NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 28, 2007*

Decided July 3, 2007

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

Nos. 06-2120, 06-2369 & 06-2435

SHEILA MANNIX,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THADDEUS MACHNIK, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United

States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 7232

Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

Order

Sheila Mannix is a disappointed litigant. In 1993 the state judiciary awarded

Mannix custody of the two sons born or conceived during her marriage to Daniel

Sheetz. The decree was modified in 2004 so that Mannix and Sheetz shared custody

of the children, and further modified in 2005 to give Sheetz sole custody. The decree 

as modified in 2005 severely restricts Mannix’s access to her sons.

Mannix then filed this federal suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against four state 

judges and unspecified “John Doe” defendants. She has since attempted to add

three additional judges as defendants. Mannix wants the federal court to issue an

injunction requiring the state judges to place her sons back in her custody. (It is

possible that she also seeks damages, but the state judges have absolute immunity

 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
Nos. 06-2120, 06-2369 & 06-2435 Page 2

with respect to damages, though not with respect to prospective relief. See Pulliam

v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984).)

The district court dismissed the suit under what it called “the domestic-relations

exception” to federal jurisdiction. Whether there is such a generic exception to all

federal jurisdiction is doubtful. The Supreme Court has consistently described this

doctrine as an interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §1332, the diversity jurisdiction, see Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), rather than as a rule for all sources of

jurisdiction. Cf. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (no “probate exception”

to the bankruptcy jurisdiction). Mannix’s action does not depend on §1332. It rests

on §1331 (federal-question jurisdiction) and §1343(a) (civil-rights jurisdiction).

We need not decide whether there is a “domestic-relations exception” so sweeping that it would block prospective relief under the civil-rights laws even if a state 

should adopt an unconstitutional substantive or procedural norm. Cf. M.L.B. v.

S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding unconstitutional a state rule under which parental rights could be terminated because of inability to pay record transcription

costs); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding unconstitutional a state rule 

that a parent’s race can determine the award of custody); Loubser v. Thacker, 440

F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2006) (Constitution forbids decision of child-custody disputes by a

bribed judiciary). For Mannix does not seek prospective relief against a statute or

rule that is said to be unconstitutional. Instead she contends that the state judiciary

has erred in her particular case, and arguments of that kind must be pursued on

appeal through the state system rather than by an independent federal suit. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

Claims for prospective relief against the original four defendant judges are moot.

One has died; two have recused themselves; the fourth was involved only to preside 

over a motion for recusal. But Mannix has proposed to add three more state judges

as defendants, and her appeal from the denial of the motion to amend the complaint

to add these additional defendants cannot be treated as moot.

But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine means that any relief from the adverse decision must be pursued through the state appellate system (with the option of seeking

certiorari from a final judgment). The core meaning of that doctrine, as the Court

stressed in Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006), and Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), is that federal district courts cannot review the merits of decisions made by state courts in civil litigation. To the extent

that Mannix wants an injunction that will alter the state court’s allocation of custody and the level of child-support payments her ex-husband must provide, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional bar.

To the extent that Mannix wants an injunction that will govern future proceedings in state court—for all custody decrees are open to revision in light of additional

information about the children’s best interests—the initial problem is the AntiInjunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283, which says that federal courts cannot by injunction

govern the conduct of state litigation. Whatever wriggle room is allowed by

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), which holds that §1983 is an exception to 

§2283, is cabined by Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), which adds that
Nos. 06-2120, 06-2369 & 06-2435 Page 3

federal courts must abstain from disrupting ongoing state litigation in all but the 

most extraordinary situations. See also Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden

State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982); Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir.

2002) (applying this principle to litigation about child custody). There is nothing extraordinary about Mannix’s situation. She maintains that Sheetz has deceived the 

state judges into making bad decisions, but as we have said that argument is person-specific. She does not accuse Illinois of making child custody depend on race or

any other attribute placed off limits by the Constitution.

Mannix appears to believe that any judge who renders a decision adverse to her

must be biased. She maintains that the federal district judge should have recused

herself. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), is a sufficient answer to this line of

argument. None of Mannix’s other contentions requires separate discussion.

AFFIRMED