1995 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-31-1995

United States v Velasquez

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 93-7236

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Recommended Citation

"United States v Velasquez" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 242.

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1 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

No. 93-7236 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 

GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 

v. 

EDWIN VELASQUEZ, 

 Appellant. 

 

On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands, 

Division of St. Croix 

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 91-cr-00014-01) 

 

 

 Argued April 17, 1995 

 Before: BECKER, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed August 31, 1995) 

 

Michael A. Joseph, Esq. (Argued) 

52A Company Street, Suite 1 

Christiansted, St. Croix 

Virgin Islands 00820 

 Attorney for Appellant 

W. Ronald Jennings 

United States Attorney 

James R. Fitzner (Argued) 

Assistant U. S. Attorney 

1108 King Street - Suite 201 

Christiansted, St. Croix 
2 

U. S. Virgin Islands 00820 

 Attorneys for Appellees 

 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

 

ROTH, Circuit Judge: 

 In this appeal, defendant, Edwin Velasquez, challenges 

the district court's exclusion of the expert witness he proffered 

to testify on his behalf on the subject of handwriting analysis 

and the lack of standards in that field of expertise. Velasquez 

was convicted on six counts of drug related offenses, including 

Count VIII, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. He 

appeals only his conviction on Count VIII. 

 At Velasquez's criminal trial, the Government relied 

upon a handwriting expert, Lynn Bonjour, to link two of 

Velasquez's accomplices to certain drug transactions. As a part 

of his defense, Velasquez proposed to call Mark P. Denbeaux, a 

Professor of Law at Seton Hall University and an expert "critic" 

of the field of handwriting analysis, to assist the jury in 

understanding the limitations of the Government's handwriting 

testimony. The district court refused to admit Professor 

Denbeaux's testimony. 

 In his appeal, Velasquez contends that, if Denbeaux's 

testimony had been admitted, the Government might not have 
3 

convinced the jury that Velasquez had managed or organized a 

continuing criminal enterprise involving at least five other 

people. Velasquez asserts that Denbeaux's proposed testimony 

might have persuaded the jury to discount the testimony of Lynn 

Bonjour in which she identified the handwriting on two mailing 

labels as that of two of Velasquez's associates. Because we find 

that Professor Denbeaux is qualified to testify as an expert on 

the limitations of handwriting analysis and because we conclude 

that the exclusion of his testimony may very well have affected 

the jury's verdict on Count VIII, we will reverse Velasquez's 

judgment of conviction on the continuing criminal enterprise 

offense and remand this case for a new trial on that count.0

I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS

 

0Because we are remanding, we will not go on to consider 

Velasquez's contention that the district court erred by 

permitting DEA Agent Gregory Thrash to testify regarding the 

manner in which cocaine is used and distributed and the manner in 

which drug organizations operate between the Virgin Islands and 

Florida. In particular, Velasquez asserts that Thrash testified 

as an expert and that the Government failed to give the required 

notice of that testimony to the defense. 

 We conclude that parts of Thrash's testimony do appear 

to fall within the bounds of expert opinion. He testified not 

just about the facts of this specific case but generally, from 

his experience, about drug trafficking organizations, including 

the persons required to perform different functions in such an 

organization. 

 At the time of the trial in 1991, however, the 

Government was not required to give notice of its expert 

witnesses. Although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

16(a)(1)(E) was amended to require such notice in 1993, even the 

amended rule requires the Government to give such notice only 

"[a]t the defendant's request." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). In 

this appeal, Velasquez fails to allege that he made such a 

request. 

 If, at the time of retrial, the defense should request 

notification of expert witnesses, the Government will have the 

opportunity to give such notice in a timely manner. 
4 

 Edwin Velasquez was charged with eight counts of 

criminal activity related to narcotics trafficking: Count I -

conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 845, 846 and 963; Count II - possession 

of a controlled substance with intent to distribute in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); Count III - possession of a controlled 

substance on board an aircraft departing from the United States 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 955 and 963; Count IV - importation 

of a controlled substance into the custom territory of the United 

States in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963; Count V -

possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); Count VI - simple possession 

of a firearm in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a); 

Count VII - engaging in monetary transactions in property derived 

from specified unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 

and 1957(a); and Count VIII - engaging in a continuing criminal 

enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. 

 During a five-day jury trial, the Government called 

Lynn Bonjour to testify as an expert on handwriting analysis.0

 

0Ms. Bonjour's qualifications are extensive. At the time of the 

trial, Ms. Bonjour was employed as a Forensic Document Analyst 

with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and had been so employed 

for fourteen and one half years. In conjunction with her 

employment, the Postal Inspection Service had certified her as an 

expert in the field of document analysis. Previously, she had 

been employed by the U.S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco and Firearms as a Document Analyst/Document Analyst 

Trainee for four years. App. 125. In addition to her on-the-job 

training, Ms. Bonjour had attended courses and seminars 

throughout the country on handwriting identification and related 

subjects, including classes at Georgetown University and George 

Washington University and courses with the Secret Service and 

FBI. She was a member of the Mid-Atlantic Association of 
5 

Defense counsel immediately objected to the admissibility of her 

testimony, contending that handwriting analysis lacked measurable 

standards and could not be considered a legitimate science. 

Following voir dire examination on the admissibility of Ms. 

Bonjour's testimony, the trial court rejected the defense's 

arguments that handwriting analysis did not constitute a valid 

field of scientific expertise. In so doing, the court relied, in 

part, on Ms. Bonjour's testimony regarding the standards and 

methodology of handwriting analysis.0 

 The court then permitted Ms. Bonjour to testify as an 

expert in the field of questioned documents/handwriting analysis. 

App. 138. Ms. Bonjour testified that, in her opinion, both 

Velasquez's girlfriend, Glenda Arrindell, and one of his alleged 

accomplices, Walter McKay, had written a mailing label which had 

been used to ship drugs. App. 144, 171. 

 

Forensic Scientists and a past president of the Questioned 

Document section of that organization. She has testified as a 

handwriting expert in approximately 100 court cases in twenty-six 

different states. 

0Ms. Bonjour described the procedures that she, and other experts 

in the field of handwriting analysis, employ as follows: First, 

the expert determines whether a questioned document contains a 

sufficient amount of writing and enough individual 

characteristics to permit identification. After determining that 

the questioned document is identifiable, the expert examines the 

submitted handwriting specimens in the same manner. If both the 

questioned document and the specimens contain sufficient 

identifiable characteristics, then the expert compares those 

characteristics, e.g., the slant of the writing, the shapes of 

the letters, the letter connections, the height of letters, the 

spacing between letters, the spacing between words, the "i" dots 

and "t" crosses, etc. App. 136. After making these comparisons, 

the expert weighs the evidence, considering both the similarities 

and differences in the handwriting and determines whether or not 

there is a match. 
6 

 To counter Ms. Bonjour, the defense proferred Mark P. 

Denbeaux, a Professor of Law at Seton Hall University, to testify 

on two facets of handwriting analysis: as a critic of the field 

of handwriting analysis or, in the alternative, as a handwriting 

analyst himself. At the voir dire examination to determine the 

admissibility of Denbeaux's testimony, he opined that handwriting 

analysis is not a valid field of scientific expertise because it 

lacks standards to guide experts in weighing the match or nonmatch of particular handwriting characteristics. App. 189-194. 

By way of example, Denbeaux pointed out that Ms. Bonjour had 

relied on spacing characteristics (the spacing between lines) to 

match Velasquez's accomplices with the shipping labels but had 

failed to consider or explain why other non-matching aspects of 

spacing (e.g., how the writing was located on the page both 

vertically and horizontally, indentation, etc.) were not relevant 

or as persuasive in forming her opinion. App. 205. 

 The district court refused to permit Professor Denbeaux 

to testify either as to the limitations of handwriting analysis 

generally or as to the limitations of Ms. Bonjour's particular 

opinions concerning this case. The court explained that "whether 

or not handwriting expertise is admissible in a courtroom" is a 

"legal" question that was resolved against the defense when the 

court permitted Ms. Bonjour to testify as a qualified expert in 

the field of handwriting analysis. App. 182; see also Court's 

Order and Memorandum, App. 31-34 (Because the court found "that 

there are standard procedures in the field of handwriting 
7 

analysis, it refused to admit the testimony of Professor Denbeaux 

to contradict the court's legal conclusion."). 

 The defense then sought to have Professor Denbeaux 

qualified as an expert in handwriting analysis so that he could 

compare the mailing labels with the handwriting specimens and 

offer his opinion regarding the authorship of the labels. Again, 

the court refused to allow Professor Denbeaux to testify. In 

particular, the court relied on the Professor's lack of formal 

training and inadequate practical experience in performing 

handwriting analysis. Although the record reflects that the 

Professor had considerable knowledge of the field of handwriting 

analysis,0 he had never undertaken formal training in handwriting 

analysis, had never been to a seminar on the subject, and had 

never been a member of any related professional organization. In 

addition, Denbeaux had "never been retained to give an opinion 

about authorship." App. 201. Although on approximately 12 

occasions, he had compared handwriting exemplars for the purposes 

 

0Professor Denbeaux testified that he had conducted eight years 

of self-directed research on handwriting analysis, during which 

he had read nearly all of the literature on the subject; had 

spent four years as a statistical social scientist; had been 

involved in some capacity regarding handwriting analysis in 

approximately four court cases; had been named an American Bar 

Association Fellow for his research related to the creation of a 

testing mechanism to certify handwriting analysts and validate 

the accuracy of their identifications; and had collaborated with 

two co-authors to publish a work challenging the entire field of 

handwriting analysis based on the lack of empirical testing, 

selectively chosen premises, and inadequate standards and 

procedures, see D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael 

J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: 

The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. Pa. 

L. Rev. 731 (1989). 
8 

of making his own identifications, none of these comparisons had 

been independently corroborated for accuracy. App. 213. 

 At the end of the trial, the jury convicted Velasquez 

on Counts I, II, III, IV, VI and VIII. The court declared a 

mistrial as to Counts V and VII. On July, 10, 1992, Velasquez 

was sentenced to 292 months imprisonment, a $250 special 

assessment and a $25,000 fine. Almost two years later, on May 

16, 1994, the court reduced Velasquez's term of imprisonment to 

180 months and five years of supervised release, in recognition 

of cooperation with the government. 

 Velasquez has appealed only his conviction on Count 

VIII, illegally engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 

involving at least five people other than himself. He contests 

the district court's exclusion of Professor Denbeaux's testimony 

criticizing the field of handwriting analysis. Velasquez claims 

that, if Professor Denbeaux had been permitted to testify, the 

jury might not have accepted Ms. Bonjour's testimony which was 

essential in connecting two of the necessary five persons to 

Velasquez's drug operations.0

 Although Velasquez did not file a formal notice of 

appeal, he sent a letter to the district court judge shortly 

 

0Because the limited record on appeal does not expressly identify 

the number of people involved in the criminal enterprise, we 

assume that Ms. Bonjour's testimony connecting these two 

participants with the Defendant's criminal activities was 

necessary to obtain Defendant's conviction on Count VIII of the 

indictment, which required that the Defendant occupy a position 

of control in a ongoing criminal enterprise involving five or 

more individuals. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982). This assumption 

is bolstered by the Government's failure to allege otherwise in 

its brief to this Court. 
9 

after his sentencing on July 13, 1992, challenging his 

conviction. In October of 1992, he requested that the district 

court treat his July 13, 1992, letter as notice of appeal or, in 

the alternative, as a motion to file a notice of appeal out of 

time. The district court granted his motion on March 31, 1993, 

and he filed his notice of appeal with this Court on April 5, 

1993. We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 We review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility 

of Professor Denbeaux's testimony for abuse of discretion, "`but 

to the extent the district court's ruling turns on an 

interpretation of a Federal Rule of Evidence our review is 

plenary.'" In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 

749 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting DeLuca v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 1990)), cert. 

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995) ("Paoli II"). We review the 

district court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous 

standard. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 19 v. 2300 

Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 1991). 

III. DISCUSSION

 The district court refused to admit Professor 

Denbeaux's testimony criticizing the lack of standards in the 

field of handwriting analysis because the court had already 

concluded that expert testimony concerning handwriting analysis 

evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admitted pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Evidence 702. We believe, however, that, even 
10 

though the district court had recognized handwriting analysis as 

a field of expertise, the court erred as a matter of law in 

denying the defense the opportunity to criticize the standards 

employed in that field of expertise.0 Professor Denbeaux's 

testimony as a critic of handwriting analysis would have assisted 

the jury in evaluating the Government's expert witness. In 

excluding Denbeaux's critique, the court ignored the fact that 

the same considerations that inform the court's legal decision to 

admit evidence under Rule 702 may also influence the factfinder's 

determination as to what weight such evidence, once admitted, 

should receive. The Government conceded as much, stating that 

evidence that handwriting analysis is not scientifically credible 

"goes to [the] weight" that such handwriting evidence should 

receive. App. 123. The district court even acknowledged, in its 

preliminary consideration of the admissibility of Ms. Bonjour's 

expert testimony, that Professor Denbeaux's proposed criticism of 

 

0In his opening brief to this Court, Velasquez also challenges 

the district court's refusal to qualify Professor Denbeaux as an 

expert in conducting handwriting analysis. In his reply brief, 

however, Velasquez recants this argument, stating unequivocally 

that "Professor Denbeaux is not an expert in the identification 

of questioned writings." Reply Br. at 1; see also Reply Br. at 

n.1 ("Trial Court erroneously understood that Professor Denbeaux 

was being put forward as an handwriting expert"). Because of 

this concession, we need not address the issue of whether 

Professor Denbeaux was qualified to testify as to his ability -or 

inability - to identify the handwriting on the exemplars 

proferred by the Government. We note, however, that there 

appears to be a close link between the ability, or not, of an 

expert generally to recognize the characteristics of handwriting 

which are described as helpful in identifying the scrivener of an 

exemplar and the ability, or not, of an expert in a specific case 

to identify the scrivener of a particular document through the 

recognition of those same characteristics. 

 
11 

the lack of standards in handwriting analysis might go "to the 

weight" of the Bonjour testimony. App. 133. 

 The axiom is well recognized: the reliability of 

evidence goes "more to the weight than to the admissibility of 

the evidence." See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 

786, 800 (2d Cir. 1992) ("DNA profiling evidence should be 

excluded only when the government cannot show [a] threshold level 

of reliability in its data. . . . [T]he court in exercising its 

discretion should be mindful that this issue should go more to 

the weight than to the admissibility of the evidence."), cert. 

denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992). Because Professor Denbeaux's 

proffered testimony called into doubt the reliability and 

credibility of Lynn Bonjour's handwriting testimony, the jury 

should have been permitted to hear his testimony in order to 

properly weigh the testimony of Ms. Bonjour. 

 If the jury had had the opportunity to credit 

Denbeaux's testimony, criticizing handwriting analysis in general 

and Ms. Bonjour's testimony in particular, the jury might have 

discounted Ms. Bonjour's testimony and thereby found that the 

Government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Velasquez's continuing criminal enterprise involved at least five 

other people -- a necessary element of his conviction on Count 

VIII. Thus, we hold that the district court's determination on 

the admissibility of Ms. Bonjour's handwriting analysis testimony 

should not be permitted to preclude the jury from hearing other 

relevant evidence attacking the reliability of her testimony. 
12 

 Our conclusion that Professor Denbeaux's expert 

testimony was admissible is consistent with the "strong and 

undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some 

potential for assisting the trier of fact" which is embodied in 

the Federal rules of Evidence. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3d Cir. 1990). Rule 

702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, 

specifically embraces this policy. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 

advisory committee's note (expert testimony should be admissible 

if it will assist trier of fact); Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741 (Rule 

702 has "liberal policy of admissibility"). 

 Rule 702 has three major requirements: (1) the 

proffered witness must be an expert; (2) the expert must testify 

to scientific, technical or specialized knowledge; and (3) the 

expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact.0 Paoli II, 35 

F.3d at 741-42. Because Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) requires 

district courts to make preliminary determinations "concerning 

the qualification of a person to be a witness, [and] . . . the 

admissibility of evidence," a district court, when faced with a 

proffer of expert testimony, must make a preliminary 

determination as to all of these elements of Rule 702. See

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 

(1993) ("Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, . . 

 

0Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical or other 

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 

the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 

as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 

education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 

otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
13 

. the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 

104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) 

scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to 

understand or determine a fact in issue.") (footnotes omitted). 

These preliminary determinations are intended to ensure the 

reliability of the expert testimony as well as its relevance. Id.

at 2795; Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237. 

 The first requirement of Rule 702 -- that the proposed 

witness be an expert -- has been liberally construed by this 

Court. Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741. "We have held that a broad 

range of knowledge, skills, and training qualify an expert as 

such," and have "eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements 

of expertise." Id.; see also Hammond v. International Harvester 

Co., 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982) (permitting engineer with 

sales experience in automotive and agricultural equipment, who 

also taught high school automobile repair, to testify in products 

liability action involving tractors). 

 The second requirement of Rule 702 -- that the expert 

testify to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge -

- is intended to ensure the reliability or trustworthiness of the 

expert's testimony. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96. 

 In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that a district 

court, when presented with a proffer of expert "scientific" 

testimony, must make a "preliminary assessment of whether the 

reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 

scientifically valid," by considering all relevant factors that 
14 

may bear on the reliability of the proffered evidence.0 113 S. 

Ct. at 2796-97; Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742. Scientific evidence is 

deemed sufficiently reliable if the expert has "good grounds" for 

his or her testimony, i.e., the expert's opinions are "based on 

the `methods and procedures of science' rather than on 

`subjective belief or unsupported speculation.'" Paoli II, 35 

F.3d at 742 (quoting Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795). We have 

cautioned, however, against applying the reliability requirement 

too strictly, explaining that "the reliability requirement must 

not be used as a tool by which the court excludes all 

questionably reliable evidence. The ultimate touchstone [of 

admissibility] is helpfulness to the trier of fact." Id. at 744 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). 

 The third requirement of Rule 702 is to ensure that the 

evidence is relevant or "fits" under the facts of the case. 

Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-96. There must be a valid connection 

between the expertise in question and the inquiry being made in 

the case. Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 743. When dealing with 

"scientific" evidence, this element is satisfied if there is a 

 

0Courts should consider the following suggested factors, in 

addition to any other applicable factors, in making a preliminary 

determination regarding the reliability of scientific testimony: 

(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; 

(2) whether the method has been subject to peer review; 

(3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the 

existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 

technique's operation; (5) whether the method is 

generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the 

technique to methods which have been established to be 

reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness 

testifying based on the methodology; and (8) the nonjudicial uses to which the method has been put. 

Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742 n.8. 
15 

"connection between the scientific research or test result to be 

presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the case." 

United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); see 

also Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742-43. 

 Is it, however, appropriate to apply the Daubert tests 

for scientific expert testimony to the field of handwriting 

analysis? The Daubert tests have been considered by some courts 

to be too stringent to employ in considering whether to admit the 

expert testimony of accountants and construction experts. See

Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d 

Cir. 1994) (Daubert clarified standards for evaluating scientific 

knowledge only and, therefore, does not apply to exclude 

affidavits of geotechnical and underground-construction experts 

who were retained to summarize and interpret voluminous, 

technical data); Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 

(accountant's affidavit summarizing his review of payroll records 

not inadmissible under Daubert because "that case specifically 

dealt with the admissibility of scientific evidence"); United 

States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1040-41 (S.D.N.Y. 

1995) (Daubert factors of testability, known error rate, peer 

review and publication, and general acceptance not applicable to 

determination of admissibility of testimony by forensic document 

examiner; "Daubert does not impose any new standard, other than 

what is found in the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for 

the admissibility of the testimony of nonscientific experts such 

as harbor pilots or real estate appraisers."). However, in an 

exercise of caution, we will review Denbeaux's testimony under 
16 

the Daubert tests because those tests are helpful to assist us in 

our consideration of the expertise in question here. We will 

therefore examine both Lynn Bonjour's and Prof. Denbeaux's 

testimony for qualifications, reliability and fitness as those 

factors have been explicated in Daubert. 

 In the present case, there is no question that the 

district court properly admitted Ms. Bonjour's handwriting 

analysis testimony because her testimony met all three of the 

requirements of Rule 702. See Government of Virgin Islands v. 

Sanes, 57 F.3d 338 (3d cir. 1995) (approving district court's 

decision to admit testimony of professor of linguistics on issues 

of voice identification). First, Ms. Bonjour is clearly 

experienced in handwriting analysis. Her qualifications in this 

regard are extensive, including her more than fourteen years of 

experience as a Forensic Document Analyst for the U.S. Postal 

Inspection Service. See supra note 2. 

 Second, the field of handwriting analysis consists of 

"scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" properly 

the subject of expert testimony under Rule 702. The district 

court held a hearing at which it made the requisite preliminary 

finding that the methodology underlying handwriting analysis was 

valid and applicable to the facts of the present case. In 

particular, the court questioned Ms. Bonjour as follows: 

COURT: Is [there] a standard methodology 

when you look at a handwriting specimen? 

BONJOUR: Yes. 

COURT: Give me a little discussion of what 

you look for in your analysis. . . . 
17 

BONJOUR: First I look at the questioned 

writing and look at that to determine whether 

it's identifiable, whether it has sufficient 

individual characteristics as opposed to 

class characteristics. So that it can be 

identified. Whether there is a sufficient 

amount of the writing for a comparison. And, 

once I determine whether or not it is 

identifiable, then I look at the submitted 

handwriting specimens for the same purposess 

[sic], to determine whether they have been 

naturally written, whether they contain 

identifiable characteristics, individual 

characteristics. I then compare the 

characteristics. 

COURT: What do you mean by characteristics? 

BONJOUR: Characteristics are the, [sic] 

slant, the shapes of the letters, the letter 

connections, the height of the letters, the 

spacing between letters, spacing between 

words, the i dots, t crosses. Every single 

thing in that writing is a characteristic. 

They, in order to effect an identification, 

they have to be demonstrated and if they do 

not match exactly, I have to have a good 

reason for why they don't. . . . Once I have 

made the comparison, I weigh the evidence I 

have seen and determine whether or not this 

is a match or probably a match or I don't 

know or it is not a match. 

COURT: Is this the protocol you follow in 

every instance? 

BONJOUR: In every instance. 

COURT: To your knowledge, in your 

association with other people who are in your 

field, is this the protocol they follow? 

BONJOUR: Yes, it is. 

App. 136-37. Immediately following this colloquy, the Court 

admitted Ms. Bonjour as an expert in the field of questioned 

documents, i.e., handwriting analysis. App. 138. We agree with 
18 

the district court that Ms. Bonjour's proposed testimony 

concerned "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" 

and was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. 

 Ms. Bonjour's testimony also satisfied the third 

requirement -- that the expert's testimony assist the trier of 

fact. Her testimony, comparing the handwriting of Velasquez's 

accomplices with the handwriting on the mailing labels used to 

ship drugs, was of assistance to the jury in determining whether 

the accomplices had written the labels, a fact at issue in this 

case. Specifically, Ms. Bonjour's testimony, if credited by the 

jury, linked two people to Defendant's drug activities where one 

of the issues at trial was whether Defendant had managed or 

organized a continuing criminal enterprise involving at least 

five other persons. Accordingly, the district court correctly 

admitted Ms. Bonjour's expert testimony on handwriting analysis 

under Rule 702. 

 Similarly, Professor Denbeaux's proffered testimony 

meets all three requirements of Rule 702. First, in light of our 

liberal interpretation of expertise, the record shows that 

Professor Denbeaux has sufficient specialized knowledge of the 

limitations of handwriting analysis to be considered an expert in 

that regard. See Downing, 753 F.2d at 1229-30 (expert testimony 

on limitations of eyewitness perception and memory may under 

certain circumstances satisfy helpfulness test of Rule 702). In 

particular, we point to the Professor's eight years of selfdirected research on handwriting analysis and his co-authorship 

of a law review article on the subject. See supra note 3. The 
19 

mere fact that the Professor is not an expert in conducting 

handwriting analysis to identify particular scriveners of 

specified documents does not mean that he is not qualified to 

offer expert testimony criticizing the standards in the field. 

 Second, the Professor's proposed testimony criticizing 

handwriting analysis consisted of "scientific, technical or other 

specialized knowledge" reliable enough to be admitted under Rule 

702. The Professor criticized the lack of standards and the 

possibility for error involved in handwriting analysis. These 

criticisms could be and, on a limited basis have been, tested; 

they have been published and subjected to peer review. See D. 

Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux, & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism 

of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of 

Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731 

(1989) (detailing tests conducted to determine accuracy of 

handwriting analysts).0 We find that sufficient evidence exists 

to show that the Professor had "good grounds" for his rejection 

of handwriting analysis. 

 Finally, the Professor's proffered testimony was highly 

relevant to the reliability of Ms. Bonjour's testimony. His 

criticisms of the field of handwriting analysis generally, as 

well as Ms. Bonjour's analysis in this case, would have assisted 

the jury in determining the proper weight to accord Ms. Bonjour's 

testimony. His testimony "fits" the facts of the case because 

 

0Ms. Bonjour acknowledged that she had read Professor Denbeaux's 

law review article, although her critique -- "it's a lot of 

gibberish" -- was less than glowing. App. 164. 
20 

his opinions, criticizing handwriting analysis and Ms. Bonjour's 

conclusions, connect to the issue of whether Defendant's 

continuing criminal enterprise involved at least five other 

people. 

 Thus, in light of the liberal standard of admissibility 

of Rule 702, Professor Denbeaux's testimony should have been 

admitted. Moreover, because his testimony bore on the critical 

issue of Ms. Bonjour's identification of the persons who were 

required to have participated in Velasquez's "continuing criminal 

enterprise," his testimony might very well have affected the 

jury's verdict on Count VIII. We cannot conclude that the 

district court's decision to exclude that evidence was harmless 

error. 

IV. CONCLUSION

 The district court erred as a matter of law in refusing 

to permit Professor Denbeaux to testify as to the limitations of 

handwriting analysis. Accordingly, we will vacate Velasquez's 

judgment of conviction for engaging in a continuing criminal 

enterprise, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, and we will remand 

this case to the district court for a new trial on that count.