alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
01 

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

SUMMARY REPORT OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE AS

TO ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

PAGE -1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

STEVEN DALE GLENN,

Defendant.

____________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO. CR05-231-JCC

SUMMARY REPORT OF U.S.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AS TO 

ALLEGED VIOLATIONS

OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

An initial hearing on supervised release revocation in this case was scheduled before me

on September 4, 2008. The United States was represented by AUSA Brian Werner and the

defendant by John W. Lundin. The proceedings were digitally recorded.

Defendant had been sentenced on or about May 26, 2006 by the Honorable John C.

Coughenour on a charge of Transportation of a Stolen Motorcycle, and sentenced to time served

in custody (8 days), 3 years supervised release. (Dkt. 1035.)

The conditions of supervised release included the standard conditions plus the requirements

that defendant participate in a drug treatment program, abstain from alcohol, submit to search,

provide access to financial information, not associate with any known outlaw motorcycle gang

members, and be prohibited from wearing gang insignia or “colors”.

On April 16, 2008, defendant’s probation officer reported that defendant had tested

positive for methamphetamine use. Defendant was reprimanded, placed in a structured testing

Case 2:05-cr-00231-JCC Document 1199 Filed 09/04/08 Page 1 of 2
01 

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

SUMMARY REPORT OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE AS

TO ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF SUPERVISED RELEASE

PAGE -2

program with increased frequency of testing, and referred for professional assessment and

counseling, as well as outpatient treatment and a community based residential program. No

further action was taken at that time. (Dkt. 1193.)

In an application dated August 5, 2008 (Dkt. 1194 ), U.S. Probation Officer Jerrod Akins

alleged the following violation of the conditions of supervised release:

1. Consuming methamphetamine on or before July 10, 2008, in violation of standard

condition No. 7.

Defendant was advised in full as to the charge and as to his constitutional rights.

Defendant admitted the alleged violation and waived any evidentiary hearing as to whether

it occurred. (Dkt. 1198.)

I therefore recommend the Court find defendant violated his supervised release as alleged,

and that the Court conduct a hearing limited to the issue of disposition. The next hearing will be

set before Judge Coughenour.

Pending a final determination by the Court, defendant has been released on the conditions

of supervision.

DATED this 4th day of September , 2008.

A

Mary Alice Theiler

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: District Judge: Honorable John C. Coughenour

AUSA: Brian Werner

Defendant’s attorney: John W. Lundin

Probation officer: Jerrod Akins

Case 2:05-cr-00231-JCC Document 1199 Filed 09/04/08 Page 2 of 2
From: saracenojo@Juno.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 4:27:57 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Joann Saraceno

Glendale, CA 91205
Before the Second Division,

February 20, 1967

No. P67/38.

#### Mattoon & Company and T. G. Cullen Co. *v.*United States,

protest 64/782 (San Francisco).

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise covered by the foregoing protest consists of Yon Arx air guns *866and parts similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Mattoon & Company*and *T. G. Cullen*v. *United States*(54 Cust. Ct. 282, C.D. 2545), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.

(Note: The following protests were decided by a special second division consisting of Rao, FoRd, and Richardson, Judges.)
Proposed Rule: Mandatory Reporting of parent company/NAICS/cogeneration 

Communication Documentation: email to stakeholders about availability of the proposed rule text 

Date Staff Contact Information 

(Name, email, phone #) 

Name of Organization 

(Attach list of all attendees 

names and emails if possible) 

Summary of Discussion (e.g., applicability, reporting 

requirements, etc.) 

Written 

Comments 

Provided? 

Did they 

also submit 

to Docket? 

Date 

sent to 

EPACCD 

3/23 Shana Harbour 

Harbour.shana@epa.gov

(202) 566-2959 

Mark Bateman--IW Financial 

Mark Brammer--Risk Metrics 

Nicole Darnall--GMU 

Amy Duvall--ACS 

Paul Hilton--Calver 

Dinah Koehler--independent, 

but contracts with the 

Conference Board 

Jason Morrison--Pacific 

Institute 

Lindene Patton--Zurick Re 

Helen Sahi--Bank of America 

Mike Wallace--GRI 

Jim Coburn--CERES 

James Salo--Trucost 

Piet Klop--WRI 

Mark Cohen--RFF 

Jim Budge--SEC 

Email sent from Shana Harbour to stakeholders following 

release of the proposed rule: 

“As some of you know, I've been very busy for the past six 

months writing (with EPA's Office of Air) a proposed rule 

amendment to the Mandatory GHG Reporting Rule. In this 

proposed rule amendment, EPA is proposing that all reporters 

subject to the Mandatory GHG Reporting Rule provide 

information on their highest-level U.S. parent company, 

primary and other applicable NAICS codes, and to indicate 

whether or not any of their reported emissions come from a 

cogeneration unit. This proposed rule amendment will allow 

EPA and other users of the data to aggregate facility-level data 

to the corporate and sector-level. 

The proposed rule was just released today. Here is a link to 

proposed preamble, rule text and factsheet: 

http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/subpart/corp_pa

rent.html

Best Regards, 

Shana Harbour” 

 

N/A N/A
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Brinks Home Security Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K
for the period ending December 31, 2008 (the Report), I, Robert B. Allen, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|(1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DATED this 31stday of March 2009.



/s/ Robert B. AllenRobert B. AllenPresident, Chief ExecutiveOfficer and Director


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Brinks
Home Security Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by Brinks Home Security Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
112

63

Austin

Paterson

Rufus

Plymouth

Biggs

Touchet

Irrigon Umatilla

Garrett

Boardman

Walla Walla College Place

Arlington

Umapine

Hermiston

Wasco

Milton-Freewater

Stanfield

Helix

Moro

Cecil

Echo

AthenaWeston

Olex

Adams

Grass

Valley

Ione

Rieth PendletonMission Cayuse

Gibbon

Lexington

Kent

Pilot Rock

Heppner

Condon

Meacham

Kamela

Shaniko

Mayville

Hardman

Antelope

Fossil

La Grande

Ukiah

Dale

Spray Monument

Kimberly Hamilton

Mitchell

Long Creek

Fox

Prineville

Sumpter

Dayville

Bates

Mount

Vernon

Post

Prairie City

John

Day

Canyon City

Unity

Paulina

Izee

Seneca

Brothers

Silvies

Holdman

Heppner

Junction

Clarno

Service

Creek

Richmond

Beech Creek

Logdell

Suplee

Millican

Morgan

Vinson Nye

Lena

Ruggs

McNary

Kooskooskie

Lowden

Maryhill

SHERMAN COUNTY

GILLIAM COUNTY

 WASCO COUNTY

JEFFERSON COUNTY

WHEELER COUNTY

CROOK COUNTY

MORROW COUNTY

GRANT COUNTY

UMITILLA COUNION CO

GRANT CO

BAKER CO

GRANT COUNTY

HARNEY COUNTY

WASHINGTON

OREGON

84

395

395

395

26

26

26

26

20

97

97

207

244

402

380

207

218

218

293

206

206

19

19

27

19

74

7

River

Columbia

John

Day

River

John

Fork

Fork

Middle

North

Fork

Day

River

South

North

Fork

Deschutes River

10 0 10 20 Kilometers

10 0 10 20 Miles

W

N

E

S

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

PRINEVILLE DISTRICT

John Day Basin

Resource Management Plan

Draft Environmental Impact Statement 2008

Map 17: Environmental Protection

 Agency Ecoregions

No warranty is made by the Bureau of Land Management as to the accuracy, reliability, or 

completeness of these data for individual or aggregate use with other data. Original data were 

compiled from various sources. This information may not meet National Map Accuracy Standards. 

This product was developed through digital means and may be updated without notification.

COLUMBIA PLATEAU ECOREGION

BLUE MOUNTAIN ECOREGION

LEGEND

Blue Mountains Ecoregion

 11a - John Day / Clarno Uplands

 11b - John Day / Clarno Highlands

 11c - Maritime-Influenced Zone

 11d - Melange

 11h - Continental Zone Highlands

 11i - Continental Zone Footlands

 11l - Mesic Forest Zone

 11m - Subalpine - Alpine Zone

 11o - Cold Basins

Planning Area Boundary

Oregon Level Three Ecoregions

Columbia Plateau Ecoregion

 10c - Umatilla Plateau

 10e - Pleistocene Lake Basins

 10k - Deschutes / John Day Canyons

 10n - Umatilla Dissected Uplands

 

OREGON

84

84 5

5

101

101

395

395

395

199

26

26

26

20

97 197

97

20

95

26

30

Coos Bay

Florence

Newport

Portland The

Dalles

Albany

Bend

Salem

Tillamook

Eugene

Madras

Roseburg

Medford

Lakeview

Burns

Vale

Pendleton

Baker

City

Klamath

Falls

Grants Pass

Astoria

PA C I F I C O C E A N

Prineville 

District

John Day Basin

Planning

Area

John Day Basin

Planning

Prineville

John

Day

M07-09-01_3-5-08
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-50571

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CURTIS SMITH,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. SA-95-CR-226-1

- - - - - - - - - -

May 28, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Curtis Smith appeals from his conviction following a jury

trial for the offense of possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base. He asserts error in the introduction of evidence. 

The first stemming from the denial of his motion to suppress and

the second from the introduction of evidence relating to his

membership in a gang. We find no merit in his arguments and

affirm his conviction and sentence. 
Smith argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress statements which he made following his

detention because they were the result of the coercive conduct of

the arresting authorities. Because Smith did not object to the

factual findings of the magistrate judge made after hearing the

motion to suppress, he may attack the findings for plain error

only. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1982)

(en banc). Smith has not demonstrated that the factual findings 

of the magistrate judge constitute clear or obvious error that

affected his substantial rights or the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of the judicial system. See United States v.

Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Based

on those factual findings, we make the legal determination that

under the totality of the circumstances, Smith’s statements were

voluntarily made and were not the result of coercive police

conduct. See United States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383, 386 (5th

Cir. 1989).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

allowing the Government to present evidence of Smith’s gang

membership following the presentation of Smith’s direct

testimony. The evidence was properly admitted under Fed. R.

Evid. 404(b) because it was probative of Smith’s intent to

distribute crack cocaine and of his knowledge that drugs were

located in the house where he was detained. See United States v.

Blake, 941 F.2d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 1991). The evidence was also
No. 96-50571

- 3 -

properly admitted as impeachment evidence. See United States v.

Riggio, 70 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.

Ct. 1366 (1996).

Further, even assuming that the introduction of the

extrinsic evidence was error, it was harmless error in light of

the other overwhelming evidence of Smith’s guilt presented at the

trial. See United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 123 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2260 (1995). 

AFFIRMED.
From: thimbles7@verizon.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 4:33:41 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Marie Kittelberger

Columbia, MD 21044
No. 69629.

#### International Expediters, Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 62/17249-13080 (Chicago).

*482Oxoinion by

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the items of merchandise are pliers, valued over $2 per dozen, which have slip joints, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
From: pwoike@aol.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 3:27:40 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Paul Woike

Bloomington, IL 61704
MARK ENGLISH,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-2133

_____________________________/

Opinion filed November 15, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Hon. Kevin J. Carroll, Judge.

Michael J. Titus, Assistant Conflict Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jason W. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Mark English challenges the trial court’s failure to conduct a competency 

hearing, as well as his battery convictions under double jeopardy principles. 

Concerning the battery convictions, the batteries were predicated on distinct acts and 

occurred during different criminal episodes. As there is no double jeopardy 

violation, we affirm as to this issue.
2

Concerning the failure to conduct a competency hearing, the trial court entered 

an order, which stated that the court had “reasonable grounds to believe that the 

Defendant may be incompetent to proceed,” appointed an expert for a competency 

evaluation, and scheduled a hearing on the issue. However, no competency hearing 

occurred on that date, and the court did not issue an order determining the defendant 

competent to proceed to trial. After a trial, Appellant was convicted and sentenced. 

The State concedes error, if there were reasonable grounds to conduct a 

hearing. Here, there were reasonable grounds. Reynolds v. State, 177 So. 3d 296, 

298 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (where “the trial court apparently had reasonable grounds 

to believe that Appellant was not competent to proceed because the court appointed 

an expert to evaluate Appellant”). “[I]f a ‘reasonable ground to believe that the 

defendant is not mentally competent to proceed’ exists, then the requirement that the 

court hold a hearing is mandatory.” Trueblood v. State, 193 So. 3d 1060, 1061 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2016). Accordingly, the trial court erred.

On remand, the trial court shall conduct a nunc pro tunc evaluation of the 

defendant’s competency at the time of the original trial; if unable, a new trial is 

required. Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 679 (Fla. 2014) (stating that a new trial 

is unnecessary where a retroactive determination of competency is possible); see 

also Brooks v. State, 180 So. 3d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“If the trial court 

fails to hold a competency hearing or enter a written order of competency, reversal 
3

is required; however, a new trial is required only if the trial court is unable to conduct 

a nunc pro tunc evaluation of the defendant’s competency at the time of the original 

trial.”).

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED in part with 

instructions.

WETHERELL, RAY, and MAKAR, JJ., CONCUR.