IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent, 

v. 

JERRY ALLEN HERRON, 

Petitioner. 

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No. 89571-6 

En Bane 

Filed AUG 2 0 2015 

_________________________ ) 

FAIRHURST, J.-We must decide whether Jerry Allen Herron waived his 

right to a public trial and, if so, whether he may later assert the public's right to an 

open proceeding. The Court of Appeals affirmed Herron's conviction, holding that 

Herron waived his public trial right and that he lacked standing to assert the rights 

of the general public. We affirm. 

I. FACTS 

Herron was charged with rape in the first degree while armed with a deadly 

weapon for sexually assaulting an acquaintance at knifepoint in his car. Roughly a 

week and a half before trial, the trial court held an initial readiness hearing where it 

informed the parties that it typically used a jury questionnaire in sexual assault cases 
State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

to discover sensitive information that might require questioning jurors individually. 

The court explained that in light of recent appellate court decisions, the practice of 

questioning jurors in chambers conflicted with Herron's public trial right. Thus, the 

court stated that "if there is any objection, I can't -- follow that procedure--." 1 

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 69 (June 8, 2007). Defense counsel 

indicated, "We certainly don't object to that." Id. 

The prosecuting attorney advised that Herron would need to affirmatively 

waive his right to a public trial on the record in order to question jurors in chambers. 

Alternatively, the prosecuting attorney suggested that the court could question 

individual jurors in a public setting with the other jurors waiting in a separate room. 

Defense counsel responded that he would not object and that "if we're looking for 

an affirmative waiver of a public examination of these individual jurors, Mr. Herron 

and I are present, we're certainly willing to waive that. ... I think that's going to 

bear far more fruit than just simply a voir dire situation." I d. at 70. 

At this point, the court inquired whether Herron understood the conversation 

and Herron replied that he did, expressly agreeing with the idea of conducting 

individual voir dire in the privacy of the judge's chambers. The court again explained 

the procedure and the rationale behind questioning certain jurors in chambers about 

their experience with sexual assault, ultimately advising Herron that whether jurors 

would be questioned in chambers or in open court was "pretty much up to you." Id. 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

at 72. The court declined to make a decision at that hearing and instructed Herron to 

further discuss the matter with his attorney. 

At a pretrial hearing the following week, the court revisited the issue. Defense 

counsel advised the court that he had discussed the matter with Herron, who was 

willing to waive his right to a public trial in order to question certain jurors privately 

in chambers. The court then engaged in an extensive colloquy with Herron. 

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Herron, you understand you have a 

right to a public trial, where no one other than perhaps the witnesses are 

excluded from the courtroom, and where -- when the jury questioning 

takes place, you have a right to have anybody that wants to be here 

present for that process. Do you understand that fully? 

DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: And by the same token, if you want to waive that 

right so that jurors will know that if they respond positively to some of 

these questions about things like have they ever been accused of a sex 

offense or been a victim of a sex offense or an unwanted sexual 

touching, have a close friend or family member -- we discussed last 

week, very often individuals are very reluctant to disclose those things, 

and particularly to disclose those things if they know they're going to 

be talked about in front of, well, for instance, 50 other jurors and other 

members of the public. 

DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

1 VRP at 104-05 (June 15, 2007). The court then reiterated that the decision was 

completely up to Herron. Herron expressed that he preferred to question these jurors 

in chambers. The court then verified whether Herron had spoken to his counsel about 

the matter, and Herron assured the court that he had. The court again asked Herron 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

if he was sure that he wanted to proceed with the closure, and Herron again 

responded that he was. 

At this point, the court turned to the prosecuting attorney for input, who 

suggested that Herron be given the option of having jurors interviewed on sensitive 

topics in an open setting but away from other jurors, "in an atmosphere that is open 

to the public, so it would comport with the defendant's right to a public trial." Id. at 

106. The court presented this option to Herron, but Herron again stated that he 

preferred to "have it done not in public" to avoid jurors from being "influenced by 

other people." Id. at 108. 

Based on these extensive colloquies, the trial court found that Herron made a 

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his public trial right. Defense counsel 

then stated that Herron would be willing to sign a written waiver to that effect, but 

it does not appear that one was ever executed. 

Three days later, the court began voir dire. The parties met briefly in chambers 

to decide which jurors would require individual questioning based on their responses 

to juror questionnaires. The court then called these jurors into chambers, and all 

parties participated in the questioning. Four jurors were excused for cause as a result 

of the individual juror questioning. 

A jury was eventually empaneled, and Herron was found guilty of first degree 

rape while armed with a deadly weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed Herron's 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

conviction. State v. Herron, 177 Wn. App. 96,318 P.3d 281 (2013). We granted 

review. State v. Herron, 182 Wn.2d 1001,342 P.3d 326 (2015). 

II. ISSUES 

1. Did Herron waive his right to a public trial? 

2. Does Herron have standing to assert the general public's right to the 

open administration of justice? 

III. ANALYSIS 

Article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantees a criminal 

defendant the right to a public trial. This public trial right extends to the questioning 

of individual jurors in chambers. State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140, 151-52,217 P.3d 

321 (2009). Before a courtroom may be closed, the trial court must engage in a fivefactor analysis commonly referred to as the Bone-Club analysis. State v. Bone-Club, 

128 Wn.2d 254, 259-60, 906 P.2d 325 (1995). 

It is undisputed that the courtroom here was closed when individual jurors 

were questioned in chambers. Moreover, the record indicates that the trial court did 

not expressly engage in a Bone-Club analysis. The resolution of this case thus 

depends on whether Herron validly waived his public trial right and, if so, whether 

Herron may then assert standing on behalf of the general public. 1 

1

We typically engage in a three-step analysis to determine whether there has been a 

violation of the public trial right. State v. Smith, 181 Wn.2d 508, 513, 334 P.3d 1049 (2014). But 

the issue before us now is not whether there has been a violation of the public trial right but, rather, 

whether Herron waived his ability to assert such a violation on appeal. 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

A. Herron knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his public trial right 

We review whether a defendant waived a constitutional right de novo. State 

v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 301, 253 P.3d 84 (2011). In general, the waiver of a 

constitutional right must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. State v. 

Thomas, 128 Wn.2d 553, 558, 910 P.2d 475 (1996). But waivers of different 

constitutional rights meet this standard in different ways. "The validity of any waiver 

of a constitutional right, as well as the inquiry required by the court to establish 

waiver, will depend on the circumstances of each case." State v. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d 

719, 725, 881 P.2d 979 (1994). 

Turning to our public trial jurisprudence, two relevant principles emerge and 

define the contours of a valid waiver. First, mere silence is not sufficient to constitute 

waiver. State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 15, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012) (defendant does not 

waive right to a public trial by failing to object). Rather, the defendant must be 

provided with a meaningful opportunity to object. For instance, in Bone-Club, 128 

Wn.2d at 261, we held that the trial court's "summary closure" deprived the 

defendant of a meaningful opportunity to object. We stated that "an opportunity to 

object holds 'no practical meaning' unless the court informs potential objectors of 

the nature of the asserted interests." Id. (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 

Wn.2d 30, 39, 640 P.2d 716 (1982)). We similarly acknowledged in State v. 

Easterling, 157 Wn.2d 167, 176 n.8, 137 P.3d 825 (2006), that a defendant does not 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

waive his ability to challenge an improper closure on appeal by failing to lodge a 

contemporaneous objection. Notably, we faulted the trial court for failing to 

affirmatively provide the defendant with an opportunity to object.Jd. 

Second, a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of the public trial right 

would not require on-the-record advice as to the consequences of a waiver but, 

rather, may be obtained through "an affirmative and unequivocal personal 

expression of waiver" that the defendant understands his right and voluntarily 

chooses to waive it. State v. Frawley, 181 Wn.2d 452,461-62, 334 P.3d 1022 (2014) 

(plurality opinion). This may be achieved through a written waiver or "an equivalent 

colloquy that satisfies this standard." ld. at 462. 

While these factors are not exhaustive, they permit us to resolve the case 

before us. There may be other factors in any given case that would establish that a 

waiver was or was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We must address those 

factors as they arise. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d at 725 (validity of waiver "will depend on 

the circumstances of each case"). 

It is readily apparent that this case does not present an instance of waiver by 

silence. Rather, the trial court provided Herron with several meaningful 

opportunities to object. Roughly a week and a half before trial, the court advised 

Herron that it would not question individual jurors in chambers if Herron objected 

and the State presented an alternative to closure. Although both defense counsel and 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

Herron related that they preferred to have individual juror questioning conducted in 

chambers, the trial court instructed Herron to discuss the issue further with defense 

counsel and postponed any decision. One week later, the court revisited the topic 

again and stated to Herron that "it is totally your decision as to how [voir dire] is 

handled" and again provided Herron with an alternative option to closure. 1 VRP at 

105 (June 15, 2007). Herron had several meaningful opportunities to object but did 

not do so. 

Rather than objecting, the record reflects that Herron affirmatively and 

unequivocally waived his right to a public trial. The trial court advised Herron of his 

right to a public trial on several occasions. In response, Herron consistently and 

repeatedly stated that he waived his public trial right in order to examine prospective 

jurors about sensitive matters in chambers.2 He explained that he preferred jurors 

"not be influenced by other people" and that in-chambers questioning "would be 

more appropriate." I d. at 108. Defense counsel agreed that "an examination in 

private in your chambers" would "bear far more fruit than just simply a voir dire 

situation." 1 VRP at 70 (June 8, 2007). Herron also expressly rejected an alternative 

to closure, favoring individual questioning of jurors in chambers instead. The trial 

2

This case presents a very clear example of a public trial waiver due in part to the sheer 

repetition by which Herron expressed his desire to waive his public trial right. We note that a 

waiver may be valid without the same degree of repetition that exists in this case; however, we 

must analyze every instance of waiver on a case-by-case basis. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d at 725. 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

court eventually found that Herron made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 

waiver based on these extensive colloquies from two separate hearings. Defense 

counsel even indicated that Herron was "willing to sign a written waiver to that effect 

as well." Id. at 109. Under these facts, we agree with both the trial court and the 

Court of Appeals and hold that Herron made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 

waiver. 3 

B. Herron does not have standing to assert the general public's right to the open 

administration of justice 

Article I, section 10 guarantees the open administration of justice without 

reference to any individual, stating simply that "[j]ustice in all cases shall be 

administered openly, and without unnecessary delay." This provision thus permits a 

member of the general public to demand access to judicial proceedings. Cohen v. 

Everett City Council, 85 Wn.2d 385, 388, 535 P.2d 801 (1975). 

Having waived his own individual right to a public trial, Herron now attempts 

to assert the general public's right to the open administration of justice. The Court 

of Appeals held that Herron did not have standing as a third party to assert the rights 

3Herron argues that the trial court exceeded the scope of the waiver by holding an inchambers discussion with the parties regarding which jurors required individual questioning. We 

need not reach that issue in this case because Herron waived his right to a public trial in order to 

conduct individual questioning of jurors. Deciding which jurors required individual questioning 

clearly falls within the scope of Herron's waiver. Indeed, had Herron not sought to perform 

individual questioning of jurors, the trial court would never have been required to decide which 

jurors required individual questioning in the first place, and the challenged discussion would not 

have occurred. 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

of the general public. Herron, 177 Wn. App. at 107-08. To determine whether 

Herron had third party standing, the court applied the three-part test announced by 

the United States Supreme Court in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 

113 L. Ed. 2d 411 ( 1991 ). First, the litigant must show that that he or she "suffered 

an 'injury in fact,"' thus giving him or her a "'sufficiently concrete interest' in the 

outcome of the issue in dispute." !d. at 411 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 

106, 112, 96 S. Ct. 2868, 49 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1976)). Second, "the litigant must have 

a close relation to the third party." !d. Finally, "there must exist some hindrance to 

the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." !d. 

Here, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Herron did not suffer 

any injury in fact from the closure. Herron, 177 Wn. App. at 107. Contrary to 

suffering an injury, Herron actually benefited from the in-chambers questioning 

because he was better able to obtain a fair and impartial jury. At one point, defense 

counsel thanked one potential juror for his honesty and candor, explaining, "That's 

exactly why we're ... going through this process." 1-A VRP at 93 (June 18, 2007). 

Another juror disclosed for the first time in her life that she had been molested by an 

uncle. Although the judge overruled the defense's challenge to this juror, the defense 

later used a peremptory challenge to excuse her. Eventually, four other jurors were 

excused for cause based on the individual questioning. There was no injury. 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

Turning to the second factor, Herron cannot show any close relationship with 

the public at large. Herron argues that he has a special relationship with the public 

because he shares an interest in the perception of fairness and integrity of the 

prosecution. However, as the Court of Appeals acknowledged, Herron's interest here 

was actually inimical to the public's interest. Herron, 177 Wn. App. at 107 n.lO. 

Herron sought to obtain a closed proceeding so that jurors could candidly discuss 

their views on sexual assault, thus better allowing Herron to discover and remove 

biased jurors. This contrasts with the public's interest to have access to jury 

selection. Thus, there is no "congruence of interests" that would sustain a finding of 

a special relationship. Powers, 499 U.S. at 414. 

Finally, there is no reason to believe that the public could not have asserted 

its own interests in this case. Herron argues that the trial court failed to provide notice 

to the public before closing the court, depriving the public from asserting its own 

interests. But the trial court and parties discussed the closure in open court on two 

separate days. Thus, members of the press or public had two separate occasions to 

voice any concern. Moreover, the press has regularly asserted its right to the open 

administration of justice. See, e.g., Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d at 32; Federated Publ 'ns, 

Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d 51,52-53,615 P.2d 440 (1980); State ex rel. Superior Court 

v. Sperry, 79 Wn.2d 69, 72-73, 483 P.2d 608 (1971). So have individual members 

ofthe general public. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 177 Wn.2d 351,357,302 P.3d 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

156 (2013); Bennett v. Smith Bundy Berman Britton, PS, 176 Wn.2d 303, 307, 291 

P.3d 886 (2013). The trial court did not impose any barriers that would prevent a 

member of the press or public from asserting his or her rights. Herron fails to meet 

any of the three factors from Powers and thus cannot assert the rights of the general 

public. 

To be clear, as a criminal defendant, Herron had standing to raise his own 

individual right to a public trial under article I, section 22. And, as a member of the 

public, he had a right to demand the open administration of justice under article I, 

section 10. But when Herron waived the right to an open courtroom, he waived it for 

all purposes. And he eagerly waived that right here. Fairness, finality, and common 

sense dictate that a defendant should not be able to assert the general public's right 

to the open administration of justice after waiving and causing the very violation of 

which he now complains. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Herron waived his right to a public trial, and Herron lacks standing to assert 

the general public's right to the open administration of justice. We affirm the Court 

of Appeals. 

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State v. Herron, No. 89571-6 

WE CONCUR: 

C C7. 

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