49–010 

Calendar No. 141 

114TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! SENATE 1st Session 114–83 

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2016 

JULY 16, 2015.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. BURR, from the Select Committee on Intelligence, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany S. 1705] 

The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an 

original bill (S. 1705) to authorize appropriations for Fiscal Year 

2016 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 

United States Government, the Community Management Account, 

and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability, and 

for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that 

the bill do pass. 

CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

On February 2, 2015, acting pursuant to Section 364 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111– 

259), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) publicly disclosed 

that the President’s aggregate request for the National Intelligence 

Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2016 is $53.9 billion. Other than for 

limited unclassified appropriations, primarily the Intelligence Community Management Account, the classified nature of United 

States intelligence activities precludes any further disclosure, including by the Committee, of the details of its budgetary recommendations. Accordingly, the Committee has prepared a classified annex to this report that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status of public 


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law. The classified annex is made available to the Committees on 

Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and 

to the President. It is also available for review by any Member of 

the Senate subject to the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 of the 

94th Congress (1976). 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION

The following is a section-by-section analysis and explanation of 

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 that is 

being reported by the Committee. 

TITLE I—BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations 

Section 101 lists the United States Government departments, 

agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for Fiscal Year 2016. 

Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations 

Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized 

to be appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel levels by program for Fiscal Year 

2016 are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations and 

that the classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House 

of Representatives and to the President. 

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments 

Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility to the 

DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103 provides that the DNI may authorize employment of civilian personnel (expressed as full-time equivalent positions) in Fiscal Year 2016 in excess of the number of authorized positions by an amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit 

applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may do 

so only if necessary to the performance of important intelligence 

functions, and must notify the congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of this authority. 

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account 

Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) of the ODNI and sets the authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA for Fiscal Year 2016. 

TITLE II—CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND

DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations 

Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of 

$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2016 for the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability Fund. 


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TITLE III—GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law 

Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by 

this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal 

employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental 

amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law. 

Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities 

Section 302 provides that the authorization of appropriations by 

the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct 

of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States. 

Section 303. Notification of appointment and separation of senior 

level personnel of the intelligence community 

Section 303 requires the DNI to establish a policy to ensure that 

the head of each appropriate element of the Intelligence Community shall notify the appropriate congressional committees, quarterly, of each appointment of an individual to a senior level position, separation from a senior level position, or reassignment within the senior level framework, during the previous 3-month period. 

A notification of appointment shall include a summary of the significant previous employment and accomplishments of the individual, such as a career biography and any academic degrees 

earned, and any other information appropriate to demonstrate that 

the individual is well-qualified to meet the needs of the intelligence 

community and that there is no significant and credible information to suggest that the individual is unfit or unqualified for such 

a position. 

A notification of separation shall include the effective date of an 

individual’s separation from a senior level position. 

TITLE IV—MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY

Subtitle A—Director of National Intelligence 

Section 401. Appointment and confirmation of the National Counterintelligence Executive 

Section 401 makes subject to Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, the Executive Branch position of National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), which was created by the 2002 

Counterintelligence Enhancement Act. Effective December 2014, 

the NCIX was also dual-hatted as the Director of the National 

Counterintelligence and Security Center. 

Section 402. Inclusion of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency 

Section 402 affirms that the Inspector General of the Intelligence 

Community (ICIG) is a member of the Council of the Inspectors 

General on Integrity and Efficiency. 


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Section 403. Provision of information and assistance to Inspector 

General of the Intelligence Community 

Section 403 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify 

the ICIG’s authority to seek information and assistance from state 

and local governmental agencies or units thereof in addition to federal agencies. 

Subtitle B—Central Intelligence Agency 

Section 411. Analytic Objectivity Review 

The ODNI’s Analytic Integrity and Standards (AIS) office was established in response to the requirement in the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) for the designation 

of an entity responsible for ensuring that the Intelligence Community’s finished intelligence products are timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based upon all sources of available intelligence, and demonstrative of the standards of proper 

analytic tradecraft. 

Consistent with responsibilities prescribed under IRTPA, Section 

411 requires the DNI to assign the AIS Chief, in consultation with 

the Senior Analytic Service at the CIA, with conducting a review 

of finished intelligence products produced by the CIA to assess 

whether the reorganization of the Agency, announced publicly on 

March 6, 2015, has resulted in any loss of analytic objectivity. The 

report is due two years from the date that the reorganization was 

announced, March 6, 2017. 

Section 412. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central Intelligence Agency 

Section 412 amends the CIA Act of 1949 to make a technical correction to Section 17 and to clarify the CIA Inspector General’s authority to seek information and assistance from state and local governmental agencies or units thereof, in addition to federal agencies, 

and to make technical changes to the Inspector General’s personnel 

authorities in the same paragraph. 

TITLE V—MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Subtitle A—Matters Relating to Russia 

Section 501. Notice of deployment or transfer of Club-K container 

missile system by the Russian Federation 

Section 501 requires the DNI to submit written notice to the appropriate congressional committees if the Intelligence Community 

receives intelligence that the Russian Federation has deployed, or 

is about to deploy, the Club-K container missile system through the 

Russian military, or transferred or sold, or intends to transfer or 

sell, such system to another state or non-state actor. 

Section 502. Assessment on the funding of political parties and nongovernmental organizations by the Russian Federation 

Section 502 requires the DNI to submit an Intelligence Community assessment to the appropriate congressional committees concerning the funding of political parties and non-governmental organizations in the former Soviet States and Europe by the Russian 


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Federation and the Russian Federation security and intelligence 

services since January 1, 2006, not later than 180 days after the 

enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act. 

Section 503. Assessment on the use of political assassinations as a 

form of statecraft by the Russian Federation 

Section 503 requires the DNI to submit an Intelligence Community assessment concerning the use of political assassinations as a 

form of statecraft by the Russian Federation to the appropriate 

congressional committees, not later than 180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act. 

Subtitle B—Matters Relating to Other Countries 

Section 511. Report of resources and collection posture with regard 

to the South China Sea and East China Sea 

Section 511 requires the DNI to submit to the appropriate congressional committees an Intelligence Community assessment on 

Intelligence Community resourcing and collection posture with regard to the South China Sea and East China Sea, not later than 

180 days after the enactment of the Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence 

Authorization Act. 

Section 512. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United 

States diplomatic facilities in Cuba 

Section 512 requires the Secretary of State, not later than one 

year after the date of the enactment of this Act, to ensure that 

every supervisory position at a United States diplomatic facility in 

Cuba is occupied by a citizen of the United States who has passed 

a thorough background check. Further, not later than 180 days 

after the date of the enactment of this Act, the provision requires 

the Secretary of State, in coordination with other appropriate government agencies, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan to further reduce the reliance on locally employed 

staff in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba. The plan shall, 

at a minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and numbers of 

employees to be replaced. 

Section 513. Inclusion of sensitive compartmented information facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in Cuba 

Section 513 requires that each United States diplomatic facility 

in Cuba that is constructed, or undergoes a construction upgrade, 

be constructed to include a sensitive compartmented information 

facility. 

Section 514. Report on use by Iran of funds made available through 

sanctions relief 

Section 514 requires the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary 

of the Treasury, to submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report assessing the monetary value of any direct or indirect 

form of sanctions relief Iran has received since the Joint Plan of 

Action (JPOA) entered into effect, and how Iran has used funds 

made available through such sanctions relief. This report shall be 

submitted every 180 days while the JPOA is in effect, and not later 

than 1 year after an agreement relating to Iran’s nuclear program 


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takes effect, and annually thereafter while that agreement remains 

in effect. 

TITLE VI—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 601. Intelligence oversight exception for contractual non-disclosure provisions 

Section 601 provides that no provision of a contract with an element of the Intelligence Community that prohibits the disclosure 

of information may be construed to prohibit the Intelligence Community from providing information to the congressional intelligence 

committees. 

The section would also preclude as a cause of action the provision 

of information pertinent to or arising from the contractual agreement, consistent with Congressional reporting obligations. 

Section 602. Notification of changes to retention of call detail record 

policies 

Section 602 requires the DNI to notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing not later than 15 days after learning 

that an electronic communications service provider that generates 

call detail records in the ordinary course of business has changed 

its policy on the retention of such call details records to result in 

a retention period of less than 18 months. 

Section 603. Requirement to report terrorist activities and the unlawful distribution of information relating to explosives 

Section 603 requires companies providing an interstate electronic 

communication service or remote computing service to the public to 

report to appropriate authorities as determined by the Attorney 

General when they know their technology is being used to carry 

out a potential terrorist attack, similar to the process required by 

existing federal law in cases of child pornography. 

Section 604. Broadening the scope of Office of the Director of National Intelligence tradecraft review 

As required by IRTPA, ODNI’s AIS office conducts a regular, detailed review of finished intelligence products, aimed at continually 

monitoring the quality of the Intelligence Community’s analytic 

work product. 

Section 604 amends section 1019 of IRTPA by broadening reviews of finished intelligence products conducted by AIS to include 

an explanation of how substantially similar, contemporaneous intelligence products are distinct in terms of source material, timeframe, methodology, or other distinguishing analytic characteristic. 

Section 605. Strategy for comprehensive interagency review of the 

United States national security overhead satellite architecture 

Section 605 requires the DNI, in collaboration with the Secretary 

of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop a strategy, with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that 

there is a comprehensive interagency review of policies and practices for planning and acquiring national security satellite systems 

and architectures, including the capabilities of commercial systems 

and partner countries, consistent with the National Space Policy 


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issued on June 28, 2010. Where applicable, this strategy shall account for the unique missions and authorities vested in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. 

Section 606. Unauthorized dealings in special nuclear material 

Section 606 includes the DNI among the senior government officials with whom the Secretary of Energy must consult, prior to 

issuing authorization to directly or indirectly engage or participate 

in the development or production of any special nuclear material 

outside the United States, by amending the Atomic Energy Act of 

1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077). 

Section 607. Enhancing government personnel security programs 

Section 607 directs the DNI to develop and implement a plan for 

eliminating the backlog of overdue periodic investigations, and further requires the DNI to direct each agency to implement a program to provide enhanced security review to individuals determined eligible for access to classified information or eligible to hold 

a sensitive position. 

These enhanced personnel security programs, which will integrate information relevant to suitability for access to classified information, and be conducted at least 2 times every 5 years, are to 

commence not later than 5 years after the date of enactment of the 

Fiscal Year 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act, or the elimination 

of the backlog of overdue periodic investigations, whichever occurs 

first. 

Section 608. Technical amendments relating to pay under title 5, 

United States Code 

Section 608 amends 5 U.S.C. § 5102(a)(1) to expressly exclude the 

ODNI from the provisions of chapter 51 of title 5, relating to position classification, pay, and allowances for General Schedule employees, which do not apply to ODNI by virtue of the National Security Act. Section 102A(m) of the National Security Act of 1947 

(50 U.S.C. § 3024) provides that the DNI may ‘‘exercise with respect to the personnel of the ODNI any authority of the Director 

of the Central Intelligence Agency . . . under the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 . . . and other applicable provisions of 

law, as of December 17, 2004.’’ As the exclusion of the CIA from 

the definition of an agency in chapter 51 was in effect as of that 

date, the ODNI is also excluded from chapter 51 by section 

102A(m) of the National Security Act. This proposal would have no 

substantive effect except to align the two statutes. 

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

Declassification review of video of the 2012 Benghazi Terrorist Attacks 

Numerous investigations have been conducted regarding the 

2012 terrorist attack against U.S. facilities in Benghazi. This Committee produced one of the first declassified Congressional reports 

and continues to believe that the public should have access to information about the attacks, so long as it does not jeopardize intelligence sources and methods. 


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The closed circuit television videos from the Temporary Mission 

Facility (TMF) captured some of the activity that took place at the 

State Department facility on September 11, 2012, and their release 

would contribute to the public’s understanding of the event without 

compromising sources or methods. 

Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, or the appropriate 

federal official, to conduct a declassification review and to facilitate 

the release to the public of the declassified closed-circuit television 

videos of the September 11, 2012 terrorist attack on the TMF in 

Benghazi, Libya, consistent with the protection of sources and 

methods, not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act. 

COMMITTEE ACTION

On June 24, 2015, a quorum being present, the Committee met 

to consider the bill and amendments. The Committee took the following actions: 

Votes on amendments to committee bill, this report, and the classified annex 

By unanimous consent, the Committee moved to consideration of 

the Chairman and Vice Chairman Mark and the classified annex. 

The Committee moved to consideration en bloc of four amendments by Senator Burr and Senator Feinstein that made changes 

to the classified annex, an amendment by Senator Rubio that made 

changes to the classified annex, and five amendments by Senator 

Warner that made changes to the classified annex. By voice vote, 

the Committee agreed en bloc to the amendments. 

The Committee moved to consideration en bloc of an amendment 

by Senator Rubio that requires a report on the use by Iran of funds 

made available through sanctions relief, an amendment by Senator 

Collins that enhances government personnel security programs, 

and an amendment by Senator Cotton that requires that the DNI 

be consulted before the Department of Energy issues authorization 

to directly or indirectly engage or participate in the development or 

production of any special nuclear material outside the United 

States. By voice vote, the Committee agreed en bloc to the amendments. 

The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by Senator Feinstein that requires the DNI to establish a policy to ensure 

the appropriate congressional committees are notified, quarterly, of 

each appointment of an individual to or separation from a senior 

level position in the IC during the previous 3-month period. The 

amendment, as modified by Senator Feinstein and Senator Collins, 

was adopted by voice vote. 

The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by Senator Cotton that made changes to the classified annex. The amendment, as modified by Senator Cotton, was adopted by voice vote. 

The Committee moved to consideration of an amendment by Senator Warner that made changes to the classified annex. The 

amendment, as modified by Senator Warner, was adopted by voice 

vote. 

The Committee authorized the staff to make technical and conforming changes in the bill, report, and classified annex, following 

the completion of the mark-up. 


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Vote to report the committee bill 

The Committee voted to report the bill, as amended, by a vote 

of 15 ayes to 0 noes. The votes in person or by proxy were as follows: Chairman Burr—aye; Senator Risch—aye; Senator Coats— 

aye; Senator Rubio—aye; Senator Collins—aye; Senator Blunt— 

aye; Senator Lankford—aye; Senator Cotton—aye; Vice Chairman 

Feinstein—aye; Senator Wyden—aye; Senator Mikulski—aye; Senator Warner—aye; Senator Heinrich—aye; Senator King—aye; and 

Senator Hirono—aye. 

COMPLIANCE WITH RULE XLIV 

Rule XLIV of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires publication of a list of any ‘‘congressionally directed spending item, limited 

tax benefit, and limited tariff benefit’’ that is included in the bill 

or the Committee report accompanying the bill. Consistent with the 

determination of the Committee not to create any congressionally 

directed spending items or earmarks, none have been included in 

the bill, the report to accompany it, or the classified schedule of authorizations. The bill, report, and classified schedule also contain 

no limited tax benefits or limited tariff benefits. 

ESTIMATE OF COSTS

Pursuant to paragraph 11(a)(3) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee deems it impractical to include 

an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the provisions of 

this report due to the classified nature of the operations conducted 

pursuant to this legislation. On June 26, 2015, the Committee 

transmitted this bill to the Congressional Budget Office and requested an estimate of the costs incurred in carrying out the unclassified provisions. 

EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

In accordance with paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the Committee finds that no substantial regulatory impact will be incurred by implementing the provisions of 

this legislation. 


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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WYDEN, HEINRICH, AND 

HIRONO 

We appreciate the bipartisan work that our colleagues have put 

into assembling this bill. We look forward to further discussion as 

it moves forward, especially on those provisions that have not yet 

been subject to public debate. We are particularly interested to 

hear from Internet and communications companies regarding Section 603, which would require these companies to notify authorities 

if they become aware of terrorist activity. Since this provision expressly does not require these companies to monitor their users, it 

appears to us that this would not actually change the current practices of these companies, and we will confirm that point with those 

companies before the full Senate considers this legislation on the 

floor. 

We are disappointed that an amendment that we filed to expand 

the mandate and responsibilities of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board (PCLOB) was not accepted, but we look forward 

to future opportunities to strengthen oversight of intelligence activities. We certainly do not look favorably on a provision in the 

House-passed FY 2016 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 2596) 

that would restrict PCLOB’s mandate. 

Additionally, there are certain provisions in the classified annex 

accompanying the bill that do not precisely reflect our positions, 

and we have addressed those provisions in more detailed classified 

additional views filed with that annex. 

RON WYDEN. 

MARTIN HEINRICH. 

MAZIE K. HIRONO. 


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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WARNER, KING, RUBIO, 

HIRONO, AND MIKULSKI 

This legislation includes an amendment we supported to require 

a comprehensive approach to the overhead satellite architecture 

that supports U.S. intelligence and defense programs. 

We believe this bill sends a strong message that we need a strategy for our space architecture that safeguards our national security 

by taking advantage of cutting-edge technology. The U.S. is in danger of losing our technological edge due to our current overreliance 

on a big-government acquisition model. Our current approach to 

overhead satellites is increasingly unsustainable due to growing 

costs, long design time, lack of competition, and an inability to take 

advantage of rapid innovation in the private sector. Given the cost 

of maintaining our satellite infrastructure and the dangers and 

constraints imposed by the threat of anti-satellite weapons, our 

space infrastructure will be stronger and more efficient if it integrates commercial capabilities into government solutions. 

On September 23, 1971, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger issued a short memo regarding President Nixon’s decision to 

pursue the first electro-optical imaging (EOI) satellite, to be undertaken ‘‘under a realistic funding program, with a view toward 

achieving an operational capability in 1976.’’ It took almost exactly 

five years to design and launch the first KH–11 satellite into orbit 

on December 19, 1976. The United States needs to get back to this 

kind of timeline in designing and launching overhead reconnaissance satellites. We cannot afford to wait a decade or more from 

design to launch of a satellite if the United States is to maintain 

its technological edge. 

Our amendment also recognizes that space is no longer an 

uncontested environment, as it once was, and that the U.S. government must be open to innovative solutions such as distributed, 

disaggregated architectures that could allow for better resiliency 

against the space threat, and also allow for ready reconstitution, 

constant replenishment, and frequent technological refresh. Moreover, the current cost-constrained budget environment dictates that 

the U.S. must more seriously consider the costs of space systems 

and be open to potentially less expensive alternatives that include 

commercial solutions. 

In April 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that the 

United States needed to reform acquisition practices across the Department of Defense, that the costs of the ‘‘exquisite solution’’ were 

making defense unaffordable, and that ‘‘we needed to shift away 

from the 99-percent exquisite service-centric platforms that are so 

costly and so complex that they take forever to build and only then 

in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must 


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look more to the 80-percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers.’’ 

In line with Secretary Gates’s thinking about the ‘‘80-percent solution,’’ the U.S. National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010, already states that to the maximum extent possible, the U.S. government should use commercial space capabilities when these are 

available, and develop ‘‘exquisite’’ governmental space systems 

‘‘only when it is in the national interest and there is no suitable, 

cost-effective United States commercial or, as appropriate, foreign 

commercial service or system that is or will be available.’’ 

Therefore, consistent with the National Space Policy, we believe 

the U.S. government should make maximum use of mature commercial space capabilities and acquisition practices for national security systems where the required performance can be met with 

commodity technology to reduce acquisition timelines and costs, 

promote competition, capitalize on the pace of commercial technology advances, and avoid unnecessary government-unique investments. National Intelligence and Department of Defense investments in technology development utilizing a unique, dedicated industrial base should only be reserved for cases where commercial 

commodity technology does not exist or where revolutionary technology is judged to be achievable and worth the attendant risk, 

cost, and time to acquire. 

Satellite systems and architectures should also be designed in 

such a way that a number of elements common to multiple spacecraft could be standardized, to reduce costs, simplify execution and 

preserve a competitive industrial base; and the entire overhead satellite architecture of the United States, including programs funded 

by the Department of Defense or by an element of the intelligence 

community, commercial providers, and foreign partners, should be 

viewed and treated as an integrated whole, not simply as a series 

of independent and unrelated satellite systems. 

Given the importance of space systems to the national security 

and their huge costs, we believe that the current state of the U.S. 

space systems architecture, and planning for the future architecture, should receive priority attention from the President, his senior national security and scientific advisors, the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 


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Our amendment therefore requires the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

to develop a strategy—with milestones and benchmarks—to ensure 

that the nation’s satellite architecture meets the nation’s needs in 

peace- and war-time; responsibly stewards the taxpayers’ dollars; 

accurately takes into account cost- and performance tradeoffs of the 

architecture; meets realistic requirements; produces and fosters excellence, innovation and competition; produces innovative satellite 

systems in under five years that can leverage common, standardized design elements and commercially-available technologies; 

takes advantage of rapid advances in commercial technology, innovation and commercial-like acquisition practices; and fosters competition and a robust industrial base. 

MARK R. WARNER. 

ANGUS S. KING. 

MARCO RUBIO. 

MAZIE K. HIRONO. 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI. 

Æ 


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