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94–386PDF 2015

ISIS: DEFINING THE ENEMY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 29, 2015

Serial No. 114–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert Ford, Senior Fellow, The Middle East Institute (former 

U.S. Ambassador to Syria) .................................................................................. 6

Ms. Maryam Rajavi, president-elect, National Council of Resistance of Iran .... 23

Walid Phares, Ph.D., co-secretary general, Transatlantic Parliamentary Group 

on Counterterrorism ............................................................................................ 43

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert Ford: Prepared statement ................................................. 9

Ms. Maryam Rajavi: Prepared statement .............................................................. 25

Walid Phares, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 47

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: 

Chart of Middle East Alliances ........................................................................... 72

Statement for the Record from the Honorable Tom McClintock, a Representative in Congress from the State of California .................................... 73

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ISIS: DEFINING THE ENEMY 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record subject to the 

length and limitation in the rules. 

The Middle East is a complex place. Major players weave an intricate web of support and opposition. As you can see on the screen 

that is on each end of the committee room—and Ambassador, I 

think there may be a chart that you have been furnished as well—

it is hard to keep track of who supports what groups. But one thing 

is clear. Nobody seems to like ISIS. 

Yet, despite everyone being against ISIS, we are not winning the 

battle against the war on ISIS. One of the reasons, I believe, is because it is not clear we understand the group very well. 

It is time we called it like it is. ISIS is a radical Islamic terrorist 

group. The White House doesn’t really like to talk about this but 

we cannot defeat ISIS if we do not understand who they are. 

It is critical that we know what its goals are, how it seeks to 

achieve those goals. Even if the White House doesn’t think ISIS is 

Islamic, ISIS does. 

ISIS explains its actions and justifies them through its interpretation of the Islamic law and Islamic writings. This philosophy is 

reflected in its daily actions and its deadly actions. 

ISIS beliefs state that Christians either must renounce their 

faith or embrace Islam or die. It is no coincidence then that we 

have seen ISIS specifically target Christians not because Christians are stealing their jobs or fighting against ISIS but merely because they are Christians. 

ISIS attempts to rid Iraq of Christians that have been in Iraq 

since the earliest times of Christianity. The 21 Egyptians beheaded 

by ISIS in Libya were killed because they were Christians. 

Christian towns across Syria have been destroyed by ISIS. Last 

Sunday, ISIS released a new video of them killing Christians, this 

time Christians in Ethiopia. 

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ISIS persecution of Christians is not letting up because its beliefs 

have not changed. This evil belief is what attracts many to join 

ISIS. Two days ago, six men from Minnesota were arrested for 

being recruited to the ISIS cause. 

Reports indicate that there is no recruiting mastermind behind 

their conversation, just the belief of sharing illicit beliefs. There are 

a dozen more examples. Teenagers, women and fighting-age males 

all are heeding the call from ISIS. 

The main way these recruits hear the call from ISIS is through 

social media. I have been raising the issue of terrorists’ use of social media since 2010 when I sent a letter to YouTube asking them 

to change the reporting function for terrorist content. 

More recently, the subcommittee held a hearing that highlighted 

how Twitter has exploded with ISIS propaganda and recruitment 

efforts. ISIS uses Twitter to broadcast its acts to the world. Twitter 

can do a better job policing its platform to stop terrorists from 

using it. 

But I was happy to see that after our hearing Twitter took down 

12,000 ISIS accounts and updated its rules so that even promoting 

terrorism is a violation. Time will tell if these new rules are enforced. 

We cannot shut down ISIS’ messaging. We must also counter it. 

To recognize that ISIS justifies its actions with Islamic verses does 

not mean we are at war with Islam. That is too simplistic and not 

realistic. 

According to ISIS ideals, it also thinks the roughly 200 million 

Shi’a around the world should also die. Same with the heads of 

state of every Muslim country that has elevated man-made law 

above Sharia law. 

What we need is a deeper understanding of what ISIS believes 

and to use this understanding to defeat ISIS and its philosophy. 

For example, if we had a better idea of ISIS philosophy then we 

would better understand why people join this group. This will, in 

turn, give us ways to stem the flow of foreign fighters going to this 

terrorist group. 

Another example—if we know ISIS’ legitimacy is based upon establishing a caliphate that must control territory, then perhaps 

seizing territory from ISIS becomes a higher priority by fighting 

them. 

There are many other possible benefits of having a better understanding of ISIS philosophy. 

Finally, we need the voices of Islam who disagree with ISIS’ interpretation of Islam to come and speak out against ISIS. 

We need to find new ways to work with local imams, prominent 

well-respected Islamic scholars and like-minded NGOs here at 

home and abroad to get their voices heard in the Muslim world. 

I think we should work with our allies to expose ISIS’ half truths 

and show it for the charlatan that it is. ISIS has used its ideals 

to recruit and kill. It is time we now use and find out what that 

ideology is and use it against them. 

I now yield to the ranking member, the gentleman from Massachusetts, for his opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for conducting today’s 

hearing. 

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Understanding ISIS, ISIL, Daesh’s ideology, how this ideology informs ISIL’s goal and actions and what are the implications for the 

United States and its allies in countering ISIL are issues that 

merit serious discussion. 

As the ranking member on this subcommittee and a member of 

the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, I have engaged on ISIL from two perspectives—on one 

hand, from our efforts to counter ISIL abroad in the Middle East 

and on the other hand from our work to prevent terrorist acts and 

the flow of freedom fighters here at home. 

ISIL is a unique threat, and although it rose out of the group 

commonly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, its objectives and tactics differ significantly from those of al-Qaeda. 

Even compared to other terrorist organizations, ISIL’s tactics are 

especially and deliberately savage. ISIL’s atrocities against its captives and religious minorities living in the territory controlled by 

ISIS is horrific. 

Even compared to other terrorist organizations, ISIL’s tactics are 

especially of concern to us. It is brutal, intolerant toward other 

faiths, and invokes its ideology to justify practices including murder, slavery and the destruction of ancient artifacts in Iraq and 

Syria. 

But ISIL’s actions are also hypocritical, for while it destroys certain pre-Islamic statues and cultural objects in the name of its ideology, it is also known to traffic in these sorts of antiquities to finance its terrorist operations. 

Indeed, ISIL’s members are not exclusively ideologues. Instead, 

I see ISIL as being made up at least loosely as three loose factions—true ideologues with an apocalyptic version of Islam, old 

pro-Saddam military and intelligence officers and foreign fighters 

from around the world. 

Some of these foreign fighters are hardened fighters but many 

are just what the uncle of Tamerlin Tsarnaev called his nephew, 

one of the Boston Marathon bombers—a loser, misguided adventure seekers and young men and women who joined ISIL for some 

sense of power and purpose they otherwise lack. 

To degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL we will have to cut off its 

supply of money and manpower. Specifically, we need to work with 

our allies to improve our efforts to prevent the flow of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria. 

We also need to do a better job of countering ISIL’s messaging 

to potential recruits and responding to ISIL’s savvy using social 

media. 

We need to counter their communications smartly and not in a 

heavy-handed way that would give them legitimacy that they, 

frankly, do not deserve. 

Further, we need to assist our allies in the region, particularly 

Jordan and Iraq, in containing and rolling back the territorial 

gains made by ISIL, for unlike al-Qaeda, ISIL still needs to control 

territory in order to survive. 

It is my hope that today’s hearing will provide some insights and 

constructive proposals on how the United States and its allies can 

enhance their efforts to counter ISIL. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

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Mr. POE. The Chair will now recognize members who wish to 

give an opening statement for 1 minute. I would ask members to 

keep their statements to 1 minute. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is good to see you again, Ambassador. Seems like the only time 

we meet in safe ground is here. Otherwise, your career has been 

in all the places that are at the center of this discussion today and 

I appreciate your being here, certainly, as someone who understands the issues and the people with a level of detail that is not—

even in the Near East—is not always understood. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing. I certainly think understanding where we must learn not to 

tolerate the intolerance that leads to ISIS or for that matter the 

intolerance that has led to other terrorist organizations, which I 

think you have done a wonderful job of showing most of them on 

your diagram that is before us. 

So, again, Ambassador, I look forward to a lively debate on all 

the steps that could be taken, most of which if they had been taken 

have failed and if they haven’t been taken the question today will 

be why not. 

I thank you and yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlemen. 

The Chair recognizes the other gentleman from California, Mr. 

Sherman, for his opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to commend the chair and the ranking 

member for their excellent selection of witnesses. One witness is 

particularly controversial and that is because that witness represents an organization that was formerly on the foreign terrorist 

organization list. Formerly. 

The Japanese Government in times past carried out horrific actions, particularly against American POWs. That was then. Today, 

we honored the prime minister of Japan. 

The prime minister was here today to promote a trade agreement 

that includes Vietnam, formerly an enemy of the United States. 

The executive branch has treated as terrorists the IRA, Sinn Fein, 

the African National Congress at various times. Formerly is formerly. 

Second, the MEK, unlike the vast majority of witnesses, present 

company excepted, has actually provided Congress with startlingly 

interesting and useful information such as the existence of the 

Natanz nuclear facility. 

Third, we are told that Ms. Rajavi has greater expertise on Iran 

than on ISIS. If we allow—if we had one witness pull out every 

time that witness thought that the core expertise of a fellow witness was in an area on a related issue and not the explicit subject 

of the hearing, we would have an awful lot of empty chairs. 

And finally, the press has attacked the inclusion of the MEK in 

this hearing because, although the MEK has provided incredibly 

useful information, they tend to provide information that furthers 

their public policy interest. 

I’ve been here almost 20 years. I’ve heard about 16,000 witnesses. I have never heard a witness that wasn’t providing information to further their public policy interest. 

5

So I look forward to hearing the witnesses here and commend 

you on your selection. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

President Obama declared his intention to defeat ISIS and developed a plan he believes can achieve his aims. However, I have serious concerns with the strategy, and I use the term loosely, especially because the President doesn’t seem to have a clear understanding of our enemy. 

In the past year, President Obama has referred to ISIS as not 

Islamic and as al-Qaeda’s JV team—statements that caused confusion about the group and may have contributed to significant strategic errors. 

Denying that the U.S. is at war with radical Islam makes it difficult to engage in a factual honest ideological debate exposing 

ISIS’ false narrative and to empower moderate Muslim voices. 

Misperceptions and the lack of understanding about ISIS have 

consistently led to underestimating this rapidly expanding terror 

group. 

The reality is that ISIS is very Islamic, even if its interpretation 

of Islam differs from the majority of Muslims around the world, 

which is exactly why we should identify the enemy as what it is. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. 

The understanding of ISIS’ origins, motivations and ideology are 

of critical importance in our bid to defeat this brutal terrorist 

group. 

ISIS’ Salafi jihadist ideology is not unique among terrorist organizations. However, its brutal exploits, proficient use of social 

media, expansive territorial control and commitment to a pre-modern form of governance constitute a dangerous evolution that set it 

apart from its predecessors. 

While ISIS’ reliance on territorial control and governance makes 

it a uniquely serious threat for the United States and our partners, 

these attributes also represent serious vulnerability. 

ISIS forces can be targeted more easily and if it continues to lose 

territory or its ability to govern it will have lost much of its legitimacy. 

I look forward to the discussion of today’s witnesses, and with 

that I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the other gentleman from New 

York, Mr. Zeldin, for his opening statement. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. 

You can’t defeat an enemy that you are not willing to define accurately. The President, in September 2014, outlined a strategy to 

defeat ISIS. That strategy needs to evolve. 

In that strategy—that speech he said that he was not going to 

have any boots on the ground. It was going to be a different stratVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:49 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042915\94386 SHIRL
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egy than past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the same exact 

speech he announced that he was sending 495 additional troops to 

Iraq. 

Here, when Secretary Kerry was before the Foreign Affairs Committee recently, he said there would be no offensive action, even 

though right now we are engaged in kinetic air strikes. 

He later clarified we still have unanswered questions as far as 

what kind of flexibility and resources are going to be given to that 

commander on the ground to actually accomplish the mission. 

We are relying on Iraqi military and law enforcement to finish 

the job in destroying ISIS. Many of them don’t even show up to 

work. Many of the Syrian rebels that we are relying on on Syria 

aren’t fighting ISIS. They are going after Assad, which it wouldn’t 

be such a bad thing if they took him out. 

The strategy needs to evolve. I look forward to this hearing today 

to bring some more accountability not only to defining the enemy 

but destroying them. 

Mr. POE. Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements 

will be made part of the record. I ask that the witnesses keep their 

presentation to approximately 5 minutes. 

I will introduce the first panel. Ambassador Robert Ford finished 

his 30-year career with the Peace Corps in the U.S. Department of 

State in April 2014 and now is a senior fellow at the Middle East 

Institute. Ambassador Ford has served the United States nobly in 

a lot of places that have conflict such as Algeria, Syria and Iraq. 

Dr. Walid Phares, who is scheduled to testify here on the panel, 

is still on a plane from New York to here. So when he gets to Dulles we will be notified. But we will proceed with Ambassador Ford 

and your testimony at this time. 

Thank you, Ambassador. Your statement will be made part of the 

record. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT FORD, SENIOR 

FELLOW, THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA) 

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. 

Thank you for your invitation today. It is an honor to be here to 

talk about the Islamic State, which is one of the biggest foreign 

challenges that our country and our military confronts today. 

I have laid out in my written testimony some more detailed 

thoughts about the ideology of the Islamic State and what an understanding of that ideology would suggest in terms of our own 

strategies. 

So in my oral testimony let me just highlight a few key points. 

Number one, the Islamic State’s ideology comes out of a Salafi 

jihadi school, as Congressmen Higgins just noted. 

It allows for no compromise on key elements of doctrine and 

practice. Let me underline that. It allows for no compromise on key 

elements of doctrine and practice. 

According to its ideology, compromise in applying divine instruction is sin and an adherent would not want to die with that sin 

weighing against him. 

7

Number two—because ultimately the Islamic State rejects compromise, it also rejects pluralism and it even rejects things like borders between states and foreign governments. 

Three—in policy terms, this means that the Islamic State itself 

thinks that it must fight communities who reject its rule. It cannot 

compromise with communities that reject its rule. 

It would be a sin for its leaders and its adherents to make such 

a compromise. So what that means is that Iran and the Shi’a may 

be the Islamic State’s greatest immediate enemy. But we need to 

understand that the Islamic State also sees us as an eventual if not 

an immediate enemy. 

It views us as an enemy to the application of its literalist interpretation of divine law across the planet. The Islamic State’s ideology also creates some weaknesses that we should seek to exploit. 

First, its severe literalist interpretation of governance and justice 

alienates a great many inhabitants of territories it controls. We 

have seen this, for example, in Syria and Iraq. 

There will be local populations in these countries with whom we 

can make common cause against the Islamic State. 

Secondly, this is especially true with other armed opposition 

groups in Syria. Those opposition groups have fought the Islamic 

State on the ground. I want to repeat that. 

Those opposition groups have fought the Islamic State on the 

ground for the past 16 months. Some of them are also Salafis. The 

Islamic State has killed scores of Salafi fighters from other groups 

because those other groups refused to acknowledge the Islamic 

State’s authority. 

Remember what I said. It accepts no compromise. What that also 

means in practical terms is that if the Assad regime in Syria were 

to fall, which is an event that I judge highly unlikely anytime soon, 

the Islamic State would not—let me repeat, the Islamic State 

would not take control in Damascus. 

Rather, other Syrian opposition groups, like antibodies, would 

rush to fight against it even harder. We should be helping anti-extremist Syrian fighters the same way we are helping the Iraqi 

army. 

Three—we should not fall into the trap, and I have seen this discussed in some policy circles here in Washington. We should not 

fall into the trap of thinking that working with Iran will help fix 

our Islamic State problem. 

The Islamic State arose in part—not entirely, but in part from 

longstanding grievances and fears within Sunni communities in the 

Levant and Iraq about growing Persian and Shi’a influence. 

Working with Iran, even indirectly, will feed the Islamic State 

narrative and will immediately help its recruiting. 

Lastly, the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate was quite 

controversial within Salafi jihadi circles. Its claim to legitimacy and 

allegiance depends on its control of land and its ability to apply its 

interpretation of Sharia, of Islamic law. 

Were it not to control land, were it not to be able to govern, its 

claim to legitimacy within those Salafi jihadi circles would be undermined, and therefore seizing ground—not just air strikes but 

seizing ground—needs to be an important part of our strategy. 

8

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude there and I look forward to a 

good discussion. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Ambassador, for succinctly outlining the 

issue before us. 

What is the doctrine of ISIS? You mentioned that there were two 

issues. They won’t compromise. Compromise is sin. What is the 

doctrine? 

Mr. FORD. The Islamic State’s leadership and its adherents, the 

ones that are ideologically driven—and I rush to add here, Mr. 

Chairman, that not everyone that fights under the banner of the 

Islamic State is probably ideologically driven—I think a great 

many, especially in Syria, are driven by more mundane things like 

salaries and access to food and war supplies. 

But for the ideologically driven among them, their goal is to 

apply their interpretation—emphasize that, their interpretation—of 

divine law, Sharia, on the planet. 

And they—because they do not accept borders, any borders, they 

believe that it is to be applied universally to all mankind and those 

who resist must, in the end, submit and—either submit or be 

killed. 

Mr. POE. Submit or die? 

Mr. FORD. Right. Now, can I add one thing on this? I have seen 

a great deal of discussion about the Islamic State and Christians. 

The doctrine—the doctrine is that Christians must either convert 

or submit, and submit in this case means pay taxes, which in Islamic law is called jizya, or they face death, too. So it is convert, 

pay the tax or they can leave—they can go somewhere else—or 

they will be killed. 

Mr. POE. Convert, pay your taxes or die? 

Mr. FORD. Or leave, yes. 

Mr. POE. Or leave. 

Mr. FORD. So what I saw, for example, people who claimed to be 

from the Islamic State in Libya, where they murdered the Egyptian 

Coptic Christians and then the Ethiopian Christians, I think that 

falls well outside even the Islamic State’s interpretation. 

For example, in Syria they allowed Christians to stay but they 

insisted that they pay that tax—the jizya. 

Mr. POE. Let me move on to some other comments that you 

made. Their leadership—let us use them. And I understand people 

are joining ISIS for different reasons. They are not all united on 

the reason that they are there. 

But it is their interpretation of what they see as divine law that 

drives their process of doctrine and then drives their process of 

compromise or refusing to compromise. 

I want to talk about the compromise part. That means compromise with anybody else—is that correct—let us say other Muslim beliefs, other Muslim philosophies about religion or the Koran. 

Mr. FORD. Correct. They believe that their interpretation is the 

only valid one and that is why they have murdered scores and 

scores of even other Salafis in places like Syria. 

They are by far the most extreme, which is why in a place like 

Syria, Mr. Chairman, you have some Salafis fighting other Salafis. 

Mr. POE. A couple more questions with my time remaining. One 

thing that you mentioned that makes them different than all these 

other terrorist groups that are listed on this chart—and you need 

a flow chart to keep up with them—in the whole world——

13

Mr. FORD. That is quite a chart, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. Well, you can keep it. There is no pride of authorship. 

They control and desire to control land. Unlike al-Qaeda and the 

Taliban, who hide in caves and run out and do mischief and then 

run back to their caves, ISIS is up front. 

They want to control swathes—big areas—and get bigger to have 

a caliphate there in Syria, Iraq and move in different directions. Is 

that what makes them different than other terrorist organizations? 

Mr. FORD. That is one of the most distinguishing features of the 

Islamic State is this drive, this insistence by the Islamic State, to 

actually create a governing entity and not just a terrorist entity 

but a real live governing organization with a bureaucracy, with a 

military, that collects taxes, that operates court systems openly. 

That is what is different, and their declaration of that, Mr. 

Chairman, was quite controversial within Salafi jihadi circles. 

A lot of other Salafis said it is not time. It is premature. Or they 

said you don’t actually control the land and you won’t be able to 

do it and so you are full of baloney. Others said your doing so will 

simply increase divisions among the Salafis and therefore it is unwise. 

So that is a point of vulnerability—that declaration of the caliphate, this issue of controlling land—is a real vulnerability within 

their own school of Salafi jihad Islam. 

Mr. POE. Try to get two quick questions, maybe quick answers 

back. How big is ISIS, number wise? 

Mr. FORD. In terms of total numbers of people that live under its 

control, happily or unhappily, probably a couple of million. 

The big cities in Iraq that are under its control are Fallujah and 

Mosul and probably have a population of 1.5 to 2 million. Then on 

the Syrian side, maybe another million. 

Mr. POE. And ISIS has made it clear by their actions and their 

beliefs and their rhetoric that Iran is an enemy of ISIS because of 

their different doctrine and philosophies of the Iranian Government. And you mentioned it would be—would it be foolish for the 

United States to try to side with Iran trying to fight ISIS? Is that 

what you were saying? 

Mr. FORD. Exactly. That plays into their efforts to recruit by saying there is an American-Iranian conspiracy to put down the 

Sunnis and we are the ones fighting it. 

Mr. POE. All right. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I will yield to 

the ranking member, Mr. Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. I like that. Makes me sound like some kind of 

bodybuilder. 

Mr. POE. I called you something different last week, if you remember. Go ahead. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Texas. 

I just want to deal with the issue, initially, of foreign fighters 

and there are some written reports—I will only go that far in commenting on them—that there might be as many as 22,000 upwards 

in terms of foreign fighters. 

They are the people they are putting on the front line, many 

times for suicide attacks and the most vicious attacks in that regard. So a couple of things. 

14

Number one, Turkey has shown, some initial hesitancy at least, 

in working to degrade and defeat ISIL. Foreign fighters continue 

to pass through Turkey. What can the United States and its allies 

do to further engage Turkey, and what more can Turkey do to 

guard its borders so that it can’t be used as a conduit for these foreign fighters as much as it has been? 

Mr. FORD. Congressman, the Turks do have a border problem 

and it is causing problems for us, too. They need more manpower 

along that border because these are—let us be frank—they are ancient smuggling routes. 

There are lots of little goat paths—there are lots of little donkey 

paths that have been there for centuries and they need to be shut 

down. 

There is not a fence along the entire 500-mile Syrian-Turkish 

border and there is not a fence along the Iraq-Turkish border either. 

So it is a question of devoting more resources. The Turks have 

also asked for greater cooperation in terms of sharing the names 

of extremists moving around. I think that will help but that is not 

sufficient. There is a strong need for actual control—physical control of the border. 

The other thing I would just say, and I think this is really important, I was in Turkey recently at the end of January and beginning 

of February. 

The Turks have real doubts about the utility of a policy that focuses on combatting the Islamic State without also dealing with 

and removing the Bashar al-Assad government, which they believe 

fuels the recruitment to the Islamic State. 

Their argument would be something like this. You can bomb and 

kill 50 of them and they will recruit 45, 48 or 50 the next day because they want to fight Bashar al-Assad. So the strategy that the 

American administration has laid out, in the Turkish view, is inadequate. 

Mr. KEATING. I see. Also, just looking at our European allies in 

this regard, what can they do that they are not doing now to help 

stem the flow of foreign fighters? 

Mr. FORD. Couple of comments on that. First, I think many of 

our European friends are genuinely concerned about the size of the 

foreign fighter flow. You mentioned a 22,000 number. I have seen 

numbers like that. 

I know, for example, that the French and the Belgians are exceptionally concerned about the numbers of their citizens that are 

going. And so, in a sense, you have to deal with it on two levels. 

One is just a pure intelligence and security effort to block movements, whether they be out of Europe or coming back into Europe. 

And then the second is, they need people within the Muslim communities of those countries themselves to be explaining to potential 

recruits why joining the Islamic State is not only wrong morally, 

but will also land them in serious trouble. 

Mr. KEATING. Other groups, including affiliates in Afghanistan, 

Algeria, Egypt, Libya as well as Boko Haram in Nigeria, have significantly pledged to ISIL as well. What are the operational and financial relationships between these organizations, and do ISIL 

leaders exert command and control in any way over these groups? 

15

Mr. FORD. There have been lots of little Salafi splinter groups 

that have announced their allegiance to the Islamic State, although 

some others have pointedly declined to do so in places like Algeria. 

The two big ones that have pledged allegiance are Libya and in 

the Sinai Peninsula. Those are the two most serious. 

On the Libya side, I am not aware that there is much command 

and control. I rather doubt that. But there certainly has been some 

sharing of information in terms of how to use social media and how 

to do filming. 

If you saw, for example, that terrible film where the Egyptian 

Christians were marched onto the beach and then murdered, that 

bore a very frightening resemblance to videos that have come out 

of places like Iraq and Syria, and the same in Sinai. 

So there certainly are some kinds of links but I don’t know if it 

extends to command and control. With respect to financial, Congressman, I just can’t say one way or the other. I don’t know. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Ambassador. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, bios are a wonderful thing, especially when they 

link us back to the early days of the Afghan initiative after 9/11. 

At that time, the then Bush administration was focused on Afghanistan and the Taliban-supporting al-Qaeda. 

We have certainly morphed a long way during the second half of 

your career and my entire career in Congress together. Today, that 

complex chart that I will hold up one more time and say it isn’t 

nearly complex enough for the problem——

Mr. FORD. I hope there is not a test on that chart later. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, if—there are a whole bunch of lines that should 

go both ways for opposed, too. But before we modify that, Ambassador, we were overly simplistic in 2001 when we viewed the Middle East. 

At that point you were halfway through your career. You were 

an expert in Near East, Middle East, and a little bit of Africa. Now, 

today, we are a little more aware of the complexity. 

We understand the real struggles between various power 

groups—the former Ottoman Empire in Turkey and their not wanting to acquiesce to other powers—obviously, Persian expansion to 

regain their historic position, and Saudi Arabia’s control of Mecca 

and Medina. 

I am not trying to give a lecture here. I will bring this to a close. 

These odd alliances that often—you explained caliphates—but, of 

course, the idea that an Alawite minority in Syria, somewhat Shi’a 

in its nature, could dominate the area and in fact support both 

Shi’a and Sunni operations against Israel is longstanding and has 

been ignored. 

So what I want to do in the limited time after this little diatribe 

of history is ask you specifically, Syria seems to be one of our most 

complex areas. 

We know that everybody in Syria either is or could be on the 

wrong side because we, obviously, know that Assad is aligned with 

Iran. We know that many of the Sunnis are involved with ISIS 

and, as you said, there is a real question about what after Assad. 

16

So let me just go through two or three quick points and you can 

take as much time as the chairman will give you afterwards. 

The potential outcome if Assad falls is one area, because although he has shown a resilience it is not a forever situation in any 

of these countries. 

Secondly, the effects of a no-fly zone both on the long-term strategy of, if you will, bringing peace of some sort to Syria with or 

without Assad leaving and its effect on refugees. 

And then the last one, which is the one I alluded to in this long 

question—how would you suggest we find and define and be comfortable in what the administration calls the, if you will, the moderate Free Syrian Army forces? 

How do you find those groups when there seem to be more people 

in the two other groups that we say we oppose? And thanks for 

taking notes on that. If there is time left, we will go to Yemen. 

Mr. FORD. I think Syria is just the hardest nut. It is just the 

hardest nut to crack, very tough. With respect to your questions, 

I think it is very unlikely, as I said, that Assad’s regime is going 

to collapse tomorrow or the next day. 

It is getting weaker but I don’t think it is about to collapse. But 

if we think—if we stretch out this—where it is going in this long 

horrible war of attrition, were the regime to finally be worn down 

what you would have is you would just have more groups fighting 

for control of the capital and you might end up with a situation 

where different opposition groups control different neighborhoods of 

Damascus. The Islamic State might control some but they wouldn’t 

control it all. 

Mr. ISSA. Right. And in that vein, what would be the effects on 

Christians, a rather large minority in the region, since Assad is effectively the protectorate of Christians? 

Mr. FORD. Well, I don’t—I wouldn’t call Bashar al-Assad the protector of the Christians. He likes to call himself that but his forces 

have bombed plenty of churches, too. 

Mr. ISSA. Sure. 

Mr. FORD. So the effect on Christians, like the effect on all Syrians, would be really bad because the fighting would just get worse. 

We will have a huge surge of refugees out of Damascus so——

Mr. ISSA. Which brings us to the other two points, the no-fly 

zone, and where do you find moderates? 

Mr. FORD. Yes. With respect to the no-fly zone, this is a tough 

one. Where I am on this now, Congressman, is a no-fly zone could 

help but not just without thought and a strategy. 

The no-fly zone—we had a no-fly zone in Iraq and it lasted 12 

years and it only ended when U.S. troops went into Baghdad. So 

I don’t think we want to do another 12-year no-fly zone over Syria. 

So the real question is, can you use a no-fly zone to get to the 

political settlement that we want? And that requires then that in 

return for our doing a no-fly zone, the opposition—the Syrian opposition—is going to reach out to elements that now support the 

Assad regime and say, hey, there is a third choice. 

It doesn’t have to be the Islamic State or Assad. There is a moderate third choice. Work with us on that. 

I have to be honest. I don’t think the Syrian opposition has done 

a very good job of that. And the other part of that is if we are going 

17

to do it the quid pro quo really needs to be from the Turks—you 

will put the resources on that border and shut it down so that we 

don’t have Islamic State and al-Qaeda elements moving back and 

forth over the order to get food, to get medical care, to travel, whatever it is. 

So if we are going to do a no-fly zone, Congressman, we need to 

leverage that to get things that we need out of the other side. 

With respect to your question about how do you find moderates 

in the Syrian armed opposition, that is a——

Mr. POE. If you would, Ambassador, try to keep it brief. 

Mr. FORD. Yes. The main thing is, Congressman, there are moderates. There always have been moderates. They need support. 

There is a competition for recruits between moderates and extremists. We need to empower the moderates to be able to recruit better. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, ISIS seeks death and destruction to anyone who 

does not believe as they do. They have a presence in Syria. They 

have a presence in Iraq. They are expanding to North Africa and 

they appear to be on the move. 

What is the historical relationship between ISIS and al-Qaeda? 

ISIS is an outgrowth of al-Qaeda—a radical outgrowth of al-Qaeda, 

I presume, but I need your clarification on that. 

Mr. FORD. The Islamic State is actually the offspring of al-Qaeda 

and in particular the al-Qaeda in Iraq organization. But originally 

al-Qaeda in Iraq was not thinking about setting up a state. 

Over a period of years, really, between 2006 and 2013, al-Qaeda 

in Iraq more and more took on the idea of creating a state, of creating a caliphate. But originally it was loyal to bin Laden and 

Zawahiri and the real split that now exists between the Islamic 

State and al-Qaeda is mainly over this issue of a state. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. The—in the Middle East or in the continent 

of Africa is there—are there instances of al-Qaeda and ISIS in open 

conflict? 

Mr. FORD. I am not aware of al-Qaeda and Islamic State elements fighting each other in North Africa or in sub-Saharan Africa. 

I have not seen that. But there has certainly been evidence of that 

in abundance in Lebanon and in Syria. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. So there is, clearly, the potential for more of 

that open conflict between those two groups. ISIS is—wants to be 

ever present. ISIS wants to control territory and expand its control 

of that territory yet they don’t appear at the moment to pose an 

existential threat to the United States. Al-Qaeda has been more explicit about that. Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. FORD. The Islamic State has said plenty of blood-curdling 

things against the United States and it has threatened the United 

States on any number of social media messages. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

Mr. FORD. I wouldn’t call it an existential threat but it is certainly a terrorist threat, absolutely, and I think we have to take 

18

them at their word, Congressman, that if they could reach out and 

strike us they would. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. Would you—would you agree that ISIS is a 

product of decades of failed governance in the Arab world and of 

the hijacking of Arab Islam—kind of a toxic mix? 

Mr. FORD. Absolutely, that is part of it. For example, there was 

a really good article in November of last year in the New York 

Times about Tunisians who were going to the Islamic State-held 

territories in Syria. 

Tunisia has a really good middle class. It has suffered but it is 

still a strong middle class with Mediterranean influences. And yet 

thousands of Tunisians have gone over to the Islamic State, and 

why is that? 

And the main reason is there are frustrations among many 

young Tunisians about corruption, lack of opportunity, bad economic opportunities. And so one element of the Islamic State appeal—not the only element but one element of the appeal—is its 

claim to good governance. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. You said in your opening statement that ISIS 

adopts a policy through their ideology of no compromise—compromise is sin. It rejects pluralism and it has a presence in an area 

of the world that is highly pluralistic and it rejects borders. 

How do you combat ISIS and their expansion in this part of the 

world? 

Mr. FORD. It is really important to seize territory because it defines itself as a state with a bureaucracy and an organization. 

Therefore ground forces, and I would strongly argue not for American ground forces but for indigenous ground forces in Iraq and 

Syria, elsewhere, Lebanon. I think that is the way to combat it ultimately. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, but I suppose my point is this. Without compromise, there is no negotiated settlement to this thing anywhere, 

anytime, and therefore they have to be destroyed. 

Mr. FORD. Exactly. 

Mr. HIGGINS. So, you know, the strategy is then, and we discuss 

a lot about where these recruits are coming from. I don’t think 

there is enough emphasis on why they are coming and I suppose 

it is a more complicated question with a complicated response to 

it. But it seems like there is one objective here, and I suppose the 

question becomes how best you accomplish that. 

Mr. FORD. You want to strangle it on a variety of different levels, 

Congressman, whether that be recruitment, financing, access to the 

media, which ties into recruitment and financing, and control of 

territory. 

For sure undermining its ability to recruit is extremely important which is why I talked about not playing into the Iran idea. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. I yield back. My time is expired. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentlemen from Pennsylvania, 

Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Ford, good to see you again. The last time we spoke 

was regarding the red line in Syria prior to Assad crossing the red 

line and if you recall my questioning was what our range of options 

might be. 

19

And so that kind of colors the context of my thinking regarding 

the administration in my opening statement, et cetera. 

With that in mind, I think that you may have alluded to the fact 

that the administration is right to understand that we have to confront the Islamic State and that this is an organization wholly different from al-Qaeda. I think throughout the course of the discussion you have kind of buttressed that claim. 

As an individual who has worked in the current administration 

and maybe understands better than some of us on the outside that 

are casual spectators and frustrated spectators, why do you think, 

if you would proffer an opinion, the administration, the President 

in particular, it doesn’t seem like he understands the threat that 

ISIS poses or at least his actions don’t reflect that. Would you comment on that? 

Mr. FORD. I think the administration actually is doing not so bad 

on Iraq in fighting the Islamic State in Iraq. It is going to be a slow 

effort but ground has been taken back, and although it is not an 

easy battle, I think there is progress. 

On the Syria side, Congressman, I think the strategy of simply 

trying to arm one element of Syrian fighters and sending them into 

the Islamic State without looking at the broader conflict in the end 

will not be adequate. 

There is this—Congress voted for it—$500 million program to 

train the new Syrian force—5,000, 10,000, maybe 15,000 if they are 

lucky—to go in over the next couple of years and fight the Islamic 

State. 

I personally doubt very much that that will be an effective way 

to do it because it won’t address the recruitment problem. 

Mr. PERRY. So let me clarify because maybe I wasn’t clear. I am 

not talking about the borders of Iraq and Syria and what is occurring there so much as the ideology, as I see it, that is not only pervasive to the region but pervasive around the globe. 

And when I see that we have leaders come to the White House 

to have a summit and a discussion of what comes out of it is some 

kind of view that the terror movement is not embedded in an ideology but in socio-economic disparities I wonder if I am, and the 

rest of the world, are completely wholly off base—or the administration is missing the mark because one of us must be. 

I mean, when you think that—you know, would you say that 

Osama bin Laden had economic issues that drove him? I mean, he 

was a wealthy man, and Ayman al-Zawahiri is—I think he is an 

eye surgeon, right? 

I mean, these are not people without means. So why would we 

focus on the—I understand from a recruitment standpoint it might 

have a component to it. But we are talking about leaving your 

home as a teenager to go cut people’s heads off and live a life of 

great hardship. 

Mr. FORD. I put it like this, Congressman. For every one Osama 

bin Laden or every one Ayman al-Zawahiri there are probably 50 

young Tunisians, young Syrians, young Iraqis who are not necessarily joining because they are ideologically driven but because 

they are angry at the world. 

20

They don’t have economic opportunity. They have been 

disenfranchised. They are sick of corruption and so the Islamic 

State is——

Mr. PERRY. There is a lot of Americans that feel that way that 

have nothing to do with it but——

Mr. FORD. Well——

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. But we don’t go doing things like the Islamic State does. 

Mr. FORD. The good news is, Congressman, we have a much 

more responsive political system than most Arab countries do. So 

those grievances are real and they drive a lot of the very broad 

Islamist movement in the region including the Salafi jihadi element among them, and my experience in the administration is that 

they focus on that broader problem——

Mr. PERRY. But we are not—we can find jobs in this country for 

people. 

Mr. FORD [continuing]. Which the Islamists——

Mr. PERRY. We are talking about getting jobs in those countries 

for people as a solution set to the spread of this scourge. It is so 

counterintuitive and seems, quite honestly, it seems imbecilic. 

Mr. FORD. Actually, Congressman, I don’t agree. I think that 

were socioeconomic conditions better in many Arab countries 

the——

Mr. PERRY. So how do you explain the foreign fighters from 

America going there? 

Mr. FORD. The foreign fighters from America are a tiny minority. 

Mr. PERRY. Regardless——

Mr. POE. Excuse me. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Zeldin. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess just picking right where Mr. Perry is leaving off, Ambassador Ford, if you were sitting in the Oval Office and President 

Obama was asking you for advice as to how to evolve the strategy 

to better defeat the threat, what would you tell him? 

Mr. FORD. Find indigenous groups that will take the lead in combatting the Islamic State in North Africa, in Syria, in Lebanon, in 

Iraq—indigenous. The American role should be supportive but they 

need, A, to find indigenous fighters and B, they need to address 

root causes. Let me give you an example. 

Mr. ZELDIN. What if you can’t find indigenous forces? 

Mr. FORD. Well, but I think you can and I think, frankly, if you 

put the resources out there you can develop the moderate forces. 

Can I give you an example of what I am talking about? This is 

a widely known story in Syria, frankly, is where the capital of the 

Islamic State is now in Raqqa. So there is a soccer player named 

Abdul Baset al-Sarout. 

He is a soccer player, well known in Syria. He joined the Islamic 

State after he had been fighting off the outside regime for 2 years 

at home and saw people bombed, et cetera, starved because of the 

regime’s brutality. He ended up joining the Islamic State. 

21

Syrian activists I know talked to him in January—the families 

know each other—and said, ‘‘Why would you join an awful organization like the Islamic State?’’

What he said was, ‘‘How dare you talk to me about human rights 

and democracy when you people in the West did nothing to help 

us when we were being bombed and ravaged by the brutal Assad 

regime—how dare you lecture me.’’

That is what I mean, Congressman. We have to deal with the 

root causes of the conflict in a place like Syria or a place like Iraq. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, you know, Ambassador, the—I don’t know if 

we really have enough—if there is enough patience where eventually we are going to be able to turn the tide on ISIS. I think that 

we all need to be much more on our game and when I say ‘‘we’’ 

I mean, obviously, not just the United States of America. 

Now, President Obama doesn’t have the military experience that 

his two-star general on the ground has. You know, no disrespect to 

him. President Bush before him, President Clinton before him, you 

know, they don’t have six, seven tours under their belt of commanding troops on the ground. 

Right now, we have thousands of American service members on 

the ground in Iraq. We had generals before our Foreign Affairs 

Committee hearing last week and we were asking what kind of 

flexibility does that two-star have on the ground. We asked if he 

knows where Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is and if he can send a Navy 

SEAL team to execute a well-planned mission at night under the 

cover of darkness to take out the leader of ISIS; or if there was 

great actionable intelligence where we knew where there was, you 

know, a boatload of computers, for example. We asked what kind 

of flexibility does this two-star general have, and the general’s answer back to me was reading a paragraph essentially saying that 

the two-star general can make a recommendation. 

Now, when I am at events around my district and elsewhere and 

I say who is in charge of the surge in Iraq at the beginning of 2007, 

everyone says Petraeus, Petraeus, Petraeus. 

How many of you know who the two-star general is who is in 

charge of our forces on the ground today? 

I have asked that question to Members of Congress and they 

don’t know the answer to that, and that two-star general doesn’t 

have the flexibility that they need to accomplish their mission to 

defeat the threat. 

Now, everything is being micromanaged in the White House. 

They send an authorization for the use of military force to Congress. We are expected to sign off on it to send our service members 

overseas. 

Right now, the 82nd Airborne Division is preparing to go to Iraq. 

We want to know that we are sending them off to succeed and not 

fail and to actually defeat the threat. 

So what may be happening right now, you know, you might have 

examples in Iraq, for example, of where we are degrading a threat, 

taking out some of their command and control, and killing some of 

their bad guys. 

We need to kill ISIS. We need to destroy them. The whole degrading thing—if we measure success whether or not we kill a few 

22

of the bad guys but meanwhile their ranks continue to grow—they 

become billions of dollars richer. 

Meanwhile, we are negotiating a nuclear arms race—a nuclear 

deal with Iran—that might trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. 

I am concerned that this President’s strategy is not evolving 

quick enough to actually defeat the threat and the people on the 

ground don’t have the ability that they need to take the action that 

will actually take out leadership when the opportunity presents 

itself. 

I asked that general to clarify. I was asking him a different question and, again, he was reading the same exact paragraph that all 

he could do was make a recommendation. 

So here we are—we are facing a real threat that if we don’t defeat them overseas—we will be facing them here at home. We are 

literally—over the course of the last few weeks we have gone after 

people who are now becoming self-radicalized U.S. citizens who 

consider themselves to be citizens of the Islamic State. 

I believe that the President’s strategy needs to evolve. We know 

what the threat is. Now we need to take it out. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman from New York. 

I want to thank Ambassador Ford, and Dr. Phares, glad to see 

that your flight finally made it. We are in the middle of a vote on 

the House floor. It is one vote and members have left and I assume 

they will come back. 

But we will start—we will have your testimony, Dr. Phares, and 

Madam Rajavi’s testimony when that vote is over with. 

Ambassador Ford, you do not need to stay. I don’t want to hold 

you up. Probably that is not a good word to use. As a former judge, 

I shouldn’t use the word hold up, and you are welcome to stay or 

leave, whichever you prefer. 

But we will be in recess until the vote is over with—5 minutes 

after the vote is over—and then we will have the testimony from 

our other two witnesses. So the subcommittee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. 

We have two other witnesses to testify. Ms. Maryam Rajavi is 

the president-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran. 

Ms. Rajavi has appeared before many national parliaments in 

Europe and has published a book entitled ‘‘Women Against Islamic 

Fundamentalism.’’

We also have Dr. Phares. Once again, thank you for getting here 

no matter what it took. Dr. Phares is the co-secretary general of 

the Transatlantic Legislative Group on Counterterrorism. 

Dr. Phares is also a professor of global strategies in Washington 

and has been an advisor to the U.S. House of Representatives Caucus on Counterterrorism since 2007. And before our next witness 

testifies, I would ask that all spectators be seated in the courtroom 

or in—sorry, that was a slip from the old days—in the committee 

room—I used to be a judge—in the committee room. So spectators 

be seated, please, or leave the court—or leave the room. Thank you. 

23

I think we have the electronics working, and Madam Rajavi, we 

welcome you to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Trade. 

I don’t know if you heard that or not but welcome to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade and the subcommittee is ready to hear your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARYAM RAJAVI, PRESIDENT-ELECT, 

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN 

[The following testimony was delivered via teleconference.] 

Ms. RAJAVI. Mr. Chairman, ranking member, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for giving me this opportunity to 

talk about this issue. 

Today, Islamic fundamentalism and extremism under the name 

of ISIS or Shi’ite paramilitary groups have turned into a global 

threat. 

Islamic fundamentalism emerged as a threat to peace and security when Khomeini stole the leadership of a popular revolution in 

1979 and established a religious dictatorship. 

The Iranian regime has served as the main source of this ominous phenomenon in the region and across the world. The primary 

objective of Islamic fundamentalists, including ISIS, is to establish 

an Islamic caliphate and enforce Sharia law. 

They recognize no borders. Aggressiveness and violence are two 

common features of Sunni and Shi’ite extremists. As such, searching for moderates among them is an illusion. 

In 1993, we published a book, ‘‘Islamic Fundamentalism: The 

New Global Threat,’’ warning about this threat and identifying its 

epicenter in Tehran. We said the mullahs sought to obtain nuclear 

weapons, to export fundamentalism and guarantee their own existence. 

Unfortunately, little if anything was done to prevent the export 

of fundamentalism. Experience shows that in the absence of a firm 

policy vis-a`-vis Tehran regime, there will be destructive consequences. 

Unfortunately, failure to stop the Iranian regime’s post-2003 

meddling in Iraq which led to occupy that country and further 

spreading fundamentalism. 

Similarly, crimes committed by Bashar al-Assad in Syria and the 

massacre and exclusion of Sunnis in Iraq by Maliki coupled with 

Western silence empowered ISIS. I emphasize that the mullahs’ regime is not part of any solution to current crisis. It is, indeed, the 

heart of the problem. 

The people of Iran, indeed, call the mullahs’ regime godfather of 

ISIS and other fundamentalist groups. The ultimate solution to 

this problem is regime change by the Iranian people and resistance. 

This regime is extremely fragile. As evident during the 2009 uprising, the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people demanded 

regime change. The regime’s show of force is hollow and a result 

of weak Western policy. 

Owing to the pivotal role of the People’s Mojahedin Organization 

of Iran as a democratic Muslim movement, the Iranian resistance 

has established itself the antithesis to Islamic fundamentalism. We 

24

believe in separation of religion and state, gender equality, respect 

for rights of religious and ethnic minorities, a democratic and nonnuclear Iran. The following practical steps are necessary to achieve 

this goal. 

One, expel the Quds Force from Iraq and end the Iranian regime’s influence in that country. 

Two, enable full participation of Sunnis in power sharing and 

arm Sunni tribes to provide security for their communities. 

Three, assist Syria’s moderate opposition and people to end 

Assad’s regime and establish democracy in that country. Four, recognize the Iranian people’s aspirations to overthrow the mullahs 

and ending inaction vis-a`-vis the gross human rights violations in 

Iran. 

Five, provide protection for and uphold the rights of members of 

Iran’s organized opposition, the PMOI, in Camp Liberty in Iraq. 

Six, empower the true democratic and tolerant Islam to counter 

fundamentalist interpretations of this religion. 

And seven, block all pathways for the mullahs’ regime to acquire 

nuclear weapons. 

But let me finish by a quote from America’s first President, 

George Washington: ‘‘The harder the conflict, the greater the triumph.’’

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rajavi follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Rajavi. 

We will have questions for you momentarily. But first, we will 

hear from Dr. Phares, and for the record both your testimony and 

Ms. Rajavi’s testimony will be made a part of the record and you 

can summarize your testimony, Dr. Phares. 

STATEMENT OF WALID PHARES, PH.D., CO-SECRETARY GENERAL, TRANSATLANTIC PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON COUNTERTERRORISM 

Mr. PHARES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the invitation. I would like to thank also the ranking member and the members of the committee for organizing this very important strategic 

seminar hearing on ISIS—defining the enemy. 

My testimony has the title ‘‘Identifying the Jihadi Ideology and 

Providing Alternative Strategies to Defeat ISIS,’’ which I believe is 

the heart of the discussion on this panel. 

For the sake of summary, I would like to go over the major principles I began with, the four points I would like to raise. 

Point number one is about the ideology displayed by the Islamic 

State, its roots, its evolution and ultimately its final goals, and the 

question I raise: Are we dealing with a new ideology? 

Is ISIS producing a new ideology, or is it an ideology that has 

been around through various organizations, various movements 

and now has reached a mutation that is allowing ISIS to win and 

win further? 

Point two I am going to raise is about what happens if ISIS is 

unchecked. If the current situation of status quo, which I call a 

moving status quo—take a few villages, they take back a few villages despite the destruction of their military machine—if that situation continues, what should we be expecting in Iraq—in Iraq and 

Syria, in the region and beyond? And maybe beyond is in our 

homelands, including the United States and across the Atlantic. 

Three—there is a current geopolitical problem or a series of problems in the confrontation with ISIS nowadays as we speak. I would 

like to offer a very short identification of what these two problems 

are—why we are obstructed, why we are not ending ISIS, as many 

in this House and the Senate and European Parliament have been 

asking. 

And last, what can the United States and its allies do or actually, I would say, should do, to defeat ISIS and the movements behind ISIS—because ISIS is just a stage in a movement that began 

before and will continue later. 

In my past 30 years of research, in six books focusing on future 

jihad and the evolution of this war of ideas, I have made the case 

that what we are dealing with, particularly since 9/11—and the 

9/11 Commission has been very clear on this—we are dealing with 

an ideology that is producing a movement, not a movement that is 

producing the ideology. 

Hence, I have recommended that the United States, to the past 

administration and this administration and future administrations, 

actually engage in a battle that we have not engaged in, which is 

to respond to the ideology, to actually mobilize those forces and 

civil societies that can respond to this ideology. 

44

And after doing this we can encourage the societies that could be 

and would be freed from ISIS to form an intellectual resistance to 

stop the return of ISIS. Remember, dear members, that we were 

in Iraq. We left Iraq. 

There was an Iraqi army. That Iraqi army was in the Sunni 

areas. So the maximum that our hopes would be right now would 

be for the same forces to go into the same regions, to defeat ISIS. 

We have defeated al-Qaeda before. So there is a constant phenomenon that keeps bringing the jihadists back, not just to Iraq 

this time, but to Syria and as far as Libya and Yemen and north 

Nigeria. 

I have suggested in my research that, number one, we need to 

identify the ideology but, number two, we need to have a coalition 

with forces that are willing to push back against the ideology. 

One cannot win a war of ideas from an American perspective 

against the whole world. We need to have allies, and the most important ally should be in the region. The problem has been, in the 

past, that we have ignored them. 

We have partnered with many forces, but I assume and I will 

make the case that we have partnered with the wrong persons, 

with the wrong forces. 

Partnering, for example, with the Muslim Brotherhood. Even 

though this is based on the notion that moderate Islamists can be 

a wall against extremist Islamists—that is what we have heard 

from Washington over the past years—we forget one thing: That 

we do not control what happens. 

If we support the moderate Islamists without making sure that 

they are vetted, that they will move against the jihadists, what will 

happen? And it already happened in Syria; when we supported 

moderate Islamists, they became al-Nusra and from al-Nusra they 

ended up becoming ISIS. 

So we need to have a better, not just vetting system, but a better 

system of ideas upon which we can develop the strategy. 

Last but not least, in my last book, ‘‘The Lost Spring,’’ I urged 

the administration and, of course, Congress to act faster before the 

catastrophes hit—that was last March—before ISIS takes over half 

of Syria and one-third of Iraq, before ISIS lands in Benghazi and 

Derna, before the Houthi pro-Iranian militias expand. All of this 

happened since last June. 

If you look at the map—the historical map of these events, most 

of the explosions that we are dealing with happened over the past 

9 months. 

On the ideological level, it is clear that this group, ISIS, has not 

invented new ideas. The success of ISIS is that it has made into 

reality all the dreams of the previous ideologies and previous 

jihadists. 

What is ISIS in Iraq and Syria? It is the dream of bin Laden. 

He spoke about it—killing infidels: Every single jihadist since the 

’20s has been talking about it. 

The major difference is that this Daesh, ISIS or ISIL has been 

able to do it because of their strength, because of the chaos in the 

region but, I would add, because of our policies, which were not 

preemptive enough nor formed the right coalitions at the right 

time. 

45

Second, if not checked, ISIS is projected to increase its control of 

the Sunni areas where they are. But that control is not going to 

be only military. 

My concern and the concern of many of my colleagues who have 

been looking at what this organization is doing, number one: They 

are drafting. 

So we are not just talking about individuals who have been in 

al-Qaeda and other places and now adhering to ISIS. They are 

going into cities and towns and drafting. So their numbers are supposed to grow. 

My greater concern, dear members, is that they are now schooling. They are doing in Iraq and in Syria what the Taliban did two 

decades ago in parts of Afghanistan and in Pakistan. 

They are creating already the next generation, and this is not 

something secret. We don’t even need intelligence to know that. It 

is on YouTube. 

We see those kids aged between eight and 12 being schooled into 

ideological madrassas and hence my first conclusion. Even if we 

take back Mosul, if we take back Tikrit, if we take back Raqqa in 

Syria or others would do, my concern is that the next generation 

is being worked on right now. So we need to have a strategy with 

regard the ideological confrontation. 

Third, on the geopolitical problems that we are facing in fighting 

ISIS today I would identify two major obstructions. One, definitely, 

and it responds to my concern: We don’t have a war of ideas. 

I have reviewed every single piece of what we call in Washington 

a strategic communications campaign, a de-radicalization campaign. I will be more than happy to expand on that when and if 

needed. 

We are not winning on the ideological level. An argument such 

the one discussed earlier that a jihadi becomes jihadi because there 

is no job—and I am not talking about the politics of it, I am talking 

about the academic dimension of it—that argument is not true. 

It has been debunked in the Middle East. When you talk to intellectuals in Egypt and Libya and Tunisia and other parts of the 

Middle East, they do not adopt this argument. 

A jihadi becomes a jihadi simply because of indoctrination, and 

the evidence is if you have 1 million individuals in any country in 

the Middle East that are jobless, why would 500 of these 1 million 

choose to become jihadi? What is the difference? 

Why wouldn’t the 1 million become jihadists? It is the same frustration. The others would choose to become revolutionaries, reformers, do demonstrations, find a job. They would choose many other 

options. 

Science and research have told us those who have shifted to become jihadists, even if they are under duress sociologically, have 

been indoctrinated before. 

There is a chip that was put in their mind by different ways that 

allowed them to take the argumentation of we are now jihadists. 

And, by the way, dear members, the jihadists themselves never use 

the socioeconomic element. 

They would never say, ‘‘I didn’t find a job or I was frustrated, 

therefore I became.’’ They didn’t even use the norm of, ‘‘We are 

against the richer people.’’

46

Their concern is caliphate or no caliphate. Their concern is to 

win that battle on the ground or not. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Phares follows:]

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Mr. POE. Thank you, Dr. Phares. I let you go a little longer. I 

need time for the members to ask questions as well to both of the 

witnesses. But I thank you for your testimony—Ms. Rajavi, your 

testimony as well. 

I will recognize myself for questions. How is ISIS philosophy different from Sunnis’, say, in Saudi Arabia or Shi’ites’ in Iran? First 

you, Dr. Phares, briefly. 

Mr. PHARES. Well, a first difference between all Sunni Salafis on 

one hand and then the Shi’ite jihadists, those that Madam Rajavi 

has mentioned, meaning the Iranian regime and the path they are 

on, they both want the establishment of an international universal 

Islamic empire with different names. 

While the Salafis in general choose the caliphate, the Khomeinis 

use the imamate for historical reasons that we don’t probably have 

the time to go over. 

But between ISIS and between the Saudis, the Saudis accept 

they are Salafi in their essence but do accept the international system. They have Ambassadors. 

They accept the United Nations, they accept a minimum of consensus while ISIS doesn’t accept borders, doesn’t accept the existence of the international system and their acts are a result of that. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Rajavi, same question. How does ISIS philosophy 

differ from the Sunnis in Saudi Arabia or Shi’ites in Iran? 

[The following testimony was delivered through an interpreter.] 

Ms. RAJAVI. So far as the formation of ISIS is concerned, it was 

also the mullahs’ regime which helped the creation of ISIS. The 

crimes committed by the Iranian regime and Assad and the killing 

of the Sunnis in Iraq helped the emergence of ISIS. 

Therefore, gaining state power, and it was the Iranian regime 

when there was a state in Iran, created the terrorism as a major 

threat for security. 

But from a philosophical respect, the most fundamental element 

in all fundamentalist groups, whether Sunni or Shi’a, they are common on the following. 

They want to force their religion or school of thought, establish 

a religious dictatorship whether under the name of caliphate or the 

absolute rule of the clergy; they do not believe in any borders and 

going after expansion and capturing other territories and also believe that those who do not accept the Sharia law must be eliminated. 

And I want to stress that there is an antithesis to this philosophy and that is a tolerant and democratic interpretation of Islam. 

There is a conflict between ISIS and the mullahs in Iran but that 

is an internal power struggle. 

But despite any differences, the continuation of other fundamentalist groups very much hinges on the Iranian regime being in 

power, remaining in power. Terrorism and fundamentalism under 

the name of Islam came to the world scene by the mullahs’ regime 

in Iran and when this regime is overthrown that will be limited or 

destroyed. 

And it is interesting that after the emergence of ISIS the people 

of Iran called the Iran regime, the godfather of ISIS. Regarding 

Saudi Arabia, I want to add that ISIS, contrary to Saudi Arabia, 

54

they do not believe in borders. Therefore, the question is not being 

Sunni or Salafi or whatever. 

The problem is those characteristics which I just identified and 

that is where you will see that despite all the differences ISIS is 

very close to the fundamentalist ruling in Iran. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Ms. Rajavi, may I ask you a question that you made 

a comment about? How do you see the mullahs in Iran having facilitated and helped the ISIS movement? 

How has ISIS been able to expand its influence, its philosophy 

because of the mullahs in Iran? Make that clear, if you would, on 

how there is that connection. 

Ms. RAJAVI. As I said, there is a power struggle between ISIS 

and the regime. But at the same time, on occasions they have cooperated. 

For example, Zarqawi, the original founder and leader of ISIS, 

received enormous logistic support from the Iranian regime and 

had his bases even in Iran. And I think it was in 2005 that intelligence security services in Germany exposed this connection between Zarqawi and the Iranian regime. 

And also there has been many reports even in the media that 

Bashar al-Assad released many of the ISIS members from prison 

in order to join ISIS. While in their air attacks they have never attacked ISIS but the focus is on the moderate opposition in Syria. 

So I want to conclude that so far as the mullah’s regime in Iran 

is concerned, they are 100 percent supporting Bashar al-Assad in 

Syria and therefore all the crimes that are committed by the help 

and support of the mullah’s regime has created a fertile ground for 

ISIS to emerge. 

And on the other hand, crimes committed by Maliki at the behest 

of the Iranian regime in Iraq and in particular the absolute suppression of the Sunnis has led to empowering ISIS to expand itself 

both in Iraq and Syria. 

Mr. POE. I will yield 5 minutes to the ranking member from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow up on Ambassador Ford’s testimony in terms of 

Dr. Phares. I really want to see if we can get to the root of some 

things, as short as this time is. 

Your main thought was that the ideology is the controlling factor—absolute controlling factor that happens. Is that correct? I 

think I got that. 

Mr. PHARES. The ideology is what produces them but it is not the 

only element that controls their action. But without the ideology 

they cannot be produced. So the movement can use this pool only 

if it exists. 

Mr. KEATING. So the leaders would be pure to that ideology? 

Mr. PHARES. Yes. The leaders who are produced by this movement, if they are eliminated, that would slow down the activity of 

the movement. 

Mr. KEATING. Then here is where I have the problem trying to 

put everything—it is nice to put everything in one box. I wish we 

could in this instance. 

55

But if it was absolutely controlling, how do you explain then that 

ISIL will then take cultural artifacts and it will destroy them because they are uncompromising, as Ambassador Ford said? 

And they are ideologically centered, so they are destroying those 

cultural artifacts that aren’t inconsistent with their ideological beliefs. But if they are so pure why are they taking these things then 

and selling them, preserving them to get money? 

Isn’t that more the actions of a criminal enterprise too? I mean, 

it is not as simple. It is complex and I think that is part of it. 

If we focus on one narrow box we are going to miss the whole 

picture. But there is an element of that, isn’t there, with ISIL? 

Mr. PHARES. Mr. Congressman, I think it is the other way 

around. If I may not disagree but readjust the argument. In past 

similar situations with totalitarian armies that were supposed to 

go only by ideology, and I am talking about World War II, should 

it be the Nazi armies or the Soviet armies, you can’t get more totalitarian and disciplined, they have done the same. 

Rank and file could go against the ideology and the instructions 

that are——

Mr. KEATING. These are the leaders that are making these decisions. 

Mr. PHARES. The leaders of the ISIS movement can also be corrupt. There is no doubt about it, and there were leaders in the 

Communist movement in the past during the Cold War and guerilla forces that were corrupt. 

My point is, we have to give what to Caesar is to Caesar and, 

of course, what the corrupt are doing is their natural behavior. I 

am not claiming that the ideology will only produce a perfect behavior. 

But what I am claiming is that without the ideology you cannot 

have jihadists. Then another argument would win. 

Mr. KEATING. But there is—they are related and they can’t, I 

don’t think, be ignored. Ambassador Ford—I am sorry you weren’t 

here and thank you for coming and making the trouble with plane 

flights and all—but Ambassador Ford, upon being pressed in questioning, became clear there are other social factors that are a part 

of this and to me, the chairman’s experience in law enforcement as 

a judge, mine as a prosecutor, there are social issues that breed 

criminal activity. 

It is not—there are people in the same social settings with the 

same challenges. They don’t become criminals. But there are some 

that are. 

Mr. PHARES. That is true. 

Mr. KEATING. And more so than not and you can’t say that that 

is not a factor even. So I think the social conditions—and I am 

sorry you weren’t here to see—hear Ambassador Ford’s testimony—

but they are a factor as well. It is not pure ideology. 

And I don’t deny there is ideology. That is a given. 

Mr. PHARES. I hear you, Congressman. There is a point, of 

course, in socioeconomics for everything else, not just for the 

jihadists but for every ultra nationalist movement. 

Let me draw your attention to the fact that Egypt in 2013, while 

the argument was that people were adhering to the Muslim Brotherhood because they were not finding jobs or because of the social 

56

conditions, when on June 30th, 2013, 33 million Egyptians, 80 percent of whom are under the level of poverty, marched against the 

Muslim Brotherhood, that defeats the logic that it is only socioeconomic. But I do agree with you that socioeconomics are part of 

it. 

Mr. KEATING. That is important because I think if we are going 

to fight them we have to fight them in so many different levels. 

And one of the things you brought up that I thought was very 

important was our messaging and how we can do a better job messaging, and I think we have to incorporate the Muslim community 

back home and have their voices be trusted voices in opposition. 

But if you could comment just briefly on what we could do not 

only in the U.S. but in Europe and Turkey, you know, in approaching this problem. I gave you a lot in a short time so I am sorry. 

Mr. PHARES. Absolutely. Thank you again. 

I did 5 years of research on our messaging, both administrations, 

the bureaucracy in general. The problem is, first of all, we have to 

vet who we are working with in terms of message, meaning we 

need to work with NGOs who have had an experience on the 

ground in the region and have an experience here and can be diverse as much as possible. 

Even within our own communities when we are dealing with organizations, we cannot say this one organization represents the entire community unless we have referendums in this country, which 

I don’t think under the Constitution we do. 

So I agree fully with you the next stage to push back against 

radicalization is from within these communities to have NGOs that 

are vetted and that they are willing to push back against the doctrine. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. I am over my time but I think this is 

a crucial issue that we have to address. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Zeldin. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Keating was just asking about the socioeconomics. My question—I just want to get to the heart, Doctor, of what is the most 

effective way to get inside the head of ISIS and demoralize them? 

Mr. PHARES. Well, that is a different battle, Mr. Congressman, 

from the interception I suggested but I will answer both. 

Pushing back against an individual who has already been 

radicalized is a much bigger mission. It would need a much larger 

mobilization. 

It needs for ISIS elements to feel that the people are against 

them and that the international community in the region are 

against them, so in response to what the congressman has mentioned about strategic communication, we need to do a better job. 

Our Arab broadcast, our Persian broadcast, that the Congress 

funds here, has not been doing, in my own view, enough to push 

back against these organizations. 

But I do propose that before these individuals are radicalized, 

this is where we need to interfere. When kids are 10 and 12 and 

13, in a short 10 years, as in Afghanistan or as in Iraq and in 

Syria, they are the new ISIS. 

57

So we need to add and supply strategies that would help first 

women, their mothers and teachers, and the NGOs to be part of 

this enterprise, not just on the military level, not just on the economic level, but on the educational level. 

Mr. ZELDIN. What is the most effective way, though, for those 

who are currently part of ISIS who are beheading individuals in 

their region—what is the best way to get into the head of ISIS and 

demoralize them? 

Mr. PHARES. Congressman, it is only a massive military defeat 

of large areas controlled by ISIS. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Thank you. I mean, I totally agree with you. I mean, 

we could spend a lot of time here, you know, talking about other 

elements of what we are up against and we can spend—we can 

have a hearing dedicated to talking about social economics. 

We can all admit that maybe there is something to do with the 

economy. That might have something to do with it. But the best 

way to get into the head of a member of ISIS is to put a round in 

it—is with lead. 

Honestly, they have to be defeated. That is what we are up 

against. And we can have a tremendous amount of patience waiting for someone else to fill this vacuum and step up in the region. 

But listen, when you want to be the leader of the free world, you 

know, American exceptionalism isn’t about figuring out a way to 

get everyone a job. You know, King Abdul of Jordan, you know, 

when one of their pilots is executed isn’t filming a video to ISIS 

and the rest of the world on how we need to get them more jobs. 

You know, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, when he 

is giving a speech about, you know, what we do with our enemies 

around the world it is not that we need to give them more wealth. 

I mean, we have to confront this threat and, honestly, if you 

want to—if you want to demoralize them, if you want to defeat 

ISIS—it is not going to be done through social programs of giving 

people jobs and more wealth. 

The world needs America to lead. Now, it is our responsibility 

here to ensure that we are never setting our services members up 

to defeat. I do not support occupations, enduring ground operations. 

But there is a big difference when you are talking about Navy 

SEALS, Delta Force, Green Berets, Marines, Army Rangers who in 

the middle of the night under the cover of darkness they are going 

to show up at areas where ISIS is operating, where ISIS is sleeping, and they are going to execute well-planned missions that is 

going to take out high-value targets and capture actionable intelligence. 

Our enemies do not respect weakness. They only respect 

strength, and strength cannot be shown just by finding jobs for 

more people who are members of ISIS. It is—it is divorced from reality to spend time here talking about social economics as if that 

is the root of what we are up against and that is the way to turn 

the tide. 

You know, we are all saying it is all part of it. That might be 

why some people are getting involved in ISIS. It might have something to do with economics. That is not going to eliminate the 

threat. 

58

Now, Madam Rajavi, listening to you speak and mentioning the 

Green Revolution back in 2009, and we think about the undemocratic elections that took place in Iran, at that point when the economy was doing better and oil was $100 a barrel, and millions of 

Iranians were rising up to take control of their country, and our 

President was saying that that was none of our problem. 

Fast forward today when the economy is worse and oil is $50 a 

barrel and people like you are showing a leadership, willing to take 

control of your own destiny. 

I honestly do not know whether or not my President is on the 

same exact team that I am because there are individuals like you 

who are willing to rise up and take control of your country’s future 

and destiny with a vision, whether it is Iran or Syria or elsewhere, 

to bring stability to the Middle East. 

I commend you for being here and for leading your effort. I yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with the last 

gentleman and point out that on the issue of socioeconomics not 

being the driving force, keep in mind 19 of the 20 hijackers on 9/11 

were from a rich oil-rich country and were middle class in their 

background. They did not take over those planes because they 

couldn’t support their families. 

This hearing is about defining the enemy and the President is attacked by some because he doesn’t have the courage to give ISIS 

the ideological victory that ISIS wants. ISIS wants to be called the 

Islamic State. 

They want to be regarded as Islamic. They want to be regarded 

as a state. I think they are heretic terrorists, not Islamic scholar 

statesmen, and so I do not think the President should be criticized 

for not calling them Islamic when they are heretics, and not calling 

them a state when they are terrorists. 

Also, the topic of this hearing is defining the enemy and I think 

the greatest enemy is the Shi’ite alliance. I have said that before 

in this room, the alliance of Iran, Assad, Hezbollah, now the 

Houthi, has killed more Muslims, killed more Americans and poses 

a greater threat of mass destruction than does ISIS. 

I am glad to have Ms. Rajavi here. I want to thank the MEK for 

revealing to the world the Natanz nuclear plant. There may have 

been a few members of the intel committee who knew that before 

the MEK told us. 

But speaking on behalf of roughly 400 Members of Congress, 

thank you for telling Congress as well. 

Now, you personally promote a very tolerant moderate view of 

Islam. You are an advocate of the separation of religion and state, 

and you have been an advocate for human rights and women’s 

rights. 

Of course, your country is ruled by very rigid laws that call for 

stoning people and chopping off limbs. ISIS does the same thing 

supposedly in support of a different version of Islam—Iran being 

Shi’ite, ISIS being Sunni. 

59

Why is their understanding of Islam the same, or at least similar 

to our eyes, and why do both the rulers of Iran and ISIS enforce 

their beliefs through these gruesome measures? If you could respond. 

I am sorry. We are unable to hear you. I don’t know if our——

Mr. POE. Technical difficulty here. 

Mr. SHERMAN [continuing]. Technical people can help that. 

Ms. RAJAVI. Thank you very much, Congressman Sherman. You 

touched upon a very important issue. You said that Islamic fundamentalism of the kind of the Shi’ite is even more dangerous than 

the Sunni one before anything else. 

The reason is that there is a state empowered in the dimension 

of the mullahs’ regime in a country—in a vast country with so 

many resources—financial resources—and it is supporting these 

Shi’ite fundamentalist groups financially, ideologically and 

logistically in every field. 

Therefore, they are much more dangerous. I agree with you. Regarding your question as to why they resort to so much violence to 

pursue their objectives I should tell you that the reason is they can 

only survive through absolute terror and fear, and this has been 

the trend of over 30 years of ruling fundamentalists in Iran that 

now has expanded to Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and other countries, and other fundamentalists take lessons from the Godfather. 

Let us not forget that the mullahs in Iran are implementing 

more than 70 kind of different tortures—cutting off limbs or gauging eyes, executing pregnant women and all the heinous crimes 

that one might imagine—and now ISIS and other fundamentalists 

are really imitating from the mullahs in Iran. 

Therefore, I reiterate once again that the ultimate solution is, 

one, evict, dislodge the Iranian regime from Syria and Iraq and 

Yemen and, even more important, regime change in Iran. 

The fundamentalist regime in Iran must be changed because this 

regime has created a political umbrella and a source of ideology 

and logistical and financial support for the fundamentalists and 

terrorists in today’s world. 

If it were not due to the destructive influence of the Iranian regime, we would not face the situation today in Iraq, Yemen and 

Syria and they would have stability. 

Let us not forget that by regime change in Iran, those militia 

under the command of the Quds Force, like the Hezbollah in Lebanon or Ansar Allah of the Houthis in Yemen, and other various 

groups in Iraq, would be eliminated without having their support 

and they would not have the vital environment to survive. 

Mr. POE. Does the gentleman yield back his time? 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would love to ask another question but I have 

gone over. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Doctor, you had—we got called out for votes—but you were making three points when I came in, and number two was you made 

reference to ideological confrontation I presume toward the goal to 

delegitimize ISIS. Could you elaborate further? 

Mr. PHARES. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

60

The first goal is to delegitimize them but there is a more important goal. It is to encourage and mobilize civil societies where ISIS 

controls so eventually, when ISIS control is eliminated by military 

means, there will be no new ISIS. 

My whole point to the panel is that ISIS is a new al-Qaeda, alQaeda a new Ansar al-Sharia. These are organizations. Every time 

there is a problem and a suppression, they come back. 

So the ideological battle is not just to deter them. It is to create 

a resistance inside these societies to make it impossible for a new 

ISIS to emerge. 

Mr. HIGGINS. So you have to confront the ideology in order to 

stop the evolution of these groups from proliferating. So how is that 

done? 

Mr. PHARES. It is done in the field where it has been fought. The 

message that ISIS and the jihadists are producing and, of course, 

sending through Internet and—the problem is not Internet and 

Facebook—the problem is who is responding to them. We need to 

partner with and work with leaders and ideologues such as the 

spiritual leader of Sunni Islam. I just came back from Egypt a few 

weeks ago. 

I met with Sheikh Azhar, the equivalent of the Sunni Pope. We 

had a long conversation. He is ready to mobilize against this way 

of thinking. 

There are many clerics around the Muslim world. They are ready 

to move. Their problem—there is no coordination among themselves and us. 

Mr. HIGGINS. With all due respect, we hear this all the time but 

it never happens. You know, the United States, whether you 

agreed with our involvement in Iraq, you know, the best that we 

could hope for was taking out a bad guy and creating a breathing 

space within which Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds could develop some 

kind of social contract and live peacefully amongst one another. 

Obviously, that didn’t happen. You know, some would say that 

ISIS is just trying to get their country back in Iraq because the origins of ISIS, clearly, are de-Baathification and the dissolution of 

the Iraq army under Saddam Hussein, who were Sunnis. 

And maybe it is second generation, but as you talk about the continuum of this kind of extremist activity, their roots are somewhere. I suppose the question is, you know, where is the end and 

how do you achieve that? 

You also said that jihadis become jihadis by indoctrination and 

I know there was some discussion here about whether or not socioeconomic factors contribute to that. 

I suppose they do to a degree. That is certainly not the only vulnerability to radicalization. But I would suggest—I would argue 

that some of it is. 

You know, I think the American people become very frustrated 

because we, as the indispensable nation, are called upon to try to 

intervene to resolve these problems. But yet at its core, these problems have to be resolved internally, and the Middle East is a very 

pluralistic society. 

There is a very pluralistic society. But there is a zero sum game 

mentality and in order for somebody to win somebody has to lose. 

61

And that is why Bashar al-Assad in Syria enjoys partnerships with 

people he has no interest in. 

Just because they are minorities, the Sunnis take over, they feel 

as though they will get slaughtered and therefore they align themselves with Bashar al-Assad so that they don’t get slaughtered. 

There is no recognition of minority rights. You know, in game 

theory there is also what is referred to as a variable sum game and 

that means that there can be multiple winners. But in order to promote a peaceful path toward an existence of peaceful coexistence 

there has to be pretty profound compromises. 

You know, I referenced before in Northern Ireland they had a 

history—a horrible history of Protestants and Catholics killing each 

other. No troops were deployed by the United States in Northern 

Ireland. 

But both sides, in order to participate in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, had to denounce violence publicly—paramilitaries on 

both sides—the Irish Republican Army and the Protestant 

paramilitaries—and they actually had to participate in the destruction of their arms with an international tribunal. 

And, you know, my point is you are either going to get democracy 

through peaceful means or, in the absence of that, civil war. And 

the United States fought a civil war where 650,000 to 700,000 people were killed at a time where our country’s population was about 

30 million people. 

I mean, that is very, very significant. But that is the consequence 

of not being able to resolve your problems peacefully. So as we, you 

know, look for solutions with these very clear maps of delineation 

as to who is responsible, but this is—you know, this is probably 

pretty accurate. There is a lot of duplicity going on there. 

You know, Tom Friedman, the author and New York Times columnist, once said, ‘‘Is Iraq the way it is because Saddam is the way 

he is, or is Saddam the way he is because Iraq is the way it is?’’

And I think unless and until these Middle Eastern countries recognize, you know, that there is something beyond the horizon than 

hating one another and killing each other in the name of God then 

we are just going to be at this table and these panels for years and 

years to come. 

There has got to be some enlightenment and that is going to require leadership, and it is going to require leadership in the Arab 

Muslim world. 

Mr. POE. And you yield back your time. And without objection, 

this chart that was hastily made by the Chair, will be made part 

of the record and with—I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Davis, 

who is not a member of this committee, be allowed to ask questions 

and if there is no objection then the Chair recognizes Mr. Davis 

from Illinois. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

thank you for your indulgence. Indeed, I am not a member of this 

subcommittee but I do have interest in the subject matter, and I 

want to thank you and I thank both of our witnesses for being 

here. 

Ms. Rajavi, over the past 30 years the United States has been 

drawn into some serious diplomatic and military dead ends in the 

Mideast by mistakenly backing individuals and organizations 

62

claiming popular support which turned out to be largely exaggerated and somewhat manufactured. 

Would you please tell us about the role of the National Council 

of Resistance in Iranian civil life and its place in current Iranian 

political life, and how do you measure your popular support in 

Iran? 

Ms. RAJAVI. With absolute repression it is not possible to go to 

the vote of people and see what the people really think, and the 

mullahs will never accept a free election. 

Therefore, the yardstick or the gage for the popularity of this 

movement, one, is its persistent continuation of its principles despite the absolute repression and having lost 120,000 of its members and sympathizers who were executed by the regime. 

I show you now this book, which includes the names of some 

20,000 members of the resistance movement from different strata 

of the Iranian society. So you can imagine that collecting such information during repression is very difficult. 

But another indication is the fear of the regime and its engagement in demonizing the Iranian resistance as another indication of 

the strength of the resistance and its popularity. 

As you may know, in all the diplomatic correspondence that they 

have their main demands from their interlocutors is to restrict the 

activities of our movement and any affiliation with our movement 

in Iran is equal to execution. 

In the 2009 uprising, the regime’s officials acknowledged publicly 

that those demonstrations were organized by a Mujahideen network, the MEK network in Iran, and this popular support has enabled this movement also to have access to most secret information 

of the Iranian regime—on nuclear, on missile and what the Quds 

Force is doing in the region as well as the human rights violations 

in Iran. 

We have always said to the mullahs’ regime that if you really 

claim that our movement has no popular support, let us have a free 

election under the auspices of the international community and let 

us see who has the popular support of the Iranian people. But let 

us not forget that a free election for the mullahs is a red line. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Phares, do you believe that the United States should be cooperating militarily with Iran in combating ISIS in Iraq and Syria, 

and if yes, how and to what extent? Is it direct cooperation or indirect cooperation through the Iraqi Government and if no, why not? 

Mr. PHARES. Well, I will begin by the answer no, and certainly 

no, Mr. Congressman. I will give the argument that unless there 

is a change in the government and in the direction, at least, of Iranian policy in the region, cooperating with the regime that is waging a campaign in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon and now in Yemen 

against five or seven of our own allies and probably soon to be trying to destabilize Bahrain, it would be a strategic mistake. 

So I am not against the principle that the United States would 

cooperate with anybody to defeat the terrorists. But if we cooperate 

with the Iranians as they are engaged militarily against our own 

allies, and there is something even more important—every inch of 

land taken away from ISIS, which is the good thing, all depends 

on who is taking away that inch from the organization. 

63

If the Iranian-controlled militias or Iranians with different aspects in Iraq are taking over, we would be replacing one problem 

with another problem. 

So my answer is, clearly, no to that cooperation unless we see a 

change or a reform and, clearly, we have not seen yet a Gorbachevlike perestroika or glasnost inside Iran for the time being. 

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much and, Mr. Chairman, again, I 

thank you for your indulgence and I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, unanimous 

consent the Chair will allow another individual who is not a member of this committee to ask questions. Ms. Chu from California is 

recognized. 

Ms. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I would like to address these questions to Ms. Rajavi. I would 

like to ask about Camp Liberty. Camp Liberty is a military base 

that has become a permanent home for over 3,000 Iranian refugees. 

But the conditions there are poor and freedom is very severely 

restricted. Worse, there are reports that the Iraqi Government is 

blockading the base, preventing food, water and medicine from arriving. 

Combined with the restriction on travel, this blockade has led to 

at least 25 deaths, the most recent being Mr. Jalal Abedini on April 

17th. 

Can you give us a sense of living conditions in Camp Liberty in 

regard to food, medicine and decent housing? 

Ms. RAJAVI. Our prime concern about the residents in Camp Liberty is their safety and security. That is the main problem that 

they are facing in Camp Liberty now to the extent that since the 

protection of the residents was transferred from the United States 

to Iraq 116 have been killed, seven have been taken hostage and 

the residents are denied timely access to medical care. 

And for this reason, as you have just mentioned, 25 people have 

lost their lives while there was the possibility to save their life. 

I think it was 116 who have been killed during these attacks by 

Iraqi forces; they have no freedom of movement and enormous restrictions have been imposed on them. 

Just to give you one example, Camp Liberty’s electricity is not 

connected to the city grid and since the Abadi government took office there has been no changes in the condition and there is still 

a prison-like situation for the residents. 

And I think the new government must recognize Camp Liberty 

as a refugee camp and remove all the inhumane restrictions which 

have been imposed on the camp and put an end to the daily harassment of the residents. 

In particular, it is very important that the camp management be 

changed because they are the same people—the people who are the 

camp management are the same people who were engaged in the 

massacre and the killing of the residents in the past attacks. 

And as you know, the United States Government had made a 

written commitment to provide safety and security for these people 

but that obligation has been violated and I think Camp Liberty 

should be really put under the protection of the United States or 

at least their personal weapons to be given so that if they are atVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:49 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\042915\94386 SHIRL
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tacked by the militias or paramilitary groups that they could defend themselves. 

And I expect that the United States upholds its commitment to 

regular monitoring of Camp Liberty. 

Ms. CHU. Let me ask now about—do you have any confidence in 

the current government to improve conditions and what is the future for the people at Camp Liberty? Is there a U.S. role? 

Ms. RAJAVI. I think the U.S. Government can really demand and 

urge the Iraqi Government to uphold its obligations. 

So far, the government has not done anything that we could really trust that they will do the right thing, and as I said that the 

people are still living in a prison-like situation in Camp Liberty as 

prisoners. 

That is why I said that the new government should recognize 

Liberty as a refugee camp and remove all the restriction imposed 

on the camp and end the harassment of the residents. 

And I want to reiterate that it is very vital to change the camp 

management and do not allow the mullahs’ regime to send its 

agents for psychological torture of the residents and laying the 

ground for another massacre in Camp Liberty. These are actions 

that they can take and I believe that the United States Government is in a position to really call on and demand from the Iraqi 

Government to uphold this obligation. 

Ms. CHU. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentlelady. 

We have also been joined on the dais by the gentlelady from 

Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, and without objection and unanimous consent that she will be allowed to question the witnesses. You have 

5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

kindness and let me add my appreciation to both you and Ranking 

Member Sherman and all the members on this panel for their courtesies extended and to indicate that this is a very historic hearing 

because as far as my memory can recollect, Mr. Chairman, this is 

one of the few times that the voice of the opposition of the Government of Iran has been part of an official discussion. 

And that is very important for the American people and for us 

to formulate the right kinds of policies. Many of us worked for long 

years to ensure that this great leader, who happens to be a woman, 

would be able to speak and would be able to lead the MEK and be 

removed from the terrorist list. 

There were many machinations and court decisions and we have 

moved to a decision which I think reflects the fairness of this nation. Might I also say that the importance of hearing both views 

in this backdrop of ISIS and the backdrop of the merging of the caliphate—it is from Syria to Iraq to Iran is very important. 

As we watch Yemen, and we watch Libya, we know that we have 

to come together around a full understanding of the influence and 

impact of ISIS. 

So let me say to Ms. Rajavi, who has been a continuing leader 

and someone who has opened her information cycle, if I will, to ensure that information be given. She doesn’t hide information. She 

has been open and forthright. 

65

So I would like to pose these questions. We are trying to discern 

ISIS the enemy and I would just make the comment that any organization that beheads and uses the kind of horrific video to intimidate certainly is a defined enemy, from my perspective, and all 

those who contribute to the growth and continuation of ISIS, using 

them as a front for the dastardly deeds they want to do, we have 

to review. 

We have to look at Syria. We have to look at what is happening 

in Iraq and we certainly must look at what is happening in Iran. 

But I do want to say as well in the nuclear nonproliferation 

agreement framework, which we don’t have, I still believe that we 

should look at that in a way that we look and analyze first before 

we condemn and we take the input that Members of Congress will 

hopefully be able to give and we look forthright to ensure that Iraq 

knows—that Iraq knows we mean business but, more importantly, 

this agreement that may come about with Iran is to enhance the 

security of the United States of America. 

To Ms. Rajavi, I would like to ask the question that you promote 

a very tolerant and moderate view of Islam. You are an advocate 

of separation of religion and state and you also favor women’s 

rights and human rights. 

Is it true that Iran is upholding laws that call for the stoning to 

death of people and the chopping off of limbs? 

Can she hear that I was directing that question? 

Mr. POE. There is a satellite involved in this communication and 

it takes a while, plus the translation. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. 

Ms. RAJAVI. Yes, precisely. I should say that what the mullahs 

really want under the pretext of Islam are doing—they are doing 

it under the pretext of Islam, but it has nothing to do with Islam. 

They stone people, amputate limbs and they rape people and so 

far, as I said, 120,000 of the best children of the Iranian people 

have been executed under the name of religion and Islam. 

But I should make it clear that Islam is a religion of compassion 

and freedom and rejects fanaticism, dogmatism and dictatorship. 

Congresswoman Jackson Lee as you mentioned, we believe in separation of religion and state. We advocate a tolerant and democratic 

interpretation of Islam, which is the genuine Islam, and we believe 

that it is the vote of the people that will count. 

In our view, there is gender equality between men and women. 

While, you know that fundamentalists are misogynists and whatever is based on compulsion is contrary to Islamic teaching. 

There is no compulsion in religion, in what you wear and how 

you think, and as the Koran said, there is no compulsion in religion. Sovereignty and the vote of people is the treatment—please, 

go ahead. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. I am going to make these very 

brief because I know our time has ended. I just simply know that 

in the 1979 revolution the Iranian intellectuals called for democracy and human rights. 

You just mentioned Islamic fundamentalism, which Iran seems 

to be the epicenter of and therefore promoting terrorism. You might 

want to comment how you think this happened to Iran and then 

maybe the top challenges that we must face. 

66

If we identify ISIL as an enemy, what are the challenges that relate to freedom, democracy, peace and security that we all want to 

see? Let me finish by saying that if you have any comments about 

Camp Liberty and those continued attacks if you want to include 

that as to how we can work to better stop that, and I would appreciate the chairman’s indulgence and I thank you very much for 

your answers to these questions. 

Ms. RAJAVI. You are absolutely right. The people of Iran wanted 

freedom and democracy from the revolution and they continue to 

yearn for freedom and democracy. But, unfortunately, Khomeini 

stole the leadership of the revolution which was for freedom and 

democracy and imposed a fundamentalist regime which by eliminating all freedom and eliminating all political forces from the Iranian society, particularly women and the youth, and established its 

rule. 

And for the past 37 years a fundamentalist government has been 

in power in Tehran. This regime is based on two pillars—export of 

terrorism and fundamentalism outside and domestic repression, 

and at the same time trying to acquire nuclear weapons in order 

to take hostage the international community for doing nothing 

against these atrocities. 

These are the basis or the pillars of this regime. In the month 

of April, just in this month, nearly 150 executions have been announced in Iran. Only by absolute repression they are maintaining 

their power. 

But on the other hand, there is—an organized resistance, which 

has been resisting this fundamentalist regime for the past 37 years 

and has been able to expose the fundamentalism and terrorism of 

this regime and to show the world who is the epicenter of fundamentalism in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen and other parts 

of the world and to show that where are the secret sites, nuclear 

secret sites of the mullahs are operating and they have been operating and also to inform the world about the human rights violations in Iran. 

But I am absolutely confident that the people of Iran and the Iranian resistance will bring an end and overthrow this mullahs’ regime and bring freedom and democracy for the people of Iran and 

for the people of the whole region. 

And just very briefly about Liberty, as I said, we expect that the 

United States Government upholds its obligations which has been 

violated by now and the U.S. Government must really put Camp 

Liberty under its own protection soon and to put an end to the 

blockade and to demand from the Iraqi Government to lift the 

blockade and to recognize their rights as a protected person under 

the Geneva Conventions. I thank you. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The gentlelady yields back her time. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The gentlelady yields back the time. Thank 

you. 

Mr. POE. I want to thank all of the members of the committee 

and guests of the committee for being here today. 

This has been a very insightful hearing and the witnesses have 

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ing with Ambassador Ford succinctly analyzing that they are driven by doctrine and they are driven by the philosophy that compromise is a sin. 

And Dr. Phares, you brought in your expertise to say and show 

that this isn’t just a philosophy that is against Christians and Jews 

but it is a philosophy that also attacks Muslims to a great deal—

maybe more Muslims than other groups. 

And Ms. Rajavi, I want to thank you as well, bringing a perspective from an Iranian point of view that is not the official mullah 

point of view of the Government of Iran, having your expertise and 

seeing firsthand the results of oppression in Iran and the oppression of ISIS, and thank you as well, especially this late time in the 

evening. I guess it is about 11:30 or 11:45 wherever, somewhere in 

there. 

But I do also want to thank all of the people in the audience that 

have shown a great interest in this hearing. 

So this subcommittee is adjourned and there will be follow-up 

questions by—that can be submitted by members of the subcommittee to all of the witnesses that have testified. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

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