UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-4271

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARY ELIZABETH BELLAMY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (2:02-cr-00138)

Submitted: June 22, 2007 Decided: July 13, 2007

Before TRAXLER, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Gretchen L. Taylor,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Norfolk, Virginia, for

Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Alan M.

Salsbury, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Mary Elizabeth Bellamy pled guilty to health care fraud,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000), and was sentenced to

thirteen months of imprisonment and three years of supervised

release. The district court revoked her supervised release based

upon her failure to provide copies of her bank statements, as

directed by the probation officer, and her failure to file complete

and truthful monthly reports. The district court sentenced her to

one day of imprisonment to be followed by thirty-five months and

twenty-nine days of supervised release. Bellamy appeals, and we

affirm.

Bellamy first contends that the district court erred by

revoking her supervised release. We review the district court’s

revocation of supervised release for an abuse of discretion.

United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). The

district court need only find a violation of a condition of

supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3583(e)(3) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). This court reviews for

clear error factual determinations underlying the conclusion that

a violation occurred. United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017,

1019 (8th Cir. 2003).

Our review of the record convinces us that, even if the

district court erred by concluding that Bellamy failed to report a

joint bank account with her daughter, revocation of her supervised
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release was nevertheless proper. The probation officer instructed

Bellamy to file copies of her bank statements when she filed her

monthly reports, which she failed to do. Although Bellamy

testified at the revocation hearing that she had computer problems,

sent the probation officer a note informing him of the problems,

and assumed from the probation officer’s silence that she did not

have to continue to file her bank statements, the district court

rejected her testimony. See United States v. Whalen, 82 F.3d 528,

532 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding district court’s credibility

determinations concerning evidence presented at a supervised

release revocation hearing not reviewable on appeal). We therefore

find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

revoking her supervised release based upon her failure to submit

her bank statements, as directed by the probation officer.

Next, Bellamy asserts that her sentence is plainly

unreasonable because the imposition of an additional term of

supervised release is unduly harsh. This court will affirm a

sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is

within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly

unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40

(4th Cir. 2006) (discussing standard), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.

1813 (2007). We find that the district court did not err in

imposing a new term of supervised release. See Johnson v. United

States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 (2000) (holding that § 3583(e)(3)
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authorizes district court to impose period of supervised release

following reimprisonment after revocation of supervised release).

The new term of supervised release did “not exceed the term of

supervised release authorized by statute for the [original] offense

. . . , less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon

revocation of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(h) (West

2000 & Supp. 2007). Thus, the sentence is not plainly

unreasonable.

Finally, Bellamy contends that she has been improperly

prohibited, as a special condition of supervised release, from

furnishing paid or volunteer services to the disabled or to any

other discrete group. Because Bellamy did not object to the

imposition of this special condition in the district court, our

review is for plain error. See United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d

864, 866 (8th Cir. 2007) (providing standard of review); see also

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36 (1993) (discussing

standard). Although a sentencing court must impose various

statutorily required conditions of release, see 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3583(d) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), it also enjoys substantial

latitude to “impose any other condition it considers to be

appropriate, as long as that condition is ‘reasonably related’ to

statutory factors referred to in § 3583(d)(1).” United States v.

Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting § 3583(d)(1)).

Such factors include “the nature and circumstances of the offense
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and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3553(a)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Additionally, a special

condition must “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary” to achieve its intended purpose. 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3583(d)(2). We have reviewed the record on appeal in light of

these standards and conclude that Bellamy has failed to demonstrate

that the district court plainly erred in imposing this special

condition of supervised release. See United States v. Carlson, 406

F.3d 529, 532 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding special condition

prohibiting work in medical field where defendant was employed as

orthopedic physician’s assistant and was convicted of health care

fraud because he fraudulently obtained prescription medications).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation

order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED