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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-1965

H OW AR D P I L T C H , et al ., Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

F OR D M OT OR C OMPANY

, et al ., Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the Nor thern Distri ct o f Indi ana, S outh Be nd Di v i sio n. No. 3: 11 -cv-00 00 1- JTM -CA N — Jame s T. Moody, Judg e.

A RGU E D D E C E MB E R 1, 2014

— D E C I D E D F E B R UAR Y 11, 2015

Before B AU E R

, K AN N E, and H AMI L T O N , Circ uit Judges. B AU E R , Ci r c uit Judge. How ard Pi ltch and Barbara NelsonPi ltch (the “Pi ltches”) w ere tr av el ing in their 2003 Mer cury Mountaineer in F ebruary 2007 when they hi t a patch of black i ce, cau sing the car t o sli de off the ro ad and into a w all. Upon i mpact, none of the car’s ai r bags d e p loy ed and both Pi ltches

w ere injured. The Pi ltches fi led the present acti on in Indi ana state court again st For d Mot or Company (“For d”) in 2010, allegin g the v ehi cle w as defecti v e under India na law

. For d2 No. 14-1965
removed the acti on to federal court, and shortly there a ft er
mov ed for sum mary judgment. On Mar ch 28, 2014, the di stric t court gr anted For d’s sum mary judgment motion holding that, wi thout exper t testim ony , the Pi ltches could not create an i ssu e of fact as to pro xim ate cause. On appeal, the Pi ltches c ontend that (1) they state a clai m for relief under the Indi ana Products Li abi li ty Act (“IPLA”); (2) there i s suffi ci e nt circum stanti al evidenc e of a defecti v e product that exper t testimony i s not required; (3) they are not required to produce exper t testim ony to establi sh pr o x ima t e caus e; and (4) the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appli es, rais ing an inference of negli gence on the part of Fo rd. W

e affi rm. I. BACKGRO UND The Pi ltches w ere co-owners of a 2003 Mer cury Mountaineer
. Whi le driving the Mountaineer i n 2006, the Pi ltches w ere inv olv ed in a car acci dent in whi ch the ai r bags di d not deploy

. Fo l l o wing the acci dent, the Pi ltches had the v ehi cle repaired. They di d not confi rm whether the restr aint cont r o l module, whi ch moni tor s a crash and deci des whether to deploy ai r bags, w as reset during or after repai rs after the 2006 colli si on. But Mr

. Piltch explain ed that i t w as hi s understanding that “whatev er needed to be r eset i n the Mer cury Mountaineer

... w as, in fac t, r eset.” A y ear lat er in 2007, the Pi ltches were inv olv ed in ano ther acci dent after driving o ver some black i ce. Thi s tim e, their Mountaineer di d a 360-degree turn and struck a low w all. The

v ehi cle ric ocheted off the w all, sli d down a hi ll, and co l l ided wi th sev eral tr ees be fo r e coming to a rest. The v ehi cle’s ai r bags again di d not d e p l o y duri ng or after the acci dent. As aNo. 14-1965 3
result of the acci dent, Mr

. Pi ltch brok e sev era l v ert ebrae and Mr s. Pi ltch sus tain ed neurolog i cal injuries. After thi s crash, the Pi ltches had their Mountaineer repaired at the same shop that had repai red t he car after t he 2006 acc i dent. In 2009, the Pi ltches sold the Mountaineer

. The buy er happened t o be a mechan i c who repr ogr ammed the v ehi cle’s blackbox, wi ping any data that mi ght re main from ei ther crash. In Februar y 2010, the Pi ltches sued For d in federal court, allegin g the Mountaineer’s ai r bags w ere de fe ct i v e and enhan ce d t he injuries they suffered as a result of the 2007 acci dent. Due to a defi ci ent juri sdi cti onal statement, t he court di smi ssed the complaint wi thout prej udi ce. The Pi ltches again fi led sui t in De cemb er 2010, thi s t i me in stat e court, and F or d removed the ca se to federal court. During di scov ery , the Pi ltches nev er serv ed any exper t repo rt s, despi te obtaining an ext ensi on of the ex pert -di scl osure deadli ne. F or d mov ed for sum mary judgment in Nov ember 2011 , arg uing that the Pi ltches could not prove a p r ima facie case of desi gn or manuf acturi ng defect wi thout exper t testim ony , nor could they pr o ve t he i r injuries w ere more sev ere than they

w ould hav e been wi thout the alleged defect. In response, the Pi ltches arg ued they di d not need an exper t. They asserted that their ci rcums tantial evidenc e, na mely the Mountaineer’s owner’s manual and Mr

. Pi ltch’s testim ony , created genuine i ssu es of fact as to defect and prox i mate caus e. The Pi ltches also arg ued that the jury could infer a defect under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

. The di stric t court g ranted For d’s motion for sum mary judgment on all claim s. S peci fi cally , the court held that the4 No. 14-1965
Pi ltches’ ci rcums tantial evidenc e w as insu ffi ci ent to go bey ond specu lation and create a legal inference as to prox i mate caus e. As to res ipsa loquitur

, the c ourtheld that the Pi ltches’ ci rcumstanti al evidenc e w as not enough to negate all possi ble caus es other than defect for the ai r bags’ fai lure to inflate. Thi s appeal follow ed. II. DISCUSSION W e rev i e w a di stric t court’s gr ant of sum mary judgment de novo in the li ght most fav or able to the non-mo v ing p a rt y
. E l l i s v
. DHL Express Inc. , 633 F .3d 522, 525 (7th Ci r
. 2011). Summary j udgment i s only appropriate i f there i s no genuine i ssu e of mater i al fact. Id

. The Pi ltches present four iss ues on appeal; the fi rst three
can be addressed in a single di scu ssi on as to whet he r t he ci rcums tantial evidenc e, without supp or t from exper t testimony , creates a genuine i ssu e of ma t e r ial fact for their clai ms under the IPLA. W

e wi ll separately address the fourth i ssu e of

res ipsa loquitur

. A. Expert T

esti mony Becaus e w e are si tting in di v ersi ty , Indi ana law appli es. See Erie R.R. Co. v
. T

ompkins , 30 4 U

. S

. 6 4 (1938) (holdi ng a federal court si tting in di v ersi ty mus t apply the sub stanti v e law of the state in whi ch i t si ts). The IPLA governs all acti ons brought by a user or consumer agains t a manuf acturer for physic al harm
caus ed by a product, reg ardless of the legal theor y upon whi ch the action i s brought. See Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1. Under the IPLA, the plainti ff mus t establi sh that “(1) he or she w as harmed by a product; (2) the p r o d uct w as sold ‘i n aNo. 14-1965 5
defecti v e condi tion unreasona bly dangero us to any user or
consu mer’; (3) the plainti ff w as a foreseeable user or consu mer; (4) the defendant w as in the bus iness of selling the p r o d uc t; and (5) the product reached the consu mer or user in the condi tion i t w as sold.” Bou r n e v
. Mart y Gilman, Inc. , 452 F .3d 632, 635 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (referenci ng Ind. Code § 3 4 -2 0-2-1)

. A plainti ff can sati sfy the second element by showing a desi gn defect, a manuf acturi ng d efect, or a fai lure to w arn. Hatha way
v
. Cin tas Corp. S e r v
. , In c. , 903 F

. Supp. 2d 669, 673 (N.D. Ind. 2012). See also Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v
. Downs , 685 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). A plainti ff i s also required to prove that hi s injuri es w ere prox i mately caus ed by the defect (in the cases of manuf acturi ng defect and fai lure to w arn) or breach of duty (in the case of desi gn defect). See Ford Mot or Co.
v
. Rushf ord, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007). Fin ally , and particu larly pert inent to the i ssu es r a ised on appeal, exper t testim ony on an i ssu e i s required when the i ssu e i s not wi thi n the understanding of a lay person. Daub v
. Daub , 629 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (requi ring exper t testim ony on i ssu e of caus e outsi de understanding of lay person); Owens v

. Ford Mot or Co. , 2 9 7 F

. Supp. 2d 1099, 1103–04 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (requi ring exper t testim ony where exis tence of a defect depends on matters bey ond understanding of lay per son). The Pi ltches inv oke both desi gn defect and manuf acturing defect theor i es in thei r sui t. Cook v. Ford Mot or Co. , 913 N.E.2d 311, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“A product may be defecti v e wi thi n the meaning of the [Indi ana Product Li abi l it y] Act becau se of a man uf a ct ur ing flaw , a desi gn defect, or a fai lure to w arn of dangers in the product’s use.”)

. T o demonst r a t e a desi gn defect under Indi ana law , “the plai nti ff must compar e6 No. 14-1965
the costs and benefi ts of al t e rnativ e desi gns” and “show that another desig n no t only could hav e prev ented the injury but also w as cost-effec tiv e under gener al negli gence prin ci ples.” Pries v
. Honda Mot or Co. , 31 F .3d 543, 545–46 (7th Ci r
. 1994). Here, not only di d the Pi ltches fai l to p r o duce alter nati v e ai r bag desi gns, but they also fai led to intro duce exper t testim ony
on the questi on of desi gn defect. Wi thout exper t testim ony , a lay jury w ould be unab le to compare the c osts and benefi ts of supp osed a l t e rnativ e ai r bag desi gns wi th the Mountaineer’s actual ai r bag de sig n. See Whitted v
. General Motors Corp. , 58 F .3d 1200, 1206 (7th Ci r
. 1995) (affi rmi ng sum mary judgment where plainti ffs fai led to present evidenc e of desi gn defect and that an alter nati v e desi gn w as cost effecti v e). See also Hatha way, 903 F

. Sup p
. 2 d at 675 (granting sum mary judgment again st plainti ff’s desi gn defect clai m wh ere plainti ff sub mi tte d no evidenc e indi cating cost effecti v eness of alter nati v e desi gn). Sim i larly , a lay jury w ould be unable to disc e r n fr om ci rcumstanti al evidenc e whether another ai r ba g desi gn could hav e prev ented the injury

. Thus, wi thout exper t testim ony , the Pi ltches’ desi gn defect clai m cannot survive sum mary judgment. The Pi ltches’ manuf acturi ng defect clai m fares no better

. T o demonstrate a manuf acturi ng defect, the plainti ff mu st show that “the product ... deviates from i ts intended desi gn.” Id . at 673 (applying Indi ana law a nd ci tin g Restatement (Third) of T orts: Products Liability § 2(a) (1988))

. The Pi ltches contend that the Mountaineer’s owner’s manual establi sh e s the intended desi gn of the ai r bags, and that the state of the ai r bags duri ng and after the 2007 colli si on indi cates a depa r t ur e from that intended desi gn.No. 14-1965 7
Ci tin g Cansler v
. Mills , 765 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), the Pi ltches ar g ue t hat thi s evidenc e, take n tog ether , rais es a genuine i ssu e of material fac t as to defect e v en in t he absenc e of exper t testim ony

. In Cansler, the court found that the plainti ff desi gnated suffi ci e nt circum stanti al evidenc e on the i ssu e of whether th e a ir bag s in questi on w ere defecti v e, render ing exper t testim ony unnec essary to create a tr i able iss ue of fact. Id

. at 706–07. The ci rcums tantial evidenc e includ ed the plainti ff’s testim ony about the speed of the car just before the colli si on and a mechan i c’s testimo ny a bout the damage to the v ehi cle after the colli si on. Id

. at 706. Though not an expert, the mechan i c w as deemed a “ski lled wi tness” who could testif

y to opini ons or inferences based on facts wi thi n hi s personal knowledge, in addi tion to his observ ations

. Id

. at 703–04 (defining a “ski lled wi tnes s” as “a person wi th ‘a degr ee of knowledge sh or t of that su ffi ci ent to be declared an exper t

... but somewhat bey on d that possess ed by the or dinary juro rs.’” Mariscal v
. State, 6 8 7 N.E.2d 378, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). The mechani c testifi ed that he had almost tw o decades of exper i ence examining automobil e wrecks wi th deploy ed ai r bags. Cansler, 765 N.E.2d at 702. After exami ning the plainti ff’s
car three to four days after the acci dent, he opin ed that “based
on hi s observ ations of other v ehi cles that had been in acci dents
sev er e e no ugh to caus e front frame damage [li ke the plaintiff’s], the ai r bag in [the plainti ff’s] Cor v ett e should hav e deploy ed.” Id

. The plainti ff also prese nt e d t he car’s owner’s manual, whi ch detailed the condi tions that w ould w arr ant ai r bag deployment, includ ing the threshold v eloci ty of i mpact that w ould trigger deployment.8 No. 14-1965
The Pi lt ch e s’ ci rcums tantial evidenc e i s not analogo us to tha t in Cansler

. Most notably , the Pi ltches do not prov i de testim ony about the acci dent other than their own. W e also do not hav e testim ony on the state o f t he car following the colli si on. Thi s i s es p e c i a l l y p rob l e m a ti c consi dering the Pi ltches preserved nei ther the Mountaineer nor , cri tic ally

, the Mountain eer’ s blackbox, whi ch could hav e co nt ained details about the crash. Wi thout thi s information, and wi thout an acci dent reconstr uc t io n exper t or other wi se “ski lled wi tness” to fi ll in
some of these blanks, a lay person w ould be unabl e to di scern whether the ci rcums tances of the crash should hav e tr i gge red ai r bag deployment or not. Furt hermor e, the presentation of the Mountaineer’s owner’s manual does nothin g to ele v ate thi s evidenc e out of the realm of specu lation. Unli ke the manual in Cansler, the condi tions for ai r bag deployment in t he Mountain eer’ s manual are wri tte n in broad gener ali ties

. The manual merely states that the ai r bags are desi g ne d to acti v ate when the v ehi cle sus tain s suffi ci ent longitudinal deceleration. How ev er

, i t nei ther defines “suffi ci ent,” nor speci fies the preci se impact speeds at whi ch the ai r bags are expected to deploy

. Fin ally , in addi tion to showing a defect, bo t h theor i es of li abi li ty requi re a showing that the defect prox i mately c aused the Pi ltches’ injuries to surviv e sum mary judgment. The Pi ltches allege a “crashw or thi ness s” case. The crashw or thi ness d o ctrine expands the prox i mate caus e element, see Barnard v
. Saturn Corp. , 790 N.E.2d 1023, 1 0 3 2 (I nd. Ct. App. 2003), and i mposes li abi li ty for des i gn d efects that enhan ce injuries from

a colli si on, but di d not caus e the colli si on in the fi rst place. See Whitted, 58 F .3d at 1205; Montgo mery W ard & Co. v
. Gregg, 554No. 14-1965 9 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind. Ct

. App. 1990). The plain t i ff’s burden of pro of for an enhancement injury clai m i s as follows: F ir st, the plainti ff mus t prove that the manuf acturer placed into the stream of comm e r ce a defecti v ely desi gned, unreasonably dangero us product. Second, the plainti ff must prove that a feasi ble safer alter nati v e product desi gn exis ted. Th i rd, the plainti ff mus t prove that after th e or i gin al i mpact or colli si on the defecti v ely desi gned product prox i mately caus ed (i .e. enhanc ed) the injuries that resulted. Barnard, 790 N.E.2d at 1032 (ci tation omi tte d). As di scu ssed abov e, the Pi lt ch e s cannot establi sh the exis tence of a defect wi thout e x p e rt testim ony
. Becaus e they
can no t establi sh a defect, they cannot meet their burden of proo f for an enhanc ed injury clai m and w e need not di scu ss wh e t he r they are able to establi sh prox i mate caus e thro ug h their presented ci rcums tantial evi dence. How ev er , ev en i f the Pi ltches establi shed a desi gn defect, under the facts of thi s case, wi thout exper t testim on y , a lay juro r could not di stingui sh betw een the injuries caus ed by the colli si on and the enhanc ed injuries caus ed by the ai r bags’ fai lure to deploy wi thout engaging in pure specu lation. The same w ould be tr ue ev en i f the Pi ltches had offered evidenc e of a manuf acturi ng d efect. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v
. Null s Mach. & Mfg. Shop , 736 N.E.2d 271, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (affi rmi ng sum mary judgment in manuf acturing defect case where plainti ff prov i ded no exper t opin i on suffi ci ent to present a questi on of fact wi th respect to prox i mate caus e).10 No. 14-1965
In sum, the Pi ltches ask the co urt to find their own testimony combined wi th the manual ’s instructi on sufficie nt to permi t an i nference of defect and of prox i mate c ause. Bu t it i s not—wi thout exper t testim ony , a jury w ould only be able to specu late as to t he viab i li ty o f the Pi ltches’ IPLA cl ai ms. B. Res ipsa loqu itur T o bri ng a clai m under the doctrine of res ipsa loq u i tu r, a plainti ff mus t show that the occu r r e nce i s “one whi ch in the
or dinary course of business does not happen i f those who contro l t he ci rcums tances use proper care.” Gary Cmty

. Sch. Corp. v
. Lardydell , 8 N.E.3d 241, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A plainti ff mus t als o s how that the injuring instrumentali ty w as in t he exclusiv e co ntro l of the defendant at the tim e of injury

. Whitted, 58 F .3d at 12 0 7

. Th e doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be appli ed in the “rar e instances ” in whi ch “ci rcums tantial evidenc e may produce reasonable inference s upon whi ch a jury may reasonably find that a d efendant manuf actured a product containing a defect.” Id. at 1208. In Whitted, we held that the plaintiff, suin g ov er an allegedly defecti v e seat belt, “di d not present enough evid e nce to establish t hat Defendan ts ret ained contro l or domini on ov er the seat belt—that i s, t ha t six y ears of inv ariab le use di d not di sturb Defendan ts’ influ ence or authority ov er the product.” Id

. Although the plainti ff presented evidenc e that the seat belt appeared to be in goo d condi tion and had not de mo ns t rat ed problems before, we held that thi s w as not enough to “nulli fy enough of the probable explanations of the seat belt break.” Id

. The Pi ltches hav e done ev en less to null i fy other explanations for t he ai r bags’ fai lure to inflate. Gi v en that the Pi ltches di dNo. 14-1965 11
not, or perhaps could not, confi rm that the ai r bag mechan i sm
w as not reset after their 2006 acci dent, i t remain s a reasonable possibil it y that the ai r bag fai led to deploy due to not being reset. What ’s more, on thi s recor d a jury could only specu late
as to whether the ci rcums tances of thi s acci dent should hav e tr i gge red deploym e nt o f the ai r bags in the fi rst place, as prev i ously di scu ssed. Thus, the Pi l t ch es’ presentation of ci rcums tantial evidenc e i s not, as the di stric t court put i t, “one of the ‘rar e instances ’ where i t i s enough to negate all possi ble

caus es other than a product defect.” Piltch v
. Ford Mot or Co. , 11 F

. Supp. 3d 884, 892 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (quoti ng Whitted, 58 F .3d at 1208). III. CONCLUSION For the foreg oin g reasons, w e AFF IRM the di stric t court’s gr ant of summ ary judgment in f av or of Fo rd.