UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4713

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

LORETTA MEREDITH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00017-IMK-JSK-2)

Submitted: February 9, 2015 Decided: February 12, 2015

Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles T. Berry, Fairmont, West Virginia, for Appellant. Shawn 

Angus Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Loretta Meredith appeals the district court’s criminal 

judgment sentencing her to one year and one day of imprisonment 

for conspiring to knowingly and corruptly attempt to obstruct, 

influence, and impede an official proceeding, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and (k) (2012). In accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel for Meredith 

filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious grounds 

for appeal but questioning whether the district court 

(1) wrongly increased the base offense level for Meredith’s 

Guidelines range for substantially interfering with the 

administration of justice, (2) clearly erred in increasing the 

base offense level for Meredith’s Guidelines range because the 

offense was extensive in scope, planning, or preparation, or 

(3) imposed an unreasonable sentence. Although advised of her 

right to do so, Meredith did not file a pro se supplemental 

brief. We affirm.

In determining whether the district court properly 

applied a sentencing enhancement, this court “review[s] factual 

findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United 

States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014).

Meredith first questions whether the district court 

improperly enhanced her sentence because “the offense resulted 

in substantial interference with the administration of justice.” 
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2J1.2(b)(2). 

“‘Substantial interference with the administration of justice’ 

includes . . . the unnecessary expenditure of substantial 

governmental or court resources.” USSG § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1.

Our review of the record reflects that the district 

court properly increased Meredith’s offense level for 

substantial interference with the administration of justice. 

Because significant government resources were invested to 

resolve Meredith’s attempts at obstruction, the district court 

did not clearly err in this conclusion. Nor did the district 

court erroneously “double-count” by applying the enhancement 

even though she was convicted of obstruction of justice. See

United States v. Dudley, 941 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1991) 

(defendant may properly receive “substantial interference with 

the administration of justice” enhancement for underlying 

perjury offense).

Meredith next questions whether the district court 

clearly erred in enhancing her sentence because her offense 

“(A) involved the destruction, alteration, or fabrication of a 

substantial number of records, documents, or tangible objects; 

. . . or (C) was otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or 

preparation.” USSG § 2J1.2(b)(3). After reviewing the record, 

we hold that the district court appropriately applied this 

enhancement. Meredith’s attempts at obstruction were extensive 
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in scope, planning, and preparation. Accordingly, given the 

statute’s disjunctive construction, whether she fabricated a 

“substantial number” of documents is immaterial.

Finally, we review Meredith’s sentence for 

reasonableness using an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first review for 

“significant procedural error,” including “improperly 

calculating[] the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider 

the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

If we find no procedural error, we examine the 

substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality 

of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence 

imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary[,]” 

to satisfy the goals of sentencing. See § 3553(a). We presume 

on appeal that a sentence below or within a properly calculated 

Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Montes-Pineda, 

445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The defendant bears the burden to rebut the 

presumption by showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when 

measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

Meredith received an adequate, individualized 

explanation of her below-Guidelines sentence. Our review of the 
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record leads us to conclude that her sentence was neither 

procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Meredith, in writing, of her right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If she requests that a petition be filed, but counsel 

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel 

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on the appellant. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED