NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAMON LAMAR CAMPBELL,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

MANUEL PORTILLO; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 12-17820

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00532-RCJ-VPC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 22, 2015**

Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Nevada state prisoner Damon Lamar Campbell appeals pro se from the 

district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging 

excessive use of force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 1 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 12-17820

Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm in part, reverse in part, 

and remand.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Campbell’s 

deliberate indifference claim because Campbell failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendants Clark and Beun were deliberately indifferent 

to Campbell’s injuries resulting from the altercation. See id. at 1057-60 (a prison 

official acts with deliberate indifference only if he or she knows of and disregards 

an excessive risk to the prisoner’s health; negligence and a mere difference in 

medical opinion are insufficient).

The district court properly granted summary judgment as to defendants Baca 

and Lindsay because Campbell failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as 

to whether Baca and Lindsay were personally involved in any constitutional 

violation or whether there was a causal connection between their conduct and any 

such violation. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(requirements for establishing supervisory liability). 

However, in granting summary judgment on Campbell’s excessive force 

claim, the district court improperly disregarded the factual allegations contained in 

Campbell’s verified complaint. See Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 784 F.3d 
3 12-17820

495, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2015) (district court cannot disregard evidence at the 

summary judgment stage solely based on its self-serving nature even if it is 

uncorroborated); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing 

that verified pleadings are admissible to oppose summary judgment). Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Campbell, Campbell raised a genuine

dispute of material fact as to whether defendants maliciously and sadistically used 

force against him. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (holding that 

“the core judicial inquiry” in resolving an Eighth Amendment excessive force 

claim is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm”); Furnace v. Sullivan, 

705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) (a court reviewing a summary judgment 

motion must “assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party”). 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings as to this claim.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Campbell’s motion 

for default judgment as a discovery sanction because the record supports the 

district court’s conclusion that defendants proceeded with discovery in good faith 

and were unable to locate the videotape. See Goodman v. Staples The Office 

Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of 
4 12-17820

review). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Campbell’s 

request to extend discovery. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 

2002) (describing trial court’s broad discretion in discovery matters).

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.