2020 IL App (1st) 182501-U 

FIRST DIVISION

December 7, 2020 

No. 1-18-2501 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF:

MARK T. ULANOV, 

Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, 

v. 

IRENE ULANOV, 

 Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the

 Circuit Court of 

 Cook County 

 No. 96 D 2992 

 The Honorable 

 Mark Lopez, 

 Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE PIERCE delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Walker and Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and we 

remand for further proceedings. The circuit court did not err by (1) enforcing 

petitioner’s obligation to maintain a life insurance policy by ordering petitioner to 

self-insure, (2) rejecting petitioner’s impossibility defense, and (3) denying 

respondent’s petition for attorney fees under Rule 137. We reverse the circuit 

court’s denial of respondent’s petition for attorney fees under section 508 because 

the circuit court applied the wrong standard, and we remand for further proceedings 

on respondent’s fee petition. 

¶ 2 Petitioner, Mark T. Ulanov, and respondent, Irene Ulanov, cross-appeal from the circuit 

court’s judgment entered in a postdissolution of marriage proceeding. Irene filed a petition against 
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2 

Mark for indirect civil contempt and for other relief, alleging in relevant part that he failed to 

maintain a $250,000 life insurance policy and provide her with proof of that policy as required by 

the parties’ martial settlement agreement (MSA). Mark acknowledged that his life insurance policy 

lapsed but argued that, due to his age and previous health problems, he could no longer obtain a 

replacement policy and that his obligation to provide a life insurance policy should be discharged 

under the doctrine of impossibility. The circuit court rejected Mark’s impossibility defense and 

ultimately ordered Mark to set aside $250,000 in an account with rights of survivorship in favor 

of him and Irene. Irene requested attorney fees under section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and 

Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2018)) and under Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). The circuit court denied all of Irene’s requests for attorney fees 

under Rule 137 and under section 508. 

¶ 3 On appeal, Irene contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her fee 

petitions. She also argues that the circuit court erred by only giving her a right of survivorship in 

the account holding the $250,000 rather than naming her the sole owner of the account. Mark’s

cross-appeal argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to modify his obligations under the 

MSA and that the only justiciable matter before the circuit court was Irene’s contempt petition. He 

contends that the circuit court erred by not discharging his obligation to provide a life insurance 

policy due to impossibility. He further argues that the circuit court erred by modifying his life

insurance obligations in a contempt proceeding because Irene never asserted a breach of contract 

claim based on Mark’s failure to maintain a life insurance policy.

¶ 4 For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further 

proceedings. 
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3 

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 Mark’s and Irene’s marriage ended in March 1996 with a judgment of dissolution of 

marriage that incorporated an MSA. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the MSA provided that Mark 

was obligated to pay maintenance. He was also required to keep and maintain a life insurance 

policy naming Irene as the beneficiary. Section 13.1 of the MSA provided that Mark 

“shall keep and maintain in full force and effect a policy or policies of life insurance 

on his life in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand ($250,000.00) naming 

[Irene] as the sole and irrevocable beneficiary thereof. [Mark] shall provide on an 

annual basis proof of payments and the existence of said policy.” 

It is undisputed that at the time of the dissolution of marriage, Mark maintained a $250,000 life 

insurance policy with Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance that he procured in 1989. It is also 

undisputed that the policy was a term policy that would expire when Mark turned 70 years old. 

¶ 7 In April 2016, Irene filed a petition for a finding of indirect civil contempt, which is at 

issue in this appeal. She alleged in relevant part that Mark had not maintained a $250,000 life 

insurance policy as required under section 13.1 of the MSA. For relief, Irene sought a rule to show 

cause as to why Mark should not be held in indirect civil contempt for failing to comply with the 

MSA, an order requiring Mark to obtain and maintain a life insurance policy that complied with 

section 13.1 of the MSA, or in the alternative, “to deposit $250,000 in trust or escrow account to 

be paid to Irene or her estate upon his death,” and attorney fees in the event that Mark was found 

to be in indirect civil contempt.

¶ 8 Mark responded to the petition. He also filed a complaint seeking a declaration that several

of his obligations under the MSA were unenforceable, had been satisfied, or should be rescinded 

because his performance was objectively impossible. Irene moved to dismiss Mark’s entire 
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complaint for declaratory judgment, which the circuit court ultimately granted. Mark does not raise 

any argument on appeal regarding the dismissal of his complaint for declaratory relief. 

¶ 9 In Mark’s amended response to Irene’s petition for a rule to show cause he asserted that he 

had been diagnosed with diabetes and cancer, he had not earned any income from his business 

since 2015, and his business closed in early 2016. With respect to the allegation that he failed to 

maintain a life insurance policy, he claimed that “[Irene] and Mark had reached an agreement as 

reflected in their MSA that Mark was to keep and continue his already-existing term policy though 

the end of its term—which he did through age 70[.]” He argued that the obligation to provide a 

life insurance policy was in the nature of support and was modifiable, and that the life insurance 

policy was “to secure [his] maintenance obligation, thereby providing for Irene’s care and 

support.” 

¶ 10 In March 2017, Irene filed a petition for $56,000 in interim attorney fees under sections 

501(c-1)(1) and 508 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(1), 508 (West 2016)). After briefing, the 

circuit court denied Irene’s petition for interim fees without prejudice to her seeking attorney fees 

at the end of the litigation, finding that both parties had the ability to pay their own attorney fees.

Irene’s motion to reconsider was denied after briefing.

¶ 11 On August 16, 2017, the circuit court conducted a hearing on Irene’s petition for a finding 

of indirect civil contempt and for other relief. The circuit court heard testimony from the parties

and admitted numerous documents into evidence. The circuit court found “good cause justification 

for [Mark’s] noncompliance with the terms” of section 13.1 of the MSA. The circuit court 

observed, however, that “the section 13.1 language is forever” and there was nothing in the MSA 

that would support a finding that Mark’s obligation to maintain a life insurance policy ended at the 

expiration of the term life insurance policy he already had in place. The circuit court concluded 
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that the obligation to provide a life insurance policy “remains in full force and effect.” The circuit 

court ordered Mark to apply for a life insurance policy and stated that if it were not possible for 

Mark to obtain such a policy, the court would “go to Plan B.” The circuit court did not elaborate 

any details of “Plan B” on the record. The circuit court did not find Mark in contempt and Irene 

has not sought appellate review of that ruling. 

¶ 12 At a September 26, 2017, hearing, the circuit court heard that Mark had applied for a life 

insurance policy in May 2017 and that his application was denied in August 2017. In November 

2017, with leave of court, Mark filed affirmative defenses with respect to his life insurance 

obligation. Two of those defenses are relevant to this appeal. First, Mark asserted that it was 

impossible for him to comply with section 13.1 of the MSA and that his performance should be 

excused. Second, he asserted that the terms of the MSA were nonmodifiable and provided no 

alternative remedies to Irene. He alleged that “fashioning any other relief constitutes an 

impermissible modification of the MSA.” He alleged that the MSA required Mark to maintain a 

life insurance policy but did not contemplate Mark establishing any kind of account or trust in lieu 

of an insurance policy. 

¶ 13 Irene moved to strike and dismiss Mark’s affirmative defenses, arguing in part that Mark 

never raised his affirmative defenses in his response to Irene’s August 2016 petition. She further 

argued that Mark had asserted his affirmative defenses in his complaint for declaratory judgment, 

which the circuit court dismissed. After briefing, argument, and considering the evidence presented 

during the contempt hearing, the circuit court entered a written order on April 5, 2018, and made 

the following findings. The doctrine of impossibility did “not absolve[ ] [Mark] of his contractual 

duty to maintain a life insurance policy with Irene as the beneficiary.” Mark had “not demonstrated 

that all other practical methods of performance are impossible.” The purpose of section 13.1 of the 
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MSA was to ensure that Irene “would receive a payment in the event of Mark’s prior death,” and 

that to achieve that purpose, Mark could hold $250,000 in an account for the benefit of Irene should 

Mark predecease her. Mark’s obligation to maintain a life insurance policy was “to secure his 

maintenance obligation, which terminates upon either party’s death.” Mark’s affirmative defense 

of impossibility was “denied,” and he was ordered to set aside $250,000 in an account, which 

would be transferred to Irene if Mark predeceased her. If Irene predeceased Mark, the account 

would become Mark’s property. 

¶ 14 Both parties moved to modify the April 5, 2018, order. Irene also filed a petition for 

attorney fees pursuant to Rule 137 and section 508 of the Act. On October 31, 2018, after briefing 

and argument, the circuit court modified the April 5, 2018, order to provide that Mark would 

deposit $250,000 into an account titled “Mark T. Ulanov and Irene Ulanov, as joint tenants with 

right of survivorship, subject to court order.” Any accrued interest on the account would be paid 

to Mark, and the account would not be subject to the claims of creditors of either party. Also on 

October 31, 2018, the circuit court denied Irene’s petition for attorney fees. No evidentiary hearing 

was held on Irene’s fee petition.

¶ 15 Irene filed a timely notice of appeal on November 28, 2018. Mark filed a timely notice of 

cross-appeal on December 6, 2018. 

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 17 At the outset, we remind counsel for both parties that Supreme Court Rule 342 (eff. July 

1, 2017) requires that an appellant’s brief contain an appendix consisting of 

“a table of contents for the appendix, the judgment appealed from, any opinion, 

memorandum, or findings of fact entered by the trial judge[,] *** any pleadings or 

other materials from the record that are the basis of the appeal or pertinent to it, the 
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7 

notice of appeal, and a complete table of contents, with page references, of the 

record on appeal.” 

Neither Irene’s appellant’s brief nor Mark’s appellee/cross-appellant’s brief contain any appendix 

at all, in violation of Rule 342. We remind all counsel that our supreme court’s rules governing 

appellate briefs are mandatory rather than advisory or aspirational (In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 

IL App (1st) 092636, ¶ 57), and we caution that future violations will not be tolerated. 

¶ 18 Turning to the merits of the appeal and cross-appeal, we find it more logical to first address 

the arguments raised by Mark in his cross-appeal, which bear on the validity of the circuit court’s 

underlying orders. 

¶ 19 Mark argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than adjudicate 

Irene’s contempt petition because that was the only pleading before the circuit court, and the circuit 

court exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing a property disposition issue. Relatedly, he argues that 

the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to impose new obligations on Mark that were not contemplated 

by the parties’ MSA. He contends that there is a jurisdictional difference between the circuit court 

enforcing the terms of an MSA—which derives from the circuit court’s inherent authority to 

enforce the terms of a judgment—and the circuit court imposing new obligations more than 30 

days after a final judgment. We are not persuaded that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction. 

¶ 20 The Act provides that “[t]he provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or 

modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment 

under the laws of this State.” 750 ILCS 5/510(b) (West 2016). After 30 days, “property provisions 

in a[n] MSA are not modifiable, but a trial court has jurisdiction to modify property distribution if 

circumstances exist that give cause to reopen a judgment as in other civil cases” such as fraud, 

coercion, or misrepresentation. In re Marriage of O’Malley ex rel Godfrey, 2016 IL App (1st) 
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151118, ¶ 42 (citing In re Marriage of Hall, 404 Ill. App. 3d 160, 164 (2010)). “Property rights 

created by a judgment of dissolution become vested when the judgment is final, and a trial court 

lacks general jurisdiction to modify an order affecting these rights.” In re Marriage of Hubbard, 

215 Ill. App. 3d 113, 116 (1991). The circuit court, however, has “indefinite jurisdiction to enforce 

the terms of a judgment that included a[n] MSA ***.” Id. 

¶ 21 We reject Mark’s argument that the circuit court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate 

anything other than Irene’s contempt petition. He contends that “the only justiciable issue before 

the trial court raised in Irene’s [c]ontempt petition was whether Mark willfully and contumaciously 

failed to comply with the parties’ [j]udgment.” Mark’s argument ignores that Irene’s August 2016 

petition specifically sought to enforce Mark’s obligation under—and sought relief for Mark’s 

noncompliance with—section 13.1 of the MSA. The issue of Mark compliance with the agreement 

was clearly before the circuit court. The circuit court had authority to adjudicate Irene’s request 

for relief given her allegation that Mark breached the MSA and her request to enforce an express 

term in the MSA. See In re Marriage of O’Malley ex rel Godfrey, 2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 36 

(observing that “[a] trial court can determine whether a party to a[n] MSA violated the agreement 

between the parties. [Citation.] Judges in the domestic relations division make these decisions 

almost on a daily basis.”). Mark’s argument that the circuit court somehow exceeded its authority 

by addressing Irene’s enforcement claim is unavailing. 

¶ 22 We also find that the circuit court was enforcing the MSA and we disagree with Mark that 

the circuit court exceeded its authority by imposing additional obligations on Mark that were not 

set forth in the parties’ MSA. Mark contends that the MSA never contemplated him paying 

$250,000 of his own money to comply with section 13.1 of the MSA. He argues that the circuit 

court cannot engraft new obligations onto a dissolution of marriage judgment or equitably modify 
No. 1-18-2501 

9 

the judgment. He relies on In re Marriage of Waggoner, 78 Ill. 2d 50 (1979), In re Marriage of 

Clark, 149 Ill. App. 3d 613 (1986), In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill. App. 3d 813, 820 (1990),

and In re Marriage of Hubbard, 215 Ill. App. 3d 113 (1991), to support his argument. Those cases, 

however, are distinguishable because they all involved a party’s attempt to obtain relief that would 

have required a property disposition that was inconsistent with the express terms of the dissolution 

judgment or would have required modifying a property disposition provided for in the MSA. Here, 

Irene specifically sought to enforce Mark’s contractual obligation to provide her with a death 

benefit if he predeceased her—an obligation expressly set forth in the MSA itself. 

¶ 23 In Waggoner, the parties’ dissolution of marriage judgment provided that the plaintiff, 

Mary, would “retain the residence of the parties, the motor vehicle and furnishings, subject to the 

indebtedness on said items.” (Emphasis added.) 78 Ill. 2d at 51. More than 30 days after the 

judgment became final, Mary filed a motion requesting that the circuit court order the defendant, 

John, to remove a judgment lien and second mortgage on the residence. Id. The circuit court denied 

Mary’s motion and this court affirmed. Id. Our supreme court affirmed, finding that the circuit 

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Mary’s motion because the motion sought “to 

compel [John] to remove the judgment lien and the second-mortgage lien from the chain of title[,]”

while the dissolution judgment “did not provide that [John] was to perform these acts.” Id. at 53-

54. The judgment clearly stated that Mary would obtain the residence subject to the indebtedness. 

Mary’s motion did not “not seek to enforce the terms of the decree, but instead to graft new 

obligations onto the decree.” Id. at 54. 

¶ 24 Here, unlike in Waggoner, Mark’s obligation to do the thing Irene’s petition sought was 

set forth in the MSA. Mark was required to (1) “keep and maintain in full force and effect a policy 

or policies of life insurance on his life in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
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($250,000.00);” (2) name Irene “as the sole and irrevocable beneficiary thereof;” and (3) “provide 

on an annual basis proof of payments and the existence of said policy.” Irene did not seek to impose 

additional requirements on Mark that were not established by the MSA. 

¶ 25 In Clark, the parties’ dissolution of marriage judgment, in relevant part, awarded the 

plaintiff, Madonna, the marital residence. 149 Ill. App. 3d at 614. After the judgment became final, 

the defendant, Thomas, filed a petition seeking to compel Madonna to transfer possession of the 

marital residence to him through a quitclaim deed. Id. The circuit court denied Thomas’s petition, 

and we affirmed. Under the terms of the dissolution judgment, Thomas had “the right to elect to 

buy out the plaintiff’s interest by paying half of the difference between the outstanding mortgage 

and taxes due at the time he exercised such option and the market value at the time of the judgment, 

$72,000.00.” Id. at 617. Madonna was originally not required to pay the mortgage, taxes, or 

insurance until a date certain, but was subsequently ordered to assume responsibility for those 

expenses and expenses for maintaining the property. Id. Madonna failed to make any payments 

related to the residence, resulting in foreclosure proceedings. Id. We held that the circuit court had 

no jurisdiction to grant Thomas’s petition because he was seeking a quitclaim deed, “which clearly 

placed the matter within the realm of the division of property.” Id. at 618. Furthermore, his petition 

would have required the circuit court to “void the buy-out provision specified in the judgment,” 

which would require modifying the dissolution judgment. Id. 

¶ 26 In Milliken, the parties’ 1985 judgment of dissolution of marriage expressly provided that 

the respondent, James, “shall be solely responsible for, and shall hold [the petitioner, Grace] 

harmless of any liability *** for the debt of [James] to [Grace’s brother, Owen], in the amount of 

$3,000.” 199 Ill. App. 3d at 814. James never paid, and three years after the dissolution judgment, 

Grace paid Owen $3810—$3000 in principal and $810 in interest—and then petitioned the circuit 
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court seeking reimbursement from James. Id. at 814-15. The circuit court ordered James to 

reimburse Grace, but we reversed. We primarily relied on Waggoner to support our finding that 

the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to grant Grace any relief because the parties’ judgment of 

dissolution did not make James and Grace jointly liable for the debt to Owen. Id. at 819. Instead, 

the judgment provided that James was solely liable for the debt, and nothing in the dissolution 

judgment established that Grace was liable for the debt in any manner. Id. at 820. Therefore, 

Grace’s petition for reimbursement was not seeking to enforce the judgment but instead sought to 

alter it. Id.

¶ 27 Here, unlike in Milliken and Clark, Mark’s insurance obligation is set forth in the parties’ 

MSA. Irene’s petition did not seek anything that was not set forth in the MSA and requiring Mark 

to comply did not result in any provision of the MSA being voided or a reallocation of the MSA’s 

property division. 

¶ 28 Finally, in Hubbard, the judgment of dissolution of marriage provided that the parties’ 

debts were to be paid from the sale of the marital home and that both parties were barred from 

receiving maintenance. 215 Ill. App. 3d at 114. More than 30 days after the judgment, the 

petitioner, Carol, filed a petition requesting that the respondent, John, be ordered to pay for debts 

that Carol incurred and would incur while preparing the marital residence for sale. Id. at 115. The 

circuit court ordered John to pay a portion of the costs of repairs. Id. On appeal, we reversed, 

relying in part on Waggoner, Clark, and Milliken, among others. We found that the circuit court 

lacked jurisdiction to order John to pay a portion of the expenses because “the judgment did not 

provide that [John] was to pay any part of the cost of preparing the marital residence for sale.” Id.

at 118. Furthermore, “the judgment stated that [Carol] was awarded ‘the remaining net proceeds 

of sale of the marital real estate.’ ” Id. 
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¶ 29 The principle set forth in Waggoner, Clark, Milliken, and Hubbard is that the circuit court 

cannot modify the disposition of property in the judgment for dissolution of marriage unless there 

is some basis for reopening the judgment itself. Where a party seeks relief that is contrary to or not 

contemplated by the express terms of the judgment of dissolution of marriage, the circuit court 

lacks jurisdiction to grant such relief. That is simply not the case here. Mark’s obligation to keep 

and maintain life insurance for the benefit of Irene is provided for in the MSA and judgment. The 

MSA gave Irene a property right in the death benefit from Mark’s life insurance policy. Irene’s 

petition did not seek to impose an obligation on Mark not found in the MSA, but instead sought to 

enforce an obligation clearly set forth in the MSA. We therefore find that the circuit court had 

jurisdiction to enter an order enforcing Mark’s obligation to provide Irene with a death benefit. 

¶ 30 Next, Mark argues that the circuit court should have discharged his obligation under section 

13.1 of the MSA under the doctrine of impossibility. On appeal, he argues that he demonstrated 

that his compliance with section 13.1 was objectively impossible due to his age and health. We 

disagree.

¶ 31 “The doctrine of legal impossibility, or impossible performance, excuses performance of a 

contract only when performance is rendered objectively impossible either because the subject 

matter is destroyed or by operation of law.” Innovative Modular Solutions v. Hazel Crest School 

Dist. 152.5, 2012 IL 112052, ¶ 37 (citing YPI 180 N. LaSalle Owner, LLC v. 180 N. LaSalle II, 

LLC, 403 Ill. App. 3d 1, 7, (2010)). “The party advancing the doctrine must show that the events 

or circumstances which he claims rendered his performance impossible were not reasonably 

foreseeable at the time of contracting.” YPI 180 N. LaSalle Owner, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 6-7 (citing 

Illinois–American Water Co. v. City of Peoria, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1106 (2002)). 
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“The doctrine of impossibility of performance requires that the circumstances 

creating the impossibility were not and could not have been anticipated by the 

parties, that the party asserting the doctrine did not contribute to the circumstances, 

and that the party demonstrate that it has tried all practical alternatives available to 

permit performance.” Illinois American Water Co., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1106 (citing 

Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Dorr, 250 Ill. App. 3d 1, (1993)). 

“Where a contingency that causes the impossibility might have been anticipated or guarded against 

in the contract, it must be provided for by the terms of the contract or else impossibility does not 

excuse performance.” YPI 180 N. LaSalle Owner, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 7. 

¶ 32 Here, section 13.1 of the MSA unequivocally states that Mark 

“shall keep and maintain in full force and effect a policy or policies of life insurance 

on his life in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand ($250,000.00) naming 

[Irene] as the sole and irrevocable beneficiary thereof. [Mark] shall provide on an 

annual basis proof of payments and the existence of said policy.” 

There is nothing ambiguous about Mark’s obligation to keep and maintain a life insurance policy, 

and there is no temporal limit on how long Mark was required to keep and maintain such a policy. 

There are no provisions in the MSA that contemplate Mark allowing a life insurance policy to 

lapse or that contemplate his potential uninsurability. At the time the parties executed the MSA, 

Mark might not have known of his future health problems, but it was reasonably foreseeable that 

a term life insurance policy that would expire at the age of 70 would be insufficient to comply with 

his continuing obligation to maintain a life insurance policy if he lived past 70. At the time, Mark 

was apparently in good health, and he does not make any argument as to whether, when the parties 

executed the MSA, he expected to reach the age of 70. Furthermore, Mark does not identify any 
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efforts that he made in the years leading up to the lapse of his term life insurance policy to comply 

with section 13.1. Instead, he asserts that after he had already breached his obligation to maintain 

a life insurance policy, he could not obtain a new policy due to his health. In other words, Mark’s 

inaction in the face of an unambiguous contractual requirement contributed to his inability to 

comply with section 13.1. Having failed to guard against the lapse of his life insurance coverage,

knowing full well that his existing policy would expire on a date certain, Mark cannot seek to 

avoid his obligation under section 13.1 of the MSA on impossibility grounds. 

¶ 33 Mark argued in the circuit court—but not in this court—that Irene knew that the policy he 

had in place at the time of the divorce was a term policy that would end when he turned 70 years 

old. But nothing in the MSA specifically referenced the policy that Mark already had; there is 

simply nothing in the parties’ written agreement to suggest that Irene agreed that Mark’s existing 

term life insurance policy was sufficient to satisfy section 13.1. Furthermore, as the circuit court 

observed, the purpose of Mark’s life insurance obligation was to provide Irene with a payment if

Mark predeceased Irene to secure his maintenance obligation. And, as the circuit court observed, 

impossibility is unavailable where there are practical alternatives available to permit performance. 

We see no error in the circuit court’s rejection of Mark’s affirmative defense of impossibility. 

¶ 34 Irene raises one issue in her appeal directed at the circuit court’s judgment relative to 

Mark’s life insurance obligation. She argues that the circuit court erred by only giving her a right 

of survivorship in the account holding the $250,000 rather than naming her the sole owner of the 

account. She contends that section 13.1 of the MSA required Mark to name her as an irrevocable 

beneficiary, giving her an “absolute right to receive $250,000 upon Mark’s death.” She argues—

without citing to the record or to any authority—that by virtue of being named an irrevocable 

beneficiary, “the money was Irene’s, whether she received it on Mark’s death or it went to her 
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15 

estate if she predeceased him.” In response, Mark argues that Irene waived this argument because 

she expressly asked the circuit court to award her a right of survivorship, and she is therefore 

barred from taking a contrary position on appeal. Alternatively, he argues that, as the circuit court 

found, section 13.1. of the MSA was designed to secure Mark’s maintenance obligation and not to 

guarantee that Irene and her eventual estate would receive the $250,000. We find no merit to 

Irene’s argument. 

¶ 35 In the circuit court, Irene initially argued that if she predeceased Mark, the proceeds of any 

life insurance policy would be paid to her estate upon Mark’s death because there was nothing in 

the MSA to suggest that the life insurance policy merely secured Mark’s maintenance obligation. 

The circuit court did not agree, and Irene eventually took the position that the parties should have 

a right of survivorship in the account holding the $250,000. We need not decide whether Irene is 

barred from challenging the survivorship aspect of the circuit court’s judgment because her 

argument fails regardless. Irene does not cite any authority or any aspect of the record to support 

her underlying theory that when a beneficiary to a life insurance policy dies, the beneficiary’s 

estate becomes—or has a right to become—the new beneficiary. Unless otherwise defined by the 

insurance policy itself, when a beneficiary of a life insurance policy dies, the policy holder 

ordinarily has the right to new name a new beneficiary. Nothing in the parties’ MSA or in the 

record on appeal reflects that Irene’s estate would be substituted as the irrevocable beneficiary of 

the life insurance policy upon Irene’s death. Instead, the MSA reflects that Irene was to be named 

the irrevocable beneficiary, which, by its own terms, means that Mark could not change the 

beneficiary designation during his lifetime. Nothing in MSA or in the record suggests that Irene’s 

estate had a right to become a successor beneficiary to Mark’s life insurance policy. In the absence 

of any authority to support her position, we have no basis from which to conclude that the circuit 
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court erred. The circuit court reasonably concluded that, if Irene predeceased Mark, Mark would 

keep the account holding the $250,000 along with any accrued interest. Irene’s right to be named 

as a beneficiary only created a contingent right in $250,000, the contingency being Mark 

predeceasing Irene. The circuit court did not err in giving Mark a right of survivorship in the 

account. 

¶ 36 In sum, Irene’s petition clearly presented the circuit court with the issue of Mark’s failure 

to comply with the MSA and whether to enforce his obligation to provide Irene with a death benefit 

in the event that he predeceased her. Under the MSA, Irene had a right to be named as “the sole 

and irrevocable beneficiary” of a $250,000 life insurance policy, and the circuit court’s order did 

not modify Mark’s obligation, but instead enforced it. The circuit court did not err by rejecting 

Mark’s impossibility defense because Mark—the one claiming impossibility—was the one who 

allowed his term life insurance policy to lapse at a time that he was likely uninsurable. 

Furthermore, at the time the parties executed the MSA, it was reasonably foreseeable that the term 

life insurance policy would lapse when Mark reached 70 years old, making it unavailable to satisfy 

section 13.1, and Mark does not argue that it is impractical or impossible for him to set aside 

$250,000. The circuit court looked to the intent of the parties and the purpose of section 13.1 and 

concluded that Mark could meet his contractual obligation to Irene by depositing $250,000 in an 

account for the benefit of Irene should Mark predecease her, with a right of survivorship. We see 

no error in the circuit court’s analysis or conclusion. 

¶ 37 Next, Irene argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying her requests for 

attorney fees under section 508 of the Act and Rule 137. She essentially argues that the circuit 

court failed to consider whether requiring her to pay her own fees would strip her of her means of 

support or undermine her financial stability. She further asserts that, even though the circuit court 
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did not find Mark in contempt, section 508(b) is a basis for awarding her attorney fees because she 

was forced to litigate due to Mark’s noncompliance with the MSA. She also contends that she was 

entitled to attorney fees under Rule 137 because Mark’s declaratory judgment complaint and his 

attempts to modify his obligations under the MSA without providing a basis for reopening the 

judgment were not well grounded in fact or law. 

¶ 38 First, we reject Irene’s argument that she was entitled to attorney fees under Rule 137 

because she has not presented an adequate basis for this court to reverse the circuit court’s 

judgment. Her argument on this point is conclusory and not supported by any citations to relevant 

authority. Her failure to develop and advance an argument supported by relevant authority results 

in forfeiture. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7). We therefore affirm the circuit court’s denial of Irene’s request 

for attorney fees under Rule 137. 

¶ 39 Next, we consider Irene’s argument that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying 

her section 508 petition for attorney fees. She primarily contends that the circuit court applied the 

wrong standard when it determined that Irene had the ability to pay her own fees because the circuit 

court should have considered “whether requiring Irene to pay her fees would strip her of her means 

of support or undermine her financial stability.” We agree.

¶ 40 Ordinarily, we review the circuit court decision on a fee petition for an abuse of discretion. 

In re Marriage of Heroy, 2017 IL 120205. The circuit court “abuses its discretion when no 

reasonable person would agree with the decision [citation], or when it bases its decision on an 

incorrect view of the law.” In re Marriage of Izzo, 2019 IL App (2d) 180623, ¶ 26. A determination 

of the correct standard to be applied by the circuit court is a question of law subject to de novo

review. Id. 
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¶ 41 Section 508(a) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that the circuit court may order a party 

to pay a reasonable amount of the other party’s attorney fees in connection with maintaining or 

defending any action under the Act, the enforcement or modification of an order or judgment under 

the Act, or any ancillary litigation incident to, or reasonably connected with, proceedings under 

the Act. 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(1), (2), (6) (West 2018). “Section 508 governs attorney fees generally, 

including petitions for contribution of attorney fees and costs incurred in postdecree proceedings 

and initial dissolution proceedings.” Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21, 46 (2009). In ruling on a 

petition for contribution of attorney fees, the circuit court “must (1) consider the financial 

resources of the parties and (2) make its decision on a petition for contribution in accordance with 

subsection (j) of Section 503.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 19 

(citing 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2014)). Section 503(j)(2) provides that when the circuit court 

decides a petition for contribution of attorney fees, “[a]ny award of contribution to one party from 

the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this Section 503 

and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under Section 

504.” Id. Section 503(d) identifies 12 factors for the circuit court to consider when dividing marital 

property. 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2018). 

¶ 42 While courts have often recited that a party seeking attorney fees must first establish their 

inability to pay (see Heroy, 2017 IL 120205, ¶ 15 (collecting cases)), our supreme court has 

clarified that the standard is more nuanced. As the court explained in Heroy, “[a] party is unable 

to pay [their own attorney fees] if, after consideration of all of the relevant statutory factors, the 

court finds that requiring the party to pay the entirety of the fees would undermine his or her 

financial stability.” Id. “[F]inancial inability to pay does not demand a showing of destitution, and 

the fee-seeking spouse is not required to divest himself of capital assets before requesting fees.” 
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In re Marriage of Minear, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1085 (1997). “It is sufficient to show payment 

would exhaust his estate or strip him of his means of support or undermine his economic stability.” 

Id.

¶ 43 Here, the circuit court made no findings as to whether requiring Irene to pay all the attorney 

fees she incurred pursuing her petition for rule to show cause and enforcement action would 

undermine her financial stability. Irene’s petition for attorney fees asserted that she was 71 years 

old and unemployed. As of the end of April 2018, she had paid her attorneys $21,500 and owed a 

balance of over $65,000. By the time of the circuit court’s hearing in July 2018, Irene’s counsel 

argued that she owed over $85,000 in fees. According to her financial affidavit, dated March 21, 

2017, Irene had a net monthly income of $3373.50, monthly living expenses of $3323.22, and was 

paying $1000 per month toward attorney fees, resulting in a monthly deficit of $950. She had less 

than $17,000 in her bank and brokerage accounts, $40,000 in retirement funds, and owns a 

$300,000 home with no mortgage. In his written response to Irene’s petition, Mark asserted that 

he was 72 years old, no longer employed, in poor health, had less than $650,000 in his bank 

accounts, and “runs a substantial deficit of approximately $7300 per month.” The circuit court, 

after considering the parties’ financial affidavits and hearing argument, concluded that Irene could 

afford her own attorney fees based on her income ($3000 per month in maintenance and her social 

security) and her other assets. The circuit court stated that that “the standard is always does one 

party have the ability to pay her fees,” and observed that while Mark might have more assets than 

Irene, “that’s not the standard.” 

¶ 44 As Heroy and the cases discussed therein instruct, the circuit court should have considered 

both Irene’s and Mark’s financial resources and the statutory factors when determining whether to 

order Mark to contribute to Irene’s attorney fees. In determining whether Irene could afford to pay
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her attorney fees, the circuit court should have examined whether requiring Irene to pay all her 

attorney fees would undermine her financial stability. Her petition laid bare that her future income 

and available liquid assets would be dwarfed by her attorney fees. The circuit court did not 

expressly conduct this kind of analysis or make any findings on the record other than that Irene 

could afford to pay her attorneys, and therefore did not expressly exercise its discretion when 

ruling on Irene’s petition. Under these circumstances, where the circuit court expressly applied the 

wrong standard and did not properly exercise its discretion, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of 

Irene’s petition for attorney fees under section 508 and remand to the circuit court so that it can 

apply the correct standard to Irene’s fee request.

¶ 45 As a final matter, Irene argues that she was entitled to attorney fees because they were 

incurred in enforcing her rights under the MSA. She asserts that while she was not entitled to 

mandatory attorney fees under section 508(b)—which mandates the recovery of attorney fees 

where the circuit court finds “that the failure to comply with [an] order or judgment was without 

compelling cause or justification” (750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2018))—the circuit court still should 

have considered whether she incurred fees as a result of Mark’s conduct, both in letting his life 

insurance policy lapse and in driving up the cost of litigation by attempting to modify a 

nonmodifiable judgment. On remand, the circuit is free to consider Irene’s arguments that she is 

entitled to fees due to Mark’s conduct in driving up the cost of the litigation. 

¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 47 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court rejecting Mark’s impossibility 

defense and requiring Mark to self-insure to comply with his obligations under the MSA is 

affirmed. We also affirm the circuit court’s denial of Irene’s request for attorney fees under Rule 
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137. We reverse the circuit court’s denial of Irene’s request for attorney fees under section 508 of 

the Act, remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 48 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded.