Opinion issued July 7, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-15-00363-CR

———————————

RUBEN MUNOZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 147th District Court1

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. D-1-DC-14-201210

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

1 This appeal, originally filed in the Third Court of Appeals, Austin, Texas, was 

transferred by the Supreme Court of Texas, pursuant to its docket equalization 

authority, to the First Court of Appeals, Houston, Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE 

ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013) (authorizing transfer of cases).
2

Appellant, Ruben Munoz, was charged by indictment with felony murder 

(Count 1) and manslaughter (Count 2). At trial, appellant pleaded guilty to Count 2 

and the jury acquitted him of Count 1. At the punishment hearing, appellant pleaded 

true to an enhancement allegation, and the jury assessed his punishment at 

twenty-seven years’ confinement. In three points of error, appellant contends that

(1) the jury had no jurisdiction to sentence him on Count 2 because it did not make 

a written finding of guilt or, alternatively, the trial court’s acceptance of his plea of 

guilty to Count 2 deprived him of his right to a jury trial; (2) the lack of a written 

finding of true on the enhancement allegation resulted in a punishment in excess of 

the permissible range; and (3) the trial court erred by entering a deadly weapon 

finding in its judgment in the absence of an affirmative deadly weapon finding or 

verdict of guilty by the jury. We affirm.

Background

In the early morning hours of March 2, 2014, Sergeant C. Rowland of the 

Travis County Sheriff’s Office was on patrol when appellant drove past him at a 

high rate of speed. During the course of pursuit, Officer Rowland crested a hill and 

discovered that the vehicle had crashed. Appellant sustained minor injuries. The 

passenger, appellant’s girlfriend, Micole Medina, died from her injuries at the scene.

Appellant was subsequently charged with felony murder and manslaughter.
3

At trial, and in the presence of the jury, appellant pleaded not guilty to Count 

1 (felony murder) and guilty to Count 2 (manslaughter). Later at trial, and outside 

the presence of the jury, appellant waived his right to a jury trial on Count 2 and 

pleaded guilty to Count 2, and the trial court found him guilty of Count 2. The jury 

found appellant not guilty on Count 1. Thereafter, the trial court held a sentencing 

hearing on Count 2. Appellant pleaded true to the enhancement allegation,2and the 

jury assessed his punishment at twenty-seven years’ confinement. This appeal 

followed.

Discussion

In his first point of error, appellant contends that the jury had no jurisdiction 

to sentence him on Count 2 because it did not make a written finding of guilt on that 

count. Alternatively, he argues that the trial court’s acceptance of his plea of guilty 

to Count 2 deprived him of his right to a jury trial. 

It is well settled that when a defendant has entered a guilty plea to a felony 

before the jury, there remains no issue of guilt for the factfinder to determine. See 

Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also In re State ex 

rel. Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (plea of guilty to jury 

 

2 Appellant was previously convicted of a drug-related felony offense in Cause No. 

2:10CR03414-002JCH, in the United States District Court for the District of New 

Mexico.
4

eliminates guilt as issue to be determined). A plea of guilty substitutes for a jury 

verdict of guilt and is itself a conviction. Fuller, 253 S.W.3d at 227. Like a jury’s 

verdict, a plea of guilty is conclusive and nothing more is required but to give 

judgment and sentence. Id. “When a defendant pleads guilty to a jury, the jury need 

not return any verdict of guilty. The case simply proceeds with a unitary punishment 

hearing.” Id.; see State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695, 698 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)

(finding defendant’s plea of guilty to jury made trial unitary proceeding). Because 

appellant pleaded guilty to Count 2 before the jury, a finding of guilt was not 

required.

Alternatively, appellant argues that the trial court’s acceptance of his 

subsequent plea of guilty outside the presence of the jury deprived him of his right 

to a jury trial on Count 2. His argument is without merit. Here, appellant had 

already pleaded guilty to Count 2 before the jury. Moreover, the record reflects that 

appellant signed a form explicitly waiving his right to a jury trial as to Count 2. The 

trial court also addressed appellant’s jury trial waiver:

The Court: And do you understand that by entering this plea you give 

up certain rights including the right to remain silent, the right to 

confront, witnesses called against you, as well as a right to a jury trial 

in this case? Even though the jury is hearing the case as to this count, 

you’ve elected to go to them for punishment, but they don’t have to 

consider you of guilt or innocence in this case as to Count No. 2 because 

you’re entering this plea. Do you understand that?

Defendant: Yes, Your Honor, I understand.
5

The record shows that the State consented to the waiver of a jury trial as to 

appellant’s guilt on Count 2. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.19 (West 

Supp. 2015) (with exception not applicable here, defendant has right upon entering 

plea to waive right to jury trial provided waiver is made in person by defendant in 

writing in open court with consent and approval of court and attorney representing 

State). In light of the above, appellant was not deprived of his right to a jury trial.

We overrule appellant’s first point of error.

In his second point of error, appellant contends that the jury’s failure to make 

a written finding of true to the enhancement allegation resulted in a punishment in 

excess of the permissible range. 

Manslaughter is a second-degree felony punishable by two to twenty years 

confinement. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04 (West 2011). The law requires that a 

defendant who has been convicted of a second-degree felony “shall be punished for 

a first-degree felony” if it is shown that he has been previously convicted of a felony. 

Id. § 12.42(b) (West Supp. 2015).

Prior to trial, the State filed its notice of intent to seek enhancement with a 

prior felony conviction. During the punishment phase, the enhancement allegation 

was read and appellant pleaded true to the allegation in the presence of the jury, 

enhancing the punishment range from a second-degree felony to a first-degree 

felony. The court’s charge on punishment stated
6

[F]or enhancement purposes, the defendant has previously been finally 

convicted on one federal offense. To the enhancement allegation, the 

defendant has entered a plea of true, and you are instructed that you will 

find the enhanced allegation is true. The punishment which you may 

assess is confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice for life, or for any tern of not more than 

99 years or less than 5 years. In addition, a fine not to exceed $10,000 

may be imposed.

The jury assessed appellant’s punishment at twenty-seven years’ confinement.

In Harvey v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the validity 

of an enhancement allegation need not be submitted to the jury when there is no 

dispute concerning its validity. 611 S.W.2d 108, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (noting 

that once defendant pleads true to enhancement allegation, State is relieved of its 

burden to prove allegations because plea of true constitutes evidence and sufficient 

proof to support enhancement allegation). Here, appellant pleaded “true” to the 

enhancement allegation before the jury, the State admitted the judgment from 

appellant’s prior conviction into evidence without objection, and no party presented 

evidence questioning the validity of the enhancement allegation. As in Harvey, the 

validity of the enhancement allegation was not in issue. See id. Therefore, there 

was no need for the trial court to submit the undisputed issue to the jury. See id. We 

overrule appellant’s second point of error.

In his third point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred by 

entering a deadly weapon finding in the judgment on Count 2 in the absence of an 

affirmative deadly weapon finding or verdict of guilty by the jury. 
7

The record reflects that Count 2, as alleged in the indictment, included a 

deadly weapon finding, and that appellant pleaded guilty to Count 2 before the jury.3 

By pleading guilty to the offense as alleged in the indictment, appellant confessed 

that he was the same person named in the indictment and that he committed the 

offense as alleged therein. See Wilkerson v. State, 736 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1987) (noting that, in felony cases, plea of guilty before jury admits existence 

of all elements necessary to establish guilt); Helton v. State, 886 S.W.2d 465, 466

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). And by properly admonishing 

appellant and accepting his guilty plea to the indictment, the trial court necessarily 

determined that appellant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. 

See Ex parte Huskins, 176 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The trial court 

was therefore authorized to enter an affirmative deadly weapon finding in the 

judgment of conviction for Count 2. See id; Aguilar v. State, Nos. 05–12–00219–

CR, 05–12–00220–CR, 2012 WL 4373692, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 26, 

2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Appellant’s judicial 

confession sufficiently supports the deadly weapon finding contained in the 

judgment.”). We overrule appellant’s third point of error.

 

3 The indictment states, “RUBEN MUNOZ, during the commission of said offense, 

did use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle.” 
8

Reformation of the Judgment

Although appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph, on the 

judgment for Count 2, the trial court entered “N/A” where it should have noted 

appellant’s plea of true and the trial court’s findings of true with respect to the 

enhancement paragraph. “[A]ppellate court[s] ha[ve] the power to correct and 

reform a trial court judgment ‘to make the record speak the truth when it has the 

necessary data and information to do so, or make any appropriate order as the law 

and nature of the case may require.’” Torres v. State, 391 S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). 

Because appellant pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph and because we 

determine that the trial court found the enhancement paragraphs true, we conclude 

that we have the necessary evidence to correct the judgment. See Torres, 391 

S.W.3d at 185. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect that appellant 

pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph in the indictment and to reflect the trial 

court’s finding of true on the enhancement paragraph.

Conclusion

We modify the judgment to reflect that appellant pleaded true to the

enhancement paragraph and that the trial court found the allegations in the 

enhancement paragraph to be true. We affirm the judgment as modified.
9

Russell Lloyd

Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Lloyd.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).