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UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

“These myths and 

misconceptions have helped 

reinforce the idea that 

perhaps the United States 

and the Afghan government 

are not actually on the same 

side of the negotiating 

table. This has been thrown 

into harsh relief as the two 

scramble to assert authority 

over where, when and how 

to hold peace talks. ”

April 9, 2012

Myths and Misconceptions in the 

Afghan Transition

Summary

•	 The coming period of transition to Afghan control of nationalsecurity will require greater

cooperation and understanding between all parties.

•	 Cooperation between the international community, the Afghan government and local communitiesis currently being undermined by a series of myths and assumptions which stem

from the unstable conditions, a perceived lack ofshared interests and a handful of highly

publicized incidents.

•	 The international community often underestimateslocal capacity for governance in Afghanistan and ignoresthe successthat Afghanistan did have with self-rule for much of the 20th

century.

•	 Local Afghan communities are skeptical of the aims of both counterinsurgency and statebuilding measures, as projects,such asinternationally sponsored elections, have failed to yield

anticipated results despite the continued presence of international troops.

•	 There is an urgent need to rethink some of the assumptions on both sides of the table which

threaten to undermine the long-term prospectsfor peace in Afghanistan.

Some Myths and Misconceptions

Asresponsibility forsecurity and other aspects of governance and rule of law rapidly transition

to Afghan control in the coming years,seriouslogistical and structural challengesremain to be

addressed. Less discussed but equally important, though, isthe fact that there is currently a gulf

in communication and understanding between members of the international community, the

Afghan government and local communities. This divide is both evidenced by and further perpetuated by a series of myths and misconceptions on allsides of thisrelationship.

Afghan Myths

On the one side, among both educated and uneducated Afghans, there isthe persistent belief that

counterterrorism is an open-ended excuse used by the international community, particularly the

United States, to assert control over Afghanistan in order to extract resources, particularly mineral

wealth, and to prevent the expansion of Chinese and Pakistani influence in the region. A common

refrain amongst many Afghansisthat United Statesis actually aiding the Taliban in an effort to

promote instability and justify its continued military presence in the country.1 They question how

Shahmahmood Miakhel

E-mail: smiakhel@usip.org

Noah Coburn

E-mail: ncoburn@skidmore.edu

PEACEBRIEF123
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

Myths and Misconceptions in the Afghan Transition

page 2 • PB 123 • April 9, 2012

a group perceived as weak and unorganized could continue to stand against the technologically

superior U.S. and NATO forces.

While some may chuckle at these ideas as absurd, failure to recognize their legitimacy in the

minds of many Afghansleadsto one of the fundamental disconnects between the avowed

partnersfor Afghan stabilization. It bearsfocusing on what is perpetuating some of these myths.

Since 2001 the international military forces have relied on local warlords and powerbrokers with

sordid histories and reputationsto bring localstability. These figures often have a perverse incentive to encourage instability in order to benefit from the weakness and corruption of government

structures, through industries and practicessuch asland grabbing and the opium trade. For almost

a decade, the international military hasrepeatedly attempted to stabilize Afghanistan, in part, by

partnering with those strong figures who are benefitting most from itsinstability. Many Afghan

citizenssee what the military views as a necessary means of expediting stability as a Faustian

pact with some of the most violent figures, particularly in provinceslike Helmand, Kandahar and

Uruzgan.2

It is also important to consider the way that Afghans perceive the massive distribution of aid

and other fundsfrom the international community. Many in the international community blame

rampant corruption within Karzai’s government for the failure to have a tangible impact on the

Afghan populousto match the levels of actual donated dollars. While some Afghans agree with

this assessment, many also feel that those in the international community who control the funds

are responsible for the ineffectiveness of how they have been applied. On several occasions and

with increasing frequency, the president has effectively countered corruption charges by accusing

the international community of its own means of corruption, particularly amongst private security

contractors.3While seemingly unrelated, these issues are often symbolically linked in the minds

of many Afghans with other concerns about the international presence,such asthe increasing

number of barriers and roadblocks by embassies and other international organizations which has

slowed traffic in Kabul to a crawl. These trends, coupled with several recent events, including the

burning of Korans at Bagram Airfield and the killing of 16 civiliansin Kandahar by an American

soldier, have increased hostility to the international presence.

Such issues damage Afghan perceptions of the international presence and the distribution of

international funds more generally. Large donors,such as USAID, ask for complex proposalsthat

many Afghan businesses and nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) are ill-equipped to write. As

a result, the vast majority of contracts go to American firms, which often then getsubcontracted

to a few Afghan firms. While this may be considered transparent by internationalsinvolved, it

isimportant to stressthat for many Afghans, there isthe sense that the processis actually not

transparent. Many of the actual implementing Afghan firms are dominated by a smallsegment of

the ruling elite who many Afghanssee as corrupt and monopolizing external funding.

International Myths

Myths and misperceptions, however, are not confined to the Afghan side of the conversation.

Among many in the international community, there isthe common misconception that Afghanistan has never had a functioning government, that corruption is an inevitable aspect of Afghan

culture and thatsince Afghans are not truly interested in democracy it isjustifiable to make deals

with warlords and otherstrongmen, even if they are known criminals.

During the 1960s and 1970s Afghanistan did have an effective local governance system that relied on creating relationships between central government officials and local leaders. While it was

not without its problems, thissystem was considered equitable by the majority of the population.
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

Myths and Misconceptions in the Afghan Transition

page 3 • PB 123 • April 9, 2012

Generally speaking it isremembered as being free of corruption, perhaps most clearly evidenced

by the practice of universal conscription, in which every man wasrequired to serve in the national

military regardless of economic standing or ethnicity. Even the sons of the king were required to

serve in the national military,standing in stark contrast with the current rumors about the child of

local elites purchasing grades at the national university or other privileges.

Some of the struggles ofsetting up good governance systemsin the last decade should not be

perceived assome sort of primordial rejection of democratic governance by the Afghan people.

For example, the high turnout in initial elections, particularly in 2004, and the increasing disillusionment with the documented corruption of recent elections do notsuggest that Afghans have

some inherent distaste for democracy. Instead, many of Afghanistan’s historical politicalstructures

and community decision-making mechanisms are deeply rooted in democratic values. Participation in elections has declined for a much simpler reason; Afghan elites have been effective at

manipulating the six national elections held since the U.S. invasion. Powerful individuals have used

electionsto solidify their patronage networks and monopolize government funds.

Other international programsthat target certain leaders(often referred to as Key Leader Engagement or KLE) or generate resourcesfor one group over another potentially undermine these

practices, making local politics actually less democratic. Thisis perhaps most apparent in the case

of the Popalzai tribe to which President Hamid Karzai is a member. In the area around Kandahar,

the Popalzai have come increasingly to dominate local political and economic structures. However,

local governance and development councilsset up acrossthe country, typically through U.S.

and British funds, often timesrely on a select group of local leaders and government officialsto

choose members of the local council. These individual members of the community often have very

different intereststhan the community writ large and the involvement of international programs

marksthem in the eyes of many community members as being distinctly unrepresentative. USIP’s

research suggeststhat Afghansin general are in support of holding electionsfor local councils,

but that the currentsystem that relies on hand-chosen representativesin many communitiesis

creating resentment. Many of these current programsseem to work on the assumption in the

international community and perhaps amongst the Kabul-based government that local communities are somehow unable or unwilling to choose their own leadership.

Effects of these Misunderstandings

What is most worrying isthat these seemingly simple misunderstandings can produce tragic results. In the most extreme cases, Kabul hasseen violent protestsin response to the perception that

the United Statesis working against Islam. In less public cases, aid programs and politicalstrategiesthat favor a small group of wealthy, elite Afghanssuggest that the United States and NATO

partners do not have the best interests of ordinary Afghansin mind when planning programs and

policies. In the most extreme cases, alliances with unsavory local commanders,some with histories

of past war crimes, hasled many Afghansto believe that the United Statesin particular is actively

encouraging instability in the country, and hasforced average citizensto make economic and

political decisions asif this were the case.

The tendency of NGOs and international donorsto work around a government that they largely

perceive as corrupt and ineffective has also created some severe economic distortions. Both

international NGOs and donors have not done enough to engage in public awareness campaigns.

This meansthat money continuesto be delivered in large amounts, delivered in waysthat are nontransparent and unpredictable for local communities. Attemptsto monitor these efforts by groups

like the Congressionally-founded Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) are
© USIP 2012 • All rights reserved.

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About This Brief

The authors have worked for many 

years in the Kabul office of the 

United States Institute of Peace in 

Afghanistan on local governance 

and rule of law projects. Shahmahmood Miakhel is USIP’s Country 

Director in Afghanistan. From 

2003-2005 he was deputy minister 

of the Interior. Noah Coburn is a 

political anthropologist focusing 

on informal justice in Afghanistan 

and is currently teaching at 

Skidmore College. He has been 

conducting research in Afghanistan 

since 2005 and is the author of 

“Bazaar Politics: Pottery and Power 

in an Afghan Market Town.” This 

report is based upon observations 

by the two authors, field visits to 

the south, east, southeast, west 

and center of the country, discussions with government officials, 

local leaders and members of the 

international community. 

usually aimed at policy audiences and Afghan communitiesrarely hear about these efforts except

in the form ofsensational media sound bites.

Finally, all of these misconceptions have made both the Afghan government and the Afghan

people much more distrustful and suspicious of the role of the international community in

the early stages of negotiations with the Taliban, and to question the ultimate aims ofsuch

negotiations.

These myths and misconceptions have helped reinforce the idea that perhapsthe United States

and the Afghan government are not actually on the same side of the negotiating table. This has

been thrown into harsh relief asthe two scramble to assert authority over where, when and how

to hold peace talks. Thisraisessome long-term concerns as any settlement negotiated between

the Taliban and the United Statesthat the Afghan government does not believe was negotiated in

good faith is unlikely to bring lasting peace to Afghanistan.

Reaching across the Table: What can be done to 

help understanding

•	 The international presence in Afghanistan needs to work on being more transparent in its

distribution of funds.

•	 The international community needs to continue to invest in the Afghan government and in

particular in local governance structures through local actors that are selected by the community, not relying on those that have come to power during the current instability.

•	 The international community and the Afghan government need to increase communication and cooperation in several areas, particularly regarding their approaches to local

governance and reconciliation with the Taliban. Before negotiations between the Afghan

government and the Taliban begin in earnest, more diplomatic conversations between the

government and the international community need to take place to avoid multiple streams

of negotiations that threaten to undermine each other.

Endnotes

1.	 See Vanessa Gezari, August 19, 2011, ‘The Secret Alliance,’ The New Republic.

2.	 See Matthieu Aikins, November 2011, ‘Our Man in Kandahar,’ The Atlantic.

3.	 See Laura King, October 4, 2010, ‘Afghan President Begins Disbanding Private Security Firms,’

Los Angeles Times.

Myths and Misconceptions in the Afghan Transition

page 4 • PB 123 • April 9, 2012