DLD-295 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2147

___________

MARK C. MEADE,

 Appellant

v.

KIDDIE ACADEMY DOMESTIC FRANCHISING, LLC; CIT GROUP INC; 

WILLIAM ENDRES; GREGORY HELWIG; MICHAEL MILLER; STEVEN TROY; 

SUSAN WISE; MARK E. MORENO

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-04077)

District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

September 27, 2012

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 15, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Mark C. Meade, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint. Because this 
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appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District 

Court’s order. See

In March 2006, Meade established the Dasoda Corporation (“Dasoda”) in order to 

open a franchise of Kiddie Academy Domestic Franchising LLC (“Kiddie Academy”), a 

franchisor of child care learning centers. That November, Dasoda and Kiddie Academy 

entered into a franchise agreement for the operation of a center in Jackson, New Jersey. 

CIT Group loaned Dasoda funds to purchase and operate the franchise. It appears that 

Dasoda’s business venture was unsuccessful. 

3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

Meade initially filed the underlying complaint in the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Morris County, against Kiddie Academy and several of its 

employees (the “Kiddie Academy Defendants”).1

 1 This is Meade’s second complaint against these defendants. On February 16, 

2011, he commenced an action in the District Court that contained many of the same 

allegations, but, by order entered October 25, 2011, the District Court dismissed the 

complaint on the grounds that Meade failed to satisfy the applicable pleading 

requirements, he lacked standing to file the suit, his claims were subject to arbitration 

provisions in the franchise agreement, and the District Court was the wrong forum for his 

action. Meade v. Kiddie Academy Domestic Franchising, No. 11-cv-0900, 2011 WL 

5104501 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2011).

 Meade claimed that the Kiddie 

Academy Defendants made various fraudulent statements and misrepresentations in order 

to induce him to sign the franchise agreement. For example, Meade claimed that the 

Kiddie Academy Defendants had grossly overstated the financial performance data and 

misrepresented the costs of operating the business. Meade also claimed that the Kiddie 

Academy Defendants had breached various terms of the agreement by, for example, 
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failing to assist him with finding a location for his franchise, and failing to assist with 

teacher instruction, classroom set up, training, and licensing requirements. Meade’s 

complaint set forth a host of other alleged wrongdoings by the Kiddie Academy 

Defendants, including violations of state consumer rights laws, federal racketeering 

violations, bank fraud, and more. Meade sought approximately eight million dollars in 

damages from the Kiddie Academy Defendants, as well as an injunction to stop the sale 

of all Kiddie Academy franchises in the state of New Jersey. In addition to the Kiddie 

Academy Defendants, Meade also named as defendants CIT Group and one of its former 

employees (the “CIT Group Defendants”). Meade sought more than two million dollars 

in damages from the CIT Group Defendants. The Kiddie Academy Defendants removed 

the complaint to the District Court on July 15, 2011. 

 The Kiddie Academy Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds 

that, inter alia

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 

plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order. 

, Meade did not have standing to seek damages for injuries sustained by 

Dasoda. The CIT Group Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Meade’s 

purported fraud allegations did not satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 9(b). By order entered March 28, 2012, the District Court granted the 

defendants’ motions and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed. 

Marcavage v. Nat’l Park Serv., 

666 F.3d 856, 858 (3d Cir. 2012). Dismissal is proper if a party fails to allege sufficient 

factual matter, which if accepted as true, could “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
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its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We may summarily affirm if the appeal presents 

no substantial question. See

The District Court properly granted the Kiddie Academy Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. We need not address each basis for the District Court’s decision to dismiss the 

complaint, as it is clear to us that Meade lacked standing to pursue this suit. It is well 

established that, absent a direct individual injury, the president and principal shareholder 

of a corporation lacks standing to sue for an injury to the corporation. 

3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

See, e.g., Jones v. 

Niagara Frontier Transp. Authority (NFTA)

The District Court also properly granted the CIT Group Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. We have reviewed the complaint, and agree with the District Court that Meade 

failed to specifically identify any wrongful act or omission by either CIT Group or its 

employees. Therefore, for substantially the same reasons provided by the District Court, 

Meade failed to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). 

, 836 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1987) 

(explaining that, even though the plaintiff shareholder may have faced the risk of 

financial loss as a result of injuries to the corporation, “[a] shareholder—even the sole 

shareholder—does not have standing to assert claims alleging wrongs to the 

corporation”). Because Meade’s claims all involved injuries to Dasoda stemming from 

the franchise agreement between Dasoda and Kiddie Academy, and because Meade did 

not allege that the Kiddie Academy Defendants took any actions against him in his 

individual capacity, he did not have standing to sue for injuries sustained by Dasoda. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
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9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake.”); see also In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 

this appeal. 

, 618 F.3d 

300, 348 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the “heightened pleading requirements” of Rule 

9(b)). 

See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. We have considered Meade’s arguments in support 

of the appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we will summarily 

affirm the District Court’s judgment.