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i 

94–098 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–11] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL 

YEAR 2016 BUDGET REQUEST FOR 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Glueck, LtGen Kenneth J., Jr., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat 

Development and Integration, and Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Combat Development Command ......................................................................... 4 

Mulloy, VADM Joseph P., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources ...................................................................... 6 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Department of the Navy ............................................. 1 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ............................ 29 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .......................................... 27 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM Joseph P. Mulloy and LtGen 

Kenneth J. Glueck, Jr. .................................................................................. 31 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 71 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 76 

Mrs. Walorski ................................................................................................... 76 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 75 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 25, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. FORBES. What we are going to do in the interest of time— 

because, as we mentioned to you, we may have another set of votes 

called—Mr. Courtney and I both are going to waive our opening remarks, and we are simply going to put those remarks in the record. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 27.] 

Mr. FORBES. We are going to waive any introductions we might 

have had for our panel members because each of the members have 

those in their packages. And so what we would like to do is go 

ahead and start with your opening remarks. 

Mr. Secretary, are you going to start us off? So if you will do 

that. Then are we going to go to, General, or, Admiral, next after 

you? Ok, so why don’t we do that? 

And, Mr. Secretary, we will let you start us off. Thank you, the 

three of you, for being here. Again, without objection, we are going 

to include all of our speakers’ written remarks in the record. 

So Mr. Secretary, we turn the floor over to you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION), DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Secretary STACKLEY. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Courtney, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today to address Department of the Navy acquisition programs. 

Joining me today are Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Joe Mulloy; and Deputy Commandant, Marine Corps, for 

Combat Development Integration, Lieutenant General Ken Glueck. 

With the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide 

brief opening remarks and submit a separate formal statement for 

the record. 

We are in the fortunate position of having received the national 

defense authorizations and appropriations bills in the first quarter 

of this fiscal year. I cannot overstate that escaping the extraordinary disruption of government shutdown, furloughs, extensive 

continuing resolutions, sequestration, and the budget uncertainty 
2 

experienced in prior recent years gives us a measure of stability 

that enables far greater efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out 

our mission this year. 

In fact, the Department of the Navy fared extremely well in this 

year’s bills. And we greatly appreciate your efforts for not only has 

Congress fully supported our request, the committee’s increased 

procurement in our most critical programs sending a strong signal 

of support regarding the role of our Navy and Marine Corps. However, the greater reality is that across fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 

2015, the Navy’s budget has been reduced by $25 billion compared 

to the funding that we had determined was necessary to meet the 

Defense Strategic Guidance or the DSG. As a result, quantities of 

ships, aircraft, and weapons have been impacted. Development programs have been stretched. Modernization has been slowed. Deployments have been cancelled. Deployments have been stretched, 

placing greater strain on the force. Depot and facilities maintenance has been deferred, all adding to a growing backlog. 

And, with a significant portion of the reductions levied against 

investment accounts, the resultant procurement quantity reductions had the perverse impact of driving up unit cost for weapons 

systems at a time when cost is one of the great threats before us 

and, too, weakening our strategic industrial base. 

In building the 2016 budget request, we have had to wrestle with 

the clash between the needs of our military to meet the requirements of the DSG, the implications of the threats posed by the increasingly technologically capable adversaries or potential adversaries, and the implications of the Budget Control Act. 

We have been faithful to our fiscal responsibilities, leveraging 

every tool available to drive down costs such that alongside range 

and speed and power and payload, affordability has become a requirement. 

Independent of the fiscal environment, the demand for naval 

presence, in the words of the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], 

being where it matters when it matters, is on a steady rise. Near 

half our fleet is routinely at sea, and of that number, about 100 

ships and more than 75,000 sailors and marines are deployed. 

Therefore, we have placed a priority on forward presence, nearterm readiness, investment in those future capabilities critical to 

our long-term technical superiority and stability in our shipbuilding program. 

Our shipbuilding program is, in fact, very stable. The fleet under 

construction is about 65 ships strong. As highlights, America LHA– 

6, commissioned this past fall with the keel of her sister ship, Tripoli LHA–7, laid earlier in the year. These ships’ tremendous aviation capabilities when coupled with the Marines’ version of the 

Joint Strike Fighter open a new chapter in naval aviation. At Newport News, as we complete construction and testing of our first new 

design carrier in more than 40 years, CVN–78, the Gerald Ford, we 

start construction of CVN–79, the John F. Kennedy. In doing so, we 

are strongly partnered with industry to control cost in the lead ship 

and to leverage lessons learned and to make the necessary investments to reduce cost on follow ships. Likewise, DDG–1000, the first 

new design destroyer in 30 years, is being brought to life readying 

for her sea trials later this year. DDG–51 construction is pro-
3 

gressing well with the first restart ship, DDG–113, on track to deliver at Ingalls Shipyard in 2016. 

Equally important is the Flight III DDG–51 destroyer upgrade. 

The Navy relies on your continued support for this capability, 

which is so critical to countering increasing cruise and ballistic 

missile threats. 

Littoral Combat Ship continues to march smartly down learning 

curve at both building yards, and as was announced, the Navy will 

commence a new frigate-class design based on modifying the current LCS, with an over-the-horizon surface missile, antisubmarine 

warfare capability exceeding that of today’s surface combatants, enhanced radar, electronic warfare capabilities, enhanced survivability features, and other upgrades significantly expanding the 

ship’s range of operations. 

In submarines, we continue to leverage learning on the Virginia 

program. And the next major upgrade, Virginia Payload Modules, 

is on track to provide increased undersea strike capacity. And we 

are rapidly ramping up design activities on the Ohio replacement 

program to support her critical schedule. In other ship programs, 

we have requested the balance of funding for a 12th LPD [Amphibious Transport Dock] class. We thank the Congress for its support 

in prior years, and we are going to leverage the benefits brought 

by that ship to our amphibious force. 

And we are proceeding with three new major shipbuilding programs: the Fleet Oiler T–AO(X) in 2016; the next big deck amphib 

[amphibious assault ship], LHA–8, in 2018—excuse me, 2017; and 

the replacement for the LSD–41, the LX(R) at the end of the FYDP 

[Future Years Defense Program]. Each is critical to our force. Each 

is critical to the industrial base. And affordability is critical to 

each. So we have constructed an acquisition strategy to meet these 

objectives. Of interest to this subcommittee, we have awarded the 

planning contract for the refueling overhaul, CVN–73 George Washington, and likewise, we are proceeding with the execution of the 

cruiser and LSD [Landing Ship, Dock] modernization programs in 

accordance with Congress’ approval in 2015. 

Major aviation programs under this subcommittee’s purview, the 

Navy’s game-changing maritime patrol aircraft, the P–8A Poseidon, 

is today on deployment, and we are on track with planned followon incremental capability upgrades to that aircraft. And the Navy’s 

next-generation early warning aircraft, the E–2D Advanced Hawkeye, has entered the fleet and, in conjunction with other fleet assets, will be providing an air defense capability far beyond that 

available in the Navy today. 

Meanwhile, the third leg of our Naval Air-Ground Task Force, 

the Marine Corps’ tactical vehicles is at the front end of much 

needed recapitalization. In 2015, we commence procurement of the 

joint light tactical vehicle to replace the Humvee. We press forward 

with survivability upgrades to the amphibious assault vehicle to 

ensure their viability for future combat. And we are moving forward with acquiring a highly capable, highly survivable wheeled 

vehicle in the first phase of the amphibious combat vehicle program. The strategy for procuring this vehicle is striking a necessary balance between requirements and affordability. 
4 

And separately, we commence procurement of our newest shipto-shore connector to provide high-speed transfer of Marine Corps 

tactical vehicles from the sea. 

In summary, the Department’s 2016 budget request is sized and 

shaped to provide that measure of capability, capacity, and readiness, to uphold national policies and to protect us against potential 

enemies. 

In response to sequestration in 2013, the Bipartisan Budget Act 

level funding in 2014 and 2015, and the reductions across 2016 

through 2020, the Department has been judicious in controlling 

costs, reducing procurements, stretching developments, and delaying modernization. However, these actions necessarily add cost to 

our programs, add risk to our industrial base, and add risk to our 

ability to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. If we are forced to 

execute at BCA [Budget Control Act] levels in fiscal year 2016 and 

beyond, these cuts will go deeper, and we fundamentally change 

our Navy and Marine Corps and the industrial base we rely upon. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today. We look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, General 

Glueck, and Admiral Mulloy can be found in the Appendix on page 

31.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral, are you up next, or, General? Which one is going to— 

General, I think you are up next then. 

Thank you for being here, and we yield you the floor. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN KENNETH J. GLUECK, JR., USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, AND COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS 

COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND 

General GLUECK. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for this opportunity to testify before you today. 

The Marine Corps’ ability to serve as our Nation’s premiere crisis 

response force is due in a large part to this subcommittee’s continued strong support. And, on behalf of all Marines, I would like to 

say thank you. 

The current situation is chaotic. This committee has heard from 

numerous witnesses this year who have characterized the global 

security situation as one that is rapidly changing, increasingly complex. These multidimensional challenges highlight the increasingly 

broad range of warfighting capabilities our military must possess 

to ensure success on the battlefield. While these challenges are 

global in nature, they increasingly occur in areas that have a maritime component. Increased competition for limited natural resources, demographic shifts to the coastal urban centers, territorial 

disputes over maritime borders, will continue to contribute to future conflict. These conflicts will require a robust naval force that 

can respond rapidly from the sea. 

Your Navy and Marine Corps team provides the means to ensure 

our national interests remain protected. Forward-deployed, forward-stationed forces enable us to respond to today’s crisis with today’s force today. These forces are characterized by their flexibility 
5 

and their ability to loiter indefinitely to provide a deterrent and, 

when required, to project power ashore at the place and the time 

of our choosing. They provide our Nation’s leadership decision 

space necessary to make informed decisions during rapidly evolving 

situations. Amphibious warships with embark Marines are crucial 

enablers to these capabilities. Referred to as the Swiss Army knife 

of the fleet, they are versatile, interoperable warfighting platforms 

capable of going into harm’s way and providing diverse capabilities 

unlike any other naval platform. 

However, demand for these ships and embark capabilities far 

outpace the available inventory. Because of inventory shortages, 

the Marine Corps has invested in land-based, special-purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and is exploring how to best leverage 

existing alternative sea-based platforms to generate enhanced littoral mobility, maneuver capabilities for our Marine Corps forces 

positioned in Europe, Africa, and Pacific areas of operation. 

Due to the generosity and foresight of Congress, our Nation will 

greatly benefit from LPD–28, the 12th ship in the San Antonio 

class, which is now programmed. When that ship comes on line, 

your naval forces will have an additional capability to respond to 

crisis. This remarkable line of amphibious ships has proven itself 

since 2006, and has provided tremendous capability to deployed 

amphibious ready groups and our embark Marines. The recent decision to base the dock landing ship replacement, or LX(R), on the 

San Antonio hull form will provide a much improved capability and 

capacity. And in particular, enhanced command and control, aviation operations, and maintenance capabilities will enable this ship 

to conduct independent operations and further expand the operational reach of our forward deployed forces. The future amphibious fleet is one that is characterized by its rapid flexibility and 

interoperability with the joint force. No one platform will prove 

transformational. It will be the combination of existing amphibious 

warships, alternative platforms for Military Sealift Command, and 

the maritime preposition force, with ships, such as the Joint High 

Speed Vessel and the Mobile Landing Platform, with the Advanced 

Forward Staging Base that will enable us to achieve our full potential. 

Your Navy and Marine Corps team is committed to conducting 

the experimentation, war-gaming, and dedicated planning to ensure that we invest wisely in our future force to generate the most 

value for every platform in the inventory. Our forward-stationed 

and deployed Marines remain our Nation’s 911 force in readiness, 

and the investments that we are making in the future will ensure 

that they remain poised to do so. In partnership with the Navy, the 

Marine Corps looks forward to working with you to address these 

issues. 

I thank you for this opportunity and look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Glueck, Secretary 

Stackley, and Admiral Mulloy can be found in the Appendix on 

page 31.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Admiral. 
6 

STATEMENT OF VADM JOSEPH P. MULLOY, USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, thank you. Chairman Forbes, Ranking 

Member Courtney, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today to testify on behalf your 

Navy seapower and projection forces. 

I welcome the new members of the subcommittee. I look forward 

to working with you all as we work on the 2016 budget. In developing this 2016 President’s budget, we carefully analyzed the needs 

of our Nation and Navy in order to meet the missions of the Defense Strategic Guidance in the most recent Quadrennial Defense 

Review. This analysis looked at ends, ways, and means necessary 

to fight and win today’s wars while building the ability to win tomorrow’s; to operate forward to deter aggression; and to be ready 

to fight and responsibly employ our diverse force. 

We remain committed to the rebalancing of the majority of our 

naval forces to the Asia-Pacific with 60 percent of our ships and 

planes in that region by 2020. However, with the reality of the current Federal budget limitations and our commitment to do our part 

in bringing our Nation’s fiscal house in order, we have made difficult choices to best balance capability, capacity, readiness, and 

our industrial base, and still meet the mission of the defense strategy, albeit with some risk. 

Our 2016 budget represents what we feel is the minimum necessary for our Navy to continue to be where it matters when it 

matters. It reflects difficult choices and actions we had to take due 

to shortfalls over the last 3 years. Thus any reduction in 2016, 

whether it be from sequestration or action by Congress at some 

level of funding in between, would be extremely challenging. 

I would like to reiterate what Secretary Stackley said: The Navy is down $25 billion over the last 3 years due to sequestration and 

the bipartisan budgets acts. That has required us to adapt and 

modify what we are doing. At the same time, this needs to stop. 

We are hanging on. We are making do, but the threats we face trying to defend this country, they don’t have to make do. If we are 

limited to sequestration level funding, the Nation would need to 

think about what kind of military we can afford and how we would 

need to reprioritize in that situation. That analysis would need to 

factor in the global environment, the Nation’s defense priorities, 

America’s role in the international security system, and the capabilities and threats of our adversaries, as well as timing of sequestration and the method of implementation. That analysis will dictate what kind of cuts will be required. You have to do that analysis first, revise our defense strategy, before talking about specific 

impacts. We fight as a joint force. We must adjust as a joint force. 

We ask for your support in providing the strategy-based Navy 

that our 2016 budget will sustain and avoid the budget-based Navy 

that sequestration will give us. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Mulloy, Secretary 

Stackley, and General Glueck can be found in the Appendix on 

page 31.] 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, thank you. 
7 

As I mentioned earlier, I am going to defer my questions to the 

end so that members can get their questions in. 

I would like to go to Mr. Courtney and yield to him for any questions he may have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for your patience and your testimony. 

Secretary Stackley, you talked about some of the modifications 

last year that Congress made to improve the initial submission 

that came over last January. And I think it is important to note 

that this subcommittee actually kind of led the way in terms of 

those modifications just for no other reason that we go first in this 

whole process. 

But, again, if you look at the authorizing committees and Appropriations Committee, they pretty much followed the path that we 

started here. So we look forward to continuing that collaboration 

that made the best of a bad situation last year. The chairman deserves a lot of credit actually for the great work that took place last 

year. 

Secretary Stackley, just to zoom in on one issue that you mentioned, and I will let, again, the other members jump in. The Virginia Payload program, which, again, is an attempt to try and as 

quickly as possible replace the strike capacity that we are going to 

lose when the SSGNs [cruise missile submarines] go off line, the 

plan came over, again, talks about implementing that modification 

program in 2019 and 2020. The Joint Resources Oversight Council 

had talked about, again, trying to do that maybe even more 

robustly. And I was just wondering if you had any thoughts about 

possibly trying to accelerate that process in terms of the ability of 

the industrial base to handle it and, again, just sort of whether the 

Navy thinks that that is a plausible change that we can make to, 

again, fill that gap that is going to happen when the—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. I appreciate the question. First, the 

SSGNs, the four SSGNs, retire in the 2026 through 2028 window. 

When they retire, each of those boats carries missile tube capacity 

for 154 missiles. So you look at about 600-missile-tube capacity 

exiting the fleet in the mid-2020s. 

The Virginia Payload Module approach is to buy back that capacity, but in doing so, it is adding 28 missile tubes per submarine, 

28-missile capacity per submarine. So it is going to take a long 

time to recapitalize the capacity that goes out with the GNs [shorthand for SSGNs] in the mid-2020s. 

The program plan is to commence installation of VPM, the Virginia Payload Module, with a next multiyear procurement in 2019. 

The design and development has all been paced to that milestone. 

If we are going to try to really hammer away at what will be a 

shortfall to undersea strike capacity, the more we can do, the earlier we can do, the better for our Nation. 

So what I have, frankly, committed in earlier discussions with 

your staff and in discussions on my side with the PEO [program 

executive officer] for submarines and the industrial sector is to take 

a look at, can we, in fact, complete those design and development 

activities earlier than the 2019 timeframe to give the Navy and the 

Nation the option to determine whether or not we want to advance 

Virginia Payload Modules earlier in the submarine build cycle. So 
8 

we are doing that work right now, and we are doing that in the 

context of the other submarine work that is all coming together at 

the same time. So we have Virginia Payload Module design, and 

then we would have the build that comes with that, that increases 

the capacity throughput that would have to take place in our submarine build yards, on top of the sea-based strategic deterrent, the 

Ohio replacement program that is a 2021 start, but well before 

2021, we are deep into design today, and we are going to be doing 

advanced construction activities at the same time. 

So we have to manage the total workload at the submarine 

yards. We have to determine can we, in fact, accelerate the design 

and development activities to support an earlier introduction to 

Virginia Payload Modules, and then look at balancing the workload 

across the two yards to do that. We are doing those studies right 

now in concert, frankly, with an overarching study that we are 

doing which is looking at how, in fact, are we going to build Ohio 

replacement in concert with the ongoing Virginia submarine construction, in concert with the introduction of Virginia Payload Modules all within a couple of year window. 

So the answer is we are looking at it. We have the right people 

looking at it. I would ask you to give us a couple of months to complete our review. And we will be ready to come back and give you 

more specifics in the March-April timeframe. 

Mr. FORBES. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. Secretary, we don’t have a couple of months, so if you can 

narrow that scope down, it would be very, very helpful to us as we 

are looking to try to just accelerate a little bit of that. If it is not 

doable, it is not doable. But we have got some big gaps that are 

sitting out there. We just want to help you try to close those gaps. 

So anything you could get for us in a quicker timeframe, at least 

for this year, might be helpful to do that. So I know you can only 

do what you can do, but we just make that request to you. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Sir, I will tell you, just to complete the thought, though, I don’t 

expect there is going to be—I don’t anticipate change to the early 

activities. It is really to take a look at the back end of the FYDP 

because that is where the mountain of the work is. 

Mr. FORBES. That is good. We recognize at this time Mr. Knight 

from California for 5 minutes if he has any questions. 

No questions. 

The gentleman from Montana is recognized for 5 minutes if he 

has any questions. 

Mr. ZINKE. I do not, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Then the vice chairman, Mr. Hunter, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, good to see you. Thank you for being here. This is 

the first question. MLP [Mobile Landing Platform], AFSB [Afloat 

Forward Staging Base], you mentioned that, General. I think we 

asked last NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to have 

some kind of a gap procurement from the Navy. It didn’t go 

through. So if Congress finds the means to do that again to provide 

the moneys, is that good? I mean, do you want that? Do you need 

that, and can you put it to good use? 
9 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I think you are specifically referring to 

advance procurement. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. 

Secretary STACKLEY. To be able to close the production gap at 

NASSCO [National Steel and Shipbuilding Company] associated 

with building the fifth of the MLP class, the third Afloat Forward 

Staging Base. The answer is, yes, it is desirable. You don’t see it 

in our budget because, frankly, the appropriators have marked it 

out each time we have tried to put it in. So, for us, it is a challenge 

to put funding in if we know the appropriator is going to mark it 

out. So any assistance in that regard would be helpful to the industrial base, helpful to getting the capability earlier, but we recognize 

the challenge associated with the appropriators’ view on that. 

Mr. HUNTER. So I guess that kind of ties in too with amphibs, 

going from 38, which is the number that the Marine Corps and the 

Navy agreed upon that is needed to conduct the missions and the 

requirements from the combatant commanders throughout the 

world. Right? So you went down from 38 to 33. We really only have 

31. You don’t have MLP and AFSB on track right now because 

there is no advance procurement funding for it. Right? So they are 

semi on track. We have now closed three embassies in the last 6 

years, had to evacuate them using Marines. You have less landbased places where you can now stage out of. Is that not a priority 

for the Navy and the Marine Corps to be able to operate? You can’t 

operate out of the embassies. You can’t operate off the land. You 

have to operate out of something. So what is the something? It 

can’t be hope and good will. Right? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me start that the AFSB we just talked 

about is the third of the three that are planned. So the first two 

are on track. The third one is on track in terms of its full funding. 

The advanced procurement would allow that to effectively be 

brought to the left a year. So that capability—— 

Mr. HUNTER. For the shipyard? 

Secretary STACKLEY. For the shipyard, yes, sir. That capability, 

we place increasing value on it, particularly as—you have walked 

the ship—particularly as you see all the opportunity that it brings, 

all the lift capacity that it brings. I will let General Glueck describe 

exactly how the Marine Corps is looking at that in terms of forward operating base effectively to support Marine Corps operations. But it has held a high priority in terms of the Navy’s budget since we started with the MLP program. 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask it this way. Does it offset the number 

of amphibs that you need, having it, having a forward staging base 

like that, where you can lift and move? Does that offset the number 

of amphibs? Is that one reason for the lower number, or are they 

two totally separate things? 

Admiral MULLOY. No, sir, it doesn’t offset it. As a matter of fact, 

if you look at it, it is that the Force Structure Assessment will now 

actually go up to 34 ships because the LPD is being bought, and 

it actually modified that we have the third AFSB in. So they are 

not a substitute. What they are is enabler or other alternatives to 

put a special purpose MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] on 

or other national mission forces. In fact, when the AFSB was initially designed, it was going to be to amplify mine hunting, and it 
10 

actually was initially designed for two MH–53s and mine-hunting 

gear. And there were going to be two of them. The value of that 

has now made itself very clear is that now what it can—we have 

designed to work with NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command]— 

can take four V–22s on the same flight deck. And it is much more 

readily able to take the Marine Corps on it and also and/or National Mission Forces. So it doesn’t offset the need, and we view it 

now as it puts the third—with the 33rd—or, pardon me, the 12th 

LPD and the statement of now that is 34, we are closing that gap. 

It comes back to being, how much money do we have? We looked 

at it was AFSBs plugged into the workload of an industrial base 

of NASSCO and, as Mr. Secretary pointed out, was AP [advance 

procurement] would help. The ship will still execute. The first ship 

is christened on time, and we are looking forward to the AFSB getting out there, and where it goes it’s still under review. It could be 

in Africa. It could be in the Middle East. But we know it will be 

helpful. Last summer, we took New York City [USS New York 

(LPD–21)] out of cycle to go to the Mediterranean to embark on a 

National Mission Force to catch a terrorist. Very quickly they used 

a ship of opportunity. That ship is now in the Middle East. So what 

did we have to do? We double-pumped that crew. They went over, 

embarked the special people, landed, took that individual back, 

who is now in court in New York City awaiting trial. The ship 

came back, did a maintenance period, and now it is on deployment. 

The AFSB would give us the opportunity of having those AFSBs 

out there. You would still be able to embark Marines for rescue or 

special mission forces, and so that is how we view that ship in this 

important nest. And we are not detracting at all from the Marine 

Corps’ requirement for amphib, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Perfectly done on time in two, Admiral. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

General GLUECK. Congressman, if I could add to that. What you, 

your numbers were correct, as you said, on the front, but the combatant commanders actually say the requirement is closer to 54. 

And I believe CNO has actually stated that, that is probably—he 

knows it is over 50. So when you only have—today, we are sitting 

with 31 amphibious ships, and you get a delta between 31 and 54, 

you know, we look at the AFSB and the MLP as ships that can 

help to fill that gap on the lower end of the military operational 

spectrum—not on the higher end. They have to be in a permissive 

environment. 

Now, the first AFSB, the Chesty Puller, was actually just christened about a week and a half ago. In fact, General Dunford was 

out there for the christening ceremony. And we see a lot of capability, potential in that ship, but once again, it is going to have to 

be in a permissive environment. You know, I have worked up actually a CONOPS [concept of operations] for the Commandant; that 

is something we could possibly use maybe in the Gulf of Guinea to 

be able to expand our reach of the V–22s down in the southern region of Africa. Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes. 
11 

† Ms. Bordallo submitted a correction for the record changing ‘‘AGR’’ to ‘‘AOR [area of responsibility].’’ 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

It is nice to be back on the Seapower Subcommittee. 

Secretary Stackley, Admiral Mulloy, and General Glueck, thank 

you for your testimony today and for being here with us. 

Vice Admiral Mulloy, I remember your service as Commodore of 

the Submarine Squadron 15 in Guam and your leadership during 

the successful dry-docking of the submarine tender USS Frank 

Cable in Guam in 2004, and it is good to see you again. Last year, 

MSC [Military Sealift Command] sent the submarine tender Emory 

S. Land from Guam all the way back to the United States West 

Coast for its overhaul. 

Admiral, what is the impact on fleet readiness of sending ships 

from their West Pac [Pacific] AGRs † back to the U.S. mainland for 

dry-docking? 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for your question and 

your introduction, and also good to see you again. The impact ends 

up being essentially in time. It takes about 2 to 3 weeks to transit, 

get the crew acclimated and back, so we lose a month or two of 

that one. It is a constant balance of what we have to do. Our goal, 

as stated by the CNO, is to commit and maintain a robust ship repair and maintenance capability in Guam. They all look at the 

spectrum of ships. And as you pointed out, the tenders have done 

maintenance in Guam. In some cases, we send them back. It really 

depends upon the sheer amount of work that has to be done about 

a life extension on a ship. That is what we are studying right now, 

is what capacity we have to have forward versus back. But the actual loss of time is probably about 6 weeks of total time. It is really 

just the transit time it requires. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Admiral, for the information. 

And, Secretary Stackley, in 2013, this committee raised serious 

concerns about the Navy’s acquisition strategy to split pier-side 

ship repair from dry-docking depot-level capabilities in Guam. 

However, we understood that the dry-docking depot-level capabilities would be restored as quickly as possible. 

In your July 2014 report on ship repair, you stated that this 

Navy is conducting a business case analysis [BCA] to develop options for providing a dry-docking capability in Guam. The results 

of this dry-docking capability BCA will be provided to Congress 

later this fall. Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet has an operational 

requirement for a dry-docking capability in Guam. When can we 

expect to see the BCA, and when can we expect to see the dry-docking capability restored in Guam? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me first describe that the BCA that 

was—the first go at the BCA, in fact, did not address whether or 

not the business case for a dry dock in Guam makes sense. What 

the BCA did was started with the assumption that there is a dry 

dock in Guam, and now, what do we get out of it in terms of value? 

So it did not answer the first questions that, frankly, the CNO 

needs answered, which is, what will it cost to recapitalize the drydock capability in Guam? What is the extent for usage? And there 
12 

is going to be planning, and we also have to consider emergent 

need for the dry dock. And then, in that case, does that argue for 

the investment in that dry-dock capability? So, right now, that 

analysis is being reworked by Pac [Pacific] Fleet. It is owed to the 

CNO so that we can make the right investment decisions regarding 

the dry-dock capability. 

Ms. BORDALLO. When will we see the analysis? What is the timeframe here? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will have to get back to you for the record, 

ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 71.] 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Stackley, Vice Admiral Mulloy, and Lieutenant General Glueck, thank you so much for joining us. Thanks for your 

leadership. 

Secretary Stackley, traditionally, as you look at aircraft carrier 

buys, we have done them in two-ship procurements. And as you 

know, in the President’s budget for 2016, the proposal is for advanced procurement on CVN–78 in a 1-year timeframe and potentially moving CVN–79 to the right. We have seen with Arleigh 

Burke-class destroyers, as we purchase ships in groups, we have 

seen about a 15 percent savings when we do that just because of 

certainty, especially for suppliers for those ships, especially aircraft 

carriers. Is there any consideration given to grouping advanced 

procurement on CVN–80 and CVN–81? And give us your perspective, too, potentially on movement to the right of CVN–79. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me start with the advanced procurement for CVN–80 and CVN–81. There is strong argument for why 

that makes great sense. When you are procuring an aircraft carrier 

about once every 5 years and you are relying on a very unique industrial base to do that, what you don’t want to do is go through 

start-stop-start-stop cycle over a stretched period of time, and that 

is a big cost impact. The challenge is, by the same token, the build 

cycle for a carrier is greater than 10 years. So CVN–79, for example, she started her advanced procurement in 2009, and she will be 

delivering to the Navy in 2022. So that is a 13-year period. So 

when you talk about doubling down on buying the material to support two carriers 5 years apart that have a 13-year build span, you 

are trying to buy material as much as 18 years ahead of when the 

carrier went to the fleet. It makes great sense looking at it just 

from the program’s perspective on why we want to do that to drive 

the cost of the carrier down. There is risk associated with things 

like not necessarily obsolescence but change associated with a carrier because the threat changes and that brings change and then 

the investment that far in advance of when the asset actually enters the fleet. As the acquisition guy, I will argue for why we need 

to do that, but getting through, carrying that argument all the way 

through to say that we are going to take the 80, which is the 2018 

ship, the 81, which is a 2023 ship, buy material early for that 2023 
13 

ship delivering to the Navy in the mid-2030s, that is going to be 

hard for me to carry the day in terms of our budget process. So we 

have to have the compelling case for the specific things from an industrial-based perspective, from a move-the-needle—move the needle from a cost perspective—to justify the combined buys of 80 and 

81 together. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, it seems like, even if the scale is an issue 

as far as how much you would have to expand to do that and manage that within the budget, you could at least then identify those 

critical suppliers that look for certainty to make sure that they can 

continue providing those specialty parts, and if you could at least 

pare it down, again, at a critical mass to where you can demonstrate economies of scale of saving, that you could at least say 

these are the areas we need to maintain this industrial base, especially for small-scale suppliers that rely on certainty to continue 

that effort. So have you all given any thought to be able to scale 

it at least within that area, maybe not to get 15 percent savings, 

but still create certainty and make sure the suppliers are there but 

also—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We have a very concerted effort 

going on between the Navy and Newport News on all things costrelated to the CVN–78 class for all the right reasons. We are looking ahead at 80, which is a 2016, the advance procurement starts 

in 2016 for the 80. Most of that is going to be nuclear material. But 

Newport News has brought the initiative to the table in terms of 

combined buys for material. And now we have to sort out, can we, 

in fact, come up with the right list of material that makes sense 

to buy early, to buy combined, to get the savings, and not just people promising savings in the end, but to actually be able to book 

the savings so we can drive down the cost of those carriers? So I 

would say that we are working with industry on that. We have got 

a long way to go to be able to carry the day inside the budget process; first, inside the building, and then, again, I will tell you, we 

are going to have some challenges convincing some folks on the Hill 

that this makes sense to invest this early in a future aircraft carrier. 

And the other question you had about the CVN–79 schedule. 

CVN–79 is the replacement for the Nimitz. We have two things to 

struggle with. One is we want to build it earlier from the standpoint of efficiency with the shipyard. However, if we build it early, 

deliver it early, then we have an overlap between the 79 and the 

retirement of the CVN–68. What we can’t afford to do is ramp up 

one extra aircraft carrier crew for a couple-year period. So what we 

are doing is we look at that as schedule flexibility. We are going 

to try to drive the CVN–79’s construction to the left for efficiency 

purposes, but then we are going to look for a window, a second 

phase in the build process for the carrier, where we are going to 

bring in electronics, the electronics systems that will be obsolete if 

we were to buy them early. So we are going to buy them as late 

as possible, install them as late as possible, so that that the systems that we install are, in fact, state-of-the-fleet at the time that 

the carrier delivers. 

Mr. WITTMAN. I think that is the key to make sure that the overlap is there so as Nimitz retires and the CVN–79 comes on board, 
14 

we don’t good through the situation we were with Ford and Enterprise, to make sure we don’t have a gap there. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you so much. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Stackley, Admiral, General, thank you all for your testimony and all that you do to protect our Nation. I would like to 

start by expressing my appreciation for the significant efforts that 

the Navy has made to really push the art of the possible when it 

comes to cutting-edge technologies, be it directed at energy where 

the Ponce’s deployment is teaching us so much right now or the 

work being done to test railgun at sea and possibly integrated into 

the third Zumwalt destroyer or the UCAS–D [Unmanned Combat 

Air System Demonstration] program’s work on pushing the state of 

the art in unmanned carrier aviation. These are exactly the sorts 

of investments that we absolutely have to have to protect and allow 

to mature to enable the Navy that we will need in the future. I 

know this is something the chairman and the ranking member care 

deeply about, about giving us our future Navy today wherever possible. To our panel, let me just in particular ask, the Navy has projected a significant shortfall of land-attack cruise missiles capability with the retirement of the guided missile submarines in the 

2020s. To address this shortfall, Navy has proposed to expand the 

Virginia-class submarines to accommodate additional land-attack 

cruise missiles capability beginning with Block V. However, even 

this effort in assuming that all the payload space is used for land 

attack will leave us significantly short relative to today’s at-sea capacity. My questions are what options exist to mitigate the shortfall and accelerate the introduction of the Virginia Payload Module 

[VPM] capability? And can you also please describe industry’s ability to potentially accelerate the design, production, and the fielding 

of Virginia Payload Modules should additional resources be provided. What would be the earliest boat that could include VPM if 

it we were accelerated? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me start by describing that our design 

activities were all geared toward the first boat of the next multiyear, which is in 2019. We have posed to the design team, come 

back and tell us, is it possible to accelerate that? That is an answer 

that I owe you later this spring in terms of what that would comprise. You have hit it exactly in terms of the capacity that leaves 

when we lose the four GNs [SSGNs]. More than just the possibility 

of accelerating VPMs by a year, the other thing we have to work 

through is the total volume of work that the submarine industrial 

base will be taking on during the decade of the 2020s to determine 

between our build rate for Virginias side by side with our build 

rate of Ohio replacement, alongside the Virginia Payload Modules. 

In that equation, is there the ability to, in fact, increase VPM production because right now we are planning on one Virginia per 

year with VPM beginning in 2019. So we are looking at, first, can 

we pull that to the left a year, and then the other thing, the other 

aspect is what would be our ability to increase the rate of production of VPMs beyond one per year, which is in our current long- 
15 

range plan. Affordability comes into play. Industrial-based capacity 

comes into play, and it is too early yet to call that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Going back to the subject of directed 

energy, obviously these systems have numerous applications on a 

variety of different ship types. Which PEO will be the lead organization for oversight and execution by shipboard laser systems? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Right now, laser systems right now are 

being developed under the direction of the Office of Naval Research. They will get up to a certain level of technology maturity. 

Inside of the Naval Sea Systems Command, we have a program organization called Electric Ship’s Office, which includes a power system to support directed energy. Ultimately, a PEO for Integrated 

Warfare System would take on a responsibility for directed energy, 

and then the shipbuilding program would have responsibility for 

the shipboard side of integrating that weapons system just like we 

do today with other conventional weapons. So, Office of Naval Research today, working with our Naval Surface Warfare Center 

down at Dahlgren, Virginia, transition technology, when it is mature, to PEO IWS [Integrated Warfare Systems], working with 

PEO Ships, most likely, for integration on a future ship program. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, gentlemen. 

The gentlelady from Missouri, Ms. Hartzler, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

And before you, if you would just suspend for a moment, to our 

panelists, we are going to have votes, and we are going to have to 

recess for about 40 minutes. Are you guys okay with coming back? 

We have two of our members that have questions they would like 

to ask if you don’t mind doing that. 

So Ms. Hartzler will be our last questioner at this time. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just quickly, you 

said in your testimony that with the shift to the Pacific, by 2020, 

did you say there would be 60 percent? 

Admiral MULLOY. Approximately 60 percent of the fleet. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. I also read that if sequestration happens, 

you won’t be able to have an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. 

Is that correct? 

Admiral MULLOY. Right now, ma’am, the Mediterranean is covered on transit protection. We are still looking at, as I mentioned 

in my opening, the full extent of the Budget Control Act [BCA] impacts on Navy would require an adjustment of the entire joint 

force. So right now we are able to supply what we call 1.0 presence 

in the Central Command in the Persian Gulf area around Saudi 

Arabia and approximately a 1.0 presence in the Pacific. What we 

provide presence in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic is what we 

call transit presence if we are moving through. But in a world situation—when Crimea was invaded, the carrier delayed in the Mediterranean before it went into the Middle East, and we then did a 

2-week extension of the carrier in the Med—pardon me, in the Central Command so that we still had that overlap. Our plan would 

still remain the same. For a long-term operation in a BCA level, 

I cannot tell you what carrier presence would be. We are taking a 

look at what opportunities are out there, but what I will tell you 

is it remains bleak unless there is a fundamental change in strat-
16 

egy to what we have to do for the carrier presence around the 

world. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Can you give me an update on the refueling of the George Washington? 

Admiral MULLOY. Do you want to start that, sir? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would just say we signed the planning 

contract with Newport News in February. There is a 30-month 

planning window. So this is all the design activities. We start the 

material procurement to get everything in line so that when the 

GW [George Washington] shows up at the shipyard, she would start 

her nominally 44-month refueling complex overhaul [RCOH]. So 

that would be notionally the July 2017 timeframe would be the 

start of the RCOH, and it is pretty important we track to that 

schedule because what we want to do is minimize the extent of 

overlap with the next aircraft carrier, which is the Stennis. So if 

that RCOH starts much beyond July of 2017, then we get concerned about the combined 73/74 RCOHs at Newport News during 

that period. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. And lastly, can you compare the building of our 

submarines compared with what China is doing as far as building 

submarines, the numbers and capability? 

Admiral MULLOY. I would have to come back to you with a correct answer about how many they built per year, but on whole, 

they are producing submarines. They may not be the same quality, 

but their submarine forces are growing over at a tremendous rate. 

They now have more diesel and nuclear attack submarines than we 

have. So they have passed us in total quantity, but in quality, they 

are still not there. But they are producing some fairly amazing submarines, and they are actually deploying them. They have now had 

three deployments into the Indian Ocean. They are expanding 

where their submarines go. And of great interest, we know one 

SSBN [ballistic missile submarine] was on an equivalent—we don’t 

think they have nuclear weapons on board, but we have seen them 

producing the missiles and testing them. One SSBN did a 95-day 

period at sea, equivalent of a long patrol. So we know they are out 

experimenting and looking and operating and certainly want to be 

in this world of advanced submarines. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would highly recommend a classified 

threat brief for the members of the subcommittee so we can go into 

detail so we can see beyond just submarines the level of activity 

that China has in terms of modernizing its force. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Absolutely. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. And, with that, we are going to recess for about 40 

minutes until these three votes are over, and we will come back 

and finish up with our last two questions. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, first of all, thank so much for your patience in working with us on this. As you know, they don’t call us 

and ask if these votes are convenient, but we appreciate you working with us. 

Now I would like to recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 

Cook, for 5 minutes. 
17 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you very much for coming back. My question relates 

to what you are talking about, but I just got back from—we went 

to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and we had a brief 

over there, and then we were in Turkey. And I am concerned 

about, you know, whether we are—and the number of platforms 

that we have, you mentioned how they are going to be diminished 

and yet the tempo of ops [operations] and the op plans and everything else, it is one after another after another. And it is like, can 

we actually cover all these contingencies or all these spots? When 

I was in NATO and they put the fear of God in me about Putin 

and, quite frankly, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and whether we 

have the platforms. Obviously, we discussed the Med [Mediterranean], but I was thinking of the Baltic, which I thought was a very, 

very shallow area that is limited in terms of what you could bring 

in there. But they have been running operations. And, of course, 

as somebody that is involved in NATO, the big threat is the attack 

on one of those smaller countries way at the end, close to Russia. 

Do we factor that into the platforms or maybe I have the misconception that we are building everything for—everything all over 

the world and whether we have to be more selective in our future 

plans based upon the contingency or the threats as they are evolving? You know, I don’t mean to dwell on it too much, but 5 years 

ago, 10 years—you know, the Berlin Wall came down, and it is safe 

there. We are doing Kumbaya; everything has changed in a remarkably short period of time. So could you address that, please? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will start and ask for Admiral Mulloy and 

General Glueck to add. 

Let me first describe that when we design our ships, when we 

set the requirements and do the design, we are looking at a ship 

with a service life that is going to extend 30 to 40 years on average. 

It is impossible to anticipate all the types of operations that any 

ship is going to be called upon in that service life. So, to the extent 

practical, we look for general purpose designs to be able to configure and be employed to deal with the full range of operations 

that the ship will be called upon. 

With specific regard to the regions that you have just described, 

where you have to deal with shallow water, restricted areas, and 

what we refer to as the littorals, in fact, earlier, about 10 years 

ago, we embarked on this thing called the Littoral Combat Ship, 

specifically a shallow draft, a modular design so you could have 

payloads that you could flex and adjust to depending on what the 

mission was to deal with those regions where our larger capital 

ships, from destroyers, cruisers, carriers, et cetera, would not be 

able to penetrate. 

In general, we look for general purpose ships that you can adjust 

their mission as the threat moves with specific regards to those regions where our larger bluewater Navy was not designed for operations. We did add to our fleet the Littoral Combat Ship that has 

that shallow draft, modular payload capability and, frankly, speed, 

which is your ally in those close-in regions. 

Mr. COOK. Didn’t we cut back on those though? In terms—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. No, in fact—— 

Mr. COOK. Are we going forward with the—— 
18 

Secretary STACKLEY. We capped the modular version of the LCS 

at 32 ships. Frankly, the Secretary of Defense was concerned that 

we were going to build out to 52 LCSs, that would be one-sixth of 

our entire battle force being this modular configuration. So he 

tasked us with coming back with something that is, quote-unquote, 

more frigate-like, more multimission. And so, in fact, what we have 

going forward, first 32 ships will be the modular Littoral Combat 

Ship; the last 20 will be a multimission—still some modularity, but 

a multimission modified version of the LCS that gives it a wider 

range of operations. 

Admiral MULLOY. The only other part I would add, sir, as we 

look at the changing demographics of the world, the threat does 

morph in where we have to go, but as Mr. Secretary Stackley pointed out was the ability of our ships to flex in terms of payloads and 

weapons. So the concern on deployability and the combatant commanders, you are absolutely right. And that is one reason why, as 

I mentioned earlier, PB–16 [President’s budget request for fiscal 

year 2016] is the minimum to be able to do this. We need the funds 

to go take our 285 ships right now and build them to 308 by the 

end of FYDP to be able to continue to support that. 

Ten years ago, we had 300-something ships, but we only had 

about 70 deployed. Now we have 100 deployed out of 300—or 280 

ships. So we are at the point of a ship comes back and immediately 

it rests, it does maintenance, and it just recycles back again to deploy. And so all the combatant commanders want them. So it is important that PB–16 reflects we need to keep building ships; we 

need to continue to maintain them; and we need to be able to make 

them available. And that is so really the combatant commanders 

to develop war plans or option plans with them, but the response 

is there. Within a short period of Crimea attack, we had a DDG 

[destroyer] in the Mediterranean. Within a short period on ISIL 

[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], we responded with an aircraft carrier. And for the first 54 days until we had country clearance, the only people bombing and attacking were American airplanes off of an aircraft carrier. So the flexibility of Navy and naval 

research, naval support vessels is so the Navy and Marine Corps 

team can respond very flexibly. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

General GLUECK. About 10 years ago, we used to have a Marine 

Expeditionary Unit that was deployed with their Amphibious 

Ready Group to the Mediterranean, but due to lack of capacity 

now, they are no longer stationed there. About the only opportunity 

you get is when they pass through, perhaps on their way to 

CENTCOM [Central Command]. I mean, that is a great opportunity; having been a new commander during that period of time, 

that is a great opportunity to build partnerships with our coalition 

partners over there, members of NATO, to exercise with them, to 

check our interoperability and be able to demonstrate that cohesive 

team that we have. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman yields back. 

Ms. Gabbard is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
19 

Gentlemen, thanks for your service and for being here today with 

us. 

I just wanted to ask about a problem that I think is well-known 

and well-recognized, as we try to find the appropriate and effective 

solution to bring our Marines to shore safely, quickly, and from farther distances than I think ever before. As we look at some of the 

solutions that are being offered, I know there are many people who 

are working towards that. So far, it seems to be done on a little 

bit of an ad hoc, kind of scattershot way where certain people may 

be bringing solutions to one element or another, but really are not 

focusing on overall integration. 

I know of some who are working to go solve the high water speed 

problems specifically in working with the Marine Corps in order to 

figure out how to do that. But my question is, how can the Marine 

Corps leverage existing research and investment in existing capability, specifically talking about the ACV [Amphibious Combat Vehicle] to help design the next generation? 

Lieutenant General, please. 

General GLUECK. Thanks for the question. It is really about the 

integration of all these capabilities. It is a family of systems is 

what we are talking about, and that has been our approach as we 

have come up with our capstone concept of Expeditionary Force 21. 

It is about that family of systems out there that is going to give 

us that leap-ahead capability. 

If you remember in my opening comments, I made a point about 

there is not going to be any one transformational capability that we 

are going to see over the surface. It is going to be the capabilities 

that exist today and how we better integrate them together to be 

able to give us that leap-ahead capability. 

So, for example, in a sea base, as you talk about where, due to 

the A2/AD [anti-access/area denial] threat, the sea base is actually 

getting pushed out further. And it is going to depend on the time 

and place as to how far that sea base will have to go. Within that 

sea base, not only will it have naval surface combatants, but you 

are also going to have members of the Maritime Prepositioned 

Fleet. So the AFSB, the MLPs, the Joint High Speed Vessels, and 

those are all going to be integrated because they are going to have 

a capability that we need at the sea base, where we are able to do 

at-sea arrival and assembly of the force in the sea base and be able 

to transfer those loads between combatant ships and some of the 

Maritime Prepositioned Ships. That is a real leap ahead. We are 

pushing full speed ahead on that and working into experimentation. 

Our concept is really, has been for the past 25 years, ship-to-theobjective maneuver. So your sea base can move around. You launch 

your vertical assault and your surface assault from wherever you 

move the sea base to. So, as we move to the future, actually, when 

we came up with the concept, there were actually three—it was 

called the triad. And it was the LCAC [Landing Aircraft Cushion]; 

it was the V–22; and it was the AAAV [Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle also known as Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, EFV] 

is what we were looking at. Those were the three capabilities that 

we needed to be able to perform that. 
20 

As you know, today, the V–22 is a success story. And so that, 

from a vertical perspective, we can go ahead and insert forces hundreds of miles behind enemy lines and be able to do that. 

On the connector side, on the surface side, it is really going to 

come down to connectors—connecting from the sea base to get to 

the shore. So how we best integrate those capabilities to get the 

greatest effect. Once again, we are not going to go ahead and try 

to find where the enemy is strongest. We are going to find where 

the enemy is weakest, and that is where we exploit it. So, I mean, 

when you look at the family of systems over the surface, you are 

talking about the LCACs, the LCUs [Landing Craft Utility]; you 

have got the Joint High Speed Vessel, which we are doing some research on right now to be able to put a ramp on it so that we could 

potentially launch vehicles while at sea with the Joint High Speed 

Vessel. And then, of course, we are going to modernize our AAVs, 

about 392 of them. And the ACVs will take up the rest of our— 

not the amphibious lift but provide us the armored lift we need 

once we get ashore. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Do you have any additional comment on that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I think General Glueck covered it pretty 

well. The only thing I would add is he touched on the LCACs. In 

fact, we have gone through a service life extension for the LCACs, 

and this year, we are moving forward with the next—what is referred to as ship-to-shore connector. And that features prominently 

in our budget across the FYDP as we ramp up production for that 

new connector. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, once again, thank you so much for being 

here. I know we are living in some very, very dangerous times, 

very frustrating times. We appreciate you guys hanging in there 

and doing the work that you do. 

I also note, sometimes in a hearing like this, as you know, the 

important thing for us is preparing this transcript so we can use 

it for our markups. Our members are wonderful members, but they 

each run in different lanes, and they may have unintentionally left 

out something that you think is very important that we need to get 

on that record. 

So I would like to give each you a few minutes to wrap up in any 

way that you need to anything that you feel you need to clarify or 

that we didn’t get on the record. 

Just in that process, the only thing I would ask you to do is 

share a little bit about the cruisers and where you see us going 

with those. We have expressed a concern that perhaps we may— 

we don’t see that in the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] 

and that gives us a little bit of concern. But I would like to make 

sure that we are committed to that modernization to do it. 

Admiral Mulloy, if we could start with you, and thank you once 

again for being here, and any closing comments you would like to 

offer. 

Admiral MULLOY. Well, first, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would 

like to close with—and I will get to the cruisers—is that, as we 

pointed out, was sequestration or any attempt to adjust to a BBA 

[Bipartisan Budget Act] law for 2016 we find would be highly detri-
21 

mental to the Department of Defense and especially the Department of Navy. We have a number of items that we continue to 

move ahead in this Navy. The LCS is important to us. The Ohio 

replacement program we have already talked about. 

So the whole gamut of what the fleet is laying in those aircraft 

carriers, and what I look for as the Navy’s chief financial officer is 

adequate, predictable, and timely budgets. So far, we barely got 

adequate, and it has been real efforts out of this committee and 

other committees to make sure that we have something, but what 

they defined as being adequate is $25 billion short. 

Predictable is not very high, except the one year that we had the 

15 is now I view as a high water mark of stability, but it is $11 

billion short of where I told us, you know, it needed to be. So I 

don’t need more predictability that. I will be like General Pyrrhus 

in Southern Italy here in 479 facing the Romans, and one more 

battle like this, I am lost. 

And I need a timely budget. It has certainly been less of a shorter CR [continuing resolution] this year, but I was budget officer for 

4 years and was N8 for another one, and every year, we have had 

a CR of various lengths. So we need to move ahead on that. We 

really need to have it. 

I appreciate your process, Mr. Chairman, and your committee to 

move ahead this year to say, we are going to move ahead of budget. 

When I look at the cruisers, I will tell you everyone—we are all 

in on doing that. We have two ships that we are starting this year; 

we have two more. There was a question about what do we do 

when that law came out—2/4/6. When that law finalized in early 

December, we had about 1 week to lock this budget. In that period 

of time, we could not use the SMOSF [Ship Modernization, Operation, and Sustainment Fund] where we were planning to use it for 

operations and maintenance. The Navy made adjustments as we 

locked the budget to add just a little bit under $500 billion for operation and maintenance for the other seven ships that we expected 

to be in this phased modernization program, but not. So we adjusted the program to fit and comply to the law, the SMOSF fund 

will pay for modernization through the FYDP. What we have to go 

back now and look at as we develop the next POM—and we are 

looking for signals from the Hill—would be is are there other additions to SMOSF? Then can we count on that account? And what 

can we do about trying to support this law, because we acknowledge that we want the ships; we are taking care of them; and we 

need that cruiser plan. But we also want to make sure we extend 

the life of them so that we can have those cruisers for a long time, 

sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General Glueck, thank you, again, for all your service and for 

being here. Any closing comments you would like to get on the 

record? 

General GLUECK. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

Last year I requested your support in funding flexibility for the 

Amphibious Combat Vehicle way ahead. Because of your support, 

the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program is poised for successful 

transition to our RFP [request for proposal] by the end of March. 
22 

Secondly, I requested your support on the development of high 

water speed capability through an aggressive science and technology program, and that is moving out smartly. 

Lastly, I requested your increased amphibious ship investment in 

both platforms and maintenance. Today, we have a funded LPD– 

28, a defined way ahead on the LX(R), and programmed approximately $1 billion dollars for amphibious maintenance modernization across the FYDP. So I want to say thank you. 

But I also come with my hat in hand. This year, I request your 

support in both continued amphibious ship and ultimate platform 

investment, particularly in the LX(R) and the increased capability 

of LHA–8; continued support of our combat vehicle strategy to replace supporting 40-year-old-plus AAVs that we have in the inventory; and lastly, your support for science and technology continued 

efforts to gain high water speed. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Secretary, we will give you the final word. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Very briefly, we spent a lot of this 

hearing discussing concerns with sequestration, the impact of sequestration. What we have delivered to the Hill is the program, the 

budget, that we believe is essential to meet the Nation’s security 

requirements from the Navy-Marine Corps perspective. The impact 

of the last several years of 2013 sequestration, the BBA’s impact 

in 2014 and 2015. You have heard us describe that we pulled away 

from the capabilities that we believe we need, either in terms of 

timeliness or in terms of capacity, and it has had a similar impact 

in terms of the industrial base. 

So, first and foremost, we want to provide you the information 

and the armor that you need in order to fight the sequestration 

and BCA in 2016 and out. Our first priority is to hold onto the program that we have delivered to the Hill. And we want to provide 

you the best information that you need to be able to support that. 

Much of this hearing has been on shipbuilding. That is the nature of your Navy-Marine Corps team. We are on path today to get 

to a 300-ship Navy by the 2019 timeframe. In the interim, we are 

working our ships hard. The deployment ratios, their dwell time, 

the length of their deployments, is bringing a lot of wear and tear 

to the force and you are starting to see that stack up in the depots. 

So the ship count is critical because the demand for presence is not 

going to go down. So you have been our partner for your time here 

on the committee in terms of supporting our shipbuilding requirements, and we look forward to continuing down that path. We need 

these ships. Their demand overseas is not going to go down. It is 

only going to increase when you look at the 2020 timeframe. We 

are not looking at 100 ships being deployed. We are looking at 115 

ships deployed. And the greatest challenge, the greatest threat we 

have to that today is the threat of sequestration. So let us know 

how we can help you in your battles here in the halls of Congress 

to try to reverse what poses a great threat to our Navy-Marine 

Corps team. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you all. Thank you for all the team that 

worked with you. And to members of the committee, thank you. 

And, with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

(71) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy remains committed to maintaining a robust ship 

maintenance and repair capability in Guam. The dry dock specific business case 

analysis (BCA) prepared by the Pacific Fleet did not have the depth and scope necessary to fully inform the Navy on how best to address the need for repair facilities 

in the Western Pacific. Some of the underlying assumptions made when conducting 

the analysis need to be revisited, which may affect conclusions regarding the affordability of recapitalizing dry docking capability in Guam. 

The Navy recently initiated a warfighting assessment that will help define the required repair capabilities in the Pacific. This analysis will be much broader in scope 

than the BCA. However, when taken in conjunction with the BCA (after revisiting 

and validating the excepted assumptions), this warfighting assessment will allow 

the Navy to make more complete and informed resourcing decisions on this important issue. This work is to be completed sufficiently to inform the Fiscal Year 2017 

President’s Budget request, and will be adjudged alongside the full range of requirements competing for funding in the budget. [See page 12.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

(75) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. Mr. Stackley, you signed out a memo on 8 August 2014 to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

highlighting the benefits of accepting non-Navy workload to offset the rising costs 

of maintaining NWCF infrastructure. 

Among the benefits of the Navy Working Capital Fund, you indicate that it aligns 

with Better Buying Power Initiatives, it will assist in establishing the Navy as a 

lead systems integrator for certain programs, and establishes more hands-on work 

at our Navy Laboratories, among other benefits. 

If OSD concurs with your approach, what are your next steps to rescind any existing policies and required approvals that have deterred Navy Work Capital Fund activities from accepting non-Navy work in the past? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Execution of non-Naval work is assessed routinely in conjunction with Systems Command reviews and any changes to related policy will be 

considered in this forum. Naval Laboratories are authorized to accept and execute 

non-Naval work that reinforces the skill sets of the workforce critical to their mission and helps off-set the total cost of operations. Commanders are required to ascertain to their chain of command that the skills and capacity to accomplish nonNaval work are consistent with their assigned areas of expertise. 

It is worth noting that since this policy was put in place, non-Naval work at the 

Naval Laboratories actually increased by nearly six percent from FY2013 to 

FY2014. The Department of the Navy will continue to follow a disciplined work acceptance approach to ensure the non-Naval workload is executed in accordance with 

the missions and capacities of the respective Naval Laboratory and to ensure the 

talent of the science and engineering workforce is optimized to meet current and future Naval missions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. I am encouraged by continued investment in technologies that 

support our military strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. As you know, the Pacific 

is incredibly large—over 165 million square kilometers. While the vastness of the 

Pacific region presents a tremendous challenge, new technologies have the potential 

to greatly enhance situational awareness and operations in the Pacific. In particular, I am encouraged about how unmanned systems like the MQ–4C Triton, with 

its persistence, endurance, and range, can meet the unique challenges of the region. 

How important is Triton to the Pacific maritime surveillance strategy, and have 

you explored opportunities to accelerate Triton to meet our growing needs in the region? 

I understand that many of the combatant commanders, particularly U.S. Pacific 

Command have ISR requirements that exceed their current capability to execute. 

How do you plan to address this shortfall? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. The MQ–4C Triton is a key component 

of the Navy Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Force. Its persistent sensor dwell, combined with networked sensors, will enable it to effectively meet ISR requirements 

in support of the Navy Maritime Strategy. MQ–4C Triton plans to operate from 

Guam in 2017 and is an integral part of increasing our presence in the Asia-Pacific 

region. 

The FY 2016 budget request reduces risk in the Navy’s Maritime Intelligence, 

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (MISR&T) Transition Plan in both capacity and capability. In addition, the Navy continues to work with the Joint Staff, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Fleet to optimize the Navy’s MISR&T 

Transition Plan and comply with the FY 2011 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA). Despite budgetary pressures forcing a reduction in procurement quantities 

of baseline air vehicles, the Navy was able to maintain fielding timelines for the future force and continue development of future sensors. The current fiscal environment limits our ability to accelerate the MQ–4C program without incurring significant risk elsewhere. Timely and predictable system delivery is crucial to the Navy’s 

plan for meeting the intent of the FY 2011 NDAA. Due to the MISR&T Transition 
76 

Plan’s dependence on timely fielding to limit increased costs of sustaining legacy 

(EP–3E) platforms, continued Congressional support for the MQ–4C program is vital 

to transition success. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. I am curious what your current plan is to upgrade or replace the 

Navy’s medium-lift helicopter fleet in the near future? The Seahawk helicopter is 

a workhorse and is performing admirably but with production ending for both the 

MH–60S and the MH–60R I am told that now is the time to start planning for midlife upgrades and/or a replacement aircraft. I am concerned that sequestration has 

caused the Navy to defer this planning for other priorities and would like to know 

that you do indeed have a plan for both upgrades and eventual replacement. 

Secretary STACKLEY. MH–60S deliveries conclude in December 2015. MH–60R deliveries will continue through mid-2018. The Navy plans to maintain both airframes 

through 2030. The MH–60S Program plans to commence a Service Life Assessment 

Program (SLAP) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 to determine what potential modifications 

may be required to keep the airframe viable through its planned service life. MH– 

60R SLAP activities may begin later than the MH–60S as the aircraft was introduced to the Fleet after the MH–60S. 

Additionally, the Navy has an ongoing Aircraft Modification Program that includes a number of efforts addressing warfighter capability improvements, obsolescence, and safety. These efforts will assist in ensuring airframe and system components are supported through the life of the H–60. 

Lastly, the Navy’s FY 2016 budget submission includes a new Program Element, 

titled MH–XX, that directs Naval Aviation developmental activities in support of the 

recapitalization of the Navy H–60 series helicopters, multi-mission medium lift helicopter capability, in the 2028 timeframe. The Navy is participating in the OSD mandated, Army led Future Vertical Lift effort to recapitalize DOD’s helicopter fleet. 

These efforts will enable timely development of a system in support of the Navy’s 

30-year Aviation Plan. 

Mr. HUNTER. While the Navy’s SCN and tactical aviation budget accounts generate headlines and attention, I am concerned that serious readiness and quality of 

life issues impacting our Navy are going unaddressed. Specifically, I am concerned 

that many of our sailors are being housed in substandard and outdated quarters 

when they are placed on APL berthing barges. 

Typically, sailors are placed on these berthing barges when their ships are in port 

for repairs, maintenance or when conducting Inter-Deployment Training Cycles. For 

frame of reference, approximately 400 sailors can be housed on an APL Small, and 

roughly 1,000 sailors can be housed on an APL Large. 

However, these deteriorating and aging vessels have significant health, safety, 

and quality of life deficiencies. Overhead clearances are only 5′8′′ to 6′2′′ high on the 

main deck and below. The main engineering spaces have encapsulated asbestos covering pipes and lead base paint on bulkheads and decks. Sixty-year old steam systems leak and are in constant need of repair. 

Thirteen of the seventeen APLs in service today were built during the 1944–1946 

time frame, which makes them almost seventy years old. In one case, The Navy’s 

Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) Quicklook Report 221618Z of May 2, 

2002, found APL–40 ‘‘unfit for human occupancy.’’ 

Would you agree that our sailors deserve better than to live on these substandard, 

antiquated, and hazardous APL barges? 

Can the Navy support a strategy to procure APL Small berthing barges as soon 

as FY2015 and certainly during FY2016 through 2020? 

Do I have a commitment from you that the Navy will work with Congress to determine if there are sufficient funds on hand (FY2015) to begin the process of procuring replacement vessels for the legacy APL fleet? 

Admiral MULLOY. [No answer was available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI 

Mrs. WALORSKI. I co-chair the Working Group on Electronic Warfare, a warfare 

domain that is particularly important to Indiana given the important work NSWC 

Crane does in EW R&D, acquisition, testing, fielding, and sustainment, including 

SEWIP and Next Generation Jammer, one of the largest EW initiatives in history. 

Despite these and other efforts, the threat continues to evolve at an alarming 

pace. Given how dependent we are on having access to the Electromagnetic Spec-
77 

trum for success on the battlefield, what is being done to develop the next generation of EW and keep pace with threats? 

A recent Defense Science Board study found major deficiencies in Electronic Warfare across the services. It recommended establishing an Executive Office within 

OSD AT&L for EW to synchronize EW requirements, technology development, initiative and operational concepts across the Services. What are your thoughts on this 

recommendation, and what do you think can be done to improve EW integration, 

specifically in terms of developing an integrated EW strategy/roadmap? 

How can Congress help the Defense Department streamline its acquisition process 

specifically in this area, including possibly circumventing the JROC process? 

Secretary STACKLEY. To inform development of the next generation of EW capability and pace advanced threats, U.S. Fleet Forces developed the Navy Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW) Campaign Plan, which identifies efforts across 

four lines of operation: training and certification; strategic communications; experimentation and tactics; and investments and future capabilities. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane, with the largest EW expertise in the DOD, has a leading role in identifying the future capabilities the Navy needs to meet warfighting 

requirements. To align EW efforts across DOD, the Deputy Secretary of Defense recently directed the establishment of an Electronic Warfare Executive Committee to 

develop a comprehensive, cross-Service EW and acquisition strategy. We fully support this effort. With respect to DOD acquisition processes, it will be critical for us 

to leverage rapid acquisition opportunities and maintain an acquisition workforce 

with sufficient EW expertise to drive design, development and procurement of new 

capabilities in response to the changing threat environment. We must also ensure 

our acquisition process reward procurement of systems that are built on open architectures to allow more flexible, rapid updates and modifications so we can pace the 

threat. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Who’s responsible and accountable for EW in the Navy and Marine Corps, respectively? If what Admiral Greenert has said is true, that this is the 

next warfare domain, who ‘‘owns’’ it for each of these services? 

Secretary STACKLEY and Admiral MULLOY. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 

directed U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFF) to lead the overall effort to ensure 

Navy’s ability to fight and win in a contested and congested electromagnetic environment. USFF developed an Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW) Campaign 

Plan that identifies how the Navy will man, train and equip the force for EMW. 

As the Navy’s Executive Agent for EMW, USFF is accountable to CNO for implementation and refinement of the plan. Navy operational commanders, resource 

sponsors, program managers and systems commands at all levels of the Navy will 

have a role in implementing that campaign plan. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. Who’s responsible and accountable for EW in the Navy and Marine Corps, respectively? If what Admiral Greenert has said is true, that this is the 

next warfare domain, who ‘‘owns’’ it for each of these services? 

General GLUECK. The Commandant of the Marine Corps receives advice and recommendations from multiple sources to support key decisions associated with his 

statutory responsibilities. These decisions include manpower, acquisition, and 

resourcing matters directly affecting the capabilities and effectiveness of the Service. 

The Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration (DC CD&I) is 

assigned as the Marine Corps integrator with the authority and responsibility to 

conduct capabilities-based force development. For Electronic Warfare (EW), as with 

other capabilities, DC CD&I develops and implements capability portfolio management processes supported by other advocates, proponents, and commanders providing subject matter expertise and services (e.g., training, acquisition, etc.). 

While the Marine Corps recognizes the interdependencies between EW (and 

broader electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO)) and cyberspace operations 

(CO), at present these two mission areas remain separate, pending potential 

changes in Joint and/or Service doctrine. In the meantime, Marines will explore 

ways to achieve the inherent advantages of closely coordinating the execution of EW 

and CO. For instance, in May 2014, DC CD&I approved the Marine Air-Ground 

Task Force Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell Concept. This concept envisions the MAGTF with an organic capability for planning, executing, and 

assessing the integrated employment of CO and EW capabilities in support of 

MAGTF operations. 

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