NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RONALD LEE TSOSIE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-10090 

D.C. No. 

3:94-cr-00031-DGC-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 5, 2020**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: GRABER, HURWITZ, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

While on supervised release from a federal conviction, Ronald Tsosie was 

convicted in Arizona state court of attempted sexual assault. After Tsosie completed 

a four-year state sentence, the district court revoked supervised release and imposed 

a 27-month term of imprisonment to be followed by 27 months of supervised release. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 7 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Tsosie challenges that sentence and argues that the district 

court plainly erred in imposing a special condition of supervised release. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

1. Because Tsosie did not argue below that the district court “fail[ed] to

adequately address all of [his] arguments,” we review the sentence for plain error,

United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 805 (9th Cir. 2012), and find none. Tsosie 

has not “show[n] ‘a reasonable probability that he would have received a different 

sentence’” had the district court explicitly considered whether he should receive a 

reduced sentence because he lost the opportunity to serve his state and federal terms 

concurrently. United States v. Hanson, 936 F.3d 876, 884 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2008)). The district court 

emphasized that its sentence served to protect the public from any further crimes 

Tsosie might commit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). It is therefore “highly 

uncertain whether [Tsosie] would have received a lesser sentence.” United States v. 

Christensen, 732 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). 

2. Special Condition 9 of supervised release authorizes the search of 

Tsosie’s electronic devices in the lawful discharge of a probation officer’s 

supervisory functions. Tsosie did not object to this condition below, but now argues 

that the district court plainly erred by failing to “make[] a factual finding establishing 

some nexus between [electronic device] use and one of the goals” of supervised 
3 

release. United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2015). The district 

court did not commit plain error in adopting the probation officer’s justification for 

the condition and finding it reasonably related to Tsosie’s rehabilitation. See United 

States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The supervised release 

conditions need not relate to the offense for which [the defendant] was convicted as 

long as they satisfy any of the conditions set forth [in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1) and 

3553(a)].”). Another special condition, not challenged on appeal, prohibits Tsosie 

from possessing sexually explicit material. Special Condition 9 works in furtherance

of that condition. 

AFFIRMED.