No. 83-298 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

IN THE MATTER OF 

C.S., a Youth. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Fergus, 

The Honorable Peter Rapkoch, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Thomas Meissner argued, Lewistown, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Eon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Jim Scheier argued, Asst. Atty. General, Helena 

John Paulson, Deputy County Attorney, Lewistown, 

Montana 

Submitted: February 29, 1934 

Decided: May 24, 1984 

Filed: 

I ' '984 

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Clerk 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

This case arose out of a series of incidents which led 

to appellant being adjudged a delinquent youth. From an 

order of commitment placing her in the custody of the 

Montana Department of Institutions, this appeal is taken. 

On March 31, 1983, the Fergus County Attorney filed a 

petition for a Youth Hearing in the District Court of the 

Tenth Judicial District of the State of Montana, requesting 

that appellant be adjudged a delinquent youth. At the time, 

she was fifteen years of age. The petition alleged that 

during the month of March, 1983, appellant committed the 

offense of violation of privacy in communication, a 

misdemeanor as provided in Section 45-8-213, MCA. The facts 

underlying the offense were that on three separate 

occasions, appellant and several minor friends made numerous 

telephone calls to a Lewistown, Montana residence. The 

purpose and effect of these calls was to harrass a woman 

living there. On April 6, 1983, an evidentiary hearing was 

held, at which the District Court found the allegations of 

the petition to be true. 

The dispositional hearing was held on April 13, 1983, 

and appellant was ordered committed to the Department of 

Institutions until she reaches the age of twenty-one, unless 

the Department deems an earlier release appropriate. She 

was placed in the Mountain View School for Girls in Helena. 

A notice of appeal was filed with this Court on May 17, 

1983, however, jurisdiction was returned to the District 

Court to allow entry of findings. After the findings were 

properly entered, this Court resumed jurisdiction for the 
purpose of this appeal. 

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether appellant's 

constitutional right to equal protection has been denied 

because her term of commitment is potentially longer than 

the maximum sentence which could have been imposed had the 

same offense been committed by an adult. The maximum amount 

of time appellant could spend in the custody of the 

Department of Institutions is six years, which is much more 

than the maximum sentence for adults who have committed the 

offense of violation of privacy in communications. Section 

45-8-213, MCA, provides for a fine of $500 or imprisonment 

of up to six months or both had the same offense been 

prosecuted in a criminal action. 

The initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis 

is whether the identified groups or classes are similarly 

situated with respect to the challenged statute, ruling or 

governmental action. Montana Land Title Association v. 

First American Title (1975), 167 Mont. 471, 539 P.2d 711. 

We find that adults and minors are not similarly situated 

with respect to Montana's sentencing laws for three reasons. 

First, as the State points out, appellant was not 

convicted of a crime but committed after being found a 

delinquent youth under Section 41-5-403, MCA. While it is 

true that both commitment and sentencing are deprivations of 

physical liberty, the cause and desired result of each is 

different. A sentence of imprisonment following a criminal 

conviction is imposed because a particular crime was 

committed, and its purpose is both retributional and 

rehabilitational. Though a juvenile commitment is usually 

triggered by a crime, the commitment is strictly for 
rehabilitation, not retribution. The purpose of the Youth 

Court Act is to, ". . . [Plrovide for the care, protection, 

and wholesome mental and physical development," of youths 

falling under its jurisdiction, and ". . . [T]o remove from 

youth committing violations of the law the element of 

retribution and to substitute therefore a program of 

supervision, care [and] rehabilitation. . . " Section 

41-5-102, MCA. There is more than an artificial distinction 

between commitment under the Youth Court Act and sentencing 

under the Montana Criminal Code. Thus an adult sentenced 

for a crime and a juvenile committed to the youth 

authorities are not similarly situated with respect to the 

purpose of their detention. 

Second, the physical liberty interests of minors and 

adults are qualitatively different. The liberty interest of 

a minor is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, to 

an extent not permissible with adults. Planned Parenthood 

of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976), 428 U.S. 52, 96 

S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 and Carey v. Population Services 

International (1977) 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 

675. Danforth, Carey and the cases cited therein make it 

clear that, contrary to appellant's claim, the doctrine of 

parens patriae is very viable today. 

Finally, we have examined those cases cited from other 

jurisdictions which have addressed this question, and found 

persuasive those which concluded that adults and juveniles 

are not similarly situated in these circumstances. cf. In 

Re Eric J. (Cal. 1980), 601 P.2d 549. Those cases have 

relied on the reasoning outlined above in upholding 

commitments similar to appellant's here. Though each 
state's juvenile corrections act is arguably different, the 

purpose of each is the same; to provide a mechanism through 

which the state can act as the parens patriae of its youth. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: 

Chief Justic'e \