59–006 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 114–608 

OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH ACCOUNTABILITY ACT 

OF 2015 

JUNE 8, 2016.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of 

the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. HENSARLING, from the Committee on Financial Services, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 3738] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Financial Services, to whom was referred the 

bill (H.R. 3738) to amend the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act to improve the transparency, accountability, governance, and operations of the Office of Financial Research, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report 

favorably thereon without amendment and recommend that the bill 

do pass. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

Introduced by Representative Royce on October 9, 2015, H.R. 

3738, the ‘‘Office of Financial Research Accountability Act of 2015,’’ 

amends Section 153 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 

Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111–203) to improve the operations 

of the Office of Financial Research (OFR). The legislation requires 

the OFR’s Director to, after a public notice and comment period, 

publish a detailed strategic plan concerning the priorities of the 

OFR for the upcoming fiscal year. Additionally, H.R. 3738 requires 

the OFR Director to, before issuing any public report with respect 

to a specific entity, class of entities, or financial product or service: 

(i) consult with and incorporate any changes provided by the federal department or agency with expertise in regulating the product 


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or entity and (ii) provide a period of 90 days for public notice and 

comment on the report after incorporating changes provided by the 

relevant federal agency. Finally, H.R. 3738 requires the OFR to develop and implement a cybersecurity plan that uses appropriate 

safeguards adequate to protect the data of the OFR. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is required to annually audit the 

OFR’s cybersecurity plan and its implementation. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act established the OFR as an office 

within the Treasury Department. The Dodd-Frank Act charges the 

OFR to collect and analyze financial transaction and position data 

in support of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The 

Dodd-Frank Act directs the OFR to create a Data Center and a Research and Analysis Center to do the following: • collect data and disseminate it to the FSOC and its member agencies; • standardize the types and formats of data reported and 

collected; • perform applied and essential long-term research; • develop tools for risk measurement and monitoring; and • make the results of its activities available to financial regulatory agencies. 

The Dodd-Frank Act requires the OFR to report annually to Congress on threats to the stability of the U.S. financial system, the 

OFR’s activities, and the key findings from the OFR’s research and 

analysis. In addition to these annual reports, the OFR also releases 

specific reports on subjects it has researched. 

The Dodd-Frank Act grants the OFR broad powers to compel the 

production of vast amounts of data from participants in the financial markets. The OFR has the authority to demand ‘‘all data necessary’’ from financial companies, including banks, hedge funds, 

private equity firms, and brokerages. The OFR can compel financial companies to produce sensitive, non-public information such as 

the identities of counterparties to credit default swaps, as well as 

information about individual loans, such as the interest rate and 

maturity. To compel the production of information, the OFR’s Director may issue subpoenas. Neither Congress nor the GAO has the 

ability to audit the OFR’s information technology systems to examine and evaluate the controls that protect the security of the data 

in the OFR’s possession. 

The OFR and Congressional oversight 

The OFR has the authority to set its own budget and to fund 

itself outside of the Congressional appropriations process. Since 

July 2012, the OFR has funded itself by levying assessments on 

bank holding companies that have total consolidated assets of $50 

billion or more and nonbank financial companies that the FSOC 

has designated for supervision by the Fed. 

Because the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the OFR to fund itself 

through the assessments it levies on financial institutions, the Act 

significantly limits the Congress’s oversight over the OFR. The 

OFR determines the size of its staff with no direction from Congress, and the salaries that the OFR pays its employees are not 

subject to the limits that govern the salaries of other government 


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employees. At the end of FY 2015, the OFR had 201 employees, 

more than six times the number of people it employed in FY 2011. 

In FY 2015, the OFR spent about $85 million; its estimated budget 

for FY 2016 is $99 million, a 16% increase. 

H.R. 3738 requires the OFR to provide the public with its an annual work plan that would include target dates for ‘significant actions’ and provide for public comments on that plan, but the legislation does not require the OFR to seek prior congressional approval for its annual work plan. The legislation ensures that the 

OFR works in concert with expert regulators to prepare its reports 

and provides agencies that have expertise in a matter subject to examination by the OFR with the opportunity to comment on the 

OFR’s work in advance of any public dissemination. 

The OFR’s controversial asset management report 

In 2012, the FSOC requested that the OFR study the asset management industry for potential risks to the financial system. On 

September 30, 2013, the OFR released its report and concluded 

that the asset management industry might pose a risk to financial 

stability—despite substantial data and analysis to support a contrary conclusion. The OFR’s asset management report was part of 

the FSOC’s decision-making process on whether to subject asset 

managers to heightened prudential standards and supervision by 

the Federal Reserve. The Treasury Department claimed that in 

conducting its research and writing its report, the OFR had ‘‘consulted extensively with Council [FSOC] member agencies.’’ 

But one of those agencies—the Securities Exchange Commission 

(SEC), which is the primary regulator for asset managers—had significant concerns about the OFR’s research and its report. The SEC 

was so troubled about the accuracy of the report that it took the 

unusual step of opening a comment period for it. As Reuters reported, the SEC: 

had been quietly advocating for major changes to the study 

for months, according to the sources. One of the SEC’s 

chief concerns stems from an earlier draft of the report 

that the agency felt exaggerated the riskiness of the business. The SEC has also been concerned that the people involved in the study lack a fundamental understanding of 

the fund industry itself, these people said. The Treasury’s 

research arm failed to take a number of the SEC’s critical 

feedback into account, said the sources. As a result, the 

SEC decided last week to issue the report for public comment, in a move designed to give the industry a way to 

vent, one person familiar with the matter said. 

During the comment period, market participants, financial experts, and interest groups expressed significant concerns about the 

OFR’s methodology and its conclusions. The overwhelming majority 

of comments described substantive concerns with the OFR’s analysis. For example, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 

Association (SIFMA) noted that the report ‘‘does not provide an accurate or comprehensive description of the asset management industry,’’ and pointed out that the ‘‘OFR appears to have used only 

a fraction of available data in its research.’’ The Investment Company Institute noted that ‘‘the OFR Study is replete with sweeping 


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conclusions unsupported by data; lacks clarity, precision, and consistency in its scope and focus; and misuses or misinterprets data.’’ 

Even groups that are normally advocates of increased government regulation faulted the OFR’s report. Better Markets castigated the OFR for ‘‘the inexplicably and indefensibly poor quality 

of the work presented in the Report.’’ Better Markets highlighted 

‘‘the inexcusable lack of transparency and disclosure regarding how 

and why the Report came about as well as how its analysis (such 

as it is) was conducted and with [whose] input and direction.’’ 

In fact, Barney Frank—the primary House author of the DoddFrank Act and the former Chairman of the Financial Services Committee—criticized the OFR’s conclusions. As the Wall Street Journal noted: 

Retired House Democrat Barney Frank is the last person on the planet you’d expect to criticize implementation 

of the 2010 law that bears his name. But there he was at 

a recent event hosted by the Clearing House trade group, 

suggesting that regulators ought to focus on banks instead 

of mutual-fund companies. According to the Clearing 

House, Mr. Frank said he did not favor designating such 

large asset managers as BlackRock or Fidelity as ‘‘systemically important’’ and that this was not the intent of his 

law. He added that ‘‘overloading the circuits isn’t a good 

idea’’ and said that the Financial Stability Oversight 

Council created by Dodd-Frank ‘‘has enough to do regulating the institutions that are clearly meant to be covered—the large banks.’’ Mr. Frank told the crowd, ‘‘I have 

not seen the argument made yet to cover’’ the ‘‘very plainvanilla asset managers.’’ 

Apparently in response to the significant criticism of the OFR 

Report, in July 2014 the FSOC announced that it would shift its 

focus to evaluating activities and products of the asset management industry rather than on designating specific entities as systemically important. In particular, the FSOC directed its staff to 

undertake a more focused analysis of industry-wide products and 

activities to assess potential risks associated with the asset management industry. 

HEARINGS

The Committee on Financial Services did not hold a hearing on 

H.R. 3738 though it has held several oversight hearings examining 

matters relating to the OFR’s operations. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Committee on Financial Services met in open session on November 3, 2015, and ordered H.R. 3738 to be reported favorably to 

the House without amendment by a recorded vote of 35 yeas to 22 

nays (recorded vote no. 71), a quorum being present. 

COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the record votes on the motion 

to report legislation and amendments thereto. The sole record vote 


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in Committee was a motion by Chairman Hensarling to report the 

bill favorably to the House without amendment. That motion was 

agreed to by a recorded vote of 35 yeas to 22 nays (record vote no. 

FC–71), a quorum being present. 


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COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the findings and recommendations of the committee based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in 

the descriptive portions of this report. 

PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee states that H.R. 3738 will bring 

accountability, oversight, and transparency to the OFR by requiring that its Director release a plan that highlights the OFR’s annual priorities; by mandating that the OFR consult with expert departments and agencies before issuing reports on entities or financial products and services; and by compelling the OFR to implement a cybersecurity plan. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND TAX

EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the following is the cost estimate provided by 

the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, May 3, 2016. 

Hon. JEB HENSARLING, 

Chairman, Committee on Financial Services, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3738, the Office of Financial Research Accountability Act of 2015. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sarah Puro. 

Sincerely, 

KEITH HALL. 

Enclosure. 


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H.R. 3738—Office of Financial Research Accountability Act of 2015 

Summary: H.R. 3738 would direct the Office of Financial Research (OFR) to develop a detailed work plan for the upcoming fiscal year and to publish all reports completed by the office’s researchers and financial analysts. In addition the bill would impose 

a new consultation requirement for all public reports produced by 

the OFR and would establish a formal notice and public comment 

period before the agency could issue a final report. Finally, under 

the bill, the OFR would prepare and implement a cybersecurity 

plan to protect the data the office possesses. The bill also would direct the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to audit the 

OFR’s cybersecurity plan and its implementation. 

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3738 would increase direct 

spending by $32 million and revenues by $28 million over the 

2017–2026 period. On net, CBO estimates that enacting the bill 

would increase budget deficits by $4 million over the 10-year period. Pay-as-you-go procedures apply because enacting the legislation would affect direct spending and revenues. 

CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase 

net direct spending or on-budget deficits by more than $5 billion 

in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027. 

H.R. 3738 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) 

and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary effect of H.R. 3738 is shown in the following table. The costs 

of this legislation fall within budget function 370 (commerce and 

housing credit). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2016– 

2021 

2016– 

2026 

INCREASES IN DIRECT SPENDING 

Office of Financial Research 

Estimated Budget Authority ... 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 15 32 

Estimated Outlays .................. 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 15 32 

INCREASES IN REVENUES 

Estimated Revenues ....................... 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 12 28 

NET INCREASE IN THE DEFICIT FROM CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES 

Impact on Deficit ............................ 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 

Basis of estimate: For the purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be enacted by the end of fiscal year 2016 

and that spending will follow historical patterns for operations of 

the OFR. 

Direct spending 

H.R. 3738 would require the OFR to develop and publish an annual work plan that includes schedules and other information for 

each report, study, working paper, grant, guidance, data collection, 

or request for information expected to be underway or commenced 

during the coming year. The annual work plan would be subject to 

a public comment period before being adopted. In addition, each of 

roughly 200 papers and reports produced each year would be subVerDate Sep 11 2014 05:20 Jun 11, 2016 Jkt 059006 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR608.XXX HR608

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ject to new review, publication, and consultation requirements. On 

the basis of information from the OFR, CBO estimates that implementing those new requirements would cost about $2.5 million a 

year. CBO estimates that preparing the annual report on cybersecurity matters would cost less than $500,000 annually. 

Revenues 

Under current law, the OFR levies assessments on certain financial institutions to cover expenses incurred by the office. During fiscal year 2016 the OFR plans to make assessments of about $100 

million. Because the bill would increase costs to the OFR, CBO estimates that there would be corresponding increases in assessments. Reflecting the procedures that the OFR uses to set the assessment rates, CBO estimates that the change in assessments 

would occur about one year after the costs were incurred. As a result, CBO estimates that enacting the bill would increase revenues 

by $28 million over the 2017–2026 period. 

Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act 

of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement procedures 

for legislation affecting direct spending or revenues. The net 

changes in outlays and revenues that are subject to those pay-asyou-go procedures are shown in the following table. 

CBO ESTIMATE OF PAY-AS-YOU-GO EFFECTS FOR H.R. 3738, AS ORDERED REPORTED BY THE 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES ON NOVEMBER 4, 2015 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2016– 

2021 

2016– 

2026 

NET INCREASE IN THE DEFICIT 

Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Impact .... 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 4 

Memorandum: 

Changes in Outlays ............... 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 15 32 

Changes in Revenues ............ 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 12 28 

Increase in long term direct spending and deficits: CBO estimates that enacting the legislation would not increase net direct 

spending or on-budget deficits by more than $5 billion in any of the 

four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2027. 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 3738 contains 

no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in 

UMRA and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal 

governments. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Sarah Puro; Impact on 

State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Leo Lex; Impact on the Private Sector: Logan Smith. 

Estimate approved by: H. Samuel Papenfuss, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 

pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 


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ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. 

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of the section 102(b)(3) of the 

Congressional Accountability Act. 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

H.R. 3738 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited 

tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clause 9 of rule 

XXI. 

DUPLICATION OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Pursuant to section 3(g) of H. Res. 5, 114th Cong. (2015), the 

Committee states that no provision of H.R. 3738 establishes or reauthorizes a program of the Federal Government known to be duplicative of another Federal program, a program that was included 

in any report from the Government Accountability Office to Congress pursuant to section 21 of Public Law 111–139, or a program 

related to a program identified in the most recent Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance. 

DISCLOSURE OF DIRECTED RULEMAKING

Pursuant to section 3(i) of H. Res. 5, 114th Cong. (2015), the 

Committee states that H.R. 3738 contains no directed rulemakings. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short title 

This section cites H.R. 3738 as the ‘‘Office of Financial Research 

Accountability Act of 2015.’’ 

Section 2. Additional duties of the Office of Financial Research 

Amends Section 152 of the Dodd-Frank Act to require that the 

Director of OFR publish a detailed strategic plan that includes (i) 

a unique alphanumeric identifier and detailed description of any 

report or working paper that is expected to be in progress or started during the upcoming year, (ii) a target date for each item listed, 

(iii) a list of all technical and professional advisory committees that 

is expected to be convened in the upcoming fiscal year, (iv) the 

name and professional affiliation of each individual who served 

during the previous fiscal year as an academic or professional fellow, and (v) a detailed description of the progress made by primary 

financial regulatory agencies in adopting the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI). 

Requires that the Director, prior to releasing a public report on 

any specified entity, class or entities, or financial product or service, consult with any Federal Department or agency with expertise 

in regulating the entity, class of entities, or financial product or 

service and incorporate an explanation of any changes made as a 


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result of the consultation. Requires that the OFR provide a 90 day 

period for public notice and comment, prior to the release of any 

public report. 

Requires the OFR to develop and implement a cybersecurity plan 

that uses appropriate safeguards adequate to protect the data of 

the OFR. The Government Accountability Office shall annually 

audit OFR’s cybersecurity plan and its implementation. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (new matter is printed in italic 

and existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 

PROTECTION ACT 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE I—FINANCIAL STABILITY 

* * * * * * * 

Subtitle B—Office of Financial Research 

* * * * * * * 

SEC. 153. PURPOSE AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE. 

(a) PURPOSE AND DUTIES.—The purpose of the Office is to support the Council in fulfilling the purposes and duties of the Council, as set forth in subtitle A, and to support member agencies, by— 

(1) collecting data on behalf of the Council, and providing 

such data to the Council and member agencies; 

(2) standardizing the types and formats of data reported and 

collected; 

(3) performing applied research and essential long-term research; 

(4) developing tools for risk measurement and monitoring; 

(5) performing other related services; 

(6) making the results of the activities of the Office available 

to financial regulatory agencies; and 

(7) assisting such member agencies in determining the types 

and formats of data authorized by this Act to be collected by 

such member agencies. 

(b) ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY.—The Office may— 

(1) share data and information, including software developed 

by the Office, with the Council, member agencies, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which shared data, information, 

and software— 

(A) shall be maintained with at least the same level of 

security as is used by the Office; and 

(B) may not be shared with any individual or entity 

without the permission of the Council; 

(2) sponsor and conduct research projects; and 


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(3) assist, on a reimbursable basis, with financial analyses 

undertaken at the request of other Federal agencies that are 

not member agencies. 

(c) RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.— 

(1) SCOPE.—The Office, in consultation with the Chairperson, 

shall issue rules, regulations, and orders only to the extent 

necessary to carry out the purposes and duties described in 

paragraphs (1), (2), and (7) of subsection (a). 

(2) STANDARDIZATION.—Member agencies, in consultation 

with the Office, shall implement regulations promulgated by 

the Office under paragraph (1) to standardize the types and 

formats of data reported and collected on behalf of the Council, 

as described in subsection (a)(2). If a member agency fails to 

implement such regulations prior to the expiration of the 3- 

year period following the date of publication of final regulations, the Office, in consultation with the Chairperson, may implement such regulations with respect to the financial entities 

under the jurisdiction of the member agency. This paragraph 

shall not supersede or interfere with the independent authority 

of a member agency under other law to collect data, in such 

format and manner as the member agency requires. 

(d) TESTIMONY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Office shall report to 

and testify before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial 

Services of the House of Representatives annually on the activities of the Office, including the work of the Data Center 

and the Research and Analysis Center, and the assessment of 

the Office of significant financial market developments and potential emerging threats to the financial stability of the United 

States. 

(2) NO PRIOR REVIEW.—No officer or agency of the United 

States shall have any authority to require the Director to submit the testimony required under paragraph (1) or other congressional testimony to any officer or agency of the United 

States for approval, comment, or review prior to the submission of such testimony. Any such testimony to Congress shall 

include a statement that the views expressed therein are those 

of the Director and do not necessarily represent the views of 

the President. 

(e) ADDITIONAL REPORTS.—The Director may provide additional 

reports to Congress concerning the financial stability of the United 

States. The Director shall notify the Council of any such additional 

reports provided to Congress. 

(f) SUBPOENA.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Director may require from a financial 

company, by subpoena, the production of the data requested 

under subsection (a)(1) and section 154(b)(1), but only upon a 

written finding by the Director that— 

(A) such data is required to carry out the functions described under this subtitle; and 

(B) the Office has coordinated with the relevant primary 

financial regulatory agency, as required under section 

154(b)(1)(B)(ii). 


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(2) FORMAT.—Subpoenas under paragraph (1) shall bear the 

signature of the Director, and shall be served by any person or 

class of persons designated by the Director for that purpose. 

(3) ENFORCEMENT.—In the case of contumacy or failure to 

obey a subpoena, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of 

any appropriate district court of the United States. Any failure 

to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court 

as a contempt of court. 

(g) ADDITIONAL DUTIES.— 

(1) ANNUAL WORK PLAN.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Director shall, after a period of 60 

days for public notice and comment, annually publish a detailed work plan concerning the priorities of the Office for 

the upcoming fiscal year. 

(B) REQUIREMENTS.—The work plan shall include the 

following: 

(i) A unique alphanumeric identifier and detailed description of any report, study, working paper, grant, 

guidance, data collection, or request for information 

that is expected to be in progress during, or scheduled 

to begin in, the upcoming fiscal year. 

(ii) For each item listed under clause (i), a target 

date for any significant actions related to such item, 

including the target date— 

(I) for the release of a report, study, or working 

paper; 

(II) for, and topics of, a meeting of a working 

paper group and each solicitation of applications 

for grants; and 

(III) for the issuance of guidance, data collections, or requests for information. 

(iii) A list of all technical and professional advisory 

committees that is expected to be convened in the upcoming fiscal year pursuant to section 152(h). 

(iv) The name and professional affiliations of each 

individual who served during the previous fiscal year 

as an academic or professional fellow pursuant to section 152(i). 

(v) A detailed description of the progress made by 

primary financial regulatory agencies in adopting a 

unique alphanumeric system to identify legally distinct 

entities that engage in financial transactions (commonly known as a ‘‘Legal Entity Identifier’’), including 

a list of regulations requiring the use of such a system 

and actions taken to ensure the adoption of such a system by primary financial regulatory agencies. 

(2) PUBLIC REPORTS.— 

(A) CONSULTATION.—In preparing any public report with 

respect to a specified entity, class of entities, or financial 

product or service, the Director shall consult with any Federal department or agency with expertise in regulating the 

entity, class of entities, or financial product or service. 

(B) REPORT REQUIREMENTS.—A public report described 

in subparagraph (A) shall include— 


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(i) an explanation of any changes made as a result 

of a consultation under this subparagraph and, with 

respect to any changes suggested in such consultation 

that were not made, the reasons that the Director did 

not incorporate such changes; and 

(ii) information on the date, time, and nature of such 

consultation. 

(C) NOTICE AND COMMENT.—Before issuing any public report described in subparagraph (A), the Director shall provide a period of 90 days for public notice and comment on 

the report. 

(3) CYBERSECURITY PLAN.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Office shall develop and implement a cybersecurity plan that uses appropriate safeguards 

that are adequate to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the data in the possession of the Office. 

(B) GAO REVIEW.—The Comptroller General of the 

United States shall annually audit the cybersecurity plan 

and its implementation described in subparagraph (A). 

* * * * * * * 


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MINORITY VIEWS 

H.R. 3738 is part of a larger legislative effort to undermine the 

government entities tasked with monitoring and responding to systemic risks to our financial stability and economy. This bill amends 

the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 

to add burdens to the Office of Financial Research (OFR), the research arm of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 

that apply to no other federal regulator or agency. Specifically, the 

bill would require the OFR to disclose its research agenda ahead 

of time by publishing an annual work plan that includes a detailed 

description of all reports, studies, working papers, grants, guidance, data collection requests. This bill would also likely undermine 

the feedback the OFR receives from other regulators, by requiring 

OFR to publicly disclose everything the primary regulator suggested and why the OFR did not accept those suggestions. 

Requiring the OFR to disclose its research agenda with this level 

of specificity is unusual, unnecessary, and counterproductive. It is 

not the practice of any other research organization, and for good 

reason. All of the research that OFR plans to perform could be 

completely undermined. Individuals may not participate in OFR’s 

studies if deliberations and internal discussions would have to be 

disclosed. Furthermore, OFR staff suggested that the bill is also 

likely to lead to less collaboration between regulators because regulators are less likely to provide candid responses if the OFR would 

be required to publicly disagree with them. And finally, H.R. 3738 

could potentially affect the U.S. financial markets; even alarm 

them—if OFR publicly reported that it is studying the effects on financial stability of a certain financial product or practice, the markets may respond even before OFR could conclude that there was 

no effect on financial stability. 

Because this bill makes it harder for the OFR to identify systemic risks to our economy, we oppose H.R. 3738. 

MAXINE WATERS. 

JOHN C. CARNEY, Jr. 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA. 

GREGORY W. MEEKS. 

WM. LACY CLAY. 

KEITH ELLISON. 

DENNY HECK. 

AL GREEN. 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH. 

GWEN MOORE. CAROLYN B. MALONEY. JOYCE BEATTY. 

Æ 


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