UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 00-4931

REGINALD THURSTON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Greenville.

James C. Fox, Senior District Judge.

(CR-96-43-F)

Submitted: April 27, 2001

Decided: June 20, 2001

Before LUTTIG, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney,

Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Yvonne V.

Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North

Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Reginald Thurston appeals the district court’s revocation of his

supervised release term and the imposition of a twenty-four-month

prison sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. 

Thurston was convicted in 1997 of aiding and abetting credit card

fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1029(a)(5) (1994), and sentenced to thirtyseven months imprisonment, followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. Thurston completed his term of imprisonment and

began his term of supervised release on October 18, 1999. 

On March 8, 2000, the Government filed a petition to revoke Thurston’s supervised release based on his failure to report to his probation officer as required under the conditions of his supervised release.

After a hearing in which Thurston testified and admitted to the violation, the district court found that Thurston had committed the violation alleged by the Government and revoked his supervised release.

We review the district court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s

supervised release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Copley,

978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). The district court need only find

a violation of a condition of supervised release by a preponderance of

the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (1994). Here, Thurston admitted

to the violation alleged in the petition to revoke his supervised

release. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

revoking his supervised release. 

Because Thurston’s underlying conviction was for a Class C felony, the statutory maximum sentence upon revocation of his supervised release was two years incarceration. Id. Pursuant to U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a) (1998), the imprisonment

range for a defendant convicted of a Class C felony with a criminal

2 UNITED STATES v. THURSTON
history Category V is seven to thirteen months. The Chapter 7 policy

statements, however, are not binding. United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d

638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). If the court has considered the relevant factors and the applicable policy statements, the court has the discretion

to impose a sentence outside the ranges set out in the sentencing

guidelines. Id. at 642-43. The transcript reveals that the district court

considered the relevant factors and policy statements in imposing the

sentence. Id. at 642. 

Because Thurston’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), we review the sentence only to

determine whether it is "plainly unreasonable." 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742(a)(4) (1994). Given the facts of this case and the nature of

Thurston’s conduct, we cannot say that the twenty-four-month sentence imposed by the district court was plainly unreasonable. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order revoking Thurston’s

supervised release and imposing a twenty-four-month sentence. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. THURSTON 3