J-A20028-22

2022 PA Super 186

FLETCHER GRADY IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BRIAN NELSON AND LISA ANN NELSON

APPEAL OF: BRIAN NELSON

Appellant No. 2115 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered September 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Civil Division at No: 2017-09268

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J. and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2022

In this personal injury action, Appellant, Brian Nelson, appeals from an 

order denying a petition to strike and/or open a default judgment entered 

against him in the amount of $1,000,000.00. We conclude that Appellant was 

entitled to have the judgment stricken, as two fatal defects existed on the face 

of the record as of the date of judgment. There is conclusive evidence that 

Appellee, Fletcher Grady, served the complaint and judgment notices on a 

non-existent address, thus depriving Appellant of notice that this action was 

pending against him. Appellee’s ten-day notice of intent to enter a default 

judgment also did not substantially comply with the language required under 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.5 and 237.1. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying 

Appellant’s petition to strike and remand for further proceedings. 

This action rests upon the following allegations. James Cannavo was a 

lessee in a nonresidential property owned by Appellant in West Chester, 

Pennsylvania. On November 1, 2015, while inside the property, Cannavo shot 

Appellee, causing serious internal injuries. Cannavo was subsequently 

convicted of attempted murder and is serving a sentence of 25-50 years’

imprisonment. It does not appear that Appellant was at the property at the 

time of the shooting. Appellee alleges that Appellant was negligent for leasing 

the property to Cannavo, whom Appellant knew was a dangerous person who 

drank, abused substances, and engaged in unlawful activities. 

The record, as of the date judgment was entered against Appellant, 

provides the following.

On September 28, 2017, Appellee commenced this action via a writ of 

summons against Appellant and his wife, Lisa Ann Nelson.1 The record 

includes a sheriff service form directing the Sheriff to serve Appellant and his 

wife with the writ of summons at “1075 Price Street” in West Chester. The 

form listed two alternate addresses in West Chester for service, 510 High 

Street and 1234 West Chester Pike (Appellant’s business address). On 

October 24, 2017, a deputy sheriff attempted to serve Appellant and his wife 

at 1075 Price Street but was unable to make service. On the service form

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1 Lisa Ann Nelson was later dismissed from this action.
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relating to Appellant, the deputy sheriff wrote, “Price St. address does not 

exist.” On the service form relating to Appellant’s wife, the deputy wrote, “No 

such number on Price St. No such address found on Chescoviews. Better 

address needed.”

The deputy telephoned Appellant and left a voice message. The 

following day, the deputy served the writ of summons on Appellant at a 

different address, 706 East Gay Street in West Chester.2

On July 31, 2018, Appellee filed a complaint alleging that Cannavo shot 

Appellee at 1075 Price Street, and that Appellant was liable for negligence in 

leasing the premises at 1075 Price Street to Cannavo. The complaint alleged 

that Appellant resided at 1075 Price Street. The affidavit of service averred 

that counsel for Appellee served the complaint on Appellant by regular mail 

on July 31, 2018. Attached to the affidavit was a letter from counsel enclosing 

the complaint, endorsed with a notice to plead, and addressed to Appellant at 

1075 Price Street.

On August 27, 2018, counsel for Appellee mailed Appellant a notice of 

intent to enter a default judgment in ten days due to Appellant’s failure to file 

an answer to the complaint. The address on the notice of intent was 1075 

Price Street. The first sentence of the notice stated, “You are in default 

because you have failed to take action required of you in this case.” This 

language was different from the text required by the applicable rule of civil 

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2

In his subsequent petition to strike the judgment, Appellant averred that this 

address was a Wawa convenience store in West Chester. 
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procedure that provides, “You are in default because you have failed to enter 

a written appearance personally or by attorney and file in writing with the 

court your defenses or objections to the claims set forth against you.” 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.5. 

On September 7, 2018, Appellee filed a praecipe for entry of default 

judgment against Appellant. On the same date, Appellee filed a certification 

identifying Appellant’s address as 1075 Price Street. The prothonotary 

entered judgment in favor of Appellee and against Appellant and sent a 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 236 notice of the default judgment to 1075 Price Street. This 

notice, as well as all other notices sent by the prothonotary to the Price Street 

address, were returned to the prothonotary’s office as undeliverable. 

Following entry of judgment, the court scheduled an assessment of damages

hearing for March 15, 2019. On March 22, 2019, the court entered a verdict 

for Appellee in the amount of $1,000,000.00.

Over two years later, on June 21, 2021, Appellee served Appellant with 

a notice of deposition in aid of execution of judgment for the first time at 

Appellant’s business address, 1234 West Chester Pike. Appellant retained 

counsel3 and filed a petition to strike or open judgment on July 21, 2021. 

Appellee filed a timely answer to the petition.

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3

It does not appear from the record that Appellant retained counsel until this 

point in the case. 
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On September 10, 2021, the court entered an order denying Appellant’s 

petition to strike or open judgment. In relevant part, the order stated, “A 

petition to strike a default judgment will only be granted where there is a fatal 

defect that is apparent from the face of the record. . . . We find no such 

defect.” Order, 9/10/21 at n.1 (citation omitted). Appellant filed a motion for 

reconsideration, which the court denied on October 4, 2021. 

On October 7, 2021, Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court. Both 

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Notably, the trial court stated in its Rule 1925 opinion:

Upon further examination, the trial Court believes it erred in not 

striking the judgement [sic]. The gist of [Appellant’s] Petition is 

that he did not receive service of the Complaint, notices for entry 

of default judgment or trial notices addressed to him at 1075 Price 

Street, West Chester, PA 19320. An examination of the record 

reflects that in an attempt to serve [Appellant], the Office of the 

Chester County Sheriff filed an Affidavit of Service Return on 

October 11, 2017 that the 1075 Price Street address does not exist 

and that alternative addresses for service on [Appellant] should 

be 510 South High Street, West Chester, PA or 1234 West Chester 

Pike, West Chester, PA. Nonetheless, counsel for [Appellee] 

continued service of all documents on [Appellant] at the 1075 

Price Street address.

In addition, all the trial notices sent by the trial Court to 

[Appellant] at the 1075 Price Street address were returned by the 

Post Office with the label “Return to Sender-No Such Number 

Unable to Forward.” As such, it appears that there is a fatal defect 

in all service on [Appellant] subsequent to the service of the initial 

Writ and associated documents.

Opinion, 12/6/21, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).

Appellant raises the following issues in this appeal:
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1. Should the Court remand this matter to the trial court for entry 

of an amended order consistent with the trial court’s Rule 1925 

opinion?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law 

when it denied [Appellant’s] Petition to Strike Off or Open Default 

(“Petition”), where a substantial defect in the procedures in this 

case, and a breakdown of the judicial system, resulted in entry of 

a $1 million judgment against [Appellant] without notice or any 

other basic due process?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law 

in denying [Appellant’s] Petition to Strike?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of law 

in denying [Appellant’s] Petition to Open?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5. Since we find the third issue dispositive, we limit our 

analysis to that issue.

An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment 

implicates the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Issues 

regarding the operation of procedural rules of court present us 

with questions of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary.

A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which 

operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a 

judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity 

appearing on the face of the record. [A] petition to strike is not a 

chance to review the merits of the allegations of a complaint. 

Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the 

validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter 

of law, to relief. A fatal defect on the face of the record denies 

the prothonotary the authority to enter judgment. When a 

prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment is 

void ab initio. When deciding if there are fatal defects on the face 

of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a [default] 

judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when 

the judgment was entered.
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Penn National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Phillips, 276 

A.3d 268, 273-74 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations and indentations omitted). 

Further, “[w]here a fatal defect or irregularity is apparent from the face of the 

record, the prothonotary will be held to have lacked the authority to enter [a] 

default judgment and the default judgment will be considered void.” Keller 

v. Mey, 67 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2013). A litigant may seek to strike a void 

judgment at any time. Domus, Inc. v. Signature Building Systems of Pa, 

LLC, 252 A.3d 628, 640 (Pa. 2021). 

In this case, a fatal defect existed on the face of the record at the time 

of entry of judgment as evidenced by the sheriff’s return of service: the use 

of a non-existent address, 1075 Price Street, for service of the complaint and 

judgment notices. One of the fundamental objectives of the Rules of Civil 

Procedure is to ensure that litigants receive proper notice of all proceedings. 

The duty to make proper service begins with service of original process. 

Sharp v. Valley Forge Medical Center and Heart Hospital, Inc., 221 A.2d 

185, 187 (Pa. 1966) (rules relating to service of original process “must be 

strictly followed”). This duty continues throughout all stages of the case. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 440 provides, “Copies of all legal papers 

other than original process filed in an action or served upon any party to an 

action shall be served upon every other party to the action.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 

440(a)(1). When there is no attorney of record for the defendant,

4 “service 

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4 Again, it appears Appellant did not have counsel in this case until July 2021, 

when he filed his petition to strike or open judgment. See n. 3. 
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shall be made by handing a copy to the party or by mailing a copy to or leaving 

a copy for the party at the address endorsed on an appearance or prior 

pleading or the residence or place of business of the party, or by transmitting 

a copy by facsimile[.]” Id. If the plaintiff seeks a default judgment due to 

the defendant’s failure to answer the complaint, the plaintiff must “mail[] or 

deliver[]” a written notice of intent to enter judgment to the defendant at least 

ten days before filing a praecipe for entry of judgment. Pa.R.Civ.P. 

237.1(a)(2). Further, when the plaintiff files the praecipe, he must certify 

that he served the defendant with the ten-day notice and attach a copy of the 

notice to the praecipe. Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.1(a)(2)-(4). Finally, the prothonotary 

must mail all orders and notices of judgment to the defendant. Pa.R.Civ.P. 

236(a)(2).

Notices required under the Rules are ineffective if they are sent to an 

incorrect address. For example, in Brown v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea 

Co., 460 A.2d 773 (Pa. Super. 1983), the plaintiff/appellee sent a ten-day 

notice of intent to enter default judgment to an address from which the

defendant/appellant had moved more than one year prior and from which mail 

was no longer forwarded to the defendant. We held that the trial court abused 

its discretion in refusing to open judgment, reasoning that “appellant never 

received any notice of appellee’s intention to enter default judgment, and . . . 

this fact was not appellant’s but appellee’s fault.” Id. at 776. 

Here, Appellee instructed the deputy sheriff to serve original process on 

Appellant at 1075 Price Street. The deputy’s return of service conclusively 
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establishes that he was unable to make service at 1075 Price Street because 

this address “does not exist”. The deputy ultimately served Appellant with 

original process at a different address. Subsequently, however, Appellee 

mailed the complaint and ten-day notice of intent to enter a default judgment 

to 1075 Price Street, an address which the sheriff’s return unequivocally states

does not exist. Moreover, the prothonotary likewise sent the Rule 236 notice 

of the default judgment to 1075 Price Street. These multiple errors in service 

of essential documents deprived Appellant of notice of the proceedings and 

required the trial court to strike the judgment against him. 

Appellee contends that the sheriff’s return of service did not conclusively 

establish that 1075 Price Street was an incorrect address. According to 

Appellee, the trial court had the discretion to determine what weight, if any, 

to give to the return, and the court acted within its discretion by deciding not 

to accept the return as true. 

We disagree with Appellee’s argument in light of our Supreme Court’s 

analysis in Hollinger v. Hollinger, 206 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1965). Hollinger held 

that “in the absence of fraud, the return of service of a sheriff, which is full 

and complete on its face, is conclusive and immune from attack by extrinsic 

evidence.” Anzalone v. Vormack, 718 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Pa. Super. 1998) 

(analyzing Hollinger). Hollinger defined the “rule of conclusiveness” as 

follows:

The rule of conclusiveness of a return of service of process is 

based upon the presumption that a sheriff, acting in the course of 

his official duties, acts with propriety and, therefore, when the 
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sheriff in the course of such official duties makes a statement, by 

way of an official return, such statement is given conclusive effect. 

However, both logic and common sense restrict the conclusive 

nature of a sheriff’s return only to facts stated in the return of 

which the sheriff presumptively has personal knowledge, such as 

when and where the writ was served; when, in his official return, 

the sheriff states that he served a writ at a certain time and at a 

certain place, such facts are known to the sheriff personally and 

should be given conclusive effect. However, the immutability of a 

return should not extend (a) to facts stated to the return of which 

the sheriff cannot be expected to have personal knowledge and 

which are based upon information obtained through hearsay or 

statements made by third persons or (b) to conclusions based 

upon facts known to the sheriff only through statements made by 

others. When a sheriff’s return states that a certain place is the 

residence or dwelling house of the defendant, such statement is 

not a matter ordinarily within the personal knowledge of the 

sheriff but only a statement based upon that which he has been 

told by other persons, i.e., he had been instructed by a third 

person to make service at a certain place which he is told is the 

residence or dwelling house of the defendant. No sound reason 

exists for giving a conclusive effect to a statement or conclusion 

which arises not from the sheriff’s own personal knowledge or 

observation but from information given him by other persons. In 

the case at bar, no attack is permissible upon the statements in 

the sheriff’s return that he served this writ at a certain specified 

time at [a specified address], but the rule does not preclude an 

attack upon the statement in the return that [a specified address 

at which service was made], was the dwelling house or residence

of Rita Hollinger.

Id., 206 A.2d at 3–4 (emphasis in original).

Anzalone provides a helpful application of these principles. There, a 

constable wrote in a return of service that service of process took place at 

“1:45 p.m.” on “7–6–96” upon the defendant’s “girlfriend” (Stacy Fuller) at 

the “Sunny Hill Apts, at poolside, Beaver Falls, [Beaver County,] PA”. The 

caption of the case listed the defendant’s address as “15 Sunnyhill Drive, 

Beaver Falls, PA 15010.” This Court observed that under Hollinger,
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statements in a return of service listing when and where a 

complaint is delivered constitute matters which are within the 

personal knowledge of the process server and not subject to 

attack. This renders the date, time and place service was made 

by Constable Ehrenberg conclusive and immune from assault. 

However, with regard to the status of the person to whom service 

was made being a “girlfriend” named “Stacy Fuller” and the 

defendant’s address being “15 Sunnyhill Drive, Beaver Falls, PA”, 

these are matters which the constable presumptively had no 

personal knowledge but learned via third party disclosure. As 

such, the defendant was not precluded from attacking such 

representations.

Id., 718 A.2d at 1249.5

In this case, Appellee instructed the sheriff to serve Appellant and his 

wife at 1075 Price Street. The returns of service indicate that a deputy sheriff 

attempted to make service at 1075 Price Street on October 24, 2017 but was 

unable to do so because this address did not exist. On the return of service 

relating to Appellant, the deputy wrote that the “[1075] Price St. address does 

not exist.” On the service form relating to Appellant’s wife, the deputy wrote, 

____________________________________________

5 The decisions cited in Appellee’s brief follow the same principle that the 

sheriff’s return is conclusive as to matters within the personal knowledge of 

the sheriff but is not conclusive as to matters that fall outside his personal 

knowledge. See Mischenko v. Gowton, 453 A.2d 658, 659 (Pa. Super. 

1982) (plurality opinion) (sheriff’s return of service which is full and complete 

on its face is conclusive and immune from attack by extrinsic evidence, but 

this rule does not extend to facts not within personal knowledge of the sheriff, 

such as whether the place at which sheriff served process was defendant’s

residence); Quatrochi v. Gaiters, 380 A.2d 404, 407 (Pa. Super. 1977) (in 

petition to open default judgment, defendant may attack validity of sheriff’s 

return when he alleges that he did not reside at place where sheriff effected 

service; defendant’s residence is not fact of which sheriff presumptively has 

personal knowledge, and he must ordinarily rely upon hearsay information 

supplied by third parties in determining defendant’s residence). 
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“No such number on Price St. . . .” Since the deputy himself visited Price 

Street and attempted to locate this address, he presumptively gained personal 

knowledge that it was not an actual address. He did not merely learn this 

detail through hearsay or third-party statements. Thus, like the date, time 

and place details in Anzalone, the deputy’s finding that the address of 1075 

Price Street did not exist was “conclusive and immune from assault.” Id., 718 

A.2d at 1249. Appellee therefore, is not correct in asserting that the court 

was free to give whatever weight (including none) it chose to the sheriff’s 

return that related 1075 Price Street does not exist. The return was conclusive 

on this fact.

During oral argument, counsel for Appellee asserted that if we were 

inclined to grant relief to Appellant, the most we could do is remand for further 

evidentiary proceedings in accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.7 (“Procedure 

After Issuance Of Rule To Show Cause”).

6

 Appellee arguably waived this 

argument because there is no reference to Rule 206.7 or its procedures in 

____________________________________________

6 Rule 206.7(c) provides that when an answer is filed to a petition that raises 

disputed issues of material fact,

the petitioner may take depositions on those issues, or such other

discovery as the court allows, within the time set forth in the order 

of the court. If the petitioner does not do so, the petition shall be 

decided on petition and answer and all averments of fact 

responsive to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer shall 

be deemed admitted for the purpose of this subdivision.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.7(c). The respondent to the petition may also take 

depositions or such other discovery as the court allows. Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.7(d).
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Appellee’s brief. Even if Appellee preserved this argument, Rule 206.7 does 

not apply to this case for two reasons. First, Rule 206.7 provides procedures 

to follow after (1) a petition is filed and (2) the court issues a rule to show 

cause. Our review of the record and docket entries reflects that the court did 

not issue a rule to show cause in this case. Second, there should not be a 

rule to show cause or any evidentiary proceeding when, as here, the court 

receives a meritorious petition to strike. In such cases, the court decides the 

petition solely on the record without a rule to show cause, discovery or 

evidentiary proceedings. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.4(a)(2) (“A judgment shall be 

stricken without the issuance of a rule to show cause when there is a defect 

on the face of the record that constitutes a ground for striking a default 

judgment”); see also Penn National, 276 A.3d at 273-74 (petition to strike 

is a “demurrer to the record” in which the court examines whether “a fatal 

defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record”). Since the record 

establishes that Appellant’s petition to strike was meritorious, further 

evidentiary proceedings in this case were neither necessary nor permissible. 

Before concluding this subject, we find it noteworthy that after Appellee 

entered judgment and obtained an assessment of damages of $1,000,000.00, 

he served discovery requests in aid of execution on Appellant at Appellant’s 

business address (1234 West Chester Pike) instead of 1075 Price Street. This 

fact suggests that Appellee elected to use the non-existent address of 1075 

Price Street for service despite having actual knowledge that 1234 West 
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Chester Pike was a proper address for Appellant. If this actually was the case, 

then we note our disapproval of such tactics, as they suggest bad faith and an 

abuse of the rules governing service of legal documents. 

We hold that the trial court erred by failing to strike the judgment 

against Appellant due to service of all documents subsequent to the writ of 

summons on a non-existent address. This, however, does not conclude our 

analysis, because we hold that the denial of the petition to strike was 

erroneous for a second, independent reason: Appellee’s use of a defective tenday notice of intent to take a default judgment.

Preliminarily, we observe that Appellant did not raise any claim in the 

trial court or in his appellate briefing that the text of the ten-day notice was 

defective. The first time that Appellant objected to the text of Appellee’s tenday notice was during oral argument. Nevertheless, we recently held in a 

non-precedential decision that when the defendant merely requests the trial 

court to open a default judgment, he may still request on appeal that this 

Court strike the judgment due to the plaintiff’s use of a defective ten-day 

notice of intent to enter default judgment. Rooks v. Walker, 268 A.3d 447, 

2021 WL 5445853, *2 (Pa. Super., Nov. 22, 2021) (memorandum). As

support, we cited the following passage from Oswald v. WB Pub. Square 

Assocs., LLC, 80 A.3d 790 (Pa. Super. 2013):

Appellant’s original petition challenging Appellee’s default 

judgment exclusively discussed the issue of opening the default 

judgment. Generally, this Court will decline to address issues not 

first raised before the trial court. However, we have long held that 
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a litigant may seek to strike a void judgment at any time. This 

Court also permits litigants to attack allegedly void decrees for the 

first time on appeal. Consequently, we will address the merits of 

Appellant’s first issue regarding a petition to strike default 

judgment.

Id. at 793 (citations omitted). We find Rooks persuasive,7 so we will address 

the merits of Appellant’s objection to the ten-day notice.

The Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit the prothonotary from entering 

default judgment against a party “unless the praecipe for entry includes a 

certification that a written notice of intention filed with the praecipe was 

mailed or delivered . . . after the failure to plead to a complaint and at least 

ten days prior to the date of the filing of the praecipe to the party against 

whom judgment is to be entered and to the party’s attorney of record, if any.”

Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.1(a)(2)(ii). Furthermore, this notice must “substantially”

comply with the language set forth in Rule 237.5, which provides in relevant 

part, “You are in default because you have failed to enter a written appearance 

personally or by attorney and file in writing with the court your defenses or 

objections to the claims set forth against you.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 237.5. 

The ten-day notice sent in this case provided in relevant part, “You are 

in default because you have failed [to] take action required of you in this 

case.” We held in Penn National and Oswald that ten-day notices containing 

____________________________________________

7 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential memorandum decisions 

of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for their persuasive 

value).
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precisely this same language were defective because they did not substantially 

comply with Rule 237.5. The Penn National court reasoned:

In Oswald, . . . the plaintiff initiated an action against the 

defendant by filing a complaint with proper service. After the 

defendant failed to respond to the complaint, the plaintiff sent the 

defendant notice of her intention to file a praecipe for default 

judgment. The default judgment notice provided in Oswald

stated, in relevant part, “You are in default because you have 

failed to take action required of you in this case.” Id. at 796 

(emphasis omitted). This Court found that this language was 

‘deficient’ since the notice failed to state “specific reasons why the 

defendant is in default.” Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v. 

David J. Lane Advertising, Inc., 33 A.3d 674, 679 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011)). Thus, this Court concluded the notice of default judgment 

rendered the notice ‘defective on its face,’ as the document was 

‘not “substantially” in the form required by Rule 237.5.’ Oswald, 

80 A.3d at 796.

In so holding, this Court adopted the reasoning of the 

Commonwealth Court in David J. Lane Advertising, Inc., 

wherein the court explained:

The general ‘failed to take action required of you in 

this case’ language is consistent with the version of 

the form in Rule 237.5 predating a 1994 amendment 

(Old Form Notice). In the 1994 amendment, which 

became effective on July 1, 1995, the Supreme Court 

chose to remove this general language in the Old Form 

Notice and to substitute the more specific language in 

the current form—’failed to enter a written 

appearance personally or by attorney and file in 

writing with the court your defenses or objections to 

the claims set forth against you.’ Indeed, it appears 

from the explanatory comment to the rule that the 

specific purpose of the 1994 amendment was to add 

this more specific language to the form. The 

explanatory comment notes that the purpose of the 

modification is to track the language set forth in 

Pa.R.C.P. [] 1018.1 for a notice to plead, which 

language expressly directs the defendant to defend by 

entering an appearance (either personally or by 

attorney) and by filing with the court in writing 
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defenses or objections to the claims in the complaint. 

The comment to Rule 237.5 further provides: ‘Since 

the notice will in many cases be sent to an as yet 

unrepresented defendant, repetition of the notice to 

defend, in modified form helps to stimulate action and 

stem the tide of petitions to open default judgments.’

In adopting the revision to the form, then, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that before 

entering judgment by default (which is no insignificant 

matter), it was important to notify a defendant 

specifically what it failed to do (i.e., why it was in 

default) by tracking the language in the earlier-issued 

notice to defend. Rather than informing a defendant 

that he merely ‘failed to take action required by you 

in this case,’ a more specific notice of why the 

defendant was in default that tracks the earlier notice 

to defend serves as a reminder to the defendant in 

many cases unrepresented at that point, of the 

defendant’s specific pleading obligations.

Id. at 678–79 (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

Id. at 278. Penn National followed Oswald’s reasoning and held that the 

ten-day notice was “defective on its face because it did not use [or 

substantially comply with] the required language set forth in Rule 237.5.” Id. 

at 278-79 (citing Rooks). As a result, Penn National held that the notice 

“on its face . . . violated Rule 237.1(a)(2). Thus, the Prothonotary was not 

authorized to enter the default judgment, and the judgment against [the 

defendant] was void ab initio. [Accordingly,] the court should have granted 

the petition to strike the default judgment.” Id. at 279.

The ten-day notice in this case recited the same language as the text 

found erroneous in Penn National and Oswald. Therefore, these decisions 

require us to find the ten-day notice herein defective on its face, thus providing 
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yet another reason why Appellant is entitled to have the judgment against him 

stricken.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order denying Appellant’s 

petition to strike the judgment and remand for further proceedings. Since we 

hold that the judgment must be stricken, it is unnecessary for us to decide 

the other issues raised by Appellant, including his requests to open the 

judgment and to remand this case for an amended order.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/21/2022