COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, D ecker and Senior Judge Coleman

SALENA NICHOLE SHOWERS v. Record No. 1782-14-3
SHENANDOAH VALLEY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
SALENA NICHOLE SHOWERS v. Record No. 1783-14-3
SHENANDOAH VALLEY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES MEMORANDUM OPINION * PER CURIAM SALENA NICHOLE SHOWERS JANUARY 20, 2015 v. Record No. 1784-14-3
SHENANDOAH VALLEY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
SALENA NICHOLE SHOWERS v. Record Nos. 1785-14-3
SHENANDOAH VALLEY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT C OURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY Victor V. Ludwig, Judge (Jody L. Castillo; Ca stillo Law, PLC, on br ief), for appellant. (James B. Glick; Susan B. Read, Guardian ad litem for the minor children; Vellines, Glick & White sell, P.L.C.; Black, Noland & Read, P.L.C., on brief), for appellee.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Salena Nichole Showers (mother) appeals the or ders terminating her parental rights to her children. Mother argues that the trial court erred by (1) term inating her parental rights and approving the goals of adoption for the children because the Shenandoah Valley Department of Social Services (the Department) failed to prove that it was in the ch ildren’s best inte rests to do so; (2) not recording the trial and preventing mother fr om being able to secure a transcript of the hearing; and (3) entering its own written statement of facts and denying mother the ability to file her own statement of facts. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that these appeals are without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
BACKGROUND We view the evidence in the light most favor able to the prevailing party below and grant to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1991). Mother has two children, a five year old a nd a two year old, who ar e the subject of these appeals. In early January 2013, th e Department entered into a safety agreement with mother. The agreement required mother to leave the children in the custody of her mother (the maternal grandmother) and to have supervised visitation w ith the children. A representative of Child Protective Services (CPS) and the Sheriff’s Depa rtment came to a residence where mother and the children were staying. They suspected that mother was under the influence of a drug. She tested positive for methamphetamines. Sin ce mother had not been following the safety agreement and was under the influence, the Departme nt removed the children from mother’s care on January 25, 2013. On February 27, 2013, the Augusta County Juve nile and Domestic Relations District Court (the JDR court) entered orders finding that the children were abused or neglected.- 3 - The Department required mother to comple te a psychological examination and follow the recommendations, which included intensive dr ug treatment, random drug screens, and counseling. Mother tested positive for meth amphetamines on May 1 and August 7, 2013. She was clean at the drug screen in September 2013 a nd did not appear at the one in October 2013. Mother was arrested on October 29, Novemb er 22, and December 12, 2013 for charges of driving under the influence and possession of a controlled substance. The Department referred mother to two drug treatment programs, but she did not complete either one. There was evidence that mother entered another drug treatment program, the Boxwood program, but she was terminated from th e program for a violation of the rules. She had nearly completed the first component of the Boxwood program before her termination. There also was evidence that on May 20, 2014, moth er completed a day treatment program at the Valley Community Services Board and was enroll ed in, but had not completed, an after-care
program. In addition to her failure to comply with th e above requirements, mother also failed to complete a parenting class. 1 Furthermore, the Department referred mother to a program that would assist her with obtaining housing, employment, and her driver’s license. Mother did not cooperate with the program. She failed to obtain housing and instead, lived with friends or her brother. She was not employed while the children were in foster care and at the time of the final hearing. Generally, with some exceptions, mother met regularly with the Department’s representatives and maintained her weekly vi sitation with her children. However, the Department suspended the visitations on Octobe r 30, 2013 because mother was abusing drugs.

1 She testified at the circuit court hearing that she had enrolled in a parenting class that was scheduled to begin after the hearing.- 4 - As of September 2013, the children have been living with the oldest child’s paternal grandmother. The children ar e doing well in her care. On February 12, 2014, the JDR court terminated mother’s parental rights and approved the foster care plans with the goals of adoption. Mother appealed to th e circuit court. After hearing all of the evidence and argument on June 3, 2014, the circu it court issued its ruling from the bench. It found that the Depa rtment presented clear and convi ncing evidence that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental righ ts pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C). On July 7, 2014, the circuit court en tered the final orders terminating mother’s parental rights and approving the foster care plans with the goals of adoption. Mother timely noted her appeal. On August 28, 2014, mother presented her notice and proposed written statement of facts. The guardian ad litem for the minor children filed objections to the proposed statement of facts. The circuit court found that both submissions were “incomplete, and, in some regards, . . . inaccurate.” Therefore, on September 19, 2014, the circuit court prepared and entered its own written statement of facts.
ANALYSIS Termination of parental rights “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is en titled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unle ss plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986) (citations omitted). When considering te rmination of parental rights, “the paramount consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interest s.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
at 463.- 5 - Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights. She contends that she completed a drug program and was committed to following through with the recommendations, so she did not relapse. The circuit court terminated mother’s parent al rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2), which states that a court may terminate parental rights if: The parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed twelve months from the date the child wa s placed in foster care to remedy substantially the conditio ns which led to or required continuation of the child’s foster care placement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end. The Department removed the children from mo ther’s custody due to concerns about her drug use. While the children were in foster care , mother continued to abuse drugs and failed at least two drug screens. She was arrested three times for driving under the influence and possession of a controlled substance. She di d not complete the recommended drug treatment programs; however, there was evidence that she completed a day treatment program approximately two weeks before the hearing. She had not completed th e after-care program. The circuit court stated, Despite her best intent ions (and perhaps expectations), she had not, at the time of the hearing in this Court, fully completed a substance abuse course, and if past is prologu e, her history of effort in that regard does not result in an optim istic prediction of her succeeding with the current course. In addition, she never completed parenting clas ses while the children we re in foster care. She signed up for a parenting class that started af ter the final hearing. Th e circuit court noticed that mother “intended to complete a parenting cl ass, but 17 months after the removal, that, too, was a hope on the horizon, the course not beginn ing until two weeks after the hearing.”- 6 - Furthermore, the circuit court was concerned that mother still did not have stable housing or employment at the time of the hearing. The circuit court found “[m]ost compelling[]” the fact that mother admitted that she was not able to care properly for the children at the time of the hearing. The circuit court commented that mother’s “progress, if progress there is, is hardly substantial.” The circuit court held that mother was “not ready to receive her children, [and] it is a fair and reasonable conclusi on that she will never be in a position to do so.” The evidence proved that mother had not subs tantially remedied the situation that led to the children being placed in foster care. As she admitted, she was not ready to care for the children, despite the services prov ided by the Department. The child ren had been in foster care for seventeen months at the time of the final he aring and needed a stable, safe environment. As the circuit court explained, “[ i]t is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Halif ax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). Considering the totality of the evidence, the circuit court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights and fi nding that it was in the children ’s best interests to do so. Rule 5A:18 Mother also argues that the trial court erre d by not securing a court reporter for the final hearing and then issuing its own written statement of facts of th e proceeding. Mother signed the order in which the circuit court stated that it wa s preparing its own written statement of facts as “seen and objected to,” but never brought the sp ecific issues raised in the second and third assignments of error to the atte ntion of the trial court.- 7 - We “will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998); see Rule 5A:18 (“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be consid ered as a basis for reve rsal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to at tain the ends of justice.”). A statement of “seen and objected to” is insufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1991) (en banc). Accordingly, we will not consider mother’s second and third assignments of error.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ru ling is summarily affirmed. Rule 5A:27. Affirmed.