Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 

Keenan, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

DEBRA I. JOHNSON, ET AL. 

OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 

v. Record No. 941482 

 January 12, 1996 

GRACE MARCEL 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON 

John D. Gray, Judge 

 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs' 

amended motion for judgment states a legally cognizable cause of 

action. 

 Plaintiffs Debra I. Johnson and Karlista Brennan initially 

sued Grace Marcel, seeking to have her enjoined from threatening 

and harassing them and from interfering with their possessory 

rights in premises they had leased from Marcel. On November 15, 

1993, the trial court entered a temporary injunction, which was 

extended for an indefinite period on December 27, 1993. 

 On January 11, 1994, with leave of court, the plaintiffs 

filed an amended motion for judgment against Marcel, alleging 

that she had caused them physical harm and emotional distress and 

seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Marcel demurred to 

the amended motion for judgment, claiming that it was 

"insufficient in law in that there is no nexus between the 

compensatory and punitive damages sought, and any duty owed by 

[Marcel] to . . . the plaintiffs" and that "there has been no 

allegation of any causal connection between any specific actions 

 of [Marcel] and [the] alleged loss, damage, or injury of 

plaintiffs." 

 On May 31, 1994, the trial court sustained the demurrer and 
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dismissed the action. The plaintiffs appeal. 

 The facts are those alleged in the amended motion for 

judgment, which are summarized as follows. Pursuant to separate 

rental agreements, the plaintiffs became co-tenants of a town 

house owned by Marcel. Soon thereafter, Marcel began to solicit 

Johnson's advice and involvement in prospective business 

ventures, but Johnson rebuffed Marcel's efforts to develop a 

business relationship. On November 6, 1993, Marcel demanded that 

Johnson vacate the town house. Johnson, however, had prepaid 

rent through December 20, 1993, and refused to vacate the 

premises. Marcel then sought to enlist assistance from Brennan 

to evict Johnson, but Brennan declined. On November 13, 1993, 

Marcel demanded that Brennan vacate the premises within 24 hours. 

 On November 15, 1993, the plaintiffs sought the court's 

protection from Marcel's continued harassment and efforts to 

evict them. The next day, the temporary injunction order was 

served on Marcel. 

 Despite the issuance of the injunction, Marcel continued to 

harass the plaintiffs. She telephoned them at home and at work. 

 She changed the locks on the town house garage, and she entered 

the town house without the plaintiffs' permission. She called 

Johnson's father in North Carolina and repeatedly told him that 

Johnson was "crazy." 

 On November 18, 1993, about midnight, Marcel pulled the 

plaintiffs' downstairs telephone out of the wall socket. Also 
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that night, she blocked the plaintiffs' driveway and made 

excessive noise by screaming, banging on doors, and threatening 

Johnson with arrest. 

 As a result of Marcel's actions, the plaintiffs, fearful for 

their physical and mental well-being, were forced to vacate the 

premises before their leases expired. Consequently, they went 

into hiding and lost their security deposits and prepaid rents. 

They also incurred expenses for temporary housing. 

 The plaintiffs contend that their allegations in the amended 

motion for judgment state a claim of common law trespass. They 

also contend that, because the trespass was deliberate and 

accompanied by aggravating circumstances, they may claim damages 

for emotional distress. We agree. 

 Although Marcel owned the premises, the plaintiffs, as 

tenants, had the right of possession. See Hannan v. Dusch, 154 

Va. 356, 360, 153 S.E. 824, 825 (1930). Therefore, under the 

circumstances of the present case, Marcel had no right to enter 

the premises without the plaintiffs' consent. 

 According to the allegations in the amended motion for 

judgment, however, Marcel entered the premises without the 

plaintiffs' consent. Despite the injunction, she also changed 

the locks on the plaintiffs' garage, ripped the downstairs 

telephone out of the wall socket, blocked the plaintiffs' 

driveway, and continually threatened, abused, intimidated, and 

harassed the plaintiffs. We think these allegations state a 
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claim of common law trespass. 

 We also think the plaintiffs may claim damages for emotional 

distress. Where, as here, the alleged trespass is deliberate and 

accompanied by aggravating circumstances, damages for emotional 

distress may be recoverable in the absence of physical injury. 

Peshine v. Shepperson, 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 472, 486 (1867); see

Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 354, 297 S.E.2d 

647, 653 (1982). 

 We hold, therefore, that the amended motion for judgment 

states a cause of action for deliberate trespass and that the 

trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer.*T Accordingly, the 

trial court's judgment will be reversed and the case will be 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded. 

 

 *

We reject the plaintiffs' other contentions. We conclude 

that the amended motion for judgment does not state causes of 

action for a private nuisance, for a "generalized intentional 

tort," or for recovery under the Virginia Residential Landlord 

and Tenant Act, Code § 55-248.2 et seq.