18-899

Hoque v. Barr

BIA

Christensen, IJ

A208 311 658

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 4th 4 day of September, two thousand twenty.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 REENA RAGGI,

8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 MOHAMMAD RAISAL HOQUE,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 18-899

17 NAC

18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, Esq.,

24 Chhetry & Associates, P.C., New 

25 York, NY.

26

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

28 Attorney General; Melissa Neiman29 Kelting, Assistant Director; 

30 Anthony J. Messuri, Trial 

31 Attorney, Office of Immigration 
2

1 Litigation, United States 

2 Department of Justice, Washington, 

3 DC.

4

5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

8 is DENIED.

9 Petitioner Mohammad Raisal Hoque, a native and citizen 

10 of Bangladesh, seeks review of a March 22, 2018, decision of 

11 the BIA affirming a June 27, 2017, decision of an Immigration 

12 Judge (“IJ”) denying Hoque asylum, withholding of removal, 

13 and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

14 In re Mohammad Raisal Hoque, No. A208 311 658 (B.I.A. Mar. 22, 

15 2018), aff’g No. A208 311 658 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jun. 27, 

16 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

17 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

18 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for 

19 the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland 

20 Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The standards of 

21 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 

22 Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2010).

23 The agency concluded that Hoque established past 
3

1 persecution at the hands of Awami League members who opposed 

2 his membership in the rival Bangladesh Nationalist Party

3 (“BNP”). Given this past persecution, Hoque was entitled to 

4 a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 

5 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). However, the Government may rebut 

6 this presumption if a preponderance of the evidence shows 

7 that an applicant can safely and reasonably relocate within 

8 the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 

9 (ii); see Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) 

10 (“Asylum in the United States is not available to obviate re11 location to sanctuary in one’s own country.”). In 

12 determining whether internal relocation is reasonable, the IJ 

13 “consider[s] . . . whether the applicant would face other 

14 serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing 

15 civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or 

16 judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social 

17 and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and 

18 social and familial ties.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3).

19 The preponderance of the evidence supports the agency’s 

20 conclusion that Hoque could reasonably avoid future 

21 persecution by relocating within Bangladesh because he had 
4

1 previously safely relocated to Dhaka for nearly two years

2 from November 2012 to August 2014. There, he opened a 

3 business and did not experience any persecution despite 

4 continuing to engage in political activity. He was not 

5 targeted by the Awami League until he moved back to his home 

6 in Noakhali. When he fled again to Dhaka in February 2015 

7 for a few months before he left for the United States, he 

8 received threatening telephone calls but suffered no harm. 

9 Given the lack of evidence that Awami League members looked 

10 for him or would be able to locate him in Dhaka, the IJ did 

11 not err in finding that the threats did not preclude a finding 

12 that Hoque could safely relocate. See 8 U.S.C.

13 § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “the administrative findings 

14 of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 

15 would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”). 

16 Hoque mainly argues that the IJ did not explicitly 

17 consider all the factors outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). 

18 As the Government notes, Hoque did not exhaust this argument 

19 before the BIA. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 

20 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir. 2007) (requiring petitioner to raise 

21 all issues before the BIA). Exhaustion aside, while the IJ 
5

1 did not go through each factor individually, he made note of 

2 the relevant regulation, which explicitly states that the 

3 “factors may, or may not, be relevant, depending on all the 

4 circumstances of the case, and are not necessarily 

5 determinative of whether it would be reasonable for the 

6 applicant to relocate.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3). The IJ 

7 implicitly considered that relocation was reasonable based on 

8 Hoque’s personal circumstances because Hoque had previously 

9 relocated for a two-year period and opened a business with a 

10 friend. Id. (listing personal characteristics, such as age, 

11 health, gender, and social and family ties, as factors to be 

12 considered). 

13 Hoque also argues that the IJ failed to fully consider 

14 that the time he spent in Dhaka from November 2012 to August 

15 2014 was a “period of relative calm,” and therefore his 

16 ability to live there unharmed was not dispositive as to 

17 internal relocation. Again, as the Government notes, Hoque 

18 did not exhaust this argument before the BIA. See Lin Zhong, 

19 480 F.3d at 122. Regardless, the IJ considered the 

20 background evidence, which does not reflect a period of calm 

21 while Hoque was living in Dhaka. The evidence demonstrates 
6

1 that “political violence has long been part of the political 

2 landscape in Bangladesh,” including during the period Hoque 

3 was in Dhaka. Admin R. (“AR”) 582. A 2015 report on 

4 elections in Bangladesh details 2013 political protests that 

5 resulted in 300 deaths. See AR 547. Another article 

6 recounts a May 2013 “massacre” in Dhaka of a BNP-backed 

7 Islamic group by security forces. See AR 577. There are 

8 numerous references to political violence leading up to and 

9 during the January 2014 election. See, e.g., AR 647. 

10 Hoque’s own asylum statement mentions how the Awami League 

11 targeted BNP members after the January 2014 election. See 

12 AR 507.

13 Given Hoque’s prior safe relocation during a period in 

14 which political violence was occurring, substantial evidence

15 supports the agency’s conclusion that Hoque could reasonably 

16 internally relocate to avoid future harm. The agency’s 

17 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 

18 removal, and CAT relief. See Lecaj, 616 F.3d at 119 (holding 

19 that applicant who fails to establish fear of harm required 

20 for asylum “necessarily” fails to meet higher standard for 

21 withholding of removal and CAT relief).
7

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

3 stays VACATED.

4 FOR THE COURT: 

5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

6 Clerk of Court