Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1406 | May 27, 2020 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Jennifer A. Joas

Madison, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Myriam Serrano 

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robyn Johnson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 27, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1406

Appeal from the 

Switzerland Circuit Court

The Honorable 

W. Gregory Coy, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

78C01-1808-F1-344

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1406 | May 27, 2020 Page 2 of 10

[1] The State charged Robyn Johnson (“Johnson”) with neglect of a dependent1 as 

a Level 1 felony. Johnson and the State entered a plea agreement, and Johnson 

reserved the right to appeal her sentence. Following her guilty plea, Johnson 

was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years with five years 

suspended to probation and the remaining twenty years executed in the 

Department of Correction (“DOC”). Contending that her sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character, Johnson 

now appeals.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Johnson is the mother of eight children. Tr. Vol. II at 11. C.B.J. was one of her 

children. Id. at 33, 46. He was born on March 3, 2015 with a twisted bowel 

and required multiple bowel resection surgeries. Id. at 46, 48-49; Def.’s Ex. 3 at 

92-94. As a result of these surgeries, C.B.J. suffered from malabsorption, 

required hydration and long-term care, and underwent additional surgeries and 

hospitalizations. Tr. Vol. II at 49, 55, 57; Def.’s Ex. 3 at 92-93.

[4] In April of 2017, C.B.J. underwent surgery at Cincinnati Children’s Hospital 

(“the Hospital”) and was hospitalized for nine weeks due to complications 

arising from that surgery. Tr. Vol. II at 56. He was discharged on June 14, 2017 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4. 
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and returned home for two days. Id. at 61. On June 16, 2017, his mother took 

him back to the Hospital due to problems with his gastro-intestinal feeding tube. 

Id. at 61-63. While C.B.J. was at the Hospital, Dr. Timothy Brenkert (“Dr. 

Brenkert”), an emergency room physician, wanted to do bloodwork on C.B.J.

out of concerns related to dehydration and a possible infection. Id. at 66-67; 

Def.’s Ex. 3 at 125. 

[5] C.B.J. was known as a “hard stick,” and problems arose when nurses attempted 

to take blood from him. Tr. Vol. II at 67. C.B.J. was crying and writhing in 

pain throughout the procedure. Id. Finally, Hospital personnel succeeded in 

filling two vials with blood; however, one of the vials was coagulated and could 

not be used. Id. at 68. Hospital staff wanted to draw more blood from C.B.J. 

Id. Johnson, who had witnessed the entire procedure and was upset with their 

treatment of her son, decided that she was going to take C.B.J. home. Id. 

Johnson believed that C.B.J. was dehydrated because his feeding pump was 

turned off after his arrival at the Hospital, and she felt that she could rehydrate 

C.B.J. at home. Id. at 69, 135. She also expressed to Hospital personnel that 

she needed to leave the Hospital to attend to her other children and go to work 

and would not leave without C.B.J. Def.’s Ex. 3 at 30. 

[6] Dr. Brenkert discussed C.B.J.’s discharge with Johnson. Id. at 177. At that 

time, Dr. Brenkert was unaware of the lab results from the vial of C.B.J.’s blood 

that was not coagulated. Id. at 179. When Dr. Brenkert learned of the blood 

test results, he was concerned with C.B.J.’s hydration levels and kidney 

function. Id. at 159-63. Combined with C.B.J.’s unmanaged heart rate, Dr. 
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Brenkert was concerned that C.B.J. had an infection, and he presented Johnson 

with an “Against Medical Advice” form (“A.M.A.”). Id. at 164, 178-82. 

Handwritten on the A.M.A. form was “short gut syndrome with tachycardia, 

dehydration, death and kidney failure.” Def.’s Ex. 4 at 9.

[7] Johnson signed the A.M.A. form and left the Hospital with C.B.J. at 5:40 a.m. 

Tr. Vol. II at 68-69, 154. At 5:51 a.m., another Hospital physician, Dr. David

Vitale, contacted Johnson and informed her that C.B.J.’s vital signs and labs 

indicated life-threatening dehydration and a possible infection and that C.B.J. 

needed to be returned immediately or he would contact police. Id. at 153, 156, 

169-70; Def.’s Ex. 4 at 158. Johnson did not return C.B.J. to the Hospital. Tr. 

Vol. II at 70, 99. Instead, she called the Vevay Police Department to ask if she 

could be arrested for not returning C.B.J. to the Hospital. Id. at 108, 153. Her 

call was re-routed to the Switzerland County Sheriff’s office. Id. at 153, 158-59, 

161. She then continued driving home, arriving there at 7:33 a.m. Id. at 153.

[8] Upon her arrival at home, Johnson put C.B.J. to bed and reconnected his 

feeding tube to give him PediaLite. Id. at 72, 103. At 8:33 a.m., Dr. Annie 

Ferguson called from the Hospital to reiterate that C.B.J.’s blood work showed 

a possible infection and that C.B.J. needed to be returned to the Hospital 

immediately. Id. at 153, 160; Def.’s Ex. 4 at 171. Johnson agreed to do so. 

Def.’s Ex. 4 at 171.

[9] At 8:45 a.m., Johnson left her home to pick up her other children and returned 

at 9:09 a.m. Tr. Vol. II at 153. At 9:27 a.m., she began attempting to arrange 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1406 | May 27, 2020 Page 5 of 10

for an ambulance that could take C.B.J. back to the Hospital. Id. at 101, 153. 

Noticing that C.B.J.’s breathing had changed, she again called to request an 

ambulance. Id. at 73, 153. At 9:37 a.m., C.B.J. was in cardiac arrest, and 

Johnson and her boyfriend performed CPR on C.B.J. Id. at 73, 101, 153-54.

[10] C.B.J was flown to the Hospital where he was pronounced dead on June 17, 

2017. Id. at 73. An autopsy determined the cause of C.B.J.’s death to be 

“severe dehydration complicating short gut syndrome with jejunostomy tube 

dependence due to small bowel resection with complications due to congenital 

intestinal malformation with midgut volvulus and the manner of death to be 

homicide (child neglect).” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 10.

[11] On August 29, 2018, the State charged Johnson with neglect of a dependent as 

a Level 1 felony. Id. at 7-8. On April 17, 2019, Johnson and the State entered a 

plea agreement by which Johnson pleaded guilty to the offense of neglect of a 

dependent as a Level 1 felony with a maximum sentence of thirty years and a 

minimum, nonsuspendible sentence of twenty years. Id. at 12-14. On that 

same day, the trial court took her guilty plea under advisement and scheduled a 

sentencing hearing for May 17, 2019. Id. at 5. At the sentencing hearing, the 

trial court heard the parties’ presentations of evidence and arguments, 

considered Johnson’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), and imposed its 

sentence on Johnson. Tr. Vol. II at 7-186. Before sentencing Johnson, the trial 

court stated as follows:

The Court does find that the mitigating factors outweigh the 

aggravating factors in this case and the plea agreement should be 
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accepted and the defendant sentenced accordingly. I would find 

that that means that the advisory sentence of 30 years, which is 

the maximum under the plea agreement, the sentence needs to be 

under that. I do find, this is not set out in here specifically, that 

this not a case where the Court is going to consider alternative 

sentencing, if at all. This is a Level 1 Felony and I believe it 

mentions in the pre-sentence that there was contact with 

community corrections or an effort to contact them and they did 

not respond. In my experience, and I was a lawyer [for] 20 and 

I’ve been up here about 10 1/2, I’ve not seen anyone on Class A 

or Level 1 doing it on detention. That doesn’t mean they have or 

haven’t done some other alternative but in my experience, that 

hasn’t happened.

Id. at 185. The trial court then imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty-five 

years with five years suspended to probation and twenty years executed in the 

DOC, the minimum sentence provided in the plea agreement. Id. at 185-86; 

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 15-19. Johnson now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[12] Johnson contends that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of her 

offense and her character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise 

a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find 

the sentence inappropriate considering the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender. Whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on the 

culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to 

others, and other factors that come to light in a given case. Cardwell v. State, 895 

N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). We defer to the trial court’s decision, and our 

goal is to determine whether an appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not 
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whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 

N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome 

by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense 

(such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the 

defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples 

of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The 

location where a sentence is to be served is an appropriate focus for our review 

and revise authority. Biddinger v. State, 868 N.E.2d 407, 414 (Ind. 2007). 

However, a defendant faces a rigorous burden convincing us that a given 

placement is inappropriate. Fonner v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2007). In reviewing a sentence, we seek to leaven the outliers rather than to 

achieve a perceived correct result in each case. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. 

[13] On appeal, Johnson requests that her sentence be reduced from twenty-five 

years to twenty years and that she be permitted to serve the sentence on home 

detention. We decline her request. 

[14] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1016, 

1019 (Ind. 2012). The sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is a fixed term of 

imprisonment between twenty and forty years, with the advisory sentence being 

thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). An addendum to Johnson’s guilty plea 

agreement established additional sentencing parameters for the trial court to 

consider, with the advisory sentence for a Level 1 felony of thirty years as the 

maximum sentence and twenty years, nonsuspendible, as the minimum 
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sentence. Johnson received an aggregate sentence of twenty-five years with five 

years suspended to probation and the remaining twenty years executed in the 

DOC. Her sentence is less than the advisory sentence for a Level 1 felony and 

within the range established by the guilty plea. In fact, the executed time of 

twenty years in the DOC to which Johnson was sentenced is the minimum term 

of imprisonment for a Level 1 felony.

[15] The nature of the offense compares the defendant’s actions with the required 

showing to sustain a conviction under the charged offense. Cardwell, 895 

N.E.2d at 1224. When Johnson committed the offense, she ignored the 

repeated requests of medical personnel to keep two-year old C.B.J. at the 

Hospital and to return him after she removed him against medical advice. Tr. 

Vol. II at 68-69, 154-56, 169-70; Def.’s Ex. 3 at 164, 178-82; Def.’s Ex. 4 at 158.

Instead of keeping C.B.J. at the Hospital to control and address his underlying 

medical condition, Johnson took C.B.J. home and contacted the Vevay Police 

Department along the way to inquire as to whether her conduct in taking C.B.J. 

from the Hospital could be considered criminal. Tr. Vol. II at 153, 158-59, 161. 

In pleading guilty to the offense, Johnson admitted to knowingly or 

intentionally putting C.B.J. in a situation that resulted in his death. Tr. Vol. II 

at 5; Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 12-14. We acknowledge that Johnson felt 

she was trying to help C.B.J. by taking him home to rehydrate him outside of 

the Hospital setting. Tr. Vol. II at 69, 135. However, Johnson was keenly

aware that C.B.J. could become critically ill in a “moment’s notice” and that 

dehydration and the critical nature of his illness could quickly escalate. Id. at 
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92. In light of the severity of C.B.J.’s chronic medical condition and the urgent 

need for additional testing to properly assess his condition, we do not find her 

sentence to be inappropriate based on the nature of the offense. 

[16] The character of the offender permits a broader consideration of the defendant’s 

character. Anderson v. State, 989 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The 

trial court reviewed Johnson’s PSI, which revealed limited criminal history and 

her own extensive medical history. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 20-199;

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. III at 2-95. The trial court found Johnson’s criminal 

history to be negligible and acknowledged the hardship that her incarceration 

would cause for her other children. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 15-16. It 

also found that Johnson showed remorse by pleading guilty and that her 

conviction was due to events that were unlikely to reoccur. Id. The trial court 

noted, based on the severity of the crime, that Johnson’s situation was “not a 

case where the Court is going to consider alternative sentencing.” Tr. Vol. II at

185. The trial court sentenced Johnson to a term of twenty-five years, with five 

years suspended to probation and the remaining twenty years executed in the 

DOC. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 16-17. Her sentence reflects the 

considerations applicable to her case, including the hardship caused by her 

incarceration, and the executed portion of the sentence is equivalent to the 

minimum sentence for her offense. Johnson’s request to serve her sentence on 

home detention due to her extensive medical conditions and the hardship of 

incarceration on her other children, focuses on why home detention would be 

more appropriate than placement at the DOC and not why placement at the 
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DOC is inappropriate, which is not our prerogative under Appellate Rule 

7(B). Fonner, 876 N.E.2d at 343-44. We cannot say that Johnson has shown 

“substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” such that 

reducing her sentence to twenty years served on home detention is warranted

based on her character. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Therefore, in light of the 

nature of Johnson’s offense and her character, we cannot say that her sentence 

is inappropriate.

[17] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.