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94–179PDF 2015

YEMEN UNDER ATTACK BY

IRANIAN–BACKED HOUTHIS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 14, 2015

Serial No. 114–32

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

TOM EMMER, Minnesota 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................. 8

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Gerald M. Feierstein: Prepared statement .................................. 10

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 30

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 31

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 32

(1)

YEMEN UNDER ATTACK BY

IRANIAN–BACKED HOUTHIS 

TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5 minutes, as 

soon as he shows up, each for our opening statements, I will then 

recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 minute. 

We will then hear from our witness and without objection, Mr. 

Ambassador, your prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record. Members may have 5 days in which to insert statements 

and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation and 

the rules. 

I would like to note for the record that the subcommittee invited 

the Department of Defense to send an official to testify before us 

this afternoon, but DoD stated that they were unable to participate 

at this hearing and declined to come. But we got the better of the 

deal, because we have you, Mr. Ambassador. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. On September 

10th of last year, President Obama announced to the American 

public his plan to degrade and destroy the terrorist group ISIL. 

While making his case for America’s role in the fight against ISIL, 

the President highlighted our strategy in Yemen and held it up as 

a model of success to be emulated in the fight against ISIL. Yet, 

about a week later, the Iran-backed Houthis seized control of the 

capital and the government. Despite this, the administration continued to hail our counterterror operations in Yemen as a model for 

success, even though we effectively had no partner on the ground 

since President Hadi was forced to flee. But perhaps even more astonishingly, in what could only be described as alarmingly tone 

deaf and short sighted, when Press Secretary Earnest was asked 

at a press briefing if this model was still successful after the Yemeni central Government collapsed and the U.S. withdrew all of our 

personnel including our special forces, he said yes, despite all indications pointing to the contrary. 

So where do we stand now? That is the important question. 

President Hadi was forced to flee. Saudi Arabia has led a coalition 

2

of over 10 Arab nations in Operation Decisive Storm, which so far 

has consisted of air strikes only, but very well could include ground 

forces in the near future. Iran feels emboldened in Yemen because 

of the leverage it has gained over the administration through the 

nuclear negotiations, but I commend that the Gulf countries, the 

GCC countries were taking a strong stance against Iran and stepping up to the plate in Yemen. Despite their action, the Houthis 

actually control more territory now than they did before the Saudi 

response. Our Embassy is closed. Our personnel have been evacuated and there is no Hadi government to speak of. And al-Qaeda 

in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the fighting and has capitalized on the deteriorating situation in Yemen, 

and we have very little visibility into their movements or their actions. 

I am concerned that the AQAP, the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has gained ground in eastern Yemen and has been left virtually unchecked to recruit and train. Let us not forget that it was 

AQAP that was responsible for the Paris attacks earlier this year 

or that it was al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that was responsible for overtaking a prison last month and releasing several hundreds of prisoners including a senior operative of al-Qaeda. 

AQAP’s leader is a follower of bin Laden and like bin Laden also 

seeks to strike Western targets, including right here in our homeland in the United States. 

Iran has reportedly dispatched a naval destroyer near Yemen in 

a game of chicken over one of the most important shipping routes 

in the Gulf of Aden. This area is a gateway between Europe and 

the Middle East and Iran must not be allowed to escalate any tensions or attempt to disrupt the shipping lanes. 

Yet, we continue to see the administration make the same mistakes it made in Syria. And just like in Syria, today Yemen is in 

utter chaos in large part due to Iran’s antagonism and meddling. 

But we must learn our lesson from Syria and engage in the Yemeni 

crisis head on with a comprehensive strategy before it spirals further out of control. There will be no political solution in Yemen 

based on the GCC initiative or restarting the National Dialogue 

Conference that collapsed in early 2014 without addressing the underlying issues. The Houthis were reluctant participants in the National Dialogue in Yemen, but it was clear that they had no interest in ceding power over to a centralized government. As a result, 

they withdrew from the National Dialogue. It collapsed and the 

Houthis took control of Sana’a and now other areas. So why would 

the administration think that the circumstances have changed that 

would allow for a reconciliation to occur? 

It is naive and dangerous to believe that a political solution is 

achievable as long as the Houthis are unwilling to cede their power 

and as long as Iran continues its support for these fighters, just 

like it is naive and dangerous to believe that a political solution in 

Syria is achievable as long as Assad remains in power. 

Even more absurd is the fact that Iran, just this morning, has 

allegedly proposed a peace plan for Yemen. This is the same Iran 

that continues to use its terrorism tentacles throughout the region 

to undermine U.S. interests by supplying arms and fighters aimed 

to further destabilize its neighboring countries. 

3

So today, we hope to hear from the administration that we have 

a comprehensive plan on how to get to a political solution, rather 

than just supporting a reconciliation process while also addressing 

the current gap in our intelligence and counterterror capabilities in 

Yemen, as well as the deteriorating humanitarian situation. Because if we act in Yemen in the same way that we have acted in 

Syria, then we are likely going to see the same crisis follow in 

Yemen, a war with no end in sight, the rise of dangerous terror 

groups, a dire humanitarian crisis, and Iran’s increased power grab 

in the region. 

And with that, I will go to Mr. Connolly for perhaps 1 minute 

because when Mr. Deutch comes, he will give his 5 minutes. 

Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

having the hearing. In listening to the recitation just now of what 

happened in Yemen and what happened in Syria, one would, I 

guess, infer or one is meant to infer that it is all the problem and 

result of policies pursued or not pursued by President Obama and 

his administration. Nothing could be further from the truth. 

The inherent instability in Yemen is not new and it certainly is 

not unique to the administration currently in power. Yemen is inherently unstable. It has multiple militia forces and jihadist forces 

at work. Towns have been taken and retaken and transferred. Terrorism and brutality have occurred and we may very well—there 

are movements to bifurcate the country as it once was. 

The instability in the region is not the fault or the responsibility 

of any administration. Our question really has to be how do we respond when there are no good options? So how do we do the least 

harm? How do we limit our exposure? How do we try, however indirectly, to effect outcomes positively? 

I don’t think throwing pot shots at this administration as if it 

were omnipotent on the world scene, especially in this region, is 

very helpful. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chabot of 

Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing. 

I want to say at the outset that I have an honor flight coming in 

shortly and I have somebody from Bangladesh back here, the 

speaker of the House, that I have to meet with, so I am not going 

to be able to stay for the testimony, but I will have staff here and 

I will certainly read the testimony. 

So, I was chair of this committee a while back and during that 

time, I went to Yemen, and I think Mr. Connolly is right. There 

have been problems there for years, but I would argue that they 

certainly have gotten worse under this administration and you 

know, it was this administration that claimed that Yemen was a 

success story and clearly, it has been anything but that. 

When we were on our way over there, there was a terrorist attack on a graduation at the military barracks and over 100 new 

soldiers were murdered by terrorists. So this has been going on for 

a while, but the problems in Yemen are just incredible. I think the 

thing that is particularly disturbing is the Iranian involvement 

there and around the region. Four or five capitals now in the region are controlled by the Iranians. So it is a very dangerous situaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041415\94179 SHIRL
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tion. I look forward to the testimony. Even though I won’t be here, 

I will certainly review that testimony. And thank you for being 

here, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. And good luck with 

that honor flight. It is always very emotional. And we will recognize Mr. Deutch after the 1 minute, with his consent. We will go 

to Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this important hearing, you know, another trouble spot in a region that has 

pervasive trouble. There are no good options here for the United 

States, but obviously we have a great interest in trying to influence 

stabilization in that region. So I am very curious to hear the 

thoughts of our distinguished panelists today. 

Additionally, it was announced that the U.N. Security Council 

imposed an arms embargo on the Houthi fighters bent on for control of Yemen and that resolution which is legally binding prohibits 

the sale of weapons to three named Houthi leaders, its former 

president, and his son. So I am just kind of curious as to what, if 

any, impact that resolution will have relative to the dynamic that 

is going on in Yemen right now. Thank you very much for being 

here. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, excellent question. Mr. Wilson of 

South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for leadership on this issue. 

And Ambassador, I just can’t imagine a more extraordinary time 

for you to be serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. And hey, I want you to succeed, but 

I am obviously very concerned about the Yemeni evacuation, what 

this means for the security of the United States and our allies. I 

am obviously concerned about Libya, its dissolution, the murders 

at Benghazi, with the rise of ISIL, the failure to have a status force 

agreement with Iraq which leads to destabilization of Iraq, the regime in Iran which has an ideology of death to America, death to 

Israel. That is their plan. And as they are moving ahead with nuclear capability, also building missiles to include an ICBM which 

could only be interpreted as a threat to the American people and 

American families. And then finally, of course, I am very concerned 

about chaos and civil war in Syria, the purported red line of the 

President which simply did not have any life and credibility. But 

hey, I still want you to succeed, and so I look forward to working 

with Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for your success. Thank 

you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Mr. Cicilline of 

Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Deutch for holding this very timely hearing. And thank 

you, Mr. Ambassador, for being here today. 

I think it is safe to say that the quick deterioration of the situation in Yemen took many people here in Washington by surprise. 

For many years, Yemen was held up as an example of counterterrorism cooperation and it looked as though a political agreement 

might be achieved in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. The United 

States provided approximately $900 million in foreign aid to Yemen 

5

since the transition in 2011 to support counterterrorism and political reconciliation, the economy, and humanitarian aid. 

Now we face a vastly different landscape and have to revise our 

assumptions and expectations. Furthermore, we risk being drawn 

deeply into another Iranian-backed armed conflict in the Middle 

East. 

I would particularly like to hear from the witness, you, Mr. Ambassador, how we might have better detected the oncoming Houthi 

rebellion, and what, if anything, could have been done to prevent 

it, what the U.S. role is and should be in the conflict between the 

parties in Yemen and how we are cooperating with regional partners and what the processes are for a solution to this conflict. 

I am also very concerned about the plight of civilians in one of 

the poorest countries in the world. Its fighting and political chaos 

has disrupted an already fragile economy, and prevents access to 

food, water, and medical care and I would like to hear from you 

what we are doing to alleviate the humanitarian situation. Thank 

you very much. I look forward to your testimony. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excellent questions. Thank you. Dr. Yoho 

does not need to address the panel now. So we will go to Ms. Meng 

of New York. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Chair, and Ranking Member for assembling this hearing, and our distinguished Ambassador for joining us 

here today. 

On January 21st, a fragile power-sharing deal between democratically-elected President Hadi and the Houthi rebel group in Yemen 

fell apart and the Houthis began seizing control of large portions 

of Yemen. These actions were troubling because of the Houthis’ illegal usurpation of power and their immediate dissolving of the Yemeni Parliament. Besides their complete disregard for democratic 

principles, the Houthis have very close ties to Iran which is supporting their aggression and seeking to expand its own sphere of 

influence in the Middle East. 

On March 26th, Saudi Arabia and more than 10 Arab partners 

began air strikes to weaken the Houthi stronghold and reinstate 

President Hadi to the presidency. While I am in support of Arab 

solidarity and intervention here, I am deeply concerned about the 

possibility of a large humanitarian crisis in Yemen and look forward to delving into these issues this afternoon. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Meng. Ms. Frankel of Florida. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. Ambassador, thank 

you for being here. 

We have heard some of my colleagues here describe Iran’s support for the Houthi forces as another Iranian takeover in the region. And so I am going to be—I am interested in your assessment 

of that, given that the Houthis ruled northern Yemen for nearly a 

millennium and have been seeking recourse for decades now, with 

strong ties to the former regime. So I hope that you can put Iran’s 

involvement in Yemen in this broader context, if you would, and 

just would add to the question what extent does Iran actually control events in Yemen? Is it more than funding, supplies, weapons 

or are there Iranian forces actually directing action in the country 

as we have seen in Syria and Iraq? I yield back. 

6

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Ms. 

Frankel. And we were all the warm-up group for our lead guy, Mr. 

Ted Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling today’s 

hearing and allowing us to address the recent troubling events in 

Yemen. Deputy Assistant Secretary Feierstein, welcome back. I understand you just returned from the Gulf. We look forward to hearing the administration’s assessment of the conflict, its impact on 

broader regional politics, and what role we should play going forward. 

Following the deposition of Yemen’s long time autocratic ruler 

Saleh in 2011, the U.S. supported an inclusive transition process, 

via national dialogue, into rebuilding the country’s political and 

governmental institutions and bridging gaps between groups that 

have had a long history of conflict. Yemen’s first newly-elected 

leader, President Hadi, made clear his intentions to cooperate 

closely with the United States. Hadi’s government remained a partner in counterterrorism cooperation and operations. Yemen, the 

poorest country on the peninsula, needed support from the International Community. The United States has long viewed Yemen as 

a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists and there is alarming potential 

for recruitment by terrorist groups given the dire economic conditions that they face. 

In fact, U.S. Department of Homeland Security considers alQaeda and the Arabian Peninsula the affiliate most likely, the alQaeda affiliate, most likely to attempt transnational attacks 

against the United States. 

And while the national dialogue was initially viewed as successful, the process concluded in 2014 with several key reforms still not 

completed, including the drafting of a new constitution. The Hadi 

government had continued to face deep opposition for Yemen’s 

northern tribes, mainly the Shiite Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. 

Over the past year, the Houthis in coordination with tribes and 

military units, still loyal to Saleh, began increasing their territorial 

control, eventually moving into Sana’a. Saleh had long been 

thought to have used his existing relationship to undermine the 

Hadi government. 

The Houthis are well trained, well-funded, and experienced fighters, having fought the Yemeni Government and Saudi Arabia in 

2009. 

Now much has been written by experts and analysts about how 

deep Iran’s connection to the Houthis go. Some argue it is overblown and that while the Houthis welcome Iranian support, they 

are not an Iranian proxy in the same way as Hezbollah. Others 

suggest that the United States has not in the past recognized how 

deep the level of support provided by Iran is or what Iran’s real 

motives are in supporting the Houthis. Perhaps the fullest extent 

of Iran’s involvement remains unknown, but as Secretary Kerry 

said last week, there are obviously supplies that have been coming 

from Iran, he said. There are a number of flights every single week 

that have been flying in. We trace those flights and we know this. 

We are well aware of the support that Iran has been giving to 

Yemen and Iran needs to recognize that the United States is not 

going to stand by while the region is destabilized or while people 

7

engage in overt warfare across lines, international boundaries of 

other countries. 

The most troubling question, I think to examine today, is whether the conflict in Yemen has now become a symptom of a larger 

power struggle in the Gulf. The Saudi-led military intervention is 

now in its third week. The U.S. has been providing resources in 

support to our regional partners, engaged on the ground. 

Madam Chairman, I would point out that this is yet another example of why we must act in the closest of security cooperation 

with our Gulf friends to counter all of Iran’s destabilizing activities 

in the region. And I was pleased to see reports this morning that 

indicated the United States has stepped up our support inspecting 

ships bound for Yemen in search of arms. 

Similarly, today’s 14 to nothing vote by the Security Council to 

impose an arms embargo on the Houthis is a welcome step and a 

needed show of unity from the International Community. 

Iran is, in turn, responding, sending a flotilla to the Gulf of 

Aden. And last week on social media, Iran’s Supreme Leader personally attacked Saudi Arabia and its defense ministers tweeting 

‘‘inexperienced youths have taken over the affairs of the state and 

are replacing dignity with barbarity.’’

As Members of Congress, we are often asked by our constituents 

by the U.S. should be involved in what goes on in the Middle East. 

They tell us the years of conflict won’t be solved by U.S. intervention. But Yemen is a clear example of what is in our national interest. We cannot allow groups like al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula which tried to attack the United States in 2009, in 2011, and 

in 2012, to take advantage of chaos in Yemen. We need the Yemeni 

Government that is going to be a partner in our counterterrorism 

and regional security efforts. 

And finally, the people of Yemen have long suffered under dire 

economic conditions. The population has more than quadrupled in 

the past 30 years. Conflict is only making the humanitarian situation worse. Saudi Arabia is delivering medical and humanitarian 

supplies, but it is necessary for the International Community to 

continue to support the people of Yemen. We have seen all too well 

how quickly humanitarian crises can slip from the front pages of 

our papers. 

Ambassador Feierstein, thank you again for being here. Given 

that U.S. personnel has been evacuated, we look to you to tell us 

where U.S. policy toward Yemen currently stands. Will we continue 

to see increased level of involvement in the Saudi-led intervention? 

How can the two U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to 

Saleh be enforced? And can there ultimately be a military solution 

to Yemen’s internal crisis. We look forward to your responses and 

appreciate your being here. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch, an excellent statement. 

And we are so pleased to welcome Ambassador Gerald Feierstein, 

who is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs. Previously, he served as our Ambassador to 

Yemen from 2010 to 2013, so he knows this area very well. He has 

served in several different postings throughout the Middle East, inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041415\94179 SHIRL
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cluding as Deputy Chief of Mission in Islamabad and Deputy Counsel General in Jerusalem. 

Thank you for your service, Mr. Ambassador. We look forward to 

your testimony. And may I point out your lovely fiance ́ sitting behind you. Welcome. Does she know the hours that you put in every 

day in your job? She may want to reconsider. 

Mr. Ambassador, you are on. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GERALD M. FEIERSTEIN, 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 

NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, I greatly appreciate this opportunity to come before you 

today to review recent developments in Yemen and the efforts that 

the United States is undertaking to support the Government of 

Yemen under President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Saudiled coalition of Operation Decisive Storm that is aimed at restoring 

the legitimate government and restarting the negotiations to find 

peaceful, political solutions to Yemen’s internal conflict. 

During the week of April 4th to 11th, I traveled with Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 

Emirates and Oman. As part of our consultations, we met with 

President Hadi and members of his team, the Saudi Ministers of 

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Interior, the Emirati Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as other senior Emirati officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Omani Minister of 

State for Foreign Affairs and his deputy. 

In all of these engagements, we found a broad degree of consistency in their determination to bring operation Decisive Storm to a 

rapid and successful conclusion, to establish that no party to the 

internal conflict in Yemen will be able to achieve its objectives 

through violence and coercion and to set the framework for a return to negotiations leading to a clear, verifiable commitment on 

the part of all parties to the conflict to implement agreements and 

complete the political transition on the basis of the GCC initiative, 

the conclusions of the National Dialogue Conference, and applicable U.N. Security Council resolutions. 

There was also a broad agreement among the Yemeni leadership 

and Yemen’s neighbors that Yemen should not be allowed to become a locus for foreign intervention that destabilizes Yemen or 

threatens the security and stability of Yemen’s neighbors and the 

region at large. 

Madam Chairman, as you know, the conflict in Yemen is enormously complicated and has roots that are largely parochial and locally focused. Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world with 

a long history of weak central governance, has for many years 

struggled to meet the needs of its diverse constituencies and address their grievances. Those failures of governance led to the fall 

of the previous regime in 2011. Reflecting significant engagement 

by the United States and the International Community, the GCC 

initiative was put in place to help Yemen transition to a new, more 

inclusive government that would be responsive to the needs and aspirations of all of Yemen’s communities. 

9

The tragedy of the current situation is that the political process 

that the Yemenis established in 2011 was achieving success and 

they had reason to believe that it would lead to a more open, democratic, and prosperous nation that was the goal of the Yemeni people. Regrettably, that transition has been sidetracked by the 

Houthi movement, aided and abetted by Ali Abdallah Saleh and his 

allies, who decided that they would seek to achieve by force what 

they had been unable to accomplish at the negotiating table. We 

hope that it is only a temporary delay. 

We remain deeply concerned about Iranian support for the 

Houthis’ military ambitions. To the best of our understanding, the 

Houthis are not controlled directly by Iran. However, we have seen 

in recent years significant growth and expansion of Iranian engagement with the Houthis. We believe that Iran sees opportunities 

with the Houthis to expand its influence in Yemen and threaten 

Saudi and Gulf Arab interests. 

Iran provides financial support, weapons, training, and intelligence to the Houthis. In the weeks and months since the Houthis 

entered Sana’a and forced the legitimate government first to resign 

and ultimately to flee from the capital, we have seen a significant 

expansion of Iranian involvement in Yemen’s domestic affairs. 

We are also particularly concerned about the ongoing, destabilizing role played by former President Saleh, who since his removal from power in 2011 has actively plotted to undermine President Hadi and the political transition process. Despite U.N. sanctions and international condemnation of his actions, Saleh continues to be one of the primary sources of the chaos in Yemen. We 

have been working with our Gulf partners in the international 

community to isolate him and prevent the continuation of his efforts to undermine the peaceful transition. Success in that effort 

will go a long way to helping Yemen return to a credible political 

transition process. 

Finally, the destabilizing actions of the Houthis and their allies 

have created conditions that are beneficial to AQAP. The deterioration of the political situation in Yemen has provided new openings 

for AQAP to regain the ground that is lost in recent years, owing 

to the efforts of the U.S. and Yemeni Governments to combat it. 

Only through a negotiated resolution of the ongoing political conflict can we resume the cooperation with the Government of Yemen 

to deter, defeat, and ultimately to eliminate the AQAP threat to 

Yemen, the United States, and our friends and partners around the 

world. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this 

afternoon. I look forward to answering any questions you may have 

about the situation in Yemen, and our policy responses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feierstein follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ambassador. And 

you are certainly an expert in this area. I note that it is important 

to not minimize Iran’s role in Yemen or the sectarian nature of this 

conflict, as I believe the administration seems determined to do. 

The administration has so far provided only limited logistical support to the Saudi-led coalition. We waited to give them the intelligence that they needed, for example, to know exactly where to hit. 

The administration is hoping for a political solution without also 

having our own comprehensive strategy in the region. So we are essentially outsourcing our Yemeni policy to the GCC and Iran, the 

Gulf countries. 

Are we in conversations with Iran or with Houthi rebels about 

the situation in Yemen? And what is our plan if the Houthis refuse 

to accept a political resolution? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Madam Chairman, we believe that the 

Iranians are well aware of our views and our positions on the situation in Yemen. We have been very clear in articulating that. 

As far as the Houthis are concerned, we have expressed an interest in establishing a dialogue with them, going all the way back to 

frankly the time that I was still in Sana’a. The Houthis, up until 

now, have declined the opportunity to engage with us directly. Nevertheless, we have been able to communicate with them, to pass 

messages to them through various intermediaries. And again, I believe that the Houthis are fully aware of our views and the positions that we have taken on their issues going all the way back to 

the early years of the 21st century. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. You testified that current 

conditions in Yemen are beneficial to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and that ISIL is an emerging presence in Yemen. How 

large of a presence does ISIL have in Yemen? What kind of pressure are we applying against them? And now that our Embassy is 

closed and all of our personnel have been evacuated, our intelligence capabilities have been severely restricted. What kind of intelligence can we collect without a presence in country and what 

insight do we have into the various factions? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. It is a very good question. In terms of 

ISIL, it is extremely difficult for us to have a clear picture of the 

extent to which they are a factor there. As you know, they claim 

credit for several attacks on mosques earlier this year. This was 

the first time that ISIL as an entity emerged really in Yemen. 

We would still consider AQAP to be by far the larger and more 

significant threat. We have heard some Yemenis and others speculate that what we are seeing is the return of perhaps of some Yemeni fighters who were in Syria or Iraq who have come back to 

Yemen and are now operating as ISIL, but I think of that as something that we couldn’t confirm at this point. 

In terms of the complications in our ability to have a clear picture, there is no doubt that the fact that we are not present in 

Yemen at this moment and that we aren’t able to maintain the 

level of communications and dialogue and the daily interactions 

that we were able to have with Yemeni counterparts while we were 

there and while President Hadi’s government was in place, certainly is an obstacle to our ability to continue to conduct operations. 

15

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Now State and DoD have 

provided a variety of capabilities to Yemeni security forces including some sensitive equipment such as night vision goggles. With 

the closure of our Embassy and with the relocation of Special Operation Forces from Yemen, it is much more difficult to monitor the 

use of such equipment. What do we know in the U.S. Government 

about the current status of the equipment that was previously provided to Yemen? Have they fallen into the hands of Houthis, alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or ISIL? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. We haven’t seen any direct evidence 

that those items of equipment that we have provided in the past 

have been taken by the Houthis or by other elements. There has 

been some speculation in the press, but we couldn’t confirm that. 

We don’t have any independent information. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And we have seen reports that 

coalition forces have amassed along the Saudi-Yemeni border and 

that some Saudi forces are already on the ground in Yemen. Do 

you expect to see GCC coalition ground forces in Yemen and what 

would Egypt’s role be in such an effort? What role would the 

United States play in such a scenario? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Based on the discussions that we had 

with our counterparts in Riyadh and in Abu Dhabi last week, I 

think that at this point in time what we understand is that they 

don’t have any current plans to actually have a ground presence inside of Yemen. They are, are you said, moving forces to the border. 

We believe that that is largely for defensive purposes. And they are 

clear that this is something that they would consider if they see the 

requirement. But right now, we haven’t seen anything. 

As for the Egyptian role, those discussions are ongoing and there 

have not been any commitments that we are aware of on the part 

of Egypt to participate in any kind of ground activity. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And lastly, you testified that the 

humanitarian situation was already dire in Yemen before this crisis and that malnutrition, bad sanitation, no access to water, internal displacements, are all rising internal concerns. What is the 

U.S. doing to work with Saudi and the rest of the Gulf Council nations to prioritize the transportation of water, essential food, fuel, 

and humanitarian supplies like medicine into the country and via 

air and seaports? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. One of the fundamental items in Deputy Secretary Blinken’s agenda with our partners in Riyadh and in 

Abu Dhabi was precisely to encourage them, to urge them, to ensure that humanitarian access to Yemen was possible. I think that 

the latest information that we have is that the picture has improved somewhat. It remains very serious. Nearly half of the population in Yemen right now, based on the estimates we have seen, 

is food deprived. So this is a very serious situation. 

We are doing a better job, I think, in getting some of the humanitarian supplies, not only food, but also medicines and other essentially humanitarian goods to Yemen. The internal distribution is 

extremely difficult because of the various military activities that 

are going on around the country, so the movement has become 

complicated. And probably the most significant concern that we 

have right now is the availability of fuel which is essential not only 

16

for the movement of goods and people, but also is essential in order 

to provide water and also bread because the bakeries run on propane gas and without propane, they can’t bake their bread. So this 

is having ripple effects throughout the economy and making the 

humanitarian situation that much more serious. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you again for your service, sir. 

Mr. Deutch of Florida, the ranking member, is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Feierstein, you 

mentioned you just got back from the region and you don’t think 

the Saudis this campaign as an open-ended one. Do they think 

there is a military solution? You had said they don’t have plans to 

launch a ground war. Do you envision a situation in which Saudi 

or coalition ground troops would go in? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Under the current set of circumstances, 

no. They are looking at various scenarios, but they have been very 

clear with us that that is not where they want to go. And the history in Yemen is not favorable for foreign ground forces. And I 

think that the Saudis are well aware of that. 

I do believe and based on the conversations that we have, the 

Saudis do not believe there is a military solution to this conflict. 

They understand, as we do, that ultimately the only solution is to 

bring the parties back to the negotiating table and their intent is 

to try to demonstrate through their current military activities that 

a military solution on the part of the Houthis or Ali Abdallah Saleh 

is not achievable, and therefore they need to return to negotiations. 

Mr. DEUTCH. There were two, so far anyway, two stories with respect to Iran and Yemen that have arisen today. One reports that 

Iran may be trying to send surface-to-air missiles to the Houthis 

and that the United States is stepping up our inspections to ships 

bound for Yemen. First, on that one, can we expect to see greater 

U.S. involvement as the conflict drags on? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I think that at this particular moment 

our intent is to try to support the Saudi coalition and our partners. 

And so what we are doing is aimed at empowering, facilitating, enhancing their capacity to take on this mission. 

In the situation of the shipping, we will be taking a very careful 

look at and examining very closely efforts to violate the embargo. 

Of course, we had the arms embargo that was passed today by the 

U.N. Security Council, but we also have long standing arms embargo on Iran and any effort on the part of the Iranians to export 

weapons would be a violation of other U.S. Security Council resolutions. And we will be looking at ways to ensure that that embargo 

is enforced. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And Iran allegedly released some draft of a peace 

plan today. Can you comment on that? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Well, I think that the comment we have 

on that is that it is ironic that the Iranians have put forward a 

peace plan that encompasses the four points that we were actually 

trying to implement when the Houthis, with Iranian encouragement, blocked the negotiations and created the humanitarian crisis 

that we are confronting today. And so I think from our perspective, 

if the Iranians are serious about their peace plan in the first instance they should stop sending weapons to the Houthis and they 

17

should also give their advice to the Houthis that they should be returning to the peace talks and the negotiating table. 

Mr. DEUTCH. That would be sound advice. Mr. Ambassador, has 

this become or does this risk becoming proxy war for regional influence between the Saudis and the Iranians? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I think from our perspective, I would 

say that Yemen is a unique situation for the Saudis, that this is 

on their border. It represents a threat in a way that no other situation would represent. And while, of course, there is concern in the 

Gulf and we heard from our partners in the Gulf about the situation in Syria and Iraq and also their concerns about developments 

in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, I think our sense is that 

the perception of the situation in Yemen is different and more 

threatening. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Again, my last question is what do we make of the 

Iran flotilla that has moved in? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. We are again tracking it. The Iranians, 

of course, have claimed that they are only there as part of the larger international effort to prevent piracy in the Bab al-Mandeb and 

the Red Sea. We will be keeping a careful eye on it. We also have 

significant forces in the area and we will be tracking. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. They just want to help. They are just misunderstood. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. Wilson of South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Again, thank you, Mr. Secretary, and I appreciate, 

too, you and I have something in common in that I have two sons 

who have served in Iraq. One is a physician and another is field 

artillery and I know that you have had a son serve there. And then 

with your background, what a distinguished background, and as I 

stated from the beginning, I am just so hopeful for your success because I believe, sadly, that as safe havens are created throughout 

that region and into Central Asia and North Africa, that the American people are at risk. So we want you to succeed and with that 

in mind, and you referenced that a minute ago and that is what 

impact do you believe the administration’s nuclear negotiations 

with the regime in Tehran have had with the support of the Iranian Government to be provided to the Houthis? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you very much, Congressman 

Wilson, for your kind words. In terms of the relationship or any 

correlation between the nuclear talks and the situation in Yemen 

or more broadly in the region, I think that our perspective is that 

what we have achieved by establishing the framework for an agreement that, of course, we hope is completed by the end of June, that 

this is something that will contribute to regional security and stability and that certainly one of the things that we discussed with 

our friends in the region and I think that President Obama, when 

he meets with the GCC leaders in summit in a few weeks, will also 

make clear that despite the negotiations on the nuclear account 

and despite what we hope is an agreement to block any further Iranian effort to acquire a nuclear weapon, nevertheless, the other 

concerns that we have about Iranian activities including in areas 

like Yemen have not changed and that we will continue to pursue 

18

aggressively a program of confronting and challenging any Iranian 

efforts to destabilize the region. 

Mr. WILSON. And I see, actually, a direct relationship of the negotiations and what’s going on in Yemen and that is untruthfulness. The Iranian regime has indicated that they have no presence, 

no support, no interest whatever, and then as correctly pointed out, 

an armada of ships appears off the coast. But with proven untruthfulness, I just can’t imagine that we would be placing faith in regard to their now denial of developing a nuclear capability while 

they are building a missile system. And so do you see the relationship of untruthfulness? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I think that certainly Iranian behavior 

merits very close observation and I don’t think that it is the intent 

of the administration to place any faith whatsoever in what the 

Iranians say. The important thing is to establish a very tight system of verification that would enable us to see if, in fact, the Iranians are cheating or otherwise violating the terms of any agreement that we might reach. So I don’t think there is any trust or 

faith involved in this. 

Mr. WILSON. I appreciate your concern there. And what impact 

do you believe that depletion of Yemen’s oil reserves as early as 

2017 will have on the Houthi relationship with other nations in the 

region? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Well, I think more broadly, of course, 

one of the issues and one of the things that we as the United 

States were working on, along with our international partners, was 

the effort to try to provide Yemen with a foundation for economic 

development. We recognize that it is the failure of the government 

to provide for its people, the failure to provide any kind of economic 

horizon or any optimism for the future is feeding into these issues, 

not only with the Houthis, but with AQAP and other violent extremist organizations. And so one of the things, as we go forward, 

not only to try to resolve some of the outstanding political issues, 

but also to work on these economic issues and to provide for our 

future. Having spent 3 years in Yemen, I can say that I was always 

optimistic that given an opportunity, Yemen could actually develop 

and provide for its people economically. Unfortunately, the political 

situation, the security situation, have undermined their ability and 

our ability to really build that kind of a future. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I appreciate your service there. I know it must 

be very distressing to you to see the current condition, but your 

service means a lot to the American people. Thank you, and I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Wilson, and thank you to 

your family for the valuable contribution to keeping our homeland 

safe. Thank you. Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Ambassador. First, I would like to ask you as much as you can 

share in an open setting, would you speak to how the current conflict has impacted our counterterrorism efforts within Yemen? You 

mentioned in your opening remarks that AQAP is taking advantage of this opportunity and my question really is do we have in 

place an alternative counterterrorism plan that will continue to disrupt AQAP and ISIS operations? What is the relationship of these 

19

three groups on the ground? Are they coordinating? But during this 

period of unrest, how are we protecting American security interests? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. It is a challenge. And certainly in the 

efforts that we have been making over the past several years with 

the support of President Hadi and his government, a lot of our cooperation or a lot of our effort was dependent on the cooperation 

that we were receiving from the Yemenis and that really enabled 

and expanded our ability to act effectively against violent extremist 

organizations. That, of course, both because we are not physically 

present in Yemen right now and because of the overall collapse of 

the Government of Yemen, that kind of cooperation is no longer 

viable, at least for the moment. 

What we are trying to do, of course, is that to the extent possible, 

we will continue to use our own independent means to gather intelligence and to try to understand what is happening in Yemen, but 

it is not as effective or efficient as it would otherwise be. And so 

our effort is really as part of a return to a political negotiation and 

hopefully the restoration of a legitimate government in Sana’a to 

be able to resume the kind of cooperation that we had earlier on. 

In terms of the interactions of the various extremist organizations, it is very difficult to say. We really don’t have much of an 

understanding of ISIL or what their relationships are, who they 

are. It is possible, of course, that they are simply people who are 

using that name because they believe it adds a certain amount of 

veracity to what they are trying to do. So in the absence again of 

any kind of presence on the ground or ability to really collect intelligence, it is difficult to say. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And Mr. Feierstein, in light of the current situation in Yemen, are there any changes that need to be made to the 

administration’s FY 16 request for Yemen to reflect these realities 

or to reflect an adjustment in the policy goals for Yemen? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. It is something that we are looking at 

and I think that we will adjust. I mean, obviously, our hope would 

be that if we can get the situation stabilized and get the political 

process going again, that we would be able to return and that we 

would be able to continue implementing the kinds of programs that 

we were trying to achieve that are aimed at economic growth and 

development as well as supporting democratic governance and the 

opportunity to try to build solid, political foundations for the society. At this particular moment, we can’t do that, but it is hard to 

predict where we might be in 6 months or 9 months from now. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, and Mr. Feierstein, my final question 

is the United Nations reports that Yemen relies on imports for 90 

percent of its staple food and we can surmise that as a result of 

the conflict that there will be disruption and obviously the World 

Food Program reports that 10 million people, 42.5 percent of the 

population were already unable to meet their basic food needs. So 

would you speak a little bit about what we are doing, what the 

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is doing to ensure that the food is getting 

to the right places, that the transportation is being permitted, that 

medicine is getting in and also are we tracking it? Do we have 

some oversight to be sure that it is actually getting to the people 

20

who need it because this has all the makings of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Yes, sir. And again, I think, one, of 

course, the United States is and has been traditionally the largest 

donor to World Food Program, UNICEF, other international organizations that are providing humanitarian relief to the Yemeni people and will continue to do that. There has not been any interruption in our support for humanitarian assistance. 

Secretary Blinken, during this visit to Riyadh and to Abu Dhabi, 

had at the top of his agenda urging our partners in the Gulf to ensure that they made accommodations to allow for humanitarian relief supplies to reach Yemen. And our understanding from what we 

are seeing over these last several days is that, in fact, the flow of 

humanitarian goods into Yemen has improved. Two ships carrying 

wheat have arrived at Yemeni ports. ICRC and Me ́decins Sans 

Frontie`res and UNICEF have been able to get relief supplies in by 

both ship and plane over the last several days. And so we are seeing improvements on that side, but the internal distribution, as you 

pointed out, the internal distribution remains problematic. 

Understand that, for example, truck drivers are very concerned, 

unwilling to move because of the fighting in the country. There are 

fuel shortages that complicate that. And so internally, we are still 

seeing difficulties getting the necessary supplies to the right places. 

It is something that we are discussing with our partners in the humanitarian community and we will see if we can improve it. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I yield back, Madam 

Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ambassador, is it 

Feierstein or Feierstein? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I say Feierstein. My parents said 

Feierstein. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, good. I am satisfying both of you. What warning 

signs were there present prior to the fall of the Hadi government? 

What did we see? Did we know this was coming or was this kind 

of out of the blue? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. The situation with the Houthis has 

been complicated for a long period of time and we have been in a 

situation when we had the initial uprising, the political uprising in 

2011 and ’12, the Houthis were part of the opposition to the Saleh 

regime. And there was a strong desire on the part of all of the political groups in Yemen to see if they couldn’t bring them into the 

political process. I think there was a broad understanding that the 

Houthis had legitimate concerns and legitimate grievances about 

the way they had been treated over the years. And there was a 

hope that they could be accommodated through the negotiations 

and through the implementation of the GCC initiative in a way to 

make them a part of the larger political fabric. And that was really 

the main effort for a long period of time. 

Unfortunately, low-level conflict continued throughout that period between the Houthis and some of the other elements, some of 

the conservative Sunni elements of the society and that flared up 

last summer in an area, in the northern part of the country near 

the traditional Houthi area in a place called——

21

Mr. YOHO. Let me interject in here. So what you are saying? And 

I think what I am hearing is the Houthis didn’t feel like they were 

involved sufficiently in the Hadi government. They didn’t have 

enough input? Is that——

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. They weren’t technically part of the 

Hadi government. They didn’t have any seats in Hadi government. 

They were part of the larger political process. They were participants in the National Dialogue Conference and in the implementation of the GCC initiative. 

Mr. YOHO. And will Khaled Bahah’s appointment as Vice President help be sufficient to satisfy what they are looking for as far 

as representation? And the other part of that question is does the 

appointment of Mr. Bahah as Vice President, does that weaken 

President Hadi’s effectiveness if he were to go back into power? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. The appointment of Khaled Bahah as 

prime minister last September was one of the elements that resolved the first confrontation with the Houthis, last September 

when they signed an agreement. And they approved the appointment of Khaled Bahah as the prime minister. 

Yesterday or the day before yesterday, when he was named as 

the Vice President, they objected, not because they have any concern about him. He is, I think, somebody who is universally respected inside of Yemen, but because they objected to the process 

that led to his appointment. But we do think that he is someone 

who is acceptable to all of the elements of society. We don’t think 

that it would undermine the legitimacy of President Hadi’s government. In fact, it accomplishes something that President Hadi had 

been encouraged to do for a long period of time. 

Mr. YOHO. Do you see him with a resolution of this conflict? Do 

you see President Hadi coming back and running that country? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I think both the United States and 

more broadly, the International Community, see that the legitimacy——

Mr. YOHO. They see him as a legitimate President? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN [continuing]. Is still with President 

Hadi. What exactly the format might be that would bring him back 

to Sana’a is negotiable. And if there is some other format that 

would be acceptable to the Yemenis, would be acceptable to us. 

Mr. YOHO. And we have known for a long time that the Iranian 

influence with the Houthis has been there for a long time. Have 

you seen their interference in this conflict more prevalent than it 

has been in the past? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. You have seen it step up? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Yes. 

Mr. YOHO. Do you have any feeling that there is an increase of 

that activity due to the Iranian nuclear negotiations that we are 

going through? Have they been emboldened more? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. We believe that there are a number of 

factors that are feeding into Iran, a sense that it has the upper 

hand was because of its engagement elsewhere in the region, because of the weakness or the disarray within the Sunni community, 

the Iranians may be emboldened. I think our sense is that the Iranian nuclear negotiations would not be a factor. 

22

Mr. YOHO. I find it interesting that the Iranians have stepped up 

their involvement and have taken over four capitals and we see a 

big influence of them in Venezuela. All this time when they have 

been under sanctions and they are supposedly struggling internally, yet we see more influence. In fact, they just purchased that 

missile defense system from Russia for $800 million and it doesn’t 

look like a country that is in financial constraints or having difficulties making its presence. I think for them to step forward and 

show this kind of leadership in that region is certainly not the kind 

of leadership I want to see. I would think the influence that we 

have with Saudi Arabia’s would be stronger. What are your 

thoughts on that? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Well, certainly I think that what we 

would like to do is see. You know, we have the nuclear agreement 

now. I think our view is that potentially that could contribute to 

regional security and stability. Certainly, the support that we are 

providing to Saudi Arabia and the Saudi coalition and Operation 

Decisive Storm is an important element and an important opportunity for us to demonstrate to our friends in the region that despite the nuclear negotiations and the framework agreement, our 

commitment to their security and stability is not affected, and that 

we will continue to confront and challenge Iranian activity where 

we see it playing a negative role in the region. 

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador Feierstein, I appreciate your time. I yield 

back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. Ms. Meng of New 

York. 

Ms. MENG. Ambassador, I thought that when the campaign started the Saudis were very smart to brand this as a pan-Arab effort. 

But with the rising of civilian casualties, can you give us a sense 

of the perspective of this on the Arab street today? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. It varies. And I do believe that broadly 

on the Arab street that there is a great deal of support for what 

the coalition is trying to accomplish in a sense that it is appropriate for the Saudis to take a leadership position in confronting 

Iranian malign intent. 

Within Yemen, of course, the situation is a little bit different and 

the concerns about some of the civilian casualties is obviously, and 

understandably much higher. We, as one of the elements of our 

support, and one of the things that we’re trying to accomplish in 

providing support to the international coalition is precisely to help 

them avoid those kinds of civilian casualties and to ensure that 

when they are going after a particular target, that they are doing 

everything possible to make sure that there is no collateral damage. 

Ms. MENG. My last question, it appears that Turkey and Pakistan have backed off their initial support for this operation. Can 

you speak about that and do you foresee this new found Arab coalition working effectively together beyond Yemen? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I think for Turkey and for Pakistan, the 

issue is more complicated. I can speak a little bit, am I am more 

familiar with the situation in Pakistan than in Turkey. But in 

Pakistan, you have, of course, a long border with Iran, an important relationship between Pakistan and Iran, as well as an imporVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041415\94179 SHIRL
23

tant and long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia. And so for 

the Pakistanis, this was probably a situation where they didn’t see, 

frankly, that there was a good way forward for them to participate. 

They have been very clear in saying that they would be absolutely 

committed to supporting Saudi Arabia if there were any kind of 

threat to Saudi Arabia specifically, but in the case of Yemen, a little bit more complicated for them and probably something that politically inside of Pakistan would have been extremely difficult. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Meng. Mr. 

DeSantis, my wonderful colleague from Florida. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think this is an 

important topic. I am going to get to this, but we just got the news 

over the wire that the President is planning on removing Cuba 

from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Now this is something 

that, although outrageous for us, is something that I think was expected. I think it was baked in the cake. But I think it is really, 

really troubling when—Cuba hasn’t done anything. They have 

given no concession. They haven’t done anything on behalf of their 

people there. They are arresting more people, repressing more people since we have had this change. They have harbored somebody 

on the FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists. Nothing is being done. 

This is just a pure, unadulterated concession with absolutely no 

basis or grounding in facts. 

I was happy to lead a special order on the floor last night with 

some of the post-9/11 veterans who were in Congress and the two 

countries that we seem to have better relationships with now, Iran 

and Cuba. The question is what have we received in return for 

that? Mostly, it is just us giving concessions to these countries. And 

I think a foreign policy based on the idea that we are going to be 

dancing with dictators is not a foreign policy that is going to succeed. And I think it is really alienating us from a lot of our allies 

and tragically, I think, is leaving people who are fighting for freedom in places like Cuba, completely in the lurch. This is not going 

to be the last that we talk about this, I know, but it is really, really 

disappointing. 

Sorry about that, Ambassador. I know that is not your cup of tea, 

but it is something that we work on on this committee and I know 

that the chairwoman especially has done it for a long time. 

Did the State Department approve President Obama’s remarks 

in September when he announced the campaign against ISIS and 

he cited Yemen as a success? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I am not entirely sure. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Because I know there was a lot of discussion back 

when Bush was President about approving the WMD passages. Is 

it standard that that goes through State when a President makes 

a major speech about foreign policy or is it just kind of the State 

has got to respond to what the White House said? I am just not 

even clear about how the process normally works. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I think as a matter of principle, it is up 

to the President to decide how he wants to prepare his speeches. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Once this statement was made and Yemen was 

cited as an example of success, were there concerns in the State 

Department that were raised about that given, the actual reality 

on the ground in Yemen at the time? 

24

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I would say that the record of our activities in Yemen from 2011, 2012, until quite recently, in terms of 

the effectiveness of our unilateral actions against AQAP, as well as 

the cooperation and the ability of the United States to partner effectively with our counterparts inside of Yemen was positive. And 

as a result of what we were able to accomplish together, we saw 

a number of positive developments in terms of taking some of the 

leadership elements out of AQAP off the table and also forcing 

AQAP to change its strategy. When the political crisis came in 

Yemen in 2011, AQAP was able to take advantage of that and increase its territorial control to the extent that they were actually 

declaring areas of the country to be an Islamic caliphate, not unlike 

what we see with ISIL in Iraq and Syria these days. 

And because of our cooperation, primarily our cooperation with 

Yemeni security forces, we were able to defeat that at a significant 

loss of life for AQAP. As a result of that, they changed their tactics. 

They went back to being a more traditional terrorist organization. 

They were able to attack locations inside of Sana’a and elsewhere. 

But the fact of the matter is that we were achieving progress in 

our ability to pressure them and to keep them on the defensive as 

opposed to giving them lots of time. And remember, in 2009, in 

2010, we saw AQAP mount fairly serious efforts, the underwear 

bomber and then also the cassette tape effort, to attack the United 

States. After 2010, they were not able to do that, despite the fact 

that their intent was still as clear and as strong as it was before. 

And so while AQAP was by no means defeated, and continued to 

be a major threat to security here in the United States, as well as 

in Yemen and elsewhere around the world, nevertheless, I think 

that it was legitimate to say that we had achieved some success in 

the fight against AQAP. Unfortunately, what we are seeing now because of the change in the situation again inside of Yemen is that 

we are losing some of the gains that we were able to make during 

that period of 2012 to 2014. And that is why it is so important that 

we have the ability to get the political negotiations started again 

so that we can re-establish legitimate government inside of Sana’a 

that will cooperate with us once again in this fight against violent 

extremist organizations. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. My time has expired. I appreciate that. 

There was a lot there and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. DeSantis, and I look forward 

to watching the video of your remarks along with our other vets 

last night. Congratulations. 

I wanted to ask an additional question, so the members can as 

well. Because of its geographic location, Yemen is so close, just a 

little short boat ride away from Africa, for example. Eritrea is right 

there and very unstable. Do you worry about were the movement 

to take place that the Houthi rebels, ISIL or whatever faction of 

terrorist organization could very well move their troops a little boat 

ride away and be in yet another area where they can control that 

land and destabilize an already troubled region? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. We certainly worried a lot about linkages between particularly the AQAP in Yemen and Shabab in Somalia. And we knew, for example, that Shabab was sending some 

of their people across to Yemen to receive training and so as you 

25

say, quite correctly, the distances are very short. We are talking 

about from Yemen to Djibouti, maybe 20 miles by sea. So it is very 

close by. And it is something that would be of concern to us. And 

again, as part of our efforts against both AQAP and Shabab, it was 

something that were trying to monitor and defeat aggressively. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, I do worry about it because we have a 

lot of American personnel, Embassies, consulates, we have a presence throughout that region. So that is a worrisome future development perhaps. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I just have one more question also. With the coalition focused as it is on the Houthis, and since we have lost at least 

for now our counterterrorism partner in the Yemeni Government 

and military, what pressure is there to the extent there is any on 

al-Qaeda and ISIS as well? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. We, of course, to the extent that we 

can, it is more limited now, but to the extent that we can we will 

continue to engage AQAP unilaterally in order to try to disrupt or 

defeat any threats against us. When Secretary Blinken was in the 

region, it was also an issue that we raise with the Saudis, in particular, and urged them also as part of their effort to go after 

AQAP targets as well as other targets so that we can continue the 

pressure. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Can you tell us how that was received? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. They agree, of course, because AQAP is 

a direct threat to their security, too. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And have we seen that happen? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. I can’t say for certain, whether we have 

given them any AQ targets to go after or whether they have been 

effective in servicing those. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. Mr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. Just kind of a follow-up 

question, with the administration coming out and saying that it is 

a success over there back in September and they are still touting 

that as of March 24th or 25th, I have here in an article, how can 

we be that far off? I know you explained the counterterrorism portion, but yet to have a country taken over while we are sitting 

there working with them and this happen, I feel it just kind of happened over night, the way our Embassy got run out of town and 

just say you have to leave, your Marines cannot take their weapons 

with them. I don’t understand how that happens or how we can be 

that disconnected. 

What are your thoughts on that? Is it just denial or is it—I don’t 

know what it is. I am confused because before you answer, it says 

its counter intuitive claim puzzles national security experts and it 

says it enrages—it says Republicans, but I am sure it enrages a lot 

of people. I am just kind of baffled. 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. You know, it was very frustrating. 

Again, I think that if you go back to where we were a year ago, 

the successful conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference 

which was really the last major hurdle in completion of the GCC 

initiative. Houthis participated in that. They participated in constitutional drafting exercise which was completed successfully. And 

so we were in the process of moving through all of the requireVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:13 Jun 16, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\041415\94179 SHIRL
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ments of the GCC initiative that would allow us to complete successfully the political transition. 

I think there were a combination of things. One that there was 

a view on the part of the Houthis that they were not getting everything that they wanted. They were provoked in our view by Ali 

Abdallah Saleh who never stopped plotting from the very first day 

after he signed the agreement on the GCC initiative. He never 

stopped plotting to try to block the political transition. And there 

was, to be frank, there was a weakness in the government, an inability on the part of the government to really build the kind of alliances and coalition that would allow them to sustain popular support and to bring this to a successful conclusion. 

And so I think that all through this period, there was a sense 

that we were moving forward and that we believe that we could 

succeed in implementing this peaceful transition, and yet we always knew that on the margins there were threats and there were 

risks. And unfortunately, we got to a point where the Houthis and 

Ali Abdallah Saleh, my personal view is that they recognized that 

they had reached the last possible moment where they could obstruct the peaceful, political transition that was bad for them because it would mean that they wouldn’t get everything that they 

wanted. And so they saw that time was running out for them and 

they decided to act and unfortunately, the government was unable 

to stop them. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate it. And it just concerns me extremely, a 

lot, that we are calling this a success and we missed the mark way 

past the mark. If we are missing this, what else are we missing 

in our foreign policies? Can I ask one other thing? We have invested $900 million since 

2011, roughly. It doesn’t seem like we have gotten the bang for our 

buck in our foreign policy. In your opinion, how would you direct 

foreign policy in a country like Yemen to where we get the results 

we want? 

Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. It is a good question. And what I would 

say is that in a place like Yemen, we have to recognize what the 

limitations are in those societies. And accept the fact that if we are 

going to make a difference, it is going to be a very long-term investment on our part. It is unfortunate that Yemen has taken a turn 

that it has taken. I don’t think that the situation is irretrievable. 

I think that with some effort on our part and the part of the rest 

of the International Community, we can get it back on track. And 

then I would hope that we would then stay with it and help the 

Yemeni people achieve a good outcome. They are good people. They 

are people who probably deserve a lot better than they have gotten 

and it would be good if we could a part of the success. 

Mr. YOHO. Ambassador, I appreciate your time. Madam Chair, 

thanks for the indulgence. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Yoho. 

And Mr. Ambassador, Yemen is a quickly-moving terrain, so we 

would appreciate if you could keep our subcommittee abreast of 

any developments. We don’t have to have a formal hearing. We can 

have a meeting in one of the meeting rooms. Thank you for being 

accessible. There are lots of moving parts and we would like to be 

abreast of every development. Thank you, sir. 

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Ambassador FEIERSTEIN. Thank you. It would be my pleasure. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Your testimony was excellent and with that, 

the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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