Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. O’Connor

O’Connor & Auersch

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Richard L. Mays,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 9, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1705-CR-1142

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marc T. 

Rothenberg, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G02-1308-MR-52124

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 2 of 8

[1] Richard Mays (“Mays”) was convicted in Marion Superior Court of felony 

murder and Class A felony robbery.1 Mays was sentenced to sixty years in the 

Department of Correction. He now appeals and argues that his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 8, 2013, Lori McKinney (“Lori”) drove to Friendly’s Bar in 

Indianapolis where she met Mays inside. The two stayed in the bar for a short 

time and then walked a couple blocks to Lori’s friend Paul Schafer’s (“Schafer”) 

house. Inside Schafer’s house, Lori and Mays met up with Zachary Ray 

(“Ray”) where they concocted a plan to get more money for drugs. 

[4] Lori, Mays, and Ray decided to head to Colonial Inn “[t]o hit a lick.” Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 19. Meaning, Lori would go inside the bar, flirt with a man, and then lure 

him outside where Mays and Ray would be waiting to rob him. The first 

attempt failed, when the man Lori lured out noticed Mays and Ray sitting in 

the back of Lori’s pick-up truck. Lori went back inside the bar where she met 

Michael Campbell (“Campbell”) who bought her a drink. Campbell wanted to 

leave with Lori and head to a nearby bar, so the two exited the Colonial Inn. 

 

1 The court dismissed the Class A felony robbery conviction because of double jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. 

III, p. 2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 3 of 8

[5] As Lori and Campbell were walking towards Lori’s truck, Mays approached 

Campbell and punched him in the head. Campbell immediately fell to the 

pavement, and Ray began kicking him. The two men went through Campbell’s 

pockets, and Ray took his wallet while Mays grabbed his cell phone. Lori, 

Mays, and Ray got into Lori’s truck, and she drove the three of them away 

from the scene. 

[6] The next day, Lori received several calls from an unknown number. When she 

eventually answered the phone, she recognized Mays’s voice on the line. Mays 

was calling from Campbell’s phone. Lori asked Mays which one of the men hit 

Campbell, and Mays responded, “They call me ‘Knockout’ for a reason.” Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 39. Campbell was in the hospital for over thirty days. He never 

regained consciousness and passed away from his injuries on May 13, 2013. 

[7] On August 9, 2013, Mays was charged with felony murder and Class A felony 

robbery. After several continuances and delays, Mays’s two-day jury trial 

commenced on April 10, 2017. He was found guilty as charged. At the 

sentencing hearing on April 28, the trial court dismissed the Class A felony 

robbery count on double jeopardy concerns and sentenced Mays to sixty years 

in the Department of Correction. 

[8] Mays now appeals his sentence. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 4 of 8

Discussion and Decision

[9] Mays argues that his sixty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and the character of the offender. Specifically, Mays contends that 

his sentence is inappropriate because it was not foreseeable that a single punch 

could result in death. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court 

may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the 

trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light 

of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[10] In conducting our review, “[w]e do not look to determine if the sentence was 

appropriate; instead we look to make sure the sentence was not 

inappropriate.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “[S]entencing 

is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 

2008). Ultimately, our principal role is to leaven the outliers rather than 

necessarily achieve what is perceived as the correct result. Id. at 1225. Mays

bears the burden to establish that his sentence is inappropriate. Grimes v. State, 

84 N.E.3d 635, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[11] When considering the nature of the offense, we observe that “the advisory 

sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the 

crime committed.” Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011). The 

advisory sentence for felony murder is fifty-five years, with a sentencing range 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 5 of 8

of forty-five to sixty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3. Thus, Mays’s sixty-year 

sentence is five years more than the advisory. 

[12] Mays’s primary argument is that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense because Campbell dying as a result of Mays’s punch was 

not a foreseeable result. Mays cites to Nunn v. State, 601 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1992), 

and Maiden v. State, 477 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1985) to support his argument.

[13] In Nunn, the defendant punched a female victim in the back of the head as he 

walked by her. 601 N.E.2d at 336. The victim later died from her injuries, and 

the defendant was charged with murder. On appeal, our supreme court held 

that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a murder conviction, and therefore 

directed the trial court to modify the defendant’s conviction to involuntary 

manslaughter. Id. at 339. The court explained, “Although under other 

circumstances, an intent to kill may be inferred from a single blow, we do not 

believe that it is established here.” Id.

[14] In Maiden, the defendant punched his four-year-old son in the abdomen. 477 

N.E.2d at 276. The child died from his injuries and the defendant was charged 

with and convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant 

argued that he could not have known that a single blow would be fatal, and 

therefore the evidence was insufficient to show that he “knowingly” killed his 

son. Id. at 278. Our supreme court disagreed and noted, “we find that a person 

of reasonable judgment would know that a blow of the severity necessary to 

lacerate the pancreas would be fatal to small child.” Id. at 279.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 6 of 8

[15] Mays contends that his case is similar to Nunn because he could not have 

envisioned that striking Campbell once would cause his death and distinguished 

from Maiden because Mays hit a grown man and not a child. However, neither 

Nunn nor Maiden dealt with a challenge to the length of a sentence nor was

either defendant charged with felony murder. Also, as Mays acknowledges, 

“intent is not germane to his conviction” for felony murder. Appellant’s Br. at 

12. Because we find neither case persuasive, we turn to the nature of the offense 

and Mays’s character.

[16] Mays was an active participant in the robbery, and he dealt the fatal blow. The 

trial court noted at sentencing, “I find it pretty deplorable that you’re luring 

people out . . . . [a]nd then jumping them and attempting to rob them for 

money.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 17. We agree. Also, the day after the attack, Mays 

bragged about striking Campbell when he told Lori, “They call me ‘Knockout’ 

for a reason.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 39. Therefore, even though it may not have been 

foreseeable that Mays’s striking Campbell once would cause his death, he was 

not convicted for his intent. And his actions leading up to and during the 

commission of the crime do not demonstrate that his sentence was 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.

[17] What is most troubling about this case, however, is the character of the 

offender. As a juvenile, Mays was arrested eleven times and adjudicated 

delinquent on three misdemeanors. As an adult, Mays has been arrested thirtytwo times, resulting in eleven misdemeanor convictions and five felony 

convictions. We acknowledge that many of these offenses involved alcohol or 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 7 of 8

drugs; however, five of Mays’s prior convictions were for taking property that 

did not belong to him, and three were for battery. We find it concerning that 

these offenses share similarities with the underlying events leading to 

Campbell’s death. 

[18] Moreover, Mays’s record also contains several probation violations. His 

probation was revoked in 1996, 1999, twice in 2003, and 2005. Additionally, 

Mays was on probation when he committed the instant offense. Mays’s 

extensive criminal history and numerous probation violations indicate that 

leniency in sentencing has not had a deterrent effect. See Ford v. State, 718 

N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (Ind. 1999). And Mays’s repeated criminal behavior and 

disregard for the law demonstrates his less-than-admirable character and does 

not aid his inappropriateness argument. See Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 

874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that “although a record of arrests by itself

is not evidence of a defendant’s criminal history, it is appropriate to consider 

such a record as a poor reflection on the defendant’s character . . . .”).

[19] We commend Mays for the programs and classes he has completed while 

incarcerated, the remorse he has expressed, and his stated intent to rehabilitate 

himself. However, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to impose 

a sixty-year sentence for Campbell’s murder is an “outlier” that should be 

reversed under our constitutional authority to review and revise sentences.

Caraway v. State, 977 N.E.2d 469, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1705-CR-1142| February 9, 2018 Page 8 of 8

Conclusion

[20] Based on the facts and circumstances before us, we conclude that Mays has not 

met his burden of persuading us that his sixty-year sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.