Supreme Court 

No. 2016-240-Appeal. 

(PC 15-3539) 

Vincent R. Coccoli, Sr. :

v. :

Town of Scituate Town Council et al. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before 

publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to 

notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 

250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 

222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that 

corrections may be made before the opinion is published. 

June 8, 2018
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Supreme Court

No. 2016-240-Appeal.

(PC 15-3539)

Vincent R. Coccoli, Sr. :

v. :

Town of Scituate Town Council et al. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on 

March 6, 2018, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the 

issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. The pro se plaintiff, Vincent R. 

Coccoli, Sr. (plaintiff or Coccoli),

1

appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of the 

defendants (the town or defendants).2 On appeal, the plaintiff argues that issues of material fact 

remain which preclude summary judgment and that he is entitled to a trial on the merits of his 

claims. After hearing the arguments of the parties, examining the memoranda submitted by the 

parties, and reviewing the record, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that 

 

1 Despite the complex nature of this litigation, the plaintiff chose to proceed pro se, against the 

better recommendation of the trial justice:

“This [c]ourt has on more occasions than I can remember, what I 

will call countless occasions, admonished Mr. Coccoli that while 

he has a right to represent himself that the matters at bar in this 

case are receivership matters, were extremely sophisticated; and as 

a result, he could and should obtain qualified counsel.”

2

The plaintiff named the Town of Scituate Town Council and the following individual 

defendants in his complaint: (1) Charles Collins, Jr.; (2) John F. Winfield; (3) David B. 

Campbell; (4) Brenda Frederickson; (5) Kathleen Knight-Bianchi; (6) William Hurry; (7) Peter 

Furness in his capacity as Receiver; (8) Town of Scituate Building Official; and (9) David E. 

Provonsil.
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this case should be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this 

opinion, we vacate in part and affirm in part the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

The genesis of this case is plaintiff’s persistent yet failed attempts to develop the Hope 

Mill Property located in Scituate, Rhode Island (the property). The plaintiff was a member of 

Hope Mill Village Associates, LLC (HMVA). In December 2006, the Scituate Zoning Board of 

Review granted HMVA conditional approval for dimensional relief and special-use permits to 

allow for the redevelopment of the property. One of the conditions required HMVA to obtain 

approval from the Scituate Town Council, the West Warwick Sewer Authority, and the Rhode 

Island Department of Environmental Management (DEM) for a municipal sewer connection 

from the property to the West Warwick Regional Sewer System. At a regular meeting of the 

town council held on April 12, 2007, the town council voted to approve the sewer connection,

pending receipt of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from HMVA. The minutes of that 

meeting reflect the vote as follows:

“After lengthy discussion between the Council, Mr. Robinson and 

Mr. Geremia, and members of the audience * * * motion was made 

by Councilman Salisbury, seconded by Councilman Collins, and 

voted by consent agreement to grant approval of the 40,000 gallon 

capacity per day, contingent upon receiving a document in writing 

from Hope Mill Village Associates within 10 days, outlining the 

specifics previously discussed:

“Extend the sewer connections to Hope Sanitary Associates, Hope 

Elementary School, Hope Jackson Fire Dept., the Police Station, 

and to upfront the cost of the Town’s portion of the interceptor. 

“Any representation made by the Developer regarding the Town of 

Scituate, should be accurate and reflect what was discussed at this 

meeting.

“Motion made by Councilman Salisbury, seconded by Councilman 

Collins and voted by consent agreement to confer with Coventry 
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and West Warwick to ascertain what their intentions are regarding 

this upgrade, and to pursue an agreement that would share the 

costs. The contact should be done by David Provonsil and Legal 

Counsel.”

In July 2007, an MOU was executed between plaintiff and the town. The MOU was signed by 

the town council president, contained an official town seal, and was recorded in the land 

evidence records. Under the MOU, plaintiff agreed to “design, procure approvals for, and cause 

to construct a new sewer line * * *.” 

By 2010, the property became part of a bankruptcy proceeding; and, in January 2010, the 

bankruptcy trustee sold the property to New England Development R.I., LLC, which filed 

receivership proceedings in August 2010. The plaintiff and two other individuals executed a 

purchase and sale agreement with the receiver with respect to the property, but they defaulted 

and the receiver terminated the agreement. Subsequently, plaintiff individually executed a 

purchase and sale agreement for the property, but he defaulted again and the agreement was 

terminated. In 2014, plaintiff individually executed a third purchase and sale agreement for the 

property; that agreement was also terminated. In January 2016, the Superior Court approved the 

receiver’s petition to sell the property to BMP, LLC.

On August 13, 2015, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against defendants, alleging 

promissory estoppel and breach of oral contract, breach of confidentiality pertaining to 

proprietary information, tortious interference with a contract, and fraudulent misrepresentation. 

The defendants moved for summary judgment on April 20, 2016, arguing that (1) defendants did 

not breach the MOU because the town never approved the MOU and, further, that there was no 

evidence that plaintiff suffered financial harm; (2) plaintiff’s claim under § 552a(b) of the 

Privacy Act of 1974 had no merit because federal law was not applicable to defendants and there 

was no evidence that defendants disclosed plaintiff’s personal information; (3) there was no 
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evidence that the town council had intentionally interfered with the purchase and sale agreement 

plaintiff had executed; and (4) plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim was improper 

because it was based on the conduct of a nonmunicipal fire chief, who was not a town employee. 

The plaintiff objected to defendants’ motion, and for the first time raised the argument that 

defendants violated the Rhode Island Uniform Trade Secrets Act,

3 G.L. 1956 chapter 41 of title 

6. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was heard on July 11, 2016. At the outset, the 

trial justice noted what he characterized as plaintiff’s “checkered” history:

“All of the claims evolve out of the plaintiff’s efforts over many 

years to develop, redevelop, the so-called Hope Mill. The history, 

recent history of the Hope Mill, insofar as judicial proceedings are 

concerned, is checkered. It has been the subject of receivership 

proceedings, bankruptcy proceedings, and receivership 

proceedings again.

“A somewhat common factor running through it has been the pro 

se plaintiff here. In other circumstances, this [c]ourt has suggested 

or held that Mr. Coccoli’s life is intertwined, to a very great extent, 

with his desire and his efforts to rehab the mill for multifamily 

residential purposes primarily, a somewhat monumental task at this 

point.”

The trial justice granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all four counts of 

plaintiff’s complaint. He first addressed the MOU and found that it was not a binding 

agreement:

“The [c]ourt cannot find that that agreement is binding on the 

defendants. It was not specifically approved by the council, it 

 

3

The trial justice correctly stated that plaintiff erroneously raised the Rhode Island Uniform 

Trade Secrets Act through his objection to defendants’ motion for summary judgment and that 

the proper avenue for plaintiff to assert a new claim would have been through amending his 

complaint:

“In an effort to attempt to rehabilitate his position, Mr. Coccoli 

seeks to invoke certain state statutes, but he did that not through 

the means of seeking to amend his complaint, he just makes a bald 

statement in his memorandum and that does not suffice.”
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contained no terms; and as a matter of fact, to this day things 

contemplated there have not occurred.”

The trial justice next addressed plaintiff’s breach of confidentiality claim:

“Mr. Coccoli seeks to invoke certain state statutes, but he did that 

not through the means of seeking to amend his complaint, he just 

makes a bald statement in his memorandum and that does not 

suffice. The complaint speaks to specific legislation, specific 

federal laws that do not touch the Town of Scituate.”

With respect to plaintiff’s contractual interference claim, the trial justice stated:

“Although the complaint was that the council was rude to Mr. 

Coccoli and his partner because some members of the council left 

the meeting apparently at a time when Mr. Coccoli or his partner 

were late. But whether late or not, whether they left the meeting or 

not, that’s not grounds for interference with a contractual relation 

and the failure to enter into a tax stabilization agreement. The 

town has no obligation to enter into such agreements. That’s a 

matter of legislative determination.”

Finally, the trial justice addressed plaintiff’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim, stating:

“The [c]ourt searched the record and fails to find who * * * made 

representation. Discovery seemed to indicate that the claims 

predicated on the fact that a non-municipal in the sense of non 

Scituate fire chief signed a document for the department of 

environmental management which had printed on the face of it that 

it was not binding upon the Town and did not constitute notice to 

the Town. The fire chief was a fire district chief, not a town 

official.”

On July 20, 2016, plaintiff moved to vacate the entry of summary judgment, arguing that he 

never received a copy of defendants’ June 13, 2016 reply memorandum prior to the summaryjudgment hearing. A hearing on plaintiff’s motion was held on July 22, 2016, and the trial 

justice denied the motion. Final judgment entered for defendants on that same date. The 

plaintiff timely appealed. 

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial justice erred by granting summary judgment 

because there exist numerous issues of material fact. He also contends that the trial justice 
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granted summary judgment in error in light of the fact that plaintiff did not receive defendants’ 

reply memorandum until the summary-judgment hearing. Finally, plaintiff reasserts that he and 

the town have an enforceable contract.

Standard of Review

“[T]his Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 

A.3d 404, 406 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Sacco v. Cranston School Department, 53 A.3d 147, 149-50 

(R.I. 2012)). Further, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all 

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court 

determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Key v. Brown University, 163 A.3d 1162, 1168 (R.I. 2017) 

(quoting Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I. 2001)). “Although summary 

judgment is recognized as an extreme remedy, * * * to avoid summary judgment the burden is on 

the nonmoving party to produce competent evidence that ‘prove[s] the existence of a disputed 

issue of material fact[.]’” Sullo, 68 A.3d at 407 (quoting Mutual Development Corp. v. Ward 

Fisher & Co., 47 A.3d 319, 323 (R.I. 2012)). 

Analysis

The plaintiff first contends that the MOU is a binding contract that the town subsequently 

breached. In order to prove a breach of contract claim, “the plaintiff must prove both the 

existence and breach of a contract, and that the defendant’s breach thereof caused the plaintiff’s 

damages.” Fogarty v. Palumbo, 163 A.3d 526, 541 (R.I. 2017). It is well settled that “the 

determination of whether a contract exists is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” 

Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199, 1202 (R.I. 1999). “The long-recognized 

essential elements of a contract are ‘competent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, 
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mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation.’” Rhode Island Five v. Medical Associates 

of Bristol County, Inc., 668 A.2d 1250, 1253 (R.I. 1996) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 322 

(6th ed. 1990)).

The trial justice rendered a bench decision in which he found that the MOU was not 

enforceable:

“[T]he minutes of that meeting, which appears as an exhibit to Mr. 

Coccoli’s papers, make it abundantly clear to the [c]ourt that there 

was no final agreement with respect to that. And in fact, the socalled memorandum of understanding upon which he bases much 

of his argument against the grant of summary judgment with 

respect to Count I had not been prepared, had not been exhibited to 

the council, and the council consistent with the affidavit from the 

town clerk did not pass approval of the memorandum of 

understanding. And yet, in a subsequent exhibit appended to Mr. 

Coccoli’s papers which deals with some of the same issues, the 

town solicitor suggests that the document that had been filed on the 

real estate records was something that was going to run with the 

land, at least in his opinion.

“The [c]ourt cannot find that that agreement is binding on the 

defendants. It was not specifically approved by the council, it 

contained no terms; and as a matter of fact, to this day things 

contemplated there have not occurred.”

The defendants argued, and the trial justice agreed, that because there was not a second vote of 

the council to reaffirm the MOU, the contract is void. We disagree. It is clear that the council 

voted to approve the sewer connection contingent upon receipt of an MOU from HMVA, and 

that contingency was met. As set out above, the minutes of the April 12, 2007 town council 

meeting reflect this vote:

“[M]otion was made by Councilman Salisbury, seconded by 

Councilman Collins, and voted by consent agreement to grant 

approval of the 40,000 gallon capacity per day, contingent upon 

receiving a document in writing from Hope Mill Village 

Associates within 10 days, outlining the specifics previously 

discussed:
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“Extend the sewer connections to Hope Sanitary Associates, Hope 

Elementary School, Hope Jackson Fire Dept., the Police Station, 

and to upfront the cost of the Town’s portion of the interceptor. 

“Any representations made by the Developer regarding the Town 

of Scituate, should be accurate and reflect what was discussed at 

this meeting.

“Motion made by Councilman Salisbury, seconded by Councilman 

Collins and voted by consent agreement to confer with Coventry 

and West Warwick to ascertain what their intentions are regarding 

this upgrade, and to pursue an agreement that would share the 

costs. The contact should be done by David Provonsil and Legal 

Counsel.” (Emphasis added.)

Thereafter, the town and legal counsel for HMVA prepared a detailed MOU that was drafted on 

the letterhead of the town’s solicitor, signed by town council president Robert Budway and 

plaintiff, notarized, adorned with the official town seal, and recorded in the land evidence 

records. After the MOU was executed, plaintiff spent approximately $2 million to begin 

infrastructure and engineering on the project, in furtherance of the MOU. The agreement as set 

forth in the vote of the council and the MOU is binding upon the town.

The facts in the record before us establish that the council voted to approve by consent 

agreement the sewer connection, contingent upon receiving an MOU—which was in fact later 

executed and recorded in the land evidence records—and that there was subsequent part 

performance under the MOU. See Richard v. Richard, 900 A.2d 1170, 1175 (R.I. 2006) (holding 

that “any partial performance must unequivocally indicate the existence of the purported oral 

agreement”). We are of the opinion that the facts presented establish that a contract was 

formed—which is a question of law. In the case at bar, there is no contention that either party 

was not competent to enter into an agreement. See Rhode Island Five, 668 A.2d at 1253. The 

MOU addressed the subject matter of the contract in depth, and evinced a legal consideration and 

mutuality of obligation between the parties: in exchange for authorizing the use of 40,000 
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gallons per day of the town’s reserve sewer capacity, plaintiff was obligated to design, procure 

approvals for, and cause to be constructed a new sewer line. See id. Finally, by signing the 

MOU and notarizing the document, the parties mutually agreed on the terms. See id. 

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor 

of defendants on Count I of plaintiff’s complaint.

We now briefly address plaintiff’s second claim, that defendants violated the Privacy Act 

of 1974 by “releas[ing] confidential proprietary information, including appraisals, architectural, 

engineering and survey work without permission.” The trial justice correctly identified this 

claim as misplaced:

“The second cause of action involves the so-called privacy act. 

That act is a federal statute. And much case law has been cited by 

defendants making it abundantly clear that it applies to federal 

agencies and not to state agencies or individuals.”

It is well settled that “the Privacy Act is specifically limited to actions against agencies of the 

United States government.” Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 

2008). Moreover, “[t]he civil remedy provisions of the [Privacy Act] do not apply against 

private individuals, * * * state agencies, * * * private entities, * * * or state and local officials[.]” 

Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985). “[T]he [Privacy] Act [of 1974] 

imposes limitations only on agencies of the federal government.” Williams v. New York City 

Department of Education ex rel. City School District, No. 12 Civ. 8518, 2013 WL 5226564,

at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2013). In the case at bar, we are dealing with a local town council 

and town officials, not the federal government. Accordingly, the trial justice properly granted 

summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count II of plaintiff’s complaint.

In Count III of plaintiff’s complaint, Coccoli alleged that defendants engaged in tortious 

interference with a contractual relationship—specifically, his purchase and sale agreement with 
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the receiver. The plaintiff avers before this Court that “but for the town’s interference, 

[p]laintiff’s expectations regarding his proposed development would have been realized.” This 

Court has held that:

“In order to establish a claim for tortious interference with a 

contractual relationship, plaintiffs must establish the following four 

elements: (1) [T]he existence of a contract; (2) the alleged 

wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional 

interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Fogarty, 163 

A.3d at 538 (quoting Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 

A.2d 622, 627 (R.I. 2000)). 

The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he had secured funding for the development of the 

property that had since gone into receivership and had submitted a deposit to the receiver in June 

2014. The crux of plaintiff’s claim is that the town council took actions that made the property 

“unappealing to any potential investor or buyer” and held closed-session meetings with plaintiff 

and investors that were “frustrating and disappointing” and allegedly resulted in the loss of funds 

for the project. Finally, plaintiff contends before this Court that the town solicitor “demonstrated 

an obvious intent to interfere with plaintiff[’s] legitimate expectancy of developing the * * * 

property.” The plaintiff’s allegations are based in part on his assertions that the town council

kept him waiting at a meeting, members of the council left the meeting when plaintiff and his 

business partner were late, and one town council member made comments about the property 

that plaintiff interpreted as rude. The plaintiff also alleged that the town council interfered with 

his purchase and sale agreement by failing to enter into a tax stabilization agreement.

Our careful review of the record reveals that plaintiff did not submit a copy of the 

purchase and sale agreement to defendants. There is nothing in the record to suggest that 

defendants were even aware of the alleged contract plaintiff executed with the receiver to 

purchase the property. See Fogarty, 163 A.3d at 538. There is also an absence of any evidence 
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suggesting that defendants intended to interfere with the contract, or that plaintiff suffered 

damages as a result of defendants’ interference. See id. Moreover, the trial justice correctly 

found that the town was not obligated to enter into a tax stabilization agreement with plaintiff 

because that is a matter of legislative discretion. Based on the evidence presented, we cannot 

conclude that defendants intentionally interfered with plaintiff’s alleged contract to purchase the 

property from the receiver. We conclude that the trial justice properly granted summary 

judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with a contractual 

relationship.

Finally, plaintiff’s claim in Count IV of his complaint sounds in fraudulent 

misrepresentation. To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove

“not only that the defendant had an intention to deceive, but the complainant also must present 

sufficient proof that the party detrimentally relied upon the fraudulent representation.” Asermely 

v. Allstate Insurance Co., 728 A.2d 461, 464 (R.I. 1999). The plaintiff alleges that he entered 

into an agreement with the town on November 1, 2011, for the environmental cleanup of an 

underground storage tank leak, and that this cleanup cost plaintiff approximately $141,000. The 

plaintiff contends that a closure application for the cleanup was submitted to DEM’s Division of 

Waste Management and contained the signature of the receiver and Donald Campbell, the Hope 

Jackson fire chief. Again, at the summary-judgment hearing, the trial justice stated:

“The [c]ourt searched the record and fails to find who supposedly 

made a representation other than—well, the [c]ourt failed to find 

who made a representation. Discovery seemed to indicate that the 

claims predicated on the fact that a non-municipal in the sense of 

non Scituate fire chief signed a document for the department of 

environmental management which had printed on the face of it that 

it was not binding upon the Town and did not constitute notice to 

the Town. The fire chief was a fire district chief, not a town 

official.”
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Notwithstanding the fact that the Hope Jackson fire chief is the chief of a nonmunicipal,

volunteer fire department, and not a town official, the plaintiff has failed to present a scintilla of 

evidence of any representation from the town, or of the plaintiff’s detrimental reliance upon such 

a representation. Moreover, the following disclaimer is contained in the DEM closure 

application:

“This signature, however, does not serve as notice to the city/town, 

does not guarantee city/town approval, and does not relieve you of 

your obligations to other applicable city/town officials. Any 

violation, deficiency or requirement which may have been 

overlooked is also subject to correction under the provision of any 

applicable code.” (Emphasis added.)

The record before us simply is devoid of any representations from the town that would induce 

the plaintiff to engage in environmental cleanup on the property. The only evidence the plaintiff 

proffered was a signature of a nonmunicipal fire chief, who is not a town official. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the trial justice properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants 

on Count IV of the plaintiff’s complaint.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate that portion of the judgment of the Superior 

Court granting summary judgment on Count I of the plaintiff’s complaint. We affirm the 

judgment of the Superior Court dismissing Counts II, III, and IV of the plaintiff’s complaint. 

The papers may be returned to the Superior Court.

Justice Flaherty did not participate.
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Vincent R. Coccoli, Sr. v. Town of Scituate Town 

Council et al.

Case Number No. 2016-240-Appeal.

(PC 15-3539)

Date Opinion Filed June 8, 2018

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Michael A. Silverstein

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Vincent Coccoli, Pro Se

For Defendants:

Patrick K. Cunningham, Esq.

Michael DeSisto, Esq.

David M. D’Agostino, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2016)