

with the verdict, from which the named plaintiff

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

James J. Healy, with whom was Christopher P.

Anderson, for the appellant (named plaintiff).

Greg S. Kreiger, with whom was John Stephen Papa,

for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The plaintiff, Stefana Pecher,1 appeals

from the judgment of the trial court, following a jury

trial, rendered in favor of the defendant, Rhea

Distefano.2 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial

court committed harmful error, requiring a new trial,

by admitting a document, titled ‘‘Release and Hold

Harmless Agreement,’’ and a photograph of a sign

(photo), both of which, at least in part, purported to

relieve the defendant from all liability for injuries arising

out of horse related activities at Showtime Stables. The

issue in this appeal is whether we can review the plaintiff’s claims notwithstanding the fact that she has failed

to provide us with a complete record. We conclude that

the absence of a complete record restricts our ability

to review fully and accurately the plaintiff’s claims of

harmful error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

On the basis of the incomplete record provided to

us on appeal, we conclude that the jury reasonably

could have found the following facts in reaching its

verdict in favor of the defendant. The defendant operates a horse stable, known as Showtime Stables. As

part of her business, she gives riding lessons to patrons.

The defendant requires riders to sign a ‘‘Release and

Hold Harmless Agreement’’ (document) that provides:

‘‘The Undersigned assumes the unavoidable risks

inherent in all horse-related activities, including but not

limited to bodily injury and physical harm to horse,

rider, and spectator.

‘‘In consideration, therefore, for the privilege or riding

and/or working around horses at ________, located at

________, the Undersigned does hereby agree to hold

harmless and indemnify ________ and further release

them from any liability or responsibility for accident,

damage, injury, or illness to the Undersigned or to any

horse owned by the Undersigned or to any family member or spectator accompanying the Undersigned on

the premises.’’

The plaintiff had taken a few riding lessons as a child

and, more recently, had taken approximately twenty

additional lessons as an adult at another stable. She

then began taking riding lessons from the defendant.

On January 23, 2010, the plaintiff, her friend, Audrey

Ulmer, and their two daughters went to the defendant’s

stable for riding lessons. The plaintiff rode a horse

named Pepsi during her riding lesson. Most, if not all,

of the plaintiff’s six lessons with the defendant had

been on Pepsi. Pepsi had a tendency to be rather ‘‘lazy,’’

and, in an effort to get Pepsi to cooperate, the rider

needed to use his or her leg strength to squeeze the

horse or, in the alternative, a crop. Pepsi is ‘‘the couch

potato of horses. . . . Her demeanor is very, very quiet.

She doesn’t get flustered easily. . . . [S]he’s safe, she’s
quiet, she’s reliable.’’ The defendant had never seen

Pepsi bolt or do anything like that.

During the plaintiff’s lesson on January 23, 2010, she

fell off Pepsi, sustaining personal injuries. When an

injury occurred to a rider, the defendant made and kept

a record of that event. That evening, after the plaintiff

had been injured, the defendant recorded the incident

in relevant part as follows: ‘‘[The plaintiff] was riding

Pepsi in first lesson of new package today when Pepsi

became very lazy. I instructed [the plaintiff] to tap

[Pepsi] on [the] shoulder with her crop and Pepsi still

wouldn’t get going. I swapped out [the] short crop with

[a] larger one for her to tap behind [Pepsi’s] leg . . .

on [the] flank area, and Pepsi trotted forward. When

Pepsi went forward she did so quickly at [a] trot, and

[the plaintiff] got bounced forward. She posted for a

few steps and lost her balance and fell forward on

Pepsi’s neck with her legs gripping behind her saddle

on the flank area. She fell forward onto Pepsi’s neck

and was holding [the] neck in [a] bear hug position,

kicking with her legs. This went on for about [five]

steps then Pepsi broke into [a] canter. I was yelling this

whole time for her to sit up, stop kicking, sit back, pull

on your reins. It was clear she was panicked, so I ran

to [the] corner where [the] horse was and grabbed her

outside rein and slowed her back to [a] trot as she went

by me. Pepsi slowed to [a] trot and went toward [the]

center of [the riding] ring and stopped. [The plaintiff]

fell when [the] horse stopped, from [a] ‘hug’ position.

[She] [r]olled onto her left hip [and] shoulder, onto [the]

dirt footing. She laid for a minute and sat up and leaned

against [a] block. I was next to her holding [the] horse

and asked if she wanted [to call] 911. She said no. She

never lost consciousness, was lucid, and could move

all parts. . . . I said can [you] get back on and finish

or is [your] knee [too] sore. She tried to rise and said

[her] knee was too sore.* There didn’t appear to be any

swelling or obvious deviation. She said she had a friend

who was [an] orthopedic [doctor] and that she would

have [Ulmer] drive her there to have it looked at.

[Ulmer] drove her car up . . . and picked her up. We

helped her into [the] car. She was limping on [the] knee

but [was able to put] some weight on it.’’

In addition to the asterisk placed in the middle of her

record of this event, the defendant also placed another

asterisk near the end of the record, seemingly to insert

more information where the previous asterisk was

placed, stating the following: ‘‘*At this point she was

sitting on [a] plastic block. I went down to [the] barn

with [the] horse [and] gave [the horse to the] kids to

untack and went back to give her ice for [her] knee.’’

As a result of her injuries, the plaintiff underwent surgery to repair her knee. She then commenced this

action.

On January 13, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion in
limine requesting that the court preclude the defendant

from offering any evidence as to the document. The

next day, the court conducted a hearing on the motion.

During the hearing, the plaintiff argued that the document was void as a matter of public policy under Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, 280 Conn. 153, 905 A.2d

1156 (2006), and that any probative value of the document was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The

plaintiff also argued that the document was cumulative

in light of General Statutes § 52-557p, which provides:

‘‘Each person engaged in recreational equestrian activities shall assume the risk and legal responsibility for

any injury to his person or property arising out of the

hazards inherent in equestrian sports, unless the injury

was proximately caused by the negligence of the person

providing the horse or horses to the individual engaged

in recreational equestrian activities or the failure to

guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity by the person providing the horse or

horses or his agents or employees.’’

At the conclusion of the argument on the motion in

limine to preclude the document, the court denied the

plaintiff’s motion but left the issue open to be revisited

if necessary: ‘‘So, I am denying the motion in limine,

which was essentially to keep out the document, and

to bar the defendant from making any reference to it.

How it unfolds in the actual course of things is to be

seen, but I am not going to rule now against the offer

of the release.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Later that day, during the cross-examination of

Ulmer, the defendant’s attorney asked her about her

signing the document. Ulmer stated that she had signed

it, and then the defendant’s counsel offered the document into evidence at that time. The plaintiff’s attorney

stated that he had no objection: ‘‘If it’s being offered

as a document signed by . . . Ulmer, I don’t have an

objection to that.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court stated

that it had some trepidation about the relevance of

the document, but ‘‘if there’s no objection, it may be

admitted to show what the witness identified herself

[as signing].’’ (Emphasis added.)

The court then gave the jury a limiting instruction:

‘‘You’re about to see, ladies and gentlemen of the jury,

a document. It’s entitled, ‘Release and Hold Harmless

Agreement.’ Mrs. Ulmer has testified that she signed it,

and that’s the sole—the content of this as signed by

Mrs. Ulmer is all you’re presently allowed to consider

it for. I would also note that—well, I’ll say more about

it if the occasion arises, but that’s all you’re allowed to

consider it for right now.’’ The document then was

published to the jury.

Following its publication to the jury, the plaintiff’s

attorney stated: ‘‘Your Honor, at this time, I’d just like

to state something for the record. I’d like to restate my

objection to this line of inquiry [on] this issue, which
we have discussed on the record earlier this morning,

and, once again, state that my basis is that the prejudicial effect of this, at this time, outweighs any probative

value to the document, and that’s exactly how it’s

unfolding at the present time. I just, for the record, I

wanted to state my objection to the relevancy of this

document and its admissibility in these circumstances.’’

The court immediately responded: ‘‘I said something

about relevance earlier, and that was not the ground

of objection. Your point is noted, sir . . . .’’

Then, during the defendant’s testimony on January

21, 2015, her attorney asked her about the document.

The defendant stated that she had given the document

to Ulmer and the plaintiff to sign, that she saw them

sign it, and that they gave it back to her. That testimony

was offered without objection, and without a further

limiting instruction, as one was not requested at that

time.

The defendant’s attorney also showed the defendant

the photo and asked her if she recognized it. The defendant stated that it was the photo of a sign that she has

posted ‘‘by the doorway as you walk into the barn, right

at eye level.’’ The defendant’s attorney then asked that

the photo be entered as a full exhibit. The plaintiff’s

attorney stated that he objected on the ground of relevance, to which the defendant’s attorney responded:

‘‘The purpose, Your Honor, is to demonstrate that the

plaintiff knew about the inherent risks of riding at the

stable, and it was there for her to see. Also, the plaintiff

testified she never saw it, but this is testimony that it

was present.’’ No further objection was set forth, and

the court admitted the photo. It also gave no limiting

instruction, and the plaintiff did not request such an

instruction at that time.

The plaintiff’s attorney also questioned the defendant

about the document, asking if she was required by law

to have her students sign such documents. The defendant responded that she did not think there was such

a requirement.

The defendant’s attorney followed up by asking the

defendant to recall the questioning of the plaintiff’s

attorney regarding the document, and then asked the

defendant why she had her students sign such documents. The defendant responded: ‘‘Because horses as a

sport in general are dangerous. There’s risks associated

with riding them, handling them, being around them.

You could get hurt, you could get killed, you could get—

a lot of things could happen. There are so many different

scenarios, so to afford myself some protection, I try to

use that.’’

Following that testimony, the defendant’s attorney

offered the document into evidence ‘‘for the purpose

of showing that [the plaintiff] was warned about the

inherent risks involved with riding.’’ The court asked
if the plaintiff had an objection, and counsel responded:

‘‘With the understanding of what we talked about in

chambers and your prior warnings, Your Honor.’’

The court admitted the document and offered the

following admonishment: ‘‘Now, ladies and gentlemen

of the jury, you’ve already seen defendant’s exhibit A,

because it came [into evidence] with Mrs. Ulmer. Now,

it’s a full exhibit. I’m instructing you that the law does

not allow somebody to waive claims for somebody

else’s negligence in advance. You know, you can do

it, technically, afterwards, but you—if you go into a

restaurant, you can’t be required to sign a release that,

if I get food poisoning because the food’s been out

for three days, you know, the customer can’t sue the

restaurant. This exhibit is only being accepted by the

court and may only be used by you as basically notice

of the hazard. It is not a release of liability. It is not

claimed to be a release of liability by the defense.’’

The court then asked the plaintiff’s attorney if it left

‘‘anything out.’’ The plaintiff’s attorney replied: ‘‘I think

that was perfect, Your Honor,’’ and the defendant’s

attorney replied: ‘‘I think that’s what we discussed in

chambers, Your Honor.’’

During the court’s final charge to the jury, the court

explained to the jury that it had a duty to listen carefully

to the court’s instructions and to follow them. It then

instructed the jury on the law of negligence, including

the duty to invitees and defective premises, and properly set forth the relevant allegations of the plaintiff’s

complaint and applied those allegations to its instruction on the law. It also instructed the jury on causation,

damages and the burden of proof, and on the defendant’s special defenses of contributory negligence and

assumption of the risk pursuant to § 52-557p.

When the court gave its limiting instruction on the

proper use of the document, the court admonished the

jury in relevant part: ‘‘As I instructed you when that

document . . . was admitted in evidence, that document is not, and is not claimed by the defendant to be,

a release or hold-harmless agreement as to a claim of

negligence of the defendant. As to the defendant—as

the defendant acknowledges, any agreement that purport[s] to release the operator and/or owner of a horse

riding facility from his or her negligent conduct would

violate public policy and, therefore, be unenforceable.

The only significance of that exhibit you could properly

find if you see fit is that the parties . . . were aware

of the general risks and hazards of horseback riding.

In particular, if you find that the defendant was negligent in any of the ways alleged by the plaintiff and that

that negligence caused the plaintiff’s injuries or any of

those injuries, the fact that the plaintiff signed that

document must have no effect on your decision regarding what fair, just, and reasonable damages to award

to the plaintiff.’’
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.

Thereafter, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to

set aside the verdict and for a new trial, and rendered

judgment in accordance with the verdict. This appeal

followed.

Our analysis of this appeal begins and ends with our

consideration of the adequacy of the record provided

by the plaintiff. We have examined the record provided

by the plaintiff and conclude that she has failed to

provide a complete and adequate record that would

enable our review of her claims on appeal. The furnishing of a complete record is particularly important to a

reviewing court that is called upon to consider the

extent of the harm, if any, to an appellant who is

requesting that the court reverse the judgment of the

trial court on the basis of an alleged improper evidentiary ruling. See Desrosiers v. Henne, 283 Conn. 361,

367–69, 926 A.2d 1024, (2007) (declining to review evidentiary claim where defendant provided only excerpts

of trial transcripts because it was impossible for

reviewing court to determine whether alleged impropriety was harmful); Ryan Transportation, Inc. v. M & G

Associates, 266 Conn. 520, 531, 832 A.2d 1180 (2003)

(declining to review evidentiary claim where plaintiff

did not provide transcript of testimony of witnesses,

stating, ‘‘even if we assume, arguendo, that the challenged evidentiary ruling was improper, we have no

way of discerning whether any such impropriety was

harmful in the broader context of the entire trial’’);

Chester v. Manis, 150 Conn. App. 57, 62–63, 89 A.3d 1034

(2014) (declining to review evidentiary claim because

incomplete record left court unable to determine if

‘‘alleged impropriety would likely have affected the

result of the trial’’); Quaranta v. King, 133 Conn. App.

565, 569–70, 36 A.3d 264 (2012) (declining to review

plaintiff’s evidentiary claim where plaintiff provided

only partial transcript of proceedings).

A review of our appellate record in this case reveals

that the plaintiff ordered and delivered a paper copy

and an electronic copy of the following seven transcripts: (1) the January 14, 2015 argument on the motion

in limine; (2) the January 14, 2015 cross-examination

of lay witness Ulmer; (3) the January 15, 2015 crossexamination of the plaintiff; (4) the January 16, 2015

direct examination of the defendant; (5) the January

21, 2015 continued direct examination and the crossexamination of the defendant; (6) the direct examination of lay witness Sundy Martin; and (7) the January

22, 2015 jury charge. We also have been provided an

electronic copy of the trial court’s preliminary instructions to the jury, the January 21, 2015 cross-examination

of Martin, and the May 11, 2015 argument on the plaintiff’s postverdict motion to set aside the verdict and for

a new trial. The plaintiff further has provided, in her

appendix, a paper copy of her counsel’s argument on
the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and for a

new trial.

We know for certain that we have not been provided

the direct examination of Ulmer, the direct examination

of the plaintiff, and the closing arguments of counsel.

Additionally, we are left to speculate about precisely

how many other witnesses may have testified and the

content of their testimony,3 exactly what the plaintiff

said during her direct testimony, what counsel may

have argued during any other part of the trial and during

closing, and whether the court gave additional instructions or guidance to the jury during other parts of the

trial that could be relevant to our analysis.

Here, as the appellant, it was the plaintiff’s burden

to provide a complete record on appeal. See Practice

Book § 61-10. She also is responsible for establishing

that she was harmed by the alleged improper evidentiary rulings of the trial court. See Connecticut Light &

Power Co. v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 128, 956 A.2d 1145

(2008) (‘‘Even when a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is

deemed to be improper, we must determine whether

that ruling was so harmful as to require a new trial.

. . . In other words, an evidentiary ruling will result in a

new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful.’’

[Internal quotation marks omitted.]). This, the plaintiff

cannot do in light of the incomplete record that she

has provided this court.4

‘‘[Our Supreme Court has] held generally that [t]he

trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility [and relevancy] of evidence. . . . The trial court’s

ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only

upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . . Additionally, before a party is entitled to a

new trial because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling,

he or she has the burden of demonstrating that the

error was harmful.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Urich v. Fish, 261 Conn. 575, 580–

81, 804 A.2d 795 (2002).

‘‘A determination of harm requires us to evaluate the

effect of the evidentiary impropriety in the context of

the totality of the evidence adduced at trial. . . . Thus,

our analysis [would include] a review of: (1) the relationship of the improper evidence to the central issues

in the case, particularly as highlighted by the parties’

summations; (2) whether the trial court took any measures, such as corrective instructions, that might mitigate the effect of the evidentiary impropriety; and (3)

whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely

cumulative of other validly admitted testimony. . . .

The overriding question [we must answer] is whether

the trial court’s improper ruling affected the jury’s perception of the remaining evidence.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Hayes v. Camel, 283 Conn. 475, 489–90, 927 A.2d 880

(2007); see also Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of
Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1, 20, 60 A.3d 222 (2013).

Without a complete record, we are unable to fully

apply and appropriately assess the Hayes factors. For

example, even if we assume, arguendo, that the document and the photo improperly were admitted into evidence,5 we are unable to assess fully and completely

the first Hayes factor, ‘‘the relationship of the improper

evidence to the central issues in the case, particularly

as highlighted by the parties’ summations’’; (emphasis

added) Hayes v. Camel, supra, 283 Conn. 489; because

we do not have a transcript of the parties’ summations.6

Also, our analysis of the remaining Hayes factors is

equally unfeasible. Indeed, although we know that we

have transcripts for at least some of the witnesses and

some of the court’s curative instructions, we do not

know whether any additional instructions were given

or what was contained in the testimony for which the

plaintiff has not provided transcripts. We also are

unable to fully assess whether the document and the

photo were cumulative of other validly admitted evidence because we do not have a complete record of

the trial, including the plaintiff’s direct testimony. Consequently, we cannot conduct a full and complete analysis of harm pursuant to the Hayes factors. Accordingly,

we conclude that without a complete record of the

trial, we are left with an inability to make an informed

assessment of the plaintiff’s claims on appeal, and we

are unable to consider ‘‘[t]he overriding question [of]

whether the trial court’s [alleged] improper ruling

affected the jury’s perception of the remaining evidence.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Hayes v. Camel, supra, 283 Conn. 490.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The original complaint was brought by Pecher, Sophia Pecher-Kohout,

and Jaromir Kohout. Pecher-Kohout and Kohout subsequently withdrew

their claims, and they are not parties to this appeal. We, therefore, refer to

Pecher as the plaintiff.

2

In the original complaint, the plaintiff named Distefano and Showtime

Stables as defendants. Subsequently, all claims against Showtime Stables

were withdrawn. Accordingly, we refer to Distefano as the defendant.

3 We are mindful that the plaintiff represented to the trial court in her

motion to set aside the verdict that ‘‘[t]he jury heard testimony from three

. . . experts and nine . . . lay witnesses.’’ (Emphasis added.) If this representation is accurate, and we have no reason to believe that it is not accurate,

we have been provided the testimony or the partial testimony of only four

of the twelve witnesses who testified at trial.

4 Because the plaintiff cannot establish, on the basis of the record that

she has provided to us, that the court’s rulings were harmful, it is unnecessary

for us to decide conclusively whether the document and the photo improperly were admitted into evidence. See Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of

Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1, 20, 60 A.3d 222 (2013) (‘‘[a]n evidentiary ruling

will result in a new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful’’

[emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted]). Nevertheless, we

take this opportunity to recognize an interesting argument raised by the

defendant concerning the relevance of the document and the photo.

General Statutes § 52-557p provides: ‘‘Each person engaged in recreational

equestrian activities shall assume the risk and legal responsibility for any

injury to his person or property arising out of the hazards inherent in

equestrian sports, unless the injury was proximately caused by the negli-
gence of the person providing the horse or horses to the individual engaged

in recreational equestrian activities or the failure to guard or warn against

a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity by the person providing

the horse or horses or his agents or employees.’’ (Emphasis added.)

In the plaintiff’s complaint, she made three allegations concerning the

defendant’s negligent failure to warn against a dangerous condition: (1)

‘‘fail[ure] to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition caused by the

use of the crop/whip’’; (2) ‘‘fail[ure] to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous

condition caused by the opening in the arena when it was unreasonable not

to have done so’’; and (3) ‘‘fail[ure] to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous

condition caused by the jumping gate the that injured the plaintiff when it

was unreasonable not to have done so.’’ During oral argument on the plaintiff’s motion in limine, the defendant argued that the document was relevant

to demonstrate that the plaintiff had been warned of inherent risks. On

the basis of the arguments presented to it, the trial court expressed some

agreement with that contention. On appeal, the plaintiff argues, for the first

time, that the document had no relevance because § 52-557p already provides

that the plaintiff assumes all inherent risks. The defendant argues, however,

that the plaintiff’s specific allegations of a failure to warn necessitated her

providing proof that she, in fact, did warn the plaintiff.

Although presenting an interesting question as to whether the ‘‘unless the

injury was proximately caused by the . . . failure to guard or warn

against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity’’ portion of the

statute was implicated by the plaintiff’s allegations of the defendant’s failure

to warn against particular dangerous conditions, and whether the document

and the photo could be evidence sufficient to defend against this portion

of § 52-557p, because we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to establish

harm, we defer our analysis of the statute for another day.

5 Although we do not decide whether the court’s admission of the document and the photo was improper, we do recognize that the use of these

types of releases is against public policy; see Reardon v. Windswept Farm,

LLC, supra, 280 Conn. 153; and the admission of evidence that contravenes

public policy generally is not favored.

Our courts have recognized that certain evidence is inadmissible because

it violates the public policy of this state. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-9, commentary (explaining that rule barring admission of evidence of payment regarding

medical and similar expenses fosters public policy of encouraging assistance

to injured party by eliminating threat that evidence can be used as admission

of liability at trial), citing Danahy v. Cuneo, 130 Conn. 213, 216, 33 A.2d

132 (1943). In denying admission of such evidence, our courts have recognized that the public policy promoted by the exclusion of such evidence

outweighs the minimal relevance of such evidence. Nevertheless, such evidence may be admissible in particular circumstances if it is offered for a

purpose other than that which has been found to violate public policy. See

Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of Greenwich, Inc., supra, 308 Conn. 14–15

(although evidence of subsequent remedial measures is violative of public

policy when used to prove negligence, such evidence may be admissible to

prove some other material issue); Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421, 440, 948

A.2d 982 (2008) (same); Miko v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 209, 596 A.2d 396 (1991) (although evidence of offers

to compromise is inadmissible as violative of public policy, statements made

during such offers may be admissible as admissions of fact).

Here, as we mentioned in footnote 4 of this opinion, the defendant sought

to admit the subject evidence on a theory other than to prove that the

plaintiff had waived her right to pursue a negligence action, i.e., that she

was aware of the risks and the defendant in fact had warned her of those

risks. Because of the inadequacy of the record, we need not decide, however,

whether the actual purpose for which the evidence was offered provided a

sufficient basis upon which to admit this evidence or whether the trial

court appropriately balanced the probative value of the evidence against

its prejudicial effect.

6 Moreover, despite the plaintiff’s argument that the document and the

photo ‘‘took center stage in the defendant’s trial presentation,’’ the parties

acknowledge that no one attempted to use the document and the photo as

a waiver of negligence at any time during the trial. Furthermore, although

the plaintiff attempts to establish that the document was central to the

defendant’s case because four witnesses were asked about it during the

trial, as we noted previously, the plaintiff stated, in her motion to set aside

the verdict, that ‘‘[t]he jury heard testimony from three . . . experts and

nine . . . lay witnesses’’ in this case. Assuming the truth of that representa-
tion by the plaintiff, we question whether the fact that four of twelve witnesses were questioned about the document signifies its centrality.

The central issue of this case appears to have been whether the defendant

was negligent in one or more of the ways alleged, including for a failure to

warn of particular dangerous conditions; it was not whether the plaintiff

had waived her rights or released the defendant from liability for such

alleged negligence. Compare Reardon v. Windswept Farm, LLC, supra, 280

Conn. 153 (rendering summary judgment in favor of defendants, who had

raised as defense fact that horseback riding student had signed release and

waived claims for liability arising from personal injuries she had sustained

during riding lesson, was reversible error because release from liability was

void as against public policy). There is no indication in the record that the

plaintiff has provided, and the plaintiff, on appeal, sets forth no argument,

that the defendant made any attempt to establish, allege, or in any manner

argue that the plaintiff released the defendant from liability for her injuries.