IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30198

In re: JAMES M. LEBLANC, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Public 

Safety and Corrections; BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE 

PENITENTIARY; ANGELA NORWOOD, Warden, Death Row; LOUISIANA 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS,

Petitioners

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus 

to the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:12-CV-796

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Petitioners, Louisiana corrections officials James M. LeBlanc, Burl Cain, 

and Angela Norwood, and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and 

Corrections, seek a writ of mandamus from this Court to vacate the district 

court’s discovery order. Petitioners are defendants in a civil action brought

against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Christopher Sepulvado, a Louisiana 

death-row inmate, along with other Louisiana death-row inmates not parties 

to this writ proceeding (together, “Sepulvado” or “plaintiffs”), who allege

substantial constitutional violations in the manner by which the petitioners 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 27, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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plan to carry out their function of executing death-row inmates and seek 

declarative and injunctive relief therefrom. 

In the course of discovery, with respect to his own execution, Sepulvado 

submitted requests for the production of a number of documents pursuant to 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 34, including a written protocol 

describing the chemical makeup of the lethal drugs and the method which the

petitioners will use to execute him, together with the identity of the drugs’

manufacturers and sources; the entities involved in supplying and testing 

those lethal chemicals; and the healthcare professionals who will be personally 

and directly involved in the process of carrying out the execution. (Dkt. Nos. 

143, 153.) When presented with the request for these documents and 

materials, petitioners objected, claiming that the information sought was 

irrelevant to Sepulvado’s lawsuit. The petitioners, however, do not contend

that the information sought is privileged. The plaintiffs moved, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, for an order compelling discovery. The 

district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge for findings and 

recommendations, and the magistrate judge recommended that the district 

court order production of the data. The district court accepted the magistrate 

judge’s recommendations and ordered the production of the information and 

materials. Seeking to limit distribution of the information, however, the 

district court issued a protective order limiting the number of people associated 

with Sepulvado who could examine the information with respect to the 

individual healthcare providers’ identities. Ultimately, after a series of 

exchanges between the parties, the district court amended its order to provide 

that the disclosure of all of the information described in the court’s March 5, 

2014 order (Dkt. No. 143), “be limited to Plaintiff, Christopher Sepulvado, 

Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff’s experts, and Court personnel.” (Dkt. No. 153.)

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Dissatisfied with the district court’s ruling, petitioners filed a petition 

for a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) requesting that this Court 

vacate the district court’s order granting plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery. 

In an order dated March 12, 2014, we temporarily stayed the district court’s 

order to allow sufficient time to consider the State officials’ petition and 

requested a response from the plaintiff, which Sepulvado provided. 

“The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in 

extraordinary situations.” Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) 

(citing Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. 

Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382-85 (1953); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 

(1947)). As the Supreme Court observed, “the writ has traditionally been used 

in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its 

prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its 

duty to do so.” Id. (citing Will, 389 U.S. at 95) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). And, while courts “have not limited the use of mandamus by an 

unduly narrow and technical understanding of what constitutes a matter of 

‘jurisdiction,’ the fact still remains that ‘only exceptional circumstances 

amounting to a judicial “usurpation of power” will justify the invocation of this 

extraordinary remedy.’” Id. (citation omitted). This is a “drastic and 

extraordinary” remedy “reserved for really extraordinary causes.” Cheney v. 

U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 

332 U.S. at 259-60).

“As the writ is one of the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal, 

three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue. First, the party seeking 

issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he 

desires—a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a 

substitute for the regular appeals process. Second, the petitioner must satisfy 

the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and 

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indisputable.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81 (citations, alterations, and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, a petitioner must show “not only that the 

district court erred, but that it clearly and indisputably erred[.]” Occidental 

Petrol. Corp., 217 F.3d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 2000). “Third, even if the first two 

prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, 

must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” 

Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation 

marks omitted). In general, “if a matter is within the district court’s discretion, 

the litigant’s right to a particular result cannot be ‘clear and indisputable.’” 

Kmart Corp. v. Aronds, 123 F.3d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1997). For that reason, 

interlocutory review of “ordinary discovery orders” is generally “unavailable, 

through mandamus or otherwise.” Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381; see In re United 

States, 878 F.2d 153, 158 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that “generally discovery and 

similar pretrial orders, even erroneous ones, are not reviewable on 

mandamus”). Cf. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110 (2009)

(citing view that “almost all interlocutory appeals from discovery orders would 

end in affirmance” because “the district court possesses discretion, and review 

is deferential”) (quoting Reise v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 957 F.2d 

293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Considering the framework of these factors, the petitioners have not 

shown that they are clearly and indisputably entitled to the extraordinary 

remedy of a writ of mandamus in this case. “The discovery provisions of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow the parties to develop fully and 

crystalize concise factual issues for trial. Properly used, they prevent 

prejudicial surprises and conserve precious judicial energies. The United 

States Supreme Court has said that they are to be broadly and liberally 

construed.” Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973) 

(citing Hickman v. Taylor, 1947, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947), and Schlagenhauf 

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v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964)). “[D]iscovery matters are committed 

almost exclusively to the sound discretion of the trial [j]udge.” Id. Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) sets the scope of discovery broadly, allowing 

parties to obtain discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is 

relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b). In general, 

information is discoverable if it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 

discovery of admissible evidence.” Id.; see, e.g., Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 

1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Discoverable information is not limited to admissible 

evidence.”). The district court may, for good cause, issue a protective order to 

“protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 

undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). “[T]he burden is upon [the 

party seeking the protective order] to show the necessity of its issuance, which 

contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished 

from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d 302, 

306 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). District courts have broad discretion in 

determining whether to grant a motion for a protective order. Harris v. Amoco 

Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir. 1985). “The trial court is in the best 

position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected 

by discovery.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). “Because 

the issue of relevancy in discovery matters is subject to such a broad standard, 

a district court’s decision will rarely be overturned by a petition for 

mandamus.” Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 197 

(9th Cir. 1975), aff’d, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); see Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381 

(interlocutory review of “ordinary discovery orders” is generally “unavailable, 

through mandamus or otherwise”); In re United States, 878 F.2d at 158 (noting 

that “generally discovery and similar pretrial orders, even erroneous ones, are 

not reviewable on mandamus”).

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The petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to mandamus. The 

petitioners received much of the relief they sought in their motion for a 

protective order: the district court directed them to turn over the requested 

information, but prohibited any party from receiving or sharing the 

information other than Sepulvado, his counsel, his approved experts, and court 

personnel. The petitioners have not shown that the district court clearly and 

indisputably abused its discretion in ordering the limited discovery to a 

narrowly circumscribed list of recipients. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81; 

Occidental Petrol., 217 F.3d at 295 (before mandamus may issue, a petitioner 

must show “not only that the district court erred, but that it clearly and 

indisputably erred”). Cf. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 392 F.3d 812, 817 

(5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that we will affirm district court discovery orders 

“unless they are arbitrary or clearly unreasonable”).1 In the exercise of our 

discretion, we are not satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the 

circumstances.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus 

is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary stay of the 

district court’s order is LIFTED.

1 Petitioners’ reliance on In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc), is 

misplaced. The court in In re Lombardi issued the writ because it determined that the 

plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rendering any discovery 

as to those claims irrelevant. See id. at 896. The petitioners here do not challenge 

Sepulvado’s underlying lawsuit; they challenge only the district court’s discretionary 

discovery order.

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