110th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

2d Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

EAST OR WEST? THE FUTURE OF 

DEMOCRACY IN MOLDOVA 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington: 2011 


LOGO-BIG.EPS
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

202–225–1901 

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov 

Legislative Branch Commissioners 

HOUSE 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA, 

Chairman 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

NEW YORK

MIKE MCINTYRE, NORTH CAROLINA

HILDA L. SOLIS, CALIFORNIA

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

JOSEPH R. PITTS, PENNSYLVANIA

MIKE PENCE, INDIANA

SENATE 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, MARYLAND, 

Co-Chairman 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, NEW YORK

JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS

SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS

GORDON SMITH, OREGON

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, GEORGIA

RICHARD BURR, NORTH CAROLINA

Executive Branch Commissioners 

DAVID J. KRAMER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MARY BETH LONG, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DAVID BOHIGIAN, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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EAST OR WEST? THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN MOLDOVA 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 

PARTICIPANTS 

Page 

Amb. Clifford Bond, Senior State Department Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ........................... 1 

Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .... 1 

H.E. Nicolae Chirtoaca, Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the United States ........... 4 

Vlad Lupan, Soros Foundation—Moldova, European Initiatives Program ................................ 7 

William Hill, National Defense University, Former Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova .. 13 

APPENDIXES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................................................................................... 28 

Prepared statement of H.E. Nicolae Chirtoaca ............................................................................ 30 

Prepared statement of Vlad Lupan ............................................................................................... 35 

Prepared statement of William Hill .............................................................................................. 41 

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EAST OR WEST? THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN 

MOLDOVA 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2008 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Washington, DC

The briefing was held at 10:10 a.m. in room 1539 Longworth House Office Building, 

Washington, DC, Amb. Clifford Bond, Senior State Department Advisor, Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderating. 

Commissioner present: Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe. 

Panalists present: Amb. Clifford Bond, Senior State Department Advisor, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe; H.E. Nicolae Chirtoaca, Ambassador of the 

Republic of Moldova to the United States; Vlad Lupan, Soros Foundation—Moldova, European Initiatives Program; and William Hill, National Defense University, Former Head 

of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. 

Amb. BOND. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to today’s briefing organized by the Helsinki Commission. The title of today’s briefing is, ‘‘East or West? The Future of Democracy 

in Moldova.’’ 

My name is Cliff Bond. I am a State Department representative on the Helsinki 

Commission. 

Chairman Hastings had planned to join us here today to share the meeting. Unfortunately, he was called away on House business. He may join us later on, but we are lucky 

to have Congressman Joseph Pitts with us who is a member of the Helsinki Commission. 

And let me invite Congressman Pitts to say a few words. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you for setting up this important 

briefing. 

The issues currently facing Eastern Europe are of great concern and deserve priority 

consideration by the OSCE and the participating States. 

This is a critical time for the region, and its next steps and future actions will send 

an important message to the rest of the world. Russia’s recent invasion of the Republic 

of Georgia has shown its expansionist goals and raise questions about the future of 

Eastern Europe and the potential for the European Bloc. 

Since its independence, the Republic of Moldova has faced many political challenges, 

in part due to the disputes over Transdniestra. Nonetheless, the country has taken steps 

2 

toward political and economic freedom. It has held free and fair elections, it’s opened its 

markets, it’s engaged in negotiations in efforts to resolve the situation in Transdniestra. 

However, there are still concerns raised over issues in Moldova, and I particularly 

remain concerned that Moldova continues to be a major source and transit country for sex 

trafficking. Moldovan women have been trafficked to the Middle East, in Eastern Europe, 

in Western Europe, and girls, young women, have even been trafficked within the country 

from rural areas. 

And so I’m very interested in hearing today’s testimonies and hope the important 

issues will be addressed. 

And I wanted to express my gratitude to Chairman Hastings for scheduling this 

important briefing to discuss the future of Moldova, and I look forward to learning from 

our distinguished panelists who are with us today. 

Thank you. 

Amb. BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman. 

We have, as you said, several very distinguished presenters here with us today. They 

are the Moldovan Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Nicolae Chirtoaca, as 

well as Vlad Lupan from the European Initiatives Program of the Soros Foundation, and 

Dr. William Hill, who’s a former head of the OSCE mission in Moldova. 

We’ll begin with Ambassador Chirtoaca, and we’ll follow through with the other two 

presenters, and then we’ll open for questioning. 

Mr. Ambassador? 

Amb. CHIRTOACA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Pitts, [inaudible], ladies 

and gentlemen. 

I would like to start my presentation by expressing my gratitude to the Helsinki 

Commission for organizing and hosting this event, and for the possibility to address the 

issue related to democracy development in my country, the Republic of Moldova, from the 

perspective of the approaching 2009 parliamentary elections and taking into consideration 

the changing geopolitical environment in Eastern Europe caused mostly by the recent 

Georgia crisis that has a direct impact on the settlement of so-called frozen conflicts in 

the ex-Soviet states. 

Since the beginning of this century, Moldova has made visible progress, moving from 

a typically weak state [inaudible] confronted with multiple problems and obsessed by an 

identity crisis to relatively stable democratic institutions, functional government structures, growing economy—GDP growth is around 6, 7 percent per year—and an economy 

based on the private sector. 

Throughout this period, [inaudible] limited internal capacities [inaudible] for change. 

The Republic of Moldova has remained committed to democratic reforms and [inaudible] 

of the society, providing security and stability in the region, mostly through efforts 

painted as peaceful resolution of the separatist crisis and the territorial reintegration of 

the state. 

Following the 2005 parliamentary elections, the government continues its effort in 

order to improve democratic governance in the country. It’s reducing corruption, pushing 

through economic reforms and welcoming foreign investments. 

At the same time, President Voronin made clear his intentions that the Republic of 

Moldova follow in the path of other successful post-Communist countries and draw closer 

3 

to the European Union as well as develop partnership relations with NATO within the 

framework of the Individual Partnership Action Plan. 

What I would like today—my presentation will be based mostly on the idea of how 

to measure democratic reforms, how deep are democratic changes, and what are criteria 

to approach this problem? And, of course, I will not—speaking as a representative of my 

country, I will rely mostly on the appreciation given to my country by the international 

organizations, first of all, by the Council of Europe who is monitoring very, very closely 

the democratic reforms in my country. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 

Europe is engaged in this process, as well as the European Union. 

I would like to remind you, Moldova just ended an entire period and implemented 

the 3-year action plan, and we have reports concerning the state of democracy in my 

country. I think it will help the participants just to see more clearly the picture without 

making quite a lot of publicity in the favor of one issue or another. 

But I would like to start with the Millennium Challenge Account eligibility, and 

Moldova has been offered the chance to develop the compact in December 2006. This eligibility is the kind of—not reward—it’s the appreciation of a partner country, a good policy 

performance and is based on scoring above the median, at least half of 17 indicators in 

each of three policy categories: Ruling justly, investing in people and economic freedom. 

The first category contains indicators that mirror the quality of democratic governance: Country performance and freedom of expression and belief, association and 

organizational rights, the rule of law, respect of human and civil rights and independence 

of judiciary. 

The conditionality—I underline—the conditionality of the assistance provided within 

the framework of cooperation with the Millennium Challenge Corporation help my government and improve the governance in accordance with the recommended norms and good 

practices. First of all, the gradual reduction of corruption and state bureaucracy, and this 

way is making irreversible the market and democratic reforms in Moldova. 

But what are the appeals of the leading [inaudible] European organizations? First of 

all, I would like to start with the recent European Commission progress state report on 

the implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy in 2007 made public on April 

2008. During the reporting period, the Republic of Moldova, it said in this report, ‘‘made 

good progress in most areas, including democracy and rule of law. The 2007 local elections 

were generally well administered, and voters were offered a genuine choice.’’ I’m quoting 

from the report, it’s not my interpretation of this paper. 

Other [inaudible] during the reporting period were substantial progress in improving 

the institutional framework and procedures on control and certification of origin, which 

allows EU to grant the Republic of Moldova additional economic state preferences. 

[Inaudible] on visa facilitation and the admission and the positive cooperation with 

EU Border Assistance Mission, known as the EUBAM. The Republic of Moldova also 

cooperated closely with the EU in all questions related to the Transdniestra settlement 

effort, and work is ongoing to put into practice the proposals of the president of the 

Republic of Moldova on confidence-building measures. 

A look at self-government and [inaudible] legislative acts, including on administrative 

decentralization, local public administration, regional development were adopted in 

December 2006. This brought national legislation closer to the recommendation of the 

Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe. 

4 

The Republic of Moldova adopted a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan 

for reforming its judicial system. It’s the capacity of the Supreme Council of Magistrates, 

the body in charge of judicial self-administration, were consolidated, and the Department 

of Judicial Administration subordinated as the Ministry of Justice was created and 

started operating in January 2008. 

The code of ethics for judges was approved in November 2006 and judicial [inaudible] 

under the [inaudible] of Supreme Council. It was introduced by law in 2007. 

My country also [inaudible] accepting activities in the fields of combating corruption 

and raising awareness on corruption in light of phenomenon, as well took steps in the 

area to adjust its legislative framework to international standards and to [inaudible] 

institutional framework. I would like also to remind you that we take part in the 

Threshold Millennium Challenge Corporation Program since 2006, and it’s also focused on 

reducing and combating corruption. 

The National Human Rights Action Plan 2004–2008 is under implementation in the 

context of ongoing efforts to battle human trafficking, [inaudible] for victims of human 

trafficking while it’s establishing five pilot regions. The National Action Plan of Anti-Trafficking 2007–2009 was set up with National Committee of Anti-Trafficking ensuring full 

implementation. 

In February 2008, the European Convention for Human Trafficking [inaudible], and 

the Republic of Moldova has been the first country to ratify this convention. 

The broadcasting role, the mass media freedom is one of the issue of concerns, and 

the opposition is not really happy how it functions. In 2006, a new law that has been 

adopted by the parliament provides a good legislative basis to ensure respect for the 

freedom of expression. The correct implementation in a manner which promotes the plurality of the media has to be ensured. 

The biggest problem of Moldova, and especially the current media and written press, 

is the fact that they are not financially free, and the financial freedom of this mass media 

goes together with economic reforms and is good competition and the moneys that are 

paid to a newspaper and to give radio stations just to ensure this independence. The next 

parliamentary elections I expect to be called in mid-March 2009, so the parliament will 

decide. 

The parliament of Moldova, because we are a parliamentarian republic, will form the 

new government, will elect the President, as the second and last tenure of President 

Vladimir Voronin comes to an end next year. The parliament has passed a number of 

amendments to the electoral code that dates back to ’97. According to the OSCE, I quote, 

‘‘It provides an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections if implemented in 

good faith,’’ the end of the quote. 

In 2007, a new law of political parties—I would like to remind you that we have, 

according to the last report of Freedom House, 28 political parties and organizations, 

because it’s quite a lot for small Moldova. Sorry, I’m saying that. Maybe, who knows how 

many parties we need? 

But there are a lot of political parties [inaudible] of the electoral code and was 

adopted and submitted to Venice Commission. Adopted in December 21, 2007, the law 

aims to regulate legislation functioning, financing of political parties [inaudible] electoral 

system, all transparent and less prone to abuse. 

5 

However, it also creates a number of restrictions that can be explained by the need 

to weigh the efficiency of the current party system as well as the national security concerns. For example, the threshold was increased from 4 to 6 percent. The electoral blocs 

were prohibited and certain restrictions to persons holding dual citizenship were introduced. 

It is worth to be mentioned that Venice Commission recommended 5 percent of this 

threshold [inaudible]. It is also worth mentioning that electoral blocs are prohibited to 

participate at elections in such European countries with long-lasting democratic traditions, like Germany, Austria, [inaudible], Hungary, and Finland. At the same time, 

according to the Moldovan legislature, the parties enjoy the right to create post-electoral 

colleges. 

According to the civil societies [inaudible] represented a vibrant aspect of Moldova’s 

public space. As is mentioned in this year’s Freedom House Nations in Transit report, 

which just appeared, by the way, I quote, ‘‘The number of active organizations is significant, and only certain NGOs have the capacity to contribute to public policies. [Inaudible] 

and activities are developing slowly but lack [inaudible]. At the same time, more reporting 

efforts did not bear the expected results. 

Dependence on donor support leaves NGOs vulnerable and poses a key challenge to 

the sector’s development. Until NGOs become transparent and are open to working with 

media, they will lack credibility in their mission to promote democratic matters. And, 

unfortunately, quite a lot of think tanks and NGOs are fully involved in the political processes, and, in this way, our citizens are liking alternative information [inaudible] 

democratization processes in my country. 

Now, about Transdniestra conflict, our strategy in a conflict settlement, about how 

we approach this issue just now, especially after the August events in the South Caucuses 

region. 

For about a year, Moldova has been vigorously pushing for resuming the discussion 

between the current international format known as ‘‘five plus two’’. I would like to 

remember this is an international format with participation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia, Ukraine, as mediators; European Union and 

United States of America as observers, as well as the Republic of Moldova and secessionist 

authorities. 

The government strategy for conflict resolution is based on a complex package 

approach to all the issues related to the [inaudible] crisis: Political, economic, social, military, and humanitarian. 

The package proposals includes the development and adoption of a special [inaudible] 

statute for Transdniestra region, while respecting the sovereignty and [inaudible] integrity of the Republic of Moldova. The consolidation of the neutrality studies, neutral 

studies, constitutional [inaudible] we call it, because it’s written—our constitution of 

Moldova, it’s a neutral state. [Inaudible] military troops from the national territory, a 

condition of ownership right and of certain special guarantees to the population of the 

eastern part of the country, currently under the control of separatist authorities. 

These particular results were adopted in 2006 by Moldovan experts who tried to find 

a common denominator that would accommodate very small dollars and Russia interests 

without undermining the viability of a future reintegrated state or legalizing Russian 

military presence in Moldova. 

6 

The key elements of the negotiation process is a special [inaudible] status for 

Transdniestra region. Clear division of confidences in [inaudible], though it is functional 

central institutions. [Inaudible] of Transdniestra region under the Moldovan parliament. 

The last part is important because of the spring 2009 parliament elections, and [inaudible] 

the population from the eastern bank of Dniestr River will take part in this democratic 

exercise. 

The separate [inaudible] of the region will be, in part, [inaudible] in the [inaudible] 

legislature, and the [inaudible] total population currently is estimated at 13 percent. 

The European Union and the United States of America long ago welcomed the package proposal as a good foundation and platform for viable and long-lasting settlement. It 

is necessary to mention that before the Georgian crisis, Moldova has never formally— 

sorry, Moscow has never formally reacted to our proposals in spite of our government persistent attempts to elicit a positive response. 

My country is currently observing the [inaudible] region while reiterating its firm 

belief of the exclusively political solutions of all of the disputes to be taken to the negotiations table. The same position is also reflected in the statement by the Government of the 

Republic of Moldova issued on August 29 regarding the situation in South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia. It’s [inaudible] that Moldova does not see the international recognition of these 

provinces as a stabilizing factor of the situation. 

At this point, we can clearly state that the [inaudible] mediators and observers 

[inaudible] still continue. Moldova insists on ‘‘five plus two’’ international format. At this 

time being, as far as we know, neither [inaudible] or Moscow does not have a different 

approach, accepting ‘‘five plus two’’ as a basic format for negotiations. 

[Inaudible] the president of the Republic of Moldova and of the Russian affiliation 

from the [inaudible] this year. There is a decision of [inaudible] to stop so-called moratorium on [inaudible] and begin a meeting in the ‘‘three plus two’’ format [inaudible] Russia 

[inaudible] on September 8 [inaudible] are developments that bring assurance of an early 

resumption of the ‘‘five plus two’’ international negotiation format. 

However, it will be wrong and premature to conclude that Moscow has fully abandoned hopes of achieving a settlement on its own terms. There are no indications that 

Russia is prepared to renounce its long-standing policy of using the end result of 

Transdniestra conflict as leverage to circumscribe Moldova’s foreign policy options or to 

legalize its military presence in Moldova, at least during so-called post-conflict years. The 

main goal is contained in the famous Kozak memorandum from 2003. 

At the same time, there are a few further concessions our government can make 

without compromising the future of the Moldovan state and the European integration 

strategy. 

Despite the progress made, effective implementation of reforms remain a challenge. 

In order to advance democracy, peace and total integration of the country, Moldova has 

to be successful in its effort to end the transition from the Soviet past to the sustainable 

and durable democracy of market economy and efficient governance. 

But I would like just to invite you to address the problem of the current state of 

democracy from the point of view of more sustainable and less politicized. We understand 

there are three different and distinct periods of transition, and we are now just in 

between the second and the third. [inaudible] liberalization we passed in ’95–’94, then a 

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democracy stabilization that took us 7, 8 years, and now we are ending by democracy 

consolidation, very often, opposition and quite a lot of [inaudible]. 

They try to use an ideal model [inaudible], how it works in developed countries with 

maybe hundreds of years of experience, trying to compare with the model and criticizing 

[inaudible], which is basically not constructive and not a positive approach to [inaudible]. 

Moldova is still in transition. It’s monitored very closely, it’s given assistance. The 

biggest key problem is institutional deficiencies. The system works, but, of course, we 

need probably 3 or 5 years and the transition. Now, this transition is based on European 

and Western paradigm of development, and the Moldovan policy, to be integrated into the 

Union, is the biggest driving force and European model, which is basically the Western 

one, is taken as [inaudible] people like just this model for development of the country. 

Concluding, I would like to mention that there’s a large consensus in the country 

among the leading political parties, nine representatives of the developing [inaudible] and 

the socially visible and responsible civil society organization regarding the European 

future of Moldova. 

There’s a common understanding that only real and consistent democratic reforms 

can bring Moldova closer to the implementation of [inaudible] built around national 

strategy for development, to restore our historic and cultural ties to Europe that date back 

to the [inaudible] of Roman empire, an early Christian period of the modern Western 

civilization. 

The integration of the countries of today’s European institution, a leading organization, first of all, the European Union is understood as the main way of implementation 

of the vision and strategy. 

Thank you very much for your attention, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak 

here today and welcome any questions that you may have. 

Amb. BOND. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

We’ll turn to Mr. Vlad Lupan of the Soros Foundation now. 

Mr. LUPAN. Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the opportunity to 

share my views about the democracy in Moldova, as well as, thank you for the concern 

that the Commission shows for my country. I hope this extremely encouraging attitude 

continues, and the Commission will organize a hearing on Moldovan matters ahead of 

2009 elections. 

I would also like to thank the Moldova Foundation based in Washington for assisting 

me in attending this session. 

I don’t intend to speak about the comparative success or successes of the current 

government, thus its existing problems, as the government has the opportunity to promote 

its point of view extensively through the existing network of officials, official visits and 

meetings. 

The civil society has fewer possibilities; therefore, I will go to the point and focus 

mainly on those concrete shortcomings that present a serious concern for democracy in 

Moldova. 

I think, first of all, three matters should be taken into account. 2008, we can agree, 

is an eventful year for Moldova. First of all, the country is approaching general and Presidential elections at the beginning of 2009. Second, 2008 is also the year when the action 

8 

plan signed between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova already expired 

formally. Third, as mentioned about 2000, it’s also a year of changes with impact on 

Transdniestran conflict resolution and Russia’s role in it, particularly after the war in 

Georgia. 

The state of democracy in Moldova and the elections are matters of concern for people 

now. The state was admirable by regional standards at the beginning of its independence, 

and the country was the first from the countries of newly created CIS to be admitted into 

the Council of Europe. 

The local assessment of the situation, the indicators of such international non-governmental organizations, as Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Transparency International, do not place now Moldova in a position of leader. 

The Council of Europe announced this year that it does not intend to renounce its 

monitoring of Moldova since the country did not meet the democratic criteria that would 

allow for such an image-making decision. 

The state of democracy is closely linked now with country’s European aspirations. 

Moldova signed, in February 2005, a 3-year action plan with the European Union. This 

[inaudible] the step-by-step implementation of those democratic reforms that Moldova 

needs in order to come closer to the EU. 

And by European rules, Moldova should abide by Copenhagen criteria: The stability 

of democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights and the respect for minorities 

as well as a free and functioning market and the capacity to face the obligation of an EU 

member state. 

The European action plan with Moldova left some question marks, some still 

unanswered. The EU, indeed, decided to encourage Moldova in 2008 due to the fact that 

it was already facing a difficult relationship with Russia on Transdniestran conflict resolution as well as due to the fact that the country already on the EU and NATO border 

still made some steps toward mostly legalistic reforms. 

At the beginning of 2008, the Europeans took the decision to formally extend the 

action plan for a brief period of time, while in May 2008 they started—they took a decision to start a reflection process in the new agreement with Moldova. 

Even though there are concerns in relations to Russia’s intentions, the EU remains 

also concerned about the pace of reform in Moldova. In its country report that was mentioned of April 3, as well as during its May 2008 decision on the reflection process, it 

stated that the action plan implementation needs progress in five crucial areas. Those are 

exactly the areas that are mentioned as Copenhagen criteria. 

Moldova also suggested that it has arrears in such fields as the independence of justice, fight against corruption, freedom of the media and investment climate and business 

environment. 

One more warning came from the European Union along the May 2008 decision to 

support Moldova with a reflection process. The Moldovan Government was asked to 

ensure free and fair elections in 2009. Such a warning came as it is widely believed that 

there is a high temptation of the governing party to use state resources and their control 

over the public media [inaudible] on competition or fraud the election in less visible ways. 

[Inaudible] one is of primary attention as it forms the base for a sustainable democracy and respect for human rights, the independence of justice. The government again 

declared the reform of the judiciary as its priority in 2008. This is indeed true, although 

9 

most of the so-called achievements meant presenting by the Minister of Justice a Council 

of Europe opinion to the prosecutor’s office, creating a commission to draft a concept paper 

and other similar actions and achievements. 

The Moldovan non-government organization, Lawyers for Human Rights, rightly 

assesses that the most relevant indicator of the state of judiciary in Moldova and about 

its independence is the number of cases that are directed to the European Court of 

Human Rights. And among the state members of the Council of Europe, Moldova holds 

the first place with the highest number of cases per capita—15 cases per 1 million citizens. Analyses, both governmental and non-governmental, show that of all the cases that 

Moldova was accused, about half are related to the faulty judiciary procedures and 

decisions. 

Despite officially expressed concerns by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, this reality is the result of the unofficial policies of the current governing party 

implemented since its accession to power in 2001. 

The independence, of course, was affected in 2002 by mass dismissal of judges by the 

Moldovan President who is also the chairman of the Communist Party. He refused to 

extend the nomination period of the judges at that time without any written explanation. 

At the same time, there were cases of nominations of some other judges based on loyalty 

to the ruling party, as Freedom House reported yet in 2003. 

Now, the civil society assesses that such a cleaning that started in 2002 led to an 

increased interference of the executive power in judiciary. 

The U.S. State Department report on human rights practices in Moldova from this 

year, March 2008, confirms that in the case of judiciary, specifically stating that the official pressure and corruption remain the problem. 

The problem with the procedure of the selection of judges is another point where the 

Moldovan NGOs agree with the findings of the U.S. State Department report. Thus, the 

initial phase of elimination is not uncommon. The judges are appointed upon suggestions 

of the Supreme Council on Magistrates by the President of the country. However, one of 

the NGO’s tests is that under an informal [inaudible], such an appointment is done only 

after a hearing by the governing Communist Party faction of the parliament and not by 

the parliament’s legal commission. 

The prosecutor’s office is also considered to be affected by the same weaknesses and 

pressures as the courts. 

When we speak about reform in Moldova and the reforms, the local EU experts conclude that the adoption of documents regulation and legislation is not followed by their 

implementation in such a problem that is reported, basically, in all the areas. This is a 

problem that is not only specific to judiciary. 

Thus, we are coming to another important element of a democratic society: Free 

media. Moldova dropped down, according to the Freedom House reports on that matter 

as well. Although media legislation legally embraces the European norms as rightly 

reported, still, the implementation, the matter that we have justice mentioned, the 

implementation of those provisions is done in such a manner as to ensure governing party 

control over the only national TV, Moldova 1. 

Despite promises of reform that the Moldovan President made in May after your 

meeting, real actions still do not meet the promises. The position parties have no access 

to the national TV, which is now, by law, a public station. The broadcasting code was preVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:36 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 3194 Sfmt 3194 E:\WORK\092408 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
10 

viously edited to allow the governing party to preserve control over the Broadcasting 

Coordination Council. This body then distributed broadcasting frequencies to the politically loyal stations and operated arbitrary licenses [inaudible]. 

There were concrete cases of inappropriate treatment of foreign commentators, 

journalists or unwanted media by law enforcement, such as the cases of [inaudible] commentators, Romanian TV prohibition and contact [inaudible] with Russia [inaudible] to 

journalists. These are also raising concerns regarding the freedom of expression. 

Even non-important and anti-governmental demonstrations, sometimes by singular 

people, were violently stopped by police despite the existing legislation. 

Media outlets are not closed in Moldova. Their criticism of the governing party is 

quite often quoted by the Moldovan President as proof of media freedom. However, the 

impression is that these media are afloat only to be such examples of [inaudible] while 

obviously they are permanently pressured, and, as mentioned above, limited in distribution and broadcast just to minimize the competition to the government-controlled media. 

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, and this makes the investment climate as 

well as business environment important elements that the state should insure. Moldova’s 

economy is growing this year, particularly when looking at the former USSR this is true. 

However, when compared with its European neighbors, it seriously lags behind. 

Due to that, nearly one-third of the Moldovans have already left to find jobs in the 

EU and Russia. The supply in remittances is already near 50 percent of country’s GDP 

and has provided the opportunities to grow. However, people leaving the country is not 

a sign of a growing economy. The money transfers cannot mean proper economic development as these are not reinvested into business. 

The so-called tax amnesty, operated last year by the government, does not seem to 

be the best solution to manage the fiscal burden. The unconfirmed rumors of Presidential 

family involvement in taking over many lucrative businesses do not help the situation. 

Pressure over foreign investors seem to produce a negative effect regardless of the good 

intentions. 

Last year, reduction of taxes, operated by the government, in an attempt to increase 

interest in investing in Moldova, was considered by International Monetary Organization 

as insufficient as to favor foreign direct investment. The FDI is proven by those organizations to grow in countries with predictable business climate and a stable judiciary—last 

one being a crucial problem reported about. 

Now we can focus on the internal political climate where there are interconnected elements that need our attention. 

The governing party made an internal analysis that prompted them to change the 

electoral legislation, as speculated, to ensure a greater electoral success in 2009. The communists changed the electoral threshold from 4 to 6 percent. They further prohibited preelectoral critical alliances which are often voted by Moldovan people. And, finally, passed 

legislation that provides state funds only to those parties that will enter the parliament 

or local regional governments. 

If seen separately, these steps, indeed, may raise minor questions. Since many of 

those principles are separately present on the European political scene. However, only 1 

year ahead of the elections and taken in conjunction to another—one to another, they 

create a commutative effect that is actually anti-democratic. 

11 

It affects the right of a large part of the populous to unite, choose and ensure that 

they are properly represented in the political life. Moreover, the government used the 

state budget to distribute funds mainly to the Communist-led local governments. The 

Moldovan President himself publicly declared that those who did not vote for the Communist Party in local 2007 elections would have to pay the price and they receive no state 

funds, a promise that is now actually implemented. Using state resources to fine voters, 

in fact, the citizens of own country, is, in my opinion, undemocratic act. 

A number of party has been affected as well directly. Signatories, for example, for 

one—or for the party’s newly created, which started to have impact on Moldovan political 

life, were subject to excessive questioning by law enforcement bodies. People were called 

by law enforcement and questioned for hours as to why they want to become a member 

of that party, who are their relatives. They’re asked to sign standing, sitting, with right 

hand, with left hand and so on. 

In case of another parliamentary party that declared during this June Congress that 

the EU integration was transformed into unsupported political gain, the government Communists accused the party of being devoted to Russia’s goals. As we already know, the 

Communists themselves are in negotiations with Russia. 

Yes, there is a matter of a new, assertive Russia. European integration, in case of 

Moldova, was declared the strategic irreversible goal of the country. The Moldovan ruling 

party also insisted to bring forth the resolution of the Transdniestrian problems and relations with Russia, as the two top priorities of the country since 2006. 

After almost unanimously adopting on July 22 of 2005 a law on the principles of the 

Transdniestrian conflict resolution by the Moldovan Parliament, the governing party 

unexpectedly launched direct, bilateral negotiations with Russia, which provoked an 

increased amount of concerns. These concerns came out of the previous experience of 2003 

when the Kremlin pressed for an unacceptable settlement through a memorandum 

adopted by Russian Presidential [inaudible], Dmitry Kozak. 

The unfortunate Kozak precedent made the civil society and political party suspicious 

of the new negotiations and [inaudible] pressures from national and particularly international [inaudible]. The governing party admitted that something that they initially 

called consultations is taking place and suggested that we prepare a package deal that 

would be based on the July 2005 law along with other documents that are in line with 

that law. The government also stated that the deal was drafted in such a way as to 

already include Russia’s interests in it and, thus, make it interesting for Moscow while 

respecting the Moldovan law. In my opinion, this is in itself a contradiction. 

Russia is a country that behaves in real political manner, projects power and believes 

in the controlled chaos of separatist region that it actually masters. 

Russia is a country that strongly believes in tradeoffs on the international arena. 

This is a reality on the ground that contradicted assessments that we are not in the 19th 

century. Indeed, we are not but Russia is. 

Moldova cannot negotiate on equal terms in a bilateral negotiation with a country 

such as Russia, because it cannot offer in tradeoff terms something that Moscow already 

has: The leverage of Moldova through the Transdniestran conflict resolution, its military 

presence and the so-called mediator’s role. It seems that the Moldovan officials in charge 

of the matter, who are the same people who negotiated a bad deal with Kozak in 2003, 

12 

did not presume that such negotiations meant offering something to Russia that Moldova 

did not have. 

Affirming that Moldova will not yield to Kremlin pressure was unrealistic. It now 

transpired that Russia was not clearly responding to the Moldovan proposal, generating 

pressure and subsequent concessions, particularly in the economic sphere. The unilateral 

dependence on Russian gas was already a concern for the government due to a previous 

decision by that government to provide Russia the control package of shares to the 

Moldovan statement [inaudible] Moldova gas in exchange for eradicating the debts. 

However, when faced with lack of Russian response to the governmental package deal 

on Transdniestra, the government recently followed up with a contradictory move that 

strengthens Moldovan dependency. The state decided to cede the local distribution network to [inaudible] as well. 

Russian companies that border [inaudible] Transdniestran region without governmental approval were ensured that their new property rights will be recognized. Experts 

were encouraged to Russia lately while there was not the same level of official visible 

encouragement to the experts to the EU, at least through diversified markets and 

ensuring economic security goals. 

These unilateral concessions made in hope to sweeten, sorry to say, Russia did not 

yield the results. And, contrary, it was rumored that Russia was warning Moldova, 

Moldovan officials to be more flexible, and that the reason for such a warning will be seen 

during 2008. It was exactly before the August war in Georgia. 

By no coincidence, Moldovan President Voronin was called to meet the Russian President on the day when Dmitry Medvedev announced the decision to recognize South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia. 

The next troubling step was an announcement made by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that deciding Moldovan conflict will return to the 2003 Kozak memorandum. 

This is the very memorandum that was rejected by Moldova as unacceptable and which 

comes against the Moldovan law of July 2005, which cannot be violated by the Moldovan 

negotiators. 

A number of Moldovan experts believe that further Russian pressure to either implement such a memorandum or to simply promote its interest in Moldova will follow with 

certainty during 2008, with possible negative repercussions over its populous. Certain 

political parties might be supported by Moscow. Transdniestran leadership will be used 

to put more pressure over Chisinau, particularly through the newly instituted two plus 

one format of negotiations that is outside the ‘‘five plus two’’ format and which is not a 

good format for Moldova, as Chisinau recognizes correctly. 

This effort is so the autonomous region of Gagauzia in the south of Moldova will be, 

and already is, reignited. Eventually, some do not even exclude gas cuts in this winter, 

which happened before, all leading to, if not a social event or a political crisis. 

Russian pressure is detrimental for a democratic future of Moldova. [inaudible] is 

insistently promoting the concept of a future Moldova with a Transdniestra veto over most 

important foreign policy decisions but also internal decisions, such as EU membership. 

Basically, it’s a [inaudible] right over democratic reforms and the Transdniestran leadership has shown that it is against such reforms. The Transdniestra itself is a dictatorship, 

and it is against such concepts when it is actually supporting such concepts as the sovVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:36 Feb 08, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 3194 Sfmt 3194 E:\WORK\092408 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
13 

ereign democracy it is promoting in Russia and the vertical of power, which allow for an 

unlimited and uncontrolled leadership that declare each of its decisions as democratic. 

In conclusion, I would like to state that there is, of course—there are several 

dilemmas in Moldova. Indeed, the Russian pressure is real and important factor in 

Moldova. Indeed, we can expect negative developments, possibly even before December 

2008. 

However, the geopolitical determinism is not the way to ensure that Moldova should 

receive unconditional support without seriously implementing democratic reforms. 

The Moldovan Communists have been responsible for the current situation of 

Moldova, which is, indeed, deteriorating since they have been, by the way, democratically 

elected to power. It does seem that they are now trying to avoid yielding to the Russian 

pressure. They would like the Moldovan civil society and political parties to help them 

out through statements that reject the Russian proposal, as it seems, so that the President can save face. 

The problem is that it is believed that the Communists will use the blame game, not 

only to avoid complications with Russia before elections. As in 2003, they will presumably 

blame the civil society for not being active enough for the political parties or for the fact 

that they have deteriorated the relations with Russia, thus place responsibility ahead of 

the elections on other shoulders. 

The dilemma of the civil society, and particularly of the political parties unaffiliated 

with the government, is how they can help a Communist Party in government that is 

prosecuting them and does not genuinely implement democratic reforms in a sufficient 

manner [inaudible] free political competition. 

We believe that support for Moldova should be and should exist and should be from 

now on conditional on reforms. 

Thank you very much for your attention. 

Amb. BOND. Thank you. 

And now we’ll turn to Dr. William Hill of the National War College, currently of the 

National War College, formerly Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. 

Mr. HILL. Thank you, Thank you very much, Ambassadors, ladies and gentlemen, 

and friends. 

First of all, I have to state that the remarks I offer here are in my personal capacity 

and do not necessarily represent the views or position of the National War College or the 

Department of Defense. 

I’ve distributed, or made available, to the Commission a short article that may or 

may not appear in the print soon, which addresses some of the issues involved in the 

status of the Transdniestran settlement negotiations going on right now. 

This briefing does, indeed, come at a sensitive time with much attention on other crucial areas of the former Soviet Union following last month’s war in Georgia. In Moldova, 

the good news out of all of this, first and foremost, I’d presume, is that nobody really 

seems to be preparing or wishes to fight each other from one position or another, and, 

therefore, any movement toward a settlement is, frankly, likely to be peaceful. 

The ‘‘five plus two’’ negotiations are on the cusp of renewing after some 21⁄2 years 

without a negotiating round. You may well see a formal session very soon, and attempts 

14 

have been ongoing to generate work on portions—or begin expert work on portions of the 

comprehensive Moldovan package that has been on the table for quite some time. 

The Russian Federation has also been more active, in particular, Russian activities 

were probably instrumental in bringing about a meeting of President Voronin and the 

Transdniestran leader, Igor Smirnov, last spring, the first time the two had seen each 

other in almost 7 years. 

The prospects for further movement or success are mixed. Partially, the positions of 

Chisinau and Tiraspol are pretty far apart. The positions of those who are involved in 

the process as mediators or observers also are not particularly close together on some 

issues, and these differences have to be reconciled, and commonalities need to be found 

before real progress can be made. 

I would point out one thing that’s not generally mentioned but I found during my 

time there, and I think it’s still a phenomenon: There is a potential, an unrealized and 

perhaps paradoxical potential, for progress in the Left Bank, in particular in the 

Transdniestran business community where leaders and representatives of a number of 

enterprises have made considerable headway for a decade or more in penetrating the 

Western European and North American markets. And these businessmen, entrepreneurs 

from the Left Bank are actually oriented toward integration and further operation in 

Western markets, and this may be a potential for finding common ground that could lead 

to an acceptable settlement for all parties involved. It doesn’t mean that it will happen, 

but it’s something that one might look at. 

The real question with the increased activity of the Russian Federation now is 

whether Russia will work within or outside the generally accepted negotiating framework. 

In this sense, in my informal conversations with negotiators, both from the OSCE and 

then particularly U.S. representatives, what I hear from them is generally that we are 

open to greater Russian activity and constructive Russian initiatives, but these initiatives 

should contribute then to progress within the ‘‘five plus two’’ format. In other words, 

there’s nothing wrong with an individual country being active, but it should lead back to 

the general framework within which we consider an acceptable settlement has to be 

reached. 

I also think that after what I’ve seen, as after especially the events of August, the 

United States is more active and more supportive of constructive progress and just more 

active in support in Moldova, and that’s probably a good thing. 

The other note I’d put to all of this is that a settlement of the Transdniestran conflict, 

in my view, would be a good thing, but it’s not a sine qua non for progress in everything 

else in Moldova. In other words, I’d like to reiterate what you’ll see if you read through 

my article. With respect to Moldova in 2008, the absence of a solution to the 

Transdniestran question will be better than a bad solution that cripples the country’s 

chances for reform and integration into Europe as a whole. For any settlement to succeed, 

Russia must be a part, but so must the rest of Europe and the North Atlantic community, 

that is, the EU and the United States. 

I’d say commenting on U.S. actions elsewhere in the globe, my Russian colleagues 

have often said that unilateralism and unilateral solutions are generally not a good thing. 

The conflict areas in the periphery of the former USSR, like Moldova, are places where 

I think Moscow would do well to listen to its own counsel, its own advice. 

15 

Very briefly, in terms of other elements that have been raised today, the status of 

Moldovan electoral democracy, this is a classic case of, is the glass half full or half empty? 

On the half full category, opposition parties generally are allowed—are able to register 

and conduct activity in Moldova. There’s considerable freedom of advocacy, organization, 

and campaigning, and opposition parties have won significant victories in elections and 

garnered a considerable percentage of the vote. For example, municipal elections in 2007, 

the opposition won a resounding victory and defeated the Communist candidates in 

Chisinau. So that’s the good part. 

On the half empty side, indeed, the 2007 law on political parties is worrisome, 

because it allows the basis for government interference and regulation of all political parties, including opposition political parties, not necessarily a desirable thing. The new 6 

percent threshold and the prohibition of electoral blocs are generally aimed, or in 

Moldovan circumstances, will probably work against diversity and freedom or the success 

of opposition parties or a multitude parties in electoral competition. 

And there’s still problems with the use of administrative resources, administrative 

restrictions on political parties or political prosecutions and investigations of opposition 

figures or opposition parties. 

Now, if you look at the situation in Moldova leading up to the elections in 2009, it 

leads to a couple of observations. First of all, the ruling party, the PCRM, or Party of 

Communists, has considerable popular support, and partisans or supporters of this party 

really don’t need to engage in some of the chicanery and administrative juggling in order 

to promote electoral success of the party. The party does have a base, so why do this if 

you want to have free and fair elections? 

The other thing is that some of the opposition’s problems are of their own making. 

The opposition, broad right, right center opposition consistently draws over 40 percent of 

the electorate in Moldova. The problem is, this is split among some 10 to 15 opposition 

parties where every political leader wishes to be king of his little faction rather than a 

part of a broad coalition within the rules that would have a chance of electoral success, 

considerable representation in Parliament and perhaps even control. It remains—it was 

a problem in the 1990s, it remains a problem late into this decade in Moldova. The opposition does have legitimate complaints about the status of the playing field, rules of the 

game, but they also have to stop shooting themselves in the foot if they want to be 

successful. 

Overall, I’d say, what we from outside really should encourage is that the United 

States, EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, and other international organizations and bodies 

that engage in electoral monitoring, in human rights monitoring, should remain very 

active and communicate early to all participants in the Moldovan electoral process, that 

irrespective of who wins, we expect a clean election, and this is the best way to ensure 

continued and broad support. 

On human rights, in general, we’ve heard things—I second what I’ve heard about difficulties with freedom of expression, in particular, broadcasting is—long since the authorities in Moldova have had the benefit of the good advice of the Council of Europe, EU, 

OSCE, and in many respects having to do with public broadcasting, they failed to listen. 

Anti-trafficking, this has been a big disappointment. Now, Moldova has done enough 

recently to get themselves raised back from tier three up to tier two, but since I began 

working with the Moldovan Government in 1999, 2000 to help them draft legislation 

16 

against trafficking in persons, more needs to be done on this. It’s a problem on both sides 

of the river. It’s sort of been, sort of, like squeezing balloons. First, the traffic went toward 

Western Europe and the Balkans. As the international community and authorities got a 

handle on that, it moved toward the east and south. But it’s something where clearly the 

authorities can and should, must do much more. 

Corruption and the judicial system is still a big problem, despite a decade and a half 

of promises of reform from many administrations and work with many international 

organizations. Some things have been done but not as much has been done as needs to 

be. And until this is tackled, it’s corrosive to the trust of citizens in government, and it 

prevents effective reform in many other areas. 

On the economy and business climate, it’s a patchy picture here. Moldova has gotten 

recently good remarks from the IMF and World Bank and is doing a number of things 

correct in the economy. However, the web of economic reforms is still patchy, and there 

are problems with implementation, especially in things that are important to the creation 

of a favorable business and investment climate and allowing small businesses to pop up, 

especially outside of the capital, and this needs to be implemented. 

Given some of these difficulties, you saw Fitch where it recently downgraded the 

Moldovan economic outlook from positive to stable, because there are some fundamental 

weaknesses behind this good picture. The biggest one is that there are not enough 

domestic jobs, enough domestic business, enough domestic investment being created. The 

figure I had is about 33 percent of the Moldovan GDP comes from remittances from 

Moldovans who work abroad. The figure, according to the Moldovan press recently, hit $1 

billion submitted back to Moldova in remittances for 2008. That’s before the end of the 

year, so it’s going to be well over $1 billion. 

It’s good to have the money coming in, but it’s not stable. What if the people stop 

sending money home? What if their families go out to join them? The problem is getting 

someone to change this and put the Moldovan economy on a more stable basis, because 

the money comes back to Moldova, people use it for consumption, which means that 

Moldova has a highly unfavorable trade balance. The current account is highly 

disbalanced but offset by the remittances. 

But the people pay taxes in Moldova so the government budget is more than filled, 

and so you go to either the executive branch or the legislative branch and they say, 

‘‘What’s the problem? We have a surplus in the government budget this year, and as far 

out as we can see if it stays the same. If it doesn’t stay the same, the economic foundations could be worrisome.’’ 

Overall, looking at Moldova, much has been done that is good, and a lot needs to be 

encouraged. Things need to be corrected, to be sure, but this is by no means—by no means 

we wish to paint a dismal picture. What I would recommend, as an individual, simply for 

my own country, is, first of all, to provide continued and consistent high-level engagement 

and support with conditionality. I think the Millennium Challenge Account has been a 

good approach, it’s been useful. Other elements of support and conditionality have been 

useful, and we can see positive results from this. 

In particular, in Transdniestra, there needs to be sustained, high-level attention. This 

is not something that can come up in a meeting every once in a while, then we forget 

about it and low-level—working-level people deal with it and don’t get any attention. 

17 

This is an important question for some of our interlocutors, and, therefore, it needs 

to be an issue that gets consistent attention from us at a level that can communicate 

authoritatively and take decisions. 

Most particularly I would advocate including this issue regularly in high-level U.S.- 

Russian Federation dialogues. It’s an important issue to Moscow, and we will not influence what Moscow thinks about it unless we raise it with Moscow at an appropriate level 

and conduct a dialogue at that level. Otherwise, we won’t be taken seriously. 

Thank you very much. Thank you for the opportunity. 

Amb. BOND. Thank you so much, Dr. Hill. 

I’m going to open it up to questions now, but I’d like to start by putting a question 

to our panelists. 

It seems to me from what you said that it’s going to be extraordinarily important to 

have an election this spring that shows the support of the Moldovan people for the government and the elected officials and strengthens their hand in dealing with the 

Transdniestra problem, as well as advancing reforms. 

Dr. Hill mentioned monitoring, election monitoring, long and short term, as a way 

to influence the outcome of those elections so that they’re free and fair. Do you have other 

ideas on things the United States, Europe, multilateral organizations, like the OSCE, can 

do to help assure that free and fair outcome? 

Amb. CHIRTOACA. Definitely, the election from March 2009 will be a moment of truth 

for our democratic system, but I would like to remind you that since the beginning of our 

period of independent existence, Moldova always had a very good record concerning the 

organization of free and, more or less, fair elections and criticism from the international 

observers. I’ve been focused mostly on the use of administrative state power resources, 

which is, basically, we understand that this is raising awareness but since the beginning 

of the ’90s. 

So we always have been, as I mentioned, monitored [inaudible] special missions sent 

to Moldova by the OSCE, by the Council of Europe, by the European Union, even by 

Commonwealths of Independent States [CIS]. It always has been monitored very, very 

closely. 

Definitely, this is already a part of Moldova. Even despite we are in transition, this 

is a part of our democratic culture. Moldovans are a civil society, one of the most maybe 

success story. I think it was the creation in 2005 of Association of Civil Society organizations that are taking—well, ensuring this kind of monitoring, not only the capital but all 

over Europe—sorry, Sigmund Freud [inaudible]—all over Moldova. 

So from that point of view, I think everything will be OK. We understand how important. We are scrutinized very closely. The European [inaudible] of Moldova depends on 

the quality of democracy, and this is not political wrestling, this is a reality, and this is 

understood politically, responsible presenting of political class that has made really, really 

a big test for Moldova. 

I have a feeling that we’ll have already some changes in [inaudible] to conflict settlement even earlier, and we did not exclude that [inaudible] in December. That meeting will 

be kind of benchmark, it is a benchmark for Russian diplomacy in trying just to make 

some efforts in using the current situation as an argument in the dialogue with the best, 

but I will not collaborate too much on this topic. We’ll see. Initiatives that we do, we are 

not inclined to any concession anymore. 

18 

This is a problem of the future of Moldovan state. The future of real sovereignty and 

independence. We’ll see what the Russian Federation will propose, and a package 

approach is conceded as the main element of our strategy. But definitely take good democracy and efficient democracy can help us to solve our [inaudible] conflict. 

Thank you. 

Amb. BOND. Thank you. 

Mr. LUPAN. Indeed, the 2009 elections are important in the view of the future of 

Moldova, because that is what the European Union actually said, that we will support 

Moldova, but we want to see free and fair elections. This is an important element for our 

future support as a country. 

I think that we should look—and we are looking as the civil society and some experts 

from the civil society—are looking at the events of 2009 from the perspective—not from 

that perspective of negative problems that are existing, on which I have focused on parts, 

but from the perspective of the future of the country, independent of which political party 

wins the elections, this is the important thing. 

The important thing is that these elections should be free and fair, and then we will 

speak about the developments, and then we can speak about the proper developments. 

This is a first step now that is necessary. The problem that we see here is that for the 

moment there are no sufficient signs that these will be free and fair elections, and these 

will be changed. And what and who can do for Moldova, what can be done for Moldova 

and who can do it? 

Speaking about monitoring, the long-term monitoring of the OSCE starts 1 month 

ahead of elections, if I’m right, if I still remember from my previous OSCE—2 months, 

all right—from my previous OSCE experience. Because I was also working for the OSCE 

myself and monitored the elections in several countries. 

Two months is not enough. Two months is not enough, because it is not a matter 

of time ahead of the elections, it’s a matter of preparations for the elections at the beginning of the campaign, and the campaign will not start 2 months ahead of the elections. 

It will be well-prepared to have a lot—but there is one positive thing that we can and 

should look at. 

There is an OIC mission in Moldova that is actually already monitoring the situation. 

There is an EU delegation in Moldova that is already monitoring the reforms and the elections. And these organisms, in conjunction with monitoring by the civil society and political parties, can be supported, you know, to monitor the pre-electoral campaign, on one 

hand. 

On the other hand, what EU can do for Moldova, and why I am focusing that much 

on the EU, because, actually, as I said before, the reforms that are stipulated by the EU 

are the democratic reforms that Moldova needs. And we want to become a member of the 

EU. 

The EU can support Moldova through a decision to start a negotiation process on the 

new agreement, and the United States can help Moldova in its bilateral discussions with 

the EU on that matter. 

What is important here, however, as I said, is to have the necessary conditionality. 

When Moldova—if Moldova wants to receive such a support, then it still should implement a number of reforms, and they should be done in good faith. 

19 

This is the role that the United States can play in its relations with the EU and in 

its relations with Moldova, particularly, the United States can clearly state that there is— 

hopefully, there is—and I feel there is—there is a support for Moldova, but this support 

needs to be seen. There should be a feedback from Moldova as well. One should be a 

player, one should be a democratic player, one should show that we are a group of the 

same countries, that we believe in the same values as the EU and United States in democratic values. And that has to be proven. 

Although, of course, it is difficult for Moldova to progress on its path to democracy, 

and it is indeed a matter of time, and it is indeed—nobody expects Moldova overnight to 

become a country but we do tend to better ourselves, and this is the message that the 

civil society is trying to send. And in this respect, the EU and the United States can help, 

and the OSCE already is helping us in the sense that it already monitors the elections. 

What can be done by these organizations for countries is that it can start to, sort 

of, support this for the monitoring of the elections already from now, and also it should 

work closely with the government on the matters that are not considered to be sufficiently 

democratic. 

Mr. HILL. I would just like to add that in my experience in working with the authorities in Moldova, including the present ones in this area, they do desire to meet their international commitments and international norms. They also want to win the election. The 

key is early involvement, engagement and feedback in the area from missions that are 

on the ground, because the problems arise, generally, in the campaign. Election day everything will look good, but it’s the conditions of the campaign which are the primary concern 

and where the engagement can be most effective. 

And I’ve found it can be effective, because my interlocutors were very often influenced, I thought positively, by international feedback. 

Amb. BOND. OK. Thank you for all of that. 

One remark and then I’m going to open it to the floor to questions, and I’m going 

to encourage people to come forward, use a microphone here, state your name and affiliation and pose a question to our speakers. 

But my comment is the dependence on remittances is not—is a problem that other 

countries share. I know in Latin America, in a couple of cases, the countries have set up 

investment funds so that their foreign workers can actually invest in the funds as well 

as send money back to their families, which will be consumed. It’s a way of saving for 

them, and it’s a way of encouraging investment in the home country. I don’t know if 

Moldova’s considered that. 

Now, if we have people who would like to pose a question? 

Please? 

QUESTIONER. My name is Vlad Spaˆnu, and I’m the president of the Moldova Foundation here in Washington. And my question is regarding the topic of today’s discussion, 

‘‘Where Moldova Goes, East or West?′′ 

So my organization, along with other organization partnerships, partnered and organized two events on post-elections Moldova. We did it [inaudible]; in 2005, after the parliamentary elections; in 2007, after the local elections. 

Among the conclusion of experts I brought from Moldova, from the United States was 

one important statement. Moldova does conduct the free and fair elections on election day, 

and I think the speakers and Ambassador Hill actually mentioned. But the big problem 

20 

is before the elections. During this month, there are—the state institutions prevent the 

competition, both the parties and for independent media. 

So the question is this to all speakers: Why Moldova behaves this way? If it wants 

to join the democratic society, the democratic family, if all Moldova wants to play both 

ways, to be a semi-authoritarian country within the CIS and at the same time to declare 

itself a democratic country and be part of the European Union. So it’s very difficult to 

play this way. 

So my question is, what way Moldova really wants to go? The current comments are 

it really wants to go to join the West or to stay outside of Western family. Thank you. 

Amb. CHIRTOACA. To tell the truth, I was not really very happy with the topic of our 

discussion but just right, OK to just to stay open about it. There’s no doubt about this, 

no question about the strategic orientation of Moldova. It’s the problem how to address 

the threat of Transdniestra, the Russian intervention in the different area of Soviet space 

and this is a problem of Moldova specifically. 

Moldova is still, let’s say, trapped and looking at endless transition. The end of 

transition landed in Europe, and this is, again, I would like to state it, repeat it here, 

again, model of development, it’s a functional democracy, efficient governance, freedom of 

mass media, rule of law and the [inaudible] judiciary system place a great, great values 

and principles. The problem is, at the institutional level, Moldova needs new capacity, 

[inaudible], strange people, educated people just to ensure the efficiency of functions of 

this democratic mechanism. 

[Inaudible], and I think this is nothing more than speculations concerning their orientation as a foreign policy and long, long-term strategy of my country. It reminds me 

a little bit Mr. Lupan saying, ‘‘We have to do political parties and vibrant single society 

organization to move Moldova in the right place. 

Moldova is not Milosevic Serbia with non-government organizations. Please get back 

to the natural functions. Please educate people, provide society with a clear vision, have 

more analytical and systemic approach. Do not make speculations, because we need 

professionals with clear strategies, and you can contribute in a very direct way unless you 

would like to be political fighters. Please organize 20 non-service political formations and 

struggle for democracy. If you’d like to be struggling for democracy, be a patriot outside 

Moldova and be freedom fighter inside Moldova. I think this is the best formula to be efficient and to help our country, which is still in an extraordinarily difficult situation, even 

now. Thank you. 

Mr. LUPAN. The problem that we are facing now, as a country, is that we have this 

situation when the attitude of the government is changing according to its preferences on 

the international [inaudible], according to its international relations. The relations of 

Moldova should not—not in the past but especially not in the future—should not be those 

factors that should be influenced, the democratic development inside the country. These 

are the things that are clear. 

I think that specificity is often quoted by many countries when they fail to implement 

certain reforms or to take certain steps. Specificity of each country is not in failing to 

implement certain reforms but to implement them in a different way, [inaudible]. 

I think this issue is where Moldova goes, East or West, was very much speculated 

in recent years, coming again to the matter of geopolitical determinants, the fact that if 

we have better relations with Russia, then we should give Russia what Russia wants. The 

21 

EU is a richer area, and we should go there, and that is why we want to be an EU 

member. 

I think these sort of issues are now already going away and should be going away. 

I think that we should be moving to the West, and I think that the point is that if it 

comes to the political and geopolitical determinants, we can see that relations with Russia 

are not exactly progressing in the way they were planned. So that’s why Moldova will be 

moving to West, and this is something encouraging. 

But as I said again, it should not be a matter of international relations. It should 

be a matter of political will of the people. And that [inaudible], indeed, was already 

expressed in 2005 when both parties signed a joint paper on the European integration. 

I think this is the only way for the moment, at least. I think this is the only way we 

should look at it. The problems of relations with other countries, indeed, appear, and 

that’s the role of all of us to correct our course in such a way as to ensure that European 

integration. 

Mr. HILL. I think Ambassador Chirtoaca has given a good enumeration of the standards and values that go into what is perceived as European or, generally, broader European integration or orientation. Clearly, my experience is that most Moldovans that I had 

dealings with were broadly oriented toward becoming a part of the larger European 

community, specifically the European Union. 

The problem is juxtaposing this with countries to the East or to the North, because 

I found on a personal level relatively little hostility among Moldovans to having good relations on a personal level with either Ukraine or the Russian Federation, although they 

might object to policies. 

But I think it’s very important to focus on these and focus on what you mean by East 

or West or European and non-European. I’m reminded by some of the very emotional 

debates of 2002, 2003 when representatives of various organizations said, ‘‘No, we want 

a European solution to the Transdniestran problem, we don’t want Federalization.’’ Well, 

my German colleagues were very puzzled to what respect a federation is not a European 

phenomenon. I mean, it was quite clear that what the people meant is they didn’t want 

a certain kind of federation that left the country in a non-viable state. And so it’s good 

to be very clear what you’re talking about. 

So I come back to that basic set of values is I think broadly shared by most of the 

Moldovan public, and given a chance to work at it freely, that’s the direction that Moldova 

will go. 

Amb. BOND. I’d just note, before this session, I was doing some reading on Moldova, 

and on the 23rd of September, an association of sociologists and demographers, so-called 

Vox-Populi, took a referendum on Moldova’s future, and 63 percent of the respondents 

said that they supported Moldova’s eventual entry into the European Union. Only 12 percent of the country were against it. 

Please, further questions? Any further questions from the audience? Please. 

QUESTIONER. My name is Jonas Rolett from the Open Society institute. 

You know, one of the things that is evident whenever there’s a discussion of Moldova 

is that it lives in, kind of, a rough neighborhood, and a lot of issues which we’ve been 

discussing today relate directly, I think, to trying to survive in that zone. 

I wanted to ask a little bit, given that there is consensus among the speakers about 

the direction of Moldova, a little bit about Western instruments that can, sort of, assist, 

22 

push, pull Moldova in its stated direction. We know, of course, that there’s the prospect, 

at least, of EU membership, and there are lots of instruments that the European Union 

has at its disposal to, sort of, promote reform and to assist Moldova, generally, to move 

in that direction. 

I’m wondering a little bit about, since we’re here in Washington, what instruments 

the United States might have, particularly on issues related to energy, democratic consolidation, support within the spheres of international diplomacy, et cetera. Thank you. 

Amb. BOND. Dr. Hill, you might want to address OSCE in particular in that, in terms 

of how we could use the OSCE. 

Mr. HILL. Well, everybody turns—OK, sure thing—everybody turns to the American 

on the panel. 

We’ve mentioned the Millennium Challenge Account, which is a way in which the 

current administration in Washington has found to address providing assistance based 

upon conditionality and rewarding performance. That is one area. 

One other area that has been, I think, recently both Washington and the embassy 

have done is to make efforts to treat Moldova as a whole country and to try to find ways 

without providing any basis for legal recognition of the Transdniestran entity to provide 

assistance to people throughout the country, including on the Left Bank, which has been 

a way—to do it in a way that is reinforcing of the idea that this is one country, all of 

the population should benefit from—and should see—that the population on the Left Bank 

should see benefits from association with the broader outside community. 

In terms of the OSCE, I mean, I could exhaust the rest of the time with recommendations, but with the OSCE and other international bodies, the first thing is for the United 

States to provide personnel and involvement, both financing and personnel. Unfortunately, recently, the United States has been understandably preoccupied with the Middle 

East and South Asia, and it’s been to the great detriment of our involvement with 

organizations that work on the ground, not only in Moldova but elsewhere through a 

broad swathe of Eurasia. And this is invaluable. Organizations on the ground provide 

direct contact, direct information, daily day-to-day back and forth with officials, both support and feedback when they have something not terribly supportive to provide. 

Yes, given the current economic situation, not only in the United States but worldwide, it’s not a great time—it’s never a great time to suggest that one needs to reverse— 

instead of declining contributions, raise them. But one needs to keep in mind—the United 

States needs to keep in mind the great necessity of maintaining American support and 

American personnel in these international operations that go out on the ground and provide a direct and less structured contact with governments, civil society, and people, less 

structured contact than you can get formally by doing it through formal, accredited, 

national diplomatic missions. 

That’s the very short list. I mean, there’s undoubtedly more that I could cite. 

Mr. LUPAN. Just a very brief mention. As I mentioned before, one of the main 

[inaudible] for Moldova and for the future of Moldova is a matter of accession to the European Union. That agreement that Moldova is supposed to sign with new agreement going 

beyond the partnership and cooperation agreement, this is something that Moldova really 

wants. This is the governmental position, but it is also the position of the civil society 

that issued a statement on these matters now in August with relation to the events in 

Georgia. 

23 

This is one of the things which I have mentioned before. There is need for Moldova 

to receive positive signals that it will receive—it will be treated as a European country. 

It will receive more attention, but it should be also conditional on reforms. And these 

reforms should be encouraged and supported. 

When we think about the involvement of the United States, we, indeed, can speak 

about the involvement with the government and with preparation of the government or, 

let’s say, training of the governmental officials for those tasks that they need to fulfill. 

Because as the Ambassador mentioned, there is a lack of capacity within the government, 

not only within the government but also within the civil society there is lack of capacities, 

because both are representing Moldova. Moldova, unfortunately, is underdeveloped, and 

that’s why we cannot develop neither one nor another. 

What I can add is that the civil society, at least, has some capacity, some limited 

capacity. It is coming out with policies and recommendations. This has been done on the 

23rd of September with another opinion of the experts with regard to the Transdniestran 

problem. This was done in August when the civil society experts came out with their 

opinion on the events in Georgia and the impact on Moldova. They have called the government to cooperate on—eventually on a study for the Moldovans’ future security. These are 

the methods that, unfortunately, cannot be done without support. 

The training and the preparations, good advice would be sometimes very helpful. 

With regard to energy worldwide, as I mentioned, there is a slight chance, but it does 

exist, that in winter Moldova could face energy cuts, particularly in gas. I don’t know 

what would be the best solution for this problem, if it will happen at all. Last time, 

Moldova was supplied gas from Ukraine. I’m not sure this will happen this time. If it happens, Moldova needs to be prepared for contingencies, and in this respect perhaps we 

should look at other options and you’re asking, look at other options to support Moldova 

in energy field through its neighbors, through Ukraine, through eventually Romania, 

although relations with Romania are not great. 

But this probably can be U.S. support, this probably can be European support for 

Moldova, and, therefore, it might be under certain circumstances accepted evenly if it 

comes through Romania. 

And I think that one of the real instruments that already exists in the field of democracy but encourages Moldova and that makes Moldova move ahead with all sorts of 

reforms is the Council of Europe. I think this instrument should be used continuously for 

further monitoring and, of course, advice for Moldova with regard to those reforms that 

I have mentioned that are necessary for Moldova. And OSCE here, as well, has necessary 

instruments. United States is present in this organization, in OSCE, I mean. It can support such projects for Moldova, as Moldova would need. 

Amb. CHIRTOACA. I would just briefly about the conditionality as one of the tools and 

driving force behind democratic reforms in the transitional countries. Definitely, there is 

a big difference between central European countries. I mean, [inaudible] Baltic for Baltic’s 

union and Bulgaria, Romania. They’ve been promised a clear [inaudible] for new integration, which is not the case of Moldova. 

I agree with the idea, we are negotiating now, so since ’98 we have partnership and 

cooperation agreements with EU, just as right that we conceded to sign another association and civilization agreement, and maybe and definitely for this negotiation we’ll start 

after the 2009 new elections. That’s why, again, this is so important to mention it. 

24 

And it’s not [inaudible] of EU conditionality, so-called Copenhagen criteria, words 

because, again, the integration of Moldova’s pursuit as a national idea with a large 

commitment, with reliable polls, even sociological polls, in terms of [inaudible] more than 

70 percent of population. We have much more modest indicators [inaudible] around one 

set of population in favor with [inaudible]. This is all about to be neutral, to have a constitutional [inaudible] of public policy and debate inside the society. 

We are dependent on natural gas 100 percent. This is our national security concern. 

I do not have very negative perception of winter problems. I do not think that there will 

be difficulties in the relationship with Ukraine and Russia ally provoked a couple of years 

ago. They, sort of, [inaudible] policy of Moscow. 

Anyway, we have to be justified, and this is a very good sign, so we have good relations with Azerbaijan corporations, and we are looking at a good terminal. We invite the 

MCC American corporation to take part in the reconstruction of well terminal on 

[inaudible] to develop the infrastructure. It’s all about MCC complex strategy. It’s 

reconstruction of infrastructure roads, qualitative [inaudible] on public health, and we 

consider that here in the United States of America plays a great role, because this is 

roughly $300 million to $350 million will be granted to local and American corporations, 

and this is an economic and business platform for further development for some more, different involvement, and this is an [inaudible] for attracting investments and to ensure 

there are growing economic, stable, growing, economic development of my country. 

And, of course, Transdniestra, this is a permanent, open and transparent dialogue 

with the Department of State with other bodies that are involved in a way [inaudible] 

in a frozen conflict. That means I can assure you this is the biggest part of our job 

[inaudible] diplomats [inaudible] in Washington, DC. 

We understand that [inaudible] limited capacity for small countries. It has a clear 

geopolitical dimension, has a clear strategic [inaudible] who are witnessing the emerging 

new security world in Europe, and, of course, we would like to move closer to more stable 

zone, and we’d like to use this moment of opportunity, but, again, it’s still very risky. 

Of course, we need assistance, partnership and ‘‘five plus two’’ exactly for U.S. 

[inaudible] of European Union, especially after Nicolas Sarkozy mediation in Georgia 

crisis. This is a new fact that gives new dynamics, and we would like to use them in the 

most positive and constructive way just to get closer to the Transdniestra conflicts 

[inaudible]. Thank you. 

Amb. BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

I’d like to turn the floor over to John Finerty [Staff Advisor, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe], who is—and deserves the credit for organizing this session 

today and has done all the work to put this program together. 

Mr. FINERTY. Thank you. I’ll try to be brief here. 

I was interested in something Ambassador Hill mentioned about the, sort of, business 

interests in the Left Bank of Transdniestra being more conciliatory, and I think this had 

a lot to do with EU borders, just the mission there and cutting down on some of the black 

marketing things like this. And some of us on the staff [inaudible]. 

It seems to me, though, that if you have the right coalition of forces where Russia 

decided for one reason or another to go along with the settlement, to get out of the way 

of a settlement, and if the suggestion is that your government has made, Mr. Ambassador, 

concessions, if you will, to resolve this situation, that could be done. 

25 

I don’t have in front of me the legislation that goes back to 2005 on the principles 

of the Transdniestra situation. It seems to me, though, there is little there that would— 

it leaves too much space for the folks who operate in Transdniestra. Would that legislation 

have to be changed? 

Amb. CHIRTOACA. This time I will start and we’ll go right to the left. 

No, the legislation will not be changed. We consider it will provoke or destabilize the 

situation, and this legislation has been voted on the basis large consensus among all the 

political parties in our Parliament. Nobody will revise or give back or just put under the 

impression it’s basic, but this is the basic principles. So the problem is flexibility, and 

there’s always a certain degree of flexibility will be thin interpretation. 

But this is a package of [inaudible]. We are speaking about a large autonomy of 

Transdniestra region populated mostly by ethnic Moldovans, and the rest of the Russianspeaking—but the biggest minority is the Ukrainian-speaking minority and then Bulgarian and Russian. So there is no basis for any kind of other approach. But this is a 

negotiated status—special status of the region all about. That’s why this is a main element I mentioned in my presentation of the future negotiations. 

Regarding the OSCE [inaudible] Left Bank [inaudible], this is a [inaudible] all a 

perception of a confidence—consolidating the future confidence measures. And when 

Transdniestra business, this is the kind of [inaudible] in eastern part of Moldova. So we’ll 

be involved in [inaudible] projects financed by MCC. It was involved in the U.S. Government. This is [inaudible] create and form new channels of communication. And the EU 

result of that is supportive. The EU would like also an opinion and would like also just 

to assist financially and to take part in this project and communication. 

[Inaudible] before all these events. Now, this is a little bit—well, it’s a different situation, but these principles remain as the basic elements of our conflict settlement. 

Mr. LUPAN. With business interests in 2005 law, hypothetically speaking, indeed, 

they do not contradict each other, in my personal opinion. The point is that this law 

clearly states that it was for certain business interests. What does it actually mean by 

that? It means that what Moldova already started to implement, the return of the 

Transdniestran enterprise under its control within the economics has yielded some posted 

results in the sense that there is less, at least, speculation about what and who does in 

Transdniestran region and with business interests. They have been reduced. 

There is a certain reduction of illegal business in Transdniestra, and that is the 

point. The point is, legally or illegally, legal or illegal business. It does not block, basically, 

the development of business. That’s what we should aim for, and I think this is the point 

where we should come and we are coming to the development of business in Moldova, as 

a whole. The development of business in Moldova as a whole should set some standards 

that would allow for both Moldovan and Transdniestran business to develop freely without 

harm and actually promote business, because that would be, of course, helpful for the 

whole country, and it would provide more taxes and better incomes and so on and more 

tax. 

Mr. HILL. OK. I told the Moldovan Government in 2005, when they were considering 

the law, that I thought it restricted their flexibility in negotiating unduly, and I still think 

that, but it’s not a fatal restriction. And, you know, laws can be amended if situations 

change and if circumstances change. 

26 

Business on the Left Bank, I didn’t say the businessmen were good guys. I did say 

they were interested in the Western European, North American market and had been 

more successful than left bank—or right bank, excuse me, western Moldovan enterprises, 

which are still oriented largely toward the Russian and Ukrainian market. But the point 

here is that the interest of many of the entrepreneurs on the Left Bank is pointing toward 

being able to conduct commerce in the greater European market, and this offers an opportunity for creating conditions that would encourage them to integrate politically into a 

Moldovan community. 

As a matter of fact, following the 2005 law, the negotiations and the package, all 

significant Transdniestran enterprises have registered as economic agents of the Republic 

of Moldova. They receive Moldovan seal stamps, documentation for trade with the European Union. They even receive preferences, EU preferences operating as economic agents 

of the Republic of Moldova. Integration here on the economic side has proceeded far in 

advance of any political integration within the country. 

What worries the businessmen, what is right now the—they don’t trust the political 

institutions in Moldova, and what has been given by Moldovan authorities, they say, 

‘‘Well, the Moldovan authorities could take away again with the stroke of a pen,’’ and they 

want a political guarantee and some sort of political system or autonomy or something 

that guarantees their ability to defend these preferences. And that’s, basically, in very, 

very blunt terms what is one of the most fundamental issues in the negotiations. There 

are others. 

My whole point in this was, though, that there is an element on the Left Bank that 

actually is favorably inclined toward integration in Moldova, and the Moldovan Government has been at times very skillful in using this phenomenon, and it’s a phenomenon 

that I would encourage, both all to use because it’s a way of narrowing the differences 

between the two banks rather than concentrating on what divides them. And there are 

other things in the historical memory that prove divisive. 

I know we’re reaching the end. I’d like to say one more thing, just to get back to the 

assistance and what outsiders can do and other things. We can give all sorts of advice 

as to what various authorities in Moldova, whether in Chisinau or Tiraspol, should do. 

The thing that strikes me, though—something worth keeping in mind, because I’m 

not sure I have the ultimate answer to it—is when you give advice, then someone locally 

has to carry it out. And if what you have in the country is a population composed of 

elderly people in villages, pensioners and their grandchildren, with the adult working 

population working abroad and sending money back, you have the ultimate capacity 

problem, and it’s one that I’ve seen increasingly and consistently going on in Moldova. 

And one of the things, whether authorities in Moldova or those that help from outside, need constantly to keep in mind is a way of encouraging the development of 

businesses, industries and jobs in Moldova that attract and keep talented young and 

middle-aged people in the country that provides the basic capacity base for doing all of 

the things that the country can do. It’s not something that can be solved quickly, and it’s 

not something that can be attacked directly through a single program, but it runs now 

as an undercurrent that affects, at least in my estimation and my experience in the 

country, it affects almost all initiatives that either domestic authorities or international 

bodies in other countries involved from the outside have to deal with. It’s simply not that 

the people aren’t talented but there just aren’t enough of them, because too many are 

working abroad because there aren’t the opportunities at home. 

27 

Thanks very much. 

Amb. BOND. I mean, it’s sort of circular, but by integrating into Europe and meeting 

conditions of European integration, you will create an environment in which people 

[inaudible]. But that’s the direction the country obviously has to go. 

Well, we are out of time, and I want to thank our speakers and their participation 

today. Also thank our audience for posing questions. 

And all of this will be transcribed and available on our Web site in about 48 hours, 

I’m told, on our Helsinki Commission Web site. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the briefing was adjourned.] 

28 

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN 

EUROPE 

Thank you, fellow Members, honored guests, and ladies and gentlemen, and welcome 

to this briefing of the U.S. Helsinki Commission entitled ‘‘East or West: The Future of 

Moldovan Democracy.’’ 

Today we turn our attention to a small nation that has been both a literal and figurative battleground since the achievement of independence after the collapse of the Soviet 

Union in 1991. 

I say a literal battleground because, as we recall, the ‘‘Transdniestria’’ region seceded 

from Moldova via civil war in 1990–92. This self-proclaimed ‘‘Dniestr Moldovan Republic’’ 

is not recognized by the international community, but it enjoys strong economic and political support from Moscow. 

The conflict between Russia and Georgia has also cast its shadow on the 

Transdniestria situation. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev recently warned Moldova 

against using force to seize back control of Transdniestria. 

I doubt seriously the Moldovan government in Chisinau would make such an 

attempt, but I can easily believe that certain forces might try to create such an ‘‘attempt’’ 

in order to further their own political or economic interests. 

Moldova has also been a figurative battleground of ideas. Many political activists 

have called for closer association with the West and its concepts of civil society, democratic governance, and rule of law as embodied in the documents of the OSCE. Others, 

regrettably in my opinion, find their inspiration in the Communist past. 

As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I would note that the Commission has 

been, on occasion, critical of Moldova in some areas of human rights: for example 1) 

human trafficking, 2) government attempts to control the media, 3) questions of judicial 

procedure and police practices. 

These are problems that should be faced and overcome, but Moldova is challenged 

not only by economic distress, but also a historic tradition that includes long periods of 

outside authoritarian control rather than national sovereignty and democratic traditions. 

Moldova is preparing for parliamentary elections next spring. The European Union 

is on record as saying that ‘‘these elections are a good opportunity for the Republic of 

Moldova to achieve decisive, comprehensive and irreversible progress in view of implementing democratic electoral standards and practices.’’ I look forward to any thoughts our 

guests may have about these elections in the context of that statement. 

I would also be interested in learning how Moldovans view the new militancy of the 

Putin/Medvedev government in Moscow. Do they see Russia as a threat to their country? 

If so, will this be reflected at the voting booth? 

And how does Russia’s role as a traditional market for Moldovan agricultural products and a major energy supplier affect domestic politics in Moldova? 

Our guests today are uniquely qualified to address these questions. We are honored 

that Ambassador Nicolae Chirtoaca, Moldova’s ambassador here in Washington, has been 

so kind as to join our discussion today. 

29 

We welcome also Mr. Vlad Lupan of the Soros Foundation program in Chisinau, 

Moldova. 

And finally, we are pleased to see again our friend Bill Hill from the National 

Defense University and former head of the OSCE Moldova Mission. 

Their bios are available on the table in the corridor. We will entertain questions from 

the floor after the presentations, and now I would invite Ambassador Chirtoaca to make 

the first statement. 

30 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF H.E. NICOLAE CHIRTOACA, AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA TO THE UNITED 

STATES 

Chairman Hastings, Chairman Cardin, Members of the Committee, Ladies and 

Gentlemen, 

It is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the issues related 

to democracy development in my country the Republic of Moldova from the perspective 

of approaching 2009 parliamentary elections and taking into consideration the changing 

geopolitical environment in the East of Europe caused by the recent Georgia crisis that 

has a direct impact on the settlement of the so called ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ in the ex-Soviet 

space. 

Since the beginning of this century Moldova has made visible progress moving from 

a typically weak state at the end of 90th, confronted with multiple problems and obsessed 

by the identity crisis, to relatively stable democratic institutions, functional governing 

structures, growing economy based on developing private sector. Throughout this period, 

despite the limited internal capacities and synergy for change, the Republic of Moldova 

has remained committed to democratic reforms and modernization of the society, providing security and stability in the region, mostly through efforts aimed at peaceful resolution of the separatist crisis and the territorial reintegration of the state. 

Following the 2005 parliamentary election, the government continued its efforts in 

order to improve democratic governance in Moldova, reducing corruption, pushing through 

economic reforms, and welcoming foreign investment. At the same time, president 

Vladimir Voronin made clear his intention that the Republic of Moldova follows the path 

of other successful post-communist democracies and draw closer to the European Union, 

as well as develops partnership relations with NATO within the framework of the Individual Partnership Action Plan. 

Moldova has successfully completed requirements that have moved the country 

through the ‘‘Threshold’’ process of Millennium Challenge benchmarks and in December 

2006 has been approved to construct a Compact proposal for funding by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). 

I would like to remind you that Millennium Challenge Account eligibility is a kind 

of reward to partner-states for good policy performance and is based on scoring above the 

median on at least half of 17 indicators in each of the three policy categories: Ruling 

Justly, Investing in People and Economic Freedom. The first category contains indicators 

that measure the quality of democratic governance, country performance on freedom of 

expression and belief, association and organizational rights, the rule of law; respect of 

human and civil rights, the independence of the judiciary. 

These indicators also help to assess a country’s commitment to promote political pluralism, equality, to ensure the transparency and accountability of government; to combat 

corruption. Eligible Countries must maintain strong policy performance as measured by 

the indicators as a condition for continued eligibility. 

The conditionality of the assistance provided within the framework of cooperation 

with Millennium Challenge Corporation helps our Government in improving the governance in accordance with the recommended norms and good practices, first of all through 

gradual reduction of corruption and state bureaucracy, and in this way is making irreversible the market and democratic reforms in Moldova. 

31 

There are many European multilateral organizations that monitor the democracy 

consolidation in Moldova. The annual reports made public by the Council of Europe (CoE) 

have the most serious impact on the evolution of democratic reforms in the memberstates. The country reports are presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of CoE (PACE) 

that adopts a Resolution and a Recommendation to the Council of Ministers. The 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has the reputation of being 

efficient regional organization promoting human rights and democratic standards within 

its area of responsibility. 

At the same time these reports serve as basis for the European Commission Progress 

Report on the implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy to assess the 

dynamics of the bilateral relations with Moldova within the EU-RM Action Plan. These 

reports deserve the special attention of the participants of today event mostly because it 

describes and suggests the ways of improvements for the shortcomings of the current 

institutional framework of the Moldovan democracy. 

According to the recent European Commission Progress Report on the implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy 2007, made public on April 8, 2008, during the 

reporting period the Republic of Moldova made good progress in most areas, including 

democracy and rule of law. The 2007 local elections were generally well administered and 

voters were offered a genuine choice. Other major achievements during the reporting 

period were substantial progress in improving the institutional framework and procedures 

on control and certification of origin, which allowed the EU to grant the Republic of 

Moldova additional Autonomous Trade Preferences, the entry into force of agreements on 

visa facilitation and readmission, and the positive cooperation with the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). 

The Republic of Moldova also co-operated closely with the EU on all questions related 

to the Transnistria settlement efforts and work is ongoing to put into practice the proposals of the President of the Republic of Moldova on confidence-building measures. 

On local self-government a number of legislative acts, including on administrative 

decentralization, local public administration and regional development, were adopted in 

December 2006. This brought national legislation closer to the recommendations of the 

Congress of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe. A national training strategy was 

adopted in January 2007 to enhance professional standards for public servants and 

elected municipal officials, although the practical impact of these measures remains to be 

improved. 

The Republic of Moldova adopted a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan 

for reforming its judicial system. The capacities of the Supreme Council of Magistracy, the 

body in charge of judicial self-administration, were consolidated and a Department for 

Judicial Administration, subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, was created and started 

operating in January 2008. 

The code of ethics for judges was approved in November 2007 and a judicial inspection system under the aegis of the Supreme Council of Magistracy was introduced by law 

in July 2007. The further pursuit of Action Plan objectives in the area of judicial reform 

will require ensuring the full implementation of the above measures in practice as well 

as further enhancement of the capacities of the judicial administration. Training for 

judges and prosecutors, including in the field of human rights, requires further strengthening. 

32 

The Republic of Moldova also undertook certain activities in the fields of combating 

corruption and raising awareness on corruption-related phenomena, as well took steps in 

this area to adjust its legislative framework to international standards and to strengthen 

its institutional framework. The National Action Plan on fighting corruption 2007–2009 

was adopted in December 2006 and amended at the end of 2007. Cooperation with civil 

society should be further intensified. 

The National human rights action plan 2004–2008 is under implementation. In 

January 2008 the Republic of Moldova ratified the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Republic of Moldova has started 

work on comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. 

In the context of ongoing efforts to tackle human trafficking, a new national referral 

system for victims of human trafficking was established in five pilot regions. A national 

action plan on anti-trafficking (2007–2009) was set up with the National Committee on 

Anti-trafficking ensuring full implementation Efforts were made to amend the Criminal 

code to reinforce sanctions and liability and to encourage the development of special law 

enforcement units. In February 2008, the European Convention for Combating Human 

Trafficking entered into force. The Republic of Moldova had been the first country to ratify 

the Convention in May 2006. 

The broadcasting law that was adopted in July 2006 provides a good legislative basis 

to ensure respect for the freedom of expression. Its correct implementation in a manner 

which promotes the plurality of the media has to be ensured. The same goes for the 

existing law on access to information and existing defamation legislation which have been 

positively evaluated by the experts of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. 

The next parliamentary elections are expected to be called in mid March 2009. The 

parliament will elect the new President as the second and last tenure of President Vl. 

Voronin comes to an end. The Parliament has passed a number of amendments to the 

Electoral Code that dates back to 1997. According to the OSCE, ‘‘it provides an adequate 

basis for the conduct of democratic elections, if implemented in good faith’’. 

In 2007, a new Law on Political Parties (28 parties and political organizations registered by the Ministry of Justice) complementing the electoral code was drafted and submitted to the Venice Commission. Adopted on December 21, 2007, the law aims to regulate the registration, functioning, and financing of political parties and seeks to make the 

electoral system more transparent and less prone to abuse. 

However, it also creates a number of restrictions that can be explained by the need 

to raise the efficiency of the current party system as well as by the national security concerns. For example, the threshold was increased from 4% to 6%, pre-electoral blocks were 

prohibited and certain restrictions to persons holding dual citizenship were introduced. It 

deserves to be mentioned that the Venice Commission recommended 5% as an optimal 

electoral threshold for Moldova. It is also worth mentioning that electoral blocs are prohibited to participate at elections in such European countries with long lasting democratic 

traditions like Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, Hungary, and Finland. At the 

same time, according the Moldovan legislation the parties enjoy the right to create postelectoral coalitions. 

Unfortunately, the civil society is far from representing a vibrant aspect of Moldova’s 

public space. As is mentioned in this year Freedom House ‘‘Nations in Transit’’ Report: 

‘‘The number of non-active organizations is significant, and only certain NGOs have the 

33 

capacities to contribute to public policies. Lobbying and advocacy activities are developing 

slowly but lack impact. At the same time, monitoring efforts did not bear the expected 

results. Dependence on donor support makes NGOs vulnerable and poses the key challenge to the sector’s development. Until NGOs become transparent and open to working 

with the media, they will lack credibility in their mission to promote democratic values’’. 

For about a year, Moldova has been vigorously pushing for resuming the discussions 

within the current international format known as 5+2 (the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, and Ukraine, as mediators, and the European 

Union and the United States, as observers, as well as the Republic of Moldova and the 

secessionist authorities). The Government strategy for conflict resolution is based on a 

complex ‘‘package’’ approach to all of the issues related to the separatist crisis—political, 

economic, social and humanitarian. 

The ‘‘package proposals’’ include the development and adoption of a special legal 

statute for the Transnsdniestr region while respecting the sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of the Republic of Moldova, the consolidation of the neutrality status and the 

withdrawal of foreign military troops from the national territory, the recognition of ownership rights and granting of certain special guarantees to the population of the eastern 

region of the country currently under the control of separatist authorities. These proposals 

were drafted in late 2006 by Moldovan experts who tried to find a common denominator 

that would accommodate both Moldova’s and Russia’s interests without undermining the 

viability of a future reintegrated state or legalizing Russia’s military presence in Moldova. 

The key element of the negotiation process is the special autonomous status for 

Transdniester region; a clear division of competences between central and regional 

authorities; functional central institutions; and proportional representation of 

Transdniester region in the Moldovan parliament. The last point is important because of 

the spring 2009 parliamentary elections and the perspective that the population from the 

eastern bank of the Dniester River will take part in this democratic exercise. As a separate electoral district, the region would be entitled to a number of seats in the supreme 

legislature institution proportional to its share of Moldova’s total population currently 

estimated at 13 percent. 

The European Union and the United States long ago welcomed the Package proposals 

as a good foundation for a viable and long lasting settlement. It is necessary to mention 

that before the Georgian crisis Moscow has never formally reacted to our proposals, in 

spite of our Government persistent attempts to elicit a positive response. 

My country is carefully observing the events in the G.U.A.M. region while reiterating 

its strong belief for the exclusively political solutions of all of the disputes to be taken 

at the negotiations table. The same position is also reflected in the Statement by the 

Government of the Republic of Moldova issued on August 29 with regards to the situation 

in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which stipulates that Moldova does not see the international recognition of these two provinces as a stabilizing factor of the situation. 

At this point we can clearly state that the dialogue with mediators and observers in 

the regulation process still continues. The meeting of the Presidents of the Republic of 

Moldova and of the Russian Federation from the end of August this year, the recent decision of the Tiraspol authorities to stop the so called ’’moratorium’’ on the dialogue with 

Moldova, and the Vienna Meeting in the 3+2 format (OSCE, Ukraine, Russia + EU, USA) 

on September 8, 2008, are developments that bring assurances of a early resumption of 

the 5+2 international negotiations format. 

34 

However, it would be wrong or at least premature to conclude that Moscow has fully 

abandoned hopes of achieving a settlement on its terms. There are no indications that 

Russia is prepared to renounce its long-standing policy of using the unresolved 

Transdniester conflict as leverage to circumscribe Moldova’s foreign-policy options or to 

legalize its military presence in Moldova at least during the post conflict period, the main 

goals contained in the famous 2003 Kozak Memorandum. At the same time, there are few 

further concessions our Government can make without compromising the future of 

Moldovan state and the European Integration Strategy. 

In spite of progress made, effective implementation of reforms remains a challenge. 

In order to advance democracy, peace and territorial reintegration of the country, Moldova 

has to be successful in its efforts to end the transition from the Soviet past to the sustainable and durable democracy of market economy and efficient governance. For the time 

being, old stile practices still exist alongside more democratic ones, as is the case in many 

transitional democracies. Moldovan democratic institutions have to be consolidated and 

much work needs to be done to consolidate the democratic institutions, to strengthen 

checks and balances, and continue economic reforms. But the most important is that these 

concerns are understood by the governance and there is a political will to address these 

issues in proper way. 

There is a large consensus in the country among the leading political parties, main 

representatives of the developing private sector and the socially visible civil society 

organizations regarding the European future of Moldova. There is also a common understanding that only real and consistent democratic reforms can bring Moldova closer to the 

implementation of one of the main goals of the national strategy for development—to 

restore our historic and cultural ties to Europe that date back to the Latinity of Roman 

empire and early Christian period of the modern Western civilization. The integration of 

the country into today’s European institutions and leading organizations, first of all the 

European Union, is understood as the main way of implementation of this vision and 

strategy. 

Thank you very much for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity to speak here 

today and welcome any question that you may have. 

35 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VLAD LUPAN, SOROS 

FOUNDATION—MOLDOVA, EUROPEAN INITIATIVES PROGRAM 

Thank you for the possibility to share my views about the democracy in Moldova, as 

well as for the concern that the Commission shows for my country. I hope this extremely 

encouraging attitude continues and the Commission will organize a hearing on Moldovan 

matters ahead of 2009 elections. I would also like to thank the Moldova Foundation based 

in Washington for assisting me in attending this session. 

I do not intend to speak about the comparative successes of the current Government 

versus existing problems, as the Government has the opportunity to promote its point of 

view extensively through the existing network of official visits and meetings. The civil 

society has fewer possibilities. Therefore I will go to the point and focus mainly on those 

concrete shortcomings that present a serious concern for democracy in Moldova. 

THREE MATTERS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

The 2008 is an eventful year for the Republic of Moldova. First of all the country 

is approaching general and Presidential elections at the beginning of 2009. The Communist party in government continues to make promises of European integration and, at 

the same time, of resolution of the Transnistrian conflict along better relations with 

Russia. These electoral statements remained valid throughout the year, including after 

the war in Georgia. 

The 2008 is also the year when the Action Plan signed between the European Union 

and the Republic of Moldova expired. Government’s commitment on democratic reforms 

is lagging behind Plan’s schedule. Moldova is encouraged by EU, in light of Russia’s pressure along recent years. It is also warned by EU to stay on course of democracy. The Governing party is cautioned not to use State resources against political opponents in 2009 

elections. 

As mentioned above, the 2008 is also a year of changes with impact on Transnistrian 

conflict resolution and Russia’s role in it, particularly after the war in Georgia. 

THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY, EU AND THE 2009 ELECTIONS

The state of democracy in Moldova was admirable by regional standards at the beginning of its independence and the country was the first from the countries of the newly 

created CIS to be admitted into the Council of Europe. The local assessment of the situation, the indicators of such international non-governmental organizations as Freedom 

House, Amnesty International and Transparency, do not place now Moldova in a position 

of leader. The Council of Europe announced this year that it does not intend to renounce 

to its monitoring of Moldova, since the country did not meet the democratic criteria that 

would allow for such an image-making decision. 

The state of democracy is closely linked now with country’s European aspirations. 

Moldova signed in February 2005 a three-year Action Plan with the European Union. This 

plan also foresees the step-by-step implementation of those democratic reforms that 

Moldova needs in order to come closer to the European Union. By European rules, 

Moldova should abide by Copenhagen Criteria that stipulate that any EU aspiring country 

should ensure in good faith the stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, human 

36 

1http://www.state.gov/gfdrl/ris/hrrpt/2007/100573.htm 

rights and respect for minorities, as well as a free and functioning market, and the 

capacity to face the obligations of an EU member-state. This joint European-Moldovan 

Action Plan left some questions marks still unanswered. 

The EU decided to encourage Moldova in 2008, due to the fact that it was already 

facing a difficult relationship with Russia on the Transnistrian conflict resolution, as well 

as due to the fact that this country, already on EU and NATO border, still made some 

steps towards mostly legal reforms. Thus, at the beginning of 2008 the Europeans took 

the decision to formally extend the Action Plan for a brief period of time, while in May 

2008 they started a reflection process on a new Agreement with Moldova. 

Even though there are concerns in relation to Russia’s intentions, the EU remains 

concerned about the pace of reforms in Moldova. In its country report of April 3rd, as well 

as during its May 2008 decision on reflection, it stated that the Action Plan implementation needs progress in five crucial spheres—these are exactly from those five areas that 

form the Copenhagen Criteria of a candidate country. Moldova was suggested that it has 

arrears in such fields as the independence of justice, fight against corruption, freedom of 

the media, investment climate and business environment. One more warning came from 

the European Union along the May 2008 decision to support Moldova with the reflection 

process—the Moldovan government was asked to ensure free and fair elections in 2009. 

Such a warning came as it is widely believed that there is a high temptation of the governing communists to use State resources and their control over the public media to either 

clamp down on competition or fraud the elections in less visible ways. 

Of all these issues, one is of primary attention, as it forms the base for a sustainable 

democracy and respect for human rights—the independence of justice. The Government 

again declared the reform of the judiciary as its priority in 2008. However, most of the 

so-called achievements meant resending by the Ministry of Justice a Council of Europe 

opinion to the Prosecutor’s Office, creating a commission to draft a Concept paper, and 

other similar moves. 

The Moldovan non-governmental organization ‘‘Lawyers for Human Rights’’ rightly 

assesses that the most relevant indicator of the state of judiciary and its independence 

in Moldova is the number of cases that is directed to the European Court of Human 

Rights. And among the states-members of the Council of Europe, Moldova holds the first 

place with the highest number of cases per capita—15 cases per 1,000,000 citizens. Various analyses, both governmental and non-governmental, show that of all the cases where 

Moldova was accused, about half are related to the faulty judiciary decisions. Despite officially expressed concerns by Prime-Minister and Minister of Justice, this reality is a result 

of the unofficial policies of the current governing party implemented since their accession 

to power in 2001. Thus, the independence of courts was affected by a 2002 mass-cleaning 

of judges by the Moldovan President, who is also the Chairman of the Communist Party. 

He refused to extend the nomination period of the judges, at that time without any (written) explanation. At the same time, there were cases of nominations of some other judges 

based on loyalty to the ruling party, as Freedom House reported in 2003. Now the civil 

society assesses that such a cleaning that started in 2002 lead to an increased interference 

of the executive power in judiciary. The US State Department Report on Human Rights 

Practices in Moldova, from March 2008, confirms that in judiciary ‘‘official pressure and 

corruption remained a problem’’.1 The problem with the procedure of selection of judges 

37 

is another point where Moldovan NGOs agree with the findings of the US State Department report. Thus, the initial phase of nomination is not uncommon—the judges are 

appointed, upon suggestions of the Supreme Council of Magistrates, by the President of 

the country. However, one NGO stresses that, under an informal practice, such an 

appointment is done after a hearing by the Governing Communist Party Faction of the 

Parliament, and not by the Parliament’s Legal Commission. The Prosecutor’s office is also 

considered to be affected by the same weaknesses and pressures as the courts. 

When we speak about the reforms in Moldova, the local and EU experts conclude that 

the adoption of documents, regulations and legislation is not followed by their 

implementation, a problem that is reported in all areas, not only in judiciary. 

Thus, we will come to another important element of a democratic society—a free 

media. Moldova dropped down several places on the ladder made in the Freedom House 

report that includes media freedom. Although media legislation legally embraces European norms, the implementation of those provisions is done in such a manner as to ensure 

governing party control over the only national TV ‘‘Moldova One’’. Despite promises of 

reforms that the Moldovan President made in May, after EU meeting, the real actions 

still do not meet the promises. Opposition parties have no access to the national TV, 

which is now by law a public station. The broadcasting code was previously edited to allow 

the goveming party to preserve control over the Broadcasting Coordination Council—this 

body then distributed broadcasting frequencies to the politically loyal stations, and operated arbitrary licenses annulments. There were cases of inappropriate treatment of forum 

commentators, journalists or unwanted media by law enforcement (such as juvenile 

Unimedia forum commentators, Romanian TV prohibition in context of relations with 

Russia, denial of access to journalists), also raising concerns regarding to the freedom of 

expression. Even non-important anti-governmental demonstrations, sometimes by singular 

people, were sometimes violently stopped by police, despite the existing legislation. Media 

outlets are not closed in Moldova—their criticism of the governing party is often quoted 

by the Moldovan President as a proof of the media freedom. However, the impression is 

that these media are afloat only to be such examples of pluralism, while in reality they 

are permanently pressured and, as mentioned above, limited in distribution and broadcast, as to minimize the competition to the government-controlled media. 

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe and that makes the investment climate, 

as well as business environment important elements that the State should ensure. 

Moldova’s economy is growing each year, particularly when looking at the former-USSR. 

However when compared with its European neighbors, it seriously lags behind. Due to 

that, allegedly one third of the Moldovans have already left to find jobs in EU and Russia. 

They supply in remittances already near 50 per cent of country’s GDP and hence provide 

the opportunities to grow. However, people leaving the country is not a sign of a growing 

economy and the money transfers can not mean proper economic development, as these 

are not reinvested in businesses. The so-called tax amnesty operated last year by the 

Government does not seem to be the best solution to manage the fiscal burden. The 

unconfirmed rumors of Presidential family involvement in taking over many lucrative 

businesses do not help the situation. Pressure over foreign investors (best known examples are Lafarge from France and Union Fenosa from Spain) seem to produce a negative 

effect, regardless of declared intentions. Thus, the reduction of taxes, operated by the 

Government in an attempt to increase interest in investing in Moldova was considered 

by international monetary organizations insufficient as to favor Foreign Direct Investment 

38 

(FDI). The FDI is proven by those organizations to grow in countries with predictable 

business climate and a stable judiciary—last one being a crucial problem reported above 

and both being exactly on the EU list of Moldovan arrears. 

And now we can focus on the internal political climate, where there are interconnected elements that need our attention—the governing party made an internal analysis that prompted them to change the electoral legislation, as speculated, to ensure a 

greater electoral success in 2009. The communists changed the electoral threshold from 

four to six per cent. They further prohibited pre-electoral political alliances, which are 

often voted by Moldovan people, and finally passed a legislation that provides State funds 

only to those parties that will enter the parliament or local, regional governments. If seen 

separately, these steps may raise minor questions, since many of those principles are 

separately present on the European political scene. However, only one year ahead of the 

elections and taken in conjunction to one another they create a cumulative effect that is 

anti-democratic. It affects the right of a large part of the populace to unite, chose and 

ensure that they are properly represented in the political life. 

Moreover, the Government used the State budget to distribute funds mainly to Communist led local governments. The Moldovan President himself publicly declared that 

those who did not vote for the Communist party in local 2007 elections will have to pay 

the price when they receive no State funds, a promise that is now implemented. Using 

State resources to punish voters, in fact the citizens of own country, is a deeply undemocratic act, in our opinion. In case of local governments, he further opted for the dismissal 

of the freely and democratically elected Liberal Party Mayor of the Moldovan capital, a 

very important electoral district in Moldova, and speaking, in spring of 2008, the President particularly hinted that such a dismissal will be organized in autumn. That was 

exactly after he went to Brussels, and promised the EU free and fair elections in Moldova. 

These goals remain valid even after Georgia events and raise further concerns about 

democracy in Moldova. Recently, the members of the Central Electoral Commission stated 

that the electoral legislation was already modified, that it can not be any longer changed 

as Moldovan laws prohibit such modifications six month ahead of the elections, and 

particularly mentioned that the recent changes also incorporated the initiative that allows 

for organizing a referendum to dismiss Chisinau’s Mayor. Such a particular attention to 

that topic, unfortunately, continues to add to the concerns regarding the undemocratic 

political environment ahead of elections. 

One should mention that harassment of the political parties was in place in Moldova 

during 2008. Thus, signatories for another, newly created party that starts to have impact 

on Moldovan political life, were a subject to excessive questioning by law enforcement 

bodies. People were called by law enforcement agencies and questioned for hours as to 

why they want to become a member of that party, who are their relatives, were asked 

to sign standing, seating, with right hand, with left hand and so on. 

In case of another Parliamentary party that declared during its June congress that 

the EU integration was transformed into a unsupported political game, the governing 

communists accused that party of being devoted to Russia’s goals, although, as we know, 

the Communists themselves are in negotiations with Russia. 

39 

THE ASSERTIVE RUSSIA, TRANSNISTRIAN RESOLUTION PROBLEM, AND FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

IN MOLDOVA

European integration was declared a strategic irreversible goal for the country. 

Moldovan ruling party also insisted to bring forth the resolution of the Transnistrian 

problem and relations with Russia as other two top priorities of the country since 2006. 

After almost unanimously adopting, on July 22, 2005, a Law on the principles of the 

Transnistrian conflict resolution by Moldovan Parliament, the governing party unexpectedly launched direct, bilateral negotiations with Russia, which provoked an increasing 

amount of concerns. These concerns came out of the previous experience of 2003, when 

the Kremlin pressed for an unacceptable settlement through a Memorandum, drafted by 

the Russian Presidential envoy Dimitri Kozak. The unfortunate Kozak precedent made 

the civil society and political parties suspicious of the new negotiations. After pressures 

from national and particularly international actors, the governing party admitted that 

something that it initially called ‘‘consultations’’ is taking place and suggested that it prepared a Package deal that would be based on the July 2005 law, along with other document that are in line with that Law. It also stated that the deal was drafted in such a 

way as to already include Russia’s interests and, thus, makes it interesting for Moscow, 

while respecting the Moldovan law. This, in itself is a contradiction, as many think— 

Russia is a country that behaves in a realpolitik manner, projects power, and believes in 

a controlled ‘‘chaos’’ of separatist regions that it masters. Russia is a country that strongly 

believes in trade-offs on international arena. This is a reality on the ground that contradicted assessments that we are not in the 19th century. Indeed, we are not—however, 

Russia is. 

Moldova can not negotiate on equal terms in a bilateral negotiation with a country 

such as Russia, because it can not offer, in Kremlin trade-off terms, something that 

Moscow already has—the leverage over Moldova through the Transnistrian conflict resolution, its military presence and the so-called mediator’s role. It seems that the Moldovan 

officials in charge of the matter, who are the same people who negotiated a bad deal with 

Kozak in 2003, did not presume that such negotiations meant offering something to 

Russia that Moldova did not have. Affirming that Moldova will not yield to Kremlin’s 

pressure was unrealistic. 

It transpired that Russia was not clearly responding to Moldovan proposal, generating pressure and subsequent concessions in economic sphere. The unilateral dependency 

on Russian gas was already a concern for the Government, due to a previous decision to 

provide Russian Gazprom the control package of shares of the Moldovan State monopoly 

MoldovaGaz in exchange for eradicating the debts. However, when faced with the lack of 

Russian response the Government recently followed up with a contradictory move that 

strengthens Moldova’s dependency—the Sate decided to cede the local distribution network to Gazprom as well. Russian companies that bought assets in the Transnistrian 

region without governmental approval were ensured that their new property rights will 

be recognized. Exports were encouraged to Russia lately, while there was not the same 

level of official, visible encouragement to the exports to the EU, at least to diversify the 

markets and ensure economic security goals. 

These unilateral concessions, made in a hope to sweeten Russia, did not yield results. 

On contrary, it was rumored that Russia was warning Moldovan officials to be more 

flexible, and that the reasons for such a warning will be seen during 2008. It was before 

40 

August war in Georgia. By no coincidence Moldovan President Voronin was called to meet 

the Russian President on the day when Dmitri Medvedev announced the decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The next troubling step was an announcement made 

by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that the sides in Moldovan conflict will return 

to the 2003 Kozak Memorandum. This is the very Memorandum that was rejected by 

Moldova as unacceptable and which comes against the Moldovan Law on July 2005, which 

can not be violated by the Moldovan negotiators. 

A number of Moldovan experts believe that further Russian pressure to either implement such a Memorandum or simply promote its interests in Moldova, will follow with 

certainty during 2008, with possible negative repercussions over populace. Certain political parties might be supported by Moscow, Transnistrian leadership will be used to put 

more pressure over Chisinau and make more concessions, the separatism of the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia will be reignited, eventually some do not exclude gas cuts in 

the winter, all leading to if not to a social then to a political crisis. 

The Russian pressure is detrimental to the democratic future of Moldova. Kremlin 

is insistently promoting the concept of a future Moldova with a Transnistrian veto over 

most important foreign policy decisions, such as EU membership—hence a veto over 

democratic reforms. The Transnistria is a dictatorship, and it is against such concepts as 

‘‘sovereign democracy’’ and the ‘‘vertical of power’, that allows for an unlimited and uncontrolled leadership that declare each of its decision as ‘‘democratic’’. 

THE DILEMMA AND NEXT STEPS

Indeed the Russian pressure is a real and important factor in Moldova. Indeed we 

can expect negative developments, possibly even before December 2008. However, the geopolitical determinism is not the way to ensure that Moldova should receive unconditional 

support, without seriously implementing democratic reforms. 

The Moldovan communists have been responsible for the current situation of 

Moldova, which is indeed deteriorating since they have been, by the way, democratically 

elected to power. It does seem that they are now trying to avoid yielding to the Russian 

pressure. They would like the Moldovan civil society and political parties to help them 

out through statements that reject the Russian proposals, so that the President can save 

his face. The problem is that it is believed that the Communists will use this blame-game 

not only to avoid complications with Russia before elections. As in 2003, they will presumably blame the civil society, which they already criticize now for not being sufficiently 

patriotic (meaning that the civil society does not unconditionally supporting the communists), and in the same manner blame other political parties for setting barriers 

between Moldovan-Russian good relations or, if Russian sanctions follow, to place responsibility for that on those civil or on those political entities that are running against them 

in elections. 

The dilemma of the civil society and particularly of the political parties unaffiliated 

with the Government is how they can help a Communist party in government that is prosecuting them and does not genuinely implement democratic reforms that would allow for 

a free political competition. We believe that support for Moldova should be, from now on, 

conditional on reforms. 

41 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM HILL, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, FORMER HEAD OF THE OSCE MISSION 

TO MOLDOVA 

WHO’S NEXT? THE RUSSIAN INITIATIVE IN MOLDOVA

After Russia’s use of overwhelming force in Georgia, it is reasonable to worry that 

Moscow will mount similar military threats to other neighboring states and former Soviet 

republics. However, the next major Russian initiative in the ‘‘post-Soviet space’’ is likely 

to come in the miniscule Republic of Moldova and to cast Russian President Dmitri 

Medvedev in the role of sage peacemaker in an internal territorial dispute left over from 

the days of the Soviet collapse. 

A small nation of some four million, predominantly Romanian-speaking people 

wedged between Ukraine and Romania, Moldova sought and won its independence as the 

USSR disintegrated in the late 1980s. A group of primarily Slavic Soviet political figures 

and enterprise managers on the east, or left bank of the Nistru (Dniestr) River in the 

Soviet Republic of Moldavia resisted Moldovan attempts to leave the USSR and proclaimed their small sliver of land a separate, Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. In 1992 

Moldova and Transnistria fought a brief, bitter war which the separatists won, with the 

assistance of a contingent of locally-based Russian troops left over from the Soviet Red 

Army. 

During the conflict in 1992 Moldova appealed for assistance to the UN, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (now the OSCE), and various western 

nations. Only Moscow heeded Chisinau’s call for mediation and brokered a cease fire that 

left Russian troops in place as peacekeepers. Negotiations for a political settlement have 

dragged on since that time between Chisinau and Tiraspol (the separatist ‘‘capital’’), with 

Russia, and then the OSCE and Ukraine serving as mediators. In 2005 the U.S. and European Union formally joined the negotiations as observers. 

With a population roughly the size of Luxembourg, Transnistria’s prospects as an 

independent state were always sketchy. The region supported itself partially through a 

heavy industrial base left over from Soviet times that enjoyed surprising success in penetrating the EU and North American markets. The left bank enclave received subsidies 

from Moscow, especially in the form of low-cost natural gas, running at least $30 million 

per year. Finally, the region augmented its income and solidified its political position 

mostly by serving as a haven for smuggling and tax evasion, not only for its own residents, but also politicians and businessmen from all of the neighboring states. ‘‘A giant 

off-shore’’ is how one Moldovan political figure characterized the region to me. 

No state, including Russia, has recognized Transnistria’s independence. Moscow’s 

stated policy has always been that Transnistria is a part of Moldova, and the two sides 

should agree voluntarily on peaceful unification of the country, with a special status for 

the left bank. However, backed by influential circles in Moscow, Transnistrian leaders 

have been reluctant to give up their lucrative status quo for an uncertain future. Moldova, 

by most statistical measurements the poorest country in Europe, has few material incentives to win over its breakaway region. Instead Chisinau has generally pinned its hopes 

on intervention by a large outside power—Russia, the U.S. or the EU—to coerce Tiraspol 

into the Republic of Moldova. 

42 

In 2003 Moldova and Transnistria almost reached a political settlement of their conflict. The proposed agreement, the so-called ‘‘Kozak Memorandum,’’ brokered by Deputy 

Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Dmitri Kozak, fell apart at the last 

minute, partially because of western objections to a provision calling for a long-term Russian troop presence. With Kozak as point man in 2003, Moscow bypassed the existing 

negotiating mechanism with its broader international participation. Swayed by promises 

that Moscow would overcome Transnistrian resistance and unite his country, Moldovan 

President Vladimir Voronin went along with the gambit until the last minute. With angry 

crowds gathering outside the Presidential Building and frantic calls from western leaders, 

only at the last moment did Voronin call Russian President Putin and tell him not to 

come to Chisinau to sign the Memorandum. Putin has reportedly nursed a grudge ever 

since. 

Five years later events are in the works that may repeat this scenario. The leader 

of the only post-Soviet communist party in power, Voronin turned toward the West after 

2003 and declared a policy of European integration. Russia retaliated by banning imports 

of Moldovan meat, fruit, and wine, placing grave economic pressure on the small country. 

Moscow also frustrated Moldovan attempts to use Ukrainian, EU, and U.S. support to 

press Transnistria into a political settlement. 

In late 2006, while keeping western negotiators informed of his course of action, 

President Voronin began a process of repairing his relations with Russia and seeking Moscow’s cooperation in negotiating a settlement with Transnistria. There have been some 

modest gains from this process, but overall the results are disappointing for Chisinau. 

As events in Kosovo and Georgia developed in 2008, Moldova sought to portray itself 

as more moderate and reasonable than Tbilisi. Moldova did not recognize Kosovo, declared 

itself a neutral country (already guaranteed in the 1994 Moldovan constitution), and 

ostentatiously announced that it had no need to seek NATO membership. Chisinau was 

rewarded in March, when after theatrical hearings the Russian Parliament advocated recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but recommended only a special status for Transnistria within Moldova. On August 25, one day before he announced 

Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russian President Medvedev met 

with Voronin in Sochi and reaffirmed Russia’s dedication to seeking a peaceful resolution 

of the Transnistrian conflict. 

The formal Transnistrian political settlement negotiation process goes on, although 

there has not been an official round of negotiations since February 28, 2006, when 

Moldovan negotiators walked out in protest of Transnistrian provocations. The mediators 

and observers in the so called ‘‘5+2’’ process—Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, the EU, and 

the US—continue to call regularly for resumption of the negotiations. The latest me4ting 

of mediators and observers took place September 8 at OSCE Headquarters in Vienna, 

ending with a hopeful statement. 

Meanwhile Moscow has intensified contacts with Voronin and Transnistrian leader 

Igor Smimov. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov brokered a one on one meeting 

between Voronin and Smimov in April; the two had not met in person since August 2001. 

Shortly after his Sochi conversation with Voronin, Medvedev also received Smimov. The 

blustery Transnistrian leader, whose line is usually that he has nothing to discuss with 

Voronin except bilateral relations between their two states, announced meekly after his 

talk with Medvedev that the two sides needed to meet to bring their positions closer 

together. 

43 

Expectations in Moldova and Russia are now widespread that Voronin and Smimov 

will get together once more in the near future, to be followed by a meeting of both of them 

with Medvedev. Lavrov has floated a trial balloon in the Russian press that revival of the 

Kozak Memorandum might be a good basis for reaching a solution in Moldova. 

President Voronin is under great pressure to reach agreement now to unite his 

country, or give up on what has been the highest priority of his two terms in office. 

National elections must be held in Moldova no later than spring 2009, when Voronin’s 

second and final term as president runs out. The sitting Moldovan Parliament must 

approve any settlement at least six months before the end of its term, so there are only 

a few weeks left before a Transnistrian settlement becomes impossible for the remainder 

of this legislative term. For Voronin, who was born and raised on the left bank during 

Soviet times, and who desperately wishes to see his country united, the pressure must 

be extreme. 

Moscow will not go after Moldova with military means. The small contingent of Russian troops now stationed in the Transnistrian region (around 1400) is probably no match 

for either the Moldovan or the Transnistrian armed forces. Any Russian reinforcements 

need to come through or over Ukraine, not a realistic possibility in current political circumstances. Including their armies, special forces, militia, interior ministry and security 

troops, both Chisinau and Tiraspol can muster between 13000 to 18000 men under arms. 

This is enough to deter each other (and the Russians), but probably not enough to take 

and hold significant territory. In addition—as opposed to Georgia—no one on either side 

in Moldova wants to fight. The quarrel along the Nistru is between political and economic 

elites, and not inimical communities, ethnic, or national groups. 

Russia has already established a public posture on Moldova that implies clearly: 

‘‘Here is how we deal with friendly countries that don’t join NATO and don’t use violence 

to settle separatist conflicts.’’ Moldova has not yet received its reward from Russia, but 

Moscow is stringing Chisinau along with the hope of a pot of gold at the end of this 

rainbow. The crucial time will come, much as it did in 2003, if and when a solution presented to Chisinau in its separate 2008 track with Moscow turns out to have a crucial 

catch in it, such as a bilateral agreement with significant obligations, perhaps a long-term 

troop presence. 

In 2003 western negotiators (I was one of them) repeatedly argued with our Russian 

counterparts that negotiating a political settlement in Moldova was not and should not 

be a zero sum game. We tried to convince Moscow that there were win-win solutions that 

protected and furthered the fundamental security interests of all parties in the region, 

indeed in the Euro-Atlantic area. Obviously we did not succeed; Russia apparently considered primacy in the region more important than cooperation. In 2008, with the strategic 

security environment much worse, Russia seems bent on pursuing the same myopic path. 

With respect to Moldova in 2008, the absence of a solution to the Transnistrian question will be better than a bad solution that cripples the country’s chances for reform and 

integration into Europe as a whole. For any settlement to succeed, Russia must be a 

part—but so must the rest of Europe and the North Atlantic community, i.e. the EU and 

US. Commenting on US actions elsewhere in the world, the Russians are fond of proclaiming that unilateral solutions do not work. The conflict areas on the periphery of the 

former USSR like Moldova are places where they ought to listen to their own advice. 

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