SUMMARY

July 28, 2022

2022COA85

No. 20CA1603, Giron v. Hice — Government — Colorado 

Governmental Immunity Act — Immunity and Partial Waiver —

Operation of Motor Vehicle Owned or Leased by Public Entity; 

Vehicles and Traffic — Traffic Regulation — Emergency Vehicle 

Exception

Under Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 

2003), the supreme court held that Colorado governmental 

immunity could be waived when an operator of an emergency 

vehicle is in pursuit of an actual violator of the law and does not 

have the vehicle’s emergency lights or sirens activated at all during 

that pursuit. A division of the court of appeals extends Tidwell and 

holds that an officer and the public entity for whom he works do not 

qualify for immunity under section 42-4-108(2) and (3), C.R.S. 

2021, when he activates his emergency lights or sirens for only part 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
of the pursuit. Thus, the division remands the case to the district 

court to reinstate the plaintiffs’ complaint.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA85

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1603

Montrose County District Court No. 19CV30074

Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge

Nichele Giron, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of 

Walter Giron; Amanda Giron; and Thomas Short, as the Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Samuel Giron,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Justin Hice and Town of Olathe,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON

Berger and Brown, JJ., concur

Announced July 28, 2022

Killian Davis Richter Kraniak PC, J. Keith Killian, Damon Davis, Joseph H. 

Azbell, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Tucker Holmes P.C., Bradley D. Tucker, Winslow R. Taylor III, Centennial, 

Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
1

¶ 1 This case requires us to analyze the supreme court’s holding 

in Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75 (Colo. 2003). 

Tidwell held that immunity is waived when the operator of an 

emergency vehicle, while in pursuit of an actual or suspected 

violator of the law, does not activate the vehicle’s emergency lights 

or siren. Id. at 80-81

¶ 2 The question presented in this case was left unanswered in 

Tidwell: Does an officer operating an emergency vehicle have the 

protection of sovereign immunity under section 42-4-108(2) and (3), 

C.R.S. 2021, when he is in pursuit of an actual or suspected 

violator of the law but when he activates his emergency lights or 

sirens for only part of the pursuit? The answer to this question is 

no. 

¶ 3 Nichele Giron, individually and as personal representative of 

the estate of Walter Giron; Amanda Giron; and Thomas Short, as 

personal representative of the estate of Samuel Giron (collectively,

the Girons),1 appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing their 

1 Because multiple plaintiffs share Giron as a last name, we will 

refer to a particular individual by first name for clarity. We mean 

no disrespect in doing so.
2

tort action against Officer Justin Hice (Officer Hice) and the Town of 

Olathe (Olathe) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the

Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA).

¶ 4 Officer Hice’s patrol car collided with the van that Walter was 

driving and Samuel was riding in as a passenger. Both Walter and 

Samuel died from their injuries and Officer Hice was seriously

injured. The Girons’ complaint asserted that any sovereign 

immunity granted to Officer Hice and Olathe was waived under 

section 24-10-106(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021, and that the exception to the 

waiver under section 42-4-108(2) and (3) did not apply because 

Officer Hice had not activated his emergency lights or sirens, or 

alternatively, even if he did activate his lights, he drove in a manner 

that endangered life or property.

¶ 5 Following a Trinity hearing, see Trinity Broad. of Denver, Inc. v. 

City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993), the district court 

dismissed the complaint, determining that Officer Hice and Olathe 

were immune from suit because Officer Hice had activated his 

emergency lights five to ten seconds before the collision. The 

district court also determined that, although Officer Hice exceeded
3

the speed limit, he did not operate his vehicle in a manner that

endangered life or property.

¶ 6 We reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand for the 

district court to reinstate the Girons’ complaint.

I. Background

¶ 7 Officer Hice of the Olathe Police Department was on speed

patrol along Highway 50. His radar detected a white Toyota driving

in the opposite direction going over seventy miles per hour (mph) in 

a fifty-five-mph zone. Officer Hice made a U-turn at the next 

available emergency turnaround and accelerated to catch up to the 

white Toyota. Data downloaded from Officer Hice’s patrol car

recorded that his speeds reached 103 mph as he approached the 

intersection of Highway 50 and 12th Street.

¶ 8 Walter and his brother Samuel were in Walter’s van — which 

had a trailer attached — waiting to turn left at the intersection of 

Highway 50 and 12th Street. Walter waited for the white Toyota to

cross the intersection and then began to make a left-hand turn 

across the highway. Officer Hice saw the van and swerved right in 

an attempt to avoid a collision. But the front of his patrol car
4

struck the passenger side of the van. At the time of impact, Officer 

Hice was traveling around seventy-five to eighty mph.

Image of Incident2

¶ 9 The Girons sued Olathe and Officer Hice. Olathe filed a 

motion to dismiss, later joined by Officer Hice, asserting 

governmental immunity. Olathe and Officer Hice argued that he

had his emergency lights activated at the time of the incident and 

2 Figure 29 from Exhibit 15, which was admitted as evidence at the 

Trinity hearing, depicts the intersection of Highway 50 and 12th

Street and the orientation of both vehicles at the start of the crash.

Officer Hice’s patrol car is shown in green, and Walter and Samuel’s 

van is shown in dark blue, with the attached trailer shown in 

brown.
5

that, while he was speeding, his driving did not endanger life or 

property.

¶ 10 After a Trinity hearing, the district court found that it was 

“undisputed that [Officer Hice] never put his siren on initially, nor 

did he put on his emergency lights.” The court also found that 

Officer Hice “reached about 103 miles an hour just prior to the 

accident.” The court determined, however, that Officer Hice’s 

“[emergency] lights were on for between five and 10 seconds prior to 

the accident and that that was sufficient time to alert other drivers 

in the immediate vicinity to take care.” As a result, the court 

dismissed the Girons’ complaint. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 Generally, governmental entities in Colorado are “immune 

from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in 

tort.” § 24-10-106(1). Because the CGIA immunity provisions 

derogate Colorado’s common law, “we construe the [C]GIA 

provisions that withhold immunity broadly [and] we construe the 

exceptions to these waivers strictly.” Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 81 (quoting

Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000)). We strictly 

construe the exceptions to waiver provisions because “the ultimate 
6

effect of the exceptions is to grant immunity.” Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 

1086.

¶ 12 An issue of governmental immunity under the CGIA presents a 

question of subject matter jurisdiction to be determined under 

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85. “Because the CGIA 

protects the government from suit, the district court must 

necessarily make factual findings to ensure that the court has 

jurisdiction to hear the case.” City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 

2018 CO 37, ¶ 10. And “the plaintiff bears the burden of proving 

that the court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.” 

Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85.

¶ 13 This burden, however, “is relatively lenient, as the plaintiff is 

afforded the reasonable inferences from [the] undisputed evidence.” 

Dennis, ¶ 11. And “because Trinity hearings are limited in nature, 

and because tort concepts are naturally subjective, the district 

court should not fully resolve the issue of whether the government 

has committed negligence; rather, the court should only satisfy 

itself that it has the ability to hear the case.” Id. Instead, issues

such as negligence or causation “are matters properly resolved by 
7

the trier of fact.” Swieckowski v. City of Fort Collins, 934 P.2d 1380, 

1384 (Colo. 1997).

¶ 14 Thus, “[i]t is well-established that the application of sovereign 

immunity [under the CGIA] presents a mixed question of fact and 

law.” Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 14. “[W]e defer to 

the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous.” Id. A factual finding is clearly erroneous when it lacks 

no support in the record. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. 

Guarantee Co. of North America, 2019 COA 44, ¶ 36.

¶ 15 After the questions of fact are resolved, “we review questions of 

governmental immunity de novo.” Maphis, ¶ 15 (quoting Dennis, 

¶ 12). “As with all matters of statutory construction, in construing 

the [C]GIA, including its waivers, we must give effect to the 

legislature’s intent.” Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 81. To effectuate that 

intent, ‘“[w]e look to the language of the statute, giving words their 

plain and ordinary meaning.’” Id. (quoting Springer v. City & Cnty. 

of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 799 (Colo. 2000)). If the plain language of 

the statute ‘“demonstrates a clear legislative intent, we look no 

further in conducting our analysis.’” Id. (quoting Springer, 13 P.3d 

at 799).
8

III. Preservation

¶ 16 Officer Hice and Olathe contend that the issue of whether 

Officer Hice failed to activate his lights in sufficient time to alert 

Walter and Samuel is not preserved because the Girons only

asserted below that the officer completely failed to activate his 

emergency lights before the collision. We disagree.

¶ 17 In the complaint, the Girons alleged that “Walter Giron was 

not able to react and yield to the Impala [Officer Hice’s patrol 

vehicle] because the Impala was approaching at a speed almost 

twice as fast as the speed limit and the Impala’s emergency lights 

were not turned on, or were not turned on in time to be seen and 

reacted to by a reasonable person.” In response to Officer Hice and 

Olathe’s brief,3 the Girons argued that the relevant time period for 

the court to consider in determining whether Officer Hice and 

Olathe were entitled to immunity was the entire thirty-four seconds 

prior to the crash, which was the time in which Officer Hice

exceeded speed limits, as shown on his body camera video. They 

3 Olathe and Officer Hice denominated their filing as a trial brief, 

although it was more accurately a pre-hearing brief, as it was

submitted prior to the Trinity hearing.
9

asked the court to not just limit its inquiry and analysis to the nine 

seconds immediately prior to the crash when Officer Hice activated 

his emergency lights.

¶ 18 “We do not require that parties use ‘talismanic language’ to 

preserve particular arguments for appeal.” People v. Melendez, 102 

P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004). Instead, “the [district] court must be 

presented with an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact 

and conclusions of law on any issue before we will review it.” Id. 

The district court specifically made findings that Officer Hice’s 

emergency lights were activated for a sufficient amount of time prior 

to the collision to alert others to his presence, which demonstrates 

to us that this contention was adequately raised for the court to 

have considered (and rejected) it. Consequently, the Girons

preserved this issue.

IV. Activation of Emergency Lights and Siren in a Pursuit

¶ 19 We conclude that the district court applied the incorrect legal 

standard and thus improperly determined that Officer Hice and 

Olathe were entitled to immunity. Based on the plain language of

section 42-4-108 — an exception to the waiver of immunity under 

section 24-10-106(1)(a) — an officer is not entitled to immunity 
10

when he does not activate his emergency lights or sirens for the 

entire time he exceeds the speed limit and is in pursuit of an actual

or suspected violator of the law.

A. The Emergency Vehicle Exception

¶ 20 Section 24-10-106(1)(a) provides that sovereign immunity is 

waived by a public entity in any action for injuries resulting from 

“[t]he operation of a motor vehicle, owned or leased by such public 

entity, by a public employee while in the course of employment, 

except emergency vehicles operating within the provisions of section 

42-4-108(2) and (3), C.R.S.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 21 Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1087, summed up the interplay of

sections 24-10-106(1)(a) and 42-4-108(2) and (3):

 “[S]ection 24-10-106 grants immunity to public entities and 

their employees generally.”

 “The motor vehicle immunity waiver of section 24-10-106(1)(a) 

takes away this immunity for the operation of motor vehicles 

by public entities and their employees.”

 “The emergency vehicle exception, however, restores immunity 

to the public entities and their employees operating emergency 

vehicles in response to emergency calls.”
11

 “Subsections (a) to (d) of section 42-4-108(2) specifically grant 

immunity for specific traffic violations, such as speeding and 

running stop signals.” Finally,

 “[T]here are possible conditions to the violations of subsections 

(b) and (c), which, if left unsatisfied, may place the public 

entities and their employees back within the motor vehicle 

immunity waiver, thereby subjecting them to potential liability 

in tort.”

¶ 22 Section 42-4-108(2), provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he 

driver of an authorized emergency vehicle . . . when in pursuit of an 

actual or suspected violator of the law” may “exercise the privileges 

set forth in this section.” (Emphasis added.) As relevant here, such 

privileges include “[e]xceed[ing] the lawful speeds set forth in

section 42-4-1101(2)[, C.R.S. 2021,] or exceed[ing] the maximum 

lawful speed limits set forth in section 42-4-1101(8) so long as said 

driver does not endanger life or property.” § 42-4-108(2)(c). But 

section 42-4-108(3) states that the exception to the waiver of 

immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(a) applies to the privilege of 

speeding under section 42-4-108(2)(c) “only when such vehicle is 

making use of audible or visual signals” that meet certain statutory 
12

requirements. (Emphasis added.) Section 42-4-108(3) then notes 

that an emergency vehicle may not need to use audio and visual 

signals, even when in “actual pursuit of a suspected violator” of a 

traffic law, “so long as such pursuit is being made to obtain 

verification of or evidence of the guilt of the suspected violator.” Id. 

¶ 23 Tidwell determined that “[t]he net effect of these statutes is 

that a governmental entity is generally immune from tort liability in 

connection with the operation of an emergency vehicle,” but “the 

vehicle must be operating with emergency lights and siren 

activated, unless the vehicle is in pursuit of a suspected violator to 

obtain evidence of guilt.” See 83 P.3d at 81. Thus, Tidwell

concluded, “[w]here an officer already has probable cause to stop a 

driver and the officer is pursuing the driver for that reason, the 

statute contemplates the use of emergency signals.” Id. at 84.

¶ 24 Because the officer’s emergency lights or sirens were not 

activated at all in Tidwell, the supreme court concluded that the

officer did not satisfy the conditions in section 42-4-108. Id. at 78-

79. It reached this conclusion by “look[ing] at section 42-4-108 as 

a whole” to ascertain the General Assembly’s purpose of the lights 

and siren requirement. Id. at 82.
13

¶ 25 Tidwell reasoned that “it is clear that a police vehicle in 

pursuit of a driver suspected of violating Title 42 must activate its 

lights and siren in order to alert the suspect to stop as well as to 

warn other drivers of the ongoing pursuit.” Id. at 83 (emphasis 

added). The court continued, “the purpose of the lights and siren 

requirement is to ensure that operators of emergency vehicles give 

due regard to the safety of other drivers on the road,” and activating 

the lights and siren is not “a mere request to stop or pull over.” Id. 

It concluded that, “[w]hile undoubtedly one of the purposes of a 

police vehicle’s audible and visual signals is to order a pursued 

vehicle to stop, another purpose is to make other drivers aware of 

the pursuit so they may alter their conduct accordingly.” Id.

¶ 26 Officer Hice’s emergency lights were only activated for the last 

five to ten seconds of the pursuit prior to the collision with Walter’s 

van (and his siren was never activated). Thus, Tidwell did not need 

to address the factual situation before us. We conclude that, if the 

officer and the public entity for whom he works seek to have

governmental immunity restored under section 42-4-108(2)(c) and 

(3) when the officer is operating an emergency vehicle in pursuit of 

an actual or suspected violator of the law and the officer is 
14

exceeding speed limits, the officer must activate lights or sirens as 

soon as the vehicle exceeds the speed limit. It is not enough for the 

officer to activate lights or sirens sometime after exceeding the 

speed limit while in pursuit. We extend Tidwell’s holding for three 

reasons.

¶ 27 First, the plain language of section 42-4-108(2)(c) and (3)

dictates this result. Section 42-4-108(2) states that the “driver of 

an authorized emergency vehicle” may exercise certain “privileges,” 

such as exceeding the speed limit under section 42-4-108(2)(c). 

(Emphasis added.) That same provision says that the “privilege” to 

exceed speed limits may be exercised by an officer in pursuit of an 

actual or suspected violator of the law. And under section 42-4-

108(3), the “privilege” of the driver to exceed speed limits “shall

continue to apply” for purposes of restoring governmental immunity

“only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals.” 

(Emphasis added.) See Ricchio v. Colo. Sec. Comm’r, 2022 COA 35, 

¶ 28 (“Unless the context indicates otherwise, the word ‘shall’ 

generally indicates that the General Assembly intended the 

provision to be mandatory.” (quoting DiMarco v. Dep’t of Revenue, 

857 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Colo. App. 1993))). Nothing in the statutory 
15

language authorizes restoration of governmental immunity to an 

officer exercising the privilege of speeding unless the officer is using 

lights or sirens.

¶ 28 Second and relatedly, the General Assembly did not give an 

officer discretion under section 42-4-108(3) to decide when to 

activate his emergency lights or sirens during the pursuit of an

actual violator of Title 42 or a suspected violator of another law. 

Under what is known as the “verification clause” in section 42-4-

108(3), if an officer has not yet ascertained whether a person has

violated a law under Title 42, he may exceed speed limits without 

activating lights or sirens “so long as such pursuit is being made to 

obtain verification of or evidence of the guilt of the suspected 

violator.” See Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 83 (“[W]e construe the verification 

exception merely to permit a reasonably safe pursuit of a suspect, 

without lights and siren, only where the officer is trying to confirm 

his suspicions that the driver has violated Title 42 and where the 

officer otherwise has no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 

stop the driver of the vehicle.”). 

¶ 29 Thus, the officer has discretion to not activate his lights or 

sirens while in pursuit of a suspected violator of Title 42 so long as 
16

he is trying to verify whether the suspected violator is an actual 

violator of a traffic law. But, once the officer determines that he is 

in pursuit of an actual violator of Title 42 or a suspected violator of 

another law, he has no discretion to decide when to activate his 

lights or sirens. Lights or sirens must be activated once the officer 

exceeds lawful speeds or engages in the other privileged conduct 

specified in section 42-4-108(2). § 42-4-108(3). We will not read 

into the statute conditions not expressly included. See People ex 

rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 31 (“[W]hen the General 

Assembly includes a provision in one section of a statute, but 

excludes the same provision from another section, we presume that

the General Assembly did so purposefully.” (quoting Well 

Augmentation Subdistrict v. City of Aurora, 221 P.3d 399, 419 (Colo. 

2009))); Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo. 

2010) (“[W]e will not construe a statute in a manner that assumes

the General Assembly made an omission; rather, the General 

Assembly’s failure to include particular language is a statement of 

legislative intent.”). 

¶ 30 Finally, because section 42-4-108 is an exception to the waiver 

of immunity, we must strictly construe it because the effect of its 
17

application would be to grant immunity. Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 

1086. Tidwell concluded that the General Assembly’s purposes in 

enacting an audible or visual signal requirement for an emergency 

vehicle were twofold: not only to command the actual or suspected 

violator of the law to stop, but also to warn other drivers on the 

road to “alter their conduct accordingly.” 83 P.3d at 83; see also

§ 42-4-213(5), C.R.S. 2021 (“The use of either the audible or the 

visual signal equipment described in this section shall impose upon 

drivers of other vehicles the obligation to yield right-of-way and 

stop . . . .”); § 42-4-705(1), C.R.S. 2021 (“Upon the immediate 

approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of audible 

or visual signals,” the driver shall yield, attempt to drive to a 

position as close as possible to the right-hand edge of the roadway, 

and stop “until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed.”). 

¶ 31 Thus, by strictly construing the exception restoring immunity 

to public entities and operators of emergency vehicles under the 

circumstances set forth in section 42-4-108(2)(c), we are simply 

effectuating the General Assembly’s intent that an officer activate 

his lights or sirens once he exceeds the speed limit when he is in 

pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law.
18

B. Application

¶ 32 The parties do not dispute that Officer Hice was in pursuit of 

an actual violator of the law under Title 42 — the driver of the white 

Toyota exceeding the speed limit. Thus, the parties agree that the 

exception in the verification clause does not apply to excuse Officer 

Hice’s failure to active his emergency lights or sirens during the 

pursuit. 

¶ 33 Consistent with Tidwell, Officer Hice began his “pursuit” once 

he began following the white Toyota. Then he passed seven other 

cars. Officer Hice was exceeding the speed limit of 55 mph, driving 

at 75 mph through the northern intersection of Highway 50, 80 

mph when he passed the seventh driver, and 103 mph just prior to 

the accident.

¶ 34 Based on Officer Hice’s body camera footage, approximately 

thirty-six seconds elapsed between when he began his pursuit of 

the speeding vehicle and when his patrol car collided with Walter 

and Samuel’s van. The district court found that Officer Hice 

“illuminated his emergency lights roughly 25 seconds within his 

pursuit.” This finding is consistent with the unrebutted testimony 

the district court heard from Rosa Perez, a forensic analyst for the 
19

Fort Collins Police Services, that Officer Hice told her that he did 

not turn on his sirens because it interferes with his radio. Officer 

Hice also acknowledged that he did not activate his emergency 

lights until he passed the seventh person, who testified not seeing 

any lights illuminated. Instead, Officer Hice testified that he has a 

“personal policy of turning on his lights when he reache[s] about 80 

mph” and that he did not activate his emergency lights immediately 

because, in his experience, it can make the behavior of other 

motorists “a little chaotic.”

¶ 35 Seven witnesses in vehicles that were passed by Officer Hice 

testified that they did not see the emergency lights activated on his 

patrol car, including up to the point of the crash. Conversely, the 

witness in the vehicle behind Walter’s van — a retired police officer 

— testified that he was certain Officer Hice’s emergency lights were 

activated on his patrol car as Officer Hice approached the 

intersection. The district court discounted the testimony of the

seven drivers and credited the testimony of the retired officer.

¶ 36 This led the district court to determine, applying an incorrect 

legal standard, that because Officer Hice’s emergency lights were 

activated for at least five to ten seconds prior to the accident, other
20

drivers had “sufficient time” to react, and thus Office Hice and 

Olathe were entitled to immunity. But given our above

interpretation of section 42-4-108(2)(c) and (3), even though Officer 

Hice activated his emergency lights five to ten seconds before the 

collision with Walter and Samuel’s van, he and Olathe do not, as a 

matter of law, qualify for the exception. For Officer Hice and Olathe 

to be entitled to immunity, Officer Hice would need to have 

activated his emergency lights or sirens the moment he exceeded 

the speed limit during his pursuit of the white Toyota.

¶ 37 As we noted above, the General Assembly carved out the

immunity waiver exception for emergency vehicles to balance a

responder’s privilege to exceed speed limits with the need to provide 

safety for other drivers. Officer Hice’s “personal policy” of deciding 

when to activate his lights or sirens when he exercises the privilege 

to exceed speed limits in pursuit of an actual violator of the law

does not qualify him for immunity under section 42-4-108(2)(c) and 

(3). To hold otherwise would allow operators of emergency vehicles, 

in their own discretion, to decide when to activate their sirens or 

lights, contrary to the plain language of the statute. See Tidwell, 83 

P.3d at 81.
21

¶ 38 Consequently, we conclude that the district court erred when 

it determined Officer Hice and Olathe satisfied the conditions in 

section 42-4-108(2)(c) and (3) entitling them to immunity under the 

exception to the waiver of immunity in section 24-10-106(1)(a).4

V. Causal Relationship

¶ 39 Olathe and Officer Hice contend that, due to the district 

court’s finding that Walter had “sufficient time” to react to the 

presence of Officer Hice’s vehicle once the emergency lights were 

activated, “there is no basis in the record to maintain the accident

resulted from Officer Hice’s failure to use emergency lights at any 

time.” We disagree that this is the proper standard to determine a 

causal relationship in this circumstance. 

¶ 40 As noted above, section 24-10-106(1)(a) waives sovereign 

immunity of a public entity “in an action for injuries resulting 

from . . . [t]he operation of a motor vehicle.” For purposes of 

determining whether sovereign immunity is waived in this case, we 

4 Based on our interpretation of the exception to the waiver of 

immunity in section 42-4-108(3), C.R.S. 2021, we need not address 

the parties’ extensive arguments as to the standard for analyzing 

when an emergency operator exceeding the speed limit endangers 

life or property. 
22

consider whether Walter’s and Samuel’s injuries resulted from the 

operation of Officer Hice’s motor vehicle.

¶ 41 Tidwell analyzed the “resulting from” language in section 24-

10-106(1)(a). That case involved injuries sustained by a passenger 

in a limousine, who was hit by a driver being pursued by an officer; 

thus, the officer was not the one directly involved in the collision 

that caused the passenger’s injuries. Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 77. The 

court acknowledged that the “resulting from” language suggests 

“some relationship between a plaintiff[’]s injuries and the public 

entity[’]s conduct before a waiver of immunity is triggered.” Id. at 

86. But it also disagreed that “resulting from” and “caused by” were 

synonymous based on the fact the CGIA used “caused by” in other 

provisions but not in section 24-10-106(1)(a). Id.; see also § 24-10-

106(1)(d)(II) (“[a] dangerous condition caused by the failure to 

realign a stop sign”); § 24-10-106(1)(d)(III)) (“[a] dangerous condition 

caused by an accumulation of snow and ice”).

¶ 42 Instead, Tidwell determined that “a waiver must be found 

where the injuries complained of occurred as a consequence or 

effect of any of the public entity’s alleged conduct or omissions.” 83 

P.3d at 86. This meant the district court was not required to 
23

determine whether Tidwell’s injuries were “caused by” the officer’s 

conduct for immunity purposes, as such a finding would be for the 

fact finder. Id. Therefore, “a waiver will exist where a plaintiff 

alleges facts proving a minimal causal connection between the 

injuries and the specified conduct.” Id. 

¶ 43 In Corsentino, 4 P.3d at 1085, the supreme court did not 

address the “resulting from” language because the deputy sheriff 

involved in that case was directly involved in the collision at issue. 

The deputy sheriff received a dispatch call in response to a home 

burglary alarm. The deputy responded with lights and sirens 

activated. While en route, the deputy was speeding and his vehicle 

collided with another car, resulting in the death of the other driver. 

Id. At issue in Corsentino was whether the officer was entitled to 

the restoration of immunity under section 42-4-108(2) because, 

although the vehicle’s lights and sirens were activated the entire 

time he was speeding, the question was whether the sheriff drove in 

a manner that endangered life or property.

¶ 44 Once the supreme court in Corsentino determined that the 

deputy sheriff was not entitled to the exception to immunity in 

section 42-4-108, it remanded the case to the district court, noting 
24

that the deputy sheriff and his employer may be “subject to 

potential liability in tort.” Id. at 1093. In other words, the court did 

not engage in a causal relationship analysis because the plaintiff’s 

“injuries result[ed] from” the operation of an emergency vehicle, 

§ 24-10-106(1)(a), and immunity was not restored based on one of 

the conditions in section 42-4-108(2) and (3).

¶ 45 Here, Officer Hice operated the vehicle that directly collided 

with Walter’s van, and that collision resulted in the injuries 

sustained by Walter and Samuel. We conclude, for purposes of 

jurisdiction under the CGIA, that Walter’s and Samuel’s injuries 

resulted from the operation of an emergency vehicle, and in the 

absence of the condition of lights or sirens activated while exceeding 

the speed limit when in pursuit of an actual violator of the law, this 

brings the Girons’ claims within the scope of the immunity waiver 

in section 24-10-106(1)(a). To resolve the immunity question, the 

Girons need not allege and the court need not determine more of a 

causal connection between the public entity’s conduct and the 

injuries.
25

¶ 46 Officer Hice and Olathe are not immune under the CGIA from 

liability for Walter’s or Samuel’s injuries. As a result, Olathe and 

Officer Hice may be subject to potential liability in tort.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 47 We reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand to the 

district court to reinstate the Girons’ complaint.

JUDGE BERGER and JUDGE BROWN concur.