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i 

94–220 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–18] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES 

AVIATION PROGRAMS AND CAPABILITIES 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 4, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Holmes, Lt Gen James M. ‘‘Mike,’’ USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Plans and Requirements, Department of the Air Force ................................... 2 

LaPlante, Dr. William A., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, 

Department of the Air Force ............................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe ........................................................................................... 17 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 15 

LaPlante, Dr. William A., joint with Lt Gen James M. ‘‘Mike’’ Holmes ...... 18 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 35 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 42 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 39 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 41 

(1) 

AIR FORCE PROJECTION FORCES AVIATION PROGRAMS 

AND CAPABILITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 4, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. We want to welcome everybody today to our hearing 

on the Air Force Projection Forces Aviation Programs and Capabilities for Fiscal Year 2016. The unfortunate thing, as we all know, 

they are going to schedule votes or have scheduled votes anywhere 

from now to maybe 2:30, so we are going to waive our opening remarks. Mr. Courtney and I both have agreed to that. And with 

that, we want to get right to our witnesses so they can make whatever comments they would like to make to the members. I have 

told them previously, Mr. Courtney has agreed to this, of course, 

that all their written remarks will be made part of the record. You 

can refer to those if you would like or you can just talk off the cuff, 

but we are just glad to have both of you here. 

As you know, we have Dr. William LaPlante here. He is the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition for the Department of the Air Force. Dr. LaPlante, thank you so much for joining 

us and for all the work you do for our country. We also have Lieutenant General James M. ‘‘Mike’’ Holmes, who is the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements for the Department 

of the Air Force. General, thank you again for your service, and to 

all those people who serve with you and below you. We appreciate 

their service to our country. 

And with that, Dr. LaPlante, I think you are going to start us 

off, and then we will go the General. So the floor is yours. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 15.] 

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM A. LAPLANTE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Courtney, and the rest of the distinguished ladies 

and gentlemen of the committee. I appreciate the work you do and 
2 

support you give us in the Pentagon and to the warfighter. And 

what you do is very important. And we hope we can answer all 

your questions and have a good discussion today. 

General Holmes and I both have a joint prepared statement that 

we submitted for the record. I am not going to go through that 

statement here. I will just make a few remarks and then turn it 

over to General Holmes. I will start by saying that, you know, the 

challenge we have in our jobs in an acquisition and programming 

strategy is quite simple. It is that we have got these two competing 

problems. We have modernization, that is, that is the airplanes, in 

your case, the mobility airplanes, the bombers, that we are using 

today, and literally using in the fight today. And the pilots flying 

these airplanes are flying airplanes that are older than they are 

and keeping that going. At the same time, we have to modernize 

for the future. 

Those two are linked, of course, because if we mess up the modernization, then we just put more at risk, those pilots flying those 

airplanes. So that is our challenge is between those two things. 

And our job every day, General Holmes and I, the Chief, the Secretary, our whole team, is keeping that all together, keeping it together with a strategy. Oh, and by the way, in a budget that is, 

to say the least, very, very challenging. So all our discussions we 

have is about the trades between those two categories, and then 

making sure that we keep the modernization programs, the KC–46, 

the next tanker, the next bomber, that we keep those programs on 

track and don’t lose our eye on the ball while we keep the modernization going. And it is a difficult trade, but that is what—what 

we are here to talk to you about. I look forward to your questions. 

I will just stop at this point and then let General Holmes give 

his remarks. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. LaPlante and General 

Holmes can be found in the Appendix on page 18.] 

Mr. FORBES. General. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN JAMES M. ‘‘MIKE’’ HOLMES, USAF, 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

General HOLMES. Thank you, Dr. LaPlante. Chairman Forbes, 

Ranking Member Courtney, gentlemen and ladies of the committee, 

thank you for your continued support to the United States Air 

Force, our airmen, and their families. Our Air Force remains the 

most globally engaged air force on the planet, and we continue to 

do our best to deliver global vigilance, global reach, and global 

power for America every day. Our Air Force today is the smallest 

in our history, and we see no end to the incredible demand for the 

capabilities that we deliver. This demand, coupled with an increasingly challenging global situation and an uncertain budget environment, drives us to make some very difficult choices. 

The 2016 President’s budget took some steps to improve our situation, and it allowed us to maximize the contributions to the total 

force, to reinforce investments in nuclear deterrence and space control, to emphasize our long-range and global and non-permissive 

capabilities, and to preserve our top three procurement programs: 
3 

the F–35, the KC–46, and the Long Range Strike Bomber, two of 

which fit into your committee’s portfolio. 

The President’s budget added money above the BCA [Budget 

Control Act] caps because the administration believes additional 

spending is necessary to meet the requirements of the strategy, 

and it gives us the ability to halt reductions in our total force end 

strength, to continue our efforts to regain full-spectrum readiness, 

and to lay the groundwork for future innovation with some seed investments. However, we face shortfalls in our ability to meet all 

the requirements of the strategy even at those levels. 

In shortfalls in capacity first. I will talk about capacity, readiness, and modernization. Shortfalls in capacity mean we must accept some risk in our ability to meet all the requirements of the 

strategy. Shortfalls in readiness are driven by previous funding levels and a continued high ops [operations] tempo and demand for 

Air Force forces which exaggerate the effect of the capacity shortfalls. And then shortfalls in modernization mean potential adversaries, who have had 20 years to watch the way the American military does business and take steps to address it, are closing the capability gaps that separated the U.S. military from potential foes. 

This narrowed gap adds future risk to both mission and forces. 

When forced to choose on where to take the risk and to spread our 

dollars, the Department of Defense directed us and all the services 

to take risk in our current capacity in order to preserve readiness 

and the investments required to be ready in the future. 

As we look at the forces that we bring to you in this committee, 

primarily our bomber, tanker, and transport forces, I think that 

our bomber investment portfolio is in pretty good shape. There are 

about $3 billion invested to make those airplanes both compliant, 

to let them keep working in the airspace system, and then to modernize them and make sure they continue to do the things we require until the Long Range Strike Bomber is brought on board in 

the numbers that we need there. 

On the tanker side, although we have a very old fleet, the investments are in place there to keep those systems compliant and keep 

them out there, and the KC–46 program is in place to replace 

them. Bringing me then to the airlift side, the C–17, we thank Congress and the committee for your tireless efforts to get us that modernized airplane. It is one of our greatest airplanes, and it is in 

shape for the future. We have some investment in 2016 to make 

sure that we protect that investment in the airplane. And then the 

C–5 modernization program is coming to an end, and we are very 

happy with the results there. 

So what I am left with and that I am most concerned about, and 

I know that many members of the committee share that concern, 

is our C–130 fleet as we advance into the future. How do we make 

sure those airplanes remain safe, that they are compliant with the 

requirements of both the national and the international airspace 

system, and then that we modernize them to last through the service life that we need, particularly the H models, to exist. 

We know that we have had years of discussion with you and with 

the committee on the best way to go forward. We have reached the 

position now that I am concerned that we will not be able to keep 

the aircraft compliant to meet the deadlines that the FAA [Federal 
4 

Aviation Administration] has set basically by the end of this 5-year 

defense plan. And if I was going to put all the money required into 

the AMP [avionics modernization program] program to get it done 

in time to get those airplanes compliant, I see the bill as coming 

to about $2.8 billion over the 5-year defense program. And Mr. Chairman, that $2.8 billion is kind of equivalent to retiring the KC–10 fleet for the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], or retiring the C–5 fleet over the FYDP, or retiring about 

150 KC–135s. On the combat Air Force’s side, it is equivalent to 

the A–10 retirement that we had to take, or the entire B–1 fleet, 

or a reduction, and a significant reduction in 40 or so F–35s. So 

what we hope to do is to be able to work with the members and 

with the committee to be able to move out and to provide the compliance capability that those airplanes need. We think that we need 

to move out quickly to provide them with the radios that are required, 8.33 kilohertz radios with cockpit video recorder and a digital flight recorder with ADS–B [automatic dependent surveillance– 

broadcast] Out with enhanced Mode S [mode select] and with an 

enhanced Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System. We think 

we can do that for about $2.5 million per airplane, and that we can 

get that done, if not by 2020 but shortly after 2020 if we can gain 

concurrence with you to move forward. 

Now, we know that leaves us a modernization piece, and we 

know those airplanes have to be modified. We know that you have 

restricted us from pursuing modification if it is not the AMP program. And what we hope to do is work with you to lay out the details of a more affordable modernization program that we can afford to buy over multiple FYDPs, but that will make those airplanes able to continue to do their mission in an increasingly challenging environment into the future. 

Thank you again for the support that you have given the Air 

Force, for the support you give our airmen and families. Thank you 

for taking the time and inviting us to come speak to you today. The 

world is not becoming less safe or less stable. We think the world 

will continue to require on the capabilities that your committee 

manages and that the Air Force provides, and we thank you very 

much for being here. We are happy to take your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Holmes and Dr. 

LaPlante can be found in the Appendix on page 18.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General and Secretary. The ranking 

member and I have decided to defer our questions so we can get 

as many member questions in as possible. I have no right to ask 

you to do this, but I am going to do it anyway. If you can keep your 

questions to about 3 minutes, as short as possible, just so we can 

get as many member questions in as possible. And with that, I recognize the gentlelady from Missouri for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate the tough job that you have. Quickly, I appreciate all you are doing and have done for the B–2 Stealth Bomber. 

Certainly the modernization program and everything is very, very 

important. You mention in your testimony that you are going to 

continue to pursue a number of sustainment initiatives to improve 

aircraft supportability, increase aircraft availability. I know that is 

something that I have been visiting with you all about as part sus-
5 

tainability and how—can you expand on some of the things that 

you are doing there to try to ensure that we have the parts we 

need for the B–2? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Well, in general, in sustainability, what we are 

recognizing even more so is that, in fact, a lot of the money we can 

save in acquisition is actually in the sustainment part. So we are 

keenly, keenly interested in that. The B–2 case, you know, we continue to have the program to bring—do cost-effective maintenance 

of the airplane, particularly in the, for lack of a better word, the 

materials area, and you know what I am talking about. So that is 

a very important program for the B–2, because in fact, one of the 

biggest contributions to the availability challenge is for that airplane is maintenance of that—those materials. That is actually 

something that is going in the right direction. The availability of 

that airplane is actually getting better because of that work, so 

that I would call out that specific initiative, and I think it is very 

important. 

The other thing that we are doing, as you indicate, is we are 

modernizing the B–2. An important program for the B–2, and I 

would like this committee to recognize this, is a program that is 

really a defensive military systems program, DMS is the acronym, 

but the thing what it does is that B–2, we think of it as an advanced weapons system, which it is, but in fact, if we don’t do 

DMS, it is not going to be—have the capabilities to operate in a 

modern contested environment. We have to do that program. It is 

funded, as General Holmes said. So those are two things I would 

call out, but you know, the B–2 is a very, very important program. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Just to follow up on the computer software program that I understand is being developed, be able to project the 

parts that would be needed to help them in advance be able to get 

in, do you have an update on that? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I don’t have an update on that specific program. 

Do you? 

General HOLMES. No, ma’am, I don’t. I know we are pursuing 

about 20 projects that help us manage the signature and the parts 

supply and that help us increase the availability rate on the airplane, but we will have to respond to you—— 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sure. 

LT Gen HOLMES [continuing]. On that one. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Be happy to look into that and get back to you 

on that. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you for all that you do. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. I thank the gentlelady. The gentlelady from Guam 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And Secretary LaPlante and General Holmes, thank you for your testimony 

today. As we proceed with the engineering development of the 

LRS–B [Long Range Strike Bomber], what are some of the strategies that have gone into developing the $550 million average procurement needed cost cap that you have set? Are you expecting to 

pursue an arrangement similar to the KC–46, utilizing a fixed 

price procurement vehicle? 

And though the program is one of the Air Force’s top three acquisition priorities, in fiscal year 2016 you have requested approxi-
6 

mately $1.2 billion for development. What effects would we see to 

this program if Congress does not repeal sequestration? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Let me answer the last point first. The effects of 

sequestration on all these programs is there. We in the Air Force 

have done our best, and so far we have been successful. Even in 

the sequester years that we have had, we protected, for the most 

part, F–35, the tanker, KC–46A, and LRS–B. We will continue to 

do it, but I will say this: I think the sequester happens, a lot of 

these programs, once again, are going to be put under tremendous 

stress. The munitions programs will be put under tremendous 

stress. But we try our best to protect those big three, but we can’t 

promise that they will be protected. 

Let me get at some of the other parts of the LRS–B. The one 

question that you asked essentially was in the development, we are 

in the development, or about ready to start the development part 

of that program, are we going to go for a fixed price development 

program like the tanker, or not? I think the short answer is, and 

now I am going to talk generically in acquisition theory, if you can 

bear with me. The theory behind when you do fixed price and say 

development versus cost plus, which is kind of the classic thing, 

tends to come down to how confident are you in the technologies 

you are developing, and it—fundamentally, you are cost estimating 

on those technologies. To be very simple, if you are developing 

something that is very cutting edge, it is very hard to estimate how 

much it is going to cost because you are actually developing something cutting edge. That is why we tend to go cost plus. 

If you are developing something that is based heavily on, say, a 

commercial item, something we have high confidence that we know 

how much it should cost, then we feel much more comfortable going 

to fixed price development. Now, here is why it matters. If you are 

in a fixed price contract, it is really important to have a good estimate of what you think it is going to cost. If you get—if you are 

wrong on that, let’s say you are wrong 50 percent one way or the 

other, somebody is going to really get hurt, right? If you are wrong, 

if the contractor ends up 50 percent over in a fixed price, they are 

very hurt, they may not survive. The program may not survive. 

The opposite, we would get rightfully criticized to say why are you 

giving a windfall buying something for twice the price that it cost. 

So you really want to have a good idea on the cost estimate in 

development. So the question then comes down to, for KC–46, the 

government made a decision that said, look, this is based as much 

on a 767. We think we have a pretty good idea on what the cost 

estimate should be. We are going to go a little—we are going to do 

a fixed price. That is not—it is actually unusual. Most development 

programs are cost plus. Okay. My belief on the LRS–B is it is going 

to be more traditional in the sense that we are doing a little bit 

more cutting edge. It is not based upon a commercial item, and so 

I think more likely it is going to be in the cost plus regime. 

But here is the important point. You brought up the $550 million 

number, and there has been some in the press on this. I would like 

just to make a couple of points on this. The first thing is, there’s 

been a lot of studies on why acquisition goes wrong. What they constantly come down to are some very much fundamental principles 

you have to do at the beginning to do it right. The first is you have 
7 

to fix your requirements, understand the requirements and fix 

them, don’t change your requirements, number one. Number two, 

it has often been said why isn’t cost built in as a requirement when 

you start a program? Why do we always say, well, maybe we will 

have a target? Number three, what we also see when programs 

don’t do well, is we typically try to put too much into the program, 

and the program usually gets slid to the right, more then gets put 

in, and you end up in this circle. 

So what we have done with our LRS–B—and it wasn’t me or 

General Holmes, it was our predecessors—back in 2010, they set 

the program up to exactly address all of those issues. Number one, 

they said we are going to make the cost a requirement. We are 

going to make the cost a requirement. We are going to pick a number after analysis, $550 million, the document was signed in 2010, 

that is why it is 2010 dollars, and people say, well, you didn’t take 

into account inflation. You can go to the Internet, run an inflation 

calculator and find out that $55 in 2010 is $57 or $58 today, so we 

know that. But we put it in as a requirement. To build 100 airplanes, it is going to cost $550 million. What that does is, that 

drives the design. Industry has to design to that number, and we 

are going to assess against that number. That is why we did it. 

And the second thing is we are building an adaptable architecture as well to address some of these other issues. And final point, 

we have not changed the requirement on it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General, my time is up. I do have a question, if 

I could place it on the record. 

Mr. FORBES. Certainly can, and submit it for the record. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Oklahoma is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Just out of curiosity, they called votes; is that 

correct? 

Mr. FORBES. That is correct, and so we only have minutes left. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES. And we will have—get your question in because I 

don’t think our members will be coming back—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. After this, so yours will be the final 

question. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I will try to be brief. For Dr. LaPlante, did 

Congress authorize an appropriate funding for the C–130 Avionics 

Modernization Program in fiscal year 2012? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And were those funds obligated in fiscal year 

2012? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. As far as I know. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. They were not. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. 2012 they were not. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. They were not. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Not in 2013 or 2014 either. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. So in fiscal year 2013, as you mentioned, it was authorized and appropriated by Congress, and those 

funds were not obligated—— 

Dr. LAPLANTE. That is correct. 
8 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE [continuing]. In 2013. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Or 2014. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Or 2014. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. That is correct. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Where it was authorized and appropriated but 

not obligated in 2014. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. That is correct. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And in 2015, is it authorized and appropriated 

for 2015? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Well, with the—I believe—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The answer is yes. The question is—— 

Dr. LAPLANTE. With—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE [continuing]. Do you intend to obligate those 

funds this year? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Oh, yes. Our plan is—if we get the approval, our 

plan is to take the money that has been obligated that we have and 

obligate it by the end of this fiscal year. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. To the AMP program? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Our plan is to do it towards the compliance items 

that General Holmes described. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So did you read section 134 of the fiscal year 

2015 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. We all have seen that language, yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Did you read the report language as well? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The report language says, ‘‘We are specifically 

directing the Secretary of the Air Force not to transfer or repurpose 

funds authorized and appropriated for the AMP program to execute 

such additional modernizations unless the modifications are included as a part of the AMP program of record.’’ Are you going to 

authorize the funds as part of the—are you going to obligate the 

funds as part of the AMP program of record? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. We are not—I think as I said, we are going to obligate those funds towards the compliance items that General 

Holmes described. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. No, but the AMP program of record is what— 

that is specifically the report language in the NDAA from fiscal 

year 2015. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. We have a different—we have different interpretations of what that language means. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. Well, Congress is clear. The Air Force 

can do ADS–B Out, as you indicated. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Right. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. But it cannot take the money from AMP. That 

has to be within the AMP program. The Air Force can do CNS/ 

ATM [communications, navigation, surveillance/air traffic management] or other program—— 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Correct. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE [continuing]. In CNS/ATM, but it has to be part 

of the AMP program of record. Are you aware of the limitation 

placed on the Secretary of the Air Force’s budget in section 134? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yes, and Congressman, let me make sure I am 

understanding. I think—I think we are doing exactly what you are 
9 

saying. We are—we are using the money for this—CT—ATM/CNS, 

we are using it for the ADS–B Out and the radios as General—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. As part of the AMP program of record? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. It is going to be that money, yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. So it needs to be part of the AMP program of record by law. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. I am not sure what that means, but—well, I am 

not sure what the—maybe we are doing exactly what you are saying. We are taking that money and we are going to buy those 

items. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So you are familiar with this. I just read—it 

was the fiscal year 2015 President’s budget request, C–130, CNS/ 

ATM program. It looks like you guys have changed the name of it 

to the VAAP [Viability and Airspace Access Program] program, Increment 1; is that correct? Are you familiar with this, the VAAP 

program, Increment 1? 

General HOLMES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Is that what you intended? Did you change the 

name or are you changing the program and how is this working? 

Because the law is pretty clear. 

General HOLMES. Sir, our lawyers believe that when certified by 

the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense delegated 

that to Mr. Kendall, that when Mr. Kendall says it is necessary for 

us to spend money from those accounts that were previously obligated—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. A couple of things. I get that. I understand in 

134 there is that out, but also in section 134, it fences 15 percent 

of the Secretary of the Air Force’s money until the Air Force obligates fiscal year 2015 and prior years’ funds to the AMP program 

of record. There is no exception made to this limitation provision. 

There is no limitation. So if you want to say that we are going to 

go forward with a different program under a different name, that 

means you are saying that we are going to cut 15 percent of the 

Secretary of the Air Force’s operations and maintenance budget. 

Are you—do you understand that is what you are doing? That is 

in the law. 

General HOLMES. Yes, sir, it is, and we have—our lawyers—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Are you going to follow the law is my question? 

General HOLMES. We are going to follow the law as interpreted 

by the general counsel. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And for the chairman of this committee, if we 

follow the law and you go forward under the program that I understand you are going forward with in the President’s budget request, 

you are, in essence—we on this committee are required to make 

sure that the Secretary of the Air Force uses 15 percent of her operations and maintenance budget. 

Now, this—this is in the law. I just want to make sure everybody 

here understands this. 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Yeah. And Representative, we hear you. I just 

want to make sure that we have to do what our legal experts read 

the law tell us we can do and so—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So you tell me. You can’t make it any more 

clear. It is written—— 
10 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Well, I am not a lawyer, but yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. A couple of other things. In the 2014 

NDAA, you know, section 133 prohibits the Air Force from using 

any funding to initiate—— 

Mr. FORBES. I am sorry to cut the gentleman off, but we have 

votes we have to go to, as time has expired. So if you would like 

to follow up with any written questions, we can do it. 

General, we also would like for you to respond, if you could, on 

the details of that modernization program. I apologize to everybody 

that we have only got a couple of minutes left for this vote. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 35.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Sure. 

Mr. FORBES. But with that, Mr. Courtney has agreed we are adjourned, and we will follow up with any written questions. And if 

you would be so kind as to answer them for the record, we would 

appreciate it. With that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 4, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 4, 2015 

(15) 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 4, 2015 

(35) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

General HOLMES. The Air Force continues to work towards the safety, compliance 

and modernization of our legacy C–130 fleet. Because of the cost and time required 

to conduct the modernization of the legacy C–130 fleet, we believe, and DOD has 

certified, that we need to fund the airspace compliance modifications first. The Air 

Force intends to follow the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act 

guidance and we want to work with the Congress and our Total Force partners to 

develop an affordable C–130 modernization program. [See page 10.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 4, 2015 

(39) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Knowing that the KC–46 tanker contract is fixed-price, how important is it to maintain funding stability for the program and what are the risks to 

the program if funding gets interrupted? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Funding stability is extremely important to the success of the KC– 

46 program. Funding stability ensures the Air Force fulfills its contractual obligations required for Boeing to deliver 18 operationally-ready aircraft by August 2017 

(Required Assets Available (RAA)). The fixed-price contract caps government Engineering & Manufacturing Development liability at $4.9B and provides 13 planned, 

on-contract procurement lots at Firm-Fixed Price or Not-To-Exceed levels. While 

these planned procurements provide a range for variable order quantities, a variation in production quantity affects the lot-to-lot pricing. 

Additionally, while the government and Boeing have successfully met all contractual obligations to date, the program is entering its most challenging part in flight 

test. For these reasons, RDT&E funding stability remains important to ensure necessary funds are available to address remaining program content, as well as program risks that may materialize. Production funding stability remains important to 

enable Boeing’s achievement of RAA and ensure the government does not pay additional per aircraft costs due to quantity variations. Any government-induced issues 

or delays could lead to a Boeing request for equitable adjustment and potentially 

re-open the contract. 

Mr. FORBES. In the past year, Boeing has experienced wiring problems in building 

the first two KC–46 tankers which has delayed the development schedule. What impact will this delay have on initial operational capability in August 2017? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Internal Boeing schedule events have shifted due to the delays in 

the first flights of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development aircraft. However, 

the final contractual milestone, Required Assets Available (RAA), has not shifted. 

RAA will still require Boeing to deliver 18 operationally-ready aircraft by August 

2017. These delays eliminate the margin Boeing built into their original schedule, 

to include all schedule margin to the RAA contractual milestone date. 

Mr. FORBES. A recent draft GAO report noted that the original KC–46 schedule 

planned to have 13 months of testing on two aircraft before the October 2015 lowrate initial production decision. Now, due to delays resulting from wiring problems, 

the program will have only one aircraft in test for a three-month period before the 

October 2015 low-rate initial production decision. How will the Air Force ensure 

that key aerial refueling capabilities are demonstrated before the October 2015 lowrate initial production decision? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. Development testing required for the Milestone (MS) C Low Rate 

Initial Production (LRIP) decision consists of a combination of ground and flight 

testing, both which have commenced. Ground testing began in November 2014 and 

flight testing began with EMD #1’s First Flight on 28 December 2014. The flight 

testing required for MS C is modest and can all be executed on one aircraft. The 

other three EMD aircraft will be used throughout the remainder of the program for 

full requirements verification and operational testing, both which are required for 

the Full Rate Production decision in CY2017. Finally, MS C is an event-driven milestone, the program continues to make measurable progress each and every day toward a successful MS C, and the AF will not ask the Defense Acquisition Executive 

for a decision to enter LRIP until all pre-coordinated entrance criteria are complete. 

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force has ignored congressional intent for the past three 

budget cycles and does not plan to obligate the $47.0 million in funding authorized 

and appropriated in fiscal year 2014 for the C–130 Avionics Modernization Program 

(AMP), The Air Force has sunk $1.5 billion in developing and successfully testing 

this program, but now plans to shelve that investment. If the Air Force does not 

intend to utilize AMP, can you explain how the Air Force intends to address the 

growing obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources (DMS) of the C–130H 

fleet? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The Air Force continues to work towards the safety, compliance 

and modernization of our C–130H fleet. Because of the cost and time required to 

conduct the modernization of the C–130H fleet, we believe, and DOD has certified, 
40 

that the AF must primarily address airspace compliance modifications. The Air 

Force intends to comply with the FY15 NDAA and work with Congress and Total 

Force partners to address avionics modernization efforts for the C–130H fleet. 

Mr. FORBES. USTRANSCOM has stated a requirement for 567 aerial tankers to 

meet its steady-state and contingency surge requirements, yet the Air Force only 

has an inventory of 454 tankers. What risk is the Air Force incurring by not having 

the sufficient number of tankers in the inventory to meet USTRANSCOM’s requirements? 

General HOLMES. The Air Force is incurring significant risk with the current fleet 

of 455 aerial refueling tankers. KC–46A deliveries improve risk to ‘‘moderate’’ once 

the fleet reaches the USTRANSCOM amended requirement of 479 aircraft (aligning 

with the Mobility Capability Assessment-2018 (MCA–18) analysis in their 2 February 2015 report to Congress on ‘‘KC–10 Aerial Refueling Aircraft Force Structure’’). This will match the level required against the updated scenarios, strategies, 

concept of operations, assumptions, and capabilities determined by the MCA–18. 

Mr. FORBES. If the Air Force is required to execute fiscal resources at Budget Control Act sequestration levels, what operational risk do you incur by having to divest 

the entire KC–10 tanker aircraft fleet? What other programmatic options would you 

have to execute if Congress prohibited the retirement of KC–10 aircraft? 

General HOLMES. The KC–10 represents 13 percent of our tanker fleet and 30 percent of our air refueling capacity. If held to Budget Control Act level funding, we 

will be compelled to divest the KC–10 across the Future Years Defense Plan. According to the Mobility Capability Assessment–2018, divesting the 59 KC–10s would 

delay achieving a moderate risk level force structure by three years (from Fiscal 

Year 2018 (FY18) to FY21). 

If forced to retain the KC–10 without the funding associated with its operations, the Air Force would have to find other sources to offset $2.8 billion—the equivalent 

of roughly 150 KC–135s, which represents 30 percent of our tanker fleet and 33 percent of our air refueling capacity. 

Mr. FORBES. Knowing that the KC–46 tanker contract is fixed-price, how important is it to maintain funding stability for the program and what are the risks to 

the program if funding gets interrupted? 

General HOLMES. Funding stability is extremely important to the success of the 

KC–46 program. Funding stability ensures the Air Force fulfills its contractual obligations required for Boeing to deliver 18 operationally-ready aircraft by August 

2017 (Required Assets Available (RAA)). The fixed-price contract caps government 

Engineering & Manufacturing Development liability at $4.9B and provides 13 

planned, on-contract procurement lots at Firm-Fixed Price or Not-To-Exceed levels. 

While these planned procurements provide a range for variable order quantities, a 

variation in production quantity affects the lot-to-lot pricing. 

Additionally, while the government and Boeing have successfully met all contractual obligations to date, the program is entering its most challenging part in flight 

test. For these reasons, RDT&E funding stability remains important to ensure necessary funds are available to address remaining program content, as well as program risks that may materialize. Production funding stability remains important to 

enable Boeing’s achievement of RAA and ensure the government does not pay additional per aircraft costs due to quantity variations. Any government-induced issues 

or delays could lead to a Boeing request for equitable adjustment and potentially 

re-open the contract. 

Mr. FORBES. The Air Force is required by law to maintain a B–1 combat-coded 

inventory of 36 aircraft, for which the Air Force is complying with. However, the 

subcommittee understands that for three of those 36 aircraft, they do not have the 

same crew ratio or flying hours programmed against them as the other 33 B–1 combat coded aircraft. Can you explain to the subcommittee the reason for this difference, and what risk do you incur in meeting combatant commander requirements 

if all 36 combat-coded B–1 aircraft were required to meet presence and operational 

requirements? 

General HOLMES. Since 33 aircraft meets current combatant commander requirements, the Air Force reduced flying hour and manpower funding on the three aircraft to fund other higher priorities. If combatant commanders’ presence and operational requirements necessitates the full fleet of 36 aircraft, the Air Force will satisfy this requirement by using other combat-ready aircrews/maintainers as required 

to man/maintain the remaining three combat-coded aircraft under reduced manning. 

Aside from potential increased risk in training operations, the Air Force expects no 

increased risk in meeting combatant commander requirements. 

Mr. FORBES. New START treaty requires a reduced number of deployed nuclear 

weapons, which in turn, will require the Air Force to decertify a certain number of 

B–52 aircraft. What is the projected number of B–52 aircraft that you will decertify 
41 

in order to meet New START requirements? And, are these aircraft modifications 

reversible if ever needed to increase nuclear bomber capability in the future? 

General HOLMES. The Air Force will modify a total of 42 B–52H aircraft to a conventional-only role by permanently removing the nuclear code enable switch and associated equipment, and installing tamper-resistant blocker panels where the equipment used to reside. Of the 42 aircraft, 30 are Active Duty/AF Reserve B–52H’s and 

the remaining 12 B–52H’s are currently parked at the Aerospace Maintenance and 

Regeneration Group (AMARG) B–52 located at Davis-Monthan AFB. Once a B–52H 

is converted to a convention-only role, it is not reversible. 

Mr. FORBES. FY16 PB proposes to cut the number of C–130s from 358 today to 

308 by the end of FY20. Can you tell us what that number is based on and what 

kind of risk it poses? 

General HOLMES. Pursuant to the language in the Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) National Defense Authorization Act, the Air Force conducted an analysis of mobility 

assets to determine the appropriate number of aircraft required to fulfill contingency, humanitarian and homeland defense missions. This analysis, presented in 

the Mobility Capabilities Assessment (MCA) study determined ‘‘there is no surge 

scenario associated with the current defense strategy—even one in which a significant homeland defense event occurs concurrently with two warfights—that requires 

a fleet of 358 C–130s.’’ Rather, the analysis concluded the C–130 fleet size requirement ranges between 248 and 320 aircraft. 

Driven by fiscal constraints, yet recognizing the important role of intra-theater 

airlift in homeland defense and disaster response, the FY15 President’s Budget 

(FY15 PB) reduced the C–130 fleet to 328 aircraft by FY19. This force structure continued to exceed the MCA’s recommended level. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 

stated in July 2013 that ‘‘the Air Force could reduce tactical aircraft squadrons— 

potentially as many as five—and cut the size of the C–130 fleet with minimal risk.’’ 

In order to reduce excess capacity in the C–130 fleet and improve allocation of 

scarce resources, the Air Force made the decision to more closely align the C–130 

fleet structure with the findings and recommendations of the MCA. 

The FY16 PB reduces the C–130 force structure to 300 total aircraft, balancing 

operational requirements and the realities of Budget Control Act constraints. These 

reductions allow the Total Force to invest in the remaining C–130 force and other 

requirements to counter existing and emerging national security threats. 

A fleet size of 300 presents a moderate risk force that can accomplish the operational requirements defined in the MCA. 

Mr. FORBES. Last year, the Air Force began a new program to upgrade the C– 

130 fleet called the Viability and Airspace Access Program, also known as ‘‘VAAP.’’ 

We understand the VAAP is currently planned for two increments with Increment 

1 modifying 172 C–130Hs with new radios, updated transponders, and an updated 

cockpit voice recorder and digital flight recorder. VAAP 2 is undefined at the point. 

What viability and airspace access programs are planned for VAAP 2? Will the 

VAAP keep the C–130H fleet viable to 2030 and beyond? 

General HOLMES. The Air Force continues to work towards the safety, compliance 

and modernization of our legacy C–130 fleet. Because of the cost and time required 

to conduct the modernization of the legacy C–130 fleet, we believe, and DOD has 

certified, that we need to fund the airspace compliance modifications first to include 

new radios, updated transponders, and an updated cockpit voice recorder and digital 

flight recorder. The Air Force intends to follow the Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act guidance and we want to work with the Congress and our 

Total Force partners to develop an affordable C–130 modernization program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. The FY16 proposed budget shows an increase to $1.246B in funding 

for LRS–B. Does the increase reflect additional costs, an effort to shorten the program schedule, a combination of both or something else? 

Dr. LAPLANTE. The FY16 budget request reflects the schedule for the development 

phase of the program. There have been no cost increases to the program and the 

overall schedule remains on track. 

Mr. LARSEN. It is my understanding that Boeing is actively marketing the KC– 

46 to allies. Does the Air Force have a view on this activity? 

General HOLMES. ‘‘The USAF is constantly educating our allies on the importance 

of establishing and maintaining certain capabilities, such as airborne refueling. We 

encourage our allies desiring an airborne refueling capability to purchase the KC– 

46 in order to provide: the best receiver air refueling platform, an increase in airlift 

capability, an airframe of improved force protection and survivability, multi-point 
42 

air refueling, capable of both day and night operations, while providing rapid, global 

capability and interoperability between U.S., Joint, Allied, and Coalition forces.’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. Where do we stand on the development of the concept of operations for employing the LRS–B? Should we expect a similar basing arrangement 

for the LRS–B as our current bomber fleet? 

General HOLMES. The LRS–B Concept of Employment has been developed at the 

classified level and has been approved by Air Force senior leadership. Basing decisions for LRS–B have not yet been made; however, the Air Force anticipates going 

through the traditional staffing and approval processes for these decisions and will 

start this activity at the appropriate time to allow for any needed infrastructure 

changes. 

Æ