Global Water Security

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT 

ICA 2012-08, 2 February 2012 

This is an IC-coordinated paper. 
Scope Note 

Global Water Security 

This is an IC-coordinated paper. 

This report—requested by the Department of State—is designed to answer the question: How will water 

problems (shortages, poor water quality, or floods) impact US national security interests over the next 30 

years? We selected 2040 as the endpoint of our research to consider longer-term impacts from growing 

populations, climate change, and continued economic development. However, we sometimes cite 

specific time frames (e.g., 2030, 2025) when reporting is based on these dates. For the Key Judgments, 

we emphasize impacts that will occur within the next 10 years. 

We provide an introductory discussion of the global water picture, but we do not do a comprehensive 

analysis of the entire global water landscape. For the core classified analysis—a National Intelligence 

Estimate—we focused on a finite number of states that are strategically important to the United States 

and transboundary issues from a selected set of water basins (Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, Mekong, Jordan, 

Indus, Brahmaputra, and Amu Darya). We judge that these examples are sufficient to illustrate the 

intersections between water challenges and US national security. 

Assumptions: We assume that water management technologies will mature along present rates and 

that no far-reaching improvements will develop and be deployed over the next 30 years. In addition, for 

several states, we assume that present water policies—pricing and investments in infrastructure—are 

unlikely to change significantly. Cultural norms often drive water policies and will continue to do so 

despite recent political upheavals. Finally, we assume that states with a large and growing economic 

capacity continue to make infrastructure investments and apply technologies to address their water 

challenges. 

This effort relied on previously published Intelligence Community (IC) products, peer-reviewed research, 

and consultations with outside experts. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the principal drafter 

with contributions from NGA, CIA, State/INR, and DOE. 
i 

 

a

 In general, livestock products have a higher virtual water content than crop products. For example, the global average virtual 

water content of maize, wheat, and rice (husked) is 900, 1,300 and 3,000 m3

/ton respectively, whereas the virtual water contents of 

chicken meat, pork, and beef are 3,900, 4,900 and 15,500 m3

/ton respectively.

Selected Water Definitions 

Aquifer: a geologic formation that will yield water to a well in sufficient quantities to make withdrawal of 

water feasible for beneficial use; permeable layers of underground rock or sand that hold or transmit 

groundwater below the water table. 

Consumptive use: water not available for reuse, due to reasons such as evapotranspiration, 

evaporation, incorporation into plant tissue, and infiltration into groundwater. 

Evapotranspiration: the sum of evaporation and plant transpiration (release of water vapor) from the 

Earth’s land surface to the atmosphere. 

Fresh water: as used in this report, fresh water may be considered as water of sufficient quality to 

support its intended purpose—agriculture, electrical power generation, industrial processes, or human 

consumption. 

Groundwater: water within the earth that supplies wells and springs; water in the zone of saturation 

where all openings in rocks and soil are filled, the upper surface of which forms the water table. 

Human security: as used in this report, sufficient access to commodities (food, water) and environments 

(shelter, health care) necessary to sustain human life. 

Interbasin transfer: the physical transfer of water from one watershed to another. 

Surface water: water that flows in streams, rivers, natural lakes, wetlands, and reservoirs. 

Trickle irrigation: method in which water drips to the soil from perforated tubes or emitters. 

Virtual water: the water used (or consumed) in the development or production of a good or commodity, 

typically agricultural products.a 

Water scarcity: when a country or region’s annual water supply is less than 1,000 cubic meters per 

person per year. 

Water problems: as used in this report, a condition of water shortage (where water demand exceeds 

water supply), poor water quality (inadequate for its intended use), or excessive water (floods). 

Water management: as used in this report, pricing decisions, allocations of water based upon 

hydrological modeling, development of water infrastructure (e.g., dams, levies, canals, water treatment 

facilities), the use of water infrastructure to control water flow, trade of products with high water content, 

and effective transboundary water agreements. 

Water stress: when a country’s or region’s annual water supply is less than 1,700 cubic meters per 

person per year (for reference, US per capita total water used is 2,500 cubic meters per year) or a high 

water withdrawal ratio (WWR). See foldout chart. 

Water withdrawal ratio (WWR): total freshwater withdrawals as a fraction of surface and groundwater 

availability. 
ii 
iii 

Global Water Security 

Key Judgments 

Our Bottom Line: During the next 10 years, many countries important to the United States will 

experience water problems—shortages, poor water quality, or floods—that will risk instability and 

state failure, increase regional tensions, and distract them from working with the United States on 

important US policy objectives. Between now and 2040, fresh water availability will not keep up 

with demand absent more effective management of water resources. Water problems will hinder 

the ability of key countries to produce food and generate energy, posing a risk to global food 

markets and hobbling economic growth. As a result of demographic and economic development 

pressures, North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia will face major challenges coping with 

water problems. 

A. We assess that during the next 10 years, 

water problems will contribute to instability in 

states important to US national security 

interests. Water shortages, poor water quality, 

and floods by themselves are unlikely to result 

in state failure. However, water problems—

when combined with poverty, social tensions, 

environmental degradation, ineffectual 

leadership, and weak political institutions—

contribute to social disruptions that can result 

in state failure. We have moderate confidence in 

our judgment as we have reliable open source 

reporting on water pricing and infrastructure 

investments and reliable but incomplete all-source 

reporting on water quality. 

The lack of adequate water will be a destabilizing 

factor in some countries because they do not 

have the financial resources or technical ability to 

solve their internal water problems. In addition, 

some states are further stressed by a heavy 

dependency on river water controlled by upstream 

nations with unresolved water-sharing issues. 

Wealthier developing countries probably will 

experience increasing water-related social 

disruptions but are capable of addressing water 

problems without risk of state failure. 

B. We assess that a water-related state-onstate conflict is unlikely during the next 10 

years. Historically, water tensions have led to 

more water-sharing agreements than violent 

conflicts. However, we judge that as water 

shortages become more acute beyond the 

next 10 years, water in shared basins will 

increasingly be used as leverage; the use of 

water as a weapon or to further terrorist 

objectives also will become more likely 

beyond 10 years. We have high confidence in 

our judgments because there are excellent allsource reports on future water shortages and a 

well-established pattern of water problems 

aggravating regional tensions. 

 

We assess that during the next 10 years a 

number of states will exert leverage over their 

neighbors to preserve their water interests. This 

leverage will be applied in international forums 

and also include pressuring investors, 

nongovernmental organizations, and donor 

countries to support or halt water infrastructure 

projects. 

• We assess that states will also use their 

inherent ability to construct and support major 

water projects to obtain regional influence or 
iv 

preserve their water interests. In addition, 

some nonstate actors (terrorists or extremists) 

almost certainly will target vulnerable water 

infrastructure to achieve their objectives. 

C. We judge that during the next 10 years the 

depletion of groundwater supplies in some 

agricultural areas—owing to poor 

management—will pose a risk to both national 

and global food markets. We have high 

confidence in our judgment as we have numerous 

reliable open source projections on agricultural 

production and water depletion trends. 

• Many countries have over-pumped their 

groundwater to satisfy growing food demand. 

Depleted and degraded groundwater can 

threaten food security and thereby risk social 

disruption. When water available for 

agriculture is insufficient, agricultural workers 

lose their jobs and fewer crops are grown. As 

a result, there is a strong correlation between 

water available for agriculture and national 

GDP. 

• Over the long term, without mitigation actions 

(e.g., drip irrigation, reduction of distortive 

electricity-for-water pump subsidies, improved 

use of agricultural technology, and better food 

distribution networks), the exhaustion of 

groundwater sources will cause food 

production to decline and food demand will 

have to be satisfied through increasingly 

stressed global markets. 

D. We assess that from now through 2040 

water shortages and pollution probably will 

harm the economic performance of important 

trading partners. Economic output will suffer if 

countries do not have sufficient clean water 

supplies to generate electrical power or to 

maintain and expand manufacturing and resource 

extraction. Hydropower is an important source of 

electricity in developing countries—more than 15 

developing countries generate 80 percent or more 

of their electrical power from hydropower—and 

demand for water to support all forms of electricity 

production and industrial processes is increasing. 

We have moderate-to-high confidence in our 

judgment as we see no breakthrough technology 

that will reduce the industrial demand for water. 

• In some countries, water shortages are 

already having an impact on power 

generation. Frequent droughts in other 

countries will undermine their long-term plans 

to increase current hydropower capacity. 

E. We judge that, from now through 2040, 

improved water management (e.g., pricing, 

allocations, and “virtual water” trade) and 

investments in water-related sectors (e.g., 

agriculture, power, and water treatment) will 

afford the best solutions for water problems. 

Because agriculture uses approximately 70 

percent of the global fresh water supply, the 

greatest potential for relief from water scarcity 

will be through technology that reduces the 

amount of water needed for agriculture. We 

have high confidence in this judgment because of 

the body of open source reporting indicating 

effective water management will be the most 

effective approach to mitigate water-related social 

tensions. 

• Simple and inexpensive water management 

improvements in agriculture, including 

improved irrigation practices and land-leveling 

(to obtain an even distribution of water), are 

often the most straightforward way to 

compensate for increased demand and 

stretch existing water supplies. 

 
v 

 

b

 River basin management capacity is an assessment of the strength and resilience of institutional factors, such as treaties and 

river basin organizations that can provide stability, increase cooperation, and mitigate political grievances over water. However, 

even well-prepared river basins are likely to be challenged by increased water demand and impacts from climate change, which 

probably will lead to greater variability in extreme events. 

Overview of Selected River Basins 

River Basin Type of Water Issue Impact/Expected Time

River Basin 

Management 

Capacityb

Indus 

• Poor water management 

• Inefficient agricultural practices 

• Soil salinization 

• Inadequate infrastructure 

• Greater variability in water availability 

• Water pollution 

• Degraded regional food security—

present to 2040 

• Reduced resiliency to floods and 

droughts—present to 2040 Moderate

Jordan 

• Depleted shared groundwater 

resources 

• Greater variability in water available 

• Water pollution 

• Poor coordination between countries 

• Reduced resiliency to floods and 

drought—present to 2040 

• Degraded regional food security—

present to 2040 

• Continuing regional tensions over 

water—present to 2040 

Moderate

Mekong 

• Increased development and demands 

• Greater variability in water available 

• Changes in sediment flows 

• Reduced regional food security (to 

include fisheries) and negative impact 

on livelihoods—present to 2040 

• Reduced resiliency to floods and 

droughts—present to 2040 

• Increased regional tension over water 

development activity—present to 2040 

Limited 

Nile 

• Decreasing per capita water available 

• Inadequate water agreements and 

management structure 

• Greater variability in water available 

• Water flow impeded as new dam 

reservoirs are filled 

• Delta erosion 

• Degraded food security—present to 

2040 

• Reduced resiliency to floods and 

droughts—present to 2040 

• Increased regional tensions over water 

and use of water as leverage—present 

to 2040 

Limited

TigrisEuphrates 

• No multilateral water-sharing 

agreement. 

• Increased variability in water supply 

• Reduced water flow near-term 

• Altered sediment flows to downstream 

agricultural and marshlands 

• Reduced resiliency to floods and 

droughts—present to 2040 

• Reduced regional food security—

present to 2040 

• Continued regional tensions over 

unilateral water development projects 

and management—present to 2040 

Limited

Amu Darya 

• Inadequate water agreements 

• Degradation of water quality and 

disruption of flows some states 

• Poor water management 

• Degraded regional food security—

present to 2040 

• Increased regional tensions over 

water—present to 2040 

• Decreased health of populations 

around dried Aral Sea 

Inadequate

Brahmaputra 

• Uncoordinated land use and 

development plans 

• Insufficient water agreements 

• Reduced water flows 

• Saltwater intrusion into the delta 

• Continuing regional tensions over 

unilateral water development 

projects—present to 2040 

• Reduced potential for hydropower 

generation in some states—2020 to 

2040 

• Reduced regional food security, 

especially fisheries—present to 2040 

Inadequate
vi 

Risks and Opportunities 

Risks. Engineering solutions to water shortages—including the transfer of water between rivers—are 

becoming increasingly common, particularly as urban water demands grow. However, such measures 

threaten to raise tensions between organizations implementing these transfers and those harmed by 

them. In addition, in developing nations significant engineering efforts often harm the livelihoods of local 

populations, leading to increased poverty and food insecurity. They are expensive and degrade natural 

processes such as water cleaning and flood and drought mitigation. The lack of water data systems, 

especially in the developing world, leaves efforts to foster efficient water management open to the risk of 

creating unintended consequences through ignorance of the freshwater systems they are altering. 

Opportunities. Because US expertise in water management is widely recognized, the developing world 

will look to the United States to lead the global community toward the development and implementation of 

sound policies for managing water resources at the local, national, and regional levels. Pressure will 

arise for a more engaged United States to make water a global priority and to support major development 

projects, including through financial assistance. 

• US expertise on water resource management in both the public and private sectors is highly regarded 

and will be sought after worldwide. Improving water management, trade of products with high water 

content, and institutional capacities to treat water and encourage efficient water use will likely be the 

most effective approaches to mitigate water-related social tensions. 

• States with water problems will require integrated water, land use, and economic data to achieve 

sound policymaking and management. The United States will be expected to develop and 

disseminate satellite and other remote sensing data and hydrological modeling tools that allow users 

to better understand and manage their resources. 

• These states will look to the United States for support to develop legal and institutional arrangements 

that resolve water disputes or advance cooperative management of shared waters. Currently, water 

basin agreements often do not exist or are inadequate for many nations sharing watersheds. New or 

updated international agreements would lessen the risk of regional tensions over water. 

• The United States can benefit from an increased demand for agricultural exports as water scarcity 

increases in various parts of the world. This would be especially true if states expecting increased 

water scarcity rely upon open markets instead of seeking bilateral land-lease arrangements in other 

countries to achieve their food security. 
vii 

Contents 

Page 

Scope Note 

Key Judgments 

Risks and Opportunities 

iii 

vi 

Discussion 

 Introduction—The Global Water Picture 

Water Shortages 

...and Poor Water Management 

Other Water Problems 

 Impacts of Water Problems 

Potential Water-Related Social Disruption and State Failures... 

Potential Driver of Conflict or Political Tool 

 Water Pressures 

Risks to Agriculture and Economic Growth 

Water-Energy-Industry Nexus 

 Improving Water Management and Investments 

Use of Technology and Infrastructure 

Trade of Products with High Water Content (“Virtual Water”) 

Adoption of Pricing Mechanisms and Policies To Encourage Efficient Water Use 

Hydrological Modeling for New and Revised Water-Sharing Agreements 

Implications for the United States 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

3 

3 

3 

4 

5 

6 

6 

7 

8 

10 

10 

11

Annex 

 What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language 13 

This Assessment was prepared under the auspices of the Director of the Strategic Futures Group and 

drafted by the Defense Intelligence Agency. It was coordinated with the Intelligence Community. 
viii 

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ix 

FRONT PAGE OF FOLDOUT 

Global Water: Present to 2025 

798325 
x 

BACK PAGE OF FOLDOUT 
1 

Discussion 

Our Bottom Line: During the next 10 years, many countries important to the United States will 

experience water problems—shortages, poor water quality, or floods—that will risk instability and 

state failure, increase regional tensions, and distract them from working with the United States on 

important US policy objectives. Between now and 2040, fresh water availability will not keep up 

with demand absent more effective management of water resources. Water problems will hinder 

the ability of key countries to produce food and generate energy, posing a risk to global food 

markets and hobbling economic growth. As a result of demographic and economic development 

pressures, North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia will face major challenges coping with 

water problems. 

Introduction—The Global Water 

Picture 

During the next 10 years, many countries 

important to the United States will almost 

certainly experience water problems—

shortages, poor water quality, or floods—that will 

contribute to the risk of instability and state 

failure, and increase regional tensions. 

Additionally, states will focus on addressing 

internal water-related social disruptions which 

will distract them from working with the United 

States on important policy objectives. 

Water Shortages 

Between now and 2040, global demand for fresh 

water will increase, but the supply of fresh water 

will not keep pace with demand absent more 

effective management of water resources. A 

major international study finds that annual global 

water requirements will reach 6,900 billion cubic 

meters (bcm) in 2030, 40 percent above current 

sustainable water supplies. Climate change will 

cause water shortages in many areas of the 

world. 

• The 2007 United Nations Intergovernmental 

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 

Assessment Report projects that by midcentury, annual river runoff and water 

availability will increase by 20-40 percent at 

high latitudes and in some wet tropical 

areas, and decrease by 10-30 percent over 

some dry regions at mid-latitudes and in the 

dry tropics, some of which are presently 

water-stressed areas. In the course of the 

century, water supplies stored in glaciers 

and snow cover are projected to decline, 

reducing water availability in regions 

supplied by meltwater from major mountain 

ranges. According to the IPCC, semi-arid 

and arid areas are particularly exposed to 

the impacts of climate change on water 

resources. Many of these areas (e.g., 

Mediterranean Basin, western United 

States, southern Africa, northeast Brazil, 

southern and eastern Australia) almost 

certainly will suffer a decrease in water 

resources due to climate change. 

• We judge that mismanagement of water 

resources—especially groundwater 

overdrafts and wasteful agricultural irrigation 

practices—will exacerbate the supply 

problem in many regions. 

Increasing Demand. Population increases, 

migration, and changing human consumption 

patterns resulting from economic growth will be 

key drivers of rising fresh water demand. World 

population is projected to grow by about 1.2 

billion between 2009 and 2025—from 6.8 billion 

to near 8 billion people. The developing world, 

with its rapidly expanding urban centers, will see
2 

the biggest increases in water demand, as its 

population grows larger and more affluent. 

Migrations to cities will drive major increases in 

water demand for personal consumption, 

sanitation, industry, and hydroelectric power. 

Urban and more affluent populations will 

demand greater quantities of water-intensive 

products with diets that contain more meats and 

fewer grains. 

• Agriculture, which accounts for 

approximately 3,100 bcm, or just under 70 

percent of global water withdrawals today, 

will, if current practices and efficiencies 

continue, require 4,500 bcm—65 percent of 

all water withdrawals—by 2030. 

...but Declining Supply. According to the 2030 

Water Resources Group (WRG), one-third of the 

world’s population will live near water basins 

where the water deficit will be larger than 50 

percent by 2030. A number of countries (or 

regions within countries) are already 

experiencing high “water stress”—when the 

annual renewable freshwater supplies are below 

1,700 cubic meters per person per year.c

 Such 

areas include the western United States, 

northern Africa, southern Africa, the Middle East, 

Australia and parts of south Asia and China. 

• By 2025, ISciences projects that water 

stress will increase significantly in many 

locations throughout the world, including 

north Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (see 

foldout). 

With more than one-sixth of the Earth’s 

population relying on meltwater from glaciers 

and seasonal snowpacks for their water supply, 

reductions in meltwater caused by climate 

change induced receding glaciers and reduced 

snow packs will have significant impacts. 

 

c

 For reference, US per capita total water used is 2,500 

cubic meters per person per year. Water stress is also often 

expressed as a high water withdrawal ration (WWR) (see 

foldout). 

• In the Andes, glacial meltwater supports 

river flows and water supplies for tens of 

millions of people during the long dry 

season. Many small glaciers will disappear 

within the next few decades, adversely 

affecting people and ecosystems. Hundreds 

of millions of people in Asia depend upon 

glacial meltwater from the Hindu Kush and 

Himalayas. 

...and Poor Water Management 

Inefficient water consumption as well as 

changing land-use patterns, such as 

deforestation and soil grading, will reduce the 

supply of water that would otherwise be 

available. Poor infrastructure in cities, with 

leakage rates between 30-50 percentd

, almost 

certainly will also diminish supplies, as will 

evaporation from manmade reservoirs. Other 

contributing factors include inadequate 

knowledge of ground and surface water 

budgets; unsatisfactory representations of 

water’s value in economic models; and the lack 

of a generally agreed understanding of water 

rights. These factors increase the difficulty of 

managing water effectively within states and 

hinder the forging of effective water-sharing 

agreements between states. 

Other Water Problems 

In addition to water shortages, countries 

important to United States will have to cope with 

poor water quality and the impact of floods. The 

IPCC report states that the risk of drought and 

floods will increase markedly in many areas of 

the world by the end of the century owing to an 

increase in extreme weather events. During the 

next few decades rising sea levels and 

deteriorating coastal buffers will amplify the 

destructive power of coastal storms, including 

surges and heavy precipitation. At times water 

flows will be severe enough to overwhelm the 

water control infrastructures of even developed 

 

d

 For reference, 25-30 percent leakage is not uncommon for 

older US cities (i.e., Detroit, Philadelphia); hydrologists 

consider leakage of 15 percent as normal or good. 
3 

countries, including the United States. The 

challenge will be greater in urban areas of the 

developing world where flood-control 

infrastructures are often poorly maintained. 

Drinking water from both aquifers and surface 

water resources almost certainly will further 

decline in many areas of the developing world, 

as water quality decreases from salt-water 

intrusion and industrial, biofuel, agricultural, and 

sanitation processes. 

Impacts of Water Problems 

KJ A. We assess that during the next 10 

years, water problems will contribute to 

instability in states important to US national 

security interests. Water shortages, poor 

water quality, and floods by themselves are 

unlikely to result in state failure. However, 

water problems—when combined with 

poverty, social tensions, environmental 

degradation, ineffectual leadership, and 

weak political institutions—contribute to 

social disruptions that can result in state 

failure. We have moderate confidence in our 

judgment as we have reliable open source 

reporting on water pricing and infrastructure 

investments and reliable but incomplete allsource reporting on water quality. 

• The lack of adequate water will be a 

destabilizing factor in some countries 

because they do not have the financial 

resources or technical ability to solve their 

internal water problems. In addition, some 

states are further stressed by a heavy 

dependency on river water controlled by 

upstream nations with unresolved watersharing issues. Wealthier developing 

countries probably will experience 

increasing water-related social disruptions 

but are capable of addressing water 

problems without risk of state failure. 

Potential Water-Related Social Disruptions 

and State Failures... 

States at Risk. We judge that over the next 10 

years, water shortages, and government failures 

to manage them, are likely to lead to social 

disruptions, pressure on national and local 

leaders, and potentially political instability. 

Social disruptions eventually leading to state 

failure are plausible when the population 

believes water shortages are the result of poor 

governance, hoarding, or control of water by 

elites and other destabilizing factors are present. 

Some States Better Able To Cope. Large 

developing countries will face water problems 

that will vary significantly across their territory. 

However, given their geographic position, 

economic strength, and capacity to engineer 

solutions, we assess the risk is low that social 

disruptions will lead to state failure in these 

countries. Nevertheless, central and regional 

governments will be preoccupied with managing 

water problems. 

Potential Driver of Conflict or Political Tool 

KJ B. We assess that a water-related stateon-state conflict is unlikely during the next 

10 years. Historically, water tensions have 

led to more water-sharing agreements than 

violent conflicts. However, we judge that as 

water shortages become more acute beyond 

the next 10 years, water in shared basins will 

increasingly be used as leverage; the use of 

water as a weapon or to further terrorist 

objectives also will become more likely 

beyond 10 years. We have high confidence in 

our judgments because there are excellent allsource reports on future water shortages and a 

well-established pattern of water problems 

aggravating regional tensions. Fluctuating 

water availability and relative scarcity of natural 

resources have been cited by scholars as a 

factor in political conflict and even war. 
4 

Water as a Driver for Peace

Water challenges have often brought divergent actors together to resolve a common problem. Once 

cooperative water agreements are established through treaties, they are often resilient over time and 

produce peaceful cooperation, even among other existing hostilities and contentious issues. 

• The Mekong Committee, established by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam in 1957 exchanged 

data and information on the river basin throughout the Vietnam War. 

• Israel and Jordan held secret “picnic table” talks to manage the Jordan River starting in 1953, even 

though they were officially at war from 1948 until 1994. 

• The Indus River Commission survived two major wars between India and Pakistan. 

In some cases, joint water governance has created cooperation on broader issues. Water can serve as a 

potential entry point for peace and support sustainable cooperation among nations. 

Water as Leverage. We assess that during the 

next 10 years a number of states will exert 

leverage over their neighbors to preserve their 

water interests. This leverage will be applied in 

international forums and also include pressuring 

investors, nongovernmental organizations, and 

donor countries to support or halt water 

infrastructure projects. Additionally, we assess 

that states will also use their inherent ability to 

construct and support major water projects to 

obtain regional influence or preserve their water 

interests. 

Water as a Weapon. We judge that the use of 

water as a weapon will become more common 

during the next 10 years with more powerful 

upstream nations impeding or cutting off 

downstream flow. Water will also be used within 

states to pressure populations and suppress 

separatist elements. 

Water Terrorism. Physical infrastructure, 

including dams, has been used as convenient 

and high-publicity targets by extremists, 

terrorists, and rogue states threatening 

substantial harm and will become more likely 

beyond the next 10 years. Even if an attack is 

less than fully successful, the fear of massive 

floods or loss of water resources would alarm 

the public and cause governments to take costly 

measures to protect the water infrastructure. 

Desalinization facilities or critical single point 

failure water canals or pipelines would likewise 

be targets for terrorists. 

Water Pressures 

If water problems are not managed successfully, 

food supplies will decline, energy available for 

economic growth will be reduced, and the risk of 

certain diseases will increase (see textbox on 

page 5). We assess that water stresses 

contribute to or aggravate existing problems 

such as poverty, social tensions, environmental 

degradation, ineffectual leadership, and weak 

political institutions. 

• Universal access to water and sanitation are 

included in the UN Millennium Development 

Goals (MDGs)—a global activity plan to 

achieve anti-poverty goals by 2015. The 

World Bank estimates that even if countries 

develop policies and improve water 

institutions, the additional external foreign 

aid required to reach the Water and 

Sanitation MDGs by 2015 is between USD 

$5-21 billion. 
5 

Risks to Agriculture and Economic Growth

KJ C. We judge that during the next 10 years 

the depletion of groundwater supplies in 

some agricultural areas—owing to poor 

management—will pose a risk to both 

national and global food markets. We have 

high confidence in our judgment as we have 

numerous reliable open source projections on 

agricultural production and water depletion 

trends. Numerous countries have over-pumped 

their groundwater to satisfy growing food 

demand. Depleted and degraded groundwater 

can threaten food security and thereby risk 

social disruption. When water available for 

agriculture is insufficient, agricultural workers 

lose their jobs and fewer crops are grown. As a 

result, there is a strong correlation between 

water available for agriculture and national GDP. 

Over the long term, without mitigation actions 

(e.g., drip irrigation, reduction of distortive 

electricity-for-water pump subsidies, improved 

use of agricultural technology, and better food 

distribution networks), the exhaustion of 

groundwater sources will cause food production 

to decline and food demand will have to be 

satisfied through increasingly stressed global 

markets. 

• In developing countries, annual precipitation 

fluctuations shape water available for 

agriculture and can determine crop 

production. 

Increased Risk of Disease

Water scarcity—driven in part by poor or inadequate water infrastructure—forces populations to rely on 

unsafe sources of drinking water, increasing the risk of waterborne diseases such as cholera, dysentery, 

and typhoid fever. During the dry season, as water supplies (including ground- and surface water) 

become more limited, concentrated pathogenic organisms increase the chance for outbreaks of 

waterborne diseases. These dry season outbreaks typically portend explosive transmission of waterborne 

diseases—particularly cholera—in the rainy season when the total quantity of pathogen in the environment 

dramatically increases. Furthermore, water diversion projects (e.g., dams, reservoirs, and irrigation 

systems) cause waters to be stagnant or slow-moving, which creates favorable conditions for increased 

populations of disease-transmitting vectors such as mosquitoes (e.g., dengue, malaria), flies (e.g., 

onchocerciasis), snails (e.g., schistosomiasis), or copepods (e.g., Guinea worm). Water scarcity, and the 

inability to wash, directly results in skin infections and trachoma, the leading cause of preventable 

blindness. In general, water scarcity-related diseases will disproportionately sicken poorer populations in 

developing countries, leading to decreased economic productivity, missed educational opportunities, and 

high health care costs. 

• On average, a child dies from a water-related disease every 15 seconds, according to a 2006 United 

Nations Human Development Report. Unsafe drinking water and poor sanitation are leading causes 

of death in the developing world for children under age 5. Close to half of all people living in 

developing nations are suffering from a health problem related to water and sanitation deficits. 

• The cholera outbreak in Haiti was initially propagated by a concentrated contamination of the 

Artibonite River during low flow levels. During the rainy and hurricane season of 2010, cholera spread 

nationwide, further contaminating drinking water supplies. As of 30 September 2011, more than 

455,000 Haitians had been treated for cholera, 242,000 were hospitalized, and 6,400 died. 

• Trachoma—which threatens 400 million individuals with blindness and is prevalent in children—is a 

direct result of dry, dusty water-scarce environments where sanitation is lacking, according to the 

World Health Organization. 
6 

• Currently, 35 percent of the global labor 

force is employed in agriculture, with a 

higher percentage in many developing 

countries, where agriculture accounts for as 

much as 95 percent of total water use, 

according to the UN Food and Agriculture 

Organization (FAO). 

Many advances in agricultural production have 

been due to the unprecedented use of finite 

groundwater reserves. An estimated 99 percent 

of the Earth’s accessible fresh water is found in 

aquifers, and about 2 billion people rely on 

groundwater as their sole source of water. 

Some groundwater is located in aquifers that are 

not renewable (fossil aquifers); in other cases, 

water extraction from aquifers exceeds the 

replenishment rate. Certain groundwater 

systems need multiple centuries to replenish. 

Total annual overdrafts from aquifers around the 

world are probably double the annual flow of the 

Nile River. 

• Based upon NASA satellite data, water is 

being depleted faster in northern India than 

in any other comparable region in the world. 

The World Bank assesses that groundwater 

irrigation directly or indirectly supports 60 

percent of irrigated agriculture, and 15 

percent of India’s food production depends 

on unsustainable groundwater use, 

according to a 2005 World Bank study citing 

a 1999 Indian report. 

Water-Energy-Industry Nexus 

KJ D. We assess that from now through 

2040 water shortages and pollution probably 

will harm the economic performance of 

important trading partners. Economic output 

will suffer if countries do not have sufficient 

clean water supplies to generate electrical 

power or to maintain and expand manufacturing 

and resource extraction. Hydropower is an 

important source of electricity in developing 

countries—more than 15 developing countries 

generate 80 percent or more of their electrical 

power from hydropower—and demand for water 

to support all forms of electricity production and 

industrial processes is increasing. We have 

moderate-to-high confidence in our judgment as 

we see no breakthrough technology that will 

reduce the industrial demand for water. 

• In some countries, water shortages are 

already having an impact on power 

generation. Frequent droughts in other 

countries will undermine their long-term 

plans to increase current hydropower 

capacity. 

Improving Water Management and 

Investments 

KJ E. We judge that, from now through 2040, 

improved water managemente

 (e.g., pricing, 

allocations, and “virtual water” trade) and 

investments in water-related sectors (e.g., 

agriculture, power, and water treatment) will 

afford the best solutions for water problems. 

Because agriculture uses approximately 70 

percent of the global fresh water supply, the 

greatest potential for relief from water the 

greatest potential for relief from water 

scarcity will be through technology that 

reduces the amount of water needed for 

agriculture. We have high confidence in this 

judgment because of the body of open source 

reporting indicating effective water management 

will be the most effective approach to mitigate 

water-related social tensions. Effective water 

management has several components: 

• Use of an integrated water resource 

management framework that assesses the 

whole ecosystem and then uses technology 

and infrastructure for efficient water use, 

flood control, redistribution of water, and 

preservation of water quality. 

 

e

 Water management includes pricing decision, allocations 

of water based upon hydrological modeling, development of 

water infrastructure (dams, levies, canals, water treatment 

facilities, etc.), the use of water infrastructure to control water 

flow, trade of products with high water content, and effective 

transboundary water agreements. 
7 

• Trade of products with high water content to 

overcome inherent local water deficiencies. 

• Adoption of pricing mechanisms and policies 

to encourage efficient water use and support 

infrastructure investments. 

• More robust remote- sensing/river-gauging 

networks and hydrological modeling to 

support new and revised water-sharing 

agreements. 

Use of Technology and Infrastructure 

Although no breakthrough technology advances 

to address water problems are expected to 

emerge and be deployed in the next 10 years, 

technology will make important contributions in 

niche areas over the next 30 years. (See 

textbox on page 9.) Proper use of existing 

technology can increase the efficiency of water 

used in agriculture, electrical power generation, 

and industrial processes; and improve water 

quality, distribution, and flood control. 

• The use of existing technology for 

conservation and efficiency—particularly in 

agriculture—offers the best hope to increase 

human security and facilitate economic 

growth. Enhancing irrigation performance 

promises better yields, but it will still be 

necessary to increase global water 

withdrawals by nearly a third. 

• Simple and inexpensive water management 

improvements in agriculture, including 

improved irrigation practices and landleveling (to obtain an even distribution of 

water), are often the most straight forward 

way to compensate for increased demand 

and stretch existing water supplies. In the 

Amu Darya Basin for example, improved 

water management practices, such as land 

leveling, could annually save 2,000 cubic 

meters of water for each of the 

4 million hectares of irrigated area, totaling 

about 8 billion cubic meters throughout the 

basin. 

• In the case of China, according to the Water 

Resources Group, even though 50 percent 

of water is used in agriculture, the largest 

growth rate in water use is seen in the 

industrial and domestic sectors. Therefore, 

investments in water efficiency and water 

treatment primarily for industrial water use 

would fill China’s water gap through 2030 

and reduce operating costs more than 

enough to offset these investments. 

Biofuels 

Biofuels are often seen as a renewable carbonneutral alternative to fossil fuels. Current biofuel 

development requires water and aggravates 

water scarcity. Access to water will become a 

primary factor in the development of biofuel 

feedstock production. At present, biofuel 

production uses a small fraction of both 

agricultural land and transportation fuel supply. 

The biomass needed to produce one liter of 

biofuel (under currently available conversion 

techniques) consumes between 1,000 and 3,500 

liters of water, on a global average, according to 

the “Comprehensive Assessment of Water 

Management in Agriculture” published by 

Earthscan and the Colombo International Water 

Institute. The World Bank reports land allocated 

to biofuels is projected to increase fourfold by 

2030, with most of the growth in North America 

(accounting for 10 percent of arable land) and 

Europe (15 percent of arable land). In the 

developing world, research projections indicate 

that a small amount of arable land will be 

dedicated to biofuel production by 2030: 0.4 

percent in Africa; 3 percent in Asia; and 3 

percent Latin America. 

 
8 

• Engineering solutions to water shortages—

including the transfer of water between 

rivers—are becoming increasingly common, 

particularly as urban water demands grow. 

However, such measures also threaten to 

raise tensions between entities 

implementing these transfers and those hurt 

by them. More effective data systems are 

required, especially in the developing world, 

to foster efficient water management and 

build trust between parties. 

Trade of Products with High Water Content 

(“Virtual Water”) 

The World Economic Forum forecasts that future 

water demand for many rapidly industrializing 

economies across South Asia, the Middle East, 

and North Africa—supporting approximately 2.5 

billion people—can be met only through 

increased trade. Although water is not a 

commodity that is directly traded on the open 

market, it is vital in the production of food and 

other commodities that are traded globally. 

Global commodity prices incorporate the value 

of water (“virtual water”) and other resource 

inputs used in production. 

• The Middle East and North Africa have 

partially addressed their water shortages by 

purchasing high-water-content food 

commodities whose virtual water content is 

equivalent to having another Nile River 

flowing into the region. Increasing water 

shortages and rising food prices will present 

growing challenges for all but the wealthiest 

countries in these regions who can afford—

typically with fossil fuel revenues—to 

subsidize food. 

• The United States, Russia, and Canada, as 

major agriculture exporters, can benefit from 

an increased demand for their products, as 

water shortages increase in various parts of 

the world. This would be especially true if 

states, expecting increased water problems, 

rely upon open markets instead of seeking 

bilateral land-lease arrangements to achieve 

their food security. 

Infrastructure/Environmental Tradeoffs 

We judge that over time, water infrastructure planning led by nongovernmental organizations has shifted 

from an emphasis on water management efficiency to an emphasis on environmental preservation of 

ecosystem services. The message to the developing world is that environmental protection takes priority 

over development because there is a lack of understanding and education related to the functionality and 

services provided by river systems. This approach often leads to missed opportunities for engagement 

and less sustainable development, as developing countries work bilaterally with countries willing to 

provide development assistance. 

Neglecting infrastructure investments (e.g., dams, canals, and water management sensors) can also 

increase vulnerability to extreme weather events. Studies have shown that water investments reduce 

damages from extreme weather events from 25-30 percent of GDP to around 5 percent, making these 

investments a crucial element in achieving social stability. 

In the interest of near-term development, states have often sacrificed the preservation of water quality 

and initiated major water infrastructure or industrial projects. This change in the allocation of funding for 

local water resources has often resulted in social disruptions. 

Hydropower dams can boost development, but also block most of the sediment and nutrient flows 

downstream needed to maintain and nourish the rivers and deltas, a crucial source for agriculture 

production and fish. 
9 

Water Technology to 2040 

Technology will have an important impact on fresh water supply and demand in the next 30 years, 

but changes will be evolutionary, according to a NIC-sponsored contractor study. Changes are 

expected in salt-tolerant crops and point-of-use applications for the safe human consumption of 

untreated water. Membrane and other nanotechnology applications that dominate the current 

desalination and water-purification industries are likely to account for the biggest advances and 

effects on fresh water availability. Although desalination may be economically feasible for household 

and industrial water, it is not currently feasible for agriculture. In providing new sources of water, any 

technology faces three hurdles: reducing energy consumption, lowering production costs, and 

eliminating the fouling of membranes and filters. 

• Because all desalination processes produce a saline concentrate, the environmental impact of 

using or disposing of this concentrate also poses a hurdle. 

• Given the low price of water charged in most regions of the world, users are less motivated to 

adopt technologies such as desalination and drip-irrigation systems. For industry and 

households, water prices in developed countries range from $0.60/cubic meter to more than 

$3/cubic meter. Water for agriculture in most countries is priced at approximately $0.10/cubic 

meter. Recent data indicate that desalination processes produce water at much higher costs: 

$0.61/cubic meter for reverse osmosis, and $0.72/cubic meter to $0.89/cubic meter for thermal 

processes. 

Technology that reduces the amount of water needed for agriculture offers the greatest potential for 

relief from water shortages. Local point-of-use technologies can also provide safe drinking water in 

the developing world. 

• Advances in large-scale drip-irrigation systems are the most likely approach to address water 

shortages for agriculture. 

• Research to develop drought resistance in crops has been conducted for several decades, but no 

commercialization exists to date. During the next three decades, selected crops could be 

developed that require half the water used by current crops, but widespread cultivation of such 

crops is problematic. 

• Limited experiments are being conducted to develop food plants that can tolerate salt or waste 

water. The advances in biotechnology may result in new plants or genetically altered strains that 

can grow in salt water from the ocean or large saltwater aquifers. 

Point-of-use water-purification technology relies upon portable systems that tend to be self-contained. 

These systems are used by recreational enthusiasts and military personnel, and will be used by 

habitants in the developing world who must obtain drinking water from untreated sources (e.g., rivers, 

lakes). New technology is currently emerging in the commercial market, and evolutionary advances 

in lowering costs and fail-safe designs are likely. Point-of-use technology is not capable of 

supporting larger agricultural or industrial needs. 
10 

Adoption of Pricing Mechanisms and 

Policies To Encourage Efficient Water Use 

Many economists advocate the privatization of 

water services to generate funds for water 

infrastructure and better manage water 

demands. However, properly run government 

water utilities can also provide excellent services 

and generate sufficient revenue to sustain their 

water infrastructure. Although water 

privatization has been successful in many 

countries, it can threaten established use 

patterns by increasing the costs of water or 

transferring ownership of water sources to 

private companies without proper local 

governance structures. Privatization also makes 

water supply vulnerable to market forces which 

can conflict with societal expectations. In many 

developing agricultural areas around the world, 

farmers pay nothing directly for water use and 

often view water charges as expropriation of 

water rights acquired with the land. Privatization 

can lead to instability, as people become unable 

to afford water and/or become restive as they 

perceive their right to water being threatened. 

• With the help of aid agencies and 

development banks to improve the 

infrastructure and local decisions to install 

water meters and charge reasonable rates, 

the government-owned water utility in 

Phnom Penh, Cambodia, now makes a 

profit and pays taxes. The replacement of 

corrupt management with honest, competent 

management also contributed to the 

turnaround. 

• In some portions of the Middle East, 

generation of financial revenue to make 

investments for basic water needs is limited 

by moral beliefs that water cannot be sold 

and only treatment and distribution costs 

may be recouped. Hence, the true cost for 

energy-intensive desalination efforts are not 

passed on to water customers. This causes 

extraordinary financial losses and reduces 

any desire for free market infrastructure 

reinvestment. Often a state’s ability to 

provide water to its populace depends on 

heavy subsidies. Any reduction of those 

subsidies would risk social disruption, water 

production, or both. 

Hydrological Modeling for New and Revised 

Water-Sharing Agreements 

We judge that as global water demands 

increase, many nations included within the 263 

shared international water basins worldwide 

would benefit from new or updated international 

agreements. Effective water agreements 

encourage greater cooperation and lessen the 

risk of regional conflicts. Today, water basin 

agreements often do not exist or are inadequate. 

Additionally, the absence of good hydrological 

modeling and water flow/level measurements 

(from on the ground or via remote sensors) 

creates distrust among nations sharing a 

common basin. Shortcomings in water basin 

agreements often further enable stronger states 

to preserve their influence over weaker states. 

• Water-sharing agreements are often 

complicated by changes to the larger 

political structure. After the collapse of the 

Soviet Union, management and sharing of 

the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers 

became contentious. Barter arrangements, 

which involved trading cheap fuel and 

electricity provided by downstream countries 

for water released by upstream countries, 

were interrupted. 

• In South Asia, three distinct treaties, 

adopting different approaches, cover the 

Indus, Ganges, and Mahakali Rivers. The 

Indus Waters Treaty divides the basin, 

giving the three western branches of the 

river to Pakistan and the three eastern 

branches to India. The Ganges Treaty 

governs the sharing of the river water 

between India and Bangladesh, stipulating 

how much water each party should receive 

every 10 days during the yearly wet season 

between 1 January and 31 May. The 

Mahakali Treaty was intended for India and 
11 

Nepal to share the development of the river. 

Of the three agreements, only the Ganges 

River accord makes explicit provisions for 

substantial shortfalls in river flow of the kind 

that may occur from climate change-induced 

impacts on glacier melt or precipitation 

patterns. 

The UN Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International 

Watercourses, adopted in 1997 by the UN 

General Assembly, is the foundation for most 

nations regarding the governance of 

international transboundary water resources. 

Although the UN Convention and international 

law offer general guidance to co-riparian states 

(states that share a river basin), largely 

ineffective practical enforcement mechanisms 

and a lack of international ratification limit its 

effectiveness. To date, 14 years after its 

adoption by the UN General Assembly, the UN 

Watercourses Convention has only 24 

contracting states, 11 short of that required for 

the convention to be entered into force. 

Implications for the United States 

Many states turn to the developed world to find 

alternative ways to meet their infrastructure 

needs. Water planners in developing countries 

regularly lack adequate data (hydrological 

models and actual water levels) for effective 

policymaking. For example, knowledge of water 

balances in specific tributaries, replenishment 

rates for shared aquifers, or water demands in 

particular communities may be either 

unavailable or inaccessible. The developing 

world will probably expect the United States, as 

a leader in technology, to continue development 

of hydrological models and remote 

environmental monitoring, as well as to 

disseminate this data and facilitate the 

integration of other terrestrial resource 

management data on a global scale. US 

technological capability in water treatment and 

purification and the efficient use of water in 

agriculture will also be sought after. 

• Although the United States is recognized as 

a leader in water technology, other countries 

have identified research in water technology 

as a national priority and will challenge US 

leadership over time. 

• The United States probably will be expected 

to continue the development and promotion 

of water management and agricultural 

technology and expertise, fostering 

management capacity and appropriately 

sharing technology. 

Irrespective of other policies toward the United 

States, both developed and developing states 

will look for US support of international 

agreements, and institutions and national and 

subnational partners, seeking to improve water 

management. Active engagement by the United 

States to resolve water challenges will improve 

US influence and may forestall other actors 

achieving the same influence at US expense. 
12 

The US Water Experience 

The development of water resources played a pivotal role in the development of the United States. 

Investments in water infrastructure helped build a regionally divided nation into one and transformed 

major regions from poverty to prosperity. The Pacific Northwest alone evolved from a poverty-stricken 

region in the 1930s to become one of the most economically successful regions in the world. The change 

was even more dramatic in the south with oversight from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). By 

making water flow data freely available to all users, the United States sets an example noticed throughout 

the world. Domestic water disputes still arise, but they are addressed fairly and transparently. The 

United States is also one of the highest exporters of “virtual water” (water consumed in the manufacturing 

or growing of an export product), providing numerous opportunities for engagement with the rest of the 

world. 

The unique 1964 agreement between Canada and the United States has guided the cooperative 

management of the Columbia River and provided benefits such as power generation, flood control, 

irrigation, and navigation that would not be available if each country acted independently. The treaty, 

which divides hydropower benefits and costs, led to the construction of three large storage dams in British 

Columbia. The dams are used for downstream flood control and power generation at the lower dams in 

the United States. The treaty will be reviewed in 2014 as part of a normal process that allows for the 

treaty to expire. 

Although most of the Colorado River originates in the basin’s upper states (i.e., Colorado, Utah, 

Wyoming), a 1922 Colorado River Compact allocates most of the water to the lower states (i.e., 

California, Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico). Unfortunately, the agreement was based on data from 

the unseasonably wet five years prior to 1922, estimating the average flow to be 17.5 million acre-feet 

(maf). The actual average flow over the last 100 years has been nowhere near this number, averaging 

about 13 maf, with high variability ranging from 4.4 maf to over 22 maf. A 2009 study by the University of 

Colorado projects that all reservoirs along the Colorado River—which provide water for 27 million 

people—could dry up by 2057 because of climate change and overuse. More recently, drought and low 

Lake Mead water levels have resulted in a multi-billion dollar plan to build a 285-mile pipeline to pump 

groundwater to the Las Vegas area from as far away as Snake Valley, which straddles the Nevada-Utah 

state line. 

A 1944 agreement between the United States and Mexico stipulates the terms of water-sharing between 

the two countries, with water delivery obligations on each side. The Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers, as 

well as their major tributaries, are covered in the agreement. The agreement allows the United States 

access to tributary contributions from Mexican rivers, and no Mexican access to contributions from US 

tributary rivers, and therefore many view the agreement as unfair. Delayed water deliveries, and even 

efforts to reduce canal water leakage, have occasionally complicated broader relations but have not been 

a major source of stress. 
13 

Annex 

What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language 

We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate—and probabilistic terms such as 

probably and likely—to convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not facts, 

proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected information, 

which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous judgments. In all 

cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have “proof” that shows something 

to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues. 

In addition to conveying judgments rather than certainty, our estimative language also often conveys 1) 

our assessed likelihood or probability of an event; and 2) the level of confidence we ascribe to the 

judgment. 

Estimates of Likelihood. Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language to 

reflect the Community’s estimates of the likelihood of developments or events. Terms such as probably, 

likely, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even chance. The terms unlikely and remote 

indicate a less than even chance that an event will occur; they do not imply that an event will not occur. 

Terms such as might or may reflect situations in which we are unable to assess the likelihood, generally 

because relevant information is unavailable, sketchy, or fragmented. Terms such as we cannot dismiss, 

we cannot rule out, or we cannot discount reflect an unlikely, improbable, or remote event whose 

consequences are such that it warrants mentioning. The chart provides a rough idea of the relationship 

of some of these terms to each other. 

 Very Even Probably Very Almost 

Remote Unlikely Unlikely chance Likely Likely certainly

Confidence in Assessments. Our assessments and estimates are supported by information that varies in 

scope, quality and sourcing. Consequently, we ascribe high, moderate, or low levels of confidence to our 

assessments, as follows: 

• High confidence generally indicates that our judgments are based on high-quality information, and/or 

that the nature of the issue makes it possible to render a solid judgment. A “high confidence” 

judgment is not a fact or a certainty, however, and such judgments still carry a risk of being wrong. 

• Moderate confidence generally means that the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not 

of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. 

• Low confidence generally means that the information’s credibility and/or plausibility is questionable, 

or that the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or 

that we have significant concerns or problems with the sources. 
14 

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15

The National Intelligence Council manages the Intelligence Community’s 

estimative process, incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside 

the government. It reports to the Director of National Intelligence in his capacity 

as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on 

substantive issues for the Community as a whole. 

Chairman 

Vice Chairman 

Counselor; Director, Analysis and Production Staff 

Chief of Staff 

Director, Strategic Futures Group 

Senior Advisor, Global Health Security 

Christopher Kojm 

Joseph Gartin 

Mathew J. Burrows 

Mark Roth 

Casimir Yost 

Clyde Manning 

National Intelligence Officers

Africa 

Cyber Issues 

East Asia 

Economic Issues 

Europe 

Iran 

Military Issues 

The Near East 

North Korea 

Russia and Eurasia 

Science & Technology 

South Asia 

Transnational Threats 

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation 

The Western Hemisphere 

Theresa Whelan 

Sean Kanuck 

Paul Heer 

Roger Kubarych 

Karen Donfried 

Jillian Burns 

John Landry 

Alan Pino 

Andrew Claster 

Eugene Rumer 

Lawrence Gershwin 

Robert S. Williams 

Julie Cohen 

Brian Lessenberry 

Arthur Tuten, Acting 
16

National Security Information 

Information available as of October 2011 was used in the preparation of this product. 

The following intelligence organizations participated 

in the preparation of this product: 

The Central Intelligence Agency 

The Defense Intelligence Agency 

The National Security Agency 

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center 

Also participating: 

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence Executive 

. 
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