UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

DERRICK JAY ALBERS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 16-6261 

(D.C. Nos. 5:14-CR-00082-C-1 & 

5:16-CV-00381-C) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

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ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

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Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HOLMES and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. 

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Derrick Jay Albers, a federal prisoner proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s dismissal 

of his motion for amended judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) as an 

unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We deny a COA and 

dismiss this matter. 

In 2014, Mr. Albers pleaded guilty via plea agreement to conspiracy to commit 

wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349, and was sentenced to 120 

months’ imprisonment. His plea agreement included an expansive waiver of his 

appellate and collateral-attack rights, with an exception only if he received a sentence 

 *

 This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, 

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value 

consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 11, 2017

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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above the guideline range. Notwithstanding the waiver, Mr. Albers appealed to this 

court; we dismissed the appeal on the government’s motion to enforce the waiver. 

See United States v. Albers, 599 F. App’x 352, 353 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) 

(per curiam). 

In 2016, Mr. Albers filed a § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of 

counsel in failing to object to the presentence report on three issues and causing him to 

unknowingly enter into the plea-agreement waiver. The government invoked the plea 

agreement’s waiver of collateral attack in its response. Analyzing Mr. Albers’ claim of 

ineffective assistance in entering into the waiver first, the district court stated his “claims 

of ineffective assistance . . . focus solely on his understanding of the appellate waiver and 

counsel’s alleged failure to properly explain its scope,” without any argument “that he 

would not have pleaded guilty.” R. at 38. The district court determined these allegations 

were insufficient to impact the validity of the waiver, especially in light of the court’s 

colloquy with Mr. Albers when accepting the plea, in which he affirmatively indicated he 

understood how broad the waiver was. The district court then concluded the waiver 

barred the remainder of Mr. Albers’ § 2255 claims. 

Mr. Albers then moved for amended judgment under Rule 59(e), arguing that this 

court “specifically and affirmatively held that the Defendant retained his right to raise 

such claims by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion under” our decision in United States v. 

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2001). R. at 44. He argued that neither 

the plea agreement nor plea hearing colloquy mentioned anything about the right to raise 

ineffective assistance claims on collateral attack. Mr. Albers called the waiver 
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“extremely ambiguous” because it merely stated he could not “collaterally challenge” his 

plea and sentence and did not specifically mention § 2255 or ineffective assistance. R. at 

46–47. He insisted he would never have agreed to the waiver had he known it was this 

broad. The district court construed the Rule 59(e) motion as a second or successive 

§ 2255 motion, “as it assert[ed] the Court erred in denying relief on the merits,” and 

dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. R. at 63, 66. 

To appeal, Mr. Albers must obtain a COA. See United States v. Harper, 545 F.3d 

1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008). Where, as here, a district court has dismissed a filing on 

procedural grounds, for a COA the movant must show both “that jurists of reason would 

find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was 

correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We need 

not consider the merits aspect of the Slack test because Mr. Albers has not satisfied the 

procedural aspect. 

Even reviewing Mr. Albers’ application with the liberality due pro se applicants, 

see Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010), there is nothing debatable 

about the district court’s procedural ruling. In his Rule 59(e) motion, Mr. Albers 

effectively makes and builds on the same arguments he raised in his initial § 2255 

motion. But a motion for amended judgment that revisits the merits of a district court’s 

denial of a § 2255 claim is a second or successive claim. See United States v. Pedraza, 

466 F.3d 932, 934 (10th Cir. 2006). And “[a] district court does not have jurisdiction to 

address the merits of a second or successive § 2255 . . . claim until this court has granted 
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the required authorization.” In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam). The proper place to direct those arguments was to this court on appeal from the 

district court’s first order, which Mr. Albers did not pursue in time. See Appeal 

No. 16-6260, slip op. (10th Cir. Nov. 3, 2016). We therefore discern no error in the 

district court’s determination. 

The motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is 

granted. But only prepayment of fees is waived, not the fees themselves. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(1). We deny a COA and dismiss this matter. 

Entered for the Court 

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk