Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

LAWRENCE D. NEWMAN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Newman & Newman, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana

Noblesville, Indiana

ROBERT J. HENKE

CHRISTINA D. PACE

Deputy Attorney Generals

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE )

TERMINATION OF THE PARENT- )

CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: )

)

G.M. (Minor Child), )

)

 and )

)

R.M. (Mother), )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 29A05-1310-JT-509

)

THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )

CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Steven R. Nation, Judge
2

The Honorable Todd L. Ruetz, Magistrate

Cause No. 29D01-1112-JT-1674

June 12, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAKER, Judge 

Appellant-respondent R.M. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights 

as to her son, G.M. More particularly, Mother argues that the Indiana Department of 

Child Services (the DCS) failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 

conditions that resulted in the removal of G.M. would not be remedied or that there was a 

reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat 

to G.M.’s well-being. However, we find that the DCS did prove that there was a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in G.M.’s removal would not be 

remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to 

G.M.’s well-being. The DCS also has a satisfactory plan for G.M., which is adoption. 

Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. 

FACTS

G.M. was born to Mother on November 7, 2010.1 G.M. was born with opiates 

and/or heroin in his system due to Mother’s use of illegal drugs during her pregnancy. 

 

1 The juvenile court had previously terminated the parental rights of A.C., G.M.’s father. A.C. is not a 

party to this appeal. 
3

Mother used illegal drugs throughout her pregnancy, and she used these drugs three days 

before G.M.’s birth, twelve hours from birth, and on her way to the hospital to deliver 

G.M. G.M. was hospitalized for approximately ten days following his birth because he 

was suffering from drug withdrawal symptoms. On November 15, 2010, the DCS 

removed G.M. from Mother’s custody. With the juvenile court’s authority, the DCS filed 

a petition alleging that G.M. was a child in need of services (CHINS). 

On November 16, 2010, the juvenile court held an initial hearing, wherein it 

authorized G.M.’s placement in foster care. The juvenile court appointed an attorney for 

Mother and set the DCS petition for fact-finding. When G.M. was released from the 

hospital, he was placed with his maternal aunt (Aunt) and uncle (Uncle). 

On March 8, 2011, the juvenile court held a factfinding hearing. Mother failed to 

appear but was represented by counsel. The juvenile court adjudicated G.M. a CHINS, 

and held an immediate dispositional hearing. It granted the DCS wardship of G.M., 

ordered Mother to engage in reunification services, and continued G.M.’s placement with 

Aunt and Uncle. 

On August 12, 2011, Mother appeared at the permanency review hearing, where 

the juvenile court maintained the reunification plan, but found that Mother had failed to 

participate in services until June of 2011, had not communicated with the DCS, had been 

periodically incarcerated, had missed visitation with G.M. for approximately seven 

months, and had tested positive for illegal drugs. The juvenile court also found that G.M. 

was progressing well in placement. 
4

A second permanency review hearing was held on November 4, 2011. The 

juvenile court found that Mother refused to take responsibility for continued positive drug 

screens, that Mother was not cooperating with the DCS or participating in any services, 

that Mother had taken up residence with a man who had a history of dealing illegal 

narcotics, and that Mother had lost custody of G.M.’s prior-born siblings. The juvenile 

court then instituted a plan for the termination of parental rights and adoption of G.M.

All services for Mother were suspended. 

On April 24, 2011, and October 6, 2012, the juvenile court again held permanency 

review hearings. The juvenile court maintained the termination of parental rights and 

adoption as the permanency plan, as Mother had failed to maintain contact with the DCS, 

refused to participate in the case, and failed to appear for hearings. 

The DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights in G.M. on 

December 5, 2011. However, Mother did not appear at the initial hearing on February 

10, 2012. The juvenile court set the matter for a factfinding hearing after appointing a 

guardian ad litem for G.M. and counsel for mother. 

On December 7, 2012, February 5, 2013, and May 31, 2013, the juvenile court 

conducted a factfinding hearing on the DCS petition to terminate parental rights. At the 

factfinding hearing session on December 7, 2012, Family Case Manager (FCM) Drew 

Dickerson, who took over Mother’s case in July 2012, testified that Mother lived with her 

boyfriend, who had a history of criminal activity and drug abuse. He also testified that 

Mother could not provide documentation of any completed substance abuse program and 
5

that she made no requests for resumed visitation with G.M. FCM Dickenson further 

testified that he believed G.M. was part of his adoptive family, that G.M. referred to Aunt 

and Uncle as “mother” and “father,” and that he believed it was in G.M.’s best interests 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights and allow Aunt and Uncle to adopt G.M. 

At the factfinding hearing session on February 5, 2013, DCS FCM Jeri Gibson, 

who oversaw G.M.’s case from November 2010 until August 2012, testified that G.M. 

was released from the hospital into Aunt’s care and never lived with Mother. He also 

testified that Mother was incarcerated more than once and did not contact him regarding 

her incarceration. FCM Gibson further testified that between June 2011 and November 

2011, Mother continued to test positive for illegal drugs and that, rather than take 

responsibility for the positive drug screens, Mother would always have excuses as to why 

she would test positive or deny that the tests were accurate. FCM Gibson also testified 

that the extreme difficulty in contacting Mother made it difficult to do unannounced visits 

or random drug screens, and he told the juvenile court that drug screen results are easier 

to manipulate when the tested subject knows when she will be screened. 

David Gilles, G.M.’s Guardian Ad Litem, testified at the factfinding hearing 

session on February 5, 2013. Giles, who had been involved with the case since February 

2010, testified that, at the time he met Mother, she was incarcerated and that she admitted 

to him that she used heroin during her pregnancy. Gilles also testified that, although he 

gave Mother his information while she was incarcerated, she did not contact him until 

approximately six months later and remained unresponsive throughout his involvement in 
6

the case. Mother told Gilles in June 2011 that she was no longer using illegal drugs; 

however, Mother tested positive for illegal drugs on June 23, 2011. Gilles testified that a 

strong bond never existed between Mother and G.M. and that he believed it was in 

G.M.’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental rights and allow Aunt and Uncle to 

adopt him. 

Aunt, G.M.’s foster mother, also testified at the factfinding hearing on February 5, 

2013. She testified that Mother did not take her drug abuse or the removal of G.M. 

seriously and that Mother refused to follow DCS protocol and attempted to directly 

contact Aunt to schedule unpermitted visitation. Aunt testified that Mother has talked 

about her drug use and that she has observed Mother under the influence of illegal drugs. 

Aunt also testified that her home with Uncle is the only home G.M. has ever known; they 

call him their son, and he calls them mom and dad. Aunt testified that she believed it 

would be traumatic for G.M. to be taken from their home and that G.M. does not know 

his biological mother. 

Additionally, G.M.’s maternal Grandmother (Grandmother) testified on February 

5, 2013. Grandmother testified that Mother had a history of substance abuse, which has 

caused Grandmother to raise two of G.M.’s older siblings. Grandmother testified that 

none of Mother’s older children live with Mother. Grandmother also testified regarding 

Mother’s housing situation, stating that Mother was transient for eighteen months from 

2007 to 2009 until she appeared to stabilize while living at the Third Phase shelter. 

However, Mother then left the shelter and refused to return and also refused to move in 
7

with Grandmother. Grandmother testified that Mother had admitted to her that she had 

been arrested for prostitution and that Mother had denied being pregnant with G.M. up 

until two months before his birth. Mother did not tell Grandmother when G.M. was born 

or communicate that G.M. had been removed from Mother’s care by the DCS. 

Grandmother testified that she believes that placement with Aunt and termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would be in G.M.’s best interest. 

Jimmy Eldridge, Mother’s husband, testified at the factfinding hearing session on 

May 31, 2013. He testified that he has been convicted of possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver on two separate occasions and that prior to those 

convictions he was convicted of two other possession charges. Eldridge also testified 

that, while he was aware of Mother’s positive drug screens, he does not accept the 

accuracy of the screens. Eldridge admitted that Mother was arrested for possessing 

paraphernalia in April 2012 and testified that Mother allowed individuals she did not 

know to use her home to have packages delivered that contained illegal drugs, but that he 

believed that all charges against mother related to the deliveries had been dropped by the 

date of his testimony. Jimmy has never met G.M. 

Mother also testified on May 31, 2013. She testified that she became addicted to 

pain medication following a car crash and has used illegal drugs since at least 2007. 

Mother began using heroin in 2008 or 2009, and she overdosed in 2009 and had to be 

resuscitated back to life and spent three months in jail due to the incident. Mother then 

went into treatment, and maintained sobriety for seven months. On the day Mother 
8

delivered G.M., she was suffering from withdrawal from Suboxone; Mother admitted to 

using heroin on the way to the hospital to deliver G.M. Mother also testified that she has 

convictions for driving with a suspended license, theft, prostitution, and for visiting a 

common nuisance. Mother also admitted that she was incarcerated on the date of the 

factfinding and dispositional hearing in the CHINS case on March 8, 2011. Mother 

pleaded guilty to visiting a common nuisance approximately two weeks before the final 

termination hearing. Mother also testified that she was homeless on or about December 

2010, and stated that she chose to decline to participate in DCS services prior to June 

2011. Mother testified that she was sober by June 2011, and denies the accuracy of any 

positive drug screen. 

After the factfinding hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement. 

On September 17, 2013, the juvenile court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of 

law; it found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to G.M.’s 

removal would not be remedied and that there was a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to G.M.’s well-being. 

Therefore, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights in G.M.

Mother now appeals. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

We initially observe that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to raise their children. Troxel v. 
9

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 

N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). However, parental rights are not absolute and must be 

subordinated to the child’s interest in determining the proper disposition of a petition to 

terminate parental rights. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 264-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 

Thus, “parental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to 

meet their parental responsibilities.” Id. at 265. The purpose of terminating parental 

rights is not to punish parents but to protect their children. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 

880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we neither reweigh the 

evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 

(Ind. 2009). Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are 

most favorable to the judgment below. Id. Here, the juvenile court made specific 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order terminating Mother’s parental rights. 

Where the juvenile court enters specific findings and conclusions, we apply a twotiered standard of review. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. We first determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings, and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. 

We will not set aside the juvenile court’s judgment unless it is clearly erroneous. In re 

A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). A judgment is clearly erroneous 

when the evidence does not support the findings, or the findings do not support the result. 

In re S.F., 883 N.E.2d 830, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
10

The elements that the DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing 

evidence in order to effect the termination of parental rights are set forth in Indiana Code 

section 3l-35-2-4(b)(2), which provides:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31–34–21–5.6 that 

reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not 

required, including a description of the court’s finding, the date of 

the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under 

the supervision of a county office of family and children or 

probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most 

recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is 

removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a 

child in need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home 

of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

. . .

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. 

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
11

We note that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, 

which requires that only one of the sub-elements, under subsection (B), be proven true by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

II. Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

A. Conditions Remedied

Mother argues that the termination of parental rights order must be set aside 

because the DCS failed to prove that the conditions that led to G.M.’s removal will not be 

remedied. More particularly, Mother argues that the juvenile court focused too heavily 

on Mother’s behavior before the termination proceedings began. 

When determining whether the conditions that led to a child’s removal will not be 

remedied, the juvenile court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the 

time of the termination hearing. In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

However, the juvenile court’s inquiry must also evaluate a parent’s habitual patterns of 

conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. Id.

The juvenile court may properly consider a parent’s history of neglect, failure to 

provide support, lack of adequate housing, and lack of employment, among other things. 

McBride v. Monroe Cnty. OFC, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The juvenile 

court may also consider the services that the DCS has offered to a parent and the response 

to those services. In re M.S., 898 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 

The evidence at the termination hearing demonstrated that the conditions that led 

to the removal of G.M. have not been remedied. Specifically, Mother admitted that she 
12

pleaded guilty to visiting a common nuisance approximately two weeks before the final 

factfinding hearing. Appellant’s App. p. 64. She was also arrested on April 12, 2012 

with the individuals she allowed to deliver illegal drugs to her home. 

Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that Mother has been unable to successfully 

control her drug addiction. While Mother did participate in substance abuse treatment, 

home-based counseling, and visitation with G.M. for a period of time, she did not 

complete any recommended drug abuse treatment. She also continued to test positive for 

cocaine. Tr. p. 38, 39, 44, 49, 50, 57-59, 154, 162, 164, 170, 171. Mother also refuses to 

take responsibility for any of her positive drug screens and argues that the screens were 

not accurate. Appellant’s App. p. 66. This failure to take responsibility for her addiction 

suggests that Mother will not seek adequate help for her addiction in the future.

Mother points out two errors in the juvenile court’s findings of fact and claims that 

the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s conclusions of law. First, she points to 

the juvenile court’s finding that the DCS tried to make contact with mother on a weekly 

or biweekly basis from December 2010 through May 2012, arguing that the finding is 

incorrect. Id. at 61. Mother is correct that the finding should have stated that FCM 

Gibson tried to contact mother from December 2010 through May 2011. 

Mother also argues that the juvenile court should not have included the finding 

concerning manipulation of drug screen tests, as this testimony was objected to by 

Mother’s counsel. Mother is correct that her counsel objected to testimony concerning 

drug screening and that the court ordered it stricken from the record. However, the 
13

remaining findings of fact support the juvenile court’s conclusions of law, and this court 

has held that “to the extent that the judgment is based on erroneous findings, those 

findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the remaining valid findings 

and conclusions support the judgment.” Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 396 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004). 

In light of these facts, it was proper for the juvenile court to conclude that there 

was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in G.M.’s removal would 

not be remedied.

B. Well-being of the Child

Mother also contends that termination of parental rights order must be set aside 

because the DCS failed to prove that the continuation of the parent-child relationship 

posed a threat to G.M.’s well-being. 

As discussed above, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the 

disjunctive. Because there was sufficient evidence for the juvenile court to conclude that 

there was a reasonable probability that conditions would not be remedied, the DCS is not 

required to prove that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to 

G.M.’s well-being. 

Nevertheless, “[w]hen the evidence shows that the emotional and physical 

development of a child in need of services is threatened, termination of the parent-child 

relationship is appropriate.” In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 

Here, Mother’s drug use has already impacted and threatened G.M.’s well-being. Mother 
14

used heroin on the way to the hospital to deliver G.M., and he suffered from withdrawal

symptoms after his birth. Appellant’s App. p. 88. Despite this harm to G.M., Mother has 

continued to use drugs. While she has sometimes maintained periods of sobriety, she has 

always relapsed into drug use. Id. at 91. Moreover, Mother currently lives with Eldridge, 

who also has a history of illegal drug use and drug crime convictions; she has also 

allowed individuals to have illegal drugs delivered to her home. Id. at 87. Therefore, we 

cannot say that the juvenile court’s determination that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship posed a threat to G.M.’s well-being was clearly erroneous. 

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

BARNES, J., and CRONE, J., concur.