### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ma y 18, 200 5 S es sio n

BERNI CE WALT ON WO ODLAND AND 

### JO HN L. WO ODLAND

v. GLOR IA J. THOR NTO N

An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for F ayett e County No. 4390 Jon K. Blackwood , Judge

No. W2004-02829-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Augu st 25, 2005

This is a persona l injury case arising out of an automobile accide nt. The def endant r ear -ende d the plaintiff’s vehic le, and the pla intiff filed t his lawsuit ag ainst the defe ndant for the damag es re sulting from the a ccide nt. A jury

trial was he ld. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awa rded the plaintiff

c o m p e n s a t o r y d a m a g e s , i n c l u d i n g a n a m o u n tf o r f u t u r e p a i n a n d s u f

f e r i n g a n d p e r m a n e n ti n

j u r y. The trial c ourt enter ed a judg ment on the verdic t. The defe ndant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgme nt, arg uing tha t some elements of the jury ’s ver dict wer e not supported by the e vidence at trial. The mot ion was denied. The defenda nt now appeals. We aff irm in part, re verse in part, and

rema nd for the tr ial court to ame nd the judg ment to conform with the e vidence at trial.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t i s Aff irm ed in Par t, Re verse d in P art, and Rem anded

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J.
, d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e Co u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J
., W.S
., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Don G. Owe ns, I I I , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Gloria J. Thornton.

Kim E. L inville, Covi ng ton, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, B ernic e Walton Woodl and.

OP IN ION

On Octobe r 12, 2001, the automobile driven by Def end ant/Appellant Gloria

J . Thornton (“Thornton”) struc k t h e re ar of the automobile driven by Plaintiff/Appellee B ernic e Walton Woo dla nd(“ Woo dla nd ” ). At the ti me of th e a c c ide nt, Woo dla ndwa s si xty -f ive y e ars old . A s a result of the c ollisi on, Woodland suffere d property damag e and pe rsonal injuries.T h or n t on ’ s h u s ba n d a l s o b r ou g h t a c l a i m f or l os s of

c on s or t i u m. 1

-2- On May 2, 2002, Wood l an d fi led this lawsuit ag ainst Thornton, alleg ing ne g lige nce a nd seeking damag es resulting from the accident. Thornton denied that she was neg lige nt and alleg ed 1 that Woodland was compar atively at fault.

On Aug u s t 9
, 2 0 0 4 , the matter w as tried be fore a jury . Severa l witnesses testified, and

se ve ra l e xhibi ts w e re a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e . B e c a us e lia bil ity is not ra ise d as a n is su e on app e a l,

we r ecount only

the evidenc e pertaining to d am age s

. During the trial, the pa rties stipulated that Thornton’s prope rty

damag e wa s $1,750.

Reg arding Woodland’s claimed per sonal injuries, she submitted t h e v ideo deposition of J ames B urnett, M.D. (“ Dr. B urnett”) . I n the deposition, Dr. B urnett testifi ed t h at W o o dland had been his pa tient since 1987. The me dical records showe d that, on the day of the a ccide nt, Woodl and visited Dr. B urnett’s off

ice with complaints of pa in in her nec k, rig ht shoulder, and r ight a rm. She

wa s te ste d th a t day , a nd a ra dio log y re po rt ind ic a te d tha t Woodl a nd ha d no a c ute inj ur ie s o r f ra c tur e s, but that she had de g ener ative cha ng es, or a rthritis, in her nec k. Dr. B urnett examined Woodland three day s after

the ac cident, and she told him that she still had neck, back, a nd shoulder pain. He pr e sc ri be d mu sc le re lax ers and pa in m e dic a tio n to a lle viate Woo dla nd ’s sy mpt oms . D r. B ur ne tt described Woodland’s condition as “a whiplash type [ in] jury [t hat] has caused a[ n] ex ace rbation of her infla mmatory

chang e i n her ne ck. It is a chronic thing .” Dr . Burnett ref err ed Woodland to a

neurosur g eon, John L indermuth, M.D. (“ Dr. L i ndermuth”) , to expl ore the possibili ty of having surg ery to relieve her ne ck pain. How ever , Woodland never unde rwe nt surg ery to treat he r
c on dit ion . B y

Ap ri l 3, 20 02 , o ve r s ix mon ths a ft e r t he a c c ide nt, Woo dla nd sti ll c omp la ine d of pa in in her ne ck and ba ck, and D r. B urnett continued to pre scribe pa in medication to her.

Dr. B urnett testified that he believed that the accident agg ravated t he existi ng deg ener ative chang es in Woodland’s neck a nd back. When a sked whether he had a n opinion about whether the condition in W oodland’s bac k and shoulder w as per manent, Dr . Burnett responde d:

Well, y ou know, as the MRI and X- ray s re v eale d, she had a rthritis and spinal stenosis, w hich was prese nt be fore the wre ck, but she ’s g oing to c ontinue to h ave pain in he r neck and shoulder intermittentlyI would – I think for the re st of her life

. The motor vehic le ac cident in Octobe r of 2001 made it worse for a while. To da

y the pa in tha t she has

, I c an’ t sa y fo r su re is, y ou k now, fr om the wre c k, but

it’s g oin g to b e pe rmane nt.

A D e c e mbe r 9
, 20 02 re po rt fr om D r. L ind e rm uth ind ic a te d th a t he be lie ve d th a t Woo dla ndwo uld “make a satisfa ctory

rec overy from her injuries with no permane nt impairment.”

Woodland’s daug hter, B ernstein Walton Owen ( “Owe n”), te stified t hat, for a bout three months after the acc ident, Woodland was unable to drive or ca rry out all of the household duties she perf ormed be fore the ac cident. Dur ing tha t three- month period, Owe n dro ve Woodland to theW oodl an d’ s h u s ban d w as a wa r ded $500 on h i s cl ai m f or l os s of c on s or t i u m, w h i ch w as a l s o di s cou n t ed by 2

25 % becau s e of

W oo dl and’ s comp ar at i ve neg l i gen ce.

-3- g roce ry store and to a

ppointments with phy sicians. Woodland paid Owen g as money and provide d her lunc h for he r assistance . Owen e stimated that Woodl and had pa id h er a t o t al o f “close [] to” $200.

Woo dla ndte sti fi e d o n h e r o wn be ha lf . Sh e de sc ri be d th e c ir c ums ta nc e s of the a uto mob ile

a c c ide nt a ndthe inj ur ie s th a t sh e su sta ine d f ro m it . Sh e testif

ie d th a t he r n e c k a ndba c k p a in pe rs ist e d fr om the tim e of the a c c ide nt thr ou g h a

pp ro xima te ly

Janu ary 20 02 . B y

the tim e of

tr ia l, Woodland said she no longe r suffere d constant pain. Howeve r, she ha d neck pa in when she lifted something he avy

or turned he r hea d a ce rtain wa y , and she occa sionally suffe red lower back pain as well. Woodland also claimed that
, af t er the acc ident, she had diff iculty sleeping . Woodland

a dmi tte d th a t sh e ha d be e n tr e a te d b y Dr . B ur ne tt f

or ne c k p a in p ri or

to the a c c ide nt i n 1 99 8, bu t sa id that the pain fr om that episode had subsided, an d that at the time of the a ccide nt she was without pa in i n h e r n e c k. She a lso te sti fi e d tha t, at the tim e of the a c c ide nt, sh e wa s r e c e ivi ng Soc ia l Se c ur ity disabilitybenef

its and had bee n since 1994 due to a pinched ne rve in he r left a rm.

At the conc lusion of t rial, t he jury found i n favor of W oodland, determining that Thor nton

wa s 7 5% a t f

a ult , a ndthat Woo dla ndwa s 2 5% a t f a ult . T he jury

a wa rd e d d a ma g e s a s f

oll ow s:

Ec on omi c Da ma g e s: a. Medic al ca

re/ser vices - pa st $3,500 b. Medica l car e/servic es - f uture 4,000 c. Miscellane ous expense 1,000 d. Property

damag e 2,000

No n- Ec on omi c Da ma g e s: e. Pain and suff

ering - past 5,000 f. Pain and suff

ering - future 5,000 g . Permane nt injury 1,000 h. L oss of the ability

to enjoy life - pa st 2,000 i. L oss of the ability

to enjoy life - f uture 2,000

Total for B ernic e Walton Woodl and $25,500

Be cause Woodland was found to be 25% at fault, the total dama g e amount wa s discounted by that perc entag e, and Woodland wa s awa rded a total of $19,125. On September 3, 2004, the trial court 2
enter ed a judg ment on the verdict. On September 7, 2004, Thornton filed a

motion to alter or amend the jud g me nt, or fo r a ne w tr ia l, c la imi ng that the re wa s no ma te ri a l e vid e nc e to su pp ort th e a mou nts

awa rded. In the alter native, Thornton reque sted a remittitur, c laiming that the evidenc e supported

a judgme nt of no more than $8,515.35. On October 8, 2004, the trial court entere d an orde r deny ing-4-

Th or nto n’ s mo tio n. F ro m th a t or de r, Th or nto n no w app e a ls. On app e a l, T ho rn ton c ha lle ng e s o nly
t h e d a m a g e a w ar d a n d r a i s e s n o i s s u e a s t o l i ab i l i t y.

When a trial judge has approve d a jury ’s verdic t, our standard of revie w is to determine whe ther there is any

materia l ev i dence to support the verdic t. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Ove rstreet v. Shon ey’s, Inc. , 4 S.W .3d 694, 718 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). W e d o not determine w here the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e lies; r ather
, we must a scertain whether any materia l e vidence in the

rec ord supports the jury

verdic t. Ove rstreet , 4 S.W .3d at 718. I n making this determination, we a re

“ re qu ir e d to take the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w of a ll the e vid e nc e in f a vo r o f the ve rd ic t, t o a ssu me the truth of all that tends to support it, allowing all rea sonable infe renc es to sustain the verdic t, and to di s ca rd al l t o the contra ry .” Mills v. Sol

om on , 43 S.W .3d 503, 507-08 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Cr

a b tr e e M a s o nr y Co

. v
. C & R Co ns tr., Inc.
, 575 S. W.2 d 4 , 5 (T e nn . 1 97 8) ). Th us , absent a reve rsible er

ror of law, we will set aside a judg ment on a jury verdic t only

wher e the r ecor d contains no material evidenc e to support t he ver dict. See Fos te r v . Bue , 749 S.W .2d 736, 741 (Tenn. 1988). W e re view the de nial of a motion to alter or amend f or an a buse of discr etion. Chambl iss v. Stohler , 124 S.W .3d 116, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

Thornton arg ues that the jury ’s awa rd is not supported by

the evidenc e at tria l. She contends that, on Woodland’s claim of economic damag es, t he evidence at trial supports an aw ard of no more tha n $ 4, 35 3, no t th e $1 0, 500 fou nd by the jury . A s to the a wa rdfo r n on -e c on omi c da ma g e s, Thornton asserts tha t the re was no evidenc e that the automobile acc ident cause d Woodland to have fu tur e pa in a ndsu ff

e ri ng , f utu re los s o f the abil ity

to e njo y lif e , o r p e rm a ne nt i nju ry . We wi ll addre ss eac h element of

damag es in turn.

First, Thornton challeng es the awa rd of $3,500 for pa st medical ca re or service s. She maintains that th e on ly

pro of of W oo dla nd ’s me dic a l e xpe ns e s r e su lti ng fr om the a c c ide nt i s c on ta ine d in Exhi bit 5. Exhi bit

5 s ho ws that Woo dla ndinc ur re d e xpe ns e s f

or se rv ic e s re nd e re d b y

Dr . B ur ne tt in the a mou nt o f $ 46 0, by Me thodi st Fay ett e Ho sp ita l in the a mou nt o f $ 61 0. 50 , b y Me mph is Hospital North i n the amount of $1,193.30, and by Memphis Neurolog ical Associa tion, P.C ., in the
amount of $140, all of which total $2,403.80. Be cause no other e vidence of Woodland’s medica l

e xpe ns e s w a s su bmi tte d, Th or nto n ar g ue s, the tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld h a ve re mit te d th e jury a wa rdto this amount on this element of dama g es. I n response , Woodland cl aims that, in addition to Ex hibit 5, Dr. Burnett testified in his deposition tha t he presc ribed pa in medications for Woodland and tha t she had those pre scriptions filled. Woodland claims that, although no pr oof of the specific char g es wa s int ro du c e d a t tr ia l, the jur or s w e re pe rm itt e d to a wa rd he r d a ma g e s f

or tho se e xpe ns e s, us ing the ir

common sense.

I n a personal i njury action, the plaintiff carries the burden at trial to prove, by a pre pondera nce of the e vidence
, the amount of her damag es. Wa lke r v . Si

dne y Ga lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W .3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). T he proof of dama g es nee d not be exact or mathe matically prec ise, but the amount of the da mag es must be shown “w ith a rea sonable deg ree of certainty which ena bles the trier of fac t t o m ak e a re asonable assessment of the damag es.” McMurry v. Metro. Gov ’t of Na shv ill e , No. M2000-02902-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 535918, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 26, 2003)-5-

(citi n g Ove rstreet , 4 S.W .3d at 703). Damag es may not be base d on “mer e conje cture or specula tion.” Id. (c i t i n g We ste rn Si zzl in, Inc . v . Ha rri

s , 7 4 1 S. W. 2 d 3 3 4
, 3 3 5 ( T enn. Ct. App. 1987) (quotation omitted)).

Wit h respe ct to Woodland’s p as t m ed i ca l car e or e x penses, Exhibit 5 showed that she ha d expended $2,403.80 on her medical care

. Although the evidenc e indicate d that she may in addition have purcha sed pain medication, there was no evidenc e even estimating how much Woodland may have spe nt on such medica tion, nor was there evidence of any other medic al expenditures. Under these c ircumstance s, we must conclude that the trial court erre d in failing to remit the jury ’s awa rd on this element of dama g es to $2,403.80, to confor m to the evidence prese nted at trial.

Th or nto n ne xt c ha lle ng e s the $4 ,0 00 a wa rd to Woo dla nd fo r fu tur e me dic a l care or servi c e s. Thornton claims that there was a bsolutely no evidenc e i n t ro d u ced at trial as to this element of damag es. I n response , Woodland asserts that the deposit ion testimony of Dr. Burnett supports an

awa rd for future me dical ca

re, be cause he testified that Woodland’s c ondition was chronic, a nd that she would continue to ha ve pain in her neck f or t he rest of her life. Fr om our review of Dr. B urnett’s testimony , howeve r, we fi n d nothing to sug g est how much, if a ny , of Woodland’s future medical

e xpe ns e s wo uld re su lt fr om the a c c ide nt. Th us , the jury ’s a wa rdfo r f utu re me dic a l e xpe ns e s c ou ld only have been based on specula tion and conjecture

. Consequently
, the j ury ’s award of $4,000 for future me dical ca

re or service s must be vaca ted.

Thornton also ar g ues on appe al that t he trial c ourt err ed in awa rding Woodland $1,000 for miscellaneous expenses. She claims that the only evidenc e reg arding Woodland’ s o u t-of-poc ket losses, other than medic al expenses, was the a mount that W oodland paid to her daug hter, Ow en, for
tr a ns po rt a tio n f

or a n a pp ro xima te thr e e -m on th p e ri od

. Owen te sti fi e d th a t he r m oth e r p a id h e r i n excess of $100, “close r t o two [hundred dollars],” for the assistance she provided during the months i m m e d i a t e l y f

o l l o w i n g t h e a c c i d e n t

. T h o r n t o n ar g u e s t h a t t h e m i s c e l l a n e o u s d a m a g e a wa rd mus t be no more than this a m o u n t

. I n response , Woodland arg ues that, in her te stimony , Owen w as
uncer tain o f w h a t s h e w a s p a id f o r h e r a s s is ta n c e to h e r mo th e r

. Wo o d la n d a ls o n o te s that the

e vid e nc e sh ow s tha t othe r fa mil y me mbe rs or frie nd s dro ve he r to phy sic ia n ap po int me nts a t ti me s, and that she should be e ntitled to mi leag e expense for these trips to he r medica l providers. As we have note d, howeve r, there must be at least some e vidence t o s u p p o rt Woodland’s claim for miscellaneous e x penses. Woodland c an identify no evidenc e pre sented a t trial to establish even a n estimate of a ny expense other than the approximately $200 paid to her daug hter. Thus, be cause there is n o e vid e nc e to s up po rt a n aw ardin e xce ss o f $ 20 0, we fi ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in fa ili ng to remit the jury ’s awa

rd for miscellaneous e x penses of $200.

Next, Thornton arg ues that there is no evidence to sup p o rt the jury ’s awa rd of $2,000 f

or property damag e, bec ause the parties stipulat ed t h at the amount of prope rty damag e wa s $1,750. Woodland arg ues t hat, considering the photogr aphs of the car and the other e vidence at trial, the jury was pe rmitted to awar d more than the s t i p u l at ed am ount. We disagr ee. E ven if the jury wer e permitted t o ignor e the parties’ stipulation as t o the value of Woodland’s property

damag e, which it was not, Woodl and wa s require d to present a t least some evidenc e of the monetary value of herT h o rn to n d o e s n o t ch a llen g e the a w a rd s b a se d o n p a st p a in a n d s u ff e r in g ($ 5 ,0 0 0 ) o r o n the p a st a b ili ty t o 3 enjo y l i fe ($2

, 0 0 0 ).

-6- property damag e in order to rec over. See Moye r v. Herman , No. 87-119-I I , 1987 WL 15472, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 12, 1987) (holding that, even thoug h the damag e to the plaintiff’ s vehicle w as shown by pictures a nd g ener al desc riptions, t h er e must be evidenc e of a monetary

value of the damag e in orde r t o rec over)

. There fore
, we find that the t rial court err ed in failing to remit the jury ’s property damag e aw ard to $1,750.

Wit h respe ct to non-ec o n o mi c damag es, Thornton c halleng es the a war ds to W oodland that wer e based on f

uture pa in and suffe ring ($5,000), pe rmane nt injury ($1,000), and the future loss of the

ab il it y to e n

jo y li f e ( $ 2
, 0 0 0 )

. T h o r n to n c la im s th a t th e s e e le me n ts o f th e ju r y ’ s awa rd we re not

3 supported by any materia l e vidence
, beca use there was no proof

at trial indicating that the ac cident was the pr ox imate cause of a ny future da mag e or pe rmane nt injury to Woodland. Thornton conc edes that Woo dla ndma y

be pe rm a ne ntl y

da ma g e d an d th a t sh e ma y ha ve fu tur e pa in. She arg ue s, howeve r, that there is no proof that any perma nent damag e or f

uture pa in we re ca u s ed by the

acc ident. On the contr ary , Thornton ar g ues, whe n Dr. Burnett was a sked in his deposition whether he tho ug ht tha t Woo dla nd ’s c on dit ion wa s perma ne nt, he re sp on de d, “ To da y the pa in tha t sh e ha s, I can’ t say for sure is, y ou know, from the wre ck, but it’s g oing to be perma nent.” Also, the me dical report by Dr. Lindermuth predic ted that Woodland would rec over “ with no permane nt impairment.” I n li g ht o f thi s e vid e nc e a nd the abs e nc e of a ny oth e r p ro of

of a c a us a l c on ne c tio n, Th or nto n a rg ue s,
we mus t va c a te a ny

a wa rdba se d o n f

utu re no n- e c on omi c da ma g e s.

I n response , Woodland contends that Dr. B urnett’s testimony and the o t h er t estimony

at trial establish the requisite causa l connec tion. Woodland arg ues that the e vidence showed that she w as
a n e xtre me ly

a c tiv e ho us e wi fe be fo re the a c c ide nt, bu t that sin c e the a c c ide nt s he ha s b e e n u na ble
to car ry out all of her normal household duties. Woodl and notes that Dr . Burnett char acte rized her

c on dit ion a s p e rm a ne nt, a ndpr e dic te d th a t sh e wi ll p ro ba bly a lw a y s h a ve pa in i n h e r n e c k. B e c a us e she wa s not in pain before the acc ident, but has continued to suffer pain since the acc ident occur red, Wood la n d c o n te n d s , th is is e v id e n c e th a t h e r p r o b le ms mo r e li k e ly th a n n o t w e r e c a u s ed bythe

acc ident.

I n a neg lige nce c laim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a ca usal conne ction betwee n the neg lige nce a nd the injury

suffe red. Se e Be

gle y v . St ate , 162 S.W .3d 535, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Thoug h causation must not be proven with a bsolute certainty , it cannot be ba sed on mere conjec ture or spec ulation. See Porter v. Gr een , 745 S.W .2d 874, 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). “ Where a ph y sic i a n t e s t i f

i e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n , h i s o p i n i o n m u s t b e r e a s o n ab l y c e r t a i n b oth
as t o the cause of the phy sical condition and its future e ffe cts.” Id. The parties do not dispute that Dr. B urnett’s testimony

supports Woo d la

n d ’ s a s s e r ti o n th at s h e s u f

f e rs from a perma nent impairment and that she will likely have neck pain in the future. Dr. Burnett’s testimony
, howeve r, simply does not support a finding that any perma nent impairment or f uture pa in was caused by

the accident. Dr. Burnett candidly admitted that he “c an’t say for sure ” that the c hronic na ture of Woodland’s ne ck pa in w a s c a us e d b y

the a c c ide nt, in l ig ht o f h e r p re e xistin g de g e ne rativ e c on dit ion . D r. L ind e rm uth-7-

went further in stating his opinionth at W o o dland would have no perma nent impairment, which te nds to show that the accident did not cause any future pa in or perma nent impairment. Ther e is no other expert test i m o n y t o s u pport this element of da mag es. Ther efor e, the jury ’s awa rd of $8,000 f

or future pa in and suffe ring , future loss of e njoy ment of life, a nd perma nent injury must be vacated.

I n s um, we c on c lud e that the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in fa ili ng to re mit the jury ’s da ma g e a wa

rdfo r p a st medical car e or service s, miscellaneous expenses, and prope rty damag e, and in f

ailing to va cate the jury ’s awa

rd for future me dical ca

re or ser vices, futur e pain a nd suffe ring , future loss of e njoy ment of life a nd perma nent injury

. T h e re m ai n i n g portions of the jury verdic t were not challeng ed on appea l and, there fore , are aff irmed.

The de cision of the trial c ourt is affir med in part and reve rsed in pa rt, as set forth above, and the

cause is remande d for the trial court to enter a judgment modify ing the jury verdic t to conform to the evidenc e at trial
, co n s i s t en t with this Opini on. Costs on appeal ar e to be taxed to the Appellee Be rnice Walton W oodland, for w hich execution may issue, if nec essary

.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE