In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 98-3685

ROBINSON ENGINEERING COMPANY, LTD. PENSION

PLAN AND TRUST and R. W. ROBINSON & ASSOCIATES

COMPANY PROFIT SHARING PLAN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

MARK G. GEORGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 88 C 1071--Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.

Argued December 2, 1999--Decided August 3, 2000

 Before Ripple, Kanne, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit

Judges.

 Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge. Robinson

Engineering Co. Ltd. Pension Plan and Trust

(Robinson) filed suit against Mark George

(George) alleging that George defrauded Robinson

out of nearly $1,000,000. Robinson claims that it

eventually served George at his residence in

Canada. George never showed up in the district

court, however, and the court in due course

entered a default judgment in Robinson’s favor.

Ten years later, asserting that he had never been

served, that he had only recently discovered the

existence of the judgment, and that the district

court had never properly acquired personal

jurisdiction over him, George filed a motion

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b)(4) to

vacate the default judgment. The court denied

George’s motion. For the reasons stated below, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I

 This case began more than ten years ago. On

February 5, 1988, Robinson filed a complaint

alleging that George, Timothy McDonald, and Canam

Financial Group, Ltd. had defrauded Robinson out

of nearly $1,000,000 through violations of the

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (RICO), 18
U.S.C. sec.sec. 1961-68, Section 12 of the

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. sec. 77l, and

Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934, 18 U.S.C. sec. 78j(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17

C.F.R. 240.10b-5. Robinson also alleged

supplemental state law claims for rescission and

fraud. The court issued a summons for George with

a service address of 400 E. Randolph Street,

Suite 1622, Chicago, Illinois.

 No one served George on Randolph Street, but

Robinson got wind of the fact that he could be

found in Canada, and so it took steps to locate

him there. On June 29, 1988, Robinson filed a

return of service indicating that Canadian

process server Jim Bangs had served George. (We

note that this was not a timely filing under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 4(g),which requires that proof of

service must be made "promptly" and "in any event

within the time during which the person served

must respond to the process." According to

Bangs’s affidavit, he accomplished service on May

12, 1988. The summons states that George had to

respond within 20 days, which would have been

June 1, 1988, as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6.

Proof of service, however, was not filed with the

court until June 29, 1988, and was docketed June

30. Because we have decided this case on other

grounds, we need not resolve whether George may

complain about this defect now.) The return of

service was supported by an affidavit from Bangs

indicating that service of process had been made

by leaving the summons and complaint with an

individual residing at George’s abode in Calgary,

in the Canadian province of Alberta.

 The details of that alleged service reveal why

George has brought the present action. Bangs

reported that he first determined that George and

McDonald resided in apartment 806 of a

condominium development in Calgary. On May 4,

1988, he observed that George’s automobile was

parked in the basement of the condominium

building. By speaking with the condominium

development management, Bangs confirmed that

George lived in apartment 806. Bangs then

arranged with the inspection service coordinator

of the development’s property management company

to serve a notice to inspect McDonald and

George’s apartment. On the morning of May 12,

1988, Bangs and the inspector went to the

apartment and the inspector knocked on the door.

When there was no answer, the inspector opened

the door to the apartment and entered to conduct

his inspection. Bangs remained in the hallway.

 Bangs then saw a man whom the inspector

identified as one of the apartment’s tenants.

Although it is clear that Bangs remained in the

hallway and did not enter the apartment, it is
unclear from the affidavit if the man emerged

from the apartment, was about to enter the

apartment, or merely passed Bangs in the hallway.

When Bangs asked the man if he was McDonald or

George, the man responded he was neither. Bangs

nonetheless thought that the man fit McDonald’s

physical description; he consequently served the

man with a copy of the summons. The inspector

told Bangs that after the man was served he

became engrossed in the contents of the summons,

flipping from page to page. The affidavit closes

with Bangs’s statement that he believes that the

summons and complaint were brought to George’s

attention. 

 On July 25, 1988, the district court entered a

minute order of default judgment in favor of

Robinson and scheduled a prove-up hearing for

August 4, 1988. After the prove-up hearing, the

court entered a default judgment in favor of

Robinson for $959,198 plus costs. The three

defendants were held jointly and severally

liable. 

 Ten years later, on March 18, 1998, George

alone moved to vacate the default judgment

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c) and 60(b)(4).

George alleged that the default judgment was void

for lack of proper service under Fed. R. Civ. P.

4. The motion was supported by two documents: an

affidavit from George and a purported affidavit

from McDonald. The document from McDonald is so

irregular, however, that we refrain here from

calling it an affidavit. The county and state are

not indicated; there is no notary seal; the

"notary" did not print or type his or her name or

give a commission number; and the "notary"

alleged that the commission was good for life.

Florida, at least (the state where George’s

affidavit was signed), would regard this as a

nonconforming affidavit. See Fla. Stat. sec.sec.

117.01(1), 117.05. George’s affidavit, which does

not suffer from these flaws, indicates that he

was never served with the summons and did not

become aware of the default judgment until late

1997. The supposed statement from McDonald states

that he was never served and that at the time

service was purportedly made, he did not fit the

description attributed to him by Bangs. George

also filed a supplemental affidavit indicating

that he and McDonald were the only residents of

the apartment, including during the period when

Bangs attempted service. On August 10, 1998, the

court entered an order denying the motion to

vacate the default judgment and George

subsequently filed this appeal.

II

 The abuse of discretion standard of review
governs both our consideration of the district

court’s entry of default and default judgment,

Merrill Lynch Mortgage Corp. v. Narayan, 908 F.2d

246, 250 (7th Cir. 1990), and our review of its

disposition of George’s motion to vacate or set

aside those rulings, id. "A judgment is void for

the purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) if the court that

rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject

matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a

manner inconsistent with due process of law."

United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equipment

From High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d

1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations

and citations omitted). And "[i]f the underlying

judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of

discretion for a district court to deny a

movant’s motion to vacate the judgment under Rule

60(b)(4)." Id. at 1317. See also Gulf Coast Fans,

Inc. v. Midwest Electronics Importers, Inc., 740

F.2d 1499, 1511 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding trial

court abused its discretion in refusing to set

aside default judgment where questions as to

personal jurisdiction remained). 

 George raises two alternative arguments for why

service of process was defective: first, service

was not proper, because abode service was not

allowed under the then-applicable version of Rule

4; second, even if abode service was proper,

Robinson failed to meet the requirements of that

rule. Rule 4 was amended effective December 1,

1993. Service of process, however, is governed by

the version of Rule 4 in effect at the time

service was attempted. See Manufacturers Hanover

Trust Co. v. Ponsoldt, 51 F.3d 938, 938 n.1 (11th

Cir. 1995). We must therefore apply the 1988

version of the rule to this case, to which we

refer as Rule 4 (1988).

 Under Rule 4 (1988), the ordinary territorial

limits of effective service were defined to be

"anywhere within the territorial limits of the

state in which the district court is held, and,

when authorized by a statute of the United States

or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits

of that state." Rule 4(f) (1988) (emphasis

added). The rule identified two situations in

which service might occur upon a party who was

not an inhabitant of or found within the state.

The first appeared in Rule 4(e) (1988), which

authorized such service whenever either a statute

of the United States or a statute or rule of

court of the state where the court was sitting

did so. The manner of service was to follow

either the relevant United States statute or

state statute, or for those relying on federal

statutes, "if there is no provision therein

prescribing the manner of service, in a manner

stated in this rule." Id. Rule 4(b) and (c)

(1988) set forth the manner of service and the
persons who could be served for ordinary cases.

Recognizing, however, that service in foreign

countries presented additional complications, the

rule also included special "Alternative

Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country."

Rule 4(i) (1988).

 Rule 4(e) is primarily concerned with the

individual’s amenability to the court’s power,

rather than the particular method of service that

may be used. See David D. Siegel, Practice

Commentaries, C4-25 (contained in 28 U.S.C.A.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rules 1-11

(1992)). In order to determine whether George was

amenable to the Illinois federal court’s power in

1988, we must first determine if the federal

statutes at issue provide for service in a

foreign country. Neither party addressed this

question; instead, everyone jumped immediately to

the question of the proper method(s) of service.

All of the federal statutes at issue here

authorize nationwide service of process,/1 but

not all of them authorize service in a foreign

country. Compare Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d

455, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding RICO

statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 1965(b), authorizes

nationwide but not international service of

process and stating plaintiff must rely on state

long-arm statute for authorization to serve outof-country defendant), with Robinson v. Penn

Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 554 (3d Cir. 1973)

(noting service of process provisions of

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. sec. 77v(a),

and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.

sec. 78aa, authorize worldwide service of process

by stating service is proper "wherever the

defendant may be found"); see also Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure sec. 1133

at 367 n.9 (1987); Advisory Committee Notes to

1963 Amendment to Rule 4 (listing Securities Act

and Securities Exchange Act as examples of

statutes that permit service outside the United

States).

 Following these authorities, we conclude that

service in Canada was authorized at least for the

claims under the Securities Act and the

Securities Exchange Act. What of the other

claims? The RICO claim arises out of the same

nucleus of operative fact as the securities

claims; it was therefore proper for the federal

court to assert personal jurisdiction over George

for it as well, under the idea of pendent

personal jurisdiction. IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund

v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1993)

(applying doctrine of pendent personal

jurisdiction to assert personal jurisdiction over

related state law claims); Robinson, 484 F.2d at

555-56 (holding it was proper for district court

to entertain pendent state law claims where
federal claims provided for extraterritorial

service). The supplemental state common law fraud

and rescission claims are somewhat more complex.

Under the Federal Rules as they stood in 1988 it

was unclear if the nationwide service provided

for in a federal statute could be used to gain

personal jurisdiction over the defendant for a

state law claim as well. (This was obviously only

a problem if the state’s long-arm statute would

not have provided for jurisdiction; otherwise

there would be an independent and uncontroversial

basis for personal jurisdiction over the state

claims.) See Siegel, Practice Commentaries at C4-

26 (explaining ambiguity and citing In re Penn

Central Securities, 338 F.Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa.

1972), aff’d, 484 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1973), as

supporting "pendent personal jurisdiction"). In

our view, the same logic that lies behind the

supplemental jurisdiction statute for purposes of

subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1367,

supports the application of supplemental personal

jurisdiction over claims that are properly before

the court under sec. 1367. As far as United

States law is concerned, George was amenable to

the jurisdiction of the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois. We

pause to note, however, that a foreign country

may or may not agree with the American theory of

the reach of the personal jurisdiction of the

United States court, and that its view could

easily affect the enforceability of the ultimate

United States judgment in its own courts./2

 We turn then to the method of service that was

used. The first question is which law or laws

provided the authorized methods available to the

court; next, we must consider whether the method

used for George complied with that law. There are

three possibilities: Illinois state law, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or Canadian law

(which in this case would be the provincial law

of Alberta, Alberta Rules of Court, Alberta

Regulation 390/68). George thinks that Rule 4(e)

(1988) requires the exclusive use of state (here,

Illinois) methods of service when a federal court

is effecting service beyond the territorial

limits of the state in which it is sitting. This

is not, however, what the rule says. The first

sentence of Rule 4(e) (1988) provides:

Whenever a statute of the United States or an

order of court thereunder provides for service of

a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu

of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or

found within the state in which the district

court is held, service may be made under the

circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the

statute or order, or, if there is no provision

therein prescribing the manner of service, in a

manner stated in this rule. (Emphasis added.) 
As none of the federal statutes at issue here

prescribe a method of service, the methods of

service laid out in the rest of Rule 4 (1988) are

proper. See Wright & Miller, sec. 1117 at 267

("In the event that the [federal] statute does

not set forth a method for serving process,

service will be made under the appropriate

subdivision of Rule 4."); Siegel, Practice

Commentaries at C4-30 ("Absent a prescribed

method in the federal statute, the regular Rule

4 methods govern."); Advisory Committee Notes to

1963 Amendment ("The clause added at the end of

the first sentence [of section (e)] expressly

adopts the view taken by commentators that, if no

manner of service is prescribed in the statute or

order, the service may be made in a manner stated

in Rule 4.").

 Rule 4(i) (1988) provides supplemental means of

service to be used when the person to be served

is in a foreign country: "When the federal or

state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this

rule authorizes service upon a party not an

inhabitant of or found within the state in which

the district court is held, and service is to be

effected upon the party in a foreign country, it

is also sufficient if service of the summons and

complaint is made . . . [using the methods there

specified]." (Emphasis added.) See also Wright &

Miller, sec. 1133 at 369. The rule was designed

to deal with difficulties that may not be

encountered in purely domestic litigation and to

accommodate the judicial policies and procedures

of foreign countries. See Advisory Committee

Notes to 1963 Amendment. By allowing use of these

other means of service, Rule 4(i) (1988) and its

current counterpart, Rule 4(f), also help

plaintiffs to ensure that any eventual judgment

will be enforceable in the foreign jurisdiction.

See Wright & Miller, sec. 1133. It neither

requires use of the foreign jurisdiction’s

methods of service nor forbids use of the federal

rules.

 The net result for George’s case is that Rule

4(d)(1) (1988) was one proper method of service.

That rule authorizes service on an individual

either by personal delivery of a copy of the

summons and complaint, or "by leaving copies

thereof at the individual’s dwelling house or

usual place of abode with some person of suitable

age and discretion then residing therein," or by

delivering a copy of the summons and of the

complaint to an authorized agent. Both parties

agree that George resided in Apartment 806 of the

condominium complex in Calgary. What is unclear

is whether Bangs left the summons and complaint

with "some person of suitable age and discretion

then residing therein"--namely, McDonald, who

everyone agrees also resided there.
Unfortunately, the evidence on that point is

murky at best. 

 Bangs’s affidavit provides little information

regarding the precise circumstances under which

he served the summons. Most importantly, there is

almost nothing to suggest that Bangs was

reasonable in believing that the man he served

resided in Apartment 806 or was McDonald. (Bangs

himself did not think it was George, nor is there

any other evidence supporting that possibility.)

Bangs’s affidavit is silent as to whether the man

was exiting the apartment when served, entering

the apartment, or just passing by in the hallway.

Other sections of the affidavit do more to

undercut Bangs’s identification of the man than

to confirm it. When Bangs asked the man if he was

McDonald or George, the man responded "No."

Nothing in the affidavit or the record indicates

that the man had any reason to suspect that Bangs

was a process server and therefore lied to avoid

being served. Moreover, Bangs describes the man

as "5 foot 8 inches tall, dark thin balding hair,

slight beard growth." For what it is worth, this

description does not match McDonald’s description

of himself at that time (two inches taller, with

red hair and a full red beard) in the document he

furnished to the court. (Despite the deficiencies

of that document, the district court did not say

that it was refusing to rely upon it.) Finally,

Bangs’s affidavit gives only the inspector’s

statement that the man was a tenant of the

apartment as a basis for Bangs’s belief that the

man resided there. The inspector’s statement,

however, is hearsay, and it is not corroborated

by any other facts provided in the affidavit.

Even if hearsay statements may appear in

affidavits, but see Wilson v. Stinnett, 96 B.R.

301, 303 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (refusing to

consider affidavit stating service was mailed

because it was inadmissible hearsay), courts look

at the presence of hearsay in determining how to

weigh the evidence contained in contradictory

affidavits. See United States v. Watkins, 168

F.2d 883, 885 (2d Cir. 1948) (holding proof of

court’s jurisdiction over defendant insufficient

when based solely on hearsay statements regarding

person’s residence); Computerland Corp. v. Batac,

Inc., 1989 WL 47294, *3 (S.D.N.Y.) (discounting

affidavit based upon hearsay assertions).

Robinson provides no evidence to suggest that

Bangs reasonably relied on the inspector’s

statement. It might have been possible to secure

an affidavit from the inspector swearing that he

witnessed Bangs give the documents to a resident

of the apartment, or better yet to McDonald.

Robinson might have obtained a photograph of

McDonald and obtained Bangs’s affidavit that this

was the person he served, assuming that was true.

Bangs could have waited to see if the person
served was in fact a resident of Apartment 806.

None of these things happened.

 Unfortunately, the district court did not

explain why it chose to overlook these problems.

In the initial entry of judgment, the district

court concluded that McDonald and George were

served and that "the service of process . . . is

proper and sufficient under Rule 4 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure." No reasons for that

conclusion appear in the order. This does not

necessarily mean that the court’s initial

decision to enter the default judgment in 1988

was wrong, given the fact that personal

jurisdiction is sometimes tested in an

adversarial proceeding only after the entry of

such a judgment. See Venable v. Haislip, 721 F.2d

297, 300 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding evidentiary

hearing regarding whether service was proper

where court failed to determine if person who

received summons was authorized to accept service

for defendant); Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410,

413 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1955) (holding requirements

of abode service not met where person who

received summons was not a resident of the

defendant’s house); Hasenfus v. Corporate Air

Services, 700 F.Supp. 58, 65-66 (D. D.C. 1988)

(holding no proper abode service where summons

left with someone believed to be a resident but

who in fact was not); Scheerger v. Wiencek, 34

F.Supp. 805 (W.D. N.Y. 1940) (holding service

insufficient where marshal’s affidavit did not

state where service was made or that person

served was "of suitable age and discretion"). By

the time the motion to set aside the default had

been filed, however, the court had even more

information, through George’s own affidavit and

McDonald’s statement (despite its technical

deficiencies, which may have been curable). Taken

together, the glaring holes in Bangs’s original

affidavit and the additional information

furnished by George and McDonald cast serious

doubt on the question whether George was ever

properly served. 

 In denying the motion to vacate the default

judgment, the court decided that the requirements

of Rule 4 (1988) were met because: (1) it found

Bangs’s account of service to be credible, (2)

its independent investigation led it to believe

that McDonald and George had reason to evade

service, and (3) it found George’s affidavits to

be self-serving. There are several problems with

this analysis. First, the court misconstrued

Bangs’s affidavit: the court somehow came to the

conclusion that Bangs said that the man was

standing "in" Apartment 806, whereas the

affidavit actually says "I remained in the

hallway and saw a white male. . . ." Second, the

court’s assumption that George was evading
service is not supported by any evidence in the

record. From the record, it appears that after

Robinson determined that George had moved to

Canada, only one attempt at service was made.

Robinson contends that this case is similar to

those where the plaintiffs have made multiple

attempts of service and were rebuffed at every

turn. Cf. Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 721

(7th Cir. 1996); Matter of State Exchange Finance

Co., 896 F.2d 1104, 1105-06 (7th Cir. 1990).

Counsel for Robinson explained at oral argument

that they in fact have made several attempts over

the past years to find George and have found him

exceedingly difficult to pin down. That may be

so, but Robinson did not support this position

with evidence before the district court either in

1988 or in 1998. Without such evidence, the court

had no basis for determining whether George has

in fact evaded service and enforcement of pending

judgments. Third, the district court based its

refusal to disturb the default judgment on

several cases where the complaint and summons

were left with cooks, doormen, and other personal

service providers. See, e.g., The Stars’ Desert

Inn Hotel & Country Club, Inc. v. Hwang, 105 F.3d

521, 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1997); National

Development Co. v. Triad Holding Corp., 930 F.2d

253 (2d Cir. 1991); Home-Stake Production Co. v.

Talon Petroleum, C.A., 907 F.2d 1012 (1990). None

of these cases is on point, however, because in

each of those situations it was clear that the

person who received the complaint and summons had

some relationship to the person for whom service

was intended and some duty to pass along mail and

other documents to that person.

 In this case, the evidence does not show who

the person Bangs served was. It might have been

McDonald, but it equally might have been a third

(unidentified) resident of the apartment, a

guest, or a passerby. This is not enough to

support a finding of proper service in a default

judgment situation. Cf. Precision Etchings &

Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21 (1st

Cir. 1992) (holding process insufficient where

summons was received by another occupant of the

defendant’s apartment building). Were George not

moving to vacate the default judgment as void

(for lack of personal jurisdiction), the fact

that George waited five months after allegedly

learning about the default judgment before filing

his motion to vacate might have provided Robinson

with a means of blocking George’s motion to

vacate the default judgment. See Zuelkzke Tool &

Eng. Co., Inc. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc.,

925 F.2d 226, 229 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The entry of

a default judgment can be vacated under Rule

60(b) if a party shows (1) good cause for its

default; (2) quick action to correct it; and (3)

a meritorious defense."). However, "under F[ed].
R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(4), [George] may attack the

judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the person

at any time since a judgment rendered without

jurisdiction over the person [is] void." Taft v.

Donellan Jerome, Inc., 407 F.2d 807, 808 (7th

Cir. 1969); see also Wright, Miller, and Kane,

sec. 2862 at 324 & n.3. Thus, the fact that

George found out about the judgment in November

1997 but did not file his motion to vacate until

March 1998 is irrelevant. 

 We have two conceivable ways of proceeding from

here. One would be simply to order the district

court to grant George’s motion to set aside the

default judgment and allow further proceedings to

take place; the other would be to remand for an

evidentiary hearing on the adequacy of the 1988

efforts to serve him. This is a close call, but

in the end we have resolved it in favor of the

latter approach for several reasons. First, if

the 1988 service was indeed properly made, then

the judgment the court entered is a proper one

and it may be enforced in the United States (and

perhaps abroad, depending on the view of the

courts where George is located). Second, even now

George has not agreed to waive service or to

submit to the district court’s jurisdiction; we

understand his motion to set aside the default

judgment as nothing more than that: he still

wants the opportunity to contest the court’s

personal jurisdiction over him. He is certainly

entitled to do so, but if there is any way to

avoid starting this old case over from ground

zero, it seems desirable to try to do so. It may

turn out, given the time that has passed since

Robinson attempted to serve George and the

potential difficulty of locating and bringing to

the hearing key witnesses who are citizens of

another country (such as Bangs and Mr. Nauglar,

the inspector present at the time of service),

that the court cannot resolve this issue. In that

case, it may still grant George’s pending motion

(because the burden of showing proper service is

on Robinson) and allow Robinson now to attempt to

perfect service on him. (Although George

obviously has actual notice of the case by now,

that is of course insufficient for service. See

Swaim, 73 F.3d at 719; Mid-Continent Wood

Products, Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th

Cir. 1991); see also Grand Entertainment Group,

Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 492

(3d Cir. 1993) ("Notice to a defendant that he

has been sued does not cure defective service,

and an appearance for the limited purpose of

objecting to service does not waive the

technicalities of the rule governing service. .

. . [A] motion that seeks to vacate an order for

lack of proper service does not waive the defect

in service.").)
 For these reasons, we Reverse the district

court’s denial of George’s Rule 55(c) and 60(b)

motion and Remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. Each party shall

bear its own costs on appeal.

/1 See 18 U.S.C. sec. 1965(d) ("All other process in

any action or proceeding under this chapter may

be served on any person in any judicial district

in which such person resides, is found, has an

agent, or transacts his affairs."); 15 U.S.C.

sec. 77v(a) ("Any such suit or action may be

brought in the district wherein the defendant is

found or is an inhabitant or transacts business,

or in the district where the offer or sale took

place . . . and process in such cases may be

served in any other district of which the

defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the

defendant may be found."); 15 U.S.C. sec. 78aa

("Any suit or action to enforce any liability or

duty created by this chapter . . . may be brought

in any such district wherein the defendant is

found or is an inhabitant or transacts business,

and process in such cases may be served in any

other district of which the defendant is an

inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be

found."). 

/2 It is also worth noting that both the United

States and Canada are parties to the Convention

on the Service Abroad of Judicial and

Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial

Matters. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 notes. In the

cases to which it applies--that is, civil or

commercial cases, where service must actually

take place abroad--the Convention is mandatory.

See Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694,

699 (1988). No one seems to have called the

Convention to the district court’s attention, and

so we express no opinion on the question whether

George has waived his right to object to service

on the ground that the procedures Canada has

specified for service within its territory were

not followed, or the question whether this case

involves the kind of "civil or commercial" matter

to which the Convention applies.