PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

CARLOS FERNANDEZ-BARRON, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 18-1254

(D.C. No. 1:15-CR-00360-RM-5)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 1:15-CR-00360-RM-5)

_________________________________ 

Ty Gee, Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Karl L. Schock, Assistant United States Attorney (Jason R. Dunn, United 

States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

_________________________________ 

Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

This case involves a drug ring that repeatedly transported large 

quantities of cocaine from El Paso to Denver. The government alleged that 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 17, 2019

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Mr. Carlos Fernandez-Barron had participated, supporting this allegation 

with evidence referring to two cars: a BMW and Chevrolet Impala. 

The government relied in part on a text message asking Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron about the timetable for delivery of a “BMW.” An expert 

witness for the government testified that “BMW” was code for a load 

delivery of cocaine (rather than an actual BMW). Mr. Fernandez-Barron 

denied that the message referred to cocaine, testifying that he had been in 

the process of selling his BMW and arranging to deliver the car. 

The references to the Impala stemmed from testimony by another 

participant in the drug ring, Ms. Martha Mota. Ms. Mota testified that 

 she had driven cocaine to two men in Kansas City and 

 the two men had arrived in a car that looked like an Impala. 

She stated that one of the men was the same person depicted in a 

photograph of Mr. Fernandez-Barron. But Ms. Mota couldn’t recognize this 

man in the courtroom during the trial. 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron was ultimately convicted on charges of 

conspiracy, distribution, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.1

 

1

 The convictions involved 

 conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 5 

kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a 

detectable amount of cocaine and 
3 

At sentencing, the district court found that Mr. Fernandez-Barron had 

committed perjury when testifying that he 

 had sold a BMW in May 2014 and

 did not own an Impala.

For this finding, the district court determined that Mr. Fernandez-Barron 

(1) had not sold a BMW until September 2014 and (2) had owned an 

Impala. Based on the perjury, the court imposed a two-level enhancement 

for obstruction of justice. 

 Mr. Fernandez-Barron appeals, challenging the enhancement for 

obstruction of justice. We conclude that the district court did not err in 

applying the enhancement. 

I. The Finding of Perjury 

The sentencing guidelines call for a two-level enhancement if the 

court finds obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. This finding can be 

based on perjury. Id. at cmt. n.4(B); see United States v. Dunnigan, 507 

U.S. 87, 94 (1993) (applying the definition of perjury in 18 U.S.C. § 1621 

to review an enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. 

§ 3C1.1). “To establish perjury, a district court must conclude the 

defendant (1) gave false testimony under oath, (2) about a material matter, 

 

 distribution and possession with intent to distribute 5 kilograms 

or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable 

amount of cocaine. 
4 

and (3) the false testimony was willful and not the result of confusion, 

mistake or faulty memory.” United States v. Rodebaugh, 798 F.3d 1281, 

1300 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Poe, 556 F.3d 1113, 1130 

(10th Cir. 2009)). 

The district court found all of these elements and imposed a twolevel enhancement for obstruction of justice. Mr. Fernandez-Barron 

challenges the findings on willful falsity2 and materiality, and we reject 

these challenges. 

II. The Standard of Review 

In assessing “the district court’s interpretation and application of the 

Sentencing Guidelines, we review legal questions de novo and factual 

findings for clear error.” United States v. Mollner, 643 F.3d 713, 714 (10th 

Cir. 2011). 

III. Perjury Regarding the BMW 

The district court concluded that (1) Mr. Fernandez-Barron had 

willfully given false testimony about when he sold his BMW and (2) this 

false testimony was material. On appeal, Mr. Fernandez-Barron argues that 

the testimony was immaterial and apparently challenges the element of 

willful falsity. 

 

2

 In his opening brief, Mr. Fernandez-Barron asserts that his testimony 

about the Impala was not false. But rather than develop this assertion, he 

argues that he did not willfully give false testimony because he was 

testifying based on his colloquial understanding of “ownership.” 
5 

A. Materiality 

The threshold issue is the materiality of Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s 

testimony about when he sold his BMW. 

1. The Standard for Reviewing the District Court’s Conclusion 

on Materiality 

The element of materiality involves “a mixed question of law and 

fact.” United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995) (citation 

omitted). When a mixed question of law and fact primarily involves legal 

principles, we engage in de novo review. Littlejohn v. Royal, 875 F.3d 548, 

558 n.3 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 102 (2018). 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron argues that materiality primarily involves a 

legal issue, which precludes deference to the district court’s decision. For 

the sake of argument, we assume that Mr. Fernandez-Barron is right. 

2. The Effect of the Testimony on the Government’s Theory 

Involving the Text Message 

The standard for materiality is whether the false testimony bears “a 

natural tendency to influence or was capable of influencing the decision 

required to be made.” United States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66, 67 (10th Cir. 

1989). This standard is “conspicuously low.” United States v. Bedford, 446 

F.3d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Dedeker, 961 

F.2d 164, 167 (11th Cir. 1992)). 

The government’s evidence against Mr. Fernandez-Barron included 

text messages and records of telephone calls between Mr. Fernandez-
6 

Barron and other members of the conspiracy. Many of the messages and 

calls corresponded with the arrival dates of cocaine deliveries. For 

example, shortly before one delivery of cocaine, Mr. Molina-Villalobos 

texted Mr. Fernandez-Barron (in Spanish): “Where do we pick up the 

BMW, Buddy?” R. vol. I, at 165. 

The government’s expert witness explained that the text message 

constituted code to pick up a car full of cocaine—not to pick up an actual 

BMW. But the expert witness conceded that his explanation would be 

undermined if Mr. Fernandez-Barron had been conducting a transaction 

involving an actual BMW.3 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron later testified that 

 

3

 The expert witness testified: 

Q. Well, let’s put it in a more practical context. So if I 

understand what you are saying, if you had more information that 

delineated a -- the existence of this car, and some background or 

basis for the car, it was a real car, it was being bought and sold, 

that could influence your conclusion, couldn’t it? 

A. Sure. regarding this specific exchange, if there was, in 

fact, a BMW that was transacted between these individuals, at 

that time, that would absolutely affect that specific text-message 

exchange. Yes. 

R., vol. III, at 1270. 
7 

 he had owned a BMW, 

 he had sold it to Mr. Lucio Lozano in May 2014, and 

 the text message had related to this sale, not to a delivery of 

cocaine. 

This testimony directly rebutted the government’s evidence linking Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron to the delivery of cocaine in May 2014. 

The district court ultimately found that Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s 

testimony was false because he hadn’t sold his BMW until September 

2014, and the sale was to a dealership rather than to Mr. Lozano. The court 

regarded the circumstances of the sale as material, reasoning that Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron’s testimony could influence the jury’s interpretation of 

the text message. 

3. Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s Arguments 

 Mr. Fernandez-Barron contends that the circumstances of the sale 

were immaterial, pointing to (1) the weakness of the government’s 

evidence on code words and (2) the district court’s later findings. 

a. Weakness of the Government’s Evidence on Code Words 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron contends that the government’s evidence on 

code words was so weak that his testimony could not have influenced the 

jury. This contention overstates the burden for materiality. “[F]or 

testimony to be material, ‘it need not have an actual effect; it merely must 

be capable of influencing the [jury].’” United States v. Hasan, 609 F.3d 
8 

1121, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Girdner, 773 F.2d 

257, 259 (10th Cir. 1985)). Regardless of the strength of the expert 

witness’s testimony, it linked Mr. Fernandez-Barron to the conspiracy. And 

if the court had credited Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s testimony about the sale 

of his BMW, that testimony would have pulverized this link to the 

conspiracy. Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s testimony could thus affect the jury’s 

finding on when he had entered the conspiracy. 

Given this potential effect on the findings, Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s 

testimony was material regardless of the alleged weakness of the 

government’s evidence involving the text message. 

b. Impact of the Court’s Findings on Materiality 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron also relies on the court’s later findings to 

prove immateriality of his testimony about the BMW. Those findings 

related to the timing of Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s entry into the conspiracy. 

The district court ultimately found, for sentencing purposes, that Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron hadn’t joined the conspiracy until March 2015—nearly a 

year after he received the text message about the BMW. Mr. FernandezBarron argues that the district court’s finding rendered the BMW testimony 

immaterial. We disagree. 

Materiality is based on the circumstances existing when the 

defendant gave the false testimony, not the circumstances that developed 

later. United States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66, 68 (10th Cir. 1989). When Mr. 
9 

Fernandez-Barron testified, neither the jury nor the judge had made a 

finding on Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s participation in the conspiracy. Without 

a finding, the jury was free to consider whether he had entered into the 

conspiracy any time from December 2013 to September 2015. So when Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron testified that he had sold the BMW in May 2014, this 

testimony could have led the jury to find that he hadn’t yet joined the 

conspiracy;4 the court’s later finding could not diminish the materiality of 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s BMW testimony when it was given. 

B. Willful Falsity 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron also argues that if his explanation had been a 

lie, it would have foolishly tied him more closely to the ringleader of the 

drug ring, Mr. Lozano. For this argument, Mr. Fernandez-Barron does not 

specify which element he is rebutting; we assume that the argument relates 

to willfulness. 

 However the argument is framed, it mistakenly assumes that Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron hadn’t already exposed his connection to Mr. Lozano. 

But before Mr. Fernandez-Barron testified, defense counsel had already 

 

4

 Mr. Fernandez-Barron argues that the load in May 2014 was not a 

material issue at trial because the government had not lodged a charge 

based on that load. But Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s involvement in that load 

could have affected the timing of his entry into the conspiracy, and the 

superseding indictment alleged that he had entered into the conspiracy in 

December 2013. So Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s involvement in a load in May 

2014 could support the government’s allegation that he had entered into 

the conspiracy as early as May 2014. 
10 

said in his opening statement that Mr. Lozano was a client of Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron’s car-repair business: 

Now, understanding that during this time Mr. Licon is also 

kind of going back and forth to Mexico, and so when he is back 

here, they are connecting. And so, at this -- and then Licon also 

owned a transmission shop in 2010 about this time, and [Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron] would work out of that shop, and it was at 

that shop that he met Mr. Lozano. And Mr. Lozano. would come 

in, he would check out cars, and eventually he asked [Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron] to do work for him. 

He asked [Mr. Fernandez-Barron] to help him fix cars, and 

[Mr. Fernandez-Barron] saw that as a good business opportunity. 

Lozano was a good client. So he helped him with his cars. 

R., vol. III, at 1281.5 So Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s testimony did not suggest 

a stronger connection to Mr. Lozano than defense counsel had already 

highlighted in his opening statement. 

 Nor did Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s explanation suggest any criminality. 

To the contrary, his explanation distanced himself from the conspiracy as 

someone who had just worked on Mr. Lozano’s cars and sold him a BMW. 

 We thus have little reason to disturb the district court’s findings 

based on Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s argument that a lie would have foolishly 

tied him more closely to Mr. Lozano. 

 

5

 Elsewhere in his opening statement, defense counsel discussed Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron’s painting of Mr. Lozano’s Silverado and work with Mr. 

Lozano on a Ford Raptor. R., vol. III, at 1282. 
11 

IV. Perjury Regarding the Impala 

The district court also found that Mr. Fernandez-Barron had 

committed perjury when testifying about his Impala. The government 

presented testimony suggesting that (1) an Impala had been involved in a 

drug transaction in Kansas City and (2) Mr. Fernandez-Barron had an 

Impala registered under his name. So when he testified, he was asked about 

his connection to the Impala. 

On direct examination, Mr. Fernandez-Barron quickly admitted that 

an Impala had been registered under his name; but he insisted that he did 

not consider himself the owner because he had sold the car to Mr. LiconGallegos. On cross-examination, Mr. Fernandez-Barron adhered to this 

distinction between registration and ownership. The district court 

ultimately disbelieved Mr. Fernandez-Barron and found that he had 

committed perjury when denying ownership of the car. 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron argues that his testimony about the Impala was 

neither willfully false nor material. We reject both arguments. 

A. Willful Falsity 

The district court found that the testimony about the Impala was 

willfully false based on doubts about Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s credibility 

and his experience in buying and selling cars: 

My reaction to [Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s argument] is that it’s 

unmitigated nonsense. First, the plates to the Impala are in his 

name. The explanation for that, which isn’t an explanation, as to 
12 

how you go and get plates for a car, without a title, or a bill of 

sale or some indicia of ownership, I doubt that I could go to the 

D.M.V., Mr. McNeilly [government counsel], and say that I’m 

going to get plates for your car, without something indicating 

some right or title it to that car. But putting that to the side, the 

answer---the explanation was, it wasn’t an issue for him to ask 

me to get plates. That simply is not an answer. 

. . . If you are in the business in the dealing of automobiles, 

you know what titles are. You know how these documents work. 

You have to know, if you’re buying and selling them, as he is 

doing on a regular basis, as part of his job. 

 

The notion that, as he said at the trial, he didn’t know what 

perjury meant. Also said that he didn’t – he understood the word 

owner to mean the person who puts the plates on, drives the car 

and perhaps pays for it, that that’s what an owner meant to him. 

That is simply unbelievable that the documents he swears under 

penalty of perjury, that he is the owner, and comes up with these 

fanciful explanations for he didn’t really know what the word 

owner meant. He didn’t really know what the word perjury 

meant. . . . [I]t’s just too much. It’s beyond the pale. 

R., vol. III, at 1652–53. We review this finding for clear error. United 

States v. Hammers, No. 18-7051, ___ F.3d ___, 2019 WL 5876843, at *9 

(10th Cir. Nov. 12, 2019).

As Mr. Fernandez-Barron argues, he quickly admitted that the car 

was registered in his name; this part of the testimony didn’t constitute 

perjury. But Mr. Fernandez-Barron repeatedly insisted that he didn’t 

consider himself the car’s owner. 

When pressed on cross-examination, Mr. Fernandez-Barron admitted 

that he had signed documents swearing to ownership of the Impala after 

allegedly selling the car to Mr. Licon-Gallegos. Mr. Fernandez-Barron also 
13 

acknowledged that registration made him the legal owner. But Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron explained that his colloquial concept of ownership had 

created confusion about the documents and the questions posed in crossexamination. 

Despite his assertion of confusion, Mr. Fernandez-Barron had signed 

documents under penalty of perjury stating that he owned the Impala. And 

he often bought and sold cars, which could suggest familiarity with state 

laws governing ownership. 

Were we the fact-finder, we might have credited Mr. FernandezBarron’s testimony that he’d been confused. But the question is not what 

we would have found. The question is whether the district court committed 

clear error. See Part IV(A), above. Given Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s sworn 

statements about ownership and his experience in buying and selling cars, 

the district court could reasonably find that Mr. Fernandez-Barron had 

known that he was the owner and had been lying when he professed 

confusion over the questions about ownership. The district court’s finding 

on willful falsity thus did not constitute clear error. 

B. Materiality 

The district court also regarded this testimony as material. Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron argues that the testimony was not material because 

 he had been extensively cross-examined on his connection to 

the Impala, 
14 

 the Impala evidence was so weak that any false testimony could 

not have influenced the jury, 

 his ownership of the car had little bearing on his guilt, and 

 the district court’s later findings rendered the testimony 

immaterial. 

We reject each argument.6 

1. Extent of Cross-Examination 

As discussed above, the government pressed Mr. Fernandez-Barron 

on cross-examination about his denial of ownership. In his reply brief, he 

contends that this cross-examination drained the impact from his 

 

6

 The parties have briefed materiality of the Impala for two separate 

incidents. The first incident involves Ms. Mota’s identification of Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron in Kansas City. The second incident involves Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron’s presence at a stash house near Denver. The district 

court’s explanation of materiality relied on the second incident. 

But Mr. Fernandez-Barron urges us to treat materiality as a question 

of law with no deference to the district court’s decision. See Part III(A)(1), 

above. We can thus base materiality on the Kansas City incident even 

though the district court had discussed materiality for a different incident. 

See United States v. Haas, 171 F.3d 259, 268 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Although 

the district court made no explicit findings as to the materiality of the 

perjurious statements, it is clear to us, as a matter of law, that those 

statements were material.”); United States v. May, 568 F.3d 597, 607 (6th 

Cir. 2009) (“While the district court did not rule that each of these 

statements was material [for purposes of the enhancement in § 3C1.1], we 

will not remand a case back to the district court solely for a finding as to 

materiality because we may answer such a question for ourselves.”). 

Based on the Kansas City incident, we conclude that the false 

testimony was material. We thus need not discuss the district court’s 

reliance on the incident at the stash house. 
15 

distinction between registration and ownership. This contention was 

waived and is invalid. 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron waived the argument by omitting it in his 

opening brief. He did present this argument in his reply brief. There he 

stated that he was continuing an argument from pages 18–19 of his opening 

brief. But on those pages in the opening brief, he was simply quoting trial 

testimony with no legal argument. This argument does not appear in the 

opening brief, and raising the argument in the reply brief was too late. 

United States v. Duran, 941 F.3d 435, 2019 WL 5212198, at *5 n.3 (10th 

Cir. 2019). 

Even if Mr. Fernandez-Barron had properly presented this argument 

in his opening brief, it would be invalid because it uses the wrong time 

period to gauge materiality. We gauge the materiality of false testimony 

when it was given, not with the gloss of later information. See United 

States v. Allen, 892 F.2d 66, 68 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The materiality test is 

determined at the time and for the purpose for which the allegedly false 

statement was made.”). So if someone lies on direct examination and 

admits the lie on cross-examination, the original lie doesn’t become 

immaterial with the later admission. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 

564, 574 (1937) (concluding that perjury is not cured by a later truthful 

disclosure because “the oath administered to the witness calls on him 

freely to disclose the truth in the first instance and not to put the court and 
16 

the parties to the disadvantage, hinderance, and delay of ultimately 

extracting the truth by cross-examination”). 

For this argument, Mr. Fernandez-Barron cites United States v. 

Langston, 970 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1992). The issue there was the effect of 

the government’s failure to correct a witness’s false testimony on direct 

examination. In addressing this issue, we concluded that the allegedly false 

testimony was immaterial because the witness had fully acknowledged the 

facts on cross-examination. Langston, 970 F.2d at 700–701. 

Drawing on this conclusion, Mr. Fernandez-Barron argues that any 

false testimony about the Impala became immaterial because of his 

statements on cross-examination. But Langston does not support this 

argument. The Langston court examined whether the defendant had been 

deprived of due process, and the test for materiality was identical to the 

test for harmless constitutional error. Id. at 700. 

One could conceivably apply Langston to conclude that Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron’s false testimony about the Impala had not contributed 

to the conviction because his underlying lie had been exposed on crossexamination. But in assessing whether the district court had erred in 

applying the enhancement, the Court doesn’t gauge materiality by 

determining whether the false testimony had contributed to the verdict. See 

Part III(A)(3), above. So Langston sheds little light on the materiality of 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s testimony. 
17 

When he testified falsely about the Impala, his connection to the car 

hadn’t been decided. If his connection to the Impala was material at that 

time, the perjury wouldn’t vanish with a later revelation during crossexamination. 

2. Weakness of the Government’s Evidence Tying Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron to the Impala 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron argues that the government’s evidence about 

the Impala was so weak that any false testimony could not have influenced 

the jury. To evaluate this argument, we consider the government’s 

evidence tying Mr. Fernandez-Barron to the Impala. 

The government argued that one of the load drivers, Ms. Martha 

Mota, had seen Mr. Fernandez-Barron in Kansas City when he drove up in 

an Impala. According to the government, Mr. Fernandez-Barron owned the 

Impala. 

Ms. Mota’s identification of Mr. Fernandez-Barron was weak. She 

testified that the man she had seen in the Impala was the man depicted in a 

photograph of Mr. Fernandez-Barron. But during the trial, she couldn’t 

recognize Mr. Fernandez-Barron as one of the men that she had seen in the 

Impala. She was equally unsure about whether the car was an Impala. She 

thought that it looked like a police car and guessed that the car was an 

Impala. 
18 

But the government continued to advance its theory that the car Ms. 

Mota had seen was Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s Impala. R., vol. III, at 1558–

59, 1564 (government’s rebuttal closing argument). So when Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron testified, he had no way of knowing what the jury would 

ultimately find. See Part III(A)(3)(a), above. Given this uncertainty, his 

false testimony about ownership of the Impala was material. 

3. Use of the Impala 

Mr. Fernandez-Barron also contends that ownership doesn’t matter 

because Ms. Mota’s testimony was based on use of the Impala (not 

ownership). Even if Mr. Fernandez-Barron did not own the car, Ms. Mota 

could have still seen him in Kansas City. But ownership tied Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron more closely to the Impala, and his efforts to distance 

himself from the car weakened the government’s theory that he had met 

Ms. Mota in Kansas City. 

Indeed, in his opening statement, defense counsel had underscored 

the eventual distinction that Mr. Fernandez-Barron would later draw in his 

testimony between registration and his colloquial concept of “ownership”: 

 The Impala is registered to Mr. Fernandez-Barron, but it’s 

actually owned by Licon-Gallegos, because at the time, Mr. 

Fernandez-Barron’s belief that Licon-Gallegos didn’t have a 

license, and so he couldn’t register the car, so he registered it 

for him. 

R., vol. III, at 1284. And, of course, Mr. Fernandez-Barron pointedly 

testified on direct examination that he had relinquished ownership of the 
19 

Impala in February 2013—long before Ms. Mota saw the car in Kansas 

City. So if Mr. Fernandez-Barron lied about ownership, he would have 

been lying about a factual issue that his own counsel thought material 

enough to inject into the trial. 

4. The District Court’s Later Findings 

 Mr. Fernandez-Barron also challenges the finding of materiality 

based on the district court’s later finding that he had joined the conspiracy 

in March 2015, long after the Kansas City incident with Ms. Mota. 

According to Mr. Fernandez-Barron, the later finding renders the Impala 

testimony immaterial. 

We disagree. When Mr. Fernandez-Barron testified, the date of his 

entry into the conspiracy involved an open issue for the jury and the judge 

to decide. So the court’s later finding couldn’t affect materiality of the 

testimony when it was given. See Part III(A)(3)(b), above. 

V. Conclusion 

 We conclude that the district court did not err in applying the 

enhancement for obstruction of justice. Mr. Fernandez-Barron’s false 

testimony about the BMW directly contradicted the government’s theory 

tying him to the conspiracy in May 2014. The court thus did not err in 

determining that his testimony about the BMW was willfully false and 

material. 
20 

Nor did the court err in finding perjury for his testimony about the 

Impala. Ms. Mota testified that the man she had seen had a car that looked 

like an Impala and identified Mr. Fernandez-Barron from a photograph. To 

counter this identification, Mr. Fernandez-Barron testified that he hadn’t 

even owned an Impala. Given his testimony and Ms. Mota’s, the district 

court did not err in determining that Mr. Fernandez-Barron had willfully 

given false and material testimony about ownership of the Impala. 

 We thus conclude that the district court did not err in finding perjury 

for both the BMW and the Impala testimony. Given these conclusions, we 

affirm the sentence.