RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2374-21 

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

CIVIL COMMITMENT OF 

R.H., SVP-487-08.

________________________

Submitted April 23, 2024 – Decided May 9, 2024 

Before Judges Enright, Paganelli and Whipple. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Cape May County, Docket No. SVP-487-08. 

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant R.H. (Carol L. Widemon, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent State of New Jersey (Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen J. 

Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2374-21

R.H. appeals from a February 2022 order continuing his civil commitment 

in the Special Treatment Unit (STU), pursuant to the New Jersey Sexually 

Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.1 We affirm. 

We glean the relevant facts and procedural history from the record. In 

1998, R.H. pleaded guilty to the sexual assault of an eight-year-old male and 

was sentenced to seven years in prison. While incarcerated, R.H. pleaded guilty 

to aggravated sexual assault and criminal sexual contact with another male child. 

The second guilty plea encompassed pre-incarceration activity with a child 

between the ages of twelve and fifteen years old that lasted "over a protracted 

period of time." On the second plea, R.H. was sentenced to fourteen years in 

prison. 

After serving his sentences, R.H. was admitted to the STU in April 2008, 

and civilly committed in July 2009. R.H. was discharged in August 2016 after 

his treatment team determined his risk of reoffending "would be sufficiently 

mitigated with an appropriate discharge plan." 

1

 We use initials to refer to R.H. because records pertaining to civil commitment 

proceedings under the SVPA are deemed confidential under N.J.S.A. 30:4-

27.27(c) and are excluded from public access pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(f)(2). 
3 A-2374-21

However, within five months of R.H.'s discharge, his parole officer 

received information from the Linden Police Department that R.H. might have 

been using a Facebook profile—under the alias "BO"—to contact women he 

knew in his childhood. The women reported this activity to the police and

provided screenshots of the Facebook messages. The messages consisted of BO 

attempting to arrange a playdate between the women's children and BO's alleged 

"nephew." Upon further investigation, R.H. admitted to maintaining the 

Facebook account; using the alias BO; and messaging the women to set up 

playdates with their children. A search of R.H.'s phone revealed: (1) he visited 

pornographic websites; (2) "links on his browser history were titled 'rape,' 'boy 

sexually abused,' and 'meet young boys'"; and (3) he "frequented the casual sex 

classifieds on [C]raigslist." R.H.'s activities violated the conditions of his 

discharge, and he was returned to the STU in 2017. 

R.H. filed an application for release from the term of civil commitment. 

In February 2022, the judge conducted a one-day hearing. During the hearing, 

the judge admitted experts' reports and their curriculum vitae into evidence. She 

also heard testimony from the State's witnesses Roger Harris, M.D., an expert 

in the field of forensic psychiatry; and Christine Zavalis, Psy.D., an expert in 

the field of forensic psychology. Dr. Zavalis was a member of R.H.'s treatment 
4 A-2374-21

team.2 The judge also heard testimony from R.H. and Christopher Lorah, Ph.D., 

R.H.'s expert in the field of forensic psychology. 

Dr. Harris opined R.H. "insufficiently progressed in treatment to succeed 

on release." He stated R.H.'s "overall pattern of sexual offending was 

significant." He also noted R.H.'s "inability to control his sexual arousal and 

denial of his offenses." 

The doctor indicated: 

just prior to [R.H.'s] August 2016 discharge from the 

STU, he was utilizing social media during his furloughs 

to engage in high-risk behavior and to reinforce his 

deviant sexual behavior, searching internet sites for 

"rape", "boys sexually abused" and "meet young boys." 

[R.H.] was viewing pornography involving rape and 

sexual abuse. He was also arranging for play dates with 

women and their minor children. He quickly 

demonstrated an inability to self-regulate his deviant 

sexual behaviors. 

Dr. Harris testified R.H. was only addressing issues that returned R.H. to 

the STU in 2017. The doctor noted R.H. scored a five on the Static-99R,3

2

 See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27-3(b). 

3

 "The Static-99R is an actuarial tool, designed to predict the recidivism risk of 

sexual offenses in adult male sex offenders who have been convicted of at least 

one sexual offense." Commonwealth v. George, 477 Mass. 331, 335 n.2 (Mass. 

2017). The Static-99R is a revised version of the Static-99. Ibid.; see also In re 

Civil Commitment of R.F. 217 N.J. 152, 164 n.9 (2014) (quoting In re 
5 A-2374-21

indicating an above average risk to reoffend. In addition, Dr. Harris indicated 

R.H.'s dynamic and psychiatric factors increased his risk to reoffend. 

The judge deemed Dr. Harris's testimony "credible with no obvious 

interest in the outcome of the case." She noted his "demeanor was 

unremarkable, he was confident in his testimony, ultimate diagnosis, and 

recommendations." 

Dr. Zavalis noted R.H.'s "current engagement with treatment at the STU 

[wa]s superficial." She concluded he remained manipulative and surrounded 

himself with chaos. The doctor also stated R.H. scored a five on the Static-99R, 

indicating an above average rate to reoffend. Dr. Zavalis noted, in the STU, 

R.H. had "more stability and behavioral controls in place." 

The doctor opined that: 

given the static and dynamic risk factors assessed and 

the level of treatment progress achieved, [R.H.] 

remain[ed] at high risk to sexually reoffend if not

confined to a secure setting such as the STU. Although 

he ha[d] remained a member of the therapeutic 

community and appear[ed] actively engaged in 

treatment, though superficially, the recommendation

. . . [wa]s that he remain in Phase 3B [at the STU]. 

[R.H.] w[ould] be encouraged to demonstrate active 

Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J. 134, 137 (2002)) (explaining "that actuarial 

information, including the Static-99, is 'simply a factor to consider, weigh, or 

even reject, when engaging in the necessary factfinding under the SVPA.'"). 
6 A-2374-21

engagement in treatment by addressing the team's 

recommendations as outlined in his treatment plan. 

The judge found Dr. Zavalis "credible with no obvious interest in the 

outcome of the case." She noted the doctor's "demeanor was unremarkable, she 

testified consistently with her report, she was confident in her testimony, 

ultimate diagnosis, and recommendation." 

Dr. Lorah recommended "immediate discharge planning." The doctor 

credited R.H. for "journal[ing], attend[ing] substance abuse groups, and [being] 

actively involved in his treatment." Further, the judge noted Dr. Lorah's finding 

that R.H. "scored a four (4) on the Static-99R which place[d] him in the 'above 

average' risk category to reoffend." Dr. Lorah determined R.H. demonstrated: 

(1) "sexual preoccupation"; (2) "poor cognitive problem solving"; and (3) 

"antisocial traits" but "ha[d] not shown th[ese] behavior[s] since his return to 

the STU." 

Dr. Lorah opined R.H.'s "predisposing disorders d[id] not currently impact 

his emotional, cognitive, and/or volitional capacity to such a degree as to make 

him highly likely to sexually reoffend in the foreseeable future." Therefore, Dr. 

Lorah concluded R.H. was "highly likely to comply with his conditional 

discharge planning." The conditions the doctor recommended included: (1) 

supervised and unsupervised furloughs; (2) group and individual therapy; (3) 
7 A-2374-21

evaluation and monitoring of his relationships and reactions to life stressors by 

professionals; (4) "meet[ing] with supervising authorities regularly and other 

stipulations commonly mandated for released sex offenders"; (5) no contact with 

minors; (6) GPS monitoring, with authorities taking action if R.H. was 

"discovered near areas known for prostitution, alcohol, and drugs"; (7) official 

action "if he visit[ed] any high-risk places such as parks, schools, beaches, or 

other places where minors congregate"; (8) curfew; (9) restricted internet and 

phone use and "monitored to limit contact with pornography and[] social media 

dating sites"; and (10) continued treatment in the community. 

Although the judge found Dr. Lorah "was confident in his testimony, 

ultimate diagnosis, and recommendations," she found his testimony to be "less 

credible" because of the doctor's "obvious interest in the outcome of the case," 

since he was a "hired expert." In addition, the judge noted Dr. Lorah was 

"defensive at times." 

The judge summarized R.H.'s testimony. She found he testified: (1) the 

"opinions from his treatment team were authored by 'a social worker'"; (2) he 

gave one hundred percent in treatment and was not being superficial; and (3) his 

"treaters" took his return personally. Moreover, while noting R.H. stated he took 

full responsibility for his relapse, she determined his testimony "suggest[ed] the 
8 A-2374-21

opposite." She found R.H. "minimized his behaviors while on release, 

suggesting the reason he failed . . . was that he did not utilize his support team," 

and "appeared to blame his treatment team for his present circumstances." 

Ultimately, the judge determined R.H.'s testimony "did not add anything to th[e] 

hearing" and "detracted" from Dr. Lorah's testimony. 

After assessing "the evidence submitted at the hearing, including the 

testimony of the experts, . . . [the judge] f[ound] . . . the State ha[d] shown by 

clear and convincing evidence that [R.H.] ha[d] a high likelihood of reoffending 

if released from the secure control of the STU." 

The judge also found: 

the testimony of Dr. Zavalis most credible and 

compelling. [The doctor's] report suggest[ed] a 

thorough analysis was completed regarding [R.H.]'s

past and current progress while remaining in the 

therapeutic community. [The doctor] admit[ted R.H.] 

appear[ed] actively engaged in treatment, although he 

[wa]s encouraged to remain vigilant about the issues he 

ha[d] acknowledged ha[d] impacted his ability to 

meaningfully benefit from treatment in the past. These 

include[ed] not being fully engaged, limited 

transparency, secret-keeping, manipulating, not 

applying what he ha[d] learned while at the STU, being 

overconfident, not being vulnerable, being attention 

seeking, and intentionally creating chaos. 

 In addition, the judge concluded R.H.'s 
9 A-2374-21

sexual history [was] quite significant as to the issues of

his impulsivity and inability to control his emotions and 

actions. The index offenses, coupled with his deviant 

sexual behavior while on release, unequivocally 

show[ed] th[e] court that [R.H. wa]s unable to 

rationally control his emotions and behaviors when he 

[wa]s met with challenges which require[d] a utilization 

of skills learned while at STU, including relapse 

prevention techniques. 

Ultimately, the judge determined R.H.'s 

current diagnosis, coupled with Antisocial Personality 

Disorder, cause[d her] to have significant concerns. 

Additionally, [R.H.'s] deviant sexual behavior was 

cultivated during his prior furloughs in anticipation of 

his last discharge. It [wa]s clear he [wa]s able to 

contain his deviant behavior in a controlled setting, 

however, the court [wa]s less convinced he ha[d] fully 

acquired the skills necessary to control his behavior 

when not met with a controlled setting. Even Dr. Lorah 

appear[ed] to recommend significant controls over 

[R.H.'s] treatment and independence, despite opining

that he [wa]s ready for discharge. The court f[ound] 

that when [R.H.] was presented with a situation 

involving freedom from authority and accountability, 

he failed to successfully utilize the strategies taught at 

STU and reverted immediately to deviant sexual 

behavior. [R.H.] ha[d] yet to fully embrace all 

treatment modalities available to him, as set forth in Dr. 

Zavalis'[s] report, and could certainly benefit from 

continued relapse prevention. 

 On appeal, R.H. contends the judge erred by: (1) failing to "focus on 

whether [he] was a present danger to the community" and, instead, used historic 

statements, behaviors, and reports; and failed to consider positive information 
10 A-2374-21

in Dr. Zavalis's testimony and report; and (2) omitting from her analysis "the 

very low rates of recidivism for persons with R.H.'s Static-99R score." R.H. 

requests our de novo review, for entry of judgment, and an immediate discharge 

plan. 

We begin our discussion with a review of the principles governing our

analysis. "The scope of appellate review of a commitment determination is 

extremely narrow." R.F., 217 N.J. at 174 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 

(1996)). "The judges who hear SVPA cases generally are 'specialists' and 'their 

expertise in the subject' is entitled to 'special deference.'" Ibid. 

In addition, "[w]e give deference to the findings of . . . judges because 

they have the 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" 

of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting State v.

Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). "Accordingly, [we will] not modify a trial 

court's determination either to commit or release an individual unless the 'record 

reveals a clear mistake.'" Id. at 175 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 58). "So long as

the trial court's findings are supported by 'sufficient credible evidence present 

in the record,' those findings should not be disturbed." Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 

42 N.J. at 162).
11 A-2374-21

The SVPA permits the State to involuntarily commit a person, if by clear 

and convincing evidence, the State can 

establish three elements: (1) that the individual has 

been convicted of a sexually violent offense, (2) that he 

suffers from a mental abnormality or personality 

disorder, and (3) that as a result of his psychiatric 

abnormality or disorder, "it is highly likely that the 

individual will not control his or her sexually violent 

behavior and will reoffend."[4] 

[Id. at 173 (quoting In re Commitment of W.Z., 173

N.J. 109, 130 (2002)) (internal citations omitted).] 

See also N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26. 

The SVPA "requires annual court review hearings on the need for 

continued involuntary commitment." W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133; see N.J.S.A. 30:4-

27.35. "Th[e] periodic reviews . . . allow adequate opportunity to assess fresh 

information concerning the committee's dangerousness." Ibid. 

"[E]xpert witnesses in the fields of psychiatry and psychology routinely 

play leading roles in SVPA commitment hearings." In re Civil Commitment of

D.Y., 218 N.J. 359, 382 (2014); see N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b). An expert can

"rel[y] on prior evaluations, treatment records, [and] other appropriate 

4

 The parties have stipulated to elements (1) and (2). 
12 A-2374-21

documents" in reaching their opinion. In re Civil Commitment of A.Y., 458 N.J. 

Super. 147, 170-71 (App. Div. 2019). 

The judge can consider "the testimony of experts and the risk assessment 

instruments on which they rely," as they constitute "pivotal proofs on the 

question [of] whether [an] individual is highly likely to offend again." Matter 

of P.D., 243 N.J. 553, 568 (2020). However, "[a] trial judge is 'not required to

accept all or any part of [an] expert opinion[].'" R.F., 217 N.J. at 174 (second 

and third alterations in original) (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 61). "The ultimate 

determination is 'a legal one, not a medical one, even though it is guided by

medical expert testimony.'" Ibid. (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 59). 

We apply these well-established principles to the matter here, and affirm. 

Initially, we reject R.H.'s request for a de novo review. A de novo review would 

be inapposite to our deferential standard of review. 

Moreover, R.H.'s contention the judge erred by considering historical, 

rather than fresh, information is misplaced for two reasons. First, experts rely 

on historical information to reach their opinions. See A.Y., 458 N.J. Super. at

170-71. As a corollary, a judge's reliance on an expert's opinion would similarly 

include historic information. Second, the judge's conclusion was based on

R.H.'s present condition. The judge noted she had "significant concerns" and 
13 A-2374-21

R.H. "ha[d] yet to fully embrace all treatment modalities available to him . . . 

and could certainly benefit from continued relapse prevention." 

R.H.'s contention the judge failed to consider Dr. Zavalis's positive

information is similarly misplaced. First, the judge could accept or reject any 

part of an expert's opinion. See R.F., 217 N.J. at 174. Second, the judge noted 

the positives in Dr. Zavalis's statement that R.H. was actively, albeit 

superficially, engaged in treatment and had "more stability and behavioral 

controls in place" in the STU. 

Finally, while acknowledging a judge can "consider, weigh, or even 

reject" actuarial assessment information, R.H. nonetheless argues the judge 

erred by "omit[ting] any consideration of" his Static-99R score in the context of 

certain "dynamic risk factors." R.H. further contends Dr. Lorah did a more 

thorough analysis. These arguments have no merit. The judge could reject 

R.H.'s Static-99R score and could accept or reject the expert's opinion. Id. at 

164, 174. Given this latitude, and our deference, we conclude there is no reason 

to question her analysis or her consideration of R.H.'s Static-99R score or the 

experts' opinions. 
14 A-2374-21

To the extent we have not addressed any of R.H.'s remaining arguments, we 

conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.