TEMPORARY 

ASSISTANCE FOR 

NEEDY FAMILIES

An Overview of Spending, 

Federal Oversight, and 

Program Incentives

Statement for the Record by Kay E. Brown, Director, 

Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues

Statement for the Record to the House 

Committee on Ways and Means, Human 

Resources Subcommittee

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 3:00 p.m. ET

Thursday, April 30, 2015

GAO-15-572T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-572T, a statement for 

the record to the House Committee on Ways 

and Means, Human Resources Subcommittee

April 2015

TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY 

FAMILIES

An Overview of Spending, Federal Oversight, and 

Program Incentives

Why GAO Did This Study

The TANF block grant provides $16.5 

billion annually in federal funding to 

states for cash assistance as well as a 

variety of other benefits and services to 

meet the needs of low-income families. 

TANF requires states to maintain a 

specified level of their own past welfare 

spending to receive all of their TANF 

funds. In fiscal year 2013, states spent 

a total of $31.6 billion in federal TANF 

and related state funds on cash 

assistance and other services for lowincome families. GAO was asked to 

provide information from its recent 

reports to inform a hearing on next 

steps for welfare reform.

This statement addresses (1) states’ 

use of TANF funds, (2) TANF’s 

accountability framework, and (3) 

innovation and evaluation in the TANF 

program, drawing primarily from GAO 

reports issued from 2010 to 2014. For 

these reports, GAO reviewed and 

analyzed state TANF data reported to 

HHS from fiscal year 1997 through 

2013; reviewed relevant federal laws, 

regulations, and guidance; interviewed 

HHS and state TANF administrators; 

and conducted visits in selected states.

What GAO Recommends

In its prior work, GAO recommended 

that HHS take steps to improve TANF 

expenditure reporting and identify 

potential changes to address the lack 

of incentives in the TANF program. 

HHS has taken some action. GAO has 

also suggested Congress consider 

ways to improve performance 

information when TANF is 

reauthorized. Consequently, GAO is 

not making any new recommendations 

at this time.

What GAO Found

While the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant serves 

as the nation’s major cash assistance program for low-income families with 

children, states increasingly use it as a flexible funding stream for supporting a 

broad range of allowable services. For example, in December 2012 GAO found 

that nationwide, in fiscal year 1997, states spent about 23 percent of TANF funds 

on services other than cash assistance, such as child welfare or child care. In 

contrast, states spent more than 66 percent of TANF funds for these purposes in 

fiscal year 2013, according to the most recent available data from the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

TANF’s accountability framework has limitations in both the approach used for 

measuring work participation and the information that is available on trends in 

services other than cash assistance. One program performance measure, the 

work participation rate, measures the extent to which states engage work-eligible 

TANF cash assistance recipients in work activities as defined by federal law. In 

May 2010, GAO found that states often relied on several options allowed in law, 

including credits for caseload reductions, to reduce the percentage of families 

they needed to engage in work to meet their work participation rate requirements. 

Thus, GAO concluded that the rate’s usefulness as an indicator of TANF 

performance is limited. There are also no reporting requirements mandating 

performance information specifically on families receiving services other than 

cash assistance. To fully assess how funds are being used, GAO suggested 

Congress should consider ways to improve performance information when TANF 

is being reauthorized. In response to GAO’s 2012 recommendation that HHS 

develop a detailed plan to revise reporting categories for TANF expenditures to 

provide a more complete picture on the use of TANF funds, HHS has taken steps 

such as revising its reporting form and accounting methodology for expenditure 

data. HHS has also cited a statutory provision as preventing it from reporting an 

improper payment estimate for the TANF program, but says it will seek statutory 

modifications to allow for such an estimate when the program is reauthorized. 

Incentives are often lacking for state and local TANF agencies to adopt and test 

promising approaches for moving cash assistance recipients from welfare to 

work, according to a November 2014 GAO report. State use of federal TANF 

funds for services that are not necessarily related to welfare-to-work activities 

may compete with funding for developing promising approaches for TANF cash 

assistance clients. Also, the federal work participation rate requirements may 

discourage states from pursuing approaches that incorporate longer-term 

education and training or treatment services, or from engaging hard-to-employ 

individuals in work activities as states can meet their work participation rate 

requirements by using the law’s other options. In addition, little incentive exists 

for states to evaluate their TANF programs, and states are not required to do so, 

although these evaluations can provide useful information on program 

effectiveness. GAO recommended that HHS, in consultation with Congress, 

identify potential changes to address the lack of incentives to adopt and test 

promising approaches and submit a legislative proposal outlining those changes. 

HHS agreed with the recommendation but has not yet suggested program 

changes. 

View GAO-15-572T. For more information, 

contact Kay Brown at (202) 512-7215 or 

brownke@gao.gov
Letter

Page 1 GAO-15-572T 

Chairman Boustany, Ranking Member Doggett, and Members of the 

Subcommittee,

I am pleased to submit this statement on our recent work covering key 

aspects of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block 

grant. As you know, in 1996 the federal government made sweeping 

changes to federal welfare policy by replacing the previous cash 

assistance program with the TANF block grant to states. The Personal 

Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 

(PRWORA),1

My statement today—based primarily on reports we issued from 2010 to 

2014— will address (1) states’ use of TANF funds, (2) TANF’s 

accountability framework, and (3) innovation and evaluation in the TANF 

program.

which created TANF, ended the Aid to Families with 

Dependent Children (AFDC) program that had entitled eligible low-income 

families to monthly cash assistance. Instead, TANF provides $16.5 billion 

per year in fixed federal funding to states to operate their own welfare 

programs within federal guidelines. This funding can help cover the costs 

of cash benefits, administrative expenses, and services primarily targeted 

to needy families; the amount does not vary according to the number of 

cash assistance recipients. States are also required to maintain a 

specified level of their own past welfare spending to receive all of their 

TANF funds. In fiscal year 2013, states spent a total of $31.6 billion in 

federal TANF and related state funds on cash assistance and other 

services for low-income families, according to the most recent available 

data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). At 

the federal level, HHS is responsible for overseeing TANF programs. We 

were asked to provide information from our recent reports on TANF to 

inform a hearing on next steps for welfare reform.

2

 1

Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. 

We used multiple methodologies to conduct the work for these 

reports. We reviewed and analyzed state TANF data reported to HHS

2

This statement is also based on updates to TANF expenditures. We obtained these 

updates in April 2015 by consulting publicly available data. Reports are cited throughout 

and include : GAO, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Implications of Recent 

Legislative and Economic Changes for State Programs and Work Participation Rates, 

GAO-10-525 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2010); Temporary Assistance for Needy 

Families: More Accountability Needed to Reflect Breadth of Block Grant Services, GAO13-33 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2012); and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: 

Action Is Needed to Better Promote Employment-Focused Approaches, GAO-15-31 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2014). 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-15-572T 

from fiscal year 1997 through 2013; reviewed relevant federal laws, 

regulations, and guidance; interviewed HHS officials; reviewed research 

summaries and syntheses of rigorous research on promising approaches 

for engaging TANF recipients in employment and increasing their 

earnings; and collected information from TANF officials using different 

methods for different studies, including interviewing state TANF 

administrators and conducting visits in selected states. We assessed the 

data we received and concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for 

the purposes of our reports. (More information on the scope and 

methodology of our work is contained within our published reports.)

We conducted the work on which this statement is based in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

Since PRWORA’s passage, cash assistance caseloads have declined, 

freeing up TANF funds for states to use for other allowable purposes. In 

May 2013, we reported that when states implemented TANF during fiscal 

year 1997, an average of 3.9 million families a month were receiving cash 

assistance.3

In December 2012 we noted that several factors have affected the early 

decline and continued low levels of cash assistance since states 

implemented TANF.

This number declined by over half within the first 5 years of 

TANF. Since that time, the average number of families receiving cash 

assistance each month has remained well below the initial number of 3.9 

million families. An average of about 1.5 million families received cash 

assistance each month in 2014, according to the most recent available 

data from HHS.

4

 3

GAO, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Potential Options to Improve 

Performance and Oversight, 

The initial decline occurred during a strong 

economy in which federal support for work supports such as child care 

increased and TANF provided new program emphasis on work. Many 

GAO-13-431 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2013). 

4

GAO-13-33. 

TANF Has Evolved 

from a Cash 

Assistance Program 

to a Flexible Funding 

Stream
Page 3 GAO-15-572T 

former welfare recipients increased their income through employment, 

and employment rates among single parents increased. At the same time, 

some families worked more and had higher incomes, others had incomes 

that left them still eligible for cash assistance. However, many of these 

eligible families were not participating in the program. According to our 

estimates in a February 2010 report, about 87 percent of the caseload 

decline through 2005 can be explained by the decline in eligible families 

participating in the program, in part because of changes to state welfare 

programs.5

Our December 2012 report found that while the TANF block grant still 

serves as the nation’s major cash assistance program for low-income 

families with children, states have also increasingly used it as a flexible 

funding stream for supporting a broad range of allowable services.

These changes included mandatory work requirements; 

changes to application procedures; lower benefits; policies such as 

lifetime limits on assistance; diversion strategies such as providing onetime, non-recurring benefits instead of monthly cash assistance to 

families facing temporary hardships; and sanctions for non-compliance, 

according to a review of the research.

6 Under 

the TANF block grant, states have generally maintained access to their 

full TANF allocation each year. As the number of families receiving cash 

assistance declined, states shifted their TANF priorities to other forms of 

aid, or non-cash services, which can include any other services meeting 

TANF purposes. We found that states spent significant amounts of TANF 

funds on services such as child welfare or child care. We reported that 

nationwide, in fiscal year 1997, states spent about 23 percent of TANF 

funds on non-cash services. In contrast, states spent more than 66 

percent of TANF funds for these purposes in fiscal year 2013, according 

to the most recent available data from HHS.

7

TANF’s funding structure has given states flexibility in making decisions 

regarding non-cash services. In December 2012, we also reported states 

 5

GAO, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: Fewer Eligible Families Have Received 

Cash Assistance Since the 1990s, and the Recession’s Impact on Caseloads Varies by 

State, GAO-10-164 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2010). 

6

GAO-13-33. 

7

These figures include both federal TANF funds and the state “maintenance of effort” 

funds that states are required to spend to receive their full federal TANF allocation. State 

maintenance of effort funds are discussed further below. 
Page 4 GAO-15-572T 

spent federal TANF funds on existing or new programs according to state 

legislative priorities and, as a result, funds are often allocated to and 

administered through multiple state and local agencies (see fig. 1). This is 

in contrast to TANF’s predecessor program, AFDC, which was typically 

administered through state welfare agencies. Our work showed that the 

multiple state and local agencies that receive TANF funds may serve lowincome families beyond the TANF cash assistance caseload.

Figure 1: Example of Possible Allocation of TANF Funds by a State
Page 5 GAO-15-572T 

Because job preparation and employment are key goals of TANF,8 one of 

the federal measures of state TANF programs’ performance is the 

proportion of TANF cash assistance recipients engaged in allowable work 

activities.9 Generally, states are held accountable for ensuring that at 

least 50 percent of all families receiving TANF cash assistance and 

considered work-eligible10 participate in one or more of 12 specified work 

activities for an average of 30 hours per week.11 Our work has shown that 

over the years, states have engaged about one third of families receiving 

TANF cash assistance in federally-defined work activities nationwide.12

As we reported in May 2010, many states have been able to meet their 

work participation rate requirements because of various policy and 

funding options in federal law, and regulations that allow states to reduce 

their required rate.

For example, according to HHS data, in fiscal year 2011—the most recent 

year for which data are available—states engaged 29.5 percent of workeligible cash assistance families nationwide in work activities.

13 Specifically, factors that influenced states’ work 

participation rates included not only the number of families receiving 

TANF cash assistance who participated in work activities, but also

 8

42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2). 

9

42 U.S.C. § 607. 

10Work-eligible individuals are generally adult recipients of cash assistance or certain noncash recipient parents of children receiving assistance who count toward the work 

participation rate. 

11The work participation rate requirement is generally 90 percent for two-parent families. 

12GAO-15-31. This was the case both before and after the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 

(DRA) that reauthorized TANF and included provisions generally expected to strengthen 

the work requirements.

13GAO-10-525.

TANF’s Accountability 

Framework Has 

Limitations

States Have Generally 

Met Work Participation 

Rates by Using Credits 

Allowed by Law
Page 6 GAO-15-572T 

1. decreases in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance,

2. state spending on TANF-related services beyond what is required,14

3. state policies that allow working families to continue receiving TANF 

cash assistance, and

4. state policies that provide nonworking families cash assistance 

outside of the TANF program.15

Beyond families’ participation in the 12 work activities, the factor that 

states have commonly relied on to help them meet their required work 

participation rates is the caseload reduction credit.16 Specifically, 

decreases in the numbers of families receiving TANF cash assistance 

over a specified time period are accounted for in each state’s caseload 

reduction credit, which then essentially lowers the states’ required work 

participation rate from 50 percent.17

In addition, states’ spending of their own funds on TANF-related services 

has also been a factor in some states’ credits. As stated previously, 

states are required to spend a certain amount of their funds every year—

their maintenance of effort (MOE) funds—in order to receive all of their 

federal TANF block grants. However, if states spend in excess of the 

required amount (“excess MOE”), they are allowed to functionally 

For example, if a state’s caseload 

decreases by 20 percent during the relevant time period, the state 

receives a caseload reduction credit equal to 20 percentage points, which 

results in the state work participation rate requirement being adjusted 

from 50 to 30 percent. While state caseload declines have generally been 

smaller after a 2006 law changed the base year for the comparison from 

fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 2005, many states are still able to use 

caseload declines to help them lower their required work participation 

rates. In fiscal year 2011, the most recent year for which data are 

available, 49 of 50 states received a caseload reduction credit, including 

22 that reduced their state’s work participation rate requirement to 0 

percent, according to HHS data.

 14To receive all of its annual federal TANF block grant, each state is generally required to 

spend 75 or 80 percent of what it was spending in fiscal year 1994 on welfare-related 

programs. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(7).

15For a more detailed discussion of these factors, see GAO-10-525.

16GAO-10-525. 

1742 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3). 
Page 7 GAO-15-572T 

increase their caseload reduction credits.18 We reported in May 2012 that 

MOE, including expenditures by third parties, is playing an expanded role 

in TANF programs due, in part, to some states’ reliance on excess MOE 

to help meet their work participation rates.19

In addition to the caseload reduction credits and excess MOE discussed 

above, we also reported in May 2010 that some states have made 

changes to their TANF programs that may affect which families are 

counted in their work participation rates, such as providing assistance to 

non-working families outside of the TANF program, as providing TANF 

assistance to such families would lower states’ work participation rates. 

Given these various factors, we noted that the work participation rate 

does not allow for clear comparisons across state TANF programs or 

comparisons of individual state programs over time. Thus, we concluded 

that because of the various factors that affect the calculation of states’

work participation rates, the rate’s usefulness as a national performance 

measure for TANF is limited.

We also noted that if states’

MOE claims do not actually reflect maintaining or increasing service 

levels, low-income families and children may not be getting the 

assistance they need and federal funds may not be used in the most 

efficient manner.

20

As stated above, we reported in December 2012 that the TANF block 

grant has evolved into a flexible funding stream that states use to support 

a broad range of allowable services. In that report, we also reported that 

the accountability framework in place in federal law and regulations had

not kept pace with this evolution.21

 1845 C.F.R. § 261.43. When calculating the caseload reduction credit, federal regulations 

allow a state that spent in excess of its required amount in the year preceding the current 

one to include only the pro rata share of the total number of families receiving statefunded cash assistance required to meet the state’s basic requirement. 

While funding for non-cash services 

19GAO, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: State Maintenance of Effort 

Requirements and Trends, GAO-12-713T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2012). In addition 

to its own spending, a state may count toward its MOE certain in-kind or cash 

expenditures by third parties—such as nongovernmental organizations—as long as the 

expenditures meet other MOE requirements, including those related to eligible families 

and allowable activities. 45 C.F.R. § 263.2(e). 

20GAO-10-525.

21GAO-13-33.

Performance Information 

for Non-Cash Services is 

Incomplete
Page 8 GAO-15-572T 

represents the majority of TANF spending, there were no reporting 

requirements mandating performance information specifically on families 

receiving non-cash services or their outcomes. There was also little 

information related to TANF’s role in filling needs in other areas such as 

child welfare, even though this has become a more prominent spending 

area for TANF funds in many states. We reported that while states 

prepared state plans and expenditure reports that individually provided

some information on non-cash services, when considered together, these 

did not provide a complete picture on state goals and strategies for uses 

of TANF funds.

Thus, in our December 2012 report, we recommended that HHS develop 

a detailed plan with specific timelines to assist it in monitoring its progress 

on revising its financial reporting categories for expenditures of federal 

TANF and state maintenance of effort funds. In response to our 

recommendation, HHS has taken some steps to improve expenditure 

reports from states. Specifically, HHS revised its reporting form and 

accounting methodology to collect more detailed and accurate 

expenditure data for the TANF program. The agency told us it also plans 

to provide technical assistance to states to help make the transition to this 

new reporting form and methodology easier.

Despite these efforts by HHS, without more information that 

encompasses the breadth of states’ uses of TANF funds, Congress will 

not be able to fully assess how funds are being used, including who is 

receiving services or what is being achieved. We suggested that 

Congress should consider ways to improve reporting and performance 

information in our December 2012 report. Changes to the program could 

be considered as part of a full reauthorization of TANF in the future.
Page 9 GAO-15-572T 

In March 2015, we reported that HHS did not report an improper payment 

estimate for the TANF program in fiscal year 2014, even though the 

program is considered susceptible to the risk of improper payments.22 In 

general, federal executive branch agencies are required to report 

improper payment estimates23 that include payments that should not have 

been made or were made in the incorrect amount.24 We concluded that 

the lack of an improper payment estimate for TANF and other risksusceptible programs constrains the federal government’s ability to 

determine the full extent to which improper payments occur and 

reasonably assure that appropriate actions are taken to reduce them. 

HHS cited a statutory provision as prohibiting it from requiring states to 

estimate improper payments for TANF25

 22GAO, Improper Payments: Government-Wide Estimates and Use of Death Data to Help 

Prevent Payments to Deceased Individuals, 

and stated that when legislation 

is considered to reauthorize TANF, the agency plans to encourage 

Congress to consider statutory modifications that would allow for a 

reliable error rate measurement. In the meantime, the agency reported 

that it has taken actions to assist states in reducing improper payments, 

such as working with states to analyze noncompliance findings from 

audits related to TANF and requiring more accurate information about the 

ways states used TANF block grants.

GAO-15-482T (Washington, D.C.: March 16, 

2015).

23The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, as amended by the Improper 

Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and the Improper Payments Elimination 

and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012, requires federal executive branch agencies to (1) 

review all programs and activities, (2) identify those that may be susceptible to significant 

improper payments, (3) estimate the annual amount of improper payments for those 

programs and activities, (4) implement actions to reduce improper payments and set 

reduction targets, and (5) report on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements.

24An improper payment is defined by statute as any payment that should not have been 

made or that was made in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and 

underpayments) under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable 

requirements. It includes any payment to an ineligible recipient, any payment for an 

ineligible good or service, any duplicate payment, any payment for a good or service not 

received (except for such payments where authorized by law), and any payment that does 

not account for credit for applicable discounts. Pub. L. No. 107-300, § 2(g)(2), as 

amended, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3321 note. Office of Management and Budget guidance 

also instructs agencies to report as improper payments any payments for which 

insufficient or no documentation was found. 

25See 42 U.S.C. § 617, which generally states that no employee of the federal 

government may regulate the conduct of the states under the laws governing TANF 

except to the extent expressly provided in such laws.

HHS Has Not Reported an 

Improper Payment 

Estimate for the TANF 

Program
Page 10 GAO-15-572T 

In a November 2014 report, we concluded that while selected state and 

local programs are making use of some promising approaches for moving 

TANF recipients into employment and increasing their earnings, 

incentives are lacking for large numbers of state and local TANF agencies 

to adopt and test such approaches under the structure of the TANF 

program.26

• States face competing priorities for use of TANF funds. TANF allows 

states to spend funds on a wide range of programs and services that 

are not necessarily related to welfare-to-work activities as long as 

these services support one of TANF’s four statutory purposes.

We pointed to some of the factors outlined above—TANF’s 

funding structure and accountability measures—as factors that may limit 

incentives for states to experiment. Specifically, we found:

27 Our 

December 2012 report found that states spent significant amounts of 

TANF funds on services such as child welfare or child care, and we 

noted that state use of federal TANF funds for these and other 

services can create tensions and trade-offs in state funding 

decisions.28

• The federal work participation rate requirements do not necessarily 

serve as an incentive for states to implement certain promising 

approaches, according to our interviews and prior work. Work 

participation rate requirements can play an important role in 

encouraging states to move TANF recipients into work. However, our 

November 2014 review indicated some ways that current policies may 

be discouraging states from engaging some TANF recipients with 

In our November 2014 report, we found that any 

additional resources needed for implementing more costly promising 

approaches for TANF cash assistance clients may compete with other 

allowable uses of TANF funds. Officials we interviewed for that report 

whose three programs exclusively used TANF funds to implement 

elements of promising approaches said that their programs had been 

continuously funded for many years and that it would be difficult to 

find funding for the programs were they beginning at that time.

 26GAO-15-31.

2742 U.S.C. §§ 601(a), 604(a). The four purposes for the TANF block grant are: (1)

provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes 

or homes of relatives; (2) end dependence of needy parents on government benefits by 

promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock 

pregnancies; and (4) encourage two-parent families. . 

28GAO-13-33.

Several Factors Limit 

Incentives for 

Innovation and 

Evaluation in the 

TANF Program
Page 11 GAO-15-572T 

complex needs and from providing an appropriate mix of activities. 

Some experts and HHS officials we interviewed suggested that limits 

on the amount of time that certain job readiness and training activities 

may be counted toward a state’s work participation rate29 may 

discourage states from pursuing approaches that involve longer-term 

treatment or education.30

Additionally, we reported in November 2014 that state and local TANF 

agencies have little incentive to test the effectiveness of new 

approaches.

In addition, our November 2014 report 

included factors discussed above, such as the caseload reduction 

credit, that have allowed states to reduce the percentage of families 

they needed to engage in work to meet their work participation rate 

requirements. We found that states may have less incentive to use 

promising approaches to engage hard-to-employ individuals in work 

activities as they can meet their work participation rate requirements 

without them.

31 States are not required under federal TANF law to conduct 

impact evaluations of their TANF programs, although these evaluations 

can provide useful information on program effectiveness. We have 

previously found that although HHS has a strong tradition of leading and 

supporting rigorous welfare research, there are fewer incentives for states 

to evaluate their programs under TANF than existed under the previous 

welfare program with its evaluation and funding provisions.32

 29See 42 U.S.C. § 607(c). 

Indeed, 

although HHS maintains an active research agenda, TANF agency 

participation in some recent and ongoing HHS evaluations has been 

limited. An HHS official we interviewed reported that engaging TANF 

programs in evaluations of promising approaches is difficult because of 

the administrative burden on the state or locality. Officials added that 

HHS has no authority to require state agency participation in research 

and evaluation and no dedicated funding to provide states or localities 

incentives to participate. We concluded that limited participation by TANF 

agencies in HHS evaluations may slow the development and adoption of 

new promising approaches, leaving TANF without a continuous 

improvement process.

30GAO-15-31. 

31GAO-15-31.

32GAO, Welfare Reform: More Information Needed to Assess Promising Strategies to 

Increase Parents’ Incomes, GAO-06-108 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2005). 
Page 12 GAO-15-572T 

Consequently, to encourage broader adoption and evaluation of 

promising approaches, we recommended that HHS, in consultation with 

Congress, identify potential changes that would address the lack of 

incentives for states and localities to adopt promising approaches and 

then develop and submit a legislative proposal outlining those changes. 

HHS agreed with our recommendation and noted that in the 

Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request, it stated, “when 

Congress takes up reauthorization, the Administration will be prepared to 

work with lawmakers to strengthen the program’s effectiveness in 

accomplishing its goals. This effort should include using performance 

indicators to drive program improvement and ensuring that states have 

the flexibility to engage recipients in the most effective activities to 

promote success in the workforce, including families with serious barriers 

to employment.” HHS made this same statement in its Fiscal Year 2016 

Budget Request. We maintain that HHS should develop more concrete 

proposals to address the lack of incentives within the TANF program 

itself, and noted that the agency need not wait for Congress to take up 

reauthorization to do so.

Chairman Boustany, Ranking Member Doggett, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my statement for the record.

If you or your staff have any questions about this statement, please 

contact Kay E. Brown, Director, Education, Workforce, and Income 

Security, at 202-512-7215 or brownke@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this statement. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this statement include Alexander Galuten, Gale Harris, Kristen Jones, 

Michael Pahr, and Walter Vance.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

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