An-Najaf U.S. Marines in Battle

AUGUST 2004
Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

)e Fight for An-Najaf in Context

Re city of an-Najaf, Iraq, is a provincial and market center located on the western branch of the Euphrates River approximately

100 miles south of Baghdad. Its population (prewar) of 563,000 expands at times with pilgrims to this important center of Islamic

scholarship and theology. It is the location of several signiUcant shrines for Shi’a Muslims and boasts one of the largest cemeteries in

the world. Its more recent history has been marked by conVict of a political nature as the place of exile for Ayatollah Khomeini and

site of the assassination of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq. It served as the location of Shi’a resistance to perceived political oppression

and was a place of battle once more in 2004.

Ris is a “battle study” written purposely from the perspective of the Marines, soldiers, and sailors who fought at an-Najaf in

August 2004. Some context is needed to Ut these events within the evolution of the campaigning in Iraq in 2004. Re Americans

deployed to al-Anbar and an-Najaf Provinces, faced a variety of threats as Iraq attempted to again govern itself. Rreats were from

disparate sources, including Sunni Ughters in Fallujah and Shi’a Ughters in Najaf. Behind each was the possibility of al-Qaeda in Iraq

or criminal exploitation of any disruption of Coalition eSorts to establish responsible Iraqi Government. Ris complexity of threats

did not lend itself to easy solutions. In March 2004, Lieutenant General James T. Conway’s I Marine Expeditionary Force was faced

with an outbreak of Sunni insurgency in Fallujah. At the same time, a Shi’a uprising took place across Iraq, including Baghdad, Najaf,

an-Nasiriyah, al-Kut, al-Amarah, and Kirkuk. Re Ughting spread to Karbala, Hillah, and Basrah with attacks on Iraqi and Coalition

outposts. Ris Ughting dropped oS in June with the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government of Prime Minister Ayad Allawi,

but the menace of further violence remained.

Re Multi-National Force-Iraq, under General George W. Casey Jr., USA, felt that before the Iraqis could be responsible for security

in each province, the centers of violence had to be dealt with by a “clear-hold-build” approach. Baghdad, Fallujah, and Najaf were thus

targeted. When Muqtada al-Sadr fomented another uprising in August, the recently arrived 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit found

itself assigned to quell the uprising in Najaf. It would be reinforced for this eSort by two U.S. Army and four Iraqi Army battalions.

Re narrative that follows documents this eSort from the small-unit level. Re importance of the close relationship between political

and military force is emphasized. Re intent is to provide a view of combat for the education and training of Marines who might face

similar circumstances.

Charles D. Melson

Chief Historian

U.S. Marine Corps History Division
1

Before the Fight

Deployed to Iraq in mid-2004, Lieutenant Colonel

John L. Mayer’s Battalion Landing Team, 1st

Battalion, 4th Marines (BLT 1/4) expected a

relatively familiar mission as operational reserve in the

Baghdad region. Instead, it walked into the path of a

raging storm, resulting in one of the most intense battles

the Marine Corps had seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In the city of an-Najaf, the battalion engaged a fanatical

enemy in a place where “it rained shrapnel,” and machine

gun, small arms, and rocket-propelled grenade Ure

reached intensities unknown to already battle-tested

Marines.1 Temperatures soared past 125 degrees

Fahrenheit in compressed and confusing city blocks. Re

special operations capable 11th Marine Expeditionary

Unit (11th MEU), of which BLT 1/4 was the ground

combat element, operated in a tightly restrictive

supporting arms environment reminiscent of Vietnam at

its height—and it cost Marine lives.

Even before they departed, the Marines of Colonel

Anthony M. Haslam’s 11th MEU did not expect an easy

deployment. Re command element anticipated tense

periods of combat as inevitable no matter what the

mission. But the violence that followed came more

quickly than even the most foresighted expected.2 Re

Marines always stood ready to Ught, but confrontation

developed so rapidly, and later so explosively, that 11th

MEU commanders found the need to expedite and adjust

their plans.

Re Urst adjustment came as the expeditionary unit

found its mission changed just days out of port from

Kuwait. Originally slated as operational reserve for the

Baghdad area, theater commanders recognized that the

11th MEU did not possess the necessary manpower

required to support the anticipated violence and

instability in the capital city following the transfer of

authority from the coalition leadership to that of the Iraqi

interim government. Instead, the theater commanders

assigned the unit a challenging security and stability

operation mission. Re expeditionary unit was to take

control of the southern Iraqi provinces of an-Najaf and

al-Qadisiyah, an area of 16,000 square miles with a

violent recent past that still festered. Colonel Haslam and

his oTcers took the sudden change of mission in stride

and began planning accordingly. Studying intelligence

reports, the 11th MEU staS outlined a comprehensive,

aggressive long-range plan.3

As Lieutenant Colonel Mayer’s battalion landing team

deployed, it faced a situation of growing violence and

complexity that had been building since the Coalition’s

initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. Re defeat of Saddam

Hussein and the subsequent establishment of a

provisional government in early 2004 created an

environment of volatile political instability, particularly

in the Shiite cities of southern Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr, a

charismatic Shiite Muslim cleric, had emerged as a selfproclaimed populist champion of Iraq’s poor and

oppressed. As the defender of the downtrodden, al-Sadr

demonized the occupying American forces as well as

what he considered their puppet Provisional Iraqi

Government. His followers included the Mahdi, an

armed paramilitary force that served as al-Sadr’s private

army and whose members vowed to follow his orders to

the death. Driven by al-Sadr’s inVammatory rhetoric, the

militia initiated a widespread insurrection throughout

much of Iraq on 4 April 2004 when the newly established

Provisional Iraqi Government issued an arrest warrant

for al-Sadr for the murder of an Iraqi judge.

Fighting erupted in several major Shiite-dominated

cities, including Baghdad, Karbala, al-Kut, an-Nasiriyah,

and others, principally south of the capital. Over the next

two months, Coalition forces responded to quell the

uprising, battering the militia in several engagements,

with 1,500 to 2,000 of its members killed in the Ughting.

Re insurrection nearly collapsed, with the remaining

militia Ughters making a last stand at Najaf. But before

the Coalition could completely eliminate the militia, they

negotiated a truce eSective as of 6 June 2004 that

temporarily ended the Ughting and leW al-Sadr unscathed.

Under the truce terms, al-Sadr and his followers were to

uphold a cease-Ure, disarm, and relinquish territory held

by his forces, but the agreement allowed the militia to retain

control of Najaf and al-Kufa, al-Sadr’s home territory, and

restricted access of Coalition forces into either city. With

this reprieve from the Coalition, al-Sadr converted the two

The Battle of An-Najaf

by Francis X. Kozlowski

On the Cover: Marines of Company A, BLT 1/4, strike the militia

occupied Iraqi police station in Kufa near an-Najaf during a raid on

20 August 2004.

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read
cities into his own personal kingdom.4 More importantly,

Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNCI) placed the vast Wadi

al-Salam Cemetery, the Imam Ali Mosque, and the Kufa

Mosque completely oS limits to all Coalition forces. Ris

mandate eSectively created a safe haven into which the

American forces could not enter without permission from

the highest U.S. military authority in Iraq.

Optimism surrounding the truce soon dissipated as alSadr’s militia, using fear and violent oppression, took over

Najaf and Kufa and reinforced control.5 Reasserting their

power came easily for the militia, as many Iraqi soldiers

and policeman had been killed or disappeared during the

two months of Ughting. Re new interim Iraqi government

installed on 30 June struggled to Und a Urm footing in

establishing security in the militia-dominated areas.6

In the Najaf-Kufa area, al-Sadr’s militia demonstrated

better structure and organization than the local

government. Rey exploited this organization as well as

the chaotic political climate to facilitate their oppressive

practices. Militia intimidation included assassination,

kidnapping, and torture of police and government

oTcials. AWer committing these heinous acts, the

militiamen would then retreat into an exclusion area,

where Coalition forces could not pursue them.7 Re

militiamen roamed the streets, set up roadblocks, and

intimidated whomever they pleased. On one occasion, alSadr’s men kidnapped an Iraqi policeman and tortured

him while broadcasting the atrocity over a government

radio frequency.8 Reir abusive actions so disrupted the

peoples’ lives and the local economy that the militiamen

quickly alienated most of Najaf ’s population. Najaf was

largely a tourist destination because of the Imam Ali

Mosque and the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery, but militia

activities frightened away nearly all the tourists. City

residents, particularly businessmen, resented the

militiamen and their actions. A local store owner

admitted that among the residents of Najaf, “90 percent of

the people here hate him [al-Sadr].”9

As Lieutenant Colonel Mayer prepared the Battalion

Landing Team and elements of his headquarters to move

to his new area of operations, the militia weighed heavily

on his decisions. Upon debarkation in Kuwait in early

July, Mayer oversaw the hardening of the battalion

landing team vehicles under contract by the Oshkosh

Corporation of Wisconsin.10 Mayer also considered a

more aggressive patrolling policy and the training of the

Iraqi National Guard units that would be under his

command. Additionally, 11th MEU headquarters guided

the development of a resource and troop distribution plan

at the various established bases in the area.

2 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

A Marine of Company C, BLT 1/4, stares at a poster of Muqtada al-Sadr during a raid on al-Sadr’s house on 12 August 2004.
AWer 10 days of acclimatization in Kuwait and Unal

training, the expeditionary unit deployed in seven vehicle

convoys to the an-Najaf/al-Qadisiyah area. Re Marines

soon observed the area’s volatility as they moved to their

respective bases of operation. Militia Ughters Ured on

several of the convoys, with a few of these incidents

leading to minor engagements that resulted in several

enemy casualties and a number of prisoners. First

Lieutenant Michael J. Borneo, commander of Combined

Antiarmor Team A, recalled how militia Ughters

ambushed his team within 10 minutes aWer it arrived in

the Najaf area. Borneo referred to them simply as a few

“farmers,” and aWer a short UreUght, his team captured

four men who participated in the attack. In the same area,

he reported numerous men carrying riVes and rocketpropelled grenade launchers “all over” the city. Rese

Iraqis exchanged hostile looks and gestures with the

Marines.11 In another incident just south of Najaf,

Captain Stephen A. Kintzley’s reconnaissance platoon

took Ure, dismounted, cleared the house where the

August 2004 3

U.S. Marine Corps Map
shooting came from, and captured three Iraqis. By the

time the Marines arrived at their destination, none

needed to be told that danger lived on the streets they

would soon patrol.

Despite these incidents, the 11th MEU’s movement

went smoothly from debarkation in Kuwait to its forward

operating bases in an-Najaf and al-Qadisiyah Provinces.

Its responsibility of securing more than 35,000 square

kilometers made for a formidable task, both operationally

and logistically. Re expeditionary unit planned to

operate out of four key forward operating bases (FOB)—

Hotel, Duke, Echo, and al-Asad—and several smaller

bases around Najaf. Forward Operating Base Hotel,

located only three kilometers north of Najaf ’s

government, commercial, and religious centers, served as

the landing team’s primary operational base.

Colonel Haslam made the decision that containing the

militia was to be the 11th MEU’s primary operational

focus. While the Marines guarded places like police

stations and the provincial government headquarters,

they had to keep close watch on militia activity,

particularly at the Imam Ali Mosque.12 In addition to the

mosque, the expeditionary unit also closely monitored

the nearby home of al-Sadr and his clerical school, which,

besides his leadership base in the Imam Ali Mosque,

served as a logistical base and militia strongpoint.

Although BLT 1/4 used FOB Hotel as its primary base

of operations, the Marine expeditionary unit’s

commanding oTcer, Colonel Haslam, chose FOB Duke

as his headquarters, approximately 20 kilometers

northwest of Najaf. Duke’s large size and geographic

isolation made it an ideal choice for security,

administration, and logistics storage.13 Re size of the

facility also provided adequate room for the

expeditionary unit’s helicopters—UH-1N Huey, AH-1J

Cobra, and CH-46 Sea Knight—for casualty evacuation,

resupply, and small-unit troop movements between

forward operating bases.

Reater commanders stationed Lieutenant Colonel

Mayer’s Company A at FOB Echo in the city of adDiwaniyah, about 50 kilometers east of FOB Hotel. From

here the “Alpha Raiders,” as they called themselves, led

local security and stability operations in the area. Re

11th MEU also used al-Asad, an enormous Hussein-era

Iraqi airbase west of Baghdad, to house several of the

unit’s air assets. It took three to four hours via ground

transport to reach Najaf from al-Asad, but it only took 20

minutes by air.

Battalion Landing Team 1/4 selected another site, FOB

Baker, for Kufa operations because of its location near the

city’s central district. Colonel Haslam stationed a platoon

of Company B at the Najaf provincial governor’s

compound to supplement Iraqi security, only a short

distance from al-Sadr’s headquarters and militia strong

points. Re 11th MEU’s executive oTcer, Lieutenant

Colonel Eugene N. Apicella, initially stationed at FOB

Echo, would be stationed at the governor’s compound to

serve as permanent liaison to an-Najaf Provincial

Governor Adnan al-ZuruU.

Re restrictions of movement imposed by the May

truce complicated the already arduous task of contending

with al-Sadr’s militia. Once Mayer’s battalion arrived in

the Najaf area, the militia’s Vagrant acts of oppression and

its aggressive attitude immediately caught the Marines’

attention. Plans and policies for dealing with the militias,

Urst developed before the expeditionary unit landed in

Iraq, now took a more solid shape as the battalion

received more situational awareness and intelligence once

in the city.14 Re militiamen’s practice of coming out of

the exclusion areas, committing acts of coercion and

intimidation, and then slipping back into their safety

4 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by Cpl Daniel J. Fosco

Col Anthony M. Haslam, commanding officer of 11th MEU, describes

the fighting that occurred in the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery to MajGen

Richard F. Natonski, commanding general of 1st Marine Division.
zones to avoid arrest or decisive engagement with U.S.

forces presented a litany of tactical as well as legal

problems for the 11th MEU staS. Re local Iraqi political

authority’s inability to assert any control in the city

further frustrated the situation.15

Before initiating its own plans, however, the

expeditionary unit needed the transfer of authority in the

Najaf-Kufa area from the U.S. Army’s Task Force Dragon,

which had engaged in caretaking operations in the cities

since the truce. Upon arrival in the vicinity on 21 July,

Colonel Haslam’s unit began a 10-day transition that

resulted in the Marines assuming control of both cities but

still technically under the authority of the Polish-led

Multi-National Division Central-South.16 While the

transition progressed, Army commanders shared their

concerns about al-Sadr’s activity in the area. Rey viewed

the situation as tense and rapidly nearing the boiling

point. Company C platoon commander First Lieutenant

Jeremy T. Sellars agreed. In retrospect, he said, he believed

that the Army operations had been only “holding a Unger

in the dike.”17 A more forthright unnamed oTcer

commented that aggressive patrolling, such as the Marines

had in mind, would be “like kicking a hornet nest.”18

As the transition began, the Marines saw Urst hand the

boldness of al-Sadr’s militia. Re very Urst Army-led

transition patrol, intended only to orient its Marine

counterparts, set the operational tone for future dealings

with the militia.19 Re Humvee patrol ran into a militia

roadblock. Rere, according to Lieutenant Sellars, a

militiaman stood nearby carrying an AK-47. Another alSadr Ughter wielded a rocket launcher, causing a

Humvee’s turret gunner to cautiously turn his .50-caliber

machine gun in the rocket-bearer’s direction.20 Re

resulting stare-down portended more hostility to come,

perhaps even a UreUght. Re Army lieutenant leading the

patrol expressed complete surprise, adding that he had

“never seen this before.” ReVecting on the same moment,

Lieutenant Sellars related that the militiaman with the

riVe appeared absolutely astonished at this perceived

American transgression and had the angriest look that

Sellars had ever seen.21

As the small convoy moved on, more Ughters appeared

carrying riVes and rockets. Re 28 May truce forbade the

militia from possessing such weapons, but plans for

disarming the militiamen had never developed. Re

routine orientation patrol had inadvertently driven by alSadr’s house and a women’s maternity hospital, locales

that the militia considered oS limits to Coalition

presence. Although these locations were technically not

in the exclusion zone, Coalition forces had stayed out of

the area to avoid possible incident.22 Why the Army chose

to take the transition patrol into this area is unclear, but

the decision to drive through the roadblock ignited

righteous anger among the militia and began a chain of

events that led to confrontation with the Marines shortly

aWerward and contributed to the hostilities that became

the larger battle of Najaf.23

Re Army patrol incident reinforced policy already in

the making by Lieutenant Colonel Mayer and his staS.

At an 11th MEU command element meeting shortly

before completing the transition, the MEU staS

committed to a tentative 90-day militia ejection plan.

Once the Marines assumed authority over the area of

operations, BLT 1/4 began its mission immediately,

setting in motion aggressive patrolling, eventually

culminating in a decisive engagement.24

Borneo Patrol

Re Army commanding oTcer of Task Force Dragon

ceremonially handed over responsibility for the entire anNajaf and al-Qadisiyah region to Colonel Haslam and the

11th Marine Expeditionary Force on 31 July 2004.

Haslam decided to begin patrolling immediately, so on 1

August, the 11th MEU staS formulated a plan, giving

careful consideration to the continuing reports of the

militia openly carrying weapons. Re Coalition allowed

Iraqi citizens to own AK-47s, but intelligence revealed

that militiamen had stockpiled various caches of illegal

arms, including machine guns, rocket-propelled

grenades, and mortars. Captain Kintzley’s reconnaissance

platoon had conUrmed these intelligence reports when

Kintzley’s roving patrols reported many men brandishing

the full range of banned weapons.25

August 2004 5

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines from BLT 1/4 begin their patrolling of an-Najaf, which led to

the confrontation with al-Sadr’s militia during the Borneo patrol.
Colonel Haslam committed to the concept of avoiding

an immediate Ught, acceding to the wishes of Adnan alZuruU, interim governor of an-Najaf Province. Haslam had

warned al-ZuruU of militia provocations, but the governor

preferred a peaceful solution. He wanted to co-opt al-Sadr

into the political process, so he counseled patience to the

Marine commander. Haslam wanted to have ample

preparation time before confronting al-Sadr’s forces

anyway, in large part to have a chance to train the Iraqi

National Guard troops and to ensure that his unit was

combat-ready. Haslam emphasized, however, the need to

demonstrate to al-Sadr that the Marines controlled the city

and would “not put up with any nonsense.”26

Recognizing both the dangerous potential of

aggressive patrolling by Marines and the assertiveness

the militia displayed with its weapons buildup, Colonel

Haslam sought to construct an appropriate policy of

“Vexible engagement.” Ris task fell to Lieutenant

Colonel Gary S. Johnston, 11th MEU operations oTcer,

a capable oTcer profoundly aware of the slippery nature

of his new undertaking. According to Johnston, “We

knew based on our intel that the al-Sadr residences were

hot spots regardless if they were in the exclusion zone.

Re hospital was nearby al-Sadr’s chief residence. . . . If

you went to check out the hospital . . . you were in his

front yard.”27 Coalition forces venturing into these areas,

Johnston recalled, would require special clearance and,

most likely, additional Urepower to deal with whatever

they might Und.28

Patrolling began on the morning of 2 August as

scheduled, consisting of Combined Antiarmor Team A

from Weapons Company in eight armored Humvees with

a total of 36 to 41 men riding four to Uve in each vehicle.29

Re patrol also included a radio battalion element and a

small Iraqi National Guard complement. Re vehicles

carried an array of weaponry, including wire-guided

antitank missiles (TOW), 7.62mm machine guns, 40mm

automatic grenade launchers, and .50-caliber machines

guns. First Lieutenant Michael Borneo led this Urst patrol

in the Najaf area since the Marine Corps took control.

While commanders felt conUdent in their Marines

and their equipment, they did not hold the same

certainty that the militia would submit to Coalition

control. Small uprisings that previous spring and the

militia’s recent display of recalcitrance demonstrated a

resistance to cooperating with the Marines. In particular,

Lieutenant Colonel Johnston, who warily drew up the

new exclusion zones plan, had doubts. He recalled that

aWer the 0800 intelligence brieUng that preceded

Lieutenant Borneo’s patrol, he had a “gut feeling that the

patrol was going to be tested.” He told fellow oTcers that

his “spider hair was tingling.”30

Johnston had given Borneo’s platoon its mission:

investigate several sites that intelligence identiUed as

“places of interest.”31 Rese included police stations, gas

stations, power plants, and hospitals around downtown

Najaf as well as other sites likely to have militia patrols or

roadblocks. He ordered Borneo to take special care to

respect exclusion areas but to demonstrate to the militia

leadership that anything outside those areas was under

Marine authority and “game for us.”32 With that guidance,

Borneo’s patrol departed Forward Operating Base Hotel

on the morning of 2 August. Re patrol maintained a

simple route, with most of the checkpoints and “places of

interest” on or near Route Miami, a four-lane principal

thoroughfare in Najaf. Re list of checkpoints included

the hospital, site of the Army-led patrol face-oS two

weeks earlier. Despite this incident, this checkpoint

received no special signiUcance or notice from the patrol,

which treated it as just another point on the list.33

Re combined antiarmor patrol leW Route Miami,

turned east on Route Brady, then north on Route Elway,

arriving at the women’s hospital.34 Within moments, the

fears that made Lieutenant Colonel Johnston’s “spider

hairs” tingle began to materialize. As Lieutenant Borneo’s

team approached the hospital, he observed a few Iraqi

National Guardsmen posted as sentries. Rey crouched

behind a car and stared across the street at a walled

compound consisting of the private al-Sadr family

hospital (more like a clinic), al-Sadr’s religious school, and

his father’s house. Rere, adjacent to the Army-led patrol

6 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by CWO-2 Matthew D. Middleton

Some of the many weapons the explosive ordnance disposal teams

collected from the militia in the Old City of an-Najaf during the

fighting in August 2004.
face-oS site, stood several militiamen outside the walls

carrying AK-47s. Since carrying these riVes did not

violate the law, the Borneo patrol could do nothing to

these men.

Moments later, however, the Iraqi troops accompanying

the patrol pointed out more militiamen inside the al-Sadr

compound hauling machine guns, rocket launchers,

82mm mortar tubes, and loading them onto a truck. Re

Marines could not ignore this movement, which was a

clear violation of the weapons restrictions clause of the

truce. Lieutenant Borneo ordered a Uve-man team to

investigate, with the intention of arresting the militia

leaders and conUscating the illegal weapons.35 As the

Marines moved across the street, they heard a shot Ured

from the compound. Re militia sentries, apparently

perceiving themselves under attack, opened Ure across

Route Elway on the approaching Marines.

Although no one actually knew where the shot

originated (someone later identiUed it as an accidental

discharge from an Iraqi National Guard soldier), as

quickly as it sounded, the Marines’ expectations of

avoiding an engagement with al-Sadr’s troops evaporated.

Re shooting changed everything in the Marines’ plans.

Re impending skirmish would become a catalyst for a

much larger battle that lay ahead. Re battalion landing

team’s operations oTcer, Major Coby M. Moran, later

called the incident “the shot heard ’round the world,”

comparing it to the shot at Concord, Massachusetts, that

initiated the American Revolution.36

Re Weapons Company patrol responded to the militia

with a textbook maneuver. Borneo brought the

dismounts back and surrounded the side of the al-Sadr

clinic located in an open area a few hundred meters

square. He eSectively cordoned the compound by

positioning two Humvees to the north and two to the

south. Re other four vehicles remained in place for the

time being. Once al-Sadr’s Ughters, an estimated 40-man

element, realized that the Marines had surrounded their

position, they responded with all their small arms. What

had started with riVe Ure suddenly escalated to machine

guns, rocket launchers, and mortars—both 60mm and

82mm—and at a signiUcant volume. Sensing the

seriousness of the situation, Borneo immediately called

August 2004 7

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

A Marine under attack by 60mm and 82mm mortars while conducting operations at al-Sadr’s house, which sat in an open compound where

multiple obstacles, including large trucks and buses, provided excellent cover.
battalion headquarters and requested the quick-reaction

force stationed at the governor’s compound, about 30

minutes away.37

Re al-Sadr compound stood in an open area, but its

perimeter wall and other obstacles provided cover and

concealment for the enemy. Borneo could see 60mm

mortar rounds going over buildings but could not see the

Uring point. Storage containers, a junkyard, long berms,

and vehicles also separated the Marines and the militia

Ughters, making the battle terrain diTcult. Re lack of

adequate troops to maneuver also increased the diTculty

of the Ught. Some rocket-propelled grenades nearly hit

several Humvees deployed in the section to the south.

Borneo counted UWeen 82mm mortar rounds hitting on

what appeared to be pre-registered targets.38 About 25

more followed during the length of the engagement.

Al-Sadr’s guards fought the Marines primarily from an

open lot outside the compound but discharged their

mortars from inside the walls. Re Marines engaged

whatever targets they could Und, Uring from the cover of

various obstacles that also restricted their Uelds of Ure.

Borneo’s platoon sergeant, Gunnery Sergeant JeSery M.

Godfredson, located to the south of the militia position,

used the large storage containers that dotted the battle

area to his advantage. While awaiting permission to Ure,

he used the container for cover, but once the Marines

began returning Ure, Godfredson pulled his armed

Humvee out of cover to Ure, then returned to cover for

reloading. While he remained under cover, the other

vehicle from his section assumed the Uring position until

its automatic weapons ran low, then they switched again.

About the same time, two more Humvees maneuvered

midway between Borneo’s and Godfredson’s sites to a

position that oSered the best Uelds of Ure. But the position

oSered no cover and quickly drew enemy Ure.

Re battlefront now extended to 360 degrees. At this

stage of the UreUght, Gunnery Sergeant Godfredson grew

frustrated by the several earth berms that crisscrossed the

lot and obstructed the Uelds of Ure. Lance Corporal Eric

Johnson and the platoon corpsman climbed one of the

berms to observe the enemy. Once on top, they

immediately noticed a militiaman about 100 meters away

preparing to Ure a rocket launcher. Johnson and the

corpsman held their Ure because the platoon still awaited

battalion headquarters’ permission to return Ure. When

permission Unally came, the corpsman immediately took

8 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of Company C, BLT 1/4, prepare for a raid on al-Sadr’s compound. The Marines contended with militiamen shooting from multiple

locations, using mortars, machine guns, and small arms.
a shot at the militiaman but missed. At the same time, the

rest of the patrol opened Ure, causing the volume of Ure to

pick up enormously. Godfredson’s Humvees pulled back

and forth delivering ferocious Ure on al-Sadr’s militia,

escalating the once-small skirmish into an increasingly

violent engagement.

Re dismounted Marines also joined the Ught. Sergeant

Eric W. Clayton took a team consisting of Lance Corporals

Johnson (who had come back down the berm), Richard

L. Sweetman, and Cedar Esquivel up the berm and laid

suppressing Ure on a dug-in militia position. Ris allowed

Gunnery Sergeant Godfredson to maneuver his Humvee

section into a better Uring position. From there, Corporal

Daniel W. Barker aimed his mounted 7.62mm machine

gun on the enemy mortar position that Sergeant Clayton

and his team had engaged with their M16 riVes. Using

Godfredson’s alternating Ure and cover tactic, when

Barker had to reload, Corporal Brent M. Boden drove his

vehicle into the position vacated by Godfredson, all the

while under heavy machine gun and rocket Ure. Boden’s

vehicle, equipped with an MK19 automatic grenade

launcher manned by Lance Corporal Kyle W. Burns,

continued suppressing the enemy mortar while avoiding

an increasingly heavy Ure from the enemy. Lance Corporal

Johnson spotted two militiamen on top of a school bus

inside the compound attempting to launch rocket

propelled grenades and killed both of them with his riVe.

From the berm, Sergeant Clayton’s team observed

militia rocket teams crouching behind one of the other

dirt berms. Lance Corporal Sweetman Ured an AT-4

antitank rocket that either killed the militiamen or scared

them away. Meanwhile, Corporal Weaver’s rear security

element had its own Ught on its hands. While his .50-

caliber machine gunner, Private First Class Edward

Roacho, suppressed sniper Ure from a building inside the

compound, Corporal Weaver maneuvered to engage the

new enemy attackers. Using his M16, he killed a

militiaman attempting to Vank his vehicle. Ren, exposing

himself to heavy enemy Ure, Weaver ran back and forth

between his position and the Iraqi National Guard forces

accompanying the patrol, encouraging them to get in the

Ught. Inspired by Weaver, the Iraqis deployed a strong rear

security that freed the Marines to Ught forward.39

On the north side of the compound, the Ughting

increased in its intensity. When Lieutenant Borneo and

Corporal Justin M. Madsymowski needed to move past a

August 2004 9

Photo by Cpl Matthew S. Richards

Marines of the 11th MEU used their Humvees for cover while fighting al-Sadr’s militia during the Borneo patrol.
building from which enemy Ure emanated, Sergeant

William C. Niemeyer II and Corporal Baltazar AguayoSierra poured riVe rounds into the building, suppressing

the Ure substantially and killing two militia Ughters. Ris

maneuver allowed Borneo and Maksymowski to acquire

a better shooting position at a soccer Ueld just north of

the al-Sadr compound. Meanwhile, Sergeant Mark A.

Contrerez and Lance Corporal Jamie M. Herman

engaged a Ure-team-sized militia element, killing two.

Nearby, a group of enemy snipers, who entered a building

inside the compound, also drew the attention of Marine

riVemen. Lance Corporal Brad A. Kidder neutralized at

least two of the positions, among windows and rooWops,

with his M16 riVe and M203 40mm grenade launcher,

and Lance Corporal Christopher B. Abner killed a sniper

at 150 meters with his M16.40 Despite the high volume of

Ure from enemy snipers and machine gunners pouring

from the compound, not a single Marine was hit.41

Re Marine crew-served weapons proved equally

eSective in suppressing the enemy attacks. When

antiarmor team members spotted two militia soldiers

with a rocket launcher under a fuel tanker 400 meters

away. Lance Corporal Brandon W. Shaw Ured several

40mm rounds from his MK19 and destroyed the tanker,

killing the two rocket men. An AT-4 shot from 200

meters by Lance Corporal Christopher M. Jackalone

destroyed a dirt berm and the two militiamen behind it.42

While observing the enemy from the berm, Johnson

came up with an idea of using the MK19 rounds like

mortars since the militia’s mortars were out of direct line

of Ure. He hurried down the berm to explain his plan to

Gunnery Sergeant Godfredson, who agreed to it. Johnson

climbed back up the berm and, as part of Sergeant

Clayton’s team, directed Ure as best he could on the enemy

mortar locations. Johnson soon realized that he could not

see well enough from this position and decided to move

closer. He sprinted across open, exposed ground until he

reached the relative cover of a nearby tractor trailer.

Climbing to the top of the truck’s trailer, he forfeited his

cover in exchange for an elevated position that allowed

him to see straight into the al-Sadr compound. From this

vantage point, Johnson saw the militiamen behind the

wall, where four of them manned an 82mm mortar. He

killed two of them with his riVe but quickly drew the

attention of enemy. He stayed in the perilous spot,

ignoring the gunUre and shrapnel. From the trailer roof,

he directed MK19 Ure, arcing 40mm grenades over

buildings. Johnson observed the impacts and called back

to his section, which relayed the information by radio. Re

plan worked Vawlessly, and aWer several well-placed

rounds, the Marines eliminated the mortar position.

Graced not only with a clever plan and eSective Ure from

10 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by Cpl Matthew S. Richards

The Humvees of BLT 1/4 carried a wide assortment of weapons, including TOW missiles, AT-4 rocket launchers, .50-caliber machine guns,

7.62mm M240G machine guns, and MK19 automatic grenade launchers.
his comrades, Johnson was also the beneUciary of good

fortune for his own safety. Despite the heavy enemy Ure,

he suSered only a small shrapnel wound to his right arm,

which required minimal attention.43

As the Ught developed, Lieutenant Colonel Johnston

monitored the action closely. He controlled the operations

that day as Colonel Haslam and Lieutenant Colonel Mayer

were several hours away at FOB Echo in ad-Diwaniyah.

As the quick reaction force neared the battle site, Johnston

had to decide how long to remain engaged with the

enemy. He had three primary factors to consider. First,

Lieutenant Borneo’s patrol was running low on

ammunition. Re reaction force could carry on the battle

for a while, but its deployment could not guarantee a

decisive end to the engagement. A second consideration

was Governor al-ZuruU’s desire to avoid Ughting.

Johnston understood this, and his own exclusion zone

plan demonstrated his commitment to that idea. Rird, as

the engagement progressed, Johnston received reports

that the militia leadership kept sending in reinforcements.

Rese updates led Johnston to a nightmare vision—

hundreds of black-clad militiamen descending on the

patrol and overwhelming his Marines by sheer numbers.44

Johnston knew the call he had to make.

When the reaction force arrived on the scene, First

Lieutenants Andrew R. Jones and David C. Lewis

quickly appraised conditions, deployed their Marines,

and laid down overwhelming Ure, which caught the

militiamen oS guard. Re militia Ughters increased their

rate of Ure, but it could not compete with the volume

delivered by the reaction force. Ten minutes aWer the

reaction force’s arrival, Johnston issued the order he

knew he had to give: disengage and withdraw. Re patrol

promptly began breaking contact. With the help of the

reaction force’s suppressing Ure, along with another A-4

rocket blast that kept the enemy’s heads down, Borneo’s

platoon slipped out smoothly, although not quietly, as

their guns blazed. Air support arrived on station about

the same time—a UH-1N Huey and AH-1 Cobra

gunship—but too late to support the withdrawal, so they

returned to FOB Duke. Borneo’s platoon Unished

breaking oS and made its way back to FOB Hotel with

the quick reaction force not far behind.45

Re withdrawal came aWer nearly an hour of intense

Ughting. Re enemy had Ured a dozen 60mm and 82mm

mortar rounds, about 15 rockets, and great numbers of

riVe and machine gun rounds. In response, the patrol had

Ured more than 600 MK19 grenades, 3 AT-4 rockets, 400

.50-caliber machine gun rounds, 20 grenades from

M203s, thousands of 5.56mm rounds from M16s and

light machine guns, as well as 7.62mm rounds from

M240G machine guns. Re reaction force expended more

than 1,300 rounds in its short engagement.46 Lieutenant

Borneo’s unit reported 15 enemy killed and an

undetermined number of wounded.47 Lance Corporal

Johnson’s slight wound was the total Marine casualty list.

Re militia’s inadequate Ughting skills had kept Marine

casualties to a minimum.

Re battalion landing team’s Urst engagement with alSadr’s militia ended as a tactical draw. Anticipating more

such engagements, Lieutenant Colonel Mayer ordered

forward his Weapons Company 81mm Mortar Platoon

and the light armored reconnaissance unit, whose four

Cadillac Gauge LAV-25s provided more formidable

Urepower as each carried a M38 25mm automatic cannon

and an M240G machine gun. Mayer could not predict

what the future held, but he wanted his Marines to be

ready for anything. As it turned out, this Ught was the Urst

of several that would evolve over the next 25 days into a

battle for Najaf.

Revolutionary Circle

A short period of calm followed the Borneo patrol.

AWer the ferocious UreUght of 2 August, the BLT 1/4

patrols of 3 and 4 August encountered only hostile stares,

with each side exchanging what Major Moran described

as “dirty looks.”48 Re situation remained tense but quiet

as the last patrol on the night of 4 August concluded

without incident, returning at 0030 on 5 August, allowing

the Marines a few hours of sleep.

Re calm in and around Forward Operating Base Hotel

quietly deceived the relaxed Marines, as only a few

kilometers south of their location, al-Sadr’s militia

prepared for another battle. Apparently embarrassed by

the failure to defeat the Marine patrol a few days earlier,

the militia decided to redeem itself by attacking the Iraqi

government, the hated American ally. Re militia plan

called for an assault on Najaf ’s police station at the city’s

main intersection of routes Hartford and Miami,

Revolutionary Circle. During the lawlessness of the ceaseUre, al-Sadr’s men had habitually harassed the Iraqi

police. On 5 August, the militia attacked the police station

with a platoon-sized element using small arms and

mortars. Rey met surprising resistance from the Iraq

police, who succeeded in Ughting back the enemy’s

probing attack.

Re 11th MEU had a liaison team at the governor’s

compound near the police station and learned of the

attack immediately. Re battalion landing team’s forward

communications and joint coordination center also was

August 2004 11
close to the police station, placed there during the

transition with the Army. Re attack alarmed the team,

but its leaders determined that it did not require action on

the Marines’ part. In fact, most of the oTcers were

pleased that the policemen handled the attack on their

own, demonstrating progress in the Coalition’s ultimate

mission of making the Iraqis self-suTcient.

Rese good omens disappeared quickly. At 0300 on 5

August, the militia attacked again with a larger and more

determined force. Ris new assault badly shook Governor

al-ZuruU’s conUdence. Fearing that the militia might

overrun the police station, he called on the Marines for

assistance. Responding immediately, the 11th MEU

commander, Colonel Haslam, deployed a reaction force.

It consisted of Lieutenant Borneo’s Combined Antiarmor

Team A, Captain Matthew T. Morrissey’s reinforced

Company C, and part of the BLT 1/4 command element

consisting of the commanding oTcer, Lieutenant Colonel

Mayer; the operations oTcer, Major Moran; and the

battalion air oTcer, Captain Carl M. Lowe.49 When the

relief force from FOB Hotel reached the Iraqi police

station a short time later, however, it found that the police

once again had repulsed the attack. Re relief force

remained at the station per the governor’s request but

soon returned to base when all seemed quiet enough.

Lieutenant Colonel Mayer’s decision to return to base

disappointed many of the Marines who arrived ready for

a Ught. Several implored him to stay in case the militia

returned. Since the altercation at the al-Sadr compound,

when told that there might be 2,000 or more militia

Ughters with ill intentions in the area, Lance Corporal

James T. Jenkins remembered thinking, “let’s go.” His

friend Lance Corporal Calvert C. Wallace recalled being

“Ured up” when the relief force mounted up.50 As the

Marines ate breakfast later that morning around 0630, the

call came to mount up again. Because of the prior

evening’s “false alarm,” few responded with the same

enthusiasm. Several Marines did not top oS the water in

their canteens, thinking they would return in a few hours.

As the militia mounted the third attack of 5 August on

the police station, the Iraqi police were running low on

ammunition and rapidly approaching a critical situation.

Governor al-ZuruU telephoned Colonel Haslam again,

reporting that the militia had massed in large numbers,

12 Battle of An-Najaf

U. S. Marine Corps Map
perhaps in the hundreds, near the police station and

around Revolutionary Circle.51 Haslam detected the

urgency of the governor’s plea and mobilized his relief

force once again. At about 0730 on 5 August, Lieutenant

Colonel Mayer redeployed the original task force

reinforced with more Urepower. Re force consisted of

Combined Antiarmor Team A, First Lieutenant John F.

MacDonald’s light armored reconnaissance platoon,

First Lieutenant Lamar D. Breshears’ mortar platoon

acting as a provisional infantry unit, and two riVe

platoons from Company C.52

Colonel Haslam ordered these units to reinforce the

Iraqi police station and to secure Revolutionary Circle,

which stood at the center of Najaf ’s downtown district

and adjacent to the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery. With the

Imam Ali Mosque about 1,500 meters to the west, these

historic and religious sites increased the signiUcance of

the mission. Lieutenant Colonel Mayer’s plan called for

Lieutenant Borneo’s combined weapons team and

Lieutenant Breshears’ platoon to secure the north and east

side of Revolutionary Circle, Lieutenant MacDonald’s

light armored platoon to picket west of the traTc circle,

and the platoons from Company C to hold the south part

of the circle and secure the endangered Iraqi police

station. Mayer believed his force ample enough to execute

the mission, although he did not have clear intelligence

about the size of al-Sadr’s force.

As the task force approached the target area, ominous

signs of upcoming trouble appeared along the route. First

of all, the behavior of the Iraqi people and traTc on the

streets troubled the Marines. As they drove toward the

objective, local townspeople waved and gestured good

wishes. Once the Marines neared the Old City (the

section around the objective area), however, the

supportive crowds disappeared.53 Re Marines also

noticed “busloads” of young men driving past them

toward the cemetery and feared they were likely militia

reinforcements.54 First Lieutenant Russell L. Romas, the

supporting tank platoon commander, recalled seeing “at

least 25 vehicles of all sorts carrying at least 200 men.” He

remembered wanting to attack them on the spot rather

than wait until they positioned themselves to attack him.

He restrained himself, acknowledging that an

unprovoked attack at this point might cause greater

problems.

August 2004 13

Photo by Cpl Dick Kotecki

Marines assigned to the 11th MEU and Iraqi policemen battled militiamen during three attacks on the police station in the city of an-Najaf, Iraq.
Once inside the Old City, the militia launched their

attack. Re whole cemetery side of Route Miami erupted

in hostile Ure, including small arms, machine guns,

mortars, and rockets. Re Marine convoy encountered

such heavy Ure that Lieutenant Colonel Mayer called

immediately for reinforcements. He contacted FOB Echo

in Diwaniyah and ordered First Lieutenant Scott A.

Cuomo’s Combined Antiarmor Team B, Captain Robert

B. Sotire’s Company A (Alpha Raiders), and Captain

Steven O. Wallace’s Weapons Company headquarters to

come forward. Re deployment of this relief force leW

FOB Echo nearly empty. Only a small security force of

service support troops remained to defend the base as the

rest of the battalion landing team sped toward

Revolutionary Circle.

Re terrain of the Revolutionary Circle area made the

relief force’s mission that much more diTcult. Re area

consisted of an urban mix of two- to Uve-story buildings,

complicated by open areas around the traTc circle and

the police compound. Re proximity of the cemetery, the

militia stronghold in the northwest quadrant of the traTc

circle, and its 1,200-meter border with Route Miami

made movement on the road diTcult as the enemy could

cover the crucial part of the route with deadly Ure for

nearly a mile.

A Uve-foot wall on the entire perimeter of the cemetery

further deUned the already challenging battle space. It

provided cover for the Marines from enemy Ure, but it

also presented an obstacle to negotiate when returning

Ure or attacking the militia. Hundreds of militiamen

swarmed and scurried within the conUnes of the

graveyard, free to engage any of their available weapons

without restriction. In this environment, BLT 1/4 Marines

confronted a maelstrom of enemy Ure, including a steady

and voluminous stream of 60mm and 82mm mortars,

and rocket-propelled grenades.

Re intensity of the Ughting at Revolutionary Circle soon

outpaced that around the Iraqi police station as the militia

refocused their eSorts on the arriving Americans. Re

initial clustering of units in and around the traTc circle

ended quickly as Marines saw that the militia had

registered their mortars directly on that spot. Most

elements of the relief force took cover in buildings and

behind vehicles and the cemetery wall. Despite the havoc,

Company C suSered only one wounded during the

scramble away from the circle.55 Lieutenant Borneo’s

Combined Antiarmor Team A responded swiWly to the

enemy Urestorm as well, positioning its vehicles against the

cemetery wall. At the same time, Section B of Lieutenant

MacDonald’s platoon of armored LAV-25s relocated to the

north of the traTc circle for a better Uring position.

Section A’s LAV-25s had a rougher time. Rey stayed inside

the traTc circle, slugging away with 25mm automatic

cannons at targets of opportunity, which abounded. As

intense as the enemy Ure was, the buildings around the

circle provided adequate cover for the vehicles against

most mortar blasts and riVe Ure while allowing plenty of

room to spread out to avoid dangerous clustering.

Re cover and concealment exercised by the Marines

minimized casualties, but it did not eliminate danger.

Company C’s platoons, which had been lucky at the traTc

circle, ran into more trouble as they secured the Iraqi

police station. In only a matter of minutes, enemy mortar

Ure inVicted several fragmentation wounds among the

Marines.56 Re battle raged as incoming enemy Ure

spread from beyond the cemetery. Shooting came from

virtually every building the Marines did not immediately

occupy in the Old City. Each building provided a

potential position for militia sharpshooters. No sooner

had Lieutenant Breshears’ platoon taken up position in

the traTc circle than his troops began taking Ure from

militia Ughters on top of a four-story building. Ris

structure was just south of the circle, north of the Iraqi

police station, and across the street from the

Revolutionary Circle on the cemetery side. Re militia

soldiers Ured straight down on the Marines as they

scrambled to take cover. All reached safety except for

Corporal Jesus E. Alveres-Garcia, who received a serious

wound from enemy Ure. Re intensity of the Ughting

forced Breshears to order the entire 2d Section of the

platoon to escort the wounded Marine to the medical aid

station at FOB Hotel.57

14 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines in a firefight with al-Sadr’s militia at the Revolutionary

Circle. The Marines on the ground are firing through “peep holes” in

the wall while the Marines in the Humvee are firing a .50-caliber

machine gun.
Both sides quickly realized the necessity of securing

rooWops for observation and Uring. As soon as they

entered the battle area, Marines dismounted and cleared

several buildings around Revolutionary Circle. Rey

occupied the rooWops across from the cemetery, where

they could Ure directly on the militiamen and into

surrounding buildings. Forward air controller Captain

Peter N. Gibbons accompanied Company C Marines to

the top of a hotel, where he could view the entire

battleUeld and call for air support as needed.

Getting permission to acquire supporting Ure,

however, presented a dilemma. Re exclusion zones,

drawn by Lieutenant Colonel Mayer weeks before,

included the cemetery and the Old City on the same side

of Route Miami. Since the enemy attacked from within

that area, the Marines had to get permission to bring

supporting Ures anywhere inside, making it a

cumbersome and time-consuming process. Every target

had to be approved, which sometimes took 20 to 30

minutes. Re wait for permission became more of a

burden as the Ughting moved closer to the Imam Ali

Mosque.58 Two initial helicopter sorties of UH-1N Huey

and AH-1J Cobras on the morning of 5 August destroyed

several key mortar positions and killed several militia

Ughters. Re “birds” then returned to FOB Duke to

rearm and await new missions.59

Both sides used all the weapons at their disposal during

the engagement, but not in direct attacks. Re militia

apparently understood the futility of attacking the

Marines straight on and facing the full impact of their

Urepower. On the Coalition side, Lieutenant Colonel

Mayer fought cautiously, awaiting the obvious advantage

of reinforcements before taking the oSensive. A largely

static battle ensued, with each side Uring at the other

without advance or withdrawal. Re Marines occasionally

did engage in Ure and maneuver to take out enemy

positions or to gain better Uring positions. In the LAV-25

platoon, Section A’s designated marksman, Lance

Corporal Michael P. Ball, climbed to an elevated Uring

position, where he targeted and killed three militiamen

at 400 meters as they moved about the cemetery.60

While the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, struggled for

control on the ground, disaster struck in the air above

them. About 0930 as the mortar platoon moved toward a

warehouse facility a few hundred meters north of

Revolutionary Circle, its members watched a rocket hit

August 2004 15

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Though the temperatures reached as high 125 degrees Fahrenheit, fully-loaded Marines would carry their wounded brethern on their backs in

order to deliver them to the corpsmen for medical treatment.
one of the expeditionary unit’s Hueys (Number 631, call

sign Rock Rree One) in the tail section. Re helicopter

went down for a hard landing about 400 meters north of

the mortar platoon just next to Route Miami.61 Reacting

quickly, Lieutenant Borneo and his Weapons Team A

moved to the site along with a section of LAV-25s.

Lieutenant Breshears’ platoon hurried to the crash site on

foot, and a section of Lieutenant Russell Romas’ M1A1

Abrams tanks rolled in the same direction. Re 1st

Platoon of Captain Samuel H. Carrasco’s Company B, the

battalion’s designated quick reaction force, arrived on the

scene in two P7 amphibious assault vehicles. All the forces

at the site immediately executed a full-scale tactical

recovery of aircraW and personnel on the downed

helicopter. Roughts of the 1993 Mogadishu “Blackhawk

Down” incident haunted the Marines as they hastened to

evacuate the damaged Huey.62* Re situation degenerated

into a footrace between the Marines and the militia

Ughters attempting to get to the crash site Urst.

Borneo’s motorized team and MacDonald’s LAV-25s

arrived in the Urst few minutes. Rey immediately

delivered a high volume of Ure on large numbers of

militiamen trying to reach the downed helicopter.

Lieutenant Borneo used his riVe to kill one militiaman

trying to Ure a rocket at the rescue party. Rree of

Borneo’s Marines took down a group of Uve attackers

rushing toward the spot where the helicopter crew had

taken refuge.63

Only one of the helicopter’s crew members was

seriously wounded, taking a riVe shot to the face. In a

twist of good fortune for the Marines, the Huey had

landed next to a medical clinic. Re pilot, Captain

Stephen H. Mount, needed attention for a facial wound,

so his copilot, Captain Andrew Turner, ran into the clinic

and came out with an Iraqi physician. Mount had been

holding a compress to his wound while trying to chamber

a round in his pistol with his teeth. His crew chief, StaS

Sergeant Patrick O. Burgess, Unally gave him a needed

hand in loading.64

Re Marines arriving at the crash site found the aircraW

empty. Some put out the Ure in the burning engine while

others shouted for the Huey crew. Mount and his men

returned the calls from their position in a courtyard

adjacent to the medical clinic. Borneo’s and MacDonald’s

teams, with the help of the recently arrived reaction force,

soon suppressed militia Ure, leaving only sporadic gunUre

from militiamen in hiding.65

Borneo and his team found Captain Mount already

bandaged by the Iraqi physician and decided he could be

moved safely. AWer searching the grounds of the clinic,

Borneo identiUed an unattended ambulance and

commandeered it. His Marines placed Mount in the

ambulance and drove him to the battalion aid station at

FOB Hotel, escorted by a combined antiarmor section of

heavily armed Humvees, which carried the other Huey

crew members. StaS Sergeant Burgess remained behind

to supervise recovery of the helicopter.

With the crew safely evacuated, the remaining members

of the rescue party focused on the aircraW. Re lessons of

Mogadishu drove the Marines to try to keep from leaving

anything of real or propaganda value at the crash site.66

Arrangements for the helicopter’s recovery fell to the

landing team’s logistics oTcer, Captain Duane T. Fosberg.

Re recovery convoy leW FOB Hotel at 1100, and upon

arrival at the crash site, carried on necessary work under

intermittent enemy Ure. Re process took three to four

hours, with contributions from the battalion’s engineer

platoon, a civilian crane, and an M88 tank recovery

vehicle.67 Even the crane operator, who ran a civilian

machine for the Urst time, took sporadic small-arms Ure

as his machine liWed the helicopter parts onto truck beds

for transport back to FOB Hotel. Re recovery convoy

suSered only one fatality when Sergeant Moses D. Rocha

was killed by enemy Ure while reloading his Humvee

mounted machine gun on the way to the crash site.68

Meanwhile, the Ught at Revolutionary Circle and the

Iraqi police station continued. Most Marines along Route

Miami had propped themselves against the cemetery wall

16 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of 1stLt Eric Taylor

The remains of the Huey helicopter (call sign Rock Three One) that

was brought down by a rocket on 5 August during the initial stages of

the fight with al-Sadr’s militia.

* The October 1993 incident in Mogadishu, Somalia, involved a foiled

raid by U.S. Army Rangers in which 18 soldiers were killed.
for protection against the intense Ure coming from inside

the grounds. Although the battle remained static, the

Marines continued to maneuver individually and in small

teams among buildings and along rooWops adjacent to

enemy positions in search of better Uelds of Ure. Air and

artillery support maintained by Captain Randy Gibbons

with Company C and Captain Carl M. Lowe with the

command element proved crucial for the ground forces in

suppressing militia movements and eliminating several

of their positions.69

Re return of the antiarmor team and the light armored

reconnaissance unit to the engagement helped turn the

Ught in favor of the units that had remained engaged at the

cemetery. Re Urepower from their vehicles kept the

enemy oS balance, allowing the infantrymen to execute

what little movement they could. Marines from these units

demonstrated exceptional Ughting skills. In one instance,

Sergeant William C. Niemeyer II took Lance Corporals

Christopher Jackalone and Smith to a Uve-story rooWop to

use the indirect Ure spotting technique for his vehicle’s

MK19 automatic grenade launcher to neutralize enemy

emplacements. From that position, they also used their

riVes to kill several militia Ughters.70 Meanwhile, the

gunners of the LAV-25s, as their aWer action report noted,

“continued to use their cannon to destroy two mortar

positions, a fortiUed machine gun bunker, and at least four

rocket-propelled grenade teams.”71

Combined Antiarmor Team B arrived later in the

aWernoon under the leadership of Lieutenant Scott Cuomo

to support the Marines Ughting around the cemetery as

part of the reinforcement convoy Lieutenant Colonel

Mayer had ordered in the morning. Later in the aWernoon,

Cuomo’s unit and Lieutenant Romas’ tanks patrolled the

length of Route Miami, Uring at targets of opportunity on

both sides of the road. For the Marines of Cuomo’s Team

B, the trip to Revolutionary Circle proved just as

harrowing as the Ughting at their destination. Re militia

Ughters tried to ambush them at 1430 as the force entered

Najaf on Route Miami, about 1,500 meters south of the

battle area.72 Militiamen opened Ure with riVes and

machine guns from three- and four-story buildings on the

west side of the road. Re two Team B Humvees leading

the convoy turned straight into the enemy Ure and

attacked. Re gunners of the vehicles, Corporal Anthony

August 2004 17

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of the 11th MEU battle al-Sadr’s militia from positions in the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery. The multi-story buildings (in the distance)

provided excellent positions for militia snipers.
C. Mazzola and Lance Corporal William O. StoSers III,

saved the convoy by aggressively delivering accurate Ure.

Reir actions allowed the convoy to escape the ambush and

continue its reinforcement mission.

Back at the cemetery, the Marines continued to trade

Ure with al-Sadr’s militia in the stiVing 115-degree heat.73

AWer Unishing at the helicopter crash site, the mortar

platoon returned to Revolutionary Circle to engage

enemy Uring from the cemetery. Gun squads acquired

rooWop positions to Ure at targets of opportunity in the

cemetery using the same tactics employed earlier by a

Combined Antiarmor Team A group. Both units killed

and wounded numerous militiamen and destroyed

several Ughting positions.74 Meanwhile, LAV-25 Section

B killed several more militiamen with its cannons while

section leader StaS Sergeant Jason G. Smith used a spotter

and the indirect MK19 Ure technique to eliminate

another mortar position inside the cemetery.

By mid-aWernoon, as four of Lieutenant Cuomo’s Team

B vehicles relieved the LAV-25 and 81mm platoons at

Revolutionary Circle, a maelstrom of Uring ensued as the

enemy launched a ferocious attack. In the hours that

followed, the newly arrived combined antiarmor team

destroyed several enemy snipers and their Uring

emplacements using the team’s formidable array of

weapons, including wire-guided antitank missiles, MK19

automatic grenade launchers, and medium machine

guns. Re Marines also enjoyed several episodes of good

luck. A Marine section leader, Sergeant David R. Stegall,

had a rocket-propelled grenade hit the ground less than

10 meters in front of him, but it did not detonate. It

skipped right over his head and bounced down the road

past an entire line of Weapons Company positions.75

By late aWernoon, all reinforcements had arrived and

the engagement had taken on a deUnite shape. Re Ught

had been intense, but by now most of the enemy positions

along Route Miami opposite the cemetery had been

eliminated. Rat leW one principal problem area—the

cemetery itself. Re militia had used it all day as a base of

operations against the Marines along Route Miami, but

Lieutenant Colonel Mayer could not clear it as he wanted

to because of its location in the exclusion zone.76 Re

ability to get into the cemetery would determine the fate

of the battle and, potentially, the city.

)e Cemetery Fight

Re intense Ught that developed at Revolutionary Circle

on 5 August 2004 convinced Lieutenant Colonel Mayer

that BLT 1/4 faced a determined foe. Re militiamen did

not Ught eSectively, but they fought hard, and their sheer

numbers largely oSset their lack of tactical prowess.

Hundreds of militia Ughters crowded rooWops, windows,

and doorways, seemingly anywhere a Ughter could hide,

all trying to kill as many Marines as possible. Re growing

casualty list demonstrated the intensity of battle. Within

hours, Mayer’s Marines had killed and wounded dozens,

if not hundreds, of al-Sadr’s militiamen. But the militia

replaced their losses faster than the Marines could

eliminate them. Re Marines observed militia

reinforcements streaming back and forth unrestricted

from the cemetery to new Ughting positions.

Mayer understood that he had to stop this continual

movement. He consulted with Colonel Haslam, who in

turn conferred with the I Marine Expeditionary Force

(I MEF) commander, Lieutenant General James T.

Conway, in order to get approval to attack the cemetery.

Conway forwarded the request to the commander of

Multi-National Forces Iraq, Army General George W.

Casey Jr. Casey’s advisors suggested seeking permission

from both the Pentagon and the White House. Although

a time-consuming and bureaucratic process, Mayer leW

nothing to chance on such a politically and culturally

sensitive decision.77

In the plan that Mayer proposed, he sought to create a

buSer between the militiamen and the Iraqi police

station—and the civilian population caught between

them. To forge this buSer, the Marines would attack

through the militia’s haven, the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery,

and eventually assault the headquarters of al-Sadr’s

Ughters in the area of the Imam Ali Mosque. Intelligence

reports indicated that the mosque contained several

18 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines maneuver for better tactical position during the fight at the

Revolutionary Circle and the cemetery surrounding the Imam Ali

Mosque.
hundred militiamen as well as their commander,

Muqtada al-Sadr.78

Mayer proposed a frontal attack: simple, direct, and

violent. Assigning the mosque as the ultimate objective,

with supplementary and intermediate objectives, BLT 1/4

would assault and clear the militia defending it. Re

attack would move east to west paralleling Route

Hartford to its intersection with Ring Road, a street

tracing the perimeter of the mosque and part of the Old

City surrounding it. Re Hartford/Ring Road intersection

was about 1,000 meters from Revolutionary Circle and

about 500 meters east of the mosque. Re militia was

concentrated both inside and around Ring Road and the

mosque. But the militia Ughters moved constantly,

creating numerous militia strong points in several

locations inside the cemetery and all along Route

Hartford south of the attack route. Additionally, large

numbers of militia Ughters surrounded the Iraqi police

station and the area adjacent to it.79

Having clariUed the enemy situation by around 1400,

and receiving approval from the high command for the

attack, Mayer solidiUed his plan. Re assault would take

place along a front stretching along Route Miami from

Revolutionary Circle to the lower end of the amusement

park on the north side of Route Favre on about a 1,200-

meter front. Re attack would move in a westerly

direction through the cemetery with the goal of clearing

the southeast sector of the cemetery along with the

northeast quadrant of the Old City inside Ring Road. At

a designated point, the lower end of the attack force

would pivot toward Ring Road and the cemetery. Mayer’s

Marines would then clear the remainder of the cemetery

and attendant built-up areas. Re plan concentrated the

forces on the southern end of the attack, where the militia

had consolidated most of its Ughters.80 Mayer also hoped

that the assault might result in al-Sadr’s capture.

Re assault force concentrated around and projected

from Revolutionary Circle. It was anchored by two

platoons of Captain Matthew T. Morrissey’s Company C

and reinforced by Company B’s quick reaction force

platoon, which provided security on the leW Vank (Route

Hartford). Lieutenant Breshears’ mortarmen, now

designated as a provisional riVe platoon, took up

Company C’s right (north) Vank. Company C’s sector

stretched 700 meters north from the traTc circle to a

point on Route Miami where a principal cemetery road

August 2004 19

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of BLT 1/4 crossing a rubble-strewn field in an-Najaf. The urban environment of the city presented the Marines with challenges in

confronting militiamen who could be hiding in rubble just about anywhere.
(dubbed Diagonal Road) intersected. Ris road ran in a

southwesterly direction from that point until it

intersected Hartford about 700 meters west of

Revolutionary Circle. Diagonal Road would become the

most important avenue in the battle that followed.

Captain Sotire’s Company A, accompanied by forward

air controller Captain Randy J. Staab, came next in the

assault line. Company A lined up north on Route Miami

from Diagonal Road to Route Favre. Captain Kintzley’s

reconnaissance platoon guarded Company A’s right Vank

in the amusement park on the north side of Route Favre

and constituted the end of the line as the northern-most

unit. Re command, consisting of Lieutenant Colonel

Mayer, his operations oTcer, Major Coby Moran, and

battalion air oTcer, Captain Lowe, was positioned on

Route Miami near the traTc circle. Only 1,500 meters

separated the point of departure from the Unal objective.81

With the plan set, Mayer’s men started lining up units

around 1530 for the cemetery assault. Re air

temperature had soared to a mid-aWernoon peak of

around 125 degrees. Even so, the assault formation

period provided a much-needed break for the Marines

as they lined up with their backs against the cemetery

wall, comforted by a little shade. Most had been Ughting

for more than six hours already. Some of the troops felt

relaxed enough to take photos.82

Not all of the Ughting had stopped, and the antiarmor

teams and tank sections continued to patrol Route Miami

from the Iraqi police station and Revolutionary Circle

northward.83 Re noise of battle—riVe Ure, machine guns,

mortars, rockets, tank guns, and occasional close air

support missions—persisted during the assault

preparation. Re resting Marines marveled at their calm

among the Ughting, occurring just short distances away.

“We’d been taking Ure all day,” recalled Corporal Calvert

C. Wallace of Company C, who noted that aWer a while,

“you don’t even mind.” Heat and thirst occupied a higher

priority at that point for many of the Marines, as some

parched troops ran up to 400 meters under Ure to bring

water back to their positions.84

Re cemetery assault began at 1800, but the battalion’s

Marines found themselves with challenges beyond just

the hostile militia Ughters. In addition to the extreme

heat, they had to contend with the terrain of the 15-

square-mile cemetery, an extremely congested and

disorganized array of brick-and-mortar crypts,

mausoleums, and catacombs, ranging from subterranean

to 10 feet tall or more, and in all shapes and sizes. Re

tightly arranged tombstones oWen prevented individual

Marines from maneuvering in between them in their full

battle packs. Re Marine expeditionary unit executive

oTcer, Lieutenant Colonel Apicella, aptly described the

terrain as “a New Orleans cemetery on steroids.” OWen,

troops had to move laterally by several crypts before

being able to move forward.85

Re attack began smoothly despite the adverse

conditions. Company C swept two factories, although the

tombs around them impeded their advance. Re 81mm

platoon and Company A made good progress as well,

moving several hundred meters and meeting only

sporadic resistance. Re reconnaissance platoon also

encountered very light Ure while moving through the

amusement park. Even the platoon from Company B,

assigned to Company C’s leW Vank and astride the enemyheld buildings across Route Hartford, experienced little

action. Re infantry crept forward supported by tanks,

combined antiarmor units, P7 amphibious assault

vehicles, and Lieutenant MacDonald’s LAV-25 light

armored vehicles.86

As Company C continued to move a few hundred yards

forward, the unit began taking sporadic Ure, which

quickly escalated into sniper Ure coming from seemingly

all directions. Heavy mortars and rockets whizzed by the

Marines, transforming the quiet cemetery into a raging

battleUeld. Re supporting weapons vehicles followed

behind the infantry and began engaging the enemy

targets with their heavy weapons, eliminating some of

their positions. Re proximity of the militia Ughters to the

infantry increased the danger of the Marines hitting

“friendlys.” Meanwhile, the militiamen along the south

side of Route Hartford opened Ure, pinning down the

Marines there. Re cemetery Ughting quickly became

chaotic as small units lost contact with each other as they

20 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by LtCol John R. Way

The closely-spaced catacombs and tombs of the Wadi al-Salam

Cemetery provided excellent cover for the defending militia. The

cemetery is reputed to be the largest and oldest cemetery in the world.
tried to maneuver around the terrain, encumbered by a

seeming forest of crypts and tombs.

Individual Marines found themselves adjusting to the

rapidly changing tactical conditions. Earlier in the day,

Private First Class Heladio Zuniga had mentioned he and

his fellow Marines were just “happy . . . to do something.”

Ren reality struck, as Lance Corporal Nathaniel A. Ziobro

recalled: “Whoa, I’m getting shot at.” Lance Corporal

Sanick P. DelaCruz remembered suddenly Uring madly in

the “same direction” as everyone else.87 In a short time they

adapted and even became inured to the conditions around

them as rounds whizzed by their heads. Lance Corporal

DelaCruz spoke of becoming accustomed to incoming

mortar and small arms Ure: “AWer a while you just get used

to it,” and “you’re just standing by a tomb as rounds Vy by

your head.”88 Ris did not imply that the Marines took the

danger lightly. DelaCruz also spoke of his profound

concern for his men in the battle ahead, as well as the

possibility of them becoming heat casualties, but it does

help explain how they adapted to their environment and

went about their job.89

Company B’s 2d Platoon, while inVicting heavy

casualties on the militia Ughters on the south side of Route

Hartford, took several casualties of their own. Reir

suppression, but not attack assignment, subjected them to

several shrapnel and sniper casualties, more than any other

platoon on 5 August.90 Lieutenant Russell Romas’ tank

platoon proved indispensable by delivering a steady Vow of

deadly high explosive rounds into the enemy-held

buildings on Route Hartford. At the hot corner of the

battle, the command center positioned itself close to the

action and monitored the situation closely. Lieutenant

Colonel Mayer, his operations oTcer, Major Moran, and

forward air controller, Captain Lowe, oversaw the action

from just a few hundred meters away, near Revolutionary

Circle, from a specially equipped C7 amphibious vehicle.91

Re most remarkable action of the cemetery Ught on 5

August belonged to Lieutenant Breshears’ mortar

platoon. Breshears knew that by launching his attack early

to keep up with Company C, he might expose his own

north Vank as Company A waited to launch. But

Company C needed its Vank protected more because it

had the most hazardous sector of the assault. Re mortar

platoon made good progress until it reached Diagonal

Road, about 200 meters from its starting point. Rere the

platoon began taking small-arms Ure that increased in

intensity as the platoon moved forward. Ren, within the

next 150 meters, the platoon encountered a well-prepared

40-man enemy force. A pitched battle quickly developed

as Breshears’ platoon found itself in close combat—so

close that his Marines exchanged insults with the enemy

as they tossed hand grenades at each other. AWer several

minutes of hard Ughting, the militiamen scattered,

removing a major obstruction to Company C’s advance to

the south. Breshears’ Marines later learned that they had

engaged the westernmost element of a militia defensive

line that originated in Company C’s objective area.92

As nightfall came, the cemetery Ughting remained

intense. Lieutenant Colonel Mayer called for a halt to the

attack as the darkness prevented the Marines from

Ughting eSectively. He ordered the mortar platoon to fall

back to Diagonal Road and set up a defensive perimeter.

Re Marines would continue the assault in the morning.

However, the lack of small unit radio contact and the

diTcult cemetery terrain led to problems disseminating

the order. Due to these communications problems and

the intensity of the battle, the order to halt the attack did

not get to Lieutenant Breshears’ section, which lay

between his 2d Section and Company A. Consequently,

when his 2d Section and Company A pulled back,

Breshears’ 1st Section was leW exposed on three sides. Re

militia quickly discovered the unit’s accidental isolation

and launched attacks from all three directions. Breshears

called in an artillery mission to relieve the beleaguered

element, but the Ure control center denied the mission

because of the unit’s location in an exclusion zone.93

Re missing order and denial of Ure support resulted in

lethal consequences for those involved on the ground. With

no alternative, 1st Section withdrew under heavy Ure. One

of its squad leaders, Sergeant Yadir Reynoso, died in the

rear-guard action. Re section leader, StaS Sergeant Ian W.

Bonnell, ordered an advance by the section to retrieve

Reynoso’s body. Not hearing the order and acting on his

initiative, Lance Corporal Justin C. Vaughn made two

August 2004 21

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Tightly arranged tombstones, tombs, and catacombs often prevented

Marines from maneuvering in between them in full battle gear.
dashes under Ure to retrieve Reynoso’s body and gear before

the section could organize. Vaughn carried Reynoso 150

meters to the rear before collapsing from exhaustion. From

that point, Vaughn’s fellow Marines helped him reach the

perimeter on Diagonal Road with the deceased Marine.94

Many 11th MEU Marines believed that the Ure

restrictions caused Sergeant Reynoso’s death. Re

incident created lingering bitterness, but it also reinforced

resolve. More importantly, it brought about a quick easing

of restrictions, a development that led to almost

immediate facilitation of Ure mission approval and

reduction of restricted areas from 1,000 meters around

the mosque to 300 meters. Re tragedy had a profound

eSect on some higher-ranking oTcers as well. Lieutenant

Colonel Gary Johnston, the 11th MEU’s operations

oTcer, said that aWer the Reynoso incident, he made sure

that if higher headquarters delayed approving a critical

Ure mission, he approved it himself.95

With the exception of this incident, the battle proceeded

according to Marine expectations, even with the battalion’s

underestimation of the number of militia Ughters. Re

day’s casualties amounted to two killed and about 20

wounded, mostly minor shrapnel wounds, with only a

handful of those serious. Re militia endured much

heavier losses in both the morning battle and the struggle

for the cemetery. Corporal James T. Jenkins of Company C

estimated that his unit alone killed 100 in the cemetery and

claimed to have counted more than 50 of them himself.96

Marine small arms accounted for many of the enemy

casualties, but the majority of the militia killed and

wounded resulted from the battalion’s heavier weapons:

M1A1 tanks, antiarmor teams, LAV-25s, and P7s. In one

case, Lance Corporal Michael J. Novak killed 15 to 25

militia Ughters with the LAV-25’s 25mm cannon. As the

cemetery assault began, Novak spotted militia teams 800

meters down Route Hartford crossing the road and

moving into the cemetery, attempting to reinforce militia

Ughters in Company C’s objective area. Novak took

advantage of their exposed position and recorded kills with

accurate, deadly Ure until nightfall halted the Ughting.97

22 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines carrying out wounded during the fighting in Wadi al-Salam Cemetery. Though the initial casualties of 6 August were 2 killed and 20

wounded, al-Sadr’s militiamen sustained substantially higher casualty rates, estimated by the Marines in the hundreds.
Close air support also contributed to the high enemy

casualty count. Led by the air control triumvirate of

Captain Gibbons (Company C), Captain Lowe (battalion

command post), and Captain Staab (Company A),

Marine air support inVicted hundreds of militia

casualties. Bringing in both helicopter and Uxed-wing

aircraW, the air controllers directed scores of air strikes, a

remarkable feat considering the area restrictions and

delays pending strike approvals that they encountered.

Rat night, the “crown jewel” of air support arrived—

the U.S. Air Force Lockheed AC-130 Spectre gunship,

which oSered astounding Urepower from an altitude of

2,000 meters. Re plane carried a 25mm Gatling gun,

which Ured 1,800 rounds per minute; a 40mm grenade

machine gun; and 105mm howitzer. Once given

coordinates, the plane targeted the enemy using infrared

and heat sensors. Marines on the ground could identify a

target, call an AC-130 strike, and the pilot could destroy

entire buildings Ulled with hostile Ughters by picking out

the enemy’s heat signatures. Rroughout the night of 5

August, the Marines in the cemetery huddled underneath

tombs and crypts trying to catch some rest. Re Marines

got excited at the sound of the AC-130, which they called

the “mad jackass” because of the signature sound it made

as it engaged its awesome Urepower on a target.98

Anticipating and planning the next day’s battle or

taking turns on perimeter watch, few of the oTcers, like

their enlisted Marines, got much sleep that night. Rey

maintained overwatch outside the perimeter from P7

amphibious vehicles, the motorized antiarmor teams, and

the LAV-25 armored cars while their leaders planned the

next day from inside the perimeter. Re company

commanders, Captains Morrissey and Sotire,

accompanied by air control oTcer Captain Gibbons, met

to plan the coming day’s course of action.99

At 0500 the next morning (6 August), the militia

Ughters began the day with mortar barrages, signaling to

the Marines in the cemetery that the Ughting had begun.

As the morning progressed, the mortar Ure intensiUed.

Amid the same blistering heat as the day before, the

battle raged with palpable intensity. Under the constant

roar of mortars, small arms, machine gun Ure, and

rockets, the Marines attempted to match the enemy Ure

shot for shot. But the mortar activity from that morning

Uxed itself in the memories of the Marines. “It was

literally raining shrapnel,” recalled tanker Lieutenant

Romas.100 As his Abrams section advanced to support

the infantry along Diagonal Road, the shrapnel was so

thick that he had his tanks “buttoned up,” not allowing

vision slits to remain open for ventilation. Re dust from

the explosions and debris made sight practically

impossible. “I was 50 meters from the tank in front of me

and I couldn’t see it,” he said.101

Rat experience notwithstanding, the 6 August

engagement in the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery favored the

Marine tanks. Reir success began the previous day on

Route Hartford, where Romas recalled a horriUc scene,

one that lingered in his mind and inVuenced the cemetery

battle’s outcome. Stationed on Route Hartford and

patrolling from Revolutionary Square westward about

300 meters from the Imam Ali Mosque, Romas observed

how the “badly outnumbered” Marines struggled to

engage the militia Ughters “shooting out of every

window.”102 Re tank platoon (call sign Tiger), assigned

to Company C when the cemetery assault began,

supported the unit in its mission to clear the cemetery.

Romas focused his eSort on the concentrated militia

strongholds, several three- to Uve-story buildings

occupied by enemy Ughters. Rese structures, coupled

with the never-ending Vow of reinforcements, prevented

Marines from advancing past the eastern edge of their

day’s objective—the built-up area in the southwest corner

of the cemetery.103

Anticipating the substantial task before Company C on

the 6th, Lieutenant Colonel Mayer placed the quick

reaction force and mortar platoons on its Vanks and

ordered the tank platoon in the middle of the Company

C line near the intersection of Route Hartford and the

Diagonal Road.104 Re buildings in the immediate area

were the focus of intense Ughting during the whole battle.

In the heat and intensity of this combat, the Abrams tanks

Ured scores of rounds into enemy positions. As the Major

Moran put it, “Romas earned his pay that day.”105

August 2004 23

Official U.S. Marine Corps Photo

A U.S. Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship raining massive fire on

entrenched militia with its 25mm Gatling gun, firing 1,800 rounds per

minute. The gunship also carried a 40mm grenade machine gun and

105mm howitzer.
With the outside temperature oWen exceeding 120

degrees, the inside of the tanks approached cooking

temperature, making heat stroke a constant threat. Romas’

Marines made it through 5 August without incident

because they arrived fresh and “pumped” with adrenalin.

But with little rest that night and the grueling work in the

same heat conditions on 6 August, the threat of heat

injuries dramatically increased. Romas realized that he

could not keep his crews in Ughting condition at this pace.

He convinced Lieutenant Colonel Mayer to approve putting

one section of tanks on line at a time. While two tanks

engaged in battle, the other section moved to the rear for

two to three hours to recuperate, rest, rehydrate, and eat

while the tank received needed maintenance. Ris rotation

provided some relief but did not entirely solve the

problems. Section B’s commander, Gunnery Sergeant

Michael S. Philley, became a heat casualty, succumbing to

delirium for a time and driving his tank up and down

Route Miami in an erratic manner.106

Lieutenant Romas conceived another idea to help his

troops recover from the debilitating heat. He remembered

having read that professional athletes had used intravenous

hydration to revitalize during hot endurance events to fend

oS heat exhaustion. Romas had his platoon corpsman,

Hospitalman Charles Skeggs, administer Vuids through

multiple intravenous (IV) injections to tank crewmen

during their recuperation periods.107 Re crews came back

from their rest periods in much better condition, oWen

with IVs still in their arms. With their revitalized crews,

Tiger Ured on the enemy for the remainder of the day,

delivering punishing blasts on militia positions with

impressive consistency. Romas’ IV innovation was

adopted by several Marines who fought in the battle.

While Company C’s sector endured most of the enemy

action, strong Ughting continued along the entire

battalion front. More accurate intelligence on militia

strength revealed that the Marines had vastly

underestimated the enemy’s numbers. Original

assessments indicated a few hundred militia Ughters in

and around the cemetery, but as updates placed the

militia force at closer to 1,000 Ughters, operations

planners reevaluated the entire assault plan and

approach.108 Re militia force estimates increased as the

day progressed.

Re mortar platoon moved forward toward its new

objective, which proved more achievable as the planners

halved the original battalion objective. While the mortar

platoon made a pivot toward Company C in support of

the latter’s mission, Company A proceeded toward its

own objective using “blast and pounce” tactics. On

multiple occasions, Captain Staab brought in close air

support to soWen a target before the Alpha Raiders made

their assault.

Captain Kintzley’s reconnaissance platoon also

continued to advance. AWer a successful mission on 5

August, the platoon linked with Company A’s north Vank

to help narrow the company’s front aWer the mortar

platoon began its pivot toward Company C on its move

toward its objective. AWer the connection, Kintzley’s

platoon came under Ure on several occasions. Each time,

however, enemy resistance quickly dissolved aWer close

air support strikes. Kintzley’s platoon reached its objective

and set up a defensive position around the intersection

of Routes Favre and Nova. While settling into his

defensive position, Sergeant John G. Avak noticed what

appeared to be a gun tube behind a wall. AWer he shot a

40mm grenade from his M203 launcher and disabled the

weapon, he saw a SPG-9 recoilless riVe, which could have

caused severe damage to Marine units. A few more 40mm

rounds eliminated the enemy Uring team, and the

reconnaissance platoon moved forward to capture the

gun as a prize, as well as the one militiaman who

remained from the Uring team.109

While Company A and the reconnaissance platoon

advanced, Company C and Company B’s 2d Platoon

stalled around the intersection of Hartford and Diagonal

Road, enduring steady casualties. It was here that

Company C suSered its Urst death.110 Re Marines took

shelter under and between tombs and crypts or against

the cemetery wall, only coming up to Ught and for

resupply. On one of these occasions, Lance Corporal

Larry Wells took a fatal sniper shot. 111

Re engagement grew so intense that Lieutenant

Romas’ tanks could not move west of Diagonal Road.

Although stymied, tank platoon Tiger continued to

deploy its weapons eSectively against enemy positions,

blasting the hotels and other four- and Uve-story

buildings as they became targets. One notable incident

that aWernoon brought a morale boost. While Uring at the

roof of a six-story hotel, one of Gunnery Sergeant

Philley’s tank rounds hit an air conditioning unit. Re

blast sent a huge Ureball several stories into the air. Re

explosion was so large that it scared Romas, who

thought he might get in trouble and recalled thinking that

he “was going to be relieved.” Instead, there came a

rousing cheer from the troops all around, and Lieutenant

Colonel Mayer radioed Romas a hearty “good shot.”

Despite the moderate Marine success, the surprisingly

strong resistance of the militia forced Lieutenant Colonel

Mayer to reevaluate his plan. His Marines had advanced

24 Battle of An-Najaf
as far as the hotels at the edge of Ring Road, but they

could go no farther. By this time, Mayer had reports that

there were as many as 2,000 to 4,000 of al-Sadr’s militia

Ughters in the area. Re original plan of clearing the

cemetery and possibly reaching the Imam Ali Mosque

could not succeed against an enemy of that size. Mayer

halted the assault and asked for reinforcements. Colonel

Haslam agreed, and with the concurrence of I MEF’s

General Conway and Multi-National Forces Iraq, the

Army sent two cavalry battalions to help wrest Najaf and

the Imam Ali Mosque area from al-Sadr’s control.112

In the meantime, Company C’s attack on its objective

continued with the support tanks, gun vehicles, and air. Re

Marines stood by while tanks and the vehicles of the

antiarmor teams and LAV-25s stayed, using their heavy

weapons to clear resistance on Routes Hartford and Miami.

Re militia Ughters launched several small-scale attacks

against the governor’s compound as well, but Captain

Samuel H. Carrasco’s Company B, 1st and 3d Platoons,

handled them easily, killing several enemy Ughters while

his Marines only suSered a few minor injuries.

Captains Gibbons and Lowe in the Company C

objective area continued their close air support

coordination in conjunction with the ground attack.

Gibbons called in 20 sorties with combined artillery

missions, and Lowe logged an equal number of

missions.113 Rey, along with Captain Staab, coordinated

the rotary and Uxed-wing aircraW that inVicted the

heaviest damage and casualties of the entire battle.114

Re climax of the day’s air activity came with the

decision to drop large general-purpose bombs on a key

enemy position. A tip from an Iraqi civilian at the

governor’s compound informed the Marines that a

certain building in the cemetery served as an militia

command center and supply point. Fixed-wing aircraW

delivered four 1,000-pound bombs on the target,

completely destroying the building. Re bombing elicited

“a lot of cheers and wows” from the troops, according to

Captain Sellars.115 An estimated 15 to 20 members of the

militia high command perished in the bombing, which

seriously disrupted militia command and control of the

cemetery defense.

August 2004 25

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines used heavy weapons, such as the 120mm main gun of the M1A1 Abrams tank, TOW missiles, and AT4 rocket launchers to eliminate

pockets of militia resistance in large multi-story buildings in an-Najaf. These multi-story buildings and garages around the cemetery gave alSadr’s militiamen excellent observation and firing positions that many times could only be eliminated by heavy weapons or close air support.
As the sun set on the second day of Ughting, another lull

in ground combat fell over the battleUeld, and activity

shiWed almost exclusively to air attacks. Re AC-130s

continued their missions of straUng enemy positions as

they had the previous night. Re proximity of the Marines

to the militia positions, however, made the Marines’ and

gunships’ tasks diTcult. To distinguish themselves from

the militia Ughters, the Marines placed Meal, Ready-ToEat (MRE) heat packets on top of their helmets so the

infrared sensors on the planes could detect their locations.

By the end of the day, Marine commanders were

moving to break oS the cemetery attack. Re Army had

informed the 11th MEU that the two promised battalions

from the 1st Cavalry Division—1st Battalion, 5th

Regiment, and 2d Battalion, 7th Regiment—would not

arrive until 7 August. Since BLT 1/4 could not accomplish

anything more tactically in the meantime, Colonel

Haslam decided to halt the advance, regroup, and

continue the attack later, when reinforcements would

allow an assault straight through to the objective. Re

interim period would facilitate rest, maintenance to

equipment, and time to train the Iraqi National Guard

contingent. Coalition forces would continue clearing the

cemetery, using armor instead of Marines on foot. At the

same time, the battalion landing team would conduct

raids to destroy enemy supplies, disrupt control, and

otherwise keep al-Sadr’s militia oS balance.116

Re oTcial order to halt the advance through the

cemetery came at 0700 on 7 August. Although

complicated in many areas because of the proximity of

the enemy, the Marines executed a withdrawal from the

Revolutionary Circle area without major incident. Some

Marines had to run 400 to 500 meters under Ure with

full battle packs to waiting transportation back to

Forward Operation Base Hotel.

Back at the base, the Marines welcomed rest and

recovery time, as well as much-needed baths. Company

C’s Lieutenant Sellars asked some of his troops, who had

told him that they were ready to “get some,” if they were

satisUed aWer having spent two days in the cemetery Ught.

“Yes sir,” they replied, although they were in no hurry to

“get some” more for a while.117

Despite not achieving its original objective of clearing

the militia resistance because of the imbalance between

militia numbers and 11th MEU resources, BLT 1/4 could

claim relative success. Re Marines had killed about 350

of al-Sadr’s militia Ughters and wounded hundreds more,

while the Marines lost only Uve killed and 60 wounded.118

Re Marines had deVated militia morale and seriously

disrupted its command structure. Although not a decisive

victory, the Marines would soon have the chance to

complete the work they had begun.

Raid Interlude

Re withdrawal from the cemetery was not an end to

the battle, just the conclusion of its Urst phase. Re 11th

MEU could do nothing more against such a large enemy

considering the size of its force and the delay in the arrival

of reinforcements.119 Re Marines needed to make major

adjustments in their approach, but the mission remained

unchanged: the capture of al-Sadr and the elimination of

his militia.

In fact, the cemetery Ught prompted a major

acceleration of the original plan in dealing with al-Sadr.

When the 11th MEU took over the Najaf-Kufa area from

the Army, Colonel Halsam had outlined a 90-day plan to

allow ample time to organize for the long campaign

against al-Sadr’s forces. But the cemetery Ught changed

everything, and Halsam advanced the timetable from

three months of preparation to as soon as practical—

weeks instead of months. “Iraqi and U.S. forces are

making Unal preparations as we get ready to Unish this

Ught that Muqtada al-Sadr started,” Halsam told the New

York Times. “We will not allow [the Mahdi] to continue to

desecrate this sacred site, using it as an militia base of

operations. Rere will be no sanctuary for thugs and

criminals in Najaf.”120

Re Marines continued to plan for their next move

against the militia Ughters, but how long that process would

take remained uncertain. Such a sizeable and complicated

task deUed an exact time frame. Several matters had to be

addressed, particularly military logistics and political

permissions required to continue operating in the Wadi alSalam area. Re Iraqi government’s desires, area and Ure

mission restrictions, and the possibility of a negotiated

settlement all required attention and consideration.

Since the relatively small size of the Marine attack force

had proven insuTcient, the force for the next phase

needed all the resources available in the theater of

operations, including Marines, Army, Iraqi ground forces

(both mechanized and dismounted), and Polish GROM

Special Forces.121 Marine and Army helicopters, as well

as Marine and Air Force Uxed-wing aircraW, would patrol

the skies in support of the ground forces. Re planners

hoped that a more robust force on land and in the air

would eliminate the militia’s advantages in manpower.

Marine commanders focused their eSorts on planning

and control, particularly on getting the Coalition ground

forces and the Iraqi government of one mind on all

26 Battle of An-Najaf
aspects of the operational picture. On 9 August, just two

days aWer the halt of the cemetery Ughting, 26 high

oTcials of the Iraqi and U.S. military met at Governor alZuruU’s compound to discuss strategy. Re group

included interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, his

defense minister, and key Coalition military leaders,

including General Casey, Lieutenant General Romas F.

Metz, Lieutenant General Conway, and his deputy,

Brigadier General Dennis J. Hejlik. Re conference also

drew a large number of international reporters. Re

militia Ughters learned of the conference, and not long

aWer the meeting began, they launched several mortar

rounds at the governor’s oTces, breaking up the gathering

and scattering the participants, who quickly leW the area.

Re attack ended soon aWer it started aWer forward air

controller Captain Bryant E. Budd Ured a few well-placed

40mm grenade shots with his M79 grenade launcher.122

But the militia had made its statement and prevented any

more future meetings of this sort in the battle area.

As short as it was, the meeting did accomplish a handful

of basic objectives. Re participants agreed on a collective

mechanism for command and coordination at the highest

levels. Re Marines established an 11th MEU subheadquarters and liaison unit. Re unit’s executive oTcer,

Lieutenant Colonel Apicella, took charge of the Marine

contingent and created a communications relay system to

facilitate contact among higher headquarters, Colonel

Haslam, and the national and provincial Iraqi governments.

Re oTcials at the meeting also drastically reduced

exclusion zone restrictions for Ure missions in the battle

area and eased the process of Ure mission approval.

General Hejlik also clariUed the confusion over command

by aTrming that Colonel Haslam would control the battle

without interference from I MEF on tactical matters. To

ensure freedom of action in the Najaf-Kufa area, General

Casey’s Multi-National Command Iraq shiWed control of

the battle area from the Polish-led Multi-National

Division South Central to the Fallujah-based I Marine

Expeditionary Force. Re Polish command did not have

the experience or resources to supervise the kind of

undertaking that the 11th MEU faced.

With collective agreement on the Coalition allocation

of responsibility, Colonel Haslam could act freely to plan

the operation. He had the resources to execute the

mission and much more Vexible political restrictions. On

August 2004 27

Photo by Maj Glen G. Butler

An AH-1W Cobra from HMLA-169 fired a TOW missile at a building in the center of the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery that was being used as a

mortar position.
11 August, Haslam met with his subordinate

commanders at Forward Operating Base Hotel to solidify

plans for operations. Re objective remained the same:

elimination of al-Sadr’s militia from the Najaf-Kufa area

through an overwhelming Unal assault. But before this

assault could take place, Coalition forces needed to soWen

up the militia with constant aggressive patrolling by the

Army cavalry in the cemetery and Old City area and by

conducting raids to destabilize and disrupt militia

operations throughout the Najaf-Kufa area to keep the

enemy oS balance. Re raids would destroy enemy

resources and distract militia leadership from reinforcing

the Imam Ali Mosque area by attacking militia

strongholds and resources.123 Plans moved quickly as

planners slated a raid for the next day. At the same time,

1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, was already engaged in “search

and destroy” patrols in the cemetery. In addition, the

newly arrived 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, positioned itself

for combat operations in southwest Najaf in the Old City.

Unmanned aerial-reconnaissance vehicles (UAVs)

complimented the scouting eSorts of the cavalry by

spotting enemy targets from above the Ughting. Rey

passed information on to supporting artillery or aircraW

to use in targeting and destroying the enemy positions.124

Re battle plans developed simultaneously as Prime

Minister Allawi had I MEF declare a suspension of

operations on 11 August, giving the Iraqi government a

chance to begin dialogue with al-Sadr. Ris move resulted

from the government’s desire for Vexibility with the

political situation, especially recognizing Shi’a sensitivity

regarding the Imam Ali Mosque. Although Governor alZuruU and some of his oTcials believed that the mosque’s

protection was secondary to al-Sadr’s removal, the

national government wanted to pursue negotiations.125

Re militia maintained high morale and, despite their

high number of casualties, convinced themselves that they

had won the Urst Ught because they had forced the Marines

to withdraw from the cemetery. Muqtada al-Sadr rejected

negotiations and released a statement encouraging his

followers to “keep Ughting even if you see me as a prisoner

or a martyr. God willing you will be victorious.”126 One of

his Ughters, Qasim Falshir, echoed the militia’s response to

al-Sadr’s words, stating that “once we are given the order to

Ught, the whole world will not stop us from doing so.” A

militia spokesman declared on 12 August that the “the

morale of the Ughters is very high.”127

28 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of BLT 1/4 on patrol in the Old City, near the cemetery. The Marines were seeking to destabilize and disrupt the operations of the militia

by using aggressive patrolling and by destroying militia assets.
AWer the cemetery Ught, raids and UreUghts became a

daily occurrence. Re Army’s cavalry squadrons carried

out most of the daily Ughting, although BLT 1/4 engaged

in frequent disruption/destruction raids to prevent alSadr and his leadership from having any stability of

communications or operations.

On 12 August, the combined force conducted its Urst

major raid near al-Sadr’s house. Intelligence identiUed the

house and surrounding buildings, where the Borneo

patrol had fought 10 days earlier, as a major militia

strongpoint, serving as a center of militia concentration

and logistics. Re raid tasked Company C, the

reconnaissance platoon, Combined Antiarmor Team A,

and three Iraqi National Guard platoons from the 405th

Battalion with seizing four of the buildings: two houses,

a hospital, and a school, which were adjacent to 800

meters of open lot and a junkyard.

Company C cleared the lot and hospital without

incident. Elsewhere along the front, other battalion

landing team elements maintained violent contact with

the enemy. Combined Antiarmor Team A observed four

militiamen running toward the al-Sadr family’s private

clinic. As two of the men stopped to Ure at Lieutenant

Borneo’s vehicle, Lance Corporal Brandon Shaw returned

Ure with his MK19 grenade launcher. When two other

militia Ughters tried to hide under a fuel tanker truck,

Shaw engaged them as well. With his MK19, he Ured a

few rounds and blew up the truck, along with the

militiamen underneath it.128

Re reconnaissance platoon also remained heavily

engaged with al-Sadr’s forces. Assigned to protect

Company C’s right or east Vank, the unit immediately

came under mortar and small-arms Ure. Re platoon

closed with the smaller enemy element and, under the

leadership of Sergeant Julio C. Palafox, neutralized the

threat with a few 40mm grenades.129

More serious trouble developed with the augmented

forces. Word came that the Iraqi National Guard platoons

and their U.S. Army Special Forces advisors had

encountered heavy resistance at the school, a four-story

building where they met a platoon-sized enemy. Re

Special Forces commander, Captain Michael Tarlowski,

USA, had been killed, and his senior noncommissioned

oTcer, a master sergeant, was seriously wounded. Re

August 2004 29

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of BLT 1/4 enter a house near the al-Sadr compound. The raid on the al-Sadr compound area included Company C, the reconnaissance

platoon, Combined Antiarmor Team A, and three Iraqi National Guard platoons.
reconnaissance platoon and Company C’s 3d Platoon

moved in quickly to assist. Rey came under heavy smallarms and machine gun Ure as they approached. Once

they reached the building, 3d Platoon found itself in an

urban UreUght for the next two hours. Re enemy fought

desperately from the upper Voors. Re militia Ughters

fought oS several of the platoon’s advances by rolling

hand grenades down the stairs and Uring wildly with

machine guns at anything that moved below them.130

AWer the Marine unit failed to dislodge the militiamen,

the task force reevaluated the situation. Re assault team

withdrew to a safe distance and called in close air support.

An Air Force sortie dropped a 500-pound bomb on the

building, but the bomb failed to explode. A follow-on

Maverick missile destroyed almost the entire building,

including the militiamen who occupied it.131 When

Marines returned to the building site, they found a

signiUcant weapons and ammunition cache.132 Re raid

cost the Coalition dearly, with a Special Forces advisor

killed and another wounded, 1 Iraqi National Guardsman

killed and 16 wounded, and 3 Marines wounded. Re

force conUrmed 3 militiamen dead and 18 wounded,

although Colonel Haslam estimated some 40 casualties.

Re Marines could not compile an accurate count of the

enemy dead and wounded in the school building.133

Rere was also a lighter moment that day as Company

C’s 2d platoon cleared and searched al-Sadr’s house. On

his bedroom dresser, the Marines found pictures of

American action movie heroes, including Clint

Eastwood, Bruce Willis, and Harrison Ford.134 It appeared

that al-Sadr, who publicly viliUed Americans and western

culture, secretly idolized American movie stars.

In keeping with its original plan, the 11th MEU kept

up the pressure on al-Sadr’s militia. Early on the morning

of 13 August, the 11th MEU launched a major raid on the

Imam Salah Mosque, directly north of the Kufa Mosque,

which intelligence had marked as a militia stronghold.

Anticipating a signiUcant militia force, the expeditionary

unit developed an elaborate operation plan. Iraqi leaders

did not want foreigners entering a religious site, so that

task was assigned to 36 Commando Unit, which was

composed of Iraqi-Kurdish troops and an Iraqi

counterterrorist force. A robust task force supported the

Iraqis. It included a U.S. Army Special Forces advisory

unit and the 11th MEU’s Maritime Special Purpose Force,

which consisted of a force reconnaissance platoon and a

specially trained riVe platoon. Re special purpose force,

along with the light armored reconnaissance platoon and

Antiarmor Team B, provided a cordon while the 36

Commando and the Iraqi counterterrorist force

conducted the raid.135 Re Marines also provided close

air support, while the remaining task force stood ready

to handle signiUcant enemy resistance.

Militia resistance proved anything but in this instance,

however. Re 11th MEU Maritime Special Purpose Force

killed two militiamen who Ured small arms on them from

rooWops. AWer watching their fellow militiamen fall to

enemy Ure, the rest of their accomplices Ved toward the

Kufa Mosque. In the meantime, Iraqi forces completed

their raid, tallying four enemy killed and nine captured.136

More importantly, the size of the raid demonstrated to

the militia the Coalition’s resolve to eliminate its forces.

Re plan that Colonel Haslam and Lieutenant Colonel

Mayer developed to take down al-Sadr and his militia

depended heavily on urban warfare tactics. Re 11th

MEU staS had learned that the Marines should not

directly engage enemy forces ensconced in buildings but

should attempt to draw them out. Rey also knew that

they could not feasibly search and clear every building.

Re Marines relied on the Army’s capabilities and

equipment to solve this tactical shortcoming. Its M1A2

Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Ughting vehicles provided

the perfect platform for the job. Enemy small arms could

not penetrate the armor of the Bradleys and Abrams,

which could counter with heavier weapons of their own:

the Abrams mounted a 120mm main gun, a .50-caliber

machine gun, and a 7.62mm machine gun, while the

Bradley carried a 25mm cannon, two wire-guided missile

launchers, a 7.62mm machine gun, and two rear-Uring

5.56mm machine guns. Mayer had observed the battle at

Revolutionary Circle and the cemetery Ught Urst hand,

and he requested these Army units as reinforcements

speciUcally for their capabilities. Re addition of armored

30 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by Cpl Matthew S. Richards

Marines of BLT 1/4, behind an earthen berm, and Iraqi security forces

conducted a joint raid on al-Sadr’s compound and neighborhood.
cavalry provided the Marine battalion landing team with

the resources needed to execute Haslam and Mayer’s plan

of armored patrolling, raids, and close air support,

eventually culminating in an assault on the Imam Ali

Mosque. Re Coalition military and government leaders

came to this agreement on 9 August and solidiUed the

details two days later at Colonel Haslam’s brief meeting

at Governor al-ZuruU’s compound.

Elements of the Army’s 5th Cavalry arrived on 7 August

and began combat patrols in the cemetery to the north of

the mosque almost immediately aWer the cemetery Ught.

Re enemy had no chance to move back into their

previously held positions. Further, the restrictions of

movement, eased to 500 meters around the Imam Ali

Mosque, made deployment much easier.137 Re situation

stabilized even more aWer the 7th Cavalry units arrived in

force a few days later. Rey patrolled the western end of

the cemetery as well as the Old City south of the Imam

Ali Mosque and east to FOB David, just south of Najaf.

Both units performed admirably and aggressively. In fact,

the tankers of Lieutenant Colonel James Rainey’s 2d

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, had to be restrained from Uring

their main guns excessively in the cemetery.138 Re

Abrams and Bradleys used identical tactics to engage

snipers, machine guns, rockets, and mortars—draw Ure,

pinpoint the origin, and destroy it. Both units deployed at

least two patrol companies every day, all day, leaving the

militiamen no rest from the constant pressure.139 Re

cavalry’s eTciency also allowed the Marines the luxury

of conducting various raids separately on a daily basis.

Despite the practical invincibility of the Army’s

armored vehicles, they endured one tragic incident on 15

August. During a UreUght, a militiaman climbed onto one

of the tanks and Ured into an opening in the turret lid,

killing the tank commander and the gunner. Re fastthinking driver threw the tank into reverse and crashed it

into a building, covering the tank—and its attacker—with

debris. Re driver and loader escaped. When

reinforcements arrived, they destroyed the enemy

position from which the militiaman came and retrieved

the tank.140

Re remaining Army tank commanders agreed that the

tragedy resulted from too few Marines accompanying the

armored vehicles to protect them. RereaWer, Marine riVe

platoons helped provide 360-degree security around the

tanks and tracks as the vehicles pursued their missions.

Re adjustments worked well, as no other such incidents

occurred for the remainder for the battle period.

Company C’s platoon leader, Lieutenant Sellars, believed

that the militiamen pushed into the Old City to escape

from the cavalry and get out of harm’s way. Lieutenant

Colonel Johnston, the 11th MEU operations oTcer,

asserted that the militiamen feared the Marine security

element more than they did the Abrams and Bradleys.141

Re Coalition also adjusted to the restrictions set by the

Iraqi government dictating that only it could give

permission to attack a mosque and that only Iraqis could

enter the sacred site as the assault force.142 As described

above, the 36 Commando and the Iraqi antiterrorist force

executed the actual assault of the Salah Mosque. Re

Coalition also used 405th Iraqi National Guard Battalion

elements whenever possible. Ris unit was still in training

and not ready for employment in a direct combat role,

but the command viewed its use as progress toward the

Iraqi forces ultimately taking over responsibility for their

nation’s defense.

While Marine commanders labored over Unal assault

preparations, the Iraqi government continued to seek a

negotiated settlement with the militia leadership. Prime

Minister Allawi, in power since 1 June, hoped to persuade

al-Sadr through the political process rather than forcing

him to submit through violence. Not all in the Iraqi

government shared Allawi’s conUdence in negotiation.

Ris group, which included Governor al-ZuruU, wanted

to remove al-Sadr from power by any means and

pressured Allawi to take the hard line. Rese anti-Sadr

oTcials even pushed for disregarding the exclusion zone

restrictions all together, even if it meant destroying the

Imam Ali Mosque to get al-Sadr out of his stronghold.143

Consequently, the Iraqi government carried out a

double-edged policy regarding al-Sadr—negotiate on one

August 2004 31

Photo by SSgt Ashley Brokop, USAF

An U.S. Army M1A1 Abrams tank of 1/5 Cavalry used its 120mm

main gun to respond to an attack by militia during a routine patrol in

Wadi al-Salam Cemetery.
hand and prepare to destroy him on the other. Re

politicians ardently worked at negotiation. Rey had

already called two cease-Ures for talks on 11 and 13

August. Al-Sadr rejected them both, including a

negotiation session with General Hejlik at al-ZuruU’s

compound on 14 August, which broke down aWer just a

few hours. In response, the hard-line An-Najaf Provincial

Council voted and demanded that al-Sadr and the militia

leave Najaf. Re following day, top Iraqi oTcials met with

Lieutenant General Metz, commanding general of MultiNational Forces Central Iraq. As a result of the meeting,

the national government endorsed the An-Najaf

Provincial Council’s 15 August vote to oust al-Sadr.144

Al-Sadr ignored the government’s demand, and the

Ughting continued. Re Army’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry,

and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, resumed their combat

patrols and raids. On 17 August, BLT 1/4’s Companies A

and C each conducted raids in conjunction with 2d

Battalion, 7th Cavalry, that secured several enemy

prisoners and weapons caches. Rat same day, 16 Iraqi

delegates arrived in Najaf for talks with al-Sadr in a classic

application of “carrot and stick” diplomacy.

Re next day, 18 August, every battalion in the 11th

MEU engaged the enemy at some point. Re Army task

forces were heavily engaged as well. Re 5th Cavalry

battalion patrolled the cemetery with a Marine foot

escort, and the 7th Cavalry battalion operated in the Old

City just inside the Ring Road (the beltway that ringed

the Old City surrounding the Imam Ali Mosque) with

helicopter gunships in support.145 Augmentation arrived

daily for the Unal assault, and the 11th MEU planned a

surprise for the militia Ughters that night: an attack on

the Kufa Technical College, a militia strongpoint and

logistical site, heretofore unscathed by the Coalition.

Intelligence identiUed the college as the principal

staging and supply point for the enemy, with perhaps 200

to 300 militiamen occupying the site. Ris base directly

supported the militiamen in the cemetery and al-Sadr’s

Ughters at the Imam Ali Mosque. Re Marines sought to

neutralize the technical college for both military and

psychological reasons. Re Coalition could not allow the

militiamen to think they had a free base from which to

operate. Meanwhile, on the west side of the Euphrates

River and on the southern end sat a major bridge where

32 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of BLT 1/4 during a sweep of an an-Najaf neighborhood, clearing up pockets of resistance and providing support for armored battalions

from the 5th and 7th Cavalry, U.S. Army.
Route Hartford crossed as the main road to FOB Echo at

Diwaniyah. Intelligence believed that the militia Ughters

had rigged the bridge with explosives, so the Marines

neither wanted to nor needed to threaten it. Rey just had

to ensure that the militiamen did not cross it to interfere

with the attack.

Re technical college’s location on the western bank of

the Euphrates River made it an inviting target for Ure.

Intelligence identiUed the campus as ideally located for

an “attack by Ure” from both air and ground Urepower

from across the river, with the plan to destroy the base

without use of ground troops. Re ground elements

would deploy in peripheral areas for security and support.

Re “destruction raid” would commence at about 0200

hours on 19 August.146 Re 50-meter-wide river would

provide ideal Uelds of Ure from an undefended eastern

riverbank, inVicting maximum destruction on the enemy

compound at a minimum risk to Marines.

Re raid party, called Task Force Blackhorse, consisted

of two heavily reinforced Company B platoons,

Antiarmor Team A, the LAV-25 platoon, a section of the

81mm mortars, a 60mm mortar platoon, and the

battalion sniper team. Re Army provided a

psychological operations platoon and a tactical humanintelligence team. Captain Lowe coordinated the air

support. A platoon from Bravo Company occupied a

building next to the bridge to provide overwatch security.

Re reconnaissance platoon established a blocking

position south of the technical college, and Team A set

up west of the campus to block enemy egress.147

As Marine units took their positions on the riverbank,

enemy machine guns opened Ure. A light armored vehicle

answered. Re LAV-25’s cannon achieved immediate Ure

superiority, but the mission called for much more

Urepower. Company B opened up with all its light

weapons and supporting machine guns on the enemy

buildings and targets of opportunity. Antiarmor Team A

Ured tube launched optically tracked wire guided missiles

(TOW) along with its .50-caliber machine guns and

MK19 automatic grenade launchers. From 1,000 meters

to the rear, both mortar platoons pounded the campus

grounds. Re sniper team, positioned on the bridge, Ured

straight down on militiamen moving about the

campus.148 Close air support also demonstrated its

tactical dominance. Captain Lowe called in AC-130 runs

with its 25mm Gatling gun roaring and 105mm howitzer

blasting away. Cobras and Huey gunships soon arrived as

well, spraying the enemy with their mini-guns. Rey Vew

August 2004 33

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of BLT 1/4 preparing to engage militiamen across the Euphrates River during a night attack on the Kufa Technical College. The college

was a major staging area for al-Sadr’s militia.
so low that the shell casings fell on the Marines like rain.

One lieutenant said of the campus that “the whole place

was just an impact area.”

Re raid continued for about an hour. Re militia

attempted to Ught back, but the Marine ground forces

eliminated militiamen resistance as they occupied and

reoccupied destroyed positions. Re attack ended with a

surprising silence. Re Unal casualty count identiUed 73

killed militiamen and an estimated 102 wounded.149 One

Marine suSered a minor wound. AWer the attack, there

were no more militia press statements boasting of the

militia’s high morale. Re Coalition called for another

cease-Ure on 20 August amid speculation that al-Sadr was

willing to negotiate, but nothing came of this pause.150

When word of the failed cease-Ure talks reached the

Marines, the 11th MEU conducted another attack by Ure

with the same units two nights later (21 August).151

Although it had been found empty on previous raids,

intelligence indicated considerable numbers of

militiamen occupying the former police station in Kufa.

Lieutenant Colonel Mayer ordered a sizable raid to

eliminate this new militia garrison. Lieutenant Romas’

four Abrams tanks led the raid, followed by Lieutenant

Kroop’s 12 P7 amphibious assault vehicles carrying two

Company A platoons, and Mayer’s command element.

Re battalion employed the “sneak and peak” tactic, with

the tanks drawing out the enemy so the AC-130s and

helicopter gunships could rain Ure on the militiamen.152

Ris technique proved easier in theory than in practice.

Before the air support arrived, the Ughting escalated

intensely, especially on this occasion when the enemy

used 120mm heavy mortars.153

Re battle at the police station developed slowly at Urst

but then exploded into a furious Ught. Re tanks moved

cautiously a few hundred meters to the front of the

amphibious vehicles, then halted, waiting for Company

A to dismount and begin clearing the building. Suddenly,

the militiamen opened Ure on the tanks, seemingly from

everywhere. Re enemy Ure came with such ferocity that

tank platoon commander Lieutenant Romas recalled

that, for a short while, he actually feared his unit might be

overrun.154 Re political realities caused by the areas of

restrictions made this fear a genuine concern. With a

small mosque in the vicinity, the 11th MEU ordered the

tanks not to use their main guns. Re tanks could only

answer the militia’s weapons with their machine guns.

Nevertheless, the Ure grew so intense that, out of pure

34 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines of Company C, BLT 1/4, assault the outskirts of Najaf’s Old City in preparation for the final push toward the Imam Ali Mosque.
desperation, Gunnery Sergeant Philley ordered his tank

to Ure two main gun rounds into the mosque.155 He

clearly violated orders, but he may have saved his crew.

In the meantime, the P7s reached the police station and

the Marines of Company A dismounted. Rey

immediately engaged in a frenzied UreUght as they began

clearing the objective. Re .50-caliber and MK19s of the

amphibious assault vehicles blazed as militia Ughters

swarmed over the police compound. Captain Staab, the

forward air controller on the mission, took full advantage

of the plentiful targets and called in the AC-130 and

helicopter gunships in rapid succession. Re aircraW Ured

on the militiamen as they scurried about the open ground

in the battle area. Re close air support also razed several

mortar and machine gun emplacements.156

Re Ughting ended when Company A Unished clearing

the Iraqi police station. Overall, the mission was a great

success. Captain Sotire’s Marines took the objective and

killed several enemy Ughters, and they took a number of

prisoners as well. Re 11th MEU estimated that Task

Force Blackhorse killed 45 of al-Sadr’s militiamen and

captured 29. Battalion Landing Team 1/4 suSered only

one injury when a Marine caught his arm in an

amphibious vehicle ramp as it closed.157 Re Marines

departed the site slowly, encumbered by two brokendown P7s and a disabled Abrams tank that had to be

towed back to Forward Operating Base Baker.

Re Army cavalry battalions continued their daily

destructive patrols, aided as before by unmanned aerialreconnaissance vehicles. Re video images from these

aircraW proved invaluable, as Ure support used them to

call in artillery and close air support.158

Not surprisingly, militia morale showed signs of

cracking aWer the Marine successes and as the militia

leadership moved closer toward negotiations. An

“oSensive cessation” on 20 August led commanders to

note progress on al-Sadr’s willingness to accept a ceaseUre deal. Re talks broke down over conditions for

turning the mosque over to Grand Ayatollah Ali alSistani, who negotiated with al-Sadr on the Iraqi

government’s behalf. Ren talks broke down again.159 AlSadr apparently did want a cease-Ure, but he was still

driving a hard bargain.

While al-Sadr stalled peace negotiations, the Coalition

continued planning for its Unal assault. Augmentation

neared completion as multiple units gathered and staged

at various forward operating bases. Rere they awaited

for orders to deploy. Re only real delay came from

indecision over which direction to begin the assault on

the Imam Ali Mosque. Planners favored an attack from

the west, which would pass around a hotel parking garage

complex, but they needed to reconnoiter the precise

avenue of approach. Lieutenant Colonel Mayer launched

a probe during the early hours of 22 August that found

the attack route more diTcult than previously assumed.

Re probing attack consisted of 5th Cavalry tanks and

began shortly aWer 0100. Re force encountered 11

improvised explosive devices while en route to the target.

Re raid focused on the southwest corner of the parking

garage, where the attackers quickly met enemy resistance.

Re engagement started as the cavalry’s guns and close

air support began taking on targets at about 0130. Re

intense resistance forced the tanks to expend half their

ammo in less than 30 minutes. Major Moran described

this engagement as the most violent action he had seen in

the Najaf campaign to this time, including the cemetery

Ught.160 Close air support joined the Ught with the AC130 and Cobra gunships Uring their Gatling guns and

HellUre missiles, respectively. Each made several runs

during the next half hour, destroying various targets.

Lieutenant Colonel Mayer decided to disengage at about

0200 and had an AC-130 cover the withdrawal. Re

aircraW stayed on station, making more runs until 0230.161

Re resistance convinced Lieutenant Colonel Mayer to

change his direction for the assault to a road a few

hundred meters to the north. Re Uerce engagement also

demonstrated that no matter where the attack began, a

tough Ught lay ahead—and it would begin the next day.

Although cease-Ure talks continued concurrently with the

assaults, not enough progress had been made to deter or

delay the Unal assault. As BLT 1/4 Marines prepared, they

had no delusions about the future engagement. Based on

this raid and the cemetery Ught earlier, they felt the worst

was yet to come.162

August 2004 35

Photo by Cpl Matthew S. Richards

Marines and Iraqi National Guard soldiers set up a checkpoint using a

Humvee equipped with TOW guided missile and machine gun.
)e Final Assault

Re Marine commanders completed their planning,

and the maneuver units moved into position. Re 11th

MEU had gathered overwhelming resources for the Uerce

few days of Ughting that the planners and troops both

anticipated might make the cemetery Ught seem mild by

comparison.

Re leaders of the expeditionary unit had conUdence

that they now had more than enough resources on hand

to accomplish the mission. Operations oTcer Lieutenant

Colonel Gary Johnston labored diligently to use all of

them in the battle plan, as the Marines had diTculty

billeting all the units. Forward Operating Base Duke,

where most of the augmentation units stayed,

increasingly resembled a carnival with its overVow of

tents, equipment, and people.

Re units available for the Unal assault amounted to a

formidable force. It included the 11th MEU and all its

generic forces, and U.S. Army units including 1st

Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, a

squadron of Apache helicopter gunships, an engineer

battalion, and Special Forces advisors for the Iraqi units.

Re Iraqi units included four regular battalions, the 36

Commando, and the counterterrorist team. As part of the

international Coalition, the Polish GROM commando

unit also oSered its services.163 All together, this force

amounted to between 5,000 and 6,000 troops against

about 2,000 of al-Sadr’s militiamen. Re Coalition

intended to send al-Sadr a strong message. As Colonel

Haslam put it, “[We wanted to] show ’em [the Mahdi] that

we could come into their world.”164

With all the resources available, the plan of attack

intended to achieve quick victory with minimal

casualties. Re planning carefully considered various

options of approach, and deciding on the scheme

involved several days of nonstop debate and planning.165

Re primary objective remained the Imam Ali Mosque,

and for political reasons, only Iraqi forces would

undertake the actual mosque assault. In the end, planning

came down to two options: a swiW 250-meter attack from

Ring Road north of the mosque moving south along

Route Nova; or a 400-meter eastward thrust along the

axis of Routes Corvette and Camaro and the a hotel

parking garage complex, which included a portion of the

Old City to the north. Re latter option presented a route

36 Battle of An-Najaf

Map by Vincent J. Martinez
with less dense urban terrain and an initial deployment

from an open area.

At the Unal assault rehearsal of concept meeting, 11th

MEU planners convinced Lieutenant General Conway,

who favored the Nova plan, that it was the more

dangerous of the two options. Not only did the route run

through a denser urban area, it also led directly into the

mosque. Any direct movement down Nova risked hitting

the mosque—the very idea of which inspired all the Ure

mission restrictions. Conway conceded this point. So did

Lieutenant General Metz, who remained quiet during

Conway’s questioning. He and Conway soon agreed to

the Corvette-Camaro plan, with a modiUcation from

Lieutenant Colonel Mayer.166 Since the generals favored a

more methodical attack than a thrust, Mayer created a

plan that would establish a toehold in the western part of

the Old City, north of Route Corvette, from which to

operate until the way opened for the eastern thrust

through the dangerous hotel parking garage complex. Re

plan, originally called “Runder Road,” would remain as

the basis, but with the Mayer “toehold” modiUcation.

Runder Road referred to Routes Camaro and Corvette,

with the Imam Ali Mosque listed as Objective A and with

al-Sadr as the target.

Re probing raid of 22 August had inVuenced Mayer as

well. Rat night, Mayer saw that leading oS an assault

from Ring Road down Camaro and Corvette would

produce more casualties than anyone wanted to

contemplate. Re modiUed Runder Road provided a

better option since the original lightening thrust to the

mosque presented too much danger.167

Re plan called for American units to surround the

mosque and then send in Iraqi assault elements using

small arms to mitigate damage to the mosque as much

as possible. In fact, many of the Marines perceived the

original Runder Road plan as dangerous, especially the

seizing of the building next to the mosque numbered 74

in operation orders graphics. Rey viewed this building

as the heart of enemy defenses around the objective, the

seizing of which might result in high casualties. Mayer’s

modiUcation relieved some of the anxiety.

Re battle order identiUed the intersection of Route Ash

and Ring Road, about 150 meters north of the Route

Corvette intersection, as the point of deployment. Ris

location oSered a largely unexposed troop delivery to

Ring Road. Route Ash and several ancillary roads came

through a largely deserted area and up an escarpment of

a long-extinct lake. Ris approach made the Corvette and

August 2004 37

Photo courtesy of Lucian M. Read

Marines setting up tactical positions on the edges of the Wadi al-Salam Cemetery prior to the final push toward the Imam Ali Mosque.
toehold plan even more attractive. Planners expected

explosive devices and perhaps some minor opposition

but arranged for the engineers and combined antiarmor

teams to take care of those matters.

Re Marine tanks would lead the way, followed by an

engineer sweep. Companies A and C would follow in P7

amphibious assault vehicles.168 At the intersection where

Ash meets Ring Road, Company C would deploy south

and occupy two buildings designated 60 and 77. Rese

several-story buildings would serve as bases for the

toehold and cover the movement of Company A along the

northeast section of Ring Road west to building 61, which,

along with another, would serve as its toehold operating

base. From there, Company A would occupy a portion of

the Old City necessary to make Runder Road successful.

Planners expected both companies to encounter Uerce

resistance during deployment to and at the objectives.

From the area of building 61, the plan tasked Company

A with clearing about 400 square meters of the Old City.

Re unit would then merge with 1st Battalion, 5th

Cavalry, whose mission was to clear the Old City both

east and west of Route Nova, also a total of about 400

square meters. Meanwhile, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry,

would suppress enemy activity east and south of the

mosque. AWer accomplishing these missions, the

Americans would have the mosque surrounded and

would halt further advance. At this point, the 36

Commando and the Iraqi counterterrorist team would

assault and clear the mosque complex. Ris would end

the battle—and al-Sadr’s control of Najaf.

While Company A and the cavalry battalions

completed their missions, the landing team’s tanks would

protect the insertion area. Ris would include the

Company C toehold and the area on both sides of Ring

Road between routes Camaro and Corvette as well and

Ring Road east to Company A’s position. Battle planners

expected several buildings in the area, including 16 multistory hotels on the way to the mosque, to cause serious

problems. In fact, anticipating this resistance prompted

Mayer’s modiUcation to the original Runder Road

plan.169

Re air controllers and artillery forward observers

expected another period of intense activity. Re

operation required them to destroy dozens of buildings

as well as to interdict the militia reinforcements they

expected to pour into militia strongholds. Intelligence

reported that unmanned reconnaissance aircraW had

spotted more than 150 carloads of militiamen entering

the area.170

Much to the relief of Marine planners, Lieutenant

General Metz assured the 11th MEU staS that

restrictions, in terms of both area and time, would be

minimized.171 General Casey gave approval to destroy

two major hotels and the parking garage located within

the rows of hotels between routes Camaro and Corvette

on the way to the mosque. Ris preauthorization would

allow the attacking force to deal with major obstacles to

Runder Road more expeditiously. Planners expected

supporting arms to do most of the work. However, even

with the relaxed restrictions to Ure support missions,

during the battle it still took about 20 minutes for major

Ure mission approval.172

Mayer’s toehold operation began at 2230 on 23 August.

Re Marines’ movement did not surprise the militiamen,

and they sporadically opposed the assault convoy with

mortars and rolled 55-gallon drums of burning fuel down

the escarpment beside the attack convoy road along

Routes Ash and Oak.173 Aside from this token resistance,

the assault force rolled to Ring Road almost

uninterrupted.

Re Marines moving at the intersection of Route Ash

and Ring Road did not enjoy such a quiet advance. Once

they came within shooting range, the militiamen opened

up on the Marines with a heavy volume of small-arms

Ure. Consequently, deployment took some time as the

tanks and Ughting vehicles (a 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry,

platoon reinforced BLT 1/4’s tanks) suppressed enemy Ure

as best they could in the chaotic Ughting.174 Re armored

vehicles did so much Uring that they ran out of

ammunition in half an hour.

38 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by LtCol John R. Way

Building 77 was a hotel and the site of vicious fighting during the final

push toward the Imam Ali Mosque. It was during this ferocious fighting

that PFC Ryan Cullenward ran into a militiaman in the basement of

the hotel and engaged the militiaman in hand-to-hand combat.

Ultimately, Cullenward was successful, using his KA-BAR knife.
Re assault plan called for Company C to attack and

clear buildings 60 and 77, both hotels. Rese buildings

would function as the unit’s operating base and serve as

an observation and Ure position for the rest of the battle.

From these points, observers could view the entire west

side of Old City, the whole line of hotels, and the parking

garage between routes Corvette and Camaro. AWer

securing that point, other nearby objectives would follow.

As Company C approached to within 30 meters of the

Urst building, the amphibious vehicles disembarked

their Marines. Supporting Ures liWed their barrages at

0100 on 24 August to allow them to execute their assault.

Rey immediately met strong resistance as the

militiamen opened up with small arms, machine guns,

mortars, and rockets from adjacent buildings. First

Platoon entered and cleared building 60 without

incident. Second Platoon encountered more stubborn

opposition at building 77. Re militia’s Uerce volume of

Ure slowed their advance, and four Marines sustained

wounds from enemy grenade shrapnel. As its Marines

moved in closer to the enemy positions, the platoon

engaged in close-quarters combat, hampered by nearly

zero visibility.175

In the frenzied Ughting that followed, Private First Class

Ryan Cullenward rushed around a corner in the dark hotel

basement and ran straight into a militiaman. Re forceful

collision knocked both men to the ground, and each

dropped his weapon. Cullenward quickly leaped onto the

militiaman and grappled with him in hand-to-hand

combat, ultimately stabbing the militiaman to death with

his KA-BAR Ughting knife.176 Ris altercation

demonstrated an extreme in the intensity of combat

required to clear the remainder of the building. Re

Marines killed four militiamen and sustained 10 wounded,

one seriously, in the process of securing the structure.177

As 2d Platoon secured its objective, the tempo in its

area decreased markedly, and the mission shiWed to

maintaining control of the toehold position. Re unit

continued to take mortar and sniper Ure over the next

two days and responded by setting up a handful of

counter-sniper positions. Lieutenant Sellars’s platoon

took one light casualty when a sniper hit Lance Corporal

Isaac W. Justice in the heel through a peephole in the

building. On the night of 25 August, one member of the

platoon shot and killed a militia rocket team member.

Otherwise, the Company C Marines spent their time

“looking around for something to shoot at.”178

August 2004 39

Photo by Cpl Annette Kyriakides

A Marine sniper looks for enemy snipers in the Old City area of an-Najaf. Marine snipers proved to be the most effective counterforce against

militia snipers.
Captain Peter M. Gibbons and his forward air control

team remained busy calling in air strikes throughout

Company C’s movement. Re strikes destroyed several of

the hotels, the parking garage, and Unally building 74 near

the Imam Ali Mosque.179 Otherwise, the day dragged on

in the intense heat and inactivity, punctuated by the

lingering smell of the four dead militiamen decomposing

nearby in the unbearable 130-degree temperature.

Hardened as they were, the Marines felt compelled to

have the bodies removed.180

Compared to Company C, Company A endured a

nearly opposite experience in their area of responsibility.

Re unit did not have the same pauses between contacts,

nor did they have to actively seek out militia Ughters. Re

enemy found Captain Sotire’s Alpha Raiders the moment

the vehicle ramps went down, and they did not break

contact with the Marines until the battle ended. In fact,

the amphibious vehicles had been under Ure as they

rumbled to the insertion point. Rird Platoon, reinforced

with Weapons Platoon machine gunners, dismounted

Urst and led the way to the objective, building 61, and

their secondary objective, an adjacent school. Both were

situated about 200 meters east of Company C so that they

covered Company A’s Vank.

Although it was under small-arms, mortar, and rocket Ure

throughout its movement, 3d Platoon took building 61 with

no trouble. First Platoon followed by attacking and clearing

the schoolhouse. From these positions, both platoons sent

elements eastward toward new positions that oSered better

observation and Uelds of Ure. Along the way, 1st Platoon

engaged a squad-sized enemy unit in a UreUght that resulted

in two enemy killed. A support-by-Ure position was

established that allowed 1st Platoon to continue east. It then

maneuvered to make contact with the 5th Cavalry as it

moved down Route Nova.181 In the meantime, the supportby-Ure position took a direct mortar hit wounding six

Marines, one seriously. With the urgent casualties

evacuated, the platoon succeeded in taking its last

objectives. Once accomplished, Company A assumed a

stationary posture like Company C had earlier.182

Both units had accomplished their night’s missions,

eSectively securing the Old City north of Route Corvette

with only a handful of “mopping up” operations for the

following day. Companies A and C then waited for the

Army’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and 2d Battalion, 7th

Cavalry, to Unish their missions controlling the north,

south, and east of the Imam Ali Mosque.

While Company C quickly secured its objectives,

Company A continued its hard Ught against the

militiamen. One might label the 25–26 August period of

Company A’s battle as the sniper phase. Like Company C,

Company A took steady Ure for the remainder of the battle,

but in this period it was more intense and more accurate,

perhaps due to reinforcement by better-skilled militia

marksmen. Militia snipers killed two Marines—Lance

Corporal Alexander S. Arrendando and Private First Class

Nicholas M. Skinner. As Lieutenant Colonel Mayer said,

the Marines learned the hard way that snipers needed to go

aWer snipers. When regular riVemen engaged enemy

snipers, they became targets themselves rather than

shooters. Re Marines also learned to keep low when

inside the buildings and especially when on the roofs.183

Re Alpha Raiders adapted quickly, not just with countersniper tactics, but to the use of snipers in general. Coalition

snipers tallied 60 conUrmed kills in a 24-hour period.184

In one unconventional anti-sniper tactic, Captain

Sotire requested tank support. Re militia snipers, Uring

from positions on an extended overhang attached to

building 61, Company A’s base, continued to give the

unit’s own attached snipers a diTcult time. Upon request,

one of Lieutenant Romas’ tanks sent a 120mm round

into the enemy building and brought down the entire

structure, killing all the militia snipers who had nested

there. Alpha’s own snipers did not sustain any injuries.185

With the operations of 25 August succeeding as much

as the previous day, enemy resistance began to wane

signiUcantly. Despite the militia snipers and other isolated

resistance, Company A Urmly secured the entire Old City

in its objective area north of Route Corvette and halted to

wait for the Army’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, to tie in

with Marine lines.186 While they waited, the Marines still

contended with sporadic engagements from fervent

40 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by Cpl Annette Kyriakides

LCpl Christian Bauzo of Alpha Company, BLT 1/4, scans for

militiamen while standing guard in the Old City of an-Najaf.
enemy Ughters. In one notable encounter on the 25th,

Lieutenant Romas’ tankers observed militiamen

running across Route Nova to attack Company A. Re

tanks Ured special obstacle-reduction rounds to clear

Uelds of Ure and thus allowed the Marines to stop the free

movement of militiamen through the area. Re tactic

worked perfectly, and over the next two days, the tanks

prevented al-Sadr’s Ughters from crossing that road.187

Fighting on 25 August raged on all other fronts around

the mosque. Marine tanks, supported by the platoon of the

Army’s Abrams and Bradleys, blasted militia targets,

particularly along Ring Road between Routes Corvette and

Camaro. Rat day and the next, they ran out of ammunition

during that Urst half hour of battle. Re Army’s armor had

to make frequent runs to the resupply point at the

intersection of Ash and Ring Roads to restore their

ammunition just as Lieutenant Romas’ Tiger platoon had

done over the past day.188 Re 130-degree heat also

necessitated the same replenishment and hydration

technique used during the cemetery Ught. Romas’ sections

fought in two-hour shiWs, with crews sometimes having

two or three hydration needles in their arms. Major Moran

noted that in a few cases, tank crewmen had hydration IV

bags hanging in the tanks during the Ughting.189

While Romas’ tanks held the militia Ughters in check,

the Army’s 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and 2d Battalion,

7th Cavalry, wrought the same devastation on the

militiamen in their sectors. With no discernable front

line, the Coalition forces treated the entire area inside

Ring Road as a combat zone. Coalition forces continued

to attack from all directions, including from the air. By

this point, the Imam Ali Mosque provided the only safe

haven for the militia Ughters as the Army and Marine

forces slowly secured control of all the areas around the

mosque. Re Americans’ strict Ure discipline and the

engagement restrictions kept the mosque absolutely oS

limits to any kind of Ure. Re troops stringently followed

this order, despite militia mortar Ure from the mosque

grounds. As Lieutenant General Metz promised, the

restricted zones had been shrunken again and again, but

the mosque itself remained non-negotiable.*

Re militia was a determined foe, but the intense

violence and breadth of the Coalition attack took a major

toll on the militiamen’s willingness to continue the Ught.

Al-Sadr’s attitude regarding negotiations reVected this

decline in his men’s motivation.190 Even before the Unal

assault, the al-Sadr camp began actively pursuing a

negotiated settlement. On 25 August, the Los Angeles

Times reported sagging militia morale in its coverage of

the battle. Re newspaper quoted a militia spokesman, Ali

Smeisim, as saying that al-Sadr “is ready for any peaceful

solution aimed at solving the problem.”191 Re article also

noted that al-Sadr’s support had been declining in recent

days and that militiamen had been “slipping away” aWer

the previous night’s air bombardment. Unmanned

reconnaissance Vights conUrmed an increasing number

of militia deserters away from their Ughting positions.192

Re commanding oTcer of the Army’s 1st Battalion, 5th

Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Myles Miyamasu, made the

point clearly when he stated that “I think they’re tired of

us beating on them.”193

Re Army cavalry units had also noticed reduced

resistance in several areas. Even before the Unal assault

began, intelligence reports noted that signiUcant numbers

of militiamen had been “either killed or leW,” although a

number of dedicated Ughters remained in the area. AWer

the Unal assault began, the militiamen demonstrated their

reluctance to Ught. Lieutenant Colonel James Rainey, 2d

Battalion, 7th Cavalry’s commanding oTcer, observed

early in the attack that “this is the Urst day we have not

seen a lot of enemy coming at us.” One tired-looking

militiaman told a Washington Post correspondent that

“we have many killed and wounded and we cannot count

them because of the situation.”194

Despite the militia leadership’s proclaimed desire to the

end the Ughting, cease-Ure talks had reached a standoS,

and the Iraqi government continued to take a hard line.

One government oTcial said that “if [al-Sadr] continues

to resist, there will be no option for him other than death

or prison.” Re hard line combined with the assault

seemed geared at “sparking a resolution.”195

Ris approach seemed to be working, but the

government wanted insurance, so it pressed even harder.

AWer the pounding the militia Ughters endured during

the night of 24–25 August, Sheikh Ahmed al-Shibani, a

senior al-Sadr aide, stated that the militiamen wanted to

come out of the mosque right away. Re Coalition, with

the Iraqi government’s endorsement, not only rejected the

oSer, but proceeded with the second day of armor and air

attacks, which included a night bombing even more

devastating than the previous one.196 Rese attacks

included destruction of the hotels and parking garage that

served as the militia’s headquarters and logistical base. By

the next day, 26 August, the militia leadership recognized

its predicament: accept the government’s conditions or

face complete annihilation.

August 2004 41

* Despite the intense fighting that took place around the Iman Ali

Mosque, the only damage observed on the mosque itself was a missing

chip off of one corner, apparently caused by a militia mortar misfire.
As 26 August dawned, the Ughting continued, with the

situation worsening for the militia resistance. Fighters

continued to desert, and those who remained faced almost

certain death. By 1500, the Coalition forces had

surrounded the Imam Ali Mosque within 100 meters, and

the Iraqi commando units stood poised to make their

assault.197 Militia leaders requested a cease-Ure to negotiate

surrender, which the Coalition commanders granted. At

1515, General Casey issued Fragmentary Order 582, which

directed oSensive actions in Najaf to cease.198 At 0200 the

next morning (27 August), the Iraqi government

announced that a truce had been reached and that

hostilities would oTcially end at 1000, 27 August 2004.199

Ultimately, immediate credit for the truce belonged to

Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, the leading Shi’a cleric in

Iraq, who brokered the deal on behalf of the Iraqi

government. His moderate political position on

negotiated solutions to problems won him the trust of

Iraq’s new leaders. Re militia would turn over the keys

to the Imam Ali Mosque to him.

Both sides agreed to a series of straightforward

conditions for the truce. Re militia commanders agreed

to lay down their weapons and leave the Old City,

including the Imam Ali Mosque in particular. In addition,

the militia would turn the entire Najaf-Kufa area over to

the Iraqi government, speciUcally the Iraqi police and the

Iraqi National Guard. Re agreement called for al-Sadr to

relinquish all political control and use his inVuence for

peaceful means, supposedly forcing him to work within

the political mainstream of Iraq.

A*ermath

In 24 days of intermittent Ughting for control of Najaf,

the Marines lost seven killed in action and the Army

cavalry two men. In addition, the 11th MEU suSered 94

wounded.200 With nearly all of these casualties coming

from BLT 1/4’s approximately 800 service personnel, this

represented about a 12 percent casualty rate. Coalition

dead also included one American soldier (Captain

Michael Tarlowski) and a signiUcant number of Iraqi

soldiers killed and wounded. Rese numbers paled in

42 Battle of An-Najaf

Photo by Cpl Matthew S. Richards

Iraqi police and security force members secure their positions with lightweight utility trucks while 1/4 Marines conduct a raid near the Imam Ali

Mosque.
comparison to militia losses. Re 11th MEU estimated

1,500 of al-Sadr’s Ughters killed and an undetermined

number wounded, most likely in the thousands.201 By any

standard, the Coalition forces, led by the 11th MEU, had

clearly defeated the enemy tactically.

Coalition forces achieved not only a tactical victory in

the battle of Najaf, but a political one as well. Rey

removed al-Sadr and his forces from the city and

eliminated the restrictions and exclusion zones created

during the May truce. Re battle reduced the restricted

areas, which began as large sections of Najaf and Kufa,

Urst to 1,000 meters from the mosque, then ending up

only 100 meters from it.202 Re Unal restriction

adjustment allowed Coalition forces to drop a 2,000-

pound bomb on building 74, which may have been the

breaking point that led to al-Sadr’s decision to accept the

government’s deal. AWer that particularly devastating

blast, Marines spotted militiamen running away through

the streets and alleys of the Old City.203 Re Coalition

victory also gave the Iraqi government the conUdence it

needed to follow through with the second assault on

Fallujah in the months to come in order to eliminate

militia control there.

Re implementation of the truce appeared to progress

smoothly, with the militiamen abandoning their weapons

to the Coalition’s satisfaction.204 Several Marine oTcers,

however, expressed skepticism about the success of the

weapons collection. Rey said that several militiamen

simply hid their weapons in nearby houses.205 Lieutenant

Romas, the tank platoon leader, said that he saw

militiamen hauling weapons out of the mosque area in

wheelbarrows.206 Subsequent Marine raids in the area

validated these claims, as they discovered dozens of

weapons caches.207

Re battle’s conclusion placed a new face on Najaf and

Kufa. With the truce, the 11th MEU shiWed from combat

to security and stability operations, the unit’s originally

assigned mission. Ris phase of the operation moved

along with remarkable eTciency. BLT 1/4 Marines altered

their activities to manning traTc control points in order

to search for weapons and to control traTc Vow. As far

as people’s activities and human relations were concerned,

the only physical evidence of the battle was that it was

easy to tell the former militiamen on the streets. Instead

of their black uniforms, they now wore street clothes as

well as scowls and stares of hatred directed at the

Marines.208 Ris challenge with identity continued as the

Marines found themselves immediately engaged in

reconstruction projects in an attempt to win the good will

of the people of Najaf, so badly aSected by the battle.

Almost all of the work took place in the Old City, which

had suSered most of the damage. Re Marines struggled

initially to gain the Iraqi people’s conUdence aWer such a

violent ordeal, but they acted quickly and sincerely and

eventually won favor.

Colonel Haslam traveled door to door for weeks

handing out compensation money to aSected families.

Over the next few months, the 11th MEU distributed

almost $45 million in condolence and compensation

payments, as well as funding for infrastructure repair and

construction projects. Rese included eight new schools

and repairs to 24 more. Re funds also reconstituted 36

police stations and checkpoints.209

Re general population warmly accepted these eSorts.

Re political situation stabilized quickly, and on 30

November 2004, an appreciative Iraqi government

returned local control of Najaf to its citizens. Re 11th

Marine Expeditionary Unit leW Iraq in February 2005 to

return to its home station at Camp Pendleton, California.

Among Marines, the opinions of the way the battle of

Najaf ended varied. Many were disappointed. Rey

wondered why they could not just Unish it by taking the

mosque. But in time, most concluded that the negotiated

deal and the restrictions on Ure missions that satisUed Iraqi

sensibilities were the right thing.210 It legitimized the new

Iraqi government at a critical time, and, in the eyes of many

at the time, gave it Urmer footing for it to move forward.

August 2004 43

Photo by Cpl Daniel J. Fosco

Marines with Company C, BLT 1/4, keep watch to ensure the safety of

civilians in an-Najaf, Iraq.
1. Maj Coby M. Moran interview with LtCol John R. Way,

23 Oct 2004 (Marine Corps History Division [MCHD],

Quantico, VA)—hereaWer Moran interview.

2. LtCol Gary S. Johnston interview with LtCol John R.

Way, 28 Dec 2004 (MCHD)—hereaWer Johnston

interview.

3. Moran interview.

4. Re area al-Sadr controlled included the Imam Ali

Mosque, considered the third most important site by

Shi’a Muslims, and the adjacent 15-square-kilometer

Wadi al-Salam Cemetery.

5. Johnston interview; Moran interview.

6. “Prime Minister Allawi, Interim Prime Minister,” White

House news release, 1 June 2004.

7. GySgt Chago Zapata, “11th MEU Battles Anti–Iraqi

Forces in Najaf,” 6 Aug 2004, Public Relations Report

#2020048120100.

8. Col Anthony M. Haslam interview with LtCol John R.

Way, 29 Dec 2004 (MCHD)—hereaWer Haslam

interview; Johnston interview.

9. “Re ConVict in Iraq: Combat; U.S. holds Back from

Attacking Rebels in Najaf,” New York Times, 12 Aug

2004, p. 2.

10. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004;

Johnston interview.

11. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 8

(Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

12. Re burial site of Muhammad’s cousin, Ali ibn Abi

Talib.

13. LtCol Eugene N. Apicella interview with LtCol John R.

Way, 30 Dec 2004 (MCHD)—hereaWer Apicella

interview.

14. Moran interview.

15. Apicella interview.

16. Cpl Matthew S. Richards, “11th MEU Arrives in Iraq,”

26 Jul 2004, Public Relations Report

#20200472613498—hereaWer 11th MEU PA report 26

Jul 2004.

17. 1stLt Jeremy T. Sellars interview with LtCol John R.

Way, 29 Dec 2004 (MCHD)—hereaWer Sellars

interview.

18. Apicella interview.

19. Moran interview.

20. Sellars interview.

21. Sellars interview.

22. Sellars interview; Moran interview.

23. Sellars interview.

24. Johnston interview.

25. Cpl Matthew S. Richards, “11th MEU Recon Out in

Open in Iraq,” 5 Oct 2004, Public Relations Report

#20200410564454—hereaWer 11th MEU PA report 5

Oct 2004.

26. Haslam interview.

27. LtCol Gary S. Johnston email to author, 28 Nov 2006—

hereaWer Johnston email 28 Nov 2006.

28. Haslam interview; Johnston interview; Johnston email

28 Nov 2006.

29. Maj Coby M. Moran email to author, 28 Nov 2006—

hereaWer Moran email 28 Nov 2006; 11th MEU

Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004.

30. Johnston interview; Johnston email 28 Nov 2006.

31. 1stLt Michael J. Borneo interview with LtCol John R.

Way, 23 Oct 2004 (MCHD)—hereaWer Borneo

interview; Maj Coby M. Moran phone conversation

with author, 13 Nov 2006—hereaWer Moran phone

conversation 13 Nov 2006.

32. Haslam interview.

33. Johnston interview; Borneo interview; Moran phone

conversation 13 Nov 2006.

34. Borneo interview.

35. Borneo interview; Moran interview.

36. Moran interview.

37. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, pp. 14–

15; Borneo interview; Moran interview.

38. Borneo interview.

39. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 14.

40. Ibid.

41. Borneo interview.

42. Ibid.; Moran interview; BLT 1/4 Command

Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 14.

43. Borneo interview; Moran interview.

44. Johnston interview; Johnston email 28 Nov 2006; BLT

1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 15.

44 Battle of An-Najaf

Notes
45. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, pp. 11–

14.

46. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 11;

Consolidated Combat Action Ribbon List with

Summary of Actions—hereaWer BLT 1/4 CAR

summary.

47. Borneo interview.

48. Moran interview.

49. Haslam interview; Moran interview.

50. Cpl James T. Jenkins and Cpl Calvert C. Wallace

interview with LtCol John R. Way, 31 Dec 2004

(MCHD)—hereaWer Jenkins and Wallace interview.

51. 11th MEU PA report 6 Aug 2004.

52. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 14.

53. 1stLt Russell L. Romas interview by Frank Kozlowski,

24–26 Oct 2004 (MCHD)—hereaWer Romas

interview; Sellars interview.

54. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 41.

55. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 15.

56. Ibid.

57. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004,

Weapons Platoon AWer Action Report—hereaWer

Mortar AAR.

58. Haslam interview; Borneo interview; Mortar AAR.

59. Moran interview.

60. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 16.

61. Borneo interview; BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–

Dec 2004, p. 16.

62. Moran interview; Borneo interview; Romas interview.

63. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 16.

64. Maj Glen G. Butler interview by LtCol John R. Way, 15

Jun 2005 (MCHD)—hereaWer Butler interview.

65. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, p. 4.

66. Butler interview; HMM–166 Command Chronology,

Jul–Dec 2004, p. 24.

67. LtCol John L. Mayer interview by LtCol John R. Way, 20

Oct 2004 (MCHD)—hereaWer Mayer interview; BLT

1/4, CAR summary, p. 21.

68. Mayer interview; BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–

Dec 2004, S–2 Section.

69. Moran interview.

70. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 16.

71. Ibid.

72. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, pp. 8, 20.

73. Sellars interview.

74. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, pp. 16,

17.

75. Ibid., p. 18.

76. Moran interview; Mayer interview.

77. Haslam interview; Mayer interview; Johnston interview.

78. Haslam interview; Johnston interview; Moran

interview.

79. Moran interview.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.; Maj Coby M. Moran phone conversation with

author, 30 Jan 2007—hereaWer Moran 30 Jan 2007.

82. Jenkins and Wallace interview; BLT 1/4 Command

Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 12.

83. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 19;

Borneo interview.

84. Jenkins and Wallace interview.

85. Apicella interview; Mayer interview; Moran interview;

Sellars interview; Jenkins and Wallace interview.

86. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 13.

87. Cpl Matthew S. Richards, 11th MEU Public ASairs

Report #2020049284211, 2 Sep 2004—hereaWer 11th

MEU PA report 2 Sep 2004.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, p. 4; Moran interview.

91. Moran interview.

92. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 19.

93. Ibid., AAR.

94. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, Vaughn

citation.

95. Johnston interview; Haslam interview; Mayer

interview; Moran interview.

96. Jenkins and Wallace interview.

97. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 19.

98. Sellars interview.

99. Moran interview.

August 2004 45
100. Romas interview.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Moran interview.

104. Romas interview.

105. Moran interview.

106. Romas interview.

107. Ibid.

108. Moran interview; Johnston interview.

109. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 31;

Moran interview.

110. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 11;

Moran interview.

111. Sellars interview; Jenkins and Wallace interview.

112. Mayer interview; Haslam interview.

113. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 12.

114. Moran interview; Johnston interview; Sellars interview.

115. Ibid.

116. Moran interview; Haslam interview; Johnston

interview.

117. Sellars interview.

118. Moran interview; Johnston interview; Haslam

interview; Mayer interview.

119. Haslam interview.

120. “Re ConVict in Iraq: U.S. holds Back from Attacking

Rebels in Najaf,” New York Times, 12 Aug 2004, p. 1.

121. Moran interview.

122. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, pp. 23, 27.

123. Moran interview.

124. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 12.

125. Johnston interview; Moran interview.

126. “Marines Plan Big Assault,” USA Today, 12 Aug 2004.

127. “Re ConVict in Iraq: U.S. holds Back from Attacking

Rebels in Najaf,” New York Times, 12 Aug 2004, p. 2;

Washington Times, 13 Aug 2004, p. 2.

128. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 23.

129. Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

130. Ibid., pp. 23, 24, 30.

131. Sellars interview.

132. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, pp. 15, 16.

133. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 13.

Haslam interview.

134. Mayer interview.

135. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 13.

136. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, p. 28.

137. Johnston interview; Mayer interview.

138. Johnston interview.

139. Sellars interview.

140. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, pp.

13, 14. Romas interview.

141. Sellars interview; Johnston interview.

142. “Re ConVict in Iraq: U.S. holds Back from Attacking

Rebels in Najaf,” New York Times, 12 Aug 2004, p. 1.

143. Johnston interview.

144. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, I

MEF, Award Recommendation (Presidential Unit

Citation) for 11th MEU—hereaWer I MEF

recommendation.

145. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 14.

146. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, pp. 12,

25.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid.

149. Ibid., p. 25.

150. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 41.

151. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 12.

152. Mayer interview; Romas interview.

153. Mayer interview.

154. Romas interview.

155. Ibid.

156. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, pp. 10,

22, 36; Moran interview.

157. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, I

MEF recommendation.

158. Haslam interview; Apicella interview; Johnston

interview.

159. Kara Newcomer email to author, 22 Aug 2004.

46 Battle of An-Najaf
160. Moran interview; Mayer interview.

161. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 16.

162. Sellars interview.

163. Johnston interview.

164. Haslam interview.

165. Johnston interview; Borneo interview; Romas

interview.

166. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 43;

Haslam interview; Johnston interview.

167. Johnston interview; Mayer interview; Moran interview;

Sellars interview.

168. Moran interview.

169. Ibid.

170. Sellars interview.

171. Johnston interview.

172. Haslam interview.

173. Romas interview.

174. BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 27.

175. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, p. 16.

176. Ibid.; Sellars interview.

177. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, p. 16.

178. Sellars interview; Jenkins and Wallace interview; BLT

1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 32.

179. Sellars interview; Jenkins and Wallace interview;

Johnston interview.

180. Sellars interview; Jenkins and Wallace interview.

181. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 18.

182. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, pp. 9, 10.

183. Mayer interview.

184. Johnston interview.

185. Romas interview.

186. Ibid.

187. Ibid.

188. Mayer interview.

189. Moran interview; BLT 1/4 Command Chronology, Jul–

Dec 2004, p. 30.

190. Johnston interview.

191. Christian Miller and Edmund Sanders, “Iraq Deploys

Guardsmen Outside Mosque in Najaf,” Los Angeles

Times, 25 Aug 2004.

192. Johnston interview.

193. Karl Vick and Nasser Nouri, “U.S. Forces Launch

OSensive Near Shrine,” Washington Post Foreign

Service, 24 Aug 2004.

194. Karl Vick and Nasser Nouri, “U.S. Forces Launch

OSensive Near Shrine,” Washington Post Foreign

Service, 24 Aug 2004.

195. Christian Miller and Edmund Sanders, “Iraq Deploys

Guardsmen Outside Mosque in Najaf,” Los Angeles

Times, 25 Aug 2004.

196. Johnston interview.

197. Mayer interview; Haslam interview; Johnston

interview; Moran interview.

198. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 18.

199. BLT 1/4 CAR summary, p. 10.

200. 11th MEU Command Chronology, Jul–Dec 2004, p. 19.

201. Johnston interview.

202. Haslam interview; Johnston interview.

203. Johnston interview.

204. Haslam interview; Mayer interview.

205. Moran interview; Sellars interview.

206. Romas interview.

207. Mayer interview.

208. Sellars interview; Borneo interview.

209. “11th MEU Begins Return Home,” 7 Feb 2005, Public

ASairs Report #20052713418; Johnston interview.

210. Butler interview; Haslam interview; Mayer interview;

Johnston interview.

August 2004 47
Back Cover: The logotype reproduced on the back cover has as its major element the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the

United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the

device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.
About the Author and Acknowledgments

Francis X. “Frank” Kozlowski served as an enlisted machine gunner and engineer oTcer between 1969 and 1972. He earned his

doctorate in history from the State University of New York at Binghamton in 1990.

Author acknowledgments: Publishing a monograph such as this is not a one-man show. Behind the author stand many people to

whom I am deeply indebted. First there is Colonel (Retired) Richard Camp, who, as acting director of the Marine Corps History

Division, commissioned me to take on writing the battle of Najaf. His enthusiastic leadership provided constant encouragement and

motivation. Ren there is Lieutenant Colonel John R. Way, whose Ueld work was responsible for the bulk of oral history material and

virtually all of the photographs used in the battle study. Dr. Bradford A. Wineman, professor at the Department of Military History,

U.S. Army Command and General StaS College, assembled the manuscript in its Unal form and selected and captioned the

photographs used. Dr. Wineman is currently an instructor at the Marine Corps University Command and StaS College.

I had the good fortune of making contact with and receiving ongoing assistance from two highly signiUcant participants in the

Najaf battle. Rese were Lieutenant Colonel Gary S. Johnston, operations oTcer for the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Major

Coby M. Moran, operations oTcer for Battalion Landing Team 1/4. Major Moran was an omnibus of help. He read my work chapter

by chapter and provided clariUcation, elaboration, and commentary that enhanced the book a great deal. His keen computer skills

also allowed for custom map-making and collation of photos for the Unal product, something that only an adept participant could

do. Lieutenant Colonel Johnston read the book chapter by chapter for accuracy and added to overall quality by his own thorough

elaboration and clarifying thoughts. In addition, he provided several invaluable maps and charts from his own Ules that allowed

many abstract descriptions to become concrete. His skillful editorial assistance was helpful as well. Re contributions of these two

Une men bespeak their noteworthy quality as Marine oTcers. Reir invaluable input took the Najaf piece to a level not otherwise

possible. Special thanks also goes to Captain Ethan Astor, BLT 1/4’s personnel oTcer, and Major Steven O. Wallace, BLT 1/4’s

Weapons Company commander.

Mr. Charles D. Melson, Chief Historian of the History Division, supplied a constant source of administrative guidance and wise

counsel. Dr. Fred Allison and Ms. Annette Amerman helped locate participants for information and to clarify names. Finally, a debt

of gratitude is owed to Mr. Romas Yonkin for technical aid and to the History Division staS, whose administrative assistance

facilitated things in general. Needed review and editing came from Mr. Charles R. Smith, Mr. Kenneth H. Williams, Major Valerie A.

Jackson, and Mr. Gregory A. Macheak. Layout and design by Mr. Vincent J. Martinez. Special thanks to Lucian M. Read for his

generous contribution of photography taken during the battle of an-Najaf while enbedded with the Marines of BLT 1/4.

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC

2009

PCN 10600000600

Marines from Alpha Company, BLT 1/4, 11th

MEU, on patrol looking for militiamen in the Old

City of an-Najaf, Iraq.

Cpl Annette Kyriakides