IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CHRISTOPHER H. MARTIN v. MIKE PARRIS, WARDEN, AND STATE 

OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Morgan County

No. 2019-CR-52 Jeffery H. Wicks, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2019-01500-CCA-R3-HC

___________________________________

The pro se Petitioner, Christopher H. Martin, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal

Court’s order summarily denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has 

filed a motion to affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the 

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the 

State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA 

MCGEE OGLE and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Christopher H. Martin, Pro Se, Wartburg, Tennessee.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General; Jeffrey D. Zentner, Assistant Attorney General; and Russell 

Johnson, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Factual Background

This court’s recitation of facts stated in the Petitioner’s appeal from the denial of 

post-conviction relief sets forth the procedural history of this case.

On August 22, 1996, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of child 

molestation and one count of statutory rape in Chattooga County, Georgia.

The Georgia court sentenced him to two consecutive terms of twenty years, 

of which the first would be served in confinement and the second 

06/23/2020
- 2 -

suspended to probation. On May 21, 1997, petitioner pleaded guilty in 

Hamilton County, Tennessee, to two counts of rape of a child. According 

to the plea agreement, appended as an exhibit to petitioner’s postconviction petition, petitioner agreed to serve two twenty-five-year 

sentences at one hundred percent. The Tennessee sentences were to be 

served concurrently with each other and with his Georgia sentences. At the 

plea submission hearing, petitioner asked whether he would be “housed” in 

Tennessee, and the trial court responded that the decision was left to the 

two departments of correction. Subsequently, petitioner was confined in 

Georgia for many years. During that time, he filed numerous motions and 

petitions in various courts, some of which he appended to his postconviction petition. In general, the documents reveal that petitioner 

believed he would be forced to serve his Tennessee sentences consecutively 

to his Georgia sentences in contravention of his plea agreement. According 

to his appellate brief, petitioner was transferred to Tennessee on July 27, 

2012.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief on July 

25, 2013. Among other issues, the key allegation presented in his petition 

is that his plea agreement included conditions that he would be housed in 

Tennessee and that if he were to return to Georgia, his Tennessee and 

Georgia sentences would be “co-terminus.” Petitioner argued that the State 

of Tennessee first breached his plea agreement when he was returned to 

Georgia and then again when he was transferred to Tennessee. The postconviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. In its 

August 28, 2013 order, the post-conviction court stated that nothing in the 

petition or in the appended exhibits supported petitioner’s contention that 

the State breached its plea agreement and, consequently, that no breach 

occurred after the expiration of the statute of limitations that would toll the 

application of the statute. Subsequently, petitioner filed an untimely notice 

of appeal on October 15, 2013.

Christopher H. Martin v. State, No. E2013-02343-CCA-R3-PC, 2014 WL 1396678, at *1 

(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 19, 2014). This court 

affirmed the post-conviction court’s order summarily dismissing the petition as untimely. 

Id. at *3. This court’s opinion also notes that the post-conviction court sua sponte 

corrected a clerical error on the judgments to accurately reflect the award of pretrial jail 

credits. Id. at *1, n1.
- 3 -

On June 18, 2019, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

alleging that his convictions were void because the trial court failed to award sentence

reduction credits the Petitioner alleges were required as terms of the plea agreement, that 

his plea was involuntarily entered as the result of the ineffective assistance of counsel, 

and that the State breached the plea agreement for failing to ensure that sentence

reduction credits were noted on the judgments. On July 31, 2019, the habeas corpus

court summarily denied relief. The Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with this 

court. Following the Petitioner’s filing of the brief, the State filed a motion asking this 

court to affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment by memorandum opinion pursuant to 

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. The Petitioner has not filed a response to 

the State’s motion. 

Analysis

Habeas corpus relief is generally available to “[a]ny person imprisoned or 

restrained of liberty” whose judgment is void or whose sentence has expired. T.C.A. § 

29-21-101 (2012); see Tucker v. Morrow, 335 S.W.3d 116, 119-20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

2009). A petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

judgment is void or that a sentence has expired. State v. Davenport, 980 S.W.2d 407, 409 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). A void judgment exists if it appears from the face of the 

judgment or the record that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction or authority to 

sentence the defendant or that the defendant's sentence has expired. Archer v. State, 851 

S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tenn. 1993); see Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Tenn. 2005). 

In contrast, “[a] voidable judgment is one that is facially valid and requires proof beyond 

the face of the record or judgment to establish its invalidity.” Summers v. State, 212 

S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tenn. 2007); see State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000).

Post-conviction relief, not habeas corpus relief, is the appropriate avenue of relief 

for certain voidable judgments. T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2012); see Vaughn v. State, 202 

S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tenn. 2006). A habeas corpus court may dismiss a petition for relief 

without an evidentiary hearing or the appointment of counsel when the petition fails to 

state a cognizable claim. Yates v. Parker, 371 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012); 

see T.C.A. § 29-21-109 (2012). The question of whether habeas corpus relief should be 

granted is a question of law, and this court will review the matter de novo without a 

presumption of correctness. Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2005).

The Petitioner argues that his judgments are void because the trial court failed to 

award sentence reduction credits that the Petitioner claims were contemplated as a term 

of the plea agreement. He also argues that the failure to award sentence reduction credits 

constitutes a breach of his plea agreement and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and 
- 4 -

involuntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. We note that the 

Petitioner conflates the trial court’s award of pretrial jail credits and the Department of 

Correction’s award of sentence reduction credits. In any event, “a claim based on a trial 

court’s failure to award pretrial jail credits is not cognizable in the context of a petition 

for habeas corpus relief.” Steven Anderson v. Russell Washburn, Warden, __ S.W.3d __, 

__, No. M2018-00661-SC-R11-HC, 2019 WL 3071311, at*1 (Tenn. June 27, 2019) 

(order); see also Dontell Sawyer v. State, No. E2019-00187-CCA-R3-HC, 2019 WL

5079358, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 10, 2019). Likewise, a claim for the award of 

sentence reduction credits is not cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. Tucker v. 

Morrow, 335 S.W.3d 116, 122 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009), overruled on other grounds by 

State v. Brown, 479 S.W.3d 200 (Tenn. 2015). This court has also held that an allegation 

concerning the breach of a plea agreement is not cognizable in a habeas corpus 

proceeding. See Antonio M. Miller v. Joe Easterling, Warden, No. W2009-02175-CCAR3-HC, 2010 WL 2787686, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 15, 2010). Finally, a claim 

concerning the voluntariness of a guilty plea and the effective assistance of counsel is not 

cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Thomas Ernest Young v. State, No. 

M2016-02333-CCA-R3-HC, 2018 WL 444202, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2018). 

Therefore, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief and 

affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. 

Conclusion

When an opinion would have no precedential value, this court may affirm the 

judgment or action of the trial court by memorandum opinion when the judgment is 

rendered or the action taken in a proceeding without a jury and such judgment or action is 

not a determination of guilt and the evidence does not preponderate against the findings 

of the trial court. See Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 20. We conclude that this case satisfies 

the criteria of Rule 20. Accordingly, the State’s motion to affirm by memorandum 

opinion the judgment of the trial court denying habeas corpus relief is GRANTED. Upon 

consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the judgment of the 

habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

______________________________________

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE