1999 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-18-1999

Hartranft v. Apfel

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 98-1626

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Recommended Citation

"Hartranft v. Apfel" (1999). 1999 Decisions. Paper 136.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/136
Filed May 18, 1999 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 98-1626 

WAYNE R. HARTRANFT, 

 Appellant 

v. 

KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner 

Social Security Administration 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

Civil Action No. 97-cv-04039 

District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner 

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

February 12, 1999 

Before: Becker, McKee, Circuit Judges 

Lee, District Judge* 

(Filed: May 18, 1999) 

_________________________________________________________________ 

*The Honorable Donald J. Lee, United States District Court for the 

Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 

McKEE, Circuit Judge. 

Wayne R. Hartranft, appeals the District Court's 

affirmance of the Commissioner of Social Security's

conclusion that Hartranft is not entitled to disability 

insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security 

Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 401-433. For the reasons that follow, we 

will affirm. 

I. Procedural History and Standard of Review 

Hartranft applied for DIB on May 3, 1994, alleging 

disability since January 29, 1990, due to numerous 

incidences of pain related to a back injury he suffered while 

working as a truck driver. In his application, he alleged 

disability due to back injury, neck pain, hernia, anxiety and 

depression. His application was initially denied, and denied 

again upon reconsideration. 

Hartranft appealed the denial and was afforded a de novo 

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ found 

that Hartranft had residual functional capacity 1 for the full 

range of light work,2 diminished by his inability to bend 

repeatedly. The ALJ thus concluded that, although 

Hartranft had been injured, he was not "disabled" within 

the meaning of the Act at any time through December 31, 

1995, the date his insured status expired. 

On April 25, 1997, the Appeals Council denied 

Hartranft's request for review of the ALJ's decision, 

concluding that the ALJ's findings were supported by 

substantial evidence and that the ALJ committed no abuse 

of discretion or error of law. Consequently, the ALJ's 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. "Residual functional capacity" is defined as that which an individual 

is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her 

impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. S 404.1545(a). 

2. "Light work" is defined as work that involves lifting no more than 20 

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects that weigh 

up to 10 pounds. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1567(b). 

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decision was the Commissioner's final decision on 

Hartranft's DIB claim. 

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Hartranft 

brought an action in the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking judicial review 

of the Commissioner's final decision. The matter was 

initially referred to a Magistrate Judge who issued a Report 

and Recommendation in favor of the Commissioner. 

Thereafter, the District Court adopted that Report and 

Recommendation and granted summary judgment in favor 

of the Commissioner. This appeal followed. 

Our review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited 

to determining whether that decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. S 405 (g); Monsour 

Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d. Cir. 

1986). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or 

considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood , 108 S.Ct. 

2541, 2545 (1988). See also, Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 

1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). We will not set the 

Commissioner's decision aside if it is supported by

substantial evidence, even if we would have decided the 

factual inquiry differently. See 42 U.S.C.S 405 (g); Monsour 

Medical Center, 806 F.2d at 1190-91. 

II. Facts 

Hartranft sustained a work-related injury on November 

20, 1989, while employed as a long-haul trucker by 

Ashland Chemical Company. Thereafter, Hartranft was

examined by Raymond D. LaBarre, D.C., a chiropractor, 

because of complaints of lower back pain. LaBarre 

diagnosed Hartranft as having "acute sciatic neuralgia of 

L4, L5." (R. 101, 111). During a follow-up examination on 

December 27, 1989, LaBarre advised Hartranft "not to do 

anything heavy or any long distance truck driving as is his 

normal occupation." (R. 101). LaBarre also opined that 

Hartranft could work "relatively light duty." Id. 

Richard K. White, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, examined 

Hartranft on February 28, 1990. Dr. White's examination 

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revealed limited motion of the lumbar spine. However, 

Hartranft's station, stance, and gait were normal, and 

Hartranft had no specific abnormalities associated with his 

gait. He did experience some problems with his feet and 

raising his leg, but his toe and heel walking were normal 

and showed no evidence of muscle weakness. No other

abnormalities were noted. 

At the request of LaBarre, Hartranft was also examined 

by Charles R. Reina, M.D., Board-certified orthopedic 

surgeon, on May 25, 1990. Dr. Reina's report stated that 

Hartranft was able to walk without limp or complaint, and 

with a normal gait. His range of motion in both hips was 

full and without pain, and his neurological examination 

was normal. Upon re-examination on December 10, 1990, 

Dr. Reina again found no neurological abnormalities. The 

medical opinions of Dr. Reina do not "corroborate" 

LaBarre's findings, as Hartranft alleges. (Appellant's Br. at 

24-25). To the contrary, Dr. Reina stated in his report that, 

based on his examinations of Hartranft, he couldfind none 

of the neurological abnormalities found by LaBarre. (R. 

135). 

LaBarre issued a report dated March 21, 1991, 

summarizing Hartranft's treatment to date, and indicating 

a "final diagnosis" of degenerative changes of the disc at L4- 

L5 and L5-S1, slight central disc bulging at L4-L5, and a 

small central disc herniation at L5-S1. (R. 118). In his 

report LaBarre opined that Hartranft would be unable to 

work "in any occupation where he has to bend, twist or lift, 

or in any occupation where he would have to stand or sit 

for any protracted period of time." (R. 119). LaBarre also 

opined that, "the accident of November 20, 1989, was the 

cause and is presently the cause of Mr. Hartranft's

disability and injuries." Id. 

On May 20, 1994, Frederick D. Burton, M.D. examined

Hartranft at the request of LaBarre. Dr. Burton 

recommended that Hartranft continue with chiropractic 

care until his pain decreased and that he not return to his 

pre-injury job without restriction. 

LaBarre continued to provide chiropractic care to 

Hartranft through November 1995. On February 10, 1996, 

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Hartranft returned to LaBarre's office complaining that he 

had experienced increased pain and discomfort since

concluding his treatment three months earlier. LaBarre 

found some muscle weakness and continued degenerative 

disc disease, and urged Hartranft to continue chiropractic 

care. 

At the hearing before the ALJ, Hartranft testified that he 

continued to work for more than two months following his 

November 1989 injury. (R. 32). He stated that he took only 

non-prescription Tylenol for his pain, adding that he did 

not like to take "pain killers" because they were addictive. 

(R. 28, 37, 39). He testified that he had a prescription from 

Dr. Burton for his "nerves" but nothing for pain. He also 

testified that LaBarre had him walking for exercise and 

doing light back strengthening exercises, but that he did 

not walk or exercise once worker's compensation stopped 

paying his medical bills. 

Hartranft further testified that, despite his injuries, he 

attempted to go back to light duty work with his employer 

but was told they could not use him anymore. He also 

testified about a daily routine that included walking his 

daughter to the bus stop, helping his wife with the dishes, 

grocery shopping, driving a car, bathing, and dressing 

himself without assistance. (R. 48). In his May 3, 1994, 

Disability Report, Hartranft gave a similar description of the 

level of activity he was capable of engaging in, including 

visiting friends and relatives, walking, exercising, and 

helping with cooking. 

The ALJ found that Hartranft did have a severe lumbar 

disc impairment and was unable to return to his past 

relevant work as a truck driver. (R.18, Findings Nos. 3, 6). 

The ALJ further found that Hartranft had the residual 

functional capacity for the full range of light work, 

diminished by his inability to bend repeatedly, and was 

thus not disabled under the Act. (R. 18-19, Findings Nos. 

7, 11, 12). 

III. Discussion 

Hartranft relies, in part, upon evidence he introduced 

regarding his chiropractor's opinion of Hartranft's disability 

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to argue that the ALJ's determination is not supported by 

substantial evidence, and that the ALJ did not give the 

chiropractor's opinion adequate weight. 

However, a chiropractor's opinion is not "an acceptable 

medical source" entitled to controlling weight. C.F.R. 

S 416.913 defines "acceptable source" for purposes of our 

inquiry as: 

 (1) Licensed physicians; 

 (2) Licensed osteopaths; 

 (3) Licensed or certified psychologists; 

 (4) Licensed optometrists for the measurement of 

 visual acuity and visual fields . . . . and 

 (5) Persons authorized to send . . . a copy or 

 summary of the medical records of a hospital, clinic, 

 sanitorium, medical institution, or health care facility. 

 . . . 

 (6) A report of an interdisciplinary team that contains 

 the evaluation and signature of an acceptable medical 

 source is also considered acceptable medical evidence. 

See also Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1995); 

Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 327 (7th Cir. 1993); Walker 

v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 630, 632 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); Lee v. 

Sullivan, 945 F.2d 687, 691 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 

Although DIB eligibility can not rest upon the opinion of a 

chiropractor, a hearing examiner can consider a 

chiropractor's opinion, along with all of the other evidence 

that a claimant may present insofar as it is deemed

relevant to assessing a claimant's disability. See 20 C.F.R. 

S 416.913(e)(3) ("information from other sources may also 

help us to understand how your impairment(s) affects your 

ability to work. Other sources include, . . . (3) Other 

practitioners for example, chiropractors") (internal 

parentheses omitted). 

Here, examinations by three board certified physicians 

failed to corroborate LaBarre's opinion of the extent of 

Hartranft's disability. None of these doctors identified the 

neurological abnormalities reported by LaBarre. Moreover, 

Hartranft's own account of the activities he was able to 

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perform was consistent with the medical observations of 

those three board certified physicians, and inconsistent 

with the degree of limitation that LaBarre reported. 3 

Hartranft cites a report from Dr. Richard K. White, in 

which Dr. White stated that Hartranft should not be

released for any kind of work. This report, however, was 

made in connection with Hartranft's workers compensation 

claim, not his DIB claim. We have previously recognized the 

different standards for determining disability under these 

two programs. See Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 247 (3d 

Cir. 1984) (noting that "the ALJ could reasonably disregard 

so much of the physicians' reports as set forth their 

conclusions as to worker compensation claims."). Here, the 

ALJ recognized the limited significance of Dr. White's 

report. 

Finally, Hartranft argues that the ALJ failed to take 

account of his subjective symptoms, including pain, in 

determining that he could still perform the full range of 

light work. The ALJ determined that Hartranft had a

discernible medical condition that could cause his pain, but 

that his statements concerning his pain and its impact on 

his ability to work were not entirely credible in light of the 

entire record. 

Allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must 

be supported by objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. 

S 404.1529. Once an ALJ concludes that a medical 

impairment that could reasonably cause the alleged 

symptoms exists, he or she must evaluate the intensity and 

persistence of the pain or symptom, and the extent to 

which it affects the individual's ability to work. This 

obviously requires the ALJ to determine the extent to which 

a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the 

extent to which he or she is disabled by it. See 20 C.F.R. 

S 404.1529(c). 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. Hartranft concedes that the ALJ need not be bound by the 

chiropractor's opinion, but argues that the ALJ erred in not relying upon 

the chiropractor's evaluation to corroborate the opinions of Dr. Reina 

and Dr. Burton. Appellant's Br. at 24. However, for the reasons we have 

recounted, we do not believe that the ALJ's treatment of the 

chiropractor's opinion was inappropriate. 

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Here, the ALJ concluded that Hartranft had a discernible 

medical condition that could reasonably cause the pain 

Hartranft complained of. However, the ALJ thought that 

Hartranft's testimony about the extent of his pain was 

exaggerated, and that Hartranft could perform light duty 

work despite his complaints of incapacitating pain. That 

ruling is clearly supported by substantial evidence in this 

record. The ALJ cited specific instances where Hartranft's 

complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were 

inconsistent with: 1) the objective medical evidence of 

record; 2) Hartranft's testimony as to his rehabilitation and 

medication regimen; and 3) Hartranft's own description of 

his daily activities. 

IV. 

Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court 

upholding the ALJ's decision. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

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