No. 12704 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

WARREN BAILLIE, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

J. W. ROLLINS, an individual, and BURLINGTON 

NORTHERN, INC., a corporation, 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

Honorable R. J. Nelson, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record : 

For Appellant : 

McKittrick and Duffy, Great Falls, Montana 

Joseph W. Duffy argued, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondents : 

Gough, Booth, Shanahan and Johnson, Helena, Montana 

Ronald F. Waterman argued, Helena, Montana 

Submitted: November 18, 1974 

Decided: 1974 
Mr. Chief Justice James T. Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

On August 10, 1970 plaintiff-appellant Warren Baillie 

filed suit against defendants-respondents Burlington-Northern, 

Inc., a corporation operating a railway in Montana, and J. W. 

Rollins, an individual employed by Burlington-Northern. The 

complaint was couched in two separate counts. The first count 

was addressed primarily against Burlington-Northern and in 

substance made these allegations: That prior to August 10, 

1970 Baillie was employed by Burlington-Northern as a railroad 

patrolman stationed in Livingston, Montana; that he was also 

commissioned as a special deputy sheriff of Park County; and 

that he performed services for Burlington-Northern for six years, 

but that on August 10, 1970 the railroad, through its agents 

and without just cause, terminated his employment contract, 

discharged him, and refused to rehire him. The second count 

was addressed primarily against Rollins. After realleging the 

employment relationship between Baillie and Burlington-Northern, 

this count alleged that Rollins, while acting within the course 

and scope of his employment, maliciously caused BurlingtonNorthern to terminate Baillie's contract of employment. Damages 

for lost wages, future wage losses, general damages, and punitive 

damages were sought from both defendants. 

On September 18, 1973 defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction over the subject matter because the same had been 

preempted by federal law. The record before the district court 

consisted exclusively of plaintiff's complaint, defendants' 

motion, and supporting briefs. After considering these documents, 

the district court on December 19, 1973 sustained the motion to 

dismiss and ordered the action dismissed with prejudice. Baillie 

appeals from the judgment entered pursuant to this order. 
The respective positions of the parties to this appeal 

can be fairly summarized as follows: Defendants contend that 

this is a labor dispute between an employer-railroad and an 

employee and therefore is exclusively within the jurisdiction 

of the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. SS 151 et seq. 

Baillie, however, maintains that the second count of his complaint alleges a tortious interference by Rollins, a third-party 

not privy to the contract, in the contractual relations between 

Baillie and Burlington-Northern, and that tort actions are outside the jurisdiction of the NRAB. 

The numerous annotated cases under 45 U.S.C.A. S 153, 

wherein the NRAB derives its authority, have construed this 

section of the Railway Labor Act to mean that the NRAB has exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes involving interpretation 

of collective bargaining agreements or contracts between employees 

and railroads. See, for example, Southern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood 

of Locomotive Firemen, 337 F.2d 127 (1964) and Brotherhood of 

Railroad Train. v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 290 F.2d 266 (1961), 

certiorari denied 366 U.S. 966, 6 L ed 2d 1256, 81 S.Ct. 1925, 

rehearing denied 368 U.S. 873, 7 L ed 2d 73, 82 S.Ct. 28. Such 

disputes include claims for wrongful removal from service. Ferro 

v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 296 F.2d 847 (1961). The disposition of the present case, then, hinges upon the answer to 

one question: Does Baillie's complaint sound in contract or in 

tort? 

On its face the first count of the complaint sounds in 

contract. There simply is no way to read it except as an allegation of wrongful discharge, which by its nature must be a 

contractual breach. Concerning the second count, aill lie urges 

that the tort of interference with contract has been alleged 
and insists that the district court erred in failing to distinguish between the second count and the first. We could not 

disagree more, for the second count so contradicts itself as to 

be rendered meaningless. For instance, it is said that Rollins, 

in doing whatever he did to Baillie, acted within the course 

and scope of his employment with Burlington-Northern. We must 

note here that it is fundamental that a corporation can act only 

through its employees and officers, and the allegation in effect 

is directed to Burlington-Northern, not to Rollins individually. 

To charge the agent of the corporation is to charge the corporation. Then all that remains is an allegation that a party to 

a contract--Burlington-Northern--tortiously interfered with its 

own contract. Different issues would be presented had other 

torts, such as conversion or libel, been alleged, or had Rollins 

truly been sued in his own right, but they are not before us here. 

From the foregoing it is manifest that this controversy 

is of the type Congress intended to be resolved only by the NRAB. 

The state courts lack jurisdiction over it; consequently, the 

judgment of the district dourt must be and is affi$med. 

Chief Justice