2021 IL App (4th) 190206-U 

NO. 4-19-0206 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

LAJON WATSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Vermilion County 

No. 17CF334 

Honorable 

Nancy S. Fahey, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in sentencing defendant.

¶ 2 In January 2018, defendant, Lajon Watson, pleaded guilty to one count of 

aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, namely a 2001 blue Oldsmobile Alero (720 ILCS 

5/12-3.05(f)(1) (West 2016)). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced 

defendant to 24 months’ probation. In August 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke 

defendant’s probation on the grounds he (1) tested positive for controlled substances and 

(2) failed to report to his probation officer on five occasions. At a January 2019 revocation 

hearing, the trial court found defendant violated his probation. The trial court later resentenced 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

February 19, 2021

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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defendant to nine years in prison. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the 

court denied. 

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion when it 

resentenced him to a term of nine years in prison. We disagree and affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In May 2017, the State charged defendant by information with one count of 

possession of a stolen vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2016)), one count of aggravated 

battery with a deadly weapon, namely a 2001 blue Oldsmobile Alero (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(f)(1) 

(West 2016)), and one count of aggravated battery on or about a public way (720 ILCS 5/12-

3.05(c) (West 2016)). Defendant pleaded not guilty.

¶ 6 On January 2, 2018, defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement. In 

exchange for defendant’s plea of guilty to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, the State 

agreed to dismiss the remaining charges, and defendant received a sentence of 24 months’ 

probation. When presented with the plea agreement, the trial court inquired, “I mean, these are 

very serious charges. What’s going on?” Defense counsel advised the court of a defense witness 

who would testify “the victim in fact threw herself at the vehicle.” The victim had also contacted 

the State to “indicate[ ] she does not want [defendant] to go to prison over this.” The court then 

asked the State to recite the factual basis for the plea. The State responded as follows:

“On May 7, 2017, *** [d]efendant *** came to visit Larry Potts. He then had Mr. 

Potts’[s] vehicle, drove away. He then got into a confrontation with Jessica 

Batista. At that time, he drove off in the vehicle. Ms. Batista was still holding on 

to the vehicle. She was then—had injuries from holding on to the vehicle. *** She 

was treated for those. She had what appeared to be road rash on her legs and her 
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left upper body and back. Mr. Potts later indicated that [defendant] had 

permission to use the vehicle.”

¶ 7 The trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea and sentenced defendant to 24 

months’ probation. The court ordered defendant not to have contact with the victim.

¶ 8 On April 30, 2018, the Vermilion County court services department filed a

probation violation report, which stated the defendant had violated the terms of his probation. 

Specifically, the report stated defendant violated the terms of his probation as a result of

(1) testing positive for controlled substances on April 27, 2018, and (2) defendant’s arrest for 

domestic battery on April 28, 2018. Defendant later pleaded guilty to the domestic battery charge

in exchange for the State’s agreement not to file a petition to revoke defendant’s probation based 

on the domestic battery conviction. 

¶ 9 On August 13, 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke defendant’s probation, 

alleging defendant violated the terms of his probation where defendant (1) tested positive for 

controlled substances on April 23, 2018, and (2) failed to report to the Vermilion County court 

services department on May 29, 2018, June 12, 2018, July 2, 2018, July 11, 2018, and August 6, 

2018. 

¶ 10 On January 4, 2019, at the hearing on the petition to revoke defendant’s 

probation, Andrew Dugas, defendant’s probation officer from January 2018 to April 2018, 

testified defendant participated in office visits and home visits as scheduled. Defendant was 

transferred to another probation officer, Michelle Merz, after his conviction for domestic battery, 

entered on May 10, 2018. 

¶ 11 Michelle Merz, defendant’s next probation officer, testified she never met with 

defendant, as he failed to report for his scheduled visits on five occasions. Merz testified 
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defendant never contacted her regarding the first three missed appointments. On July 9, 2018, 

defendant called Merz asking to reschedule the July 11, 2018, appointment because it conflicted 

with his work schedule. Merz testified she did not excuse the appointment and defendant was 

informed he was required to appear. Defendant failed to attend the July 11, 2018, appointment 

and the following appointment on August 6, 2018. On cross-examination, Merz testified, due to 

defendant’s prior missed appointments, he was required to submit a letter from his employer 

stating his work schedule to be excused from an appointment with court services. Merz did not 

receive a letter or any other document from defendant. 

¶ 12 Defendant testified he began working at Rantoul Foods in May 2018. Defendant 

worked from 4:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., Monday through Saturday. Defendant stated he was not 

permitted to take days off from work.

¶ 13 Following the hearing, the trial court found defendant had violated his probation 

and set the matter for resentencing. 

¶ 14 On February 7, 2019, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. Brett Stine

testified he also served as defendant’s probation officer from January 2018 to April 2018. He 

shared work responsibilities with Dugas. Stine testified defendant reported regularly to court 

services. Defendant was respectful and had no positive drug tests during the period he and Dugas 

supervised defendant. 

¶ 15 Defendant testified he had four children. Two of the children lost their mother in

December 2018. Defendant was current with his payment of child support until he was taken into 

custody. Defendant testified he saw his children every weekend and helped with expenses such 

as clothing, sports equipment, and school supplies. If released from custody, defendant could 

resume his employment with Rantoul Foods. Defendant felt he would benefit from substance 
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abuse treatment. He testified he was drinking alcohol frequently on the weekends but he would 

not drink around his children. Defendant stated he wanted to be a better parent. On 

cross-examination, defendant confirmed his history of incarceration and agreed he had been “in 

and out of jail” during his children’s lives.

¶ 16 The State recommended a term of nine years in prison, highlighting defendant’s 

extensive criminal history and the threat of harm from the original offense. Defense counsel 

requested a period of probation, arguing defendant’s work ethic demonstrated his ability to be “a 

productive citizen and productive father.” Defense counsel also referenced the original offense, 

noting the victim attempted to take possession of the vehicle, believing defendant had stolen the 

vehicle, and was injured as a result of the struggle when defendant drove away. 

¶ 17 Following arguments, defendant made a statement in allocution, apologizing to 

the victim, his friends and family, and his probation officer. Defendant stated he wanted to be a 

better person and wanted to be a father to his children and “not just us[e] them as a crutch ***.”

¶ 18 In resentencing defendant, the court stated,

“Well, the thing that strikes me about what you just said to me is that you never 

have gotten a chance. ***

* * * 

You have gotten chances. And frankly, on—specifically on this case you 

blew the chance.

 *** 

And, you know, I find your testimony in some respects just disingenuous 

and not believable. You haven’t been there for your kids. You may have paid 

child support sporadically, but throughout most of their lives you have been in 
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and out of jail and in and out of [the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC)] 

and there’s not—nobody to blame for that but yourself. But yet you are looking 

for somebody to blame. You are looking for your dad to blame, you are looking 

for society to blame, and nobody is giving you a chance. That’s BS. You are 

responsible for your own actions.

 *** 

You have spent *** at least five different times in DOC. And how 

[defense counsel] can argue that does not justify you being called a career 

criminal is beyond me because that is a career criminal. You are in and out of 

DOC.

You have been given a chance. I don’t believe that you have taken care of 

your children other than sporadically and when it was convenient for you. You 

certainly thumbed your nose at probation, didn’t take that seriously at all.

So when I look at the factors in mitigation *** I think the wording is 

[‘]entail an excessive hardship on your dependents.[’] I don’t find that factor in 

mitigation applies to you at all because I find that you basically haven’t been 

available or there for your dependents anyway.

When I look at the factors in aggravation, I find that your conduct caused 

or threatened serious harm. The underlying offense of dragging someone in a car 

and then running over that person obviously fits into that factor. You definitely 

have a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity, and the sentence is 

needed to deter others from committing the same crime.
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So having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense, to the 

history, character and condition of the offender, the Court is of the opinion that

probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and would be 

inconsistent with the ends of justice.”

The court resentenced defendant to nine years in prison. On February 7, 2019, defendant filed a 

motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied. 

¶ 19 On April 5, 2019, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. The Office of the 

State Appellate Defender filed an amended notice of appeal with the Vermilion County clerk, but 

the notice was lost. On December 4, 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court issued a supervisory order 

(Watson v. Justices of the Appellate Court, Fourth District, No. 125491 (Ill. Dec. 4, 2019) 

(supervisory order)) directing this court to allow defendant to file an amended notice of appeal 

and to treat such amended notice of appeal as a properly perfected appeal from the March 15, 

2019, judgment. 

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 Defendant argues his nine-year sentence is excessive because it is greatly at 

variance with the spirit and purpose of the law and is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of 

the offense. Specifically, defendant argues the trial court placed undue weight on aggravating 

factors and failed to accord appropriate weight to mitigating evidence. The State disagrees.

¶ 22 Defendant does not dispute his nine-year sentence falls within the applicable 

statutory limits. A sentence that falls within the applicable statutory limits is generally reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 36, 958 N.E.2d 341. 

This is because the trial court is generally “in a better position than a court of review to 

determine an appropriate sentence based upon the particular facts and circumstances of each 
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individual case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “A sentence within the statutory limits 

will not be deemed excessive and an abuse of the court’s discretion unless it is ‘greatly at 

variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the 

offense.’ ” People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 20, 142 N.E.3d 794 (quoting People v. 

Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 54, 723 N.E.2d 207, 210 (1999)).

¶ 23 We find no abuse of discretion in defendant’s sentence. Initially, we reject 

defendant’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to find substantial grounds existed 

tending to excuse or justify defendant’s aggravated battery of Batista. The court described the 

underlying offense as defendant “dragging someone in a car and then running over that person.” 

Defendant’s actions could have resulted in catastrophic injury to Batista. Thus, although 

defendant’s actions caused harm sufficient to sustain an aggravated battery conviction, it

threatened much more serious harm. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2018) (that the 

defendant’s conduct threatened serious harm is a factor in aggravation). Defendant’s sentence 

was thus not greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly 

disproportionate to the nature of the offense.

¶ 24 We also reject defendant’s argument the trial court failed to appropriately 

consider the impact of defendant’s incarceration on his children. The court acknowledged 

defendant worked and paid child support, albeit “sporadically and when it was convenient” but 

found defendant “in some respects *** just disingenuous and not believable.” The court noted 

defendant had “been in and out of jail and in and out of DOC” for most of the children’s lives, 

and thus, defendant had not “been available or there for [his] dependents anyway.” The court 

considered the impact of defendant’s incarceration on his children and found that factor in 

mitigation did not apply to defendant. It is not our role to substitute our judgment for the 
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sentencing court. See People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214, 940 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (2010). 

We do not find an abuse of the court’s discretion. 

¶ 25 Defendant also argues the trial court failed to appropriately consider in mitigation 

defendant’s willing guilty plea, expressed remorse, and rehabilitative potential. We disagree. In 

this case, the court considered the evidence presented, the recommendations of counsel, the 

comments of defendant, and the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation in reaching its 

sentencing decision. The court highlighted defendant’s criminal history, including the fact he had 

served multiple terms of imprisonment. The court, who was in the best position to make 

credibility determinations, believed defendant to be “in some respects *** disingenuous and not 

believable.” Ultimately, the court found the nine-year prison sentence warranted to deter others 

from committing similar crimes. Based on the evidence before it, we cannot say the trial court 

abused its discretion in rendering its resentencing decision.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 28 Affirmed.