*********************************************** 

The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was 

released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions 

and petitions for certification is the “officially released” 

date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut 

Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of 

discrepancies between the advance release version of an 

opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut 

Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports 

or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to 

be considered authoritative. 

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the 

opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and 

bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not 

be reproduced and distributed without the express written 

permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. 

*********************************************** 
MELISSA CHANG v. DAVID CHANG

(AC 42175)

Alvord, Prescott and Bright, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from certain postjudgment orders of the

trial court granting in part the plaintiff’s motions for contempt. The

plaintiff cross appealed to this court from certain postjudgment orders

of the trial court denying in part her motions for contempt and granting

the defendant’s motion for contempt. The motions for contempt were

all predicated on a postjudgment order of the court incorporating a

stipulation by the parties. In her motions for contempt, the plaintiff

alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had wilfully violated the parties’

stipulation when he was late in returning the parties’ minor son to her

house after school on four occasions and by refusing to work with the

guardian ad litem in mediation to resolve a parenting access schedule

issue. In his motion for contempt, the defendant alleged, inter alia, that

the plaintiff had wilfully violated an order of the court when she removed

the parties’ minor daughter from private physical therapy sessions,

which had been prescribed by the daughter’s physician. Held:

1. The trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt

regarding the parties’ parenting access schedule: the language in the

stipulation underlying the motion, that the parties ‘‘shall work with the

guardian ad litem’’ to adjust the schedule, was not clear and unambiguous, and the testimony of the guardian ad litem as to her interpretation

of the relevant language was extrinsic evidence, which could only be

considered when the order was found not to be clear and unambiguous

and, thus, could not support a finding of contempt, and the defendant’s

conduct in engaging in a forty-five minute telephone conversation with

the guardian ad litem constituted a reasonable interpretation of the

relevant language; moreover, the additional qualifying phrase ‘‘if necessary’’ in the stipulation provision in question was ambiguous as it was

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation; furthermore, the

relevant section of the stipulation contained no clear and unambiguous

language that instructed the parties how to proceed when they disagreed

as to the necessity of adjusting the parenting access schedule.

2. The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion for contempt regarding the defendant’s actions in returning the parties’ minor son to her at

the end of the school day; the stipulation language in question, that ‘‘the

defendant shall be responsible for coordinating [their son’s] timely return

to the plaintiff’s care’’ after school was not clear and unambiguous, as

the parties did not specify an exact time the son must be returned to

the plaintiff, and, on each of the four days at issue in the motion for

contempt, the parties’ son stayed after school to meet with his teachers

and tutors or to practice the drums, which was a reasonable interpretation of the relevant stipulation language.

3. The trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for contempt

regarding physical therapy for the parties’ minor daughter, as its judgment finding that the plaintiff wilfully failed to comply with a court

order that she engage in a good faith consultation with the defendant

prior to making a decision about the children’s health did not conform

to the defendant’s pleadings; in his motion, the defendant alleged that

the plaintiff had wilfully failed to comply with a court order when she

unreasonably withheld her consent for timely medical treatment for

their daughter, failed to insure their daughter’s medical needs were

timely and appropriately met and failed to place their daughter’s needs

and interests above the plaintiff’s personal preferences, thus, the basis

on which the court found the plaintiff in contempt was not one of the

bases pleaded by the defendant in his motion for contempt, and the

defendant’s contention that the court’s order requiring good faith consultation and prohibiting the unreasonable withholding of consent must

be read together was unavailing, as those obligations are two separate

components of the court’s order.
Argued January 16—officially released June 2, 2020

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant filed a

cross complaint; thereafter, the case was tried to the

court, Pinkus, J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and

granting certain other relief; subsequently, the court,

Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, issued an

order in accordance with the parties’ stipulation; thereafter, the court, Sommer, J., granted in part the plaintiff’s motions for contempt and granted the defendant’s

motion for contempt, and the defendant appealed and

the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. Reversed in

part; further proceedings.

Reuben S. Midler, for the appellant-cross appellee

(defendant).

Yakov Pyetranker, for the appellee-cross appellant

(plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this postdissolution matter, the defendant, David Chang, appeals and the plaintiff, Melissa

Chang, cross appeals from the judgment of the trial

court resolving their postjudgment motions for contempt. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly granted the plaintiff’s October 25, 2017

motion for contempt regarding her proposed adjustment to the parties’ parenting access schedule. On cross

appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly

(1) denied her November 15, 2017 motion for contempt

regarding the timely return of the parties’ minor son to

her by the defendant after school and (2) granted the

defendant’s November 19, 2017 motion for contempt

regarding withheld consent by the plaintiff to procure

private physical therapy for the parties’ minor daughter.1 We agree with the defendant. We also agree with

the plaintiff as to her second claim, but disagree with

her first claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part and

reverse in part the judgment of the court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal and cross appeal. On

June 15, 2015, the court, Pinkus, J., dissolved the parties’ eleven year marriage and imposed orders, some

of which concerned their two minor children, a son

and a daughter. See Chang v. Chang, 170 Conn. App.

822, 823, 155 A.3d 1272, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 910,

158 A.3d 321 (2017). Following the dissolution of their

marriage, the parties each filed several postjudgment

motions. In order to resolve the issues underlying some

of their several postjudgment motions, the parties

entered into a multiparagraph stipulation on August 31,

2017 (August 31, 2017 stipulation), which the court,

Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, approved and

entered as an order of the court on the same day. The

August 31, 2017 stipulation and one of the orders from

Judge Pinkus’ June 15, 2015 memorandum of decision

underlie the parties’ postjudgment motions for contempt, which were ruled on by the court, Sommer, J.,

in a September 13, 2018 memorandum of decision. The

defendant appeals and the plaintiff cross appeals from

the September 13, 2018 ruling. Additional facts will be

set forth as necessary.

We set forth the standard of review and relevant legal

principles at the outset because they guide our analysis

of the claims made in the appeal and cross appeal.

‘‘[O]ur analysis of a judgment of contempt consists of

two levels of inquiry. First, we must resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. . . .

This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. . . .

Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order

was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion
in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt,

which includes a review of the trial court’s determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by

a good faith dispute or misunderstanding. . . .

‘‘Civil contempt is committed when a person violates

an order of court which requires that person in specific

and definite language to do or refrain from doing an

act or series of acts. . . . Whether an order is sufficiently clear and unambiguous is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of contempt because [t]he contempt

remedy is particularly harsh . . . and may be founded

solely upon some clear and express direction of the

court. . . . One cannot be placed in contempt for failure to read the court’s mind. . . . It is also logically

sound that a person must not be found in contempt of a

court order when ambiguity either renders compliance

with the order impossible, because it is not clear enough

to put a reasonable person on notice of what is required

for compliance, or makes the order susceptible to a

court’s arbitrary interpretation of whether a party is in

compliance with the order.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Bolat v. Bolat, 191 Conn.

App. 293, 297–98, 215 A.3d 736, cert. denied, 333 Conn.

918, 217 A.3d 634 (2019).

‘‘To impose contempt penalties, whether criminal or

civil, the trial court must make a contempt finding, and

this requires the court to find that the offending party

wilfully violated the court’s order; failure to comply

with an order, alone, will not support a finding of contempt. . . . Rather, to constitute contempt, a party’s

conduct must be wilful. . . . A good faith dispute or

legitimate misunderstanding about the mandates of an

order may well preclude a finding of wilfulness. . . .

Whether a party’s violation was wilful depends on the

circumstances of the particular case and, ultimately, is

a factual question committed to the sound discretion

of the trial court. . . . Without a finding of wilfulness,

a trial court cannot find contempt and, it follows, cannot

impose contempt penalties. . . . The clear and convincing evidence standard of proof applies to civil contempt proceedings . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Hall, 182 Conn. App.

736, 747, 191 A.3d 182, aff’d, Conn. , A.3d

(2020).

‘‘It is . . . necessary, in reviewing the propriety of

the court’s decision to [grant or] deny the motion for

contempt, that we review the factual findings of the

court that led to its determination. The clearly erroneous standard isthe well settled standard for reviewing

a trial court’s factual findings. A factual finding is clearly

erroneous when it is not supported by any evidence in

the record or when there is evidence to support it, but

the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been made.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Auerbach v. Auerbach, 113
Conn. App. 318, 326–27, 966 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 292

Conn. 901, 971 A.2d 40 (2009).

‘‘In domestic relations cases, [a] judgment rendered

in accordance with . . . a stipulation of the parties is

to be regarded and construed as a contract. . . . It is

well established that [a] contract must be construed to

effectuate the intent of the parties, which is determined

from the language used interpreted in the light of the

situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . . [T]he intent of the

parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable

construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and

ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly

applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . .

Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according

to its terms. A court will not torture words to import

ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room

for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party’s subjective perception

of the terms. . . . Contract language is unambiguous

when it has a definite and precise meaning . . . concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion . . . . In contrast, an agreement is

ambiguous when its language is reasonably susceptible

of more than one interpretation. . . . Nevertheless, the

mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate

a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Bolat v. Bolat, supra, 191

Conn. App. 298.

I

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court

improperly granted the plaintiff’s parenting access

schedule adjustment motion for contempt because the

relevant language of the August 31, 2017 stipulation

underlying that motion is not sufficiently clear and

unambiguous. We agree.2

The following additional facts, found by the court,

and procedural history are relevant to this claim. In

paragraph 3 of the August 31, 2017 stipulation (paragraph 3), the parties agreed that they ‘‘shall work with

the guardian ad litem to adjust the parenting access

schedule, if necessary, to accommodate the academic

calendars of the children, the holiday and vacation

schedules and to establish synchronicity between the

parties’ minor children and the members of the plaintiff’s household.’’ Immediately following Judge

Novack’s adoption of the August 31, 2017 stipulation

as an order, during September and October, 2017, the

plaintiff sought to adjust the parenting access schedule.

Specifically, the plaintiff sought to have the defendant

exchange with her the weekends that he was scheduled
to spend parenting time with their children. The plaintiff

sought this adjustment of the parenting access schedule

so that she would have parenting time at the same time

that her boyfriend had his parenting time with his son

from a prior marriage. The parties agreed to mediate

the issue with the assistance of the guardian ad litem,

Attorney Bonnie Amendola, who scheduled a meeting

between the parties for October 26, 2017 (October meeting). Prior to the October meeting, Amendola contacted

the defendant by telephone. During their telephone conversation, the defendant expressed to Amendola that he

did not believe it was necessary to adjust the parenting

access schedule because the son of the plaintiff’s boyfriend was not a member of the plaintiff’s household.

He further told Amendola that such a change was not

necessary to the best interests of his children. Finally,

he expressed his concern that the plaintiff’s new boyfriend presented a safety risk for the parties’ daughter.

For these reasons, the defendant did not want to participate in the October meeting and would not agree to

swap weekends with the plaintiff. On October 19, 2017,

Amendola notified the plaintiff that the defendant ‘‘was

unwilling to meet to resolve the ‘swap’ issue’’ and that

she was cancelling the mediation.

On October 25, 2017, the plaintiff filed her motion

for contempt alleging that the ‘‘defendant was unwilling

to engage in mediation to resolve the ‘swap’ issue and

[that Amendola] therefore cancelled the [October]

meeting.’’ The plaintiff further alleged that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s conduct [was] wilful.’’ In its September 13, 2018

memorandum of decision, the court found that the ‘‘language of paragraph 3 [of the August 31, 2017 stipulation], clearly and unambiguously states [that] the parties shall work with the guardian ad litem.’’ The court

was dismissive of the defendant’s suggestion that the

language in paragraph 3 was susceptible to multiple

reasonable interpretations, stating that ‘‘merely positing

questions does not create ambiguity where the fundamental language of the [August 31, 2017] stipulation is

clear.’’ The court further found that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s

own testimony as confirmed by the testimony of

[Amendola] . . . supports the finding that the reason

the meeting did not proceed was that he refused to

comply with a clear and unambiguous court order and

that his refusal was wilful.’’ Thus, the court ‘‘conclude[d] that the plaintiff . . . satisfied her burden of

proof on [the parenting access schedule adjustment

motion for contempt].’’

Applying the previously set forth legal principles to

paragraph 3 of the August 31, 2017 stipulation, we conclude that the language contained therein is not clear

and unambiguous. See Bolat v. Bolat, supra, 191 Conn.

App. 297 (analysis of court order is ‘‘legal inquiry subject

to de novo review’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In analyzing whether paragraph 3 is clear and unambiguous, the court failed to discuss the language ‘‘work
with the guardian ad litem’’ and, thus, overlooked its

potential ambiguity. Although the court did not assess

the clarity of the language ‘‘work with the guardian ad

litem,’’ it seemingly agreed with Amendola’s interpretation of that language because it found that the defendant

did not ‘‘work with’’ her on the basis of his refusal to

participate in the October meeting.3 Amendola testified

that her interpretation of ‘‘work with the guardian ad

litem’’ required the parties to meet or to mediate with

her. The plaintiff, by contacting Amendola to initiate the

October meeting and by filing her motion for contempt

after the defendant refused to participate in the October

meeting, appears to have endorsed Amendola’s interpretation of the language ‘‘work with the guardian ad

litem.’’

The defendant’s conduct, however, evinced an interpretation of the phrase ‘‘work with the guardian ad

litem’’ that did not require him either to meet or to

mediate in order to satisfy his obligation under paragraph 3 but, rather, permitted him to conduct a lengthy

telephone conversation with Amendola in which he

expressed his position on the plaintiff’s proposed

adjustment to the parenting access schedule. That the

defendant conducted such a substantive telephone conversation is supported by the uncontroverted testimony

of Amendola and the defendant. Their testimony was

that the defendant, in the course of a forty-five minute

conversation with Amendola, explained the reasons

why he did not want to change the parenting access

schedule or even discuss it further at the October meeting, namely, the son of the plaintiff’s boyfriend was not

a member of the plaintiff’s household, a change to the

parenting access schedule was not in his children’s

best interests, and he was concerned that the plaintiff’s

boyfriend presented a safety risk to the parties’

daughter.

Paragraph 3 does not provide the parties with any

discernible guidance as to what constitutes ‘‘work[ing]

with the guardian ad litem.’’ Nevertheless, we conclude

that a reasonable interpretation of paragraph 3 is that

the defendant’s telephone conversation with Amendola

constituted ‘‘work[ing] with the guardian ad litem.’’

Stated differently, the defendant’s lengthy telephone

conversation with Amendola, in which he stated his

reasons for not wanting to adjust the parenting access

schedule, could reasonably be interpreted as ‘‘work[ing]

with the guardian ad litem’’ because of the imprecision

in the language used in paragraph 3. Because the language ‘‘work with the guardian ad litem’’ is susceptible

to multiple reasonable interpretations, we conclude

that paragraph 3 is ambiguous. See Bolat v. Bolat, supra,

191 Conn. App. 298 (‘‘an agreement is ambiguous when

its language is reasonably susceptible of more than one

interpretation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).4

Additional ambiguity is present in paragraph 3 with
the use of the phrase ‘‘if necessary,’’ which conditions

the parties’ obligation to take action under paragraph

3. First, the term ‘‘necessary’’ is susceptible to more than

one reasonable interpretation. See Auto Glass Express,

Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 293 Conn. 218, 232–33, 975

A.2d 1266 (2009) (Our Supreme Court concluded that

the phrase ‘‘amount necessary’’ is ambiguous because

‘‘Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines

the term ‘necessary’ as ‘[something] that cannot be done

without: that must be done or had: absolutely required:

essential, indispensable. . . .’ Black’s Law Dictionary

(6th Ed. 1990), however, notes that the term ‘[n]ecessary’ also ‘may import that which is only convenient,

useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to

the end sought.’ ’’). Because the term ‘‘necessary’’ reasonably can be interpreted in more than one way, paragraph 3 is not clear and unambiguous.

Moreover, paragraph 3 fails to instruct the parties

how to proceed when they disagree as to whether it is

necessary to adjust the parenting access schedule, and

cannot be construed to require a party to accept an

adjustment proposed by the other party. Said another

way, there is no clear and unambiguous language in

paragraph 3 that obligated the defendant to accept the

plaintiff’s proposed adjustment to the parenting access

schedule even if he were to ‘‘work with the guardian

ad litem’’ in the way that the plaintiff interprets that

language.5

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the court

improperly granted the plaintiff’s parenting access

schedule adjustment motion for contempt.

II

In her cross appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court

improperly denied her child return motion for contempt. We disagree.

The following additional facts, found by the court,

and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiff’s

claim. In paragraph 4 of the August 31, 2017 stipulation

(paragraph 4), the parties agreed to the following relevant language: ‘‘The plaintiff shall be responsible for

coordinating [their son’s] transportation from her residence to [private school] at the defendant’s reasonable

cost and the defendant shall be responsible for coordinating [their son’s] timely return to the plaintiff’s care

at his sole expense.’’ On November 15, 2017, the plaintiff

filed a motion for contempt alleging that, on four days,

the defendant failed to timely return their son to her

home after his dismissal from his private school. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that on September 20 and

29, and October 13, 2017, their son was dismissed from

his private school at 2:40 p.m., picked up by the defendant between 4:15 and 4:28 p.m., and dropped off at the

plaintiff’s home at, around, or after 5 p.m. The plaintiff

further alleged that on October 19, 2017, their son was
dismissed from his private school at 4 p.m. and dropped

off by the defendant at the plaintiff’s home at 5:30 p.m.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s conduct was

in violation of the August 31, 2017 stipulation and

was wilful.

In its September 13, 2018 memorandum of decision,

the court found that on each of the four days at issue

in the child return motion for contempt, the parties’

son stayed after school to meet with his teachers and

tutors or to practice the drums, and neither he nor

the defendant informed the plaintiff. The court further

found that the parties’ son stayed after school because

‘‘[s]tudents benefit from tutoring or other general academic enrichment as a result of after school access to

teachers.’’ The court determined that ‘‘[t]he scheduling

matters of which the plaintiff complains are not examples of wilful violation[s] of clear and unambiguous

court orders by the defendant, but lapses in communication between [the parties].’’ The court determined that

‘‘[t]he plain language of [paragraph 4] does not require

the defendant to return [their son] by a specific time

as [the] plaintiff argue[d].’’ Accordingly, the court concluded that ‘‘there is no basis for a finding of contempt

under the facts presented.’’

We conclude that paragraph 4 is not clear and unambiguous. See Bolat v. Bolat, supra, 191 Conn. App. 297

(analysis of court order is ‘‘legal inquiry subject to de

novo review’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Paragraph 4 states that ‘‘the defendant shall be responsible

for coordinating [their son’s] timely return to the plaintiff’s care at his sole expense.’’ Paragraph 4 does not

specify that the defendant must return their son to the

plaintiff immediately after students are dismissed from

their classes at the private school. As a result, paragraph

4 is reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that the

parties’ son must be timely picked up by the defendant

and driven to the plaintiff after he completes the academic and enrichment extracurricular activities that he

is engaged in at his private school.6 See Bolat v. Bolat,

supra, 298 (‘‘an agreement is ambiguous when its language is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Had the

parties wanted more precision as to what time their

son must be returned by the defendant to the plaintiff,

they could have specified an exact time in paragraph

4.7 The parties did not. In light of that failure, we conclude that paragraph 4 is not clear and unambiguous

as to when their son must be returned by the defendant

to the plaintiff after getting picked up at his private

school.8 Accordingly, the court properly denied the

plaintiff’s child return motion for contempt.

III

The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly

granted the defendant’s physical therapy motion for

contempt because the basis on which the court found
the plaintiff in contempt differed from those pleaded

by the defendant. We agree.

The following additional facts, found by the court,

and procedural history are relevant to this claim. In his

June 15, 2015 memorandum of decision, Judge Pinkus

ordered, in relevant part, the following: ‘‘The parties

shall have joint legal custody of the minor children.

The plaintiff shall have final decision-making authority

regarding the minor children after good faith consultation with the defendant. Such custody designation confers upon both parents the obligation to consult and

discuss with each other regarding major decisions

affecting the minor children’s best interests, including,

but not limited to matters of academic education, religious training, health and general welfare of the children. Neither parent will unreasonably withhold consent to matters affecting the children but shall endeavor

to make decisions in such a way as the children’s needs

are timely and appropriately met, despite a parent’s

particular personal preference in relation to the other

parent, and both the parents shall place the children’s

needs and interests above such individual and personal

preferences.’’ The parties’ daughter has been diagnosed

with ‘‘arthrogryposis, a neuromuscular condition which

inhibits her ability to use her upper limbs. This condition is marked by contracture of her elbow, wrist and

finger joints.’’ The parties’ daughter received private

physical therapy with Ginette Courtney from ages two

to six. Since the summer of 2017, when the plaintiff

terminated their daughter’s engagement in private physical therapy, the parties have disagreed over whether

their daughter should continue to receive private physical therapy. Their daughter receives physical therapy

at her elementary school, which is more limited than

the private physical therapy she had received previously. The plaintiff believes that their daughter does

not require private physical therapy because she

engages in sports activities. On October 16, 2017, the

daughter’s treating physician wrote her the following

prescription: ‘‘Physical therapy: eval & treat w/ attention

to hamstring stretches & quad strengthening, ankle dorsiflexion strength b/l achilles stretching on right.’’

On November 19, 2017, the defendant filed the physical therapy motion for contempt. Therein, the defendant

alleged that he had proposed that their daughter have

her prescription filled by ‘‘work[ing] on a weekly basis

with . . . Courtney.’’ The defendant further alleged

that the plaintiff ‘‘[had] refused to allow [their daughter]

to treat with . . . Courtney and [had] failed to discuss

with [him] or identify any other private physical therapist to fulfill the requirements of [their daughter’s] prescription.’’ Instead, the defendant alleged, the ‘‘plaintiff

[had] opted to have [their daughter] continue to visit

the physical therapist at the . . . public school which

she now attends,’’ which the defendant asserted was

‘‘inadequate to satisfy [their daughter’s] prescription.’’
As a result, the defendant alleged, their daughter has

not been treated ‘‘[d]espite more than one month having

elapsed since the parties received the prescription.’’

Accordingly, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had

‘‘unreasonably withheld her consent for timely medical

treatment for [their daughter],’’ ‘‘failed to insure that

[their daughter’s] medical needs are timely and appropriately met,’’ and ‘‘failed to place [their daughter’s]

needs and interests above her personal preferences,’’

all in violation of Judge Pinkus’ order. The defendant

further alleged that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s conduct [was]

wilful.’’

In its September 13, 2018 memorandum of decision,

the court construed the physical therapy motion for

contempt as alleging ‘‘that the plaintiff [was] in wilful

violation of court orders as a result of her refusal to

continue private physical and occupational therapy for

the parties’ . . . daughter . . . .’’ The court ‘‘[found]

by clear and convincing evidence [that] the plaintiff

[had] wilfully failed to comply with the clear and unambiguous court order that she engage in a good faith

consultation with the defendant prior to making a decision about the children’s health.’’ The court thus ‘‘conclude[d] that the defendant [had] satisfied his burden

of proof based on the clear and convincing evidence

of the plaintiff’s failure to engage in good faith consultation with the defendant about proper medical care for

their child.’’ Accordingly, the court granted the defendant’s physical therapy motion for contempt.

The following legal principles are relevant to the

plaintiff’s claim. ‘‘Any determination regarding the

scope of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction or its

authority to act presents a question of law over which

our review is plenary. . . . Generally, it is clear that

[t]he court is not permitted to decide issues outside of

those raised in the pleadings. . . . When reviewing the

court’s decisions regarding the interpretation of pleadings, [t]he [motion] must be read in its entirety in such

a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference

to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do

substantial justice between the parties. . . . Our reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial

justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with

it the related proposition that it must not be contorted

in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational

comprehension. . . .

‘‘Pleadings have an essential purpose in the judicial

process. . . . For, instance, [t]he purpose of the

[motion] is to put the defendants on notice of the claims

made, to limit the issues to be decided, and to prevent

surprise. . . . [T]he concept of notice concerns

notions of fundamental fairness, affording parties the

opportunity to be apprised when their interests are

implicated in a given matter. . . . Whether a [motion]
gives sufficient notice is determined in each case with

reference to the character of the wrong complained of

and the underlying purpose of the rule which is to

prevent surprise upon the defendant. . . .

‘‘[I]t is imperative that the court and opposing counsel

be able to rely on the statement of issues as set forth

in the pleadings. . . . [A]ny judgment should conform

to the pleadings, the issues and the prayers for relief.

. . . [A] plaintiff may not allege one cause of action

and recover upon another. . . . The requirement that

claims be raised timely and distinctly . . . recognizes

that counsel should not have the opportunity to surprise

an opponent by interjecting a claim when opposing

counsel is no longer in a position to present evidence

against such a claim.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lynn v. Bosco, 182 Conn. App.

200, 213–15, 189 A.3d 601 (2018).

With respect to the physical therapy motion for contempt, the court found the plaintiff in contempt for her

‘‘failure to engage in good faith consultation with the

defendant about proper medical care for their child.’’

The basis on which the court found the plaintiff in

contempt was not one of the bases pleaded by the

defendant in the physical therapy motion for contempt.

The defendant alleged that the plaintiff ‘‘unreasonably

withheld her consent for timely medical treatment for

[their daughter],’’ ‘‘failed to insure that [their daughter’s]

medical needs are timely and appropriately met,’’ and

‘‘failed to place [their daughter’s] needs and interests

above her personal preferences.’’ The defendant’s allegations are that the plaintiff violated specific obligations

within Judge Pinkus’ order. These obligations are separate and distinct from the obligation that the court cited

as its basis for finding the plaintiff in contempt.

The defendant argues that ‘‘any unbiased reading of

the language set forth in paragraph [2 of his physical

therapy motion for contempt] would reveal that the

order which the plaintiff was alleged to have violated

contains reference to the requirements of a ‘good faith

consultation prior to the plaintiff exercising final decision making authority’; and, the requirement that ‘neither parent will unreasonabl[y] withhold consent to

matters affecting the children . . . .’ Any reasonable

construction of the original order of Judge Pinkus

requires that those provisions be read together in a

consistent whole as they are limitations on the exercise

of ‘final decision-making authority.’ ’’

The defendant is correct that quoted within paragraph 2 of his physical therapy motion for contempt is

the part of Judge Pinkus’ order that pertains to ‘‘good

faith consultation.’’ The defendant did not allege, however, that the plaintiff violated the ‘‘good faith consultation’’ requirement of Judge Pinkus’ order, thereby

impermissibly depriving the plaintiff of fair notice that

the issue of ‘‘good faith consultation’’ would be before
the court in the defendant’s physical therapy motion for

contempt. See Lynn v.Bosco, supra, 182 Conn. App. 214.

Moreover, we do not agree with the defendant’s contention that the requirement of ‘‘good faith consultation’’ and the prohibition against unreasonably withholding consent must be read together. Although both

obligations are related to decision-making for the parties’ children, they are unique obligations within the

decision-making process. Thus, the obligation to consult in good faith could be violated without triggering a

violation of the obligation to not unreasonably withhold

consent, and vice versa.

Because the requirement of good faith consultation

and the prohibition against unreasonably withholding

consent are two separate components of Judge Pinkus’

order, in order for the plaintiff to have been found in

contempt for her failure to consult in good faith regarding their daughter’s physical therapy needs, the defendant was required to have pleaded such. There was no

allegation in the defendant’s physical therapy motion

for contempt that the plaintiff refused to consult in good

faith with the defendant concerning their daughter’s

physical therapy. As such, the court’s judgment does

not conform to the pleadings. See id. (‘‘[a]ny judgment

should conform to the pleadings, the issues and the

prayers for relief’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Therefore, it must be reversed.9

The judgment is affirmed only as to the denial of

the plaintiff’s child return motion for contempt; the

judgment is reversed as to the granting of the plaintiff’s

parenting access schedule adjustment motion for contempt and the defendant’s physical therapy motion

for contempt.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Collectively, over a five week period, the parties had filed five postjudgment motions for contempt, three of which are at issue in this appeal.

2

In light of our conclusion that the relevant language of the August 31, 2017

stipulation underlying the plaintiff’s parenting access schedule adjustment

motion for contempt is not clear and unambiguous, we do not consider

whether the defendant’s conduct was wilful. See Puff v. Puff, 334 Conn.

341, 365, 222 A.3d 493 (2020) (‘‘[i]t is the burden of the party seeking an

order of contempt to prove . . . both a clear and unambiguous directive

to the alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncompliance

with that directive’’ (emphasis added)).

3

In a portion of its analysis discussing the meaning of the term ‘‘synchronicity,’’ as it is used in paragraph 3, the court stated that it ‘‘accepts and

adopts the definition and interpretation of paragraph 3 of the [August 31,

2017] stipulation according to the testimony of [Amendola].’’ A clear and

unambiguous order is a necessary predicate to holding a party in contempt.

See Bolat v. Bolat, supra, 191 Conn. App. 297. Witness testimony as to his

or her interpretation of language in an order is extrinsic evidence, which

should only be considered when the order is found not to be clear and

unambiguous and, thus, cannot support a finding of contempt. See Parisi

v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370, 384–86, 107 A.3d 920 (2015) (remanding case

‘‘to resolve the ambiguity in the parties’ separation agreement through a

determination of their intent after consideration of all available extrinsic

evidence and the circumstances surrounding the entering of the agreement’’

after concluding ‘‘that the alimony buyout provision of the parties’ separation

agreement is ambiguous, thereby precluding a finding of contempt’’).

The court’s statement ‘‘accepting and adopting’’ Amendola’s interpretation
indicates that it may have improperly applied the well established principles

of contract interpretation to assess whether paragraph 3 was clear and

unambiguous. The plaintiff argues that ‘‘[j]ust because the court referred

to an interpretation that accorded with its own, it does not necessarily

follow that the court failed to reach independently the legal conclusion as

to whether paragraph 3 was clear and unambiguous.’’ Because we conclude

that the court erroneously determined that paragraph 3 was clear and unambiguous, we need not decide whether it improperly relied upon extrinsic

evidence to reach its determination.

4

In the section of her brief that discusses the defendant’s wilfulness, the

plaintiff argues that ‘‘[i]f the defendant truly harbored a different interpretation of his obligation to engage with the guardian [ad litem] at the proposed

meeting . . . then the basis for his refusal to engage further was nothing

but a form of self-help. If anything, given that the defendant at no time

obtained, much less sought, a clarification or modification of paragraph 3,

it would have been error for the court not to find him in contempt.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) To the extent that the plaintiff argues on

appeal that the court’s finding of the defendant in contempt should be upheld

despite an unclear and ambiguous order; see Sablosky v. Sablosky, 258 Conn.

713, 720, 784 A.2d 890 (2001) (‘‘we conclude that where there is an ambiguous

term in a judgment, a party must seek a clarification upon motion rather

than resort to self-help’’); we disagree.

This case in no way presents facts warranting a finding of contempt

against the defendant because he exercised self-help when faced with an

unclear and ambiguous order. We emphasize that the defendant did not

exercise self-help but, rather, attempted to comply with the requirement in

paragraph 3 that he ‘‘work with the guardian ad litem’’ by speaking with

Amendola on the telephone and stating his reasons for his opposition to

the plaintiff’s proposed adjustment to the parenting access schedule. See

In re Leah S., 284 Conn. 685, 700, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007) (concluding that

because trial court order was ‘‘ambiguous at the outset, and therefore conferred broad discretion’’ on party, party, ‘‘far from employing self-help tactics

. . . instead employed the broad discretion conferred upon it by the court’’).

5 We acknowledge that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant acted contemptuously by failing to ‘‘work with the guardian ad litem,’’ and she did

not allege that he contemptuously disagreed with her proposed adjustment

to the parenting access schedule. Nevertheless, the relief she sought was

an implementation of the adjustment she desired. In the parenting access

schedule adjustment motion for contempt the plaintiff requested, inter alia,

that the court ‘‘order the defendant to immediately engage in mediation

regarding the . . . ‘swaps’ with [her] and the guardian ad litem, and if the

parties are unsuccessful in resolving [the] issue after two . . . mediation

sessions, the guardian ad litem shall make a binding recommendation until

further agreement by the parties or order by the court . . . .’’ The plaintiff

further sought an ‘‘order that until further agreement by the parties or

recommendation by the guardian ad litem, the weekend ‘swaps’ be instituted

immediately in accordance with the schedules of the members of [her]

household . . . .’’ If the plaintiff believed that an adjustment to the recently

established parenting access schedule was necessary, a motion for modification of visitation under Practice Book § 25-26 would have been a more direct

and effective approach to receiving impartial consideration of the adjustment

she sought.

As an initial matter, the plaintiff has not provided us with any legal support

for her position that the guardian ad litem, under the facts of this case, was

authorized to make a binding recommendation on a child custody and

visitation matter. Furthermore, had the plaintiff moved to modify the parenting access schedule, instead of filing a motion for contempt against the

defendant, she might have received appropriate consideration and relief

more expeditiously. The fact that the plaintiff filed the parenting access

schedule adjustment motion for contempt less than two months after the

parties entered into the global August 31, 2017 stipulation further informs

our conclusion that filing a motion for contempt was imprudent. When the

parties cannot agree on a decision impacting the parenting of their children,

they should turn to the court to resolve their impasse in a manner that does

not seek to punish the other party, unless it truly is warranted. See Sablosky

v. Sablosky, supra, 258 Conn. 722 (‘‘[t]he doors of the courthouse are always

open; it is incumbent upon the parties to seek judicial resolution of any

ambiguity in the language of judgments’’).

6 The plaintiff argues that there was no evidence to support the court’s

findings that ‘‘[s]tudents benefit from tutoring or other general academic
enrichment as a result of after school access to teachers’’ and that ‘‘[their

son] chose to stay after school for reasons that are important to a child’s

education.’’ We conclude that there was evidence to support both of

these findings.

With respect to the second finding, the defendant’s uncontested testimony

was that on three of the four days at issue in the child return motion for

contempt their son stayed after school to meet with his teachers, to complete

his homework, and to practice on a percussion set available at his private

school because there was not a set at his home. On one of the four days,

the defendant was late due to a ‘‘client meeting.’’ On that one day, the court

reasonably could have concluded that the defendant did not act wilfully.

See Hall v. Hall, supra, 182 Conn. App. 747 (‘‘[F]ailure to comply with an

order, alone, will not support a finding of contempt. . . . Rather, to constitute contempt, a party’s conduct must be wilful.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)).

7 The court stated that specifying an exact time by which the parties’ son

must be returned to the plaintiff ‘‘would be [an] impractical, if not impossible’’ obligation for the defendant to satisfy. The plaintiff homes in on this

language arguing that ‘‘[t]he court effectively determined that no order, be

it crystal clear or utterly amorphous, can provide a sufficient basis for a

violation in this particular case—none but one: whatever [the parties’ son]

may decide enriches his education.’’ It is not our function to offer an opinion

as to the parties’ capabilities to abide by paragraph 4 in parenting their son

were it to specify an exact time by which he is to be dropped off at the

plaintiff’s home by the defendant. Paragraph 4, in its current form, however,

is not clear and unambiguous and, thus, cannot support a finding of contempt

against the defendant.

8 Because we conclude that paragraph 4 is not clear and unambiguous,

we do not consider whether the defendant acted wilfully. See Puff v. Puff,

supra, 334 Conn. 365; footnote 2 of this opinion.

9

In addition, we note that we harbor the same concerns with regard to

the defendant’s motion for contempt that were articulated in footnote 5 of

this opinion.