In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 99-1625 and 99-1636

In re: Rimsat, Limited,

Debtor,

Appeals of: Kauthar Sdn Bhd, et al.

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

Nos. 1:98cv363 and 1:98cv370--William C. Lee, Chief Judge. 

Argued February 22, 2000--Decided May 18, 2000

 Before Coffey, Easterbrook, and Williams, Circuit

Judges.

 Williams, Circuit Judge. Kauthar Sdn Bhd and

three of its former attorneys, Daniel Voelker,

William Howard, and William Factor, seek review

of a bankruptcy court order sanctioning them for

improper conduct during a bankruptcy proceeding.

For various reasons, the appellants contend that

the sanctions order must be reversed. Because the

bankruptcy court committed no reversible error in

sanctioning the appellants, however, we affirm.

I

 Kauthar Sdn Bhd is a Malaysian entity that

invested a substantial sum of money in Rimsat,

Ltd., a firm that planned to provide satellite

service to the Pacific Rim using satellite rights

allotted to the island nation of Tonga and

controlled by Tongasat, a Tongan company.

However, Rimsat ran into financial trouble and

filed for bankruptcy. Tongasat and Rimsat

attempted to settle their claims against each

other on two occasions, but Kauthar objected to

both of the proposed compromises contending that

Tongasat was being let off too easy, to the

detriment of Kauthar’s investment in Rimsat. In

contesting the Tongasat/Rimsat compromises,

Kauthar’s attorneys pursued an aggressive

litigation strategy to force a more favorable

settlement plan. Their strategy earned them at

least one warning from the bankruptcy judge about

unnecessary and purely strategic litigiousness

before the events leading up to the bankruptcy
judge’s ultimate decision to sanction them.

 In challenging the second proposed

Tongasat/Rimsat compromise, Kauthar sought to

depose a number of individuals associated with

Tongasat, including the Princess of Tonga, who

chaired Tongasat’s Board of Directors, and Edward

Lau, Tongasat’s outside general counsel and its

deposition designee. Tongasat filed a motion for

a protective order and the bankruptcy court held

a hearing on the matter. At the hearing, the

bankruptcy judge expressed concern that Kauthar’s

discovery requests had gone beyond the limited

scope relevant to the compromise and ruled that

Kauthar could only depose one person from

Tongasat. William Factor, who represented Kauthar

at the hearing, informed the court that Kauthar

would choose to depose the Princess. Tongasat

objected on the ground that the Princess lacked

personal knowledge regarding the disputed issues.

With the understanding that the Princess would

submit an affidavit attesting to her lack of

personal knowledge, the bankruptcy judge ruled

that Kauthar would have to depose someone else,

and on Kauthar’s behalf, Factor selected Edward

Lau. Kauthar’s attorneys then filed a motion to

compel the deposition of the Princess asserting

that the Princess had personal knowledge of

disputed issues.

 Meanwhile, Daniel Voelker and William Howard

represented Kauthar at Lau’s deposition. Voelker,

who conducted the deposition, focused his

inquires on whether Lau believed he could

disclose information he had acquired from the

Princess. Dissatisfied with Lau’s refusal to

answer yes or no in general to these inquires,

Voelker began to argue with and ask harassing

questions of Lau. For instance, at one point, he

asked Lau, "In the conversation you had in August

of 1995, what did the Princess say to you, and

what did you say to her? I want to know

everything she said to you, Mr. Lau, every single

word she uttered?" Voelker then began to bicker

with Lau and Lau’s counsel, implying that Lau

intended to be dishonest in answering and

intended to improperly invoke attorney-client

privilege when he asked, "Are you going to answer

[my question] fully and completely and honestly,

or are you going to selectively answer the

question and assert in your own mind, Mr. Lau,

the attorney-client privilege?" Unable to get the

answers he wanted regarding Lau’s ability to

disclose information acquired from the Princess

and claiming that Lau was not a proper deposition

designee, Voelker terminated the deposition

without asking a single question regarding the

proposed Tongasat/Rimsat compromise.

 Afterwards, Tongasat filed a motion for
sanctions based on the deposition. The motion

alleged that Kauthar’s attorneys never had any

intention to depose Lau and intentionally

sabotaged the Lau deposition. The motion sought

attorneys’ fees and other costs associated with

the deposition.

 When the parties next came before the

bankruptcy judge, the judge informed "Kauthar’s

counsel" that he was disturbed by the deposition

and, in light of their previous conduct in the

litigation, he was seriously considering not only

imposing a monetary sanction but also revoking

their pro hac vice status./1 Kauthar’s counsel

filed a response to Tongasat’s sanctions motion

contending that their conduct was entirely

reasonable. Tongasat then filed a reply disputing

the contentions of Kauthar’s counsel and

requesting, among other additional sanctions,

that the pro hac vice status granted Kauthar’s

counsel be revoked.

 Approximately eleven months after receiving

Tongasat’s reply, and thirteen months after

approving the proposed Tongasat/Rimsat

compromise, the bankruptcy court ruled on the

sanctions motion. It concluded that in light of

the conduct of Kauthar’s counsel throughout the

litigation and the behavior of their counsel at

the Lau deposition, there could be no doubt that

Kauthar’s counsel never had any intention of

seeking relevant information from Lau, but rather

sought only to increase the cost and

inconvenience of the litigation and delay the

then-imminent hearing regarding the

Tongasat/Rimsat compromise. Pursuant to its

authority to impose sanctions under 11 U.S.C.

sec. 105(a) and the inherent powers doctrine, the

bankruptcy court ordered Kauthar and its

attorneys to pay $10,890.81 in costs associated

with the Lau deposition and revoked Voelker’s,

Howard’s, and Factor’s pro hac vice status.

Kauthar and its attorneys appealed to the

district court, but the district court affirmed

the sanctions order. Now Kauthar and its

attorneys appeal to this court,/2 contending

that they were denied due process when the

bankruptcy court sanctioned them, that the

bankruptcy court abused its discretion in

sanctioning them, and that the sanctions order

against them must be vacated because the

bankruptcy court waited too long to issue it./3

II

 Before we consider the appellants’ challenges to

the bankruptcy court’s sanctions order, we must

determine whether we have jurisdiction over the

present appeal. The general rule is that a court

of appeals has jurisdiction over a bankruptcy
appeal only if the bankruptcy court’s original

order and the district court’s order reviewing

the bankruptcy court’s original order are both

final. 28 U.S.C. sec. 158(d); In re Devlieg,

Inc., 56 F.3d 32, 33 (7th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam); In re Morse Elec. Co., 805 F.2d 262, 264

(7th Cir. 1986); 16 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur

R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice

and Procedure sec. 3926.2, at 273 (2d ed. 1996).

In the bankruptcy context, however, finality does

not require a final order concluding the entire

bankruptcy proceeding; certain orders entered

prior to the conclusion of the bankruptcy

proceeding will be deemed final. In re FortyEight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d 1294, 1298-99

(7th Cir. 1997); In re Official Committee of

Unsecured Creditors of White Farm Equip. Co., 943

F.2d 752, 754-55 (7th Cir. 1991). Where an order

terminates a discrete dispute that, but for the

bankruptcy, would be a stand-alone suit by or

against the trustee, the order will be considered

final and appealable. In re Szekely, 936 F.2d

897, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1991); Wright, Miller, &

Cooper, supra, sec. 3926.2, at 272-73.

 Dicta in In re Wade, 991 F.2d 402, 406 (7th

Cir. 1993), suggests that sanctions orders fall

into this category, but it is unclear whether

such a position can be maintained in the wake of

Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 119 S. Ct.

1915 (1999), which holds that sanctions orders

are not automatically appealable prior to final

judgment, at least in the non-bankruptcy context.

Even if it was not final at the time it was

issued, we are persuaded that the bankruptcy

court’s sanctions order has since become final.

Kauthar’s claims against the bankruptcy estate

have been valued and accepted, and the final

distribution of the bankruptcy estate’s claims

has been approved. Because Kauthar’s dispute with

the bankruptcy estate has been resolved, orders

relating to Kauthar’s participation in the

bankruptcy proceeding are now final. White Farm

Equip., 943 F.2d at 755; Szekely, 936 F.2d at

899-900; see also Forty-Eight Insulations, 115

F.3d at 1298-99. That this finality arose after

the present appeals were filed is no barrier to

jurisdiction, as the doctrine of cumulative

finality allows an appeal from a non-final order

to be "saved" by subsequent events that establish

finality. See In re Emerson Radio Corp., 52 F.3d

50, 52 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Interwest Bus.

Equip., Inc., 23 F.3d 311, 314-15 (10th Cir.

1994); Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, sec.

3926.2, at 290. Therefore, and since there is no

reason to doubt the finality of the district

court’s order simply affirming the bankruptcy

court’s order, our jurisdiction over this appeal

is secure. We now turn to the challenges the

appellants raise to the bankruptcy court’s
sanctions order.

III

A. Due Process

 The appellants first challenge the bankruptcy

court’s sanctions order on constitutional

grounds. They contend that the bankruptcy court

failed to afford them the fair notice and

opportunity to be heard that the Fifth

Amendment’s due process clause requires a court

to provide before imposing sanctions. See In re

Hancock, 192 F.3d 1083, 1086 (7th Cir. 1999);

Larsen v. City of Beloit, 130 F.3d 1278, 1286-87

(7th Cir. 1997). As the appellants’ due process

challenge raises issues of law, our review is

plenary. Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d

Cir. 1995); Kirkland v. National Mortgage

Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir.

1989). Cf. United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156

F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that, in

general, due process claims are reviewed de

novo).

 The appellants first complain that they received

inadequate notice that they were possible

subjects of sanctions. The bankruptcy court’s

practice of referring to them collectively as

"Kauthar’s counsel," they contend, did not

sufficiently put them on notice. Fair notice can

come from the court or an opposing litigant,

Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1086 (notice from the

court); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of

Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) (notice

from opposing party); Martin, 63 F.3d at 1263

(notice from opposing party), but it must, among

other things, inform the person that he or she is

in jeopardy of being sanctioned by the court.

Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1086; Larsen, 130 F.3d at

1286-87.

 Voelker and Howard have no grounds for

contending that they did not receive adequate

notice. They are specifically mentioned in

Kauthar’s motion for sanctions, and they were the

ones who conducted the Lau deposition. That their

conduct at the Lau deposition might be the basis

for sanctions could hardly have been more plain.

Consequently, we conclude that they received

adequate notice that they might be sanctioned.

 Factor tries to distinguish himself from Voelker

and Howard by pointing out that he was not

present at the Lau deposition and the bankruptcy

court’s reference to "Kauthar’s counsel" did not

put him on notice that he might be sanctioned

based on the deposition. The problem with this

argument is that Tongasat’s motion for sanctions
specifically asks the bankruptcy court to impose

sanctions against Kauthar’s attorneys based upon

"the notice of, argument for, and conduct of the

deposition of Edward Lau." Since Factor signed

the notice of deposition, Tongasat’s motion put

him on notice that his conduct might be the basis

for sanctions. Moreover, in detailing the

evidence of Kauthar’s counsels’ intent to harass

individuals associated with Tongasat, Tongasat’s

motion for sanctions specifically refers to an

argument Factor made regarding the possibility of

deposing the Princess. In light of these facts,

the practice of the bankruptcy court and Tongasat

to refer to Kauthar’s attorneys collectively,

rather than individually, should have put Factor

on notice that he was in jeopardy of being

sanctioned. Thus, Factor received adequate notice

that he might be sanctioned.

 The appellants next complain that they received

inadequate notice of precisely what conduct might

warrant sanctions. They contend that, although

the bankruptcy court based its sanctions decision

on the entire course of Kauthar’s counsels’

conduct with respect to the Tongasat/Rimsat

compromise, neither the bankruptcy court nor

Tongasat ever specifically identified particular

instances of misconduct, other than the events

surrounding the Lau deposition. And, a court may

not, consistent with due process, impose

sanctions based on particular conduct unless the

parties being sanctioned have received notice

(from the court or an opposing party) that that

conduct may be the basis for sanctions. Schlaifer

Nance, 194 F.3d at 334; Bonilla v. Volvo Car

Corp., 150 F.3d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 1998); Martin,

63 F.3d at 1263.

 In this case, however, we do not read the

bankruptcy court’s sanctions order as relying on

conduct, other than that related to the Lau

deposition, in a manner that gives rise to an

obligation to provide the kind of particularized

notice the appellants believe they were due. The

bankruptcy court merely referred to Kauthar’s

general litigation strategy as evidence to

support the court’s finding that the appellants

intentionally sabotaged the Lau deposition in an

effort to further delay the proceedings and

inconvenience Tongasat and to explain why

monetary sanctions alone would be insufficient to

deter similar future conduct. Moreover, the court

never referred to particular instances of conduct

outside the events surrounding the Lau

deposition; it referenced only Kauthar’s general

litigation strategy. As particular conduct, other

than that related to the Lau deposition, did not

actually form the basis for the sanctions

imposed, there is no reason to think that

Kauthar’s attorneys were entitled to the sort of
particularized notice they believe they were due.

When a court imposing sanctions simply cites

attorney conduct for the limited purpose of

providing context and background, particularized

notice is not required. In fact, demanding

particularized notice in such situations would

only discourage sanctioning courts from writing

the sort of comprehensive sanctions orders,

containing all of the relevant background

material, that are most helpful to reviewing

courts.

 To the extent that the appellants were entitled

to notice informing them that Kauthar’s general

litigation strategy might provide a background

against which Tongastat’s motion would be

evaluated, statements by the bankruptcy court and

in Tongasat’s sanctions motion referencing

Kauthar’s general litigation strategy with

respect to the Tongasat/Rimsat compromise

provided adequate notice. For instance, before

taking Tongasat’s motion for sanctions under

advisement, the bankruptcy judge spoke of the

context in which Tongasat’s motion would be

evaluated, "For a year [Kauthar’s counsel has]

apparently embarked upon what appears to be a

conscious effort to maximize litigation and, in

doing so, make certain that the litigation is as

time-consuming, difficult, unpleasant, and

expensive as humanly possible." The bankruptcy

court did not deny the appellants due process by

failing to ensure that they received adequate

notice of what conduct might subject them to

sanctions. 

 Finally, the appellants complain that the

bankruptcy court deprived them of their due

process right to have an adequate opportunity to

be heard by not holding a hearing before imposing

sanctions. Providing an opportunity to be heard

includes giving an attorney against whom a court

is considering imposing sanctions the chance to

present his or her case at a meaningful time in

a meaningful manner, but a hearing is not

invariably required before sanctions may be

imposed. Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1086; Kapco Mfg.

Co. v. C & O Enters., Inc., 886 F.2d 1485, 1494-

95 (7th Cir. 1989); Schlaifer Nance, 194 F.3d at

335; Cook v. American S.S. Co., 134 F.3d 771,

774-76 (6th Cir. 1998). Putting to one side the

possibility that the appellants were not entitled

to a hearing in the first place, the problem with

the appellants’ argument that the bankruptcy

court should have held a hearing before imposing

sanctions is that the appellants never requested

a hearing. Since a court is not invariably

required to provide a hearing before imposing

sanctions, the appellants’ failure to request a

hearing waives any right they might have had to

one. See Kapco, 886 F.2d at 1495 (suggesting that
request for hearing after sanctions were imposed

was too late). Accordingly, the bankruptcy court

did not err by imposing sanctions without holding

a hearing./4

B. Abuse of Discretion

 The appellants next challenge the merits of the

bankruptcy court’s decision to sanction them. We

review a decision to impose sanctions for an

abuse of discretion. Hancock, 192 F.3d at 1085.

Unless the sanctioning court has acted contrary

to the law or reached an unreasonable result, we

will affirm the sanctions decision. See generally

Hernandez v. Joliet Police Dept., 197 F.3d 256,

264 (7th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Kakvand, 192 F.3d

656, 661 (7th Cir. 1999).

 The appellants first argue that the sanctions

imposed against them must be reversed because the

bankruptcy court failed to make an explicit

finding of bad faith. The parties agree that the

bankruptcy court could only exercise its

authority under 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) and the

inherent powers doctrine to impose sanctions if

the appellants acted in bad faith./5 It is also

agreed that the bankruptcy court did not

explicitly say that the appellants acted in bad

faith. Still, it is impossible to read the

bankruptcy court’s opinion without concluding

that the bankruptcy court did in fact determine

that the appellants acted in bad faith. For

example, the bankruptcy court found that

Kauthar’s attorneys, acting in concert, had

decided in advance to sabotage the Lau deposition

and that they did so intentionally and for the

purposes of imposing costs on Tongasat and

delaying the upcoming hearing on the

Tongasat/Rimsat compromise. Such conduct

certainly qualifies as bad faith conduct, even if

the bankruptcy court never said so in so many

words. Nevertheless, the appellants contend that

the bankruptcy court’s failure to use the words

"bad faith" requires that we reverse the

bankruptcy court’s sanctions order./6

 We disagree. Reversing an order imposing

sanctions in the face of findings like those made

by the bankruptcy court in this case simply

because the sanctioning court did not use the

words "bad faith" would needlessly elevate form

over substance. Where it is clear that a court

has found that a litigant intentionally abused

the judicial process in an unreasonable and

vexatious manner, we will not reverse an order

imposing sanctions merely because the sanctioning

court did not make an explicit finding of "bad

faith." Cf. In re Volpert, 110 F.3d 494, 500-01

(7th Cir. 1997) (affirming sanctions order under

11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) without mentioning any
explicit finding of bad faith by the sanctioning

court). In this case, the bankruptcy court’s

failure to make an explicit finding of "bad

faith" does not require us to reverse the

sanctions it imposed against the appellants.

 The appellants next argue that their conduct

did not warrant sanctions in any event. With

respect to Voelker and Howard this argument is

impossible to accept. They were the ones who

conducted the Lau deposition in an unproductive

and harassing manner, and such behavior is

undoubtedly sanctionable. See generally Carroll

v. Jacques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290

(5th Cir. 1997) (sanctions imposed based on

abusive conduct during deposition); Sassower v.

Field, 973 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1992) (sanctions

imposed based on a pattern of vexatious conduct

including "incredibly harassing depositions");

Heinrichs v. Marshall & Stevens Inc., 921 F.2d

418 (2d Cir. 1990) (sanctions imposed based on

improper conduct at depositions). Voelker and

Howard, nevertheless, attempt to explain their

conduct at the deposition as a reasonable

response to Lau’s intransigence. But, even if

their conduct could be given the innocent

explanation they urge, the bankruptcy court did

not abuse its discretion in interpreting the

events differently.

 With respect to Factor, the question is a

closer one, as there is no direct evidence of his

participation in the scheme to sabotage the Lau

deposition. Still, there is sufficient

circumstantial evidence that Factor acted in

concert with Voelker and Howard and that Factor

shares responsibility for the scheme. To begin

with, Factor was the attorney for Kauthar who

noticed the Lau deposition. Likewise, he signed

the motion to compel the Princess’s deposition,

a deposition the bankruptcy court considered to

be a part of the plan to delay the proceedings

and otherwise inconvenience Tongasat and those

associated with Tongasat. Moreover, he, Voelker,

and Howard were all members of the same law firm

and jointly represented Kauthar in the bankruptcy

proceedings. In fact, it was Factor who argued

against Tongasat’s objection to Kauthar’s request

to depose the Princess and who chose to go ahead

and depose Lau. Perhaps most significantly,

however, the bankruptcy judge, who was

undoubtedly familiar with the roles played by the

various counsel who appeared before him, found

that Factor acted in concert with Voelker and

Howard to sabotage the Lau deposition. For all

these reasons, it is impossible to conclude that

the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in

sanctioning Factor.

 The appellants next argue that, even if
sanctions are appropriate, the sanctions the

bankruptcy court imposed are excessive and

unwarranted. However, the appellants did not make

these arguments to the bankruptcy court in their

response to Tongasat’s motion for sanctions. And,

such arguments must be made to the sanctioning

court if they are to be considered by a reviewing

court, as the failure to make an argument

constitutes waiver of that argument. In re

Kroner, 953 F.2d 317, 319 (7th Cir. 1992);

Magicsilk Corp. of N.J. v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123,

125 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Since the

appellants did not argue (at least in a timely

fashion/7) that any of the sanctions proposed by

or to the bankruptcy court would have been

excessive or unwarranted if in fact sanctions

were appropriate, we will not consider their

arguments on appeal.

 Finally, Factor, alone, argues that because

ordinary procedural rules would have been

adequate to address the misconduct on his part,

the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by

resorting to 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a)/8 and its

inherent powers. Specifically, Factor suggests

that Bankruptcy Rules 9011/9 and 7026/10

(which largely track Rules 11 and 26 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) would have been

adequate to sanction his misconduct. The

bankruptcy court opted instead to rely on its

authority under 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) and the

inherent powers doctrine because Rules 9011 and

7026 would only allow the court to sanction

Factor, as he was the only one who signed the Lau

notice of deposition.

 A sanctioning court should ordinarily rely on

available authority conferred by statutes and

procedural rules, rather than its inherent power,

if the available sources of authority would be

adequate to serve the court’s purposes. Chambers

v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991); Corley v.

Rosewood Care Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 142 F.3d

1041, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1998). But, this rule

does not require the sanction imposed on Factor

to be reversed. To begin with, the bankruptcy

court acted pursuant to its statutory authority

under 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) as well as its

inherent powers. Thus, it is unlikely that the

rule to which Factor appeals even applies to his

situation. Moreover, a sanctioning court is not

required to apply available statutes and

procedural rules in a piecemeal fashion where

only a broader source of authority is adequate to

justify all the necessary sanctions. Chambers,

501 U.S. at 50-51. The bankruptcy court was

justified in resorting to 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a)

and its inherent powers in order to ensure that

all the culpable parties received an appropriate

sanction and did not abuse its discretion in
declining to sanction Factor under Bankruptcy

Rule 9011 or 7026.

C. Timeliness of Sanctions

 The appellants contend that the 13-month delay

between the bankruptcy court’s acceptance of the

proposed compromise of the Tongasat claims and

the final issuance of its sanctions order

requires that the sanctions order be reversed.

The appellants cite Prosser v. Prosser, 186 F.3d

403 (3d Cir. 1999), in which the Third Circuit,

pursuant to a rule announced under its

supervisory power, reversed a sua sponte

sanctions order that was entered after final

judgment. In an effort to prevent piecemeal

appeals and ensure that the deterrent effect of

a sanction is not dissipated through delay, the

Third Circuit held that such orders must be

entered prior to final judgment if they are based

on conduct occurring prior to that time. Id. at

405-06.

 Even if we were persuaded to adopt the same

rule the Third Circuit has, but Cf. Divane v.

Krull Elec. Co., 200 F.3d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir.

1999) (rejecting proposal to require Rule 11

motions to be filed before final judgment), the

present case would not call for the application

of the rule. To begin with, while the

Tongasat/Rimsat compromise had been approved, the

bankruptcy action itself remained open and

Kauthar remained an active litigant. Thus, the

approval of the Tongasat/Rimsat compromise (even

if it were considered an appealable final

decision) does not create the same sort of

finality as an ordinary final judgment and

therefore does not justify the same requirement

that sanctions orders be issued before a court

enters a final judgment. Moreover, the Third

Circuit’s rule appears to apply only to sua

sponte sanctions orders. Here the sanctions order

was the product of a sanctions motion filed by

Tongasat. In sum, while lengthy delays in the

imposition of sanctions are not preferable, we do

not believe the delay that occurred in this case

warrants reversing the bankruptcy court’s

sanctions order.

IV

 In sanctioning the appellants the bankruptcy

court did not deprive the appellants of due

process, abuse its discretion to impose

sanctions, or otherwise commit reversible error.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the bankruptcy court’s order

imposing sanctions against the appellants.
/1 Pro hac vice status allows an attorney who has

not been admitted to practice before a court to

practice before that court in a particular case.

See Black’s Law Dictionary 1227-28 (7th ed.

1999).

/2 After it appealed, Kauthar reached a settlement

with the other parties to the bankruptcy

proceeding, including Tongasat, releasing each

party from any claim relating to the proceeding

that might be asserted by any of the other

parties. Thus, Kauthar’s challenge to the

bankruptcy court’s sanctions order is moot and

Kauthar is dismissed as a party to this appeal.

See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall

Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1993). However, because

Voelker, Howard, and Factor are not parties to

the settlement agreement and a release would not

address the revocation of their pro hac vice

status, their challenges to the bankruptcy

court’s sanctions order are not moot.

/3 Appellants Kauthar, Voelker, and Howard also

request that we expunge certain portions of the

bankruptcy court’s order that they contend are

without factual support. While we certainly may

reverse or vacate the bankruptcy court’s decision

to impose sanctions, we seriously doubt whether

we can expunge portions of the court’s order. The

authority we have discovered, although not

directly on point, suggests that such relief is

not available by way of appeal. See Clark Equip.

Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820

(7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to vacate opinion

criticizing attorney, but mentioning that the

attorney might seek mandamus); Bolte v. Home Ins.

Co., 744 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding

challenge to opinion criticizing, but not

sanctioning, attorney is not appealable). And,

the appellants have not cited any authority to

the contrary. Accordingly, we deny the request to

expunge portions of the bankruptcy court’s

opinion.

/4 The appellants also mention in passing an

allegation that they had inadequate notice of the

source of the authority the bankruptcy court

would invoke. Beside the fact that the appellants

never develop an argument on this ground, such an

argument would be a difficult one to make because

Tongasat specifically referred to 11 U.S.C. sec.

105(a) in its sanctions motion and a bankruptcy

court’s authority to act under that statutory

provision is often tied to the inherent powers

doctrine. See In re Volpert, 110 F.3d 494, 501

(7th Cir. 1997) (discussing without deciding the

issue).

/5 The parties’ agreement subsumes at least two

unresolved issues, whether a bankruptcy court can
act pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine, and

whether bad faith is required for a bankruptcy

court to exercise its authority under 11 U.S.C.

sec. 105(a). We offer no opinion on these issues.

/6 The appellants cite cases involving sanctions

imposed pursuant to the inherent powers doctrine

in which the reviewing court has required a

specific finding of bad faith. See, e.g., Roadway

Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980);

Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.

1995). However, it is impossible to tell from

these cases whether a sanctioning court would

have to use the words "bad faith" or whether

explicit findings demonstrating unequivocally

that the sanctioned party had acted in bad faith

would be sufficient. Accordingly, the cases the

appellants cite are not particularly helpful in

reviewing the sanctions order in this case.

/7 In a motion to reconsider, Factor did argue that

revoking his pro hac vice status was an excessive

sanction, but arguments raised for the first time

in a motion to reconsider are not preserved for

appeal. Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d

199, 201 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994).

/8 In relevant part, 11 U.S.C. sec. 105(a) provides,

"The court may issue any order, process, or

judgment that is necessary or appropriate to

carry out the provisions of this title."

/9 The version of Rule 9011 in effect when Factor’s

misconduct took place allowed a bankruptcy court

to sanction an attorney who signed a pleading or

other paper that was frivolous or vexatious.

/10 Rule 7026 simply incorporates by reference

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, which allows

a court to sanction an attorney who signs a

discovery request, response, or objection that is

frivolous or vexatious.