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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 116,761

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS, 

Appellee,

V.

COREY LEROY YAZELL,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Johnson District Court; THOMAS KELLY RYAN, judge. Opinion on remand filed 

February 5, 2021. Appeal dismissed. 

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek 

Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee. 

Before MCANANY, P.J., MALONE and GARDNER, JJ.

PER CURIAM: This probation revocation appeal comes to us on remand from the 

Kansas Supreme Court. We had dismissed Yazell's appeal after finding it moot, but the 

Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It found that the Kansas Adult 

Supervised Population Electronic Repository (KASPER) is unreliable evidence, so 

appellate courts may not rely on it to make factual findings in support of mootness, and a 

case does not become moot simply because a criminal defendant completed his or her 

sentence. State v. Yazell, 311 Kan. 625, 465 P.3d 1147 (2020). The Supreme Court 

directed us on remand to describe the source showing the defendant's change of custody 
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and its reliability, and if we again find that Yazell has completed his sentence, to

reconsider whether his case is moot. We do so and again find Yazell's appeal moot.

Factual and Procedural Background

In January 2016, Yazell pleaded guilty to one count of possession of 

methamphetamine and one count of driving with a suspended license. In March, the 

district court sentenced Yazell to 14 months of prison for the methamphetamine 

conviction and a concurrent 90 days for the driving conviction. The court then suspended 

the imposition of that sentence and placed Yazell on 12 months of probation.

Yazell's order of probation included these conditions: (1) he would report to his 

probation officer when directed; (2) he would not associate with persons who have

criminal histories; (3) he would satisfy any outstanding warrant; and (4) he would not 

violate any law, including laws criminalizing the possession of controlled substances. 

Yazell also agreed in that order to the following condition: "Any defendant allowed to 

report outside of Johnson County, Kansas, waives any hearsay objection to evidence in 

any proceeding to revoke probation." Yazell's probation was transferred to Missouri 

through the interstate compact, triggering his hearsay waiver. 

In September 2016, the State moved to revoke Yazell's probation. Its motion 

alleged several violations of his probation conditions: he was arrested in Missouri on 

July 7, 2016, on drug charges; he failed to report to his probation officer several times; 

he was associating with individuals with criminal histories; and he failed to satisfy 

outstanding warrants in Missouri.

In October, the district court held a hearing on the State's motion. Jeri Reece, the 

Kansas interstate compact officer who managed Yazell's case while he lived in Missouri,

testified to information she had received in interstate compact reports. She identified the 
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State's exhibit as the Missouri police report she had reviewed. Although Reece could not 

remember how she had obtained the police report, she explained that typical protocol was 

either for the Johnson County probation office to request the report from the Missouri 

police department or for the Missouri probation officer who was supervising the 

probationer to forward the report to the Johnson County probation office. Reece had kept 

the police report as part of her office file on Yazell. 

When the State moved to admit the police report into evidence, Yazell objected, 

arguing that Reece's testimony based on the report would be hearsay. Yazell argued that 

even though he had agreed to waive any hearsay objections in his probation order, he had 

not waived his Confrontation Clause or due process rights. The district court overruled

Yazell's arguments and admitted the police report, finding: (1) Yazell had chosen to sign

the probation order waiving any objections to hearsay at his probation violation 

proceedings; (2) Yazell had fewer constitutional rights to confront witnesses in a

probation violation proceeding than at trial; and (3) Yazell could have subpoenaed the 

officer who wrote the police report and thus cross-examined him. 

The State then sought to clarify the record, advising the district court that under 

State v. Palmer, 37 Kan. App. 2d 819, 825, 158 P.3d 363 (2007), defendants at probation 

violation hearings "have a right to confront witnesses." The State asked the district court 

to find that confrontation was undesirable or impractical and that the evidence was

reliable. The district court tacitly agreed:

"Oh, [I] appreciate that and I think that is exact point. I didn't think that statement 

specifically, the right to confrontation is not waived but it is not as expansive to that 

degree as you would have at the time of a trial.

"And that this proffer and not admitted police report is that, it is a police report 

that was provided to interstate compact supervisor whether it came directly from a 
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request from the police department in Blue Springs or if it came from the Missouri 

probation officer, it was provided to Ms. Reece, part— as part of her file.

"And that that was the basis for her recommending and requesting this motion to 

revoke. So for all those reasons [the police report] is admitted." 

The police report stated that on July 7, 2016, police had stopped a car Yazell was a 

passenger in for a traffic violation. The police report also stated:

(1) two other passengers in the car had criminal histories; 

(2) police found a digital scale at Yazell's feet that field tested positive for 

methamphetamine residue; and 

(3) once Yazell got out of the car he consented to a search of his person, and

police found two marijuana cigarettes in his pocket.

Reece also testified to Yazell's other probation violations. He had failed to report 

to his Missouri probation officer four times. And he had failed to satisfy outstanding 

Missouri bench warrants in effect when he was sentenced—one for failure to appear on a 

charge of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) that had a $10,000 bond and

others for failure to appear on charges of driving while suspended, having $600 and 

$2,000 bonds.

The district court revoked Yazell's probation. It found that Yazell had violated the 

terms of his probation by committing new law violations as stated in the police report, by 

failing to report to his probation officer, and by failing to resolve his outstanding 

warrants. It then imposed Yazell's original sentence of 14 months' imprisonment followed 

by 12 months' postrelease supervision. 

Yazell timely appealed. We dismissed Yazell's appeal after finding it moot, but the 

Kansas Supreme Court found that "the Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it relied 
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on KASPER and the State's hearsay assertions about a Corrections employee confirming 

the accuracy of the report." Yazell, 311 Kan. at 631. The Supreme Court directed us on 

remand to describe the source showing the defendant's change of custody and its 

reliability, and if we again find that Yazell has completed his sentence, to reconsider 

whether his case is moot. 

Is Yazell's appeal moot?

Mootness asks whether clear and convincing evidence shows the actual 

controversy has ended and a judgment would be ineffectual and not impact any of the 

parties' rights. State v. Williams, 298 Kan. 1075, 1082, 319 P.3d 528 (2014). "Generally, 

Kansas appellate courts do not decide moot questions or render advisory opinions." State 

v. Tracy, 311 Kan. 605, 607, 466 P.3d 434 (2020). Mootness is a discretionary policy 

used to avoid unnecessary issues but allows a court to consider an issue "when judicial 

economy would benefit from a decision on the merits." State v. Roat, 311 Kan. 581, 587, 

466 P.3d 43 (2020). Mootness is a legal question we review de novo. 311 Kan. at 590.

On the same day the Kansas Supreme Court decided Yazell, it decided Roat. Roat

explained the burden-shifting analysis for mootness:

"A case is moot when a court determines that '"it is clearly and convincingly 

shown the actual controversy has ended, the only judgment that could be entered would 

be ineffectual for any purpose, and it would not impact any of the parties' rights."' . . .

. . . .

"The party asserting mootness generally bears the initial burden of establishing 

that a case is moot in the first instance. In an appeal solely challenging a sentence, the 

party asserting mootness may establish a prima facie showing of mootness by 

demonstrating that the defendant has fully completed the terms and conditions of his or 
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her sentence. The burden then shifts to the party opposing the mootness challenge to 

show the existence of a substantial interest that would be impaired by dismissal or that an 

exception to the mootness doctrine applies. [Citations omitted.]" 311 Kan. at 584, 593.

Thus to find this case moot, we must find reliable evidence that the defendant has 

fully completed the terms of his or her sentence, that our ruling would not affect any of 

defendant's rights, and that an exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply. Yazell 

contends that none of these requirements is met, while the State contends that each is 

met.

Reliable evidence shows Yazell has completed his sentence.

The State may meet its burden of establishing a prima facie showing of mootness 

by showing the defendant has "fully completed the terms and conditions of his or her 

sentence." Roat, 311 Kan. at 593. So we first consider whether the State has presented 

reliable evidence that Yazell has completed his sentence. Yazell, 311 Kan. at 628

("Before the appellate court may consider mootness, it must confirm the change in 

circumstance.").

Appellate courts rarely make factual findings, but to decide a defendant's change 

of custody for purposes of mootness we must do so. Yazell, 311 Kan. at 628. Because the 

appellate forum is generally not conducive to testing evidence, we "must carefully 

scrutinize the reliability of evidence before making the rare finding of fact." 311 Kan. at 

628. When considering appellate fact-finding on documents or websites, our Supreme 

Court has stated three concerns: (1) whether the information makes claims of 

authenticity or reliability, (2) whether the information is certified, and (3) whether those 

who generate the information are available for cross-examination at the appellate level. 

311 Kan. at 631. Because KASPER did not mitigate these concerns, our Supreme Court 

held that "courts may not rely on it to make factual findings." 311 Kan. 625, Syl. ¶ 1. 
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After remand, the State filed a notice of change of custodial status, attaching a 

"Certification of Time Served." See Supreme Court Rule 2.042 (2020 Kan. S. Ct. R. 18). 

This certification shows that Yazell completed his sentence in this case over two years 

ago, on November 10, 2017. The document, which includes Kansas Department of 

Corrections (KDOC) letterhead, a signature from Vickie Belanger, senior administrative 

assistant, and a certification statement, reads:

"I, the undersigned Vickie Belanger, of lawful age being duly sworn, do hereby, 

declare and certify that I am designated as a Public Service Administrator for the Kansas 

Department of Corrections and by virtue of my said office I am the legal keeper of all official 

records and files of the Office of the Secretary of Corrections. The foregoing is true and 

correct information from the records of: YAZELL, Corey KDOC # 114606."

Is this certification reliable enough for us to find that Yazell has completed his 

sentence, for purposes of our mootness analysis? A panel of this court recently answered 

that question affirmatively:

" A written certification from the KDOC records custodian is reliable evidence 

that may support appellate fact-finding for the limited purpose of deciding whether an 

appeal is moot." State v. Castle, 59 Kan. App. 2d 39, Syl. ¶ 4, 477 P.3d 266 (2020).

Castle reasoned:

"The certification contains a signature of the KDOC records custodian 'being duly sworn'

and states that it provides 'true and correct information' from Castle's records with the 

KDOC. Castle has offered no evidence to controvert the evidence presented by the State. 

He contends the State has failed to meet its burden to show he is released from custody. 

Significantly, Castle has not affirmatively represented to this court that the information in 

the KDOC certification is inaccurate.
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"Granted, Castle is unable to 'cross-examine' the KDOC records custodian who 

signed the certification. Likewise, the signature on the certification is not notarized or 

subscribed before the person who administered the oath. Following this procedure would 

have strengthened the evidentiary value of the certification. But without any evidence 

offered by Castle challenging the accuracy of the information in the KDOC certification, 

we accept the written certification as reliable evidence sufficient to show that Castle is no 

longer in prison for the limited purpose of deciding whether this appeal is moot." 59 Kan. 

App. 2d at 46-47.

Yazell's response to the State's notice of change of custody argues that Castle was 

wrong, that more is required, and that we should remand so the district court can make 

the necessary factual findings. He argues that this court must determine whether Yazell is 

in custody by using only information in the record on appeal, information proper for 

judicial notice, or facts determined by the district court on remand. We are unpersuaded.

We are not reviewing a factual finding in the record made by another court nor are we 

taking judicial notice of a fact for purposes of appellate review. And it would be 

undesirable and impractical to remand for a hearing by the district court because these 

certifications are standard documents, cross-examination likely would lack substance, 

Yazell does not contest the controlling fact in the certification, and a remand would delay 

the case, contravening judicial economy. Yazell suggests nothing the district court could 

accomplish that we cannot. Instead, as Yazell states, this mootness question requires this 

appellate court to make a "rare finding of fact" based on our own careful scrutinization of 

the reliability of evidence. 311 Kan. at 628.

Our facts are like those in Castle, and we adopt Castle's reasoning. The 

certification here is signed by the KDOC records custodian and is "duly sworn." Unlike 

KASPER, which makes no claim to authenticity or reliability, the certification states that 

it provides "true and correct information" from KDOC's records. The written certification 

is reliable evidence sufficient to show that Yazell is no longer in prison for the limited 

purpose of deciding whether this appeal is moot. Yazell does not argue that he has not 
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completed his sentence, nor does he proffer any reliable evidence contradicting the 

KDOC's certification.

The State has thus established a prima facie case of mootness by showing reliable 

evidence that Yazell has fully completed the terms of his sentence. 

The burden now shifts to Yazell to show his substantial interest that would be 

impaired by dismissal or that an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Yazell tries

to do both. 

Yazell fails to show that dismissal would impair his substantial interest.

Because the State has made a prima facie case of mootness, Yazell bears the 

"burden of demonstrating the existence of a meaningful interest that would be impaired 

by dismissal." Roat, 311 Kan. at 593.

Yazell does not argue that our ruling on appeal would have any effect on his case,

since he challenges the revocation of his probation—yet he has satisfied the sanction 

imposed for his probation violation, which was serving the entire prison term of his 

original sentence. His debt to society has been paid in full. Even if hearsay evidence was

used to show his probation violations, "[m]ere stigma or 'rightness' is insufficient to 

justify continuing to exercise jurisdiction over an appeal." Roat, 311 Kan. at 599. The 

State of Kansas has no authority to punish or supervise Yazell any further in this case, so

"[a]ny action this court might take regarding his probation revocation would be an idle 

act insofar as [his] rights in this action are concerned." State v. Montgomery, 295 Kan. 

837, 841, 286 P.3d 866 (2012).

Instead, Yazell first argues that his case is not moot because a court in his future

criminal cases could consider his lack of amenability to probation an aggravating factor 
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when determining a departure sentence. See State v. Snow, 282 Kan. 323, Syl. ¶ 15, 144 

P.3d 729 (2006), disapproved of by State v. Guder, 293 Kan. 763, 267 P.3d 751 (2012), 

and abrogated by State v. Jenkins, 311 Kan. 39, 455 P.3d 779 (2020). Yazell relies on 

Snow's finding that under K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-4716, nonamenability to probation is a 

sufficient aggravating factor to support a departure sentence. 

The State counters that the defendant can contest the probation violation finding at 

a future departure hearing because the controlling issue then will be a factual one—

Yazell's overall amenability to probation, rather than the mere legal conclusion that 

Yazell violated probation. In other words, the State contends that the consequences from 

Yazell's probation revocation depend on a judge's discretion in a future criminal 

proceeding rather than on the mere fact of Yazell's probation revocation.

We are generally unpersuaded by Yazell's argument, which asks us to assume that 

he will violate the law again. This future consequence of a departure hearing depends on

his violating the law, getting caught, being convicted, and moving for a departure 

sentence. That consequence is speculative and "speculation is not a legitimate basis to 

avoid dismissal for mootness." State v. Steele, No. 115,270, 2020 WL 3393818, at *2 

(Kan. 2020) (unpublished opinion). "Respondents themselves are able—and indeed 

required by law—to prevent such a possibility from occurring." Lane v. Williams, 455 

U.S. 624, 632 n.13, 102 S. Ct. 1322, 71 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1982).

And as to a possible finding in a future departure hearing that Yazell lacks 

amenability to probation, our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected this future collateral 

consequences argument. It holds that the nonstatutory consequences arising from a 

probation revocation, which depend on a judge's exercise of discretion in a future 

criminal proceeding rather than upon the mere fact of a probation revocation, cannot

perpetuate a controversy for purposes of the mootness doctrine:
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"But Hilton claims that she might suffer even further consequences in a future, 

separate criminal proceeding because of what the probation revocation will imply about 

her amenability to probation. We rejected that argument in Montgomery, stating:

'A case is not moot where it may have adverse legal consequences in the 

future. But the nonstatutory consequences arising from a probation revocation, 

which consequences will depend upon a judge's exercise of discretion in a future 

criminal proceeding rather than upon the mere fact of the prior probation 

revocation, are insufficient to perpetuate a controversy for purposes of the 

mootness doctrine, if the case has otherwise ceased.' Montgomery, 295 Kan. 837, 

Syl. ¶ 4.

"That rationale fits Hilton's circumstance, as well." State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 845, 

850, 286 P.3d 871 (2012). 

This rationale from Hilton and Montgomery fits Yazell's circumstance too. His 

case is thus not saved from mootness even if a court may consider his lack of amenability 

to probation an aggravating factor in the event he is again convicted of a crime and the 

court, in its discretion, considers a departure motion. 

Yazell also mentions, in response to the State's notice of change of custody, that 

his case is not moot because his "conviction might be used against [him] in the future in 

criminal history or as prior bad act evidence." Yazell states only that just as an appeal 

from a criminal conviction after the defendant has served his full sentence, his appeal 

from a contested finding of a probation violation is not moot. Yet he cites no authority for 

that proposition. To the contrary, the United States Supreme Court has refused to extend 

to revocations of parole the presumption of collateral consequences that may apply to 

criminal convictions. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 12, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 

2d 43 (1998); Lane, 455 U.S. at 632-33.
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And Yazell's assertion about future use of his probation violation as bad acts 

evidence fails for the same reason as does Yazell's argument about a departure hearing. It 

is speculative because it rests on the assumption that Yazell will commit another crime, 

and because the admission of prior bad act evidence rests in the discretion of the trial 

judge, not on the mere fact of a probation violation or other bad act. See State v. Lemmie, 

311 Kan. 439, 453, 462 P.3d 161 (2020); see also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15-16 (rejecting 

as purely speculative and discretionary defendant's claims that his parole violation for 

forcible rape and armed criminal action could be used to impeach him in a future criminal 

or civil proceeding or could be used against him directly under Federal Rule of Evidence 

405—permitting proof of specific instances of a person's conduct when a trait of 

character of that person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense—or Federal 

Rule of Evidence 413—permitting evidence of the defendant's commission of other 

sexual assaults when the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault). 

Nor are we persuaded by Yazell's assertion that his "conviction might be used 

against [him] in the future in criminal history." Yazell seems to assert that his probation 

revocation is a conviction that would negatively affect his criminal history score. This 

too, is speculative, assuming that Yazell will violate, instead of comply with, criminal 

laws.

But even assuming Yazell's unstated premise that he has a predilection for 

recidivism, dismissing this appeal can have no legal effect on how a future sentencing 

court would classify Yazell's prior crimes in a new sentencing proceeding. Yazell fails to 

tell us what "conviction" he is referring to. His appeal does not challenge his 2016 

convictions for possession of methamphetamine and driving with a suspended license, 

which were the basis for his sentence that the court suspended and then imposed when it 

revoked Yazell's probation. Those are the prior crimes from this case which would be 

included in his future criminal history score. See State v. Tracy, 311 Kan. 605, 608, 466 

P.3d 434 (2020). Yazell's appeal challenges only the admission at his revocation hearing 
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of a police report that was used to establish some of his probation violations. But Yazell's 

probation revocation was not premised on any conviction of a new crime—no evidence 

was proffered that he was convicted for any crimes stated in the police report. Instead, 

probation can be revoked, as here, on a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that 

a probationer committed a new crime. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3716(c)(7)(c)(C). State v. 

Gumfory, 281 Kan. 1168, Syl. ¶ 1, 135 P.3d 1191 (2006). 

Yazell thus shows no meaningful interest of his that dismissal would impair. See 

Roat, 311 Kan. at 593. Similarly, in Spencer, when the defendant claimed that an order 

revoking parole could be used to increase his sentence in a future sentencing proceeding, 

that injury was not concrete enough to preclude a finding that his appeal was mooted by 

his release from his sentence.

"We of course have rejected analogous claims to Article III standing in other contexts.

'[W]e are . . . unable to conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is 

satisfied by general assertions or inferences that in the course of their activities 

respondents will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws. We assume that 

respondents will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution 

and conviction.' O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S. Ct. 669, 677, 38 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).

"See also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-103, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L. Ed.

2d 675 (1983)." Spencer, 523 U.S. at 15.

Cf. Roat, 311 Kan. at 600-01 (finding a "future hypothetical requirement—objecting to a 

criminal history score—does not create a justiciable controversy").

Because Yazell fails to meet his burden of showing a meaningful collateral interest 

that would be impaired by dismissal, his appeal is moot, unless an exception applies.
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The argued exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.

Yazell contends the following exception applies to the mootness doctrine:

"Because the doctrine is not jurisdictional, it is subject to exceptions. One commonly 

applied exception to the rule that appellate courts will not review moot issues is where 

the moot issue 'is capable of repetition and raises concerns of public importance.' State v. 

DuMars, 37 Kan. App. 2d. 600, 605, 154 P.3d 1120, rev. denied 284 Kan. 948 (2007). In 

that context, public importance means

'"'something more than that the individual members of the public are interested in 

the decision of the appeal from motives of curiosity or because it may bear upon 

their individual rights or serve as a guide for their future conduct as individuals.'"

State ex rel. Stephan v. Johnson, 248 Kan. 286, 290, 807 P.2d 664 (1991) 

(quoting Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1185, 1188-89).' Skillett v. Sierra, 30 Kan. App. 2d 

1041, 1048, 53 P.3d 1234, rev. denied 275 Kan. 965 (2002)." Hilton, 295 Kan. at 

850-51.

Hilton applied that exception, finding a likelihood of repetition because with only

18 months' probation "it would have been highly unlikely that anyone in that 

circumstance could have obtained relief on appeal for any error in the revocation 

proceedings before the issue became moot." 295 Kan. at 851. And Hilton's claim that the 

district court erroneously aggregated two consecutive 12-month probations into a total 

probation term of 24 months for revocation purposes was of public importance—"district 

courts are likely to face the circumstance of two cases with consecutive prison terms, and 

it is certainly a matter of public importance that such courts know the permissible manner 

in which to structure probation in those circumstances." 295 Kan. at 851.

Yazell's issue is capable of repetition. As he argues, in other probation revocation 

hearings, a district court may erroneously rely on hearsay. Yet the district court did not 
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err here because Yazell waived any hearsay objection. See State v. Conner, No. 89,918, 

2004 WL 1542320, at *2 (Kan. App. 2004) (unpublished opinion) (finding that the

condition of courtesy probation that defendant waive hearsay objections at later hearings 

did not violate due process). Still, because of the short duration of Yazell's sentence, the 

issue was not resolved on appeal before he completed his sentence.

But Yazell fails to argue that the issue on appeal is of public importance. He 

asserts only that "other defendants may be subjected to illegal extensions." Yazell 

apparently equates the admission of hearsay at a probation revocation hearing to an 

"illegal extension" or to cause an "illegal extension," but he fails to explain what this 

means. The district court did not extend Yazell's probation—it revoked it.

And to say that other defendants may receive illegal extensions argues only that 

the issue is capable of repetition. Yazell fails to argue or cite any authority for any tacit 

assertion that subjecting other defendants to "illegal extensions" is of public importance. 

By failing to develop any argument about public importance, Yazell abandons this 

argument. See State v. Salary, 309 Kan. 479, 481, 437 P.3d 953 (2019).

Even so, the issue whether Yazell violated the terms of his probation is not of 

public importance. And even if we recognize that the broader issue—whether revoking 

probation based on hearsay violates due process—is of public importance, we are 

unpersuaded that we need to decide that issue since the law on that topic is already well 

established in Kansas. See, e.g., State v. Marquis, 292 Kan. 925, 928, 931, 257 P.3d 775 

(2011) (A probationer at a probation violation hearing is not afforded the full panoply of 

rights due in a criminal prosecution and has no Sixth Amendment right to confront a 

witness); State v. Graham, 272 Kan. 2, 6, 30 P.3d 310 (2001) ("[U]nsubstantiated and 

unreliable hearsay cannot, consistent with due process, be the sole basis for a probation 

revocation. When hearsay is reliable, however, it can be the sole basis for a probation 

revocation. When hearsay is offered as the only evidence of the alleged violation, the 
16

indicia of reliability must be substantial."); State v. Yura, 250 Kan. 198, 208, 825 P.2d 

523 (1992) (adopting a two-part test for finding whether hearsay evidence at a probation 

revocation hearing meets minimum due process, requiring an explanation as to why 

confrontation was undesirable or impractical and the reliability of the evidence).

So although district courts may again have to decide whether due process permits 

them to rely on certain hearsay evidence in probation revocation hearings, the district 

courts already have clear guidance from our Supreme Court on how to resolve that issue.

Because the law on this issue has already been authoritatively declared, it is not a matter 

of public importance for us to revisit it. See Hilton, at 851 (finding issue "a matter of 

public importance that such courts know the permissible manner in which to structure 

probation in those circumstances").

We thus dismiss Yazell's appeal as moot.