alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
|   | Exhibit 34.3 |
|--------|--------------|

 

**Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

 

We have examined management’s assertion, included in the accompanying Management’s Assessment of Compliance with Regulation AB Servicing Criteria, that Great Lakes Educational Loan Services, Inc. (the “Company”) complied with the servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122 (d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation AB for the Company’s student loan servicing platform (the “Platform”) as of and for the year ended December 31, 2008, except for 1122(d)(1)(iii)-(iv), 1122 (d)(2)(ii)-(iv), 1122(d)(3)(i)-(iv), 1122(d)(4)(i), 1122 (d)(4)(iii), and 1122(d)(4)(x)-(xiii), which the Company has determined are not applicable to the activities performed by them with respect to the servicing platform covered by this report.  Management is responsible for the Company’s compliance with those servicing criteria.  Our responsibility is to express an opinion onmanagement’s assertion about the Company’s compliance with the servicing criteria based on our examination. 

 

Our examination was conducted in accordance with the attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, as adopted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.  Our examination included testing of less than all of the individual asset backed transactions and securities that comprise the platform, testing of less than all of the servicing activities related to the Platform, and determining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and performed those selected activities in compliance with the servicing criteria.  Furthermore, our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and servicing activitiesperformed by the Company during the period covered by this report.  Our procedures were not designed to determine whether errors may have occurred either prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during the period covered by this report for the selected transactions or any other transactions.  We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a legal determination on the Company’s compliance with the servicing criteria. 

 

In our opinion, management’s assertion that the Company complied with the aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for the year ended December 31, 2008, for the Company’s student loan servicing platform is fairly stated, in all material respects. 

 

/s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP

 

February 7, 2009
### Areal geology of the Placerville quadrangle, San Miguel County, Colorado

By: Alfred Lerner BushC. S. BromfieldCharles Thomas Pierson

                            https://doi.org/10.3133/b1072E

#### Links

- More information:  **National Geologic Map Database Index Page**                            (html)
-                                                                                                                             Document:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  **Report**                                                                                                     (7524 pdf)                                                                                                                                     
- Plates:                               - **Plate 4**                            (5512 pdf)                        
  - **Plate 5**                            (232 pdf)                        
  - **Plate 8**                            (357 pdf) 
- Download citation as:  RIS                         |                         Dublin                            Core

#### Abstract

Part or all of this report is presented in Portable Document Format                        (PDF). For best results viewing and printing PDF documents, it is recommended that you download                        the documents to your computer and open them with Adobe Reader. PDF documents opened from your                        browser may not display or print as intended. Download the latest version of Adobe Reader, free of charge. More information                        about viewing, downloading, and printing report files can be found at the common download problems FAQ.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 21, 2011

t0914 

# Order

September 21, 2011

143043

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 143043 COA: 295863 Wayne CC: 09-019100-FC LEKISHA DANIELLE HINES, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the applicati on for leave to appeal the March 15, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.
**Exhibit 32
** **

**CERTIFICATION**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002**

 

I, Marc Angell, Principal Executive Officerand Principal Financial Officer of Music of Your Life, Inc. (the “Company”) certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed the annual report on Form10-K of the Company;

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual reportdoes not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisannual report; and

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements,and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of, and for, the period presented in this annual report.

 

Date: September 15, 2015

 

/s/ Marc Angell	

Marc Angell

Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer**
August 14, 2000


Mr. John Spielberger
Chief Executive Officer
Information Technology Services, Inc.
20 Precision Drive
Shirley, NY 11967

Dear Mr. Belleau:

IBM Credit  Corporation  ("IBM Credit")  reviews your financial  statements on a
regular basis. Our review of the financial  statement for the quarter ended June
30, 2000 indicated that Information  Technology  Services,  Inc. ("ITS") did not
meet  certain  of its  financial  covenants  set  forth in  Attachment  A to the
Inventory and Working Capital Financing Agreement.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

Covenant                            Covenant Requirement               Covenant Actual
--------                            --------------------               ---------------

<S>                                 <C>                                         <C>
(a) Revenue on an Annual Basis      Greater than Zero and
     to Working Capital             Equal to or less than 15.0:1.0              4.68:1.0

(b) Net Profit after Tax            Equal to or
     to Revenue                     Greater than -$500,000.00               -$530,000.00

(c) Total Liabilities to            Greater than Zero and
     Tangible Net Worth             Equal to or Less than 3.0:1.0               1.55:1.0
</TABLE>

IBM Credit  hereby waives these  defaults for the fiscal  quarter ended June 30,
2000 to the extent set forth above. IBM Credit expects ITS to strictly adhere to
the provisions of the financing program agreement and to perform its obligations
thereunder  accordingly.  Nothing  herein shall obligate IBM Credit to waive any
other  default  now or in the future.  If IBM Credit  decides to waive any other
default,  it may require changes to the financing program  agreement  including,
but not limited to,  increasing the finance  charges and fees IBM Credit charges
ITS  and/or  charge  a  waiver  fee in  exchange  for our  agreement  (i) not to
terminate the financial  accommodations  that IBM Credit extends to ITS and (ii)
not to exercise  any and all of IBM  Credit's  other  rights and remedies it may
have under the terms of its financing program agreement with ITS and by law. Any
forbearance  or delay by IBM Credit in exercising  its rights  against ITS, does
not constitute a waiver by IBM Credit or any rights and remedies available to it
or constitute an agreement to continue to forbear or delay in exercising  any of
its rights or remedies.

Please  contact me at (800)  678-6900 if you have any  questions  or you wish to
discuss further.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stephen A. Nichols
Stephen A. Nichols
Region Credit Manager
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-11363

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CRYSTAL COMPTON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:16-CV-1855

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Crystal Compton, federal prisoner # 28755-177, moves for a certificate of 

appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s order transferring her 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 motion to this court as an unauthorized successive § 2255 

motion. The district court’s transfer order is an appealable collateral order 

over which this court has jurisdiction. In re Bradford, 660 F.3d 226, 228-29 

(5th Cir. 2011). However, because such a transfer order is completely separate 

from the merits of the action, it is not a final order within the meaning of 28 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 2, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-11363 Document: 00514099694 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/02/2017
No. 16-11363

2

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B), and a COA is not required. See United States v. Fulton, 

780 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir. 2015). Therefore, Compton’s request for a COA is 

denied as unnecessary. See id.

On appeal, Compton reasserts the claims raised in her § 2255 motion

and raises numerous issues for the first time on appeal. She does not identify 

any error in the district court’s order transferring her motion to this court as 

an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion. When an appellant fails to make 

any argument challenging the district court’s ruling, it “is the same as if he 

had not appealed that judgment.” Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff 

Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). By not identifying any error in the 

district court’s order, Compton has abandoned the only issue before this court. 

See Brinkmann, 813 F.2d at 748. Because Compton’s § 2255 motion was 

indeed successive and filed without our authorization, the district court did not 

err in transferring it for lack of jurisdiction.1 See Fulton, 780 F.3d at 686, 689.

MOTION FOR COA DENIED AS UNNECESSARY; AFFIRMED.

 

1 In a previous case, we denied her request for permission to file a successive habeas 

petition. In re Compton, No. 16-10968 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2016).

 Case: 16-11363 Document: 00514099694 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/02/2017
From: 1943rah@gmail.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 1:20:20 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Bob Hammill

Davenport, IA 52806
From: shelliewee@yahoo.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 3:48:43 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Shellie Deckard

Garfield, AR 72732
IV 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. RES. 279 

Congratulating East New York Transit Technical High School of Brooklyn, 

New York, on winning the 2006–2007 PSAL New York City Boys 

Basketball Championship. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 27, 2007 

Mr. TOWNS submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Education and Labor 

RESOLUTION 

Congratulating East New York Transit Technical High 

School of Brooklyn, New York, on winning the 2006– 

2007 PSAL New York City Boys Basketball Championship. 

Whereas East New York Transit Technical High School of 

Brooklyn, New York, defeated Thomas Edison High 

School of Queens, New York, by a score of 52–46 to win 

the 2006–2007 PSAL New York City Boys Basketball 

Championship; and 

Whereas this is the second time in the school’s history that 

East New York Transit Technical High School has made 

it to the State playoffs, the last time being in 1993: Now, 

therefore, be it 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

•HRES 279 IH 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives con2 gratulates Mr. Larry Kalvar, the principal of East New 

3 York Transit Technical High School, Mr. Michael 

4 Perazzo, the head coach of East New York Transit Tech5 nical High School, and the East New York Transit Tech6 nical High School boys basketball team upon winning the 

7 2006–2007 PSAL New York City Boys Basketball Cham8 pionship. 

Æ 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
THE ATTBRNEY GENERAL 

OFTEXAS 

Hon. 0. N. Humphreys, Jr. 

Administrator, Texas 

Opinion No. H-l 

Alcoholic Beverage Commission Re: Whether the provisions 

Sam Houston State Office Bldg. of Article 666-17(2) 

Austin, Texas 78711 b& V;;;;;'E,;;n;; 

PackAge Stores that 

were in existence 

prior to its effective 

Dear Mr. Humphreys: date? 

Article 666-17(2)(a), Vernon's Penal Code, as amended 

In 1951, provides: 

"Where a major,ity of the ownership in 

each of more than one '(1) legal entity, holding 

Package Store Permits under this Act, is 

owned by one (1) person, or by persons related 

within the first degree of consanguinity, the 

businesses thereof may be consolidated under 

one (1) legal entity and the permits shall be 

issued to such entity notwithstanding any 

other provision of this Act and further provided that after such consolidation it shall 

be illegal to transfer any of such permits 

to any other county." 

Your request for an opinion asks whether this provision 

applies only to those Package Store Permits that were in exiStence on its effective date. 

You advise that the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission 

has permitted consolidation since the effective date of the 

original enactment of the provision in 1949. 

Except for the use of "is owned" instead of "shall be 

owned' or some similar Ilanguage, we see nothing in the 

statute to indicate an intention .that It be limited to those 

Package Store Permits 4n effect at the date of ,i,ts enactment. 

-6334- 
Hon. 0. N. Humphreys, Jr., page 2 (H-1) 

Since, in 1951 and thereafter prior to the amendment of 

the Texas Liquor Control Act by Acts 1971, 62nd Legislature, 

R.S. Ch. 65, p.681, all permits automatically expired on 

August 31 of each year, such a restricted construction 

would render the statute virtually meaningless. 

Generally a statute is held to operate prospectively 

unless a contrary construction is required by its plain and 

unequivocal language. Article 1, Section 16, Constitution 

of the State of Texas; Life Insurance Co. v. Rey 50 Tex. 511 

(1878); Cox v. Robleon 105 Tex. 42b 150 S W 1149(1912). 

Interestingly this rule is stated s~ecificaliy in the Code 

Construction Act, Art. 51129b-2, V.A.C.S., Section 3.02. 

Finally, the construction placed upon the Act by the 

Commission is entitled to considerable weight. 

We therefore conclude that the "consolidation" provision of Article 666-17(2)(a) i s not limited to Package 

Store Permits in existence on its effective date and we 

answer your question in the negative. 

-SUMMARYArticle 666-17(2)(a), Vernon's Texas Penal 

Code, which provides for consolidation of entities 

holding Package Store Permits into one (1) entity 

under certain conditions, is prospective in application and is not limited to those entities holding 

Package Store Permits at the time of its effective 

date. 

*rs very truly, 

APPROVED: 

Attorney General of Texas 

bAVID M KENDALL Chairman 

Opinion'C!ommitte& 

-6:j35-
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20

- 7319

DARRELL L. GOSS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. BRYAN P. STIRLING; WARDEN RICHARD COTHRAN; WARDEN J. DEAN; MAJOR R. CHVALA; CAPTAIN L. PACK; CAPTAIN STAGGERS; LIEUTENANT LARRY; ASSOCIATE WARDEN G. LEAMAN; WARDEN JOHN R. PATE; VIRGINIA GRUBBS, Postal Director; D. PHILLIPS, Assistant Postal Director; L. MORRIS, Major for Allendale; ASSOCIATE WARDEN ROBERTSON; MR. JENKINS, Captain for Allendale; ASSOCIATE WARDEN GLIDEWELL; CHARLES WILLIAMS, Warden for McCormick; MAJOR MARSHALL , Defendants

- Appellees , and CINDY BEER,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Rock Hill

. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. ( 0:18

- cv - 00326

- BHH )

Submitted : September 13, 2021 Decided: September 24, 2021

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges , and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge

.2 Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Darrell L. Goss , Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM:
Darrell L. Goss appeals from the district court’s entry of final judgment in his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action, challenging the magistrate judge’s December 17, 2019, order denying his motion for sanctions and the district court’s August 2 5 , 2020, judgment adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting summary judg ment to Defendants other than Cindy Beer , whose motion to dismiss was granted with prejudice

. Goss did not file objections to the magistrate judge’s December 17 ruling denying
his motion for sanctions with the district court and has not provided on appeal any reason
to excuse his failure to do so

. Goss has thus waived his right to review of the magistrate judge’s ruling , and we affirm it

. Kitlinski v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 994 F.3 d 224 , 233 (4th Cir . 2021) ; see Arakas v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin. , 983 F.3d 83, 104

- 05 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining circumstances in which this court may exercise discretion to excuse waiver). We also have reviewed the record and find no reversible error in the district

cou rt’s August 2 5 ruling . We thus affirm that ruling for the reasons stated by the district

court. Goss v. Stirling , No. 0:18

- cv - 00326

- BHH (D.S.C. Aug. 2 1 , 2020) , ECF No. 257

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequ ately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.
AFFIRMED