Selected Works 

of 

General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA 

Tenth Chairman 

of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

22 June 1982—30 September 1985 

JO INT

S TA F

CH

F

I E FS OF

Joint History Office 

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Washington, DC ♦ 2008 

PREFACE 

This book presents material drawn from the public record of General John W. 

Vessey’s service—22 June 1982 through 30 September 1985—as the Tenth Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Arranged in chronological order, the material is drawn from his 

speeches, Congressional testimony, published articles, selected correspondence and 

interviews. It reflects General Vessey’s work to rebuild and upgrade the armed forces of 

the United States. Of particular interest are his efforts to improve the quality of the Joint 

Staff and his emphasis upon the importance of the unified and specified commands which 

foreshadowed important provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act of 1986. 

Selection of the volume’s contents was the responsibility of the Joint History 

Office and Major General Julian Burns, USA (Ret.), who had served on General Vessey’s 

staff. Special thanks to Ms. Jacqueline Burns for typing portions of the text and to 

Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Brooks and Ms. Penny Norman of the Joint History Office for 

preparing this manuscript for publication. This volume is an official publication of the 

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been 

considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, its contents do not represent the official position 

of the current Chairman or of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

BIOGRAPHY 

John William Vessey, Jr., was born in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on 

June 29, 1922. In May 1939, thirteen months before graduating from 

Roosevelt High School, he enlisted in the Minnesota National Guard as a 

motorcycle rider. 

During World War II, General Vessey served with the 34th Infantry 

Division as First Sergeant of a field artillery battery in the North African 

and early Italian campaigns. He was commissioned a second lieutenant 

of field artillery at the Anzio beachhead and continued with the 34th

Division until the end of the war in Italy. 

After the war, most of Vessey’s service continued to be in field 

artillery assignments. In the 1950s he served with the 4th Infantry 

Division in Germany and the Eighth US Army in the Republic of Korea. 

During this period he also attended the Command and General Staff 

College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

General Vessey received a Bachelor of Science degree and Master 

of Science from George Washington University while he commanded the 

2nd Battalion, 73rd Field Artillery in the 3rd Armored Division; then he 

spent a year as a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 

In Vietnam, General Vessey served as Executive Officer of the 25th

Infantry Division Artillery. In March 1967, while acting as Commander 

of the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, he received the Distinguished Service 

Cross and the Battalion received the Presidential Unit Citation for 

actions during Operation JUNCTION CITY. 

From Vietnam, he went to Germany, to serve as Commander of the 

3rd Armored Division Artillery from October 1967 until March 1969 and 

then as Division Chief of Staff for a year. He went back to Southeast 

Asia in December 1970 to head the US Army Support Command, 

Thailand. In January 1972 he went into Laos to coordinate all US 

military operations in support of the war in Laos. 

Upon his return to the United States, General Vessey became 

Director of Operations in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations and Plans. In August 1974 he assumed command of the 4th

Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado. He became the 

Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans in September 

1975. 

From 1976 to 1979 General Vessey served as Commanding 

General of the Eighth US Army; Commander of US Forces, Korea; and 

Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. In 1978 he 

became the first Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of Korea-United 

States Combined Forces Command. 

From July 1979 until June 1982 General Vessey served as Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army. 
On 18 June 1982 he became the tenth Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the last World War II combat veteran to serve in the 

position. During his tenure there was increased emphasis on 

decentralization. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger authorized 

General Vessey to direct military operations on the Secretary’s behalf. 

He oversaw execution of the operation that rescued US citizens and 

brought a pro-US government into power. 

There was also an increased emphasis on space as a theater of 

operations. In early 1983 the Joint Chiefs mentioned to President 

Reagan that defense against nuclear missiles might be technically 

feasible in the next century and on 23 March 1983 he announced his 

vision of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Realizing the enormous 

military advantages to be gained from operations in space and to support 

SDI, the JCS recommended the establishment of a unified command for 

space. US Space Command was activated on 23 September 1985. 

General Vessey retired on 30 September 1985 at the age of 63, 

several months before the expiration of his second term as Chairman. 

He was the last four-star World War II combat veteran on active duty 

and, with 46 years of service, had served the longest of anyone then in 

the Army. General Vessey was the only Chairman who had been neither 

a Service Chief nor commander of a unified or specified command. 
PROMOTIONS DATES

 Temporary Permanent 

2LT 06 May 44 

1LT 01 Apr 46 13 Jun 51 

CPT 04 Jan 51 29 Oct 54 

MAJ 14 May 58 26 Jan 62 

LTC 07 Jan 63 02 Jan 69 

COL 28 Nov 67 12 Mar 73 

BG 01 Apr 71 23 Dec 74 

MG 01 Aug 74 23 Aug 76 

LTG 01 Sep 75 

GEN 01 Nov 76 

ASSIGNMENTS DATES

 From To 

National Guard enlisted service 1939 1944 

34th Division Artillery, Camp Claiborne, LA, 

 Northern Ireland, North Africa, and Italy as S/Sgt, 

 1st Sgt, and then battlefield commission to 2Lt 

 (Communications Officer/Forward Observer/ 

 Air Observer) 1941 1945 

US Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK 1945 1949 

Student, Field Artillery Officers Advanced Course, 

 Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK 1949 1950 

Battery Officer; then Battery Commander, 18th Field 

 Artillery, Fort Sill, OK 1950 1951 

Assistant S-3 and Liaison Officer; then Headquarters 

 Battery Commander; then Assistant S-3 and 

 Liaison Officer, 4th Infantry Division Artillery, 

 US Army Europe 1951 1954 

Student, Artillery Officer Advanced Course, 

 Artillery and Guided Missile School, Fort Sill, OK 1954 1955 

Battery Commander, Artillery and Guided Missile 

 School Officer Candidate School 1955 1956 

Gunnery Instructor, Artillery and Guided Missile 

 School, Fort Sill, OK 1956 1957 

Student, US Army Command and General 

 Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 1957 1958 

Artillery Section 8th US Army with duty station CINCPAC 

 Coordination Center, Philippines 1958 1958 

Chief, Operations Branch, Artillery Section, 

 8th US Army, Korea 1958 1959 

Assignment Officer, then Executive Officer, 

 Artillery Officers Division, Office of Deputy Chief 

 of Staff for Personnel, Washington, DC 1959 1963 

Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA 1963 1963 
Commander, 2nd Battalion, 73rd Artillery, 3rd Armored 

 Division, US Army Europe 1963 1965 

Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 

 Washington, DC 1965 1966 

Executive Officer, 25th Infantry Division Artillery, 

 Vietnam 1966 1967 

Commander, 3rd Armored Division Artillery, US Army 

 Europe 1967 1969 

Chief of Staff, 3rd Armored Division, US Army Europe 1969 1970 

Student, US Army Primary Helicopter School, 

 Fort Wolters, TX; later US Army Aviation 

 School, Fort Rucker, AL 1970 1970 

Commanding General, US Army Support 

 Command, Thailand 1970 1971 

Deputy Chief, JUSMAGTHAI (Chief MAAG, Laos) 1972 1973 

Director of Operations, Office Deputy Chief of Staff for 

 Operations and Plans, Washington, DC 1973 1974 

Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division 

 (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO 1974 1975 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, US Army, 

 Washington, DC 1975 1976 

Commanding General, 8th US Army; and Commander 

 in Chief, US Forces, Korea; and Commander in Chief, 

 United Nations Command; and (1978) Commander 

 in Chief, Republic of Korea-United States Combined 

 Forces Command, Korea 1976 1979 

Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC 1979 1982 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC 1982 1985 

PRINCIPAL US MILITARY DECORATIONS 

Distinguished Service Cross 

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with oak leaf cluster) 

Army Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 oak leaf clusters) 

Navy Distinguished Service Medal 

Air Force Distinguished Service Medal 

Legion of Merit (with oak leaf cluster) 

Bronze Star (with oak leaf cluster) 

Air Medal (with 4 oak leaf clusters) 

Joint Service Commendation Medal 

Army Commendation Medal (with “V” device) 

Purple Heart 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 

DATE PAGE

1982 Selected Works 1 

11 May 82 Statement—Senate Armed Services Committee 

Confirmation Hearings for General John W. Vessey, 

Jr., USA as Tenth Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

22 Jun 82 Remarks—Ceremony in Honor of General John W. 

Vessey, Jr. as the new Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Pentagon, Washington, DC 

14 Oct 82 Address—Dwight Eisenhower Society, Gettysburg, 

Pennsylvania 

16 Oct 82 Letter to an American Citizen in Massachusetts 

22 Oct 82 Speech—Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce 

3 Nov 82 Address—The Navy League, New York City, NY 

10 Nov 82 Remarks—From a Letter to the President of the 

Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund 

8 Dec 82 Statement—Senate Armed Services Committee on 

the PEACEKEEPER ICBM Program 

1983 Selected Works 15 

5 Jan 83 Remarks—Activation Ceremony of U.S. Central 

Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

8 Jan 83 Remarks—Winter Commencement Exercises, 

University of Maryland, College Park, MD 

Jan 83 Interview with National Guard Magazine 

1 Feb 83 Statement—Senate Armed Services Committee on 

the FY 84 DOD Authorization 

3 Feb 83 Remarks—The National Prayer Breakfast, 

Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC 
24 Feb 83 Address—The Economic Club of Chicago, Chicago, 

IL 

25 Feb 83 Remarks—Naval Recruit Graduation Review, Recruit 

Training Command, Naval Training Center, Great 

Lakes, IL 

19 Mar 83 Remarks—General Mark Clark Volunteers 42nd

Annual Banquet, Charleston, SC 

28 Mar 83 Interview in US News and World Report

21 Apr 83 Statement—House Armed Services Committee on 

Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization 

9 May 83 Address—Prayer Breakfast, St Paul, MN 

9 May 83 Address—Minnesota Meeting, St Paul, MN 

13 May 83 Remarks—New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, New 

Orleans, LA 

25 May 83 Remarks—U.S. Southern Command Change of 

Command Ceremony, Howard Air Force Base, 

Panama 

May 83 Portion of Interview for Armed Forces Journal

10 Jun 83 Address—National Defense University Foundation, 

Fort McNair, Washington, DC 

14 Jun 83 Statement—House Armed Services Committee, 

Subcommittee on Investigations, on JCS 

Organization 

24 Jun 83 Remarks at the Graduation Ceremony for the 

Empire State Military Academy, Camp Smith, 

Peekskill, NY 

30 Jun 83 Address—25th Division Officers and Men Breakfast, 

Schofield Barracks, HI 

5 Aug 83 Remarks—Opening Ceremonies for the 22nd Class of 

the U.S. Army Command Sergeants Major Academy, 

Fort Bliss, TX 
16 Aug 83 Remarks—84th National Convention, Veterans of 

Foreign Wars, New Orleans, LA 

17 Aug 83 Remarks—Extract from 88th Annual National 

Convention, Jewish War Veterans of the United 

States, Atlanta, GA 

Sep 83 Portion of Interview with USA Today Newspaper 

4 Nov 83 Remarks before the Union League Club of New York 

6 Nov 83 Interview—NBC News’ Meet The Press, Washington, 

DC 

22 Nov 83 Remarks—Banquet of the Korean-American 

Association, Seoul, Korea 

1984 Selected Works 97 

4 Jan 84 Address-White House Outreach Working Group on 

Central America, Old Executive Office Building, 

Washington, DC 

31 Jan 84 Opening Remarks—Senate Armed Services 

Committee, on the FY 85 DOD Authorization 

2 Feb 84 Statement—House Foreign Affairs Committee, on the 

FY 85 DOD Authorization 

9 Feb 84 Statement—House Foreign Affairs Committee, on the 

FY 84 and 85 Security Assistance Program 

22 Feb 84 Remarks—Society of the Sons of the Revolution at 

the Annual Banquet in Honor of the Birthday of 

George Washington, Richmond, VA 

15 Mar 84 Remarks before the Association of The United States 

Army, Fort Hood, Texas 

29 Mar 84 A Letter to the Army Aviation Association of America 

26 Apr 84 Address—Annual Convention of the Society of 

Military Engineers, St. Paul, MN 

May 84 Portion of Interview with Sea Power Magazine 
2 Jun 84 Remarks—40th Anniversary of the Liberation of 

Rome, Rome, Italy 

15 Jun 84 Remarks—St. Louis Regional Commerce and Growth 

Association/Air Force Association Luncheon and 

Mid-America Ball, St. Louis, MO 

20 Jun 84 Remarks—Joint Staff Action Officer Orientation 

Program, Pentagon, Washington, DC 

21 Jun 84 Remarks—Combined 1984 Graduating Classes of 

the Naval War College, Newport, RI 

27 Jun 84 Portion of Interview in EURONET By Harry Ellis, 

USIA Washington, DC 

7 Jul 84 Remarks—Symposium of the American Academy of 

Achievement, Minneapolis, MN 

12 Jul 84 Remarks—8th Annual Planners Conference, Armed 

Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA 

Jul 84 From a Letter to the Veterans of the Second Polish 

Corps on the Fortieth Anniversary of the Victory at 

Monte Cassino, Italy 

9 Aug 84 Remarks—At a Dinner in Honor of General El Orabi, 

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Arab 

Republic of Egypt, Fort Myer, Virginia 

21 Aug 84 Address—Society of Logistics Engineers, 

Minneapolis, MN 

21 Sep 84 Remarks—Indian National Defense College Visiting 

Students, Pentagon, Washington, DC 

26 Oct 84 Extract from Remarks on the 126th Birthday of 

Theodore Roosevelt, National Defense University, 

Washington, DC 

Oct 84 Article—Introduction for the 106th General 

Conference Journal of the National Guard 

Association 
2 Nov 84 Remarks—Annual Banquet of Alumni of Supreme 

Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), 

Washington, DC 

12 Nov 84 Remarks—World Peace Luncheon, National Veterans 

Day, Birmingham, AL 

19 Nov 84 Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

on Enhanced CINC Participation in the PPBS 

Nov-Dec

84

Article—Defense 84—“On the Front Lines of 

Deterrence” 

1985 Selected Works 183 

14 Jan 85 Remarks—People’s Liberation Army Military 

Academy, Beijing, People’s Republic of China 

20 Jan 85 Remarks—Congressional Medal of Honor Society 

Presidential Inaugural Day Brunch, Washington, DC 

7 Feb 85 Closing Remarks to the Senate Budget Committee on

the FY 86 DOD Authorization, Washington, DC 

7 Feb 85 Remarks—Birmingham City Command of the 

Salvation Army, Birmingham, AL 

28 Feb 85 Remarks—Chevy Chase Club, Chevy Chase, MD 

7 Mar 85 Statement—Senate Appropriations Committee, on 

the Strategic Nuclear Modernization Program 

11 Apr 85 Remarks—Atlanta Community Leaders Luncheon, 

Atlanta, GA 

12 Apr 85 Letter of Resignation to Honorable Ronald Reagan, 

President of the United States, Washington, DC 

18 May 85 Extract from an Address—Commencement 

Exercises, Norwich University Graduation, 

Northfield, VT 

7 Jun 85 Address—Commencement Ceremonies for 1984-

1985 Class, Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 
21 Jun 85 Letter of Response to the Investigations 

Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 

on JCS Reorganization, House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC 

25 Jun 85 Statement—Senate Appropriations Committee, 

Defense Subcommittee, on the FY 86 DOD 

Appropriations 

7 Aug 85 From a Letter to an American Citizen in California 

23 Sep 85 Remarks—Activation of U.S. Space Command, 

Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, CO 

30 Sep 85 Remarks—Retirement Ceremony for General John 

W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Andrews AFB, MD 
1982 

Selected Works 

Confirmation Hearing before the 

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

On Appointment of General John W. Vessey, Jr. 

As Tenth Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

11 May 1982 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am honored to be here 

today, but I must tell you that I am also humbled and quite surprised to have 

been chosen for this job. 

As Senator Durenberger said, I have been in the military service quite a 

long time—over 41 years of active service. I have risen to a rank that is far 

higher than any I ever expected or hoped to achieve. 

I realize that the promotions I have had are due to the fact that I have 

had some of the best people in the world working for me and due to the fact 

that I have had the honor to work for and with some of the finest military 

officers in the world. 

When I look at the job of Chairman and the giants who have held the job 

in the past—including my friend, Dave Jones—I frankly asked myself the 

question: “Why in the world am I here?” Nevertheless, the President did ask 

me to take this job and I accept the duties without reservation. I think that I 

understand fairly well the duties and the grave responsibilities involved. 

I pledge to you that, if confirmed by the Senate, I will carry out those 

duties as well and as faithfully as my abilities permit. 

I also understand the grave responsibilities of this Committee to help 

provide defense for the United States, and I pledge to you that I will work 

openly and honestly with you to help you inform the Congress and, through 

the Congress, the American people about the very important defense issues 

that this country faces. 

1 
Address at PENTAGON HONORS CEREMONY 

For General John W. Vessey, Jr. 

As Tenth Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Washington, DC 

22 June 1982 

Mr. Secretary, my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, distinguished 

guests, and soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen. 

At the turn of the century when Elihu Root was instituting his reforms, 

something he said gave the Army War College its motto. He said, “We study 

war not to promote war but to preserve the peace.” 

These fine men and women out here today represent two million men 

and women in the Active forces and over 900,000 men and women in the 

National Guard and Reserve forces—soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, Coast 

Guardsmen—who study war not because they want to but because they realize 

that their dedication, their training, their discipline, and their willingness to do 

what the citizens of this country want them to do—risk their lives to defend our 

values—comprise an important instrument for the President of the United 

States, the people of the United States, and you, Mr. Secretary, to preserve the 

peace. And, I can tell you they will work very hard at it. Thank you. 

Address to the 

DWIGHT EISENHOWER SOCIETY 

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 

14 October 1982 

It is an honor to join in paying tribute to one of this nation’s greatest 

soldier-statesmen, Dwight Eisenhower. His place of honor in our military 

history is inscribed forever as the Supreme Commander of the victorious allied 

forces in Europe. As time goes on, however, it is important to recall the totality 

of his contribution to the Nation. The breadth of skills and depth of dedication 

that he brought to his WW II task should serve to inspire us all to meet our 

own obligations as citizens of this great nation. 

Called to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor and put in charge of the 

Army’s War Plans Division, General Eisenhower had the vision and courage to 

champion the setting of strategic priorities while others wanted to fight 

everywhere at once. His capacity for leadership was awesome as Commander 

in Chief during the Allied invasions of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, as well as 

the Normandy landing and the final push into Germany. Not only did he plan 

and coordinate the most massive military operations the world had ever 

known, he did so by harmonizing the efforts of a set of brilliant but strong2 
willed commanders. At the same time, he was instrumental in convincing 

Allied governments with sometimes divergent goals to pull together in executing 

a forceful and coherent strategy. General Eisenhower was indeed the 

consummate multinational military commander. And having performed in 

similar roles, I have a great appreciation for what he was able to do. 

President Eisenhower, who knew well the horrors of war, was a man of 

peace. But he also knew from experience that in a less than perfect world 

peace could only be maintained through the military strength necessary to 

deter would-be aggressors, and that free nations would have to pull together to 

provide that strength. His strategy of peace through strength, our own in the 

United States as well as alliance strength and solidarity, included a strong 

nuclear deterrent, an alliance structure—particularly NATO—to deter or meet 

conventional aggression, and a willingness to negotiate arms reductions, 

provided compliance could be verified. 

Those principles remain the cornerstone of our national security policy 

today. But the world today is perhaps even more complex and more dangerous 

than that of the 1950s. There are many more nation-states than there were in 

the 50s and the pressures from political, religious, and ethnic factions within 

and among them seem to be greater. Economic changes and technological 

developments have led to far greater interdependence among all nations. The 

result is that a dispute which erupts in what once was a relatively isolated spot 

on the globe has the potential of threatening the interests of many far-flung 

nations. 

Add to this the relentless buildup of Soviet military power, both nuclear 

and conventional, and an increasing willingness to use that power as 

demonstrated over the past three years in Afghanistan, and we have a 

dangerous world indeed. If we as a nation are going to continue to steer a safe 

course through these troubled waters, we must show that we can and we will 

meet threats of military aggression with force—not to invite a confrontation but 

to preserve the peace. 

In the simplest and most direct terms I know how to use, I must say we 

do not want a war. We especially do not want a nuclear war. The United 

States needs to pursue sensible policies to reduce the probability of nuclear 

war—or any war—while at the same time preserving and improving the security 

of our nation and its allies and the liberty of the people. Reducing the 

probability of war and maintaining the security of the Nation must be treated 

together; they are inseparable. We don’t want war, but we don’t want to be 

paralyzed by the fear of war as we go about our business in this world of 

nation-states. 

Our goal is to preserve peace through strength and resolve. Our hope is 

that, as we persevere, the Soviets may finally conclude that their interests 

would be best served by joining us in meaningful and verifiable arms reduction 

agreements that will lead to a safer world. In President Eisenhower’s Farewell 

Address, he warned us against being reduced by emotionally appealing, 

miraculous solutions to the problems of peace and security. Were he with us 

today, I’m convinced he’d warn us again to be wary of some of the emotionally 

3 
attractive but strategically dangerous suggestions we hear today—such as 

nuclear freezes and no-first-use pledges. If we are to succeed, we will have to 

muster those same qualities that Eisenhower brought to his efforts to preserve 

our security: 

—Strategic vision—the ability to see the forests for the trees and to focus 

on what must be done for the common good. 

—Moral courage and strength of character to stay the course against 

pressures for expediency and short-sighted solutions. I would like to read to 

you from his Farewell Address to the Nation on January 17, 1961: 

“Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by 

the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole 

attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology—

global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and 

insidious in method. Unhappily, the danger it poses promises to 

be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for 

not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but 

rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and 

without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex 

struggle—with liberty the stake.” 

—The leadership capacity to help others see their responsibility for the 

greater good. 

—And, above all, dedication and service to the Nation. 

The concept of service is what has made this country great. It is based 

on the recognition that life has little meaning if we as individuals are not part 

of something greater than ourselves. This nation was founded on a mutual 

commitment of its citizens to the highest ideals of human dignity for ourselves 

and all mankind. There is nothing in which we as citizens should take greater 

pride as a people. But, with that pride also comes a responsibility to guard 

and nurture the values upon which this nation was founded. 

One thing that has concerned me of late is that our use of pronouns 

often tends to undermine the spirit of unity and mutual responsibility that our 

citizenship demands. It seems to me that as we learn more and more about 

the wants and imperfections and human frailties that plague this great and 

beautiful nation of ours, our tendency is to associate responsibility with “they.” 

Whether it be pollution in the air, defenses too weak, taxes too high, poor 

education for children, rebellious youth, rising prices, not enough jobs, or 

failure to provide help for the needy, the ubiquitous “they” seem to be the 

objects of our blame—“They did it!” 

I want to suggest to you that the Great American Pronoun ought to be 

“we.” When our forefathers set this country on the course that has brought us 

4 
here today, “we” was the pronoun of choice. In the Declaration of 

Independence, they pronounced: 

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are 

created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 

unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 

Pursuit of Happiness.” 

And the Great American Pronoun is the first word in our Constitution: 

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 

perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 

provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and 

secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 

ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 

America.” 

We the people established those noble goals. We the people adopted a 

constitutional system that has survived all others. We the people are 

responsible for whatever we are or are not as a nation and what we will be in 

the future. We the people of today have an equal responsibility to secure the 

blessings of liberty for our posterity. 

I want to skip back to the Declaration of Independence for another “we” 

that I find particularly meaningful in the life of the man we honor today. This 

quote comes from the last lines of that great document: 

“And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on 

the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each 

other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.” 

Those words embody the very essence of service to our country. Many 

men and women from that day to the present have sacrificed their lives and 

their fortunes and kept sacred their honor in meeting their commitment to this 

nation. If we ever lose that spirit of service, then we will have lost what is 

America. 

I am delighted to see so many young people here today to help pay 

tribute to a man who dedicated his entire adult life in service to his country. 

Your interest in our heritage and those who have given so much to preserve it 

is heartwarming because you are our future. Soon you will be choosing what 

to do with your lives. Some will continue to study and some will join the work 

force. Because this nation is what it is—a free society dedicated to the worth of 

the individual—you will be expected to work hard and you can expect to be 

rewarded for your efforts. And, if you make no effort, then you won’t be 

rewarded. 

As you ponder your choices, allow me to presume what I think Ike would 

have said if you had asked him what his greatest reward in life was. I think he 

would have said. “Service to your country is its own reward.” There is nothing 

5 
more satisfying in life than knowing that you have contributed to the 

betterment of society. 

There are many ways to serve your country. In peacetime, particularly, 

civic service is as important as military service. I think military service, 

though, has given me something that I might have missed in other pursuits. 

There is a special feeling of belonging, a special cohesion, that comes from 

being a part of a team effort. That is what service in the Army, Navy, Air Force 

or Marines means—being part of a team with an important responsibility. I 

hope many of you choose the opportunity to experience the kind of satisfaction 

that comes from being a member of such a team dedicated to preserving world 

peace, to protecting our security, and to serving fellow human beings. 

In closing, I pray that we in the military and you as citizens maintain our 

resolve and our dedication to the ideals that Dwight David Eisenhower stood 

for. Our willingness to sacrifice for the good of our country and for mankind 

will preserve the peace. The cost of vigilance is sometimes high, but never as 

high as the price of wars that come from a lack of vigilance. That price is not 

paid simply in dollars but in the blood of our citizens. If we the people stand 

ready to shoulder the responsibilities passed on by those who have preceded us 

with honor, then we the people will preserve the blessings of liberty for 

ourselves and our posterity. 

From a Letter to an American 

Citizen in Massachusetts 

16 October 1982 

You can’t spend as many years as I have in uniform without making 

some difficult decisions; but one thing seems clear. My most difficult decisions 

all revolved around ordering people to do something in combat when I was not 

completely confident about the prospects for success. There are a number of 

examples, but let me offer one such instance by way of illustration. 

As a commander of a relatively small counterattack force in Vietnam, we 

were attacked by a far larger enemy unit. I was ordered to commit my men in 

response. There was small chance for success, but we did what we had to do. 

We sustained heavy casualties, but succeeded in taking the pressure off our 

main defenses until they could respond with even greater strength. 

What conclusions can be drawn? Namely, a military leader should not 

commit the forces under his charge lightly, but when faced with military 

necessity, he may be required to sacrifice for greater good. This concept is 

inherent in our understanding of service to the citizens of our great country. 

6 
Speech before the Greater Tampa 

Chamber of Commerce

Tampa Bay, FL 

22 October 1982 

A nuclear freeze would also almost surely end any hopes of a nuclear 

arms reduction agreement. If we know anything about the Soviets, we know 

that they are tough negotiators; that they prefer to negotiate from strength, and 

always seek agreements that they see as clearly advantageous to them. What 

gives us hope that we can achieve significant, equitable and verifiable 

reductions both in START and in the INF negotiations is that the Soviets fear 

that we can offset their advantages through our modernization programs, and 

therefore see reductions as the lesser of evils. The best way to bring them to 

that point is to show firm resolve in our plans to deploy Pershing II and 

Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles in Europe to offset the already-deployed 

Soviet SS-20s as well as to modernize our strategic nuclear force. A nuclear 

freeze would stop those programs dead in their tracks and the Soviets would 

have no need—no incentive—to negotiate seriously. 

Address to the NAVY LEAGUE 

New York City, New York 

3 November 1982 

Thanks very much. Thanks for inviting me to be here with you tonight 

for this wonderful 78th Anniversary Dinner to help you honor officers and 

sailors of the United States Navy—the best navy in the world. When asked 

some months ago to participate in tonight’s activities, I went to my friend, 

Admiral Jim Watkins and said, “What will be expected of me?” He told me that 

I would have to come here and say some nice things about the Navy. I told him 

I could do that both easily and honestly. Then I got a little skittish and I went 

back and asked him to tell me very frankly if I would have to get up here and 

embarrass myself tonight by saying, “Beat Army.” 

The reason that I am a little apprehensive about letting this very 

important policy meeting of the Navy League Council slip into athletic rivalry 

has to do with last year’s Army-Navy game. Somehow, Admiral Bill Small’s 

aide and my aide had convinced the two of us to make a wager on the game. 

And we were betting our pride, actually, because the agreement was that we 

would exchange game balls with the score inscribed and display the balls in 

our offices for the next year. Well, those of you who have followed Army 

football at all for the last 10 years will recognize that my agreeing to the wager 

was a stoic recognition that life has some self-inflicted wounds rather than any 

7 
calculation of the odds. But after that miraculous 3-to-3 tie, I did get a game 

ball. I put the score on it and delivered it to Bill Small’s office. My gracious act 

was answered by weeks, nay months of silence from the Office of the Vice Chief 

of Naval Operations. In February, I finally got a ball box; but it was a big box 

and I opened it up and it had a basketball in it, not a football, and it was 

inscribed, “Navy 62 – Army 59.” 

You’ve asked me here tonight, I guess, because I’m the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs and I believe that perhaps you want me to tell you a little about 

what I see from the foxhole that I now occupy. 

One of the sights I see regularly is a group of four people that work with 

me, the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And I want to tell you that I 

am very pleased with what I see. The Nation is blessed with four top-notch 

Service Chiefs to head its Armed Services: General Bob Barrow, the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps, an outstanding Marine and soldier; General 

“Shy” Meyer, Chief of Staff of the Army, the same; General Charlie Gabriel, the 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, top-notch fighter pilot, great leader; and topped 

by Admiral Jim Watkins, my friend sitting here beside me on the dais tonight. 

These officers are all respected, battle-proved veterans, true experts in 

their own Services. And I want to tell you that they’re working diligently to 

improve those Services. But I can also tell you that they’re men of broad 

strategic vision who understand that the defenses of this nation are only as 

good as the ability of those four Services—and the Coast Guard, in time of 

war—to work closely together. They understand that President Eisenhower 

was right in 1958 when he told the Congress that wars in the future could only 

be won if the four Services are working closely together under unified 

command. 

I can tell you also that those four Service Chiefs are addressing in a 

business-like, professional manner the duties that you the people of the United 

States have spelled out for them in the law as members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. 

Now, according to some of the stories that I read in the newspapers and 

hear on the radio and television, I’m supposed to see quite a lot of inter-Service 

bickering in that crowd. In fact, according to some of the stories, I’m supposed 

to partake in that bickering myself. Let’s be very clear. Those Chiefs don’t 

always agree; and I don’t think you expect them to agree or necessarily want 

them to agree. When they occasionally disagree, the points on which they 

disagree are very clear. Since by law I’m charged with explaining their 

disagreements to the Secretary of Defense and the President, I’m happy to have 

the disagreements be clear. 

Another view that one gets from that foxhole of mine is a good view of the 

very dangerous world we live in. We see a greater independence of the 

economies of the Free World and the consequences for our own economy—the 

economy and our economic well-being are inextricably tied to raw material 

providers and finished goods suppliers from all around the world. At the same 

time we see a Soviet Union willing to spend 14 to 15 percent of its Gross 

National Product for defense. “Defense”—that’s a euphemism. In fact, it’s an 

8 
inaccuracy. It should be “offense” because neither by character or size can the 

Soviet arms build up of the last 20 years be justified by legitimate defense 

needs. We see that same Soviet Union willing to dabble in all parts of the Free 

World, attempting to upset the freedom of peoples who are friends and allies of 

ours. 

Mr. Brezhnev’s truculent remarks a week ago need to be answered quite 

clearly by the American people. The message to Mr. Brezhnev should be, “We 

don’t want war. We don’t want a nuclear war. We don’t want a conventional 

war or any kind of war in between. But we have no intention of being 

paralyzed by the fear of war as we pursue our life in this world on nationstates. We plan to do all we can to prevent war by remaining very strong while 

trying to convince you, Mr. Brezhnev, to negotiate seriously towards arms 

control agreements that will genuinely reduce the danger of war.” 

Another view I get from my foxhole is of the men and women in the 

Services, and I want to tell you that their pronoun is “we.” Wherever I go, it’s 

we can do it; we are ready; and we will do what needs to be done. 

In the short four and a half months that I have been the Chairman, I’ve 

visited all the Services and I have had some good looks at the Navy and Marine 

Corps. I have visited a variety of Marine Corps activities. I’ve seen the Navy on 

aircraft carriers, in submarines and hydrofoil patrol craft, in aviation 

operational units and training units, in those wonderful SEAL units, and at the 

Naval War College. 

Now, I am neither a naval officer nor naval expert. And I understand 

that there are some naval officers who aren’t naval experts and there are an 

awful lot of people who think they’re naval experts who aren’t naval officers. 

But I do want to tell you that I’m an experienced naval watcher, having started 

taking an interested and concerned look at the Navy during an exciting convoy 

trip to Britain in 1942 and I have continued those observations through the 

last forty years. During many of those years, my own safety and the well-being 

of my command have depended on the United States Navy doing its job 

correctly. At no time in my 43 years of service has that been more important 

than it is right now. 

From the perspective of a naval watcher, I can’t tell you whether or not 

those sailors I saw were doing their jobs correctly (I can check the Marines a 

little better); but, I can tell you a few things about the sailors that I did see. 

First, “we” was their pronoun—we can do it. We will do it. Secondly, there 

was unbounded enthusiasm. There was a clear spirit of teamwork and 

willingness to take on difficult tasks, and to see them through. There was an 

extraordinary base of knowledge about a lot of complex, interrelated equipment 

and a firm knowledge of tactics. They knew how they were going to fight and 

were confident in their ability to fight well. But most important of all, there 

was a solid foundation of military discipline. You can be proud of our Navy. 

How did it get that way? How do we keep it that way? Well, one answer, 

of course, is good leadership at the top and the support of the American people 

and the Congress. But that’s not enough. It also depends on the patriotism, 

dedication and loyalty of those Blue Jackets. How do you get that? Edmund 

9 
Burke best described the source of those commodities. He was at the time, of 

course, talking about the British forces, but I submit to you that the same 

thought applies to our own forces today. Burke said, “It is the love of the 

people. It is their attachment to their government from the sense of the deep 

stake they have in such a glorious institution which gives you your Army, your 

Navy and infuses into both that liberal obedience without which your Army 

would be a rabble and your Navy nothing but rotten timber.” 

As long as the people of this great country of ours recognize that they are 

our Armed Forces—our Army, our Air Force, our Marine Corps, our Navy, our 

Coast Guard—and that we need them to protect our liberty, then those 

extraordinary young Americans will be out there in strange lands or on, over 

and under the seas doing extraordinary things to keep this country free. 

And the work of this Navy League, in many ways—all the ways from the 

support you provide for a strong national defense to projects like the INTREPID 

here, and your other educational projects—are outstanding examples of the 

love that the American people have for our great institutions, including your 

Armed Forces. And I thank you for that work and I salute you. Thank you 

very much. 

From a Letter to the President 

Of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund 

10 November 1982 

The dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial culminates the labors 

of many Americans to recognize the service and sacrifice of the Nation’s men 

and women in uniform during the war in Vietnam. 

These blocks of granite bear eloquent witness to their noble efforts. 

Putting aside personal consideration, they accepted a call to duty. These 

names are our comrades, friends, parents, sons, and daughters. They served 

as we wanted them to serve, by obeying an oath. It is the strength of that 

commitment that enables every American to share the precious gift of freedom 

we have in our great land. 

We owe our Vietnam veterans dignified thanks and recognition for their 

loyalty and courage. I salute you. 

10 
Statement before the 

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

On the PEACEKEEPER ICBM Program 

8 December 1982 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting 

me to testify about the very important matter you are addressing. 

You have heard Secretary Weinberger’s description of the PEACEKEEPER 

missile and his explanation of the basing mode and the reasons for choosing it. 

The Secretary also discussed the missile’s relationship to deterrence and to the 

U.S. arms control policies. I will try to avoid repeating what the Secretary has 

told you and will amplify the military aspects of the new land-based ICBM. 

Nevertheless, because a key aspect of our strategy is deterrence and because 

arms control negotiations are an important part of our security policy, some of 

my points will overlap with those of Secretary Weinberger. 

In his acceptance speech on being elevated to the top Communist party 

position last month, Mr. Andropov said, “We well know that peace cannot be 

achieved by begging from the imperialists. It can be defended only by relying 

on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces.” It is not Mr. Andropov’s 

words that need be our primary concern; it is the fact that his country has 

built a massive military machine which to us seems to be far greater than 

required for any legitimate defense needs. That military machine, with over 

180 army divisions supported by about 7,000 combat aircraft and backed by 

thousands of theater nuclear warheads and thousands more for strategic 

nuclear weapons, threatens our allies and us. Hence, the need for us to 

maintain forces to deter the use of those Soviet forces, if we want peace. 

Certainly, all of our strengths—moral, social, political, economic, and military—

contribute to our deterrent strength. Today we are addressing military 

strength and its contribution to deterring war. 

From the military point of view, deterrence results from a great deal of 

uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets that their war aims can be achieved. 

The entire range of U.S. and allied forces contribute to this deterrence. In 

today’s world, strategic nuclear forces alone will not provide deterrence, but the 

strategic nuclear forces are an important part of our deterrent force. For all 

who may read the record of these hearings, I want to say as clearly as I can 

that that United States does not want a war, any kind of war, and especially a 

nuclear war. We want to prevent war. Paradoxically, the success of our 

deterrent posture results from a clear perception on the part of the Soviets that 

the U.S. is capable—however unwilling—of engaging in the nuclear conflict we 

seek to deter. It is an understanding of the war-fighting capability of the forces 

that will help lead us to the right mix of forces to prevent a war. 

During the Brezhnev years, the Soviets went to great efforts to modernize 

their strategic and theater nuclear forces. They have fielded and continue to 

field new, accurate ballistic missile systems with multiple, independently 

11 
targetable reentry vehicles, the so-called MIRVs. The United States did not 

undertake a comparable modernization program. 

In order to judge what is necessary to deny the Soviets their war aims 

and hence effect deterrence, it is useful to consider what those aims might be. 

We know a good deal about the Soviet war aims. They are: 

—To ensure continuity of the Communist party of the Soviet Union 

control of the Soviet government, military, police, and internal security organs 

and the population. 

—To provide continuity of functioning of the Soviet politico-military 

economic system to prosecute the war to a victorious conclusion, to repair 

immediate damage and to organize recovery. 

—To defeat NATO forces, to occupy NATO countries as intact as possible 

and to use Europe’s economic assets to assist Soviet recovery. 

—To neutralize the United States and the People’s Republic of China 

(P.R.C.) by destroying their military forces and preventing the reconstitution of 

U.S. and P.R.C. military forces. 

—To minimize losses to Soviet leadership, scientific-technical elites and 

other essential personnel, to the unessential population, and to the economy. 

—To dominate the post-war world in which “socialism” (read “Soviet-style 

communism”) will have replaced “imperialism” (read Western democracy) as the 

basic politico-economic system in all nations. 

The Soviets have built the forces, both conventional and nuclear, to 

pursue their war aims. I find it hard to believe that the Soviets or anyone can 

want a nuclear war; certainly, we do not. Yet, the Soviets have, in fact, 

allocated vast resources to build the forces and harden the command 

structures to attain their war aims in a nuclear war. Therefore, the United 

States and its allies need to have the forces and capabilities to prevent the 

Soviets from achieving those war aims. When it is clear that we do, deterrence 

exists and the probability of war is greatly reduced. 

Today, we are concentrating on strategic nuclear forces. As the members 

of this committee know well, the United States has for years relied on the socalled TRIAD of strategic nuclear forces, bombers, submarine-launched 

ballistic missiles, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Each leg 

of the TRIAD has its own strengths and weaknesses, unique capabilities, and 

vulnerabilities. Our strategic analyses through the years have continued to 

confirm that maintenance of modern, effective forces in each leg of the TRIAD 

complicates greatly the Soviet chances for achieving war aims through a 

nuclear strike on our forces, gives us the flexible sort of forces we would need 

to respond to any attack and thus contributes greatly to deterrence of war. As 

the committee knows, we have programs to modernize all three legs of the 

TRIAD. Our B-52 bombers are 25 years old, on the average. Modern 

technology permits us to build far more effective bombers with capability to 

penetrate Soviet air defenses well into the late 1990s in the case of the B-1 and 

well beyond the year 2000 in the case of the Advanced Technology Bomber 

12 
(ATB). The first of the new TRIDENT submarines has just become operational. 

The TRIDENT itself is a much-improved submarine with additional missile 

capacity. A very important future addition to the TRIDENT is the D-5 missile 

now under development. The D-5 will have the accuracy to give the submarine 

missile forces the ability to attack hard targets. At the same time we are 

moving to modernize our strategic forces; we are undertaking important 

modernization of our strategic command, control and communications 

systems. The modernization will enable us to provide better attack detection 

and ensure the National Command Authorities have necessary communication 

with the forces. 

A critical element of the modernization program is the new ICBM—the 

MX or PEACEKEEPER. The accuracy improvements and its ability to carry ten 

warheads give us the ability to attack hard targets quickly, the so-called timeurgent, hard-target-kill capability. 

The Soviets also maintain a triad of forces, but theirs is considerably 

different from ours. Where we have only about one-third of our missile 

warheads in ICBMs, the Soviets have about two-thirds of theirs in ICBMs. As I 

said earlier, in recent years the Soviets have modernized their ICBM force. The 

over 300 SS-18 missiles with up to 10 accurate warheads each and 300 SS-19s 

with six accurate warheads, all in super-hard silos, are the heart of that 

modernization effort. The Soviet ICBM force can attack the fixed targets of the 

United States, with assurance of high levels of damage on those targets, and 

can at the same time maintain a large reserve of weapons for follow-on attacks. 

At this time, it is worth saying a little about the targets we and the 

Soviets present to each other. If I put myself in the shoes of the Soviet planner 

attacking the fixed military targets of the United States, I see a target base that 

is less than half the size in numbers and only about half as hard in terms of 

protection as the target base the Soviets present to us. The Soviet planner also 

sees a lot of targets that are not fixed, our alerted bomber force and our 

deployed submarines; and, of course, we see a somewhat different mix and a 

larger set of non-fixed targets in the USSR. Simply said from the war planner’s 

point of view, the United States is an easier target than the USSR. 

The hardened fixed targets in the Soviet target base, the missile silos 

with reserve missiles and the hardened command and control facilities which 

would play a key role in follow-on attacks, are the targets we want to be able to 

attack quickly—the time-urgent, hard targets. The accuracy and warhead 

combination of our present MINUTEMAN missile force does not give us high 

confidence of destroying those targets rapidly. The vulnerability of the 

MINUTEMAN force to a first strike adds to our operational problems. Therein 

lies the need for the PEACEKEEPER with its improved accuracy and increased 

warhead-carrying capacity. It will give us the capability of attacking those hard 

targets promptly with high confidence of inflicting damage sufficient to 

contribute to greater uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets that their war 

aims can be achieved. 

The planned Closely Spaced Basing (CSB) for the PEACEKEEPER adds 

greatly to the survivability of the missile. It complicates the Soviet attack 

13 
problem and further creates more uncertainty that war aims can be achieved 

and thus makes a further substantial contribution to extended deterrence. 

The current Soviet systems are not designed to attack CSB. While the 

Soviets could seek to make CSB vulnerable in the future, it would require them 

to redirect their current efforts at great cost in both time and resources. We 

are confident we would detect such efforts on their part and, if needed, make 

necessary improvements in survivability. The net result will be a continuing 

high degree of uncertainty on the part of the Soviets that they can successfully 

attack the system. 

In the context of current strategic arms control negotiations, the 

modernization of the ICBM leg of the TRIAD in CSB will provide an important 

incentive for serious negotiation. We do not enhance prospects for arms 

control by failing to correct existing vulnerabilities or failing to modernize our 

strategic forces. As we seek significant reductions in strategic armaments, 

modernization will be an essential element in preserving our deterrent at 

reduced force levels. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly support the President’s arms control 

initiative for substantial reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The JCS 

support for the reductions recognized that, with both sides at lower levels of 

forces, any disparity in the quality and capabilities of the forces would be even 

more pronounced than at today’s levels. Therefore, their support for the 

reductions was with the understanding that all three legs of the TRIAD would 

be modernized. 

The JCS were unanimous in their recognition of the need and in their 

support for fielding the MX or PEACEKEEPER missile system. There were 

differing views on the basing scheme for the missile and these differing views 

were all presented to the Secretary of Defense and the President before the 

decision was made. The JCS support the President in the implementation of 

the decision he has made. 

14 
1983 

Selected Works 

Remarks at the 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND ACTIVATION CEREMONY 

MacDill Air Force Base, FL 

5 January 1983 

By law, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have the mission to establish unified and 

specified commands in strategic areas. 

On 1 January 1983, by order of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

established the United States Central Command—USCENTCOM—and 

Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston was designated as Commander. Forces 

were assigned and are represented here today. CENTCOM now joins eight 

other unified and specified commands worldwide helping the U.S. in 

maintaining the peace. 

CENTCOM’s area of responsibility is large geographically. It extends 

from Egypt east to Pakistan and from Jordan south to Kenya. It includes vast 

land areas on two continents. 

The region has great historical significance. It is the birthplace of 

Western civilization and the genesis of three of the world’s great religions; it has 

been the historic land-bridge for trade between Europe and the East. It has 

been the scene of battles, conquests, and empires whose numbers alone 

stagger the imagination. 

Most important for us here today, the region has great contemporary 

importance. It is comprised of diverse, proud peoples who love freedom and 

share a common hope for peace. It continues to encompass important trade 

routes. The area contains mineral wealth that is absolutely vital to the world’s 

economic well-being. It contains nineteen independent nations with a variety 

of governmental forms and political leanings. 

Unfortunately, at this moment the region is not totally at peace; there are 

wars and rumors of war. That’s not unusual; that’s part of the world. For the 

United States the region is truly a strategic area. It is indeed fitting that this 

command be established. 

15 
It is important for the world to know why it has been established. The 

Command is established to represent the United States militarily in the region. 

The Command will be the U.S. vehicle for military cooperation with friendly 

governments in the region when the governments concerned, our own, and 

those of our friends, agree that military cooperation is necessary. The 

Command will administer the U.S. security assistance program in the region. 

It will control U.S. military forces that may be in the region for exercises or 

peacetime operations. It will plan for other peacetime functions that our 

unified commands perform, such as noncombatant evacuation and emergency 

disaster assistance to nations in the region. 

The Command will make its contribution to that fundamental element of 

United States strategy, the prevention of war, and do it in the same way that 

the other unified and specified commands do. The Command will be ready to 

carry out its directed wartime missions in the region as circumstances should 

require. 

There are several things the Command will not become. It is not a force 

built to meddle in the affairs of countries in the region. It is not a force built to 

acquire territory for the United States. 

The Command is a signal to everyone concerned, friends and possible 

foes, that the United States has great interests in the region, that we stand 

ready to defend those interests and to help promote peace and stability in 

cooperation with our friends in the region. The Command will be a force for 

peace by being ready for war. 

I have known and worked with General Kingston for some years. He is 

an officer with great talent as a planner and trainer, but it is his reputation for 

audacity and success on the battlefield for which he is most widely known. 

You soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen who will work for him need to know 

that you have a top-notch commander in whom the President, the Secretary of 

Defense and the JCS have great confidence. 

I bring you special greetings from Secretary Weinberger, who regrets his 

absence. On behalf of the Secretary and all members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, I wish you Godspeed as you take on your important duties. 

16 
Address at the 

WINTER COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES 

University of Maryland, University College 

College Park, MD 

8 January 1983 

Thank you very much. It is indeed an honor and privilege for me to be 

here today. 

In preparing for this address, I asked a member of my staff to think 

about some possible topics and prepare a draft. Instead, he sent back a short 

outline and a note that read, “Graduation speeches are a bore. Give them two 

jokes, one thought to take with them, and stop!” Now, if you’ll count my two 

stories as the jokes...you’ll see that we’re two-thirds of the way through this 

exercise. 

Well, I know you’ve got a lot of things on your mind and that most 

graduation speeches fall by the wayside at about the same time the caps and 

gowns come off. But let me give you that “one thought” to take with you—

perhaps two connected thoughts. 

The last time I spoke in this building I spoke to a group of educators. 

For my theme I used an essay, in fact a speech, by Nicholas Murray Butler 

entitled, “Five Evidences of an Education.” The speech was given in 1901, but I 

assure you that I first read it a number of years later. I have never forgotten 

that essay, and I’d like to draw on Butler’s thoughts again today. 

Butler said the first of the five evidences of an education was correctness 

and precision in the use of the mother tongue. From my own experience I can 

tell you more has been misdirected on the battlefield and misunderstood in the 

Pentagon because of a lack of understanding of the English language than any 

other single factor. 

Butler said that the second evidence was refined and gentle manners. 

Now you might ask how that applies in this hustle-bustle world of today. I 

would use Butler’s own words to describe the applicability. He said, “Manners 

don’t make the man, but manners reveal the man. It is by the amount of 

respect, deference and courtesy shown to human personality that we judge 

whether one is on dress parade or whether he is so well-trained, well-educated, 

and so habitually ethical in thought and action that he realizes his proper 

relation to his fellows.” 

The habit of reflection was Butler’s third evidence of an education. 

Eighty-two years ago he found it necessary to raise the allegation that the busy 

lives of Americans might cause us to lose the habit of reflection. He went on to 

say that “the educated man has the standards of truth, of human experience 

and of wisdom by which the new proposals are judged and those standards can 

only be gained through reflection.” When we’re dealing with things such as 

nuclear weapons, the MX missile system, war and peace, world hunger, our 

social infrastructure, alternative sources of energy, or the Social Security 

17 
system, we need the habit of reflection in order to understand where all that 

fits in the scheme of human things. 

Butler’s fourth evidence was the power to grow. He said that if the 

impulse to continuous study and self-education, the conditions for permanent, 

intellectual growth are wanting, education has failed in one of its primary 

purposes. 

His last evidence was the power to do, or efficiency. Butler alleged that 

knowledge and information for their own sake are at best questionable—but 

that the established and habitual relationship between intellect and will was 

the means by which the possessors of knowledge turn knowledge into action. 

From my own personal experience, it is not useful for someone to know how to 

do something if he is unwilling to do it when the time comes for that job to be 

done. 

I want to expand a bit on Butler’s last evidence of education. This 

willingness to turn knowledge into action can also be called “service.” The 

concept of service is what has made this country great. It is based on the 

recognition that life has little meaning if we as individuals are not part of 

something greater than ourselves. This nation was founded on a mutual 

commitment of its citizens to the highest ideals of human dignity for ourselves 

and all mankind. As a people, there is nothing in which we should take greater 

pride. But, with that pride also comes a responsibility to guard and nurture 

the values for which this nation stands. 

One thing that has concerned me of late is that our use of pronouns 

often tends to undermine the spirit of unity and mutual responsibility that our 

citizenship demands. It seems to me that as we learn more and more about 

the imperfections and human frailties that plague this great and beautiful 

nation of ours, our tendency is to associate responsibility with “they.” Whether 

it be pollution in the air, defenses too weak or too expensive, taxes too high, 

poor education for children, rebellious youth, rising prices, not enough jobs, or 

failure to provide help for the needy, the ubiquitous “they” seem to be the 

objects of our blame—“They did it.” 

I want to suggest to you that the Great American Pronoun ought to be 

“we.” When our forefathers set this country on the course that has brought us 

here today, “we” was the pronoun of choice. In the Declaration of 

Independence, they pronounced: 

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are 

created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 

unalienable rights, That among these are Life, Liberty, and the 

Pursuit of Happiness.” 

And the Great American Pronoun is the first word in our Constitution: 

“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more 

perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, 

provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and 

18 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 

ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 

America.” 

We the people established those noble goals. We the people adopted a 

constitutional system that has survived all others. We the people of today have 

an equal responsibility to secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our 

posterity. 

We need to take a lesson from our Forefathers when they committed 

themselves to the Declaration of Independence by saying: 

“...with a firm Reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, 

we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our 

sacred Honor.” 

What is my thought for you to take away? Well, to paraphrase slightly 

the comic strip character Pogo, “You is now ‘they’.” If we are going to overcome 

the opprobrium attached to being “they,” we must all work together, because 

whatever we as a Nation are or are not, whatever we do or fail to do—we will be 

responsible. What ever you do, don’t give up that participation. Take stock of 

your education occasionally, and you might find Butler’s five evidences a useful 

starting point. 

Thank you. 

Interview in National Guard Magazine

January 1983 

Question: If you had to tell the average company or battalion commander one 

thing, what—in terms of advice for next year’s annual National Guard 

training—would you advise? 

Answer: Concentrate on training for the most important command task that 

your unit has to perform. When I was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, I worked 

with members of the Army Reserve Force’s Policy Committee and the Army 

Staff to find a way to reduce the administrative burden on the commanders of 

our Guard and Reserve units. That just can’t be done here at the Pentagon. It 

has to be done all the way down through the chain—so that those officers and 

soldiers, the men and women out there in the operating units, get to spend 

those 39 or so days a year on the most important tasks and aren’t 

overburdened with day-to-day administrative chores and things of that nature. 

And that’s one of the reasons that the Army has moved toward a greater 

mixture of full-timers with the Guard and Reserve units to help take up the 

19 
slack so that the part-time soldier can get on into the training for the main part 

of his combat task. 

Statement before SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

Subcommittee on Defense

On the FY 84 DOD Authorization 

1 February 1983 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity 

to share with you my views on the defense needs of the Nation. 

The capabilities of United States forces are improving to face the growing 

threat. Clearly, they are stronger now than at any time in the recent past; and 

many needed programs have been set in motion. We can have considerable 

confidence in the forces we have, in their readiness and in their ability to 

undertake assigned tasks. My confidence has been bolstered by what I’ve seen 

of our troops at home and abroad. But military strength is relative. The 

capability to deter threats against our interests cannot be viewed in isolation. 

Our posture must be judged against the capabilities of potential adversaries 

today, and the likely threats of the years ahead. Our national security is far 

from assured. We need to work together to reduce the risks to our security 

now and in the future. 

The Soviet Threat 

Peace in the world and our own security are challenged by the sustained 

growth of Soviet military power and compounded by instabilities in many areas 

of the world—instabilities which are all too often exploited by the Soviets and 

those who assist them. 

Soviet military power is a reality with which we must deal. Soviet military 

forces are large—about 5 million active in contrast to our 2 million active. 

Their forces are also well-organized, well-trained, and well-equipped for a full 

range of military operations. 

Soviet forces are designed for offensive operations while at the same time 

protecting the homeland from attack. 

Soviet weapons are good, and the extraordinary Soviet effort in research 

and development, over 50 percent greater than ours, should guarantee that 

their weapons will also be good in the years ahead. 

The Soviets continue to modernize their forces across the board and at a 

rapid pace. 

Soviet training demonstrates the ability to use the forces effectively. 

20 
Strategic Modernization 

We and our allies need military forces which, combined with our other 

strengths, will deter the Soviets from using their forces to threaten our 

interests. We need to continue the recent momentum in improving the 

manning, modernization, and readiness of our forces. 

Few programs have received the attention now focused on our strategic 

nuclear force modernization. While we have been debating the need to 

modernize, the Soviets have been fielding modern systems and developing and 

testing the next generation of improvements for their strategic forces. In the 

past two years, the Soviets have fielded many hundreds of new ICBM warheads 

with greater accuracy and improved hard-target-kill capability while we’ve 

fielded none. Another measure of Soviet activities in strategic forces can be 

seen in the test and training launches of strategic ballistic missiles. Last year 

the Soviets launched about 150 missiles compared to less than one-third that 

number for the U.S. 

The Soviet nuclear threat makes clear the need to give our strategic 

forces the highest priority in modernization. We delayed modernization and 

now we are faced with the need to modernize all legs of our TRIAD at the same 

time. To maintain our strategic deterrent, we need to go ahead with the 

prompt deployment of the PEACEKEEPER missile, TRIDENT submarine, B-1 

bomber and cruise missile. 

Theater Nuclear Weapons 

This committee is well aware of the details associated with our planned 

deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and the PERSHING II missile 

under NATO’s dual-track decision of 1979. SS-20s continue to threaten the 

nations of NATO Europe and the forces of the Alliance. Since last February, 

the Soviets have deployed over 50 additional SS-20 intermediate-range missiles 

pointed at our Western allies; we have yet to deploy anything comparable. Our 

commitment to the elimination of the most destabilizing longer-range systems 

in Europe was reemphasized by the President just last month. There should be 

no question about the determination of the United States to strive for an arms 

control agreement which addresses legitimate security issues of the NATO 

Alliance. But, barring a satisfactory agreement, it is essential that we move 

forward with plans to deploy the PERSHING II and ground-launched cruise 

missiles. 

Arms Control 

We should continue to pursue nuclear arms reduction earnestly. 

Comprehensive, equitable, and verifiable arms reduction agreements could 

lessen the danger of nuclear war. But we must be guided by Soviet actions, 

not just their words. It is clear to me that our nuclear weapons modernization 

21 
programs are needed not only to spur serious arms reduction negotiations and 

meaningful restraint, but to provide our security after the negotiations are over. 

Alliances 

The defense of the United States will continue to depend upon a strong 

system of alliances and other security coalitions. Our firm commitment to 

NATO and other allies is consistent with the global defense requirements of this 

country. Our friends and allies contribute weapons, trained manpower, and 

facilities which support us and help defend shared interests. 

There is an important interdependency among us. We should continue 

to refine with our allies the division of labor in our mutual security effort and 

encourage improvements in readiness and sustainability of combined forces. 

U.S. and allied forces must continue to strive for a high degree of 

interoperability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and major commanders will continue 

to stress combined training and operations. 

Allied host nation support for our forces can assist in implementing the 

agreed Alliance strategy at reduced costs and it should be supported. 

The forward deployment of U.S. air, land, and naval forces remains a key 

ingredient of our strategy. Such forces demonstrate the strength of the U.S. 

commitment to collective defense and help provide a forward shield to permit 

reinforcing our allies when needed. The planned levels of those forces will 

allow necessary modernization to proceed and preserve their deterrent value. 

Strategic Mobility 

Our strategy will continue to depend heavily on strategic mobility. 

Mobility forces work hand-in-glove with forward-deployed units to demonstrate 

our strength and bolster our deterrent capabilities. Today, our strategic 

mobility is improving, but it is not yet adequate to move and support our forces 

for the tasks that may be assigned. The airlift and sealift improvements in the 

budget need to be pursued. 

Technology 

Sensible use of high technology multiplies the effectiveness of our forces. 

The size of the Soviet forces dictates that we use technology to overcome part of 

the disadvantage. We need to field high quality weapons and equipment 

efficiently and quickly. We must press on with programs which allow our 

forces to maintain a technological edge and we need to get modern equipment 

into the hands of the troops so we can begin getting the benefits from it. We 

should lay to rest the notion that U.S. soldiers, sailor, airmen, and Marines 

can’t operate modern equipment. At the same time, we need to recognize that 

modern defense forces require good people. Our manpower programs must 

continue to be aimed at recruiting and retaining people with the aptitudes and 

motivations to operate modern weapons. 

22 
People 

People will remain the cornerstone of our forces. The support of the 

Congress has been a key factor in the programs that have so greatly improved 

our total posture over the past two years—programs which reversed downward 

trends in recruiting and retention. Well-trained, highly motivated Service 

members will continue to be the heart of our combat readiness. 

Pay and allowances, living and working facilities, the level and quality of 

the training, confidence in equipment, and the quality of leadership all have a 

great influence on the retention of good people in military service. This year 

the President found it necessary for military personnel, as well as all our other 

recipients of governmental payments, to forego pay raises. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff understand the President’s decision and, with the Secretary of Defense, 

hope the action will not cause recruiting and retention to suffer. We cannot 

afford to commit the same mistakes we made in the 70s if we are to maintain 

the modern, ready forces this nation needs to deter war. 

As you deal with the budget and programs for the years ahead, I urge 

you to do so in the light of the very real security threats the Nation faces today 

and those it will surely face in the future. Much as we might like to do so, we 

cannot roll back the calendar to days when we could rest safely behind our two 

ocean frontiers, mobilize our forces to go off and fight our wars in distant 

lands, and do it in our own time. Our safety and security are inextricably tied 

to peace in the rest of the world. Military force alone will not guarantee our 

security, but the lack of sufficient modern, ready military forces of the kind 

needed to deter attack may well guarantee that we could lose our security. 

Remarks at the NATIONAL PRAYER BREAKFAST 

Washington, DC 

3 February 1983 

Mr. President, Mrs. Reagan, friends and—to borrow from Archbishop 

Sheen’s greeting of a few years ago—Fellow Sinners. What a great occasion 

this is: 3,500 people, 120 countries represented, the entire range of our 

political spectrum present, people with widely divergent views on what to do 

about the Federal budget, defense spending, social programs, nuclear weapons 

and almost any other issue of the day. We are here together acknowledging 

our own human frailty, our lack of omniscience, and our dependence on God. 

Even more important, this diverse group is here together to ask God’s help, not 

just for ourselves, but for each other and our fellow humans everywhere, as we 

wrestle in the days ahead with the world’s problems, the Nation’s problems, 

and our own personal problems. The power of God is truly here; it will touch 

us all and we will surely be helped. 

23 
Many of you are probably wondering why in the world a soldier is 

standing here behind the podium and I want you to know that I have pondered 

the same question. We have had a few soldiers, even some generals, who have 

been great orators. In fact, General MacArthur’s words in your program are an 

indication of that fact. But most of us are awful at it. I, myself, have three 

basic speeches. One is on tank maintenance; one is on helicopter 

maintenance; and the third is on reenlistment. 

Last weekend the seriousness of the task I had accepted for today began 

to weigh heavily on me. My thoughts kept turning to some of the truly great 

speakers I had heard at these breakfasts—Archbishop Sheen, Senator Hughes, 

Congressman Guy Vander Jagt, to mention a few. I thought that the best 

solution might be to go back and get a record of Mr. Vander Jagt’s speech of a 

few years ago and play it here today. 

But on Sunday, the Old Testament lesson was from Jeremiah, and 

Jeremiah was writing about a problem somewhat similar to mine. Jeremiah 

had written: 

“Now the word of the Lord came to me saying ... ‘I appointed 

you a prophet to the nations.’ 

“Then I said, ‘Ah, Lord God! Behold, I do not know how to 

speak, for I am only a youth’”—that part’s not similar—‘but the 

Lord said to me, ‘Do not say, I am only a youth; for to all to whom I 

send you you shall go, and whatever I command you you shall 

speak. Be not afraid of them, for I am with you to deliver you,” 

said the Lord. 

“Then the Lord put forth His hand and touched my mouth; and 

the Lord said to me, ‘Behold, I have put My words in your mouth’.” 

I reread the passage from Jeremiah a couple of times Sunday after the 

Redskins’ game and then the message seemed quite clear to me and the 

message was, “Give them the reenlistment speech.” I want to talk 

reenlistment—reenlistment in the Army of the Lord. I know this talk goes to 

our forces overseas and to our ships at sea. All those members of the Armed 

Forces know that the fellow in my job represents all the Armed Services; so, if it 

suits you, please substitute Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard for 

Army. 

Does God have an Army? Sure he does. The Biblical references to God’s 

Army or the Host of the Lord are so frequent that we needn’t spend much time 

on the point. Joshua was accosted by a captain in the Lord’s Host. The writer 

of the Chronicles judges David’s army by the standard of the Army of the Lord. 

Luke speaks of the multitude of the Heavenly Host. The psalmist in today’s 

Old Testament lesson tells us that the King of Glory is the Lord Almighty in 

battle—the Lord of the Army. Paul told Timothy to be a loyal soldier in Christ’s 

Army. 

How does a person join the Lord’s Army? What sort of mental and 

physical examinations must we take? How do we sign up? 

24 
The qualifications are simple. We can look in the Bible at the enlistment 

of Levi and we can understand how the process works. Jesus saw Levi sitting 

at his desk in the tax office and said to Levi, “Follow me,” and the Gospel of 

Mark tells us that “Levi got up and followed Him.” The enlistment 

qualifications become clear when Jesus said, “I did not come to invite the 

righteous, but to invite the sinners.” 

Those of you who have been in national service in the military of your 

own countries know that there is a great difference between military life and 

civilian life. You don’t work for the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine 

Corps; you serve in them. Once you’re in, you are in for all of it. The same is 

true in God’s Army—you’re in for all of it and the action starts immediately! 

The point is best illustrated by Jesus’ conversation with some potential recruits 

on the road to Jerusalem. Jesus said to a man, “Follow me.” And the man 

replied, “Let me go bury my father first.” But Jesus told him, “Leave the dead 

to bury their own dead. You must come away and preach the Kingdom of 

God.” 

Another man said to him, “I am going to follow you, Lord, but first let me 

bid farewell to my people at home.” But Jesus told him, “Anyone who puts his 

hand to the plow and then looks behind him is useless for the Kingdom of 

God.” So, I tell you when you’re in God’s Army, you’ve got to be ready for 

action—and be ready right now! 

What about the pay? It doesn’t seem reasonable to ask men and women 

to sign up in anybody’s forces these days without some display of the pay 

system. The pay table for God’s Army is prominently displayed and easy to 

read. Saint Paul lays it out by saying, “Now that you are employed by God, you 

owe no duty to sin, and you reap the fruit of being righteous, while at the end 

of the road there is life evermore. Sin pays its servants; the wage is death, but 

God gives to those who serve Him; His free gift is eternal life through Jesus 

Christ our Lord.” Simple, isn’t it? Same pay for everybody—privates, captains, 

generals—even Cabinet officers, Congressmen, and Presidents. No budgetary 

problems either, Mr. President. It never varies; it’s not tied to the Consumer 

Price Index, and even if it were, the entire cost of the annuity has already been 

paid by the Lord Himself. 

The Secretary of Defense and I have spent the last two days on Capitol 

Hill introducing the 1984 Defense Budget to the Senate and House Armed 

Services Committees. About 94 billion dollars of that budget will go to buy 

equipment and supplies to be used by the men and women of America’s Armed 

Forces to defend the Nation. The equipment includes the entire range of 

military hardware, all the way from what we formerly called steel helmets 

(which are no longer steel) to nuclear-powered submarines. Needless to say, 

many of the questions about the Defense Budget concern equipment 

procurement. Are we buying good equipment for our people? Is it simple 

enough to operate easily and, at the same time, can it do the intended job? 

Does it cost too much? Have we tested it adequately? Do we know it will work 

as intended? Good questions because much of the spirit and morale and 

effectiveness of armed forces is tied to confidence in the equipment. 

25 
What about God’s Army? What sort of equipment is issued to the 

soldiers? Again, we go to the Bible for the answer. Incidentally, God’s Army 

isn’t strangled with paper work. Only one field manual! The Bible has the 

administrative instructions, the training instructions, and the operations 

orders. The equipment table is in Saint Paul’s Letter to the Ephesians and it 

tells us, “We are up against the unseen power that controls this dark world, 

and spiritual; agents from the very headquarters of evil. Therefore, you must 

wear the whole armor of God that you may be able to resist evil in its day of 

power and that even when you have fought to a standstill, you may still stand 

your ground. Take your stand then with truth as your breastplate, the gospel 

of peace firmly on your feet, salvation as your helmet and in your hand the 

sword of the spirit, the Word of God. Above all be sure to take faith as your 

shield, for it can quench anything and every burning missile the enemy hurls 

at you.” That equipment has withstood a 2,000-year operational and reliability 

test that would dazzle even the General Accounting Office or the House Armed 

Services Procurement Subcommittee. 

What are the standards of service in God’s Army? Is there some sort of 

code to guide new recruits? Yes, there is; and, of course, it’s in the basic field 

manual, too—it’s in II Peter, and it says, “You must do your utmost from your 

side, and see that your faith carries with it real goodness of life. Your goodness 

must be accompanied by knowledge, your knowledge by self-control, your selfcontrol by the ability to endure. Your endurance too must always be 

accompanied by a real trust in God; that in turn must have in it the quality of 

brotherliness, and your brotherliness must lead to Christian love.” 

On the face of it, that seems like a good guide to action for a new recruit, 

but will it and the equipment we’ve been issued stand up on the battlefields of 

this century? We could look at a lot of examples, I think, in this century, but 

I’d like to go back exactly 40 years because today is 3 February—in fact, 40 

years and about 8 hours ago. 

The troopship SS Dorchester was nearing Greenland with 900 souls 

aboard, including 600 U.S. servicemen, mostly soldiers, when she was hit by a 

torpedo from German submarine U-456. She began to sink rapidly. There 

were four U.S. Army chaplains aboard: Alex Goode, a Jewish rabbi; Clark 

Poling, a Dutch Reformed pastor; George Fox, a Methodist minister; and John 

Washington, a Catholic priest. The four had bunked together during the trip. 

When the torpedo hit, they went to the deck together and worked together. 

They prayed together with the men. They helped rig rafts and passed out life 

vests from the storage box. When the vests were exhausted, they gave up their 

own. The ship sank in 20 minutes. A lot of the 229 survivors remembered 

seeing the chaplains standing on the heaving, squall-tossed deck as the ship 

sank. Their arms were linked and they were praying. 

Today, the Chapel of the Four Chaplains stands in Philadelphia. Its first 

chaplain, Clark Poling’s father, gave it its theme “Unity Without Uniformity.” A 

theme which fits this breakfast group and this great country of ours—and it 

certainly fits God’s Army, “Unity Without Uniformity.” 

26 
The Dorchester sank 40 years ago. Maybe the equipment and the code fit 

that situation, but a lot has changed since then. Man has been to the moon; 

we have supersonic jet airplanes; we have intercontinental ballistic missiles 

and nuclear weapons. If we use that old equipment I outlined, how will the 

battle come out? Will it work today? 

Again, the field manual gives us the promise of victory, and I would use 

just one of the sets of words that gives us those promises. I’d like to read from 

Paul’s letter to the Romans: 

“In the face of all this, what is there left to say? If God is for 

us, who can be against us? He who did not shield His own Son 

but gave Him up for us all—can we not trust such a God to give 

us, with Him, everything else that we can need?” 

“Who would dare to accuse us, whom God has chosen? The 

Judge Himself has declared us free from sin. Who is in a position 

to condemn? Only Christ, and Christ died for us, Christ rose for 

us, Christ reigns in power for us, Christ prays for us!” 

“Can anything separate us from the love of Christ? Can 

trouble, pain or persecution? Can lack of clothes and food, danger 

to life and limb, the threat of force of arms? Indeed, some of us 

know the truth of that ancient text: 

‘For thy sake we are killed all the day long; We were accounted 

as sheep for the slaughter.’ 

“No, in all these things we win an overwhelming victory 

through Him who has proved His love for us.” 

“I have become absolutely convinced that neither death nor life, 

neither messenger of Heaven nor monarch of Earth, neither what 

happens today nor what may happen tomorrow, neither a power 

from on high nor a power from below, nor anything else in God’s 

whole world has any power to separate us from the love of God in 

Jesus Christ our Lord!” 

The U.S. Army has a catchy recruiting slogan that says, “Be all that you 

can be—in the Army.” That slogan fits God’s Army better than the U.S. Army, 

and I say to you, “Be all that you can be—in God’s Army.” Enlist or reenlist 

today. 

Thank you. 

27 
Address to the 

ECONOMIC CLUB OF CHICAGO 

Chicago, IL 

24 February 1983 

Around 500 B.C., Heraclitus put forth the theory that the “one-stuff,” the 

basic substance, the constant of the universe, was flux or change. I believe 

that if Heraclitus could have shown his colleagues in Miletus the changes that I 

have seen in 43 years in uniform, they’d probably not have disputed his theory. 

As many in this room know so well, we live in an age of fundamental change 

that affects our country and the world community on a vast, virtually 

unprecedented scale. 

We live in a complicated world of nation-states whose variegated politics 

seem almost inexplicable and whose economies are inextricably intertwined. 

Economic interdependence has grown astoundingly. In the year I joined the 

Army, the United States was a net exporter of about twenty thousand barrels of 

oil a day. In 1979, some 40 years after I enlisted, we imported six million 

barrels of oil a day. In the year that I took the oath of enlistment, we imported 

one million tons of iron ore, but we also exported eight million tons of finished 

steel products. In 1979, we imported fifteen million tons of iron ore and we 

also imported about twenty-five million tons of finished steel products. 

I know this audience appreciates the implications of interdependence. 

Treasury Secretary Regan wrote earlier this month that exports of goods and 

services as a share of U.S. Gross National Product doubled between 1970 and 

1979, accounting for about 12 percent of GNP. Today we see about 20 percent 

of all goods produced in this country and 40 percent of our agricultural 

production go into export. I share Mr. Regan’s assessment that the time is long 

past when economic dislocations in a foreign country will not impact the 

United States. Henry Kissinger was quoted in Time magazine last month, “In a 

world of many perils, continuing economic weakness is likely to undermine the 

democracies’ ability to conduct an effective foreign policy or to maintain their 

collective defense.” 

We see changes in our domestic economy, with a shift from capitalintensive, heavy industry to highly specialized, short-run manufacturing 

involving sophisticated technologies. One by-product of this so-called postindustrial society has been an entirely new industry of collecting, processing, 

and disseminating information—and, the members of the press 

notwithstanding, all facets of the communications revolution are equally 

startling. I am here tonight at the request of my friend, John Nichols, from the 

Illinois Tool Works. He and I and many of you know that this country is 

moving away from whole categories of security-relevant enterprises—including 

machine tools, heavy foundry fabrication, and shipbuilding to name a few. 

Our world has grown far smaller. In the same number of days that it 

took me to make my first trip from New York to the British Isles in 1942, I 

recently visited a NATO headquarters in Italy, visited our troops in Lebanon, 

28 
spent a couple of days with our naval forces in the Mediterranean, visited 

Egypt and our troops in the Sinai, spent a week at the NATO meetings in 

Brussels, worked a week in Washington and took a long weekend holiday. 

This world of ours is also a dangerous place. One popular weekly news 

magazine noted a few years back that in the time since World War II there have 

been 150 wars at a sacrifice of 25 million people. Conditions have not 

improved since that estimate. Unfortunately, I need only call your attention to 

continuing strife in Iran-Iraq, Lebanon, Kampuchea, the Somali/Ethiopian 

border, Namibia, or Central America; the brutal suppression of Afghanistan’s 

mujahideen; or the specter of the threat of aggression posed by Libya, North 

Korea or any number of Soviet proxies to remind you of that fact. 

Clearly, it is not a perfect world that we live in. The Good Lord didn’t 

promise us a perfect world, but it is the only world we have. I believe our job is 

to make the best world out of it that we can, not just for ourselves but, more 

importantly, for those who follow us. Our national security requires economic, 

political, social, military, and spiritual health. They are all interconnected, but 

tonight let’s talk about military health. 

The principal reason that the United States needs military health is the 

threat posed by the Soviet Union and its military forces. The most significant 

and certainly the most dangerous trend over the last 25 years has been the 

unrelenting growth of Soviet military power. The Soviets have armed 

themselves to the teeth. They continue to do so at a rate far in excess of 

legitimate defense needs. We need not theorize regarding their motives. 

In his acceptance speech on assuming the duties of Secretary-General of 

the Communist Party in November, Yuri Andropov said, “We well know that 

peace cannot be achieved by begging from the imperialists. It can be defended 

only by relying on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces.” Mr. 

Andropov failed to mention that the battlegrounds of their “defense of peace” 

have included Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and 

Poland, to say nothing of those “imperialist” nations of Estonia, Latvia and 

Lithuania. 

I find it difficult to believe that anyone could want war. Yet we know that 

the Soviets are building the forces they believe are needed to achieve their war 

objectives. This relentless Soviet quest for military superiority achieved new 

levels during the past year across all areas of strategic and conventional forces. 

To cite several examples by way of illustration: 

• The Soviets began test flights of a new land-based, solid-propellant 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile while continuing to modernize their SS-17, 

SS-18, and SS-19 missiles. The Soviets in 1982 fielded more MX-quality 

warheads in their forces than we are asking to deploy in our entire ICBM 

modernization program. Soviet preparations to begin testing of other new 

ICBMs continued—we’ll probably see them next year. You know the sad 

dilemma we face trying to surmount opposition to the MX program. 

29 
• Test flights were flown by their new strategic, manned bomber, the 

BLACKJACK—larger than our own B-1B. Our own B-1B will not deploy until 

1985, after years of R & D, false starts, and acrimonious controversy. 

• More than 80 mobile SS-20 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 

launchers with three nuclear warheads each were added to Soviet forces so 

that more than 330 launchers and reloads are now arrayed against Western 

Europe, Japan, and China. We have no comparable systems. 

• Three Soviet KIEV-Class aircraft carriers now conduct Atlantic, 

Pacific, and Indian Ocean operations; a fourth ship has been launched. 

Development continues on a newer, larger class of aircraft carriers. Their navy 

took delivery of several new classes of submarines. While we maintain an edge 

of superiority in these areas, it is decreasing year to year at an alarming pace. 

• They continue development of a new long-range heavy-lift transport 

aircraft. The prototype, just completed, is closely comparable to our own C-5. 

• The Soviets’ high-energy laser program ran at three-to-five times the 

U.S. level and is geared to the development of specific laser weapon systems, 

including land-based and sea-based air defense. 

• They’ve shown a new approach to combined arms combat with the 

introduction of special, high-speed, tank-heavy raiding forces. The Soviets 

continue to increase the number of modern T-64, T-72, and T-80 tanks facing 

NATO. 

We are not talking about unsophisticated weapons systems. The Soviets 

have begun deployment of a MIG variant, the FOXHOUND, their first 

interceptor with a true look-down/shoot-down capability. Two more fighters 

with this capability are in development and will probably enter service soon. 

The trends are clear. Foy Kohler has written that this Soviet military 

investment and their view of science and technology are so fully intertwined as 

to make them indistinguishable. You members of industry and science know 

that the Soviets pursue the acquisition of our technology through legal and 

illegal sales, Third-World transfers, and a highly organized espionage system. 

Customs Commissioner William von Raab wrote last year that the Soviets “... 

have come to depend on the U.S. electronics industry as a major source of both 

components for their own military systems and for manufacturing equipment 

with which to develop new systems.” Let there be no doubt about the quality of 

our own systems. But, never expecting to outnumber our potential enemies, 

we now find the qualitative edge we once enjoyed dissipating at an alarming 

rate. 

We must deal with the reality of Soviet military power. Their forces are 

large—about 5 million active in contrast to our 2 million. Their forces are also 

well-organized, well-trained, and well-equipped for a full range of military 

operations. Soviet leaders continually say that they don’t want war, yet when 

we look at the forces they’ve built, the threat of war seems very real. 

As we in the United States go about our business in this world of nationstates, we don’t want to be coerced by Soviet power or to have our friends 

30 
coerced. We don’t want war, but as we pursue the political, economic, social 

and cultural objectives that “We the People” choose to pursue, we don’t want to 

be paralyzed by the fear of war. 

The strategy of the United States is the prevention of war. Let me state 

unequivocally (just in case there is any doubt in your mind) that neither the 

Chairman nor any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wants war, not a 

conventional war and certainly not a nuclear war. On the contrary, we are in 

the business of “waging the peace.” The modern jargon word is “deterrence,” 

dissuading one’s potential enemies from starting a war by making it selfevidently clear that their war aims cannot be attained—that the cost will be too 

great. Many people have suggested that we announce a “no-first-use” policy for 

nuclear weapons. President Reagan restated our policy in 1981 and it was 

reaffirmed last year by the NATO Ministerial Council: “No NATO weapons, 

conventional or nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to an 

attack.” Our fundamental strategy is defensive. 

Our strategy reflects a global perspective, centering on alliances and 

forward-deployed forces in East Asia and Europe; strong naval forces to control 

sea lanes from our island nation; a central reserve of flexible land, sea, and air 

forces comprised of active forces and reserve units; the necessary strategic 

mobility capability; the command and intelligence systems; and on the North 

American continent and in the oceans of the world the most important 

ingredient in our ability to prevent nuclear war: our strategic nuclear forces. 

We want to make it clear that we can and will retaliate to a Soviet 

nuclear attack by destroying Soviet forces in such a way that guarantees that 

their war aims will not be achieved. To do so, the United States must and will 

maintain a modern strategic triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers) with the required 

readiness, accuracy, warhead effectiveness, warning systems, and command 

arrangements. Modernization of our strategic nuclear forces to counter the 

dangerous and growing nuclear warfighting potential of the USSR is essential 

for deterrence and peace now and for the hope of strategic arms reduction talks 

and a more stable peace in the years ahead. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff firmly support the President’s arms control 

initiative for substantial reductions in strategic nuclear arms. Our support for 

the reductions recognized that, with both sides at lower levels of forces, any 

disparity in the quality and capabilities of the forces would be even more 

pronounced than at today’s levels. Therefore, the Chiefs support for the 

reductions was given with the understanding that all three legs of the TRIAD 

would be modernized. As we seek these significant reductions in strategic 

armaments, modernization will be an essential element in preserving our 

deterrent at reduced force levels. 

The capabilities of United States forces are improving. Clearly, they are 

stronger now than at any time in the recent past; many needed programs have 

been set in motion. The readiness of our own forces is improving and has 

improved dramatically in the last several years. Probably the most important 

31 
reason behind these readiness improvements is the improvement in the people 

situation in our Armed Forces. In 1982, all the Services met their recruiting 

goals and their reenlistment goals. About 86 percent of the recruits that 

entered the Services were high school graduates and about 85 percent of those 

were average or above average in the mental categories. The retention of welltrained officers and non-commissioned officers has improved markedly. The 

Services are well on the way to solving the serious NCO shortages that have 

plagued them over the past few years. 

Other things have contributed to readiness improvements—a lowered 

maintenance backlog for equipment, an increase in flying hours and steaming 

hours for airplanes and ships. Our exercises and maneuvers have been 

expanded and improved. Training is vastly better. A concerted investment in 

new training methods is paying off. The accelerated delivery of modern 

weapons has begun to reach the forces this year, and will make further 

improvements in readiness. It is important to maintain the momentum. 

I would, at this point, like to interject a note on a topic that has attracted 

considerable attention in the Nation’s press over the past year—the role the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff play in the formulation and execution of our national 

defense policy. 

Broadly speaking, the tasks of the JCS fall into two general areas: to 

provide military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the President and the 

National Security Council; and to provide the strategic planning and direction 

for the Nation’s forces and to oversee the readiness and capabilities of the 

forces to carry out the war plans. 

You are probably familiar in at least a general way with the calls over the 

past year to reorganize the way the JCS do their business. One of the things I 

did on my first day in office last June was to agree with the other members of 

the JCS that we personally, not staff officers, would make a thorough 

examination of our organization and our way of doing business. 

We also agreed that, because the JCS relationships are with the 

Secretary of Defense, the President and the Commanders of the unified and 

specified commands, we would work out the problems—real and perceived—

with those people directly, and not debate the issues in the press. We agreed 

on criteria to be used for judging the changes that had been proposed by others 

and by our own members. We also agreed that if any of the changes we could 

make within the present law made sense, we would go ahead and implement 

them. We have done that. We also examined a list of suggested changes which 

might require changes in the law or in our instructions from the Secretary. 

This personal review by the Chiefs was completed last November and we 

forwarded our recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Since he and the 

President are not finished with their review of our suggestions, I am not going 

to tell you what they are. I will say that from our point of view our suggestions 

would belie the claims by some that I am prepared to do no more than “tinker” 

with the present mechanism. 

The present set of Joint Chiefs believes that the duties outlined in the 

law are the right duties and at the heart of those duties is giving the Secretary 

32 
and the President good, timely military advice. Our concept of timeliness is 

that they ought to get the advice before they know they need it. We have 

developed a close working relationship with the Secretary and we consult 

regularly as a group with the President. In fact, in the past eight months we 

have met with the President as a group more than has occurred in any recent 

four year Presidential term. The relationship between this particular group of 

Chiefs and their civilian supervisors seems to me to be exactly what the law 

implies it should be. 

JCS organization simply cannot be viewed in isolation when one explores 

the conduct of our national security affairs. God forbid that this nation will be 

forced to fight another war; but, if we do, it will be fought by the Commanders 

of our unified and specified commands. The Chiefs are paying increased 

attention to the views of those commanders and we are incorporating their 

views in our strategic guidance. We also recognize the need for better 

integration of the efforts of the Services—the Army, Navy, Air Force and 

Marines—and we’re working hard to emphasize greater integration of effort to 

expand our total combat potential. Can we do more? Can we do it better? Of 

course we can! And we will as we go about trying to provide the best and most 

defense available for every dollar in the defense budget. 

Over the last three weeks, I participated in more than thirty hours of 

Congressional hearings on the defense budget. The debate about the size of 

the budget has been sharp and spirited. The questions raised are questions 

that deserve to be explored and answered for the citizens of our country. The 

key question is how much is enough? The strategy that I outlined involves 

forces far smaller than those of the Soviet Union and involves close cooperation 

with friends and allies around the world. The defense budgets of the last year 

and projected for the years ahead, when expressed as percentage of the Gross 

National Product, are well below those of the average for the peacetime years 

between the Korean War and the War in Vietnam. 

Earlier this evening, I said that this Administration came into office 

pledged to restore our defenses. They were backed by an overwhelming public 

majority. Have Soviet actions or international events changed so profoundly 

that the pace or scope of our defense effort should be slowed or redirected? 

The answer, clearly, is no and it is on this point that the current debate must

focus. 

The question of how much is enough for defense is sometimes translated 

into tradeoffs: defense or full employment, defense or social programs, or what 

is a “fair” allocation of resources and funds between defense and other areas. 

Certainly, none of us are happy if anyone who wants a job in this country is 

unable to find work. The citizens of the country need to pay attention to the 

social infrastructure of the Nation. But, we must remember that only the 

Federal government can provide for the common defense. What we pay for 

defense with a strategy of deterrence is the price of peace for us, for our 

children, and for generations to come. If our strategy fails, either because it 

was wrong or because we failed to devote enough of our efforts and treasury to 

it, we will pay in a different coin—the blood of our citizens. 

33 
Is there waste in our defense program? Yes. Show me any organization 

or social grouping—from your family to the corporations whose headquarters 

grace the shoreline of this city—and there will be waste. It is, I suppose a sad 

reflection on the shortcomings of fallible humans. I want to tell you that there 

is no Federal endeavor which receives greater scrutiny than Defense. Many 

man-years are spent by the military Services and by the Defense Resources 

Board in developing and revising each year’s program. It is thoroughly 

reviewed and modified by other Executive Branch offices before it ever reaches 

the defense, budget, and appropriations committees of the Congress. 

Can the defense budget be cut? Yes! Can you do it without affecting the 

defenses of the country either in the short run or in the future? The answer is 

no! Cuts of the magnitude proposed in some quarters would have an 

absolutely disastrous effect on our defenses. Herb Stein, in a very fine article 

in the Wall Street Journal on February 11, 1983, correctly labeled such 

proposals “unilateral disarmament.” 

Some years ago Henry Kissinger said, “Henceforth the adequacy of any 

military establishment will be tested by its ability to preserve the peace.” I 

agree with this statement but would add that in the event deterrence fails, 

adequacy will be measured by the ability to win. 

The natural and understandable longing for peace sometimes 

undermines our ability to prepare for war. And I believe it is precisely that lack 

of preparation that will tempt our enemies and lead to the very war we seek to 

avoid. This phenomenon was explained very well by John F. Kennedy in his 

1940 book, Why England Slept. He wrote, “A boxer cannot work himself into 

proper psychological and physical condition for a fight that he seriously 

believes will never come off. It was the same way with England. She so hated 

the thought of war that she could not believe it was going to happen” As Bobby 

Knight, the Indiana basketball coach once said, “Everyone has the will to win, 

but few have the will to prepare to win.” 

We can thank Herman Wouk and ABC-TV for refreshing our memories of 

World War II. There are some parallels between the world of the late 1930s and 

the world of the early 1980s. In those days just before World War II, many 

people in England, France, and the United States also considered defense 

appropriations far too high. They weren’t dishonest or disloyal, but they were 

dead wrong. I hope we are not so judged by history. 

34 
Remarks at the 

NAVAL RECRUIT GRADUATION REVIEW 

Naval Training Center 

Great Lakes, IL 

25 February 1983 

Graduating companies. I speak not only to you graduating recruits but 

also to you parents, girl friends, wives, and friends. I think I have learned a 

few things during my service in the Armed Forces of the United States—I guess 

it will be 44 years come this next May—and I’d like to pass on a few of them to 

you recruits. I have also been the parent of a recruit. So, I have learned 

something about that, too; and I want to pass on a few tips to you parents. 

The first observation I have is that these 400 or so recruits probably 

came in for 400 different reasons when they joined the Navy. But, there’s only 

one reason from now on for them to stay and that’s because they’ve taken an 

oath of enlistment to serve their country and to obey the orders of the President 

of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over them, 

according to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

And they have taken that oath because “We the people” of the United 

States decided that we needed to defend our country from whatever threats 

may face it. These young men don’t work for the Navy. They serve in it. And 

there’s a great difference. Some of you work for various companies around 

here. Working for a company carries with it some loyalty to the company, some 

duty to the company; but, you also have the opportunity to quit whenever you 

want and go wherever you want to go. That isn’t the case for these young men. 

They’re going to go where the Navy wants them to go and they’re going to do 

what’s needed to be done to defend this great country of ours. 

One of the things they’ll learn—whether they stay in the Navy for an 

entire career or whether they leave it at the end of their first enlistment to go 

on to some other civilian pursuits—is that the most important thing about the 

Navy is teamwork. It’s not a one-man show. It belongs to everyone, all the 

men and women who are in the Navy. 

There are no unimportant jobs in the Navy or the Army or the Air Force 

or the Marine Corps. When it comes to doing what we want to prevent but 

have to demonstrate that that we can do in order to prevent it—that is to 

defend the Nation and to be prepared to fight in its defense—you get to 

something that requires more trust and confidence in your fellow human 

beings than in any other business or profession in the world. It makes no 

difference what the color of the man’s skin is who fights next to you, what state 

he came from, what his religion is, what his ethnic background is, whether he 

is rich or poor. What counts is what’s in his head, what’s in his heart and 

what he can do with his hands to help the team get its job done. Your buddies 

depend on you. You depend on them. Learn to get along with them. Learn to 

make the team work. 

35 
For you parents, I would say these young men are going out to a very 

difficult duty. They’ll be asked to do extraordinary things—some things that 

you can’t imagine the difficulty of. We have ships sailing in the Indian Ocean; 

and there’s a task force rounding the northern tip of Norway today. If you 

think it’s cold here; imagine what it’s like on the deck of those ships out in the 

far north of the Pacific or what it is like under the seas for days on end. Those 

people will be expected to participate in those activities and fulfill the jobs 

assigned to them. And I’m confident that they’ll do it well because they’re topnotch young sailors in the United States Navy. 

As you graduate today. I know you too are top-notch. And, it is important 

that you are the best because the security of the Nation depends on each sailor 

doing his duty. My best to all of you. Good luck. Good sailing. 

Remarks at the 

GENERAL MARK CLARK VOLUNTEERS 

42nd Annual Banquet 

Charleston, SC 

19 March 1983 

I can’t tell you what a big honor it is for me to be here with you tonight, 

General Clark. General Clark had a lot of American volunteers serve for him 

during the almost 66 years since he was commissioned, notably those in the 

First World War and World War II and Korea. But I’m particularly proud to say 

that I served under General Clark in his 5th Army—the 5th Army will always be 

“General Clark’s Army”—and in his 15th Army Group. I served through the 

entire Italian Campaign, and I had the good fortune to serve under him both as 

an enlisted man and as an officer. 

Among my mementos is a short 5th Army radiogram appointing me and 

one other 34th Division Sergeant to be 2nd Lieutenants. It was signed simply 

“Clark.” Today, I get more than a little bit of pride out of looking at that 

radiogram when I dig it out. It changed my life dramatically, and that seems to 

be quite obvious. I can tell you very honestly, General Clark, that at the time I 

wasn’t all that enthusiastic about it. I had a very neat job as First Sergeant of 

a Field Artillery battery, and that radiogram arrived on the 6th of May of 1944, a 

few days before the breakout from the Anzio Beachhead. What it really meant 

was that I was going to be a Forward Observer for an Infantry company rather 

than be back in the battery position. By the time we reached the Alban Hills a 

few days after the breakout, we were only a few miles from the beachhead and I 

was the only one of those guys still on the rolls of the Service. So, General 

Clark’s talk about the seriousness of the fighting certainly brings back the 

same sort of memories to me. 

36 
Many years later, well over 30 years later, I walked from a change of 

command ceremony to my new office as Commander in Chief of the United 

Nations Command in Korea. And outside the office door was a brass plaque 

engraved with the names of the former commanders including, of course, 

General Mark Clark who was the commander during that historic period—the 

last year of the Korean War and the signing of the Armistice. At that time I 

couldn’t help but wonder if General Clark really knew what he had wrought 

when he signed a routine order for a National Guard Sergeant to be a 2nd

Lieutenant back in 1944. 

I congratulate Captain Lybrand, Sergeant Raines, and the men and 

officers of the Mark Clark Volunteers. I want to tell you that you have a very 

proud name, but you also carry a great responsibility to live up to that name. 

So, do your job well. 

One of the things about this job of mine is that you find yourself 

compelled to read the newspapers in Washington, as well as those from New 

York, every day. That may be one of the reasons that the life expectancy for 

former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs is not very long. They die of gas pains 

after having read the newspaper every day. I’d like to talk to you about a few of 

those articles. The articles talk about the state of the Nation a lot. One of the 

articles that I read in the paper as I rode down in the airplane this morning 

was an article about the defense budget being too large and about the necessity 

to cut the defense budget. Now, I want to say to you that there’s only one 

reason today to spend any money for defense at all and that is because there 

are threats to the Nation’s security. We live in a very complicated world of 

nation-states. The economies of these nation-states have become more 

intertwined as we’ve gone through the years. For example, the year I joined the 

Minnesota National Guard, the United States was the net exporter of oil—about 

20,000 barrels a day. Forty years later, we are a net importer of oil—about 6 

million barrels of oil a day. In the year that I took the oath of enlistment, we 

imported one million tons of iron ore. But that same year we also exported 8 

million tons of finished steel products. Forty years later we imported 15 million 

tons of iron ore, but we also imported 25 million tons of finished steel products. 

The world is growing a lot smaller, too. I remember my first trip overseas 

in the early months of 1942—we sailed to North Ireland. And I remember the 

length of that trip. In exactly the same number of days I recently did the 

following: I visited the NATO Headquarters in Italy, I visited our troops in 

Lebanon, I spent a couple of days with our naval in the Mediterranean, I visited 

our Infantry battalions and saw our peacekeeping mission down in the Sinai in 

Egypt, I spent a week at the NATO meetings in Brussels, I worked a week in 

Washington, and I took a long weekend holiday. So, you can get to a lot of 

places a lot faster than you could 40 years ago. 

The world is also a more dangerous place. One of the most popular 

weekly news magazines a few years back said that since World War II there 

have been 150 wars at a sacrifice of 25 million people. Conditions haven’t 

improved since that estimate. And all you need to do is look around the 

world—at Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Kampuchea, the Somali-Ethiopia border, 

37 
Namibia, Afghanistan and at the threats posed by Libya, North Korea, or any 

number of other Soviet proxies, including Cuba in our own backyard—to 

recognize that the world is a dangerous place. Yet, the principal reason that 

the United States needs its military health and a defense budget is the threat 

posed by the Soviet Union and its military power. The most significant and 

certainly the most dangerous trend over the past 25 years has been the 

unrelenting growth of Soviet military power. The Soviets have armed 

themselves to the teeth, and they continue to do so at a rate far in excess of 

any legitimate defense needs for themselves or their allies. 

Now, I find it pretty difficult to believe that anyone would want a war in 

these days. Yet, we know the Soviets are building forces that they believe they 

need to achieve their war objectives. In this relentless quest, the Soviet 

military superiority continues even today, in every single area of military power. 

They’ve built up a vast force of strategic ballistic missiles. They’ve continued to 

test new bombers that are larger than the new B-1 bomber that the United 

States is trying to add. They’ve added a vast force of intermediate-range 

nuclear missiles to threaten the nations of Europe and Asia; and, they’ve added 

greatly to their naval power that permits them to go into all corners of the 

earth. They’ve maintained large ground forces since General Clark was trying 

to take them out of Austria many years ago, and those ground forces have 

continued to grow and be modernized with some of the best equipment in the 

world, and certainly the greatest numbers. When you look at 50,000 tanks, 

you’re talking about a staggering number of tanks. 

We in the United States must deal with the reality of Soviet military 

power. Their forces are very large—about 5 million in the active force and with 

millions to be called in their reserves, while we sit here with 2 million in our 

active forces and about another 1 million in the reserves and National Guard. 

The United States has a defensive strategy. We want to go about our 

business in this world of nation-states and conduct our business peacefully. 

We don’t want to be coerced by Soviet power, and we don’t want our friends to 

be coerced by Soviet power. We don’t want a war, but as we pursue the 

political, economic, social and cultural objectives that “We the People” have set 

for ourselves, we don’t want to be paralyzed by the fear of war either. 

Twenty-five years ago, when the Soviets started this tremendous buildup, 

this nation had unquestioned nuclear superiority. Yet, we believed it necessary 

to maintain an army that was 30 percent larger than today’s active Army, and 

a Navy of well over 700 ships in contrast to today’s 500 ships. And we were 

willing to spend over 71⁄2 percent of our Gross National Product for defense. 

Yet, today—a time when our economic interdependence with the rest of 

the world is far greater than when the Soviets started this buildup, when the 

Soviets have at least achieved nuclear parity and continue to extend their 

influence far beyond the area they influenced 25 years ago and when they are 

spending 15 percent of their Gross National Product for defense—we’re telling 

ourselves that we can’t afford to spend 6 1⁄2 percent of our Gross National 

Product for defense. I tell you we need to think that through very clearly. I 

understand the need for reducing the deficit, and I understand the need for 

38 
fixing the social problems of this country; but, I want to remind you that our 

strategy is defensive. We’re not going to start a war, but we’re going to have to 

defend ourselves. We want to prevent a war if at all possible. 

This business of preventing war reminds me of the ads that you see in 

the newspaper from the Independent Insurance Agencies—it’s a very good ad. 

The ad shows a picture of a house burning down and the announcer says, 

“When’s the worst time to find out you had the wrong insurance coverage on 

your house?” Well, exactly the same is true for defense because if we don’t 

prevent a war we will pay for it not simply with dollars; we’ll pay for it with the 

blood of our citizens. So, I tell you that the defense budget that the President 

has asked for is not too small. It is exactly what is needed. In fact, if anything, 

it is not big enough. The Soviets have outspent this country for defense by 

close to $500 billion in the last 10 years. We cannot afford to let our defenses 

continue to fall farther behind. 

The next myth I want to talk about also comes from an article I read in a 

newspaper on the way down here. The article said that modern equipment is 

too complicated for you, the people who are in the Armed Forces of the United 

States today. They say that you can’t handle high technology; the equipment 

will break down and you won’t know how to make it work on the battlefield; 

and besides that, what this country really needs to do is buy more, cheaper 

equipment instead of buying modern, technologically sophisticated equipment. 

Well, that’s another myth that needs to be destroyed. In the first place, 

this country has valued its manpower more than any other country. We have 

made up for the expenditure of manpower by buying modern, sophisticated 

equipment, and we needed to do that. The modern equipment that we’re 

buying today will do just exactly that. 

General Marchant talked about the Air National Guard squadron being 

the first to get the F-16s. During August of 1944, the Allies broke out of the 

Normandy beachhead. To do that, 3,000 heavy bombers of the 8th Air Force 

flew more than 18,000 sorties. Something like 30,000 air crewmen were 

exposed every time one of those sorties was flown. When 18,000 were flown, 

30,000 airmen were subject to the enemy air defenses. With today’s 

technology, you can take 800 F-16 fighters with 800 crewmen, instead of 

30,000 crewmen. You can take the same number of bombs to the target in far 

less time than it took the 8th Air Force to do it, and you can get those bombs 

there a lot more accurately. 

In North Vietnam, there were 872 bombing sorties flown against Thanh 

Hoa Bridge, all unsuccessfully. Eleven aircraft were lost, and 22 American air 

crewmen were killed trying to destroy it. On the 27th of April, 1972, eight 

sorties were flown using modern, laser guided bombs. The bridge was 

destroyed and no aircraft were lost. And, in my view, that’s an example of what 

happens when you use high technology correctly. 

The same is true when you have great sea power in our Navy today. The 

new AEGIS Class Cruisers have a crew of 319. The AEGIS replaces cruisers 

that once had a crew of 1,600 men; and the firepower and capability of those 

cruisers far, far surpasses anything that the older cruisers had. 

39 
The same is true for the new submarines. The LOS ANGELES class 

submarine can search through 10,000 square miles of ocean in a 24-hour 

period—nearly 10 times the area that its predecessor could do. The 

TOMAHAWK cruise missile, which is just entering service, can strike targets 

250 miles away, far exceeding the 8-mile reach of old submarines. 

Now, the same is also true of land power. The same is true for the people 

with the Infantry; the battalion of the 118th Infantry here today will be expected 

to cover an area about 40 to 50 times greater than its predecessor, the World 

War II battalion, covered. You can do that simply because you’re supported 

with better firepower; you’ve got better mobility yourself; and you’ve got better 

communications and firepower in your own hands and among the troops that 

support you. My youngest son is an attack helicopter pilot in the Army. When 

I think what those attack helicopter pilots are going to have to do when they go 

out there and face those 50,000 Russian tanks—and they’re going to have to 

get a lot of them—I don’t want him out there flying some cheap helicopter. I 

want him out there flying the best ones that this country can afford. I don’t 

want any of you out there either flying around in cheap equipment, or firing 

cheap guns or cheap anti-tank missiles. I want you to have the best that this 

country can have because, in the first place, that’s the way we’ll prevent war 

and, secondly, that’s the way we’ll win if we have to fight. 

I am very pleased to see that the 169th will be the first of the National 

Guard squadrons to get the F-16s. I am also pleased to learn that the 1-263rd

Armor will begin training on the M-60A3 tank this summer—a very modern 

tank that will make that tank battalion able to fight both in the night and the 

day and to engage targets at much greater ranges than in the past. The North 

Carolina National Guard will be equipped soon with the M-1 Abrams tank. In 

fact, they’ll get it a lot earlier than many of the active Army get it. 

The importance of the Guard and Reserves today can’t be 

overemphasized. I was out here at the air base today and looked at the 437th

Active Military Airlift Command Wing and sat there with the Commander of the 

315th Reserve Wing. Those two work hand-in-glove and they typify the 

relationship between the Active force and the Reserve Components today. I 

want to tell you that neither the Active Components nor the Reserve 

Components will be good unless they have modern equipment. The idea that 

we can buy more cheap equipment and not give our men the best and most 

modern equipment that we can afford to buy is a myth that needs to be 

destroyed. 

The third myth that I read about in the paper on the way down here 

today was the myth that the United States is the one that is being intransigent 

in trying to negotiate the nuclear weapons reduction agreement with the Soviet 

Union. I read an article that suggested that maybe President Reagan was 

preparing to fight a nuclear war, and that he might even be building a firststrike nuclear force. That’s utter hogwash, and every citizen of this country 

ought to recognize that. And, certainly, the leadership of the Soviet Union 

knows that. They’re the ones that have built the first-strike nuclear force. 

What we need to do is modernize ours because it’s old and desperately needs to 

40 
be modernized; and then we need to make it very clear to them that they need 

to reduce their nuclear forces. The President of the United States has made a 

very sensible proposal in both the Long-range Intermediate-range Nuclear 

Force negotiations and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva. But it 

is, in fact, the Soviet Union that is being intransigent in saying that we’re being 

unfair to them because we want them to make very substantial reductions in 

those nuclear weapons. 

The fourth myth is that we could reduce the probability of nuclear war by 

voting a nuclear freeze in this country. The Soviet Union has, in fact, 

modernized their nuclear forces, and if we vote a freeze that involves us not 

modernizing our own nuclear forces, we vote ourselves into a permanent 

disadvantage with the Soviet Union. We would play right into their hands and, 

certainly, there would be no incentive for them to negotiate seriously with us 

for reduction of nuclear arms. 

Now, those myths need to be destroyed. I’m very pleased to see your 

remarks, General Clark, about the importance of modernizing our own nuclear 

forces while we try to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce 

nuclear arms. 

The last thing I want to mention to you officers and men of the Combat 

Support Company of the 1st Battalion of the 118th Infantry is that you have a 

great outfit here, and I’m very pleased to be here with you. You have a lot of 

new people who come into this outfit every year. Train them well and take care 

of them. I’m delighted to hear of the Mark Clark Volunteers Association and 

the work that it does in trying to make life more pleasant for those new 

members of the unit. I want to tell you officers and NCOs of this Combat 

Support Company: take care of those new soldiers because you’re going to 

build a company with them, and that company is going to be part of a 

battalion, and that battalion is going to be part of the Army that we build to 

keep together to defend this nation. 

It’s been a great pleasure to be with you, and it’s been a great honor to 

be with my old commander, General Clark. Thank you. 

Interview in US News and World Report

28 March 1983 

The strategic balance continues to shift in favor of the Soviet Union. We 

deterred war yesterday and we are going to deter war today; but the margin of 

assurance for that deterrence is dissipating. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Question: Why should the MX be considered so important? 

Answer: The Soviets have built a nuclear force to achieve their own war 

objectives. Whether or not that signals a willingness to go to war is certainly a 

41 
debatable point. I would think that it’s hard to find a sane man in today’s 

world who would want such a war. 

Nonetheless, we have to design a strategic force that will make it clear to 

them that they cannot achieve those objectives, that we will frustrate them. 

The MX is a vital part of that goal. As we seek significant reductions in 

strategic armaments, it will also be essential in preserving our deterrent at 

reduced force levels. 

Question: If the best strategic minds in the Pentagon are having such a 

hard time finding a place to base the MX, doesn’t that suggest that it may be 

an idea whose time has come and gone? 

Answer: No, the time of the land-based ICBM has not come and gone. 

The accuracy, the high-readiness rates and relatively low operating costs of the 

modern ICBM continue to make it an important part of our strategic deterrent 

force. The quarrel over the basing system for the MX is really an argument 

about the relative vulnerability of the missile. It is important, but that should 

not be the most critical issue. What is most important about the MX and ICBM 

modernization is at the business-end of the trajectory, a capability that we do 

not now have in the inventory. It is the capability to attack hardened Soviet 

command bunkers and missile silos quickly. Only the MX—or some weapon 

like it—will give us the ability to do that. So, even if you took the MX and 

erected it right our there in the parking lot, we would be far better off than we 

are today. 

To the extent that you can add survivability beyond my “parking-lot” 

version of the MX, so much the better. 

Question: General Vessey, why does the Pentagon give America the 

impression that Russia produces near-perfect weapons and goes from strength 

to strength while the United States always has trouble with its weapons and is 

constantly plagued by problems in its defense buildup? Is the military 

situation really that bleak and lopsided? 

Answer: If the picture we have painted appears that grim to the public, 

then we have painted it inaccurately. It’s fair to say that the Soviets have all 

the same problems in producing high-technology weaponry that we have—

maybe more. Besides, their troops are inferior to ours. 

And while we in the United States are choking on the question of 

whether or not to spend 6.3, 6.4 or 6.5 percent of our Gross National Product 

for defense, the Soviets are spending 15 percent of their GNP for defense. That 

alone has got to give them great social and economic problems—and it clearly 

does. 

But having said that, we must also recognize that the Soviets are 

continuing to build an enormous military arsenal. They are building far more 

than they would ever need for legitimate defense—and that concerns me. 

Question: Are you saying that in a war today the Soviets could inflict 

defeat on the United States? 

Answer: That’s a very tough question to answer. We would do 

extraordinary things to keep them from inflicting a defeat on us. I guess the 

best way to express it is this: I could not feel very comfortable about the 

42 
outcome if we had to go to war with Russia tomorrow, but neither could the 

Soviet Union feel comfortable about the possible outcome. 

Question: One final question about this country’s defense burden: 

Given the problem of maintaining a high level of military spending over a long 

period, would it make sense to cut back some of America’s global 

commitments—for example, in the Persian Gulf or the Far East or even 

Europe? 

Answer: We’ve given a lot of thought to that. I don’t see that you can do 

that in this world today. 

There are two great military powers—the United States and the Soviet 

Union. The United States has economic, social and political connections with 

the rest of the Free World, all of which are important to our society today. I 

don’t believe we can abdicate those responsibilities even if we wanted to. The 

chances are that we would find out later that we made a mistake, and we’ll pay 

a much higher price than we are being asked to pay today, and the coin in 

which we pay may well be the blood of our people or the loss of our freedom 

rather than simply dollars. 

Statement before the 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

On Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization 

21 April 1983 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting us to 

testify on the important subject of strategic force modernization and to give our 

views on the report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces. 

Because the Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in their latest 

recommendations to the President on the Strategic Force Modernization 

Program and because our views are unanimous on the report of the President’s 

Commission, my colleagues have asked that I deliver a single statement on 

behalf of all of us. 

In December of last year, the President asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

review our strategic forces modernization program, and to report back to him in 

February with the results of the review. We did so. We also reviewed the 

report of the President’s Commission and provided our recommendations to the 

President on that report on the 4th of April. Today, Mr. Chairman, we report to 

you that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, working independently of the Commission, 

arrived at conclusions about the land-based ICBM force which are 

fundamentally the same as those of the President’s Commission. We report to 

you, as we did to the President, that we are unanimous in our support for the 

report of the Commission. 

43 
Through the years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined strategic 

nuclear force issues in great detail. This particular group of Chiefs has 

continued the examination. Since last Fall, we have met 48 times to examine 

strategic nuclear force issues. We have looked at our entire strategic nuclear 

force, examined its effectiveness, survivability, the need for modernization, and 

the arms control impacts of our programs. We have looked at the 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force, with particular emphasis on MX, its 

contribution to our total force, and the alternate basing modes for the MX. We 

have heard reports from recognized authorities from both inside and outside 

the government; we met often with the Secretary of Defense on these issues; we 

met twice with the President’s Commission; and, since the first of the year, we 

have met twice with the President on strategic forces issues. We have spent a 

great deal of time and effort studying the problems. 

The need for our defense forces stems from the threats this country may 

face. This Committee has a good understanding of the Soviet threat. 

Therefore, we will not spend a great deal of time in reciting the specifics of that 

threat. We would simply point out that the Soviets have made massive 

strategic deployments in the past decade. In the last six years, they have 

deployed operational missiles among the most accurate in the world, and those 

missiles are based in the world’s hardest silos. In the last year, as part of the 

further modernization of those missiles, they deployed over 1,200 modern, 

hard-target killer warheads—more than we intend to deploy in our entire ICBM 

modernization program. 

For the past several decades, the United States has relied on deterrence 

through strength to counter the growing Soviet threat. We have tried to make 

it clear to the Soviets that they would not be able to achieve their aims through 

war. Our strategy is to deter war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that 

deterrence and stability come from establishing significant doubt in the minds 

of the Soviets that their war aims can be achieved. We also believe that, from 

the military point of view, the entire range of U.S. and allied forces—strategic 

nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces, and general purpose forces—all 

contribute to deterrence. Strategic nuclear forces are a major part of that 

deterrent, and it is the modernization of those forces, especially of our ICBM 

forces, that we wish to discuss with you today. 

In considering the modernization of our strategic forces, we must 

recognize that accelerating Soviet modernization and our own lack of 

modernization in the past two decades have left us well behind the Soviet 

Union in several important measures of military capability. We have not 

deployed a new ICBM since the early 1970s. We have deployed only one new 

ballistic missile submarine since 1967. In fact, under the provisions of SALT I, 

the Soviets are dismantling ballistic missile submarines that are newer than 

our newest POSEIDON boats. We began to deploy cruise missiles only in 

December of last year. On the other hand, during this same period the Soviets 

tested and deployed several new types of ICBMs and new and improved 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviets have had cruise missiles 

deployed on submarines since the early 1960s. 

44 
The present body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has consistently 

recommended the modernization of the entire strategic nuclear TRIAD to 

restore an adequate margin of safety in the immediate future. The President’s 

Commission has made the same recommendation, confirming the need for the 

modernization plans including strong support for improvements in our vital 

strategic command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities. We 

reaffirm our own strong support for that modernization. 

On the 11th of February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed the President on 

the results of their review of strategic forces and recommended: 

—Continued strong support for the TRIAD, and continued support 

to modernize the TRIAD. We believe that the combination of landbased ICBMs, sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers with airlaunched cruise missiles provide a broad range of capabilities 

whose synergism complicates the Soviet planning, provides us 

flexibility and provides an important hedge against technological 

surprise by the Soviets in neutralizing any particular leg of the 

TRIAD. 

—Continued highest priority support for improvements in 

command, control, communications and warning. Because our 

strategy is one that does not include a first-strike, the ability of the 

command and control and intelligence system to survive an attack 

and provide the wherewithal to retaliate is key to deterrence. 

—Fielding MX in MINUTEMAN silos. The accurate, prompt, hardtarget attack capability of the MX is needed now and will add 

greatly to our deterrent strength. 

—Continued research and development for survivable land-based 

ICBM systems, to include research on small, mobile ICBMs. 

—Continued research to resolve the uncertainties about hardness 

of fixed bases for ICBMs. 

—We also recommended that the President set a new direction for 

the future and announce increased research for active defense 

against ballistic missiles. We pointed out our recognition that 

there was no near-term solution for defense against ballistic 

missiles, but that technological developments on the horizon could 

give hope to our own people and to our Allies that we could use our 

technology to provide defenses which, when supplemented with 

arms control agreements, could move us away from sole 

dependence on the threat of retaliation. 

We agree with the Commission that deployment of MX as soon as 

possible is necessary to counter the increasing Soviet advantage in hard-targetkill capability, to replace an aging ICBM force, to provide a leverage in arms 

control negotiations, and thus to improve our deterrent posture. 

The Commission pointed out that it is the survivability and effectiveness 

of the entire TRIAD, and not of any single leg, on which deterrence must rest. 

45 
Strategic modernization must deal with the combination of land-based ICBMs, 

sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers with air-launched cruise missiles, 

which provide a broad range of necessary, complementary and mutually 

supporting capabilities. The synergism of these capabilities complicates Soviet 

planning and provides us flexibility to threaten various forms and levels of 

retaliation against the Soviet Union. It also provides an important hedge 

against technological surprise which might lead to neutralization of any leg of 

the TRIAD. The accurate MX warheads will let the Soviets know that their 

missile silos, their leadership, and associated command and control are placed 

at risk, and that their ability to achieve their war aims is seriously in doubt. 

Deterrence will be improved. 

I told the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 8th of December that 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support the deployment of the MX but that there 

were differing views on the basing mode. Today, we have reported that we all 

support basing MX in MINUTEMAN silos. Now, some will ask what has 

changed our views since the President’s 22 November 1982 recommendations 

on deployment. To set this issue to rest, we think I should provide you some of 

the details of our November recommendations to the President. 

On 8 November we told the President that we believed he was being 

forced into a final basing decision prematurely and that his first decision to 

field MX in MINUTEMAN silos while searching for a better mode was a good 

decision. Three of the Chiefs believed then that we should deploy the MX in 

MINUTEMAN silos due to technological and cost uncertainties with the Closely 

Spaced Basing mode. General Gabriel and I, considering the early 

Congressional rejection of MX in MINUTEMAN silos, recommended going ahead 

with deployment in the Closely Spaced Basing Mode and recommended a 

vigorous research and development program to resolve the uncertainties of 

Closely Spaced Basing. We believed that most of the uncertainties could be 

resolved and that uncertainty itself has deterrent value. Central to both 

viewpoints was unanimous agreement on the importance of deploying on 

schedule. After considering the intervening political development and in 

reconsidering the arguments on technological uncertainty, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff have unanimously concluded that the crucial need for an advanced, 

highly capable ICBM can best be met by the deployment of MX in MINUTEMAN 

silos. 

The Commission correctly looked beyond the specifics of an MX basing 

mode and, more importantly, did not consider the ICBM force in isolation. 

They saw that, in the mid-term and beyond, our goal should be to increase 

stability. We endorse their recommendation that research on a small, single 

war-head ICBM begin at once. Development of such a weapon may offer the 

prospect of continued deterrence with even greater stability in the future. We 

also strongly support the recommendation for continued research to resolve 

uncertainties about silo or shelter hardness. The Commission’s report gives us 

a formula that makes sense both militarily and fiscally. The Commission has 

performed a great service for the country, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

unanimously support their recommendations for modernizing our ICBM force. 

46 
Following the Commission’s recommendations will provide effective 

deterrence. The deployment of MX will help redress the imbalances that have 

developed over the past decade. In the future, adding the small, singlewarhead ICBM coupled with an aggressive arms control effort offers the 

prospect of increased stability. We believe that these steps, coupled with the 

President’s long-term goal of effective defense against ballistic missiles, provide 

a blueprint for deterrence well into the next century. We understand the 

Commission’s concern over the technical difficulties associated with defense 

against ballistic missiles in the immediate future. Therefore, we agree with the 

Commission that, for the near-term, deterrence must continue to depend on 

strong offensive forces. 

Before concluding, we should mention arms control. As the Secretary of 

Defense noted in his FY 1984 Annual Report, it is the policy of the United 

States to maintain the lowest level of armament compatible with the 

preservation of our security and that of our Allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

have concluded that the preservation of that security urgently requires 

deployment of MX and continuation of the strategic modernization program. 

But we are united in strong support for meaningful, effective, and verifiable 

arms reductions. Such reductions will occur only if we make it clear to the 

Soviets that we have the resolve to maintain an adequate strategic deterrent 

force. Approval of the President’s recommendations is an essential first step 

toward greater stability and genuine arms reduction. 

All of us share a common desire to provide for our national security in 

the most effective and most economical way. Soviet goals and objectives are 

not a reflection of our own, and the capability that might deter the United 

States does not necessarily deter the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

are firmly convinced that the program outlined by the Commission and 

endorsed by the President will deter aggression and represents a balanced 

approach to providing the forces necessary to provide for the common defense. 

A strong, modern deterrent coupled with aggressive arms control policies will 

provide for stability and ensure national security. The President’s decision has 

the unqualified support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and deserves the full 

support of the Congress. We urge this Committee to lead the House of 

Representatives in this most important undertaking in providing security for 

the American people and the Free World. 

47 
Address at a Prayer Breakfast 

Bloomington, MN 

9 May 1983 

God intended golf to teach us something about life. In our relationships 

with Him, God will forgive us for our bad shots. He’ll let us be guiltless to play 

the next one. But another thing you must remember is that in this world of 

human history, He won’t let us go back to the tee for a mulligan. In the world 

of history, we’re going to play the next shot from where the ball lies. If we’ve hit 

the last shot into the rough or the bunker, that’s where the ball is and from 

there we must play it. 

Address to the 

MINNESOTA MEETING 

St Paul, MN 

9 May 1983 

It is a distinction to be here and participate in the Minnesota Meeting’s 

first year of activity. Certainly a laudable activity. The need for all of us to be 

informed of the difficult and important issues that face our country today 

seems to be self-evident and the Minnesota Meeting will certainly help do that 

here in Minnesota. I was pleased to see that my boss, Secretary Weinberger, 

was here last year to inaugurate your series. 

About a year has elapsed since I assumed my duties as the tenth 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some of you may wonder when we’re all 

over why generals aren’t good orators. As I told the group this morning, I have 

three basic speeches. One’s on tank maintenance, one’s on helicopter 

maintenance and the third one’s on reenlistment. I got this job a little bit by 

accident. Actually, I had no idea I was being considered for the job. I had 

come back from a trip to South America and I was asked to see the Secretary of 

Defense. I went to see him and I had all my notes from my trip to South 

America where I had met with a number of Latin American leaders. He said, 

“Come on. We’ve got to go see the President. We have an appointment in five 

minutes.” And I said, “Alright.” So I thought, “Boy, the President’s going to 

ask me about South America.” We got in the elevator and Mr. Weinberger said, 

“The President wants to settle this JCS Chairman business and you’re pretty 

high on a short list.” And I said, “Stop. I can’t go over there. I’ve just built a 

new house in Minnesota. My wife thinks that we’re going to retire. I’ve put in 

my retirement papers. I couldn’t say ‘yes’ even if the President asked me.” Mr. 

Weinberger said, “Come on. You’ll just have to tell that to the President.” 

48 
Well, we got over there and I explained the astronomical cash flow 

problem I had with a 191⁄2 percent construction loan on my house and I told 

him of my wife’s views; and the President said, “Well, you just get some advice 

and go home and tell your wife because I want you to take this job.” So, I went 

immediately to Fort McNair to explain it to Avis; and, as I explained what the 

President had said, a tear rolled down her cheek. I said, “How in the world do 

we get into things like this?” She said, “You lied about your age to get into the 

National Guard, and God is punishing you.” 

But it’s an interesting job. People ask me how I like it and I tell them I’m 

too busy to ask myself that question and, besides, I might not like the answer. 

Hardly a day goes by that I don’t read some new account asserting that this 

country lacks a coherent defense strategy; that we are throwing money at the 

military Services; and that our weapons are too costly and too sophisticated for 

our fighters to operate. It doesn’t surprise me at all that our citizens are 

sometimes confused about some of the things one reads about the state of the 

country’s defenses and about our national security. And I’d like to share some 

of my observations with you based on some 44 years of wearing this uniform. 

As I survey the range of enormously complex security issues that 

confront our elected officials, our civilian appointed leaders, and our uniformed 

leaders, I get mixed emotions. On the one hand, I know that the state of our 

own military health is better now than I have seen it at any time in the 44 

years that I’ve been in uniform. Many needed programs have been set in 

motion to correct the shortcomings of recent years. There’s accelerated 

procurement of new equipment on the way. I see some Minnesota National 

Guardsmen out here in the audience. I know that you’re getting some of it 

now. We see much better readiness as a result of years and years of research 

that we’ve put into training. We understand much better how to train soldiers, 

sailors, airmen and Marines. We see better leadership as a result of the 

improved education and training for the young leaders that we have. We see 

greater recognition and respect for our uniformed people by the people of this 

nation. 

I am buoyed by my first-hand observations of the Army, the Navy, the Air 

Force and the Marine Corps. You can be proud of the forces that you have out 

there, both Active and Reserve. They are all over the world, under the oceans 

and in the skies, doing remarkable things and doing them very well. And by 

doing so they are reducing the risk of war for this country. And let there be no 

doubt in your mind on that account. The peacetime strategy of the United 

States is the prevention of war. 

My awareness of the strides we are making to improve our forces 

contrasts with some concerns that I have about our willingness and 

commitment to provide for our future security. We inherited the liberty and 

freedom that we enjoy in this world, the unprecedented liberty and freedom we 

enjoy in this world of ours, from the work of our Forefathers who did take care 

of our security. 

As I look to the future, I can see some primary challenges for us: 

49 
—An already dangerous world will become increasingly more so 

during the remaining years of this century. 

—The political and economic interdependence of our global 

family of nation-states will continue to grow. 

—Our principal military threat will continue to be the 

unrelenting growth of Soviet military power. 

And despite our standing around and beating our breasts and rending our 

garments about our own growth in military power, I see no abating in the 

growth of Soviet military power. 

—The Nation must remain united in its determination to 

provide for the common defense if we’re going to secure the 

blessings of liberty for our posterity. 

It seems very trite to observe that this world is a dangerous place, but 

that reality is often overlooked as we look at what we’re trying to do with our 

budgets to solve the problems that this nation has. One popular weekly news 

magazine noted a few years back that since World War II; there have been 150 

wars at a sacrifice of 25 million lives. Conditions haven’t improved much since 

that estimate. If you adopt the criteria that a war may be defined by a 

significant loss of life and the employment of regular armed forces, there are 20 

wars of one variety or another going on in the world today—in the Middle East, 

in Africa, and South Asia and right here in our own hemisphere. Add to that 

20 or so other hot spots where conflict is likely—either for religious, or social, 

or political, or economic reasons—and you can see why the Secretary General 

of the United Nations said the world is “perilously close to a new international 

anarchy.” 

At the same time that international stability is so seriously threatened, 

the economic interdependence of the world has grown astoundingly. When I 

joined the Army, the United States was a net exporter of oil—about 20,000 

barrels a day. Forty-three years later, last year, we imported five million 

barrels of oil every day—and that was down a million barrels of oil from the two 

years previously. Comparable statistics, as you businessmen know, apply to 

almost every area of business activity. We’re dependent on foreign markets, on 

overseas resources, and on global lines of communication. It is not necessary 

to look to distant horizons to seek manifestations of that interdependence or of 

the brutal consequences of armed aggression in the world today. It’s a reality 

that’s very close to home here in the United States. 

The President asked us to turn our eyes southward to the fourth border 

here a week or so ago—to the Caribbean Basin. We see Latin America’s 

importance to the future vitality of Western society steadily growing, not only in 

terms of its strategic resources and expanding industrial base but also because 

of its strategic importance geographically. 

In his address to Congress last month, the President reminded us that 

Central America’s economic and military importance to the United States is 

50 
often understated. We’re well aware of our close ties to our European allies. 

Yet half of the NATO supplies we would need to reinforce Europe would come 

from our Gulf Coast and go through the Caribbean. Equally important, 44 

percent of all foreign tonnage that comes into this country and 45 percent of all 

our crude oil imports pass through the Caribbean. The Caribbean Basin is our 

fourth largest market for exports. We have vital interests in the region, and we 

have to look seriously at the legitimate security concerns of the United States. 

During the weeks preceding Easter, you may have seen photographs in 

the papers here in Minnesota of Navy F-14 jet fighters escorting Soviet BEAR 

bombers off the East Coast and down into the Caribbean to their bases in 

Cuba. Those Soviet aircraft serve as a reminder of the foreign presence here in 

our hemisphere—a presence that is growing year to year. In the decade 

between 1970 and 1980, there was a thirteen fold increase in Soviet naval 

activity in the Caribbean. Soviet influence and presence in Cuba have grown 

dramatically in recent years. The stream of Soviet military assistance to that 

small nation has been incessant—totaling more than a billion dollars in 

security assistance in 1982 alone. 

The struggling governments and people in the Caribbean and Central 

America region need our strong support, not only because of our traditional 

cultural and economic ties with the region but also because of the strategic 

imperatives that we face today. That entire region is facing a crisis, with social 

and economic change aggravated by subversion in almost every country. It is 

American policy to offer an integrated program of economic and military 

assistance. The need to seek social, economic, and political progress is clear. 

For some countries, El Salvador in particular, there are pressing reasons why 

they must have military assistance in order to get security in the country so 

that the other internal reforms can take place. 

Consider what a freely elected government in El Salvador faces today; it’s 

the challenge of 7,000 armed insurgents trying to shoot their way into the 

government. I say that that shouldn’t happen. Leftist guerillas have 

responded in a predictable manner to this country’s call for democracy, reform, 

and human freedom. Their latest slogan being broadcast to the farmers there 

in El Salvador today is “Plant and Die.” Electric power plants and bridges have 

been destroyed to disrupt the economy. Clearly, the leftist were repudiated in 

last year’s election; but, despite that, they continue their violent intimidation. 

Since that time, armed guerillas have ransacked a third of the country’s 

mayor’s offices in attempts to preclude future elections. 

I want to tell you very clearly that neither I nor any of the other 

uniformed military leaders of this country nor any of the civilian leaders in the 

Department of Defense advocate introducing U.S. combat forces or trying to 

implement an American military solution to the problems of Central America. 

But insurgencies such as those in El Salvador must be handled by a 

combination of political and military and social efforts. What we seek to do is 

give El Salvador the training and the military assistance that they need so that 

they can solve the problem themselves, and so they can establish the security 

that’s needed for economic growth. I frequently read in the newspaper “The 

51 
American-backed” or “American-sponsored” El Salvador Armed Forces. The 

forces we have trained, if you took the total of the people that we have trained 

in El Salvador, amount to about 10 percent of the Armed Forces of El Salvador. 

They are the best-trained units, and have been subjected to almost continuous 

combat, but those forces amount to only about 5 percent of the armed forces 

that are extant today. 

The regional and world situation today drives the United States strategy. 

Our strategy has evolved from the experiences of two world wars and the 

political realities of the post-war era. Our peacetime strategy is defensive. It 

reflects our global perspective. It’s built on our economic interdependence. It’s 

centered on our alliances—strong alliances in Europe and in East Asia. We 

strengthen those alliances by having troops stationed in those particular areas, 

both to give military strength to the alliances and to give political unity to those 

alliances—to let those people know that we and they share a common future 

and common security problems in the world today. 

Another element of our own strategy is strong naval forces because we 

are, in fact, almost an island nation here when separated from our East Asian 

or European allies. We need to control the seas in order to be able to 

communicate with them. We have a central reserve of ready and flexible land, 

sea, and air forces which are comprised not only of active forces but also of 

strong National Guard and Reserve forces. We have the necessary strategic 

mobility to be able to move those forces. Our forces are considerably smaller 

than those of the large forces we would expect to oppose. Consequently, we 

need to be able to move faster and we need to have the command and control 

and the best intelligence in the world to make those smaller forces effective. 

And here on the North American continent and in the oceans underneath we’ve 

got that other key ingredient of our national strategy, and that is our strategic 

nuclear forces—the forces that we need to prevent a nuclear war. 

Our strategy calls for the use of American technology, America’s strong 

point. And we rely on technology because we value human life a lot more than 

we value things. I constantly hear people say why not buy more cheap 

weapons because we can buy a lot more of them and give those to our forces. 

And then if you lose them you won’t have lost so much. You’d just have more 

of them. Well, I don’t know how many of you have children in the Armed 

Forces. I have one and I don’t want him out there with cheap weapons. 

From a military perspective, the most significant and certainly the most 

dangerous trend over the last 25 years has been the unrelenting growth of 

Soviet military power. The Soviets have armed themselves to the teeth and 

they continue to do so at a rate far in excess of any legitimate defense needs by 

any measure—theirs or ours. The plain fact of the matter is that, in the last 10 

years, Soviet military investment in hardware alone has exceeded ours by some 

500 billion dollars. We are forced to contend with the raw military power that 

the Soviets have acquired and I have seen the face of battle enough in my 

military career to find it difficult to believe that anyone could want a war. Yet, 

we know the Soviets are building the forces they believe are needed to achieve 

their war objectives. This relentless quest for power and military superiority by 

52 
the Soviets has achieved new levels during this last year in almost every area of 

strategic and conventional forces. Certainly, the Soviets have a host of 

problems. They’re not 10 feet tall. They do some very dumb things. They are 

a one-dimensional power. They are a great power militarily only. And they’ve 

got some other strategic problems in the world. As I often say, they’re the only 

country in the world surrounded by hostile communist neighbors. But 

certainly their power must be recognized. We never expected to outnumber our 

potential enemies. But now we find that qualitative edge that we once enjoyed 

dissipating at an alarming rate. In areas where we once had an advantage, we 

see the Soviets closing the gap. Those trends simply can’t be ignored. 

As we here in the United States go about our business in this world of 

nation-states, we don’t want to be coerced by Soviet power. And we don’t want 

our friends and allies coerced by Soviet power. We don’t want a war as we 

pursue our political, cultural, economic and social objectives in this world—

those that “We the people” choose. Those are our objectives and we want to 

pursue them. But we don’t want to be paralyzed by the fear of war as we go 

about pursuing those objectives. 

Nuclear deterrence and the role of our strategic nuclear forces have 

commanded a great deal of public attention recently and rightfully so. The 

issues are debated exhaustively on moral, political, and military grounds. And 

I think it’s important for all citizens to understand the complex issues, since 

the prevention of war and the preservation of our way of life are inextricably 

linked to the deterrence of war. I know that Secretary Weinberger discussed 

his views on these issues with you last Fall and I’d like to go over, perhaps, 

some new points. 

We call our strategy “deterrence.” And that means simply that our 

potential enemies must realize that the losses they’ll suffer from our retaliation 

won’t be worth the advantage they might gain by attacking. They realize that, 

if they attack, they cannot achieve their wartime objectives. The United States 

built the first strategic nuclear capability in this world. We did that in the 

1950s not in response to Soviet nuclear power but in response to Soviet 

conventional power. We did it because we and our allies were unwilling or 

unable to match the vast conventional forces that the Soviets maintained on 

the borders of Western Europe and elsewhere in the world. That conventional 

threat that the Soviets posed at the time is still there. It is considerably larger 

now than it was at that time. And it’s much more modern today than it was 

then. In addition, the Soviets have amassed a remarkable nuclear capability. 

We can’t wish that threat away. It simply won’t go away with wishes or hopes 

for good will. The U.S. is striving for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, but 

with nuclear proliferation in the world a sad reality, I think it’s unlikely that 

the nuclear genie will be stuffed back into the bottle. 

Some will argue that the conventional forces alone should suffice to deter 

man’s regrettable tendency to destroy one another and all those things that we 

hold dear. And I would say to you that history tells us otherwise. Liddell-Hart, 

in his landmark history of World War II, compared the opposing forces and 

revealed some things that some of us may have forgotten. He wrote that in 

53 
1939 it was doubtful Germany could long withstand the pressure of prolonged 

conflict given the country’s shortage of war products and resources. Hart 

argues that Germany’s early spectacular victories did not result from an 

overwhelming superiority of arms and weapons. In fact, the German army and 

navy were not prepared for war in 1939 and were not superior by many of the 

indices we now hold when compared with the forces of Great Britain and 

France. What they did possess, of course, were some new ideas about warfare 

and an ideological commitment that brought them to the brink of victory. 

Indeed, Nazi Germany was not deterred by the combined superiority in 

conventional forces arrayed against her. On the other hand, there’s no denying 

that with the possession of strong nuclear and general purpose forces in the 

hands of a coalition of free and democratic governments, the continent of 

Europe has enjoyed one of its longest periods of uninterrupted peace. 

There is an article of great insight that was published in the National 

Review here on the first of April. The article was “Moral Clarity in the Nuclear 

Age,” written by Michael Novak—and, if you haven’t read it, I strongly urge that 

you read it. Novak said, “Deterrence is sometimes judged against ideals and 

not against recent history.” And there are certainly moral arguments and 

specific actions to support that point. 

In the past six years, the Soviets have deployed among the most accurate 

operational missiles in the world, and they put those missiles in the world’s 

hardest missile silos. In 1982 alone, as part of that modernization of their 

strategic nuclear missile force, they deployed over 1,200 modern, so-called 

hard-target-killing warheads—more than we intend to deploy in our entire 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force modernization. And they did the same 

thing in 1981 and they will probably do the same thing again in 1983. 

The Soviet Union has deployed and tested a number of new ICBMs and 

new and improved submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The Soviets have 

had cruise missiles on their submarines since the 1960s. Now, we simply have 

to recognize that the accelerating Soviet modernization and our own lack of 

major improvements in the past two decades have left us well behind in some 

very important measures of strategic military capability. 

We as a nation simply must deal with the reality of Soviet military power 

and the destabilizing consequences of the Soviet actions. Salvador de 

Madariaga, the great Spanish historian and philosopher who worked on the 

League of Nations Disarmament Council for many years, said that nations 

don’t distrust each other because they’re armed. They’re armed because they 

distrust each other. And that’s a very important point for us to remember. 

We must be clear to the Soviets if deterrence is to work. We must be 

clear that we can retaliate to a Soviet nuclear attack by destroying the Soviet 

military forces in such a way that guarantees their war aims will not be 

achieved. Someone said they heard George Brown here some years ago, my 

predecessor twice-removed. George said when General Ogorkov, Chief of the 

Soviet Armed Forces, went to see Brezhnev and Brezhnev said, “Now. Is now 

the time?” he wanted Ogorkov to say, “Not yet.” Well, that’s exactly what I 

want General Ogorkov to say to Mr. Andropov, too. “Not yet.” 

54 
Now, to do this we must simply modernize our strategic nuclear forces. 

And it’s essential for deterrence. It’s essential for peace. And it’s essential for 

any hope of strategic nuclear arms reductions. If Mr. Andropov can look at this 

country and Western Europe and see us dismantling our own modernization 

program through the western political process, there’s no need for him to go to 

the negotiating table to reduce nuclear arms. 

Many loyal and intelligent Americans have advocated a so-called nuclear 

freeze in the hope of reducing the risk of nuclear war. There is a very strong 

surface appeal for such proposals, but the sad fact of the matter is that a freeze 

is more likely to increase—and not decrease—the chances of war because it’ll 

undermine the very foundation of deterrence. A freeze would prevent this 

country from correcting the deficiencies that I’ve described would perpetuate 

Soviet advantages that exist today. It would not guarantee that the Soviets 

wouldn’t continue to build on those advantages by either clandestine programs 

or by technological improvements which are difficult to verify. It would not 

prevent Soviet improvements in passive and active defensive measures which 

could further degrade our own deterrent posture. It could well nullify our 

determination to reach meaningful arms reductions during the negotiations 

that are going on. 

The potential destructive power of nuclear weapons is awesome. But is 

any weapon “immoral” in and of itself? I believe we must consider the ends 

that are to be achieved by their possession. Mindful that there will be no 

“winner” in a nuclear war, we have to do all we can to prevent one. Together 

with our European allies, we’ve pledged that no weapons, conventional or

nuclear, will ever be used in Europe except in response to an attack. The 

greater moral good that we seek to achieve through deterrence must take into 

account the actions of our adversaries and the conditions that we face in the 

world today. Peace must be tended. It must be nurtured. It must also be 

protected. To do otherwise would be morally incorrect. 

De Madariaga, at the same time, in that same quotation, said that the 

problem with disarmament was that it has looked at the problem of war upside 

down and at the wrong end. That is to say that you have to come to some 

fundamental agreements between the contending nations before you can 

expect disarmament. 

The natural and understandable longing for peace and domestic 

prosperity sometimes undermines our ability to prepare for the war we seek to 

prevent. But George Washington said, “There is nothing so likely to produce 

peace as to be well-prepared to meet an enemy.” 

In the days just before World War II, many people in England, France 

and the United States considered defense appropriations too high and an 

adequate defense too difficult to maintain. They weren’t dishonest. They 

weren’t disloyal, but they were sure dead wrong. I hope we are not so judged 

by history. 

55 
Extract from Remarks to the 

NEW ORLEANS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

13 May 1983 

The health of the Armed Forces is like fresh bread—you have to make it 

fresh every day or it gets stale. Just as you can’t leave bread on the shelf 

forever and expect it to be fresh when you ask for it; military readiness requires 

daily attention. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

Our strategy calls for the use of American technology—America’s strong 

point. We do that because we value human life more than we value things. At 

the same time the taxpayer deserves a fair shake. He deserves to have us buy 

sensible equipment whose value is worth the price. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

I am certainly not the first Chairman of Joint Chiefs faced with questions 

about the adequacy and costs of our defense. In April of 1950, the first 

Chairman of the JCS, General Omar Bradley, was describing the problems of 

defense to an American radio audience. “The problem,” he said, “is to provide 

enough military strength during the peace years—so that we will never have to 

pay the cost of war, either in lives or dollars.” The defense budget under 

consideration that spring was 13 billion dollars. This great American soldier 

went on to tell his listeners that the Second World War had cost the United 

States close to a hundred billion dollars a year. Two months after the radio 

talk of General Bradley’s 60,000 North Korean troops, spearheaded with Sovietbuilt tanks, invaded the Republic of Korea and plunged the world and an 

unprepared America into another bloody conflict. The proposed defense budget 

of 13 billion dollars climbed to more than 60 billion dollars by the following 

year. But those 60 billion dollars were not the real cost. The real cost was the 

33,000 Americans killed in battle and the more than 70,000 lost from the 

Republic of Korea. When we have not stayed strong enough to prevent war, 

history has shown us that we paid with a price and a coin that is far more 

precious, the blood of our citizens. This and other examples remind us of the 

wisdom of George Washington’s counsel that, “There is nothing so likely to 

produce peace as to be well-prepared to meet the enemy.” 

We simply cannot afford to disregard the advice of men like Washington 

and Bradley. We have learned the bitter experience that the terrible costs of 

war and the price of peace are great. On this Armed Forces Day, we should 

resolve to give our men and women in uniform and their civilian leaders not 

just our appreciation, but our pledge of continued support. In so doing, we will 

provide our nation the strength that it needs to preserve the peace. 

56 
Remarks at the 

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY 

Howard Air Force Base, Panama 

25 May 1983 

It is an honor for me to be in Panama again. I am pleased to participate 

with you today in the passing of command of U.S. Southern Command from 

General Nutting to General Gorman. I am pleased that General Nutting’s 

achievements and talents are being recognized with promotion and 

reassignment to another important command, the one most directly 

responsible for supporting SOUTHCOM. I bring General Gorman to this 

command with mixed emotions. I am sorry to see him leave his last job 

because he served very ably as my assistant, but I am delighted to see his 

talents recognized by promotion and assignment to this important command. I 

am also pleased to see the President of the United States recognize the 

importance of the command by making it once again a 4-star General post. 

On 27 April 1983, President Reagan made it clear to the Congress, to the 

people of the United States, and to the world that Central America is a vital 

interest to the United States, closely linked to our security and well-being and 

vital precisely because how people live and work here is a matter which affects 

each and every one of our citizens. The region is important for its proximity to 

our shores. But there is another and more fundamental reason that this area 

is important. The region is comprised of independent and proud people who 

share with the people of the United States a love of freedom, a trust in 

democracy, and a hope for peace. President Reagan has recognized the 

importance of our obligations to the people of the region. He has established 

four goals for U.S. policy in the region: 

1. We will support democracy and human freedom. 

2. We will support economic development. By a margin of three to 

one, U.S. aid is economic. We recognize that military assistance is 

complementary to other essential national development programs. 

3. We will support the security of the region’s threatened 

democracies. 

4. We will support dialogue and negotiations, both among the 

countries of the region and within each country. 

This ceremony today is a clear signal of our continuing commitment to fulfill 

the President’s goals. 

Unhappily, some countries in Central America are not as fortunate as 

Panama. They are torn by violence or beset by terrorism. To economic 

problems and the stress of modernization has been added the specter of 

Marxist totalitarianism. Foreign military power is being thrust upon the region 

by the Soviet Union and by its puppets in Cuba, Libya, and the Warsaw Pact. 

57 
These governments seek to spread totalitarianism by exploiting instability in 

the region. They give arms and training to misguided extremists who seek to 

gain by violence what they have failed to gain by democratic process. 

Secretary of State Shultz put it very well in speaking of El Salvador: 

“Unable to win the free loyalty of El Salvador’s people, the guerillas are 

deliberately and systematically depriving them of food, water, transportation, 

light, sanitation, and jobs. And these are the people who claim they want to 

help the common people.” 

The missions of U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) accord with 

our concerns for the security and stability of our friends in Latin America. 

USSOUTHCOM stands as an embodiment of our good will—supporting our 

nation’s stance as a full partner in this hemisphere, not as a patron. 

Chief among the missions of the Command is the defense of the Panama 

Canal, a facility whose security is important to all nations in the region, not 

only the United States and Panama. Today, more than ever, defense of the 

Canal is a vital regional concern, and its security is unavoidably affected by the 

stability of all countries in the region. It is, therefore, even more important that 

the United States continue to implement the Panama Canal treaties, to work 

with Panama in defense of this vital waterway. It is heartening to note that the 

success of the recent canal-defense exercise, “Kindle Liberty,” was due in large 

measure to the cooperation of the government of Panama, General Paredes, 

and the National Guard. In the years ahead, cooperation between Panamanian 

forces and U.S. forces must continue to grow as Panama assumes, in 

accordance with the treaties, greater and greater responsibility for the defense 

of the Canal. 

Secondly, as the focal point for inter-American military cooperation, 

USSOUTHCOM will continue to assist in providing a shield against subversion 

and insurgency. The command serves to assist our friends to act in their own 

defense so that sovereign governments of the region can develop economically, 

politically and socially. 

Today, USSOUTHCOM says farewell to its commander of over three 

years. General Nutting made far-reaching and lasting contributions to the 

security of the region. He played a key role in the development of our policy for 

Latin America at a time when subversion, insurgency and open hostilities 

threatened the peace and security of the region. His support for security 

assistance has led to many improvements in the forces of El Salvador, 

Honduras, and other regional countries. In Panama, General Nutting played a 

critical role, in cooperation with General Paredes, in the development of 

innovative methods to improve combined training and to enhance the 

effectiveness of U.S. forces and those of the Panamanian National Guard. His 

work has resulted in closer cooperation between our two countries. His 

distinguished service and extraordinary skill are duly recognized in his 

promotion to General and assignment as Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness 

Command. 

I have asked General Gorman to continue on the path set by General 

Nutting. I am sure that he will prove equal to the task. I have known and 

58 
worked with General Gorman for many years. He is an officer with great talent 

and with a demonstrated understanding and respect for the people of Central 

and South America. You fine soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who will 

serve with him know that he is a proven combat leader, a true soldierstatesman, an officer with a record of extraordinary achievements in peace and 

war, and a top-notch commander in whom the President, The Secretary of 

Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have great confidence. His promotion to 

the rank of General is richly deserved and accords with the broad range of 

important responsibilities he will assume as your new commander. I know you 

will serve him well. 

Finally, I bring to you special greetings from Secretary Weinberger who 

regrets his absence today. On his behalf and for all the members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, I extend to you, General Nutting and to General Gorman, best 

wishes for your continued success in the challenging days ahead. 

Interview 

Armed Forces Journal 

May 1983 

The issue is not JCS reorganization. The central issue is making the key 

man in this whole national security establishment as effective as we can 

possibly make him—that’s the Secretary of Defense. 

Address to the 

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION 

Fort McNair 

Washington, DC 

10 June 1983 

I am very pleased to be here at this meeting of the Foundation. I am a 

graduate of two of the colleges of the National Defense University; I wasn’t 

smart enough to get selected to go to the other one. The meeting of the 

Foundation here is important to the National Defense University. It’s 

important because of the goals you’ve set for the Foundation. It’s important to 

the University—to the work of the University—and will certainly make the 

University a better place and a more valuable place for the Nation. I know that 

you members of the Board have taken on a lot of extra work. Certainly, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and I thank you for the work that you are doing. 

59 
Getting the Foundation underway is an important step in the National 

Defense University’s history. As you know, NDU itself was established in 1976 

but it actually had its beginning here in 1903. During that 80-year history, the 

University has evolved and matured into what it is today. But I think that 

what it has come to be was fairly well-envisioned by President Teddy Roosevelt 

when he laid the cornerstone out here for the building that is now called 

Roosevelt Hall. He said the lesson to be learned by our people was ... “that the 

Army, like the Navy, will do well in war mainly in proportion as it has been 

well-prepared in peacetime.” 

The concept of having colleges to train our officers to prepare for war has 

not always been popular. As a matter of fact, when the British established 

their staff college in the early 1800s, the Duke of Wellington said: “By God! If 

there’s a mutiny in the Army—and in all probability there will be one—you’ll 

see that it’s these new-fangled school masters that will be at the bottom of it!” 

Now, having come here to all schools of the College as a lecturer and to listen 

to the students’ questions after my lectures, I’m inclined to believe that that 

may be so today. But there are other views of what the College is and might 

be. As a matter of fact, somebody said in 1982—and I will let him remain 

nameless—that “It was the war college system that got the job of justifying 

government decisions ex post facto—far from serving as the basis for 

development of national security, the function of the war colleges now is to put 

icing on previously established policy.” 

That’s a grave charge. The Joint Chiefs have invoked General Pustay on 

a number of occasions to answer that charge or to make certain that the 

charge cannot be supported. I can tell you from frequent visits to this 

University and also the nature of the University’s product, that such is really 

not the case. NDU is a unique source of knowledge and education for both 

military and civilian leaders of this government. It is under the direction of the 

Joint Chiefs, as you know. It has an experienced military and civilian staff, and 

it provides education on national security issues that is probably broader by a 

sizeable factor than one can get anywhere else in this country. It treats 

national security issues in the fashion that President Eisenhower meant for 

them to be treated when he proposed in 1958 the last major reorganization of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the defense Reorganization Act of 1947. At that 

time, President Eisenhower said there would be no more uni-Service battles. 

The Navy could not fight by itself, the Army could not fight by itself and the 

then-new Air Force could not fight by itself. The National Defense University 

honors that point and has made certain that the officers who attend here 

understand. 

NDU serves as a lubricant for the defense decision-making process of the 

government. In addition to providing graduates who serve on the higher-level 

staffs, it also conducts studies and research projects for the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and for the Secretary of Defense. It delves into worrisome civil and 

military problems that we can’t or don’t have the time to deal with because of 

the press of day-to-day activities. I cite my own time here as a student. I was 

here in the Industrial College in 1965. My seminar did a study of logistics 

60 
support for Southeast Asia. Our seminar was one of those chosen to address 

the session of the two colleges, the National War College and the Industrial 

College, and to present our findings. In the audience at that time was the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics, 

and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force for Logistics. 

There were 11 members of our seminar who worked on that report. When we 

finished our report, we were then asked to meet with those Assistant 

Secretaries. We did and before the day was out, nine of the 11 members of 

that study group had their orders changed to be sent to implement the 

recommendations which they had made. Fortunately, or unfortunately, there 

was a little pop quiz and I spelled “logistics” with a “J”. So I was not one of 

those who had his orders changed. I went directly on to a combat unit in 

Vietnam, but I was able to enjoy the fruits of the work of my fellow students. 

NDU also provides an atmosphere of reflection that is a little bit 

insulated from the fire brigade urgency of day-to-day governmental work. I 

have to go to a JCS meeting a little later on this afternoon. Certainly, that is 

the plight of other leaders in government, both civilian and military. We are 

“meeting” people. 

The University also serves as a sort of neutral ground where civilians 

who are not connected with the government can meet with military leaders and 

civilian leaders in government to examine political and economic problems as 

well as military problems that face our country. That is important because, 

certainly, our national security doesn’t rest on military strength alone. It rests 

on our economic health and political health, our social health and our spiritual 

health. Hence, sponsoring such conferences as you are engaged in here is an 

important activity of the University. 

For me, as the JCS Chairman, I find the University particularly useful. 

When I signed on to this job last year, I worked out an agreed menu with the 

other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the Commanders in Chief 

of the unified and specified commands. And, at the top of that menu was war 

planning, or military planning. And it’s an important thing for those of us who 

are in this business to be involved in. As I told the Chiefs at that time, we 

could blame the Congress if the defense budget was too low; we could blame 

the society or the school principals or the parents if the recruits were not smart 

enough to do their jobs; we could blame the defense contractors if the 

equipment didn’t work; but, if the war plans were no good, the finger points 

only at us. And, whatever the difficulties were, we had to have realistic plans 

for the defense of this nation. It was our responsibility and ours alone. Now, I 

think we have most of those knots reasonably well-tied together. Certainly, 

they are not as well-tied together as they ought to be, and we are using the 

National Defense University to help us. 

As many of you old warriors out there in the audience know, war plans 

tend to grow like mold in the basements of headquarters. They sometimes 

never see the light of day. We think it is our job as the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

tell the people how to make plans—to give those plans the right direction in the 

first place with some guidance from the top. In many places in the world, our 

61 
Commanders in Chief are out there with yellow foolscap, pencils with erasers, 

and hand-held calculators trying to make the war plans while we have the vast 

computer resources and analytical agencies, many of which are at the war 

colleges helping the students study the hypothetical problems. The fellows out 

there who solve the real problems don’t have the support that they need. So, 

the other thing that we’ve tasked the President of NDU to do is to harness that 

capability that we have in the colleges that makes up the entire education 

establishment of the Armed Forces and make that available to the 

Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands to help solve their 

problems in their global planning responsibilities. 

These then are some of the important ways that NDU has evolved since 

President Roosevelt gave the college its start in 1903. In looking back to that 

time, I see a number of familiar crises that faced our nation. When the 

University had its beginning in 1903, the Army was struggling with the 

Philippine insurrection and simultaneously trying to reform itself under that 

great reformer, Elihu Root. The Navy was mustering its strength at that time 

under President Roosevelt and was soon to embark on a trip around the world 

to show the rest of the world that the United States did have a “blue-water” 

Navy. The Marines were also involved in activities outside our shores. The 

whole of the Marine Corps, a battalion, was posted in Central America at that 

time. The Air Force, of course, wasn’t far away because the Wright Brothers 

made their first flight in that year. With those events as a backdrop, Teddy 

Roosevelt stood on the steps of the building that was about to have his name 

and he said: 

“As a people, whether we will or not, we have reached the stage 

where we must play a great part in the world. It is not open to us 

to decide whether or not we shall play it. All we have to decide is 

whether we shall play it well or ill .... This nation, by the mere 

trend of events, has been forced into a position of world power.” 

And then he added, “It cannot bear these responsibilities aright 

unless its voice is potent for peace and justice, as its voice can be 

potent for peace and justice only on one condition ..., that we ask 

peace, not in the spirit of the weakling and the craven, but with the 

assured self confidence of the just man armed.” 

I would say to you that those words President Roosevelt pronounced on 

that day in 1903 ought to be handed out on cards to Congressmen who are 

going to vote on the defense appropriations bill this year—and to those who are 

going to decide whether or not to modernize our strategic deterrent as well as 

seek arms control negotiations and to those who will decide whether or not we 

are going to continue to keep this nation a healthy, global power, as indeed we 

must be. We cannot avoid the responsibilities we have in the world. I say to 

you that this new National Defense University must play a major role in 

keeping this nation a just nation justly armed. It must play its part in the 

preservation of peace. The quality of the education that the officers and civilian 

62 
leaders get here will have a great deal to do with the defense decision-making 

in the years ahead. And we hold them to the responsibility of giving an 

adequate education, one that will help our nation maintain its security and the 

peace and freedom of the world. 

For those reasons I applaud you of the Foundation for the work that 

you’re doing because it exemplifies that the country has always been a country 

of free citizens willing to help do the job themselves. 

Statement before the 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

Subcommittee on Investigations 

On the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

14 June 1983 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. 

Thank you for asking me and my colleagues to return here to testify on 

the very important topic of improving the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. You will recall that General Gabriel, Admiral Watkins and I presented 

our views on July 28, 1982, roughly one month after we assumed our duties. 

You may remember also that General Myer and General Barrow had already 

preceded us in their testimony. Since then, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have 

studied proposals for improving the way the JCS contribute to national 

defense. I would like to discuss with you the conclusions we reached and to 

describe the changes we have set in motion to improve the way we do our 

business. The Chiefs have asked me to report the findings of our review. 

Early last summer, the Chiefs and I agreed that we would undertake this 

review of our organization and our way of carrying out our responsibilities. As 

a basis for our review, we recognized that the effectiveness of the JCS is a 

direct function of the relationships the JCS maintain with the Secretary of 

Defense and the President, with the Commanders of the unified and specified 

commands, and with each other. Accordingly, we decided to address the 

issues personally rather than have staff officers do the work. 

We agreed on criteria we would apply to all proposals for change. I 

described these in some detail last July, but I want to repeat them today: 

• Would the change improve our ability to wage war if we’re ever forced 

into one? The ultimate test is the ability to transition from peace to war 

and to fight the war to a successful conclusion should deterrence fail. 

• Would it provide the President and the Secretary of Defense better 

and more timely advice? 

63 
• Would it better ensure that the requirements of the commanders in 

the field, the Commanders in Chief of unified and specified commands, 

are met? These Commanders in Chief, the “CINCs,” are the ones who 

will execute the war plans and fight the battles; and their needs were a 

key part of our review. 

• Would it improve the ability to allocate national security resources 

more wisely and efficiently—helping the President and the Secretary of 

Defense to meet their difficult responsibility of getting the most security 

from our limited budget? 

The Secretary of Defense asked us to add a fifth criterion, 

• Would the suggested changes maintain our national legacy of civilian 

control of the military? We added and used the criterion. 

As the starting point for our examination, we used the duties of the JCS 

prescribed in Section 141, Title 10, U.S. Code. Our examination of those 

duties outlined in the law confirmed for us that those are the correct duties 

and responsibilities for the JCS. Further, we concluded that the existing law 

gives us most of the latitude we need to improve the effectiveness of our own 

operation. We are working to do that now in cooperation with the Secretary of 

Defense and with the commanders in the field. We believe improvements are 

underway. There is improved personal communication among the JCS, the 

President and the Secretary of Defense; we are placing emphasis on the 

timeliness of JCS advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense; there is 

increased participation by the CINCs of the unified and specified commands in 

the program and budget decisions; and we believe we are sharpening the JCS 

focus on strategic matters. 

We agreed last summer to call in the Commanders in Chief of the unified 

and specified commands, asking each to brief us personally on his most 

demanding war plan and his concept of operations. We learned a great deal 

and have set in motion the mechanism for better planning guidance to those 

commanders. The CINCs have become more active participants in defense 

resource planning and in global operational planning; and the Secretary of 

Defense has asked that I, as the Chairman, become their spokesman on 

operational requirements. As a result, the advice of the CINCs has become 

increasingly influential in the development of joint warfare requirements and 

programs. 

We have taken measures to assure continuity between the Chairman and 

the JCS member acting in my absence by assigning an Acting Chairman on a 

quarterly basis. 

Service schools continue to emphasize joint planning and operations; 

and, a training program for officers of the Joint Staff is being prepared. Our 

system of colleges under the National Defense University is giving new 

attention to joint strategies and operations at theater and global levels. 

64 
In the conduct of our review, we learned something that probably should 

have been obvious from the start. The challenge for any “reorganizer” is to 

enhance the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense 

is the key man in the defense establishment; and reform must focus on 

improving how he uses the JCS, his military advisors, as part of the entire 

DOD organization. We determined that an important part of his effectiveness 

depends on how well the JCS carry out the duties prescribed for them in the 

law and on the effectiveness of three, interdependent relationships. 

The first relationship is that among the Chiefs and the Secretary of 

Defense and the President, a relationship which stems from duties specified in 

Section 141, Title 10, U.S. Code. In the performance of these duties, we’ve 

developed a close working relationship with the Secretary and we consult 

regularly as a group with the President. The relationship between this 

particular group of Chiefs and their civilian superiors seems to me to approach 

what the law indicates it should be. 

The second relationship is the relationship among the Chiefs as a 

corporate body. We must have trust and confidence in one another. Each 

Service Chief has responsibilities as the senior uniformed officer in his own 

Service, responsibilities different from those duties he performs as a member of 

the JCS. These other duties uniquely distinguish each Chief as best qualified 

to advise on the capabilities and limitations of his Service. The close 

relationships developed within this group of Chiefs ensures that this expert 

advice is heard. 

The third relationship, which I addressed earlier, is that among the Joint 

Chiefs and an important group of nine—the commanders of the unified and 

specified commands. The JCS as a body and the Chief of each of the Services 

must ensure the requirements of the CINCs are heard and acted upon. 

These relationships are fundamental elements in any consideration of 

how we do our business. JCS organization cannot be considered in isolation. 

The functions of the JCS can only be considered in the light of the larger 

mechanism for building our defenses. In this respect, the effectiveness of the 

JCS is a function of understanding and of mutual respect within each of the 

relationships I outlined. The relationship must be tendered by all the people 

involved. 

Nevertheless, our review has led us to conclude that some adjustments of 

Department of Defense organization and procedures are indicated—

necessitating changes in the law. This is so for a number of reasons. Past 

experience shows that military advice on strategy, on force requirements, and 

on measures for the transition of our defense posture from peace to war can 

best be provided by the JCS. However, the JCS need to improve our ability to 

provide the analytical basis for military strategy; force structuring, joint tactics, 

techniques, procedures and related training; and joint logistics. Further, the 

staff working for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, is not now best 

structured to assist the JCS on major decisions relating to force requirements 

or to weapons system choices. Accordingly, the Joint Staff needs to be 

strengthened. Finally, in the interest of aligning our peacetime and wartime 

65 
functions, the law also should be amended to place the Chairman in the chain 

of command to the unified and specified commands. 

I would like to amplify on these needed changes as contained in two 

basic recommendations for new legislation made through the Secretary of 

Defense and submitted to both Houses on April 18, 1983. 

First, we recommended that statutory restrictions on the size of the Joint 

Staff and tenure of its officers be changed to augment and strengthen their 

support to the Chiefs. The changes are necessary so that the size of the Joint 

Staff can be adjusted when necessary to ensure it has the number of 

experienced officers needed to assist the JCS and the Secretary of Defense in 

carrying out their assigned responsibilities. 

Second, we recommend that Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 124, be 

amended to place the Chairman in the formal chain of command. The 

Chairman presides over the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and he communicates, at the 

direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, orders to the 

Commanders of the unified and specified commands. The proposed legislation 

would make explicit the Chairman’s functions as a link between the Secretary 

of Defense and the unified and specified commands, an arrangement which 

already works well in practice. 

In sum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that these changes to the current 

organization are necessary for a more effective JCS. Other proposals which 

were advanced for changes to the organization of the JCS were given a 

thorough examination by the Chiefs. We have told the Secretary of Defense 

that we believe that other improvements can most probably be made within the 

boundaries of existing legislation. And, we have recommended that we work 

together to develop and test those changes. 

We do not believe it is necessary to specify that the Chairman is the 

principal military advisor. This is adequately provided in existing law and the 

proposal would serve only to disrupt or confuse the flow of advice from the 

other members of the JCS. We believe the Chairman does not require a fulltime, 4-star Deputy Chairman. The system of quarterly rotation of an acting 

Chairman is working well. Similarly, the JCS gave careful consideration to the 

concept of a National Council of Senior Military Advisors apart from the Chiefs 

of the Services, but we believed that the proposals already outlined provided 

the opportunity for us to improve the military advice to the Secretary of 

Defense. Nor is it necessary or appropriate to revise the law to subordinate the 

Joint Staff specifically to the Chairman. The Chairman is already responsible 

for the management of the Joint Staff and its Director on behalf of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

Mr. Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed the review of the 

various proposals to change the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our 

recommendations, concurred in unanimously by all the Chiefs, have been 

submitted to the Congress through the Secretary of Defense; and we 

recommend their approval. 

66 
Remarks at the Graduation Ceremony 

EMPIRE STATE MILITARY ACADEMY

Camp Smith 

Peekskill, NY 

24 June 1983 

The Army’s a great leveler. The enlisted men and women come from a 

multitude of backgrounds—different family backgrounds, different economic 

backgrounds, different skin colors, different sexes. But those don’t mean a 

thing when it comes to the Army. It’s what’s in your head, what you can do 

with your hands and what’s in your heart that counts and makes the team 

work. It builds that trust and confidence in each other. 

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 

There are some constants in military success. Today, as in times gone 

by, success on the battlefield demands not only technical competence but trust 

and confidence of the highest order in each other—trust in the skill of one’s 

comrade, knowing that the fellow next to you, the fellow in front of you, and the 

fellow behind you, whether from another Service or from your own outfit—trust 

that the other fellow on the team is going to do his job and do it correctly. 

Trust and loyalty, courage and willingness to share the burden. Those 

relationships and that teamwork can be built only with discipline—

organizational discipline that comes from such things as drill as well as 

individual discipline and the self-discipline that comes from the ability to stand 

out there at attention or at ease, with the sweat running down your nose and a 

fly on your ear, and be able to continue to stand at attention. Because in 

battle, you’ll have to do things that are a lot harder than that. 

Von Steuben had some good guidance for officers. He said that “The first 

duty of the Captain is to gain the love and confidence of his men by treating 

them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their 

complaints and, when those complaints are well-founded, seeing them 

redressed,” and that the Captain should know the men by name as well as 

character. Now, that does not mean fawning or mollycoddling. It means the 

highest duty is teaching one’s men and women to know their duties on the 

battlefield so that they can build that trust and confidence in each other. 

67 
Address to the BREAKFAST of the 

25TH DIVISION OFFICERS AND MEN 

Schofield Barracks, HI 

30 June 1983 

The United States has extraordinary responsibilities in the world today. 

There are many in our population who would like to have us evade those 

responsibilities or renege on those responsibilities. Unfortunately, that is not 

possible. There are many in the world today who would like to “uninvent” 

nuclear weapons. That is not possible. The Good Lord didn’t promise us a 

world without troubles or a perfect world. But He gave us the only world we 

have and our job is to make the best we can out of that world. I think we as 

Americans have the duty to make that world as safe as we can—first, for our 

own citizens, to protect those rights and liberties which our Forefathers 

pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honors to protect. Second, 

we have a duty to make life as safe and as good as we can for our friends and 

allies in the world. 

One reason I want to talk to you today is that I hear a lot of talk in the 

newspapers which says we don’t have a strategy. Well, I want to tell you that’s 

a lot of baloney. We do have a strategy. It’s a very sensible strategy. Our 

strategy is one of preventing war by making it self-evident to our enemies that 

they’re going to get their “clocks cleaned” if they start a war with the United 

States. 

Our strategy counts on a couple of things. It counts on alliances. You 

see that if you go to Korea—it’s sort of the anchor of our alliances in East Asia. 

And we have our alliances in Europe. Many of you have served there. 

Another part of our strategy is forward-deployed forces to reinforce those 

alliances. We have forward-deployed forces for two reasons. The first is to 

make sure that the alliances have military strength enough to make it selfevident to our enemies that we’re ready to fight. Second, by providing 

American forces in those forward-deployed military units to countries that are 

part of alliances, we provide political strength to the alliances. We let those 

nations know that we’re with them. That’s important because we need them 

and they need us. 

There are some other parts of our strategy and they tie into the 25th

Division. We don’t have large forces. You people who go out to Korea face the 

North Korean forces across the Demilitarized Zone. The North Korean Army is 

about the same size as ours. It comes from a country of about 18 million 

people. We come from a nation of 225 million people. So, you see, we don’t 

have nearly as many of our people in uniform as they do. We have a large Navy 

and Air Force which they don’t have. Nevertheless, our forces are not large in 

comparison to the military commitments that this nation has. So, we count on 

three things, three key ingredients, to make our forces more effective. 

The first is extraordinary good intelligence. We spend more money than 

anybody else in the world on intelligence. We have better intelligence than 

68 
anybody else in the world. The second thing is good command and control. 

We can send forces to the Egyptian desert and I can send an order to the task 

force commander and get it there in no time at all. And, the third ingredient is 

extraordinary mobility. We can move forces to other parts of the world better 

than anybody else. Nathan Bedford Forrest wasn’t the first to recognize that 

when he said, “Get there ‘fustest’ with the mostest.” But, he was the first to 

put it in truly good American English. Certainly, that’s something that was 

recognized by Sun Tzu, Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, Napoleon, 

Washington and all those strategists before him. If you want to make smaller 

forces effective, you have to be able to control them, let them know more about 

the enemy than the enemy knows about them, and then get them where they 

need to be in a hurry. That translates into how you do your job, as well as 

what you see going on in the Armed Forces today. 

The Army is involved in its greatest modernization program of all time. 

People ask me what I got the most satisfaction from in my career. I think I got 

the most satisfaction out of my career when I was Vice Chief of Staff of the 

Army, as the guy who was in charge of getting Army procurement programs 

moved through the bureaucracy of the Pentagon. I take pride in saying that 

while I was Vice Chief of Staff, the Army went into production with the M-1 

tank, the M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the PATRIOT air defense system. 

We aren’t in production yet but we have permission to go into production with 

the AH-64 APACHE helicopter, the BLACKHAWK helicopter and the Multiple 

Launch Rocket System along with modernizing both our 155mm and 8-inch 

cannons. In addition to that, we have a whole range of electronic warfare 

equipment and command and control equipment that is modernizing the Army. 

The whole purpose behind that modernization is not to make life easier on the 

battlefield but to make you more effective on the battlefield—to be able to do 

just exactly what I outlined in the larger sense for the Nation, and for you as 

part of the Division. That is, to be able to know more about the enemy, to be 

able to move faster for the Division Commander, and to control our forces in 

the fashion that makes them as effective as they can possibly be on the 

battlefield. 

Now, what does that say to you? That says to you—as officers; as 

Brigade Commanders, Battalion Commanders, Company Commanders, and as 

noncommissioned officers: Sergeants Major, First Sergeants, Platoon 

Sergeants, and Squad Leaders—that you inherit an extraordinary responsibility 

to the taxpayer of this country, to the citizens of this country, to make your 

forces effective. We’re buying a tank that costs the taxpayer around 2 million 

dollars apiece. That’s a lot of money by anybody’s standards. It has a jet 

engine in it. It has a solid state computer, a laser rangefinder, and 

ammunition that costs about $1,000 a round. It’s there for one reason and 

that’s so you can get out there and punch holes in a whole bunch of Russian 

tanks if you have to. Fortunately, if the Russians recognize that we can do it 

and will do it, we’ll probably never have to do it. That’s the best possible 

outcome. It means that you and I have to do our job to make the equipment as 

effective as we possibly can. 

69 
Having spent many, many years in armored divisions—I can snipe at the 

armored divisions here when I’m talking to an Infantry division—I always went 

around to the tank crews and said, “Tell me how you got your tank driver’s 

license?” Well, I want to tell you that we’ve had a lot of tank battalions through 

the years which weren’t as strict with tank drivers’ licenses as the State of 

Minnesota is for driver’s licenses for cars. We can’t afford to do that anymore. 

I rode over here in a helicopter this morning. It cost the Army about a quarter 

of what that tank costs the Army. We sent those two warrant officers through 

six months of training. We give them standardization rides frequently. We do 

all sorts of things to ensure their proficiency. The same sort of thing needs to 

be done with this modern, very good equipment that you’re going to get or that 

you’re already getting. We need to be as strict with that equipment as we are 

with things like helicopters to make sure that they are run properly and that 

we get the most out of them. 

The second thing that we need to do is take care of ourselves. That fire 

control system in the M-1 tank or in the M-60A3 tank costs the taxpayers a 

quarter of a million dollars. The effectiveness of that equipment is dependent 

on the eyeballs and the hands and the brains of the soldier that goes behind it. 

If he doesn’t take care of himself, if he’s not in good physical condition, if he’s 

not eating the right things, if he’s boozing, on drugs, or something like that, 

that quarter of a million dollars is down the drain. It won’t do any good at all. 

Leaders have the duty to see that all members of the Armed Services stay in 

good physical and mental condition so that we’re ready to do what we have to 

do. 

The third thing I’d like to bring up are the tactics involved with the new 

equipment that the Army is getting. When you take a company of those AH-64 

helicopters and hang the HELLFIRE missiles on them, and if you say, “I’m 

going to get the same reliability, the kill probability, that we got in the 

operational tests from each of those missiles with that one company of 

helicopters, you’ve got a whole Russian tank division’s worth of tanks—dead. 

With the test results we got with the HELLFIRE missile, that’s how many tanks 

a company of attack helicopters would kill—a whole Russian division worth of 

tanks by one company of helicopters! 

That means you, the commanders, have to think through the tactics 

properly to take advantage of that capability. You don’t dribble those things 

away. You don’t send that attack helicopter company out chasing one or two 

tanks. You don’t send it out to do cavalry missions or something like that. 

Create conditions on the battlefield so that you can get a division’s worth of 

tanks. Now, when you face a division of enemy tanks, you know Murphy’s Law 

will operate. Somebody will screw up. Some guy will fly in the wrong direction. 

Somebody will forget the proper Army techniques for some of the missiles. But, 

even if you only get 75 percent of the tanks of the Russian tank division, you 

have destroyed that tank division for all intents and purposes. What I’m saying 

to you is that it requires a quantum leap in the tactics of the United States 

Army to take advantage of the equipment we have now purchased and to take 

advantage of the soldiers that we now have. 

70 
The job for you and me, the leaders, is to make sure that we put those 

ingredients together, including the proper functioning of the new equipment, 

the tactics that take the best out of that equipment, the care and feeding of 

those soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines so that they are in good physical 

condition and have the right mental condition to do the job that they have to 

do. If we do that, there won’t be any war. The Russians will know it and I 

believe they know it now. But we can’t afford to be sloppy or they might draw 

the wrong conclusions. If they draw the wrong conclusions, then we will have 

to fight; and, if we are already sloppy and have to fight, then we’re in serious 

trouble. 

The last thing is the training techniques. We have put a lot of money 

into the science of training. We know more about how to train soldiers so that 

we won’t have those catastrophic first-day-in-the-battle casualties that we’ve 

had in recent wars. What we have to do is take command. Have you got the 

“MILES” here? (Yes, sir.) How’s it working? (Great.) Good. The greatest thing 

that’s come along. Are you going to get an opportunity to go to the National 

Training Center, Bill? (No, sir.) You ought to complain about that. Try and get 

it. If you don’t get to go there, build your own out here so that the operator 

gets some very realistic enemy tactics. 

If we do all those things, the world will be a safer place. 

I would leave you with this. The United States does have a strategy. It’s 

an effective strategy. We have strong forces. We’re getting stronger. The 

people in this country are a little nervous about what’s being spent for defense. 

You read stories in the newspapers everyday about how the procurement 

system is fouled up, and how we want to wish away nuclear weapons. Just 

cool it; do your job; be effective. The truth will come out and the citizens of this 

country will do what they have to do. 

Remarks at the Opening Ceremonies 

For the 22nd Class of the U.S. Army 

Command Sergeants Major Academy 

Fort Bliss, TX 

5 August 1983 

What we have to do is think through these modern tactics and not be in 

the Stone Age with our tactics. We must make sure that we’re not sending one 

helicopter off to fight one tank or some such thing as that and that we don’t 

violate the principles of mass and surprise .... We are training people to do the 

jobs that absolutely have to be done. We’re training them in a way that will 

avoid those catastrophic casualties that can occur in the first days of combat 

because training has been inadequate. 

71 
And it is up to you, the senior noncommissioned officers, to make sure 

that the most precious thing the unit has—the most precious commodity aside 

from the men and women in uniform themselves—training time, is used 

effectively. 

If we do all these things, I’m absolutely convinced that the Soviets will 

know what we have done and that there will be less danger of us having to fight 

them. Your skills are important, in fact, essential; but it’s the combination of 

skill, integrity and character that will make the difference in your fighting 

organization. Your job is to build an Army and to see that it stays built and 

stays in good condition. 

Remarks to the 

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS, 

84th NATIONAL CONVENTION

New Orleans, LA 

16 August 1983 

Thanks for the welcome and thanks for inviting me. It is nice to be with 

fellow Veterans and fellow members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. I bring 

you greetings from my fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from the 

men and women of America’s Armed Forces. The people in the Armed Forces 

today appreciate very much the support that the VFW has given, and we 

appreciate its reputation for supporting a strong national defense and for 

supporting the veterans of the Armed Forces. On behalf of all those members 

of the Armed Forces, I want to thank you for that support. 

I was introduced to the VFW long before I became a veteran. My dad was 

an Infantry squad leader with the Rainbow Division in the First World War; 

and, after the war he helped to organize the Oscar and John Soberg Post 210 

in Lakeville, Minnesota—I think he was the second commander there. Just as 

the VFW does today, that post was a very important influence in our 

community. Among other things it did was sponsor the first Boy Scout troop 

that I joined. Even to this day, my mother, when she wants to dress up or 

show off a little bit, puts on her Ladies Auxiliary Past President’s pin. 

These conventions, too, have a great reputation. They provide the forum 

for serious reflection and an opportunity for you to hear a lot of very important 

people—and some of us not so important—and at the same time I’m sure they 

give you an opportunity to have a little fun. I remember my dad saying that 

when he went to the VFW conventions and talked to my mother over the 

telephone, she could smell his breath over the phone. 

I know you have listened to President Reagan, Senator Glenn, and 

Secretary Weinberger. Incidentally, I want to thank you for honoring “Cap” 

Weinberger here last night. He is a good and courageous Secretary of Defense. 

72 
I know they have told you a lot about their views on national security, about 

the threats we face and the need to sustain the revitalization of our forces. I 

am glad you had the opportunity to hear their important views. I am a little bit 

apprehensive about being fourth behind those heavy hitters, and I’m sure I’m 

not supposed to be the clean-up hitter; but maybe we are at the tail end of the 

batting order here now. I guess I was invited because I’m an old soldier. I will 

warn you in advance that, except for probably MacArthur, old soldiers aren’t 

necessarily good speakers. I remember a tale about General U.S. Grant who 

was once presiding over a court martial of an old soldier. Grant heard the 

defense lawyer say that the old veteran had been through many, many 

campaigns. “Well,” Grant said, “And so has that mule over there but he is still 

a jackass.” 

I want to tell you a little bit about what I see from the foxhole that I now 

occupy and some of the concerns those sights give me. In this country today, 

we spend a lot of time being concerned about defense budgets and hardware 

and defense policy. But, I don’t have to tell this group that the most important 

ingredients in our national defense are the individual soldiers, sailors, airmen 

and Marines who serve in those forces—tomorrow’s veterans. 

People are the heart of our defenses. No matter how advanced our 

technology or how devastating our weaponry, the skill of the men and women 

in uniform is going to be the key to the success of our arms. The effectiveness 

of modern weaponry, either for preventing war in times of peace or for ending it 

successfully in times of war, depends on the minds, the eyes, the hands, the 

skills, the spirit, and the hearts of those Service men and women who operate 

the equipment. No matter what degree of sophistication we get for the tools of 

war, there will always be, on some remote battlefield, two soldiers with a 

flashlight, huddled underneath their ponchos, soaked to the bone, trying to 

coordinate their forces in a battle that occurred by chance on some map sheet 

they were never issued. And I can tell you that right now, out there today, 

there’s a high probability some fancy piece of gear is being fixed by some 

innovative serviceman with bubblegum and bailing wire. 

It is very much as General Creighton Abrams said: “People aren’t in the 

Armed Forces; people are the Armed Forces.” We’ve relearned that lesson 

about twenty times in the past 207 years of our history. The lesson is that if 

you want good defense forces, the cornerstone is people, good people. 

I have spent a good part of my time as the Chairman visiting our 

operational forces throughout the world. In the process, I have had the 

opportunity to see soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines operating in deployed 

forces in all sorts of circumstances—most of them difficult. I want to report to 

you that those forces are in good shape and the people manning those forces 

are among the finest we have ever had. Today, the Armed Forces are getting 

and keeping very good people. The recruiting and reenlistment for the first six 

months of this year were better than last year, and last year was the best it 

ever was. Eighty-nine percent of all the new recruits have high school 

diplomas. That is better than we had at any time during conscription. 

73 
What’s more important, though, is that all the Services are keeping topnotch men and women to fill the very important non-commissioned officer jobs 

and the jobs requiring high skills. And I’ll tell you that the more I look at our 

armed forces, and the more I look at the Soviet Armed Forces, the more I 

believe that the difference between us—the difference that will allow us to be 

successful on the battlefield—is the fact that we have more, very good, 

professional non-commissioned officers. 

We have the image in this country of Sergeant Bilko and Sergeant 

Snorkel as typifying the Armed Forces over the years. Two weeks ago I visited 

the Army’s Sergeants Major Academy. The class was made up of students from 

all four Services and from both Active and Reserve Forces. Two hundred and 

thirty-eight of the 255-man class were First Sergeant rank or the equivalent in 

the other Services. The average age was 39. The average time in service was 

20 years. The range of their special skills was as long as my arm. They are 

Rangers and Special Forces, and tankers and infantrymen and submariners, 

and air crewmen. Half of them were parachute-qualified. They were all in topnotch physical condition. And, if that doesn’t destroy—or help destroy—the 

“Sergeant Snorkel” image for today’s armed forces, let me tell you about their 

education: one of them had a PhD., six of them had Masters Degrees, another 

sixteen had Bachelor Degrees, twenty-two had Associate Degrees; sixty-six had 

completed some college; and all were high school graduates. 

If you look back at the average age and the average length of service, you 

have to come to the same conclusion that my survey of that group did—every 

hour of that college work they got at night during their off-duty time. I say to 

you that America can take pride in its armed forces but, more importantly, it 

can take pride in the people in them. Certainly, the support they receive from 

organizations—in particular like the VFW—is crucial to help Americans realize 

that service in the Armed Forces is honorable duty; and that helps us get highquality people and keep them. 

Sonny Montgomery has questioned whether or not the All Volunteer 

Force works. Is this the final answer for providing manpower for the Nation’s 

Armed Forces? I don’t know, but I do know it is working today. In time of war, 

we know we will need compulsory military service. As the economy continues 

to improve, will we be able to continue to get good people in the right numbers 

to man the Armed Forces under the volunteer system? I don’t know. But, I 

say to you that whatever the Nation has to do, it should watch very carefully 

and make sure that it does get good people in the right numbers—and we must 

do that whether it’s the draft or increased pay, or whatever it happens to be. 

In the past three weeks, I have visited Army units in primitive camps in 

Central America. I have seen the Marines in Beirut. I have visited naval units 

off the coast of Central America and off the coast of Lebanon. I gave seen Air 

Force units manning early warning sites in Greenland and Iceland, and I have 

visited our missile units out in Wyoming. And I’ll say to you that in those three 

weeks, I have seen a tremendous number of skilled people doing a wide variety 

of difficult jobs under arduous conditions. The point that impressed me most 

in seeing those people is that I didn’t see a sullen soldier, sailor, airman or 

74 
Marine in the crowd. Their spirits were high. The more difficult the job they 

were doing, the better they seemed to like it; and I say to you that is a very 

good sign for America and a very good sign for our armed forces. 

Not too long ago, I visited an Infantry battalion that we have doing 

peacekeeping duty in the Sinai. If you have never been to the Sinai, it is 

nothing surrounded by nothing. These guys are stretched out from the head of 

the Gulf of Aqaba down to Sharm El Sheikh on the peninsula, the tip of the 

Sinai Peninsula. They are in squad positions because it’s really a squad 

leader’s job. And they’re doing a terrific job. I had dinner with an infantry 

company one night and I said to one of these soldiers, “What do you do when 

you are not out on those squad positions?” He said, “Well, last weekend 62 of 

us from our company climbed Mount Sinai.” Then he said, “I learned 

something, too, Sir.” I said, “What did you learn?” He said, “Old Man Moses 

was really in good shape.” 

Well, as I look out over here—and particularly towards the delegations 

from my home state of Minnesota—I see faces of comrades in arms who have 

been in places like those I have described, who have been huddled under those 

ponchos, or who have been cramped in cockpits, or on ship’s bridges. And, I 

must tell you that we in uniform today feel a special link to you patriots here 

today. You served as we serve now; you know the meaning of the word 

“service.” You know firsthand that our people in the active forces, and in the 

Reserves and National Guard do more than simply work for the Armed Forces; 

they serve in the armed forces. That concept of service is an altogether 

different concept than simply being a member of a work force. It is a mark of a 

special obligation taken by members of our armed forces, a mark of people who 

are ready to surrender some of their own personal liberties to take special risks 

so that their fellow citizens can be secure. These people in our military forces 

are going to go where the citizens of this country want them to go. They are 

going to fight the wars that the citizens of this country want them to fight. 

They are going to do whatever the citizens of this country want them to do. 

They are prepared to do that, whatever the risk. Keeping these people ready for 

their tasks requires a continuous commitment from the citizens of the Nation. 

I have heard it said that the health of the Armed Forces is like fresh bread. If 

you want fresh bread, you have to make it fresh every day or you just have 

stale bread. I’ll tell you that the same is true for military forces. If you want 

good military forces, you have to give them daily attention. Soldiers, sailors, 

airmen and Marines are going to lose their proficiency if they don’t work at 

their trade regularly. 

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that point; and, I 

want you to know that we do battle with the budgets to see that our forces get 

the money they need to keep them ready. Our people in the Armed Forces are 

dedicated and they serve unselfishly; but, it is important that we continue to 

make it attractive and rewarding for good people to stay in the Services, 

particularly when they become skilled. The pay and the other emoluments 

must be adequate. The rewards for military service have to reflect the unique 

nature of military service. Funds for training and supplies and for the other 

75 
aspects of readiness have too often been looked on as “slop buckets” that can 

be dipped into at will. And I want to see that the people we have in uniform get 

proper treatment, and that they get the equipment and training they need. 

Just as the Armed Forces have a duty to the Nation I believe the Nation 

has a duty to our people who serve in uniform—those who have served, those 

who now serve, and those who will serve in the future. The liberty that our 

citizens enjoy today has been secured by those who have served in the past—

including those who are sitting in this room, the members of the VFW. 

We are not at war today. One of the reasons we are not at war is 

because of the service of those men and women in the Armed Forces today. We 

have to remember that it is their willingness and their readiness to fight for this 

country that are an important part in keeping the Nation out of war. They are 

out there today doing very tough, sometimes dull, but often very dangerous 

work, in very dangerous places. They are doing that to keep this nation at 

peace. Very much a part of that willingness and readiness to defend the Nation 

is the certain knowledge among those members of the Armed Forces that the 

citizens of our country—during peacetime, during combat and after the wars 

are over—will take care of them and their families: that we will give them good 

equipment, good training, and take care of their families if they have to march 

off to war; that we will pick up our wounded and give them good medical care; 

that we will pick up our dead and give them reverent and dignified treatment 

for their remains and their graves; that we will do whatever is necessary to get 

back those who become prisoners of war and we will account for all the missing 

in action; and that we will honor those who gave their lives by helping the living 

veterans, as the motto of this organization so eloquently and simply states. 

Anyone who joins the Armed Services to get rich has to be faulted for bad 

judgment; and, I don’t believe you will find any members who expect to get 

rich. However, those who do serve deserve to be able to feed their families, and 

feed them without the use of food stamps, and to educate their children and be 

rewarded somewhat reasonably for the skills and the extraordinary service they 

give the Nation. The pay and the emoluments and the retirement system have 

to continue to attract good people or we simply won’t have good armed forces. 

They deserve good equipment, too—top-notch equipment, equipment that 

works and equipment that gives our people an edge over our potential enemies. 

Our strategy calls for the use of American technology, one of America’s strong 

points. We do that because we value human life more than we value things. I 

frequently hear some misguided people say, “Why don’t we buy cheaper 

weapons because then we can buy a lot more of them and give them to our 

armed forces? We won’t feel the loss so greatly if we lose them to the enemy.” 

The problem with that philosophy is that when you lose the equipment, you 

also lose the men who operate it. I see many of you out here who are my age 

and I know that many of you have children in the Armed Forces. I have a kid 

who flies attack helicopters for the Army and I don’t want him or any other 

young American out there with bargain-basement, cheap, ineffective weapons. 

In that respect, I am happy to say to you that the Reserve Components of 

our Armed Forces are beginning to get a sensible share of modern equipment. 

76 
We have finally begun moving very good equipment into the Reserve 

Components. And that is very important because the Reserves and the 

National Guard figure more importantly in our strategy than ever before. I say 

to you that continued support for the National Guard and the Reserves from all 

the people in this country, and particularly from their employers, is important 

to the security of the Nation. 

At the same time, it is very important for us in uniform to recognize that 

the taxpaying citizen deserves a fair shake in this whole exercise. He deserves 

to have us buy sensible equipment whose value is worth the price—equipment 

that’s effective but not “gold-plated.” The members of the Armed Forces and all 

the taxpaying citizens deserve to have a fair shake from American industry and 

from American labor by having them produce quality equipment. As Secretary 

Weinberger pointed out recently, the Nation deserves the highest levels of 

integrity and honesty from industry in seeing that a fair price is asked. 

All these factors lie at the heart of our military health—good equipment, 

good people, good training, dedicated leadership and support from the 

populace and industry. As I said earlier, I am buoyed by the progress that I 

have seen in my frequent visits to the field. Yet, at the same time, I am 

concerned about our willingness to provide for our future security. There is a 

great debate going on in this country today: “How much is enough for 

defense?” “Are we spending too much for defense?” “Can we get by with less?” 

“Can we avoid modernizing our strategic nuclear deterrent forces?” I say to you 

that this debate turns the whole issue of national security on its head because 

the real question is, “What must we do to provide for our security?” I don’t 

need to remind the people in this room that we inherited our liberties from our 

Forefathers. They, at their particular time in history, didn’t hesitate to do what 

was needed to be done. They paid for our security by pledging “their lives, their 

fortunes, and their sacred honor.” We today reap the benefits of that 

commitment and of their sacrifices. And our burden is the privilege of doing 

the same now for our posterity. 

President Reagan said to me when I took this job last year, “Keep us 

strong, keep us ready, so that we can keep the peace.” Indeed, it’s clear to me 

that that’s the essence of our strategy; keeping the peace by deterrence. And 

that’s a fancy word which simply means making it plain to the other guy that 

we’re going to kick the tar out of him if he tries to start a war. 

The job for me and the other members of the JCS is to make sure that 

our forces are as ready as the defense budgets will permit—that we tell the 

Secretary of Defense and the President what is needed to defend this country 

and to carry out its strategy; to see to the welfare of those soldiers, sailors, 

airmen and Marines so that they can be trained and equipped properly, that 

they are in good physical condition, and have the right mental and spiritual 

health to do the job that they have to do. 

I want to take just a minute to reassure you that the advice of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff is being sought and heard by the President and the Secretary of 

Defense. We meet regularly with the President of the United States; and this 

group of Chiefs has met more with the President of the United States than any 

77 
group of Chiefs has with the last four Presidents. I meet daily with the 

Secretary of Defense, and he meets regularly with the Chiefs as a body. 

I can tell you that all those four Service Chiefs are addressing in a 

business-like fashion the jobs that the citizens of this country have laid out for 

them to do in the law. We have a good body of Joint Chiefs right now—Admiral 

Jim Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations; General Charlie Gabriel, Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force; General John Wickham, the Army Chief of Staff; and P.X. 

Kelley, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. They are all respected, battleproven veterans. They are true experts in their own Services. And, I want to 

tell you that they are working diligently to improve those Services. 

I can tell you also that they are officers of broad strategic vision who 

understand that the defenses of this nation are only as good as the ability of all 

four Services to work closely together. Those four Chiefs understand that 

President Eisenhower was right when he told the Congress in 1958 that wars 

in the future could only be won if the four Services worked closely together 

under unified command. In fact, all of those Chiefs have experience in unified 

commands. I want to tell you also that I hear a lot about reorganization of the 

Joint Chiefs; and I tell you that the Chiefs have examined their own 

organizations. We have made recommendations to the President for some 

changes in the law. We have made recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense on better ways to do our business. And, we have set about the task of 

cleaning up our own act to make sure that we can do the job as well as the 

Lord will permit us to do it. 

According to stories that I read in the newspapers and hear on television 

and radio, I am supposed to see quite a lot of inter-Service “bickering” among 

those Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact, according to some of the stories, I take part 

in that “bickering” myself. Those Chiefs don’t always agree; and I don’t think 

you would want them always to agree. Occasionally, when they do disagree, 

they disagree on matters of policy and they make those points very clear. Now, 

by law, I am charged with explaining their disagreements to the Secretary of 

Defense and the President and I am happy to have those disagreements made 

clear. 

I want to thank you for having me here today and giving me the 

opportunity to tell you a little bit about how I see the Armed Forces. I know 

that you understand what the price of liberty is. My colleagues on the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff understand the very special duty that we have to help preserve 

the peace and liberty for our country. Sunday night, perhaps some of you did 

as I did and watched “Bataan, the Forgotten Hell,” on television. Certainly, 

that tragedy was a reminder of America’s lack of preparedness in the past. 

I recall being at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in 1950. Early that year, we were 

cutting up lard in the mess hall, cutting it off the meat, so we could make soap. 

At that time, General Bradley, the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

had the job I now have. I heard General Bradley in a radio broadcast tell the 

American people about the defense budget. He said: “The problem is to 

provide enough military strength during the years of peace so that we will never 

have to pay the cost of war, either in lives or dollars.” The defense budget that 

78 
was under consideration that spring was woefully short of what was needed; it 

was 13 billion dollars. Two months after that radio broadcast, 60,000 North 

Korean troops, spearheaded with Soviet-built tanks, invaded the Republic of 

Korea and plunged an unprepared America into another bloody conflict. The 

proposed defense budget of 13 billion dollars climbed to 60 billion dollars by 

the following year; but, more importantly, this country paid in another coin, a 

coin a lot more precious, and that was the blood of our people. 

If we want peace and liberty, every lesson I see in history tells us that we 

should have an adequate defense force in peacetime and we should be ready to 

help other free people protect their liberty when threatened—whether that 

threat is from Soviet SS-20s aimed at our NATO allies or from communist 

guerillas in Central America. If we don’t, we will probably have an unholy 

peace without any liberty, such as the peace in Poland today; but, even worse, 

we could probably lose both the war and the peace and liberty. I say to you 

that is not necessary, and it is also very un-American. 

And I say to you that with the help of God, and with the readiness and 

spirit of selfless service of Americans serving in our armed forces, with the 

support of the American people, especially outfits like the VFW, and with 

support from the President and the Congress, we can, in fact, preserve both 

peace and freedom, not only for ourselves but for our posterity. It is nice to be 

with you. God bless you all. 

Extracts from Remarks at the 88th

ANNUAL NATIONAL CONVENTION, 

JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE 

UNITED STATES

Atlanta, GA 

17 August 1983 

Thanks for the welcome. I am very pleased to be here and have the 

opportunity to address this distinguished, patriotic group at its 88th Annual 

Convention. I bring you greetings on behalf of my fellow members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and on behalf of the men and women in the Armed Forces of the 

United States today. 

As the oldest active veterans’ organization in our country, you enjoy a 

great reputation. Certainly, these conventions also enjoy a great reputation as 

well—a gathering of comrades in arms who address important issues of the day 

but also to reminisce a little bit about the past, and perhaps even to have a 

good time. 

Your outfit has come a long way from that small meeting of the Hebrew 

Union in 1896—a meeting that was gathered together to answer the slander 

that American Jews were reticent in the defense of freedom. General Omar 

79 
Bradley, who was the first officer to hold the job that I now have, said that “The 

military achievements of the men of the Jewish faith are part of the proud 

record of American fighting men.” When he said that, he was addressing 

principally service in World War II and Korea; but, he simply echoed what 

General “Blackjack” Pershing had said about American Jews after World War I 

when he said, “No one had served with more patriotism or with higher 

motives.” Certainly, the record of both World Wars stands as a clear testimony 

to the patriotism of American Jews. In World War I, the Jews in the United 

States served in the Armed Forces at a rate two and a half times their numbers 

in the population as a whole. And, in World War II, they served at a rate that 

was over 30 percent higher than their numbers in the population. 

Your organization has long since gone beyond the original goals of the 

Hebrew Union. Today, you are well-known for your service to all veterans and 

for your community involvements, particularly your concern for maintaining 

liberty and justice and for promoting brotherhood among all our citizens. 

I personally believe that the promotion of brotherhood in the battle 

against bigotry is an appropriate task for all veterans’ organizations. There’s 

no greater leveler than service in a combat organization. The observant veteran 

knows that, when the chips are down, the color of a man’s skin, his religious 

and ethnic background and his economic and social status all get washed 

away. It is what’s in his heart and soul and what he can do with his mind and 

body that counts. 

I am convinced that all of us in our nation share with all the free peoples 

of the world a hope for liberty and justice and a common responsibility to 

prevent wars—not just nuclear war but all wars—while, at the same time, 

containing the threat of totalitarianism. We have to confront both those issues 

if we want to walk properly the path toward peace and liberty for us and for our 

posterity. And, certainly, peace without liberty is empty. 

We should not shrink from our obligations to sustain the necessary effort 

to preserve peace and liberty in the face of the challenges of the Soviet system, 

a system which is the very antithesis of our own values. Even while we 

negotiate and try to work with them to reduce the risk of war, we absolutely 

have to do what is needed to be done to ensure the adequacy of our own 

defense. 

In Secretary Weinberger’s speech to the American Jewish Committee of 

New York in May of this year, he noted the unity found in King David’s words 

from the 29th Psalm where it reads, “The Lord will give strength unto His 

people; the Lord will bless His people with peace.” And I say to you that 

strength and peace are bound together. It is a recognition in this world that 

only a free nation which is also strong can deter the enemies of peace and 

justice. 

Those words imply two parallel ideas that contribute to peace. The first, 

that we be sufficiently strong to deter war and also the threat of war. We don’t 

want a war but we also don’t want to be paralyzed by the fear of war. By 

deterrence, we seek to preserve peace and freedom and to protect our vital 

80 
interests by making it self-evidently clear to any potential enemies that they 

cannot achieve their aims through violence or the threat of violence. 

Secondly, we must seek by every reasonable means to reduce the risks of 

war and the dangers of war. Certainly, arms control negotiations is one of the 

means that we need to pursue. But, we also need to work to reduce the 

misunderstandings that lead to war. Salvador de Madariaga, the great Spanish 

philosopher and historian who worked for many years on the League of Nations 

Disarmament Commission, said, “Nations don’t distrust each other because 

they are armed; they arm because they distrust each other.” And that is a very 

important point for us to remember. We need to reduce the distrust among 

nations. 

Our objectives in this country have been relatively constant over the 

years. The world itself has changed and the threats to our security have 

changed. In the 1950s and the early 1960s we clearly had strategic nuclear 

superiority; and, our conventional forces, although they were outnumbered by 

our potential enemies, were technologically superior. Since that time there has 

been a general shift of power. We arrived at a point early in this past decade 

where the security of our nation and that of our allies could no longer be 

assured for the future—in spite of the great strength of our forces and those of 

our allies. 

Global instability threatened Western interests abroad and endangered 

our own national health here at home. Moreover, the unrelenting growth of 

Soviet military power became an overriding concern. Today, after two decades 

of uninterrupted buildup by the Soviets and almost a decade of neglect on our 

part, our nation is now working hard to restore the degree of military power 

necessary to maintain the peace. 

The relentless quest for military superiority by the Soviets has achieved 

new levels during this past year. Certainly the Soviets aren’t 10 feet tall. They 

have problems of their own. They are really a one-dimensional power—a 

military power. You don’t see a lot of people trying to escape to the Soviet 

Union, or clamoring for Soviet blue jeans or Soviet computers or Soviet 

automobiles. Their policy has no moral authority. Their economy is in serious 

trouble by Mr. Andropov’s own admission; and their ideology is laid bare even 

to their friends as being militant and aggressive. I often tell people that they 

are the only country in the world surrounded by hostile communist neighbors. 

But, their power has to be recognized. 

The Soviets have deployed strategic missiles which are among the most 

accurate in the world. They have placed those missiles in the world’s bestprotected missile silos. And, they have aimed those missiles at us. In 1982 

alone, as part of this modernization program, they deployed over 1,200 modern 

so-called hard-target-killing nuclear warheads. That is more than we intend to 

deploy in our entire Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force modernization 

program. I want to tell you they did the same thing in 1981 that they did in 

1982. They deployed another 1,200 this past year and there will probably be 

another 1,200 this next year. They have developed a new strategic bomber that 

is comparable to our own B-1 and they have new, modern ballistic missile 

81 
submarines. We simply have to recognize that the accelerating pace of Soviet 

modernization and our own slow pace in improving our strategic forces have 

left us well behind the Soviets in some important measures of military 

capability. 

We as a nation must deal with the reality of Soviet nuclear weaponry and 

its destabilizing consequences. We have to make it clear to the Soviets that 

they cannot threaten nuclear war, or any war, without understanding that we 

can and will respond in such a way that guarantees that their war aims will not 

be achieved. If that is clear to the Soviets, I am confident that there will be no 

war. 

The President’s Bipartisan Commission, the Scowcroft Commission, has 

made some very sensible recommendations. The Commission said that we 

must modernize our strategic nuclear forces to counter this dangerous trend 

and the growing power of the Soviets. The modernization of our strategic 

forces, including the PEACEKEEPER missile, the Trident submarine, the B-1 

bomber, the cruise missiles, but more importantly, the essential command and 

control—the warning systems—are all necessary and they are necessary right 

now to ensure deterrence and keep the peace. In addition to this 

modernization, our negotiation strategy is tied very closely to our 

modernization in order to seek verifiable arms reductions. And we shouldn’t be 

deluded at all. If we give the Soviets the hope that they can wait out the West’s 

political process in order to limit our arms, they are simply not going to 

negotiate with us at the negotiating table. 

Up to this point, I have concentrated on the nuclear balance. But you 

have to know that the Soviets have good reason for increased confidence in 

their conventional forces as well. They are fielding a sophisticated range of 

capabilities on land, in the air and on the seas. And all of these challenge our 

own forces and the forces of our allies. In the past 15 years they have added 

30 divisions to their army and that takes them up to more than 180 divisions—

on the other hand, we have only 24 in the Army and four more in the Marine 

Corps. Of those, seven are in the Reserves. Their air power is massive and 

sophisticated; and, for the first time, they have developed a very strong bluewater navy. Increasingly, their influence has spread well beyond their borders. 

Their naval power, their airborne forces and, most significantly, their use of 

surrogates, such as the Vietnamese and the Cubans in Third World conflicts, 

seek to outflank our traditional alliances, to threaten our strategic materials 

and to endanger our long-standing friends and allies. 

The Soviet Union isn’t our only problem; but, certainly, they stand ready 

to capitalize on every other problem in this turbulent world. It is a world which 

the Secretary General of the United Nations characterized as being “perilously 

close to a new international anarchy.” Since World War II, there have been 150 

wars and 25 million people have been killed in those wars. If you use the 

criteria that a war is an activity involving significant loss of life, with the use of 

regular armed forces, there are 20 wars going on in the world today. 

At the same time that international stability is so seriously threatened, 

the interdependence of nations in the world has grown astoundingly. We have 

82 
close cultural ties, religious ties, moral ties and political ties with many nations 

of the world. We have friends and allies—such as Israel—with whom we have 

longstanding commitments, and they have longstanding commitments to us. 

We are dependent on foreign markets, on overseas resources, and on 

global lines of communication to keep our economy going. The year that I 

joined the Army, the United States was a net exporter of oil. We exported 

about 20,000 barrels of oil a day. Forty-three years later, we import five million 

barrels of oil every day and that was down about a million barrels from what it 

had been a couple of years earlier. The day has long since passed when we can 

close our eyes to conflict outside our own shores. And, I want to tell you it is 

not necessary to look very far beyond our horizons and beyond our shores to 

see that interdependence and consequences of armed aggression in the world 

today. That reality is very close to home. In April, and again last month, the 

President asked all Americans to put their attention to the desperate need for 

aid for our neighbors to the south. The President made it very clear that we 

have vital interests in Central America and the Caribbean and we have to look 

very seriously at our legitimate security concerns and those of our friends. We 

live in this hemisphere. Peace, liberty, security for democracy and economic 

health for our American neighbors will certainly help us maintain the same 

benefits for ourselves. 

What may not be so well-recognized is the way conflict in one part of the 

world affects everyone else. Take the example of the turbulent African 

continent. Last Tuesday night, I listened to ABC News and I heard Peter 

Jennings sum up his broadcast by saying, “There is a nasty little war in a 

thoroughly inhospitable place. What has been going on until recently in 

northern Chad has been a civil war. The trouble is there aren’t any wars 

anymore which don’t somehow involve the major powers.” 

Now I would say to you that Mr. Jennings is only partially correct 

because any war anywhere affects not only the major powers but every other 

nation. Libya, for example, which is involved in Chad, has gotten itself 

involved deeply in Africa, and in the Middle East. Its mischief has recently 

surfaced in this hemisphere, in Central America. For instance, in Nicaragua, 

Libyan support and PLO extremists are active in training and supplying the 

Soviet-supported Sandinistas. 

I return at this juncture to my basic point of peace and strength. Just as 

peace and the preservation of liberty remain our unending objectives, there will 

be those whose only instrument is force. It is, therefore, essential that we see 

to the health of our own military strength, to deter conflict and to act as a 

shield for more peaceful resolution of differences. Our job is to meet the 

challenge and make our strategy of deterrence work. We must recognize that 

our willingness to rebuild our strategic forces and our willingness to strengthen 

the conventional forces all send signals to those who would threaten peace. We 

must tend to our national power—and not only to the military dimensions of 

that power but also to our diplomatic power, our political power, our political 

strength, our economic and our moral health as well. 

83 
I am heartened today to see more consensus in this nation toward that 

end. We saw, at last, a favorable vote in the Congress to support the 

recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission for the modernization of our 

strategic nuclear forces. But that still hangs very much in the balance and 

there are a lot of other votes to come. You need to tell your Congressmen that 

they need to support that if we’re going to remain a strong nation. 

We also are beginning to see a growing awareness and concern for the 

welfare and security of our Central American neighbors. We are seeing the 

continued strengthening of our own armed forces. I listen to the news last 

night and heard from a Nicaraguan spokesman who said that our own military 

maneuvers in Honduras would cause that part of the world to break out into 

war. Now, I am not sure how that is going to happen, because, certainly, we 

are not going to start a war. We are simply down there with some forces 

helping train a friendly, free democratic nation. If the Nicaraguans can’t figure 

out that those forces down there make it very unhealthy for them to start a 

war, I cannot possibly see how war is going to start. 

I recall what President Reagan said to me when I took this job last year. 

He said, as he announced my appointment, “Keep us strong, keep us ready, so 

that we may keep the peace.” Indeed, it is clear to me that the essence of our 

strategy is keeping the peace by keeping strong. We keep the peace by 

deterrence. That is a fancy Washington word. What it really means is we’re 

going to make it clear that we’re going to kick the tar out of anybody else if they 

start a war. 

If our nation provides properly for its military health, for its economic 

and political health and, above all, for its spiritual health, there won’t be any 

question as to our capabilities or our resolve. Our potential enemies will know 

that we’re ready and I believe they know that now. Every lesson of history that 

I see tells us that if we want to preserve both peace and liberty, we had better 

stay strong. If we want to be satisfied with peace alone, we may well lose not 

only the peace but we will undoubtedly lose our liberty as well. We had better 

be strong. 

I want to thank you for having me here today. My colleagues on the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff know that we have a special duty to work very hard to help 

protect that peace and the liberties that we all enjoy. We want to thank you for 

the support that you have consistently given for a strong defense to this nation. 

I say to you that with the support from the President, the Congress, and the 

people of this great nation of ours, we will preserve both peace and liberty, not 

only for ourselves but for our posterity. My very best wishes to all of you. 

84 
Interview with Newspaper 

USA Today 

September 1983 

Question: Is there one rank that sticks out that you have enjoyed more 

than another? 

Answer: I think the toughest job I had, and the one I remember as 

having more personal responsibility than any other, was being a first sergeant 

in combat. That was a good job also. 

Remarks before the 

UNION LEAGUE CLUB OF NEW YORK 

4 November 1983 

I understand very clearly the duty of those people in the media who 

inform the American people. But I want to tell you that I also understand the 

need for conducting military operations successfully. I think the Grenada 

rescue operation is the way you want military operations conducted. I 

understand the need for surprise when one conducts military operations, and I 

understand the need for saving American lives.... So, we kept that operation 

secret from a lot of people in order to have surprise and to have that operation 

be a success, and to reduce the casualties involved. 

We had a potential hostage situation until the end of the second day. At 

5:30 at the end of the second day, we finally freed all of the students, the 

American students at the St. Georges Medical School. The next day we let the 

press in. So, I just want to tell you this—for those who might have been misled 

by motives that were imputed to those who kept the press out of there—that we 

were doing it for two reasons: one was to make the operation a success; the 

second was to make sure that we successfully got those American students 

out. 

85 
Interview on NBC News’ 

Meet The Press 

Washington, DC 

6 November 1983 

Mr. Monroe: General Vessey, will you sum up for us, please, how the Grenada 

operation went from your point of view? Did everything go as expected? Did 

anything go wrong? And how would you describe our gains from it? 

General Vessey: That’s a lot of question, Mr. Monroe. We planned the 

operation in a very short period of time, in about 48 hours. We planned it with 

insufficient intelligence for the type of operation we wanted to conduct. As a 

result, we used more force than we probably needed to do the job, but the 

operation went reasonably well, considering those factors. Murphy’s Law 

operated, as it does in almost every military operation or in almost anything 

else that human beings undertake. Things did go wrong, but generally the 

operation was a success. The troops did very well. 

Mr. Monroe: How would you describe our gains from it from your point of 

view? 

General Vessey: We went in there for political gains. We had Americans that 

were potential hostages in a country that was undergoing great unrest. We 

also had a request from the East Caribbean States to help them establish order 

in one of their member states. But there are some other gains: I think we 

exposed what happens to countries that come under Cuban and Soviet 

domination. 

Mr. Monroe: Do you have any retrospective thoughts about the extent to 

which reporters were excluded from that operation in the first couple of days 

and then restricted for another two or three days? 

General Vessey: Well, there’s a lot to be done in that particular field. We kept 

reporters out and a whole lot of other people out of that operation because we 

needed surprise and secrecy to have any chance of having the operation be a 

success under the terms that we’d set out for ourselves, and, those were 

minimum casualties, not only for our own people but also for the people of 

Grenada. 

Up until about sundown on the second day, we still had a potential 

hostage situation. We hadn’t freed all the students from the Grand Anse 

Campus. The morning of the third day, we had the press in there. 

Mr. Kalb: Thank you, General. I’m sorry. Did you have more to say on that, 

sir? 

General Vessey: Well, there’s obviously a lot more to say on military 

operations and the press. I think we need to work together to find ways to 

inform the public, but without endangering the military operation of our own 

people. 

86 
Mr. Halloran: General, let me turn your attention to Lebanon, if I could. Has 

the United States been able to discover who caused the truck bombing that 

took so many Marine lives two weeks ago? Can you tell us who did it? 

General Vessey: No, I can’t tell you who did it. As you probably know, several 

different outfits have claimed credit for it. I really don’t know who did it. I 

wish I did. 

Mr. Halloran: Sir, the senior officials of the Reagan Administration have talked 

openly of having retaliation against those who did it, or some other form of 

retaliation. Do you think the United States should retaliate? And if so, how? 

General Vessey: I think that the United States should certainly protect its 

forces from that sort of activity. I also believe that we should be pro-active in 

pursuing international terrorism. And that’s what it is. It’s terrorism used as 

a political weapon. Retaliation, that’s another question. 

Mr. Halloran: Well, let me put it this way, then. If the United States does not 

retaliate, won’t that be a signal to terrorists all over the world that they can 

attack American forces without fear of some kind of response? 

General Vessey: I think we should attack the terrorists, Mr. Halloran. 

Mr. Kraft: General Vessey, in response to Mr. Monroe’s question, you said 

there was a lot more to say about relations between the military and the press. 

Is there anything you are contemplating? Any steps? 

General Vessey: Yes. I have asked retired General Si Sidle, whom some of 

you may know—long in the public affairs business—to try and head up a panel 

for me of experienced newsmen to help us decide how we can conduct military 

operations and protect the operation—protect our own people—and still inform 

the American people—how to do it in this modern age of the television camera 

and instantaneous communications around the world. 

Mr. Kraft: A panel’s been appointed to look into the responsibility for the 

Beirut incident, let’s call it, the terrorist attack. There was a panel that looked 

into the Desert One thing; and, as I recall it, we got a kind of bureaucratic 

answer that diffused responsibility. 

My question is whatever became of command responsibility, identifying 

the responsible officer and court-martialing him? 

General Vessey: Well, I think that certainly still exists and if court-martials 

are in order for whatever commanders are responsible, we’ll have courtmartials. 

Mr. Kraft: If we did take action in Lebanon, would you favor cooperating with 

the Israelis? 

General Vessey: The Israelis are in Lebanon in a different position than we 

are. The Israelis are at war with the Syrians. We came in as a peacekeeping 

force to try and help re-establish Lebanon and get both the Israelis and the 

Syrians out. Their retaliation comes from a different background than our own 

87 
does. We need to find the perpetrators. We don’t need to be siding with either 

the Israelis or the Syrians in trying to re-establish Lebanon. 

Mr. Reynolds: General Vessey, two questions on Beirut, one past and one 

present. In terms of the past, there’s been a great deal of criticism about the 

United States not using Israeli medical facilities which were just thirty minutes 

away, in terms of getting wounded men to Haifa. And in terms of present, 

there have been reports of some of the radical Muslim groups slipping in 

missiles through East Beirut, which are capable of hitting the Marines. These 

are rockets and rocket launchers, and also possibly capable of hitting some of 

the ships. Do we have the capability to take some sort of action against that? 

General Vessey: Well, concerning the medical treatment. The people on the 

ground knew that the Israelis had offered medical facilities. Mr. Arens called 

Mr. Weinberger a few hours after the incident. Mr. Weinberger called me and 

told me of it. I called the Deputy Commander in Europe and informed him. He 

said he already knew of it and had instructed the people on the ground to take 

advantage of whatever medical help they needed to get the job done. 

Concerning new weapons, Lebanon is an armed camp and there are all 

sorts of weapons. Certainly, we’re doing everything that we can do to 

understand where those weapons are so that our forces can protect 

themselves. 

Mr. Reynolds: General, in terms of intelligence, both in the case of Beirut and 

also in the case of Grenada, is there a review going on of the kind of intelligence 

that is available to us in terms of human intelligence? 

General Vessey: Well, there’s a constant review of intelligence in Beirut and in 

Lebanon. That’s a very difficult intelligence target and there are all sorts of 

reports that come out of Lebanon. Certainly, one has to look at the reports and 

also look at the source of the report. You almost have to ask yourself what sort 

of an axe does this guy have to grind who’s giving us this report. 

Concerning Grenada, we had the right sort of intelligence for what we 

were looking at beforehand, and in 48 hours we had to plan a military 

operation that we hadn’t expected to have to plan. 

Mr. Monroe: I’d like to ask your comment, sir, on a report in this morning’s 

Washington Post from Loren Jenkins, who has been in Grenada for the last 

several days, interviewing U.S. military people—commanders, pilots and 

soldiers. And he says these interviews have now convinced him that the 

Pentagon exaggerated the degree of resistance in Grenada from Cubans. He 

says that there appears to have been only a minor force of Cuban advisers who 

offered brief resistance and there were no major ground engagements. 

General Vessey: Let me say that whoever’s been in Grenada the last few days 

interviewing troops on the ground has not interviewed the troops who did the 

fighting. I would suggest that he go to Fort Stewart, Georgia or to Fort Lewis, 

Washington and interview the Rangers who did the fighting or talk to the 

Marines who are now on their way to Lebanon. Those are the people who did 

88 
the fighting. There may be a few from the 82nd Airborne there who did some of 

the fighting later on in the first day, and then the second and third days. But 

the hard fighting against the Cubans was done by the Rangers. 

Mr. Monroe: Would you comment on Mr. Jenkins’ conclusions, nevertheless, 

that the Pentagon exaggerated the amount of Cuban resistance and the 

appearance to him that there was only a minor force of Cuban advisers who 

offered only brief resistance? 

General Vessey: I talked to the operations officer and some of the command 

element of the 1st Battalion of the 75th Rangers yesterday, and I have come to 

the conclusion that the Pentagon underestimated the resistance from the 

Cubans in the first stages of that operation. 

Mr. Kalb: General, I’d like to pick up two points that were left hanging before. 

In terms of retaliation by the United States for what happened to the Marines 

in Lebanon—I was wondering what your own feeling was. Are you opposed to 

retaliation? 

General Vessey: When American servicemen are killed and killed in any 

numbers, my gut reaction is to retaliate, Mr. Kalb. 

Mr. Kalb: Then, beyond your gut reaction, are you planning any? 

General Vessey: That would be inappropriate for me to answer that question. 

Mr. Halloran: Sir, you said that Lebanon is an armed camp. Are the 

Marines—who are primarily an amphibious assault force—are they the right 

troops to be in that situation? 

General Vessey: Our armed forces that are in Lebanon are not there to 

conduct a military operation to seek a United States military solution to that 

problem. Those people are on the ground as part of United States “earnest” to 

the government of Lebanon as they get on with the political solution. And 

perhaps that’s the most irritating thing to us military people, the slowness in 

getting on with solving the problems politically. 

Mr. Halloran: Those people have been in a somewhat indefensible position, as 

we’ve seen by the bombing that took place two weeks ago. Should they be 

moved to other positions? Should they be allowed to patrol out front more 

aggressively? 

General Vessey: There’s a ceasefire in Lebanon now between the government 

of Lebanon, the Druze, and the Syrian-supported people who are attacking the 

government of Lebanon. That ceasefire line is very close to where our Marines 

are. And I would suspect that if our Marines were to go out and try to get 

better positions, they’d have to engage in a battle with some of those people 

involved in the ceasefire. 

Mr. Kraft: General Vessey, I’d like to expand this range of questioning a little. 

The United States is a superpower with military responsibilities that are global. 

89 
Isn’t it really inappropriate of us to have forces present in what’s a kind of 

U.N.-type peacekeeping operation? Isn’t that the real lesson, that we make our 

forces hostage when we put them in that kind of a situation? 

General Vessey: I don’t think we’ll learn the real lesson, Mr. Kraft, until some 

years from now when we see what happens in Lebanon. Using our forces in 

small numbers in a peacekeeping operation is, as you suggest, a little bit 

unusual for the United States. But Lebanon isn’t the first place. We’ve got a 

battalion who’s down between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai, and has been 

there for some years now, on a peacekeeping operation and doing very well. 

Mr. Kraft: What lessons, General, would you draw so far? Would it be fair to 

say that we should think very, very hard about putting American troops in that 

kind of a situation, that, in general, the bias should be against it, strongly 

against it? 

General Vessey: I think one has to think through very carefully putting 

American troops in any kind of an operation where we’re using them as a 

political lever. And certainly, I would urge caution in any such operation. 

Mr. Kraft: Did you urge caution this time? 

General Vessey: I think it’s fair to say that everyone in the military, and the 

Secretary of Defense, and everyone in the government urged caution and was 

concerned about doing what we’re doing in Lebanon. 

Mr. Reynolds: General, in terms of what’s gone on in the past few weeks, the 

phrase “stretched thin” has been used pretty consistently. Not only stretched 

thin in terms of the number of troops, but also stretched thin in terms of 

available transport—Navy ships, and Air Force planes, and so forth. Do you 

think that we’re stretched thin? 

General Vessey: I don’t think that you could have found anyone who’s held 

this job of mine who ever thought we weren’t stretched a little thin and we 

didn’t have enough—except perhaps General Marshall, who didn’t hold the job 

but in effect had it at the end of World War II when he had some nine million 

men under arms and no wars going on. But I would say to you that our 

strategy is one that involves being able to use mobility, good intelligence and 

good command and control, in order to employ relatively small forces wisely 

and quickly to do the jobs that the Nation needs to be done. And I would say 

that Grenada—a small operation—is a good example of how we built our forces 

and what we’re able to do with them. 

Mr. Reynolds: But, General, if something happened in another area of the 

world very, very soon and very quickly—for example, something that all of us 

hope does not happen, but if something flared in the Persian Gulf—would we 

be capable of reacting there, too, at the same time? 

General Vessey: Yes, we would, Mr. Reynolds. In fact, I spent a few hours on 

the phone talking to the Commander of the Military Airlift Command to make 

90 
sure that he was in a position to carry out some other contingency if we had to 

do it. 

Mr. Monroe: Could you give us some specifics, General, about the Cubans in 

Grenada? How many of them appeared to be well-trained military people, what 

kind of arms, how much resistance they put up? 

General Vessey: As you may know, we didn’t really want to fight the Cubans 

when we went in there and we weren’t sure whether the Cubans would fight. 

Our government had attempted to get to the Cuban government and tell them 

that we’re not there to fight the Cubans, so please don’t fight us. 

When we came in at the Point Salines Airfield, the Rangers dropped at 

500 feet in a very skillful and daring parachute drop. They were attacked 

immediately by anti-aircraft fire as they were dropping. When they got on the 

ground, they were attacked by ground fire and had to move quickly to clear 

that ground fire. 

Now, I went through that area a couple of days later and you could see 

that there were two camps that the Cubans were in. One was very close to the 

airfield tower. It was a camp of people who did construction work primarily, 

but there were arms racks in the barracks. We found a roster that said, “1st

Company, 2nd Company, 3rd Company, 4th Company, mortar battery and antiaircraft company.” That’s the way they were organized to do the 

“construction.” 

And there was another camp which appeared to have been probably the 

full-time military people who were in charge of organizing these, perhaps, 

“construction engineers,” as we would call them, and have them perform their 

military jobs. There was some very tough fighting there in the first few hours. 

Mr. Kalb: General, you said, at the very top of the program, you had 48 hours 

to plan Grenada. Is that a good way, a prudent way, to launch an operation? 

General Vessey: Considering the situation that existed, it was about the right 

balance. If we had waited another day to get more intelligence information we 

would have lost a lot more people. 

Remarks at the Banquet of the 

KOREAN-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

Seoul, Korea 

22 November 1983 

I am very pleased to be here tonight. I left Korea four years ago and I 

have been back in Korea for only three days; but the only food that concerns 

me is the Western food. And I wonder what happens to “kimchi” and “bulgogi” 

and all those other wonderful things. It’s nice to see this great progress in 

91 
Korea but I would hate to see good Korean food disappear with modern 

industrial society. 

This year, with President Reagan’s visit here two weeks ago, we marked 

the thirtieth anniversary of our Mutual Defense Treaty. And, last year, the 

United States and Korea celebrated the centennial of diplomatic relations 

between our two countries. Those of you who have studied the history of our 

relations over these past one hundred years know that it reads like a real 

drama, laden with tragedy, shifting moods and characters, heroes and villains, 

defeats, triumphs, and more recently, mutual trust beneficial to both our 

nations. The history of our relations doesn’t read like the dull history of staid 

diplomatic relationships between so many other nation-states in the world. 

Security cooperation arrangements between our two countries have been very 

much a part of the great story; and, in fact, for the most active 40 percent of 

that century of relations, the mutual security relationships have been one of 

the central themes of our relationship. 

The prelude to the establishment of diplomatic relations had a violent 

beginning. In 1866, the armed schooner GENERAL SHERMAN violated the 

seclusion of the Hermit Kingdom; its crew was executed and the ship was 

burned. It was not until 1882 that a treaty of peace and amity, commerce and 

navigation was signed. I believe it was the first arrangement that the Hermit 

Kingdom had made with any Western nation. 

A year later, King Kojong asked the U.S. Government for the services of 

an American officer “to instruct and drill our troops,” promising “to confer upon 

him the second highest military rank in the Kingdom.” For those of you who 

think security assistance matters move slowly in Washington in modern times, 

I would point out that it took almost five years to answer that request. In 

December 1887, General Phil Sheridan, then Commander of the United States 

Army, appointed his friend and West Point classmate, Brigadier General 

William McEntire Dye, to the Korean post. 

It is difficult to believe that General Dye could foresee the enduring and 

close military relationships that the two countries would come to have. The 

two nations were so different—Korea, with its homogenous population and 

4000-year old cultural roots, and the United States, an upstart nation with its 

polyglot population and scarcely a century of history of independence. Yet, the 

affection General Dye was to develop for Korea and for the Korean people, and 

the respect that Koreans had for him, were harbingers of the relationships that 

were to develop in later years, and that we share today. 

I would like to quote from a prophetic article which General Dye wrote in 

1897. He said, “... Korea must develop not only in agriculture, but also in 

other directions if she will have a full measure of prosperity and especially in 

the military line if political independence is to be preserved .... For full 

development and protection, Korea needs manufacturing and commercial 

enterprise, improvements in her methods of agriculture, and a military 

awakening of her people, for she is embraced by the well-known law decreeing 

‘survival of the fittest’.” 

92 
I think if General Dye were to see us here today, and to see Korea and 

the cooperation between our two countries—and particularly in the security 

field—I believe he’d say, “Well done!” 

In fact, very well done indeed. Today, we see Korea as an emergent and 

mature nation on the world scene. The economy of Korea has risen from the 

ruin of the terrible war which only 30 years ago seemed irreparable. It is now 

hailed as an economic miracle and a model for all countries. You have a rate of 

growth which exceeds 8 percent of the Gross National Product every year and a 

low 6 percent inflation rate. 

The achievement of the Korean people is not only economic. It is an 

achievement in the advancement of the well-being of the people of Korea. Your 

steady sometimes painful movement toward democratic institutions, balanced 

with respect for Korean society and culture, assure the stature of Korea as a 

responsible member of the Free World community. There are numerous 

examples: the prestigious International Parliamentary Union had its meeting 

here in October; the Asian Games will take place here in 1986; and the World 

Olympics are scheduled to take place here in 1988. 

Unfortunately, this great history has not been without its price. The 

history of American-Korean security relationships from 1945 to the present is 

well-known to all of you in this room—many of you were intimately involved in 

that history; the establishment of the arbitrary line in 1945 to facilitate the 

Japanese surrender; Russia’s callous acts which turned the line into an iron 

barrier dividing a historically unified country; the 1948 Constitution and the 

August 15th establishment of the Republic; the UN recognition of the Republic 

and Russia’s hurried establishment of the communist puppet state in the 

North; then, the withdrawal of the US troop units and the beginning of the 

training for the peace-oriented, constabulary-like defense forces of the 

Republic, overshadowed soon by the Russian work to train and equip Kim Il 

Sung’s army; the first Chairman of the JCS, my predecessor, General Bradley’s 

fears of an attack from the North and Dean Acheson’s January 1950 speech at 

the National Press Club; and the June 25th, 1950, attack by North Korea and 

the decisive response by the United Nations. 

These were precursors to the bloody war which was to follow and the 

further development of the unique security relationships that now exist 

between our two countries. The war brought the Armed Forces of the United 

States and the Armed Forces of Korea and the people of our two countries very 

close. The United States sent 1.6 million men into the war zone during the 

course of the three years of the war; Korea sent thousands and thousands of 

soldiers, sailors, and airmen to the United States for training. The armed 

forces of the two nations fought side-by-side for three years of tough, bloody 

fighting. United States units were augmented by Korean soldiers, a unique 

practice which continues to exist today. It is probably the only place in the 

world where such a practice has existed. 

The post-war years saw us grow even closer together: economic 

cooperation which helped the fantastic industrial growth and economic 

93 
development in Korea, and Korea’s historic support of the United States in 

Vietnam. All of you are very familiar with both of those. 

Unfortunately, the most serious challenge to the Republic of Korea and 

the cause of so much tension and grief remains the unrelenting, mindless 

animosity of North Korea—a nation of only 17 million but with an army as 

large as the Army of the United States. Nevertheless, the extraordinary 

buildup of the North Korean forces in the 1960s and early 1970s escaped many 

Americans in the United States, periodically from 1945 on. Many Americans 

regarded the presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula as a very 

temporary situation. Many failed to recognize that all the same forces that 

converged on Korea in General Dye’s time 100 years ago have now been 

magnified by the interdependence of the modern industrial world. 

A critical point in the drama of U.S. forces presence in Korea came in 

early 1977 when President Carter announced a plan to withdraw U.S. ground 

forces from Korea while maintaining the general United States commitment to 

Korea’s security. On the face of it, that announcement was a jolt for the 

security relationships; but, as I look at it and look at the ensuing events in 

retrospect, I believe the announcement may have led to a healthier posture for 

both our countries. Certainly, the announcement stirred a thorough 

examination of the situation and a heated debate in the United States. The 

North Korean military buildup was studied and the importance of Korea to the 

security of Northeast Asia and to the United States came into clearer focus. 

Serious study by respected members of the United States House and Senate, 

such as Mr. Stratton and Senators Nunn and Glenn, helped to illustrate the 

problem. 

The result has been sensible plans for modernizing the Republic of Korea 

and the United States forces on the Peninsula. President Carter eventually 

suspended his plan for withdrawing U.S. ground forces. And, more recently, 

President Reagan, by his words and by his presence here two weeks ago, 

reaffirmed that United States ground and air forces would stay in Korea, and, 

in fact, would be modernized and strengthened. But, more importantly, new 

command arrangements have been worked out with the establishment of the 

Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command. That happened 

five years ago this month. Those command arrangements provide for the 

closest possible integration of all facets of military operations and should serve 

as the model of “how-to-do-it” for any group of nations which want to band 

together for security purposes. 

I don’t want you to think I believe that our military relationships are the 

only important connections between our two countries. They’re not. In fact, 

the economic, cultural, and social ties seem to have eclipsed our military ties in 

recent years, and it is right that they should. On the other hand, today’s solid 

military security arrangements provide the necessary shield behind which the 

Republic of Korea can build up its unique heritage of a 4000-year-old culture 

and pursue new levels of economic health, of political maturity, and of social 

harmony and justice—and, hopefully, pursue a reduction of tensions, and 

94 
permanent peace on the Peninsula, and the goal of eventual peaceful 

reunification of the country. 

Those last goals require cooperation from North Korea and its friends, 

cooperation which for the moment does not seem to be forthcoming. President 

Pak and President Chun both made sensible calls for talks. They made them 

repeatedly and they were repeatedly and recklessly rejected by Kim Il Sung. 

The terrible tragedies of the past several months have weighed heavily on all of 

us; the atrocity in the skies over Sakhalin Island in which 269 lives were lost 

and the brutal murders in Rangoon—those murders in Rangoon confirmed by 

Burma as having been perpetrated by North Koreans. Those events have sorely 

tested this nation and shocked the world. 

But the far-sighted actions of the Government of the Republic of Korea 

have demonstrated to the world the stark contrast between a mature member 

of the community of civilized nations and a renegade power which uses state 

terrorism as an instrument of national policy. The superb government officials, 

your friends and my friends, lost in that assassination cannot be brought back 

to life; but there is now no doubt in any part of the world that North Korea is a 

pariah state, a state to be isolated morally, diplomatically and economically. 

President Reagan has pledged the United States to work with your 

government to censure North Korea for its brutality. But he promised 

something else. He said that the United States, as a Pacific power, is 

committed to the security of this region, that “... the United States will stand 

resolutely by you, just as we stand with our allies in Europe and around the 

world. In Korea, we have learned the painful consequences of weakness.” 

Weakness is provocative. As we enter the second century of our security 

relationship, we will do well to remember Secretary Dulles’ words, “The Korean 

War began in a way wars often begin. A potential aggressor miscalculated.” 

Even as we go about the tasks of seeing to our economic, social and political 

well-being, we must continue in our vigilance. There must be no 

miscalculation as to the durability of the United States and Korean resolve to 

provide for the security of the Republic of Korea. If our resolve and our 

vigilance are clear to potential aggressors, I am confident we have the prospect 

of many years of peace and progress for both our nations. 

The security of the Republic of Korea affects the world far beyond the 

situation on this peninsula. Strategic geographic realities have been an 

enduring consideration. Korea sits in the middle of a triangle involving China, 

the world’s most populous nation, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one 

of the few military superpowers of the world, and Japan, one of the great 

economic and industrial powers of the world. The interrelationships of these 

three powers alone would make the security situation in Korea important. 

Beyond that, in the past twenty years the republic of Korea itself has become 

an important international economic and trading factor in the world. It has 

ties to the whole world, not just to East Asia. Security and stability in 

Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula are important to the whole Free 

World. 

95 
Outside my office, as many of you know, I have a large picture given to 

me by some Korean friends. It’s a color photograph of my wife and me dressed 

in beautiful old costumes of the Yi dynasty royalty. Under the picture I have 

lettered the caption: “We support NATO, too.” The lesson in that picture is 

that the freedom and security of the whole world is inextricably tied together. 

Those strategic realities will govern the security relationship of our two great 

nations in the years ahead. It has been a great honor for me to have had some 

small part in our security ties in past years. It is a great honor for Avis and me 

to return to the land that we consider our second home and to enjoy again the 

warm friendship of the Korean people. Thank you (in Korean). 

96 
1984 

Selected Works 

Address to the WHITE HOUSE 

OUTREACH WORKING GROUP 

ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Old Executive Office Building 

Washington, DC 

4 January 1984 

Happy New Year! I look out across this audience, and I see that I am 

speaking on Central America as the thirty-second speaker in the series of 

experts on Central America. I look in the audience and see people who know 

more about Central America than I do. It reminds me of some years ago when, 

as a much younger officer, I was ordered to give a talk to retired Army generals. 

The subject of my talk was the strategy for the defense of Europe. In the 

audience were Dwight Eisenhower, Mark Clark, and people of that ilk; and I got 

up there and wondered what in the world I was doing standing up in front of 

that crowd. 

As introduced, my topic is Central America in the context of our larger 

strategy for the defense of the United States. One nice thing about this job is 

that you get an opportunity to look at the global strategy of the United States 

from a unique perch. We live in a dangerous world. And we don’t have to look 

much beyond the headlines of today’s newspapers to understand that. 

What we want to do is live in that world as safely as we possibly can, not 

only for ourselves but also for our friends and allies, because we know that the 

world has become inextricably intertwined. We can’t escape that fact. We have 

a national strategy which is a natural strategy for a democracy. We want to 

live in peace. We don’t intend to start any wars, but we want to make it selfevidently clear to those who would like to start wars with us that it would be 

costly for them to do that and thus unwise. 

That strategy is global in nature, recognizing the intertwining of the 

economy and the social and political fabrics of the world. It rests on a series of 

alliances in various important places in the world. The major alliances that 

come to mind, of course, are our alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty 

97 
Organization, our alliance with the East Asian nations, and then we have a 

number of other smaller alliances and mutual defense treaties that are 

important to us and to the people with whom we have those treaties. Then, we 

have ties with nations, many nations, with whom we have no mutual defense 

treaties but our ties are traditional; and, there is an understood recognition 

that we are important to their defense and they are important to ours. 

The military part of that strategy involves having forces in place in major 

parts of the world where those alliances exist and are immediately threatened 

by our major enemy, the Soviet Union, or some other major enemy. Those 

forces are there for two reasons: one is to lend some military strength to the 

alliances and, second, to help keep the political cohesion of the alliances—

which is probably more important than the day-to-day military strength. The 

nations of the world, the civilized nations of the world, agreed to act in concert 

to maintain the peace and to maintain the fundamental liberties to which we 

ascribe. 

We have small armed forces for the size of our country. For the years 

from 1976 to 1979, I commanded our forces in Korea. I looked across the 

demilitarized zone at the North Korean Army, an army just about the size of 

our army—which sort of puts the size of our armed forces in perspective. This 

means that we have to add some other ingredients to that strategy. Another 

ingredient is the central reserve of ready reinforcements that are able to go to 

any of these alliances or to other places in the world where trouble may be. 

If you want to move forces someplace, you have to control the sea and 

the air in order to get the forces there. You need to have good command, 

control and communications in order to do that. And you need to have 

extraordinary good intelligence. Now, we can criticize our strategic mobility, 

our command, control and communications or our intelligence—and I probably 

do that every day—but, at the same time, we put our money in those things in 

order to make them as good as we possibly can; and they are good. 

The recognition of where we sit on the Earth and where those key threats 

to us are is very much a part of understanding that strategy. One really needs 

a globe. Since I became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I generally ban 

Mercator maps of the world because I find that people have a “Mercatorprojection mentality.” Mercator projections fail to get across the point that the 

shortest way to the other parts of the Northern Hemisphere is not through the 

Atlantic or the Pacific but over the Pole. 

And another thing—if we looked at a polar projection of the world, we 

would see the importance of the Caribbean to the United States and its ability 

to interact with the rest of the world. I brought along a map of only a small 

part of the world, the Caribbean and Central America—just to remind us of 

that—because, if we were to have a war with the Soviet Union, over 50 percent 

of our reinforcing shipping would flow through the seas that we see here, 

through the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean and out into the Atlantic. 

If one looked at a plot of the sinkings by the German submarine force of 

allied ships in the first 6 months of World War II, you would see that well over 

half of the ships were sunk along our coasts, from the Virginia Cape to the 

98 
south and through the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. That gives you some 

idea of the importance of the region. And the Germans then understood that 

importance as well as we do today. The Soviets also understand the 

importance of the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico and Central America to us. 

The Soviets are opportunists and they will do whatever they can do in their 

power to make life miserable for us in peacetime and certainly lay the 

groundwork for making life very difficult for us if we should ever fight the 

Soviet Union. 

Now, I say to you that we don’t want to fight the Soviet Union, but 

making it clear that we are in a good position to fight them would be the best 

way to deter war in the first place. I don’t need to recite to this group the 

efforts of the Soviet Union through the past 25 years since Castro took over in 

Cuba. I see many who are well aware of them and I know that you have heard 

about them from other speakers who have spoken here. 

The real question is, “What do we do about the situation as it exists 

today?” Cuba is communist. The Nicaraguan revolution has not been true to 

its promises for democracy and freedom and, in turn, has opened the gates for 

Cuba and the Soviet Union to move into the mainland of Central America. 

There is a bitter fight going on in El Salvador today, with that country trying to 

stay alive. Honduras, between El Salvador and Nicaragua, feels threatened. 

Guatemala has an insurgency going on. Costa Rica feels troubled and 

threatened. And, certainly, the unease extends in both directions through 

Mexico and down through Panama and down to the northern coast of South 

America. So, the question is, “What do we do to clear up the situation that 

exists today?” 

I would like to make two points. First, we need to clear it up. We need to 

clear it up for our own strategic defense to make sure we are not left in a 

disadvantageous position against our major enemy, the Soviet Union. 

Secondly, we really don’t want to go to war in Central America. My sensing 

from talking to the people in that area is that they don’t want us to come down 

there and do their fighting for them or bail them out. They are perfectly willing 

and ready to do that themselves, but they need some help to do it. 

There are longstanding problems in Central America ... the economic 

problems for example. I think that those of us living in this hemisphere can’t 

expect to live here with close neighbors whose per capita GNP disparity ranges 

about 6 to 1, 7 to 1, and not expect to have some abrasiveness with that part of 

the world. They need economic help; but, at the same time, recognizing that 

our help to that part of the world is 3 to 1 in favor of economic over military, I 

want to tell you that unless the security situation improves, all the economic 

help in the world won’t help solve the problems down there. That was 

demonstrated this past week in the destruction of the one major bridge on the 

Central American highway in El Salvador. Certainly, a country that is faced 

with an insurgency where the insurgency is destroying the economic 

infrastructure has a very, very difficult time aiding its people to raise their 

standard of living and economic well-being. So, security is very, very important 

to those countries. 

99 
Now, what has been the strategy of the United States? It seems to me 

that we talked about part of it. One is aiding those people down there to 

defend themselves and to solve their problems, and also helping them at the 

same time to get on with solving their economic problems. 

There are some problems inside the United States with aiding those 

countries. I would cite, for example, the problems of El Salvador in military 

assistance last year. The Administration went forward with the request to the 

Congress that was only about half of what the experts on the ground thought 

was needed. Then the Congress, in turn, cut that in half. Then, we had to deal 

that out in dribs and drabs which led the Salvadorans to do unwise things 

militarily and not only militarily on the ground but also economically in using 

their military aid. They ran out of ammunition so the President had to ask for 

emergency authority for more money so they could get more ammunition. 

Then, because they ran out of ammunition, we had to fly the ammunition down 

there at a transportation cost that was perhaps four or five or six times what it 

would have been if we could have shipped it in more orderly fashion by ships. 

So, that ate up the military aid. 

This year we have started off in just about the same fashion. We are on 

a Continuing Resolution Authority for El Salvador and we are at about 25 

percent of what any reasonable military and diplomatic team looking at the 

problem would say is needed; and I think the Kissinger Commission, when they 

finish, will affirm that it is probably even less than 25 percent—with 

restrictions on that, telling us that only a certain portion of that can be done 

until certain judicial actions are taken with regard to some of the murders that 

have taken place in El Salvador. I don’t want you to believe that I am against 

holding a club over the Salvadoran Government to clean up its own act. I 

simply want to tell you that by February, we will probably be flying ammunition 

there again at some exorbitant cost because the government will not be able to 

keep itself alive and prepare for the elections in March without using up the 

ammunition it has on hand. 

What do we need to do? We need to make it clear to Cuba and Nicaragua 

that it is not in their interest to interfere with those other nations. We need to 

separate the Nicaraguans from the Cubans and I would tell you that it seems 

to me the Administration has done a remarkably good job in getting that 

message across. We note here Daniel Ortega saying the right sorts of things. 

Most of the intelligence people say, “Well, his actions have not caught up with 

his words yet.” But, at least we see some evidence of the Nicaraguans moving 

in the direction that President Reagan has said they must move. 

The exposure of the involvement of the Cubans and the Soviet Union and 

the North Koreans and other assorted strange and unusual people on the little, 

innocent island of Grenada certainly ought to be a lesson for the rest of the 

nations in this hemisphere. It certainly should be a lesson to us—that the rest 

of those people are serious; they’re serious in their attempts to make this 

hemisphere an uncomfortable place for the United States. So, we need to be 

serious about our efforts to abort their attempts. We need to follow through 

with the pledge to those people who have said, “We can defend ourselves if you 

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will give us the help.” We need to give them the help in reasonable amounts in 

order to do what has to be done militarily. At the same time, we have to give 

them some hope for solving their economic problems so they can solve the 

political problems which are all important to solving the military problems. 

I went to the Simon Bolivar celebration in Bogotá last year and it was an 

interesting and enjoyable celebration to attend. At the same time, I got caught 

by some American press people who said that “Here are all these Presidents of 

South American countries saying unkind things about the United States, and 

about the military exercises in the Caribbean.” And then, when I would go 

around to some of the other social events and I would see Vice Presidents or 

Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Defense Ministers of these same countries, they 

would sidle up to me and say, “Keep up what you are doing in Central America. 

It is the only way you will get the message to Cuba and the Nicaraguans. And 

you are being successful. We want you to know you are being successful.” So, 

I would beard them with the point that our own press people had made to me: 

“If this is so, why are your Presidents making these speeches?” And, they’d 

look at me incredulously and say, “Certainly, you understand more about the 

history of this region than to ask that question. How can any of the leaders of 

this country stand up and make pro-United States speeches at this Simon 

Bolivar celebration? You simply have to recognize that and recognize that what 

you are doing is the correct thing and keep a steady course and go ahead and 

do it.” 

I would think that those words are the key for us—a “steady course and 

go ahead and do it.” Remember that we are not going to solve the problems in 

Central America forever and turn and walk away from Central America this 

year or next or the year after. They are going to be our neighbors forever and 

ever, as long as we are here on the North American continent. We have an 

unending interest in that part of the world and we simply have to keep up the 

steady course and the commitment to solving those problems. 

Opening Remarks before the 

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

On the FY 85 DOD Authorization 

31 January 1984 

Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee: 

Secretary Weinberger has covered the major points of the budget. He 

has laid out very clearly the need for a strong defense and why this budget is a 

sound basis for that defense. He also stated that the health of our armed 

forces is being restored. In the interest of time, I will add only a few points to 

those made by the Secretary. 

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The health of our armed forces is good. This trend is most evident in the 

quality of the men and women in uniform. From my visits all over the world, I 

can tell you that the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines we have now are the 

best I’ve seen in my 45 years in uniform. The Congress and the Executive 

Branch have made this renewed strength possible. And, on behalf of the men 

and women in uniform and my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I want to 

thank you for your support. 

We talk a lot about hardware, but people are the heart of our forces; and 

we are filling up the shortages in skilled manpower. Recruitment and retention 

are excellent. And, this nation needs to continue to make military life 

attractive or we simply won’t have good armed forces. 

The operational commanders in the field report renewed confidence in 

their forces. New, good equipment from long-delayed modernization is now 

coming into the hands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines where it 

counts most. Our forces are well-trained and well-led. In talking to military 

leaders of our allies and friends, I find that they, too, are reassured by the 

restored strength of American forces. These facts must serve as an incentive 

for Soviet restraint and the growth of our strength will eventually provide a 

climate for sensible negotiations. 

I say to you that this nation should not slack off. This is a key year for 

the United States. Last year I reported to you that we were making progress in 

reversing the decline of the 1970s in our general purpose forces and that we 

were in the early stages of modernizing our strategic nuclear deterrent forces. 

In the face of what the Soviets are doing, it is important that we press on. 

We should remember that while we are making progress the Soviets are 

not standing still. They continue to field increasingly capable equipment in 

their already large and modern conventional forces. This year they will 

conclude a significant phase in the modernization of their ICBMs while we 

haven’t put even one PEACEKEEPER in a silo. And, they continue to fish in 

the troubled waters of the resource-rich Third World. 

When I look at the Soviets’ forces, I see forces which are very large, 

capable of offensive operations on a global scale, and increasingly capable of 

achieving their wartime objectives. And, I see they are willing to use their 

forces and those of their surrogates to achieve their aims. 

When I look at U.S. forces, I see that our forces are essentially designed 

for deterrence. That has been our strategy, and it is a sensible strategy. We 

hope to make it clear to any aggressor that he can’t achieve his objectives by 

war or the threat of war. Since World War II we have attempted to build and 

maintain the kind of forces that would, along with our allies, make our 

deterrent strategy work and preserve the peace and our way of life. 

The Joint Chiefs have looked at the strategy and the threat and we 

believe that this budget will better assure the security needs of this nation. 

Our nation need not match the Soviets weapon for weapon or man for man. 

Nor should it neglect other elements of our power—our political, economic and 

spiritual health. But, this nation absolutely must continue to deal realistically 

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with the unrelenting growth of Soviet power and with the realities of an 

increasingly interdependent and dangerous world. 

I urge the members of Congress to remember that crises in this turbulent 

world come without much warning, and that reasonable preparation constantly 

carried forward is a sound investment in our future security, both to avoid 

defeat in battle and, more importantly, to prevent war in the first place. 

Finally, I would like to quote the late Senator Henry (Scoop) Jackson’s 

eloquent statement one year ago before this Committee: 

“I would hope ... that this would be a time of steadiness, a time 

when we go about our work in a manner and in a way which will 

demonstrate to the world that we can provide a very strong and 

steady hand in a very unsteady world. I think that is the challenge 

that we all face because the world looks to this country with only 7 

percent of its population and the world expects at times bigger 

things than we are capable of providing, but above all else I think 

we need to provide a steadiness, not only in reality, but in 

appearance that will give confidence to others.” 

Statement before the 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

On FY 85 DOD Authorization 

2 February 1984 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

The U.S. military posture has improved from the low point of the 1970s. 

Commanders in the field report renewed confidence in their forces. The 

resources provided have permitted them to reverse the decline in the total force 

readiness and sustainability of existing forces. Moreover, these resources are a 

firm foundation upon which to continue to build the deterrent forces which, 

together with those of our allies, are necessary to protect the nation’s interests 

for the remainder of this century. The Congress and the Executive Branch have 

made this possible. On behalf of my colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

the men and women in uniform, I thank you for your support. 

The nation’s military forces are good, and substantial progress is being 

made in overcoming past deficiencies. Many programs are beginning to show 

positive effects with the operating forces. Good people are the heart of our 

forces, and we’re filling up the shortages in manpower. Recruitment and 

retention are excellent. New, good equipment from long-delayed modernization 

is now coming into the hands of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines 

where it counts most. Our forces are well-trained and well-led. In talking to 

military leaders of our allies and friends, I find that they, too, are reassured by 

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the restored strength of American forces. These facts serve as an incentive for 

Soviet restraint, and the growth of our strength will eventually provide a 

climate for sensible negotiations. 

However, the nation should not be complacent, nor accept the notion 

that these past three years can somehow erase the decline in real growth over 

the 1970s or eliminate the gap caused by the continued growth of Soviet power. 

Reductions in the President’s requested budget this past year have slowed the 

momentum of revitalization. This slowed rate of growth in force capabilities will 

affect readiness and retard responsiveness in a crisis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

have looked at the threats to our nation’s security and at our strategy. We 

believe this year’s budget is sensible; it is a reasonable response to threats to 

national security and to the requirements of the military strategy of the United 

States. 

Threat 

The U.S. military posture—the ability to protect U.S. interests—is 

affected by many variables. Growing Western interdependence and Third World 

instability are dynamic influences on national security. While we were restoring 

our strength, the Soviets were not standing still. The momentum of the Soviet 

military buildup, unequalled in peacetime, will carry Soviet force expansion 

and modernization programs well into the 1990s. With this pace of 

modernization over the last ten years, the Soviets have produced three times as 

many aircraft and four times as many tanks and other tracked vehicles than 

has the United States. They also have deployed a large and powerful navy. 

Soviet conventional forces can dominate the Eurasian land mass, endanger our 

vital lines of commerce, and simultaneously threaten U.S. and allied interests 

in Europe and Asia. Even a limited confrontation with the Soviet Union 

immediately could have global implications. 

The Soviets continue to modernize their strategic nuclear forces. In 1982 

alone, they deployed over 1200 highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missile 

warheads. They deployed another 200 ICBM warheads in 1983, which will lead 

to the completion of a significant phase of their strategic ICBM modernization 

this year. All this is taking place and we have not yet deployed a single 

PEACEKEEPER missile. These Soviet missiles with a total of over 5000 

warheads are being placed in the world’s hardest silos and are linked with a 

redundant, survivable, and reliable command and control network to the Soviet 

leadership in well-protected sites. The Soviets have also strengthened their 

theater nuclear forces. Even as we negotiated, they deployed SS-20’s at the rate 

of one a week and improved their theater nuclear forces in Eastern Europe. The 

Soviets claimed no nuclear weapons were in East Europe and that recent 

deployments to Eastern Europe were in response to our deployments of 

PERSHING and GLCM. The facts are that Soviet levels of new tactical nuclear 

systems reflect decisions made years before we deployed PERSHING II and 

GLCM. 

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Soviet military power impedes the peaceful resolution of Third World 

problems and contributes to regional instability in ways that could promote 

wider conflict. The Soviets are not the only source of turbulence in the world. 

In the case of international terrorism, there are many causes and sponsors. In 

Central America and Lebanon, centuries of injustice, poverty and violence have 

led to the dangerous situations that exist today. But the Soviets seek to gain 

from international turmoil. Together with clients and surrogates, the Soviets 

are attempting to weaken the ties between the United States and its allies and 

to establish their own patterns of influence throughout much of the Third 

World. 

Strategy 

The basic national security objective for U.S. Armed Forces is to help 

preserve the United States as a free nation with its fundamental institutions 

and values intact. This nation and its allies seek to provide security and protect 

our way of life by preventing war. Our strategy is defensive; it is based on 

deterrence. Should deterrence fail, the strategy is to restore peace on favorable 

terms, and at the lowest scope and intensity of warfare consistent with our 

objectives. 

Strategy guides the development as well as the deployment of U.S. forces. 

Because of the great distances from the United States to areas of vital interests 

and the relative nearness of the threats of those interests, this nation has 

maintained forward-deployed land, naval, and air forces since the end of World 

War II. These forces lend political and military strength to our alliance strategy 

by a visible demonstration of the strength of the U.S. commitment—putting 

potential aggressors on notice that an attack will be met immediately by allied 

opposition that includes the United States. 

We maintain a strong, central reserve of Active and Reserve forces in the 

United States ready to reinforce those forces forward-deployed with our 

alliances, and to protect U.S. interests in other regions where there are no 

forward-deployed forces or where friends ask for help. 

Because U.S. forces will likely remain small relative to the requirements 

we have for them, they need to be as effective and flexible as possible. Superior 

training and superior equipment are required. Our forces must be fully 

equipped with modern equipment to give them the necessary technological 

edge over a numerically superior enemy. Our forces must be well-trained. Topnotch training is the decisive edge in combat effectiveness and it allows us to 

get the most out of our equipment. 

U.S. commanders rely on good intelligence to warn and inform the forces 

and on effective and survivable command and control systems to direct their 

most effective use. As has always been the case, superior mobility and control 

of the key sea lines of communication will be essential to help make this 

strategy work. We have come to rely increasingly on space for command and 

control. However, because the Soviets have fielded the world’s only operational 

anti-satellite weapon, space can no longer be considered a sanctuary. 

105 
Our non-strategic nuclear systems are essential to our deterrent strategy 

of flexible response. These systems deter Soviet aggression by our countering 

Soviet theater nuclear systems and by providing the capability to respond at 

whatever level of intensity necessary to prevent the Soviets from achieving their 

war objectives. 

Over-arching all the components of our strategy, the strategic nuclear 

TRIAD and its associated command and control systems provide the strategic 

deterrent so essential to peace. We require modern, ready strategic nuclear 

forces in sufficient numbers to make it clear to the Soviets that their war 

objective cannot be achieved if they resort to strategic nuclear war. 

Implications for Our Forces 

The budget supports the strategy. Much of the budget is dedicated to the 

shorter-term needs of the existing forces, and supports the progress of the 

Services in restoring the vitality and the health of the total force. We urgently 

need to sustain that vitality. At the same time, the budget provides an effective, 

sensible program for modernization accompanied by modest growth in the size 

of our forces and appropriate R&D support. 

The Joint Chiefs believe the proper balance has been struck—the balance 

between providing the present needs in readiness and sustainability and 

ensuring future capabilities through modernization. Inherent to this balanced 

approach is reliance on our technological base. The modernization programs 

are jeopardized by Soviet successes in acquiring Western technology. The 

nation urgently needs to protect the technology which gives us the qualitative 

advantages so necessary to give our forces an edge over potential enemies. 

Force Readiness and Sustainability 

Improving the warfighting efficiency of existing forces to deter and, if 

necessary, to fight at any level, intensity, and location remains top priority. We 

don’t know when or if war will come. The forces must be ready. The success of 

this nation in battle depends critically on our ability to respond rapidly with 

well-trained, well-equipped, properly supported forces, and to sustain those 

forces. In turn, wartime readiness depends on how well the nation performs the 

peacetime functions of preparing for war. 

Existing forces are now more capable of executing the strategy. Under 

this budget the Services will continue to provide new equipment to the forwarddeployed forces and to those early-deploying forces in the central reserve in the 

United States. Priority is given to those first to fight, to include the Reserve 

Component forces. Many Guard and Reserve units are receiving first-line 

equipment—including the M-1 tank, the M-2 Fighting Vehicle, the F-16 fighter, 

the PERRY Class Guided Missile Frigate, and modern tactical communications 

equipment. 

To tie these forces together, the Commanders in Chief of the operating 

forces and the Joint Chiefs are continually refining joint doctrine, combined 

106 
training and exercises. Flying hours, battalion training days, and steaming 

hours will be increased over the FY 84 levels. A 16 percent increase in joint 

exercise funding will allow some 70 joint and combined exercises. The exercises 

are essential to readiness and to evaluate U.S. strategic plans. Such joint and 

combined exercises have the further advantages of showing our resolve and of 

improving the ability of the forces from the various Services to operate 

effectively with U.S. allies. 

The capability of the forces of all Services to work together effectively and 

with forces of other countries is a major part of our coalition strategy. This 

strategic imperative is manifested in our unified command structure. The key 

players in implementing this strategy are the Commanders in Chief of the 

unified and specified commands, the CINCs. They are our operational 

commanders and provide oversight of our forces, as well as the direct interface 

with our allies. 

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in cooperation with the Secretary of 

Defense, are actively working with the CINCs to meet their needs. This is 

evident in the development of joint doctrine. The CINCs now have a direct role 

in the development of operational concepts. The CINCs have been deeply 

involved in creating this budget by personally presenting their warfighting and 

operational needs. 

The CINCs need and have asked for a source of funds to meet urgent, 

near-term readiness and warfighting requirements. At present, when 

unforeseen requirements arise, the CINCs’ only recourse is to seek funding 

through the Services—a lengthy process which may not be responsive. To 

satisfy unanticipated readiness problems, we propose a special fund. The fund 

would be managed by the Joint Chiefs who are in the best position to evaluate 

the urgency and priority of a request. 

Another peacetime function essential to warfighting effectiveness is 

sustaining the forces. Sustainability gives our forces staying power both in 

peace and war. Forces that cannot be sustained can be outlasted, and 

deterrence gained by modernization and readiness becomes less credible. This 

budget will allow the Services to continue the progress they have made. 

Stockage levels are programmed to increase; and depot maintenance is 

improving, as are sustainability levels. 

Supporting Our Alliance Strategy 

We are working to encourage our friends to improve their ability to act in 

their own behalf or with us in the defense of common interests. In so doing, we 

make a contribution to our own security. In implementing our global strategy, 

allied Host Nation Support and security assistance stand as two of the most 

cost-effective measures. For example, better security assistance terms, and 

larger quantities, are urgently needed right now in Central America. Effective 

security assistance to this troubled region will help to improve the security 

situation so social, political and economic reform can progress. 

107 
Strategic Forces 

The United States has placed a high priority on modernizing its strategic 

forces. This broad effort includes making command and control systems more 

responsive and survivable, improving strategic warning capabilities, and 

improving all legs of the TRIAD. The Joint Chiefs fully support the conclusions 

of the Scowcroft Commission that the nuclear weapons modernization 

programs are essential both for deterrence and to create the climate for 

meaningful arms reduction negotiations. The development and deployment of 

the PEACEKEEPER missile, TRIDENT submarine system, B-1B and Advanced 

Technology Bomber, air-launched cruise missile, and a new, small, singlewarhead ICBM are essential programs to ensure the U.S. strategic deterrent. 

This is a key year for the United States. This nation has delayed strategic 

nuclear modernization and we are now faced with the need to modernize all 

three legs of the TRIAD at the same time. The Soviets have built a strategic 

nuclear force capable of achieving their war objectives. We needs a force which 

will make it clear to them they cannot achieve those wartime goals. The 

TRIDENT submarine program and the D-5 missile will modernize our aging 

POSEIDON fleet. The PEACEKEEPER will upgrade our ICBM force to offset the 

imbalance caused by Soviet deployment of modern, hard-target capable ICBMs, 

while research proceeds on the small missile. The B-1B will provide a 

survivable, responsive bomber force able to penetrate Soviet defenses well into 

the 1990s. We need to go ahead with these programs to assure the credibility of 

our strategic deterrent. 

A major effort to modernize our strategic command, control and 

communications (C3) systems continues in this budget request. In order to 

assure the capability to detect and provide warning of an impending attack, 

sensors, command centers and their supporting communications are being 

hardened against nuclear effects. Our C3 systems are being designed for 

increased survivability as well as redundancy and improved interoperability of 

key command facilities. 

The Joint Chiefs support the President’s initiative to have this nation 

employ its technological talent to seek an alternative to sole reliance on 

offensive retaliation. In consultation with our allies and with the U.S. scientific 

community, we are exploring means which provide the hope that we can end 

the dominance of offensive nuclear weaponry. 

Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces 

Nonstrategic nuclear forces are a key part of our strategy of flexible 

response. The modernization of our nonstrategic nuclear systems with the 

fielding in PERSHING II, modernized Field Artillery warheads, and groundlaunched cruise missiles, as well as associated command and control, will 

improve effectiveness, reduce risks to allied territory, and improve safety and 

security. With the continued cooperation of NATO and the support of the 

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Congress, the new long-range systems will serve to counter Soviet SS-20 

deployments and strengthen the credibility of our deterrent posture. 

Chemical 

The Joint Chiefs place great priority on modernizing the U.S. retaliatory 

chemical munitions stockpile. U.S. forces are improving their ability to defend 

against chemical attack, but the Congress must clearly understand that the 

lack of a modern chemical retaliatory capability will have our forces fighting at 

great disadvantage. Additionally, unless we take steps to modernize our own 

chemical munitions, we provide little incentive to the Soviets for a meaningful, 

verifiable arms control agreement prohibiting chemical weapons. This budget 

provides for long lead-time items and facilities in order to begin production in 

FY 86. We urgently need to move forward in the production of modern chemical 

munitions to make our chemical warfare deterrent credible. 

Negotiations 

The Joint Chiefs fully support efforts to gain genuine, mutual, equitable 

and verifiable reductions in armaments. Arms control and other related 

negotiations are being pursued with the idea that equitable and verifiable 

agreements can contribute to security at reduced force levels. Arms control 

should not be viewed as a substitute for force modernization; rather, arms 

control and other defense efforts should be mutually reinforcing. 

Any agreement is only as good as the willingness of the signatories to 

comply with the obligations assumed. Soviet violations or probable violations of 

provisions of several agreements presently in force show a disturbing pattern of 

Soviet behavior. This behavior must be taken into account in the development 

of U.S. defense programs and approaches to arms control. 

Conventional Forces 

In this age of nuclear parity and with conventional and low-intensity 

conflicts widespread throughout the world, conventional forces are the 

mainstay of our force structure. In this budget, land forces are being 

reorganized to improve flexibility and to capitalize on the effectiveness of newly 

introduced weapons, such as the ABRAMS tank, BRADLEY Fighting Vehicle, 

APACHE helicopter, and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). 

Improvements to and modernization of Active and Reserve Army divisions, to 

include the new light division concept, will enhance global flexibility. Naval 

forces continue to build toward a 600-ship Navy with 15 carrier battle groups, 

4 battleship surface action groups, modernized attack submarines, and 

amphibious lift for Marine forces. We are procuring the best fighters flying 

today. We need to continue to procure such aircraft and modernized munitions 

as we build and strengthen the Air Force towards 40 tactical fighter wing 

equivalents. Modern, survivable, high-capacity tactical communication systems 

109 
are being obtained to provide adequate, secure and reliable information 

distribution systems. This budget will also improve the ability of Special 

Operations Forces to support the needs of the CINCs at any level of conflict. 

Our strategy calls for a rapid-reacting central reserve and the 

transportation to move it. Budget requests for the Navy and the Air Force 

recognize the importance of supporting the other Services in deploying their 

forces. Progress is being made to improve sealift and airlift: the maritime Ready 

Reserve force fleet is expanding, the purchase of KC-10A is funded, C-5A 

improvements are underway and KC-135 re-engining and conversion of fast 

sealift SL-7s are well-along and need to be kept going. The Army and Marine 

Corps have taken measures to improve the capabilities of their forces to deploy. 

For instance, maritime pre-positioning for the Marines and the Army’s light 

division will improve their mobility. 

People 

No matter how good the strategy or how excellent the equipment, good 

people will remain the heart of our defense forces. Well-trained, highly 

motivated Service members are fundamental to combat readiness. This nation 

has very good people in its Armed Forces today because of the nation’s renewed 

pride and faith in those people and the willingness to pay the price for 

adequate security. The people in our Armed Forces are willing and ready to go 

wherever this nation asks them to go to protect our vital interests. Their tasks 

are difficult and dangerous. Very much a part of their willingness and 

readiness to do these difficult tasks is the sure knowledge that we as a nation 

will provide for their needs. The men and women in uniform need to know we 

will give them the best possible equipment and training for their difficult tasks, 

and they need to know this nation will provide reasonable pay and 

compensation for them and their families. 

There are a number of proposals being studied now with respect to 

compensation and retirement. I urge the Congress in reviewing these issues to 

remember the unique demands of military service. The Armed Forces need to 

have confidence that trends will not be set in motion that will erode pay and 

other benefits or return the forces to the unstable personnel picture of the 

1970s. In the case of retirement, it is not a pension system; it is an integral 

part of a lifetime, career compensation program. It is a means to shape the age 

and skill mix of the force. The military profession is still a young person’s 

calling and the retirement system for the Active and Reserve Forces must 

account for that. 

Conclusion 

As the Congress considers the Defense Budget this year, I urge the 

members to remember that crises too often give little warning of their 

approach. Orderly preparation is not possible once growing tensions indicate 

immediate danger. An Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps—in being and 

110 
constantly maintained in readiness—support the other elements of our 

national power, give weight to diplomacy, and deter aggression. 

The Soviets will not stand still. They will continue on the path they have 

begun, fielding increasingly capable forces on the land, on the sea, in the air, 

and in space. Our nation has no plans to match the Soviets weapon for 

weapon, and the Joint Chiefs do not suggest a neglect of the other elements of 

our national power. However, this nation simply must do what’s needed to be 

done to counter the Soviets with forces which deny the utility of Soviet military 

power for coercion or war. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that our strategy provides this nation 

with a sensible approach to preserve the peace and protect our national 

security. It is a strategy which makes it clear to potential aggressors they 

cannot achieve their goals by war or by the threat of war. The success of our 

strategy will continue to rely on the ability of the nation to provide ready, 

modern forces. The Joint Chiefs believe that the budget for FY 85 will do that. 

This budget provides the necessary resources to assure the revitalization of our 

armed forces and the continued effectiveness or our strategy. 

Statement before the 

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 

On the FY 84 and 85 Security Assistance Program 

9 February 1984 

Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee: 

Security assistance is an important instrument of U.S. foreign policy and 

an essential component of the U.S. coalition strategy. Effective and consistent 

security assistance relationships with allies and friends are fundamental to the 

achievement of our national security objectives. The success our nation has 

had in helping other nations help themselves through the security assistance 

program is due to the support of the Congress and the Executive Branch. On 

behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I want to thank you for your support. 

This nation urgently needs to continue to support and enhance this 

crucial program. Further, our government needs to improve efficiency and 

flexibility in the management of the program. In doing so, we will more 

effectively improve the ability of our allies and friends to defend themselves and 

we thereby enhance our own security. 

U.S. Strategy 

This is a dangerous world. Turbulence in Third World countries and 

direct threats to global stability by the forces of the Soviet Union and its friends 

threaten the security of all free nations. It is a world of growing economic, 

111 
political and social interdependence. U.S. security and well-being are 

inextricably linked to that of other nations—to our friends, allies and trading 

partners—as theirs are to ours. 

We have a coalition strategy. In keeping with this coalition strategy, we 

maintain forward-deployed forces in key areas and a system of unified 

commanders with military responsibility for designated major regions of the 

world. To make our coalition strategy more effective, we are working to 

encourage our friends to do more in their own behalf or in cooperation with us 

in defense of our common interests. Security assistance stands among the 

most cost-effective means to achieve this. 

The long-term influence of security assistance programs can be 

considerable. Security assistance programs were key ingredients in building 

the alliances we have today in Europe and in Asia. In the Third World, these 

programs have helped stabilize governments friendly to the United States, and 

they have helped contain the spread of Soviet imperialism. Professional military 

training has enhanced force development and influenced future military 

leaders who later serve in positions of leadership in many of the nonaligned 

nations. 

Guidelines For Security Assistance 

The Joint Chiefs believe security assistance is an important adjunct to 

other elements of our national power—our diplomatic, economic and political 

influence in the world. Security assistance should and does complement our 

strategic military objectives. In this respect, the equipment, services, and 

training provided under the security assistance program should do three 

things: 

—Advance each recipient’s ability to meet independently threats to its 

national security both from outside aggression and from externally supported 

groups bent on violent internal change. 

—Foster the development of regional defense arrangements and 

cooperation that enable combined actions to deter or defeat regional 

incursions. 

—Enable recipients to develop forces capable of operating with U.S. and 

allied forces in a collective security framework. 

The Soviet Challenge 

The Soviet Union realizes the value of security assistance as a low-cost, 

low-risk instrument for achieving political objectives. To this end, the Soviet 

Union has substantially increased its assistance programs over the past 

decade. Between 1979 and 1982, Soviet arms deliveries exceeded those of the 

U.S. by a factor of 3:1 in tanks, 4:1 in supersonic aircraft, and 7:1 in 

helicopters. The Soviet capability to deliver arms rapidly has kept pace with 

increasing sales. In 1982, deliveries were the second highest on record, and 

while all the data are not yet in, deliveries in 1983 promise to be as high. The 

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Soviets clearly have established an influential role in military sales to the Third 

World. 

The Soviets frequently use surrogates as conduits for arms transfers to 

fulfill political objectives. Aid provided by Soviet surrogates is designed 

primarily to support guerilla activity in such areas as Africa, the Caribbean 

Basin and Central America. For example, among the many other arms and 

ammunition we found in Grenada were boxes from North Korea labeled “rice” 

but which contained ammunition. The Soviets are expected to continue to use 

direct and surrogate military assistance and arms sales to boost hard currency 

earnings and to gain influence and military access in Third World countries. 

Soviet security assistance in the Mideast and Central America stands as 

a graphic example of Soviet use of such aid to gain geostrategic advantages, 

promote conflict, overthrow governments friendly to this nation, and thwart 

U.S. attempts to promote peace and stability. In Central America and Cuba 

alone, the Soviets provided military assistance deliveries in a six-month period 

through June of 1983 which outstripped our own by almost $9 million. They 

provide this aid, as they do worldwide, on very easy terms. We saw in Grenada 

how their aid is being used to overthrow governments and intimidate others. I 

want to emphasize that, had the Soviets and Cubans been successful in 

Grenada, they would have been in a position to threaten safe passage to and 

from the Panama Canal. 

U.S. Programs And Legislative Initiatives 

The Joint Chiefs do not suggest that we enter a security assistance race 

with the Soviets, or that this nation emphasize, as do the Soviets, the military 

element of our influence at the expense of our diplomatic, economic, political, 

and moral influence in the world. However, our adversaries place great 

emphasis on security assistance to achieve their objectives and there is a 

pressing need for assistance to our friends and allies. We should continue to 

emphasize diplomacy and economic influence as the preferred instruments of 

national influence. But, the U.S. security assistance program has a strong 

connection to our national security strategy and is often a prerequisite to 

effective diplomacy and economic aid. Further, our security assistance to many 

countries is essential to gain the basing, transit and support agreements we 

need to respond rapidly to crises worldwide. 

About half of our security assistance funds goes to Israel and Egypt, and 

seven countries account for over 80 percent of the program. In addition to 

Israel and Egypt, major recipients are Turkey, Spain, Greece, Pakistan, and 

Korea. We need to continue to help these countries for a combination of 

political and military reasons. Nevertheless, by the time these seven countries 

are provided for, we have few resources left for other important strategic areas 

if the overall levels are cut. The Joint Chiefs urge adoption of the balanced 

program contained in the Administration’s budget. 

We must be concerned with the growing debt burden of developing 

nations. High-interest loans for security assistance exacerbate political, social, 

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and economic problems on which revolutionary movements thrive. It is 

important to increase grant assistance substantially or ease the terms on 

which loans are extended. These better terms should be directed to nations 

whose survival and increased strength are in the U.S. strategic interest but are 

also in economic difficulty. This year and for the foreseeable future, this 

concern applies to a growing number of nations in Latin America, the Mideast 

and Africa. 

Increases in grant assistance or concessional terms are highly 

recommended for Turkey and Portugal, the poorest among our NATO allies, 

where military modernization is key to strategic defense commitments. NATO 

depends on Turkey as the linchpin of the Southern Flank against several 

potential adversaries along an extensive frontier. Of all the NATO allies, Turkey 

maintains the largest standing army; but much of its equipment is in bad 

shape and outdated. Increased standing assistance to Turkey to correct this 

deficiency is critical for the successful defense of Europe. In this regard, the 

Joint Chiefs support the Administration’s “On-Budget” proposal in that it 

improves affordability of security assistance programs to our security partners. 

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 

deserves the whole-hearted support of the Congress. Training military 

personnel from allied and friendly nations is a very effective way of establishing 

and maintaining long-term cooperative security relationships with nations 

whose interests are closely linked to those of the United States. The program 

has a side benefit by giving a first-hand look at American life and democracy to 

future leaders from many different countries. Over the years, such training 

here has paid real dividends for the United States. Thousands of foreign 

leaders have undergone training at senior U.S. military schools during their 

military careers. For example, fully one-third of the foreign graduates of the 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff School have attained general or flag 

officer rank. During one recently surveyed five-year period, 160 foreign 

graduates of U.S. senior service schools had become cabinet ministers, 

legislators, or ambassadors, and over 1,800 foreign graduates had attained 

general or flag officer rank. 

The extension of U.S. influence also has a multiplier effect since U.S.-

trained foreigners train still others. We need to make wider use of training as a 

security assistance tool. One initiative the Joint Chiefs support would permit 

exchanges of training for individuals or units on a reciprocal, no-cost basis. 

Many countries cannot afford U.S. costs and the IMET budget can go only so 

far. This keeps both sides from benefiting from reciprocal training, and we need 

to correct that. 

The Joint Chiefs also support changing the law so that there is a single, 

standardized cost for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) training of foreign personnel 

in U.S. military facilities. A single FMS price would reduce confusion on the 

part of our allies, reduce fiscal impediments to formal U.S. military training, 

and remove inequities in the current FMS pricing structure. 

In the past, urgent requests from our friends necessitated a drawdown of 

U.S. equipment and munition inventories to supply their time-sensitive needs 

114 
in a crisis. Some of these actions had an adverse impact on U.S. force 

readiness in that a large quantity of the material supplied was from inventory. 

Time was required to recover from these transfers. The Special Defense 

Acquisition Fund (SDAF) provides a limited buffer and will enable faster 

recovery for items already on order. The Joint Chiefs are confident the SDAF 

can be a useful tool when funded to the levels requested in the budget. We 

encourage raining the obligation authority and increasing the capitalization 

rate so the SDAF can be more effective. 

A number of other initiatives have been submitted to the Congress over 

the last two years, all of which the Joint Chiefs continue to support. I 

understand many received favorable action in the committee reports last year. 

We would appreciate your efforts to complete an Authorization Bill this year. 

Regional Considerations 

The United States is now helping vulnerable Central America countries 

achieve self-determination and economic and social development. Progress is 

hampered by the lack of necessary funds to develop adequate defense 

capabilities to meet threats to the security of the region, particularly in El 

Salvador and Honduras. Nicaragua continues to threaten Honduras and other 

countries with the largest military force in the region and insurgency continues 

in El Salvador. Only through a comprehensive four-part approach, which 

includes development of economic, political, and social reforms as well as 

development of the indigenous military capability, will lasting stability be 

achieved. Grant assistance is most appropriate to achieve force development 

without further burdening the fragile institutions of the countries in the region. 

About one-fourth of the funds from Central America are for Honduras, 

and about half for El Salvador. In El Salvador, we clearly need to provide 

economic assistance and the impetus for social reform. However, it would be 

fundamentally unsound not to provide also the means for that country to 

provide for its own security. Without a security shield, the Salvadoran 

government will be unable to prevent Marxists from destroying any economic or 

social progress made. As the National Bipartisan Commission on Central 

America pointed out, U.S. military assistance programs require “greater 

continuity and predictability.” The operational commanders and our advisors 

in the field report that, because of the sudden starts and stops of U.S. military 

assistance there, Salvadoran forces must constrain their operations and 

thereby cede advantages to the guerillas. The Joint Chiefs urge the Congress to 

provide more timely, predictable and adequate support to the Salvadoran 

forces. 

In Grenada we saw how important cooperation among states in the 

region could be. We also saw that the self-defense forces of many countries are 

only small police forces which have only limited paramilitary capabilities. These 

police forces are not prepared to assume duties in low-intensity conflict. If 

current restrictions on the training of police forces are modified or lifted, the 

115 
ability of the self-defense forces of Caribbean Basin nations and Costa Rica to 

maintain their nations’ security could be enhanced. 

In the case of Lebanon, public attention has been riveted on the role of 

the multinational force (MNF), of which our forces are a part. As we all know, 

the situation there is extremely volatile. Nevertheless, we should not be 

diverted from the larger issue of helping the Government of Lebanon restore 

Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country. One major portion of that effort 

is the development of strong Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to give breathing 

room to the political process. This nation, in cooperation with the British, 

French and Italians, has been assisting the LAF. We are making progress in 

helping the LAF to forge a more effective force capable of assuming larger, more 

comprehensive control of its territory as foreign forces withdraw. As the 

national government of Lebanon reconstitutes itself, we will be prepared to 

continue to provide assistance in the hopes that our objectives can be 

eventually achieved. 

Conclusion 

The Administration has put forward a number of carefully thought-out 

proposals for funding the security assistance programs for the remainder of 

this fiscal year and for FY 85. The Administration has also put forward 

important proposals to increase the flexibility and effectiveness of those 

programs. 

I want you to know that the Joint Chiefs fully support the legislation 

placed before you. The legislative initiatives contained in this program and the 

funds and other resources sought are essential to support what the Joint 

Chiefs believe are necessary and sensible needs from friendly and allied 

governments. They look to us for assistance in a dangerous world. They also 

look to us for steadfastness of purpose. I urge your support for these programs. 

Remarks at the SOCIETY OF 

THE SONS OF THE REVOLUTION

At the Annual Banquet in Honor of the 

Birthday of George Washington 

Richmond, VA 

22 February 1984 

Thanks very much. It is nice to be here with the Society to celebrate the 

253rd birthday of George Washington—Father of our Nation and the first head 

of the Army. And, it is a special pleasure to be in this great city of Richmond. 

It is the city with the distinction of celebrating Washington’s Birthday as a 

holiday for the first time. In 1782, 202 years ago today, the local newspaper 

116 
said that, “Tuesday last being the birthday of his Excellency, General George 

Washington, our illustrious Commander in Chief, the same was celebrated here 

with utmost demonstrations of joy.” And I feel that we are doing that very well 

here tonight. 

I can see that Richmond has lost none of its pride in Virginia’s most 

famous son. It is a great tradition that you have here, to gather every year to 

celebrate the heritage of George Washington. He was a great man, certainly; 

but he was a man—and he was a patriot like you people gathered here tonight. 

He had an abiding faith in America. And he had a great faith in God. His 

wisdom and understanding of human frailties is summed up in what he often 

told his soldiers. He said, “Tis not in mortals to command success.” 

Over the span of many generations, we tend to forget the greatness of 

George Washington. Up in the northern part of Virginia where we ought to 

remember him particularly, we in Washington, D.C., seem to treat his birthday 

as simply just another holiday. 

Two hundred years ago today we would have found George Washington 

at his home in Mount Vernon—having just disbanded his Army in late 

November of 1783 at Newburgh, New York. He hadn’t yet received the call to 

become the first President. He was settling down to run the farm, to tend the 

business, to handle the bills. And, as I came down here tonight in the 

helicopter, I could see other things that reminded me of George Washington. I 

guess maybe those things are the only things the two of us have in common. 

We both have our houses pointed toward the water; we both love to fish; and 

we both became military officers. 

George Washington was not only a fisherman and a gentleman, but he 

knew well the horrors of war. He was in fact a man of peace. He knew from 

hard experience that the Good Lord didn’t promise us a perfect world. He knew 

that peace could only be maintained through the military strength necessary to 

deter our enemies from attacking us. We call that “deterrence” in Washington 

and that means that if anyone tries to pick a fight with us, we’ll kick the tar out 

of them. He said that “If we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it. 

If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for 

war.” 

That principle is the cornerstone of our national security policy today. 

The necessity for maintaining adequate defenses hasn’t changed. Each of 

these speakers here tonight has said of his own Service that we have good 

forces. You can be justly proud of those men and women in uniform today. As 

in Washington’s day, it is the individual soldier, sailor, airman, Marine and 

Coast Guardsman in our forces—both Active and Reserve—who is the 

guarantor of our freedom. I can tell you from my observations that our people 

in uniform today fully measure up to their heritage as descendents of the 

Continental Army and Navy which won our liberty. 

As I flew up here tonight, I looked out and was able to see Mount Vernon. 

Along the banks of the Potomac, I could see Bolling Air Force Base and 

Anacostia Naval Air Station; I flew on past Fort Belvoir, past the Coast Guard 

Radio Station; down past Quantico, and further on down I could imagine Fort 

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A.P. Hill, Fort Lee, Fort Eustis, Fort Monroe, Langley Air Force Base and 

Norfolk Naval Air Station. I couldn’t help but think that George Washington 

would certainly be proud today as much of the Armed Forces have been 

stationed on the land on which he grew up. 

But, the world is much different today that it was in the late 1770s. It is 

more complex. There are many more nation-states out there; the pressures 

from political, religious and ethnic factions seem even greater than they did in 

George Washington’s time. The economic changes have brought about a 

greater interdependence between our nation and the other nations of the world. 

In Washington’s time, he could take comfort in what he called the great 

“Atlantic Barrier.” Today, that barrier can be bridged in hours by jet aircraft 

and in minutes by nuclear missiles. In Washington’s time, he could rightly 

advise the Congress to “avoid foreign entanglements.” Today, we see that our 

economy and security are inextricably intertwined with the rest of the world. 

In Washington’s era, the area covered by his whole Army at Yorktown could 

have been defended by one Infantry battalion today. In Washington’s time, 

after the Revolution, there were no communists around in this part of the 

world to foment disorder and pervert legitimate revolution, such as we saw in 

Nicaragua, into rigid totalitarianism. This is a new system of repression which 

now threatens its neighbors in Central America. 

Added to this is the relentless buildup of Soviet military power, both 

nuclear and conventional—recognizing their increasing willingness to use that 

power as demonstrated over the past three years in Afghanistan, Africa, 

Southeast Asia, Europe and here, right in the territory of our own free people. 

And we can see it is a dangerous world. If this Nation of ours is going to steer 

a safe course through these troubled waters, we must show that we can meet 

the military threats posed by potential enemies. We don’t want to invite a war; 

we want to preserve peace. I just want to tell you in the most simple, direct 

terms that we don’t want a war. We don’t want any kind of war—we 

particularly don’t want a nuclear war. But at the same time, it seems very 

important to all of us that we don’t want to be paralyzed by the fear of war as 

we go about our business in this world of nation-states. 

We need to pursue sensible policies that will secure the security of our 

own people—the liberty of our people—and reduce the probability of war. Our 

goal is to preserve the peace through strength. Our hope is that if we 

persevere, the Soviets and their allies may finally conclude that it is in their 

best interests to sit down with us to reduce the level of nuclear arms in a 

verifiable way that will ensure a safer world. I am sure if George Washington 

was here tonight, he would warn us against being diverted away from the 

security of our nation with any of these emotionally appealing, miraculous 

solutions to the problems of peace and security. 

Yesterday, I was testifying with the Secretary of Defense before the House 

Budget Committee. I listened to attack after attack on the defense budget by 

members of that committee. The public media was there to inform the 

American people. One of the curious things that I observed was that every time 

one of these guys critical of defense would talk, the cameraman would perk up 

118 
and point their cameras at him. Late in the afternoon, finally, a Congressman 

from Texas named Phil Gramm got up and made a very sensible remark about 

the need for defense; and he asked some very sensible questions. I said to 

myself, “I hope these television guys get him on the news.” Then I looked over 

at them. Two of them were dead asleep and the rest of them were sitting down 

with their cameras pointed at the ceiling. 

That reminds me of a time in our early history. One of the delegates to 

the Continental Congress made the motion to limit the active Army to no more 

than 5,000. George Washington, himself a delegate, turned to the fellow next 

to him and whispered in a loud voice, “That’s a good idea. And we’ll pass 

another motion which limits the attackers to no more than 3,000.” 

George Washington knew the price of freedom. He circulated among the 

States in 1783 what he called the “Four Pillars of Freedom.” The first Pillar 

was “An indissoluble Union of the States under one Federal Government.” The 

second was “A sacred regard for public justice.” Thirdly, “The adoption of a 

proper peace establishment”—and I think he had the right name for the Armed 

Forces. And, fourthly, he said the “The prevalence of that pacific and friendly 

disposition among the people of the United States, which will induce them to 

forget their local prejudices and policies, to make those mutual concessions 

which are requisites to the general prosperity and, in some instances, to 

sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the community.” 

I will tell you that wrapped up in that last Pillar of George Washington is 

the concept of service to the Nation, which is what made this country great. It 

is based on the recognition that life has little meaning if we as individuals are 

not part of something greater than just ourselves. The Nation was founded on 

a mutual commitment among its citizens to the highest ideals of human dignity 

for ourselves and all mankind. There is nothing in which we should take 

greater pride as citizens of this nation and as human beings in the world of 

ours. 

The very essence of service to country was exemplified by the life of 

George Washington. Men and women from his day and through the days to the 

present have sacrificed their lives and their fortunes to preserve their sacred 

honor and to preserve this great country of ours. I believe that it is our duty as 

citizens of this country to do exactly the same, not only for us but also for our 

prosperity—to preserve the liberty that we so greatly desire and want for this 

great country of ours. 

The cost of vigilance is sometimes high. It is never as high as the price of 

war. We pay taxes in dollars today. The President is asking $305 billion for 

the defense of this country today. But, it is not nearly as much as it will cost if 

we have to go to war and then we would not only pay in dollars but in a coin 

far more precious. And that would be in the blood of our citizens.I am 

reminded of the extraordinary foresight of George Washington when he was to 

accept the British surrender at Yorktown. He said to his troops: 

119 
“My brave fellows ... let no shouting or cheers increase the 

shame of the fallen enemy. It is sufficient for us that we witness 

their humiliation.” And then he said, “Posterity will cheer for us.” 

We have important work to do. You have important work to do here in 

Richmond. I and my fellow colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff have 

important work to do. Whatever we do in this great country, we’ve got work to 

do to keep this country strong and free. I would hope and pray to the good 

Lord that we do our work and we do it well. These are trying times. 

Nevertheless, we can’t forget our responsibilities for those who will follow us. I, 

like Washington, say that I hope that posterity will cheer for us. I pray that 

they will. 

Remarks before the 

ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

Fort Hood, TX 

15 March 1984 

The great advantage that the United States has over the Russians is our 

professional non-commissioned officer corps. We have about ten times the 

number of professionals, as a percentage, in our Armed Forces than the 

Russians do. Their tanks are commanded by-and-large by two-year draftees. 

We’ve got experts on ours. That is what is going to make the difference if we 

ever go to war. And as long as the Russians recognize that, they won’t want to 

fight us. That is the most important job we have: that is, to prepare those 

people for tomorrow. That is the job not only for you people in the military, but 

it is part of the responsibility of you people in the civilian community to help 

the Armed Forces get and keep good people and equipment. That is the heart 

of our defense. 

A Letter to the 

Army Aviation Association of America 

29 March 1984 

Army Aviation faces some important challenges. The first challenge is to 

make certain that its activation as a branch by itself doesn’t move it away from 

the other combat branches; rather it must move even closer if we are to get the 

most out of the capabilities of the new hardware and the top-notch Aviation 

120 
officers and soldiers we now have in the force. There will be a tendency for 

some to say that the Armed Forces now has four air forces instead of three. 

The members of the Army Aviation Branch must make it clear that Army 

Aviation is a ground combat branch that uses the medium of the air to provide 

extraordinary mobility for ground combat operations. Army Aviation uses air 

to provide roads where there are no roads and hills where there are no hills. 

Yet, at the same time, it uses the existing terrain for cover and concealment 

just as do the Infantry and the Armor. 

We must make certain that we use the extraordinary capabilities we have 

built into the Army in the best possible way. The new helicopters, the new 

tanks, the Infantry Fighting Vehicles, MLRS and other modernized artillery, 

new sensors, new intelligence-fusion techniques, distributed information 

systems, and, above all, very good soldiers to give us the opportunity to make 

combat teams on the battlefield more effective than any that have ever been 

before. The key to all that is the teamwork of the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, 

and Aviation units. All have to understand each other’s capabilities and 

limitations. I firmly believe that we will find that smaller, integrated teams will 

be far more useful than in the past. The Aviation Branch is the new player in 

this exercise and as such will carry an extraordinary burden for ensuring that 

teamwork exists. 

Address to the 

ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE 

SOCIETY OF MILITARY ENGINEERS 

St. Paul, MN 

26 April 1984 

It was pointed out that I started my military career in the State of 

Minnesota. It’s a state that doesn’t noticeably show much of the active military 

services. I had breakfast with the Governor this morning and he reminded me 

of that fact. But, it is a state that has a long, distinguished military tradition. 

I suspect that this Color Guard is made up of men from the State of Minnesota. 

Minnesota provided more soldiers per capita into the Union Army—even 

though it had been a state only a couple of years before the war—than any 

other state in Union. Its outfits were among the first to fight in World War I. I 

was with the outfit to fire the first American artillery round against the 

Germans in World War II. It was a Minnesota National Guard outfit. So, 

you’re in a place that has a great military tradition although it may not be 

evident in the number of active military posts here. 

Flying out here, one can be reminded of what American military 

engineers have done for this country. We came out on a great day yesterday. 

We flew over Pittsburgh; we could look down and see the beginning of the Ohio 

121 
River and later the great waters of the Mississippi. I couldn’t help but think of 

what American military engineering has done from the days of the beginning of 

the country, from George Washington as a surveyor to what has been done 

today—not just to support our military operations but to support the 

development of this country. 

Among other things that Harry Griffith always talks about is that he was 

an aide to General Kelly Volpe, who was Division Commander during the last 

years of World War II. General Volpe always used to say when he was an 

instructor at the Infantry School at Fort Benning that a slide rule in the hands 

of an Infantryman was a dangerous tool. It only belonged to the Engineers. As 

I told General Volpe, it was many years later when I was an instructor at the 

Artillery School Gunnery Department and taught a slide rule course there. I 

told those guys, “Don’t expect me to teach you how to use this because you’re 

not smart enough. I’ll just teach you how to keep from getting your fingers 

caught. It really belongs to the Engineers.” 

But all military people are Engineers in one sense or another. I am often 

reminded of one of Bill Mauldin’s great cartoons in World War II. It shows two 

Engineer soldiers out there with that great, modern engineering tool, the 

Number Two D-handled shovel, trying to drain away the water from a hole 

that’s hub-deep in mud and there’s a jeep with a star on the front of it. One 

soldier says to the other, “O.K., O.K., so he’s a general. What do you want me 

to do? Pass in review?” 

Admiral Bull Halsey at Guadalcanal said that during World War II, every 

time he saw a bulldozer, he wanted to kiss it and the operator because they 

typified what military engineers are to the combat operations, no matter where, 

no matter what Service—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force or the Marine 

Corps. 

In December, I was back in Italy for the fortieth anniversary of the battle 

of Mignano-Monte Lungo. It was the first battle in which the Italians fought on 

our side. And it was just up from where we had crossed the Volturno River 

three times. I recall watching four successive Engineer-soldier bulldozer 

operators get the Silver Star within the space of about an hour while they were 

trying to create bridge approaches, because a bridge was desperately needed to 

get ammunition to the other side of that river. 

I am happy to greet all of you on behalf of my colleagues on the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and to be with this organization. Seeing the uniforms of all the 

Services represented here reminds me that the Society of American Military 

Engineers represents the principle Eisenhower enunciated in 1958 when he 

sponsored the last great reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said 

there will be no more single-Service fights or single-Service wars. He said the 

Services simply had to work together in the future in order to be able to defend 

this nation jointly, together. 

The extent to which you enhance communications among the Services 

and among the various engineering branches will help us all to do our jobs 

better. 

122 
Your program says I am the keynote speaker. The definition for 

“keynote,” as I understand it is to lay out the unifying theme. I looked at your 

program and I am not sure that I’m capable of laying out the unifying theme. 

But what I would like to do is talk a little bit about national strategy and how 

military installation planning fits into national strategy and then have some 

plain talk—planner to Engineers—and talk about some of the problems that we 

face. 

Every budget cycle that we go through in Washington starts with some 

fundamental questions. The same questions are asked from two different 

directions. Some people say, “What can we do with the money that we get?” 

And others say, “What should be done and how much will it cost to do it to do 

it to protect the interests of the United States?” 

Now, there may be some similarities in those two ways to answer those 

questions but I would submit that there is a fundamental difference. My own 

personal bias is for asking, “What should be done?” because that leads us to 

better planning and to getting down to what is really needed to protect the 

United States. 

In asking the questions in that direction, we make some reasonable 

assumptions about the future. Now, if there is anything that the past has 

taught us, it is that the world is certain to change in a fashion that we cannot 

predict. Indeed, we will certainly not anticipate all the changes that will come 

to the world in the days ahead. We won’t bat a thousand in the assumptions 

that we make in developing our war plans or any other types of planning. But, 

at the same time, we must look to the future and make the best possible 

estimates that we can because our problems won’t go away just because we’ve 

assumed them away. 

I tend to be a little conservative when I examine what to do with our 

Armed Forces. I usually stick with evolutionary changes rather than 

revolutionary changes. But I want to tell you that I also recognize that, as 

surely as we fail to anticipate the future, we will be forced to make some 

hurried or wasteful changes and additions when the future arrives. 

As Screwtape told his nephew, Wormwood, in C.S. Lewis’ wonderful 

book, humans fail to remember the future is approaching us at a constant rate 

of 60 minutes per hour. We forget that sometimes; however, in the world we 

face today, the rate of change that we see is not often constant within those 60 

minutes. Certainly, when we look at recent changes in society—technology, 

military forces—the clock seems to be rolling around much faster than 60 

seconds in every minute and 60 minutes in every hour. So, whatever the 

future brings, we’ll be somewhat surprised. We need to plan for the future and 

we need to anticipate what is likely to come, but we also need to be able to 

adjust to the future that will come no matter what it is. Recognizing those two 

dichotomies in our planning will help us to make better plans. 

Whatever the future brings, we will need to continue to do what needs to 

be done to protect our nation and the peace and our way of life. Our strategy 

for the last 40 years has been fairly constant. It is a strategy of deterrence. We 

are only trying to maintain the peace by maintaining forces self-evidently 

123 
capable of guaranteeing that anyone who attacks the United States would not 

achieve his objectives, either by war or by the threat of war. Our strategy has 

counted on certain fundamental elements. One is alliances. We have ties with 

the rest of the world. It seems to me that as we go through time, we will see 

that our society and our economy become even more inextricably intertwined 

with the rest of the world. So the alliances continue to have their importance 

and, if anything, their military importance will increase. 

Consistent with this business of alliances is the fact that we will have 

overseas bases and forward-deployed forces. They are important to the 

alliances because they lend political cohesion to the alliances by letting people 

know that the United States is committed to the common defense of certain 

parts of the world. They also lend military strength to the alliances by having 

our Armed Forces there. We also count on the strong central reserve of land, 

air, naval and amphibious forces, both Active and Reserve Component forces, 

based here in the United States—forces that can go to reinforce those alliances 

or go elsewhere in the world where our interests are threatened. 

How do people in your positions relate to that particular strategy? There 

is an old Corps of Engineers manual dated 1919 and it defined “forts” as 

“tactics applied to the earth.” I believe that our bases, posts, facilities, harbors, 

airstrips, and MX silos today are our national strategy converted to reinforced 

steel rods, concrete, and asphalt. They are a manifestation of what our 

strategy was and what our strategy is—what it will be and what it can be. At 

least, that is the linkage to what our strategy can do. 

By looking at what our Engineers have done in the past, we can see what 

our strategy once was. You look at old forts on the beaches of Hawaii, 

Corregidor, and the Philippines and you will see what the strategy was. 

Certainly, one can do that with a history book as well. Ed Luttwak wrote a 

book, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. He took a look at a few of the 

ruins of Rome. Merely by walking through several centuries of Roman ruins—

looking at their engineering works, their frontier roads, barracks, fortifications 

and so forth—Dr. Luttwak was able to deduce Roman strategy throughout the 

history of the Roman empire. 

Our problems are a little more difficult. We don’t want to look back into 

the past to see what the strategy has been. What we want to do is look into the 

future and see what the strategy should be and what we should do today to 

carry out that strategy. 

There are a number of very practical demands that challenge us in 

carrying out the management of installations and facilities to support our 

national strategy. You know what they are but it is probably worth our going 

through them: The first is to ensure that we have healthy forces in being, 

including those in our Reserves. We have to take care of those forces. 

Secondly, we have to be able to support those forces in time of war. And that 

means rapid mobilization, along with the necessary reception stations, 

barracks, and training areas. 

Those two components are made all the more challenging by the strategy 

that I outlined earlier—that is, this business of forward-deployed forces. Those 

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forward-deployed forces are our frontline forces today. Their efficiency, their 

morale and their health are visible signs of the United States’ commitment to 

those alliances and to that strategy—and of our commitment to defend wellforward. If those installations are shoddy, if the overseas barracks are rundown and over-crowded, if the training areas are inadequate, if all those things 

that make up our installations overseas don’t contribute to the perception by 

both allies and potential foes alike that those installations belong to top-notch 

fighting forces of the strongest, freest nation in the world, then the credibility of 

United States power and our commitment to those alliances is on the wane; 

and the danger of war simply goes up. 

Secondly, we have to be able to reinforce those forces whenever needed 

and we have to be able to go to other places in the world that we may not now 

really anticipate. I know that last year this conference heard from General Bob 

Kingston, the Commander in Chief of Central Command, and I am sure that he 

spent a lot of time emphasizing the facilities problems in carrying out any sort 

of strategy for securing the peace and our interests in the Middle East and 

Southwest Asia. Overflight rights, facilities, and bases are key. If you don’t 

have overflight rights and facilities and bases in the area, you don’t have any 

strategy—if you don’t have access, you don’t have a strategy. 

There are a number of realities that we have to wrestle with: 

There is the reality of domestic and foreign political considerations. 

Certainly, we have to operate within our political system. We wouldn’t want it 

any other way. That is what we are here to do. We have to operate within the 

constraints of our own government’s relationships with other countries. 

One important point that is often forgotten is that military construction 

and real property maintenance in the United States has immediate political 

implications. Every military installation in our own country is in somebody’s 

Congressional district. At the same time, almost 40 percent of our forces 

overseas have no immediate representatives in the Congress of the United 

States. Their principal constituency is the men and women in uniform, and 

those of you here today. And I know that you understand the importance of 

good facilities for our men and women overseas, and their families. However, it 

is a genuine difficulty with the Congress. When you look at what happens to 

the military construction budget, you see what I mean. 

I recall traveling from Fort Carson, Colorado, were there were absolutely 

magnificent new barracks and then going over to Korea to see soldiers in 25-

year old Quonset huts—all leaking, no insulation, space heaters, and 25 

consecutive years with that kind of winter, all because of a lack of adequate 

resources and the difficulties in getting Congress to help us. We need to put 

our minds to work on finding ways to solve those problems. 

The problems besetting management of the overseas basing and facilities 

have other obstacles. Just as our ability to employ forces is preceded by our 

ability to provide forward bases and access rights and transit authority, getting 

the bases and access rights and transit authority is preceded by the requisite 

agreements among the nations involved. Often those negotiations must be 

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done quietly to be effective and sometimes, in this open society of ours, that 

just isn’t very easy to do. 

Further, as a part of our coalition strategy, we give needed assistance to 

our friends and allies so that they can act in their own defense. Sometimes 

this security assistance is in the terms of sales and loans or grants involving 

military equipment but many times it is in terms of help with facilities—

facilities that can be used by both that nation and our own nation. 

I had the good fortune to command the Army troops in Thailand during 

the last two years of the road building in Thailand. And I remember 

Congressmen marching out to us and saying, “Why in the world are they 

building these roads out there? What value can they possibly have for the 

United States?” What those roads have done for the United States is that the 

dominos have stopped falling at the Thai border. Prime Minister Prern was 

here to see our President last week. He and I talked about those roads in 

northeastern Thailand. He talked about the old northeast district which used 

to be a hotbed of communism. That used to be where the Thai communist 

party was so successful. He said there are no longer any communists there, 

and the people are now tied to the rest of Thailand. He said, “”We have regular 

commerce. The people up on the long border need fish from the Gulf of 

Thailand. Now, they send their own groups back down to Bangkok by the road 

that the United States Army Engineers built.” So, our assistance there has 

been a great contribution to peace and stability in that part of the world. 

We are trying to do the same thing in Central America today. So, it is 

important that this is understood by the people of the United States. We have 

a very modest construction program underway to help some friends of ours in 

Central America so that they can defend themselves. They really won’t need 

forces from the United States to do that for them. However, that construction 

program is criticized inaccurately and widely. No one focuses on the fact that 

over in Nicaragua the Russians and the Cubans are putting in military 

construction programs that are many, many times the modest size of the 

United States construction program in Honduras. But those are the 

considerations with which we must deal if we look at facilities management and 

at our strategy. 

There is another reality: This is a practical one and it is that the 

facilities, by their very nature, last a long time. We often hear today that the B52’s that we have are older than their crews, and that the aircraft carrier 

MIDWAY has been around since the middle of World War II. That is true of 

many weapons systems. In the case of facilities and facilities planning and 

how that affects what can be done in the future, the problems are much 

magnified. For example, the Commanding Officer of Fort Sill, Oklahoma, lives 

in a house that soldiers built for General Sherman. And that is not unique. 

The same sort of thing is true throughout the West and the South. 

We have to think through this business of what construction will fit the 

future and what won’t fit the future and how we manage that business. We 

have a great tendency to build buildings, marvelous buildings, that will last 

forever; and sometimes they shouldn’t last forever. Maybe, we shouldn’t build 

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them that way because, if they’re designed for today’s installations and 

facilities, they won’t fit our needs in the future. We might well be better off 

starting from the ground up. Wonderful barracks that were built 50 years ago 

are now headquarters buildings—not very efficient headquarters buildings, but 

they’re better than no headquarters buildings at all. Hospitals are a particular 

planning problem. Almost every single new hospital, no matter how old it is, 

has got medical equipment sitting around in hallways because the medical 

equipment designers go faster than the hospital building designers and 

builders can possibly go. The power department for hospitals—almost every 

single hospital—is underpowered for today’s modern equipment. 

We have good, smart people thinking through these problems. I saw one 

hospital recently that has some smart planning. It has been built so that the 

add-on capability is ready: the pipes, the electricity, the hydraulics, and so 

forth go right up to the top floor. The inside building walls are such that they 

can be adjusted quickly and easily as medical equipment sizes change. All that 

needs to be added to that hospital is the heating plant and the air conditioning 

plant and it will be ready for an expanded hospital. 

We look around and we see plywood partitions in old German barracks. 

We’ve got latrines that are shared in fairly new buildings. There are little signs 

on the outside that flip over and say “Men” and “Women” because ten years ago 

we didn’t really believe that we’d have both men and women in the same 

barracks. 

Unforeseen organizational changes will upset today’s best-designed 

facilities—changes designed by some soldier, sailor, airman or Marine in green 

eye-shades in the basement of the Pentagon. He’ll ruin the design of the 

facility that was designed to fit perfectly and efficiently the organization that’s 

on the ground today. So, how we deal with those particular anomalies in the 

facilities planning that seems to make the just-designed or just-built 

installations no longer efficient is something that goes beyond your 

communications between you and the planner. And that’s one thing that I 

want to emphasize to you today. 

Certainly, opportunities exist for all sorts of new ideas. On your agenda, 

I see you asking what can be done. We’ve got all sorts of generalized poundfoolish operations and I don’t have to tell this crowd that. Maintenance seems 

to be the popular bill-payer. When I was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, as 

many of you know, I established the “John W. Vessey Memorial Program” and I 

would not touch the programs which go below a predetermined line of 

“irreducible minimums.” Service barracks that were built in World War II to 

last five years lasted over 40 years and were being held together by tape in 

many places. 

When I was Commander of U.N. forces in Korea, Congress was seized 

with the temporary nature of our forces in Korea and said that we should build 

only “relocatable barracks.” Now, we took that to heart. We took that to heart 

and we let out a contract for something called “relocatable barracks”—a great 

design had come along with sandwich walls, aluminum and corrugated 

paperboard between the aluminum sheets, and put together with glue that 

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didn’t hold. The barracks weren’t “soldier-proof.” One kick by a disgruntled 

soldier put a hole through the wall. The net result has been that in nine short 

years we have redone those barracks about three times; and when I was in 

Korea last November, I witnessed the third modernization of those barracks. 

I say these things not to be critical of Engineers because it is not the 

Engineer’s fault; but I say this to illustrate my point: that between ourselves 

and our civilian masters, we can do some pretty wasteful things. We must 

strike the right balance for the future, between what the future looks like it is 

going to be and hedging for the fact the future probably won’t be what we 

expect it to be. Certainly, we have some examples of absolutely outstanding 

work. One of those is the Pentagon. I marvel at the Pentagon every time I 

spend a day there. It is a design wonder—probably the most efficient office 

building in the world, one that can be adjusted to meet tomorrow’s conditions. 

The designers certainly have to get great marks. (I guess maybe they didn’t 

have to put up with inquiries on the environmental impact statement!) 

However, in those cases where we were not successful in thinking 

through the problems, there is waste, at great expense to the citizens of the 

country. What is worse yet is that we don’t have the installations that we need 

to support the strategy and maintain the peace. So, in the long haul, it is the 

planning, and it is the strategic planners—the Engineers, the facilities 

planners, and the constructors—getting together and wrestling through what 

the future will be like, what is the probability that our view of the future is 

wrong and how do we make the necessary adjustments today to hedge against 

that. That’s what will save taxpayers’ money and will give us the installations 

to support our strategy in the future. It won’t be done by publicity in the 

newspapers. It can be done only by thorough study and hard work—something 

I know the Nation can trust you Engineers to do well. Thank you. 

Interview with 

Sea Power Magazine 

May 1984 

Question: Are you happy with what has been done to give you more sealift? 

Answer: I’m happy that we have done what we have done but I want to see 

more. If there is anything that has happened to change the strategic equation 

for the United States it is the decline of the American Merchant Marine. It is a 

sad thing, and it is probably not well understood by the American people. But 

it has happened. On the other hand, for contingencies short of general war, 

there are all kinds of ships out there. And someone with a bag of money can 

hire ships and we can get to places. That’s not the sound way for us to be able 

to do it; but the fact of the matter is that the Defense Department has spent 

more on sealift recently than it has in all the rest of the time from World War II 

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to date. But we have to continue to think through how to use modern sealift to 

get us where we are going. 

Extract, Remarks on the 40th ANNIVERSARY 

OF THE LIBERATION OF ROME 

Rome, Italy 

2 June 1984 

On behalf of the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United 

States, I would like to thank President Pertini, Prime Minister Craxi, the people 

of Italy, especially Mayor Vetere, and the citizens of Rome for your hospitality 

and for permitting us to celebrate the 40th Anniversary of the Liberation of 

Rome. 

I also want to thank the veterans of the First Special Service Force who 

worked hard to help sponsor this celebration. Today we pay special tribute to 

those Canadian and United States soldiers who first reached Rome. That 

action was made possible by the fighting and support of many thousands of 

soldiers, airmen and sailors from many countries of the great alliance. Today, 

we also pay tribute to all members of the alliance—the British, the New 

Zealanders, the Indians, the French, the Moroccans, the Algerians, the Poles, 

the Brazilians, the other Canadian and United States Forces. We pay a very 

special tribute to those Italian patriots who fought for the liberation of their 

homeland, whether in the partisan forces or the brave men of the reconstructed 

Italian Army which started with a few battalions from Alpini and Bersaglieri in 

the bloody fighting at Mignano-Monte Lungo. My own division fought from 

Salerno to Lago di Como, and I tell you that in the tough fighting south of 

Bologna we were particularly pleased to have the Legnano Grupe on our flank. 

And, forty years later, I cannot help but pay tribute to the German soldiers who 

fought and died—valiantly, but for the wrong cause. 

For those of us who had participated in the battles of the autumn of 

1943 and the spring of 1944, June 4, 1944, was a very important day. We 

were helping liberate Rome, the Queen City of Western civilization, the first 

major capitol to be liberated in World War II. We knew that there would be a 

lot more difficult fighting ahead, but seeing this beautiful city, beautiful even 

during the war, and experiencing the warm gratitude of the Italian people was 

exhilarating—the flowers, the smiles, even a few kisses and an occasional glass 

of vino were added to the wonder of the day. I must explain that we were not 

permitted to stop. We were sent directly through the city to attack toward 

Civitavecchia. 

Today, the 4th of June, 1944, looks far more important than it did then. 

Europe has had 39 years without war. This year we celebrate the 35th

anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty. The world continues to be haunted by 

129 
the fear of war and aggression, but the free nations of NATO have banded 

together in a strong alliance to serve the cause of peace. The Federal Republic 

of Germany is a member of that alliance. 

The great NATO alliance threatens no one, but it tells the world that free 

people will remain strong to defend their freedom. The Soviet Union needs to 

heed and understand those facts. 

I also want to pay a special tribute to all the veterans of the Italian 

Campaign and their families who have come to this celebration. Many famous 

names are represented. From my own country—General Clark’s son, General 

Frederick’s daughter, Bill Mauldin, the soldier-cartoonist who did much to 

make the war bearable for those who fought it and understandable for those 

who didn’t—just to name a few. 

Special thanks to General Bartolucci and the men and women of the 

Italian Armed Forces, our staunch allies from Mignano—Monte Lungo to today. 

It is my fervent prayer that Rome has seen its last war and that the peace you 

have enjoyed for the last 40 years will be with you forever. Thank you. 

Remarks to the ST. LOUIS REGIONAL 

COMMERCE AND GROWTH ASSOCIATION/ 

AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION LUNCHEON 

AND MID-AMERICA BALL

St. Louis, MO 

15 June 1984 

Two weeks ago I was in Rome. I was there to help commemorate the 

Fortieth Anniversary of the Liberation of that queen city of Western civilization. 

Forty years earlier I had been a minor “bit part” player in that play. At that 

time, 40 years ago, our outfit had taken some objectives in the Alban Hills. 

When Rome was liberated, we were sent through Rome. We were told, “Don’t 

stop. Keep moving. Go up Highway One to the north. Your objective is to 

reach Civitavecchia.” So we went through the city very quickly. But we 

collected a few of the handshakes, a lot of the smiles, a couple of kisses, and a 

few glasses of wine from the grateful population. And I would say that when I 

went back there the same girl was there who kissed me when I came through 

earlier. She said she wished she’d asked for my grandson to return instead of 

me. 

The next day we were all buoyed by the news of the invasion at 

Normandy. Our outfit had been in combat since November 1942, and we really 

didn’t see any end to the fighting at that particular time. It didn’t seem to be in 

sight. But, in fact, we had really reached the denouement of World War II. 

At that time, I hardly realized that what had begun then was the 

beginning of that great alliance, NATO, which restored the peace a year later 

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and which has kept the peace with liberty and preserved freedom in the West 

for more years than Europe has known for any other period in modern times. 

As I stood there for the ceremonies two weeks ago, it occurred to me again that 

a lot of good had come out of those very difficult battles: a Western security 

system and a concept which embraces NATO and the free nations of the West 

was born. 

A great transformation was set in motion. It turned comrades-in-arms 

into partners in peace, and made friends and allies even out of past foes. That 

strength still exists today and it still preserves the peace. But I become 

troubled when I sense some slackening of our will to do that, and some views 

that our common partnership should be dissolved. Now, what I say to you is 

that the real question is, “Will this nation let that happen? Will we allow 

ourselves to lose what has kept the peace for so long?” 

Some of you will say that an awful lot has changed since I was foxholedeep in that European real estate 40 years ago. And that is true. The world 

has changed dramatically. The world has grown smaller, certainly in time, and 

it has become more inextricably intertwined in its economies. In 1944 there 

were barely 60 independent nations. Today there are over 170, and we’ve 

developed close cultural, religious, moral and political ties with many nations 

of the world that didn’t exist in 1944. 

Further, we have become dependent on foreign markets, on overseas 

resources, and on global lines of communication to keep our own economy 

going. In 1939, the year that I first enlisted, the United States was a net 

exporter of oil—not much by today’s standards, about 20,000 barrels a day. 

But 44 years later, we import 3.3 million barrels of oil a day. And if you look at 

metals, it’s an even more complicated story. 

As the world has become more complex and intertwined, it appears to 

have become more dangerous and troubled, too. Since World War II, by some 

measures, there have been 150 wars with the loss of 25 million lives. If you 

count a war as something in which regular armed forces are engaged, there are 

23 wars going on in the world today. When one looks around the Middle East, 

at East Asia, at Central America, the world seems to boil. 

Other things have changed. Japan and Germany, our former foes, are 

now our friends and allies. The Soviet Union, an ally in World War II now 

seems to be an uncompromising adversary with a value system that seems to 

be the antithesis of our own and of all free people. Yet, we know that it is 

composed of human beings just like you and me and that there must be some 

bond that we can find to do away with that adversarial relationship. 

We are having a hard time finding it. The Soviets have armed themselves 

to the teeth, and at a level that is unprecedented in peacetime. The result is a 

truly one-dimensional great power—a military power. The agriculture of the 

Soviet Union is less efficient now than it was in time of the Tsars. It is the only 

principal nation in the world with a life expectancy that is going down. Yet, at 

the same time, it is a great power; and particularly in the military field, it is a 

power that we absolutely must recognize. 

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So, the military picture has changed. In 1941, except for the few valiant 

forces that were under attack on the 7th of December, the rest of our forces 

were not engaged and it took us nearly a year to get sizeable combat forces into 

action. If war starts today with the Soviets, nearly 40 percent of our peacetime 

forces will be in action immediately if the war is a conventional war. If the war 

is a nuclear war, it could be minutes before the entire populations of both 

countries are involved. 

Despite all these differences, I believe that there are some fundamental 

similarities between now and 1944. When you remember the world steering 

towards war in the 1930s, you can’t help but think of the 1938 episode in 

Munich that sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia. At that time, the British Prime 

Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, said, “How horribly fantastic and incredible it is 

that we should be digging trenches or trying on gas masks here because of a 

quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing!” He 

was speaking of Czechoslovakia. And he said, “I myself am a man of peace to 

the depths of my soul.” He undoubtedly was a man of peace, but Britain got 

war anyway! Munich was for Britain the culmination of a process, the erosion 

of national will. 

In the 1930s, while our adversaries armed, Britain and America slept. 

Many in both countries, like many of our own people today, had the idea that 

defense appropriations were far too high. Now, these weren’t stupid or disloyal 

people but they were wrong—dead wrong. They hadn’t learned from H.L. 

Mencken when he said that, “There is no record in history of a nation that ever 

gained anything valuable by being unprepared to defend itself.” Or what 

Churchill said to his own people a couple of years earlier that “We can afford 

what we need for defense. What we cannot afford is to say, ‘We can only afford 

what is easy to provide.’” 

Are there parallels today, with the Soviets marching into Afghanistan, 

with the North Koreans rattling their swords on the Korean Peninsula, with the 

Cubans, Vietnamese and their other Soviet friends involved on a global scale in 

a mass of Third World countries? I believe there are. 

The people who believe that war can be prevented through unilateral 

disarmament or wishing away the Soviet nuclear armament are not disloyal or 

stupid but they are wrong. They are dead wrong. 

I want to make it very clear that I don’t think we should charge around 

looking for war. Like Chamberlain, I’m a man of peace and I suspect that every 

person in here is a person of peace. But, I think the first message for America 

today is the message that came from our first President, George Washington, 

when he said, “If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all 

times ready for war.” That’s the first lesson for man today. We’ve got a great 

country—with all its warts, it’s the freest and greatest and potentially the 

strongest nation on earth. And it will be so long as its citizens are willing to 

serve it and protect it. That’s our first lesson. 

That’s our strategy today—preserve the peace. Preserve peace and liberty 

for ourselves and not just for ourselves but for those who follow us—for our 

posterity—as those who passed before us preserved it for us. 

132 
The second lesson from that war is closely aligned with the first: 

Effective deterrence means good armed forces. And that requires the support 

of our nation to provide adequate armed forces. It means good equipment—

good equipment to give our people in uniform the edge in battle. And, good 

armed forces also mean good people. People are the heart of our defenses. It 

was so in Normandy; it was so in Rome; it was so in Korea; it was so in 

Vietnam; and it was so in Grenada. I have heard it said that armed forces are 

like fresh bread. If you want fresh bread, you’ve got to make it every day. 

Otherwise you get stale bread. The same is true for the Armed Forces. If you 

want good military forces, you have to pay attention to them continually. 

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that point; and, I 

want to assure you that we work very hard to ensure that our budgets make 

sense and that the budgets can provide for ready forces today and provide for 

ready forces in the future. 

Speaking of those four colleagues of mine on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I 

often read that we engage in a lot of “bickering”; and I want to report to you 

that we want to keep that myth alive so we schedule bickering on the training 

schedule. Every weekend we try to assemble on the golf course and we bicker. 

We usually bicker about who should give putts to whom within the leather. I 

want to report to these Air Force Association people here that Charlie Gabriel 

always wants me to give him putts within the leather. But he can’t putt that 

well, so I won’t do it. 

I would say to you also from my own personal observation that you are 

fortunate in having four good Service Chiefs; good, loyal, hard-working and 

intelligent people. It’s a great pleasure for me to work with them. 

One thing the Joint Chiefs do agree on completely and that is that our 

strategy starts from a single point. Our nation shares with all free peoples of 

the world a hope for liberty and justice and a responsibility to prevent war—not 

just nuclear war, but all war. At the same time, we want to preserve our liberty 

and make sure that totalitarianism doesn’t move on. The United States has a 

defensive strategy. We want to go about our business in this world of nationstates and conduct that business peacefully. We don’t want to be coerced by 

Soviet power and we don’t want our allies or friends coerced by Soviet power. 

We don’t want a war. We don’t want a nuclear war or any kind of war. 

But at the same time we want to be able to pursue our legitimate 

political, economic, social and cultural objectives in this world and “We the 

people” don’t want to be paralyzed by the fear of war as we go about our 

business. As I said earlier, we have to make it very clear to the Soviets and any 

other potential adversaries that we are sufficiently strong so that they can’t 

obtain their objectives by starting a war. 

Russ Dougherty sitting down here had a marvelous editorial in the June 

1984 issue of Air Force Magazine and I suggest that you read it. Russ said that 

deterrence is the product of capability, that is the people and the equipment, 

times the will of the Nation. If we have the will to deter and not the capability, 

it won’t work. The same thing applies the other way around. If we have the 

133 
people and the equipment but we don’t have the will, deterrence won’t work 

either. 

All of that is pretty much indicated in the Nation in a day-to-day way by 

its defense budget. And I’d like to talk for just a minute about the budget and 

I’d like to talk about one part of it, the strategic nuclear deterrence part of the 

budget. Strategic nuclear weapons are a subject that has the whole world 

aboil. I’d like to make a couple of points: 

Last year the President’s Bipartisan Commission, the so-called Scowcroft 

Commission, made some very sensible recommendations to the President and 

to the American people. The President and the Congress and the JCS fully 

concurred with those recommendations. 

The Commission said that we must modernize our strategic nuclear 

forces to counter the growing power of the Soviets’ strategic nuclear forces. At 

the same time, the Commission said we have to engage in negotiations with the 

Soviets to try to control nuclear arms and to seek a more stable world and, if 

possible, to reduce the number of nuclear arms in the world. The 

modernization of our strategic forces—the PEACEKEEPER missile, the 

TRIDENT submarine, the B-1 bomber, cruise missiles, and the necessary 

command and control—is essential, the Commission said. And it is essential 

now. 

Our negotiation strategy with the Soviet Union is tied very closely to the 

modernization of our forces. Everyone knows these negotiations are at “top 

dead center” right now. We didn’t walk out. The Soviets walked out of those 

negotiations. However, every once in a while I hear Americans—politicians, 

news analysts, public figures—talking in a fashion that suggests that they 

believe that we are the ones who walked out of the negotiations. That is not 

the case. 

Why did the Soviets walk out? I don’t think we know. We may find out 

someday. We will probably read some memoirs that come out of the Kremlin 

some years from now. And, I suspect if we do, we will read that 1983 and 1984 

were years in which the Soviet strategy was a ‘full court press” to separate the 

United States from its principal allies in the rest of the world. Those were the 

negotiating tactics. It was almost like a charade. 

It was focused around the modernization of the intermediate-range 

nuclear missiles in Europe. We have to remember it was the Soviets who upset 

the balance by deploying some 1200 warheads with their new intermediaterange nuclear forces, the SS-20’s. They tried to prevent the Western allies from 

deploying any to restore that balance. But the alliance held together. 

We also have to remember that the Soviets have added about 3500 new, 

modern intercontinental ballistic missile warheads to their forces since SALT II 

was signed. We haven’t added any. Yesterday, the Senate by one vote agreed 

to produce 21 missiles with the 1985 budget instead of the 40 the 

Administration asked for. The House earlier agreed to produce 15 with some 

restrictions on the production. So, the balance will be somewhere between 15 

and 21, somewhere between 150 warheads and 210 warheads, in contrast to 

3500. 

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Now, what I want to tell you is that, if the Soviets see us faltering with 

the PEACEKEEPER or deciding not to build the B-1 or the TRIDENT, they’re 

not going to have any particular reason to come back to the table. We need to 

keep a steady hand and march ahead with the strategic arms modernization. If 

they do come back to the table after we have limited our own arms, they will 

come back with a handful of aces while we are sitting there with deuces and 

treys. We need to remember that their objective is to control our arms and 

ours is to control theirs. 

We ought to recognize that we will not prevent war by strategic arms 

negotiations alone. Salvador da Madariaga, the great Spanish philosopher and 

historian who served for many, many years on the old League of Nations 

Disarmament Commission, said that the world has the issue of war and peace 

and disarmament upside down. He said, “Nations don’t distrust each other 

because they are armed, they arm because they distrust each other.” The 

Soviets distrust us and we distrust them. We need to work on that distrust. 

But, in the meantime, our business is the business of preventing war. It 

is like that television ad I see every once in a while about the house burning 

down. The announcer comes on and says, “When is the worst time to find out 

that you had the wrong insurance coverage on your house?” Well, the same is 

true for defense. The worst time to find out your defenses are not any good is 

after the war starts. 

In early 1950, I remember having our cooks in Army mess halls cut fat 

from the meat so that we could render it into lard and then make soap. We 

were tearing up newspapers for the troops to use as toilet paper. We were 

really skimping on defense. And General Bradley, the first officer to hold the 

job that I now hold, made a speech early in that year about the importance of 

having enough defenses to prevent war. We didn’t spend enough and we didn’t

prevent war. 

In June of 1950, the Korean War broke out and the defense budget went 

up by a factor of four; but, worse than that, it went up in a different coin. It 

went up in blood and we paid for it with the blood of our citizens. And if that’s 

what we want to avoid, we need to do what needs to be done. 

So, I say to you, that’s our job. We have to make sure our people and 

our posterity can remain free and secure. If we don’t need armed forces or we 

don’t need defense, we shouldn’t spend a dime on them. But we do need 

armed forces and we do need to be prepared for war so that we can preserve 

the peace. If we do that, I am sure that we will do just exactly that—continue 

to preserve the peace. Thank you very much. 

135 
Remarks to JOINT STAFF ACTION 

OFFICER ORIENTATION PROGRAM 

In the Pentagon 

Washington, DC 

20 June 1984 

Let me just spend a few minutes with you and give you the view from my 

foxhole. Part of our duty as members of the defense establishment of the 

United States is to provide security for the United States today and tomorrow—

and by “tomorrow” I mean a long way from now: when I’m in my rocking chair 

and when you are in your rocking chairs. The decisions we make today will 

have a lot to do about what kind of security the Nation has in those days. 

The principal guy under the President in developing the security of the 

United States is the Secretary of Defense. The more you look at it, the more 

sweeping those duties of the Secretary seem. He provides the civilian control of 

the Armed Forces of the United States. He is the President’s agent for doing 

that. He has two staffs. He has a civilian staff that serves him in matters of 

overall policy on how to deal with the rest of the Federal Government, how to 

deal with the Legislative Branch of the Government, and how to get help from 

the industrial and scientific community. 

Then he has a military staff. And his military staff is a staff of five. It is 

composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff of the 

Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps—commonly called the “Joint Chiefs of Staff.” 

The Secretary is forbidden by law from having any other military staff. The law 

also says that the duties of those five are to be the principal military advisers to 

the President, the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council. 

Now, that group of five has a staff of its own. It is called the “Joint Staff,” 

and its duties are laid out for them in the law. The Joint Staff is to serve the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and through them the Secretary of Defense in developing 

strategic plans and providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the 

United States, logistics plans to support those strategic plans and the 

assignment of logistic responsibilities to the Services. With the help of the 

Joint Staff, the Joint Chiefs review the personnel and material requirements for 

the Armed Forces, they establish joint training and education systems for the 

Armed Forces, and they provide representation at the UN Military Committee. 

They also provide for the establishment of the strategic commands and 

for strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States through another 

group of guys, the CINCs of the unified and specified commands. That is the 

system that provides the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United 

States. 

Now, what about the Services? There are duties for the Services, too—

the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. Those outfits 

organize, train, equip and support the Armed Forces that are to be fought by 

the unified and specified commanders. 

136 
The Services respond to the Secretary of Defense, too; and they build 

forces in response to the requirements laid out in the strategic direction that is 

set out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and endorsed by the Secretary of Defense. 

Sometimes that relationship gets cluttered or is not understood. Part of the 

reason is that there is an understandable, direct and good connection between 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services; the members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff also happen to be the uniformed heads of their respective Services, with 

the exception of the Chairman. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have two different sets of duties, one as heads of 

their Services to organize, train, equip and support forces to be fought by the 

unified and specified commands and the other to come back in from the other 

side of the house, hang their hats on the peg, put on a different hat, and go in 

the Tank with the other Chiefs. 

You see that there has been a great debate in the newspapers in the last 

few years about whether or not this body which heads the Services, coupled 

together with the Chairman, can also do these other tasks as members of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some would suggest that because they are so wed to 

building an Army or a Navy or an Air Force or a Marine Corps that they can’t 

be objective enough to do the other tasks. On the other hand, I would suggest 

to you it is a very good arrangement. With the Chiefs being in those other 

chairs, who knows more about the Army, the Navy, the Air Force or the Marine 

Corps than the uniformed heads of the Services? So, it is my firm belief that 

they are the right people to be the strategic advisers to the President and the 

Secretary of Defense. 

Now, the Chairman’s role in this is a unique role. He has some duties 

specified in the law. They are fairly simple duties like the duties of the JCS. 

But by and large, I can summarize all his duties by saying the Chairman is a 

servant. He serves three bodies. He serves the President and the Secretary of 

Defense, that sort of mythical body called the “National Command Authority”—

and, sometimes, the Secretary of Defense delegates duties to the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. But his duties as part of the National Command 

Authority are only delegated when the Secretary is not present. 

Then, the Chairman serves another body. He is a servant of the body of 

which he is a member, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His service to those two bodies 

is as a channel of communication principally because the Chairman is the guy 

who sits with the President and the Secretary of Defense at National Security 

Council meetings and National Security Planning Group meetings or small 

security meetings with the President and the Secretary of Defense. He is also 

the guy who sits in the meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So, I am a 

“messenger boy.” I carry messages beck and forth and it is important that I 

carry those messages clearly. It is important that I serve both of those bodies 

in my relationship with the other body. 

The Chairman is also the servant of the third group and that is the 

Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands. He brings their 

points of view to the JCS. He also takes those views to the Secretary of Defense 

and the President and into the other fora through which the Secretary of 

137 
Defense does his job. For example, the Defense Resources Board is an 

important forum where decisions are made on allocating resources to build the 

forces—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. The 

Chairman’s duty is to help make sure that the forces that those CINCs want 

get built by the force builders in the Services. 

Those are the duties that I have. You who are members of the Joint Staff 

or those agencies which serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff—your job is to help me 

and the other four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do their jobs. You who 

are members of Service staffs are to help the members of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff do their other job—that is, build, organize, train, equip and support the 

forces that are fought by the unified and specified commands. Sometimes, you 

may help make the strategy for the forces but that is not your primary task. 

That is the job of the Joint Staff. Are there any questions on that? 

Two years ago when I took over this job I made out a “menu” for the JCS 

and for the CINCs of the unified and specified commands and they endorsed 

that menu. We have pursued those items with some vigor. I have a fancy 

chart of that menu here. And I’ll go through it with you because it is important 

that you understand what the JCS are trying to do. 

The thing we said that was the number one item on the menu is war 

plans because they drive force requirements. War plans are the one area that 

we as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINCs are solely responsible for. 

Nobody else makes the war plans. We can complain about the suppliers of 

weaponry because weapons are not built to standards. We can squawk about 

the recruits because the secondary education system doesn’t work as well as it 

ought to. We can grumble about the Congress because Congress doesn’t 

provide enough money. But, if the war plans are wrong, we can point only to 

ourselves. So, war plans call for particular attention. 

What we have done is start out with a unique exercise; we brought the 

Commanders in Chief of the unified and specified commands in here and I told 

them they could bring one staff officer. If they had to have slides, they could 

bring one staff officer to flip the slides for them. But their duty was to explain 

to the JCS the concept of the operation for their most demanding war plan and 

we didn’t want any staff officer explanations. We wanted the explanations of 

the commanders. Then, we started from there with the idea of doing some 

things like giving top-down guidance on the way the war plans should work. It 

is my theory that they should not grow like moss up from the basement but 

should start with guidance from the top. 

The second thing we put on the menu is to provide planning support for 

the CINCs. The idea behind this is to give “Modern Aids to Planning” to those 

CINCs of the unified and specified commands. Every Service has an analytical 

agency; every war college has a war gaming facility; but, there are a lot of 

CINCs with only yellow foolscap and number two pencils, hand-held 

calculators and slide rules. Our objective is to harness all this computer 

horsepower and give it to the warfighters out there making plans. 

Some of these other menu items are sort of old hat—such as tying 

military strategy to the national strategy. That is the duty of the Chiefs. 

138 
Another is reviewing the NATO strategy and addressing the changes that take 

place. Some changes are taking place right this afternoon with the Congress 

voting on whether or not to mandate a withdrawal of U.S. forces from NATO 

because some of the NATO nations have very little percent growth in defense 

budgets. 

Another is increasing the influence of the CINCs of the unified and 

specified commands in the POM and the budgets. We have come a long way 

with that. In two weeks, the CINCs will be in again to meet with the Secretary 

of Defense and with all of his advisers on the Defense Resources Board. The 

Chiefs and the CINCs have made considerable progress in making our views 

known there. We have examined the cross-Service issues, the things that 

make the unified and specified commands work. Those issues are primarily 

command and control and communications, intelligence and mobility plus 

logistics support. Then there were some of the other things that we agreed 

should be on the menu: Arms control, JCS organization (which is still an issue 

which gets some attention), the Unified Command Plan “seams,” joint doctrine, 

and how to handle joint manpower. 

We will update that menu here in a few days and have it ready for the 

CINCs the next time they come in here. We will reaffirm the general direction 

for the next two years. 

Now, what is your job? How do I view your job? Well, you’re like me—

you are a servant of the two groups, with a similar relationship to the third 

group. The first group is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and you help them do those 

jobs that they are to do. Their principal job, again, is providing military advice 

to the Secretary of Defense and the President. 

When this group of stalwarts of mine assembled two years ago, we talked 

about military advice. When was military advice good and timely? Through 

the years the men who were the JCS oscillated between giving advice that was 

unsolicited or waiting until the Secretary of Defense and the President asked 

for it. We came to the conclusion that if we were to do our job correctly then 

we had to give them timely advice. We set a rule for ourselves for timely advice: 

that was, “Give them advice before they know they need it.” And if they get 

advice before they know they need it, they’ve gotten timely advice. If they have 

to ask us for advice on what to do, it is probably already too late and we 

haven’t done our job. So, that’s our goal. As staff members of the Joint Staff, 

your objective is to help us do that. Help us see the world and anticipate what 

is to happen and give that advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President 

before they know they need it. 

The spread of duties you may have is as wide as the spread of duties on 

the Staff itself. But what I want to tell you is that whatever you are doing it is 

important. Some of you may be down there counting money for the exercise 

budget. You may have done that out in a subordinate command at a far lower 

level and what you’re doing here doesn’t seem to be much different except that 

you’re aggregating bigger numbers. What I want to tell you is that there are no 

unimportant duties here. 

139 
You are dealing with issues that have risen to the highest level of military 

authority in the country. Some of the issues perhaps could have been solved 

below, somewhere else. But, the fact of the matter is they’re here now and the 

fact that they are here makes them important. Somebody thought they were 

important enough to get here. They’re here. They’re ours to solve and none of 

them are unimportant. None of you will perform duties that are any more or 

less important than the others. The sum total of our effectiveness is what we 

do as a whole. The more I travel around in a uniform the more I recognize that 

there is nothing that requires teamwork more than military operations. No 

other place in which you are requires teamwork more than here. 

So, it means understanding the programming and budgeting system. It 

means understanding the joint planning system. It means understanding who 

knows what around the Staff and how to get that information and use it for 

yourself for the problem that you have to solve; and it means how to get along 

with the other members of the Staff. 

There are some qualities that I believe are important, particularly while 

you are here. You will be dealing with issues that affect the security of the 

country now and which will affect the security of the country in the future. 

They are issues that should be dealt with within the fora that are assigned for 

solving those problems. We don’t need to write out our problems on the front 

page of the Washington Post or the New York Times. In other words, if you 

have by proclivity a tendency to chatter to newspaper reporters or in cocktail 

bars or wherever it happens to be, please see me or the Personnel officer after 

this formation and we can part friends now. But, I’ll tell you that if that is your 

proclivity and you do it later, we will part but we will not part friends. 

The second part of that is that you come here wearing Army green, Navy 

white or blue, Air Force blue, Marine olive drab or civilian clothes and you 

bring here the expertise that is needed because you’re an expert in your own 

particular Service. Oftentimes we hear the issue of, “Well, we need the guys 

that aren’t experts in their Services but experts in joint planning,” or something 

like that. Well, joint planning requires experts from the Army, the Navy, the Air 

Force and the Marine Corps. Those are the only people who can do the jobs 

here correctly. And it requires them to work together toward the common goal. 

This means that you come here as an Army officer, as a Naval officer, or 

whatever it is; but, you’re not working for the Army or the Navy. You’re 

working for the JCS to produce plans that provide for the security of the United 

States. 

You need to put a little “purple” in your green or your white or your olive 

drab or whatever it happens to be in your addressal of problems. When you 

operate, you are expected to be an expert in all and you must learn that while 

you are here. 

Not only is there no unimportant work, there is also more than enough 

work for everybody to do and we are not inhibited by a lack of room for 

improvement. We have plenty of room for improvement in whatever we do, so 

there is a great opportunity for you guys to make a great contribution to the 

140 
country today and in the future. I kiddingly tell the guys up in my office “We’ll 

work half days on Sunday—about 6 to 6. The rest of the time you will put in a 

full day.” But, I say that to you for a purpose because you will have those 

kinds of days as well. We had a session over the weekend when I know one 

fellow had to miss the surprise birthday party he had planned for his wife. He 

had no choice because he was the expert in this particular field. The President 

needed an answer. 

On the other hand, there are times when there may be some slack time 

in your particular field and I don’t want you sitting around here or standing 

around waiting for somebody to issue orders because somebody three levels up 

is still sitting there playing golf on the carpet in his office. Go home because 

tomorrow you may not have the opportunity. 

Once again, welcome to the staff. It’s the highest military staff in the 

land. So, do good work. Thank you. 

Remarks to the Combined 1984 

Graduating Classes of the Naval War College 

US Naval War College Campus 

Newport, RI 

21 June 1984 

A Concept of Service 

You finish the War College here in its Centennial Year. It’s an exciting 

time. It’s an exciting time at the War College and it’s an exciting time in the 

world. In fact, some might say it’s a scary time in the world—war in the 

Persian Gulf with the danger of that war spreading to interrupt the flow of oil to 

the Western economies, war in Afghanistan, war in Kampuchea, trouble on the 

China-Vietnam border, and wars and rumors of wars in this hemisphere 

almost next door in Central America. The Soviets have left the arms control 

talks. The Middle East peace efforts seem to be stalled at “top dead center.” 

For those of you in the Armed Forces of the United States, you leave here 

at an exciting time from the perspective of your profession. There is more going 

on in the development of tactical concepts, in equipment modernization, in 

innovative training, and in genuine cooperation among our Armed Forces than 

I’ve seen in the 45 years I’ve been in uniform. We see cooperation among the 

four Services on a scale not seen before. You’ve read of the recent Army-Air 

Force announcements about battlefield collaboration and the work between the 

Navy and the Air Force on collateral maritime missions. For you, what makes 

it even more exciting is the fact that we, as a nation and as Armed Forces, are 

absolutely uninhibited by lack of room for improvement. There is a lot of good 

and very important work for you to do out there. 

141 
Now, you’ve had a long course here. You culminated it with a look at 

strategy. You’ve gone through tactics and techniques and doctrine and things 

of that nature; and I realize that my job title is one that calls for me to lead that 

body which is responsible for providing the strategic direction for the Armed 

Forces of the United States. But I’m not going to talk to you about strategy 

today or about tactics or techniques or doctrine or anything else. I want to talk 

to you about you and about the institutions you serve, the Armed Forces of the 

United States. Now, I realize that I’m talking to officers from other nations and 

I think you’ll see that what I have to say perhaps fits the concepts of your 

nations. I realize I’m talking to some civilian graduates of the College and I 

think that you’ll see that perhaps these same general concepts apply to you—if 

not exactly, then at least generally. 

You military people have chosen to serve the Nation through service in 

the Armed Forces. The key word is “service.” You serve in the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. You don’t work for them. 

The reason for your service is because “We the People” agreed to provide 

for our common defense. You serve the people, and you do it best by helping 

preserve the peace by preparing for war. The people of this Nation need to have 

confidence that you do not promote war. You don’t advocate war, but war is in 

fact your business and you are ready for it. 

In April I was in Greece. When I was in Athens, I went to the Acropolis; 

and while there I couldn’t help but think of that marvelous dialogue that Plato 

relates in the “Second Book” of the Republic wherein he has Glaucon and 

Socrates talking about the attributes of the armed forces of the day, which 

Plato called the “Guardians”—the Guardians of the city. At one point in the 

dialogue, Plato has Socrates saying, “Nothing can be more important than that 

the work of the Guardians should be well done.” He said, “If shoemakers 

become inferior and claim to be what they are not, the state is not in peril; but 

if the Guardians of our city only appear to be Guardians and are not

Guardians, you surely see that they utterly destroy the city.” 

Socrates and Glaucon go on to describe desirable attributes for the 

Guardians. They said they should be “quick to see, swift to overtake the 

enemy, and strong.” Socrates adds that they should be “brave” and that their 

strength is spiritual as well as physical. Then they go on to decide that “...one 

man cannot practice many arts, and that war is an art and must be studied 

and practiced. And Socrates adds that “The higher the duties of the Guardian, 

the more time and skill and art and application will be needed by him.” 

Socrates and Glaucon conclude their description of the Guardians by 

recognizing, “They ought to be dangerous to their enemies but gentle to their 

friends,” and by “their friends,” they mean the citizens of the Republic. Then, 

they go on to wonder if it’s possible to find these conflicting natures in a single 

person. 

Through the years, most civilized countries have wrestled with the same 

questions about their armed forces: How to have warriors with the necessary 

skill and ferocity in times of war and not have them be a menace to the society 

142 
in times of peace. Our Forefathers in this great Nation were very concerned 

about those issues. The product of their concern is the relationship that exists 

today between our society and its warriors. That relationship was founded in 

the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution. 

The Nation has always been skeptical of military power—witness Ben 

Franklin’s brilliant but unsuccessful pamphlet, “Plain Talk,” asking his fellow 

colonists in 1747 to do more in their own self defense, and Thomas Jefferson’s 

initial opposition to a Navy. And, in 1784, the Continental Congress declared 

that standing armies in peace were inconsistent with the principles of the 

Republic. The Congress reduced the Continental Army to about a hundred 

officers and men and then they stationed them as far away from civilization as 

they possibly could. As some of you know, we still do that today. 

Later, at the Constitutional Convention, one delegate proposed that the 

Constitution prohibit the Army from ever being larger than five thousand men. 

Now, George Washington was also a delegate to the Convention and it’s 

reported that he said, “That’s fine—as long as we have another provision in the 

Constitution that no enemy will be permitted to attack the Nation with more 

than three thousand men.” 

That skepticism was later developed in the Federalist Papers, and it all 

relates to why our military, springing from the society it serves and is sworn to 

defend, embodies the principles that govern the society. We, the military, are a 

part of “We the people.” That is why our military forces have never produced a 

“man on horseback”; why the military forces have not been involved in the 

political affairs of the Nation; and why they’ve not strayed from the narrow path 

of defending the Constitution as it was originally intended—that is, protecting 

the society and not policing the society. 

You, the officers, the men and women of the Armed Forces of today, are 

the Nation’s Guardians, Guardians of today. You’re the warrior class of the 

United States in the 1980s and 1990s. You have chosen to give up some of the 

benefits of your own personal liberty so that the citizens of the Nation may 

enjoy those benefits in full. You have chosen to serve the Nation; but, it’s also 

important that you recognize that the Nation has chosen you to serve. That’s a 

unique relationship. As with Socrates’ Guardians, your higher duties will 

require more of your time, skill, art and application. And that’s the reason for 

your attendance here at the Naval War College. As with the Guardians of 

Plato’s Republic, nothing is more important than that your work be well done. 

As you go on to your assignments, your skill and your concept of service 

and your values and your loyalties to the Nation and to your Service will carry 

you through the years ahead. The skills you learned here, the issues that were 

exposed, are all important; and you need to develop them and hone them 

through the years ahead. But you also need to continue to hone the concept of 

service. The concept of selfless service is essential for the Armed Forces as an 

institution; it is essential for you as members of the Guardian class; and it is 

essential for the security of the Nation. 

143 
You don’t choose the wars you fight or the places you serve, whether it’s 

fighting a war or preserving the peace. You don’t go home until the job’s done. 

And, in doing the job, you may well have to put life and limb at risk. Sir John 

Hackett called it the military’s “unlimited liability contract.” That’s a good 

name for it. Many years ago a great sailor, Lord Nelson, said, “Duty is the great 

business of a sea-officer; all private considerations must give way to it, however 

painful it may be.” Petty considerations just don’t apply. 

The ultimate test for the Armed Forces is the survival of the Nation; but 

the service of every sailor, soldier, airman, Marine or Coast Guardsman is 

tested in less awesome ways every day. It is the sum of the performance of all 

its members that defines the success of the Armed Forces. Each member of 

our military forces is accountable for his or her compliance with orders under 

law; but for the Guardian, compliance with orders alone is not enough. The 

security of the Nation requires that you comply with orders and laws and 

regulations but it also requires that you comply with the unique sense of 

service to your fellow Guardians, the fellow members of your class. Matt Dillon 

used to say on Gunsmoke, “it’s a chancy job and a little lonely.” 

There are no degrees of importance in the service you perform. Some of 

you will go from here to command ships and squadrons; others will be working 

in logistic outfits supplying weapons and equipment or doing research and 

development. Some of you will be buried in the anonymity of staff work. Some 

of you will go to faraway places that your mother-in-law won’t be able to find 

on the map. 

One thing that I want to emphasize to you is that whatever the duty, it is 

important. Under the code of the Guardians, there is no unimportant duty. 

Under that code, the sailor who died in insignificant sorties against pirates 

some place was as important as the crewmen who saved the remnants of the 

ill-fated Greeley expedition on the Arctic ice a hundred years ago today, or as 

important as those Rangers who scaled Pointe du Hoc at Normandy 40 years 

ago, a couple of weeks past, or as important as the naval officers who directed 

the gunfire to support that operation. 

There is no service that is more important than the other in our scheme 

of Armed Services and there is no duty that’s more important than the other 

under the code of the Guardian. Once in a while we aviators like to think that 

when we’re up in the air—free—that we have mastery over all. How many 

times have you sat on the ramp, waiting for a maintenance man to show up 

when the airplane was broken? You were absolutely unable to move until that 

maintenance man showed up. 

We, the fighters, sometimes think it all belongs to us. But, when we’re 

wounded and picked up by some obscure medic to ease our pain, then we 

realize that we are no more important than he is. 

The fighter pilots often think that recce guys don’t do anything 

important. Yet, when you read the history of the battle of the Coral Sea, you 

will see that the Japanese lost the battle because a recce pilot didn’t do his 

duty correctly and they probably lost the war because of that. The fighter pilot 

144 
who was picked up out of the jungle or out of the water by an old helicopter 

pilot knows that his duty is not more important than the other fellow’s duty. 

Some three weeks ago, I was in Italy for the 40th Anniversary of the 

Liberations of Rome—visiting some of the battlefields of my youth. At the 

ceremonies, I think I was the last of the World War II veterans on active duty; 

but I want to tell you I was only a drummer boy. A young television reporter 

cornered me and asked me if I wasn’t disappointed about what had happened 

40 years ago when Rome was liberated and then overshadowed by the D-Day 

events in Normandy a couple of days later. He asked me if I wasn’t 

disappointed to have participated in great battles which some historians later 

had characterized as unimportant? And I told him that if he wasn’t a member 

of the warrior class, if he wasn’t a Guardian, he wouldn’t understand the 

answer so there was no point in my telling him. 

On the previous Monday, on Memorial Day, my present squad, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, fell in; and marched in step the six miles from the Capital to the 

Tomb of the Unknown Soldier for the burial of the Vietnam Unknown. We did 

that as sort of a sign to all present and future members of the Guardians, a 

confirmation of our belief in the code. That is that there are no unimportant 

duties, that whoever has fallen serving his country, wherever he is, even if he is 

unknown, has died performing important duty. 

Now speaking of those JCS, sometimes you may hear about JCS 

“bickering.” I want you to know that we do bicker. We have it on the training 

schedule—it’s a myth that has gone on for years so we schedule them. We 

bicker on the golf course every weekend and we bicker about whether or not we 

should give putts within the leather. And the Chief of Naval Operations can’t 

putt that well so we won’t give him those putts. 

But I want to emphasize to you that whatever the tasks assigned, they 

are all important. None can be left undone without peril to the Nation. Twenty 

years or so from now, one of you, by the Grace of God and through the 

confidence of your fellow members of the Guardian Class, may be serving as 

Chief of Naval Operations or as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For 

whomever that is, I want to tell you today it’s important for you to recognize 

your service is no more important than that of your classmates here who will 

not have risen to such rank. 

Inseparable from the concept of service is the concept of integrity. The 

citizens of this great nation place great trust in their military services. They 

will continue to judge us by stricter rules that they apply to themselves. And 

they should do that because, ultimately, their security rests with us and the 

way we perform our duties. The people of this Nation have entrusted their 

Armed Forces with the most awesome weapons the world has ever seen, but 

they have also placed the lives of their sons and daughters who serve and the 

safety of their own families for now and in the future in the hands of the Armed 

Forces. 

Don’t confuse integrity with infallibility. There’s a great tendency to do 

that. As Gary Cooper said in High Noon, you should “aim to be high-regarded”; 

but you should remember that you are human and fallible. Those who serve 

145 
with you and under you are also human and fallible. Those who will lead you 

are also human and fallible. The code of the Guardian has room for fallibility. 

Certainly, the higher up the flagpole you go, the more of your fallible backside 

will show. There is room for that; but, there is no room for a lack of integrity or 

for those who place self before duty or self before comrades or self before 

country. Careerism is the one great sin, and it has no place among you. 

Now, you may sit there and say, “Well, that’s pretty well for you to say 

that when you’re high on the lofty perch as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff but we all want to get ahead.” And I know you want to get ahead. I 

understand that. I applaud it. But if you get there over the bodies of careers 

and your comrades, you have served your nation poorly and you have violated 

the code of the Guardian. 

There won’t be any tribunal to judge your actions at the height of battle; 

there are only the hopes of the citizenry who are relying upon your integrity 

and skill. They may well criticize you later amid the relative calm of victory or 

defeat. But, there is a crucial moment in crisis or battle when those you lead 

and the citizens of the Nation can only trust that you are doing what is right. 

And you develop that concept through integrity. 

There is a marvelous passage in the last pages of Field Marshal 

Montgomery’s book. He said, “But there are times in war when men must do 

hazardous jobs, and when success and the Nation’s fate depend upon the 

courage, determination and tenacity of officers and men. When those who set 

duty before self give of themselves to see the task committed to them through 

to its completion, they win the day and the highest honor that mortal man can 

give.” 

To the international students here today, let me say, “Thank you for 

attending.” I hope that your attendance here was as valuable for you as it was 

for us. I’m sure that the United States students and the staff and faculty have 

enjoyed your company and profited from your presence. It is my firm belief 

that nurturing contacts among the military forces of the nations of the world 

will help reduce the risk of war. 

I’d like to say just a word to the families here. Your husbands or wives, 

as the case may be, have reached a point in their careers that is very important 

to them and it’s important to you obviously. It is also important to the 

institutions they serve and important to the Nation. They needed your support 

as they went through this school and they need your support now as they go 

on to new duties. I realize that lecture is not necessary for you families 

because if you hadn’t supported them, they probably wouldn’t be here in the 

first place. 

But I just want to tell you that I acknowledge that the family serves as 

surely as does the member of the family who wears the uniform, and I 

acknowledge your great importance to the military community. So, as you 

leave here tomorrow, know that you have my thanks and the thanks of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and best wishes for the exciting days ahead. 

146 
In the liturgy for morning prayer in the Lutheran Book of Worship, there 

is a prayer which is a good prayer for the Guardians and their families. It goes 

like this: 

“Lord God, You have called Your servants to ventures of which 

we cannot see the ending, by paths as yet untrodden, through 

perils unknown. Give us faith to go out with good courage, not 

knowing where we go , but only that Your hand is leading us and 

Your love is supporting us.” 

I want you to know that that’s my prayer for you and I give you my 

congratulations. Best wishes to all of you. It’s been a pleasure to be here. 

Interview in EURONET 

By Harry Ellis, USIA 

Washington, DC 

27 June 1984 

I want to say that I’m a member of the largest peace-marching group in 

the world and that’s the NATO military forces—5 million strong, all in uniform, 

marching for peace. I think that we in the West need to understand that’s 

what we’re doing—we’re preventing war and keeping the peace. 

Remarks at the 

SYMPOSIUM OF THE AMERICAN 

ACADEMY OF ACHIEVEMENT 

Minneapolis, MN 

7 July 1984 

Thank you, Spence. President and Mrs. Carter, friends, and guests. It is 

a delight to be here again with the Academy. This is a talented group of young 

people and I want to congratulate Bryan and Wayne for conducting this 

symposium in Minnesota this year. Some people think I am Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. I’m actually a secret agent for the Minnesota Tourist 

Bureau. I have just bottled up about five cases of mason jars full of this 

Minnesota air and weather and I am going to take it back to Washington and 

sell it. 

147 
You have come here as a talented, gifted group of young people and I 

want to leave you with one message: that you are certainly talented—some 

would say privileged—but I say you’re also obligated. In this marvelous city of 

Minneapolis, just a couple of blocks away, is the City Auditorium. It is a 

marvelous old building and if you go over there and look up on the corner of 

the building, you will see a sign. It says, “Participation in the rights of 

citizenship assumes participation in the duties of citizenship.” That’s your 

obligation. 

Mr. Pickens told you today, “Preserve the system that allows this country 

to be great, that allows people to do what they want to do.” Dr. DeBakery at 

noon told us, “Strive for excellence in education.” It is important that all 

Americans, all people in a democracy, have an opportunity for a good 

education. Certainly, those are some of the duties of citizenship. 

I want to leave you with a couple of thoughts. First, 45 years in the 

uniform of the United States has taught me that there is no unimportant work. 

Last month we celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the landing at Normandy. 

General Bernard Rogers represented me at the celebrations there. I went 

instead to Rome to the commemoration of the battle that I participated in 40 

years ago at the liberation of Rome. And I couldn’t help but recall the sacrifices 

that had been made by many, very talented young people just like you in order 

to take on those particular tasks. Through the years the fact that there is no 

unimportant work comes home to me more and more. We aviators think we’re 

great when we’re flying and soaring through the air; but, if the mechanic hasn’t 

done his work, the airplane won’t work and we won’t get off the ground. So, 

his work is just as important as ours. The general may think he has made a 

wonderful battle plan but if those Rangers who scaled the cliffs at Pointe du 

Hoc at Normandy had not succeeded, the battle plan would have been for 

nothing. 

So, there is no unimportant work. In whatever you do, to strive for 

excellence in that work is absolutely key. 

I’d like to leave with you a thought about this great country of ours. I 

read something the other day you might be interested in because it says that 

“Our youth love luxury. They have bad manners and contempt for authority. 

They show disrespect for their elders and they love to chatter. They contradict 

their parents and gobble up their food and tyrannize their parents....” Socrates 

wrote that, over two thousand years ago! And I suspect that someone in every 

age has written something like that and we can probably read it in tonight’s 

newspapers if we look. 

This country is a country whose pronoun is “we” not “they.” Too often I 

hear the ubiquitous saying that “They did it”; “They are responsible for the 

tyranny of the people”; “They are responsible for government debts”; “They are 

responsible for the arms race”; “They are responsible for the danger of war.” 

But for this country, the pronoun is “we.” “We the People of the United States 

in order to form a more perfect Union.” “We hold these truths to be self-evident 

that all men are created equal.” “We pledge our lives, our fortunes and our 

sacred honor” so “we” can do whatever “we” want to do. Whatever is done in or 

148 
by this country, “we” will have charge—not “they,” but “we.” So, it is important 

that each of us accept our responsibilities and our obligations, not only to 

ourselves and our families but to our community, our country and the world at 

large. 

Now, I have to put in one last plug and that is for an opportunity to 

serve. George Washington said that “If we want peace, let it be at all times be 

known that we are ready for war.” The Armed Forces of the United States help 

protect the Nation. They are only a small part of the protection but they’re an 

important part. And for those of you who would like to serve the Nation in 

whatever capacity, the Armed Forces are a great place to serve. If you want to 

be a rich man, I would tell you that if you rise to the top and get my job—the 

top of the Armed Forces of the United States—and live a thousand years—after 

all that salary for a thousand years, you won’t make as much money as many 

stockbrokers do on one stock deal. 

Or, if you don’t want to live that long, if you live 120 years, you can make 

as much money as he did on the tender of stock. But if you want to have some 

fun and want to serve your country, it’s a good place to serve. But, as in the 

stock market, it’s not the place for everybody; but give it an opportunity. 

Congratulations on your selection. I wish you all the best from the 

Armed Forces of the United States and from our State of Minnesota. 

Remarks to the 8th ANNUAL 

PLANNERS CONFERENCE 

At the Armed Forces Staff College 

Norfolk, VA 

12 July 1984 

Thank you, it’s nice to be here. I thought I would be a little early, but I 

was called down to the Omni Hotel by the manager. He wanted to know if I 

could do something to change the theme for the conference; he thought it was 

“Bop ‘til you drop.” 

It’s good to be here with you; and on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I 

want to thank you for your hard work. I haven’t come down here to tell you 

how to solve the problems. If I knew how to solve the problems, we wouldn’t 

have this conference. We’d get them solved and get on with it. What I want to 

do is tell you how important your work is in getting on with the problems that 

you have to solve. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is a unique body. I constantly read in the 

newspapers that we engage in inter-Service “bickering;” and I want you to know 

that, in a certain sense, we probably do. In fact, we’re so convinced that that 

myth needs to be maintained that we schedule inter-Service bickering on the 

training schedule. The way we do it is we meet every weekend for a game of 

149 
golf and we bicker about who should give putts to whom. It usually winds up 

that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force think I 

should give them “putts within the leather;” but, neither of them can putt that 

well and I won’t do it. So, we bicker. 

After two years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I’ve come to the 

conclusion that it’s not inter-Service bickering; it’s just understanding how to 

explain things. There’s one thing on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed 

unanimously, and that is that the duties laid out in the law under Section 141 

of Title 10 of the U.S. Code for the Joint Chiefs are the right duties. And some 

of those duties tie in very closely to what you’re doing. So, I’d like to just read 

four of them: 

—The first is to prepare strategic plans and provide the strategic 

direction for the Armed Forces of the United States. 

—Then, to prepare joint logistics plans and assign logistics 

responsibilities to the Services in accordance with those plans. 

—To establish unified commands in strategic areas. 

—And then to review the material and personnel requirements of the 

Armed Forces in accordance with those strategic and logistics plans. 

Now, there are a few other duties laid out for the Joint Chiefs, but those 

are the major ones. You can see that the key to the Joint Chiefs carrying out 

their duties is war planning. Some of you probably heard me say that what’s 

wrong with the war planning system is that too many of the plans grow like 

moss in the basement of headquarters. They’re kept in the dark and they’re 

not exposed to the light of day. 

I want to tell you that, when I took this job, the Chiefs and the CINCs 

and I sat down and said, “What are our priorities? What is the menu of things 

that we need to do?” And we concluded among us, with no differences of 

opinion, that the first priority is the war planning—making good war plans. We 

recognized that we could blame the parents, perhaps, if the young people 

coming into the Armed Forces lacked discipline; we could blame the educators 

if the young people coming into the Armed Forces couldn’t add and subtract 

and use the English language; we could blame defense contractors if the 

material didn’t work well, and we could blame the Congress if the budgets 

weren’t quite as good as they ought to be. But, the fact of the matter is that if 

the war plans were wrong, there is only one place the finger pointed, and that 

was at us. So, we concluded that we needed to put in every effort that we 

could to have sensible war plans and to have all those knots tied together that 

make effective war plans in support of the strategy of the Nation. 

Our strategy is a deterrent strategy, one that calls for preventing war. 

That is why when people look at what we do in peacetime sometimes they say, 

“Well, it’s not exactly the way we would want to fight.” That’s right; it isn’t. 

Yet, at the same time the essence of deterrence is the clear understanding by 

your potential enemies that if they start fighting with you they’re going to get 

their clock cleaned. 

150 
Our global strategy is a coalition strategy, one that calls for the 

integration of our efforts with those of our allies. There will be no “U.S.-only” 

global war anywhere. It will involve a wide range of alliances. 

To buttress our coalition strategy we have forces forward-deployed in a 

number of places, but principally in East Asia and in Europe. We keep this 

basis of forward-deployed forces for two reasons: One is to provide peacetime 

military strength to our alliances so that our potential enemies can look at 

those forces and see that our alliances are militarily healthy; and the other is to 

uphold the political health of the alliances. Both of these are important; and 

neither is more or less important than the other. You can see that in what’s 

happened in the last couple years with the negotiations with the Soviet Union 

on nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has spent its time trying to separate us 

from our allies. Its goal has not been to defeat us militarily; its goal has been 

to defeat us politically in the arena of world opinion and doing so by separating 

us from our allies. 

Now, our system of global command is understood by you, I’m sure. We 

have a global system of unified command under the CINCs that the law lays 

out for the command of United States forces. But overlaid on top of that is the 

system of allied command. And in many cases, our own unified commanders 

also double as allied commanders. I hate words that end in “ize”, but this one 

is used so often that I have to use it: “rationalize” our own national military 

plans with the alliance plans is a very important function for us and for our 

CINCs. 

Each of those CINCs out there is unique. Each has a unique set of allies, 

a unique chunk of geography for the geographic CINCs, a unique facet of the 

potential threat that faces us, unique command and control problems, and, by 

and large, unique command arrangements in the range of how many hats he 

wears. So, it is important as we look at our planning system that we 

understand that uniqueness. 

The dual-hatted command relationships for our major war-fighting 

commands calls for discipline and efficiency in our armed forces; but, 

principally, discipline and efficiency in our planning system. The CINCs’ 

missions that have been given them call for them to have an understanding of 

the concept of the operation under which they themselves will fight and under 

which the Nation will fight as a nation. 

There are some challenges that each CINC faces: 

The first challenge is ensuring that the Services are integrated properly, 

that he gets the most out of the forces provided him; that he has sustainment 

and lift capabilities to carry out his war plans; that he recognizes our strategy 

calls for rather small forces for the size of the commitments we have; and that 

we will not be able to do everything at one time. 

The key elements of our strategy are, first, extraordinarily good 

intelligence. We sit around and squawk about the intelligence being poor, but 

the fact of the matter is we have intelligence capabilities far beyond anything 

anybody ever dreamed of a few years ago. Distributed information systems 

permit us to make small unit commanders wiser than larger unit commanders 

151 
were a few years ago. That first element is coupled with a central reserve, a 

strong central reserve of reasonably ready forces. I use the words “reasonably 

ready” because it is important that we understand that they will never be more 

than reasonably ready. We will have to bust their tails to make them 

reasonably ready, and it doesn’t make sense to have them any more than 

reasonably ready because the readiness that we buy for today that can’t be 

carried over to tomorrow is the cost of peace for today. So, when the clock 

strikes midnight tonight, if there is no war today, we want to be able to carry 

over as much of that readiness as we possibly can until tomorrow. 

We plan for the “big wars.” We spend most of our time planning for the 

big wars. We sort of operate under the philosophy that the “small wars” are 

lesser-included conflicts of the big wars; and if we can take care of the big 

wars, we can handle the small wars. Now, what I would tell you is that in one 

sense that’s wise; and, in another sense, it is risky. Not counting the Vietnam 

War, the United States since the end of World War II has committed its military 

forces in over 215 different instances short of major war. And most of them 

have been in deterrent efforts; and, some have been in shooting situations. So, 

that means that our planning system has to be able to adjust to that. 

Flexibility is the key note. Many of you know there’s a very fine line 

between flexibility and weakness; and we certainly don’t want to build a 

planning system that’s so flexible that it’s absolutely “limp” and unable to do 

anything. On the other hand, it is unwise to build a planning system so rigid 

that it cannot adjust to the tomorrow which comes over the horizon. If there’s 

anything which history tells us it is that the assumptions we put into our plans 

will not be exactly right. They simply will not fit the tomorrow that comes over 

the horizon. Our job is to have a planning system that recognizes that fact and 

that uses modern technology and the wisdom we have to adapt to the tomorrow 

which does come over the horizon and adjust to the tomorrow which does come 

over the horizon and adjust our war plans quickly to fit whatever situation 

occurs. 

This brings us to the heart of what you people will face as you develop 

Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) or the follow-on 

planning system: How much rigidity, how much flexibility, and how much 

refinement? It has been my firm belief, through the years, that we have spent 

entirely too much time adjusting the war plans for precision inside the 

“probable error” of the plans themselves. And it has driven all sorts of strange 

things. We have seen changes in the force structure being driven by changes 

in the war plans. 

If you want to see the effect of the war plans, march out to some of the 

Combat Service Support units in the Reserves of any of the Services—but look 

more particularly at the Reserves of the Army because of the broader nature of 

their responsibilities. You will find officers who have changed branches of 

service four or five times in the space of 25 years because somebody has 

changed the war plan. That change has driven the change in the force 

structure that has driven the unit to change its designation from 

Quartermaster to Engineer, or whatever it happens to be. The fact of the 

152 
matter is that the change in the war plan was probably miniscule but the 

changes that it drove were broad changes in the case of those particular 

units—sort of like the guy with his hand on the whip, you know: you make a 

little shift at the handle of the whip and there’s a change out there on the tip of 

the whip that is accelerated thousands of times. 

So, it is an issue with which we must grapple: How often to change the 

war plan? How much good is brought about by changing the war plan for 

refinement? 

Some changes are absolutely inevitable; they must be made. We’re 

modernizing the force. It doesn’t make sense to have war plans for yesterday’s 

force. At the same time, it probably doesn’t make a lot of sense to have war 

plans for tomorrow’s force that will never be reached. So, the degree of 

precision in our planning is something with which we must grapple. 

A bad plan is one that can’t be altered—one that can’t be altered to fit the 

situation. The purpose of our armed forces is to be ready to fight and having 

good plans will ensure that we are ready to fight or be able to execute good 

plans. As Clausewitz said, “Everything in war is simple but the simplest thing 

is difficult.” And the difficulties accumulate and, in the end, produce that 

“friction” of war. This notion of “friction” certainly comes to us in the words of 

that great American philosopher, Murphy, who said, “If anything can be 

screwed up, it will be screwed up.” That’s what can happen in the case of our 

war plans. 

The issue of discipline in the planning system—flexibility in the planning 

system—and the issue of how much effort goes into the process of planning are 

the issues with which we have to deal. This is particularly true in making 

refinements now with automated planning and information systems JOPS, 

JDS, and then into JOPES and WIS and how we get from one to the other, and 

in the process keep plans that are effective and permit us to make those 

changes and at the same time build toward the goals that we want. Effective 

planning rests on the understanding that we know what we’re trying to do in 

the first place. 

Planning to do what? When the Joint Chiefs undertook this task of 

improving the planning system, the first thing we did was ask each of the 

CINCs to come in and brief his concept of operation to the Joint Chiefs. And 

we said, “We don’t want any staff officers. You may bring a staff officer to 

change the slides if you want to, but you can have no staff officer in the room. 

And you must explain your concept of the operation to the Joint Chiefs so they 

can understand it.” And then we could go on to ask ourselves what made 

sense about the plan and what did not. 

Now, that may sound like a simple thing to you. But I want to tell you 

that it is the first time that that’s happened. And it was perhaps the most 

useful exercise that the JCS have gone through in the time that I have been 

Chairman. It made us realize that we have a number of very, very good plans. 

Yet, we have some clear disconnects in the plans that we have. We set about 

fixing those disconnects. 

153 
It is reminiscent of when Churchill was in Parliament, back sometime 

before World War I. The Parliament received word that the telegraph cable to 

South Africa was laid. There was a great cheering in the Parliament and 

shouting and clapping and so forth and finally when all this had stopped, 

Churchill rose and said, “Now what shall we say to the Africans?” 

This is really the essence of what it is we’re trying to do in refining our 

planning system. We need to use modern technology to help us. We have 

begun a program we call “Modern Aids to Planning.” It is a recognition that 

while each of the Services and each of the War Colleges and many of the Staff 

Colleges have absolutely remarkable, computer-driven wargaming simulation 

capabilities, many of the CINCs are out there with yellow foolscap, pencils, and 

hand-held calculators trying to make their war plans. The object of the 

exercise is to find a way to harness the planning potential of the entire Armed 

Services and make it available to the people who are going to make the real war 

plans, the CINCs of the unified and specified commands, and who are also the 

people who are going to execute whatever war plan is adjusted to meet the 

tomorrow that comes over the horizon—those same CINCs of the unified and 

specified commands. 

From a Letter to the Veterans of the 

Second Polish Corps on the 

Fortieth Anniversary of the Victory at 

Monte Cassino, Italy 

July, 1984 

On the occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the victory at Monte 

Cassino, I am happy to join with my fellow veterans of the Italian Campaign to 

reflect on what was achieved and to commemorate the heroism and the 

memory of our comrades in arms. 

I wish to extend my special greetings to the brave veterans of the Second 

Polish Corps. It was a proud outfit whose reputation is best summed up by 

then Fifth Army Commander, General Mark Clark. He hailed the Corps as the 

“... splendid fighting outfit ... which achieved what the rest of us had failed to 

do, to take Cassino.” 

But, it was a victory for us all, shared in by every nation and by every 

Service which contributed to the final victory. It is both a source of pride and a 

tribute to what the free peoples of the world can do together in pursuit of peace 

and freedom. 

We live in a world of heightened tensions that pose great threats to world 

peace. Whatever demands we face in the future, the achievements during 

those tough days in World War II will continue to serve as an example to the 

154 
men and women in our armed forces today as they go about their dangerous 

tasks of deterring war and safeguarding the peace. 

Remarks at a Dinner in Honor of General El Orabi 

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Arab Republic of Egypt 

Quarters 6, the Chairman’s House 

Fort Myer, Virginia 

9 August 1984 

General El Orabi, 

As the American military people here tonight know, I have only three 

speeches: one is on tank maintenance, one is on helicopter maintenance, and 

the third is on re-enlistment. Yet, I won’t give any of those tonight. 

We are very pleased to have you here in the Chairman’s House. This 

house has an interesting history. The first three Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff lived in the respective houses of the Service Chiefs. But when General 

Lemnitzer became the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former military 

man was President of our country, President Eisenhower. He himself had 

moved into the house just down the street from here when he was the Chief of 

Staff of our Army. 

So, when General Lemnitzer reported in as the Chairman, the President 

called him to the White House and said, “What house are you living in?” He 

said, “Sir, I am living in my old quarters on Fort Myer, Quarters One.” And the 

President said, “You can’t live there. That house belongs to the Chief of Staff of 

the Army.” And, so, Gen Lemnitzer didn’t know what to say. He said, “But...”; 

and the President said, “You have one week to choose the new house for the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You are to engage no staff officers and 

you are not to talk to the Secretary of Defense. In one week you will choose the 

house and come back here and tell me which house it is.” 

So, Lemnitzer told me he didn’t know what to do. He walked down the 

street from his quarters as Chief of Staff, and stood in front of this house. He 

looked out and saw the best view of Washington from the front porch and said, 

“This is the house.” So, he went to President Eisenhower. He said, “I have 

chosen the house.” He and the President then drew the plans to make this 

house—which at the time was a house in which the families of two officers 

lived—into the Chairman’s House. And so it is today. 

It is not the Vessey house—it is not our house—but it is the Chairman’s 

House; and we are very pleased to have you here. For the rest of you here, 

welcome to Quarters Six. We welcome you to this dinner to honor General and 

Mrs. El Orabi. They have been in the country here now for a week, having 

visited Air Force installations at Nellis Air Force Base, Fort Sill, Fort Knox, and 

here in Washington. 

155 
I think it is significant that General El Orabi is here at a time when our 

Armed Forces are again cooperating in ventures to help preserve peace in the 

world. For example, we are helping in a very modest way the Armed Forces of 

Egypt as they deal with the problems of mines in the Red Sea. Our help, I 

hope, will be useful to Egypt; yet, it is to be noted that the Armed Forces of 

Egypt are quite capable and are the primary dealers with the challenge. That 

cooperation, nevertheless, demonstrates what we have been able to 

demonstrate several times in recent years: that our Armed Forces can 

cooperate very well on projects that help preserve peace in the world. 

Indeed, our debts to Egypt are characterized by the fact that this year is 

the 100th anniversary of the completion of the Washington Monument—which 

General Lemnitzer so generously allowed us to see from the front porch of this 

house. Now, you know that we “borrowed” the Washington Monument from 

Egypt—modeled after the ancient Egyptian obelisks. I think it symbolizes the 

fact that we, the younger of the nations of the world, owe the older nations of 

the world, as is Egypt, a great debt for our civilization—science, mathematics, 

astronomical sciences, military prowess. So, it is a great pleasure for us to 

welcome you here. 

For those of you who don’t know the name “El Orabi” and what it means 

to Egypt, it means that he is a military leader from a long line of important 

Egyptian leaders and military leaders and who, himself, is a renowned military 

leader of proven great qualities, having led armored formations up through 

every echelon to Field Army and to Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces. 

He was honored today by the President of the United States with the 

Degree of Commander, the Legion of Merit, the highest award we give to foreign 

officers. So, we are very pleased to have you here and we hope that this will be 

but one in a series of many visits to our country. 

Now, please, to all of you, join me in a toast to General and Mrs El Orabi 

and to the Armed Forces of Egypt, and the friendship of those Armed Forces 

with our own. 

Address to the SOCIETY 

OF LOGISTICS ENGINEERS 

Minneapolis, MN 

21 August 1984 

Over fifty years ago, when General Douglas MacArthur left his post as 

Chief of Staff of the Army, he reminded the Congress that free, peace-loving 

nations such as ours might not want war but it might come anyway. He said 

that “Hasty improvisation of an efficient fighting force is totally impossible 

without extensive, reasonable preparation constantly carried forward as a 

regular feature of national policy. It is not only necessary to assure avoidance 

156 
of the bitterest consequences of war, but it is also a wise investment in the 

maintenance of peace.” 

Later, when we were not successful in deterring World War II, General 

George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army some six years after MacArthur, 

said “We used to have all the time in the world but no money. Now we have all 

the money, but no time.” 

These two quotes from our history characterize both some of our 

problems and some of our attitudes today. Today, we certainly don’t have all 

the money that we need; but, we seem to have all the time in the world. 

However, the fact of the matter is that when the need arises, we would have 

very little time. We live in a dangerous and complicated world and I am 

personally convinced that it is the moral, political, economic and military power 

of the United States and its friends and allies that keep the enemies of our way 

of life and of our freedom at bay. 

Weakness is provocative. It is lack of preparation that will tempt our 

enemies and lead to the very war we seek to avoid. This nation has no other 

responsible option than to make realistic preparations to deter those who 

would threaten war. A couple of years ago I was listening to a radio interview 

with Bobby Knight, our great Olympics basketball coach. He was asked about 

the will to win. And he said, “That’s not the problem. Everyone has the will to 

win. But, not everyone has the will to prepare to win.” And I say to you that 

we won’t have time to recover from the lack of preparation as we did in World 

War II. If we don’t have the will to prepare for war, we will not deter war and 

we will surely not win the war should war occur. 

There are two trends in recent years to remember. First, the industrial 

world has grown more interdependent and our own economy has grown more 

dependent on foreign raw materials and energy sources than ever before. 

When I joined the National Guard in 1939, the United States was a net oil 

exporter—not much by today’s standards, but about 20,000 barrels a day. In 

1984, we now import 3.4 million barrels a day. Those energy resources by 

chance and geography are far away from us but many of them are very close to 

the Soviet Union. 

The second trend to remember is that the Soviets’ military capability to 

threaten our interests and those economic resources that are important to the 

economies of the entire Free World has increased dramatically. This is 

especially reflected in the Soviet ability and willingness to move military power 

far beyond its borders to meddle in places like the south of Africa, Central 

America, and Southeast Asia. Their buildup in all areas of military power can 

be described with two words: “relentless” and “massive.” They outspent us by 

some $500 billion in the decade of the seventies and, that was an investment 

primarily in hardware whereas most of our expenditures were personnel costs. 

Our defense strategy to counter the threats to our interests is a global 

strategy which relies on alliances. We have allied ourselves with other free 

nations of the world, all pursuing the idea that by putting up a unified front, 

we can make the world a safer place. We have overseas bases and forces 

deployed in connection with those alliances. Those forces lend important 

157 
political cohesion to the alliances because they underwrite the United States 

commitment to those alliances—the commitment to the common defense—and 

they also lend military strength to the alliances. 

There are other important aspects to our national strategy. We count on 

a strong central reserve of forces based here in the United States—land, air, 

naval and amphibious forces, both Active and Reserve Component forces—

forces that can reinforce those alliances or go anywhere else in the world where 

our interests are threatened. 

To make those forces effective, we rely on several other components of 

strategy which are uniquely American. First, good intelligence—extraordinarily 

good intelligence that lets us know what is going on in the world, warns us of 

dangers to come and informs us of what has happened. Good command and 

control. We don’t have large forces. We have small forces and if we’re going to 

make them effective, we have to be able to make the most of them with good 

command and control. Finally, we must have superior mobility to get our 

power wherever we may need to use it. That means that, in addition to 

superior air and sealift, we need freedom of the seas and the ability to control 

the air; and we need the free use of space. Overarching all of this are our 

nuclear deterrent forces. 

Now, how do logistics and logisticians play in this strategy? An 

important part of the answer is that logisticians and those who are operators 

and strategic planners need to communicate with each other; and, that 

communication needs to improve. Some of the people who think they are 

strategists and operators tend to forget how important logisticians are. One of 

the great “explainers” of military history was Winston Churchill. He said that, 

“Supply and transport stand or fall together and history and success in battle 

depend on both.” Or as Admiral King said during World War II, “I don’t know 

what the hell this word ‘logistics’ is that General Marshall is always talking 

about; but, whatever it is I want some of it.” 

Logistics defined by Churchill as simply supply and transport is 

inadequate. It is the totality of national preparedness to support our defenses. 

This military business of providing for the common defense is also public 

business. If General Motors, General Electric, US Steel and AT&T, (before “Ma 

Bell” broke up) were combined, their gross revenue would total less than half 

that of the defense budget and the number of employees less than a third. So, 

national defense is public business, not just for those people in uniform but for 

all Americans. 

Logistics is both a science and an art and it must start even before we 

buy equipment and end only after we send the weapons to the junk heap. We 

must be concerned about research and development, about acquisition, about 

life-cycle performance and the totality of the supporting system throughout the 

service life of whatever it is we buy. We must build our forces and equipment 

so that they can be supported in the first place. These are complex tasks and 

we need the help of the best minds in the country to make them work. 

One thing that has colored attitudes towards logistics in recent years is 

the issue of nuclear weapons. There have been those who believe that a major 

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war will inevitably go nuclear—particularly if there is war between the Soviet 

Union and the United States—and, consequently, a “short” war. That point of 

view defies common sense. First, it is not inevitable that a major war would go 

nuclear. Second, if we prepare only for a short war, we may well guarantee we 

have the nuclear war we’re trying to prevent. So, we as a nation cannot be 

found lacking in the sustaining power for our conventional forces. Our 

conventional forces simply cannot be short of breath if we’re going to prevent 

war or, God forbid, if we have to fight one. 

Another view that has influenced attitudes toward logistics is that we can 

somehow do again what was done in 1941 and 1942—that is, mobilize our 

economy with what seems to be astounding speed. However, our strategy has 

changed since World War II. Today, not only are our vital interests threatened 

but we also have forward-deployed forces if there is a war; and that is far 

different from the situation we faced in 1941. It will be a “come as you are, and 

stay until it’s over” war. So, we need to be able to fight immediately and to 

mobilize rapidly; but, that task is growing more difficult. We simply have to 

recognize that it is growing more difficult and take steps to accommodate that. 

Many things have changed to make it more difficult for the United States 

to mobilize rapidly. Today, the increasing sophistication of technology means 

that we probably can’t inject an untrained labor force into defense production 

immediately and expect success. The lead times for production have increased 

and certain critical parts are made from raw materials that we obtain from 

foreign sources. Supplier networks in some cases are shrinking at an alarming 

rate. The high costs of capital and of technological expertise are impediments 

to new companies entering important defense areas. Additionally, we see years 

and years of what I characterize as tax and accounting policies in which we 

were eating our capital plant through taxes and profits; and all that has 

affected our industrial base. 

The military, the Congress, the departments of government and private 

citizens in industry need to pay attention and work hard—and I say again, 

work hard—to prepare this country to be able to mobilize and to support our 

forward-defense posture. Logisticians and planners and businessmen alike 

can help by working this problem and by bringing it to the forefront of national 

attention and by seeking ways to solve some of these very difficult problems. 

Certainly, the economy has changed dramatically. When I went to the 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington in the 1960s, we were 

told that whatever else happened in the world, the American machine tool 

industry was the unshakable bedrock of our industrial power. A couple of 

years ago when I was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, we wanted to modernize 

our large cannon plant. We went out for bids for machine tools and we didn’t 

get a single bid from American machine tool manufacturers! 

Another example is our transportation system. We no longer have the 

Merchant Marine ships that we built or that we mustered into service during 

World War II. As a matter of fact, we have only a tenth of the American flagged 

ships that we had during the Vietnam War. You may say, “Well, that’s all 

159 
right. We’ll just do what we did in World War II, just build the ships again.” 

The fact of the matter is we no longer have the shipyards either! 

Look at our entire transportation and economic systems—and I don’t 

pass any value judgment on the economy which we now have. The simple 

reality is we have what we have and what we don’t have we do not have. We 

can’t change that overnight and we can’t wish that away. The economy has 

changed and has grown more interdependent with those of other nations. Our 

economy is tied to the rest of the world and we need to be able to call on that 

as a strength, not as a liability, and to work with our allies so that we can pull 

together and be able to mobilize the Free World to defend itself. 

Good logistics is made all the more challenging by the strategy that I 

outlined earlier—that is, the fact that we have forces forward-deployed today. 

Those forces are really on the front lines of freedom. Their health is a visible 

sign of the commitment of the United States to those alliances and those forces 

must not only be good in order to serve our strategy but they must also look

good. If their installations are shoddy, or run-down and over-crowded, if their 

logistics are inadequate—if all those things don’t contribute to the perception of 

both allies and friends as well as our potential enemies that those are topnotch fighting forces from the strongest, freest nation in the world, then the 

credibility of the United States and its strategy comes into question and the 

danger of war simply goes up. 

Secondly, we have to be able to reinforce those forces and we have to be 

able to go rapidly to other places in the world that we may not now anticipate. 

We don’t have all the money in the world so that we can pre-position 

equipment and forces in every corner of the world where we might expect 

trouble. So, that means we have to think of innovative ways to use 

transportation and information systems to support the forces that we have so 

we can go wherever we may need to go. Certainly, we need to be able to muster 

our civilian and well as our military airlift and sealift and to draw on help from 

our friends as well. If we can’t—if we don’t have overflight rights, base rights 

and support from other nations—our strategy will be empty. 

There are a number of logistical challenges that we have to wrestle to the 

ground: 

There’s the reality of domestic and foreign political considerations. This 

precious democratic system of ours is a major factor in what happens to our 

defense systems. We have to operate within our political system and we have 

to operate within the constraints of our own government’s relationships with 

other countries. We wouldn’t want it any other way, but that is a constraint 

nevertheless. 

One important point often forgotten is that every military installation in 

the United States is in somebody’s Congressional district and we don’t seem to 

have much trouble getting support for those. At the same time, with almost 40 

percent of our operating forces overseas have no immediate “representative” in 

the Congress, although there are some very capable Congressmen who 

recognize the problems. When the time comes to put in priority either 

supporting forces overseas or supporting those in the United States, we don’t 

160 
seem to have as much difficulty getting support for the installations in the 

United States. 

Logistics planning has other obstacles. Getting the bases that we need 

as well as the access rights, transit authority and other agreements is preceded 

by the requisite agreements among the nations involved. Those negotiations 

must be done quietly to be effective; but, in this open society of ours, that isn’t 

easy. Almost every morning in Washington I can read about the Top Secret 

conference I attended the day before. 

Nevertheless, our ability to cooperate with our allies is a real success 

story. Our cooperation with NATO allies and with our allies in East Asia—

Japan and Korea—is an astounding success story about the ability of nations 

to get together and provide logistics support for the common defense. So, we 

need to continue to work at it. We need to recognize that it needs to be a twoway street or we’re not going to get good cooperation from those nations. 

There’s another reality of the Eighties. Facilities and weapons, by their 

nature, last a long time. We say we’d like to replace our physical plant once 

every 50 years; but, the Commanding Officer at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, lives in a 

house built by soldiers for General Sherman. That’s not unique. Our B-52’s 

are older than their crews—every one of them. The aircraft carrier MIDWAY is 

in operation off the coast of Korea today and she has been in service since 

World War II. 

These facts imply a real challenge in planning for sensible designs which 

can be altered to accept improvements as they come along. We shouldn’t do 

what the Russians do—that is, keep everything, never throw anything away. 

Nevertheless, our weapons need to have logistics systems that look to the long 

haul, that recognize they have to support and maintain equipment for 20 or 30 

years and still be effective. 

This is a difficult task. Over the long haul, unforeseen requirements will 

upset today’s best logistical plans. It isn’t the tomorrow we expect to see that 

is the difficult problem for planners. It is the tomorrow that will come over the 

horizon that is completely different from the one we expected that will give us 

the problems. And that goes double for the logisticians because even a minor 

change in an operational and strategic plan is like the handle on a whip for the 

logistician. A small change at the handle of an organizational chart or an 

operations plan leaves logisticians of the tip of the whip making changes which 

are orders of magnitude larger. 

New information systems and capabilities to manipulate and transmit 

information should help us conduct planning more effectively and more 

flexibly. We need to use the new systems in a sensible way to relieve the 

burden but not to choke the decision makers. Information systems and 

communications channels are like bridges across the Potomac in Washington. 

If you don’t have discipline in the system, you can cover the Potomac River with 

bridges from Alexandria in the south to Cabin John Bridge in northwest 

Washington and still have a traffic jam in the morning. The same is true with 

information systems and communications systems. If you don’t have discipline 

in them, information and data choke up decision making and thoroughly 

161 
frustrate problem-solving. We have a marvelous capability if we just take it on 

ourselves to use it effectively. 

New technology is a major claimant for resources. Some would allege 

that we have become technology-dependent, others that our hardware is not 

sustainment-oriented—that we are too enamored with the idea that we should 

have new, fancy gadgets and that we don’t think about supporting them. There 

may be some truth in that; but, if we are to enhance the combat capability of 

our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, it is technology that will provide the 

leverage. Technology will help us put more punch into our fighting forces. We 

can fight with far fewer forces and far more effectively if we use technology well. 

But we must guard against Parkinson’s Law that the “Shrinkage in the combat 

forces results in exactly proportionate increases in headquarters personnel.” 

The challenge is to improve our productivity and to reduce our logistics 

tail by the smart use of technology. There are some great examples. The ring 

laser gyroscope is now predicting between 15,000 and 40,000 man-hours 

mean-time-between-failure. The Army’s new BLACKHAWK helicopter’s T-7000 

engine breaks down so infrequently that its mechanics have trouble 

maintaining proficiency. 

But, technology will not substitute for the support required to sustain 

ourselves in battle. Van Creveld in his book, Supplying War, showed how 

logistics can be like a self-licking ice cream cone. He said the Frederick the 

Great’s horses in a supply train consumed 20 pounds of fodder a day. If the 

supply wagon carried nothing else but fodder, leaving out ammunition and the 

other combat essentials, the horses could consume the whole load in 120 

miles. Van Creveld also demonstrated that Patton’s five-ton truck carrying 

nothing but fuel to the front lines some 200 years later made only about 300 

miles. It was logistics not the enemy that stopped Patton’s forces. So, we need 

to use technology to reduce demands on the logistics system and to improve 

the efficiency of the logistics system itself. 

As we field forces today, sustainability must be there. It must be on the 

ground to support our forces. If it is not, the forces can’t fight. At the same 

time, we must look far into the future for the opportunities that technology 

provides. As we do, we must also plan for logistics support so that we may 

realize the foxhole effectiveness of new systems as they are fielded. We must 

do “double duty’ by providing for today’s forces and by supporting the forces of 

the future. Because, as surely as prevent war today, tomorrow will come and 

we will need to prevent war tomorrow as well. 

We must strike the right balance for the future—between what the future 

looks like while hedging against the fact that the future probably won’t look 

like the future we expect it to be. Logistics is the mucilage of strategy. So, 

planners must get with the logisticians and wrestle through what the future 

will be like and the possibility that our view of the future may well be wrong. 

That’s what will prevent war while employing each and every taxpayer’s dollars 

to buy the best defense possible for least cost. 

162 
Remarks to the 

INDIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE 

COLLEGE VISITING STUDENTS 

In the Pentagon 

Washington, DC 

21 September 1984 

I am pleased to welcome you here. Welcome to our country and to the 

opportunity to see our armed forces. While you are here, you will see one of 

our two largest naval bases and you will see an installation at which we have 

an airborne division and some other forces. While you are there you will have 

the opportunity, perhaps to deduce a few things about our national defense 

strategy; but I want to tell you a couple things before you go. 

The strategy of the United States is a defensive strategy. We have no 

intention of starting a war with anyone. Our strategy revolves around a few 

fundamental ingredients. The first is that we are allied with a number of other 

nations in the world whose security and political interests are similar to ours. 

Those nations are in three large blocs: in Europe and the western part of Asia, 

in East Asia and the Pacific, and in this hemisphere, as in Central America. As 

you go around our country this week, those of you who have been here before 

will recognize that. Additionally, over here at Fort McNair where our National 

Defense University is, you will see the Inter-American Defense College in which 

officers from all the nations of this hemisphere study together. 

We have a saying about the two great oceans in the world. We say we 

live on the Atlantic and we have ties across the Atlantic; but about the other 

great ocean, the Pacific, we say we don’t live on the Pacific, we live in the 

Pacific. One of our states is almost 3,000 miles from the west coast of North 

America, out in the Pacific, and one of our other states runs just below the 

Arctic Circle, all the way from North America to the eastern tip of Asia and the 

Soviet Union. So, we have different relationships between the two oceans. 

Our strategy is tied very closely to our alliances. We have forces 

stationed overseas in conjunction with those alliances. The forces have two 

purposes. One is to help give self-evident strength to our military alliances and 

the other is to provide political cohesion to the alliances—that is, to let our 

allies know that if there is an attack, we will be there. If our friends are 

attacked, we will be attacked as well, and they know they can count on us. 

That strategy calls for certain other facets of our armed forces and you’ll 

see some of this when you visit our forces. It calls for a strong central reserve. 

In our central reserve we have both active forces—people who serve every day—

and Reserve Component forces—that is, civilians who are called to active duty 

as we mobilize. Our Reserves spend more time in training than those of most 

countries. A Reserve soldier, sailor, airman or Marine spends about 48 days a 

year in training. He trains one weekend a month and during the summer he 

trains for a two-week period. 

163 
To make our concept work, our strategy needs several other ingredients: 

one is extraordinarily good mobility. You will see a little bit of that, perhaps, at 

Fort Bragg in our airborne units. But our strategy also calls for mobility on the 

seas and for a navy that can control the seas and provide essential mobility. 

You’ll see that when you go to Norfolk. 

We believe that the Soviet Union is the principal threat to our security 

interests in the world and we believe that we and our allies would be 

outnumbered if we were to be attacked by the Soviet Union or the Warsaw 

Pact. Consequently, another ingredient of our strategy is to use technology to 

make smaller forces more effective on the battlefield. I use the word 

“battlefield” because I am a soldier but I mean the battle in the air and the 

battle on the sea and the battle under the sea. We think that those battlefield 

ingredients are somewhat the same as the strategic ingredients—good 

intelligence, good command and control and communications, and 

extraordinarily good mobility on the battlefield. It means that by combining 

those, we can take smaller forces and make them effective against larger forces. 

Our armed forces today are healthy. We are modernizing our equipment. 

We have good people. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are like those 

in every other army, navy or air force in the world. They are human beings; 

some make mistakes but we think we have the leadership to take care of that. 

All of this strategic concept operates under a security umbrella of our 

strategic nuclear force. We have been attempting to engage with the Soviet 

Union in arms control negotiations to help make the world a safer place. We 

want to deal with the danger of nuclear war. We haven’t had much success. I 

am sure that when the Soviets look at the lack of success, they probably blame 

us. When we look at it, we blame them. The fault probably lies somewhere in 

between; but we are convinced that there are sensible limitations on nuclear 

arms and that we must keep a modern nuclear force to guarantee our own 

security. We are not looking for nuclear superiority or to build more weapons 

or any such thing as that. We simply want a force that makes it self-evident to 

our potential enemies that they cannot employ their force against us and our 

allies with any hope of success. 

Again, I would say to you I’m very pleased to have you here. It was 

members of the Indian Armed Forces who hosted our National Defense 

University in April 1983. I thank you for that. And 40 years ago in 1944, the 

Indian Armed Forces were a great help to me personally. In the spring of ’44, I 

was fighting in the battle of Monte Cassino in Italy. In fact, we were relieved 

from our offensive positions there by some of the first troops from India to fight 

in Europe during World War II. They were from the famous 4th Indian Division 

and when we were attacked by the Germans, I recall very affectionately the 10 

days or so I spent in a foxhole with an Indian soldier from the 4th Division at 

Monte Cassino. 

Once again, welcome and thanks for coming. 

164 
Extract from Remarks on the 

126th Birthday of Theodore Roosevelt 

National Defense University 

Washington, DC 

26 October 1984 

President Roosevelt chose to establish the War College and he chose to 

lay the cornerstone himself. As he did so, he gave a speech and I would like to 

quote from that speech. He said, “As a people, whether we like it or not, we 

have reached the stage where we must play a great part in this world. It is not 

open to us to decide whether or not we shall play it. All we have to decide is 

whether we shall play it well or ill .... This nation by the mere trend of events 

has been forced into a position of world power. It cannot bear these 

responsibilities aright unless its voice is potent for peace and justice, as its 

voice can be potent for peace and justice only on condition ... that we ask 

peace not in the spirit of the weakling and the craven but with the assured selfconfidence of the just man armed.” 

I would say to you that those words are timely. They apply to us today 

even more than to the situation which faced those who heard those words 

spoken here in 1903. 

Tomorrow, the United States will launch a new aircraft carrier in Norfolk, 

Virginia. I think it is very fitting that we have such an aircraft carrier, a very 

modern one, the Theodore Roosevelt, named for the great man. The power of 

that aircraft carrier, and of all of our Armed Forces, fits the last part of his 

speech—that is, the United States must be like a “just man armed.” 

Theodore Roosevelt recognized in his speech that we must use our power 

wisely—not only our military power but also our economic strength, our 

political strength, our diplomatic strength and, above all, our spiritual 

strength. It was, I think, Theodore Roosevelt’s recognition of these other 

components of national power—not just military power—which inspired him to 

establish the War College: to improve the leadership of our Armed Forces by 

establishing what was the basis for this great National Defense University 

today. And I say to you, we pray that the sailors and Marines manning that 

aircraft carrier will manage and employ her with great skill and that those of us 

who are the leaders will use it and all our forces wisely to further the great 

cause of peace and justice. 

165 
Article for 

THE 106th GENERAL CONFERENCE 

Journal of the National Guard Association 

October 1984 

On behalf of my colleagues, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I send you the warm 

greetings of all soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines in the active force on this 

occasion of your 106th General Conference of the National Guard Association. 

As members of our National Guard—volunteers all—you are the 

inheritors of America’s great militia heritage. The citizen-at-arms is a concept 

fundamental to the health of our Republic and to the security of this great 

nation. Personally, I am proud to number myself as a former Guardsman. I 

joined the Guard in 1939 and I can remember the camaraderie and the 

personal satisfaction of service to country among my fellow citizen-soldiers. 

Today, I am happy to see the revitalization of the Guard and the Reserves 

as full partners with the active force in the defense of freedom. It’s a Total 

Force now. For example, the Air Force has increased its use of the National 

Guard and Reserves to the point that over 40 percent of strategic airlift and 

tanker crews, over 50 percent of tactical reconnaissance assets and over 65 

percent of CONUS strategic interceptors are from the Guard and Reserve. The 

Army National Guard provides 46 percent of the Army’s total combat units and 

37 percent of the combat support capability. 

Our nation needs to continue to find ways to employ all its strengths to 

keep the peace in a troubled world. We know our defense commitments cannot 

be lessened, nor can we somehow turn our backs on an increasingly 

interdependent world. We must find ways to make our strategy more effective, 

not to change it. That is why the Guard is so important. 

Our strategy is one of deterrence. Through the self-evident effectiveness 

of our forces, we hope to make it unavoidably clear to any aggressor that he 

cannot achieve his objectives by force or by the threat of force. To do that we 

maintain forward-deployed forces in key areas, especially where we have longstanding allies. This forward-deployed stance is backed up by a reserve of 

quick-reaction forces here in the United States. These forces, always ready, 

must be prepared to reinforce our forward-deployed forces or to go wherever 

our interests are threatened. 

The sine qua non of our armed forces is their preparedness to fight and 

win. It will be a “come as you are, stay until it’s over fight.” And, I believe that 

if our forward-deployed forces and those in the United States are ready and 

that if the enemy knows they’re ready, we won’t have to fight in the first place. 

He will know that he can’t achieve his objectives by force and he won’t pick a 

fight with the United States and its allies. 

So, our National Guard of today figures even more prominently in our 

strategy. That is why I am enheartened to see the great improvements in our 

forces begun at the end of the last decade. They’re the best I’ve seen in 

peacetime in my 45 years in the uniform of our country. The Guard is at last 

166 
getting good equipment. F-16 fighters are already in one Air Guard outfit, with 

others scheduled, and the F-15 is scheduled to arrive soon. Army Guard units 

are getting new helicopters and the very best main battle tank in the world, the 

ABRAMS. 

But, equipment alone is not enough. The challenge is before us all to 

find new ways to train better and to gain maximum preparedness from every 

tax dollar spent. New training techniques will help us. Moreover, we must 

take care of our people. People aren’t just in the National Guard, they are the 

Guard. They’re our most precious asset and they lie at the heart of the 

improvements we’re seeing today. So, I say to you: Take care of our people in 

uniform. The freedom and security of this great nation depend on them. 

Remarks to the 

ANNUAL BANQUET OF ALUMNI OF 

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED 

POWERS, EUROPE (SHAPE) 

Washington, DC 

2 November 1984 

Thanks, General Lemnitzer. I’m very happy to be here with this 

distinguished group of SHAPE Alumni and friends of the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization. We hear a lot about peace movements in the world today and, 

certainly, the greatest and the most important peace movement in the world 

has been NATO. I look at the audience tonight and along the head table and I 

see distinguished military officers and civil servants from a number of 

nations—people who have served the cause of peace with dedicated service and 

great talent, helping to keep NATO strong. I am particularly honored to be here 

with people like General Lemnitzer, General Goodpaster, General Schulze, Ed 

Rowney, and General Wood. At the same time I must confess that standing up 

here in front of old bosses is a little bit frightening. 

Now, I did learn something. I thought this was to be a great gathering 

with old warriors having some drinks and telling lies about past battles. I 

thought that was very nice but then the chief musician got up and said he was 

happy to be in front of this SHAPE “political-military” gathering. I had often 

heard that compound adjective, “political-military,” and I didn’t know what it 

meant. But now I understand that the political part is the lies and the military 

part is the drinking. 

I just returned from the last of two trips to NATO meetings in 40 days. 

The last trip was to the Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Stresa, which is on 

the shores of Lago de Maggiore, and that just happens to be the place where 

my old outfit ended up in World war II. Speaking of that war, we’ve had a little 

conclave here—a small set of old war stories here: we have my outfit that was 

167 
at Cassino and General Goodpaster’s outfit which was behind us, supporting 

us and shooting to keep us up there, and we have General Schulze whose 

outfit was shooting in the other direction .... As General Lemnitzer said, “It 

didn’t move very fast.” The reason is because these two guys were shooting at 

us from both directions! 

At any rate, being there in Stresa brought the same thoughts that came 

to my mind when I went back to the fortieth anniversary of the liberation of 

Rome last year: that is, out of those great battles of the Second World War 

grew something none of us realized would grow at that particular time. It is 

that concept of Western security we now have today—a concept which 

embraces NATO and all the free countries of the world; a great transformation 

which turned comrades in arms of those days into partners in peace, which 

made friends out of foes and which has stood as a bulwark against some very 

great threats to Western security and Western civilization. 

NATO hasn’t been content to stand still since its founding. Five years 

after its founding—and 30 years ago today—Britain’s Lord Ismay, who was the 

first Secretary General of NATO, published a report called NATO, the First Five 

Years. The report could justifiably be proud of the incorporation of the Federal 

Republic of Germany into the Alliance 30 years ago on the 22nd of October, 

1954. In his brief introduction to that report, Lord Ismay had much to say that 

is of use to us today. The words are so wise and so timely and contain such 

important guidance that I would like to read them to you now. 

He said, “The signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 marked 

the beginning of a revolutionary and constructive experiment in international 

relations. In signing the treaty, twelve independent sovereign states—later to 

be joined by others—undertook pledges which called for immediate and 

continuous collective action, not only in the military, but also in the political, 

economic and social fields.” 

Then he went on to say, “Many difficulties, however, still remain, and 

others will surely arise as time goes by. Our community of free nations, with 

interests extending to many parts of the world, is bound to be constantly faced 

with new problems requiring new solutions. Indeed, we in NATO will need, for 

years to come, a great deal of imagination and energy in order to develop by 

collective action the defensive power of our alliance and to tighten in all the 

fields the bonds between member states on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.” 

I would submit to you that that could have been written by the Secretary 

General today and be as applicable as it was 30 years ago. 

Change has certainly been the dominant feature of the decades since 

Lord Ismay wrote those words. Change challenges us today as we seek new 

solutions for the problems that face the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance today. 

The world has grown stronger and more inextricably intertwined. The 

interdependence among nations of the world has grown. Nations have 

proliferated. When Lord Ismay wrote that report, there were barely 60 

independent nations in the world; today, there are over 170. And we have 

important ties with many nations today that didn’t even exist at the time that 

report was written. 

168 
Even as the world has become more complex and intertwined, it has 

become more troublesome and dangerous. Since World War II there have been 

150 wars with the loss of over 25 million lives. And if you say that war is 

something in which regular military forces engage and shoot at each other, 

there are some 23 wars going on in the world today. When you look at 

Southeast Asia, Central America, the Middle East, the world seems to boil. 

There have been many other changes. Japan and Germany, once our 

foes, are now our friends. The Soviet Union is now an uncompromising 

adversary with a value system that seems to be the very antithesis of our own 

and of all free people. The Soviets have armed themselves to the teeth and at a 

level unprecedented in peacetime history. And the result is a great power but 

it’s a one-dimensional power—a military power. As I often say, it’s the one 

nation, the only nation in the world, that’s surrounded by hostile communist 

neighbors. But it is a power which we have to recognize. It challenges NATO 

and the entire Free World. Not only NATO in the Central Front but NATO on 

the flanks—Norway, Denmark and Iceland in the north; Italy, Greece and 

Turkey in the south. The growing nuclear might and technological expertise of 

the Soviets have added to its long-standing numerical advantages. 

The Soviets challenge us, particularly the United States, in a global 

sense. I have a picture outside my office on the wall. It is a picture of Avis and 

me when I was CINC, UN Forces, Korea. We were in costumes of Yi Dynasty 

royalty and underneath it a friend of mine had lettered a sign that says, “We’re 

for NATO, too.” I keep it there as a sign to officers on the Joint Staff to help 

remind them that the security of NATO depends as much upon the Russians 

understanding that they don’t have a secure flank in East Asia as it does on 

our contribution to NATO. 

The military picture has changed. It remains for the nations of the West 

to continue work with our friends and allies not only in the North Atlantic 

Treaty Alliance but also with all the free nations of the world to guarantee the 

peace that we now have. 

There have been plenty of critics of this great Alliance. There are 

probably more today than there ever have been because criticism seems to be a 

way of life; and one can probably make a little extra change by criticizing 

something that already exists and seems good. Many of those critics have had 

good advice which is contributing to responsible changes in the Alliance. 

However, many of the critics go through sort of a ritual fire dance every year as 

if the demise of NATO were guaranteed in advance. Those critics don’t have 

any responsibility to provide reasonable solutions for the great problems that 

the Alliance faces. 

A couple of weeks ago the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with Lord Carrington, 

the new Secretary General of NATO, and I want to tell you that we were 

impressed with the new Secretary General. He steps into a field of giants who 

have held that post before and I think he will hold his own. He gave us an 

outline of his particular plan for how he intends to work with the NATO nations 

to contribute to the strengthening of the Alliance and to help us understand 

each other as we go through the political problems in each of our countries. 

169 
One of the things he told us is that other NATO nations contribute great 

things to the defense of NATO that don’t seem apparent to those of us in the 

United States. And he talked about the Federal Republic and the great 

contribution that they make by having the forces of the other nations of the 

Alliance on their soil. I thought about that as I visited Germany a couple of 

weeks ago. It sort of comes home to you that if you take a state about the size 

of Oregon and you multiply the population by 30 and then you stuff into it all 

of the active duty Army and Air Forces that we have in the United States and 

then a couple of times a year double that with forces from the outside for 

maneuvers, then you get some measure of what the people of the Federal 

Republic endure in order to provide their fair contribution to the defense of the 

West. 

In the past few weeks, I have had the opportunity to visit armed forces of 

five allied nations, including our own. And I want to tell you that the Alliance 

today is healthy. I spent five days with the German Armed Forces two weeks 

ago. I visited with the Army in Munster, the Air Force at Oldendorf, and the 

Navy at Wilhelmshaven; but, more importantly for you Americans, I visited the 

Heimatschutz Brigada 51, the Home Defense Forces brigade, which is a 

combination outfit of active and reserve forces. It was really heartening to see 

that combination of active duty and reserve forces providing a very strong 

contribution to the Alliance. 

I want to tell you that the forces I saw in all those nations were wellequipped, well-trained, and well-led. More importantly, I didn’t find a sullen 

soldier, sailor, airman or Marine in the armed forces of any of those five 

nations. Now, people say, “Well, you’re a four-star general. You know they’re 

going to lead you around to the good guys.” I want to tell you that I have been 

in uniform 45 years and I spent five years as an enlisted man before I became 

an officer and if something is wrong, I can smell it. Those people I saw were 

absolutely top-notch; and they had good morale and they knew what they were 

doing and they were doing it very well. 

I want to tell you Americans a little bit of the story about what I saw 

because it has to do with what you need to do in order to keep this country on 

course. I went to Grafenwohr where many of you men have served. I looked at 

the fielding of the M-1 tank and the M-2 BRADLEY Fighting Vehicle. I want to 

tell you a little bit of what I saw because about five years earlier I went over to 

Congress to defend the M-1 tank in its most critical hearing, a hearing in which 

the GAO was there to say that the tank was no good, that they had investigated 

the testing and that it wasn’t worth a hoot. I had just come back from Korea so 

I went down to Fort Knox to look at the follow-on testing of the tank. I decided 

I needed to drive it and shoot it myself and I did that. I was to testify the next 

day and I really didn’t know what I was going to say. Suddenly, it occurred to 

me that the sergeants there knew more about that tank than anybody else in 

the world. So, I asked two of them if they had a good, pressed uniform. And 

they said they did. I said, “Come along with me. You’re going to Washington.” 

And I took them into that Congressional hearing and they absolutely destroyed 

170 
the GAO’s witness and the testimony he was giving. And we got that tank by 

just a couple of votes in the Congress. 

Now, let me tell you what has happened. There are 1300 M-1 tanks in 

Europe today. In the past year, the operational readiness rate for the M-1 tank 

has been 95 percent. There was a great debate about whether or not the 

turbine engine would work in the tank. But the 5 percent of the time that 

those tanks have been down, the engine had contributed only 4 percent of 5 

percent. There was a great question about whether or not the gunfire control 

mechanism would work. On the tank gunnery range which is now absolutely 

mechanized, all computer-driven, there is no guesswork about whether you hit 

or miss. The first round hits for the M-1 are 50 percent higher than for the M60A3. That’s a fabulous increase in the combat capability. 

I saw the same sort of thing in the German armed forces with the new 

equipment that they have. Also, I saw the new fast sea-lift ship—the new Rollon, Roll-off ship which can carry 271 tracked vehicles and 652 wheeled 

vehicles and which took them to the NATO exercises this fall. Those ships are 

being made ready to reinforce NATO very quickly. 

I visited the INF units, those with the new GLCM and the P-II. The 

cooperation between Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 

States in fielding those systems has been superb; and the Soviets have to know 

it. The Soviets spent the last couple of years trying to divide NATO over that 

particular issue. They were unsuccessful in doing it. 

But, still there are some muddle-headed people, both here and in 

Europe, who think that we’re in great trouble because the Soviets are 

responding to our viewpoint. They have forgotten the fact that we’re deploying 

those missiles in response to the 1100 warheads that the Soviets deployed on 

their SS-20’s. It is very important for us to remember that. 

Both here and in Europe we have some people who think that they’d like 

to wish nuclear weapons away. We won’t wish them away. God will not let us 

“uninvent” nuclear weapons. They’re here. It’s sort of like golf. God doesn’t 

give any mulligans. The ball is where it lies. We have those nuclear weapons 

out there today and we have to learn to live with them and we have to have a 

strategy that deals with the Soviet Union with that understanding. And we can 

do that. 

Lord Ismay concluded his report 30 years ago and he said, “Complacency 

and weariness are among the evils we must guard against. The longer a man 

carries a load, the heavier it becomes; and all the member countries have been 

carrying a heavy load of defense expenditure for a long time.”—That was 30 

years ago.—“Nevertheless, the threat from the Soviet Union remains and it 

would be a mockery of all the exertions and sacrifices that have been made if 

the members of the North Atlantic Alliance were, under whatever pretext, to 

allow their unity to be disrupted.” 

“The North Atlantic Treaty remains a basic element in our foreign 

policies. Let us keep these words uppermost in our minds. Our fate is in our 

own hands. If we remain united, true to ourselves, true to each other, we will 

171 
avoid the unspeakable horrors of another war and be able to devote to the 

tasks of peace an ever-increasing measure of our energy and resources.” 

I would say to you that if you look at the better condition of the peoples 

of our nations and the prosperity that has existed in the intervening years, 

then you will agree those words are exactly true; and if we look to the future, 

those words will bear us through the years ahead. 

Remarks at the WORLD 

PEACE LUNCHEON, 

NATIONAL VETERANS DAY 

Birmingham, AL 

12 November 1984 

Thanks to all of you for that welcome. It is an honor for me to be 

introduced by a great patriot and supporter of national defense like 

Congressman Bill Nichols. Governor, Mayor, Senators, Congressman, fellow 

veterans, friends of veterans, you distinguished Gold Star Mothers, the families 

of POWs and MIAs, and all you admirals and generals. Now, I ask the rest of 

you folks, “Did you ever see so many Admirals and Generals in all your life?” I 

just wonder if this much brass ever got into the same mess hall before at one 

time. 

I am very glad to be here at this World Peace Luncheon and to help in 

this the oldest Veterans Day ceremony in America. I bring you the greetings of 

my fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and on behalf of all the men and 

women in the Armed Forces of the United States, I thank you for your support. 

I also bring you the personal greetings of my boss, Secretary Weinberger. He 

was your guest here last year and he wanted me to thank you again for your 

hospitality and to give special thanks to Raymond Weeks for all that he has 

done and continues to do for veterans. 

As an Army aviator, I had the opportunity to serve at Fort Rucker. I 

didn’t see an awful lot of Alabama. I thought Dothan was simply a navigational 

checkpoint for pilots and had no people there. But I found out later that it was 

a very nice town. I learned to have a great affection for the State, and so, when 

Mr. Weeks asked me to come here, I was delighted to accept. Besides, I know 

that Alabama State Law, Title 13A, Section 11-53, protects public speakers 

from harm. It makes “possession of brass knuckles and slingshots in the 

audience punishable by a fine of not less than $50.” So I feel safe up here. 

I don’t know very many generals who are good public speakers. We’ve 

had a few—MacArthur and some others. Most of us are lousy. So, I concluded 

that I was really invited because I was a veteran. But, even veterans don’t 

necessarily have good reputations for public speaking. They tell the story 

about “Stonewall” Jackson presiding at a courts martial; and one of the defense 

172 
counsels said, “General, you should go easy on the old veteran. He has been 

through many campaigns.” And old Jackson said, “Yeah, that may be so. But 

look at that mule over yonder. He’s been through many campaigns, too, but 

he’s still a jackass.” 

Birmingham can be justifiably proud of the great part it has played in 

promoting Veterans Day. Veterans Day is certainly the logical outgrowth of 

what was originally the celebration of the Armistice after World War I. Sixty-six 

years ago, when those guns were silenced, a young private tried to put into 

words how he felt when peace was declared in a poem entitled “November 11” 

and he wrote: 

“We stood up and didn’t say a word. It felt 

Just like when you have dropped your pack 

After a hike, and straightened out your back, 

And seemed just twice as light as any bird ... 

But all we did was stand and stare and stare, 

Just stare and stand and never say a word.” 

What for tired troops of that American Expeditionary Force of World War 

I on Armistice Day was an instinctive response is now for us a national 

expression of gratitude to those who have fought for the nation’s freedoms in 

all our wars. Veterans Day is a time when those of us who returned home safe 

from the nation’s wars stop to remember our friends who never had a chance 

to find out what it was like when they “dropped their pack.” It is also a time for 

us to look at lessons of the past. 

The nation that forgets the sacrifices of its heroes and those who served 

risks everything that was won for that nation. I believe that one of the most 

encouraging signs of our renewed spirit as a free people is the recognition we 

have at last extended to those who fought and died in Vietnam. Two years ago, 

thousands of Americans gathered to witness the dedication of the Vietnam 

Veterans Memorial in Washington. This past weekend there was another 

ceremony at the Memorial to unveil a magnificent statue that completes the 

monument. And the President accepted the monument as a national 

monument. This morning, Senator Denton and other leaders of Alabama from 

national and state levels, and from county and town governments, gathered to 

honor Alabama’s families with members still missing in Vietnam. 

There is work yet to be done. We can’t forget the nearly 2,500 Americans 

still missing from that war. Accounting for those Americans is a task we must 

complete. Neither can we forget the veterans of every other war—those who 

have returned home to help rebuild our lives and theirs. As a nation we have 

committed ourselves to give them the help they need and deserve. 

Nor should we forget the single great lesson of all the wars of this 

century—that all of us in our nation share with all our allies and the free 

peoples of the world a common responsibility to prevent war—not just nuclear 

war but all war, and to do so in a fashion that preserves freedom and liberty. 

173 
We have to confront both those issues if we want to stay on the path toward 

peace and liberty for ourselves and, more importantly, for our posterity. 

We can’t shrink from our obligations to preserve peace and liberty in the 

face of the challenges of the Soviet system. While we try to negotiate with them 

and to work with them to reduce the risk of war, we have to insure the 

adequacy of our own defense. There is some great guidance for us in the last 

words of the 20th Psalm where David said, “The Lord will give strength unto His 

people; and the Lord will bless His people with peace.” I believe for us in this 

age and time that strength and peace are bound together. In this world of 

nation-states in which we live, only a free nation which is also strong can deter 

the enemies of peace and justice. 

Those words imply two parallel ideas that contribute to peace. The first 

is that we must be sufficiently strong to deter war or the threat of war. We 

don’t want war—nuclear war or any kind of war—but at the same time we don’t 

want to be paralyzed by the fear of war as we go about our business in this 

world. So, our strategy of deterrence is one to preserve peace and freedom and 

to protect our vital interests by making it self-evidently clear to any potential 

enemies that they can’t achieve their aims through war or the threat of war. 

“Deterrence” is a fancy Washington word; but, where I come from, Crow Wing 

County, Minnesota—and I suspect here in Alabama—it really means that “If 

you pick a fight with us, you’re in great danger of getting the tar kicked out of 

you.” 

Second, we should seek by every reasonable means to reduce the risks of 

war. Certainly, arms control negotiations are one of the means that we need to 

pursue. But, we need to recognize that arms control alone will not prevent 

war. Salvador de Madariaga, the great Spanish philosopher and historian who 

worked for many, many years on the old League of Nations Disarmament 

Commission, said in his memoirs, “Nations don’t distrust each other because 

they are armed.” He said, “They arm because they distrust each other.” And 

that’s a very important point for us to remember. 

Our objectives in this country have been relatively constant over the 

years. But the world itself has changed and the threats to our security have 

changed and grown. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, we had clear nuclear 

superiority; and, our conventional forces, although outnumbered by those of 

our potential enemies, were technologically far superior. Since that time there 

has been a shift of power. The Soviets have armed themselves to the teeth. 

Certainly, they are not ten feet tall. They have problems of their own. We don’t 

see people trying to escape to the Soviet Union. We don’t see them clamoring 

to buy Soviet automobiles or Soviet computers or even Soviet blue jeans. Their 

economy is in serious trouble by their own admission and their ideology is laid 

bare even to their friends as being militant and aggressive. Russia is the only 

country in the world that is surrounded by hostile communist neighbors. 

But, still their vast military power is something with which we have to 

reckon. They have added over 3,000 new, modern, Intercontinental Ballistic 

Missile warheads over the last few years while we have been arguing about 

whether or not we should modernize our force at all. They have added about 

174 
1,400 modern, intermediate-range nuclear warheads aimed at our allies in 

NATO. Then they tried to convince NATO and the people of the United States 

that it is immoral for us to respond even though we do so with less than half 

that number. They continue to meddle all the way around the globe—in 

Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Africa and in Central America, as the activities of 

the last few days should have brought home to us. 

Because peace and the preservation of liberty remain our unending 

objectives, it is essential that we see to the health of our military forces. Our 

willingness to rebuild our strategic forces and to strengthen our conventional 

forces can send important signs to all those who would threaten peace. 

I am heartened today to see more consensus in this nation toward that 

end. Last year we saw a favorable vote in the Congress to support the 

recommendations of the Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission for the 

modernization of our strategic nuclear forces—the MX, the B-1, the sea-based 

forces and the command and control. But, there is a hesitancy in the Congress 

to continue that and there are still many, many important votes to come while 

that issue continues to hang in the balance. We need steadiness in the pursuit 

of strength and we need steadiness in the pursuit of arms control. 

As the senior military officer of the United States, let me just take a 

moment to report to you stockholders in America’s security that the condition 

of your Armed Forces is good. I have visited our Armed Forces all over the 

world. I report to you that they are doing well: the tougher the job is, the 

higher their spirits are; and that’s a good sign for the United States. You can 

be proud of what your Armed Forces are doing—both the active forces and the 

Reserve Components. They are on the land, on the sea, under the sea, in the 

skies, doing remarkable things and doing them remarkably well wherever you 

have asked them to do those tasks. 

Our people in the Armed Forces are dedicated and they serve unselfishly. 

The people in the active forces and in the Reserves and the National Guard do 

more than just work for the Armed Forces; they serve in the Armed Forces. 

And that is a completely different concept from just being part of a work force. 

People in the Armed Forces, whether in the active force or the Reserves and the 

Guard, are going to go where you, the citizens of this country, want them to go; 

and they are going to do whatever you, the citizens of this country want them 

to do, whatever the risk. 

Just as our Armed Forces have a duty to you and a duty to the Nation, I 

believe that the Nation has a duty to our people in uniform—to those who have 

served in the past, to those who serve now, and to those who will serve in the 

future. We’re not at war today. There are many, many reasons why we are not 

at war today. But one of those, one of the very important reasons, is that we 

have 2.1 million very good men and women in the active force and we have 

another million plus in the National Guard and Reserves. And they are serving 

to let our potential enemies know that this nation will remain strong. 

Very much a part of the willingness and the readiness of the people in 

the Armed Forces to defend this nation is the knowledge that the people of the 

country, during peacetime and war, will take care of the people in uniform and 

175 
take care of the veterans. While they are in the Service, we expect to give them 

good equipment, good training, and adequate pay and compensation; we will 

take care of their families if they have to march off to war; we will pick up our 

wounded and give them decent medical care; we will pick up our dead and 

provide reverent treatment; we will do what’s necessary to get back prisoners or 

those missing; and we will provide sensible help and care for all who served. 

The people in our Armed Services deserve good equipment, top-notch 

equipment, equipment that works and gives our people the edge in battle. Our 

strategy calls for the use of American technology, one of America’s strong 

points. We do that because we value human life more than we value things. I 

frequently hear misguided people say, “Why don’t we just buy cheaper 

weapons? That way we can buy more equipment and then we won’t feel so 

badly if we lose it to the enemy.” Now the problem with all that is that when 

the equipment gets destroyed, so do the people who are operating it. I don’t 

want your sons or daughters or any young American out there in battle with 

cheap, bargain-basement, ineffective weapons and equipment trying to protect 

our freedom. 

I am also happy to see the great cooperation between the active forces, 

the National Guard and the Reserves. And that certainly exists right here in 

the State of Alabama as well as anywhere else. It is essential that we keep our 

Reserve forces strong because they figure more prominently in our strategy 

than they ever have before. They are truly Minutemen. We expect them to 

have a state of readiness beyond anything that we have ever expected before, 

and we expect them to be able to march off in a hurry. I have seen the 

National Guard and the Reserves of all four Services on maneuvers all over the 

world—in Europe, East Asia, the Middle East—certainly a demonstration of the 

readiness of this country. But they need special help from you in the civilian 

community. They particularly need help from the employers and I call for your 

support to the Employers Support for the Guard and Reserve. 

At the same time, it is also important for us in uniform to remember that 

the taxpayer deserves a very fair shake in all this, too. He deserves to have us 

buy good equipment—equipment that is worth the price and equipment that is 

effective but not “gold-plated.” By the same token, the Armed Forces and the 

taxpayer deserve a fair shake from American industry and labor by having 

them produce quality equipment and by seeing that a fair price is asked for it. 

All these factors lie at the heart of our military health—good people, good 

equipment, good training, and dedicated leadership. And I am buoyed by the 

progress I have seen. Yet, I am concerned about our willingness to continue to 

provide for our security. We have heard it mentioned here many times today 

that we owe our security to those patriots who served before us—to our 

Forefathers who secured our liberty and freedom. They at their time in history 

did what was necessary. Now, it is time for us to pay our part of the price if we 

are to reap the benefits and to have our posterity reap the benefits of liberty. 

The price we have to pay is high but it is money; it is not blood. If we don’t pay 

it in money, we will pay it in blood eventually. 

176 
I recall what President Reagan said to me when I took this job two and a 

half years ago. He said, as he announced my appointment, “Keep us strong, 

keep us ready, so that we may keep the peace.” The essence of our strategy is 

keeping the peace by keeping strong and ready. The United States is not 

charging around looking for war. No one who has ever experienced war could 

ever want another one. I am reminded of that great cartoon by Bill Mauldin 

from World War II. It shows “Willie and Joe” all dirty and scruffy and tired, 

sitting on the bombed-out steps of what was once a house. A clean, confidentlooking soldier swaggers by and Willie turns to Joe and says, “That can’t be no 

real combat soldier, Joe. He’s actually out lookin’ fer a fight.” 

We face a difficult and uncertain world. But, we can face that world with 

confidence. We have just finished a national election, an important 

demonstration that the pronoun for the United States is “We.” Sometimes, 

when I listen to people talk, I believe they think that it’s “they”: “They did it.” 

“They are responsible”—that ubiquitous “they” without any antecedent to the 

pronoun. But, in fact, America’s pronoun is “we.” “We hold these truths to be 

self-evident that all men are created equal.” “We, the People of the United 

States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic 

Tranquility, provide for the common defence.” “We pledge our lives, our 

fortunes and our sacred honor”—Whatever this country does or fails to do, “we” 

will do it, “we” the people. “We” are responsible for it. 

There aren’t any cheap, easy gimmicks as we seek world peace and 

national security. Strength, steadiness, hewing to the cause of freedom and 

justice, helping friends and willing allies, a willingness to serve—all are great 

contributors. Military strength alone will not guarantee world peace or even 

our own security. We need our political health, economic and social health and 

certainly, above all, we need moral and spiritual health in order to sustain our 

freedoms. 

Every coin we have has written on it “In God We Trust.” As we march off 

into this uncertain future seeking to secure our liberty and freedom, there is a 

good prayer in the Lutheran Book of Worship in the Order of Matins and it 

goes, “Lord God, You have called Your servants to ventures of which we cannot 

see the ending, by paths as yet untrodden, through perils unknown. Give us 

faith to go out with good courage, not knowing where we go, but only that Your 

hand is leading us and Your love is supporting us.” 

I thank you for having me here today. My colleagues, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, know that we have a special duty to work very hard to help protect this 

nation and I want you to know that we are going to do it. With the help of God, 

with the loyal and selfless service of our armed forces, with the help of patriots 

like you, and the support of the President and the Congress, and the people of 

the other states, we will preserve peace and liberty, not only for ourselves but 

for those who follow. Thank you. 

177 
Memorandum for the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Subject: Enhanced CINC 

Participation in the PPBS 

19 November 1984 

[A natural tension exists between the civilian staff of the Secretary of Defense 

and his military staff, the JCS. Here is an example, wherein the DEPSECDEF 

essentially told the CJCS not to carry out his Title X responsibilities. This 

dialogue was handled without staffs so as to keep the dispute out of the Press. 

The DepSecDef memorandum was quietly withdrawn as a result of this 

correspondence.] 

Your memorandum, subject as above, dated 14 November 1984, has 

been received, reviewed and implemented. The steps you have taken to 

enhance the role of the CINCs are both welcome and appreciated. 

In light of your personal memorandum to me and the last section of the 

broadly distributed memorandum, it appears appropriate to review briefly the 

background of this issue in order to keep it in perspective. 

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined the CINCs role in the POM and 

program review process in response to your request and in a search for 

“useful adjustments to enhance and improve the CINCs role.” 

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously approved rather modest 

changes to the procedures they have followed for the past few years and 

advised the Secretary of Defense of our proposed internal course of 

action on 9 October. 

c. The action taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was believed to be well 

within the responsibilities imposed upon us by the Secretary of Defense 

and Congress—and in accord with what we perceived to be your policies. 

The question is one of responsibility. 

a. As the SecDef’s immediate military staff, it is the duty of the Joint 

Chiefs to: 

(1) Coordinate all communications in matters of joint interest to the 

CINCs. 

(2) Review major armed forces requirements in relation to strategic 

and logistics plans. 

(3) Review CINC plans and programs to determine their adequacy, 

feasibility, and suitability. 

b. Subject to the authority of SecDef, the CJCS acts as the CINCs 

spokesman on operational requirements. [10 USC Section 124 C (2)] 

This change in the US Code was only recently passed and has not as yet been 

formally implemented. It is, I believe, self-executing. 

178 
The actions taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were designed to be within 

the scope of their responsibilities and to expand and improve the dialogue 

among the key uniformed participants. The Joint Chiefs of Staff want to play a 

helpful role in the process. We wish to enhance our ability to provide 

competent, professional advice; but our role and how our advice is used 

depend on the entire DOD organization—not just upon us. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff have only taken those necessary first steps to prepare ourselves to 

discharge our obligation—not to change the PPBS process or to direct how 

others participate in the process. If any thing the Joint Chiefs of Staff or I have 

said is subject to a contrary influence, it is regretted. It seems to me that the 

differences in your 14 November memorandum and my 6 November are more 

apparent than real. 

The information and guidance the Joint Chiefs of Staff intend to furnish 

the CINCs is attached at Enclosure 2. 

I would be remiss if I failed to make one essential point. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and I have always conducted our affairs not only to serve the Nation’s 

security interests but also to try to ease the burdens of the President and the 

Secretary of Defense, and you. Our focus has been and remains on improving 

SecDef’s effectiveness by doing our job as well as we can as committed 

members of a team under clear civilian control. I do not believe there is any 

issue here, but if there is concern about these essential elements, I hope we 

can discuss them without delay. 

Article for DEFENSE 84 

“ON THE FRONT LINES OF DETERRENCE” 

November-December 1984 Edition 

Our nation has a defensive strategy. We exclude the possibility we will 

initiate a war or launch a preemptive strike. We rely on the maintenance of 

strong, always-ready nuclear and conventional forces supported by superb 

intelligence, good mobility, and superior command and control to make it selfevidently clear to any adversary that the cost of aggression would be too high to 

justify an attack. 

Our global strategy and policy place great emphasis on a collective 

defense posture. Our strategy is a coalition strategy, and we are fortunate to 

have reliable allies. To buttress our coalition strategy and to assure its 

effectiveness, we maintain a balanced mix of forward-deployed forces and a 

flexible force structure of rapid-reacting forces in our central reserve. 

Our unified or joint system of command, in keeping with our strategy 

and our global perspective, is unique. Unified command calls for a single 

operational commander responsible to the National Command Authorities and 

exercising command over all the units of his assigned forces, regardless of 

179 
Service. This system of command has worked well since President Eisenhower 

on April 3, 1958, set out the guidelines for a system of “operational commands 

that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our 

objectives.” Further, his concept was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve 

“as staff in assisting the Secretary of Defense in his exercise of direction over 

the unified commands.” 

In this arrangement, information flows up and down a ladder. Command 

guidance, coordinated intelligence, policy, and strategy flow down to the field 

commanders. Operational reports, requests, and raw information flow back 

up; and these communications must flow laterally, too. They may skip a rung 

or two descending or ascending. Nevertheless, our system is disciplined by the 

principle that decisions are made at the lowest possible level so that flexibility 

is given, along with the resources, authority, initiative, and responsibility, to 

those who can use it to best advantage—the commanders on the scene, that is 

the Commanders in Chief of our nine unified and specified commands, the 

CINCs. 

We give our CINCs the necessary information and resources, and then we 

give them the rattle-room to exploit the situation or to resolve problems under 

a system in which orders are given as broad descriptions of the intended 

outcome—not as detailed descriptions of what precisely is to be done. The 

missions of the Commanders in Chief under this concept are demanding and 

require excellent support to accomplish the tasks. Let me address some 

general aspects of the challenges that I see. 

First, our Commanders in Chief exist to be ready to fight and to fight 

successfully. Should deterrence fail, they are the ones who will carry out our 

war plans. Under those plans, each unified and specified command has a 

unique mission, a unique slice of geography, and a unique set of allies. 

Accordingly, the views of the CINCs must be fully considered as we build and 

maintain our forces in peacetime. Also, the Commanders in Chief need good 

planning support to develop their war plans. We need to harness modern 

computer technology so the CINCs can use it to develop better war plans. 

Second, we must ensure that the forces from each of the Services are 

integrated properly so we get the most out of them. The Commanders in Chief 

and the forces provided by the Services to the Commanders in Chief must be as 

effective as we can make them. Our nation has small forces in relation to the 

myriad requirements for those forces. We must realize the full potential of our 

military might by ensuring these forces can work together. Through sensible 

equipment, joint doctrine, and exercises, we ensure interoperability and we get 

a payoff that’s greater than the sum of the individual parts. 

That ties into my third point of ensuring we have the capability to work 

with allies. We have fought three major wars in the last 40 years, all of which 

required close cooperation with our friends. Should we have to fight again, 

we’ll do it in cooperation with our allies. 

We share with a number of nations common goals and objectives so that 

they’re willing to join us in the defense of the freedom that we cherish. Some 

nations have different military heritages—some of them compatible with ours 

180 
and some not as compatible. Our languages and cultures may be different. 

The task for us is to maintain forces and to exercise and train them in 

combined exercises so that our Commanders in Chief can operate effectively 

within a coalition framework. 

Everything we do must stand that one test, “Have we improved the 

warfighting capabilities of the Commanders in Chief and that of the forces 

assigned to the operating forces under the Commanders in Chief?” Our nation 

cannot lose sight of this objective as we build, exercise, and maintain our 

forces in peacetime. The effectiveness of our Commanders in Chief is the basis 

upon which our deterrent strategy is built and through which peace is 

maintained and liberty preserved in a troubled world. 

181 
182 
1985 

Selected Works 

Remarks to the PEOPLE’S LIBERATION 

ARMY MILITARY ACADEMY 

Beijing, People’s Republic of China 

14 January 1985 

Thank you for the warm welcome. I am honored to be here. Some of my 

colleagues in the United States asked me, “Why are you going to China in 

winter? Beijing is cold in winter.” First, I say in response that I am from the 

coldest region of my own country, Minnesota, and I enjoy the winter. 

Second, I remember something I read about the art of Chinese painting. 

It said, “If you want to learn to paint a tree, do so in winter when leaves no 

longer block the view of its true form and character.” Similarly, I believe that if 

military leaders from our two nations understand the true form and character 

of each other, we can advance the cause of peace. 

I am here to become acquainted with your military leaders and your 

armed forces, and to understand your strategy, your military doctrine and 

tactics, and the form and character of your armed forces—all to improve my 

own understanding of the ways in which the military forces of our two 

countries, our two independent nations, might help each other. 

The defense requirements of our two nations are different, and your 

defense requirements are in many ways more complex than ours. I look to the 

north of my own country and I see Canada and the longest peaceful, 

undefended border in the world. Then, I look to the north of China and I see 

the Soviets poised on your border with around sixty divisions, as well as Sovietsupported aggression in countries to the south and west of China. 

Your armed forces are different from those of the United States; but, we 

have many common problems. We both face the same threat, the heavily 

mechanized, modern forces of the Soviet Union. We both have friends who face 

aggression from Soviet surrogates. We share a common desire for the wellbeing of our peoples. 

I believe that we as soldiers can help work for peace if we understand one 

another. To help you understand the United States military forces, let me take 

183 
the time allotted me to trace quickly from the fundamental elements of our 

military strategy through the structure of our military forces, the weapons we 

provide our forces, and the training and support of those forces. Then, I hope I 

can answer your questions. 

Our forces, our doctrine and weapons are developed to support our 

strategy. Our society, our heritage, and the character of our people have a 

great influence on our strategy and the building of our armed forces. Our 

strategy is defensive. Our fundamental objective is to defend our people, our 

institutions and our way of life, and to help other independent nations 

maintain a peaceful world in which we can all pursue the legitimate economic, 

political and social goals of our people. We have no intention of starting a war 

with anyone. We believe we can best prevent war by being self-evidently 

prepared to defend ourselves and our friends. We want to discourage war. A 

word we often use is “deterrence.” We have absolutely no ambitions for 

territorial gain. We have fought in two World Wars in this century and the only 

territory we sought was burial grounds for our dead in the countries we were 

helping defend. 

Our strategy is shaped by our economic and cultural ties to many parts 

of the world. We share common goals with many nations. We have ties across 

both the Atlantic and the Pacific, but we are uniquely tied to the nations of the 

Pacific. One of our states, Hawaii, is completely surrounded by the Pacific. 

Another, Alaska, extends just below the Arctic Circle to the eastern tip of Asia 

and the Soviet Union. And, we have more trade with countries in the Pacific 

than with any other region of the world. We also have great trade and cultural 

ties to Europe, Africa and the other nations in the Western Hemisphere. 

In keeping with our global outlook, our strategy revolves around a few 

fundamental ingredients. The first is that we are allied with a number of other 

nations in the world whose security and political interests are similar to ours. 

Those nations are in three large blocs: in Europe and the western part of Asia, 

in East Asia and the Pacific, and in the Western Hemisphere. 

We have forces stationed overseas and afloat in conjunction with those 

alliances and at the invitation of the nations where stationed. These forces have 

two purposes: one is to give self-evident military strength to the alliances and 

the other is to help provide cohesion for the alliances—that is, to let our friends 

know that if they are attacked, we will consider ourselves attacked as well. 

Our forces are designed so that they can operate far from home bases and in 

cooperation with the forces of many other nations. 

Historically, the American people have been opposed to large standing 

military forces and opposed to stationing forces overseas. Before World War II 

we had very small regular forces and very few forces overseas. In both World 

War I and World War II we were forced into hasty, expensive mobilizations after 

we or our friends were attacked. Today, our forces are larger; and more of 

them are overseas than we would want. The combination of modern warfare 

and the world political situation seems to dictate both. Our people accept the 

need to do what we are doing, but the policies are questioned and reviewed 

every year. 

184 
Our strategy calls for a strong, responsive central reserve of forces which 

can reinforce our deployed forces or go other places where needed. In our 

central reserve we have regular full-time forces and Reserve forces—that is, 

those forces composed of civilians who are called to active duty as we mobilize. 

Our Reserve forces spend more time in training than those of many countries. 

A Reserve soldier, sailor, airman or Marine spends about 38 days a year 

training in his combat tasks. He trains two days and nights each month and 

for one full two-week period each year. 

Perhaps I can give an example of that. On my way here I had airplane 

trouble in Alaska. My airplane had to stop until I picked up a Reserve airplane 

crew, some civilians who were on active duty for two days. And it was a 

surprise to them that they had to fly me the rest of the way to Japan. 

Considering the size of our country and our global ties, our forces are not 

large in number. Our population is close in size to that of the Soviets. We 

have 238 million people; they have 278 million people. We have 2.1 million 

men and women in our active forces in contrast to the Soviets 4.8 million. We 

have organized Reserve forces of 1 million in contrast to the Soviets’ 10 million. 

We also have a trained reserve manpower pool of 400,000 which can be 

mobilized. 

From the fundamental ingredients of our strategy—that is, defensive and 

deterrent, relatively small forces, cooperation with allies, deployed forces and a 

central reserve—flow other ingredients we believe necessary to make the 

strategy a success. Those ingredients are, first, very good intelligence, good 

command and control, then good mobility—that is, both strategic mobility and 

tactical battlefield mobility—the ability to control the air over the battle area, 

and to operate on our lines of communication without undue influence from 

enemy air forces; the ability to control and use the seas at places of our 

choosing; and the ability to use space for legitimate missions without 

interference. 

The last element of our strategy is the maintenance of nuclear forces 

which are strong, flexible and modern. The purpose of the nuclear forces is to 

make it very clear to any potential enemy that they cannot achieve their war 

aims by attacking us or our allies with nuclear forces and also to help 

discourage attacks with non-nuclear forces. 

First, concerning intelligence. We want good, timely intelligence to warn 

us of attack and to help us decide on our course of action. We devote a lot of 

effort to assuring that all our leaders, from the head of the government down to 

platoon and squad leaders, are well-informed about the situations they face. 

By coupling modern sensors, computers and communications with traditional 

battlefield intelligence techniques, we want to give our commanders at every 

echelon more knowledge about the battlefield situation than the enemy 

commanders they face. We want our company commanders to know more than 

the enemy regimental commanders. 

With good intelligence, our commanders can then use good command 

and control and extraordinarily good mobility to get the necessary forces to the 

point of decision. We believe these principles apply to the global strategic 

185 
situation as well as to the tactical battlefield situation. I use the word 

“battlefield” in the broadest context, meaning in addition to the land battlefield 

the battle areas in the air, on the sea and under the sea. 

You can see that with the combination of our very long coast-line—

12,130 miles long—having an island state among our fifty states, our extensive 

world trade, our commitments to allies, and our deployed forces dictates that 

we have strong naval forces; and we do have those. We have a 540-ship Navy 

and we plan to increase it to 600 ships. At the heart of our naval forces are our 

aircraft carrier battle groups—13 of them, with a goal of 15 groups of ships 

built around aircraft carriers, each with over 100 modern aircraft. The naval 

forces are designed to control the seas at places of our choosing and to take the 

battle to the enemy’s naval forces and their land bases. Four Marine 

amphibious divisions and supporting air wings are ready to support the naval 

campaign. 

Control of the air over the battle area and our lines of communication is 

provided by 140 Air Force modern fighter and attack squadrons, by 110 Navy 

and Marine Corps fighter and attack squadrons, and by surface-to-air missiles 

and guns on our ships and by a force of mobile surface-to-air missiles and 

anti-aircraft guns with our land forces. 

Our Army has 27 divisions and 30 independent brigades. About half are 

armored or mechanized forces. The others are a variety of so-called light 

forces, including a parachute division and a helicopter-borne, air-assault 

division. Our divisions are large—between 15,000 and 18,500 personnel. 

I mentioned the freedom to use space for legitimate missions. We use 

satellites for communications, for weather reconnaissance, and for warning of 

attack by land- and sea-based ballistic missiles. We use technology to protect 

our satellites from electronic attack and we are developing a limited antisatellite weapon to deter physical attacks on our satellites by being able to 

threaten attacks on enemy satellites. As you may know, the Soviets have 

already built and tested an anti-satellite weapon. 

Our nuclear forces are designed to deter attack and are not designed for 

a first strike. About 80 percent of our strategic weapons are in the bomber and 

submarine forces and only 20 percent in intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 

contrast, the Soviets have 70 percent of their warheads in their 

intercontinental ballistic missile force, the force most useable for a first strike. 

We keep all three elements—bombers, submarine missiles and intercontinental 

ballistic missiles—in our force because we believe each provides special 

strengths which will help ensure against tactical or technical surprise. 

We are now modernizing all parts of the force. We have consistently 

sought greater accuracy and greater reliability for our weapons systems. 

Consequently, we have been able to reduce the yields and the number of 

warheads required for our objectives. Our weapons are designed to retaliate 

against the key elements of Soviet military power and not against cities and 

people. As important as the weapons systems themselves is having reliable 

space-based and land-based warning systems and a good modern, survivable 

186 
communications and control system. We believe it important to keep all facets 

modern, reliable and ready in order to help keep the peace. 

In Geneva last week, our Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign 

Minister Gromyko agreed to resume negotiations to try to reduce offensive 

nuclear arms and to discuss space and defensive weapons. The United States 

will enter those negotiations in good faith and with the sincere hope that we 

can find a way to reduce the level of nuclear arms on both sides. 

We believe that our scientific and technological strength should be used 

to strengthen our Armed Forces. We place great value on each man and 

woman in uniform and we go to great lengths to provide them good, reliable, 

effective tools for battle. We spend a lot of time and effort training for success 

in modern battle. As is the case for all nations whose strategies are defensive, 

we are continually modernizing our forces to meet defense challenges of the 

future while recognizing that we help keep the peace in the present by having 

ready, effective forces today. 

People are the heart of our Armed Forces. All the best equipment in the 

world is useless without good people—good people who are well-led, welldisciplined, physically fit, and who are well-trained in good, combined arms 

doctrine. All members of our Armed Forces are volunteers. About half of them 

we call “careerists.” We expect them to serve between 20 and 30 years. The 

other half are on their first enlistment and have less than four years of service. 

Thirteen percent of the forces are officers or warrant officers. The officers are 

university graduates and 33 percent of them have graduate degrees. Ninetythree percent of the enlisted force are high school graduates and over 14 

percent have some university education. Fifty-five percent of the force is 25 

years of age or younger. Six percent of the force is over 40 years of age. Nine 

percent of the force are women. 

We believe that each member of the Armed Forces must be well-trained 

and regularly tested in his or her individual duties. We believe that individual 

training is only a prelude to team training, the kind of training which gets most 

of our training effort. We set tasks, conditions and standards for all training 

whether it be for an Infantry squad exercise or for a large force maneuver 

involving land sea and air forces. We believe that realistic peacetime training 

will save lives in wartime, and we also believe it will help preserve the peace by 

letting our potential enemies know that we are ready to fight. 

Training is the key to success in battle. Our armed forces devote a great 

deal of attention to training and to improving our training techniques. Training 

is expensive and we want to make certain that we train wisely. We spend a lot 

of time working on marksmanship, maneuver and command and control in 

realistic, live-fire exercises and in developing good, well-understood combined 

arms doctrine. We use computer-driven simulations to train in all sorts of 

skills from aircraft crews to anti-tank gunners to battalion, brigade and 

division staffs. 

We use instrumented training ranges to help find our mistakes in 

peacetime. For example, at the Air Force Fighter Weapons Center our pilots 

train against pilots specially trained to use Soviet tactics in aircraft closely 

187 
resembling Soviet aircraft in capabilities. Every maneuver, every instrument 

reading, and every radar command and radio transmission are recorded for 

evaluation and study. At the Army’s National Training Center our tank and 

mechanized forces maneuver against a force trained and equipped as a Soviet 

tank regiment and a Soviet motorized rifle regiment. Both forces use lasers 

closely approximating the range and accuracy of all direct-fire weapons. There 

are laser detectors on every man and vehicle. The details of the maneuver—all 

movements, all firing and all radio transmissions—are recorded. All officers 

and soldiers carefully study the results to find their own mistakes to help 

improve future training. 

Our doctrine stems from our experience that in battle the whole is 

greater than the sum of the parts. The fingers of the hand spread apart can be 

broken, but together they form a fist. Through effective command and control 

and through a doctrine understood by all, we achieve unity of effort among all 

arms to concentrate combat power of combined arms forces at the decisive point. 

We design our forces and employ them so that this integration is assured in 

combat—helicopters and close air support aircraft work in close coordination 

with the ground maneuver and the fire support elements; naval and air units 

cooperate at sea and near the land. Our exercises and our simulations are 

designed to train our people to operate automatically in combined arms 

teams—teams which may involve elements from the Army, the Navy, the Air 

Force and the Marine Corps. 

To help illustrate what I have been trying to say, let me discuss briefly 

how we would plan to fight the Soviet first echelon tank forces: We will reduce 

the effectiveness of attacking tank forces by interdicting the defiles and choke 

points with air and artillery using modern munitions. We will use electronic 

warfare to disrupt communications. We will slow the attacking force with 

mines, both planned minefields and mines fired by artillery or laid by 

helicopter. The main parts of the battle will be fought by the combined arms 

teams—our own tank, mechanized infantry, and attack helicopter units 

supported by attack air and artillery. 

Here is a picture of our newest Main Battle Tank. (Slide is shown) It is 

commanded by a staff sergeant, a soldier with six to nine years of service. It 

has a gunner who probably has three to six years of service, a driver with two 

to five years of service and a gun loader who has one to three years of service. 

They drill about five days a week in crew tasks. They fire hundreds of subcaliber rounds on miniature ranges. They have regular maneuver training as a 

part of their platoon, company, and battalion in combined arms exercises. 

About four times each year they will maneuver with Air Force and artillery 

support. About 35 percent of their training is at night. They fire 134 rounds of 

main gun tank ammunition each year on difficult, realistic ranges. About half 

of the firing is at night and all firing is carefully graded. 

Here is a picture of our Infantry Fighting Vehicle. (Slide is shown) It 

carries an Infantry squad commanded by a staff sergeant with six to nine years 

of service. The vehicle itself has a rapid-fire 25mm gun capable of destroying 

light armored vehicles and it carries four TOW anti-tank missiles for long-range 

188 
fire against tanks. The infantrymen can dismount and employ a shorter range, 

wire-guided anti-tank missile and all the infantrymen can carry hand-held 

anti-tank rockets. The training and firing tests for the mechanized infantry 

squad are similar to those of the tank crew. 

This next picture is of the Attack Helicopter. (Slide is shown) Its main 

mission is anti-tank. It carries 16 laser-guided anti-tank missiles and a 30 

mm cannon. The missile range is about 6000 meters and it can be guided by 

the helicopter crew, by another helicopter or by an artillery observer with a 

tank or infantry company. The crew of the helicopter consists of two warrant 

officers. One of them has six to fifteen years of service and about 1500 hours 

of flying time in a helicopter. The other has less than six years of service and 

about 500 hours of helicopter flying time. They train extensively in computerdriven simulators which reproduce all aspects of their combat mission. They 

fly about 10 one-and-a-half hour missions each month—almost all of it in what 

we call “nap of the earth flight” in combined arms training. About 40 percent 

of the training is at night. 

This next picture is an Air Force A-10 attack plane. (Slide is shown) Its 

main armament is a high-velocity 30mm gun which fires a tank-killing, 

depleted uranium round. The pilot is an officer, lieutenant or captain, with two 

to 10 years of service. He had 500 to 1000 hours of flying time. He too trains 

on flight simulators and he flies about 15 one-and-a-half-hour missions each 

month. He trains with Army units in combined exercises. If he is stationed in 

the United States, once a year he will fly his airplane to Europe or to East Asia, 

or to the Middle East to participate in maneuvers with our own forces and with 

allied forces. 

Our philosophy of command seeks unity and flexibility in execution. We 

follow the principle that decisions are made at the lowest possible level where 

tactical flexibility and effective combined arms action is assured. Information 

flows up and down and laterally. Command guidance, coordinated intelligence, 

and information flow back up. We try to get new intelligence immediately to all 

who can use it. We give authority, responsibility, information and resources to 

those who can use them to best advantage—the combat leaders on the scene. 

We give our combat leaders at every level the necessary information and 

resources, and then we give them room to exploit the situation or to resolve the 

problems under a system in which orders are given as broad descriptions of the 

intended outcome—not as detailed prescriptions of what precisely is to be 

done. 

The defense structure I have outlined is responsive to civilian control. It 

is a valued principle in our society that the military be subservient to the will of 

the people as manifested in our civilian leaders. We have four Services in the 

United States—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps. These 

four Services, each under a civilian leader and a uniformed Chief of Staff, are 

responsible for the peacetime function of organizing, training, equipping and 

supporting the forces they provide to the operational commanders. Our 

operational commanders command forces of all Services and are responsible 

for all forces in large geographic areas for special missions such as our Air 

189 
Defense Command. The operational commanders receive the orders of the 

President, the civilian Commander-in-Chief, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

the uniformed Chiefs of the four Services and me as the Chairman. We are the 

military advisors and the military staff for the elected civilian leaders of the 

people. 

This then is a short overview of our military system. My description is 

sketchy and incomplete, but I hope it will help you understand us. 

Let me conclude by repeating that while our two nations are different, we 

are also similar in our desire for peace as the best way to advance the wellbeing of our peoples. Similarly, while our Armed Forces are different, we in 

uniform have much we can learn from each other. For our part, the U.S. 

military draws its military traditions from many nations. One of those 

traditions of military excellence and tactical skill was first found here, in China. 

In the words of Sun Tzu: 

“The general who in advancing does not seek personal fame, 

and in withdrawing is not concerned with avoiding punishment, 

but whose only purpose is to protect the people and promote the 

best interest of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state. 

Because such a general regards his men as infants they will march 

with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own 

beloved sons and they will die with him.” 

This is the concept of selfless service to a cause larger than self which 

motivates United States soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines—as I am sure it 

does your own forces. It reflects the special bond of trust and confidence 

between the military forces and the society those forces serve and protect. 

As one Western philosopher in ancient Greece about the same time as 

Sun Tzu, Plato said: “Nothing can be more important than the work of the 

Guardians should be well done .... If shoemakers become inferior and corrupt 

and claim to be what they are not, the State is not in peril. But if the soldiers, 

the Guardians of our law and State, only appear to be Guardians and are not, 

you surely see that they destroy the State utterly.” Then, he goes on to say that 

Guardians or soldiers should be dangerous to their enemies and gentle to their 

friends, “quick to see, swift to overtake the enemy, and strong.” He concludes 

that bravery is essential but that bravery comes not from physical strength but 

from spiritual strength. 

These ancient principles guide our armed forces. From what I have seen 

of your people, your country, and your armed forces, I am sure that these same 

principles motivate you. 

190 
Remarks at the CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL 

OF HONOR SOCIETY PRESIDENTIAL 

INAUGURAL DAY BRUNCH 

Washington, DC 

20 January 1985 

I am happy to welcome you to Washington on the eve of the official 

Fiftieth Inauguration. I bring you the greetings not only of my fellow Joint 

Chiefs who are here but also the over 3 million soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

Marines and Coast Guardsmen—active and Reserve. We thank you for your 

service and for the example that you have set of selfless sacrifice for the 

security of the Nation. 

Yesterday I came back from a week-long visit to the People’s Republic of 

China. That trip home was a stark reminder of the dangers in this troubled 

world today. In spite of the great sacrifices made and the dangers endured by 

you and others, the world is still a very troubled place. In fact, there are 23 

wars going on in the world today. But, our nation, blessedly, is at peace. My 

trip home from China—flying over or near the sites of the land, sea and air 

battle areas of past wars—World War II and Korea—brought to me quite clearly 

just how fortunate we are today. We are here, a nation at peace, having 

completed that uniquely American ritual that we perform every four years—

electing our President. We are concluding that ritual by peacefully installing 

him as the leader of the greatest democracy on earth. Many other nations 

would be witnessing wars or riots or a struggle for power at this very moment. 

We are not. That is not the way we change leadership in this country. Instead, 

this morning there was a quiet little ceremony which I just witnessed at the 

White House and there will be a public ceremony tomorrow that you will 

participate in. 

What about the future? Will we be as secure in 2005 as we are in 1985? 

There are those in this world who are not all that confident that we will be. In 

fact, there are some who are downright pessimistic. There is a stunning new 

book by a French author named Jean-Francois Revel called How Democracies 

Perish. In the opening lines of the book, he described the world as “a 

democracy-killing machine.” And he goes on to say in the book that 

“Democracy is not basically structured to defend itself against outside enemies 

seeking its annihilation, especially since the latest and most dangerous of these 

external enemies, communism, parades as democracy perfected when it is in 

fact the absolute negation of democracy.” 

Another French author, Ardant du Picq, in his book Battle Studies, said, 

“There is no military spirit in a democratic society .... A democratic society is 

antagonistic to the military spirit.” 

In some ways, both Revel and Ardant du Picq have some good arguments 

to support their contentions. Although the word “democracy” is liberally 

sprinkled in the titles of many nations in the world, only a very small fraction 

of the world’s population live in reasonably democratic nations. 

191 
The pessimism of those two French writers ought to keep us on our toes 

as we look at the history of the world around us; but their pessimism ought not 

to frighten us as we look at our own history. The plaque on the corner of the 

Minneapolis city auditorium which we marched by on the way to the railroad 

station in 1941 when we were mobilized—I remember reading it—it says: 

“Participation in the rights of citizenship assumes participation in the duties of 

citizenship.” This is fundamental to democracy; and the duties range all the 

way from voting to elect our President and legislators to paying the taxes we 

levy on ourselves. Those duties encompass fighting, yea, even risking death in 

the battles that “We the People” choose to fight in the defense of this nation 

and its principles. 

You who wear the Medal of Honor are the embodiment of that 

fundamental principle and are proof of the unbroken history of America’s 

willingness to do what must be done to keep this nation free. You represent a 

spirit and a virtue which are uniquely American and which refute the 

predictions of doom for democracy. I want to tell you that the men and women 

in uniform today embody that spirit as well—a spirit of free men and women 

not wanting war but ready and willing, if need be, to fight for a just cause. 

The men and women in uniform today are worthy descendents of those 

who served in the past. There are over two million soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

Marines and Coast Guardsmen on active duty today. There are another million 

men and women in the National Guard and Reserves. They comprise a force 

for peace which by its preparedness makes it clear to our potential enemies 

that they cannot win a war with the United States. We are at peace today 

because we are strong. If we maintain our strength, we will increase the 

chances of keeping the peace. 

Joachim Von Arnim, the German novelist who lived in the early 1800s, 

said, “The history of the world begins anew with every man, and ends with 

him.” He meant that one man or one woman can make a difference. We have 

here a roomful of people who made a difference. Aristotle once said, “Virtue 

was the habit of right choice.” Certainly, your bravery was virtuous. What you 

did was the right choice. Through your sacrifices and the sacrifices of millions 

of others whose achievements were not so heroic, our nation enjoys peace 

today. 

We have been at peace for over 10 years now. No new Medals of Honor 

have been awarded except for the tardy but fully deserved award to Sergeant 

Benavidez. So, there have been fewer occasions to award the Medal of Honor; 

and the ranks of those of you who wear it are thinning. With the death last 

week of Charles Kelly, the first enlisted man to receive the award in World War 

II, there are now only about 250 or so of you in this nation of some 250 million. 

But, I know that is just fine with you. I know that in this room there is 

the hope that there will be no need for bravery such as yours again. And I pray 

that you are right. War in this modern age, as in every age, is a terrible thing 

and we need to work very hard to prevent it. The best way for this nation to 

prevent war is by tending to all the elements of our strength—not just our 

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military strength but our economic strength, our political strength, our social 

strength, and, most importantly, our moral strength as well. 

Our nation seems to learn over and over again that the price of peace 

and freedom is constant vigilance. The cost of vigilance is high. We will 

remember that as we debate the defense budget over the next few months. You 

in this room know that the cost of vigilance in peacetime has never been as 

high as the price of wars that come from the lack of vigilance. The price of war 

is not simply paid in dollars for defense budgets; it is paid in the blood of our 

citizens and in the blood of our allies. 

So, if this nation wants to maintain its freedom, it should continue to 

stand shoulder to shoulder with the other free nations of the world, and 

continue to accept its responsibilities as a leader of the nation-states of this 

world. In turn, we the citizens of this country—“We the People”—have to 

continue to accept our responsibilities as citizens—citizens of a leading nation 

in this world—and do what we have to do to preserve liberty for ourselves and 

our posterity in the years ahead. 

Once again, on behalf of all the men and women of the Armed Forces of 

the United States, I want to thank you for what you have done. Thanks for 

coming to Washington for this Fiftieth inauguration, the great celebration that 

signifies the freedom that you helped preserve. Thank you very much. 

Closing Remarks to the 

SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE 

On the FY 86 DOD AUTHORIZATION 

Washington, DC 

7 February 1985 

Throughout this hearing I have listened to some assertions from some 

very respected Senators and I am sorry they are not here now to hear this; but 

it is my first chance to say it and I think it is very important to say it for the 

record. It happens to be about things that I think I know more about than 

anyone else in the room. 

The first assertion was, Sir, that we have no clear idea of how we are 

going to fight effectively. And I want to tell you that that’s baloney. We know 

exactly how we’re going to fight. We have a very clear idea of how we’re going 

to fight and we have a very clear idea of how we’re going to use the things and 

the people that the Congress has appointed; and we will do it very well. 

The second assertion is that there are no choices being made in what we 

are going to buy. We have a very elaborate procedure for deciding what we’re 

going to ask the Congress to appropriate for our troops to use on the 

battlefield. And, we test the equipment and we try it out and we do all sorts of 

experimenting with it to make sure that it works right. 

193 
The third point is that we’re not getting value received for what’s been 

put into the defense budget. I just want to tell you that’s baloney and anybody 

who goes out and looks at the Armed Forces of the United States will see that 

it’s baloney. We have the best Armed Forces we’ve ever had and to say that 

you don’t get value received is just pure bunk. 

Remarks at the BIRMINGHAM CITY 

COMMAND OF THE SALVATION ARMY 

Birmingham, AL 

7 February 1985 

Thanks for the welcome. It’s nice to be back in Birmingham. Mr. Mayor, 

I’ve still got the key to the city you gave me in November and I’m happy to know 

that the lock has not been changed. 

This is a great celebration and it is wonderful to be here for this 

important occasion. Birmingham has always been known as a good Army town 

and obviously the Salvation Army has known that it’s a good Army town, too. I 

was here last November to help celebrate your 30th anniversary of Veterans 

Day; and, on behalf of the men and women in the Armed Forces, I thanked the 

city of Birmingham then for their support for the Armed Forces. I want to do 

that again. Thank you for your support. 

I enjoyed my stay here then, honoring the Veterans. I have a smart, 

young Marine aide who is with me here tonight. He was there then. He told 

me afterwards that a kindly lady, about my age, came up to him afterwards 

and said, “The General gave a nice talk. We thought it was superfluous!” This 

“smart aleck” Marine said, “Well, thanks very much. I thought it was 

superfluous myself.” He said, “I think the General is thinking of publishing it 

posthumously.” So, the lady, God love her, said, “Good! The sooner the 

better.” 

I have been in the U.S. Army close to 46 years now and it is nice to be 

with you in another army, the Salvation Army. I was a little concerned about 

what I would say. It reminded me of three years ago. I was asked to give the 

speech at the National Prayer breakfast in Washington. I really did not focus 

on what to say until the Sunday before the event was to take place. I had from 

Sunday to Thursday and I hadn’t really decided what to say. It suddenly 

occurred to me that I was going to be speaking to 2300 people in the flesh and 

then a whole bunch of others over the radio. And I began to get a little 

nervous. 

That morning the Old Testament lesson was from Jeremiah and 

Jeremiah had a problem somewhat similar to mine. He said, “Now the Word of 

the Lord came to me, saying, ‘I appoint you a prophet to the Nations.’ And 

Jeremiah said, ‘Ah, Lord God, behold I do not know how to speak for I am only 

194 
a youth.’”—I knew that part did not apply to me! Jeremiah goes on to say, “The 

Lord said to me, ‘Do not say I am only a youth for to all to whom I send you, 

you shall go. And whatever I command you, you shall see. Be not afraid of it 

for I am with you to deliver you,’ said the Lord. Then the Lord put forth His 

hand and touched my mouth and the Lord said to me, ‘Behold, I have put 

words in your mouth.’” I thought about that and I thought I might take some 

guidance from that passage. 

I have only had three speeches in my whole life. One’s on tank 

maintenance; one’s on helicopter maintenance; and the third one is on 

reenlistment. So, I thought I’d just give them the reenlistment speech. And I 

did. 

Now, maybe that’s what I’ll talk to this group about tonight—

reenlistment. The work of the Salvation Army is done quietly and it’s an army 

which fights a special kind of battle. But, it marches under the same banner 

that the Lord calls us all to march under—and that is, the unifying banner of 

the Army of the Lord. 

I serve in two armies. I am a general in the United States Army, but I’m 

a private in God’s Army. When I was a private in the United States Army—and 

I was for a long time—the Salvation Army was there. In fact, it was the 

Salvation Army during World War II which helped create the USO. As many of 

you know, that service still goes on today. But the Salvation Army wasn’t 

content just to create the USO. It manned service centers throughout the 

United States and sent volunteers overseas to over 3,000 places where our 

people were serving in combat. The Salvation Army did the same thing in the 

Spanish-American War and in World War I. Incidentally, one of those who 

served in World War I was Chaplain Norman Marshall—remembered for 

another reason because of his son, who is your National Commander today. 

Additionally, some 32 Salvation Army officers served as chaplains in the 

Armed Forces during World War II and one rose to the rank of Deputy Chief of 

Chaplains in the United States Army. 

That tradition of support to our Armed Forces continues today—that 

business of caring for the physical and spiritual needs of men and women in 

uniform who are also serving in defense of this great nation of ours. That is 

not an easy thing to do. There’s a story about a Salvation Army Chaplain in 

World War II. Just before a big infantry assault, a soldier ran up to him while 

the cannons were firing away and the soldier said, “Chaplain! Before this 

attack starts, tell me everything you know about God. Quick!” 

Well, that tradition goes on today. That tradition of bringing 

nourishment for both body and soul continues very actively in the Service. 

There was a Salvation Army Chaplain who I ran into with the Army out at Fort 

Ord, California; and there is another one at Lackland Air Force Base. So, it is 

nice to be here with friends of our Armed Forces, the Salvation Army. 

When I look at the Salvation Army today and the U.S. Army, I see that 

the two armies have many things in common—and one of those is change. The 

Armed Forces of the United States have changed greatly over the years to meet 

the changing security needs of our nation. Certainly, the Salvation Army has 

195 
changed since 1880 when the Salvation Army Commissioner George Scott 

Railton came to this country. America is now different from the America that 

the Salvation Army served in those days. Commissioner Railton came to the 

United States in 1880 when we were enjoying the benefits of the Industrial 

Revolution but also suffering from the problems of a society on the move. 

The turmoil of those years is described in Alvin Toffler’s book, The Third 

Wave. I’m sure many of you have read it. It describes our history as 

comprised of three distinct waves: the first wave being the agricultural era of 

man. That wave began long before Christ and was a gradual change, taking 

some 2,000 years to spread over the civilized world. The second wave, the 

Industrial Revolution, was far more rapid and took only about 200 strife-torn 

years to change the world—bringing with it great physical prosperity but also 

bringing with it the most destructive of the over 14,500 wars in recorded 

history—causing great emotional upheaval. And all that led to the Salvation 

Army. 

The third wave—according to Toffler we are in that wave now—is the 

information wave, and Toffler says it will take about 20 years—only about two 

more decades—to complete this change in the nature of man’s life, and that 

change will be greater than what we have experienced over the previous 100 

generations! 

I guess for an illustration you might take ourselves. I don’t know about 

you but I am a representative of my generation. My generation is computerilliterate. I have a computer terminal in my office and it stares at me and I 

stare back at it most of the day. We have learned to chat a little bit now but 

it’s not friendly. On the other hand, I am sure you are like me. My children 

and grandchildren are very comfortable and well-versed in computers and 

modern communications devices—about like we were with the automobile. 

If you look at this rate of change since World War II, we see that Toffler 

might be right. Man’s knowledge has grown so fast that we have learned more 

in the last 40 years than the accumulation of all human knowledge before 

World War II back to the beginning of recorded history. We see remarkable 

things taking place. We see supersonic transportation. We see man in space. 

We see man going to the moon. We see the world literally grown smaller with 

nations inextricably intertwined through our economies, our political systems, 

our common interests, our cultures and through communications and travel. 

We saw that last night when the President introduced that marvelous, young 

West Point cadet. It sort of demonstrates the way the world has changed. 

First, the cadet was a girl, a West Point cadet. Secondly, she came from 

Vietnam hidden in a boat about 10 years ago—which just tells you how fast the 

world has changed as well as the present point about what great opportunities 

there are in this world and in this nation of ours. 

All this great change and the knowledge that man has experienced has 

not brought peace among men or among nations. History has shown us that 

change in human affairs is not easy and brings challenges as an inevitable 

consequence; and, if we’re not prepared for change, challenges can lead to 

crisis and conflict. Therefore, we have to look to the future so that we won’t be 

196 
totally surprised. The promise and potential for the years ahead for us is great; 

but, at the same time, we know that God only gives us a small glimpse of the 

future and we will only be partially prepared for it. But we as a people and as a 

nation and you as a city must first weather the challenges that lie ahead. 

Certainly, we want to pursue our goals as a nation-state at peace. We don’t 

want our future challenged by other nations whose ambitions may be 

manifested by a tendency to use force. And certainly, I don’t have to identify 

such nations. The President did last night—the Soviet Union. 

There are some 20 wars going on in the world today. Every indication 

that I see tells me that the rest of this century is going to continue to be very 

much like this one—certainly a lot of change and instability. It is an area 

which both the Armed Forces of the United States and the Salvation Army have 

in common—and that’s the need to be ready for change. 

I want to tell you that I spent the better part of this week explaining to 

the Congress why I think the Armed Forces of the nation must and can 

continue to adapt to the changes ahead of us and to protect us from the 

conflicts that threaten our way of life. A young man from the television station 

a few minutes ago asked me to explain whether or not I thought we were 

spending too much for defense and not enough for social programs. I told him, 

“The two are not connected.” I said, “I can tell you we’re not spending enough 

too much for defense. The issue of whether or not we’re not spending enough 

for social programs is another complete issue that the citizens of this country 

will have to decide. But we must decide to spend enough for defense to defend 

ourselves and we can afford to do whatever else we need to do.” 

I explained that same point in Congress this week. I have explained that 

peace and freedom do not come cheaply. And I have explained to the Congress 

that the changes in our Defense Establishment that have taken place over the 

last few years have not been cheap; but they have been important and we are 

safer for those changes having taken place. I want to report to you sort of 

parenthetically—not the main theme of this evening—that your Armed Forces 

today are better than I have seen them in the 46 years that I have been in the 

Armed Services. By any common-sense measure the nation is safer because of 

the improvements that have been made. The Soviets must know that and that 

is why we will be back at the bargaining table next month. The objective of this 

whole exercise is to reduce the probability of war and maintain the peace. 

This is the fortieth anniversary of many of the battles of World War II 

that took place toward the end of that war. In looking back to the lessons of 

that war, I recall the words of George Marshall who was Chief of Staff of the 

Army in 1941, shortly before the United States went into the war. He said in 

his first Report to Congress that America is embarked on what he called a 

“great experiment in democracy, a test of the ability of a government such as 

ours to prepare itself in time of peace against the ruthless and arbitrary action 

of other governments.” 

At great cost, we passed such a test in World War II; and I want to tell 

you that, if we are to continue to enjoy peace and liberty in this great 

democracy, we have to continue to tend to our military strength. But we also 

197 
have to continue to tend to all the other elements of our strength—our 

economic strength, our political strength, our cultural and social strength and, 

above all, our spiritual strength. 

There is a new book by a French author, Jean-Francois Revel, entitled 

How Democracies Perish. In the opening lines of the book, Revel describes the 

world as “a democracy-killing machine.” He goes on to say in that book that 

“Democracy is not basically structured to defend itself against outside enemies 

seeking its annihilation, especially since the latest and most dangerous of these 

external enemies, communism, parades as democracy perfected when it is in 

fact the absolute negation of democracy.” 

Now the pessimism of that French writer ought to keep us on our toes. 

He has a lot of very good points in his book. Certainly, as we look at the world 

around us, and the history of the immediate past, that pessimism might worry 

us. But it is my own belief that we need not be overly frightened, though we 

must be concerned. 

When my outfit mobilized almost 45 years ago, we marched past the City 

Auditorium in Minneapolis, Minnesota. It was about 20 degrees below zero 

that day. I remember looking at the corner of the Auditorium and there was an 

engraved marker, a plaque which reads, “Participation in the rights of 

citizenship assumes participation in the duties of citizenship.” That principle 

is fundamental to the health of our democracy; the duties of citizenship range 

all the way from voting to elect our Presidents, our Congressmen, legislators 

and our city governments to paying the taxes that we the people levy on 

ourselves. Those duties sometimes encompass going off to fight in the defense 

of this nation and its principles. Those duties also include being responsible 

citizens who step forward in selfless service to help improve the plight of our 

fellow human beings. 

That concept of selfless service is another thing which the Armed Forces 

of the nation and the Salvation Army have in common. 

The Nation will always need good men and women to serve her. We need 

good people in our Armed Forces; and, on the other hand, so does the 

Salvation Army. As Joshua said to his army at the end of a long campaign: 

“Choose ye whom ye will serve; as for me and my house, we will serve the 

Lord.” It is no accident that William Booth changed the original name of the 

Salvation Army from the “East London Revival Society” to the “Christian 

Mission” and finally, in 1878, to the name it has today, the “Salvation Army”—

because it is just that, an army of the Lord. And the key word in any army is 

“serve” or “service.” 

The Salvation Army, like the United States Army, has discipline in the 

concept of service. Members go where they are needed. They follow orders. 

And that’s an important duty for all of us who serve in the Army of the Lord. 

Christ’s first order to Levi was “Follow me.” That’s the exact same motto for the 

United States Infantry. Those of you who served in the Armed Forces of our 

nation know that life in the military is more than just a job. We don’t work for 

the Army, the Navy, the Air Force or the Marine Corps; we serve in it. We don’t 

choose the missions for the Armed Forces—or its wars—but the members are 

198 
faithful to a higher authority to go out and accomplish the missions. Nor does 

the service end at the pleasure of the soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. It ends 

when the mission is accomplished. It is part of what the British General Sir 

John Hackett calls the “military’s unlimited liability contract.” In the case of 

the Army of the Lord, that contract lasts for Eternity. 

When we are called to serve in the Armed Forces, it is not up to us to 

choose what is important or what is unimportant. There are simply no degrees 

of importance in the service we perform. Some people in our Armed Forces go 

on to command great combat units or ships or airplanes or formations in 

battle; others do obscure staff work in highly anonymous jobs; and some go off 

to serve in places which their mothers-in-law can’t find on the map. But, the 

key thing is that the service of the generals is no more important than the 

service of the privates. And that’s an important part of military service. All 

service is important and all service should be well done. The soldier, sailor, 

airman, or Marine who dies in some obscure skirmish died doing service as 

important as those soldiers who fought under General Patton in those great 

battles which brought him to the Rhine River 40 years ago tonight. 

St. Paul in Ephesians says that we get different gifts but all those gifts 

are to be used in the service of God. We in the military service are sometimes 

accused of being impersonal and being concerned with masses of troops and 

not individuals. I want to tell you that’s wrong. We know the importance of 

one soldier in one place can mean the difference between success or failure in 

battle. The same is true in the Salvation Army. Each individual is important. 

You heard Julia Ward Howe’s wonderful words being sung by the choir 

tonight. There is a story about Julia Ward Howe. I think this is one Lawton 

Chiles told the other day at the National Prayer Breakfast. Julia Ward Howe 

came to Washington to ask for some help from a senator, to help a fellow who 

was down on his luck. The Senator told her, “I’m so sorry, Julia. I just can’t 

do it. I’m just too busy to be concerned with individuals.” Julia Ward Howe 

said to him, “That’s quite remarkable, Senator. Even God hasn’t reached that 

stage yet.” 

Joachim Von Arnim, the German Romantic novelist from the early 

1800s, said, “The history of the world begins anew with every man, and ends 

with him.” He meant that one man or one woman can make a difference. We 

have here a roomful of people who made a difference. Aristotle once said that 

virtue was the habit of right choice. Certainly, your choice as members and 

supporters of the Salvation Army to help others is a virtuous choice. You made 

the right choice. Through your service and the service of thousands of others 

like you, volunteers who work for the Salvation Army and other charities, 

Americans who are down on their luck are put right with God and they are put 

back on the road to self-respect and improvement. 

In the Invocation tonight, we were reminded of Jesus’ words when he 

said, “Whatever you did for the least of these, you did for Me.” It is an 

important thing for us to remember. As I said before, I think it is imperative 

that this nation tend to all elements of its strength. I want you to know that I 

and my fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary Weinberger 

199 
and his staff will continue to do all we can to help defend this great nation; and 

with the help of the Congress and the American people, we will be successful. 

The health of the Armed Forces today is good, thanks to the investment that 

“We the People” have made over the last several years. At the same time, as I 

look out and see so many people here to support the Salvation Army, it’s a sign 

to me that our spiritual health is good as well. 

The U.S. Army has a catchy recruiting slogan that says, “Be all you can 

be—in the Army.” I believe that slogan fits the Salvation Army very well; so, I 

tell you, all you supporters of the Salvation Army, be all you can be—in the 

Salvation Army. And reenlist today. I have a few words from a couple of great 

sergeants in God’s Army and I’d like to close with those: Sergeant Peter and 

Sergeant Paul. 

I’m going to start with Sergeant Peter. He said some important things. 

He said, “For this very reason, make every effort to add to your faith, goodness; 

and to goodness, knowledge; and to knowledge, self-control; and to self-control, 

perseverance; and to perseverance, Godliness; and to Godliness, brotherly 

kindness; and to brotherly kindness, love.” 

And Sergeant Paul had a few words to say about taking care of our 

equipment and being ready. He said, “Therefore, put on the whole armor of 

God so that when the day of evil comes, you may be able to stand your ground. 

And after you have done everything, stand firm with the belt of truth buckled 

around your waist, and the breastplate of righteousness in place and with your 

feet fitted with readiness that comes from the gospel of peace. In addition to all 

this, take up the shield of faith with which you can extinguish all the flaming 

arrows of the Evil One. Take the helmet of salvation, the sword of the spirit 

which is the Word of God. And pray in the spirit on all occasions with all kinds 

of prayers and requests. With this in mind, be alert and always keep on 

praying for all the Saints.” And you are all the Saints. Pray also for me. 

Thank you very much. 

Remarks to the 

CHEVY CHASE CLUB 

Chevy Chase, MD 

28 February 1985 

Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks for the welcome. It is nice to be here 

tonight. That was an absolutely magnificent meal. It covered most of the 

places that I have been except Laos and Thailand. Ed, here, knows all about 

that and I have forgotten what the coleslaw was called which was made from 

green papaya. But I used to eat that and then when we were flying helicopters, 

I always thought if I lost a gas-producer in the helicopter, I would just blow 

into the engine. It was hot. The meal was superb and it made me a little 

200 
sleepy but I hope I can keep you awake. I eat another meal regularly at this 

time of the year because it’s that time of the year when the trips we make are 

from the Pentagon to Capitol Hill; and it’s called “crow.” It is served to us up 

there quite regularly. 

There is a poem that was found in the Ordnance Bureau in 1868. It goes 

like this—and it sort of describes my life these days: 

The Devil came up from Hell one day, 

And went straight to Washington City. 

He said to a friend he met by the way, 

“I shall call on the Armed Services Committee.” 

He walked into the room with an air quite gay, 

And took every one there by surprise, 

By bowing and saying, “I’m here for the day— 

And I’m the father of lies!” 

Then they called in an officer gray and old, 

With a character as pure as snow, 

And they charged him with lies by contractors told, 

And with frauds which he did not know. 

Then told him to leave, that he need not reply, 

But go forth to the national wrath, 

And they sent their report (while the Devil sat by) 

To the papers by telegraph. 

“Egad!” said the Devil, “I like this well. 

You torture a man more here, 

Than I in a brimstone lake in Hell. 

For there he has no more to fear.” 

Speaking of crow, I am reminded of a story about a fellow from my home 

in Crow Wing County, Minnesota. His name was Ole. He went on an errand 

for his wife, Lena, who sent him to the drug store. On the way home he 

stopped by the local pub and he spent a good deal of the evening there. 

Coming home, he tripped over the doorsill and fell flat on his face. Ole looked 

up to see Lena standing over him and all he could see were her bedroom 

slippers and then from there on up this towering figure. She looked down at 

him and he said, “I had a speech all prepared, but I have just decided to take 

your questions from the floor.” 

Before I do that, I want to give you a report on the national security as I 

see it today from the foxhole that I now occupy. Before I get into that I want to 

read from a Pennsylvania magazine article describing the world situation. And 

it reads, “War at this time rages over a great part of the known world. Our 

newspapers are daily filled with fresh accounts of the destruction it everywhere 

occasions.” That statement was written in the same year that your “Bradley 

House” was built. It was written by Ben Franklin and published in his 

pamphlet, Plain Truth, in 1747. But, certainly, it could just as well have been 

201 
written today. There are about 20 wars going on in the world today. And the 

behavior of the Soviet Union with its strong nuclear and conventional forces 

raises the stakes for us and the rest of the Free World to an unprecedented 

level. 

We can look to our history over the years and we can see that our own 

peace and well-being and national security have benefited from agreements 

that we’ve had with potential adversaries and competitors in the international 

scene. The Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1818 between Canada and the United States 

is a good example. We may take for granted the great friendship we have with 

Canada, our good neighbor and ally to the north; but, in 1818, a few years 

after the war of 1812, Canada and the United States looked very much like 

enemies to each other. Yet, the two nations put aside their differences and 

agreed to a treaty which for all practical purposes demilitarized the Great Lakes 

and now we have the longest undefended border in the world. 

Some people say, “Why can’t we do that sort of thing with the Soviet 

Union today?” Well, certainly there have been great efforts that were tried. 

But, when one looks at that, you have to be reminded of what Salvador de 

Madariaga, the great Spanish philosopher and historian who worked for many, 

many years on the old League of Nations Disarmament Commission, said. He 

said, “We’ve got the issue of war and disarmament upside down and 

backwards. Nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed.” He 

said, “They arm because they distrust each other.” So, if we’re going to work 

on the business of armaments and what it has to do with keeping the peace in 

this world, we really have to work on the distrust as much as on the 

armaments. 

This country has a defensive strategy. We have a strategy that is called 

“deterrence.” We say that a sensible balance of forces—nuclear forces and 

conventional forces for us and our allies—will help us keep the peace and 

reduce the likelihood of war. We don’t seek any superiority over the Soviet 

Union, but we want to be very sure that the Soviet Union understands that it 

can’t use its military power for coercion to threaten war or to attack us without 

understanding that they won’t succeed. We believe that if we build and 

maintain forces that are self-evidently capable of frustrating their objectives, 

then we will keep the peace. And, that is our strategy of deterrence. 

I want to give you a little report—I see old soldiers and young soldiers 

and airmen and sailors and Marines out here and old bosses. I want to tell you 

that the Armed Forces you have today are as good as any we have had in the 

45 years or so that I have been wearing the uniform. And you can be very 

proud of them. We have extraordinarily good people in the Armed Forces today 

and they’re better equipped, better trained and better supported than they have 

been in many, many years. 

We read a lot about hardware and the arguments about whether we 

should buy this piece of hardware or that piece of hardware. But I think it is 

important for us to remember that combat capability is the sum of people, the 

hardware, the training and the support that they have. And by support I don’t 

just mean the ammunition; I also mean the moral support that they get from 

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the people of this country for the job that they have to do. I can tell you that 

what you have there now is a well-supported armed force that combines those 

elements into a very significant combat capability. 

You see things like the new tanks we argued over for years and years. 

Well, I visited units with the new tanks and I saw that the tank gunnery 

qualification scores for the crews are 46 percent higher than they were a couple 

of years ago with the old tank—a tank which was a good tank, too. I see that 

the first-round hits are 83 percent for both night and day. I see the F-16 

airplane, the best single-engine airplane in the world. In the bomb 

competitions, the F-16 pilots today do better with plain, ordinary “dumb” 

bombs—as the Air Force people call them—than the F-4 pilots did with “smart” 

bombs three or four years ago. Now, that’s a phenomenal increase in 

capability. 

Our alliances also are a very important part of our security and our 

strategy. This nation is blessed with good allies who share with us common 

interests and common values and who are willing to join us in the defense of 

our way of life. NATO is a good example of those alliances. Our East Asian 

alliances are other good examples. NATO has maintained the peace in Europe 

for over 35 years. This year we see the 40th anniversary of many of the last 

battles of World War II. I look around here tonight—how many veterans of 

World War II are here? The place is loaded with them. That war laid waste to 

whole nations; yet, at the same time, out of those battles grew a concept of 

Western security that we have today. Not only did that concept restore the 

health of the allies, but it also helped bring allies and former foes together as 

partners in defense of the West and its principles today. 

The Soviets too recognize the value of allies. They have worked very hard 

as a principal part of their strategy, to try and separate us from our allies over 

the years, as well as to try and limit our arms. They have also worked very 

hard to try to build their own ties and alliances in the world. They haven’t 

been nearly as successful as we have. As somebody said, “The Soviet Union is 

the only nation in the world surrounded by hostile communist neighbors.” 

A good example of the Soviet attempts to separate us from our allies has 

been over the deployment of the intermediate-range nuclear weapons to 

Europe. That deployment began in December of 1983; and, from 1979 when 

NATO made the decision until those weapons began to be deployed in 

December of 1983, the Soviets did everything they possibly could to separate 

the United States from its European allies. They were unsuccessful. Those 

weapons are being deployed in Europe today in spite of what the Russians did. 

When the weapons began to come in, the Russians walked out of the 

negotiations—an act for which they were much criticized. 

They are now back at the table. The world, I think, has sighed a great 

sigh of relief, knowing that the two superpowers are now back talking to each 

other again about the possibilities of reducing both the risks and probability of 

nuclear war. But we should recognize that these talks will not take away the 

dangers to peace. The principal Soviet goals will still be pursued. They will 

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continue to try to separate us from our allies and they’ll continue to try to limit 

our arms, by whatever means. 

Now, why did the Soviets come back to the table? Well, I conclude by 

looking at what has happened that it is the synergism of the interrelationship 

between the steadfastness and unity of the nations of the West, the resolve of 

the United States to rearm itself and keep itself strong, our willingness to go 

ahead with our nuclear modernization program and the President’s Strategic 

Defense Initiative. 

I believe that the resolve of the West—and the Soviet regard for 

strength—has convinced the Soviets that it is in their own self-interest to 

return to the negotiating table. These two elements—good defenses and good 

allies—if pursued together can continue to provide for peace in the West. But, 

if we in the West unilaterally limit our arms, whether it is through our own 

political process or our failure to act when we need to act, then we will hand 

the Soviets what they are looking for and we won’t get anything out of those 

negotiations. 

There is an important vote coming up in the Congress in a couple of 

weeks, depending on how the politicians manage. It is the vote on whether to 

continue the production line for the 21 MX or PEACEKEEPER missiles that 

were authorized last year. I would like to take just a minute and talk about 

that because we have been before committees of the Congress a number of 

times in the past weeks testifying about that subject. When I hear the 

questions from the representatives of the people and when I see a lack of 

understanding there about what the contribution of that particular weapon is 

to our security, I wonder about what the rest of the people understand. There 

are some myths about the intercontinental ballistic missile and its contribution 

to security. I believe they need to be removed. 

One of the first myths is that we are building a first-strike weapon that is 

destabilizing, and that is going to endanger the world and therefore cause the 

Russians to build even more weapons or do something drastic. Now, what I 

want to tell you is that the United States keeps 80 percent of its strategic 

nuclear warheads in its bomber force and in its ballistic missile submarine 

force and only about 20 percent in the intercontinental ballistic missile force. 

There is no way in the world that the Russian military planners will ever 

conclude that we are building a first-strike force with 20 percent of our 

warheads in our ICBM warheads. So, that’s a myth. 

Then, the second point that comes up often is that the PEACEKEEPER is 

vulnerable—that we are going to stick it in silos where it will be vulnerable to 

Soviet attack and it will either invite attack or, because we will have to use it or 

lose it, we will use it first instead of waiting for them to attack us. I want to tell 

you that’s another myth. If the only thing we had in our strategic nuclear 

deterrent force was intercontinental ballistic missiles, then the vulnerability of 

that missile would be of some concern. But when only 20 percent of the 

warheads are in that force, and when we have a good warning system and a 

good command and control system, I want to tell you that it is not vulnerable. 

That’s a myth. The Soviets know when we keep our forces in the TRIAD—

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bombers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic 

missiles—that they can’t attack any particular part of the force without having 

the rest of the force available to retaliate against them. 

Now, the idea that we are building a large force that is going to make the 

Soviets believe we are trying to seek nuclear superiority is another myth that is 

often heard. During the five-year period from 1977 to 1983, the Soviets added 

1,100 modern, intercontinental ballistic missile warheads, with about 5,000 

warheads—good, accurate, modern warheads—another 700 submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and about 300 bombers. That occurred while we 

debated whether we should add any or not. They placed their ICBM’s in the 

hardest silos in the world and linked those silos to hardened command centers. 

And during the same period, we added 135 ICBM’s—the last of the last 

modernization and a few SLBM’s and no bombers. In fact, we actually retired 

more than we added. Now, we rely on that TRIAD—and a good warning system 

and a good command and control system. We make it very clear to the Soviets 

that we are not building a first-strike force; that we are, in fact, defensive. But 

we also want to make it very clear that we have a modern, healthy, nuclear 

deterrent force so that the Soviets understand they cannot attack us and 

achieve their war aims. 

What I want to tell you about that PEACEKEEPER vote is that it needs to 

succeed. It needs to succeed for a number of reasons. The first is that we need 

it in the force because it is three times more effective than the missile it is 

replacing. It puts at risk those things that are of great value to the Soviets and 

those things they know they need to carry out their war plans. We cannot do 

that with the weapons that are in the force today. 

And the second reason it needs to be passed is because when John 

Tower and Max Kampelman, our negotiators in Geneva, meet with the Soviets, 

the Soviets will not see that we are going to limit our own weapons through our 

own political process. 

There is another myth, and I heard that myth was even repeated here: 

that is, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff don’t support the deployment of the 

PEACEKEEPER and I want to tell you that’s a myth. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

unanimously continue to support the immediate deployment of that missile 

system. 

We need to get on with that strategic modernization and we need to get 

on with the strategic modernization not only for our nuclear forces, but we 

need to keep up the modernization of our conventional forces because the 

unrelenting buildup of the Soviet forces continues. We can get a little bit 

complacent because we have had larger defense budgets over the last four or 

five years than we have had for a long time. We have made some significant 

improvements in our forces, but the Soviets have not stood still. And we 

haven’t gained much in the overall distance between our forces and the Soviet 

forces. 

Another initiative that is going to come up for a vote soon is the research 

and development money for the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. That 

initiative is a research initiative which says that we should look into our 

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technological genius, which is one of our great strengths, to find out whether or 

not our sole reliance on offensive retaliation can be mitigated or perhaps even 

abandoned in the future. Within the bounds of the ABM Treaty, the United 

States is going to explore the means which might give us the opportunity to 

combine both offense and defense in the future for our strategic nuclear 

deterrence. The President has made it clear that this research alters in no way 

our commitment to deterrence or our commitment to our allies. 

Now, the Soviets are intensely interested in this Strategic Defense 

Initiative. They appear eager to do everything they possibly can to constrain 

the program. And that is an interesting phenomenon in the Soviets because 

they are the country with the only operational anti-ballistic missile system in 

the world, and the country that has spent more money on strategic defense 

than all the rest of the world combined by, I would say, a factor of 10, and the 

country that is investing huge sums in research in exactly the sort of program 

that the Strategic Defense Initiative envisions. 

Now, responses to the program have been mixed and some are concerned 

that it will alter the deterrent balance, that it will drive up the levels of 

armament and that it will make agreement more difficult when we go to 

Geneva. Certainly, any new technological advance makes arms control 

negotiations more complicated. We assume that with every other facet of 

strategic nuclear arms. But I would say to you that we certainly have an 

argument that the Soviets themselves subscribe to: the concept that a mixture 

of offensive and defensive systems is compatible with deterrence. The Soviets’ 

own deployments have demonstrated their views of that. 

There is another contention that the Soviets may be incited to add more 

offensive arms in trying to overwhelm the Strategic Defense Initiative with more 

weapons—or that they won’t agree to reductions in offensive weapons because 

they will need them to overwhelm the defensive systems. I would say to you 

that as a practical military matter the approach that is being pursued in a 

layered defense is more likely to provide incentives for the Soviets to reduce or 

even abandon their ICBM force, perhaps 20 years from now when some of this 

comes into fruition, rather than have them build more. And, certainly, what 

the Soviets really fear is the fact that the Strategic Defense Initiative will make 

their ICBM force ineffective, not that they will have to build more. 

But, the SDO program is something that will come only in the future. It 

is a broad research program. We don’t have any preconceived notions of the 

outcome. In the meantime, negotiations can make the contribution to 

increased stability in the world if we can have what the President has asked 

for: significant, large reductions in strategic nuclear arms. 

The accord that was reached in January in Geneva is only a first step. 

There is a long road ahead. If we are able to persuade the Soviets to make 

substantial reductions or perhaps even move to a concept that recognizes that 

both sides can have a defensive organization, it will be a good thing for the 

world. But, we haven’t convinced the Soviets to make such a move in the past; 

so, the other thing that we need to do is make it very clear to them that we’re 

going to continue to modernize our own forces and keep those forces strong. 

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We need to go ahead with the modernization of the conventional forces and 

nuclear forces. 

Again quoting from what Ben Franklin said in 1747 in Plain Truth: “’tis a 

wise and true saying that one sword often keeps another in the scabbard. They 

that are on their guard and appear ready to receive their adversaries are in 

much less danger of being attacked than those who are negligent.” 

I would say to you that this is a very important time in the history of this 

nation and it is a very important time to make sure that the Soviets do 

understand that we have a sword in our scabbard and not only that but that 

we will, in fact, use it to defend ourselves. If they understand that, I am 

confident that we’ll keep the peace, not only for ourselves but for our friends 

and allies in the world. It just simply comes down to making it patently selfevident to the Soviets that we are going to have modern, strong forces so that 

they cannot succeed with their war plans. I am confident that we will be 

successful. 

Statement before the 

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE 

On the Strategic Nuclear Modernization Program 

Washington, DC 

7 March 1985 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. 

I am pleased to be here on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to urge your 

support for the President’s program to modernize our strategic nuclear 

deterrent forces as our highest military priority. 

In particular, the Joint Chiefs urge the immediate and continued 

deployment of the PEACEKEEPER. Its deployment will strengthen the TRIAD, 

help ensure deterrence, serve as an incentive for Soviet restraint and provide a 

sensible climate for more productive negotiations. The PEACEKEEPER is 

tested and proven; it is ready for deployment; and we need it now. 

THE U.S. STRATEGY 

Since the end of World War II our goal has been to preserve the peace 

through strength. This means that we, along with our allies, need to maintain 

the necessary military strength in addition to the other elements of our 

national power to make it self-evidently clear to our principal adversaries that 

they can’t achieve their objectives by force or the threat of force. It is a 

defensive strategy. Our strategy implies several essential components. The 

first is alliances, such as NATO and our alliances in the Pacific region. We 

have banded together over the years with other countries who share with us 

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common interests and a desire for peace. The health of those alliances has 

long depended upon good armed forces, both nuclear and conventional. 

Second, we deploy forces in some of the regions where we have alliances. 

These forward-deployed forces do two things: they deter attack by making it 

clear to aggressors that their attack will be met by forces which include those 

of the United States and, second, they lend political strength to the alliances by 

showing our friends that our commitment is strong. To back up these forwarddeployed forces, we maintain a strong central reserve of forces here in the 

United States, Active, Reserve and National Guard. These forces can go to 

reinforce our forward-deployed forces or go elsewhere in the world to protect 

our interests. 

To support this concept, we need control of the seas and we have a good 

Navy to do that. We need the free use of space. We need good intelligence to 

warn and inform us; we need good mobility to project our power and to sustain 

it far from our own shores; and we need outstanding command and control to 

direct our forces. 

Overarching all these components are our nuclear deterrent forces and 

the essential warning and command and control systems. Our strategic 

nuclear forces are embodied in the TRIAD—a concept which has kept the peace 

for over twenty years. The TRIAD is designed as a deterrent, not for a first 

strike. About 80 percent of our strategic weapons are in the bomber and 

submarine forces. Only 20 to 25 percent of our force is in land-based ICBMs. 

We maintain the three elements of our TRIAD because each leg of the TRIAD 

provides special strengths which reinforce the deterrent value of the other legs 

and help guard against tactical and technical surprise. The TRIAD is the 

foundation of our deterrent strategy. 

THE SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT 

The Soviets continue to modernize their strategic nuclear forces. In 

contrast to our relatively small force of land-based ICBMs, the Soviet force is 

over 80 percent land-based, the kind of force most useable for a first strike. In 

1982, the Soviets deployed more, highly accurate ICBM warheads than we 

intend to deploy in our entire PEACEKEEPER program. In 1983, they deployed 

another 200 ICBM warheads and in 1984 they were nearing completion of the 

latest phase of the modernization of their current silo-based strategic ICBMs. 

The Soviet’s SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, which could total over 5,000 warheads, 

are in the world’s hardest silos, with a redundant, survivable, command and 

control network. Moscow is protected by the world’s only operational ballistic 

missile defense system. We expect deployment of newer missiles, the SS-X-24 

and SS-X-25. 

THE MILITARY RATIONALE FOR PEACEKEEPER 

The Soviets continue to spend large sums for offensive nuclear weapons 

capable of achieving their war aims. In addition, they have extensive programs 

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for active and passive strategic defense. These facts lead to the conclusion that 

the best deterrent is a US military capability that makes the Soviets’ 

assessment of war outcomes under any circumstance so uncertain and so 

dangerous as to remove any incentive for them to initiate an attack. This 

fundamental prescription for deterrence means that the deterrent value of the 

PEACEKEEPER must be measured in terms of the uncertainty it causes for 

Soviet war planners in designing an effective ability to achieve their war aims. 

The Soviets have taken on difficult tasks for themselves in attempting a 

war-winning strategic posture. The military requirements for such a capability 

are extensive, including the need for very sophisticated weapons, large forces 

and the capacity to execute difficult attack scenarios. These self-imposed 

Soviet military requirements are the key to an effective U.S. counter-strategy. 

We believe that the Soviets’ war aims are to destroy U.S. nuclear and 

conventional military capabilities with their land-based missiles while 

maintaining large reserves for post-war dominance. In order to have high 

assurance of success, the Soviets need to strike our forces several times and 

they have the force structure to do that. To counter this Soviet strategy, we 

need the PEACEKEEPER missile. 

The PEACEKEEPER missile is a direct counter to Soviet war aims 

because it can retaliate promptly with phenomenal accuracy against the Soviet 

attacking force and other high-value military targets during the conduct of 

what will necessarily be a prolonged attack. The deterrent value of the 

PEACEKEEPER comes from this potential to retaliate against Soviet missiles 

and hardened command posts meant to protect Soviet political and military 

leaders. 

Some have questioned the vulnerability of the PEACEKEEPER system. 

Vulnerability has to be considered in light of the whole TRIAD of our strategic 

force. The Soviets cannot attack the land-based leg of our TRIAD in isolation 

from the other legs of the TRIAD. The Soviets must deal with all legs of the 

TRIAD and supporting command and control simultaneously. This enormously 

complicates the achievement of the Soviet war aims. If the PEACEKEEPER was 

the only element of our strategic nuclear deterrent force, then its vulnerability 

would be of far greater concern that it is with the ICBM force contributing 

about 20 percent of our strategic nuclear deterrent force. Within the TRIAD, 

any potential vulnerability of the land-based leg is compensated by the warning 

system, the command and control system, and the other legs of the TRIAD. 

Deploying the PEACEKEEPER does not mean that the United States is 

developing a first-strike posture. It is absolutely necessary that we have the 

retaliatory capabilities to be able to deny Soviet war aims. According to the 

Soviets’ own calculus, the PEACEKEEPER will thoroughly complicate an 

effective attack. The PEACEKEEPER will add significantly to our deterrent 

posture and it will be a stabilizing factor in the strategic nuclear U.S.-Soviet 

equation. 

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CONCLUSION 

The United States delayed its strategic nuclear modernization and we 

have had to modernize all three legs of the TRIAD at the same time. We are 

making steady progress with the bomber and submarine force modernization. 

The TRIDENT submarine program will modernize our aging ballistic missile 

submarine fleet and the D-5 missile will add new capabilities to the sea-based 

leg of the TRIAD at the end of this decade. The B-1B program is on schedule; it 

will be in the operational force next year. It will provide a modern, responsive 

bomber capable of penetrating Soviet defenses. 

The modernization of the ICBM force has had a series of delays wellknown to this committee. The delays have not been technological or system 

delays; the missile is performing superbly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge the 

immediate deployment of the PEACEKEEPER. The PEACEKEEPER is tested 

and proven, and is ready for deployment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that 

we must proceed now with the deployment of the PEACEKEEPER in order to 

maintain the effectiveness of the TRIAD and our deterrent strategy into the 

next century. 

Remarks to the ATLANTA 

COMMUNITY LEADERS LUNCHEON 

Atlanta, GA 

11 April 1985 

Thank you. It is nice to be in Atlanta on this beautiful spring day. To be 

with this group of community leaders is an honor. When I look at the past 

speakers who have addressed this group, I wonder why Ed Wheeler asked me. 

I thought perhaps it was a gathering of old handball players. For a fellow who 

has three speeches—one’s on tank maintenance, one’s on helicopter 

maintenance and the third’s on reenlistment—it is an honor also to be here the 

year of the 150th anniversary of Oglethorpe University and, I guess, the 200th

anniversary of the death of James Oglethorpe. 

Coming into the Atlanta airport is always a thrill. We have a little Bible 

class at our church. One of the older ladies, a member of the class, asked the 

pastor, “How do you get to Heaven? What’s the route to Heaven?” Well, for the 

Lutheran folks, you get a good dose of Grace by faith and so forth but the 

pastor said, “There are probably a number of routes. I don’t know exactly 

which route you take; but, whichever way you go, I know you have to change 

planes in Atlanta.” 

I have a bit of a cold and if I sound like I’m talking through my nose, it is 

because I just returned from a trip to Eastern Europe and I have a 

“communist” cold. Like all things communist, it seems to hang on longer than 

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it is welcome. We live in what was characterized in the Invocation as a 

“troubled world.” I think one need only to read what is in the headlines of the 

newspaper on any given day to be reminded of the fact. 

There are some 20 wars going on in the world today. There have been 

millions of people killed in wars since World War II. And it looks like a dark 

and dreary world. Harpers Magazine at one time had an article that said, “It is 

a gloomy moment in the history of our country. The domestic situation is in 

chaos; prices are so high as to be utterly impossible. The political cauldron 

seethes and bubbles with uncertainty, Russia hangs like a cloud dark and 

silent upon the horizon. Of our troubles, no man can see the end.” That was 

Harpers in 1848. The world in 1985, like in 1848, is a dangerous place. 

There are a number of contributions to the instability of the world. 

Certainly, I’m not expert enough to tell you what they all are. But I look at the 

Soviet Union and the massive military buildup that has taken place over the 

past 25 years and I can only conclude that it is one of the major factors in the 

instability of the world today. 

Some years ago an author said, “Look eastward to that prison house of 

peoples, Russia. There is only one way of dealing with Russia and that is the 

way of courage.” The author was Karl Marx. Many years later another author 

wrote, “The Soviets view their relationships with the West as played not in the 

spirit of cooperation, but with a competitive zeal designed to further Soviet 

interests at the expense of the opposition .... Recognizing that the Soviet Union 

approaches issues from a different orientation ... the United States should ... 

bolster its will and rise to the challenges with a degree of resolve ... in terms 

comprehensible to the Soviet Union. It should avoid any unilateral restraint 

and accommodations because this type of behavior is interpreted by the Soviet 

Union not as an invitation to cooperation but as an opportunity which must be 

exploited.” 

That is from the Master’s thesis of Major Arthur P. Nicholson, when he 

finished the Naval Post Graduate School in 1980. As you know, Major 

Nicholson was killed by a Soviet soldier the week before last. 

We live in an interdependent world—interdependent in terms of politics, 

in terms of social structure and, more than anything else, in terms of 

economics. When I first put on the uniform, the United States was a net 

exporter of oil, not much by today’s standards—but 20,000 barrels a day was 

not insignificant in 1939. Today, we import 3.3 million barrels a day and that 

is down to almost half what it was 10 years ago. The same can be said of a 

number of things. Last year we had a trade imbalance of $100 billion, a trade 

deficit. Now, I don’t cite that fact to pass judgment on trade deficits, I simply 

cite it to give some idea of the magnitude of our economic ties with the rest of 

the world. That $100 billon is more than the Gross National Product of many 

nations in South America or in Africa. So, our ties with the rest of the world 

are very great, particularly in the economic sense. 

This is the time of the year for us when we go to the Congress to testify in 

support of the President’s defense budget. We’ve gone through that series of 

hearings for the most part, and I sense that there are three “burning questions” 

211 
in the minds of the members of the Congress this year. Because the Congress 

represents “We the People,” I would say that those three “burning questions” 

also are on the minds of “We the People.” So, I would like to talk about those 

three questions. The first is “How much is enough for defense?” The second is, 

“Are we spending the money that we are spending for defense sensibly?” And, 

the third question is, “What do we do about nuclear weapons?” I am sure there 

are other “burning” issues but I would like to address those for a few minutes 

and then save some time for questions. 

The first question is, “How much is enough?” Well, there are a number 

of ways that one might measure how much is enough. People say, “Since we’re 

at peace, it must be enough.” Or you can use a regression analysis and look 

back at years in the past when we had what was considered to be a stable 

world situation and say that that might give us some guidance. You might look 

at the peacetime years between the Korean War and the Vietnam War. If we 

did, we would see a number of facts. The first is that that was the time we had 

unquestioned nuclear superiority. Secondly, we as a nation were willing to 

spend about 8 percent of our Gross National Product for defense over a period 

of about 10 years’ time. We maintained an Army which was about 200,000 

stronger than the Army we have today. We had a 900-ship Navy in contrast to 

the 450-ship Navy we have today. We had 26,000 airplanes in the Air Force in 

contrast to the 13,000 airplanes we have today. We had a National Guard and 

Reserve that were much stronger than what we have today. We had an 

Individual Ready Reserve that had one and a quarter million people in it in 

contrast to the 300,000 or so that are in today. 

We could look back at 1979, five or six years ago, when we were willing 

to spend only 4.9 percent of our Gross National Product for defense and we 

would see an Army that was 16,000 under its authorized strength which was 

then 250,000 below that strength I mentioned earlier. We would see a Navy 

that was short 22,000 Petty Officers. We would see Armed Forces that were 

short about 5,000 pilots. We would see that we were recruiting about 50 

percent high school graduates and about 40 percent of those that were enlisted 

in the Armed Forces were in the lowest mental category acceptable to the 

Armed Forces. And, you would also see a world in which U.S. power had fallen 

to a low point. 

There are a number of ways to determine how much is enough. I would 

suggest to you that neither of those regression analyses is necessarily the way 

to do it. One ought to look at the world and determine how to proceed for the 

years ahead. You should look at your strategy and decide how best to meet 

that strategy at the lowest cost to the taxpayers. 

Now, as we go through this, you might see some other answers to that 

question but the only thing that I will tell you further on that particular 

question is that we should be guided by the words of Winston Churchill in a 

talk to Britain in the 1930s. He said, “We can afford what we need for defense. 

What we cannot afford is to say, “We only need what is convenient to provide.’” 

I want to tell you today that our Armed Forces are reasonably healthy, 

and I’d like to go on to that next question, which is, “Are we spending sensibly 

212 
what we spend for defense?” We have spent a trillion dollars for defense in the 

last five years, so what have we produced? That is a good question, and one 

that deserves an answer. So, I’d like to talk a bit about what the money has 

produced. What I would like to tell you in the first place is if we had stayed at 

the 1980 level, we would have spent very close to a trillion dollars anyway. 

What has happened? An additional $300 billion was spent for defense over the 

last five years over and above the 1980 level. Where did it go? About $80 

billion went for people; that is, improvements in people’s pay, additional 

inducements to get good people in, and keep good people. About $110 billion 

went for equipment, new equipment. Thirty-seven billion dollars went for 

improved support; that is; building up the war reserve stocks. 

What did it produce? Well, I want to tell you now that over the last few 

years 93 percent of the people enlisting in the Armed Forces are high school 

graduates. Only about 7 percent of those enlisting are in the lowest mental 

category acceptable for the Armed Forces. The reenlistment rates have gone 

from about 25 percent for first-term enlistees to about 52 percent. For career 

soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, the percentage has gone from 63 percent 

to 83 percent. What I want to tell you is that is the heart of the improvement of 

your Armed Forces. People are the heart of good armed forces. The United 

States has learned and relearned that lesson throughout its history and I tell 

you that as citizens we don’t need to relearn it again. Let’s remember that. 

The pilot shortage has been about cured. The Navy Petty Officer 

shortage has been cured. The Army’s non-commissioned officer shortage has 

been cured. So, the people situation is in pretty good shape. And it’s in far 

better shape than those numbers show you. Because the turbulence has been 

reduced, and because the training attrition is down, we need to bring in fewer 

people, and stability in the force is there to do the job better because they have 

been on the job longer. 

But, what did we get for equipment? Many times I read about criticisms 

of the equipment that we have purchased. I want to tell you that the 

fundamental axiom of American defense—and this is not a new one—is that we 

will make up for shortages in manpower by providing our people the best 

possible equipment that we can get for them. We think it is better to expend 

hardware and energy than it is to expend life and blood. 

Today we have some of the best airplanes in the world. We have added 

2400 of the new M-1 tanks and another 2200 of the new M-2 Fighting Vehicles. 

The Navy has gone from 493 to 523 ships while it retired 50 World War II 

vintage ships. But it is the combination of people and equipment that has 

made the difference. And what glues that together is the training, that extra 

$37 billion that was added to improve training. We have done tremendous 

amounts of research and development trying to find and improve ways to keep 

our military equipment in the field in operation. And that has paid off in good 

training. 

I would just like to say a few things. The F-16 airplane in the Air Force 

today in today’s bombing competitions does far better than the F-4s, the 

airplane it replaced. The F-16 does it with “dumb” bombs. That is, with just 

213 
plain, ordinary bombs with no guidance it does better than the F-4 did with 

guided missiles a few years ago. And with a one-man crew instead of a twoman crew and with improved operational ready rates the airplane has far 

exceeded anything that we ever had with the F-4. The maintenance man-hours 

and flight hours are far better than was ever expected. 

Then, there is the tank force, for example: The M-1 tank was greatly 

criticized and almost lost in Congress because of the criticism that was raised 

over that tank. That tank has now been fielded in large numbers. I visited a 

tank force in Europe last year; and, with the combination of better tanks and 

better people and better training, that tank force in Europe has an operational 

ready rate of about 94 percent. That is in contrast to about 70 percent for the 

old tank force. More importantly, the tank can fight at night and in the 

daytime and the tank crew qualification scores are 46 percent higher than they 

were four years ago. The first-round hits in tank gunnery qualifications are up 

to 83 percent in contrast to around 50 percent a few years ago. 

Now, if you just do a little mathematics in your head: with 2,000 tanks 

in the field and a 70 percent operational ready rate, it means that 1400 tanks 

are ready to go out and meet the enemy. If you have a 94 percent operational 

ready rate, it means that over 1800 tanks are ready to meet the enemy and 

that means you have another armored division’s worth of tanks ready. Now, if 

your first-round hits are 83 percent instead of 53 percent, and the tank is able 

to fight 24 hours a day instead of 12 hours a day, you see that you have an 

almost exponential increase in combat capability. The same is true across the 

board. Go to the naval forces and you see that, with the addition of the AEGIS 

cruisers to the carrier battle groups, we have increased the air protection for 

our carriers about nine times what it was before that AEGIS cruiser was 

available. 

I could go on and on but what I want to tell you is that the taxpayer is 

getting value received from the money put into defense. Do we always do it 

right? No. The answer is categorically “No.” I can cite the $700 toilet seat, or 

the $435 hammer or whatever it happens to be. The people say, “Well, what do 

you do with tax money given for defense purposes?” Well, we work very hard to 

try to avoid such excesses. I want to tell you that we have two million people 

wearing the uniform full-time. We have another million wearing it part-time in 

the Reserves. We have a million civilian employees out there. That is about 4 

million people. Most of them are working very, very hard to do their jobs well; 

but I have been around long enough to know that no matter how dumb it is, 

somebody is out there doing it wrong. It is just the way human nature is. 

I got a letter from a fellow just recently. He said, “Dear General Vessey, 

Congressman So and So has been airing a political TV commercial in which he 

claims the Pentagon pays $435 for a hammer. In the Review and Outlook 

column of the Wall Street Journal, the editorial entitled “The Ponderous 

Pentagon” states the Pentagon pays $100 for a hammer. My question is which 

is right? How much does the Pentagon pay for hammers? Does the Pentagon 

buy second-hand hammers? Maybe you could get them cheaper that way. I 

have an extra one in my garage that I will let the Pentagon have for free. I am 

214 
proud to be an American and if I can save America $435 (or even $100) by 

giving up a hammer, I would be proud to do so! Let me know if I can help!” 

So I wrote him a letter. I said, “Thanks for your letter about hammers. 

You are absolutely right in implying that either $435 or $100 is too much to 

pay for a hammer. I inquired into the matter to try to get answers to your 

questions. First, how much does the Pentagon pay for hammers?” The 

General Services Administration tells me that the Defense Department bought 

83,000 hammers from the General Services Administration this past year. The 

prices varied from $6.40 to $8.70. Most of them were of the $6.40 variety. In a 

routine audit this past year, Navy auditors discovered that as a part of a 

weapons system support contract, a contractor had prorated support overhead 

charges on some common tools, among them a hammer. Under that contract, 

the hammer cost $430. Needless to say, the Navy corrected the contract and 

recovered the excess charges for the hammer and the other common tools. So, 

the answer to your question is that the Pentagon pays somewhere between 

$6.40 and $8.70 depending on the type of hammer.” 

“I, like you, would be happy to give up one of my hammers if I thought it 

would save the taxpayers from spending $100 or $435. Fortunately, I think 

both of us can keep our hammers in good conscience.” 

The next question that I would like to talk about briefly is, “What to do 

about nuclear weapons?” Now, the first thing I’d like to say about that is that 

nuclear weapons are here. They are here in this world and we can’t change 

that. Some people think that God let man invent golf for the entertainment of 

the rich. Those of us who had to dive for golf balls in water hazards know that 

that’s not the case. We know God let man invent golf to teach him something 

about life. And the most important thing that it teaches man is the ball is 

where it lies. So, you have to play it from there. And we are where we are in 

this world. God may forgive our sins but He won’t give us any “mulligans.” 

Nuclear weapons are out there and we have to deal with the world the way it is. 

We have returned to the negotiating table with the Soviet Union in 

Geneva with a policy that says that we want to have drastic reductions in the 

level of nuclear weapons. Now, I looked up the last speech that Mr. Chernenko 

gave in which he said that he agreed we need to have reductions in nuclear 

weapons, perhaps to move to a world that has no nuclear weapons. I looked at 

President Reagan’s speech just before we returned to Geneva and he seemed to 

be saying the same thing. So, maybe our negotiators can sit down there and 

find some reasonable way to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. 

In the meantime, it is important for us to recognize that the first element 

of our strategy is our strategic nuclear deterrent force. We have not built a 

force to attack somebody else. We have built a force to try to make it clear to 

our potential enemies that they cannot attack us and succeed. I would like to 

point out a few facts about our strategic nuclear force. We keep about 25 

percent of the warheads in our strategic nuclear force in ballistic missile 

warheads. That is the most dangerous type of warhead, the type which, in 

large numbers, could be used for a first strike. The Soviet Union keeps about 

70 percent of its strategic nuclear warheads in ballistic missile warheads. So, 

215 
we have to make it clear that we have no intentions of shooting first, of striking 

anybody else. But we also want to make it clear that the Soviets can’t strike us 

and achieve their war objectives. 

We keep the rest of our nuclear force in bomber weapons or ballistic 

missile submarines. There are a number of issues before the Congress this 

year and have been for a number of years to modernize that force. We believe 

it is important for that force to be a modern force. We believe it is important 

for that force to be a modern force for a whole bunch of reasons. First, for 

safety. Second, for effectiveness, so that potential enemies will know that we 

have an effective force. And thirdly, if we get to a markedly reduced level of 

nuclear weapons through negotiations, we want a force that continues to be an 

effective deterrent force because that is our strategy. We don’t want a war. We 

don’t want any kind of a war. But we don’t want to be paralyzed by the fear of 

war as we go about our business in this world of nation-states in which we live. 

The President appointed a commission a couple of years ago that is 

commonly called the “Scowcroft Commission” to examine this issue. That 

commission came up with some very sensible recommendations. They are in 

the public domain. If you are at all unsure about the nuclear weapons issue, I 

would suggest that you read that report because it brings right up to the 

forefront the importance of modernizing our force. A few weeks ago the 

Congress voted to go ahead with the so-called MX, the PEACEKEEPER 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, and to modernize that force, at least partly. 

Now, another set of votes will come up later this year and I would suggest that 

they are important votes. They are important votes for “We the citizens” and it 

is important for our elected representatives. 

I would say one last thing about the issue of nuclear weapons 

negotiations and that is that the level of weapons will not necessarily reduce 

the danger of war. Salvador de Madariaga, the Spanish philosopher and 

historian who worked for many, many years on the old League of Nations 

Disarmament Commission, wrote in his memoirs that mankind has the issue of 

war and disarmament upside down and backwards. He said that, “Nations 

don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they arm because they 

distrust each other.” And if we really want to reduce the danger of war in this 

world, we have to work on the mistrust. If we settle the mistrust issues, the 

level of armaments will then automatically go away. 

I would say to you that in this issue of defense of the Nation, “We the 

People” have an obligation to ourselves but there is also another obligation and 

that obligation is laid out in the Preamble of the Constitution where it says 

“Preserve the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.” When 

Congress votes for the defense budget in May, they will not be voting for 

defending ourselves today. Those budgets have already been taken care of. 

What they are voting for is defending our posterity in the years ahead. 

It is reminiscent a little bit of the TV ad—I’ve forgotten the announcer’s 

name. The man comes on the TV with a burning house in the background and 

he says, “When is the worst time to find out that you don’t have the right 

insurance on your house?” Well, the answer is self-evident in the ad with the 

216 
burning house in the background. And I would say to you that the same thing 

applies to national defense. When is the worst time to find out that you don’t 

have the right national defense? That’s during a time of trouble for the Nation 

because you don’t pay then in dollars. You pay in the blood of our citizens and 

that is what we do not want to do. And I am absolutely convinced that by 

maintaining the right levels of defense for this nation we can keep the peace. 

We don’t have to go to war and we can keep the peace not only for ourselves 

but for our posterity. 

Letter of Resignation to 

Honorable Ronald Reagan 

President of the United States 

The White House 

Washington, DC 

12 April 1985 

Dear Mr. President, 

I respectfully request that I be retired from active duty on 30 September 

1985. I realize that the date is eight months ahead of the date on which my 

second term as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, would terminate under the law, 

but I believe it is a good time for me to leave. Thanks to your leadership, that 

of Secretary Weinberger, and the support of the Congress and the American 

people, our Armed Forces have made extraordinary improvements in the last 

few years. As for replacing me, there are at least five very well-qualified officers 

from which you can choose, and any of those five will do the job very well. 

You do not need another report on the improvements in the armed 

forces; I would simply call your attention to your last meeting with the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and tell you that the Armed Forces are in the best condition I’ve 

seen them in my 45 years of service. On the other hand, we must remember 

that the readiness of the Armed Forces and the state of our defenses must be 

tended continually. Like the freshness of bread on the shelves of a bakery, 

readiness of the Armed Forces must be tended daily. We must prepare for 

tomorrow as we deal with today’s problems. I realize that the nation must deal 

with many problems beyond those of defense, but, frankly, I am worried about 

the direction to which the Congress is turning in dealing with the defense 

budget this year. I urge your continued support for the necessary 

improvements in our defenses needed to secure the peace in the years ahead. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are functioning quite well. They have good 

relationships with you and with Secretary Weinberger. They have had their 

own operations and procedures under continual review over the past three 

years and set in motion some substantial improvements in defense planning 

217 
and the formulation of military advice. Needless to say, we are not inhibited by 

lack of room for more improvement, but I believe you have the right set of 

Chiefs and the right Secretary of Defense to make the needed improvements. 

Lastly, it has been a great honor and privilege to serve the country under 

your leadership and to work with the dedicated people who help you “provide 

for the common defense.” Cap Weinberger’s model of selflessness, competence, 

and diligence has been great for the Defense Department. I ask to leave in 

September only because my wonderful wife has saluted and obeyed for the past 

40 years; she cheerfully endured numerous family separations, countless 

short-notice moves, life in strange places, and difficult living conditions. I 

promised to have her in our home in Minnesota before the first snow of the 85-

86 winter. I must keep my promise. 

Very respectfully, 

Extract from 

COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES AT 

NORWICH UNIVERSITY GRADUATION 

Northfield, VT 

18 May 1985 

This is a happy, wonderful spring day in the Vermont countryside. It is a 

great day for families and faculty and for you graduates. I am pleased to be 

here, particularly in this the bicentennial year of the birthday of Captain Alden 

Partridge. He not only founded America’s first private military school but he 

also provided the foundation for today’s ROTC program which has been the 

bulwark of providing officers for the Armed Forces of the United States—and 

not only for the active forces but also for that legacy of our great Militia 

heritage, our Reserve and National Guard. 

One of the briefest commencement addresses ever given goes like this: 

“You have finished your education in a time of uncertainty, 

unrest and unprecedented change .... Don’t conclude prematurely 

that the individual is unimportant and that you can abdicate your 

responsibility for making the tough, hard decisions that you may 

wrestle with for most of your lives. You live in a country that is 

healthy while much of the world is either lean or hungry. There 

will be all kinds of alarums and excursions (but you cannot) say, 

‘Let someone else make these hard decisions as to what our policy 

and our purpose should be.’” 

That commencement address was given about 150 years ago by the great 

German philosopher, Goethe; and, I say to you that it is as applicable today as 

218 
then. Ten days ago, we marked the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II 

in Europe. In spite of the sacrifices made and the dangers endured by millions 

of freedom-loving people—including 1600 Norwich graduates who fought in that 

war—the world is still a very troubled place. In fact, there are about 20 wars 

being fought as you graduate today, if you define a war as a conflict in which 

uniformed forces are engaged and people are being killed. 

Blessedly, our nation is free and at peace today. What about the future? 

Will we be as secure in 2025 as we are in 1985? There are those who are not 

confident that we will be. In fact, there are some who are downright 

pessimistic. There’s a new book by the French author, Jean-Francois Revel, 

called How Democracies Perish. In the opening lines of the book, he describes 

the world as “a democracy-killing machine.” He goes on to say, “Democracy is 

not basically structured to defend itself against outside enemies seeking its 

annihilation, especially since the latest and most dangerous of these external 

enemies, communism, parades as democracy perfected when it is in fact the 

absolute negation of democracy.” 

In some ways, Revel has some good arguments to support his 

contentions. Although the word “democracy” is liberally sprinkled in the titles 

of many nations in the world, the United States is only one in a very small 

minority of reasonably democratic nations. 

That observation should keep us on our toes as we look at the world 

around us; but it should not frighten us as we look at our own history. Von 

Arnim, the 19th century German novelist and a colleague of Goethe, said, “The 

history of the world begins anew with every man, and ends with him.” What he 

meant, I believe, is that one man and one woman can make a difference. That 

is the essence of our democracy. I remember reading a plaque on the 

Minneapolis City Auditorium as my outfit marched off to war as we were 

mobilized during World War II, 45 years ago. It says: “Participation in the 

rights of citizenship assumes participation in the duties of citizenship.” The 

full participation by each citizen is fundamental to democracy; and the duties 

range all the way from voting to elect our President and legislators to paying the 

taxes we levy on ourselves. Sometimes, those duties encompass fighting, even 

risking death, in the battles that “We the People” choose to fight in the defense 

of this republic of ours. 

Much has been said throughout your years here about the great 

responsibilities the graduates of Norwich have as citizens and as soldiers. 

Alden Partridge said that Norwich would provide not only an education but also 

a military background which would “qualify graduates for the correct and 

efficient discharge of their duties when their country may require their 

services.” Last night, many of you swore an oath which you reaffirmed this 

morning as officers in the Armed Forces of the Nation to defend the 

Constitution of the United States against all enemies. As you accept those 

responsibilities, all of us here today and all Americans will be placing in you 

our highest trust. 

But there is a second reason we have placed our highest trust in you, a 

reason that people sometimes forget—each of you, in or out of the military, are 

219 
also the embodiment of our nation’s values. In some ways that second 

responsibility outweighs the first, because without those values, our freedom 

would be an empty exercise in self-indulgence. 

To protect our nation’s values, the decisions you make must be based on 

principle rather than expediency. It can mean that you choose the harder right 

instead of the easier wrong.; and that may mean that you sometimes must 

stand alone, supported only by your convictions. Perhaps these words are 

alien to your experiences at Norwich because, for the past four years, you have 

lived in a community whose code is one of integrity. You have been supported 

by faculty, by fellow students and by parents who try to live by the principles of 

this institution. Whatever temptations you may have had over these four years 

to let your standards slip, you have prevailed. But, today, you are leaving this 

community and you are entering a world which is neither so guided nor always 

so supportive. 

But, I am not concerned because the greatest thing about Norwich is not 

its faculty, good as it is; nor its impressive tradition of training the citizen and 

the citizen-soldier; nor the physical beauty of the campus in this part of 

Vermont. The greatest thing about Norwich is you—the young men and women 

who will perpetuate the values of this institution and of this nation which you 

will serve. 

You have the talents and the values and perseverance that it takes to be 

the real heroes and heroines of your generation—the embodiment of “We the 

People,” the “We” who have kept the Nation free and who will pass on the 

blessings of liberty to our posterity, just as you will one day pass those 

blessings on to your posterity. 

I want to close with a prayer for you. This prayer comes from the Order 

of Matins in the Lutheran Book of Worship. It is a good prayer for military 

people and a good prayer for you graduates on Commencement Day. It goes 

like this: 

“Lord God, You have called Your servants to ventures of which 

we cannot see the ending, by paths as yet untrodden, through 

perils unknown. Give us faith to go out with good courage, not 

knowing where we go, but only that Your hand is leading us and 

Your love is supporting us. Amen.” 

That is my prayer for you and I give you my congratulations. Best 

wishes to all of you. 

220 
Address at the COMMENCEMENT 

CEREMONIES FOR 1984-1985 COMMAND 

AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 

7 June 1985 

You finish the Staff College at an exciting time; and if you look out at the 

world, you will see that it is also a troubled time. You see war in Afghanistan, 

war in Kampuchea, war in the Persian Gulf, and war here in Central America 

in this Hemisphere. Certainly, our look at the world today might lead us to 

believe that the world is headed for a major conflict; but our job is to do our 

part to see that it doesn’t happen. 

For you in the Armed Forces of the United States, you leave at a 

particularly interesting time as far as your profession is concerned. There is 

more going on in the development of tactical concepts, in equipment 

modernization and in cooperation among the Armed Services of our country 

and with our allies than ever before in history. Those of us who are in the 

business of trying to set the course for the future have tried to leave you three 

tools for the future: good people, extraordinarily good equipment, and good 

training concepts. Looking at the past and what we had in the past and 

looking at what we have today, I can tell you that we’ve done that. Perhaps, 

the best of that is the people. You also have extraordinarily good equipment. It 

is not perfect equipment. It was designed by fallible human beings and built 

by other fallible human beings and operated by a third set of fallible human 

beings. Yet, it is good equipment, extraordinarily good equipment. What is 

more important is that the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps have all 

invested tremendous amounts of money for research and development in 

training for the future. We have today the best training concepts that we have 

ever had. 

The most exciting part for you is that we are absolutely uninhibited by 

lack of room for improvement. There is a tremendous amount of good and 

important work for you to do out there—such as the development of tactical 

concepts to take advantage of those tools that I mentioned to you. So, as you 

confidently move into the future to do your work, I encourage you to preserve 

what is useful from the past but march into a future which is a changing 

future. 

Look back at your roots, and I want to talk to you a little about your 

roots—about your roots as officers and about the roots of the institution you 

serve, the Armed Forces of the United States. I realize that I am talking to 

officers from other nations and to some civilian graduates of the college; but I 

think you will see that the concepts that I will lay out apply to your nation and 

to you civilians as well. 

You have chosen to serve the Nation through service in the Armed 

Forces. The key word is “service.” You don’t work for the Army, Navy, Air 

Force, or Marine Corps; you serve in them. And that is a completely different 

221 
concept than working for them. Britain’s Sir John Hackett called it the 

military’s “unlimited liability contract.” That’s a good name for it. You don’t 

choose the wars you fight; you don’t choose the places you serve; but, 

sometimes your duty will take you to places where you will risk life and limb. 

The reason for your service is because “We the People” agreed to provide for our 

common defense. You have chosen to serve the Nation; but there is an 

important corollary: the Nation has chosen you to serve. That is a unique 

relationship. The people of this nation want peace, but they want a confident 

peace. They don’t want to be paralyzed by the fear of war as they march on in 

the days ahead. The people of the Nation need to have confidence that you 

don’t advocate war, but war is, in fact, your business and they need to know 

that you are ready for it. By being ready for it, you help ensure the peace. 

There is a marvelous dialogue in the “Second Book” of Plato’s Republic

where Plato has Glaucon and Socrates talking about the attributes of the 

armed forces of that day. Plato has Socrates saying, “Nothing can be more 

important than that the work of the Guardians should be well done.” He said, 

“If shoemakers become inferior and claim to be what they are not, the state is 

not in peril; but if the Guardians of our city only appear to be Guardians and 

are not Guardians, you surely see that they utterly destroy the city.” 

Socrates and Glaucon then go on to describe the attributes for the 

Guardians. Guardians should be “quick to see, swift to overtake the enemy, 

and strong.” Socrates adds they should be brave, but their strength must be 

spiritual as well as physical. Then, between them they decide that one man 

cannot practice many arts, that war is an art and must be studied and 

practiced, and that the higher the duties of the Guardians, the more time and 

skill and application will be required. They conclude that the Guardians ought 

to be dangerous to their enemies but gentle to their friends; and, by their 

friends he meant the citizens of the Republic. Then they wonder about whether 

or not these conflicting attributes can be found in a single person. 

Through the years, most civilized nations have wrestled with those issues 

about their armed forces: how to have warriors with the necessary skill and 

ferocity in times of war and not have them be a menace to the society in times 

of peace. 

Our Forefathers of this great nation were concerned about these issues 

and they were notably skeptical about military power. In fact, in 1784, the 

Continental Congress declared that standing armies in peace were inconsistent 

with the principles of the Republic. The Congress reduced the Continental 

Army to about a hundred officers and men and then stationed them as far 

away from civilization as they possibly could. And I suspect that some of your 

orders today may indicate that we still do the same thing. 

That skepticism was later developed in the Federalist Papers, and it all 

relates to why our military, which springs from the society it serves and is 

sworn to defend, embodies the principles that govern the society. We the 

people in the military are a part of “We the People.” That is why our military 

forces have never produced the so-called “Man on Horseback,” and why we 

222 
have not strayed from the duty of defending the Constitution as was originally 

intended—that is, protecting the society but not policing the society. 

You, the men and women of the Armed Forces today, are our nation’s 

Guardians; you are the warrior class of today. You have chosen to give up 

some of the benefits of liberty so that the society as a whole can exercise those 

benefits and liberties in full. As with Socrates’ Guardians, your duties will 

require more time and skill and art and application. That is why you have 

come to the Command and General Staff College. As with the Guardians of 

Plato’s Republic, nothing is more important than that your work be well done. 

Your skill, your concept of service, your values, and your loyalty will carry you 

through whatever duties you have to perform in the years ahead. The skills 

you learned here are important. It is essential that you hone them as you go to 

your next assignment; but it is also essential that you hone that concept of 

service. 

A message I would like to leave with you is that there are no degrees of 

importance in the services you perform. Some of you will command aviation 

units or tank units or infantry units. Others will work in logistics supplying 

weapons and equipment or doing research and development. Some will be 

buried in the anonymity of staff work. Some of you will go to faraway places 

that your mother-in-law won’t be able to find on the map. Wherever you go, 

the duty is important and each set of duties is as important as the next. 

A year ago on Memorial Day, my present squad, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

participated in the burial of the Unknown Soldier from the Vietnam Conflict. 

We were offered a limousine ride from the Capitol to Arlington Cemetery; but I 

said, “No, we’ll march.” We fell in and we marched; and despite all this 

business about bickering among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I want you to know 

that we marched in step three miles from the Capitol to the Tomb of the 

Unknown Soldier. We did that for one reason, and that was to demonstrate 

our belief in the code that there are no unimportant duties, that whoever has 

fallen serving his country, even if he is unknown, has performed very, very 

important duties. 

Twenty or 25 years from now, one of you by the Grace of God and 

through the confidence in you or your fellow members in the warrior class, may 

be serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or as Chief of Staff of the 

Army and standing up here on the podium harassing the graduating class. For 

whomever that is, I want to tell you one thing: it is important for you to 

recognize today and then that your duties are no more important and no less 

important than the duties of your classmates who did not rise to those high 

ranks. The officer is a servant of the Nation; he is a servant of his superiors; 

and he is a servant of those who are subordinate to him. And it is important 

that, whatever rank you hold in the authority of whatever office you have, you 

recognize that you serve the Nation by serving your fellow soldiers by your 

professional competence and by your dogged and unceasing care and concern 

for the men and women entrusted to you. 

Inseparable from the concept of service is the concept of integrity. The 

citizens of this nation place great trust in you as Guardians of the Republic. 

223 
They will continue to judge all of us by rules stricter than they apply to 

themselves. If you buy a $435 hammer, you’re going to get hammered for it 

even though you bought 83,000 hammers for $6.40; and that is the way it 

should be. The people of this nation should do that because, ultimately, their 

security rests with you and with us. The people of the Nation have entrusted 

the Armed Forces with the most awesome weapons ever known to man. And 

they have entrusted them with hundreds of billions of dollars of their hardearned treasure. But, more importantly, they have entrusted the leaders of the 

Armed Forces with the lives of their sons and daughters who serve in the 

Armed Forces and with their own lives and their security for today and for the 

years ahead. 

Don’t confuse integrity with infallibility. There is a great tendency to do 

that. As Gary Cooper said in High Noon, “You should aim to high-regarded.” 

But you should remember that you are human and fallible, and that those who 

serve with you and those you will lead are also human and fallible. The code of 

the Guardian has plenty of room for fallibility. And certainly, the higher up the 

flagpole you go, the more of your fallible backside will show. There is room for 

that. But there is no room for lack of integrity or for those who place 

themselves above duty, above their comrades, or above their country. 

Careerism is the one great sin in the Armed Forces and it has no place among 

you in the warrior class. 

Now, you may sit there and say, “Well, that’s alright for you to say when 

you’re on your lofty perch as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because 

you’ve made it; but we want to get ahead.” I know you want to get ahead and I 

applaud that, but, if you get there over the bodies or careers of your comrades, 

you have served the Nation poorly. 

There’s a marvelous passage in the last pages of Field Marshal Bernard 

Montgomery’s book. He said, “There are times in war when men must do 

hazardous jobs, and when success and the Nation’s fate depend on the 

courage, determination and tenacity of officers and men. When those who set 

duty before self give of themselves to see the task committed to them through 

to its completion, they win the day and the highest honor that mortal man can 

give.” 

To the international students here today, let me say, “Thanks for 

attending.” I hope that your attendance has been as valuable for you as it has 

been for us. I am sure that the faculty and the students here have enjoyed 

your company and profited from your presence as members of the class. It is 

my firm belief that nurturing contacts among the military forces of the nations 

of the world will help reduce the risk of war. I know that my own friendships 

with my classmates of the 43 nations represented in my class of the Command 

and General Staff College have served the security of the Free World. In the 

past year alone, in the line of duty, I have met classmates from five of those 

nations. 

I also want to say a word to the families. Your husbands or wives, as the 

case may be, have reached an important point in their careers. It is important 

to them and it is important to the Nation. It is important to you. They needed 

224 
your support as they went through the school and they need your support now 

as they go on to new and more demanding duties. I realize that this lecture is 

not necessary for you families because if you had not supported them, they 

would probably not be here in the first place. Nevertheless, I would like to read 

from a speech that tells a little about military families. It was a speech given 

by Karen Nicholson when a memorial was dedicated in honor of her husband, 

Major Arthur Nicholson, who was killed recently by a Soviet sentry. She said in 

her speech: 

“To belong to the military is to belong to a very special family. 

Perhaps because we are so often away from our loved ones, a bond 

develops that you can find nowhere else. And that love and 

concern has opened many doors and has stood by us in the past 

weeks. Nick was the most patriotic person I have ever known. 

And that’s why he made the military his life. He felt that each and 

every day he did something for his country, for his family and for 

everyone he knew. He devoted his life to understanding other 

people, especially the Soviets, in the hope that through friendship 

and knowledge of each other he could contribute to world peace. 

He didn’t want to die and we didn’t want to lose him, but he would 

gladly lay down his life again for America.” 

Now, I read that in recognition that the family serves as surely as do the 

people in the family who wear the uniform. I acknowledge your great 

importance to the military community; and, as you leave here, I want you to 

know that you go with my thanks and the thanks of the other members of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff for the sacrifices that you make. You go with our best 

wishes for you and your families for the exciting days ahead. In the Liturgy for 

Morning Prayer in the new Lutheran Book of Worship, there is a prayer which is 

a good prayer for Service men and women and their families. It goes like this: 

“Lord God, You have called Your servants to ventures of which 

we cannot see the ending, by paths as yet untrodden, through 

perils unknown. Give us faith to go out with good courage, not 

knowing where we go, but only that Your hand is leading us and 

Your love is supporting us.” 

I want you to know that that’s my prayer for you and I give you my 

congratulations. It has been a pleasure to be here. Best wishes to you all. 

225 
Honorable Bill Nichols 

Chairman, Investigations Subcommittee 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 

21 June 1985 

Dear Mr. Chairman, 

In accordance with your May 23, 1985, letter to the Secretary of Defense, 

enclosed are my responses to questions on the organization of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. 

In addition to answering these questions, you asked that the Secretary 

and I provide separate statements of our views on matters specified in your 

letter to the Secretary of April 24, 1985, specifically, “Three legislative 

proposals: a bill (HR 2265)...that includes many of the provisions of the Housepassed 98th Congress JCS bill that were not enacted in the fiscal year 1985 

Defense Authorization Act; a bill introduced by Representative Ike Skelton; 

1983 Department of Defense JCS recommendations that were not enacted in 

the 98th Congress, ... the JCS-related portions of recently published studies by 

the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Heritage 

Foundation.” 

This letter will address itself to those matters specified above. However, 

before I do so, I want to review some background which may not be known by 

all members of the Committee. 

On 14 June 1983, I along with all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

testified before your Subcommittee. The topic was improving the effectiveness 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That testimony relates directly to the scope of the 

hearings you are to hold, and since all members of the JCS at that time had an 

opportunity to express their views, I would respectfully refer this committee to 

the transcript of that hearing. 

When I became Chairman in June 1982, I agreed with my colleagues on 

the JCS that we would undertake a review of our organization and our way of 

carrying out our responsibilities. As a basis for that review we recognized that 

the effectiveness of the JCS is a direct function of the relationships the JCS 

maintain with the Secretary of Defense and the President, with the 

Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands (the “CINCs”), 

and with each other as members of the JCS. Accordingly, we decided to 

address the issue personally rather than involve our staffs. We also agreed 

that we would specifically address the recommendations for change made by 

my predecessor, General Jones, and those made by General Meyer, then a 

member of the JCS. 

We agreed on four criteria we would apply to all proposals for change: 

226 
—Would the change improve our ability to wage war if we’re ever forced 

into one? The ultimate test is the ability to move from peace to war and 

to fight the war to a successful conclusion, should deterrence fail. 

—Would it provide the President and the Secretary of Defense better and 

more timely advice? 

—Would it better ensure that the requirements of the commanders in the 

field, the Commanders in Chief of the Unified and Specified Commands, 

are met? These Commanders in Chief are the ones who will execute the 

war plans and fight the battles; and their needs were a key part of our 

review. 

—Would it improve the ability to allocate national security resources 

more wisely and efficiently—helping the President and the Secretary of 

Defense to meet their difficult responsibility of getting the most security 

from a fixed budget? 

The Secretary of Defense asked us to add a fifth criterion, which we added: 

—Would the suggested changes maintain our national legacy of civilian 

control of the military? 

As the starting point for our examination, we used the duties of the JCS 

prescribed in Section 141, Title 10, US Code. Our examination of those duties 

specified in the law confirmed for us that those are the correct duties and 

responsibilities for the JCS. Our examination also confirmed that the 

challenge for any “reorganizer” is how to enhance the effectiveness of the 

Secretary of Defense, because he is the key man in the Defense Department, a 

man whose duties go considerably beyond those of most Cabinet officers. 

We concluded that reform must focus on how he uses the JCS, his 

military advisors, as a part of the entire DOD organization. His effectiveness 

depends on how well the JCS carry out the duties prescribed for them in the 

law and on the three interdependent relationships I mentioned earlier. 

Further, we concluded that the existing law already gives us most of the 

latitude we need to improve the effectiveness of our own operation. In 

cooperation with Secretary Weinberger, the JCS are working to do that now. 

Many improvements have already been made; and others are underway. The 

JCS believe that with the continued support of the Secretary we have the 

opportunity within existing authority to continue to improve our effectiveness. 

Nevertheless, we also concluded that some of the changes needed would 

require changes in the law. The JCS made recommendations to that effect to 

the Secretary. These changes were incorporated in the DOD bill submitted to 

both Houses of Congress on 18 April 1983. The JCS recommendations which 

were incorporated fully in that bill had two parts: 

First, we recommended that statutory restrictions on the size of the Joint 

Staff and tenure of its officers be changed to augment and strengthen their 

support to the Chiefs. The changes were necessary so that the size of the Joint 

Staff can be adjusted when necessary to ensure it has the number of 

227 
experienced officers needed to assist the JCS and the Secretary of Defense in 

carrying out their assigned responsibilities. The Congress adopted many of 

these proposals in 1984, but the 400 officer cap on the size of the Joint Staff 

remains and should be removed. 

Second, we recommended that Title 10, U.S. Code, 124, be amended to 

place the Chairman in the formal chain of command. The Chairman presides 

over the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and he communicates, at the direction of the 

President or the Secretary of Defense, orders to the Commanders of the Unified 

and Specified Commands. The proposed legislation would make explicit the 

Chairman’s functions as a link between the Secretary of Defense and the 

Unified and Specified Commands, an arrangement which already works well in 

practice. This legislation was not enacted and I continue to believe that it 

needs to be. 

In our examination of other proposals for change, we concluded it was 

not necessary to specify that the Chairman is the principal military advisor. 

The Chairman has ample opportunity to provide advice under existing law. We 

concluded that the Chairman should not have a full-time, four-star Deputy or 

Vice Chairman. Similarly, the JCS gave careful consideration to the concept of 

a national council of senior military advisors apart from the Chiefs of the 

Services and concluded that such a council was not required. We also 

concluded that it was not necessary or appropriate to revise the law to 

subordinate the Joint Staff specifically to the Chairman. The Chairman is 

already responsible for the management of the Joint Staff and its Director on 

behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Mr. Chairman, with this as a background, I will comment on other 

proposals for change as you requested I do in your letter. Elements of those 

proposals which have not already been discussed or which are not specifically 

included in the questions provided are discussed below: 

The provision that “subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 

Secretary, the Chairman supervises the commanders of the combatant 

commands and acts as their spokesman on operational requirements” is 

consistent with the JCS proposal that the Chairman be placed in the chain of 

command. As you are aware, the Authorization Bill of 1984 has already 

codified the Chairman’s role as spokesman for the CINCs, a procedure which 

works well in practice. 

The JCS do not agree with the provision which would authorize the 

CINCs or the members of the JCS to comment formally on reports and 

recommendations of the Joint Staff before the JCS review them. This provision 

could lead to inflexible rules which would hamper timeliness and quality 

through bureaucratic layering in the staff process. The views of the CINCs are 

always sought as a matter of course when time permits and when appropriate. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the JCS duties detailed in Section 141 of 

Title 10 US Code, are the correct duties. Carrying out those duties requires 

three healthy relationships: (1) the relationship between the JCS and the 

President and the Secretary of Defense; (2) the relationship between the JCS 

and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands; and (3) the 

228 
relationship among the JCS themselves. All of the people involved, the 

President, the Secretary of Defense, the members of the JCS, and the CINCs of 

the combatant commands must work to keep the relationships healthy if our 

present system or any mutation I can foresee is to work effectively. The 

Administration proposed two law changes which I believe would improve the 

present organization. Otherwise, the law as now written with the changes to 

the law enacted in the Fiscal Year 1985 Authorization Act give ample authority 

to the JCS to perform their duties if those relationships I pointed out are 

healthy. 

Questions and Responses 

Question One. What should be the JCS Chairman’s role as a military advisor 

to the President and Secretary of Defense? 

General Vessey. I believe the Chairman’s role as a military advisor should be 

as it is currently established in the law. He is a member of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and the members of that body serve as the principal military advisors to 

the Secretary of Defense and the President, and the National Security Council. 

He represents the Chiefs in many fora and he has the responsibility of 

conveying the views of all the Chiefs. It is not necessary that he be given 

authority to give advice in his own right. That is already covered in existing 

practice. 

Question Two. How much control over the Joint Staff should the Chairman 

have? 

General Vessey. The law already gives me all the control over the Joint Staff I 

need. Even before the changes passed by the Congress and approved by the 

President last year in the Authorization Act, Title 10, Section 143 in 

subparagraph C provided for the Joint Staff to perform such duties as the JCS 

and the Chairman prescribe. The Joint Staff is the corporate staff of the JCS 

and should be available to all the Chiefs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff manages the Joint Staff and its Director on behalf of the JCS. The law 

clearly gives the Chairman the authority to task the Joint Staff either 

independently or on behalf of the JCS. Last year, the changes in the law 

explicitly gave the Chairman the authority to select the officers to serve on the 

Joint Staff. As the law reads, it seems implicit that the Chairman owes an 

accounting to the JCS for his management of the Joint Staff on their behalf. As 

can be seen from the words in the law and from actual practice during my 

tenure as Chairman and in my observations of past Chairmen, the Chairman 

has extraordinary authority over the Joint Staff in directing its use to serve the 

JCS. 

Question Three. Please explain how assignments to the Joint Staff are made 

now that the law governing selection of Joint Staff officers has been changed. 

How many names are you requiring to be included on the nomination lists 

cited in the law? What procedures have been established to ensure that 

229 
nominated officers are selected from among the most outstanding Service 

officers? 

General Vessey. The recent changes to the law were helpful and give me more 

flexibility in the management of the Staff. Those that give the Chairman tenure 

authority and selection and retention authority over personnel assigned to the 

Joint Staff are especially helpful. I have discussed this matter with the Chiefs 

and they are committed to ensuring that the Joint Staff is staffed with the most 

outstanding officers. Let me state at this point, however, that the men and 

women we have on the Staff now are top-notch, and they are working hard to 

give the Joint Chiefs the support they need. 

A new Department of Defense Directive, “Duty with the Organization of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS)”, currently being staffed, implements Title 10, 

United States Code, Section 646, and issues policies and procedures 

concerning the assignment, promotion and retention of officers assigned to the 

OJCS. In short, this new DOD directive, applying to the OJCS and the Military 

Departments, solidifies the personnel processes for nominating and selecting 

only the most outstanding officers for assignment to the OJCS. It further 

supports career enhancement and professional development initiatives 

commensurate with being selected for and serving a successful OJCS 

assignment. The expanded authority of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to 

request multiple nominations to facilitate selection decisions to staff the OJCS 

enhances the Chairman’s prerogative for personnel management of the OJCS. 

All assignments to the OJCS are nominative. The option to decline nominations 

that do not meet stipulated selection criteria is actively exercised as is the 

management option to by-name request the assignment of specific personnel. 

Requests for multiple nominees to consider for fill of selected billets is exercised 

as appropriate. 

Question Four Should the JCS Chairman be a member of the National 

Security Council (NSC)? 

General Vessey. The JCS are the principal military advisors to the President, 

the Secretary of Defense and the NSC. That arrangements is probably 

satisfactory; however, making the Chairman a statutory member would serve 

as a reminder of the need for military advice. The key issue here is that the 

Nation’s senior civilian leadership should receive military advice from the 

Nation’s senior military leaders. Under this Administration, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

advice is heard at all NSC deliberations. The present arrangement is probably 

satisfactory. 

Question Five Should the JCS Chairman have a deputy? 

General Vessey. The JCS were unanimous on this issue. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff do not support creating a four-star Deputy or Vice Chairman. There are 

some very good arguments for having a Deputy Chairman, but the difficulty 

lies in the relationships between a Vice or Deputy Chairman and the other 

Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree on a charter for a Deputy 

Chairman which satisfactorily defined those relationships and, consequently, 

230 
unanimously opposed establishing a Deputy Chairman position. We prefer our 

current system of a quarterly Acting Chairman in my absence. The Chairman 

has a three-star assistant and the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully support this 

position and the role of this individual. Our system of a quarterly Acting 

Chairman is working well. It has the significant benefit of exposing the Chiefs 

to my duties and enhances their ability to perform as members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

Question Six. Would strengthening the JCS Chairman’s hand help to ensure a 

stronger voice for field commanders? 

General Vessey. It is difficult to answer this question because it is not clear 

what is meant by “strengthening the JCS Chairman’s hand.” Nevertheless, the 

issue of how we ensure that the CINCs’ views are heard is an important one. 

The CINCs are charged with carrying out our war plans. Their needs are 

central to the PPBS process. As such, steps have been taken for the CINCs to 

fulfill the role established for them by the National Security Act. Through their 

active participation in Defense Resources Board summer program review and 

Defense Guidance development, the CINCs have a significant influence in PPBS 

both in their own right and through me, their spokesman for operational 

requirements. The Unified and Specified Commanders’ views are often solicited 

and they have direct access to me and I to them. I also encourage them to air 

their views at our periodic CINCs’ conferences and we in the JCS actively seek 

their views and evaluate their requirements as we advise the Secretary on the 

budget. 

The CINCs have adequate authority to lay out their requirements to the 

Services through their component commanders as well as lay out those 

requirements directly to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. Programs and 

budgets and resource allocation at the national level produce the forces and 

support given to the CINCs through the component commands. Consequently, 

the issue of giving the CINCs a stronger voice is more a question of the 

resources that have been allocated or which are available to be allocated to 

each CINC rather than a question of his voice in Washington. In the Unified 

Command Plan, there are some CINCs with unusual Service component 

structures, usually for reasons of economy. In those cases, the JCS have to pay 

particular attention to ensuring that the CINC’s connection with the Services 

and the JCS themselves is clear and unobstructed. The second part of the 

issue concerns how the CINC influences how the forces under his command 

are equipped, supplied, and trained for the likely missions. Here again the 

CINC has the same channels open to him that he has on budget matters; that 

is, to the Services through his component commanders, as well as directly to 

the Service Chiefs on Service-unique matters and to the JCS on joint 

operations matters. The CINC himself has a great deal to do with the training of 

his forces, particularly with joint training. He works with the JCS to establish 

the Joint Exercise Program for his command. The JCS have also involved the 

CINCs deeply in the development of joint doctrine tactics, techniques and 

231 
procedures. It is an effort to ensure that the voices of the CINCs are heard in 

force development. 

Question Seven. Should the unified and specified commands have liaison 

officers in Washington? 

General Vessey. This has both advantages and disadvantages. We have some 

CINCs who have liaison officers in Washington now but their functions vary 

and are highly specialized to support the unique needs of those CINCs. We 

have all the flexibility we need to establish or to disestablish such liaison 

offices should circumstances warrant; but we do not want them to become 

mandatory or too large. 

Question Eight. Please explain the structure and functions of the Organization 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff. What is the relationship of these 

bodies to each other? Include an explanation of the numbers of personnel 

assigned to each of the elements of both organization and their duties. 

General Vessey. The structure of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and Joint Staff has been evolving ever since the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 

formally established by the National Security Act of 1947. This act provided for 

a Joint Staff not exceeding 100 officers operating under a Director appointed by 

and responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In its initial form, the Joint Staff 

had three main components, headed by Deputy Directors for Strategic Plans, 

Intelligence and Logistic Plans. The Joint Secretariat and certain other 

elements of the JCS organizations were not counted as part of the Joint Staff. 

This distinction between the Joint Staff and other supporting elements still 

exists today. Amendments in 1949 to the National Security Act of 1947 raised 

the permissible number of Joint Staff officers to 210. Between 1949 and 1958, 

increasing workloads of the JCS and the broader JCS duties enacted in 1958 

required expansion of the Joint Staff to the 400 limit which still exists today. 

During the decade of 1960s, a number of additional agencies were 

established to deal with areas of concern that assumed increased importance, 

such as arms control negotiations, counterinsurgency activities, and the need 

to produce a wider range of studies and analyses. During the same period, the 

manning necessary to discharge the responsibilities of the numbered JDirectorates increased, accounting for virtually all the spaces under the Joint 

Staff’s statutory limit of 400 officers. With the approval of the Secretary of 

Defense, the new agencies were usually established in a status outside the 

Joint Staff but subject to the supervision of its Director. The title used was 

often that of “Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff” for a particular 

function. As a consequence, the term “Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(OJCS)” came into use to include all the directorates and agencies under the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, both within and outside of the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff 

is considered a part of the OJCS with the only distinction being the legislative 

ceiling imposed on the size of the Joint Staff—no such ceiling exists on the size 

of the OJCS. This differentiation has existed for some ten years and has been 

regularly reported to Congress through OSD via the annual Defense Manpower 

232 
Requirements Report (DMRR) which shows the total authorized end-strength 

for the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The current report reflects 1562 positions, of which there are 850 

officers, 369 enlisted, and 343 civilians. Included in this overall total are the 

376 officer positions currently authorized in the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff 

consists of the Office of the Director, Joint Staff, the Directorate for Manpower 

and Personnel (J-1), portions of the Directorate for Operations (J-3), the 

Directorate for Logistics (J-4), the majority of the Plans and Policy Directorate 

(J-5), and the majority of the Directorate for Command, Control and 

Communications (C3S). The remaining activities within the OJCS are primarily 

associated with the Office of the Chairman; the National Military Command 

Center (NMCC), the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) and 

the Alternate National Military Command Center; JCS representatives to 

various international activities and negotiations; the Strategic Plans and 

Resource Analysis Agency (SPRAA); the Joint Analysis Directorate (JAD); the 

Joint Planning Staff for Space (JPSS); and associated automation and resource 

management functions in support of the entire OJCS. 

Question Nine. How can we be sure that civilians in the Pentagon are not 

making decisions that more properly should be made by the military? 

General Vessey. The Joint Chiefs make few decisions, per se. Our function is 

to advise the President, the Secretary of Defense and the NSC and to carry out 

the policies of the Secretary and the President. 

My view is the civilian leadership should establish broad policy guidance, 

establish objectives, set fiscal guidance and supervise—leaving to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff the military functions of advising on military matters, developing 

military strategy and war plans, maintaining readiness and conducting military 

operations. I believe that the heart of maximizing the DOD decision making 

process is improving the effectiveness of the Secretary of Defense by improving 

the support rendered by the Secretary’s military staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Through our proposals and through the Joint Chiefs of Staff fulfilling their 

responsibilities under the law, the Secretary of Defense would receive better, 

more timely military advice on matters pertaining to military policy, strategy, 

planning, and programming. The Secretary and his civilian staff would then be 

able to focus more attention on matters of policy and management. 

Question Ten. Do civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense become 

involved improperly in the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? 

General Vessey. No, not really, but there is a problem in that the military 

personnel in OSD tend to provide military advice which should be coming from 

the Secretary’s military staff, the JCS. 

Question Eleven. Can’t something be done to simplify the massive, complex 

organization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense which encompasses, in 

effect, a number of large defense agencies as well as the Secretary’s immediate 

office? 

233 
General Vessey. This is really the Secretary’s business but I do have a few 

thoughts. First, the Defense Department indeed is big, but it should be big 

because its responsibilities are large. The Secretary of Defense has 

responsibilities which are unique and go considerably beyond those of any 

other Cabinet officer. He is a Cabinet officer to the President. He is also 

manager of the biggest agency in the Free World. Its budget exceeds twice that 

of the AT&T before the breakup, General Motors, General Electric and US Steel 

combined. Third, he is a member of the National Command Authorities and as 

such is directly responsible for the defense of the Nation. 

In view of the weight of his responsibilities and many demands made on 

him, he needs a large staff and Congress should not indiscriminately limit his 

authority or flexibility to adjust his staff and his organization to meet his 

needs. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense needs to police his 

organization continually to insure clarity in lines of responsibility and to insure 

that unnecessary overlap and duplication does not stifle the advice and 

assistance he needs. 

Statement before the 

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE 

Subcommittee on Defense 

On the FY 86 DOD Appropriations 

25 June 1985 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. 

I report to you that the military posture of our armed forces is sound. 

The forces are manned with good, capable people; their armament is being 

improved with good, modern equipment; their training has been improved; and 

they have better support behind them. By every commonsense measure, our 

forces are more ready than at any time in the recent past. These improvements 

are due to the support of the American people and the Congress; and, on 

behalf of the men and women in our armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

I thank you for your support. We ask for your continued assistance in the FY 

1986 budget. 

The Nation should neither be complacent nor accept the notion that 

these past three years can somehow erase the decline in real growth over the 

1970s or eliminate the gap caused by the continued growth of Soviet power. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have looked at the threats to this nation’s security and 

at our strategy. We believe this year’s original budget request was sensible. It 

was neither massive nor excessive. It was a reasonable response to threats to 

the national security and to the requirements of the military strategy of the 

United States. Reductions in the President’s requested budget will slow the 

234 
momentum of improvements to our deterrent posture and they will affect 

readiness and retard responsiveness in a crisis. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not advocate these cuts. However, we 

participate fully with the Secretary of Defense in the development of the 

amended budget before you now. We participated understanding the 

reductions had to be developed. The threats to our interests have not 

slackened; but, if the defense budget needs to be cut for reasons other than 

defense, then the way the Secretary has laid out these cuts has the support of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Good people are the heart of our forces, and I am pleased that the 

favorable trends reported last year generally continue. Recruitment and 

retention are good. About 50 percent of the force are careerists. We have a 

fine corps of non-commissioned officers. By every standard, we have welldisciplined, dedicated, capable Service men and women who are proudly 

serving their country. We need to continue to support the programs which will 

ensure our Armed Forces are manned by intelligent, trained, well-disciplined 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. 

Our forces are better equipped. New, good equipment from long-delayed 

modernization has made its way into the hands of our forces—Active, reserve 

and National Guard. In FY 84 alone, the equipment added to the force 

included the following important items: 

— 769 M-1 Tanks 

— 598 BRADLEY Fighting Vehicles 

— 120 BLACKHAWK Helicopters 

— 209 PATRIOT Missiles 

— 72 Multiple Launch Rocket Launchers 

— 11 APACHE Attack Helicopters 

— 187 New F-15, F-16 and A-10 Fighters 

— 46 Ships (including 16 warships) and 282 Aircraft for the Navy 

— Plus thousands of trucks, small arms and communications items. 

We have added not just quantity to our force but, more importantly, 

greatly increased capability. A few examples: 

— M-1 ABRAMS Tank—Average tank gunnery qualification scores 46 

percent higher than those of M-60A3 crews. Last year, a U.S. tank 

company in M-1’s scored the highest in the prestigious Canadian Army 

Trophy competition against the best tank crews and tanks in the Free 

World. 

— M-2 BRADLEY Fighting Vehicle—High-speed battlefield companion to 

the M-1. More armor protection for the crew; TOW missile and cannon 

firepower; and greatly increased mobility in comparison to the M-113 

Armored Personnel Carrier (APC). 

— F-16 Fighter—The best single-engine fighter in the world. 

Maneuverable, agile, maintainable (needs only half maintenance-man 

235 
hours of the fighter it replaced). Phenomenal bombing accuracies; does 

as well with conventional bombs as F-4 did with guided bombs. 

— M-16A2 Rifle—Lightweight, dependable, versatile, improved accuracy, 

improved sustained firing capability for the Infantryman. 

— AEGIS on the TICONDEROGA Class Cruiser—Provides up to nine-fold 

increase in air defense firepower for the protection of the Fleet. 

— SL-7 Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) Fast Sealift—USNA ALGOL during 

September 1984 REFORGER exercise moved 271 tracked vehicles, 652 

wheels, 230 military containers—loaded in only 36 hours, and capable of 

traveling from Beaumont, TX to Antwerp, Belgium, in six days instead of 

13. 

Our forces are well-trained and they know how to fight together in ways 

which capitalize on the advantages the new equipment can offer. We are 

emphasizing joint and combined training. The training is realistic and 

innovative. The forces are trained and measured against high standards. 

Support and sustainability programs are on-hand as new equipment is fielded 

to ensure that the new equipment is integrated effectively. In the past three 

years the funding for ammunition and spare parts has grown by over 25 

percent. Within those areas we have doubled funding for war reserve spares, 

and in Europe alone, Army ammunition on the ground is up about 16 percent. 

All these factors—good people, good equipment, good training and 

support—add to our strength. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this 

improved military posture helps deter war and can help provide a climate for 

sensible negotiations with the Soviets. A strong national defense helps ensure 

the peace and safeguard our security. 

Your support is important for the continued security of the Nation and 

that of our allies. Regrettably, our security and that of the West are not 

assured. Even under the best of circumstances, the second half of the decade 

of the 1980s will continue as a period of challenges to our security and as a 

period of widespread instability. The Soviet Union has been unrelenting in its 

buildup of military power and in its willingness to use or to threaten to use 

that power either directly or through the use of its surrogates. 

As the Congress considers the defense budget, I urge the members to 

remember the need for day-to-day readiness. Crises too often give little 

warning of their approach. The lessons learned since World War II show us 

that no matter how good the preparations, orderly mobilization is very difficult 

and very costly once growing tensions indicate immediate danger. Under 

modern conditions, hastily building new, battle-ready forces is not practical 

even if the national treasure is spent without restraint. An Army, Navy, Air 

Force and Marine Corps, in-being and maintained in readiness, are the best 

military guarantors of our security. They add weight to our diplomacy and 

support the other elements of our national power. 

Every indication the Joint Chiefs of Staff see tells us the Soviets will most 

likely continue on the path they have been on, fielding stronger nuclear and 

conventional forces on the land, on and under the sea, in the air, and in space. 

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The United States has no plans to match the Soviet buildup weapon for 

weapon. Certainly, the Joint Chiefs do not believe this should be done or need 

to be done. However, this nation and its allies simply must do what is needed 

to counter the Soviets with a military posture which makes clear that the 

Soviets cannot achieve their aims by starting a war or threatening war. 

The Joint Chiefs believe that our strategy provides this nation with a 

sensible approach to preserve the peace and to provide for our national 

security. It is not a new strategy. It is the strategy of deterrence which we 

have pursued for nearly forty years. The success of that strategy rests on 

ready, modern Active and Reserve Component forces, both conventional and 

nuclear, and on the maintenance of strong alliances. 

THREAT

While being pleased with the improvements in our own forces, we must 

remember that the Soviets have not been standing still. The momentum of the 

Soviet military buildup, unequalled by any peacetime nation in history, will 

carry Soviet force expansion and modernization programs well into the 1990s. 

With this pace of modernization over the last ten years, the Soviets have 

produced about three times as many aircraft and about four times as many 

tanks and other tracked vehicles as the Untied States. They have deployed a 

large and powerful navy. The Soviets have the world’s only operational antisatellite weapon. 

Soviet forces have always enjoyed significant quantitative advantages. To 

counter this, the United States has traditionally relied on the qualitative 

advantages afforded by its technology. The Soviets, however, are continuing to 

field new equipment, much of it comparable to that produced in the West; and 

our qualitative edge is narrowing. The Soviets have achieved military 

advantages through a willingness to devote large resources to research and 

development, through adaptation and outright piracy of Western technology, 

and through their willingness to accept inefficiency in order to field new 

equipment rapidly. They devote twice the resources to research and 

development as the United States and they produce five times as many 

scientists and engineers—over 400,000 annually. In the past ten years, the 

Soviets have produced some 40 major aircraft developments, 60 major 

shipbuilding developments, 60 ballistic missile and space system 

developments, and 45 in ground forces. They develop new jet engines and 

several new rockets every year and they are presently testing two new attack 

helicopters. 

With the momentum of investments in their military forces over the past 

decade and with sustained levels of effort in research and development, net 

Soviet combat power in every theater has increased. In the ground forces in 

the European Theater, for example, the Soviet Union along with the other 

countries in the Warsaw Pact has continued to increase its strength in armor, 

anti-armor and heavy fire support. The Soviet air forces are now flying third 

generation attack and fighter aircraft throughout the Warsaw Pact. They have 

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deployed the MiG-29 FULCRUM with look-down/shoot-down weapons systems 

and are expected to deploy the SU-27 FLANKER with similar capabilities. The 

Soviet Navy has by far the world’s largest submarine fleet with 376 ships. 

There are 250 BACKFIRE bombers, over 120 of which are dedicated to naval 

aviation and global anti-ship missions, and the BLACKJACK—comparable to 

the B-1B—will be operational by 1988. Their surface combatants are among 

the most modern in the world, and they are now building a nuclear-powered 

aircraft carrier we believe will be large enough to operate conventional take-off 

and landing, high-performance jet aircraft. 

Most ominously, the Soviets continue to modernize their strategic 

nuclear forces. In 1982, the Soviets deployed more highly accurate 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) warheads than we intend to deploy in 

our entire PEACEKEEPER program. In 1983, they deployed another 200 ICBM 

warheads and in 1984 they were nearing completion of the latest phase of the 

modernization of their current silo-based strategic ICBMs. The Soviets’ SS-18 

and SS-19 missiles, which would total over 5,000 warheads, are in the world’s 

hardest silos, with a redundant, survivable command and control network. 

Their Moscow complex is protected by the world’s only operational ballistic 

missile defense system. We expect deployment of newer missiles, the SS-X-24 

and SS-X-25. We have yet to deploy a single PEACEKEEPER missile. 

Soviet power is a reality that cannot be assumed away. With a 

population exceeding ours by only 17 percent, they have active armed forces 

two and a half times larger and ready reserves exceeding ours by about a factor 

of ten. We must continue to face up to the realities of Soviet military power 

this year and in the coming years with a sustained program that demonstrates 

the steadiness of our resolve to defend our interests. 

WHAT THIS BUDGET PROVIDES 

The Joint Chiefs believe that the revised budget for FY 86 supports the 

Nation’s strategy, though at a lesser degree of confidence than we would have 

liked. We participated in the formulation of this budget, and we are satisfied 

that the proper balance has been struck at the reduced resource levels which 

have been set. There is sensible balance in the resources provided for nuclear 

and conventional forces. Today’s readiness needs are balanced with the need 

for modern forces in the future. The budget provides growth in research and 

development activities to help maintain a qualitative advantage for U.S. forces 

in the years ahead. 

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES 

The JCS support the full deployment of 100 PEACEKEEPER missiles. 

The Congress needs to understand that every JCS analysis of the military 

requirement for the modernized ICBM confirms the need for 100 MX missiles. I 

recognize that the Congress in adjusting the FY 86 military budget may not be 

able to find a way to authorize the full number of missiles in the President’s 

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original budget. Whatever decision is made, I strongly urge that the Congress 

set in motion the necessary provisions for completing the program for 100 

missiles. 

All the original justification for deploying the MX remains in effect. The 

only things that have changed since the Bipartisan Scowcroft Commission 

confirmed the need for 100 MX missiles are the steady and unrelenting 

additions to Soviet strategic forces. One hundred MX missiles make a critical 

contribution to deterrence because the MX threatens what the Soviets value 

most, their hardened ICBM’s and leadership. 

Our TRIAD of strategic nuclear forces is the umbrella under which all 

our deterrent forces operate. The TRIAD is designed as a deterrent, not for a 

first strike. About 75 percent of our strategic weapons are in the bomber and 

submarine forces and 25 percent in ICBM’s. We maintain the three elements 

of our TRIAD because we believe each leg of the TRIAD provides special 

strengths which reinforce the deterrent value of the other legs and which help 

guard against tactical and technical surprise. The TRIAD has been the basis of 

our deterrent posture for over two decades. 

The United States delayed its strategic nuclear modernization, and we 

have had to modernize all three legs of the TRIAD at the same time. We are 

making steady progress with the bomber and submarine force modernization. 

The TRIDENT submarine program will modernize our aging ballistic missile 

submarine fleet and the D-5 missile will add new capabilities to the force at the 

end of this decade. The B-1B program is on schedule; it will be in the 

operational force next year. It will provide a modern, responsive bomber 

capable of penetrating Soviet defenses. 

The modernization of the intercontinental ballistic missile force has 

encountered a series of delays well known to this subcommittee. The delays 

have not been technological or system delays; the missile is performing 

superbly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urge the immediate deployment of the 

PEACEKEEPER. Its deployment will strengthen the TRIAD, help ensure 

deterrence, and strengthen the position of our nuclear arms negotiators. The 

PEACEKEEPER is tested and proven, and it is ready for deployment. We must 

proceed now with the deployment of the PEACEKEEPER in order to maintain 

the effectiveness of the TRIAD and our deterrent strategy into the next century. 

Research and development on the small ICBM is proceeding. It will add 

the new dimension to the ICBM forces in the mid-1990s. 

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE 

The Joint Chiefs support the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 

to have this nation employ its technological talent to determine whether an 

alternative to sole reliance on offensive retaliation is feasible. Within the 

bounds of the ABM Treaty, the Unites States is exploring means by which we 

might end the dominance of offensive ballistic missile weaponry. The cuts 

being considered in this important program will severely restrict our ability to 

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continue research and will cause us to lag behind the Soviet Union—the only 

nation in the world with an operational ABM defense system. 

CHEMICAL 

The Soviets have extensive offensive and defensive chemical warfare 

capabilities. Our lack of a modern chemical retaliatory capability detracts from 

our overall deterrent posture. Should deterrence fail, our forces would be 

fighting at a great disadvantage in spite of the strides we have made in 

improving defenses against chemical weapons. Unless we modernize our 

chemical munitions and continue to provide for a sensible research and 

development program to prevent technical surprise, we provide little incentive 

to the Soviets for negotiating a verifiable arms control agreement prohibiting 

chemical weapons. This budget provides for long lead-time items and facilities 

in order to begin production of binary chemical weapons, weapons which are 

safer to store and to employ and which help reduce the likelihood of Soviet use 

of chemical weapons. 

NEGOTIATIONS 

The Joint Chiefs fully support efforts to obtain genuine, equitable and 

verifiable reductions in armaments. Arms control and other related 

negotiations are being pursued with the idea that equitable and verifiable 

agreements can contribute to security and stability. Negotiations are not a 

substitute for force modernization; rather, negotiations and our modernization 

programs are mutually reinforcing. We must modernize our own systems even 

while we seek genuine reductions in force levels through negotiations. 

PEOPLE 

No matter how good the strategy or excellent the equipment, good 

soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines remain the heart of our defense forces. 

This nation has very good people in its armed forces today because of the 

Nation’s renewed pride and faith in those people and the willingness to pay the 

price for adequate security. The men and women in uniform need to know we 

will give them the best possible equipment, training and support for their 

difficult tasks; and they need to know this nation will provide reasonable pay 

and compensation for them and adequate support for their families. As we 

continue into a period of economic recovery and as we face a declining 

manpower pool, we must guard against the erosion of pay, retirement, and 

other benefits. We surely do not want to return the forces to the unstable 

personnel picture of the mid-1970s. The budget provides the right amount of 

support. 

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CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, I want to repeat what I said before this Committee a year 

ago: this nation and its allies must remain strong and steady. Last year I 

reported to you that we were making progress in reversing the decline of the 

1970s in our general purpose forces and that we were in the early stages of 

modernizing our strategic nuclear deterrent forces. That progress must 

continue in order to maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent strategy. 

When the Joint Chiefs look at the Soviets’ forces, we see forces that are 

very large and capable of offensive operations on a global scale. We see their 

willingness to use their forces and those of their surrogates in Asia, Europe, 

Africa, and in this hemisphere to achieve their aims. Our forces are designed 

for deterrence. That has been our strategy since World War II, and it’s been a 

sensible strategy. 

The Joint Chiefs have examined the strategy and the threat, and we 

believe that this budget, though now reduced below a level we requested, will 

allow more modest improvement in our forces by providing good people, good 

equipment, good training, and good support. As I said at the beginning, we 

need not match the Soviets weapon for weapon or man for man; but, this 

nation absolutely must continue to deal with the unrelenting growth of Soviet 

power and with the realities of an increasingly interdependent and dangerous 

world. I urge your support for the President’s defense budget. 

From a Letter to an 

American Citizen in California 

7 August 1985 

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to the President about the 

issue of keeping the peace in this nuclear age. As a Christian, a citizen, a 

professional soldier, and a father of three children, I join you in your quest for 

a stable and peaceful world. I understand your concerns and share with you 

an abhorrence of war, particularly the thought of nuclear war. But, as we go 

about our business in this world of nation-states, the United States cannot be 

paralyzed by the fear of war in the pursuit of our political, economic, social and 

cultural objectives. We cannot allow ourselves or our allies to be coerced by 

Soviet power. 

Our purpose is to “wage the peace.” However, nuclear freezes or even the 

reduction of nuclear warheads by themselves do not necessarily reduce the risk 

of war. We should not be afraid to negotiate with the Soviets, but such efforts 

must be within the context of preserving our security. Failure to recognize this 

point may well lead to an increase in the probability of nuclear war. This is 

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why I support both the President’s strategic modernization programs and the 

negotiations in Geneva. 

As much as you and I would like to, we cannot wish away nuclear 

weapons. But we can act responsibly; and, I firmly believe that, as George 

Washington said, “... if we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are 

at all times ready for war.” Being ready for war is a campaign against war; it is 

expensive and does involve risk, but it is far cheaper in both dollars and blood 

than actual conflict. 

Again, thanks for your letter and I want you to know we are on the same 

team. 

Remarks at the 

ACTIVATION OF U.S. SPACE COMMAND 

PETERSON AIR FORCE BASE 

Colorado Springs, CO 

23 September 1985 

It is a beautiful, brisk morning here in Colorado, and I am pleased to be 

here on this fine day to preside over this important ceremony. 

By law, with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

President, through the Secretary of Defense, has the authority to establish 

unified and specified commands in strategic areas. 

The President has approved formation of the United States Space 

Command as a unified command and General Bob Herres as its first 

commander. Forces assigned are represented here today. U.S. Space 

Command now joins the other United States unified and specified commands 

worldwide helping the United States and its allies in maintaining the peace. 

The United States Space Command is created in response to a 

recommendation of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense to consolidate 

our military activities in space. USSPACECOM is composed of the Air Force 

and Naval Space Commands—and a new Army element. The Command will 

support our unified and specified commanders worldwide. The Command will 

serve the national security interests and the needs of the United States and its 

allies by providing an organizational structure that will centralize 

responsibilities for more effective use of space systems. 

The United States Armed Forces use space systems to preserve national 

security by performing such functions as communications, weather 

forecasting, navigation, and warning. This new command will improve the use 

of current systems and will enhance planning for future use of these systems 

in these areas. The U.S. military use of space is just as is our use of the land, 

sea and air: non-aggressive. It threatens no one. These activities, which began 

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over 25 years ago, are consistent with our commitment to the peaceful uses of 

outer space and with all U.S. treaty obligations. 

It is important for the world to remember the United States’ strategy. 

Our strategy is one of deterrence. We maintain forces in readiness both here in 

the United States and deployed in regions of the world where we have alliance 

commitments and vital interests. It is an alliance strategy, and we are 

fortunate to have good allies such as Canada and our partners in NATO and 

elsewhere who share with us common interests and a willingness to join in the 

defense of the freedom we cherish. 

USSPACECOM will be an important part of that strategy. It was formed 

as a unified command with men and women of all four of our Services. It was 

formed after close consultation with Canada. And it will complement the 

mission of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, NORAD. 

Its mission is defense. Our nation has no intent to attack anyone. By 

the maintenance of strong, ready deterrent forces, we want to prevent war. 

There are several things the Command will not become. It is not a force 

built to escalate the arms race. It is not a force built to achieve dominance for 

the United States. The Command will make its contribution to that 

fundamental element of United States strategy, the prevention of war, and do it 

in the same way that the other unified and specified commands do. The 

Command will be ready to carry out its directed wartime missions as 

circumstances should require. 

Forming the Command is a signal to everyone concerned, friends and 

possible foes, that the United States has a great interest in maintaining the 

peace and that we stand ready to defend those interests and to help promote 

peace and stability in cooperation with our friends. The Command will be a 

force for peace by being ready for war. 

I have known and worked with General Herres for several years. He is an 

officer with great talent as a planner and strategist. You who have known him 

as Commander in Chief of the Aerospace Defense Command understand that 

reputation. I tell you soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines who come under 

his command today that you have a top-notch commander in whom the 

President, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS have great confidence. I 

charge you to continue to give your best and to help keep this nation secure by 

keeping us strong and ready. 

Finally, I bring you special greetings from Secretary Weinberger. And, on 

behalf of the Secretary and all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I wish you 

Godspeed as you take on your important duties. 

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Remarks at the 

RETIREMENT CEREMONY FOR 

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR. 

Andrews Air Force Base, MD 

30 September 1985 

Mr. President, you and the Vice President do a great honor to the Armed 

Forces of the United States by participating in this ceremony today. 

It is a great time to be in the Armed Forces of the United States. It is a 

great day to be a soldier. I hope we have the Recruiting NCOs all around the 

building here and are signing up new recruits after this wonderful ceremony. I 

want to say thanks to the troops that put it on. It’s the first military operation 

that has taken place in the last three years and four months that I’ve not been 

cut in on. 

Concerning the ceremony itself, I have often said that I plan to build an 

anthology of retirement and change of command speeches after I left the 

Service and publish it as “Service Humor.” I don’t really want to contribute to 

anybody else’s anthology; but as I went out this morning and took my jog from 

Quarters Six down along the edge of Arlington Cemetery, I looked out over the 

city and I could see that the city was shrouded with a pre-dawn haze. I 

couldn’t help but think of the contrast of that view of Washington last night 

when the Washington Monument, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, and 

the Capitol were sparkling in the Harvest Moon. 

And I thought as I looked at that morning haze that those symbols of the 

foundation of our liberty and freedom—the principles upon which this nation is 

built, the principles in our Constitution—sometimes get a little bit out of focus 

as they were this morning in that haze. And we need to reflect on how we let 

them get out of focus and to reflect on the importance of protecting them. 

So, I thought, well, maybe I ought to risk being in somebody’s anthology 

and to say something here at this ceremony. There is a natural proclivity for 

the old guys leaving to give one last lecture, and I thought of that. And I 

thought maybe I should give a lecture to the American people, thanking them 

for their support for the Armed Forces and for a strong defense—and tell them 

that their support is needed in the days and years ahead—that their support 

for a strong defense should not be a one-shot operation. 

I thought I might tell them what Winston Churchill said to the British 

people before World War II, “We can afford what we need for defense. What we 

can’t afford is to say that we can afford only what is convenient to provide.” I 

thought I might remind them that they won’t wish away nuclear weapons, that 

they won’t wish away the Soviet threat and that as you go to negotiations with 

the Soviets, Mr. President, you need a firm defense of the United States as a 

building block for those negotiations. But I’ve said all that before. The 

American people don’t need that message, so that shouldn’t be the lecture. 

Then I thought of talking to those patriots who represent “We the People” 

in the Congress and thanking them for their support for a strong defense. But 

244 
I also wanted to tell them that I’ve listened to a number of their lectures over 

the past few years when I went over to testify. I thought I might tell them that 

they deserve to get maybe a 60-second lecture from me today. And I thought 

I’d tell them that they dabble too deeply into the defense budget. They get too 

far down into the details and they get lost; so, sometimes they don’t get the 

Appropriations Bills out on time. The combination of those two probably 

wastes more of the taxpayers’ money than they are trying to find in savings by 

dabbling into the depths of the defense budget. 

I thought about telling them, respectfully, of course, that, while they are 

diddling around with the notion of reorganizing the JCS, their own organization 

for dealing with defense sadly needs reform. And I thought I might tell them in 

the language of the modern-day soldier to “get their act together”—to get on 

with two-year authorization bills and multi-year procurements, to clean up the 

committees and stop dabbling in the details of the Defense budget, and to 

judge us by broad objectives and whether we meet those objectives and 

whether we do it with reasonable Defense budgets. But, I’ve said all that 

before; so it didn’t seem that that lecture would be appropriate. 

I thought of lecturing my fellow members in the Armed Forces about the 

great responsibilities the people of this nation have laid on them and how 

important their diligence, their alertness, their teamwork, their loyalty and 

their perseverance are to the security of this nation today and in the years 

ahead. I thought of reminding them of the importance of being alert, being 

ready, and being well-trained. And the importance of doing all those things 

with the knowledge of the taxpayers’ dollars—and to take care of the equipment 

and supplies that have been provided to them. But I’ve said all that before; so, 

there is no need for that lecture. 

And I thought of all sorts of other lectures .... To my Russian 

counterpart about the foolishness of attempting to start a war with the Western 

allies. Or to our allies about the importance of providing adequate 

contributions to the common defense. Or to my fellow members of the JCS 

about keeping up the good work. Or lectures to defense contractors and to 

American workers about the importance of quality work in the defense 

materials upon which the lives of these people here depend. But I’ve given all 

those lectures so there is no need to repeat them. 

Then I thought of all the people I should thank .... Maybe to thank the 

Lord for His help. But we do that every day. Or to thank everybody in the 

military chain of command for the help they’ve given me—from you, Mr. 

President, on down to the lowest private, even to the ones just recruited or reenlisted today. Or thanking my old comrades like General Bolte, my World War 

II commander. Or Lux Holbein, the Chief of Police in Hanau, Germany, who 

came all the way from Europe for this ceremony and who helped me get five of 

my stalwarts out of jail 30 years ago. 

And I could thank all the security people and the workers in the 

Pentagon who have made life easier; but, there are far too many people to name 

and I hope you all know that I’m grateful. 

245 
I thought of thanking Avis for successfully packing the household goods 

for the 29th time and getting them shipped off without any help from me. Or 

thanking the children for not mutinying for a dozen or so moves during the 

middle of the school year; but, they are all grown up and they know I’m 

grateful. 

By the time I thought of all those things to say, my run was about over 

and I was back at the Chairman’s house; and the first glimpse of the morning 

sun silhouetted through the haze the Capitol and all those monuments down 

there. It occurred to me that the principles upon which this nation rests are 

firm—that when you look out there at the Capitol you can’t help but be 

reminded of the Preamble to the Constitution—“We the People.” And as I 

thought about Arlington Cemetery in which all those gravestones are there for 

all the other “indispensable” people who preceded me, I was reminded that 

defending the country over the past 209 years has been steady business—

steady work—and will continue to be in the years ahead. I have a very good 

man replacing me. So, I put the flag out in front of Quarters Six and, as I put 

it in the bracket, I thought that, in addition to all the JCS problems and all the 

undone work I was leaving Bill Crowe, I leave him that very good, 20-buck 

bronze eagle that I bought for the end of that flag pole. 

It occurred to me that probably the best thing to do here this morning 

was to give to my fellow citizens the same charge that Saint Paul gave to the 

Hebrew Christians when he said, “Let us run with perseverance the race that 

has been set before us.” And then just simply say, “Thanks. Thanks, troops.” 

246