Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JOHN T. WILSON GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

GARY R. ROM

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

ANDREW ABBOTT, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 33A04-1109-CR-545

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE HENRY CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Bob A. Witham, Judge 

Cause No. 33D02-1012-FD-338

March 30, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DARDEN, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Andrew Abbott appeals his sentence following a plea of guilty to class A 

misdemeanor trespass.1

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court improperly sentenced Abbott.

FACTS

On December 28, 2010, the State charged Abbott with Count 1, class D felony 

theft, and Count 2, class A misdemeanor trespass. The State also alleged Abbott to be an 

habitual offender. The trial court held an initial hearing on December 28, 2010, during 

which Abbott pleaded not guilty to Count 1 and guilty to Count 2. The trial court took 

the guilty plea under advisement and set it for disposition on January 11, 2011. As to the 

remaining count, the trial court set a pre-trial conference for March 9, 2011, which it 

subsequently rescheduled to March 7, 2011. The trial court ordered that Abbott be held 

without bond due to a pending parole violation.

On January 11, 2011, the trial court, on its own motion, ordered that the hearing

on Count 2 be consolidated with the pre-trial conference, to be held on March 7, 2011. 

On March 7, 2011, Abbott filed a motion to reset the pre-trial conference. Accordingly, 

the trial court rescheduled the consolidated hearing and conference for May 16, 2011.

 

1

 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2.
3

On March 28, 2011, Abbott requested a change of appointed counsel. The trial 

court granted Abbott’s request and reset the pre-trial conference and hearing to March 30, 

2011. “By agreement of the parties,” the trial court reset the conference and hearing to 

April 6, 2011. (App. 4). On its own motion, the trial court then continued the conference 

and hearing to April 11, 2011. On April 11, 2011, Abbott requested that Count 2 be 

dismissed “due to not being sentenced within 30 days.” (App. 4). The trial court took the 

matter under advisement. 

On May 18, 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss Count 1 and the habitual 

offender allegation. On May 20, 2011, the trial court granted the State’s motion and 

scheduled a “review hearing” on Count 2 for June 29, 2011. The trial court subsequently 

rescheduled the hearing two times “[b]y agreement of the parties[.]” (App. 4, 5). On 

August 17, 2011, the trial court accepted Abbott’s guilty plea, entered judgment of 

conviction, and sentenced Abbott to one year.

DECISION

Abbott asserts that the trial court improperly sentenced him. Specifically, he 

argues that the trial court failed to sentence him within thirty days of his conviction for 

trespass. He therefore seeks discharge.

Indiana Code section 35-38-1-2(b) provides that “[u]pon entering a conviction, the 

court shall set a date for sentencing within thirty (30) days, unless for good cause shown 

an extension is granted.” (Emphasis added). Here, there is no evidence in the record that 

the trial court accepted Abbott’s guilty plea prior to August 17, 2011. In fact, the trial 
4

court only stated that the guilty plea was taken under advisement on December 28, 2010. 

Thus, we cannot say that the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on December 

28, 2010, as asserted by Abbott. See State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 834 (Ind. 1997)

(finding that the trial court did not enter a judgment of conviction where it only stated 

that the guilty plea was taken under advisement; there was no evidence that the trial court 

accepted the guilty plea; and there was no order book entry finding the defendant guilty); 

cf. Benson v. State, 780 N.E.2d 413, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the undisputed 

evidence showed that the trial court accepted the plea agreement where the chronological 

case summary stated that the trial court entered a judgment of conviction), trans. denied. 

Rather, the trial court entered the final judgment of conviction on August 17, 2011, when 

it sentenced Abbott. See Ford v. State, 570 N.E.2d 84, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (where

the trial court does not formally enter judgment following a plea of guilty, the sentence is 

the final judgment of conviction), trans. denied. Accordingly, we find that the trial court 

timely sentenced Abbott.2

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur. 

 

2

 We also note that Abbott did not object to the delay in sentencing until April 11, 2011, several months

after he pleaded guilty to Count 2. Although the record is silent as to the reasons for the numerous delays 

in sentencing, it appears that the trial court was dealing with a myriad of filings regarding Abbott, 

including a motion for a speedy trial on Count 1; Abbott’s request for change of appointed counsel, which 

the trial court granted; attempts to negotiate a plea agreement on Count 1; and the filing of a new charge. 

During the course of these proceedings, trial court delayed the sentencing both on its own motions and

either at Abbott’s request or by agreement of the parties. We therefore presume that there was good cause 

for the delays. See Vandergriff v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1053, 10.53 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that good 

cause “may be presumed where the record is silent as to the reason for the delay and the defendant made 

no objection”). Given the presumed good cause for the delays, the trial court is excused from the thirtyday sentencing requirement. Id.