Strategic Approaches 

to Preventing Multiple 

Casualty Violence

Report on the 

National Summit 

on Multiple 

Casualty Shootings
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University held a 

candlelight vigil on the Drillfield on April 16, 2010, as a 

Day of Remembrance to commemorate the tragedy that 

occurred there just three years earlier when a gunman 

killed 32 students and faculty and injured 23 others.

Front cover photo: ©2013, by Roger Gupta. All rights reserved. Used with permission.

Inside cover photo: ©2013, by Ben Townsend. All rights reserved. Used with permission.
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street, N.E.

Washington, DC 20530

www.cops.usdoj.gov

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, call the 

COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770.

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and 

do not necessarily represent the official position or policies 

of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific 

agencies, companies, products, or services should not be 

considered an endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. 

Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations 

to supplement discussion of the issues. 

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as 

of the date of this publication. Given that URLs and websites 

are in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the Office of 

Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of 

Justice, can vouch for their current validity. 

Recommended citation:

Paparazzo, John, Christine Eith, and Jennifer Tocco. 2013. 

Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence: Report on the 

National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. Washington, D.C.: 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services.

ISBN: 978-1-932582-75-8

April 2013

e021311546
Contents

Letter from the Director (The COPS Office) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Letter from the Director (The FLETC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Letter from the Dean (JHU-PSL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Summary of Summit Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background on Multiple Casualty Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Background on the National Summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Academic Research and Emerging Perspectives on Multiple Casualty Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Framing the Summit Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Summit Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Appendix A: Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Appendix B: Pre-Event Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix C: Young Adult Panel Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Appendix D: Research Questions Posed to Summit Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Appendix E: Attendees and Support Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Appendix F: Technical Advisors’ Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Appendix G: Definitional Framework and Summary of Current Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

About the COPS Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

About the FLETC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

About JHU-PSL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
iv

Dear colleagues,

On behalf of the entire U.S. Department of Justice and the Office 

of Community Oriented Policing Services, I would like to share my 

appreciation for the collaborative efforts made to develop this report and 

establish a base for continued discussion on preventing multiple casualty 

violence.

A key component of effective community policing is the advancement 

of partnerships and problem-solving strategies. Stronger partnerships 

yield effective communications and broader outreach and, coupled with 

new strategies to address public safety concerns, help law enforcement 

coordinate preventative initiatives to mass casualty incidents. But as 

the tragic assault in Newtown, Connecticut, demonstrates, threats and 

circumstances can change. The need for continued discussion, training, 

and vigilance on all levels remains critical.

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has made an enormous 

effort here to convene like-minded agencies and pair them with interested 

parties from various academic and medical backgrounds at the first 

National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. This report on the 

findings of the summit provides a significant step toward the development 

of universal practices to assist the field. This tool will help shape roles and 

responsibilities and help guide work toward early identification and more 

effective prevention.

The COPS Office is a proud partner of this effort and considers this 

initiative to be an ongoing priority. At every tragic occurrence involving 

multiple casualty violence, the same questions are asked about what 

could be done better to prevent such an act from happening. To see 

such a diligent and dedicated effort being made to find the answers is 

encouraging. 

Sincerely,

Bernard K. Melekian, Director

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
v

Dear colleagues,

I am pleased to share with you the final report from the National Summit on Multiple Casualty 

Shootings, a collaborative initiative of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services; and the Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety 

Leadership, held at the FLETC headquarters in Glynco, Georgia, December 11–13, 2012.

This effort began in late July 2012, shortly after the tragic shooting at the Century movie theater 

in Aurora, Colorado. While a great deal of progress has been made over the past decade in training 

law enforcement officers on active shooter response, there is a substantial need to advance our 

understanding of how multiple casualty acts of violence can be prevented. From the early planning 

stages of the summit, we recognized the importance of bringing together subject-matter experts 

from a wide range of disciplines—including law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, 

education, and academia—that could play a role in developing prevention strategies. By taking this 

holistic approach, the summit resulted in cross-cutting recommendations that I believe hold great 

promise in addressing the many dimensions to this complex problem. 

As law enforcement trainers for more than 90 federal agencies, as well as for thousands of state, 

local, and international law enforcement officers, the FLETC is deeply committed to keeping our 

communities safe. Too many innocent lives have been lost in seemingly inexplicable acts of multiple 

casualty violence. The FLETC remains dedicated to collaborating across professional communities to 

help prevent future tragedies. 

Sincerely, 

Connie L. Patrick, Director

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
vi

Dear colleagues,

In July 2012, a partnership was established between the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); the U.S. Department 

of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; and the Johns Hopkins 

University, School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership. One of the goals 

of this partnership was to conduct a national summit on multiple casualty shootings. 

This partnership succeeded in this goal by bringing together subject-matter experts 

from many disciplines at the FLETC facility in Glynco, Georgia, on December 11–13, 

2012. Through facilitated discussion and open exchange, summit participants shared 

their knowledge and experiences on this vital topic.

Johns Hopkins University, through its many schools and centers, has been conducting 

research into characteristics of violence for many years. I am very proud that the School 

of Education, through its Division of Public Safety Leadership, was an active partner in 

developing and conducting the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings and in 

the creation of this summit report, which you are now viewing.

This form of violence continues to plague our country and take the lives of countless 

innocents, so the work is not done. I hope you will reflect on the contents of this report 

and ask yourself what you can do to continue the movement that was established 

during this first summit.

Sincerely,

David W. Andrews, Ph.D., Dean

School of Education

The Johns Hopkins University
Acknowledgments vii

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to the following for their dedication and 

commitment to the project:

The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, especially Director Bernard 

K. Melekian and Principal Deputy Director Joshua A. 

Ederheimer

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center, especially Director Connie L. 

Patrick and Deputy Director D. Kenneth Keene

The Johns Hopkins University, School of Education, Division 

of Public Safety Leadership, especially Dean David Andrews

The principal authors of this report: John Paparazzo, MSM, 

Johns Hopkins University; Christine Eith, Ph.D., Johns 

Hopkins University; and Jennifer Tocco, M.Ed., MPA, Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center
Executive Summary 1

Executive Summary

Immediately following the tragic shooting on July 20, 

2012, at the Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, 

and in recognition of increased public alarm over multiple 

casualty violence in the United States, the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center (FLETC) began partnering with the U.S. 

Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and the Johns 

Hopkins University, School of Education, Division of 

Public Safety Leadership (JHU-PSL), to bring together a 

cross-section of stakeholders from a variety of disciplines, 

including law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, 

education, and academia, for the purpose of improving the 

nation’s ability to prevent such incidents. 

The three partners worked over the next several months 

to plan and coordinate the National Summit on Multiple 

Casualty Shootings, held at the FLETC’s headquarters in 

Glynco, Georgia, December 11–13, 2012. More than two 

dozen experts from multiple disciplines assembled in an 

effort to advance the safety and security of the nation’s 

communities: educational institutions, workplaces, public 

venues, places of worship, recreational areas, etc. The summit 

goal was to bring together a cadre of leaders and subject-area 

authorities to develop and propose a national dialogue on 

multiple casualty violence and to create a path forward.

During the preliminary meeting phase of the summit, 

the planners developed a set of definitions to serve as 

a framework for discussions about preventing multiple 

casualty violence. The FLETC, COPS Office, and JHUPSL invited subject-matter experts from a wide range 

of disciplines to engage a cross-section of professions 

positioned to help facilitate the prevention of multiple 

casualty violence. 

Over the course of the three-day summit, these participants 

further refined and structured the national dialogue on 

multiple casualty violence and discussed, debated, and 

built consensus on potential strategies for preventing such 

incidents. Through careful examination of voluminous 

summit notes and documentation, summit partners 

synthesized definitions into a common framework and 

developed recommendations for future actions. These 

delineate the direction of future conversations and meetings 

on preventing multiple casualty violence. 

Summary of Summit 

Recommendations 

Summit recommendations fell into a framework 

comprising one set focused on what institutions, including 

governmental and non-governmental organizations, can do 

to improve the prevention of multiple casualty violence, and 

one set centered on improving prevention efforts pertaining 

to individual subjects: 

Institution-focused

1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing 

escalation toward a violent act.

2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models 

designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through 

threat assessment and intervention.

3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the 

identification and notification of potential threats to begin 

a cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting.

4. Better educate health care practitioners; school 

administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement 

professionals about the Health Insurance Portability 

and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational 

Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to 

alleviate misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing 

information across disciplines. 

5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements 

for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of 

potentially violent behavior. 

Subject-focused 

6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously 

reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and 

sending alerts about incidents.

7. Enhance existing resources to develop a national, 

searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining 

to individual behavior that is indicative of escalation 

toward a violent act, and facilitate the sharing of such 

information across jurisdictional boundaries.

8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for 

citizens who report indicators of potentially violent 

behavior. 
2 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Background on Multiple 

Casualty Violence 

Acts of violence resulting in multiple casualties, such as 

recent shootings of random victims in places like schools, 

theaters, and shopping malls, have increasingly alarmed 

the collective American society. These incidents generate 

significant interest and frequently dominate media coverage 

in their immediate aftermaths. While they continue to 

constitute a small proportion of American crime, the horror 

they inflict on the national consciousness has compelled 

researchers and policymakers alike to develop detailed 

definitions and frameworks for study, theorize about root 

causes, and explore avenues for prevention. 

Scholars have defined terminology that helps to distinguish 

among the various types of multicide.1

 The three commonly 

defined classifications of multiple casualty violence are 

mass murder, serial murder, and spree murder. Points of 

distinction among these include the number of victims, the 

location of events, and the existence of a cooling-off period.2

These definitions identify distinct patterns in multiple 

casualty events, and a common factor has been the emotional 

or mental health of the subject. Particularly in cases of 

multiple casualty acts of violence, prior to their rampages, 

subjects often had been perceived by at least one person as 

frustrated or angry and often had expressed these emotions 

prior to the event.3

 The manifestation of a potential subject’s 

frustration or anger is likely to be expressed through threat 

or behavioral changes. In almost every incident of workplace 

homicide (99 percent), the actor made threats prior to 

engaging in the shooting event; similarly, most perpetrators 

of multiple casualty acts of violence that occurred in schools 

had a history of previous conflict.4

1. Alverez, A., and R. Bachman, Murder American Style (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 

Publishing, 2003).

2. Douglas, J., and M. Olshaker, The Anatomy of a Motive (New York: Pocket Books, 

1999).

3. Ibid.

4. Zinna, K.A., After Columbine: A Schoolplace Violence Prevention Manual (Silverthorne, CO: Spectra Publishing, 1999).

Historically, the majority of multiple casualty events have 

occurred in one of three places: the home, workplace, or 

school. In recent events, such as the shootings in Tucson, 

Arizona, and Aurora, Colorado, subjects have moved into 

public spaces where victims are members of the community 

and are targeted at random while engaged in recreation or 

daily life. While multiple casualty events are always a shock 

to the consciousness, the assault on innocence becomes 

particularly startling when children are the targets, as was the 

case in Newtown, Connecticut. The community and public 

at-large are left asking who could have done such a thing 

and how such a horrifying act could have been prevented. 

While statistically rare, multiple casualty acts of violence 

are not a recent phenomenon; the first noted incident of 

violence occurred at a school in 1927.5

 The prevalence of 

these acts of homicide is very low, with an estimated 26 

multiple casualty shooting incidents identified since 2000, 

including approximately seven acts in 2012.6

 However, 

given the far-reaching impact of violence on individuals and 

whole communities, public health scholars have conducted 

significant research on violence prevention.7

 The devastating 

effects of multiple casualty violence on individual families 

and on our collective national consciousness create an urgent 

need to transcend the boundaries of theoretical research in 

the development of practical strategies to improve prevention 

efforts. 

5. Bernstein, A., Bath Massacre: America’s First School Bombing (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009).

6. FLETC staff collected data from a variety of publicly available sources to list events 

that fall within the summit’s scope, namely pre-planned multiple casualty violent events 

within the United States, excluding terrorist acts, killings in conjunction with the commission of other crimes, and domestic violence incidents in which only family members are 

killed. This compilation, found in Appendix A, was intended to inform the planning phase of 

the summit and is not necessarily comprehensive. 

7. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Injury Prevention collects data on the prevalence and mechanism of death for certain, most-effected 

populations. Further, the National Violent Death Reporting System provides additional information into violent deaths; however, the system covers only 18 states across the United 

States. (See “National Violent Death Reporting System,” CDC.gov, 

www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/NVDRS/index.html.)
Background on the National Summit 3

Background on the 

National Summit 

In the wake of the July 2012 multiple casualty shooting in 

Aurora, Colorado, the Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center (FLETC) began partnering with the U.S. Department 

of Justice’s (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services (COPS Office) and the Johns Hopkins University, 

School of Education, Division of Public Safety Leadership 

(JHU-PSL), to develop a plan for improving the nation’s 

ability to prevent such incidents. 

During the early planning stages of the National Summit on 

Multiple Casualty Shootings, FLETC, COPS Office, and JHUPSL personnel reviewed existing literature related to multiple 

casualty incident response and prevention. This work 

illuminated a need to explore specific gaps in preventing 

these kinds of incidents from occurring. The summit 

planners identified a panel of subject-matter experts from a 

wide variety of relevant professions to participate in a threeday summit with the goal of proposing a national dialogue 

on preventing multiple casualty shootings. 

The summit concluded on December 13, 2012, only one 

day before the horrific event in Newtown, Connecticut—a 

tragic reminder of the urgency to act to protect our 

communities from such violence.

Purpose and scope

Unlike a number of previous efforts, the purpose of this 

summit was not to examine law enforcement’s tactical 

response to acts of multiple casualty violence; instead, the 

focus was on identifying pre-incident intervention strategies 

and opportunities for improving institutional systems to 

help reduce the likelihood of such incidents by employing 

a strategic, multidisciplinary approach. The goal of the 

summit was thus to advance the safety and security of the 

nation’s communities—academic institutions, workplaces, 

public venues, places of worship, recreational areas, etc.—

by bringing together a cadre of leaders and subject-area 

authorities to develop and propose a national dialogue on 

multiple casualty shootings. 

To ensure the summit resulted in actionable and achievable 

recommendations, its scope was limited to only pre-planned 

violent events within the United States and excluded 

terrorist acts, killings in conjunction with the commission 

of other crimes, and domestic violence incidents in which 

only family members are killed. This approach enabled 

participants to focus the discussion on the kinds of events 

that are among the least understood and for which few 

prevention strategies are currently in place, especially on a 

national scale. 

The catalysts for the summit were recent high-profile active 

shooter events in the United States. Thus, early discussions 

compelled summit planners to title the event the National 

Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. However, ensuing 

conversations during the planning phase and during the 

event itself did not focus on the nature of the weapons used 

in the incidents, and it became clear as time went on that the 

themes and recommendations emerging from the summit 

were not dependent upon the weapon of choice. Thus, this 

report deemphasizes the subject’s choice of weapon, and 

future work resulting from this summit is expected to be 

nonspecific on this point. 

Objectives

The objectives for the summit were as follows: 

1. Identify and place in order of priority the concerns, 

issues, and needs challenging the prevention of multiple 

casualty shootings. 

2. Identify notable successes in the identification, 

notification, evaluation, intervention, documentation, 

and dissemination of information for addressing multiple 

casualty shooting threats. 

3. Suggest a course of action, short-term and long-term, 

for advancing the dialogue regarding the prevention of 

multiple casualty shootings. 
4 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Anticipated outcomes

Anticipated outcomes of the summit were as follows: 

1. Delegates, in concert with summit sponsors, develop 

an interdisciplinary network for information sharing, 

communication, and strategy development for addressing 

the threat of multiple casualty shootings.

2. Delegates reach a consensus on common themes 

associated with the prevention of multiple casualty 

shootings with the focus on furthering this dialogue on a 

national level.

3. Delegates submit a report citing recommendations 

designed to address the identified issues. 

Summit format

This summit extended over three days and comprised 

four breakout sessions, four large-group sessions during 

which individual groups reported out on their findings 

and recommendations, a presentation from legal experts 

regarding topics significant to preventing multiple 

casualty shootings, and a plenary session on the final day. 

Breakout sessions were intended to elicit cross-professional 

perspectives, and the plenary session aimed to build 

consensus among summit participants regarding next 

steps. These discussions established a foundation for future 

summits that are expected to focus on specific issues relating 

to prevention of multiple casualty violence. 

Approximately three weeks in advance of the summit, 

the JHU-PSL planners e-mailed the participants a letter 

asking them to complete a web-based pre-survey to elicit 

any preconceptions regarding approaches to preventing 

multiple casualty shootings. Specifically, the survey queried 

participants’ confidential perceptions of the current state of 

pre-event capabilities and capacity to identify and interrupt 

a potential act of multiple casualty violence. Responses to 

this survey helped the summit planners refine the research 

questions to be used at the summit and facilitate discussions 

during the three-day event.8

8. See Appendix B for a copy of the survey.

The summit began with a facilitated discussion among 

young adults between the ages of 16 and 21. The purpose 

of this Young Adult Panel was to elicit perspectives on 

leveraging social media for identifying potential perpetrators 

and reporting suspicious activity or threatening behavior. 

The summit planners specifically chose the young adult 

demographic due to the explosion in the use of social media 

over the past few years in daily communications and in 

emotional expression, especially among this generation. 

Prospects for prevention are likely to be prevalent among 

peers who interact with potential subjects in their daily 

lives; therefore, their perspectives and habits are crucial in 

understanding prevention and interruption opportunities.9

Following the Young Adult Panel and a brief opening 

introductory session, the summit participants were 

assigned to breakout groups that became their teams for 

the duration of the summit. Initial breakout sessions were 

intended to validate the framework the summit planners 

formulated—namely, structuring dialogue that related to 

prevention around the identification of potential threats; 

notification protocols, processes, and procedures; evaluation 

strategies; pre-incident interventions to interrupt planning 

and preparations; and documentation of pre-incident 

activities, along with the appropriate collection, storage, and 

dissemination of those documents.10

Later breakout sessions explored current activities in the 

participants’ professions related to multiple casualty violence 

prevention, including discussion on existing gaps and 

opportunities for improvement. During the plenary session, 

the summit facilitator worked with participants to synthesize 

recommendations and build consensus around central 

themes and solution strategies. 

9. See Appendix C for a summary of the Young Adult Panel.

10. See Appendix D for the research questions posed to participants during the breakout 

sessions.

Selecting the delegates

From the early planning stages, the summit planners 

committed to bringing together a multidisciplinary group of 

experts, believing that the most effective solution strategies 

could be derived only through debate and discussion 
Background on the National Summit 5

among experts in all fields and professions positioned to 

facilitate prevention of multiple casualty violence. Indeed, by 

explaining the opportunities, strengths, and limitations of 

particular disciplines, the participants were able to engage in 

meaningful, action-oriented dialogue. 

While law enforcement communities have traditionally taken 

the lead on the tactical response to active shooter incidents, 

other professionals and practitioners are likely to have 

contact with those planning incidents at various stages, and 

additional experts possess significant academic knowledge 

in topics relevant to the prevention of multiple casualty 

violence. 

For example, psychologists and psychiatrists may serve 

patients who exhibit signs that might be indicative of a 

propensity toward violence. Educators and other school 

personnel may work with or encounter students who 

likewise present behavior common among individuals who 

have perpetrated multiple casual shootings. Similarly, law 

enforcement officers may encounter persons demonstrating 

signs of threatening behavior during the course of their daily 

duties. 

Health care administrators bring experience with identifying 

patterns associated with persons admitted to hospitals, and 

potential mental health care follow-up, as well as knowledge 

about the health care system in general. Academics, 

particularly those in fields such as psychology, psychiatry, 

education, and public health, have studied various aspects 

of multiple casualty violence, each examining particular 

aspects of the phenomenon without much opportunity to 

synthesize viewpoints and findings. 

Those with expertise in intelligence analysis understand 

how to identify and mitigate risks and how to piece 

together information to identify patterns. Private security 

practitioners bring experience related to both physically 

securing buildings and identifying suspicious persons or 

activities in closed locations. Finally, those who have lived 

through multiple casualty shooting incidents, especially 

in law enforcement leadership capacities, bring practical 

perspectives and lessons learned that add realism to 

conversations related to all phases of multiple casualty acts of 

violence. 

The summit planners selected delegates in all of these 

professions, disciplines, and areas of expertise, resulting in 

a final cadre of 22 professionals. Several notable subjectarea experts were regrettably unable to attend but expressed 

interest in participating in future summits and dialogue.11

Due to the complexities of the HIPAA, FERPA, and Privacy 

Act, the summit coordinators invited legal experts to serve 

as technical advisors during all working sessions. Attorneys 

were present to answer technical questions, ensuring 

discussions were based on accurate perceptions of existing 

laws.12

11. See Appendix E for the list of summit participants. 

12. See Appendix F for a summary of the presentation provided by legal experts during 

the summit.

Reporting on the summit 

Although the summit aimed to build consensus among 

participants, gaining complete agreement on every point is 

nearly impossible when a group of experts comes together 

representing a diversity of professional viewpoints, areas of 

expertise, and past experiences. Indeed, healthy debate often 

produces the most profound insights. 

The recommendations included in this report reflect the 

major themes that emerged, focusing on those that the 

majority of participants supported. The discussion points 

in this report reflect the participants’ debates and dialogue 

throughout the three-day event. 
6 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Academic Research and Emerging Perspectives 

on Multiple Casualty Shootings 

Important academic work has been done in the area of 

multiple casualty violence. However, there remains no 

specific profile of rampage shooters due to the limited 

number of events to study. Furthermore, the epidemiological 

research approach often taken with respect to multiple 

casualty violence does not include exploring the context of 

such events, including potential socio-cultural triggers. 

A framework of identifiable characteristics could provide a 

collective understanding of the risk factors or underlying 

causes of these acts of violence, which should improve 

prevention efforts. Existing literature and perspectives that 

emerged during the summit point to the need to fill this gap. 

Developing and implementing effective prevention strategies 

will require the interaction of both the individual- and 

institutional-level factors that are present as escalation toward 

violent acts occurs.

The social sciences can inform these conversations in 

ways that focus not solely on the individual but also on 

the subject’s social context and interpersonal interactions, 

providing a macro-level approach to understanding the 

roles of social norms, social networks, communities, and 

neighborhoods. In a review of school shootings, Katherine 

Newman and colleagues identified five key sociological 

similarities across the shooters: individual marginalization, 

a magnification of this marginalization by psychological 

issues, exposure to cultural scripts, a failure of surveillance, 

and access to guns.13

Although this research specifically examined incidents 

involving shootings, summit participants broadened the 

discussion to address access to any kind of deadly weapon. 

While the factors Newman and colleagues identified focused 

on the similarities at the subject level, they also suggest 

missed opportunities for intervention at the societal level. 

Individual marginalization rarely goes undetected by family, 

friends, teachers, or colleagues; however, in many cases, 

post-event evidence identified that changes in the subjects’ 

behavior were not effectively communicated in ways that 

could have prevented tragedies. 

13. Newman, K.S., C. Fox, D.J. Harding, J. Metha, and W. Roth, Rampage: The Social 

Roots of School Shootings (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

The significant interaction between social marginalization 

and mental health issues is another area where missed 

opportunities for intervention can occur. Many recent events 

have involved offenders who were known to have mental 

health problems. Research indicates that while violence is 

no more prevalent among the mentally ill population than 

in the general population, mentally ill individuals who 

engage in violence target family and friends typically in 

home settings.14 Nevertheless, as the public discusses multiple 

casualty violence, mental health issues are often cited as 

contributing factors in multiple casualty violence.

Developing a prevention strategy for a phenomenon with a 

low rate of occurrence is difficult, but there are opportunities 

to build on existing research to further the knowledge 

base in this area. Risk assessment studies have found that 

the elimination of major mental disorders can reduce 

community violence by an estimated 5 percent.15 Further 

discussion and research in this area might include discerning 

the barriers to effective mental health identification and 

treatment, recognizing the continuing social stigma 

of mental illness and its negative impacts on cultural 

scripts, and improving the overall health and wellbeing of 

individuals with mental illness to increase social acceptance. 

14. Monahan, J., H.J. Steadman, E. Silver, P.S. Applebaum, P. Clark Robbins, E.P. Mulvey, 

L.H. Roth, T. Grisso, and S. Banks, Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of 

Mental Disorder and Violence (Oxford University Press, 2001).

15. Swanson, J.W., “Mental Disorder, Substance Abuse, and Community Violence: An 

Epidemiologic Approach,” in Violence and Mental Disorder: Developments in Risk Assessment, edited by J. Monahan and H.J. Steadman, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 

1994), 101–136. 

The primary prevention focus for such acts of violence 

requires a cultural shift in the way in which society looks 

at the risk of multiple casualty acts of violence, from one 

driven by fear of reporting relatives and friends, to one in 

which reporting to authorities is viewed as a safe way to 

help loved ones in crisis. While multiple casualty incidents 

are statistically rare, striking similarities exist among many 

of them—namely, the individual’s marginalization from 

his or her familial or social network, a recognized change 

towards aberrant behavior, and a failure of friends and family 

to report when behavior changes became a threat to public 

health and safety. The natural order of the family unit is to 

protect and care for its members; however, the family has 

the potential to serve as the first source of identifying that 
Academic Research and Emerging Perspectives on Multiple Casualty Shootings 7

a potential problem exists with one of its members. In the 

context of the existing stigma surrounding mental illness, 

a family or close friend may try to protect an individual 

experiencing a mental health crisis in an attempt to limit 

further stigmatization. 

An individual’s identity is often negatively impacted by 

the social stigma, or “labeling,” frequently associated with 

mental illness, leaving the person emotionally withdrawn, 

depressed, and feeling rejected.16,17 Attempts by friends and 

family to intervene on their own are not always successful 

and have the potential to further isolate the individual 

struggling with a mental health crisis by fostering the stigma 

within the home. In an attempt to help and care for an 

individual in need, the family or friend actually becomes 

more of a barrier to successful intervention by not reporting 

potentially threatening behavior. This occurs because the 

family or friend hopes to avoid further stigmatization and 

fears losing the loved one’s trust and, consequently, the 

ability to ensure the individual’s safety and wellbeing. 

A phenomenon known as the bystander effect may also 

facilitate understanding regarding why individuals who pose 

credible threats are not reported to appropriate authorities. 

In recent multiple casualty acts of violence, such as the one 

in Carson City, Nevada, in 2011, the subjects openly carried 

weapons into public places. How and why no one acted to 

thwart these individuals’ actions immediately prior to the 

shootings can be explained in part by the bystander effect—

the failure to act in an emergency situation.18,19

16. Goffman, E., Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New York: Simon 

& Schuster, Inc., 1963).

17. Cox, W.T.L., L.Y. Abramson, P.G. Devine, and S.D. Hollon, “Stereotypes, Prejudice, and 

Depression: The Integrated Perspective,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 7 (2012): 

427–449, http://pps.sagepub.com/content/7/5/427.abstract.

18. Latané, B., and J.M. Darley, “Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in 

Emergencies,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10 (1968): 215–221.

19. Tassione, D.D., Adolescent Connectedness, the Student Bystander, and Targeted 

School Violence (Texas Woman’s University, 2006).

In order for an event to be prevented, members of a 

society must recognize behavior as problematic, interpret 

that behavior as a potential threat, and be willing to take 

responsibility for some sort of intervention that would 

interrupt the event. This intervention does not require direct 

contact with the individuals and could be as simple as an 

anonymous phone call to an authority. However, it does 

require a cultural shift toward shared responsibility for 

public safety. 

This cultural shift requires an inculcation and acceptance 

that reporting abnormal behavior is in the best interest of 

society, and in fact, is a civic responsibility. Research suggests 

that one of the primary barriers to reporting threatening 

behavior is the overall fear of stigmatization or future 

victimization on the part of the reporter. The general concern 

is that, without the appropriate protections in place, whether 

in school or public settings, reporting threatening behavior 

can have negative consequences on the person doing the 

notifying if not kept confidential.20 Thus, in addition to 

the stigma that can be placed on the individual posing the 

threats, there is a perception of potential stigmatization of 

family, friends, or even bystanders who report behavior 

indicative of violence without confidential protections in 

place. This results in fear ranging from being labeled a snitch 

to becoming a target of violence.21

Acts of violence that take multiple lives, particularly those 

that occur during violent rampages, shock the societal 

consciousness. These acts are differentiated from other 

homicides and assaults that, while continuing to decline, are 

somewhat more pervasive in our society.22,23 In an attempt 

to make sense of a senseless act, society often scrutinizes 

the assailant and points to any distinguishing factor that 

could explain how and why someone could commit such 

a heinous act. Behavioral characteristics, while important in 

understanding the act, are not the only pieces of the puzzle. 

20. Wilson-Simmons, R., K. Dash, P. Tehranifar, L. O’Donnell, and A. Stueve, “What Can 

Student Bystanders Do To Prevent School Violence?” Journal of School Violence 5 (2006): 

43–62.

21. Ibid.

22. FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), Crime in the United States, 2011, Uniform 

Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012).

23. Blumstein, A., and J. Wallman, “The Crime Drop and Beyond,” Annual Review of Law 

and Social Science 2 (2006): 125–146.
8 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

A systems approach is required to understand how someone 

could have perpetrated such an extreme act of violence 

and particularly where in that system a failure could have 

occurred. This requires understanding the social and 

cultural explanations for individual behavior, as well as 

developing a better understanding of the subject so that early 

identification of a potential threat can occur and lead to a 

successful intervention to prevent future acts of multiple 

casualty violence. 

In addition to issues associated with stigmatization 

and the potential consequences of the bystander effect, 

misperceptions associated with laws intended to protect 

individual privacy, particularly in the medical and 

educational domains, are barriers to timely and effective 

reporting of potentially threatening behavior. While the 

HIPAA, FERPA, and Privacy Act do not generally prohibit 

professionals from coming forward with or sharing 

information that could help prevent acts of violence, there 

are widely held, though inaccurate, perceptions that these 

laws place limitations on information sharing and reporting 

that prohibit effective prevention. Moreover, fears of personal 

liability create a public reluctance to come forward with 

information in cases where indicators of potentially violent 

behavior may be present. This, coupled with concerns about 

retribution, contributes to a hesitancy to report.

There is a need to elevate awareness regarding behaviors 

indicative of potential violence, taking into account both 

individual-level characteristics and the social context in 

which subjects live, study, and work. The prevalence of 

mental health issues among perpetrators, as well as relatives’ 

and friends’ reluctance and resistance to report suspicious 

or potentially threatening behavior, are areas that must 

inform future dialogue on prevention. The misperceptions of 

limitations imposed by laws such as HIPAA, FERPA, and the 

Privacy Act, as well as public reluctance to report, are further 

barriers that require clarification as experts develop practical 

strategies to address this alarming national crisis.
Framing the Summit Recommendations 9

Framing the Summit 

Recommendations 

Academic perspectives and summit 

discussions point to the need to foster

a cultural shift away from stigmatizing 

the need for mental health care and 

to focus on overcoming challenges 

associated with reporting suspicious 

and potentially threatening behavior. 

The participants’ conversations 

were informed by the definitional 

framework the summit planners 

created to convey the essential, 

nonlinear components of multiple 

casualty violence prevention:

Figure 1. Components of Multiple Casualty Violence 

Prevention

Source: The FLETC, JHU, and the COPS Office

Identification. The process of 

recognizing that an actor poses a 

possible threat of violent conduct.

Notification. Providing information 

to an appropriate authority (someone 

with actionable responsibility) 

regarding a possible threat.

Evaluation. The analysis and 

determination of threat credibility 

(this includes the capacity and 

capability to conduct an act of 

violence).

Intervention. The deliberate 

interruption of the planning phase 

of a multiple casualty shooting event (the planning phase is 

comprised of the stages of escalation toward a violent act).

Documentation and Dissemination. Documentation is the 

written record of all activities involved in the intervention, 

including related activities that preceded or followed the 

intervention; dissemination is the sharing of documentation 

and all relevant information across multidisciplinary and 

jurisdictional boundaries in accordance with applicable laws.

In addition, the Young Adult Panel created a platform for 

dialogue particularly focused on improving the ability 

of governmental and non-governmental institutions and 

professions to identify potential perpetrators, provide the 

necessary mental health services to individuals in need of 

them, ensure a safe and effective infrastructure for reporting 

suspicious activity, and shifting social values toward the 

acceptability of reporting loved ones and friends. 

The young adult panelists emphasized the value of school 

resource officers (SRO), citing them as likely avenues for 

reporting information about specific behavior, particularly 

when given opportunities to do so anonymously. Specifically, 
10 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

some indicated that the SRO would be the first person they 

would tell if they saw something suspicious, adding that the 

SRO might help them determine if a situation has risen to a 

level warranting intervention. In the context of prevention, 

SROs represent opportunities for identifying credible threats 

due to their frequent interactions with students and the 

resultant potential to identify students exhibiting potentially 

troubling behavior.

The participants’ discussions about these definitions 

informed and impelled identifying current best practices, 

gaps in current strategies, and recommended solutions for 

improving prevention that focused on four key issues:24

▪ Focus on prevention approaches and the role of multiple 

disciplines in the essential, nonlinear components of the 

prevention process, including identification of potential 

threats; notification protocols, processes, and procedures; 

evaluation strategies; pre-incident interventions to 

interrupt planning and preparations; and documentation 

of pre-incident activities, along with the appropriate 

collection, storage, and dissemination of those documents.

▪ Create intolerance for inaction. Promote a shift in cultural 

and social values that makes potentially violent behavior 

unacceptable and fosters a more engaged public that is 

increasingly willing to report it.

▪ Target services to provide or expand mental health and 

social services to communities.

▪ Emphasize that although the familial bond can 

interrupt the escalation toward violence, it can also be 

an impediment to prevention due to family members’ 

reluctance to report potentially violent behavior. 

24. See Appendix G for a summary of participants’ refinement of the definitional framework summit planners provided. 

The data collected resulted in eight recommendations 

for action in preventing multiple casualty shootings (see 

the “Summit Recommendations” section). The five-part 

definitional framework and the Young Adult Panel provided 

common points of reference that informed the delegates’ 

discussions and the emergent recommendations.
Summit Recommendations 11

Summit 

Recommendations 

The data collected during the summit point toward two 

major categories of recommendations for action on the 

part of government agencies and other institutions in the 

prevention of multiple casualty violence. One set focuses on 

the various institutions that are positioned to help prevent 

future incidents and specifically how they can work together 

more effectively to this end. The second set centers on the 

subject, or potential perpetrator, and specifically improving 

the community’s ability to recognize and report potentially 

threatening behavior. Both involve maintaining a multidisciplinary approach through increased collaboration across 

professions.

Institutions-focused 

1. Maintain a multidisciplinary focus on preventing 

escalation toward a violent act.

Summit participants widely acknowledged that a 

multidisciplinary approach is necessary to prevent future 

multiple casualty shootings. While the law enforcement 

community has developed tactical solutions for responding 

to events, a broader base of professions and the public 

must be engaged in preventing multiple casualty violence. 

Representatives from each field participating in the summit 

provided examples of existing practices25 that have been used 

in preventing violent acts. The most effective preventative 

strategies will emerge when these efforts are coordinated, 

synthesized as appropriate, and adapted to meet others’ 

needs. This approach should include creating avenues for 

networking and sharing information across disciplines, 

such as the collaborative website established by JHU-PSL for 

compiling reports and other documents related to preventing 

multiple casualty violence. 

25. Although this report does not name specific models discussed during the summit 

to protect the anonymity of the summit participants, future summits will explore effective 

interdisciplinary models designed to prevent multiple casualty violence.

2. Identify and promote the use of interdisciplinary models 

designed to prevent multiple casualty incidents through 

threat assessment and intervention.

Summit participants discussed existing models designed to 

connect the various parties positioned to help prevent future 

multiple casualty incidents through threat assessment and 

intervention. They articulated the value of identifying and 

cataloging existing effective models and disseminating best 

practices for adaptation and use in communities throughout 

the United States. These models include collaborative 

mechanisms for effective identification of potential threats; 

notification protocols, processes, and procedures; evaluation 

strategies; pre-incident interventions to interrupt planning 

and preparations; and documentation of pre-incident 

activities, along with the appropriate collection, storage, and 

dissemination of those documents. 

Summit participants referenced numerous examples of 

threat assessment models, such as college and university 

approaches that bring together faculty, staff, and students 

to assess student behavior and threat potential and law 

enforcement approaches that coordinate communications 

with other professional communities such as education 

and mental health. Interdisciplinary, whole community 

models should include law enforcement (at all levels 

of government), educators, school counselors, medical 

and mental health professionals, sociologists, attorneys, 

academics and researchers, community leaders, clergy, 

private security, etc. 

3. Develop a public service campaign with a focus on the 

identification and notification of potential threats to begin a 

cultural shift toward the acceptability of reporting. 

While research and progress continue in developing 

strategies to prevent multiple casualty shooting events, a 

more immediate measure is required to increase the public’s 

willingness and ability to report potentially dangerous 

activity. Summit participants recommended developing a 

public service campaign, similar to the DHS “See Something, 

Say Something” initiative, with the purpose of educating 

the public on identifying suspicious behavior and potential 

threats. This campaign should aim to foster a culture of 

intolerance toward acts of violence, acceptability of reporting 
12 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

(even by family members and friends), and accessibility 

to mechanisms both for reporting threats and for treating 

potential violent subjects in instances of valid threats. The 

intended change in social values mimics that which has been 

accomplished with initiatives such as anti-drunk driving, 

anti-smoking, anti-bullying, and seatbelt safety campaigns. 

While these campaigns have been effective, the results of 

this proposed awareness campaign may not be immediately 

realized. Cultural shifts take time; however, the campaign 

should begin in earnest.

An additional component of this campaign should include 

a brief, publicly accessible, and easily consumable awareness 

piece on immediate steps individuals should take if 

confronted with an active shooter situation. While seemingly 

tangential to preventing incidents before they reach the point 

of violence, preparing the public to minimize casualties is 

a critical component of overall prevention and is an area in 

which opportunities to save lives abound. Inculcating into 

the public what to do if an incident does occur instills a shift 

in the public from the mindset of a panicked victim to a 

reasoned reaction in the event of a crisis. While different in 

content to the overall prevention awareness campaign, this 

is an essential part of the comprehensive cultural shift that 

must occur.

4. Better educate health care practitioners; school 

administrators, faculty, and staff; and law enforcement 

professionals about the Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights 

and Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act to alleviate 

misperceptions or perceived barriers to sharing information 

across disciplines. 

Summit participants articulated existing confusion 

among practitioners regarding what constitutes protected 

information and what may be readily provided to law 

enforcement without a subpoena. Consequently, they 

recommended better educating the health care, educational, 

and law enforcement communities about HIPAA, FERPA, 

and the Privacy Act to alleviate misperceptions or perceived 

barriers to sharing information across disciplines. Strategies 

for accomplishing this recommendation include increasing 

awareness of misconceptions, providing training to pertinent 

professional communities, and disseminating information 

through professional organizations and journals. 

5. Draft a model statute establishing affirmative requirements 

for pertinent professions to report bona fide indicators of 

potentially violent behavior. 

The summit discussions revealed the need to create 

a stronger infrastructure for reporting suspicious or 

potentially threatening behavior. Participants observed such 

opportunities in the creation of a model law establishing 

affirmative requirements for pertinent professions, such 

as law enforcement officers, medical practitioners, and 

educators, to report bona fide threatening behavior. The goal 

of this law would be similar to that which was accomplished 

with compulsory reporting requirements in cases of child 

abuse.

Subject-focused

6. Use technology to create a mechanism for anonymously 

reporting indicators of potentially violent behavior and 

sending alerts about incidents.

To facilitate anonymous reporting of suspicious behavior 

and potential threats, summit participants recommended 

leveraging social media in the development of technological 

tools such as mobile phone applications. These could serve to 

enhance both reporting of threats and sending public alerts 

during incidents. 

With the proliferation of cellphone applications, participants 

suggested that mobile phone providers create a free, 

mandatory application for all smart phones sold in the 

United States, configured in a manner that prevents the 

application from being deleted or disabled and allows the 

reporting of suspicious activity to local law enforcement. 

The application might be in the form of a template that 

could send anonymous information as a text message to law 

enforcement. 

In addition, participants noted that a free smart phone 

application could be developed that alerts students, 

workers, and the public of threatening conditions in a 

particular community. Beyond applicability to multiple 

casualty shooting events, this could enable transmission of 

information during all-hazards situations.
Summit Recommendations 13

7. Enhance existing resources to develop a national, 

searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining 

to individual behavior that is indicative of escalation toward 

a violent act, and facilitate the sharing of such information 

across jurisdictional boundaries.

Summit participants recommended developing a national, 

searchable database of information/intelligence pertaining 

to pre-incident indicators and threats that is available 

to professionals involved in prevention activities across 

jurisdictional lines, within the boundaries of applicable 

privacy laws. 

Numerous searchable databases exist at both the state and 

national levels which may be adapted to include criteria 

for potential multiple casualty shooters. For example, the 

National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) 

determines eligibility to purchase firearms. The current 

system uses criminal convictions to determine if a person 

is denied the purchase of a firearm and currently includes 

checks for court-ordered committals and convictions based 

on insanity pleas. The NICS could be adapted to include 

information on mental health dispositions, significant 

medication treatments, etc., enhancing the reliability and 

effectiveness of the NICS check. Implementing the use 

or reform of such a database for the purpose of sharing 

information would need to address potential barriers related 

to particular professionals accessing the system and inputting 

pertinent information. 

In addition, an entity such as fusion centers should be 

charged with analyzing and synthesizing information 

relevant to preventing multiple casualty acts of violence. 

Fusion centers are operated by state and local entities with 

the support of federal partners and serve as focal points 

for receiving, analyzing, gathering, and sharing threatrelated information among various levels of government 

and private sector partners. Summit participants suggested 

fusion centers could fill this role because they are already 

established and have the ability to disseminate information to 

partner organizations and could serve as conduits for sharing 

information pertaining to specific individuals.

8. Draft a model statute providing limited liability for 

citizens who report indicators of potentially violent behavior. 

To encourage reporting by the public, a model statute 

should be drafted that provides limited liability for citizens 

reporting potentially violent behavior. It would establish 

a qualified immunity from civil actions for defamation. 

The goal is to increase the collective willingness to report 

suspicious or potentially violent behavior. 
14 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Next Steps 

Incidents such as those addressed at this summit are 

anomalies for most emergency responders, educators, 

mental health practitioners, and others directly involved in 

response and prevention, as well as for the public at large. 

Therefore, deterring such violence will require a shift in the 

national mindset from one of intense reaction immediately 

following tragedies to one of sustained capacity-building for 

prevention. 

To continue advancing the national dialogue begun during 

the summit, one or more follow-up summits are anticipated 

to address the recommendations identified in this report. 

Future discussions will focus on which entities should take 

the lead on particular recommendations, as ownership 

is unclear. Additional topics for examination will likely 

include gaps identified during the initial summit, such as 

further definition of school resource officers’ roles in threat 

assessment and private security entities’ roles in preventing 

incidents. 

The eight recommendations that emerged during the first 

summit centered on the need to develop a strategic approach 

to information-sharing for preventing multiple casualty 

violence. Consequently, future areas for exploration include 

educating the various disciplines and the public about how 

to identify behavior indicative of potential violence and how 

to notify appropriate parties when such behavior is observed. 

There is also a need to identify effective interdisciplinary 

models designed to prevent multiple casualty violence, 

and to develop technological avenues for obtaining and 

sharing information pertaining to potential threats across 

jurisdictional boundaries. Finally, further attention is needed 

on the various legal issues involved in sharing information, 

such as alleviating misperceptions about limits imposed by 

existing laws and developing model statutes to protect those 

who report and to facilitate reporting by those in pertinent 

professions. A final publication, consolidating themes and 

recommendations from future summits and meetings, will 

be completed and disseminated among stakeholders. 

In the days immediately following the shooting in the 

Century movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, the FLETC, the 

COPS Office, and JHU-PSL began a partnership committed 

to advancing a national dialogue and developing actionable 

recommendations to prevent such horrific acts of violence in 

society. The shock average Americans experienced, that they 

may not be safe engaging in typical recreational activities like 

going to the movies, instilled an urgency to act that became 

all the more powerful only one day following the summit’s 

conclusion when parents became fearful of sending their 

young children to school. The summit partners remain 

committed to engaging the various professional disciplines 

through which joint efforts will promote solutions that keep 

the nation’s communities safe. 
Appendix A: Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings 15

Appendix A: 

Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings

This matrix contains examples of the kinds of multiple 

casualty violent incidents addressed in this report. While 

not intended to be exhaustive, FLETC staff has attempted 

to compile information on as many incidents as possible 

to provide an overview of the substance and scope of 

multiple casualty violence in the United States.

2012 December 14

Location Sandy Hook Elementary School, Newton, CT 

 Casualties 27 fatalities 2 injured 29 total

Perpetrator Adam Lanza 20 years old Committed suicide at the scene

Description	 Lanza	first	shot	and	killed	his	mother	and	then	proceeded	to	do	the	same	to	20	schoolchildren	and	six	

school	faculty	members	before	taking	his	own	life	at	Sandy	Hook	Elementary	School.	Lanza	had	a	history	

of	mental	illness	and	was	known	to	be	uncomfortable	in	social	situations.	 	

2012 December 11

Location Clackamas Town Center, Clackamas County, OR 

Casualties 2 fatalities 1 injured 3 total

Perpetrator Jacob Tyler Roberts 22 years old Committed suicide at the scene

Description	 Roberts	ran	into	a	shopping	center	wearing	tactical	clothing	and	a	white	hockey	mask	and	fired	randomly	

at	customers	and	employees	with	an	AR-15	rifle.	He	fatally	wounded	two	people	and	seriously	injured	one	

before	committing	suicide.	Family	and	friends	of	Roberts	offered	no	explanations	regarding	what	motivated	

him	to	commit	murder.	Days	beforehand,	he	sold	all	his	possessions	and	was	supposed	to	be	moving	to	

Hawaii	but	missed	his	flight.	

2012 August 31

Location Pathmark, Old Bridge, NJ 

Casualties 2 fatalities 0 injured 2 total

 Perpetrator Terrence Tyler 23 years old Committed suicide at the scene

Description	 Tyler,	a	former	marine	with	mental	health	problems,	had	only	been	working	at	the	Pathmark	for	a	couple	

weeks	when	he	got	into	an	argument	with	a	coworker,	left	the	store,	and	retrieved	an	AK-47	from	his	car.	

Employees	who	saw	him	retrieve	the	gun	locked	the	supermarket	door.	He	shot	out	the	windows,	went	

inside,	and	killed	two	people	before	committing	suicide.	
16 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

2012 August 5

Location Sikh Temple of Wisconsin, Oak Creek, WI 

Casualties		 6	fatalities	 4	injured	 10 total

Perpetrator	 Wade	Michael	Page	 40	years	old	 Shot by police; committed suicide at the scene

Description	 Page	opened	fire	at	a	Sikh	temple,	killing	four	people	inside	and	two	outside	with	a	9-mm	semi-automatic	

pistol.	After	responding	police	shot	him,	Page	committed	suicide.	An	Army	veteran,	Page	had	ties	to	White	

supremacy	and	neo-Nazi	groups.		 	

2012 July 20

Location Century movie theater, Aurora, CO 

Casualties		 12	fatalities	 58	injured	 70 total

Perpetrator	 James	Eagan	Holmes	 24	years	old	 Arrested at the scene

Description	 During	a	midnight	screening	of	the	Batman	film	The Dark Knight Rises,	Holmes,	dressed	in	tactical	

clothing,	set	off	teargas	grenades	and	shot	into	the	audience	with	multiple	firearms.	Minutes	later,	

responding	police	arrested	Holmes	outside	the	theater.		

2012 May 30

Location Café Racer, Seattle, WA

Casualties		 5	fatalities	 1	injured	 6 total

Perpetrator	 Ian	Stawicki		 40	years	old	 Committed suicide later

Description	 Stawicki	shot	and	killed	four	patrons	and	wounded	the	chef	at	Café	Racer	in	Seattle,	Washington.	He	then	

killed	another	woman	next	to	Town	Hall,	Seattle’s	community	cultural	center.	He	later	committed	suicide	

when	police	found	him	following	a	citywide	manhunt.	 	

2012 April 2

Location Oikos University, Oakland, CA 

Casualties 7 fatalities 3 injured 10 total

Perpetrator	 One	L.	Goh	 43	years	old	 Arrested soon afterward

Description Goh	went	to	Oikos	to	find	the	administrator	who	had	denied	him	a	prorated	$6,000	tuition	fee	reversal	

after	he	decided	to	leave	the	nursing	program.	Unable	to	find	her,	Goh	opened	fire	at	random,	killing	six	

students	and	a	receptionist	with	a	.45	caliber	semi-automatic	pistol.	He	surrendered	an	hour	later	at	a	

nearby	supermarket.		

2011 October 12

Location Salon Meritage, Seal Beach, CA 

Casualties		 8	fatalities	 1	injured	 9 total

Perpetrator	 Scott	Evans	Dekraai	 41	years	old	 Arrested a few blocks away

Description	 Dekraai	sought	to	kill	his	ex-wife,	with	whom	he	was	fighting	a	custody	battle,	when	he	entered	a	hair	salon	

and	began	shooting,	killing	her	and	seven	others	at	random	and	injuring	one.	This	incident	is	also	referred	

to	as	the	Seal	Beach	shooting.	
Appendix A: Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings 17

2012 September 6

Location IHOP, Carson City, NV 

 Casualties		 4	fatalities	 7	injured	 11 total

 Perpetrator	 Eduardo	Sencion	 32	years	old	 Attempted suicide at the scene; died in a hospital

 Description	 Sencion,	using	a	weapon	similar	to	an	AK-47,	opened	fire	inside	an	IHOP,	shooting	11	people,	including	

five	National	Guardsmen.	Of	the	four	killed,	three	were	uniformed	National	Guardsmen	and	one	a	civilian	

woman.	When	Sencion	was	a	teenager,	doctors	diagnosed	him	with	paranoid	schizophrenia.		 	

2011 January 8

 Location Constituents meeting at Safeway, Tucson, AZ 

 Casualties 6 fatalities 13 injured 19 total

 Perpetrator Jared Lee Loughner 22 years old Arrested at the scene

 Description	 Prior	to	the	shooting,	an	Arizona	Game	and	Fish	Department	officer	stopped	Loughner	for	running	a	red	

light	but	let	him	go	with	a	warning	to	drive	carefully.	Loughner	then	took	a	taxi	to	a	supermarket	where	U.S.	

Representative	Gabrielle	Giffords	was	holding	a	constituents	meeting.	Loughner,	who	was	diagnosed	with	

schizophrenia,	opened	fire	on	Giffords	and	numerous	bystanders,	killing	six	people	and	injuring	13	others.	

2009 November 5

 Location Fort Hood, Fort Hood, TX 

 Casualties 13 fatalities 32 injured 45 total

 Perpetrator	 Nidal	Hasan		 39	years	old Shot and arrested at the scene

Description	 Hasan,	a	U.S.	Army	psychiatrist,	began	shooting	people	at	random	at	Fort	Hood	with	two	handguns,	killing	

13	and	wounding	32	more,	less	than	a	month	before	he	would	have	deployed	to	Iraq	or	Afghanistan.	

2009 August 4

 Location LA Fitness, Collier Township, Bridgeville, PA 

 Casualties 	 3	fatalities	 9	injured	 12 total

 Perpetrator	 George	A.	Sodini	 48	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 The	2009	Collier	Township	shooting,	also	known	as	the	2009	Bridgeville	LA	Fitness	shooting,	took	place	

in	a	fitness	health	club.	After	turning	off	the	lights	in	a	dance	class,	Sodini	killed	three	and	wounded	nine	

other	people	before	taking	his	own	life.	Over	a	nine-month	period,	Sodini	had	chronicled	his	rejections	by	

women	in	an	online	diary,	his	severe	sexual	frustration,	and	his	plans	to	carry	out	the	attack.	 	
18 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

2009 April 3

Location American Civic Association, Binghamton, NY 

Casualties		 13	fatalities	 4	injured	 17 total

 Perpetrator	 Jiverly	Antares	Wong		 41	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

	 (aka	Jiverly	Voong)	

 Description	 Wong,	a	naturalized	immigrant,	walked	into	the	American	Civic	Association	immigration	center	and	began	

shooting	with	a	9-mm	Beretta	and	.45-caliber	Springfield,	beginning	with	two	receptionists	and	then	

firing	on	an	English	as	a	Second	Language	class.	A	day	after	the	incident,	a	package	containing	photos	of	

Wong	and	a	rambling	note	arrived	at	a	news	station,	sent	by	Wong.	This	incident	is	also	referred	to	as	the	

Binghamton	shootings.	

2009 March 29

 Location Pinelake Health and Rehab, Carthage, NC 

 Casualties 	 8	fatalities	 2	injured	 10 total

 Perpetrator	 Robert	Kenneth	Wayne	Stewart	 45	years	old	 Arrested at the scene

 Description	 Just	before	10:00	AM,	Stewart	arrived	at	the	nursing	home	where	his	estranged	ex-wife,	his	apparent	

main	target,	worked.	He	began	firing	randomly	at	people,	killing	eight	and	wounding	two	before	a	

responding	police	officer	shot	and	apprehended	him.	Stewart’s	ex-wife	survived	the	shooting	by	hiding	in	a	

passcode-protected	location.	This	incident	is	also	referred	to	as	the	Carthage	nursing	home	shooting.	

2009 March 10

 Location Geneva County (Kinston, Samson, and Geneva), AL 

Casualties 10 fatalities 6 injured 16 total

 Perpetrator	 Michael	Kenneth	McLendon	 28	years	old	 Committed suicide

 Description	 McLendon	killed	his	mother,	set	the	house	on	fire,	and	then	went	to	a	relative’s	trailer	where	he	killed	four	

more	family	members.	He	also	killed	the	wife	and	child	of	the	sheriff’s	deputy	who	lived	nearby.	He	then	

killed	a	pedestrian	alongside	the	road	and	a	customer	inside	a	local	gas	station.	McLendon	drove	away	

from	the	gas	station,	firing	at	cars	while	driving	on	a	highway.	He	then	killed	a	man	who	was	attempting	to	

subdue	him	and	fired	at	officers	in	front	of	a	Geneva	metal	products	plant	in	which	he	previously	worked.	

He	then	went	inside	and	killed	himself.		 	

2008 February 14

 Location North Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 

 Casualties 	 5	fatalities	 21	injured	 26 total

 Perpetrator	 Steven	Kazmierczak	 27	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Kazmierczak,	who	had	been	treated	for	mental	health	problems,	entered	an	auditorium	and	opened	fire	

at	students	and	the	instructor	from	the	stage.	He	then	proceeded	to	walk	up	the	aisle,	shooting	students	

who	were	hiding	and	unable	to	escape.	He	killed	five	people	and	injured	21	before	committing	suicide.	
Appendix A: Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings 19

2008 February 7

 Location Kirkwood City Hall, Kirkwood, MO 

 Casualties 6 fatalities 1 injured 7 total

 Perpetrator	 Charles	Lee	Thornton	 52	years	old	 Killed by police at the scene

 Description	 Thornton	shot	a	police	officer	with	a	revolver	and	took	the	officer’s	handgun	before	entering	City	Hall	

located	across	the	street.	Thornton	reached	council	chambers	with	these	two	weapons	shortly	after	a	

meeting	began.	There	he	shot	a	police	officer,	the	public	works	director,	two	council	members,	the	mayor,	

and	a	reporter.	In	total,	he	killed	five	people	and	wounded	two	others.	The	mayor	died	months	later	from	

the	injuries	he	received	during	the	shooting.	This	incident	is	also	referred	to	as	the	Kirkwood	City	Council	

shooting.	 	

2007 December 5

 Location Westroads Mall, Omaha, NE 

Casualties 	 8	fatalities	 6	injured	 14 total

 Perpetrator	 Robert	A.	Hawkins	 19	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 After	leaving	a	suicide	note,	Hawkins	entered	a	mall	in	Omaha,	Nebraska,	and	shot	and	killed	eight	people,	

injured	six	others,	and	then	killed	himself	within	six	minutes.	He	had	been	hospitalized	twice	at	psychiatric	

institutions	and	diagnosed	with	oppositional	defiant	disorder	and	had	parent-child	relationship	problems.	

2007 April 16

Location Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 

 Casualties 32 fatalities 23 injured 55 total

 Perpetrator	 Seung-Hui	Cho	 23	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 On	the	campus	of	the	Virginia	Polytechnic	Institute	and	State	University,	Cho	killed	two	students	in	a	

dormitory	and	then	crossed	campus	to	an	academic	building	where	he	opened	fire	on	students	and	faculty,	

killing	30	more	people	and	wounding	many	others.	He	committed	suicide	when	police	officers	entered	the	

part	of	the	building	where	Cho	was	located.	Cho	had	been	treated	as	an	outpatient	for	mental	illness.	

2007 February 12

 Location Trolley Square, Salt Lake City, UT 

 Casualties 	 5	fatalities	 4	injured	 9 total

 Perpetrator	 Sulejman	Talović	 18	years	old	 Killed by police at the scene

 Description	 Talović,	an	18-year-old	with	a	history	of	minor	juvenile	incidents,	dropped	out	of	high	school	and	had	been	

living	with	his	mother.	Talović	began	shooting	people	with	a	shotgun	and	handgun	in	a	shopping	area,	

killing	five	people	and	wounding	four	others.	An	off-duty	police	officer	killed	Talović	in	a	store,	preventing	

further	bloodshed.	 	
20 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

2006 October 2

 Location West Nickel Mines School, Lancaster County, PA 

 Casualties 	 5	fatalities	 5	injured	 10 total

 Perpetrator Charles Carl Roberts IV 32 years old Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Roberts	entered	the	one-room	Amish	school	with	a	Springfield	XD	9-mm	handgun,	12-gauge	shotgun,	

.30-06	bolt-action	rifle,	600	rounds	of	ammunition,	a	stun	gun,	two	knives,	and	a	box	containing	household	

tools.	He	barricaded	the	doors,	bound	the	hostages,	and	then	lined	them	against	a	chalkboard.	He	

released	all	of	the	male	students	and	adults	but	not	the	10	female	students,	killing	five	of	them	and	

wounding	the	remaining	five	before	killing	himself.		 	

2006 March 25

 Location Capitol Hill neighborhood, Seattle, WA 

 Casualties 6 fatalities 2 injured 8 total

 Perpetrator	 Kyle	Aaron	Huff	 28	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Huff	attended	a	quiet,	after-rave	house	party	that	lasted	throughout	the	night.	He	then	opened	fire	at	7:00	

the	following	morning,	killing	six	and	wounding	2	of	the	30	people	in	the	house.	Huff	then	turned	the	gun	

on	himself	after	police	confronted	him	on	the	front	porch.	This	incident	is	also	referred	to	as	the	Capitol	Hill	

massacre.		 	

2005 March 21

 Location Red Lake, MN 

 Casualties		 9	fatalities	 5	injured	 14 total

 Perpetrator Jeff Weise 16 years old Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Weise	killed	his	grandfather	and	grandfather’s	girlfriend	before	going	to	his	high	school	and	killing	a	

security	guard,	a	teacher,	and	five	students	and	injuring	five	others.	He	then	committed	suicide.	Another	

student,	Louis	Jourdain,	was	arrested	one	week	after	the	shootings	and	charged	with	conspiracy	to	commit	

murder	based	on	several	e-mail	messages	he	exchanged	with	Weise.	The	charges	were	dropped,	but	

Jourdain	pleaded	guilty	to	sending	threatening	messages	via	the	Internet;	however,	because	he	was	a	

juvenile,	Jourdain’s	sentence	was	not	disclosed.	 	

2005 March 12

Location Living Church of God, Brookfield, WI 

Casualties		 7	fatalities	 4	injured	 11 total

Perpetrator	 Terry	Michael	Ratzmann	 44	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 After	Ratzmann	left	the	Sheraton	Hotel	in	which	a	minister	of	the	Living	Church	of	God	was	giving	a	

sermon,	he	returned	20	minutes	later	carrying	a	9-mm	handgun.	He	opened	fire	on	the	congregation,	

killing	the	minister	and	six	others	and	wounding	four	more	before	he	killed	himself.	The	minister	reportedly	

had	given	a	sermon	two	weeks	earlier	that	infuriated	Ratzmann,	who	had	suffered	from	depression.	

However,	police	have	not	determined	whether	these	factors	contributed	to	the	murders.		 	
Appendix A: Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings 21

2002 February 10

Location Midtown Manhattan, New York, NY, and Garfield, NJ 

 Casualties 	 2	fatality	 25	injured	 27 total

 Perpetrator	 Ronald	J.	Popadich	 39	years	old	 Arrested later

 Description	 Popadich	shot	a	woman	who	had	rejected	his	sexual	advances	and	later	died	from	her	wound.	Two	days	

afterward,	he	injured	18	people,	one	of	whom	also	died	later,	in	a	hit-and-run	spree	in	Midtown	Manhattan.	

The	next	day,	Popadich	shot	and	injured	a	cabdriver.	On	the	third	day,	he	hijacked	a	car	from	a	woman	at	

gunpoint	and	returned	to	Manhattan,	injuring	seven	more	people	in	another	hit-and-run	spree.	Bergen	

County	authorities	arrested	Popadich	at	his	Garfield,	NJ,	home	less	than	two	hours	later.	He	lived	with	his	

widowed	mother	and	was	unemployed.	Neighbors	recalled	typically	seeing	him	alone.	 	

2001 April 14

 Location JB’s Pub, Elgin, IL 

 Casualties 2 fatalities 16 injured 18 total

 Perpetrator	 Luther	V.	Casteel	 42	years	old	 Arrested at the scene

Description	 Removed	from	a	bar	for	harassing	female	customers,	Casteel	shaved	his	hair	into	a	Mohawk,	changed	into	

fatigues,	and	returned	to	the	bar,	opening	fire	on	a	crowd	of	200	and	killing	two	before	customers	subdued	

him	until	the	police	arrived.	He	was	carrying	two	handguns,	two	shotguns,	and	200	rounds	of	ammunition.	

Casteel	had	previously	served	13	years	in	prison	for	armed	robbery.		 	

1999 September 15

 Location Wedgewood Baptist Church, Forth Worth, TX 

 Casualties 7 fatalities 7 injured 14 total

Perpetrator	 Larry	Gene	Ashbrook	 47	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Ashbrook,	whom	his	family	described	as	a	paranoid	schizophrenic,	interrupted	a	teen	prayer	rally	at	a	

church	and	spouted	anti-Baptist	rhetoric	before	opening	fire	with	a	9-mm	semi-automatic	and	.380-caliber	

handgun.	Ashbrook	killed	seven	people,	four	of	whom	were	teenagers,	and	wounded	seven	others.	

1999 April 20

 Location Columbine High School, Columbine, CO 

 Casualties 	 13	fatalities	 24	injured	 37 total

 Perpetrator	 Eric	Harris	 18	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

	 Dylan	Klebold	 17	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Harris	and	Klebold	had	been	arrested	for	theft	and	trespassing,	and	Harris	had	received	anger	

management	treatment.	Although	they	appeared	apologetic,	the	two	were	enraged,	created	a	hit	list,	

and	collected	guns.	Armed	with	shotguns,	semi-automatic	weapons,	and	bombs,	they	arrived	at	their	

high	school	and	fatally	shot	12	classmates	and	one	teacher	before	both	committed	suicide.	Most	of	their	

bombs	placed	in	the	cafeteria	and	other	locations	failed	to	detonate.	 	
22 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

1998 March 24

Location Westside Middle School, Jonesboro, AR 

Casualties 	 5	fatalities	 10	injured	 15 total

Perpetrator	 Andrew	Golden	 11	years	old		 Arrested at the scene

 Mitchell Johnson 13 years old Arrested at the scene

Description	 Golden	and	Johnson	loaded	Golden’s	mother’s	van	with	camping	gear	and	weapons,	including	semiautomatic	rifles	they	stole	from	his	grandfather	the	night	before,	and	drove	to	Westside	Middle	School.	

Golden	pulled	the	fire	alarm	and	then	joined	Johnson	in	the	woods	outside	of	the	school.	When	children	

and	teachers	filed	out	of	the	building,	the	boys	opened	fire,	killing	four	female	students	and	one	teacher	

and	wounding	10	others.	Golden	and	Johnson	attempted	to	run	back	to	the	van	and	escape,	but	police	

captured	them.	Each	was	released	from	prison	when	he	turned	21	years	old.	 	

1994 June 20

 Location Fairchild Air Force Base, Fairchild, WA 

 Casualties 	 4	fatalities	 23	injured	 27 total

 Perpetrator	 Dean	Mellberg	 20	years	old	 Killed by police at the scene

 Description	 Using	an	MAK-90	assault	rifle,	Mellberg	sought	out,	shot,	and	killed	his	psychiatrist	and	a	psychologist	

whose	observations	caused	Mellberg	to	be	discharged	from	the	Air	Force.	He	then	proceeded	to	walk	

through	the	hallways	and	cafeteria	of	the	hospital,	shooting	adults	and	children	alike	and	killing	an	8-yearold	girl.	He	then	went	to	the	parking	lot	where	he	killed	a	woman.	While	Mellberg	chased	another	potential	

victim	around	the	parking	lot,	a	military	police	officer	shot	and	killed	him.		 	

1993 December 7

 Location Long Island Rail Road, Garden City, NY 

 Casualties 	 6	fatalities	 19	injured	 25 total

 Perpetrator	 Colin	Ferguson	 35	years	old	 Arrested at the scene

 Description	 Ferguson,	whom	doctors	diagnosed	as	paranoid	and	delusional,	opened	fire	on	a	Long	Island	commuter	

train	in	Garden	City,	New	York,	killing	six	people	and	injuring	19	others.	While	he	was	reloading	his	gun	for	

the	third	time,	passengers	tackled	Ferguson	and	held	him	down	until	the	police	arrived.	 	

1993 August 6

 Location Luigi’s restaurant, Fayetteville, NC 

Casualties 	 4	fatalities	 6	injured	 10 total

 Perpetrator	 Kenneth	Junior	French	 22	years	old	 Shot by police; arrested at the scene

 Description	 French,	armed	with	two	shotguns	and	a	.22-caliber	rifle,	entered	Luigi’s	restaurant	at	approximately	

10:00	PM	and	opened	fire,	killing	the	restaurant’s	two	elderly	owners	and	two	patrons	and	injuring	six	

others.	Witness	stated	that	French	was	ranting	about	President	Clinton	and	“gays	in	the	military”	during	

the	shooting,	but	the	location	and	victims	of	French’s	attack	seem	to	have	been	randomly	chosen.	An	offduty	police	officer	who	was	working	nearby	stopped	French	by	shooting	him.	Other	officers	who	arrived	on	

the	scene	were	able	to	arrest	French.		 	
Appendix A: Matrix of U.S. Multiple Casualty Shootings 23

1991 October 16

 Location Luby’s Cafeteria, Killeen, TX 

 Casualties 23 fatalities 20 injured 43 total

 Perpetrator	 George	Pierre	Hennard	 35	years	old	 Shot by police; committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Hennard,	an	unemployed	former	merchant	seaman,	drove	his	pickup	truck	through	the	front	window	of	

Luby’s	Cafeteria	and	then	opened	fire	with	a	Glock	17	pistol	and	a	Ruger	P89.	Of	the	80	patrons	in	the	

restaurant,	Hennard	killed	23	people	and	wounded	20	others	before	responding	officers	shot	Hennard	and	

he	committed	suicide.		

1989 January 17

 Location Cleveland Elementary School, Stockton, CA 

 Casualties 	 5	fatalities	 30	injured	 35 total

 Perpetrator	 Patrick	Purdy	 24	years	old	 Committed suicide at the scene

 Description	 Purdy,	who	had	a	long	criminal	history,	opened	fire	on	the	playground	of	a	school	he	attended	as	a	child,	

killing	five	schoolchildren	and	wounding	29	others	and	one	teacher	with	an	AK-47	rifle	before	committing	

suicide.	Purdy	was	described	in	a	police	report	two	years	earlier	as	having	a	mild	intellectual	disability.		

1987 April 23

 Location Palm Bay, FL 

 Casualties 	 6	fatalities	 14	injured	 20 total

 Perpetrator	 William	Bryan	Cruse	Jr.	 60	years	old	 Arrested at the scene

 Description	 The	shooting	spree	began	at	6:00	PM	in	front	of	Cruse’s	home	when	he	ran	after	two	teenagers	who	had	

cut	through	his	yard.	He	shot	a	kid	across	the	street,	wounding	him,	before	driving	to	two	shopping	centers	

where	he	fired	into	various	stores,	killing	four	people	and	two	responding	officers.	More	people	were	

wounded	from	gunfire	as	well	as	from	the	panic	and	confusion	of	events.	Cruse	took	three	hostages	at	the	

Winn-Dixie	supermarket	but	let	the	two	women	go.	The	remaining	hostage,	a	man,	either	escaped	or	Cruse	

let	him	go.	The	police	forced	Cruse	out	with	tear	gas	and	a	flash	device	and	arrested	him.	 	

1985 October 30

 Location Springfield Mall, Springfield, PA 

 Casualties 3 fatalities 7 injured 10 total

 Perpetrator	 Sylvia	Seegrist	 25	years	old Arrested at the scene

 Description	 Diagnosed	10	years	earlier	with	paranoid	schizophrenia,	Seegrist	opened	fire	in	the	parking	lot	of	a	

Springfield	shopping	mall	and	then	went	inside	to	continue,	killing	a	two-year-old	child	and	two	men	and	

wounding	seven	others.	A	shopper	managed	to	disarm	and	subdue	Seegrist	who	was	then	handcuffed	

by	a	security	guard.	She	is	currently	incarcerated.	Pior	to	the	event,	Seegirst’s	parents	had	tried	to	find	a	

residential	mental	health	program	because	they	believed	she	was	dangerous	and	needed	to	remain	in	

treatment.		 	
24 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

1984 July 18

Location McDonald’s, San Ysidro, CA 

 Casualties 	 21	fatalities	 19	injured	 40 total

 Perpetrator	 James	Oliver	Huberty	 41	years	old	 Killed by police at the scene

 Description	 Huberty,	an	unemployed	former	security	guard,	began	firing	his	guns	in	a	McDonald’s	parking	lot	where	he	

shot	three	children.	He	then	entered	the	restaurant,	told	everyone	to	get	down,	and	proceeded	to	kill	

customers	and	employees.	Within	an	hour,	he	had	killed	21	people	and	wounded	19	others	with	a	9-mm	

Uzi	semi-automatic	rifle,	a	Winchester	12-gauge	shotgun,	and	a	9-mm	Browning	HP	handgun.	His	assault	

ended	when	a	SWAT	team	sniper	shot	and	killed	Huberty.	 	

1949 September 6

 Location Camden, NJ 

 Casualties 13 fatalities 3 injured 16 total

 Perpetrator	 Howard	Unruh	 28	years	old Arrested soon afterward

 Description	 After	spending	an	evening	at	the	movies,	Unruh,	who	would	later	be	diagnosed	a	paranoid	schizophrenic,	

came	home	to	find	his	gate	was	stolen.	He	awoke	the	next	morning,	put	on	his	best	suit,	and	began	

walking	through	his	neighborhood	intent	on	killing	as	many	people	as	he	could	with	a	9-mm	German	Luger	

pistol.	Within	20	minutes,	he	killed	13	people	whose	ages	ranged	from	2	to	68	and	wounded	3	others.	

When	he	heard	police	sirens,	he	returned	home	where	police	arrested	him.	Found	insane,	Unruh	was	

detained	without	trial.	After	60	years	of	confinement	at	Trenton	Psychiatric	Hospital,	Unruh	died	in	2009.	

This	incident	came	to	be	known	as	“The	Walk	of	Death.”	 	
Appendix B: Pre-Event Survey 25

Appendix B: 

Pre-Event Survey

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings, co‐sponsored by the Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and Johns Hopkins University. This 

survey will serve as a mechanism to query participants’ perceptions of the current state of capabilities and competencies, across 

multiple domains within a community, to identify and interrupt a potential multiple casualty shooting event. 

Results of the survey will be used during the meeting to facilitate dialogue among the working groups and will not be used 

outside of the summit. Your participation is voluntary, and you can skip any question that you do not wish to answer. Please 

return your completed survey in the self‐addressed envelope by December 1, 2012. 

Instructions: Please circle your level of agreement to each of the following questions:

Strongly Strongly

disagree Disagree Neutral Agree agree

1. The possibility of a multiple casualty shooting is a 

significant threat to any community. 1 2 3 4 5

2. Current efforts to identify individuals who present a 

credible threat of violence are effective. 1 2 3 4 5

3. Efforts should be made to develop a uniform method of 

documenting the interruption of a potential act of violence. 1 2 3 4 5

4. There are recognizable characteristics of an actor that 

indicate a potential threat of violence. 1 2 3 4 5

5. There are adequate processes in place for reporting and/

or evaluating behavioral change in:

a. Public schools (K–12) 1 2 3 4 5

b. Private schools (K–12) 1 2 3 4 5

c. Colleges and universities 1 2 3 4 5

d. The workplace 1 2 3 4 5

e. The community 1 2 3 4 5

6. Current privacy protections deter the reporting of 

suspicious activity. 1 2 3 4 5

7. Concerns over potential lawsuits deter individuals from 

reporting an aberrant change in behavior in others. 1 2 3 4 5

8. Social media is a useful tool for identifying potential 

threats to an individual or community. 1 2 3 4 5

9. There should be a queriable, national repository for 

documentation related to threats of violence. 1 2 3 4 5

10. There is a value to multidisciplinary collaboration in the 

disruption of a potential violent act. 1 2 3 4 5
26 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Strongly Strongly

disagree Disagree Neutral Agree agree

11. The following authorities have a responsibility to evaluate 

and intervene when notified of a possible threat:

a. School principal 1 2 3 4 5

b. University administrator 1 2 3 4 5

c. Teacher 1 2 3 4 5

d. Mental health provider 1 2 3 4 5

e. Medical professional 1 2 3 4 5

f. Law enforcement 1 2 3 4 5

g. Facility security at workplace 1 2 3 4 5

h. Supervisor/human resources 1 2 3 4 5

i. Community leader 1 2 3 4 5

j. Legal professional 1 2 3 4 5

k. Clergy/religious leader 1 2 3 4 5
Appendix C: Young Adult Panel Summary 27

Appendix C: 

Young Adult Panel Summary

At the opening session of the summit, a panel of 10 young 

adults from between the ages of 16 and 21 assembled to 

take part in a facilitated discussion on the topic of multiple 

casualty violence and the impact of social media. The 

comments and responses from these young adults helped 

to inform the summit participants’ discussions, particularly 

as they related to this generation’s willingness to report 

information on potentially violent behavior.

These young adults were asked a series of questions and 

had opportunities to comment on others’ opinions. The 

following are the questions and synopses of the responses:

Q. What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think 

of a mass casualty event?

Most of the young adults agreed that their first thoughts 

were of people who have problems and don’t tell anyone 

about them.

Q. How would you like to get information about this issue 

out to people in your age group?

All of the students agreed that social networking sites would 

be the most expedient method to disseminate information 

to people in their age group. They also believe that a young 

person persistently posting about guns would be a sign 

for concern. There was also agreement that people rarely 

see posts about guns; more often they see depression posts 

(posting emotions is popular), which should be taken as a 

sign. Finally, they feel that social networking gets the word 

out quickly because it spreads through word of mouth once 

one person sees it.

Q. If social networking can be effective at identifying 

patterns of behavior, should the person who recognized the 

concerning behavior provide or seek help? 

The students believe that subjects exhibiting concerning 

behavior will not necessarily be truthful in the public arena 

once they have gained attention. A person who identified 

concerning behavior has to take action in private if he or she 

has a personal relationship with that subject.

Q. Can you identify behaviors that would make you nervous 

enough to report it?

The observations of the students were that they could always 

tell who was emotionally unstable; that individual always 

went to the school counselor. These firsthand observations in 

school settings provided the impression of concern; however, 

there was a reluctance to call the police unless the scale of 

depression was sufficiently high. 

Q. How would you best make that call?

Some students stated they would get in touch with the 

individual’s friends because they have the relationship with 

the person; however, if the individual was their friend, they 

would address the issue head-on. There was also a sentiment 

that people who did see something on Facebook wouldn’t 

call the police. However, every school has police on campus 

(colleges/universities), and people can stop by their office to 

report the suspicion without blowing it out of proportion. 

In all cases, the students indicated they would want to 

remain anonymous if they contacted the authorities. The 

students also believed that many people sending a message to 

authorities about an individual’s behavior would have greater 

credibility and thus greater impact. 

Q. What would make a number of people contact the 

authorities?

There needs to be a program in place that would alert the 

professionals; certain trigger words would cause the alert.

Whatever system is used, it must be easy. There also needs to 

be guidelines for reporting so the system is not abused. An 

important factor is that the message gets to a person of trust 

and authority.

Q. If there were an interactive system in place to report/

receive information, how should it be presented to you?

There needs to be an app for smartphones that is a 

mandatory installation, and free, so everyone will have access 

to it. A similar system should be in place that interfaces with 

all social networking sites.

Q. What would cause you to report a family member?

Most of the students responded that they would not report 

a family member to the police. One student did state 

that people reach a point where they feel they can’t help 

anymore, so they report the family member in an effort to 

get him or her help.
28 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Appendix D: 

Research Questions Posed 

to Summit Participants

Day	One	–	Session	I

Session Goal: To gain a better understating of the definitions 

outlined for this summit from the position of experts 

Groups were provided the following definitions: 

Identification. The process of recognizing that an actor 

poses a possible threat of violent conduct.

Notification. Providing information to an appropriate 

authority regarding a possible threat.

Evaluation. The analysis and determination of threat 

credibility.

Intervention. The deliberate interruption of the planning 

phase of a multiple casualty shooting event.

Documentation and Dissemination. Documentation

is the written record of all activities involved in the 

intervention; dissemination is the sharing of documentation 

and all relevant information across multidisciplinary and 

jurisdictional boundaries in accordance with applicable laws.

A term was assigned to each of the four groups, so that each 

term received sufficient coverage. If time permitted, the 

other terms were to be discussed as well. The groups were 

asked to address the following questions in reference to their 

specific terms:

1. Can/should this definition be broadened?

2. What is being done in our respective professions with 

regard to identification?

3. How does the process of identifying a possible threat of 

violent conduct occur in our respective professions?

a. Moderator Probe: Is there a difference in the 

identification process when a person is in a profession 

that requires mandatory reporting of a potential threat?

4. Is formal training provided on the topic of identifying an 

actor who poses such a threat?

a. Moderator Probes: How frequently is this training is 

provided? Should other members of an organization 

(e.g., school, workplace, or hospital) receive similar 

training?

Day	One	–	Session	II

Session Goal: To reach consensus on common themes and 

definitions associated with the prevention of multiple 

casualty shootings

Groups were provided lists of the terms covered during 

Session 1 in different orders and were asked to discuss the 

following questions for each term in the order provided, 

ensuring sufficient coverage of each term among summit 

participants collectively: 

1. Can/should any of these definitions be broadened?

a. Moderator Note: The group should have clear direction 

that this discussion should go beyond the report out 

for the morning session.

2. What is being done in our respective professions with 

regard to these elements of prevention?

Day	Two	–	Session	I

Session Goal: To understand existing capabilities for 

interrupting a potential violent threat within a community

Groups were provided lists of the terms covered during 

previous sessions in different orders and were asked to 

discuss the following questions for each term in the order 

provided, ensuring sufficient coverage of each term among 

summit participants collectively: 

1. Based on the conversation yesterday, what is currently 

done with regard to these elements of prevention?

2. What can be done to strengthen these capabilities?

3. What are the impediments to these elements of 

prevention?
Appendix E: Attendees and Support Personnel 29

Day	Two	–	Session	II

Session Goal: To establish a baseline understanding of 

competencies regarding violence prevention, and to identify 

knowledge gaps regarding the identification, notification, 

evaluation, intervention, documentation, and dissemination 

of information for addressing threats of violence

Groups were provided lists of the terms covered during 

previous sessions in different orders and were asked to 

discuss the following questions for each term in the order 

provided, ensuring sufficient coverage of each term among 

summit participants collectively: 

1. What best practices exist within your profession with 

regard to these elements of prevention?

a. Moderator Probes: Focus group discussion on 

competencies within each profession. For example, 

how are “best practices” determined within each 

profession? Where do you look to identify “best 

practices”?

2. Can/should these best practices serve to inform other 

disciplines (e.g., law enforcement, education, and mental 

health professionals)?

Appendix E: 

Attendees and 

Support Personnel

Participants 

Michael Berkow, J.D., M.S.

Director, Coast Guard Investigative Service,

U.S. Coast Guard

Commander James Cannon, MBA, M.S., DHA, PA-C

Director (Chief); Medical Administration; Health, Safety, 

Work-Life Service Center; U.S. Coast Guard

Jay Corzine, Ph.D. 

Professor of Sociology, University of Central Florida

Major Gene Deisinger, Ph.D.i

Deputy Chief of Police, Operations Division, 

and Director, Threat Management Services, 

Virginia Tech Police Department, 

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

John Edwardsii

Chief of Police, Oak Creek (Wisconsin) Police Department

Rod Ellis

Chief of Police, Glynn County (Georgia) School Police

(Summit K-12 School Resource Officer representative)

Anastasia Ford, M.S.

Manager, Corporate Security, The Home Depot RDC

Ken Furlongiii

Sheriff, Carson City (Nevada) Sheriff’s Office

Robert S. Hauck, M.S.

Chief of Police, Tomball (Texas) Police Department

Ken Hohenberg

Chief of Police, 

Kennewick (Washington) Police Department

Lin Huff-Corzine, Ph.D.

Professor of Sociology, University of Central Florida

John Jarvis, Ph.D.

Chief Research Psychologist, Behavioral Science Unit, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michelle Keeney, J.D., Ph.D.

Chief Research Psychologist, National Threat Assessment, 

U.S. Secret Service
30 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

David McArdle, M.D.

Board-Certified Emergency Physician and Clinical 

Associate Professor, Department of Emergency Medicine, 

Georgia Health Sciences University

Phyllis McDonald, Ed.D.

Associate Professor, Division of Public Safety Leadership, 

School of Education, Johns Hopkins University

James L. Meyerhoff, M.D.

Adjunct Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Georgetown 

University School of Medicine

Bryan Sipe

Director and Chief of Police, Campus Safety Department, 

College of Coastal Georgia

Darrel Stephensiv

Instructor, Division of Public Safety Leadership, 

School of Education, Johns Hopkins University;

Executive Director, Major City Chiefs Association;

& Former-Chief of Police, Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North 

Carolina) Police Department

Lieutenant Chrystal Tibbs, M.S.

Visiting Fellow, Research Division, International 

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP);

& Commander, Homeland Security Division / Joint 

Analysis Intelligence Center, Prince George’s County 

(Maryland) Police Department

Lieutenant Don Tuten, M.A.

Commanding Officer, Intelligence and Homeland Security 

Units, Jacksonville (Florida) Sheriff’s Office

Joseph Wolf, M.S.

Director of Training, Albuquerque (New Mexico) Police 

Department;

& Former-Director, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement Academy

Todd Wuestewald, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of 

Oklahoma;

& Former-Chief of Police, Broken Arrow (Oklahoma) 

Police Department

Technical Advisors

Jeffrey Blumberg, J.D., M.A.

Director, Compliance Branch, Office for Civil Rights and 

Civil Liberties, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Charles G. Kels, J.D. 

Attorney-Advisor, Office of Health Affairs, Office of the 

General Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(HIPPA subject-matter expert)

Steven McDonald, J.D.

General Counsel, Rhode Island School of Design

(FERPA subject-matter expert)

Moderators

Richard Clark, M.S.

Executive Director, Nevada Commission on Peace Officers 

Standards and Training;

 & First Immediate Past-President, International 

Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards 

and Training (IADLEST)

Ron Dionne

Chief, Training Innovation Division, Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center

Bryan Lemons, J.D., MPA

Deputy Assistant Director, Administration Directorate, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Kirt Rothe, MPA

Chief, Behavioral Instructional Methodologies Branch, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Terry Stuart, MPAcc

Director, National Criminal Investigation Training 

Academy, Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation 

Division
Appendix E: Attendees and Support Personnel 31

Facilitators

Sheldon Greenberg, Ph.D.

Associate Dean, Division of Public Safety Leadership, 

School of Education, Johns Hopkins University

Michael Hanneld, J.D.

Assistant Director, Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center

John Paparazzo, MSM

Assistant Director for Training and Technical Support, 

Division of Public Safety Leadership, School of Education, 

Johns Hopkins University

Research Staff

Christine Eith, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, Division of Public Safety Leadership, 

School of Education, Johns Hopkins University

William A. Norris, Ph.D.

Chief, Training Research Office, Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center

Resource Staff

Steve Argiriou, J.D.

Senior Policy and Projects Analyst, Glynco Training 

Directorate, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Valerie Atkins, M.S. 

Deputy Assistant Director, Glynco Training Directorate, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Barry Bratburd

Senior Policy Analyst, Office of Community Oriented 

Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice

David Brunjes, J.D.

Chief Counsel, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Charlsetta Glover

Management Analyst, Glynco Training Directorate, Federal 

Law Enforcement Training Center

Ariana Roddini

Chief, Behavioral Science Division, Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center

Margaret Sullivan

Public Affairs Specialist, Protocol and Communications 

Office, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Jennifer Tocco, MPA, M.Ed. 

Management and Program Analyst, Office of the Director, 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

i. Experience with multiple shooting incident at Virginia Tech

ii. Experience with multiple shootings incident at Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin

iii. Experience with multiple shootings incident at IHOP in Carson City, Nevada

iv. Experience with multiple shootings incident in St. Petersburg, Florida
32 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

Appendix F: 

Technical Advisors’ Briefing

During the summit, a number of technical 

advisors attended, who represented areas 

of expertise that could help inform the 

participants on matters such as the Health 

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 

(HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and 

Privacy Act (FERPA), and the Privacy Act. The 

following is a synopsis of the presentation 

they provided.

FERPA	

FERPA is a federal statute that protects student “education 

records,” broadly defined to include almost any record 

that an educational institution maintains that contains 

personally identifiable information about one or more of its 

current or former students. The basic rule of FERPA is also 

quite broad: In general, an institution may not disclose an 

education record, or information from an education record, 

to anyone other than the student him- or herself without 

the student’s written consent. Nevertheless, FERPA is not a 

significant impediment in this context because of a number 

of limitations and exceptions it contains:

▪ FERPA is a records statute. It applies only to records and 

information from records, not to information generally. 

Thus, at least as far as FERPA is concerned, there is no 

restriction on the disclosure of personal, eyewitness 

knowledge.

▪ FERPA also does not apply to records that do not fall 

within its definition. Thus, records that do not contain 

personally identifiable information about students, or from 

which such information has been redacted, may be shared 

freely. In addition, the definition of “education records” 

contains a specific carve-out for “law enforcement unit 

records,” which therefore also may be shared freely even if 

they do contain personally identifiable information about 

students. For purposes of FERPA, “law enforcement unit 

records” are records that are created by an institution’s 

law enforcement unit (whether commissioned police or 

noncommissioned security), created at least in part for a 

law enforcement purpose (even if also created in part for 

internal discipline or other purposes), and maintained by 

that unit (copies shared with other offices are considered 

“education records,” but the law enforcement unit’s copies 

remain free of FERPA’s nondisclosure restriction).
Appendix F: Technical Advisors’ Briefing 33

▪ Finally, FERPA contains a number of policy-based 

exceptions to the nondisclosure requirement, several 

of which are particularly important and useful in this 

context:

— An institution is free to share with its own law 

enforcement unit, its behavioral intervention team, its 

counseling office, and any other unit or employee any 

education records that will help that unit or employee 

to perform its institutional function.

— When an institution has a good faith reason to believe 

(measured against whatever information is available 

to it at the time, not what is available in hindsight) 

that there is a significant threat to the health or safety 

of a student or others, it may share “appropriate” 

information with “appropriate” parties (defined as 

what and who reasonably appear to be necessary to 

help deal with the perceived threat). In guidance, 

the Family Policy Compliance Office, the office 

with the Department of Education that oversees and 

enforces FERPA, has specifically stated that external 

law enforcement, mental health professionals, parents, 

and potential victims, among others, generally will 

qualify as “appropriate” parties, and that “FERPA is not 

intended to be an obstacle in addressing emergencies 

and protecting the safety of students.”

— Institutions may share any and all education records 

and information from them with the parents of 

“dependent” students (as measured by federal tax law).

— Institutions may share relevant records and information 

about their students, including disciplinary records, 

with other institutions to which the students are 

seeking to transfer or in which they are now enrolled.

— Institutions may disclose to anyone the “final results” 

of a disciplinary hearing in which it finds a student in 

violation of an institutional rule for conduct that would 

constitute a crime of violence. “Final results” is defined 

to include the name of the student found in violation, 

the violation that was found to have occurred, and the 

sanction imposed. 

— FERPA does not protect education records from 

disclosure pursuant to a court order or lawfully issued 

judicial or administrative subpoena. In general, the 

institution must first give the student reasonable 

advance notice before complying, so that the student 

may object, but FERPA does not provide a substantive 

basis for objection. However, in the case of grand jury 

or other law enforcement subpoenas, an institution 

is not required to give such notice if the subpoena 

instructs the institution not to do so.

Note, however, that all of these disclosures are optional 

under FERPA; they give institutions the right, but not the 

obligation, to disclose in the specified circumstances. While 

institutions generally want to do the right thing, they are 

by their nature skeptical and so will not necessarily accept 

an unexplained and unsupported assertion of an emergency 

uncritically. Those seeking information under any of these 

exceptions will likely need to make their case. Perhaps the 

best way to smooth the path is to reach out to relevant 

campus officials, discuss your respective interests and needs, 

and work on building trust and relationships before any 

emergency arises.

Civil Rights/Civil Liberties 

Balancing civil rights with security can be difficult during 

hard times. But the protection of civil rights always needs 

to be considered—doing so in difficult times is what makes 

the United States the great country that it is. We always need 

to consider how we communicate with the public when 

seeking information and should not stereotype or profile 

in relation to beliefs, ideologies, religion, or ethnicity. 

Rather, we should look for indicators of violence. Civil 

rights should always be stressed during any situation when 

asking the public to provide information about a threat. 

Whether the information coming in is factual always needs 

to be considered, as well as how it could affect the person 

identified as a potential threat. 
34 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

HIPAA	

The privacy regulations promulgated pursuant to the HIPAA 

Privacy Rule set national standards for the protection of 

certain health information. The current Privacy Rule is in its 

second iteration, dated 2002; a new final rule published on 

January 25, 2013, becomes effective on March 26, 2013. 

The Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities,” which include 

health care clearing houses, health plans, and health care 

providers who transmit health information in an electronic 

fashion in connection with certain transactions. The Privacy 

Rule governs protected health information (PHI), which 

comprises individually identifiable health information held 

or transmitted in any form by a covered entity or its business 

associate. 

As a general rule, covered entities may not use or disclose 

PHI except for specifically permitted purposes. Covered 

entities may generally use or disclose PHI for treatment, 

payment, or health care operations. The Privacy Rule lists 12 

purposes for which covered entities may use or disclose PHI 

without an individual’s authorization or permission. Among 

those purposes are (1) law enforcement under specified 

conditions, including in response to a law enforcement 

official’s request for information about a victim or suspected 

victim of a crime, and (2) a serious threat to health or safety, 

as when the covered entity believes the disclosure of PHI 

is necessary to mitigate a serious and imminent threat to a 

person or the public. 

Disclosures made without an individual’s authorization or 

permission must be accounted for by the covered entity 

for six years; however, law enforcement may request that 

accounting be temporarily suspended if it would likely 

impede an investigation. Such disclosures are also subject 

to the “minimum necessary” rule, which requires covered 

entities to endeavor to disclose only the minimum amount 

of PHI needed to accomplish the specific purpose of the 

disclosure. 

Pointers and takeaways include the following: 

1. The Privacy Rule excludes from its coverage education 

records or treatment records covered by FERPA. 

2. The Privacy Rule establishes a ceiling, not a floor; more 

restrictive state laws may still apply. 

3. When law enforcement requests PHI under the specified 

provision, the best practice is to ask for the entire health 

record only if that is actually the “minimum necessary” 

amount of PHI required for the investigation or other 

legitimate purpose. 

4. Law enforcement can help build rapport with covered 

entities by establishing a relationship and protocols in 

advance, and by seeking a medical expert/provider to 

walk them through only what they need to know, rather 

than making massive document requests as a matter of 

course. 

5. Keep in mind that the Privacy Rule puts the entire onus 

of compliance on the covered entity, which explains why 

there is so much fear and misconceptions associated with 

it. 

6. When approached in the right way, the Privacy Rule does 

not need to be an impediment to effective information 

sharing to protect the public’s safety.
Appendix G: Definitional Framework and Summary of Current Practices 35

Appendix G: 

Definitional Framework and 

Summary of Current Practices 

Below is a summary of the participants’ refinement of the 

definitional framework provided by the summit planners, 

as well as a brief summary of their beliefs regarding current 

practices related to these terms:

Summary	of	definitional	

framework	discussion

Identification. The process of recognizing that an actor 

poses a possible threat of violent conduct.

The identification aspect of prevention has many possible 

factors. The recognition of a change in behavior or character 

may be observed by any number of contacts. These contacts 

may range from family members, co-workers, fellow 

students, friends, neighbors, counselors, mental health 

professionals, or law enforcement personnel. Each, and all, is 

based on the level of interaction with the actor(s). Another 

aspect of these observations must be the recognition that 

being “different” or “quirky” is not a crime and alone may 

not be enough to cause alarm. A combination of factors 

should lead an observer to have concern and take the next 

step: i.e., notifying an appropriate authority.

Notification. Providing information to an appropriate 

authority (someone with actionable responsibility) 

regarding a possible threat.

Once observers identify what they believe is a reason for 

worry, they must take the next step and notify an appropriate 

authority about their concerns. Based on the connection 

between the observer and the actor, the appropriate authority 

can be different people. For example, in a school setting, 

the appropriate authority could be a counselor, principal, or 

other person in a position of responsibility. In the workplace, 

the appropriate authority could be a supervisor, a manager, a 

human resources person, or, based on the level of concern, a 

security person. In many instances, the appropriate authority 

may be the police. In situations where the actor is a family 

member, friend, or neighbor, the police are the likely first 

line of responsibility to deal with the situation. In many 

cases, the police will be notified by an appropriate authority 

to interact with an actor.

In all cases, the most important factor in reporting 

the concern is that the authority figure has actionable 

responsibility to reply to the situation. This greater level of 

responsibility ensures that the concern is acted upon and not 

simply noted.

Evaluation. The analysis and determination of threat 

credibility (this includes the capacity and capability to 

conduct an act of violence).

Many threat assessment models are successfully utilized by 

law enforcement, schools of higher education, mental health 

professionals, and the workplace. Each of these models takes 

into account a number of factors: what is the capability of 

an actor to carry out an act of violence; what is the capacity 

of an actor to carry out an act of violence; what if any 

communication has been received from the actor; what is 

the actor’s motivation to commit an act of violence; and 

what is the overall context of the threat? Numerous other 

factors are included in these assessments that are based on 

the intended target (if known) and method of violence, etc.

The goal of any assessment is to determine if the actor does 

or does not pose a threat. If a level of threat is determined, 

then the next step must be some form of intervention or 

interruption of escalation toward an act of violence. 

Intervention. The deliberate interruption of the planning 

phase of a multiple casualty shooting event (the planning 

phase is comprised of the stages of escalation toward a 

violent act).

Determining when the planning phase ends caused much 

dialog among the participants. They finally agreed that the 

planning phase continues until the point of execution. At the 

execution phase, the actor is carrying out the act of violence. 

During the planning phase, the actor is completing the 

physical elements (gathering weapons, ammunition, 

etc.), as well as the cognitive and emotional elements. The 

intervention must occur before the move from ideation to 

action. 
36 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

There are many methods of intervention, each based 

on the type of professional interaction. In the medical/

mental health profession, intervention may be diagnostic, 

medication, psychological evaluation (voluntary and 

involuntary), and long-term treatment. In school settings, 

the intervention may include school sanctions, as well as a 

referral to a law enforcement agency for assistance. Based 

on when and where the intervention occurs during the 

planning phase, mental health professionals will be involved, 

as may the police. This can be due to an emergency petition 

for psychological evaluation or crisis counseling.

Documentation and Dissemination. Documentation is the 

written record of all activities involved in the intervention, 

including related activities that preceded or followed the 

intervention; dissemination is the sharing of documentation 

and all relevant information across multidisciplinary and 

jurisdictional boundaries in accordance with applicable laws.

While the law enforcement profession documents potential 

incidents that have been prevented, other professions 

involved in the prevention do not typically contribute 

information that becomes part of this documentation. 

Comprehensive information from all involved professions 

could be used for future deterrence of multiple casualty 

acts of violence, particularly if it is disseminated across 

professions. A repository should be created for accumulating 

reports from all pertinent professions on the indicators of 

potential violence that helped prevent violent incidents with 

the intent of providing information on events, subjects, and 

methods that any jurisdiction could use to prevent a future 

event.

Summary of beliefs 

regarding practices

By and large, the summit participants agreed that the 

elements of the definitions were not necessarily individual 

actions or components to the prevention of an act of 

violence. Rather, they work in concert and are more of a 

fluid response to individual characteristics.

What is being done in the represented professions with 

regard to these elements?

Most of the represented professions believe there is some 

consistency with regard to identifying the characteristics of 

a potential multiple casualty shooter. These characteristics 

usually involve a change in personality or character that 

is observable and, therefore, actionable (from a treatment 

perspective).In law enforcement, these characteristics usually 

manifest themselves in an action that causes an intervention. 

Such actions may be threats, weapons violations, etc. In 

a school setting, the actions may be more subtle, such as 

disassociated behavior, isolation, outbursts, etc.

With regard to reporting an individual, schools seem to 

have the most consistent policies. If a student is causing 

concern over his or her behavior, counseling and/or forms 

of school sanctions are readily used. The actual interventions, 

in most cases, are left to the law enforcement professionals. 

In workplace, school, and college/university settings, the 

actual interventions are conducted by law enforcement 

personnel. There may be earlier forms of intervention, such 

as behavioral intervention teams at a university or peer 

support programs in the workplace, but most of these are 

intermediary steps. 

Is training provided in the represented professions to 

address the elements?

All of the represented professions mentioned they receive 

some form of behavioral assessment training. Obviously, 

some of the mental health professions have a greater 

level of training than other participants, but all claimed a 

level of comfort in recognizing behavioral change. Some 

professions, such as school resource officers, receive training 

in mentoring and mediating student disputes; this places 

them in a unique position to observe student behavior 

and determine changes that are unhealthy and potentially 

dangerous.
Bibliography 37

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40 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

About the 

COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

(COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department of 

Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community 

policing by the nation’s state, local, territory, and tribal 

law enforcement agencies through information and grant 

resources. 

Community policing is a philosophy that promotes 

organizational strategies that support the systematic use of 

partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively 

address the immediate conditions that give rise to public 

safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime. 

Rather than simply responding to crimes once they have 

been committed, community policing concentrates on 

preventing crime and eliminating the atmosphere of fear 

it creates. Earning the trust of the community and making 

those individuals stakeholders in their own safety enables 

law enforcement to better understand and address both the 

needs of the community and the factors that contribute to 

crime.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, territory, 

and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire and train 

community policing professionals, acquire and deploy 

cutting-edge crime fighting technologies, and develop and 

test innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also 

provides training and technical assistance to community 

members and local government leaders and all levels of law 

enforcement. The COPS Office has produced and compiled 

a broad range of information resources that can help law 

enforcement better address specific crime and operational 

issues, and help community leaders better understand how 

to work cooperatively with their law enforcement agency to 

reduce crime.

▪ Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested nearly $14 

billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s 

streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime 

prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical 

assistance to help advance community policing. 

▪ By the end of FY2011, the COPS Office has funded 

approximately 123,000 additional officers to more than 

13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies 

across the country in small and large jurisdictions alike.

▪ Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community 

members, and government leaders have been trained 

through COPS Office-funded training organizations.

▪ As of 2011, the COPS Office has distributed more than 

6.6 million topic-specific publications, training curricula, 

white papers, and resource CDs. 

COPS Office resources, covering a wide breadth of 

community policing topics—from school and campus safety 

to gang violence—are available, at no cost, through its online 

Resource Information Center at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This 

easy-to-navigate website is also the grant application portal, 

providing access to online application forms.
About the FLETC 41

About the FLETC

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), 

a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS), serves as an interagency law enforcement training 

organization for 91 federal partner agencies and also 

provides training to state, local, rural, tribal, territorial, and 

international law enforcement agencies. During FY2012, 

the FLETC trained over 69,000 students, and it has trained 

over 1,000,000 law enforcement officers and agents since 

its establishment in 1970. Its mission statement is: “We train 

those who protect our homeland.”

The FLETC is headquartered at Glynco, Georgia, near the 

port city of Brunswick, halfway between Savannah, Georgia, 

and Jacksonville, Florida. In addition to Glynco, the FLETC 

operates two other residential training centers in Artesia, 

New Mexico, and Charleston, South Carolina, as well as a 

non-residential facility in Cheltenham, Maryland. The FLETC 

also maintains an office in Orlando, Florida, which provides 

a gateway to technology and training expertise within a 

nationally recognized hub for simulation and training. 

Since 1995, the FLETC has participated in the International 

Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Program. In addition to 

providing instructors for the core and specialized programs 

at the ILEAs located in Hungary, Thailand, Botswana, and El 

Salvador, the FLETC has personnel assigned as the director 

of the ILEA in Botswana and deputy director of the ILEA in 

Thailand. 

As an interagency training organization, the FLETC’s 

staff comprises professionals from diverse backgrounds. 

Approximately half of its instructors are permanent FLETC 

employees, and the remaining half are federal officers and 

investigators on assignment from their parent organizations 

or recently retired from the field. The mix provides a balance 

of instructional experience and fresh insight.

Consolidation of law enforcement training permits the 

Federal Government to emphasize training excellence and 

cost-effectiveness. Through professional instruction and 

practical exercises, the FLETC not only prepares students 

for their law enforcement responsibilities but also affords 

opportunities to interact with students from many other 

agencies. Students become acquainted with the missions and 

duties of their colleagues, forming the foundation for a more 

cooperative law enforcement effort. Partner Organizations 

provide input regarding training issues and functional 

aspects of the FLETC, taking part in curriculum development 

and review conferences and helping to formulate policies 

and directives. Through this collaboration, the FLETC remains 

responsive to the training mission.

As the trainer of choice for federal, state, local, rural, tribal, 

territorial, and international law enforcement agencies, 

the FLETC is committed to continuously modernizing 

its training programs and facilities. Through partnerships 

with the military and cooperative agreements with the 

entertainment industry, leading technology companies, and 

academic institutions, the FLETC has become an innovator 

in the use of modeling and simulation to support law 

enforcement training. Both independently and through 

cooperative research and development agreements, the 

FLETC conducts original research to identify methods for 

offering more effective and efficient training. To support 

the training needs of today and tomorrow, the FLETC 

has recently added state-of-the-art training facilities such 

as the Counterterrorism Operations Training Facility (a 

network of various urban, suburban, rural, and intermodal 

training venues), the Simulations Laboratory, and the Cyber 

Forensics Building to support the training needs of today 

and tomorrow. The FLETC continues to invest strategically to 

meet the evolving training requirements of an increasingly 

complex law enforcement landscape. 
42 Strategic Approaches to Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence ▪ Report on the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings

About JHU-PSL

The Division of Public Safety Leadership (PSL) began 

in 1994 as the Police Executive Leadership Program 

(PELP). Dean Emeritus Stanley C. Gabor, who at the time 

led the Johns Hopkins University School of Continuing 

Studies, began this unique program, built on a demanding 

leadership, liberal arts, and humanities curriculum. 

Beginning with a single cohort of 24 police executives, PSL 

currently sponsors 15 cohort classes in multiple locations 

with a student population representing law enforcement, 

fire/EMS, emergency management, public health, transit, 

campus safety, private security, the intelligence community, 

and the military. Presently, PSL is within the Johns Hopkins 

University, School of Education, under the leadership of 

Dean David Andrews.

From its inception, PSL has been at the forefront of 

preparing current and future executives to deal successfully 

with the routine and complex issues associated with public 

safety and sustaining community well-being. To this end, the 

division provides graduate, undergraduate, and noncredit 

education designed to advance excellence in leadership. The 

division has won national awards and recognition for its 

academic programs, which include the Master of Science and 

Bachelor of Science in Management and Master of Science in 

Intelligence Analysis. The division’s faculty is highly diverse, 

with academic and professional backgrounds in business, 

philosophy, education, law enforcement, law, psychology, 

intelligence analysis, physics, and medicine.

Today, over 1,000 students representing over 50 agencies 

have graduated from these programs. PSL alumni have 

advanced to head law enforcement agencies in over 70 

jurisdictions throughout the United States. Other graduates 

have led major fire departments and become leaders in 

federal agencies, intelligence organizations, and the military.

PSL provides support and technical assistance to 

organizations nationwide, conducts research, and plays a key 

role in centers of excellence, work groups, and boards and 

commissions on behalf of federal, state, and local agencies. 

The division is home to two prestigious organizations, the 

Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) and the Maryland 

Chiefs of Police Association (MCPA).
The American public has expressed increasing alarm over incidents of multiple casualty violence. While the law 

enforcement community has progressed in advancing training in the tactical response to incidents, there are significant 

gaps in strategies aimed at preventing multiple casualty violence. To address this need, the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Center collaborated with the U.S. Department of Justice’s 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Education, Division of 

Public Safety Leadership, to facilitate the National Summit on Multiple Casualty Shootings. The summit planners invited 

subject-matters experts from a wide range of disciplines, such as law enforcement, health care, law, social sciences, 

education, and academia, to help improve the nation’s ability to prevent multiple casualty violence. The participants 

developed eight recommendations, all centered on the need to create a strategic approach to information sharing in the 

prevention of multiple casualty violence.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street, N.E.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, 

call the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

ISBN: 978-1-932582-75-8 e021311546

April 2013