F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A L I C E M E

N D O Z A , an individual, Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

T H E R O M

A N C A T H O L I C A R

C H B I S H O P O F L O S A

N G E L E S , a corporation sole, on behalf of and for the benefit of Nativity Church, without prejudice as to Canon L aw Erroneously Sued as Archdiocese of L o s Ang eles,

Defendant-Appellee

. N o. 14-55651

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02543- GW -MAN

ORDER AND OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Georg e H. W u, District J u d g e, Presiding

Submitted April 6, 2016 * Pasadena, California

F iled J une 7, 2016

B efore: A. W allace Tashima, B arry G. Silverman, and Susan P. Graber, Circuit J udg es.

* T h e p an el u n a n i m o u sl y co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).M E N D O Z A V

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Order;

Per Curiam Opinion

SUMMARY * *

Em ploym ent Discrim ination

The panel withdrew its opinion filed April 14, 2016, a nd file d a n e w opinion affirming the district court’s summary j u d g ment in favor of defendant in plaintiff’s a ction alle gi n g that defendant violated the Americans w ith Disabilities A ct when it failed to return her to a full time position following her medical leave.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judg ment

on claims of d isability discriminatio n a n d disparate treatment. The p anel stated that the Ni n t h Circuit’s ADA cases, requiring a plaintiff who alleg es disparate treatment to show either that a discriminatory animus is the sole reason for t h e challeng ed action or that discrimination is one of two or more

reasons for the challeng ed d ecision, at least one o f which may be leg itimate, remain g ood law follow i n g E E OC v

. Abercrombie & F

itch Stores, I

nc. , 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015), a Title VI I case. The p a n el also affirmed the district court’s
summary judg ment on plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation claim.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.M E N D O Z A V

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COUNSEL

W illiam W

. B loch, L A Superlawy ers, L o s Ang eles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Daniel R. Sullivan, Carrie A. String h am, Sullivan, B allog & W illiams, L L P, Santa Ana, Californi a , f or D efendantAppellee.

ORDER

The p e r c u r iam opinion filed April 14, 2016, 2016 W L 1459214, is WITHDRAWN
, and a new opinion is to b e filed contemporaneously

with this order.

OP INION

PER CURI AM:

Plaintiff Alice Mendoz a appeals the district court’s entry

o f summary judg ment in favor of defendant in Mendo z a ’s action alleg ing that the d efend a n t violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) when it failed to return her
t o a full time position following Mendoz a’s medical l e a v e. W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e r eview de
novo, Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
, 237 F .3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001), and we affirm.

Mendoz a worked full- t i m e a s a bookkeeper for a small parish church. She took sick leave f or ten mon t h s, during

w hich the pastor of the church took over the bookk ee p i n gM E N D O Z A V

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duties himself and determined that th e job could be done b y a part-time bookkeeper. W hen Mendoz a returned from sick leave, there no long er was a full-time bookkeeping position,

so the pastor offered her a part-time job, which M endoz a declined. B ecause the parties do not c ontest the iss u e o n appeal, we assume withou t d e c i ding that Mendoz a is a qualified individual with a “disability ” to bri n g her c laims within the coverag e of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 1 2112(a), in spite of the fact that her d octor c leared her to return to work with “no limitations.”

The district court properly g ranted summary judg ment to the Archbishop o n Mendoz a’s disa b ility discrimination a nd disparate treatment claims because Mendoz a failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether the Archbisho p ’ s leg itimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for not returning Mendoz a to fulltime work was pretex tual. See id. at 1 093–94 (holding th a t, under the ADA, if a

n employ ee establishes a prima facie case and the employ er provides a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action, the employ ee must raise a triab l e i s s ue as to pretex t); see also Pac. S

hores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach
, 730 F .3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff who alleg e s disparate treatment m ay demonstrate that discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated defendant).

The Supreme Court’s r e cent decision in EEOC v

. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
, 135 S. Ct. 20 2 8 (2015), does not affect our analy sis. I n Abercrombie & Fitch
, the Supreme Court held that, in a T itle VI I ac t ion alleg ing disparate treatment, the plaintiff n eed only show that the need for a relig ious accommodation was a factor motivati n g the employ e r’s adverse decision. I d. at 2032. Knowledg e is not

a requirement of a Title V I I claim. Id. at 2032–33. “AnM E N D O Z A V

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employ e r may not make a n applicant’s reli gi o u s practice, confirmed o r otherwise, a f actor in employ

me n t d e cisions

. . . . I f the [

job] applicant a c tually re q u i r e s a n accommodation of that relig ious practice, and the employ er’s desire to avoid the prospec t i v e a ccommodation is a motivating factor in his d ecision, the employ er violates Title VI I .” Id. at 2033.

Mendoz a’s claims are disting ui shable, because she alleg ed, n ot Title VI I violations, but violations of the A D A
, which defines discrimination “to include an e m p l oy er’s failure to make ‘r e a sonable a c commodation[ ] to the k nown phy sical or mental li m i t ations.’” I d. (quoting 42 U .S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). W e take the opportunity to reiterate that

our ADA cases, which allow a plaintiff w ho alleg es disparate
treatment to p rove her case by demonstrating either t h at “ a discriminatory animus is the sole reason for the c h alleng ed action” or that “discrimination is one of two or more reasons for the challeng ed decision, at least o n e of w hich may be leg itimate,” remain g ood law. See Head v. Glacier Nw, Inc.
, 413 F .3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2005). 1

The district court properly g ranted summary judg ment to the Archbishop o n Mendoz a ’ s reasonable accommodation claim because Mendoz a failed to e s t ablish that a full-time position was available. See Dark v. Curry Ct y

. , 4 5 1 F .3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff has the burden to show ex istence o f reasonable accommodation that

1 W e n eed n o t decid e i n th is case w h eth er S u prem e Co u rt cases d ecid ed

su b seq u en t t o Hea d h av e ero d ed H ea d ’s v itality

. S

ee Bu kiri v. Lyn ch
, No

. 1 5- 56 5 2 4
, 2 0 1 6 W L 1 5 67 0 3 0
, at * 1 n .1 (9 th Cir. A p r. 1 9
, 20 1 6) (u n p u b lish ed d ecisio n ) (co llectin g cases f ro m o th er circu its an d declin in g to ad d ress th e issu e as “ n o t o u tco m e d eterm in ativ e”).M E N D O Z A V

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would have enabled her to perform the essential functions o f an available job).

W e need not and do not d ecide in t h e first instance whether the Archbishop or the parish church was Mendoz a’s employ e r, because it is not necessary for the p urpose o f deciding this appeal.

AF F IRMED.