MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2017 ME	6

Docket: Wal-16-133

Argued: December	15,	2016

Decided: January	12,	2017

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HJELM,	and HUMPHREY,	JJ.

HOLLIE	A.	BEAL

v.

TOWN	OF	STOCKTON	SPRINGS

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]	 Hollie	 A.	 Beal appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 the	 Superior	 Court	

(Waldo	 County,	 R.	 Murray,	 J.)	 affirming	 a	 decision	 by	 the	 Town	 of	 Stockton	

Springs’s	Board	of	Selectman	(the	Board)	determining	that	a	structure	owned	

by	Beal	was	a	 dangerous	 building	 or	 nuisance	 pursuant	 to	17	M.R.S.	 §	 2851	

(2016).		Beal	contends	that	(i)	the	Board	violated	her due	process	rights	when	

the	Board allegedly	denied	Beal	the	opportunity	to	be	heard,	to	cross-examine	

witnesses,	and	to	have	an	impartial	fact-finder, and	(ii) there	was	insufficient	

evidence	 in	 the	 record	 to	 support	 the	 Board’s	 findings.	 We	 affirm	 the	

judgment.
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I.		CASE	HISTORY

[¶2]		Beal	acquired	property	located	at	65	Sandy	Point Road in Stockton	

Springs in	 2004.	 The	 556-square-foot	 building	 was	 originally	 built	 around	

1900	as	a	grain	storage	shed	but	was	more	recently used	as	a	residence.	 In	

June	 2014,	 the	 Town’s Code	 Enforcement	 Officer	 (CEO)	 made	 a	 site	 visit	 to	

Beal’s	 residence after	 receiving	 a	 complaint about	 the condition of	 the	

property.	 After	the	July	17,	2014, Board	meeting,	when	Beal	and	her	attorney	

met	with	the	Board	to	discuss concerns	about	the	habitability	of	her	property

raised	 by	 the	 CEO’s	 site	 visit,	Beal agreed	 to present	a	 rehabilitation	 plan	 to	

the	Board	within	thirty	days.	

[¶3]	 	 About	 a	 month	 later,	 Beal	 notified	 the	 CEO that	 a general	

contractor	 had	 assessed her property, and she submitted	 a	 one-page	

rehabilitation	 plan.	 On	August	 20,	 the	 CEO	informed	Beal	that	the plan	was	

inadequate because	 it	 lacked a	 complete	 list	 of	 items	 needing	 repair	 and	 a	

time	 frame for	 completion.	 The	 CEO	 further	 informed	 Beal	 that	 the	 Board	

anticipated	 that	 the	 parties	 would	 enter	 a	 consent	 agreement	 at	 the	

September	4	meeting.	 Because	Beal	did	not attend	the	September	4	meeting,	

the	Board	did	not	take	any	action	regarding Beal’s	property.	 The	matter	was	

discussed by	 two	 members	 of	 the	 Board. One	 of	 the	 Board	 members	
3

indicated,	during	the	conversation, that	he	believed	that	the	structure	should	

be	 condemned.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 September,	 the	 Board set	 a	 public	 hearing	 to	

determine	whether	the	structure	constituted	a	dangerous	building	within	the	

meaning	of	17 M.R.S.	§ 2851.

[¶4]	 Just	 before	 the	 start	 of	 the	 November	 20,	 2014, hearing, Beal	

requested	that	the	three	members	of	the	Board	recuse	themselves	based	upon	

her concern	 that	they had	 already	 prejudged	 the	 case.	 The	Board	members	

expressly	stated	on	the	record	that	they	had	not	already	decided	the	issue	and	

would	 base	 their	 decision	 on the	 evidence	 presented	 at	 the	 hearing.	

Accordingly,	each	member	of	the	Board	declined	to	recuse from	participating	

in	the	hearing and	subsequent	decision-making.		

[¶5]		The	Board	proceeded	with	the	public	hearing	and	heard testimony	

from	 the	 CEO,	 Beal’s	 general	 contractor,	 and	 Beal.	 The	 CEO presented	

photographs	and testified	about	numerous deficiencies	and	hazards regarding	

the	 plumbing,	 chimney,	 roof,	 and	 structural	 supports.	 Beal’s general	

contractor testified	that,	although	the	building	needed	many	repairs,	the	only	

safety	 hazard	 in	 the	 building	 was	 a	 support	 issue	 that	 recently	 had	 been	

corrected.	
4

[¶6]		The Board	asked	witnesses questions that	were	submitted,	but	did	

not	allow	Beal’s	counsel to	question	any	 of	 the	witnesses	by	either	direct	 or	

cross	 examination. The	 chair	 invited	 Beal’s	 attorney	 to	 submit	 written	

questions	 that	 the	 Board	 would	 then	 pose	 to	 the	 witness. The	 Board	 also

allowed	 Beal’s	 counsel to	 present	 a	 summation	 argument. Beal’s	 counsel

formally	objected	to	the	hearing	procedure.	 At	the	conclusion	of	the	hearing,	

the	 Board	 members	 voted	 unanimously	 that	 the	 structure	 was	 a	 dangerous	

building,	and	requested	that	the	town	manager	and	CEO draft	written	findings	

of	fact	to	be	presented	at	its upcoming	meeting.

[¶7]	 	 During	 an	 executive	 session held on	 December	 15,	 the	 Board	

consulted	 with	 the	 Town’s	 attorney	 to	 discuss the	 focus	 of	 a	 dangerous	

building	 hearing,	 the	 process	 for	 obtaining	 an	 administrative	 site	inspection	

warrant,	and	the	Board’s	ability	to	reopen	the	hearing.	 At	its next	meeting,	the	

Board	 voted	 to	 reopen the	 public	 hearing, “for	 the	 purpose	 of	 allowing	

additional	testimony	to	be	presented	to	ensure	all	areas	of	the	definition	of	a	

dangerous	 building	 have	 been	 thoroughly	 explored.”	 It	 scheduled	 the	

reopened	hearing	for January	15,	2015.		

[¶8]	 	At	 the January	 15 hearing,	 the	Board	heard	additional	testimony	

from	 the	 CEO regarding	 his	 concerns	 about	 the	 structural	 integrity	 of	 the	
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building.		He	explained	that	the	building	has	rotted	sills	and	a	chimney	in	very	

poor	condition,	and	 that	his	ability	 to	give	a	more	 thorough	report	had	been	

stymied	by	Beal’s	refusal	to	allow	him	“access	to	the	interior	of	the	structure,	

specifically	the	basement	or	the	lower	level.”	 The	Town’s	attorney	questioned	

the	CEO	about	several	aspects	of	his	testimony.	

[¶9]	 Beal	 attended	 the	 reopened	 hearing,	 but,	 although	 offered	 the	

opportunity,	affirmatively declined	 to	present	any	 further	information	 to	 the	

Board.	 Beal’s	counsel	was	absent	 from	the	hearing.	 At	the	conclusion	of	the	

hearing,	the	Board	affirmed	its November	20	decision	declaring	 the	building	

hazardous.	 In	 addition,	it continued the	 hearing with	 regard	 to	 the	issue	 of	

disposition,	 and	 ordered	the	 CEO	to	 apply	 for	 an	 administrative	 warrant	to

inspect	the	interior	of	the	structure.	

[¶10]	 	 On	 April	 16,	 2015,	 after	 the	 administrative	 warrant	 had	 been	

issued	 and	 executed,	 the	 Board	 resumed the	 public	 hearing	 and	 heard	

extensive	 testimony	 from	 the	 CEO	 regarding	 the	 interior	 condition	 of	 the	

structure.	 Beal attended	 the	hearing,	presented	evidence,	and	was	provided

an	 opportunity	 to	 question	 the	 CEO	 and	 dispute	 his	 observations. Again,	

Beal’s	 counsel was	 absent	 from	 the	 proceeding.	 At	 the	 close	 of	 the	 hearing,	
6

the	 Board	 unanimously	 concluded	 that	 the	 structure	 was	 a	 dangerous	

building.

[¶11]		In	May 2015,	the	Board	issued	a	written	order	in	which	it	found	

that the	 following	 deficiencies	 collectively	 made	 the	 structure	 unsafe,	

unstable,	 unsanitary,	 and	 a	 fire	 hazard:	 rotted	 sills	 that	 caused	 a	 deck	 to	

collapse,	a	chimney	with	deteriorated	mortar	and	no	flue	liner,	a	sagging	roof	

caused	by	an	improper	foundation	and	cracked	roof	joists,	floor	joists	that	did

not	properly	rest	on	a	carrying	beam,	exposed	wiring	and	electric	wires, and	

unsanitary	and	improperly	installed	plumbing. In	the	“disposition” portion	of	

the	order,	the	Board	included	requirements	that	Beal	have	a	licensed	plumber	

and	a	licensed	electrician	 bring	 the	 building	 up	 to	 code,	and	 required	 her	 to	

“repair	and/or	replace	all	structural	members”	by	August	26,	2015.

[¶12]	 Beal filed	 a	 complaint	 for	 review	 of	 government	 action	 in the	

Superior	 Court.	 	 See	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80B;	 17	 M.R.S.	 §	 2852 (2016). The	 court	

affirmed	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 Board	 in	 a	 written	 order	 dated	 March	 3,	 2016.	

Beal	 timely	 appealed	 to	 this	 Court. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 80B(n);	 M.R.	 App.	 P.	

2(b)(3).
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II.		LEGAL	ANALYSIS

A. Standard	of	Review

[¶13]		Our review	of	administrative decision-making	is	deferential	and	

limited.	 	 Friends	 of	 Lincoln	 Lakes	 v.	 Bd.	 of	 Envtl.	 Prot.,	 2010	 ME	 18,	 ¶	 12,	

989 A.2d	 1128.	 	 “When	 the	 Superior	 Court	 acts	 in	 an	 appellate	 capacity	 we	

review directly	a	local	agency’s	decision	for	abuse	of	discretion,	errors	of	law,	

and	 findings	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 evidence.”	 	 Duffy	 v.	 Town	 of	 Berwick,	

2013 ME 105,	 ¶	 13,	 82	 A.3d	 148.	 The	 party	 challenging	 a	 Board’s	 decision

bears	the	burden	of	persuasion	on	appeal.		Id.

B. Due	Process

[¶14]	 	 Beal	 contends	 that	 the	 Board	 violated	 her	 due	 process	 rights	

when,	 at	 the	 November	 2014	 hearing, the	 Board allegedly	 denied	 her	 the	

opportunity	 to	present	evidence,	 to	cross-examine	witnesses,	and	 to	have	an	

impartial	fact-finder.1

[¶15]	 	The	 due	 process	 clauses	 of	 the	Maine	and	 federal	 Constitutions	

guarantee	 due	 process	 before	a	government	entity deprives	any	 person of	a	

property	 right.	 	 Kirkpatrick	 v.	 City	 of	 Bangor,	 1999	 ME	 73,	 ¶	 13,	 728	 A.2d	

 1		Beal	urges	us	to	confine	our	review	on	appeal	to	the	November	20,	2014,	hearing	because	the	

Board	did	not	rescind	its	original	decision	when	it	conducted	the	subsequent	hearings.	 We	are	not	

persuaded	by	 this	argument.		Beal	appealed	 from	 the	final	May	2015	decision	 that	 followed	 three	

days	of	hearings—not	from	the	preliminary	November	2014	decision.
8

1268;	see also U.S.	Const.	amend.	XIV,	§	1;	Me.	Const.	art.	I,	§	6-A.		Due	process	

will	“vary	from	case	to	case	.	.	.	to	assure	the	basic	fairness	of	each	particular	

action	 according	 to	 its	 circumstances.”	 	 Kirkpatrick,	 1999	 ME	 73,	 ¶	 13,	

728 A.2d	 1268.	 	 We must analyze three	 distinct	 factors	 when	 assessing	

whether	an	individual’s	due	process	rights	have	been	violated:		

first,	the	private	interest	that	will	be	affected	by	the	official	action;	

second,	 the	 risk	 of	 an	 erroneous	 deprivation	 of	 such	 interest	

through	 procedures	 used,	 and	 the	 probable	 value,	 if	 any,	 of	

additional	 or	 substitute	 procedural	 safeguards;	 and	 finally,	 the	

Government’s	 interest,	 including	 the	 function	 involved	 and	 the	

fiscal	and	administrative	burdens	that	the	additional	or	substitute	

procedural	requirement	would	entail.

Mathews	v.	Eldridge,	424	U.S.	319,	335	(1976);	In	re	M.P.,	2015	ME	138,	¶	31,	

126	A.3d	718;	Hale	v.	Petit,	438	A.2d	226,	231-32 (Me.	1981).		

[¶16]	 	There	is	 no	 dispute	 that	 declaring	 Beal’s	 property	 a	 dangerous	

building	affects	an	important	private	property	interest	or	 that	 the	Town	has	

an	interest	in limiting	use	of	or eliminating	dangerous	buildings.		See Mathews,	

424	U.S.	at	335.		The	only issue	here	is	whether	Beal	was	afforded	the	process	

she	was	due,	including	“notice	 of	 the	issues,	an	 opportunity	 to	be	heard,	 the	

right	 to	 introduce	 evidence	 and	 present	 witnesses,	 the	 right	 to	 respond	 to	

claims	 and	 evidence,	 and	 an	 impartial	 fact-finder.”	 Jusseaume	 v.	 Ducatt,	

2011 ME	43,	¶	12,	15 A.3d 714.		
9

[¶17]	 	 Although	 the	 Board	 prohibited	 cross-examination	 of any	

witnesses at	 the	 November	 hearing,	 after	 consultation with	 the	 Town’s	

attorney	 the	Board reopened	 the	evidence	and	 rescinded	 this	 restriction	 for	

the	remaining	hearings.	 In	addition,	even	at	the	November	hearing,	Beal had	

an	 opportunity	to	 respond	 to	 evidence	 presented	 against	 her,	 in	 two	 ways.

First,	 Beal	 could—and	 did—present	 rebuttal	 testimony	 to	 refute	 the	 CEO’s	

claims. Second,	the	Board allowed	the	submission	of	written	questions	which	

could	 then	 be	 asked	 by	 the	 Board and the	 presentation	 of a	 summation	

argument.

[¶18]	 	 During	 the	 January	 and	 April	 hearings,	 when	 Beal	 could	 have	

directly	 questioned witnesses,	 she	 declined	 to	 do	 so,	 and	 Beal	 has	 not	

explained	how	she	was	prejudiced	or	what	additional	information	she	might	

have	 developed	 from	 cross-examining the	 CEO	 at	 the	 November	 hearing.		

See Hale,	 438	 A.2d	 at	 231-32	 (lack	 of	 opportunity	 for	 cross-examination	 not	

deprivation	 of	 due	 process	 when	 applicant had	 opportunity	 to	 support	 its	

proposal,	 criticize	 competing	 application,	 and	 comment	 on	 criticism	 of	 its	

proposal). On	 this	 record,	 we	 see no	 reason	 to	 disturb	 forty	 years	 of	

precedent	 that does	 not	 require that	 boards	 provide	 the	 opportunity for

cross-examination at	 every	 local administrative	 hearing.	 	 See In re Me.	 Clean	
10

Fuels,	Inc.,	310	A.2d	736,	745-48	(Me.	1973) (the	due	process	right	to	respond	

to	 opposing	 evidence	 does	 not	 include	 cross-examination	 of	 opposing	

witnesses	in	an	administrative	hearing).

[¶19]		Persons	who	come	before	an	administrative	board	are	entitled	to	

a	 fair	 and	 unbiased	 hearing.	 	 Fitanides	 v.	 City	 of	 Saco,	 2015	 ME	 32,	 ¶	 22,	

113 A.3d	 1088; Gorham	 v. Town	 of Cape	 Elizabeth,	 625	 A.2d	 898,	 902	

(Me. 1993).	 	 An	 administrative	 hearing	 officer	 “enjoys	 a	 presumption of	

honesty	and	integrity,	which	is	only	rebutted	by	a	showing	of	some	substantial	

countervailing	reason	to	conclude	that	a	decisionmaker	is	actually	biased	with	

respect	 to	 factual	 issues	 being	 adjudicated.”	 	Mr.	 &	 Mrs.	 V.	 v.	 York	 Sch.	 Dist.,	

434 F.	Supp.	2d	5,	12-13	(D.	Me.	2006).

[¶20]		Because	Beal	did	not	move	for	a	trial	of	the	facts,	we	must	confine	

our	examination	of	her	bias	claim	to	the	existing	record.		See	Baker’s	Table,	Inc.	

v.	 City	 of	 Portland,	 2000 ME	 7,	 ¶	 9,	 743	 A.2d	 237	 (stating	 that	 a	 party	 may	

move	for	a	trial	of	the	facts	pursuant	to	M.R.	Civ.	P.	80B(d)	to	supplement	the	

record	on	issues	such	as	bias,	to	the	extent	necessary	to	the	appeal).

[¶21]		To	support	her	claim	of	bias,	Beal	relies	on a	letter	sent	to	her	by	

the	CEO	on	August	20,	2014, in	which	he	states	that “[he]	and	the	Selectboard	

agreed	 that	 a	 complete	 list	 of	 items	 that	 need	 remediation	 .	 .	 .	 shall	 be	
11

required”	prior	to	the	signing	of	the	consent	agreement	between	Beal	and	the	

Town	on	September	4,	2014.	 In	addition,	Beal	relies	on	statements	made	at	

the	 September	 4	 public	 meeting	 by members	 of	 the	 Board	 who	 were	

responding to	 a	 citizen’s	 question	 about	Beal’s	 property.	 	All	 the	 statements	

were	made	prior	to	the	initiation	of	the	dangerous	building	proceedings.

[¶22]	 	 The statement made	 by	 the	 CEO,	 who	 is	 not	 a	 member	 of	 the	

Board,	does not	demonstrate	denial	of	due	process.		See	Gorham,	625 A.2d at	

902.	 	 The	 statements	 made	 by the	 Board	 members	 must	 be	 considered	 in	

context.	 	Although	 one	member	 of	 the	Board	 stated	 that	 he	 thought	 that	 the	

house	“should	 be	 condemned,” he	 and	 the	 other	 Board	 member	 also	 stated

several	times that	there	is	a	process	that	must	be	followed,	that	the	property	

owner	has	rights, and	that	the	Board	has	an	obligation	to	do	things	correctly.	

[¶23]		At	the	time	that	those	statements	were	made,	the Board—acting	

in	 its	 executive/administrative capacity—was	 anticipating	 an	 informal	

resolution	of	 the	matter. It	was	not	until	several	weeks	later	 that	 the	Board	

decided to	proceed	with	a	 formal	hearing. When	Beal	presented	her	motion	

for	 recusal,	 the	 Board members—now	 acting	 in	 an adjudicatory	 capacity—

affirmatively	 stated on	 the	 record that	they	had	 not	 prejudged	 the	 case	 and	

that	 their	 decision	 would be	 based	 upon	 the	 testimony	 and	 evidence	
12

presented	at	the	hearings. The Board	members	listened	and	asked	questions	

over	 the	 course	 of	 several	 months before	 rendering	 their final	 decision.		

See Lane	 Constr.	 Corp.	 v.	 Town	 of	 Wash.,	 2008 ME 45,	 ¶ 30,	 942 A.2d	 1202;	

Gorham,	625	A.2d	at 902-03.		Beal	has	not rebutted the	presumption	that	the	

Board	members	acted	with	honesty	and	integrity	when	they	ceased	informal	

negotiations and	instead	conducted	the formal	hearing.		

[¶24]	 	On	 her	 appeal,	Beal has	 not	 demonstrated	 that	 she	was	 denied	

due	 process	 or	 that	 she	 was	 subjected	 to	 a	 decision	 by	 a	 biased	 decisionmaker.

C. Substantial	Evidence

[¶25]	 	 Beal	 contends	 that	 the	 Board’s	 decision	 was	 not	 supported	 by	

substantial	evidence	in	the	record.	 Beal	argues	that	the building’s deficiencies	

do	 not	 meet	 the	 statutory	 definition	 of	 dangerous	 building,	 and	 the	 Town	

failed	to	meet	its	burden.		

[¶26]		“Substantial	evidence exists	when	a	reasonable	mind	would	rely	

on	 that	 evidence	 as	 sufficient	 support	 for	 a	 conclusion.”	 	 Osprey

Family Trust v. Town	 of	 Owls	 Head,	 2016 ME 89,	 ¶	 9,	 141	 A.3d	 1114.	 	 When	

reviewing	 administrative	 findings	 of	 fact,	 we “examine	 the	 entire	 record	 to	

determine	whether,	on	the	basis	of all	the	testimony	and	exhibits	before	it,	the	
13

[Board]	could	fairly	and	reasonably	find	the	facts	as	it	did.”		Friends	of	Lincoln	

Lakes,	 2010	ME	 18,	¶	 13,	 989	A.2d	 1128.	 	We must	affirm	 findings	 of	 fact	if	

they	 are	 supported	 by	 any	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	 record	 “even	 if	 the	

record	 contains	 inconsistent	 evidence	 or	 evidence	 contrary	 to	 the	 result	

reached	by	the	[Board].”		Id. ¶¶	13-14.

[¶27]		Here,	the CEO	provided	detailed	testimony	about	the	interior	and	

exterior	 conditions of	 the	 house—including	 major structural	 deficiencies,	

plumbing	issues,	and	fire	hazards—and	presented	photographs	to	support	his	

observations.	 Although Beal	 provided	 some	 testimony	 to	 the	 contrary,	 the	

Board	 was	 not	 obligated	 to	 accept	 it.	 	 Therefore,	 there	 was	 substantial	

evidence	 on	 the	 record	 to	 support	 the	 Board’s	 findings	 of	 fact	 and	 ultimate	

determination	 that	 Beal’s	 property	 constituted	 a	 dangerous	 building	 within	

the	meaning	of	17	M.R.S.	§ 2851.

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.
14

Aaron	 Fethke,	 Esq.	 (orally),	 Law	 Office	 of	 Aaron	 Fethke,	 Searsport,	 for	

appellant	Hollie	A.	Beal

Erik	M.	Stumpfel,	Esq.	 (orally),	Rudman	Winchell,	Bangor,	 for	appellee	Town	

of	Stockton	Springs

Waldo	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	AP-2015-5

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY