UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ISAAC EZELL JONES, a/k/a Ike,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (3:14-cr-00667-JFA-4)

Submitted: December 20, 2016 Decided: January 9, 2017

Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leslie T. Sarji, SARJI LAW FIRM, LLC, Charleston, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. John David Rowell, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Isaac Ezell Jones pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 

to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and 280 grams or more 

of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The 

district court imposed a variant sentence of 95 months’ 

imprisonment. On appeal, Jones’ counsel filed a brief pursuant 

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court made several errors in calculating Jones’ 

Sentencing Guidelines range. 

Following our review of the record, we ordered merits

briefing, directing the parties to address whether the district 

court committed plain error in imposing a Guidelines enhancement 

for possession of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1). The Government now 

moves to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appellate waiver 

provision in Jones’ plea agreement. Jones opposes the motion. 

For the reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion 

and dismiss the appeal.

We review de novo the issue of whether a defendant validly 

waived his right to appeal. United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 

522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013). Where, as here, the Government seeks 

to enforce the appeal waiver and has not breached the plea 
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agreement, we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the 

issue being appealed falls within the waiver’s scope. United 

States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).

A defendant’s waiver of appellate rights is valid if he 

entered it “knowingly and intelligently.” United States v. 

Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010). Generally, if the 

district court fully questions a defendant regarding the waiver 

provision during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is 

valid and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 

151 (4th Cir. 2005). 

In his plea agreement, Jones waived his right to appeal 

both his conviction and sentence, reserving only his right to 

raise certain postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The language of the 

waiver is clear and unambiguous, and our review of the record 

reveals that Jones understood its full significance. We 

therefore conclude that Jones’ waiver is valid and enforceable.

Even “a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not 

subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the 

district court.” United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th 

Cir. 1992). Thus, we will refuse to enforce a valid waiver to 

preclude review of “a few narrowly-construed errors” that fall 

automatically outside the scope of the waiver. Johnson, 410 

F.3d at 151. This “narrow class of claims” includes “errors 
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that the defendant could not have reasonably contemplated when 

the plea agreement was executed.” United States v. Poindexter, 

492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]he type of ‘illegal’ sentence which a defendant 

can successfully challenge despite an appeal waiver involves 

fundamental issues, including claims that a district court 

exceeded its authority, premised its sentence on a 

constitutionally impermissible factor such as race, or violated 

the post-plea right to counsel.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 530 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United 

States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537-40 (4th Cir. 2012)

(discussing narrow class of unwaivable sentencing claims).

Jones attempts to characterize his appellate argument as a 

due process challenge that falls within the narrow class of 

unwaivable sentencing claims. However, his merits brief readily 

belies this argument. Our review of Jones’ submissions leads us

to conclude that Jones’ challenge to the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

enhancement amounts to a garden-variety claim of procedural 

sentencing error falling squarely within the waiver’s broad 

compass.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no potentially meritorious 

issues that fall outside the scope of the appeal waiver. We 
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therefore grant the Government’s motion and dismiss Jones’ 

appeal. 

This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, 

of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States 

for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Jones.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED