THE ENRON COLLAPSE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 

FOR WORKER RETIREMENT SECURITY 

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND 

THE WORKFORCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARINGS HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 AND FEBRUARY 7, 2002 

Serial No. 107-42 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education 

and the Workforce

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 2002 

81-198 pdf 

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ii

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE 

JOHN A. BOEHNER, Ohio, Chairman 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin GEORGE MILLER, California 

MARGE ROUKEMA, New Jersey DALE E. KILDEE, Michigan 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina MAJOR R. OWENS, New York 

PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

HOWARD P. “BUCK” McKEON, California PATSY MINK, Hawaii 

MICHAEL N. CASTLE, Delaware ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SAM JOHNSON, Texas TIM ROEMER, Indiana 

JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania ROBERT C. “BOBBY” SCOTT, Virginia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana LYNN N. RIVERS, Michigan 

CHARLIE W. NORWOOD, JR., Georgia RUBEN HINOJOSA, Texas 

BOB SCHAFFER, Colorado CAROLYN McCARTHY, New York 

FRED UPTON, Michigan JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts 

VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee RON KIND, Wisconsin 

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky DENNIS KUCINICH, Ohio 

JIM DeMINT, South Carolina DAVID WU, Oregon 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia RUSH D. HOLT, New Jersey 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania SUSAN DAVIS, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

TOM OSBORNE, Nebraska 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

 Paula Nowakowski, Chief of Staff 

 John Lawrence, Minority Staff Director 
iii

Table of Contents

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE..................................................................................... 2

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GEORGE MILLER, COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE..................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELAINE L. CHAO, SECRETARY, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WASHINGTON, D.C. .................................................................. 6

APPENDIX A - WRITTEN OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE................................................... 38

APPENDIX B - WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELAINE L. CHAO, 

SECRETARY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WASHINGTON, D.C. ....... 39

APPENDIX C – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, STATEMENT OF CONGRESSWOMAN 

MARGE ROUKEMA, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE ............. 40

APPENDIX D – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN 

FRED UPTON, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE ........................ 41

APPENDIX E – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN 

DONALD PAYNE, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE.................. 42

APPENDIX F - SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, RESPONSE OF THE HONORABLE 

ELAINE L. CHAO, SECRETARY OF LABOR TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY 

CONGRESSMAN JOHN TIERNEY, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE 

WORKFORCE ............................................................................................................................. 43

APPENDIX G – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 

ACCOMPLISHMENTS, CALENDAR YEAR 2001, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 

WASHINGTON, D.C................................................................................................................... 44

APPENDIX H – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, STATEMENT OF THE ERISA 

INDUSTRY COMMITTEE (ERIC), WASHINGTON, D.C. ...................................................... 45

Table of Indexes............................................................................................................................ 46
iv

Table of Contents for February 7, 2002 Hearing.......................................................93 

 Table of Indexes for February 7, 2002 Hearing......................................................316
1

HEARING ON 

THE ENRON COLLAPSE AND 

 IT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKER RETIREMENT SECURITY 

_____________________

Wednesday, February 6, 2002 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 

 The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in Room 2175, Rayburn House 

Office Building, Hon. John A. Boehner, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

 Present: Representatives Boehner, Petri, Ballenger, Hoekstra, McKeon, Castle, Johnson, 

Greenwood, Souder, Upton, Hilleary, Ehlers, Fletcher, DeMint, Isakson, Goodlatte, Biggert, Platts, 

Tiberi, Keller, Osborne, Culberson, Miller, Owens, Payne, Mink, Andrews, Roemer, Scott, Rivers, 

McCarthy, Tierney, Kind, Sanchez, Ford, Kucinich, Wu, Holt, Solis, Davis, and McCollum. 

 Staff present: David Connolly, Jr., Professional Staff Member; Christine Roth, Professional 

Staff Member; Dave Thomas, Legislative Assistant; Paula Nowakowski, Staff Director; George 

Canty, Counselor to the Chairman; Ed Gilroy, Director of Workforce Policy; Victoria Lipnic, 

Workforce Policy Counsel; Allison Dembeck, Executive Assistant; Stephen Settle, Professional 

Staff Member; Molly McLaughlin Salmi, Professional Staff Member; Dave Schnittger, 

Communications Director; Kevin Smith, Senior Communications Counselor; Heather Valentine, 

Press Secretary; Maria Miller, Communications Coordinator; Jo-Marie St. Martin, General 
2

Counsel; Linda Stevens, Chief Clerk/Assistant to the General Counsel; Patrick Lyden, Professional 

Staff Member; Deborah L. Samantar, Committee Clerk/Intern Coordinator. 

Mark Zuckerman, Minority General Counsel; Cheryl Johnson, Minority Counsel; Michele 

Varnhagen, Minority Labor Counsel/Coordinator; Peter Rutledge, Minority Senior Legislative 

Associate/Labor; Ann Owens, Minority Clerk; Camille Donald, Minority Legislative 

Associate/Labor; Dan Rawlins, Minority Staff Assistant/Labor; and, Joe Novotny, Minority Staff 

Assistant/Education.

Chairman Boehner. A quorum being present, the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

will come to order. Good morning, everyone. We're meeting today to hear testimony on the 

collapse of Enron and its implications for worker retirement security. 

 I would like to welcome our witness today, the Honorable Elaine Chao, Secretary of Labor.

It is an honor to have you with us once again. This is the second time that Ms. Chao has appeared 

before our Committee since becoming Secretary, and I'd like to thank her for coming here today to 

discuss this important and timely matter. 

 Let me also extend a warm welcome to my colleague and Ranking Member, Mr. Miller, and 

to all my colleagues on the Committee. I want to thank Mr. Miller for his cooperation in helping to 

put this hearing and tomorrow's hearing together, and thank all of my colleagues for what I thought 

was a very successful first year under new management, if you will, on both sides of the aisle in the 

Committee last year. 

 I think you all know that, under Committee Rule 12(b), opening statements are limited to 

the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee. Therefore, if other Members have 

statements, they will be included in the record, and without objection, so ordered. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE 

Late last year, thousands of working Americans employed by Enron Corporation watched 

helplessly as their company collapsed, and tragically, their retirement savings were lost with it. 

Longtime, loyal Enron workers who had saved for years and placed their trust in the company's 

401(k) plan saw their dream of a safe, secure retirement vanish, almost overnight. 

 Across our country, millions of hard-working Americans are asking anxiously: “Could this 

happen to me? What actions are the Bush Administration and Congress prepared to take to ensure 

that it doesn't happen to me? Why did thousands of employees who had saved all their lives for a 

safe and secure nest egg see their retirement savings evaporate as the company unraveled?” We 

also have the responsibility of asking to what extent did outdated federal pension laws contribute to 

Enron's fall and the fate of its workers' 401(k) plan? 

Today we begin the process of asking all of those questions. As our Committee begins 

hearings this week into the Enron collapse, we do so with a firm commitment to identify further 
3

reforms that promote security, education, and freedom for employees who have saved all of their 

lives for a secure retirement. 

 Last week, President Bush sent a clear message to Congress that he was committed to 

addressing the Enron tragedy by calling for new safeguards to help workers preserve and enhance 

their retirement savings. The President followed up his State of the Union speech on Friday by 

announcing his proposal to restore Americans' confidence in the security of their pension plans. 

 The President’s recommendations include: providing workers greater freedom to diversify 

and manage their own retirement funds; ensuring that senior corporate executives are held to the 

same restrictions as average American workers during so-called blackout periods; giving workers 

quarterly information about their investments; and expanding workers' access to investment advice. 

We look forward to Secretary Chao telling us more today about the President's pension reform 

proposal, as well as the Department of Labor's role in overseeing pension plans and its Enron 

investigation.

 While the ongoing investigations by the Bush administration and Congress will reveal the 

extent to which Enron's employees may have been victims of criminal wrongdoing or neglect, it is 

already evident that Enron's employees are the victims of an outdated federal law that continues to 

needlessly deny the rank-and-file workers access to quality investment advice. 

 Media reports have indicated that there were several windows of opportunity before and 

after the blackout of the Enron 401(k) plan that employees had to sell their company stock and 

diversify their retirement savings. This tells us that some of Enron's employees could have 

preserved their retirement savings if they had access to a professional advisor who would have 

warned them in advance that they should diversify their portfolio. 

 Last November, the House took the first step toward giving rank-and-file workers the same 

access to professional investment advice that wealthy employees and executives have by passing 

the Retirement Security Advice Act. I'm very pleased that President Bush and other members of 

the Administration have embraced this bipartisan bill. My hope is that the Senate will quickly 

follow suit in the same bipartisan spirit so that President Bush can sign this legislation into law on 

behalf of American workers. 

 Investment advice is likely only one part of a broader legislative exchange needed to 

prevent another Enron tragedy. The Enron collapse has provided tragic confirmation of the need 

for modernization of America's pension laws, a problem Congress must now confront with a new 

urgency. American workers deserve the security of knowing there will be no more Enrons and the 

freedom to continue to capitalize on the opportunities to save and invest. We need to ensure that 

American workers are fully protected and fully prepared with the tools they need to protect and 

enhance their retirement savings. 

 I would now like to yield to my friend and distinguished colleague from California, Mr. 

Miller.
4

WRITTEN OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE – SEE APPENDIX A 

OPENING STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER GEORGE MILLER, 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for convening this hearing. Madame 

Secretary, thank you for joining us this morning, and we look forward to your testimony. 

 The story of Enron is a scandal and a tragedy of enormous proportions. It is a story of highranking company officials whose arrogance and desire for personal aggrandizement overwhelmed 

their sense of responsibility to their company, to their employees, to their shareholders, and to the 

law. The Enron scheme did not simply result in the bankruptcy of what was once listed as the 

seventh-largest corporation on the Fortune 500 list. It was a scheme that devoured the retirement 

nest eggs of thousands of hard-working men and women. 

 The spectacle of company executives hiding the abysmal financial condition of Enron on 

one hand, while cashing out company stock and exercising options on the other, is an audacious 

assault on our pension plans and security laws. It offends our sense of fairness and clearly offends 

our sense of justice. 

 When we dig a little deeper, we see that Enron used the expansion of the 1990s to trim 

employees' pensions and benefits while increasing the benefits of their executives. Immediately, 

they started a process of having a two-tier system within the company. Those same executives got 

bailed out with golden parachutes and stock options while workers were locked into imploding, 

worthless stock. 

 In addition to the employees who lost their 401(k) retirement, scores of rank-and-file 

employees took permanent cuts in their pension plans because the company offset their benefits 

based on inflated and now worthless stock contributions in the company's ESOP plan. We also 

have learned how Enron had specific provisions that limited the employees' access to employer 

contributions in stock, even though they had invested in their own retirement 401(k) plan, until 

they reached the age of 50. 

 As Enron demonstrates, a worker's retirement savings can quickly become vulnerable if 

there are not adequate employee rights and protections. Clearly today, the outdated pension rules 

are putting employee nest eggs at risk. 

 As we see from the chart over here to the right, Enron is not the only company that has 

substantial financial assets of company stock vested in their employees' 401(k) plans. If you read 

this chart that was produced by the Congressional Research Service, you'll see Procter & Gamble at 

94 percent and Sherwin Williams at 91. These have all become too familiar for us. We also notice 

that, in many instances, these plans have restrictions on the ability of vested employees to move 
5

financial assets that have been contributed by the employer. 

 Enron is symptomatic of something larger than just the question of people's retirements and 

the security of their retirement plans. It also indicates the vulnerability of workers in today's world. 

As the minimum wage continues to fall behind the cost of living and as workers find themselves 

losing their jobs, they become more and more vulnerable by not having health insurance, not being 

able to afford the COBRA payments, and finding out that they now must invade their retirement 

plans.

If their retirement plans are worth anything, they are invading them now to try to pay the 

mortgage and save their house. They're paying a penalty if they do that. You’re given an incentive 

if you make a savings plan to buy a house, but if you save a house, you pay a penalty. They're 

invading their pension plans so they can make their COBRA payments. They're invading their 

pension plans so they can save their cars so they can try and find work. 

 So pension plans are under assault because of workers' insecurity in the workplace overall. 

I think that this Committee has an obligation to address the needs of the 38 million Americans 

without health insurance, the needs of the hundreds of thousands of Americans that have exhausted 

their unemployment benefits, and the needs of workers who, in many instances, were working at 

the lower levels of the economy and have no other resources to address these concerns. 

 More importantly, this hearing is about fundamental change. It's about fundamental justice. 

It's about fundamental fairness. It's about fundamental equity. The President said, and this nation 

agreed, that on September 11th everything changed for America, certainly with respect to its 

national security. On October 16th, when Enron changed its financial picture, everything changed 

for retirees in America with respect to their financial security. We must be willing to investigate 

each and every underlying law, underlying protection and relationship in this situation. 

 I'm sure that my colleagues, who have been visited by people on the street, or when 

shopping in a store, if not asked about Enron, then were asked about 401(k)s. They're asking you 

about the security of their retirement. We have a national crisis. We have a national crisis of 

confidence. We have told small investors the miracle of the 401(k) plan was that if they invested 

for the long term, if they had the faith in the markets, if they started early, they could end up with 

$1 million or more as a retirement nest egg. They were told to be diligent: “Don't just buy a stock, 

look at the 10-K statement, look at what the auditors say.” Now we find out that the auditors were 

in on the gig. The auditors were in on the gig because they were financially compromised, and so 

they were part of cooking the books. 

 So where does a small investor go now? The small investor goes to an investment advisor. 

We now find out that the investment advisors are in on the gig, because the investment house was 

looking for fees, looking for commissions, looking for partnerships with Enron and other 

corporations. Where does a small investor go now with confidence about their retirement? Where 

do the people who are 50 to 55 years old, who lost their entire nest egg at Enron go to rebuild their 

financial security, their plans for the future, their retirement years? Where do they go? In the 

current system, they have no place to turn, because the system is not on the level. The system is 
6

dramatically compromised by financial conflicts of interest, by fraud, by deceit, by deception. 

 It is the role of government to once again level the playing field, protect the consumer, 

make sure that people who engage in criminal activity go to jail, maybe and hopefully as an 

example. Because as we have seen with the Andersen Company, they're fully prepared to settle for 

hundreds of millions of dollars when they've been found doing wrong. They've been the subjects 

of the largest fines in SEC history, and they continued the practice at Enron and God knows where 

else. So apparently, it's time that people take responsibility and face the idea of the jail door 

slamming behind them. 

 But at this moment, the small investor, the person protecting their retirement, has no place 

to turn. Hopefully, this Congress, this Committee, this Administration will understand the nature 

of this crisis that we're suffering across the country. 

 This isn't just coming from George Miller. This is coming from some of the most 

conservative Wall Street analysts in this country, and we see it every day as it plays out, as 

companies try to readjust the false images that they presented to the American public, to their 

investors, to the shareholders, to their employees. 

 We now see people who were selling their stock a couple of weeks ago buying it back as an 

act of faith. Give me a break. Give me a break. People two weeks ago sold $100 million worth of 

stock and they bought back $17 million last week as an act of faith to show the investors that they 

really had confidence in their company. 

 Now, we have a lot of work to do, ladies and gentlemen. This Administration has a lot of 

work to do, and we cannot fail in this, because we have told millions of Americans that this is their 

road to retirement security. We've just hit a huge, huge bump in the road that threatens each and 

every one's retirement plans. 

Chairman Boehner. Let me thank my colleague, and before the Secretary begins her testimony, 

remind Members that we will allow five minutes for questions once the Secretary has finished her 

testimony. 

 For the benefit of the Members and the Secretary, we do expect several votes at about 

11 o'clock, and for the benefit of the Members, you should know the Secretary has given us a twohour time frame. At about 12:15, the Secretary is going to have to go. So I would encourage all 

Members in their questioning to try to tighten it up and allow this process to move forward. 

 With that, we want to thank the Secretary for being here, welcome you back again, and 

allow you to share your testimony with us. 

 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELAINE L. CHAO, SECRETARY, 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
7

 Good morning, Chairman Boehner, Ranking Member Miller, and Members of the 

Committee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss the 

President's plan to protect workers' retirement security. 

 As you may have heard, 42 million Americans have 401(k) accounts through their 

employers, owning a total of about $2 trillion in assets. These aren't just statistics. In fact, they 

represent the hopes and the aspirations of millions of Americans for a secure and decent retirement. 

In a few weeks' time, thanks to the work of the Members of this Committee, we will 

convene the Saver Summit. This unique event is dedicated to the premise that Americans should 

be encouraged to save and to plan for their own future. I think we all agree that the best incentive 

to save that we can offer is to protect the security of these savings, whether they're held in a 401(k) 

program or a company or a union pension plan. 

 The President's plan will help those who are saving for retirement by giving workers more 

choice, confidence, and control over their retirement plans: choice, in terms of how they invest 

their retirement savings in ways that work best for them and their families; confidence in their 

investment that comes from investment decisions that are derived from getting reliable and 

professional financial assistance; and the same degree of control over their investments that any 

other worker in the organization receives, from the top floor to the shop floor. 

 The first principle of the President's plan is expanding Americans' freedom of choice over 

their retirement investments. Over the last 20 years, there has been a revolution in the way that 

people plan and save for retirement. The 401(k) plan has helped to make America a nation of 

investors. Workers at every income level are being empowered to make their own decisions about 

their financial futures based on their families' needs and goals. That increase in freedom has opened 

up the potential for a better quality of life for millions of Americans, but like every other increase 

in freedom, it has also introduced new risks. 

 Recent corporate bankruptcies have revealed the need for stronger safeguards to protect 

workers. We believe that one important way to reduce these risks is to give workers even more 

freedom, not less, more choice, not less. That is why the President's plan will give workers a right 

that the employees of Enron did not have, and that is the right to sell company stock contributed by 

an employer to their 401(k) after a three-year period. 

 For most individual investors, diversification is the key to reducing risk over the long term, 

and the President's proposal will give workers the right to make that choice. We need to remember, 

it is their money. They earned it. They sacrificed to save it. They should have the right to decide 

how to invest it. For that same reason, freedom of choice also means that Washington should not 

be allowed to set arbitrary limits on how much company stock a worker can hold. While it may be 

tempting to go down this road in the wake of recent business failures, this would actually take away 

from workers the right to choose, which they deserve. Arbitrary limits on workers' investment 

choices would not be progress. It would be turning back the clock. 

 Our modern economy is far from being perfect, but one of the wonders of the American 

system is that an administrative assistant from Microsoft or Home Depot or General Electric can 
8

become a millionaire by working hard, sticking with their company and investing in it, and having 

a good investment strategy. 

 Now, of course, we all know that Enron did not turn out like a Microsoft or a Home Depot 

or General Electric, but one thing that our country stands for is the belief that individual Americans 

should have the right and the freedom to make their own financial choices based on what's best for 

them and their families. This is the core of what the entire world calls the American dream. 

Restricting workers' choices won't necessarily make their investments safer. It will just reduce the 

freedom that workers have to shape their own financial futures. 

 At the same time, choice, by itself, will not ensure the security of workers' retirement 

savings, either. People need to have confidence in the decisions that they will make about their 

investments, and that comes from getting reliable investment assistance and accurate financial 

information. That's why our plan and the President's plan incorporates Chairman Boehner's 

Retirement Security Advice Act, which passed the House with an overwhelming bipartisan 

majority. 

[Secretary Chao. Mr. Chairman, I hope that you won't mind that we borrowed your fine work in

this regard? 

Chairman Boehner. You're more than welcome to use it all you'd like.] 

As this Committee knows, these provisions would encourage employers to make investment 

assistance available to their employees by giving them access to professional financial advisors. On 

this point, I think we should also make several others, and let me make them. I think we need to 

make two important reality checks. 

 First, the last year or so has been tough sledding for the average individual investor. 

Second, most people simply don't have the time or the inclination to become experts on managing 

financial portfolios, even their own. They have jobs to do, children to take care of, school activities 

to support, and of course, bills to pay, among their very many other activities. Especially in these 

less certain economic times, people are in desperate need of help as they chart a retirement strategy 

that fits their unique circumstances and goals. 

 In the same way that we provide retirement benefits through employers, we believe that it is 

possible to provide retirement financial assistance through employers in a way that safeguards the 

workers who receive these benefits. Just as ERISA currently provides, we would require 

investment advisors to act solely in the interest of the employees, their clients, and we will go after 

anyone who violates this vital and sacred trust.

Advisors should also be required to disclose any conflicts of interest that they may have and 

any fees that they may earn in recommending particular investments. Employers themselves would 

be responsible for choosing an appropriate investment advisor and monitoring the program on 

behalf of their employees. 

 Our department, the Department of Labor, is committed to expanding our outreach efforts 

to let workers know what their rights are, what information they should be getting, and how to raise 
9

concerns about self-dealing by financial advisors. With these safeguards, we can give workers the 

confidence that they need to make good investment decisions and build a secure retirement. After 

all, why should only the CEOs get good financial advice? 

 Finally, workers need to have the assurance of control over their retirement savings, 

regardless whether they are a senior executive or a rank-and-file worker. They need to have ample 

opportunity to make investment changes before a blackout period occurs. They must be guaranteed 

that their employers will be held to the highest standards of conduct and that employers will 

prudently act solely in their interest during a blackout period. Workers should be assured that 

everyone in the organization, from the CEO on down, would have to abide by the same set of 

restrictions. 

 The President's plan will achieve this, by requiring that workers be notified a full 30 days in 

advance that a blackout period is going to occur. Our proposal will also prevent corporate officers 

from selling or purchasing any company stock while workers are prohibited from trading in their 

401(k) plans during a blackout period, so there would be pension parity. We will also amend 

ERISA to clarify in no uncertain terms the fiduciary responsibilities and accountability of 

employers during blackout periods. 

 Taken together, these measures proposed by the President will give workers the choice, the 

confidence, and the control that they need, that they have a right to, to protect their savings and 

plan for a decent retirement: the choice to make their own decisions; the confidence that comes 

from good information and accountability; and a level playing field that gives workers control over 

their retirement savings. As the President said in his State of the Union address, a good job should 

lead to security in retirement. We know. At the Department of Labor, retirement security is our 

specialty and our mission. 

 In the year 2001 alone, last year, we conducted nearly 4,000 employee benefit 

investigations, obtained 76 indictments and 49 convictions, and recovered $662 million on behalf 

of aggrieved beneficiaries, employees. We were on the ground investigating Enron before it even 

declared bankruptcy, and we are doing everything we can to help these workers, and that is my 

personal commitment. 

 Whatever kind of retirement plan an employee may have, whether it be a 401(k) or a 

corporate or a union pension plan, our goal is to protect all hard-working Americans, from the 

cubicles of Palo Alto to the shop floors of Detroit, so that employees and workers can look to their 

retirement with confidence and with hope. 

 Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to address this very important subject 

today. We look forward to working with Chairman Boehner and this Committee to ensure greater 

retirement security for all Americans. 

 I would be pleased now to answer any questions. 
10

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELAINE L. CHAO, SECRETARY, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, WASHINGTON, D.C. – SEE APPENDIX B 

Chairman Boehner. Thank you, Madame Secretary, for your willingness to come today, and for 

sharing your testimony with us. 

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, can I ask for a point of personal privilege, sir? Obviously, the Chair is 

able to recognize a former presidential candidate and great advocate, Rev. Jesse Jackson, who is in 

the audience. 

I appreciate the time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Boehner. Thank you, Mr. Ford. 

 We all know that when it comes to making changes in our retirement and pension laws, that 

we have to tread carefully, that we want to do more good than harm. As we begin our discussions 

on this subject, I was hoping that you might be able to share with us some areas that the President's 

task force looked at, but decided not to proceed with, or decided to tread carefully with. Are there 

issues such as this that the task force decided to proceed with care on? 

Secretary Chao. As some of you may know, the President has appointed two Cabinet-level task 

forces. The task force that I am on deals with pension reform. The Secretary of the Treasury and 

the Secretary of Commerce are on it, as well. Our task is to deal with pension reform. This is an 

issue that my department has been working on for quite a while. It is a personal commitment of 

mine to look into pension retirement security. 

 So last fall, before any of this occurred, I had already asked my team to begin to review the 

ERISA laws and rules and regulations to see how we can improve them, and also to review them 

for efficacy, obviously, and for responsiveness. So when the Enron situation developed, we were 

already on top of the situation, as I mentioned. We don't usually disclose the investigations, but 

because of the intense media questions, we did confirm on December 5th that on November 16th 

we opened up an investigation, and that was in advance of the company's bankruptcy. 

 There is a second task force that deals with governance and with accountability, and the 

President has asked the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and several 

others to take a look at those issues. 

 We acted in a very, very prompt and responsive fashion, and there was agreement that 

workers needed to have freedom and flexibility to decide their own financial futures. We had 

considered some other issues of accountability and auditing, for example, but that rightly belongs 

to the second task force. I understand they are coming up with their recommendations shortly. 

 I think everyone understands the need for speedy action to not only protect workers who 

have already been hurt, but to think about future situations, so that we can ensure future retirement 
11

security, as well. 

Chairman Boehner. There are a number of bills that have been introduced in response to the 

Enron collapse, and one of the features of several of these bills would be to place a restriction on 

the amount of company stock that was in a 401(k), either contributed by the company or purchased 

by the employee. As I read through the President's proposal, there is no recommendation for a cap. 

Ms. Chao, why isn't there a cap? 

 If Mr. Miller's chart could be put back up, we may want to reference it. 

Secretary Chao. This goes back to your previous question, and actually, we did consider the cap.

We obviously wanted to protect workers, and we considered a lot of possibilities. The question of 

the cap actually is that we wanted to give workers the freedom and the right to decide their own 

financial futures, because this, after all, is their money. It's not the government's money. 

 Workers need and should have the right to determine how they want to invest their own 

monies. Again, this is their money. They saved it. They made sacrifices along the way to make 

those savings, and they should have the right to determine how they want to make their investment 

decisions.

Chairman Boehner. Madame Secretary, let me just say that I applaud the task force and the 

President for not putting a cap on the amount of company stock that can be in a 401(k) and thereby 

limiting employees' ability to maximize their retirement security. 

 I would just point out on the chart as supplied by my good friend Mr. Miller, there are two 

companies on this chart that I have very close knowledge of. Procter & Gamble and the Kroger 

Company are both located and headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio. I have literally thousands of 

constituents employed in both of those companies that live in my district. 

I can tell you that they're both on this list because, in Procter & Gamble's case, 94 percent 

of the plan assets are in company stock. For the Kroger Company, the amount is about 65 percent 

of the total assets of their plan in company stock. Generations of employees at Kroger, and 

generations of employees at Procter & Gamble have done very well investing in their stock. 

 If I were their investment advisor, I might suggest to them that they not have as high a 

percentage of company stock as a proportion of their overall portfolio. I think with the investment 

advice bill that we've already passed, they would get the same kind of advice from the private 

sector.

 But how can we, the government, deny people the right to make that choice themselves, 

especially when, in those two companies' cases, generations, not just over the last five or ten years, 

but generations of workers have done very, very well? 

Secretary Chao. I think it goes back to your point Mr. Chairman that we do indeed want to ensure 

a worker's right to make their own financial and investment decisions. Where we can be of help is 
12

to provide assistance with professional financial advice. 

 Your bill provides for employees to hire financial advisors that would be made available to 

employees, with the caveat that these financial advisors must act in the best interests of the 

employees, that they disclose any conflicts of interest, and that they disclose any fees that they will 

receive from any such investments. 

Chairman Boehner. I hate to correct the Secretary, but the financial advisors would be required to 

act solely in the interest of the employee. Not just in the best interest, but solely in the interest of 

the employee. 

 My time has more than expired. Let me yield to my colleague from California, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 Madame Secretary first, let me just welcome Rev. Jackson. Thank you very much for being 

here at our hearing, and thank you for bringing the workers to Washington last week, and for your 

participation in this effort. I understand there are a number of workers in the audience today. 

 Madame Secretary, I'm delighted to hear you say that it's the workers' money and you don't 

think there should be a cap. In my bill, I do not have a cap, because I think workers ought to make 

this determination. It's not the government's money. 

 Well, let me tell you something else. It's not the company's money. 

Secretary Chao. I totally agree with you on that. 

Mr. Miller. Well, then, why do you let the company dictate what I can do with my money for three 

years? 

Secretary Chao. I think we did discuss other timetables as well, and we wanted to make sure that 

there was a balance between employer and employee interests. We did not want to discourage 

employers from making matching corporate contributions. 

Mr. Miller. I appreciate that. Now, may I interrupt you? 

That balance, I think, is very important. 

Secretary Chao. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. The President said the other day, “Good for the captain, good for the sailor.” 

Secretary Chao. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. But the fact of the matter is the executives were selling stock all this time. This talks 

about stability. You need three years' control of people's money for stability. They were bailing 
13

out of this company. Even people with fiduciary responsibilities were bailing out of this company 

because they had stock options, not retirement. 

Secretary Chao. Right. 

Mr. Miller. So they sold more stock than in the retirement plan, so it can't be about stability. 

Secretary Chao. No, the three years is basically connected. 

Mr. Miller. Let me finish. 

Secretary Chao. Sorry. 

Mr. Miller. Let me just finish. 

Secretary Chao. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. The fact of the matter is that that pension is part of the compensation package for that 

employee. That contribution is made for services rendered by that employee. That is their money 

at that moment. 

 I think when we talk about the freedom of the employee to make these investment decisions 

the freedom must be real. If you were in a three-year restriction between 1998 and 2002, we saw 

some of the stellar companies in this country lose 70, 80, 90, 95 percent of their capitalized value. 

Why should I be stuck in that system if it's really about the freedom for me to maximize my 

retirement potential? 

 In the Washington Post today, in the New York Times today, stories of Enron executives 

bailing out all during this time, even those people who had a fiduciary relationship with the pension 

plan. The employers didn't think that that was instability. So I raise that point about that. 

 The other point is that the President's plan doesn't address the so-called KSOP, the hybrid of 

the ESOP and the defined benefit plan, and it doesn't provide them this kind of protection. I think 

you have to take a look at that. Also, what do you do about the 401(k)s that are designed just for 

the executives that require a payout to those executives even if the company fails? The sailor is last 

in line in bankruptcy, the executive is first in line, because they have a guaranteed payout. “Good 

for the sailor, good for the captain?” I don't think so. I don't think so. 

 So you can escape these regulations by going to a KSOP, and you can escape these 

regulations if you're in an executive 401(k) plan. Obviously, the harm continues for a three-year 

period, when markets move at the speed of light. That's one thing the American public learned. 

 Also, regarding the question on advisors. We've had some discussions in this Committee 

back and forth on Mr. Boehner's bill. I continue to be concerned about the independence of the 

advice, because now you have people coming from large investment banks, or large mutual funds 

that hold positions or contracts with the companies they advise, and you say they must disclose. 
14

How is that different than the requirements between Arthur Andersen and Enron? The disclosure 

didn't take place. People didn't disclose this to the employees. 

 I think we've got to talk about the penalties for the failure to do that, and I think the 

disclosure has to go to the full financial basket, if you will. Even on CNBC, when one of these 

smart investment advisors comes on, because they got in trouble, CNBC asks them: “Do you have 

a position in this company? Are you long? Are you short? Do you have a relationship?” 

 Why? Because we now know the investment advisors are no longer independent 

contractors, they have to worry about what's going on in the executive suites, and the relationships 

between companies they give advise to. 

 I think you also need to make a provision. Can this investment advisor advise me about my 

company stock, about my Procter & Gamble, my Kroger, my K-Mart, because they've been invited 

in now, they have a relationship with this company. Are they going to tell them that they think 

Enron is a basket case, way back in December, way back in October last year? Are they going to 

do that? Are they going to be free to tell me? Because, again, we know that a lot of these 

employees kept this stock out of loyalty to the company. Even when they could sell, they didn't 

sell. We hope to educate them about the trap that that's part of. 

 So I would hope that you would look at those provisions of your legislation, because I think 

it's very important. I mean, I don't believe, in a market that moves as fast as it does today, that we 

can tell people that the employer can lock up their retirement funds. And you said it's their money. 

I'm not so sure the government should be able to put a cap on employee’s investment decisions, but 

the employer sure as hell should not be able to lock up these funds for three years. In three years, 

we could be in a boom, out of a recession and hopefully in a recovery, and they would not have 

access.

Secretary Chao. Mr. Miller, let me just say that I look forward to working with you on this. This 

is a plan of great concern to the President, and to me personally. We are doing everything we can 

at the Department to help Enron workers, and you have my commitment on that. 

 I might also just add, on the three-year vesting, the vesting is important, whether it's three 

years or whatever. That was a compromise figure. Basically, we wanted to arrive at a period in 

which, indeed, the money is theirs. When you say that you know whose money is it, if the money 

in the retirement fund is not vested, it's not really the employee's. 

Mr. Miller. Excuse me. I'm going to interrupt you. 

 The employee got that as part of their compensation with that paycheck or that contribution 

or that distribution for services rendered. I appreciate the fiction that somehow this isn't a defined 

benefit plan. That's in their 401(k) plan, in theory. Just like people think there's something in the 

Social Security trust fund, these people thought there was an account with their name on it. It's 

their money. It was put in their plan, “x” number of shares of Enron stock. That is their money at 

that moment. The vesting rules I appreciate. They were from a different time without computers, 
15

with bookkeeping problems. 

Secretary Chao. But that's what the three years was supposed to address, the vesting. So if that is 

something that we can discuss, I will be more than glad to. 

Mr. Miller. Because with that vesting rule, they're locked in, as I said, at a time in the last three 

years when their companies lost 70, 80, and 90 percent of their capital value. That cannot be the 

answer of this Administration to these workers; that they're going to be locked in through economic 

cycles and they have to watch the diminishment of their plans. 

Secretary Chao. I may have used the wrong word, for which, if I did, I apologize. But the issue 

also is, if an employee leaves before, let's say, a three-year, or whatever is the vesting period, the 

employee will not carry it with them. 

Mr. Miller. Madame Secretary, that's why the vesting has to be changed. It's an old-time rule, 

when you were trying to coerce employees to stay. Today employees are mobile. They get offers. 

Why should they have to give back three years of compensation because they get a better job offer 

for their families? Why are you punishing these employees? 

Secretary Chao. Well, Mr. Miller, as I mentioned, I look forward to working with you on this, but 

that is clearly not the intent. 

Mr. Miller. I look forward to working with you, Madame Secretary, but that is the result, though. 

We have to look at the results. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. 

Secretary Chao. There are several other points that you have made which I appreciate. Let me go 

through them. It's not meant to be argumentative. I do want to work with you. 

 I believe I would take a look at the ESOP issue. Our plan does include ESOPs; so if there's 

some misunderstanding about them, let's try to clear that up, as well. Regarding trustee disclosure, 

we want very much to ensure that trustees are acting in the sole interest of the employees, and if it 

is not happening, our Department and others will be investigating that. I've heard you about the 

401(k) guarantee issue. Let's talk about that issue, as well, and the advisor independence issue. 

Mr. Miller. Thank you. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Ballenger. 

Mr. Ballenger. I'll try to keep this less than 15 or 20 minutes. 

Secretary Chao. Thank you. 

Mr. Ballenger. First of all, I'd like to say that I agree with you.
16

I have a company that's been in the manufacturing business since 1957, and we had a 

pension plan until 1974, and then the government came in and decided to put in ERISA. That 

meant the government was going to tell us what we could do with our money, in spite of what Mr. 

Miller says. So we dropped our pension plan, and went to a profit-sharing plan, which didn't work 

because some years we didn't make a profit. But these were still decisions that were made by 

management, and what was given to the employee was a decision made by management. Then we 

went to an ESOP. It was a privately owned company; the stock in the company was only valuable 

to the company. There wasn't any way you could doctor it up. 

 I think if you looked at the largest firms on that list that Mr. Miller has, most of those 

companies had ESOPs. ESOPs are where you give the company stock to the employee, and 

somewhere along the line, if you don't have a vesting period, the idea that you're trying to attract 

the workers to stay on the job is going to be lost. I don't care how he looks at it. It is of value to 

the company to give this benefit to the employees if they'll stick around. That's a valuable thing. 

 What I'm really trying to say is the more the government involves itself in these things, the 

more damage that can be done to future benefit plans. I just hope that somewhere, somehow, and I 

read your statement or heard you say it, we don't throw the baby out with the bathwater. 

 The basic idea, as far as I'm concerned, is these are programs that companies 

conscientiously put in to protect the employee as they retire, especially an ESOP. Because the only 

way that you can get stock out of an ESOP is to either quit, die, or retire. The whole point is, it's 

basically a retirement plan for the employee, and in a privately owned company like mine, nobody 

wants to buy the stock except the company. 

 So somewhere along the line, I think people have to look from a small business viewpoint, 

instead of from the viewpoint of a business listed on the New York Stock Exchange. That's a very 

small minority of the companies that exist in this country today. I'd like to put my two cents in if 

there is anything that I can do to defend ESOPs before we destroy them, as Mr. Miller would like 

to do. 

 I'd just like to congratulate you, because your statement pretty well covered everything that 

I think is worthwhile. If you have difficulty explaining to him some of the things that you wrote 

down or if there are any questions you would like me to answer, if you give me a shot, I'll be glad 

to help you answer those questions. 

[Laughter.]

Secretary Chao. Thank you. 

Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, ma'am. I don't need any further time. 

Secretary Chao. Well, a worker's total compensation includes retirement, yes, but it includes not 

only retirement. It includes other benefits and also current income, as well. 
17

Mr. Ballenger. Well we had a defined benefit plan to start with, and the government came in, so 

we went to a defined contribution plan to get away from the government. Then the government 

comes in again and we went to ESOPs, and then the government comes in again and we go to 

401(k)s.

 We are not trying to rob employees. We're trying to give them a benefit that will be good 

for their retirement, but if the government is going to make it so difficult, we don't have our own 

legal department. We don't have people that can draw these plans up. I do hope that you'll look at 

the viewpoint of smaller industries that are trying to help their employees out. 

 Thank you, ma'am. 

Chairman Boehner. Would the gentleman from North Carolina yield? 

Mr. Ballenger. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Boehner. Mr. Miller, my good friend and colleague, seemed somewhat concerned 

about a three-year vesting period on company-given stock. I think we should clarify that what 

we're talking about here is stock that's matched if you will, by a company for a 401(k) or other 

similar savings program. 

 You know, today, under the rules, you could require stock be held in an account where you 

couldn't touch it until age 55, or in some cases, 55 and 10 years of service. Arriving at a balance of 

three years, I think has some merit. We have to understand that these systems that provide 

pensions to over half of our workforce are voluntary systems provided by employers to their 

employees. To the extent that we would change it, for an example, as in Mr. Miller's case, to 

immediately allow stock to be divested, to be changed, or to be sold could have the impact of 

employers providing less of a company match to 401(k) plans. 

 I think we've got to be very careful, as we go through this process, that we don't create 

disincentives for employers to become less active in this process and to give less company stock. 

 With that, let me introduce and recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Roemer, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 Welcome, Madame Secretary. 

Secretary Chao. Thank you. 

Mr. Roemer. Happy to have you here. 

 We've all heard the term, particularly in the last few days, “axis of evil.” We've heard it on 

more than one occasion. I actually think it's applicable here. We have corporate greed, number 

one; two, we have faulty accounting practices; and three, we have unfair and unbalanced 401(k) 
18

and pension systems, which equal an unmitigated disaster for the working people at Enron. Not 

only were 401(k)s almost demolished, pensions were wiped out. We had plans across America, in 

Florida losing $330 million in investments. 

 So what do we do? How do we try to fix this? How do we try to make sure another Enron 

doesn't happen again and that we don’t expose working people to the problems and the pain and the 

disaster that they're experiencing now? 

 We have a system, Madame Secretary, where the executives cashed out, to the tune of 

millions of dollars. The workers were locked in, belted in, bolted into a system and couldn't get out 

of it, as they saw the stock plummet further and further, and their lifetime savings evaporate and 

disappear. We don't have a two-tiered system, we have a separate and unequal and unfair system 

for executives and for workers here. 

 Now, I have two questions. One relates to diversification. I know Mr. Miller's bill does not 

limit the amount of money that can be invested in a 401(k) in one particular company's stock. On 

the one hand I want to ask you why when all advice, whether it's from my father, who occasionally 

tries to give me some investment advice, or Charles Schwab, states, “Diversify. Don't put 

everything in one basket,'' do we have companies putting 94, 81, 75, 87 percent of their 401(k)s 

into one stock? Now, if you don't cap it, is there a way not to coerce workers into that kind of 

unbalanced system? Maybe there are some other ways to work on this. 

 The second question I have for you regards your budget. I just saw the other day, with the 

new budget in the Department of Labor, that we have cut Youth Opportunity Grants by $180 

million. Now, in Indiana, we have a lot of unemployment and under-employment, and workers in a 

great deal of pain because of this recession. Especially for young people, it doesn't seem to me to 

be the fair or the appropriate time to be cutting back since we’re trying to retrain our workforce in a 

global economy, whether they're going from a huge steel mill to smaller steel producing plant, or 

trying to move from steel to Intel chip-producing plants. 

 So I would hope that you would restore the cuts to these worker-training programs. I throw 

those two questions out to you. 

Secretary Chao. The first question is about diversification. As I have said, the President's plan is 

very much in support of diversification, but we don't believe that a cap would serve the workers 

well, primarily because we're talking about 401(k)s, and this is their money. They have saved for 

it.

 There is a vesting period, which if an employee leaves before the vesting period, they will 

not be able to take the money with them. Whether that will be changed, obviously, is legislative 

intent, but as of now, a person's retirement program consists of three streams of income. One is 

current income. One is non-cash items, such as benefits. Third is retirement. 

 So we want to make sure that people have the right information, because we believe that it 

is their right to choose how they want to make their investment decisions, and what we need to do 
19

is to help equip them, empower them with the right information. 

Mr. Roemer. Well, you said initially, Madame Secretary that there was discussion on whether or 

not there should be a cap. 

 If there was discussion about a cap in the President's announcement of this plan, what other 

things did you look at besides a cap to try to encourage diversification and not just limit it to 

information or education? 

Secretary Chao. I really can't remember, but we discussed the cap, because obviously, there is 

existing legislation that's been introduced, and so we wanted to discuss that possibility, but I really 

can't, I can't remember the rest. Let me go on to a second point, and I want to be responsible in 

answering to you, which is why I want to be accurate. 

 On the second issue of the Youth Opportunity Grants, I think that's what you were talking 

about. That basically was a pilot program, and we have consolidated that pilot program with the 

rest of Workforce Investment Act programs, so that we have mainstreamed it. If a state determines 

that there is a need for youth opportunity grant activities, then the state can make those decisions, 

and the state has the money, because under the Workforce Investment Act, there are excess 

carryover funds of about $1.7 billion. That was a pilot program. We're wrapping it into WIA 

funding, and mainstreaming that program, so it will be up to the states. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Michigan, Mr. Hoekstra, for five minutes. 

Mr. Hoekstra. I thank the chair. 

 Madame Secretary, it's great to see you here. 

Secretary Chao. Thank you. 

Mr. Hoekstra. I really applaud this Administration's leadership on this issue. 

 I can only reflect back a few years ago when the largest private sector union in America, the 

Teamsters, were wracked by a corrupt leadership, a leadership that took them to the verge of 

bankruptcy, looted their treasury for over $160 million, and ran a corrupt election. The last 

Administration did not stand up for worker rights. 

 This Administration is forthright. You're leading the way on protecting these and other 

workers, and you're coming forward with proposals. Thank you very much. The same goes for the 

Chairman of this Committee for standing up for worker rights and taking the lead on this issue.

There are a lot of people who have been “Johnny-come-lately” to stepping up for worker rights, 

many people that were not around when the 1.4 million Teamsters were being abused by their 

leadership.
20

 The question that I have deals with the level of accountability, whether it is at Enron, 

whether it is corruption within the Teamsters, or within other large organizations. We now know 

after almost five years with the Teamsters, that the number of people actually being held 

accountable and serving jail time I believe is maybe one, but no one was held accountable. 

 Has the Administration talked about, in these types of white-collar crimes, the feasibility of 

strengthening the punishments available for white-collar crime so, as our colleague from California 

talked about, it's no longer fines but that some of these individuals actually will be held accountable 

and will serve jail time? 

Secretary Chao. I think “accountability” is a word that carries a lot of weight these days. Indeed, 

there has to be accountability, and I think workers have to be protected. White-collar crime has 

traditionally been an area that has not received very much of that. From this Department's point of 

view, that's never been the case. We have always been vigilant. As mentioned, we were among the 

very first agencies, if not the very first, to launch an investigation. 

 Let me also add, the issues with the Teamsters I think were in the past. There's a new 

president, Mr. James Hoffa who has worked very hard to bring a new era of integrity to the union. 

Mr. Hoekstra. That's exactly right, absolutely. 

Secretary Chao. It does bring about another point, and that is some of the bills that are being 

introduced to protect workers exclude union pension plans. I think that would be hard to justify, 

because again, we are concerned about protecting all workers. 

Let me also add, ERISA does have criminal sanctions. 

Mr. Hoekstra. There are criminal sanctions. The question is whether they will be applied and to 

what extent. 

 I just want to encourage you as you go through the process, and as you go through the 

process with the Justice Department and Attorney General Ashcroft, that if there is criminal 

behavior that is identified that it be prosecuted to the fullest extent. 

 I had a tough time going back to my constituents, as they watched the scandals within the 

previous Teamsters regime and recognized that because of a lack of aggressive prosecution by the 

previous Administration that people walked away. The perception is again that members of the 

Teamsters or in this case, employees of Enron get hurt, whereas the executives or the leadership 

seem to walk away scot-free. I hope that doesn't happen in this case. 

 I hope the leadership that this Administration has shown to date continues, and I hope it 

continues through the prosecutorial stage. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Chao. We are fully committed to bringing accountability. 
21

Mr. Hoekstra. That's right. Thank you. 

Secretary Chao. Thank you. 

Chairman Boehner. The chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much, Madame Secretary. It's always good to see you here. I hope 

one time you can come for something where it's just pleasant and we can have an amiable kind of 

conversation.

Secretary Chao. I always try for that. 

Mr. Payne. Well, you’ve got another three years. 

[Laughter.]

Chairman Boehner. Madame Secretary, it sounds like you've been sentenced. 

[Laughter.]

Mr. Payne. And I hope that happens to some other people. 

 Let me just indicate, too, that I appreciate the Chairman calling this hearing, and also I think 

Mr. Miller certainly laid out many of the concerns that I have, and did it very well. In the old days, 

there were the defined benefits. You know, that was the way it was done. You worked, you retired 

at 65, and you knew what you were getting. 

 But along comes the defined contribution. 

Secretary Chao. Right. 

Mr. Payne. You work, and they say: “Put your money in here. You can walk away with a million 

dollars.” However, the people who are now exposed to defined contributions, 401(k)s, and ESOPs, 

are not people who have the counsel of high-powered lawyers or good accountants. They just go 

along because they’ve heard it's the right thing to do. 

 So there's a big difference in the defined contributions, where you knew what you got.

When my father retired, he knew what was going to come in every month, sort of like Social 

Security, which leads me into another concern with the new so-called privatization of Social 

Security that's being pushed. 

 How are people supposed to invest their money into different, private investment plans? 

Once again, poor people don't have good health care, they don't have good schools, they don't have 

good housing, and they don't have good advice, because they can't afford it. It's just the way that 
22

our country is divided; those who have and those who have not. 

 I listened to Mr. Joseph Berardino yesterday, CEO of Arthur Andersen. Their firm is a 

consultant to Enron; $25 million for this, $10 million for that. He said he didn't even know and 

also the auditors didn't know. They were advising the company but didn't know there were 

problems, even with their auditing employees going to golf tournaments wearing Enron shirts. It 

just doesn't seem to add up. They're the auditors; they're the watchdogs with the company shirt, 

just like the good old boys network. How can you audit someone if you're at their golf tournament 

or at their reception? And so these things made no sense. I was very disappointed in Berardino’s 

testimony yesterday, from Andersen. 

 However, let me just say since my friend has mentioned the Teamsters. I hope that we see 

the same kind of zeal for the men in the suits and the suites, so they also have to pay. You know, 

we have penalties where a kid who sells five grams of crack cocaine gets five years. That's the 

minimum sentence. That's the law. And they shouldn't sell crack, it's bad, it destroys people. But I 

wonder, what's going to happen to people who have sold this bad information to all of these 

workers, who are poor now, and who have no retirement? 

 I watched Mrs. Linda Lay with a lot of compassion, who said they were on the verge of 

bankruptcy. She was really poor now. They're broke; luxury penthouse, $7 million; two homes in 

Aspen, $15 million; $10 million, houses in Texas. So evidently, being poor or broke is relative. 

It's according to where you are on the ladder. 

 Now, that has really nothing specifically to do with you, but this conversation bothers me to 

no end. Some people who have lost their life savings are here now. I appreciate Reverend Jackson 

and Reverend Sharpton bringing these people in and talking with them. I hope there are other 

groups that are reaching out to help them. 

 I do have one quick question, though, for you to respond to before my time expires. Let me 

just ask this specific question. For a number of years, the GAO and the IG have raised serious 

concerns specifically regarding the audit procedures for pension plans. They recommended that 

limited scope audits be replaced with full audits, and that auditors be obligated to immediately 

report possible misuse of funds or fraud of pension funds to the Department of Labor. Limited 

scope audits depend on other state and federal regulators, such as state insurance and banking 

agencies, to vouch for plan assets under their jurisdiction, rather than a full audit of such plan 

assets. The current Administration vigorously sought to address these shortcomings through 

legislation, but Congress failed to act on them. 

 Would you, or why hasn't the Department of Labor recommended such changes? I know 

you've only been Secretary for a short time and maybe you will? What is your view on these 

recommendations? 

Secretary Chao. Let me answer your three points. 

 One, on what you just said about workers accessing financial advice, we totally agree with 

you. The President's plan would, in fact, again, support the Chairman's bill and also empower 
23

workers with the right information so they can make the best decisions that they can about their 

retirement security. That's in the President's plan. So we do support professional financial 

advisors.

 Second of all, in the criminal investigation, you will not see any slacking in this Department 

in terms of pursuit of any criminal activities. As you all know, the Justice Department is also 

involved with the criminal investigations, and they actually investigate the bulk of them. We work 

with them and others. But you will not see any diminution at all, or any lack of intensity, let me 

assure you. 

 Thirdly, on the limited audit question, that is the question that is addressed by the second 

task force, the one on governance, accountability. So we did discuss it to some extent, but again, 

that is going to be within the purview of the second task force that's coming up, but I appreciate 

hearing your concerns. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. 

 Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. 

 I, too, share the concern about the job training programs that have been cut. I understand 

some youth employment programs may possibly be eliminated. That was also tried in '94, when 

Pell Grants, which are not in your Department, were going to be slashed. I think that we're going in 

the wrong direction on these domestic programs. 

Secretary Chao. For Job Corps, we actually increased the budget an additional $73 million. The 

Youth Opportunity Grants, as someone mentioned earlier, were a pilot program and were 

consolidated with existing WIA funds. There's about $1.7 billion in excess Workforce Investment 

Act funding at this point. The states can administer those programs, and they would have the 

flexibility to do so. 

Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. 

Mr. McKeon is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madame Secretary, for being here today. 

 It seems to me that what we're dealing with is a multi-faceted problem. We have the 

collapse of Enron, the problem with their management, the lack of credible oversight from their 

auditors, the lack of credibility from market advisors and conflicts of interest. 

 I would like to thank you for your personal commitment to help those workers and those 

employees and do all you can for them. Also thank you for your commitment to pursue criminal 

investigations and to, as Mr. Hoekstra said, make sure that everybody that has any criminal liability 
24

here is pursued to the fullest extent. I think that is the least that we can do. 

 There are many hearings and investigations moving forward, and I'm concerned that 

sometimes we do assign guilt. Politicians tend to jump on these things quickly, and my concern is 

that we sometimes move too quickly to fix a specific problem. Then we end up finding that 

unintended consequences hurt a lot of other people that are not guilty, that are totally innocent. By 

innuendo, we've kind of convicted several other companies that have been around for many, many 

years and have been very successful. As the Chairman pointed out, their employees and their 

generations of employees have benefited from their work with those companies. So I think we 

have to be very careful that we don't indict many companies because of the problems of some. 

 There's been some talk about the blackout period of Enron, and I would like to use this 

hearing to learn about that. Could you give us information about what the stock price of Enron was 

prior to the blackout period, during the blackout period, and after it? Do you have information? 

Secretary Chao. We have an investigation going on; so let me ask about what I'm allowed to say 

and what I'm not allowed to say. 

[Witness confers with staff.] 

I just wanted to check. As you can imagine, if there's an ongoing investigation, I always 

have to be careful about what I can say, but that is information that I can reveal. 

 During the lockdown period, which we are investigating, there seems to be some 

disagreement. The lockdown period appears to have started when the stock was around $14, and at 

the end of the lockdown period, it was about $10 per share, so most of the gains of the stock, 

unfortunately, had already been dissipated by the time the lockdown period occurred. 

Mr. McKeon. I appreciate you and the President coming forward quickly with a plan to address 

some of the shortcomings we've already seen. I think it will be dealt with like other legislation 

plans. We'll debate and we'll work on it. 

I think the major thing that the President said, that I support, is that management and 

workers should be treated the same. There should not be an advantage for management over 

workers when dealing with their pension plans. I think management is paid more, generally, for 

their work. They shouldn't be given the additional advantage in this area. I think that is a very 

important principle, and I hope that we will hold with that as we work through this legislation. 

 Thank you for being here today. 

Secretary Chao. I appreciate that. Indeed, the President felt very strongly that during a blackout 

period, if an employee were not able to sell, then obviously the executives should not be allowed to 

either. 

Mr. McKeon. Nobody should be able to. 
25

Secretary Chao. Right. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Holt. 

Mr. Owens. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, point of order. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York. 

Mr. Owens. Do we still have to assume that the Secretary has to leave at 12:15? I think you said 

that at the beginning. 

Chairman Boehner. That is correct. I would expect that we will continue until there's about five 

minutes left on the vote, and then we will be gone approximately 15 to 20 minutes. So when we 

get back, we'll have time for several more questions. 

 The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madame Secretary, for coming. 

 Enron robbed employees of $1 billion, and collusion between Enron executives and lawyers 

and accountants harmed employees, their children, investors, stockholders, and millions of 

families. New Jersey actually pays, because the New Jersey pension fund had $60 million tied up in 

this.

 But looking at the pension programs, clearly, investment advice to employees is part of 

what's necessary to prevent future Enron-like debacles, and I was pleased to cross the aisle to join 

our Chairman, Mr. Boehner, in passing the Retirement Security Advice Act. But that's only part of 

what we need to do. 

 It's worth remembering, and I'm sure you are aware of this, that employers often chafe 

under Department of Labor regulations and investigative threats. I think people are looking at it a 

little bit differently now. They recognize that there really is a role for government regulations 

regarding transparency and fiduciary responsibility and fairness. We simply can't count on the 

good will of the executives and the pension managers. 

 Remember that Enron employees trusted their company. 

Secretary Chao. Yes. 

Mr. Holt. They were gung-ho about their company. They couldn't believe that their friends, who 

were their executives, would rob them, but that's what happened. 

 Let me ask you, is your idea of a good pension plan one where all employees have complete 

freedom to invest their own pension funds whenever and however they like? 
26

Secretary Chao. I think it's worthwhile to remember we're talking about 401(k)s. These plans, 

ESOPs and 401(k)s in particular, are self-directed retirement plans, so they are usually held in 

addition to a pension plan, or some other long-term retirement plan. Many times, they are not the 

only leg. 

Mr. Holt. Beyond the vesting requirement that you said that you did favor, three-year vesting or 

something of that sort? 

Secretary Chao. May I just interrupt for one second? I think that was a nod to reality, because we 

wanted to be able to encourage employers to continue the corporate matching programs and we 

don't want to discourage them. So it's a balance. Usually the vesting period is three to five years. 

Mr. Holt. I understand the argument. I understand Mr. Ballenger's argument that you want the 

allegiance of the employees. But this is a kind of artificial allegiance to keep them imprisoned with 

a vesting requirement. 

 Beyond vesting, though, should the company dictate in other ways what employees do with 

their funds? 

Secretary Chao. What specifically do you have in mind? 

Mr. Holt. I'm asking you. 

Secretary Chao. 401(k)s are basically self-directed retirement plans, so employees usually take 

over control as to how they want to invest. 

 You know, employees now will usually receive a brochure that tells them all the different 

investment plans that they can go into, that they can slot either 100 percent of their 401(k) funds 

into, 50 percent, 25 percent, or whatever. 

 I think the important principle is that we don't want to discourage them or take away that 

right. Whether the worker decides to utilize that right is something else, but we don't want to take 

away the right that he or she has to decide how they want to invest their funds. 

Mr. Holt. Let me just make the point that company coercion can be overt or subtle. You know, 

social psychologists have looked at this. I think years ago, Solomon Asch showed that a group can 

make a person believe that one line is shorter than another when the fact is absolutely clear that it is 

not shorter than the other. So I think it is important that we have independent oversight, and we 

can't shortchange that. 

 Now, just very quickly, there's a short answer to this with regard to the training programs. 

Can you say that with the consolidation and combining and cutting of worker training programs in 

the President's budget, there will be no decrease in the number of workers served? 

Secretary Chao. There will be no decrease or compromise. 
27

Mr. Holt. In the number of workers served? 

Secretary Chao. In the quality of the services available or in the services that are available to the 

number of clients that we have. That is not our purpose at all. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. 

Secretary Chao. There's excess funding of $1.7 billion in the pipeline. 

Mr. Holt. Thank you, Madame Secretary. 

 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on EmployerEmployee Relations, Mr. Johnson of Texas, for five minutes. 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Chao, I appreciate you being here, and I want to 

applaud the President for taking a constructive step in putting forth this proposal on pension issues. 

 I appreciate particularly his strong support for enactment of meaningful investment advice, 

which you've been talking about, and Mr. Boehner has been talking about for plan participants, so 

that they know about the risks and rewards of various investment decisions. I want you to know, 

Secretary Chao, that constituents in my congressional district are not very excited about the United 

States Congress trying to tell them how they must limit company stock in their 401(k)s, and I 

applaud the President for avoiding placing arbitrary caps on investment in employer stock. 

 Speaking about elaboration on investment advice, I've received a note from a constituent in 

Dallas. I got this from James Setliff, and he works for Texas Instruments, and he said: “I have 

made my retirement possible by investing 100 percent of my 401(k) into my company, Texas 

Instruments, stock at opportune times.” He knew when his company stock was a good investment, 

and when it wasn't. He really does not feel that the United States Congress or anyone else in the 

government should tell him that he doesn't know what he's doing. 

 The constituents I've heard from support shortening the period that the company match 

must be held, and I want to hear from plan sponsors about what impact this will make on company 

matches. I do have a few concerns that if Congress goes too far in legislating new rules for defined 

contribution plans, we will regulate these plans to death, just as we put defined benefit plans on the 

endangered species list. I disagree with Mr. Miller. This is a country of free enterprise and it's up 

to this Congress and you to protect that. 

 Let me ask you this. I've heard that the National Savers' Summit is going to take place at 

the end of this month. Can you tell me how those preparations are going and what topics are going 

to be addressed? 

Secretary Chao. We are convening a major summit on retirement security, and it's called the 

Savers' Summit. It will be held February 28th through March 1st. Members of Congress are 
28

invited. We have a great roster of speakers. We've been planning for this for well over eight 

months, and it's going to be a very exciting event. But more importantly, I think it will emphasize 

how important it is to give information to working Americans about how they can save and 

safeguard their retirement. 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I also understand that Enron had a variety of employee benefit plans 

meant to help with retirement security for employees. For instance, we know they had a 401(k) 

plan, but I've heard they also had an ESOP, a defined benefit plan, a deferred compensation plan, 

and executives had stock option incentives. 

 I wonder if you could provide the plan documents filed at the Department of Labor for any 

of these benefit plans from that? 

Secretary Chao. Of course we can. 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I would appreciate that. 

 My understanding is that the Enron employees had 20 investment options, and many of 

them chose to have the contributions invested in company stock, along with the company match. 

That was invested in stock, and that's true, isn't it? 

Secretary Chao. Yes, that is. 

Mr. Johnson. Well, do you think that if the House- passed Investment Advice Act were enacted 

into law, some of those 401(k) plan participants would have diversified their investments? 

Secretary Chao. I think if they were empowered with the right information, they certainly would 

have.

Mr. Johnson. Well, I thank you for your testimony today, and we appreciate you being here, and I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Secretary Chao. Thank you. 

Chairman Boehner. Madame Secretary, we do have two votes on the House floor. 

Secretary Chao. Okay. 

Chairman Boehner. We will be gone for about 15 to 20 minutes, and we will try to hustle back as 

soon as we can. The Committee will stand in recess. 

[Recess.]

Chairman Boehner. If everyone could take their seats, we would like to resume. 
29

 The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, for five minutes. 

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Madame Secretary. 

 First, let me just say as a matter of reference that we have a safety net, Social Security, that 

no matter what you do with your investments, you will have your safety net. You have your 

private accounts outside, the pension funds and everything, where you can invest and win and lose 

whatever you want. 

 And I guess unlike some others, I am not particularly offended if, for the tax-preferred 

pension accounts for which people have expectations, we have some regulations that would 

stabilize those accounts and make them safer. We even have government guarantees for some 

pensions. So if we do something to make them safer, I am just not as offended as some other 

people.

 You had indicated your proposal has limits on lockouts. Is there any limit to the total length 

of time for these lockouts? 

Secretary Chao. Are you finished? Great. I wasn't sure with some of the other speakers. 

[Laughter.]

The lockout period is a very important area, and we have looked very seriously at it. At the 

present time we have decided not to have any lockout limit. But there is a very strong component 

in there that actually will provide incentives for employers to make that lockout period very short. 

 That incentive is in a 401(k) plan. An employee has control over his or her investment, and 

so they bear the liabilities. Now, the employer does not. So during the lockout period, the 

employer bears the liability. And we want to clarify that within the ERISA law and codify it. So 

that is a very powerful incentive, that if the employers are going to have liability for any investment 

decisions during that blackout period, that they would try to make that blackout period as narrow, 

or as short as possible. 

Mr. Scott. Now, that is a limitation on executives selling stock during the lockout period? 

Secretary Chao. That is a separate provision that we would be introducing. 

Mr. Scott. Would that limitation prevent people who have 401(k)s from selling stock in their 

private accounts? 

Secretary Chao. The question was whether they can sell not in their 401(k), but in their private 

accounts?

Mr. Scott. Right. 
30

Secretary Chao. Yes, because it is a transfer process, whereby you have a new administrator come 

in.

Mr. Scott. No, I mean on your private, separate non-tax-deferred account. If you happen to own 

company stock in that account, unrelated to your 401(k). 

Secretary Chao. If you hold it with another administrator, you can sell it, certainly. If you hold it 

with an outside broker, yes. But if you held it within the company stock portfolio, and the 

administrator is administering it for you, then because there is a changeover in administrator, there 

probably would be some period in which there would have to be some transfer. 

Mr. Scott. And this is when the captain and the sailor would be limited. Is the captain prevented 

from selling stock outside of his pension fund? 

Secretary Chao. If there is a blackout period, nobody sells. Or everybody sells, yes. 

Mr. Scott. Well, I mean, you just said that the sailor could sell in a separate account during the 

blackout period. 

Secretary Chao. Well, the sailor may also have some outside accounts as well. 

Mr. Scott. Right. 

Secretary Chao. Right. 

Mr. Scott. And can the captain sell in his outside accounts? 

Secretary Chao. Let me get you expert advice on that. 

Mr. Scott. Okay. 

[Witness confers with staff.] 

Secretary Chao. I have a clarification for that, and I am in error, I apologize. Under that pension 

parity, the executive would not be able to sell any stock during that period. 

Mr. Scott. Okay. Let me ask you another question before my time runs out. Some have suggested 

we need new laws to prevent this from happening again. My sense is if we enforce the laws we 

have now, we probably could prevent a lot of it. 

Secretary Chao. Yes. 

Mr. Scott. You have indicated that there have been 77 criminal indictments, 42 convictions, and 49 

guilty pleas. Were these convictions just for straight embezzlement? Or was a gross violation of 

fiduciary duty and fraud a part of any of these convictions? 
31

Secretary Chao. I think it was a whole series of each of them. 

Mr. Scott. Could you provide the Committee with a list of the charges, a brief description of the 

allegations, and what sentence was imposed? 

Secretary Chao. Yes, of course. Yes, certainly. 

Mr. Scott. Thank you. 

 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Castle, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. Castle. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Madame Secretary, for being 

here. In fact, I wish you or anybody before you would have been here five or ten years ago to 

address these plans. 

 You are absolutely right in what you said; all these pension plans started to shift about 20 

years ago so individuals had to be involved in their decisions. And unfortunately, I don't think we 

kept up as well as we should have, in terms of advice laws. But you have made some good 

suggestions here. If it took Enron to energize it, then that is good, and we should congratulate you, 

and not fault you for whatever may have happened many, many years ago. 

 I think there is serious wrongdoing here. I am also on the Banking Committee, and we have 

looked at this. I believe totally there is serious wrongdoing. How far that goes, I don't know. I 

think there is a tremendous imbalance amongst individuals involved in this and any corporate 

circumstance. You have the executives, the accounting firms, the board of directors, the law firms, 

the credit rating agency, the stock analysts, a few other groups, and maybe a thousand or so people. 

They are totally interested in driving that stock as high as they can and taking debt off the books, 

and all the kinds of things that led to the manipulations that became the Enron problem in this 

circumstance. 

 On the other hand, you have the employees, who may be Enron stockholders. Frankly I 

suspect if you asked them, they probably would have said we are proud, we are happy to be Enron 

stockholders, because the stock is going up and we are making money, or Proctor & Gamble or any 

of the other examples used today. And all of a sudden, when it collapsed, everyone is saying, oh, 

gee, this happened. 

 I don't think anybody manipulated all this so that the pension plans would collapse. That 

wasn't the purpose. They did it to enrich themselves, and they have enriched themselves, at least 

for a while, to a fare-thee-well. And unfortunately, there is the trailing effect of the pension plan, 

or the 401(k)s and the other types of plans holding the Enron stock being in a state of collapse. 

 I think our retirement laws do need to be changed. I think you are aimed in the right 

direction. I'm not sure if you are totally right. I don't know enough to say that. I don't know if Mr. 
32

Miller was right in some of the things that he said. Those are things that have to be looked at. I 

just would beg you to keep an open mind with respect to what has to be done to protect people out 

there.

 Now, having said that, I have some concerns about it. I totally believe in some of things 

that you are talking about. I totally believe in freedom of choice and that kind of thing. But I think 

basically those of us who have to make decisions at this time should have the fullest information 

we can possibly have. We should have notification of anything that is going on that impacts upon 

what we are doing. There is some discussion about annual statements and quarterly statements and 

monthly statements. Let people see what is happening to the extent that it can be done. I think all 

this needs to be as open as possible in terms of trading. I will tell you, I believe simplification is 

important. 

Secretary Chao. Absolutely. 

Mr. Castle. Have you called a big mutual fund firm and tried to make a transaction, and gone 

through all that phone stuff? After about half an hour, you feel like slamming down the phone and 

saying to heck with it, I will just lose money. It is easier than dealing with these operations. 

Simplification, I think, is of vital importance in all of this. 

 I think we need to look at executive compensation; maybe not you or maybe you. You are 

as good a person as I know in this Administration to do it. But we really need to look at that, in 

terms of what we are doing. 

 Obviously, I don't think we are going to change these laws. I don't think we are going to go 

back to the defined benefits plans. I don't think we are going to go back to fixed circumstances. I 

think to the extent that all of these funds are transportable, no matter what they are, that is an 

important asset in terms of what we are doing. So we need to look at that as well. You are doing 

the right thing, but there are serious questions that still need to be answered.

I would like to ask you if you have looked at all at stock options? I worry about stock 

options a tremendous amount. It is incredible to see the compensation of chieftains of corporate 

America today, versus the employees, and stock options have become such a major part of this. 

There is such a thrust to push that up, in terms of the manipulations we saw at Enron, that I am 

afraid it is happening in other corporations, and I am afraid we are going to have other problems 

before all is said and done. 

 I am not for over-regulating, but I am, as I said, for notification and an open process. Is 

anyone looking at this and its influence to try to make absolutely sure that stock manipulation is not 

invited because of what we are doing? 

Secretary Chao. On the stock options, let me just say a couple of things. One is it is not solely a 

retirement tool; in many cases, it is also a retention tool. 

Mr. Castle. Well, I understand that. I understand that completely. But my concern is that it helped 

lead to the problems in Enron. 
33

Secretary Chao. Having said that, your important point is about the abuses, and perhaps overgenerous stock compensation through stock options. And that, again, is the work of the second 

task force, about accountability and about governance. I think if anything, we have to emphasize 

accountability more and more. 

Mr. Castle. Let me go back to the point that I made earlier about the simplification process here, 

and then my time will have run out. I can't stress simplification enough. 

Secretary Chao. Yes. I totally agree. 

Mr. Castle. I am a terrible investor myself. I don't have anyone to complain about except my own 

stupid decisions, for the most part. And I think the average person is in that mode. 

 But I would hope you would look at that carefully, because I don't know if people truly 

understand the advice they are getting. It is fine to talk about advice; I love Chairman Boehner's 

bill, which you have supported. I think all that is good. But let's make sure that people understand. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Secretary Chao. It is a right to have that advice. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman’s time has expired. The chair recognizes the gentleman from 

New Jersey, Mr. Andrews, for five minutes. 

Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame Secretary, thank you for your appearance this 

morning and your always-insightful testimony. 

 I think you would agree that choice is only meaningful if it is informed and voluntary. I 

have a very real concern that we have voluntary and informed choice by people in 401(k) plans. I 

think it is a staggering coincidence that in a plan that is part employer-driven and part employeedriven, that 72 percent of the Home Depot 401(k)s are in Home Depot stock. That is not an 

accident. I am not sure it is a voluntary choice, either. 

 You have embraced the bill that passed the House that the Chairman sponsored on 

investment advice. And I want to ask you some questions about it. 

 What if Enron had retained a major financial services company to manage its 401(k) plan, 

and if that financial services company, in another distant part of the company, was marketing 

limited partnerships on behalf of Enron, there hawking them every day, and the employees of the 

financial services company were regularly giving advice to Enron employees that buying Enron 

stock was a great idea? Under your proposal that you have embraced here, that would be legal, 

wouldn't it? 

Secretary Chao. I think that brings into question the whole issue about accountability. 
34

Mr. Andrews. Well, is it legal, or isn't it? It is conflicted advice, and if they gave notice of it, I 

think under your proposal it would be legal. If they put it in the employee handbook on the first 

day of work that by the way, our investment advisor is someone that also sells products for us, it 

would be legal, wouldn't it? 

Secretary Chao. But they do have to give notice as to how much all of this is going to cost. 

Mr. Andrews. They have to give the notice, as I read the bill, only once, and it doesn't have to be 

contemporaneously. It doesn't have to be exactly at the time that the question is asked. 

Secretary Chao. But ERISA does require that they be. I see your point. ERISA does require that 

they be responsible for their advice. But that is where we want to make sure that people are given 

the information, and that all disclosure is made. 

Mr. Andrews. I think the answer to the question is it would be legal under your proposal, and I 

think that is a terrible idea. And I also will tell you that you could come back and say, well, if it 

was a breach of fiduciary duty by the investment advisor, it is illegal under ERISA. There are two 

problems with that. 

 One, proving it is very hard to do. You really couldn't prove a quid pro quo there; you 

couldn't say that the reason the investment advisors were hawking Enron stock was because another 

part of their company was making money by hawking Enron products on the street. There is no 

quid pro quo, necessarily. 

 And the second problem is how do you get a lawyer? You know, in theory the individuals 

who came to Washington who have been stolen from have a remedy today. They have a great 

remedy. If they can put up $50,000 retainer for a law firm, and find a law firm who will take the 

case, and go through three years of discovery, they have a right to get their money back. And never 

mind the fact that maybe they had their house foreclosed on, or couldn't pay their health insurance 

in the meantime, or couldn't pay their daughter's college tuition in the meantime. None of that is 

compensated under the present law. 

Do you think it should be? 

Secretary Chao. Well, when a person is terminated, for example, if their company goes into 

bankruptcy, the first line of defense is obviously any savings that they have. But they are also 

eligible to go on unemployment insurance. And while that may not be enough, that is another 

source of assistance as well. 

Mr. Andrews. Yes, but the question is whether or not using the facts in this case, and I don't know 

if they would, someone would justify a finding of breach of fiduciary duty by those who ran the 

Enron pension plan. 

Secretary Chao. Then those people will be held accountable for civil or criminal penalties. 
35

Mr. Andrews. Well sure they would be held accountable. If you could get a lawyer, if you could 

afford one, and if you won, all you do is get your money back. You don't get all the things that 

happened to you in the meantime. 

 If a toaster blows up in your face, you get your lost wages and your health care bills, and 

your pain and suffering and all the rest. But if you get lucky, and get a lawyer, and go through 

three years of discovery, and win your case, you get your money back. But you don't get any of the 

other stuff. Do you think that is right, or do you think we should fix that, as we do in the Miller 

bill?

Secretary Chao. We have a lot of assistance available for people who are concerned about 

malfeasance or abuses of their plans. And if I may, I will just give the number. It is 1-866-275-

7922.

Mr. Andrews. Well, but if someone called that number and said, you know, my house just got 

foreclosed on, because the people running my pension plan screwed up. The law is that they can't 

get any remedy for that. They can't get the money to get their house back. 

Secretary Chao. They can sue. As you mentioned, they can sue. They can get a lawyer. 

Mr. Andrews. They can sue, but the remedy doesn't include getting the consequential damages for 

the harm that they suffered. And it should. 

 I yield back the balance of my time. 

Secretary Chao. Thank you. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Fletcher, for 

three minutes. And then the Secretary really does have to go. 

Mr. Fletcher. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Secretary Chao, it is always good to see you. 

Thank you for the work that you are doing. 

 You know, as I look at this Administration, it is very encouraging, when you look at the 

tough but measured response they had to the terrorist attack. And I see that same resolve here as 

we look at the Enron collapse. It is very tough, but it is also very measured. 

 I know after 9/11 there were some that initially wanted to jump in very quickly and take 

some immediate, radical action. And yet the President and the Administration proceeded with a 

very thoughtful approach in response that has been extremely effective. I think that you all have 

done the same here, and so I laud you for the work that you have done along with the President on 

these pension plan reforms that you are advocating here today. 

 Particularly, one of the things that we have heard some comments on is the three-year 

vesting requirement, and it was five years until we recently passed a bill to reduce it to three years.

The Ranking Member was very supportive of that three-year vesting period, regardless of what he 
36

comments about now. Additionally, at that time I believe it passed out of this Committee by voice 

vote, and there was absolutely no objection, none, zilch, nada, to that three-year vesting period. 

 I think it is very reasonable. Having set up retirement plans myself in small businesses, as 

well as with the larger corporation I was involved with, I think it is important that we have the 

incentive. Companies will drop their 401(k) plans if they find that there is no loyalty associated 

with that. You invest a tremendous amount in employees. You invest in training, and education.

So I laud you for that. 

 Let me ask a question about the enforcement mechanisms regarding the President's new bill. 

Do you have the resources? And are we really able to oversee and enforce these pension rules? I 

understand that some of that is outside your jurisdiction, but I wonder if you would comment on the 

enforcement? 

 I know we are going to respond very tough to Enron, and I hope that we do certainly hold 

them accountable for every element of the law there. And I just want to ask you to comment on the 

enforcement provisions. 

Secretary Chao. Yes. I want to reinforce that we have an investigation ongoing. We will push it 

as far as it will go, and we will take it to whomever the investigation brings us to. We will spare no 

effort in ensuring that justice is done, number one. And we will do everything we can to try to get 

back as much as we can for employees. 

 On the enforcement side, I have great confidence in our enforcement abilities. I think we 

do a very good job, and I don't think we need any additional resources at this time. 

Mr. Fletcher. Well, thank you. And I want to laud, again, the response of the Administration and 

the integrity with which they have responded to the requests even from Enron for special 

privileges, which they refused to give. 

Secretary Chao. Right. 

Mr. Fletcher. So thank you. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. Madame Secretary, we want to thank you 

for your testimony, and your willingness to answer questions. Some of our Members did not have 

the chance to ask questions today, and if you don't mind, we would like to keep the hearing record 

open.

Secretary Chao. Of course. 

Chairman Boehner. If Members do have written questions to submit to you, we will include their 

questions and your responses in the hearing record. 

 And with that, the hearing stands adjourned. 
37

Secretary Chao. Thank you. I look forward to working with you. 

Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the Committee was adjourned. 
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Table of Indexes 

Chairman Boehner, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, 31, 33, 35, 36 

Mr. Anderson, 34, 35 

Mr. Andrews, 33 

Mr. Ballenger, 15, 16, 17 

Mr. Castle, 31, 32, 33 

Mr. Fletcher, 35, 36 

Mr. Ford, 10 

Mr. Hoekstra, 19, 20, 21 

Mr. Holt, 25, 26, 27 

Mr. Johnson, 27, 28 

Mr. McKeon, 23, 24 

Mr. Miller, 12, 13, 14, 15 

Mr. Owens, 25 

Mr. Payne, 21, 23 

Mr. Roemer, 17, 19 

Mr. Scott, 29, 30, 31 

Secretary Chao, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 

31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 


93

Table of Contents 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE................................................................................... 96

STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. PADGETT, SENIOR LAB ANALYST, EOTT (ENRON 

SUBSIDIARY), BAYTOWN, TX ............................................................................................. 100

STATEMENT OF CINDY K. OLSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, HUMAN 

RESOURCES AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ENRON CORPORATION, HOUSTON, TX

.................................................................................................................................................... 103

STATEMENT OF MIKIE RATH, BENEFITS MANAGER, ENRON CORPORATION, 

HOUSTON, TX.......................................................................................................................... 103

STATEMENT OF SCOTT PETERSON, GLOBAL PRACTICE LEADER FOR DEFINED 

CONTRIBUTION SERVICES, HEWITT ASSOCIATES, LINCOLNSHIRE, IL ................... 105

TESTIMONY OF DR. TERESA GHILARDUCCI, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, NOTRE DAME, IN

.................................................................................................................................................... 108

APPENDIX A - OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE................................................. 175

APPENDIX B - WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. PADGETT, SENIOR LAB 

ANALYST, EOTT (ENRON SUBSIDIARY), BAYTOWN, TX ............................................. 179

APPENDIX C - WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CINDY K. OLSON, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, HUMAN RESOURCES AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ENRON 

CORPORATION, HOUSTON, TX............................................................................................ 185

APPENDIX D - WRITTEN STATEMENT OF MIKIE RATH, BENEFITS MANAGER, 

ENRON CORPORATION, HOUSTON, TX............................................................................. 189

APPENDIX E - WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SCOTT PETERSON, GLOBAL PRACTICE 

LEADER FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SERVICES, HEWITT ASSOCIATES, 

LINCOLNSHIRE, IL.................................................................................................................. 193
94

APPENDIX F - WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DR. TERESA GHILARDUCCI, ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, 

NOTRE DAME, IN .................................................................................................................... 203

APPENDIX G – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, ENRON CORPORATION SAVINGS 

PLAN, AS AMENDED AND RESTATED, EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1999................................ 211

APPENDIX H – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, E-MAIL FROM ID FOR HUMAN 

RESOURCES NEWS, TO ALL PGE EMPLOYEES, 9/27/01, E-MAIL FROM ENRON 

ANNOUNCEMENTS TO ALL ENRON EMPLOYEES, 10/16/01, E-MAIL FROM ENRON 

ANNOUNCEMENTS TO ALL ENRON EMPLOYEES, 10/22/01, AND E-MAIL FROM 

ENRON ANNOUNCEMENTS TO ALL ENRON EMPLOYEES, 10/26/01........................... 281

APPENDIX I –SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, LETTER FROM CHAIRMAN JOHN A. 

BOEHNER, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE, TO STEPHEN F. 

COOPER, INTERIM CEO AND CHIEF, ENRON CORPORATION, FEBRUARY 1, 2002 . 287

APPENDIX J – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, LETTER FROM RANKING MEMBER 

GEORGE MILLER, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE, TO 

STEPHEN F. COOPER, INTERIM CEO AND CHIEF, ENRON CORPORATION, JANUARY 

31, 2002 ...................................................................................................................................... 293

APPENDIX K – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, MEMORANDUM FROM SHERRON 

WATKINS TO MR. LAY .......................................................................................................... 297

APPENDIX L – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, ENRON CORP. CASH BALANCE 

PLAN, ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN, ENRON CORP. EMPLOYEE STOCK 

OWNERSHIP PLAN, MAY 3, 2001 ......................................................................................... 307

APPENDIX M – SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD, STATEMENT OF CONGRESSWOMAN 

HILDA SOLIS, COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE ...................... 313

Table of Indexes.......................................................................................................................... 316
95

HEARING ON THE ENRON COLLAPSE AND ITS 

IMPLICATIONS FOR WORKER RETIREMENT SECURITY 

____________________

Thursday, February 7, 2002 

Committee on Education and the Workforce 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Washington, D.C. 

 The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 2175 Rayburn House Office 

Building, Hon. John A. Boehner, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

 Present: Representatives Boehner, Ballenger, Hoekstra, McKeon, Castle, Johnson, 

Hilleary, Ehlers, Fletcher, DeMint, Isakson, Biggert, Platts, Tiberi, Keller, Osborne, Culberson, 

Miller, Kildee, Owens, Payne, Mink, Andrews, Roemer, Scott, Woolsey, Rivers, McCarthy, 

Tierney, Kind, Sanchez, Ford, Kucinich, Wu, Holt, Solis, Davis, and McCollum. 

 Staff Present: Christine Roth, Professional Staff Member; David Connolly, Jr., Professional 

Staff Member; Dave Thomas, Legislative Assistant; Paula Nowakowski, Staff Director; Ed Gilroy, 

Director of Workforce Policy; Allison Dembeck, Executive Assistant; Victoria Lipnic, Workforce 

Policy Counsel; Jo-Marie St. Martin, General Counsel; Patrick Lyden, Professional Staff Member; 

Molly McLaughlin Salmi, Professional Staff Member; Stephen Settle, Professional Staff Member; 

Kevin Smith, Senior Communications Counselor; Heather Valentine, Press Secretary; Maria 

Miller, Communications Coordinator; Deborah L. Samantar, Committee Clerk/Intern Coordinator. 
96

John Lawrence, Minority Staff Director; Mark Zuckerman, Minority General Counsel; Cheryl 

Johnson, Counsel; Michele Varnhagen, Labor Counsel/Coordinator; Peter Rutledge, Senior 

Legislative Associate/Labor; Camille Donald, Legislative Associate/Labor; Dan Rawlins, Staff 

Assistant/Labor; Ann Owens, Clerk; Daniel Weiss, Special Assistant to the Ranking Member; 

Joycelyn Johnson, Staff Assistant; Joe Novotny, Staff Assistant/Education.

Chairman Boehner. A quorum being present, the Committee on Education and the Workforce 

will come to order. 

 I want to welcome everyone back for a second day of hearings on the collapse of Enron and 

its implications for worker retirement security. Under Committee rule 12(b) opening statements 

are limited to the Chairman or Ranking Member of the Committee. Therefore, if other Members 

do have opening statements, they will be included in the hearing record. 

 Without objection, so ordered. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, 

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE 

On December 2nd, 2001, the Enron Corporation filed the largest bankruptcy petition in U.S. 

history. The next day the company announced that it would lay off 4,000 of its 7,500 employees as 

part of a corporate restructuring program. 

 Devastating losses in the company's employee 401(k) plan left many loyal Enron employees 

without their retirement security. The stories told by Enron's employees are heart wrenching. The 

Enron collapse has sent chills down the spine of every American employee who has worked and 

saved for a safe, secure retirement. About 42 million American workers own 401(k) accounts, with 

a total of nearly $2 trillion in assets. 

 In the aftermath of Enron's fall, millions of workers across the country are now asking the 

obvious question; why did this happen and could it happen to me? One of the tragic realities of the 

situation is that it has rattled the confidence of American workers in this country's pension system, 

a system that, by and large, has served employees and their families very well. 

 Even more tragic is the possibility that it could have been avoided. At least some of Enron's 

workers might have been able to preserve their nest eggs if Washington had taken some basic steps 

to update our pension laws. For example, many Enron employees might have had access to a 

professional investment adviser who could have warned them that too many eggs in one basket 

might be a bad thing. Current law enacted more than a quarter century ago before 401(k) accounts 

were even envisioned denies workers this opportunity. 

 Congress has taken some positive steps in the recent past to update our Nation's pension 

laws, and this Committee has been the focal point in those efforts. We passed the landmark 

reforms authored by my friend and colleague, Congressman Rob Portman. The reforms gave 
97

workers portability, faster vesting and a host of other needed changes. We passed the Retirement 

Security Advice Act to give rank and file workers the same access to professional investment 

advice that wealthy executives have. 

 But in spite of these efforts a lot of work still lies ahead. In the aftermath of Enron, this 

modernization effort is taking on a grim new urgency. In short, while investigations will reveal 

whether Enron's employees are the victims of illegal actions, we already know that they are victims 

of an outdated Federal law and unless Congress acts to update those laws, there may be more 

victims. That is not acceptable to me. I know it is not acceptable to my colleague and friend, Mr. 

Miller, and I don't think it is acceptable to the other Members of this Committee. 

 President Bush has asked Congress to take action to strengthen worker retirement security 

and renew employee confidence in the pension system. He has put forth a serious plan to help 

Congress meet those goals. Among other things, the President's plan would bar senior corporate 

executives from selling company stock during times when workers are unable to trade in their own 

401(k) accounts. This would require that employees be given notice 30 days before the beginning 

of any blackout period. It would give employees greater freedom to sell company stock and 

diversify into other investment options. In addition, it calls for the Senate to pass the Retirement 

Security Advice Act that passed the House with broad bipartisan support. 

 While the Members of this Committee have wide-ranging views on this subject, we all 

agree that we have a responsibility to act. Even before Enron's fall, Republicans and Democrats on 

this panel had worked for many months in a continuing effort to identify portions of ERISA that 

needed modernization. In light of that effort and in light of the testimony we heard yesterday from 

the Secretary of Labor and what I expect we will hear today, I believe that the President's plan 

provides an excellent starting point for legislative action in this Committee. 

 I know that the Chairman of the Employer-Employee Relations Subcommittee, Mr. 

Johnson, shares my views, and together we will be introducing the President's proposal as the first 

step toward a consensus product that can be signed into law on behalf of American workers. I look 

forward to working with all of my colleagues on this Committee toward that goal. 

 I also want to thank all of our witnesses for being here and your willingness to testify. We 

are all anxious to learn the facts of the Enron story related to retirement plans for employees, as we 

go forward with the legislative process. I look forward to our witnesses helping us all to better learn 

the lessons of Enron. 

 I now yield to my colleague and friend from California, Mr. Miller, for his opening 

statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHN A. BOEHNER, COMMITTEE ON 

EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE – SEE APPENDIX A 
98

Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not have an opening statement. 

 I would like to yield to Mr. Kildee for a couple of brief remarks and then to Mr. Roemer for 

the purpose of introducing of one of our witnesses. 

Mr. Kildee. I thank the gentleman for yielding. 

Mr. Chairman, yesterday during the first hearing on the Enron situation, I was in the 

Resources Committee for a 6-hour hearing on the Indian Trust Funds. The Indian Trust Funds so 

far have led to the Secretary of the Interior, Mrs. Norton, being held in contempt of court. I think 

that all of us have certain contempt for what happened at Enron, and we're here to find out why it 

happened and what we can do to prevent it from happening in the future. 

 And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman Boehner. Thank you. 

 Mr. Roemer? 

Mr. Roemer. I want to thank my Ranking Member for yielding me time on this. 

 I am very proud to have one of my constituents here as a witness to testify before our 

Committee today. Dr. Teresa Ghilarducci from the University of Notre Dame, an economics 

professor, is here with us to testify about some possible solutions to prevent future problems with 

our 401(k) pension systems. She gave eloquent and very articulate testimony last week at a meeting 

that George Miller and I had in my District with both unemployed and underemployed workers. 

 So we very much look forward to your testimony and look forward to the opportunity to ask 

you some questions about what lies ahead to prevent future fiascoes.

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kildee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Boehner. It's now my pleasure to introduce our panel of witnesses. 

 Our first witness today is Mr. Tom Padgett. Mr. Padgett is a Senior Lab Analyst at EOTT, 

an Enron subsidiary. 

 Our second witness is Ms. Cindy Olson, the Executive Vice President Human Resources, 

Community Relations, and Building Services for the Enron Corporation. 

 Our third witness will be Ms. Mikie Rath. Ms. Rath is the Benefits Manager for Enron. 
99

 Our fourth witness is Mr. Scott Peterson, Global Practice Leader for Defined Contribution 

Services at Hewitt Associates. 

 And our fifth and final witness today is Professor Teresa Ghilarducci. She's Associate 

Professor, Department of Economics, University of Notre Dame, as you've heard, and has been a 

frequent witness here on this Committee. We welcome you back. 

 Before you begin your testimony, I will ask each of you to take an oath, and you should be 

aware that it is unlawful to make a false statement to Congress while under oath. And in light of 

that, if you'd all please stand and raise your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Chairman Boehner. All the witnesses have indicated their willingness to do so. 

 There are two more items of business that we want to deal with quickly before we get to the 

witnesses. We have many questions that we want answered today, and Mr. Miller and I have come 

up with an agreement that allows each side to spend a little more time than is usual on questions. 

 Mr. Miller and I have agreed to equally divide 40 minutes, giving each side 20 minutes of 

time. We will alternate from the majority to the minority in 10-minute increments until the time is 

gone. After the 40 minutes is over, we'll return to regular order and the 5-minute rule for questions, 

starting with Members who have not had a chance to ask questions. 

 With that said, I ask unanimous consent that 40 minutes be equally divided and controlled 

by the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, used in 10-minute increments. Without 

objection, so ordered. 

 Our second item of business I'd like to note for the record is that I made a request for the 

production of documents by the Enron Corporation. In compliance with my request, the 

corporation produced a large number of documents for both the Democrat and Republican 

Committee staff yesterday. I understand that the witnesses have not had an opportunity to review 

all of the documents produced for the Committee. Many of these documents contain certain private 

personal matters and proprietary interests. Hence, the Committee will release only certain 

documents today until the Committee has had sufficient time to determine how best to handle the 

releasing of information contained therein. 

 As a result and with the concurrence of the Democrat Members of the Committee, there are 

several documents produced that I believe would be helpful to the Committee during the hearing 

today. These documents are in each of your folders and I would appreciate everyone's cooperation. 

 At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent to insert the following documents into 

the hearing record: (1) a copy of the Enron Corporation's savings plan document, which we will 

refer to as Exhibit 1, (2) copies of four e-mails sent to employees regarding the savings plan, which 
100

we will refer to as Exhibit 2, (3) a copy of my letter to the corporation requesting certain 

documents, which we will refer to as Exhibit 3, and (4) a copy of the letter from Mr. Miller to the 

corporation also requesting certain documents, which we will refer to as Exhibit 4. Without 

objection, so ordered. 

 Having said that, Mr. Padgett, you may begin your testimony. If you are not familiar with 

the lights in front of you, the green light will be on for 4 minutes. The amber light will be on for a 

minute, and when the red light comes on, we hope that your testimony will be concluded. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. PADGETT, SENIOR LAB ANALYST, EOTT 

(ENRON SUBSIDIARY), BAYTOWN, TX 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Miller, Members of this Committee, I appreciate the 

opportunity to sit here before you today and state my situation, which I believe mirrors the situation 

of many of my colleagues who work for Enron. 

 My name is Tom Padgett. I was an employee of the Enron Corporation with 30 years of 

credited service at their Morgan’s Point Chemical Plant in LaPorte, Texas until August of 2001, 

when Enron transferred our plant to EOTT Energy Corporation. My wife, Karen, is a registered 

nurse whose work activity is limited now due to crippling rheumatoid arthritis. We have three 

grown children and five grandchildren. 

 I turned 59 years old last December 10th, and I've worked in the chemical industry for 35 

years. My job title is Senior Lab Analyst in the Quality Control Lab. My specific job functions 

consist of running analysis on petroleum feed stock products coming into the plant, on-stream 

analysis of products within the plant, and final product analysis to make sure our products meet 

customer specifications. I work 12-hour shifts at the plant. 

 There are, or were, a lot of people like me at Enron. Not everyone at Enron is an energy 

trader or an MBA. We're also chemical plant employees and managers, electrical utility workers 

and pipeline employees, just to give a few examples. We live and work in places like LaPorte, 

Texas, Port Barre, Louisiana, and Portland, Oregon. 

 I am a participant in the Enron Corp. 401(k) savings plan. Our retirement savings and our 

retirement plans were based solely on my 401(k) savings plan with Enron. The value of our 

savings account on December 31st, 2000 was $615,456. We still have not received our year-end 

statement for 2001, but using the present value of Enron stock, we estimate our savings account is 

now worth less than $15,000. 

 We have sacrificed over the years in order to contribute as much as we could to our 401(k) 

plan account. I joined Enron from my previous job with Tenneco and rolled over our savings from 

our Tenneco 401(k) plan into the Enron plan. I continued to participate in the Enron savings plan 

after our plant was transferred to EOTT Energy. Over the last 10 years we were able to build up a 

sizable sum of money in our Enron 401(k) plan. I made contributions to the plan by deductions 
101

from my paycheck every 2 weeks. Enron matched my contributions with the company's stock. 

Under the Enron 401(k) plan, the company's matching contribution was made exclusively with 

Enron stock, and participants were required to hold the matching stock until age 50. Nearly all of 

our savings were invested in Enron stock. 

 I was a dedicated and loyal employee to Enron, and I worked with the others in my plant 

and in the company to help make Enron one of the best companies in the Nation. Throughout my 

time with Enron, the top management of the company constantly encouraged us to invest our 

savings in Enron stock. I took the fact that the company matched our savings with only Enron 

stock as a further endorsement of the stock as a safe retirement investment. 

 More recent statements made by Enron's top management, including e-mails from Ken Lay 

about the company stock, also caused me to keep investing my savings into the stock. I remember 

in the fall of 2000, Enron's top executives telling us at an employee's meeting and by company email that Enron's stock price was going to increase to at least $120 a share. When Mr. Skilling 

resigned last August, Mr. Lay told us that the company was stronger than it had ever been. 

 Many people now ask why we and so many other Enron savings plan participants did not 

diversify our savings accounts. My answer is that we were loyal Enron employees, proud to be 

owners of what we were led to believe was a great company. 

 I would note that our decision to invest our retirement savings in our company appears, 

from what I have seen in the newspapers and on television, to be the same as other employees in 

many large companies in the United States like Procter & Gamble, General Electric and Coca-Cola. 

 Enron’s top management, who I now believe benefited handsomely from our commitment, 

encouraged our stock ownership. Based on what we were told repeatedly by the men at the top, I 

never dreamed that this disaster could have happened. We're not Wall Street analysts. I am sure 

that most Enron employees manage their investments themselves like Karen and I did. The fact 

remains, though, that good investment decisions require honest information. We all know now that 

the information we were given was false. 

 We also have been asked about the lockdown of our savings account by the company in 

October 2001. I received notification from the company approximately 10 days before the 

lockdown that I would not be able to access my savings account for a period of about 4 weeks. I do 

not know when the lockdown period actually began, but I do know at about the same time Enron 

released some very damaging news about the condition of the company. By the time we were able 

to access our account, our Enron stock was worth less than $10 a share. 

 The reason that Enron gave for the lockdown was to change plan administrators. What I 

have still not heard explained was why the company proceeded with the lockdown at a time when 

they had to know that this damaging information was going to come out and cause the stock price 

to drop even more. 

 Karen and I had planned on retiring this coming June when I will be 59-1/2 years old. Our 

plans were to move to the country and possibly start a small farm or ranch for disabled, 
102

handicapped or terminally ill children. Our idea was that this would allow these children's parents 

to have some special time to themselves to strengthen their relationship, knowing their child would 

be taken care of during this time. 

 We had planned on spending more time with our own family and grandchildren and caring 

for our elderly parents. Karen and I had planned on spending more time together, fishing and 

doing some traveling. We felt like we had enough money in our retirement savings to take care of 

ourselves as we grew older so we would not be a burden on our children. Now that is all gone and 

our children may need to take care of us. 

 I have lost nearly all of my retirement savings because of Enron's collapse. It appears I will 

need to work for another 10 years or as long as my health holds out in order to support my family. 

I just recently had surgery on my right hand so I can continue in my present capacity running 

samples in the lab. 

 We're not alone in this, of course. The plant where I work has approximately 100 

employees, and most of them had their 401(k) savings in Enron. There were five or six other 

employees in my plant that also planned on retiring this year. Now they also will have to keep 

working to support their families. I am sure our experience is the same as thousands of other Enron 

employees. However, we are still more fortunate than some at Enron. We still have our jobs, 

unlike many who worked for Enron. I have a strong faith in God, and I know that we will make it 

through this. 

 You have been interested to hear about our experience and I appreciate your invitation to 

appear before you today. As our lawmakers, I will tell you that I believe the law should protect 

workers and their retirement savings from what happened at Enron. Companies must be 

responsible for giving truthful information to their employees about their retirement investments. 

Our loyalty and trust as Enron employees have been betrayed, and it does not look like we will be 

able to recoup our losses from the company or others who are responsible. But we hope that our 

experience and your work will prevent this from happening to others. 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THOMAS O. PADGETT, SENIOR LAB ANALYST, EOTT 

(ENRON SUBSIDIARY), BAYTOWN, TX – SEE APPENDIX B 

Chairman Boehner. Thank you, Mr. Padgett. 

Ms. Olson? 
103

STATEMENT OF CINDY K. OLSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 

HUMAN RESOURCES AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ENRON 

CORPORATION, HOUSTON, TX 

Good morning. My name is Cindy Olson, and I am Executive Vice President responsible 

for Human Resources and Community Relations for Enron. I am here to respond to questions 

concerning the impact of recent events on the 20,000-plus participants in our benefit plans. 

 I don't feel, however, that I am able to address the bigger issue of how it came to pass that 

our company fell so far so fast. One internal report has just been released and I know that this 

Committee, other Congressional Committees, other government investigations, and ultimately the 

courts will continue to investigate what went wrong at Enron. 

 I hope to help the Committee assess the consequences of Enron's demise for our employees 

and retirees and their families. With me today is Mikie Rath, the Manager of Benefits. I hope we 

can show you that the people who ran the benefits plans did the best they could with a very difficult 

situation.

 At Enron, we gave our plan participants many choices for their investment decisions. The 

401(k) plan offered participants 20 different investment options for their retirement savings. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that my participation in this hearing and your investigation helps the 

Congress as you consider legislation that can create better ways to protect the retirement plans of 

workers. Such legislation perhaps could promote diversification, facilitate companies' ability to 

provide better investment advice or include other appropriate steps that experts suggest. I will be 

happy to answer any questions you have. Thank you. 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CINDY K. OLSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, HUMAN 

RESOURCES AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, ENRON CORPORATION, HOUSTON, TX – 

SEE APPENDIX C 

Chairman Boehner. Ms. Rath. 

STATEMENT OF MIKIE RATH, BENEFITS MANAGER, ENRON 

CORPORATION, HOUSTON, TX 
104

Good morning. My name is Mikie Rath and I'm the Benefits Manager at Enron. Like Ms. 

Olson, I am appearing here this morning to answer your questions concerning Enron's tax qualified 

retirement plans. As the person with the day-to-day responsibility for administering Enron's benefit 

plans, I hope to explain the structure of our plan and the events surrounding Enron's transition from 

Northern Trust to Hewitt. 

 As for the circumstances that led to Enron's downfall, my knowledge is limited to what I've 

heard reported in the press. 

 Enron's 401(k) plan offers a menu of 20 investment options, including a diverse selection of 

mutual funds, a Schwab account that functioned in many respects like a self-directed brokerage 

account, as well as Enron stock. This benefit of company matching was added to our program in 

1998. Participants are free to trade the investments they select in their 401(k) accounts on a daily 

basis, including Enron stock. However, like many companies that provide these matching 

contributions, Enron's plan design restricted participants from trading the company's matching 

stock contributions until they had reached age 50. 

 Enron sought good service providers for its participants. After Enron outsourced its benefits 

services in 2000, it became clear that Northern Trust had difficulty providing the level of service 

that Enron employees demanded. In January 2001, Enron began searching for a new benefits 

administrator, and after a Request for Proposal process, we selected Hewitt in May of 2001. 

 When large companies change 401(k) service providers, a temporary suspension of trading 

in the plan is typically needed in order to allow account information to be reconciled by the old 

administrator and accurately transferred to the new administrator's computer systems. This 

temporary suspension, which is sometimes been referred to as a "lockdown" or a "transition 

period," can take several weeks. 

 In Enron's case, Enron, Northern Trust and Hewitt worked together to shorten that time 

period as much as possible without sacrificing the integrity of participants' accounts. Ultimately, 

the trading suspension encompassed 11 trading days, from October 29th to November 13th, 2001. 

Enron mailed a brochure to all participants some 3 weeks before the trading suspension, explaining 

the transition and notifying participants of the temporary suspension. Enron employees with e-mail 

accounts received additional reminders in the days leading up to the transition. 

 Unfortunately, as the Committee is no doubt aware, the commencement of the transition 

coincided with certain bad news about the state of Enron's finances. We considered postponing the 

transition, but found it was not feasible to notify more than 20,000 participants in a timely fashion. 

 As the Enron news continued to break, we on the plan's Administrative Committee again 

considered stopping the transition. However, in addition to the problem of notifying participants, 

we found it would actually take longer to reverse the transition than to finish it. Ultimately, we 

worked with Hewitt to shave 1 week off the transition, and we implemented a process for notifying 

participants of the early resumption of trading. 
105

 I hope my testimony can be helpful to you, and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF MIKIE RATH, BENEFITS MANAGER, ENRON 

CORPORATION, HOUSTON, TX – SEE APPENDIX D 

Chairman Boehner. We have a vote on the House floor and we have approximately 5 minutes 

left. The Committee will stand in recess for approximately 15 minutes. 

[Recess.]

Chairman Boehner. The Committee will come to order. We apologize to our witnesses for doing 

our constitutional duty by going to the floor and voting. 

 With that, Mr. Peterson, you can begin your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT PETERSON, GLOBAL PRACTICE LEADER FOR 

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SERVICES, HEWITT ASSOCIATES, 

LINCOLNSHIRE, IL 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Miller and Members of the Committee, I am Scott Peterson, 

and I lead the Defined Contribution Services business of Hewitt Associates. 

 Let me say at the outset Mr. Chairman that we at Hewitt feel for those throughout the 

country who have suffered these losses. Our team that serves Enron is based in the Houston area, 

and some of the affected Enron employees and former employees are their friends, their family 

members or their neighbors. We are therefore pleased to have the opportunity to assist this 

Committee in its important responsibilities. 

 Hewitt is a leading provider of human resources outsourcing and consulting services. 

Hewitt was selected by Enron to become the new record keeper for the Enron 401(k) plan in May 

2001 after a competitive bidding process. The job of the record keeper includes maintaining the 

plan's records and processing all transactions by plan participants, including contributions, changes 

in investment elections and withdrawals. 

 Our role as record keeper of the Enron 401(k) plan is important but limited. For example, 

we did not design Enron's 401(k) plan or determine the investment options to be offered. Those 

and other discretionary decisions are matters for the plan's sponsor and its fiduciary to decide, 

which in this case are Enron and its Administrative Committee. We also are not trustees of the 
106

plan.

 Let me now turn, as the Committee has requested, to Enron's selection of Hewitt as the 

record keeper for its 401(k) plan and the transfer of those responsibilities to Hewitt. Our team at 

Hewitt had three basic jobs. First, we had to agree with Enron exactly what services we would 

provide and how we would provide them. Second, we had to adapt Hewitt's record keeping 

system, Internet and call center to the specific provisions of Enron's plan. Third, we had to receive 

the participant data from the outgoing record keeper, place it on our system and verify its accuracy. 

 The date on which all of this work is completed is known in the human resources industry 

as the "live" date. During the record keeper’s selection process in early 2001, Enron informed the 

bidders that the live date would occur in October. After we had been selected, Enron designated 

October 23 as the live date. As I will explain in a moment, this original live date was changed 

twice as our work went forward. 

 Enron also designated a transition or blackout period that would begin on September 14th 

and end on the live date of October 23rd. A blackout period has two elements. First, the outgoing 

record keeper must complete final processing of participant activity and perform a final 

reconciliation of accounts. Second, the new record keeper must receive the data, load it on its 

system and verify its accuracy. 

 During a blackout period, participants have restricted access to their accounts. Under the 

original timetable established by Enron, the blackout period had two phases. First, participants 

would be subject to restrictions on certain paper-intensive activities, such as loans and withdrawals, 

from the close of trading beginning on September 14th. 

 Second, changes in investment allocations would not be permitted during a shorter period 

beginning with the close of trading on Friday, September 26th. Participants would again have full 

access to their accounts and could change investments starting on October 23rd. 

 In mid-August, Enron informed us of certain plan changes. We told Enron that it would 

take us an additional 2 to 3 weeks to accommodate these and other changes. Enron decided on a 

new live date of November 20th. The blackout period was also rescheduled. Under the new 

schedule, restrictions on loans and withdrawals would begin on October 19th. The blackout on 

changes and investment allocations would begin at the close of trading on Friday, October 26th, 

and end on November 20th. 

 On October 25th, almost a week into the first phase of the blackout period, Enron reached 

out to their legal counsel, to us and to Northern Trust, the outgoing record keeper. They asked us 

to consider and respond that afternoon to a few questions. These were primarily questions 

involving the practical effects of shortening the blackout period. They also mentioned they could 

bring the whole process to a halt and wait until the following February or March. 

 Later that day, based on the information we had, we responded to Enron's request for 

information. We told Enron that we would, of course, assist them in implementing any decision 

that they made. Later that same day, Enron informed us that there would be no scheduled changes.
107

We have subsequently learned that Enron had been advised by its legal counsel that it should not 

make any changes in the schedule. As a result, the restriction on changes in investment took effect 

at the close of trading on the next day, October 26th. 

 Ultimately, we did accelerate the live date by a week to November 13th. We did so at the 

direction of the Enron Administrative Committee at a meeting held the afternoon of November 1st, 

after the plan's assets had been transferred to the new trustee that morning. We received the 

necessary data to load on our system on Wednesday, November 7th, and we went live four business 

days later on Tuesday, November 13th. Participants could make changes in their investment 

allocations and request other transactions beginning on that day. 

 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would of course be pleased to respond to any questions that 

you or other Members of the Committee have. 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SCOTT PETERSON, GLOBAL PRACTICE LEADER FOR 

DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SERVICES, HEWITT ASSOCIATES, LINCOLNSHIRE, IL 

SEE APPENDIX E 
108

Chairman Boehner. Ms. Ghilarducci. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. TERESA GHILARDUCCI, ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE 

DAME, NOTRE DAME, IN 

Thank you for inviting me. I hope that I can help put the Enron situation in the context of 

our Nation's pension policy and trends. 

 Employee benefits used to be a leveler. It used to be a part of pay that narrowed the gap 

between the rich and the poor. Health insurance meant that the CEO and blue-collar worker had 

the same access to a heart bypass surgery, and CEOs or the high-paid employees could not have a 

pension unless that pension trickled down to blue-collar, or the rank and file workers. 

 But in the 1990s especially, that was reversed. The pension plans have actually contributed 

to a widening gap between top earners and low-income earners. Pension coverage rates, and also 

pension coverage rates for professionals like Mr. Padgett, have actually dropped. From 1978 to 

1998, workers at the top, 78 percent, used to be covered by pensions, and now only 72 percent are 

covered; and that is still the highest rate of all of the income quintiles. But in addition to pension 

coverage falling, employer expenditures, which are a good proxy for pension quality, also fell. It 

fell by a whopping 22 percent since 1978. So we have to ask ourselves, has pension policy failed? 

 Pension policy is tax policy. Pension plans exist because of their favorable tax-favored 

status. The tax-favored status represents over $90 billion in taxes not collected. We all paid for 

some of Enron's pension plan. 

 I want to add a footnote here. An under appreciated, under discussed and unintended 

consequence of tax rate cuts is a reduction in incentives for employers to provide pensions and for 

individuals to divert their earnings. In fact, it is estimated that a 1 percent drop in the income tax 

rate, causes a 0.4 percent decline in pension coverage. In this context, Enron's 401(k) pension plan 

collapse is not entirely idiosyncratic. It reveals the gradual erosion of the entire pension system, 

and to us researchers and analysts this erosion is not very surprising. 

 The 1990s was the perfect storm for pensions to increase. We're all getting older, and 72 

million baby boomers are getting older and presumably want more retirement security, rather than 

cash. And times were flush in the 1990s, so the demographic and economic situation should have 

predicted more pension coverage, not less. So what happened? 

401(k)s happened. 401(k)-type plans have out shadowed the traditional defined benefit 

plans. Enron used to have a traditional plan; long-term employees were bought out, and that 

traditional coverage was folded into their 401(k) coverage. 
109

 My research with my coauthors has shown that if a firm adopted a DC (defined 

contribution) plan or the famous subset, 401(k) plan, in the '80s or '90s, it lowered its pension 

contribution, its cost per participant, by 20 percent. In sum, though, there are several reasons for 

the shift towards DC plans. I have concluded in my research that the primary reason is that they 

are cheaper for employers. 

 Now that workers desire to have control over their own accounts certainly contributes to 

this, but having control over your own account has some fatal flaws. One, Congress can't fix the 

inherent flaw that workers chose the wrong year to be born. We could all turn sixty-five when the 

financial markets are down for maybe a decade or so, like they were in the 1970s and perhaps the 

way they are going to be now in the next ten years. 

 Congress also can't change our human nature that makes us bad investors, but also loyal 

employees. We are overconfident and optimistic about our success and our employers' success. 

We think that what just happened, like a healthy stock market, has a high probability of happening 

more often than it really does. That's called the psychological state of saliency, and we usually 

pick instant gratification over deferred. That's what it's called, deferred gratification. 

 In short, human nature is such that we buy high, we sell low and we trade too often. So 

given this nature of ours, education can only go so far. 

 I'm going to emphasize just four pension reforms. I have two others that talk about 

coverage, but today given the tone and subject of this hearing, I'll focus on two that increase the 

transparency of how pension funds are administered and two that reduce the risks for workers who 

have only 401(k)s as their pension. 

 First, I feel it's under appreciated that administrative fees have a very significant effect on 

overall pension accumulations. Going to Hewitt, with no offense to my co-panelists, to have all of 

the bells and whistles to manage the plans can actually cost an employee up to 20 to 40 percent of 

their accumulated assets. If employers were required to pay for those administrative fees, because 

401(k)s have been a structure in which those fees get passed on to employees and it's really hidden, 

then I think employers would take more responsibility and be more accountable for the services 

they provide. 

 In that vein, I also urge Congress to increase the transparency, or the way pensions are 

administered, by requiring worker-employee representation on the pension and on the 

administrative boards. I feel, and have for over fifteen years in my research, that if folks like Ms. 

Olson and Ms. Rath had been regularly consulting employees' representatives, the scenario would 

have been different. We are the only industrialized nation that does not require representation of 

employees on pension boards. 

 My third recommendation, which refers to reducing risks, is that I urge Congress to restrict 

the amount of sponsor equities or employer equities, in individual tax-favored retirement accounts. 

I know it's controversial that there be such restrictions, but it is not controversial among academic 

economists and academics in general. We all know it's unwise not to diversify, even workers know 

that it's unwise not to diversify. But employees are loyal, and again their self-identity and self-
110

esteem is tied up in how well they think their employers are going to do. 

 Fourth, as an advisory board member of the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, I urge 

Congress to require, require, because just urging probably won't matter, an investigation into ways 

to reduce the risks of defined benefit plans. 

 In conclusion, I've argued that Congress should address that individual control of pension 

accounts comes at a high probability of failure, and that pensions exist because employers and 

employees want them and because taxpayers pay for them. Therefore, extending responsibility and 

fiduciary responsibility to those folks who administer the plans makes sense. 

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DR. TERESA GHILARDUCCI, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, NOTRE DAME, IN – 

SEE APPENDIX F 

Chairman Boehner. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Mr. Padgett, I really want to thank you for your willingness to come and tell the Committee 

your story. How many years were you actually an employee? Or are you still an employee of the 

Enron Corporation? 

Mr. Padgett. I’ve been an actual employee for ten years. Enron took over the plant where I work 

on January 1, 1992 and then they sold that plant to EOTT Energy on August 1, 2001. 

Chairman Boehner. How long were you at that plant before Enron or its subsidiaries purchased 

the plant? 

Mr. Padgett. I was there about six months. I worked for Tenneco prior to that. 

Chairman Boehner. And your age is? 

Mr. Padgett. Fifty-nine. 

Chairman Boehner. Fifty-nine. 

 Did you or any of your coworkers that you're aware of seek professional investment advice 

for your 401(k) plan? 

Mr. Padgett. No sir. 

Chairman Boehner. Did you receive any information, or as I would describe it, investment 

education from your employers or others talking about the need to diversify your account? 
111

Mr. Padgett. No sir. 

Chairman Boehner. I certainly understand loyalty on behalf of employees and wanting to believe 

in the company they work for and their desire to hold company stock. 

 I gave several examples yesterday of companies in my own area; and in many cases, 

employees have done very well holding a vast majority of their 401(k) assets in their own accounts. 

I think we have a situation here where not only the employees of Enron, but also the investors in 

Enron were all led down a primrose path. I don't want to point fingers at what did or didn't happen. 

I think time will tell. But I do appreciate your willingness to come. 

 What I'd like to do in this first ten minute segment that I have is to make sure that we have 

all the facts on the table in terms of what the employee pension package, looked like. Then I’d 

specifically like to get into the design and the options in the 401(k) plan. I'd like Ms. Rath to 

answer most of these questions. 

 Could you give us a basic, broad-brush picture of what retirement plans and programs 

Enron offers to its employees, such as defined benefit plans, ESOP, 401(k)? 

Ms. Rath. Yes, sir. We actually have all three of those. We offer our employees a defined benefit 

pension plan. We offer our defined contribution 401(k) plan, and for employees who were hired 

prior to 1994, Enron had an ESOP plan. 

Chairman Boehner. Can you describe briefly the defined benefit plan at Enron? 

Ms. Rath. The defined benefit plan was changed to a cash balance formula beginning in 1996. 

Prior to that, it was a traditional "final average pay" that rewarded years of service and was based 

on age, years of service and salary. 

 We changed our formula to a cash balance formula. We grandfathered in everyone who 

was in the final average pay to protect those benefits. Then, moving forward, we offered cash 

balance formula, because our workforce was changing. A cash balance formula actually allows 

people who work ten years to walk away with some benefits. 

Chairman Boehner. What are the participation requirements for each of these plans? 

Ms. Rath. We start vesting in each of these plans based on date of hire. The cash balance formula 

requires a five year vesting, which is all or nothing. There is no partial vesting in that plan. 

 The 401(k) plan was changed in 1999 to require a one year vesting in the company 

matching contributions. 

Chairman Boehner. Can you outline the benefits of each of these programs? 

Ms. Rath. For a participant? I want to make sure I understand. 
112

Chairman Boehner. Yes, for a participant. 

Ms. Rath. The defined benefit plan is just one of many of the benefit programs that Enron offers. 

It doesn't require the employee to participate. It's a company-provided benefit that the company 

funds into a trust. Our defined contribution plan is the employees' option to protect their own 

financial security. In other words, they can elect up to 15 percent of their salary to go into that 

plan, either on a before-tax basis or an after-tax basis. 

Chairman Boehner. On a percentage basis, what would be the overall size of the defined 

contribution plan versus the defined benefit plan? 

Ms. Rath. At the beginning of 2001, our 401(k) plan had assets in excess of $2 billion. Our 

defined benefit plan had approximately $200 to $300 million in it. 

Chairman Boehner. If we can turn to the 401(k) plan, where a lot of the attention has focused in 

the last several months, can you outline the investment options available to employees in the 401(k) 

plan? 

Ms. Rath. Yes. We offer two stock funds, an Enron stock fund in a former company that we had 

owned in 1999 as EOG. It used to be Enron Oil and Gas. We offered a stable value fund, which 

was invested mostly in insurance contracts, which was the most stable investment fund. We had 

ten different Fidelity funds, including some that were closed, like Magellan, in growth and income. 

 And in 1998, with the merger of Portland General's 401(k) plan with ours, Cowan 

Investments had done an investment search, and we added six different funds that encompassed a 

small cap growth fund and a bond fund and some of the Windsor funds, as well as a Vanguard S&P 

that our employees wanted. 

Chairman Boehner. And the company match was how much? 

Ms. Rath. The company match began in 1998 in a tiered approach. In 1998, it was based on 2 

percent of pay, so the company matched 50 cents on the dollar up to 2 percent of pay. It increased 

in 1999 to 4 percent of pay. And then in 2000, to coincide with the merger of Portland General's 

plan, it was 50 cents on the dollar up to 6 percent of base pay. 

Chairman Boehner. So if an employee put 12 percent of their base salary into the plan, how 

much would the company match? 

Ms. Rath. Three percent. 

Chairman Boehner. Three percent. 

 There have been a lot of discussions as to how much of the stock was in fact restricted. The 

company didn't match before 1998, and you had a 401(k) prior to that; is that correct? 
113

Ms. Rath. We had the Enron 401(k) plan. When InterNorth and Houston Natural Gas merged in 

1987, the plans became the Enron Corp. savings plan. 

Chairman Boehner. Was there any match prior to 1998? 

Ms. Rath. There was a match prior to 1997 in one of the companies, and I'm afraid I don't really 

know all of the details of that, but yes, there was a match prior to 1987. 

Chairman Boehner. But in a contemporary period, the real match began in 1988? 

Ms. Rath. Yes. 

Chairman Boehner. And we know the amount of that match, and that match was in Enron 

company stock? 

Ms. Rath. Yes. 

Chairman Boehner. Can you outline the restrictions on that stock that was given by the company 

to the employees? 

Ms. Rath. Part of the plan design was that the company match would be invested and allowed to 

be diversified at age fifty. That is fairly typical in ESOPs that are marginally invested in company 

stock to allow diversification as an employee gets older and needs protection. 

Chairman Boehner. Let's look at the total. How much company-provided stock, as a match, 

existed in those 401(k) accounts on January 1st, 2001? 

Ms. Rath. We had a total of about 60 percent, if I remember all of the numbers; and I would say 

that probably a third of that was company match. The rest of that was employee contributions. 

Chairman Boehner. All right. In terms of the match, how could the employees sell or diversify 

the stock that was given by the company? 

Ms. Rath. If they were over age fifty, we had an online system either through the Internet or a 

voice response system that would enable employees to get on and just choose what funds they 

wanted to move. 

Chairman Boehner. I'm trying to determine with accuracy the amount of company stock that was 

in fact restricted as a percent of the overall amount of company stock that employees owned. 

Ms. Rath. I don't know that we have the statistics to know who was over age fifty, or who was 

eligible to move that. 

Chairman Boehner. All right. My time has just expired, and I recognize the gentleman from 

California, Mr. Miller, for ten minutes. 
114

Mr. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of the witnesses for being 

with us this morning. 

Ms. Olson, if I might ask you some questions, what is your educational background? 

Ms. Olson. I have a bachelor's degree in accounting. 

Mr. Miller. And you started with Enron when? 

Ms. Olson. In 1979. 

Mr. Miller. 1979. And your current title is what? 

Ms. Olson. Executive Vice President of Human Resources and Community Relations. 

Mr. Miller. And could you describe for us your job responsibilities? 

Ms. Olson. Currently, I have responsibility for all of human resources, which includes benefits, 

compensation payroll, and the business unit support of our HR generalists. I also have employee 

communication, employee programs, community relations programs and also building 

administration. 

Mr. Miller. And you would report to whom in the corporation? 

Ms. Olson. I report to the CEO and COO directly. 

Mr. Miller. Directly? 

Ms. Olson. Directly. 

Mr. Miller. You were appointed to the Savings Plan Administrative Committee. When was that? 

Ms. Olson. In January of 2001. 

Mr. Miller. How was that determination made to appoint you? 

Ms. Olson. I was actually asked by the Chairman, Jim Prentice, to join the Committee. 

Mr. Miller. I see. Okay. 

 When you joined that committee, were you apprised, I don't know if Enron has in-house 

counsel, or others, of your fiduciary responsibilities as a member of that committee? 

Ms. Olson. I don't recall being apprised by counsel. I know that Cynthia Barrow, the Director of 

Benefits, indicated the responsibility, the fiduciary responsibility. 
115

Mr. Miller. And that was indicated as what? Did they describe that fiduciary responsibility? 

Ms. Olson. To ensure the plan participants' investments were protected. 

Mr. Miller. So it was explained to you that you’re responsibility was to the plan participants? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. And to the quality or the safety of their investments in that plan. Is that correct? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. Was that explained to you? Was it explained to you that that really is your sole 

fiduciary responsibility? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. Is that your understanding? 

Ms. Olson. That was my understanding. 

Mr. Miller. It was reported information within the last couple of days, that in February and March 

of 2001, you sold some 20,000 shares of Enron stock. Is that correct? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. And you acquired those shares by what means? 

Ms. Olson. That was part of my compensation. 

Mr. Miller. So these were not stock options. This was stock that was given to you and you had 

ownership of that stock? 

Ms. Olson. No. They were stock options. 

Mr. Miller. They were stock options? 

Ms. Olson. They were stock options, and some were restricted stock. We received 50 percent 

equity, 50 percent in restricted stock and 50 percent in stock options. 

Mr. Miller. And those restrictions were what? 

Ms. Olson. They had to vest based on the company's performance. 

Mr. Miller. So sort of like a typical option, if the company did better, the price of the stock was 

up. You had a chance to exercise whatever your option price was, but the company had to produce 
116

or perform? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. 

Mr. Miller. And then the other stock given to you was restricted in what manner? 

Ms. Olson. That was based on company performance as well. 

Mr. Miller. How were you able then to sell these 20,000 shares? 

Ms. Olson. The restricted stock I could sell because the company had performed well. It was in 

the top 10 percent of the S&P 500. 

Mr. Miller. So it wasn't tied to stock performance? It was tied to the positioning of the company, 

then? Is that what you're saying? 

 Have you read the Fortune Magazine article on Enron that was published in March of 2001? 

Ms. Olson. I probably have. 

Mr. Miller. Were you aware of some of the issues that were raised by reading that article, or prior 

to that article? 

Ms. Olson. Probably so. 

Mr. Miller. Were you aware that the price of the stock was dropping during 2001? 

Ms. Olson. Very aware. Everyone in the building was aware. We have a stock board in our 

lobby.

Mr. Miller. Did you think about that in terms of your position on the advisory committee of the 

plan? 

Ms. Olson. I was aware of the stock dropping just like everyone else because of the stock board in 

the lobby. 

Mr. Miller. It is my understanding that in August, Sherron Watkins shared a memo with you 

regarding her concerns with Enron. Is that correct? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. She came to me and asked for my advice, if she should go to Mr. Lay. 

Mr. Miller. Can I show you a copy of that memo and ask if that's what she shared with you? 

Ms. Olson. She shared a one page memo with me. 
117

Mr. Miller. Is this the document she shared with you? 

Ms. Olson. The top page of this document, I believe, is the document she shared with me. 

Mr. Miller. Do you have or are you in possession of a copy of this document? 

Ms. Olson. The top page? 

Mr. Miller. Yes. 

Ms. Olson. I don't know that I kept the original document she gave me. About three weeks ago, I 

called Mr. Lay's office and asked to get a copy of the document, and I was sent this package with 

the Vinson & Elkins report attached. 

Mr. Miller. So you were sent the complete package? I don't know how many pages it is. What is 

it, seven or eight pages? When you asked for a copy of the Watkins document, that's the document 

that they sent you? 

 When was that? 

Ms. Olson. That was a couple of weeks ago. 

Mr. Miller. A couple of weeks ago. Were you aware of the issues raised in the additional pages to 

the document? 

Ms. Olson. No. I was not. When she brought me the document originally, it was the top page, and 

I didn't have the capacity or the capabilities to determine if what she was saying in the memo was 

accurate.

 She also told me that she herself didn't know if these were technically right, and she wanted 

to have someone else who had more knowledge of the financial situation look at her document. 

That's why I sent her to Mr. Lay. 

Mr. Miller. So your recommendation, I think this has been reported, was to forward this on to 

Lay. Now, this document is unsigned, but you assumed that she was the author if she said she was 

the author of this document? 

Ms. Olson. I assumed so. She's the one that brought it to me in my office that day. 

Mr. Miller. And do you know that it was forwarded to Mr. Lay? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. I set the meeting up with Mr. Lay. 

Mr. Miller. Okay. And what happened then? 
118

Ms. Olson. He met with her. I can't remember if she told me or Mr. Lay told me that he was 

kicking off an investigation by Vinson & Elkins into her allegations. 

Mr. Miller. And that document was when? In August, right? 

Ms. Olson. The latter part of August. 

Mr. Miller. Was the information in that document discussed in the advisory committee? 

Ms. Olson. In the Administrative Committee? 

Mr. Miller. Administrative Committee, excuse me. 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Miller. What was your reaction to the document? 

Ms. Olson. I didn't know. 

Mr. Miller. You didn't know what? 

Ms. Olson. I didn't know. I didn't know if what she was saying was true. She didn't either. 

Mr. Miller. What was your reaction? 

Ms. Olson. That she needed to go talk to Mr. Lay. 

Mr. Miller. What would have been your reaction, if you thought it was true? 

Ms. Olson. If I had thought this was true, I would have asked counsel what my next move needed 

to be. 

Mr. Miller. But you didn't go to counsel? 

Ms. Olson. I didn't know if it was true. 

Mr. Miller. Did you raise it in the Administrative Committee? 

Ms. Olson. No, I did not. 

Mr. Miller. Why is that? 

Ms. Olson. Because I didn't know if it was true. She herself told me she didn't know if it was true. 

That's why she wanted an investigation. 
119

Mr. Miller. In the first page of the one page memo, she states, assuming she's the author of this, 

that “she's incredibly nervous that we will implode on a wave of accounting scandals.” That has 

been stated already on the public record. 

 She goes on later to describe the situation with Condor and Raptor deals in 1999 and 2000:

"we enjoyed a wonderfully high stock price, many executives sold the stock, we then try and 

reverse or fix the deals in 2001, and it's a bit like robbing the bank in one year and trying to pay it 

back 2 years later. Nice try, but investors were hurt, they bought $70 and $80/share looking for a 

$120/share price and now they're at $38 or worse. We are under too much scrutiny and there are 

probably one or two disgruntled 'redeployed' employees who know enough about the 'funny' 

accounting to get us in trouble.” 

 Now, you're a fiduciary to the pension plan? 

Ms. Olson. Yes, I am. 

Mr. Miller. And this doesn’t upset you? You're putting on your fiduciary hat in that part of your 

job to raise these questions in the advisory committee, true or untrue? 

Ms. Olson. She told me that she didn't know if her allegations were true. 

Mr. Miller. I understand that, but the memo now exists in fact. It's been circulated in the 

company in one fashion or another, either exclusively to you, or you don't know to whom else she 

shared with this. 

Ms. Olson. I am sorry what's your question? 

Mr. Miller. My question is, now you have information that, if true, would directly, and obviously 

did directly, impact on the value of the shares of stock in the pension plan. I guess what I'm asking 

you is, in your fiduciary relationship whether or not you deemed it necessary to relay this 

information and have some kind of discussion of this information in the advisory committee? 

 The next meeting would have been September, because these were monthly meetings? 

Ms. Olson. Right. But she told me she didn't even know if the information was true. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, the Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations, for ten minutes. 

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask unanimous consent that statements be made a part of 

the record. 

Chairman Boehner. Without objection, so ordered. 
120

Mr. Johnson. Ms. Olson, I'd like to continue with those questions if I might. You were a 

fiduciary. As such, how often was the 401(k) plan audited, and by whom? 

Ms. Olson. During the time when I was on the committee, I don't recall when the 401(k) plan was 

audited.

Mr. Johnson. Was it ever audited? 

Ms. Olson. I believe so, but I don't know that for a fact. 

Mr. Johnson. The auditors didn't come through your office? 

 Ms. Rath do you know? 

Ms. Rath. Yes, sir. I do know. The plans were audited every single year. The last two years we 

were audited by Ernst & Young. The year prior to that we were audited by Arthur Andersen, and 

the years prior to that, when I first joined Enron, we were audited by a minority firm called Mir, 

Fox & Rodriguez. 

Mr. Johnson. I see, and do those reports come to you after the audit is done? 

Ms. Rath. Yes, sir. They do come to me and then they're filed with our 5500s. 

Mr. Johnson. What was the date of the last audit? 

Ms. Rath. We would have audited year 2000 plans in year 2001, to be filed with our 5500s that 

we filed in October of 2001. 

Mr. Johnson. October. And did they indicate any problems at that point? 

Ms. Rath. The auditors would have probably not made a recommendation in their report as to the 

status of the stock. They were just audited. Typically they don't order audit the investments. They 

just order our processes and that were in place according to the laws. 

Mr. Johnson. Ms. Olson, did you sell any stock after Mr. Skilling left the company? 

Ms. Olson. No, I did not. 

Mr. Johnson. Did that trigger anything as far as you were concerned? I mean, did you think about 

making a recommendation? 

Ms. Olson. Let me go back. I did convert my ESOP shares that I had held for several years in the 

late part of November. I did sell those shares. 
121

Mr. Johnson. Were you doing that to protect yourself? Did you think about protecting the plan 

for all of the employees at that time? 

Ms. Olson. Actually, the reason I did it is because of the uncertainty of Enron at the time, which 

everyone in the building knew. I just had remembered that I had forgotten to sell those ESOP 

shares.

Mr. Johnson. But why was it important for you to sell them at that point? 

Ms. Olson. It wasn't important. It was just something that I thought about doing when I saw all of 

the uncertainty. 

Mr. Johnson. You saw the uncertain what? 

Ms. Olson. The uncertainty. We have televisions in the elevators and all over the floors. It was 

clear in November that there were problems with Enron. 

Mr. Johnson. Okay. So you knew there was a problem. 

 Well, as a fiduciary, why didn't you suggest? 

Ms. Olson. In November we started meeting as an Administrative Committee in the beginning of 

November on a weekly basis. We hired counsel, and we hired an independent financial adviser.

None of us knew for sure where the stock price was going. We felt like we needed someone 

professional and independent to advise us. 

Mr. Johnson. Okay. Do you know Robin Hosea? 

Ms. Olson. I've heard of her. 

Mr. Johnson. Did she work in your department? 

Ms. Olson. She worked in the Benefits Department. 

Mr. Johnson. Either one of you? Did she work in your department? 

Ms. Rath. She was a member of the Benefits Department, yes, sir. 

Mr. Johnson. That's under you? 

Ms. Rath. She didn't report to me. 

Mr. Johnson. But that department is under you. 

 Well, you know, according to the news reports, Enron's Senior Benefits Accountant has said 

that $15 million was paid to friends of executives out of the 401(k) plan. That’s her. Can you 
122

comment on what those payments were and to whom they were made? 

Ms. Rath. Any payment made from the 401(k) trust fund has to be reported on the 5500 filings, 

and on those filings it requires us to list every single payment. There were no payments to 

individuals on the 5500 audited financial statements. 

Mr. Johnson. So no money, according to you, was diverted from the 401(k) plans, to your 

knowledge?

Ms. Rath. No, sir. There was no money diverted. 

Mr. Johnson. Okay. Do you know if any or can you estimate how many senior executives cashed 

out during that period? Or do you have any idea? 

Ms. Olson. No, I'm sorry I don't. 

Mr. Johnson. Okay. I'm going to yield the rest of my time to Mr. Isakson. 

Mr. Isakson. Thank you. 

Ms. Olson and Ms. Rath, I'd be interested in the status of your individual 401(k)s. Have 

you lost any money in your 401(k)s? 

Ms. Rath. I haven't calculated what I've lost between any 401(k) and my stock options, 

Congressman. 

Mr. Isakson. Ms. Olson, do you know? 

Ms. Olson. It's hard to calculate money. It depends on what point in time you're calculating that. 

I have about 3,000 shares in the company match and the 401(k). 

Mr. Isakson. What were the most shares you ever had? 

Ms. Olson. Probably 6,000 or 7,000. 

Mr. Isakson. Okay. 

Mr. Padgett, other than your 401(k) experience, had you ever been an investor in the stock 

market? 

Mr. Padgett. No, sir, I hadn't. 

Mr. Isakson. Mr. Peterson, how many times have you been involved in your firm taking over the 

administration of a plan? 
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Mr. Peterson. Personally? 

Mr. Isakson. Yes. Lots? A few? 

Mr. Peterson. A few; probably seven or eight. 

Mr. Isakson. Do you know of any case where a lockdown period was postponed? 

Mr. Peterson. I can't think of a specific situation off the top of my mind. 

Mr. Isakson. Do you know any company that cannot communicate with its workers within a 

five day period of time? 

Mr. Peterson. I'm not sure how to answer that, sir. 

Mr. Isakson. In most corporations you've ever worked with, is the communication mechanism 

between a company and their employees such that they can be communicated with in a few days? 

Mr. Peterson. To active employees, I'd say yes. 

Mr. Isakson. Okay. 

Ms. Olson, on your written statement that you submitted, it says that you were removed 

from the Executive Committee in early 2001, and it says in late January of 2002, you became 

responsible for Human Resources again. All of the copies of minutes that we have from the 

Administrative Committee from May 3rd through November 13th indicate you were not present. 

I assume that's the period of time you were removed? 

Ms. Olson. I was removed from the Executive Committee in late 2000, early 2001. And then just 

two or three weeks ago, I've become a part of it again. 

Mr. Isakson. Why were you removed? 

Ms. Olson. Mr. Skilling and I didn't see eye to eye. 

Mr. Isakson. Why were you reinstated? 

Ms. Olson. I was asked by the current management. 

Mr. Isakson. Mr. Peterson, Ms. Ghilarducci stated that your fees could constitute 20 to 40 percent 

of a 401(k) plan. I believe that's what she said. 

 Am I correct, ma'am? 
124

Ms. Ghilarducci. No. If you have high fees, it can erode the accumulation by 20 to 40 percent. I 

don't know what the Enron fees are. 

Mr. Isakson. So your statement did not relate to Hewitt Associates? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Right. 

Mr. Isakson. Okay. 

Mr. Peterson, what percentage could your fees contribute in erosion? 

Mr. Peterson. I'm sorry. Are you using the numbers that I have? I'm going to answer the 

question slightly differently. I don't intend to be changing it. Generally in a plan like this, our fees 

are a function of the number of people we're serving, not the assets in the plan. So it can vary 

depending on the average balance per person. 

 With that as background, I'd say for a mature 401(k) plan, often our fees run about ten basis 

points of assets. 

Mr. Isakson. Ten basis points? 

Mr. Peterson. One-tenth of 1 percent. 

Mr. Isakson. So the record should reflect that the distinguished Professor's statement was a 

general statement, not relevant to Hewitt. Is that correct? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Hewitt or Enron, right. 

Mr. Isakson. Mr. Padgett, what are your plans? 

Mr. Padgett. My plans are to continue to work as long as my health holds out. Our plans for 

retirement are no longer plans. 

Mr. Isakson. Given what you've been through, how are you now planning for whatever that 

retirement will be in the years that your health allows you to work? 

Mr. Padgett. Well, we're continuing to put 15 percent every month in our 401(k) plan, but it's not 

going in Enron stock. 

Mr. Isakson. It's diversified? 

Mr. Padgett. It's going into a mutual fund absolutely. 

Mr. Isakson. Have you sought any advice? 
125

Mr. Padgett. From? 

Mr. Isakson. On where to put that? 

Mr. Padgett. No, sir. 

Mr. Isakson. Mr. Chairman, I think my time is about to expire, and I yield back. 

Chairman Boehner. The Committee will break. We have two votes on the House floor, and 

considering that we may be here for some time this afternoon, you might want to grab something to 

eat. The Committee will resume its deliberations and stand in recess until 12:30 p.m. today. 

[Recess.]

Chairman Boehner. The Committee will come to order. It is 12:34 p.m. We will resume our 

deliberations. The gentleman from California, Mr. Miller, is recognized for ten minutes. 

Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 If I might continue, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Olson, you mentioned that you were well aware of 

what happened to the Enron stock, and that everybody in the building was aware of it. It sounds 

like there was a fair amount of tension in the building during the course of the slide of Enron, and 

obviously with the flow of information. 

 Did you ever discuss this in the committee, in the Pension Administrative Committee? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. That is why we retained counsel and started looking for a professional financial 

adviser for the committee. 

Mr. Miller. When was that? 

Ms. Olson. In the first part of November. 

Mr. Miller. You asked counsel for what purpose? 

Ms. Olson. We wanted someone independent to advise us on what we needed to do. 

Mr. Miller. What has their advice been? 

Ms. Olson. They continue to look at this, and the corporate counsel is working with them right 

now.

Mr. Miller. With all due respect, the advice would not be worth much today. 
126

 I don't understand. I guess the term fiduciary relationship is a strict relationship. When you 

went on the committee, you were advised that this was for the purposes of the employees, and the 

relationship ran to the preservation and the protection of the assets of the fund. 

 During the entire course of events, was there ever a suggestion that maybe Enron stock 

should be sold to preserve the assets of the fund? 

Ms. Olson. That is why we hired the attorney for the committee and an investment adviser, to ask 

their independent recommendations. 

Mr. Miller. So every time you made a recommendation that is how you did it? 

Ms. Olson. The situation was very tenuous. We wanted outside counsel and an outside 

independent financial adviser to help us. 

Mr. Miller. You haven't received any advice from that effort yet? 

Ms. Olson. Not final advice, no. 

Mr. Miller. Let me go back to the memo. You say you did not know whether it was true or not 

true. Did you give the memo to this financial counsel? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Miller. You know, in everyday life, whether you are the FBI or a Member of Congress, 

people bring you facts. Again, in your fiduciary relationship, how did you make that determination 

as a member of the Committee, not as an Enron employee, that you did by suggesting that the 

author go to Mr. Lay. I am talking about your fiduciary relationship to the plan. 

Ms. Olson. I didn't know whether the allegations in that memo were accurate or not. 

Mr. Miller. I know that. I know that. But you now possess a piece of information that may or 

may not be accurate. Should it be accurate, it would be devastating to the assets of the plan. You 

are a fiduciary of that plan. Don’t you get a sense that you should have discussed this within the 

plan because you would have to take some action? 

Ms. Olson. No. I didn't know if the memo was accurate or not. 

Mr. Miller. I know you didn't know if the memo was accurate or not, but you had that 

information. 

Ms. Olson. It was information that was not substantiated. 

Mr. Miller. I understand that. But if substantiated, it had an immediate and devastating impact on 

the plan. I believe you have an obligation, and you may not agree with me, to investigate as a 

fiduciary of the plan that information, independent of Mr. Lay. Mr. Lay was not a fiduciary to the 
127

plan; you were. It is a very difficult position you have. 

 Listen, I empathize here. You were wearing two hats, one of which is, I think, almost 

impossible to wear in your position. You are a major corporate officer and you have a fiduciary 

relationship to the plan, which is about the employees' assets. I am not sure that that is a situation 

that people can function in. 

 So you felt there was no requirement under your fiduciary relationship to raise this? 

Ms. Olson. No, not in this case. Like I said, I didn't know if the memo was substantiated. 

Mr. Miller. You keep saying that. The next logical step of any person would be to find out rather 

quickly if it was or was not substantiated if you were protecting a $1 billion fund. 

Ms. Olson. It was in the hands of Mr. Lay and Vinson & Elkins. 

Mr. Miller. It was in the hands of Mr. Lay. He had no fiduciary relationship to the fund. That is 

the inconsistency in this position. But that was not the only piece of information you had. You had 

whatever conversations you had with people in the building, in the company. 

You were having a falling out with Mr. Skilling, was that correct? 

Ms. Olson. Not at that time. 

Mr. Miller. Not at that time. You had the information from the Fortune Magazine piece. What 

were the discussions on the Advisory Committee? 

Ms. Olson. We hired an investment advisor. 

Mr. Miller. You hired an independent counsel in November? 

Ms. Olson. The first part of November. 

Mr. Miller. That was done where, at the September meeting? 

Ms. Olson. At the November meeting, we hired independent counsel. 

Mr. Miller. How many independent meetings were you present at? 

Ms. Olson. I can't recall. 

Mr. Miller. Do we have those documents? These were the same documents Mr. Isakson had. 

 In the May meeting, you are listed as not present. On the front page of those, the first one, 

is that May? 
128

Ms. Olson. May. 

Mr. Miller. Then the next one is what month? 

Ms. Olson. August. 

Mr. Miller. You were listed as not present? 

Ms. Olson. Right. 

Mr. Miller. What is the next one? 

Ms. Olson. October. 

Mr. Miller. You are listed as not present. 

Ms. Olson. Right. 

Mr. Miller. What was going on? 

Ms. Olson. I can't recall. There were a lot of things going on. 

Mr. Miller. And this is what was happening to the stock? 

Ms. Olson. That was why there were a lot of things going on. 

Mr. Miller. You were not at the Advisory Committee. 

I would like to ask you a question of Ms. Ghilarducci. 

I think it is virtually impossible that this committee could exercise a fiduciary relationship, 

and I guess you can conclude that from our remarks. If this committee said, we want to sell the 

pension plans' Enron stock that is a message so devastating to the company and on Wall Street that 

it would be almost impossible for a major employee wearing a fiduciary hat to exercise that duty. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. That's right. Those fiduciary responsibilities require that if you think something 

will hurt the beneficiaries of the fund, the participants, they should have sold the stock. 

 So many pension funds have this dual-hat problem. A standard way that they deal with it is 

to always have independent counsel or employee representatives, or there might be two 

independent counsels, so they fight with each other. But Enron might be idiosyncratic in that they 

did not really straightforwardly recognize the conflict problem and do something about it. 

 I am also a trustee and a fiduciary on a large pension fund, and we have independent 

counsel.
129

Mr. Miller. I just think that is the bottom line, here. The lockdown period and all the rest is 

interesting, but you have a group of individuals who are Enron employees, and they give and take 

of all of the politics of any big structure, either corporate or the Congress or what have you. 

 And to walk in and to suggest that they should sell the stock at 38 or 24 or 12 or at 9 is, I 

think, threatening to their careers and to their livelihoods. That is why I say I don't envy the 

position you were put in, but I think it is an impossible position. I think it runs against the interest 

of the employees in the pension plan that is in that situation if you do not have employee 

representation or you do not have independent counsel or you do not have independent members of 

that board. 

 We have so-called independent members of the board of directors for that reason. Now we 

find out that many of them were conflicted financially. But that is the theory, that somebody is 

watching the store, because people have this crossed interest. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Right. 

Mr. Miller. Ms. Olson, you talked to an attorney or somebody about your stock, and it is reported 

that he said you were too emotionally wrapped up in this stock and you had to diversify and sell. 

That is the reason; I believe you testified to that. 

Ms. Olson. That, along with the fact that I had been taken off the Executive Committee and I was 

looking at leaving Enron. 

Mr. Miller. You were personally making a whole series of fiduciary relationships with respect to 

yourself, but they were not exercised with respect to the fund. 

Ms. Olson. It was my personal investment portfolio that was not diversified. 

Mr. Miller. I think that would be the same relationship that the employees would like to think you 

exercised on their behalf but did not. Thank you. 

The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. 

 The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Ballenger, for five minutes. 

Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 I would like to ask any members of the Enron employee group the following questions. 

Enron used stock to fund you all, not necessarily with money, but with their own stock. They 

backed up all these secret partnerships and so forth with stock. They used stock like it was water. 

 Was there any knowledge on your part that they were authorized by some vote of the 

stockholders or anybody else to issue all this stock? What kind of stock was it? Where did it come 

from? 
130

Ms. Rath. Congressman, the stock that funded the 401(k) match came from treasury shares. 

Mr. Ballenger. Was there an authorization for a number of shares in that treasury? 

Ms. Rath. I wouldn't know that. That would have to come from someone in our treasury 

department. 

Mr. Ballenger. You know, when the Condors got in trouble, they also pulled out 200,000 or 

300,000 shares to cover the debt that was there. It is like they can issue any stock at any moment. 

 Unless I am mistaken, that is not the law. Generally speaking, the law states that in order to 

have treasury stock to issue any time you want to, you have to have a vote of the stockholders to 

permit this. 

 You all were all stockholders? 

Ms. Rath. Yes. 

Mr. Ballenger. Were you ever questioned about voting to allow the board of directors to do this? 

Ms. Rath. All participants in the qualified plans that owned shares were sent proxy cards for each 

annual board of directors meeting; depending on how many shares they were voting. 

Mr. Ballenger. When they send you a proxy card they should legally send you the description of 

what is going to come up at the directors meeting. 

Ms. Rath. Yes, sir, they did. 

Mr. Ballenger. Did they say we authorize another 5 billion shares of stock to be offered at any 

time it becomes necessary? 

Ms. Rath. Quite honestly, I would have read the summary card, but I don't know that I can 

honestly tell you that I read through the entire thing. 

Mr. Ballenger. All I am saying is if they issued the stock and offered the stock to you as 

stockholders working with your 401(k), and they also used that same 300,000 or 400,000 shares to 

back up these partnerships that were in financial trouble, at least that is what I read in the news 

media, it would appear that not only the stockholders that worked at Enron were being misled and 

maybe illegally used. But also, there is a possibility that every stockholder in the United States was 

being misused. That is just me reading something into it that I hope is not there, but it sure appears 

that way. 

Ms. Olson, I hate to see you always have to be the one to answer questions, but you happen 

to have been in the position for a long time. You were put on the committee in 2001 and taken off 

again. When did you go on and when did you go off? 
131

Ms. Olson. The Administrative Committee? 

Mr. Ballenger. Yes. 

Ms. Olson. I was on the Administrative Committee starting in January, 2001. I am still on the 

committee. 

Mr. Ballenger. But at one time you were taken off. 

Ms. Olson. No, I was talking about the Executive Committee of Enron. I was put on the 

Executive Committee of Enron in 1999 and removed from that committee in late 2000 early 2001. 

I can't remember exactly. It was the end of the year. 

Mr. Ballenger. How many members were on the Executive Committee of Enron? 

Ms. Olson. Approximately twenty. 

Mr. Ballenger. Each one of them had fiduciary responsibility of some sort? 

Ms. Olson. The Executive Committee of Enron was the Executive Committee of the company. 

The Administrative Committee is the committee for the plan participants. 

Mr. Ballenger. Okay. Sherron Watkins was an accountant but had not been there a great length of 

time like you had? 

Ms. Olson. I don't believe she had been there as long as I had. 

Mr. Ballenger. Was she in the line of command? She obviously was probably below you. Where 

did she rank? 

Ms. Olson. She was one of the 400 vice presidents that we had at Enron. 

Mr. Ballenger. You were a vice president? 

Ms. Olson. I was an executive vice president. 

Mr. Ballenger. That made you the top vice president, I guess? 

Ms. Olson. Not the top. 

Mr. Ballenger. Could the Administrative Committee sell stock? Did you have the authority to do 

that?

Ms. Olson. Yes. We didn't feel like we had the total responsibility to do that. That was one of the 

reasons we went and got independent counsel. 
132

The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. 

 The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Owens, for five minutes. 

Mr. Owens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 I have been here for twenty years almost, and I was here when the savings and loan swindle 

took place. Most Americans don't know that the taxpayers were out $500 billion. That fact has 

been hidden from them. In the end, it cost more than $500 billion, and the taxpayers paid the bill. 

 Most of those transactions were dealt with in terms of civil wrongdoings, and civil penalties 

were imposed. In some cases, they fined individuals, and due to technicalities in the law, I have 

read recently that some of those individuals who had to pay financial penalties are suing now to get 

some of their money back. But most of them did not go to jail. 

Mr. Padgett, do you and the rest of your colleagues consider this situation that you find 

yourself in, where you have been victimized, as the result of a series of unfortunate accidents, or do 

you think there has been a racketeering swindle here? 

Mr. Padgett. Well. 

Mr. Owens. If that puts you on the spot, you don't have to answer. 

Mr. Padgett. I won't say it puts me on the spot. I have my own personal opinions, but as far as 

being able to answer that according to the law. 

Mr. Owens. Let me phrase it another way: Are any of your colleagues who have been swindled, 

demanding prosecutions of anybody at this time, do you know? I know there are some class action 

suits going forward, but is anybody demanding some prosecutions? 

Mr. Padgett. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Owens. Thank you. 

 I would like to ask Ms. Rath, how many shutdowns has Enron had in the last ten years; 

shutdowns of the pension fund? 

Ms. Rath. We have had two blackout periods in the savings plan since I have been there. 

Mr. Owens. Did any occur during the period when the price of stock was rising? 

Ms. Rath. The one prior to this one was in July of 1999. 

Mr. Owens. Both times the stock was going down? In July of 1999, it was already on the decline, 

right?
133

Ms. Rath. I don't remember, quite honestly, what the stock price was then. 

Mr. Owens. It went up to 90 at one point, right? It was declining. We have charts here which 

show it was declining at that time. So in both cases, the stock was going down. In periods where 

the stock was going up there have been no shutdowns. 

Ms. Ghilarducci, you have put your finger on something I would like to have explained in 

more simple detail. You said that taxpayers subsidize pension funds. Can you explain that in 

simple terms that we who are not economists and mathematicians can understand? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. That is hard if you are an economist, but I will try. 

 If you get a dollar in pay, you have to pay tax on that dollar. If you divert that dollar into a 

pension, you get an exemption from your income tax. It is deferred. You have to pay it when it 

comes out. We pay for it by not collecting taxes on money diverted and the investments that they 

earn on those funds. 

Mr. Owens. We have had many debates on pension funds in the last ten years on this Committee. 

At all times, the majority of Republicans have insisted that this is really the money of the 

corporations. The Federal Government should not interfere. That has been the song over and over 

again.

 So we have a situation where we have retreated from regulation and involvement and 

protection of the citizens because of this insistence that this is really the corporations' money, but 

the taxpayers have a stake here? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes. 

Mr. Owens. Let me ask one other question. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes. 

Mr. Owens. You said that there is a high probability of 401(k) failures. When did that wisdom 

come into being? How long have we known there is a high probability of failure? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. From the very beginning. 

Mr. Owens. From the very beginning? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes. Academic economists in pension policy knew they were much more risky 

than defined benefit plans, but no one really talked that way because 401(k) balances were going up 

along with the stock market. So the risk involved in those plans has been there from day one. 

Mr. Owens. We all know they are more risky, but you said a high probability of failure? 
134

Ms. Ghilarducci. Right. 

Mr. Owens. Has there been some information that substantiates that this has been in existence for 

some time? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. That is the analysis. They have higher fees. Human nature is such that people 

will trade incorrectly. There is also a high probability that you retire at a time that the markets are 

not doing as well. It is a matter of luck, as well. 

Mr. Owens. Did I hear you also say that ours is the only industrialized nation that does not require 

employee representation? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes. Yes. 

Mr. Owens. In other industrialized nations, I suppose the corporations can out vote the employee 

represented on the board, but at least the employee is there as an observer in most of the pension 

plans in other nations. Is that what you are saying? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes. I did a survey a couple of years back, and so has the World Bank. It is 

surprising. In about half the countries, the employees represent half of the trustees, and in this 

country, 8 percent of pension plans have joint trustees. Those are the ones that unions and 

management negotiate jointly. So we have experience here. 

Mr. Owens. Thank you. 

Mr. Castle. [Presiding.] Thank you. I yield myself five minutes. 

 Let me offer my sympathy to you, Mr. Padgett, and to a lot of other Enron employees and 

employees in other parts of the country who have had problems with things like this, too. Our goal 

is both to find out what happened at Enron, and to find out how we can solve these problems. 

Mr. Peterson, you indicated that in the management of Hewitt there is a ten basis point 

charge, which would be one-tenth of 1 percent, is that correct? 

Mr. Peterson. Excuse me. The point that I was trying to convey was the fee that Hewitt & 

Associates charges for administration. 

Mr. Castle. Are there other charges? 

Mr. Peterson. There are typically fund management fees, as well, not part of Hewitt. 

Mr. Castle. Are there funds within the pension plan that may have their own charges? 

Mr. Peterson. Probably in the neighborhood of ten basis points. 
135

Mr. Castle. Ms. Ghilarducci, when you say that fees of 20 to 40 percent caught your attention, I 

thought you were applying that to Enron, but you were not as it turned out later. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Right. 

Mr. Castle. I assume the ten basis point fee is probably in the realm of reasonable. Can you 

confirm that, or not? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Certainly. The Department of Labor, I have to refer you to them, has done 

extensive research on what the fees are, what is common, and the fact that they are growing. 

Mr. Castle. I'm just trying to find out if in your judgment ten basis points is a relatively fair fee. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. That is a small fee. That is a small part of earning in a plan. 

Mr. Castle. I understand that. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Enron would seem to have much higher fees. 

Mr. Castle. Do you know of any fees they have besides mutual fees, and the administrative fees? 

Are there other fees in Enron? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. I don't know about Enron. 

Mr. Castle. There might be other fees? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. The lawyer they hired, the independent counsel, would probably be counted as a 

fee on the form 5500. Practices vary. 

Mr. Castle. Let me ask this question of either Ms. Rath or Ms. Olson, about the switch to Hewitt. 

Why was the switch made? 

Ms. Olson. The switch was made to Hewitt from Northern Trust because of the service level that 

we were getting from Northern Trust. 

Mr. Castle. Was it just a service question or an investment question? 

Ms. Olson. There was also a consideration for the cost of the service, as well. Mikie was actually 

the one that was on the ground working that. She probably can answer that in more detail. 

Mr. Castle. Ms. Rath? 

Ms. Rath. We were very concerned about our service level. It had deteriorated, and I was 

working with Northern Trust pretty consistently to see if we could salvage that relationship over 

the period of years that I have been there. 
136

 When we realized that their technology would not support what we were requiring for 

24,000 participants in a $2 billion plan, we started looking at other providers. We selected Hewitt, 

and if you don't mind, I can tell you that we saved over $700,000 a year on our fees. 

Mr. Castle. It was really an administrative decision? You were not too worried about the choices 

of mutual funds or Enron stock or anything of that nature? Is that what you are saying here? 

Ms. Rath. Absolutely true. Callan Associates, who was our investment adviser, helped us select 

our funds, so we were pretty sure that our funds were in good order. We were looking for 

administration and technology. 

Mr. Castle. Okay. Let me go back to you, Ms. Olson. I get a little confused between Executive 

Committees and Administrative Committees and some of the committees you have referenced. 

 You seem to have been in a position where you were talking to other people or helping run 

aspects of the company, if not the company itself. I didn't really understand this when you were 

answering questions. The page we are referring to is the first page that says, "Dear Mr. Lay" that 

has other pages attached to it, but you only saw that first page, is that correct? 

Ms. Olson. Initially when Sherron Watkins came to me she showed me the first page. 

Mr. Castle. Right. It does bother me, frankly, that in reading that first page, it didn't raise a lot 

more flags than it did. I know you have already testified to this, and I know I am going over old 

ground. But the bottom line is that somebody in a position of authority, particularly with respect to 

pension plans and even their own stock, who would see this would probably have asked more 

questions or been pretty panicked. 

 You have indicated that she told you that she was not even sure if this was all true. I have 

heard you say that several times. But I have to tell you that I am still surprised that you would not 

have reacted to the point of talking to others. Did you speak to anybody else about this at that time 

or any time thereafter? 

Ms. Olson. Absolutely. I set up the meeting with Mr. Lay. I felt like it was serious enough. 

Mr. Castle. Did you speak to any of the committees that you were on, the Executive or 

Administrative Committees? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Castle. Did you share it with anyone else other than Mr. Lay? 

Ms. Olson. No. The only other person I spoke to about this was Mr. McMahon. Mr. McMahon 

was running the Global Products Group at the time, and Sherron Watkins had gone to him, as well. 

He had encouraged her to go to Mr. Lay. 
137

Mr. Castle. My time is up. I am going to ask you one question and that will be the end of my 

time. 

 Did it occur to you, even though it was potentially unfounded information, but had the 

ability to impact tremendously upon the value of Enron stock and even the future of the 

corporation, to share it with anyone else other than the two individuals you have named, Mr. Lay 

and Mr. McMahon, such as the full committee, or to call it to anyone's attention? 

Ms. Olson. No, because Mr. Lay and Vinson & Elkins were looking into it. I felt it was in good 

hands with them, and if there were something wrong, they would tell us. 

Mr. Castle. I accept your answer. I am not sure I totally agree with it, but I accept your answer. 

Mr. Kildee? 

Mr. Kildee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 I am puzzled, too, by the fact that you did not follow through on this letter from Ms. 

Watkins because it was unsubstantiated. If you were to receive a note saying that there was an 

explosive under the front seat of your car, you would check that out, would you not? 

Ms. Olson. More than likely, yes. 

Mr. Kildee. I know I would. I think any prudent person would. 

 While this was not an explosive underneath the front seat of your car, which you would 

have checked out, I'm sure, as you have indicated, the word "implode," that "this thing is going to 

implode" is on the front page of this letter. 

 It seems to me that there was a certain dereliction of not following through on this. I get 

mail and I have received mail through the years, and just with the first glance of it, I immediately 

check out the issue raised. I think this was a responsibility of yours to share this with other people 

on the Administrative Committee, as you would have checked out a report that there was a bomb or 

explosive under the front seat of your car. It was your responsibility to those people. 

Ms. Olson. I felt like by giving it to Mr. Lay and the Vinson & Elkins investigation, that was my 

responsibility.

Mr. Kildee. That is one of the problems we have here. You, in your capacity at Enron 

Corporation, are the fiduciary for the workers whose money is entrusted to you, and you are also an 

employer of Enron Corporation. 

 In reporting to Mr. Lay, you only acted upon one of your responsibilities. You reported to 

Mr. Lay. But your responsibility as fiduciary, to my mind, was not followed through on at all. The 

Administrative Committee should have been alerted to the fact that you had received something 
138

unsubstantiated.

 I have had threats on my life in my twenty-six years in Congress. I always turn those over 

to somebody. I have a responsibility to myself. You had a responsibility to other people. I find it 

baffling, and I can understand the conflict there, the inherent conflict of interest, but I cannot justify 

that you get information and only discuss it with your employer, not those whom you are really 

sworn to protect. 

 I find that very baffling, very disturbing. I want to trust my fiduciary, and not have my 

fiduciary just report to her employer, but also report to those who trust her to carry out her 

fiduciary responsibility. 

 May I ask Ms. Ghilarducci is there some way that we can craft legislation, first of all, to 

make sure that this inherent conflict we have here does not take place? Can we change Federal law 

on that, and does the President's proposal go far enough? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Other countries realize that corporate executives and pension trustees are often 

the same person and they have an inherent conflict. The way other countries deal with that is to put 

equal representation of employees on the board, in recognition that both have a stake. 

 The President's proposal does not talk about joint administration. We have experience in 

this country where that two-hat problem is solved, and that experience has been good. 

Mr. Kildee. Let me ask you this question, too, because you are an expert on this and you also 

function this way. 

 I have the highest voting record of anyone in Congress, so I attend meetings. The only 

reason I was not here yesterday was because I had two hearings scheduled at the same time. But if 

the fiduciary in charge were to miss about half of the meetings of the Administrative Committee 

within a year, is that malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or what? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. There is nothing in Federal law that says how many committee meetings you 

have to go to, but the standard interpretation would be considered malfeasance and neglect. 

The Chairman. Thank goodness there is no Federal law in having to attend a committee meeting. 

Mr. Kildee. It would be considered malfeasance, by missing about half the meetings? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Oh, yes. 

Mr. Kildee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Culberson, for five minutes. 
139

Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I represent west Houston and many hundreds if not 

thousands of Enron employees who have lost their jobs, as well as their life's savings. 

 I wanted to ask if you could give me an estimate, in your opinion how many employees at 

Enron lost their jobs and most, if not all, of their life's savings. 

Ms. Olson. Are you asking me? 

Mr. Culberson. Yes, just ballpark. 

Ms. Olson. As you probably know, over 4,000 people walked out of that building on December 

2nd or 3rd and lost their jobs. 

Mr. Culberson. How many lost most or all of their life's savings or most of their 401(k)s? 

Ms. Olson. I don't have an estimate for that. I don't know if Mikie does or not. 

Ms. Rath. We don't have an estimate of how many people lost, because it is very difficult to tell 

when people were actually buying stock. As of January, we still had 1,400 employees buying 

Enron stock at 39 cents, so it is difficult to know because of the daily environment who actually 

lost or who was just trading. 

Mr. Culberson. Okay, thank you. 

 Could you also please tell us for the record who to your knowledge participated in the 

decision to make the transition to Hewitt and begin that blackout period? Who participated in that 

decision, and why was that decision made to transfer to Hewitt and trigger this blackout period 

when employees could not trade or move their stock around in their 401(k)s? This question is for 

both you and Ms. Rath, please. 

Ms. Olson. The decision to not stop the transition was at a meeting including Mikie and myself, 

the director of benefits, and also our corporate counsel. And that decision was made based on the 

fact that we could not get information to all the plan participants that we were going to stop the 

transition in time, partially because of the anthrax issue. We as a nation were looking at that. And 

we had over half of the participants outside of the building all over the country, so that was the first 

meeting where we considered stopping the transition. 

 The next meeting we considered stopping the transition was the Administrative Committee 

meeting, where we had Hewitt present. We determined at that point that we could probably speed 

up the transition and finish it faster than we could stop it. 

Mr. Culberson. So the only people involved in that decision were who again? 

Ms. Olson. Myself, Mikie, Cynthia Barrow, the Director of Benefits, and Pat Macken, who was 

our Counsel. 
140

Mr. Culberson. The notification that went out to employees of the impending blackout period 

included the e-mails which the Committee has been provided copies of. I believe there is one dated 

September 27, 2001, and I am confident you have copies of these. Another is dated October 16th, 

one is dated October 22nd, and one is dated October 26th. 

 Have you seen these e-mails? Are these accurate reproductions of those e-mails that were 

sent out to company employees? 

Ms. Rath. The e-mail from September 27th was not sent out from the Enron benefits department. 

Our first e-mail went out in mid October, the 16th or 17th, and then we sent another e-mail out the 

following week, and then two e-mails on that Friday, the 26th. 

Mr. Culberson. These e-mails, though, are accurate copies, and you can verify the authenticity of 

these to the best of your personal knowledge? 

Ms. Rath. Yes. 

Mr. Culberson. Did Enron use any other method of notifying employees of the pending blackout 

period, other than the e-mails? 

Ms. Rath. Oh, definitely. 

Mr. Culberson. What were those? 

Ms. Rath. We sent out a tricolor, trifold color brochure to all of our participants because we do not 

have any way of notifying our 13,000 inactive participants of savings plan changes as we make 

them. So our policy has always been to mail to employees' homes, or participants' homes using the 

U.S. Postal Service. So we did that the first week of October. 

Mr. Culberson. I understand that there were thousands, as you have already testified, of people 

who lost their jobs and many who lost their life's savings as a result of the collapse of Enron. 

During this time in which the 401(k) plan was locked down, I understand there was also a deferred 

compensation plan known as a rabbi trust. 

 I wanted to ask if during this period of time in which the average employee was locked 

down and unable to make any changes or withdrawals from the 401(k), did any of the senior 

executives at Enron make any withdrawals from the deferred compensation plan known as the 

rabbi trust, and if so, who were they and how much did they withdraw? 

Ms. Rath. I am actually not an expert on the deferred compensation, but I can tell you that it was 

linked to the 401(k) plan, and both of those plans were moving together from Northern Trust to 

Hewitt. So for the particular blackout period and transition, it would have also been in transition 

from Northern to Hewitt at the same time. 

Mr. Culberson. Ms. Olson, could you answer that question, please? 
141

Ms. Olson. I am not aware of the deferral plan, either. That is in another area. That was in 

another area. I am not sure of that particular time frame. 

Mr. Culberson. Okay. 

 There is, I understand, under the securities code section 16(b) which designates that there 

are certain executives of the company that are responsible for corporate policy issues and trading 

activities, and if they do not fall under that classification, their trading activity is not reportable. 

 Do you know whether or not any of the most highly compensated traders at Enron were 

classified as people whose trades would not be reportable, and do you know if any of those people 

exercised options in 2001 to get out of their 401(k) plan? 

Ms. Olson. I'm sorry, I was not responsible during that time frame for that. I don't have that 

information. 

The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. 

 The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for five minutes. 

Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Olson, I was just looking at your attendance results from May to December. Did you 

get to the December 2nd meeting? 

Ms. Olson. I can't remember. 

Mr. Payne. It makes it either a 60 percent absence, and if you didn't make December, it is 70 

percent since May. I guess it is easier to remember the meetings you went to. 

 Let me just say also during the time you missed 70 percent of those meetings the stock went 

from $81.39 to $.40, if you were at the December 2 meeting. However, at the same time, you were 

fortunate to get some expert advice, and you were able to sell, or I guess get $6 million on some of 

your sales. Was that correct? 

Ms. Olson. From 1996 through 2001, that is correct. 

Mr. Payne. Okay. I thought I had something that said that much of this sale was done in 2001. I 

have something that says that "she," meaning you, sold "$6.5 million in Enron stock in 2000 and 

early 2001.” 

Ms. Olson. That was from 1996 through 2001. That was the total for those years. 

Mr. Payne. Okay, and your company does not have any sort of policy regarding the two meetings 

that you missed? Miss and you are off? I mean were you ill then, or do you remember? 
142

Ms. Olson. I just don't remember. 

Mr. Payne. Did you see Oliver North when he did the Iran Contra hearings? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Payne. If you get a chance to review it on the History Channel, you ought to do that, because 

he was something else, too. He didn't remember a thing. 

 Now, you had the Hewitt group come in. When did they come in as the auditors or 

whatever?

Ms. Rath. We transferred assets and record keeping functions to Hewitt beginning November 1st. 

Mr. Payne. Of 2001? 

Ms. Rath. 2001. 

Mr. Payne. When did the Northern Trust become your auditors, or the plan executors? 

Ms. Rath. They were our record keeper beginning in late 1993, early 1994, when our 401(k) plan 

went from a monthly-valued plan to a daily-valued plan. 

Mr. Payne. And the previous company you mentioned happened to be a minority firm, and they 

were terminated in 1993? 

Ms. Rath. I'm sorry; I thought you were asking me about our record keeper. 

Mr. Payne. No, I am talking about Northern Trust that was the overall administrator of your plans. 

Ms. Rath. Yes. 

Mr. Payne. They could not keep up, their computers were too slow, they were unsatisfactory, you 

talked about how bad a job they were doing, and therefore you changed companies. 

Ms. Rath. Yes. 

Mr. Payne. I was just wondering about the company that served previous to the Northern Trust. 

Ms. Rath. It was before me. I have no idea who was before Northern Trust. 

Mr. Payne. Okay. I just wanted to mention to the gentleman, Mr. Padgett, that I really am very 

sorry and disturbed that your whole fortune was lost, especially because of the unintended 

consequences you mention: that you were going to retire; you were going to get a little farm; you 

were going to try to help handicapped children, to relieve parents of handicapped children. Your 
143

parents, I'm sure they are getting older, and you wanted to spend a little more time to care for them. 

Mr. Padgett. Actually, Congressman, my mother passed away January 2nd, and my step dad 

passed away January 19th. 

Mr. Payne. I am really sorry to hear that. 

 The thing I am trying to bring out is that in this whole thrust for greed and this Midas touchkind of society we are living in today, not only are you injured, but also some children out there 

that may have been helped by what you would have provided. 

 You were satisfied, you worked hard, you just wanted to have a little peace and quiet and 

spend a little time with your wife and do a little fishing, just simple things. 

Mr. Padgett. Absolutely. 

Mr. Payne. But also to make a real difference in the lives of some other people who are stressed 

and need a little break. So, you see, this downward spiral effect is almost like Dante's Inferno. 

This is the seventh level of purgatory. What I have heard from some of these witnesses is 

distasteful, it is disgusting; and the arrogance of "we cannot remember," or the flip way that we just 

have no recall, and it was only $6 million in two years rather than four years. This is really what is 

gnawing at this great country: greed; people's insensitivity; the whole question of "give me my 

thing and let the rest go, wherever it might end up.” 

 Before my time expires, I want to say that once again, our hearts go out to you. 

Mr. Padgett. Thank you, Congressman. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Johnson, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good to see you all back. 

Ms. Rath, we talked about audits done each year. What was done with those audits? Were 

they given to you and were they reviewed by you? 

Ms. Rath. They were reviewed by me, yes, sir. 

Mr. Johnson. What was the result of your review? 

Ms. Rath. My review was just to make sure that everything was stated correctly from a textual 

standpoint. I didn't review all the numbers. 

Mr. Johnson. You indicated that the auditor made no recommendations is that true? Most of the 

audits I have seen, they provide a recommendation with them. 
144

Ms. Rath. We had one year where our audit firm, I don't remember whether it was this past year 

or the year before, didn't recommend that we change record keepers, but they strongly suggested 

that there were problems with Northern Trust. I don't remember the exact words of the letter, but 

there was definitely some caution in there. 

Mr. Johnson. Do you recall what the problem was with Northern Trust? 

Ms. Rath. The problem that was consistent was getting accurate data from their system. We had 

problems with an IRS audit for the same reason, and problems with our plan audits. It was pulling 

data out of that system that was inaccurate. 

Mr. Johnson. Really? How do you account for that? 

Ms. Rath. Northern Trust would have to account for that fact. 

Mr. Johnson. They did it for you? 

Ms. Rath. They did it for us. It was their computer systems. 

Mr. Johnson. To your knowledge, did the Administrative Committee review those audits? 

Ms. Rath. To my knowledge, the Administrative Committee did not review the audits. 

Mr. Johnson. The buck stopped at your desk? 

Ms. Rath. The buck stopped at my department, yes, sir. 

Mr. Johnson. Okay. I ask about payments from the 401(k) plans to executives, and you indicated 

you didn't know of any from the 401(k) plans. Were there any payments to the executives from 

any of the other benefit plans such as health plans or other plans that you might have? 

Ms. Rath. In my capacity, I reviewed the ESOP plan and the pension plan and the savings plan 

only. Our health plans were audited, but I couldn't speak to what payments were made from those 

plans.

Mr. Johnson. Out of the three you mentioned, there were no payments made. Is that true or false? 

Ms. Rath. We followed the guidelines pretty carefully, sir. I am pretty sure there were no 

payments made except those that were required to be made. 

Mr. Johnson. Is it, in your opinion, possible that it could have happened without you knowing 

about it? 

Ms. Rath. I cosigned letters authorizing the trust to make payments, so I didn't authorize or sign 

any letters to any individuals other than plan providers. 
145

Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

 Do you know, Ms. Olson, what the level of concern about the company's stock performance 

was in the Administrative Committee, which you were on, I understand? 

Ms. Olson. Yes, absolutely. That is why we went out and hired counsel and a financial adviser.

We did have a concern. 

Mr. Johnson. But you hired counsel and an adviser. Was that to protect yourselves, or was it to 

help the people in the plan? 

Ms. Olson. It was to help the people in the plan, to advise us what we needed to do. 

Mr. Johnson. What was their advice? 

Ms. Olson. They haven't come back with specific advice yet. 

Mr. Johnson. Come on. 

Ms. Olson. They haven't. 

Mr. Johnson. When did you ask for that counsel? 

Ms. Olson. We started working with them the first part of November. 

Mr. Johnson. They still haven't come back to you? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Johnson. Are you paying them? 

Ms. Olson. I think so. 

Mr. Johnson. Can you tell us who your legal counsel was? 

Ms. Olson. Cal Courtney. 

Mr. Johnson. Okay. Did they ever give you any advice about Enron's performance, or did they 

just walk off in the dark and say, we will see you later? 

Ms. Olson. We hired FTI, and they are the financial adviser that is working on giving us advice at 

this point. 

Mr. Johnson. Okay. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the questioning. 
146

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Roemer, for five 

minutes. 

Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Padgett, how much money did you start out with in your 401(k) account? 

Mr. Padgett. How much did I start out with? 

Chairman Boehner. How much did you get up to, finally? 

Mr. Padgett. At December 31, 2000, it was $615,000 approximately. At the highest point of the 

stock, it was probably $675,000. 

Mr. Roemer. When it was at $675,000 what was the stock worth? 

Mr. Padgett. About $90. 

Mr. Roemer. Today your 401(k) is worth how much? 

Mr. Padgett. Probably less than $5,000; I have not calculated lately. It kind of makes me ill. 

Mr. Roemer. I don't blame you. 

Ms. Olson, what is your 401(k) account worth today? Or what was it worth at its high peak, 

as Mr. Padgett's, and what is it worth today? 

Ms. Olson. At the high peak it was worth around $800,000. It is worth around $400,000 today. 

Mr. Roemer. You lost about half the value of your 401(k), and Mr. Padgett lost $600,000, almost 

everything. How do you explain that? 

Ms. Olson. Because I had some of my 401(k) in stable asset and not Enron stock. 

Mr. Roemer. So you had stock outside of just purely the Enron stocks? 

Ms. Olson. I took advantage of one of the other options. 

Mr. Roemer. Did you sell stock, though, as you walked into the building? You mentioned 

previously in your testimony that signs are flashing everywhere in the lobby that show what the 

stock is worth and TVs are on everywhere. 

 Were you selling Enron stock all the way through, since you received the memo from 

Sherron Watkins? 
147

Ms. Olson. No. The last options that I exercised were in March of 2001. 

Mr. Roemer. When did you get the memo from Sherron Watkins? When did she walk in? 

Ms. Olson. Sometime at the end of August of 2001. 

Mr. Roemer. She gave you this memo, and you didn't do anything with your stock after you saw 

this memo? 

Ms. Olson. I did sell 3,000 shares of my ESOP, which I have had since 1992. 

Mr. Roemer. Was that just a personal decision you made to do that? Did you discuss that with 

friends or a stockbroker or personal advisers, or did you just decide to sell? 

Ms. Olson. It was the few days before it was imminent, according to the media that we were going 

to file bankruptcy, so I moved my 3,000 shares of ESOP to a stable asset in the 401(k). 

Mr. Roemer. Yet Mr. Padgett, who was totally exposed with Enron stock, does not receive any 

kind of advice. He is not seeing the Enron board flashing the demise of the company, he is off in 

another part of the Enron Corporation, and he loses everything. 

 How did Mr. Lay react when you gave him the memo that Sherron Watkins had given you 

saying that there was something seriously wrong with Enron? 

Ms. Olson. Actually, she took the memo with her to meet with Mr. Lay. I had set up the meeting, 

and she gave him the memo. 

Mr. Roemer. So you called Mr. Lay and said, “Ms. Watkins has a serious concern, serious enough 

to set up a meeting with you. I think you should meet with her”? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. I said that I thought he should meet with her. 

Mr. Roemer. It was serious enough to meet with Mr. Lay, but not serious enough to act on in your 

role as a fiduciary for the rest of the people like Mr. Padgett? 

Ms. Olson. The reason Ms. Watkins wanted to meet with Mr. Lay was for him to kick off an 

investigation to determine if her allegations were accurate. That is what Mr. Lay did. 

Mr. Roemer. But the allegations were serious enough for you to call the CEO of the company, 

who you report directly to, and say, “You should sit down and meet with her,” yet you did not 

attend meetings to do something about that serious concern and try to help the rest of the 

employees? 

Ms. Olson. I believed that it was in the hands of Mr. Lay and Vinson & Ellis and it would be 

handled that way. 
148

Mr. Roemer. Did you follow up with Mr. Lay then, and ask, “How did the meeting go with Ms. 

Watkins? Should we do anything, Mr. Lay? We have a lot of exposed employees here. What 

should we do, Mr. Lay?” What did she say to you, and do you think there is some kind of veracity 

and accuracy in this memo? 

Ms. Olson. Mr. Lay or Ms. Watkins, one of the two, let me know they were kicking off an 

investigation of Vinson & Elkins. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time is expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Georgia.

Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we could continue to pursue some rounds on this, 

and again I appreciate the time. 

Chairman Boehner. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Isakson. 

Mr. Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Ghilarducci, I appreciated the four-point recommendations that you made. I wanted to 

ask you about one of them. As I remember it, one of your recommendations was that there be 

some type of legal limitation on the percentage of a 401(k) plan that could be in the company's 

stock. Is that correct? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Absolutely. 

Mr. Isakson. Let me tell you the foundation for my question so it does not appear to be a loaded 

question. I'm always worried that we in Congress let the pendulum go too far the other way, and, 

because of a terrible incident, end up prohibiting a lot of very positive things. 

 By way of example, yesterday in his testimony Mr. Miller's posted some 20 companies and 

the percentage of their company stock that was in 401(k) s. One of them was Home Depot, which 

happens to be a company founded in my district and a company that I know a lot about from its 

founders. The chart is not here today, but I believe it showed that 74 percent or thereabouts of 

Home Depot's 401(k) plans were in Home Depot stock. 

 Now, my recollection of the Home Depot success story was that in its early days it used 

company stock contributions and encouraged investment in company stock in the 401(k) as an 

incentive to build a company, because the workers actually had equity. The story, if I remember 

correctly, is Home Depot made millionaires out of thousands of their employees because it was the 

employee’s work that produced the great success story. 

 I completely understand forced diversification by a capitated corporate plan could have 

possibly protected Mr. Padgett to the extent whatever that capitation was on Enron stock. I also 

realize had he been an employee of Home Depot, it would have prohibited him from significant 

earnings.
149

 So here's my two-part question. If the Congress got into that type of recommendation or it 

was offered, do you think in your learned opinion that it ought to be a provision that employees 

should be informed of and could opt out of instead of it being mandatory across-the-board? That 

would cause the employee to be informed, and it would cause them to make conscious decisions. 

Would you think that would serve the purpose of employee protection, while not preventing them 

from benefiting from the honorable efforts that are true in this country? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. I appreciate the question. I've thought about it quite a bit, and in my testimony I 

notice that that employee would be conflicted. So to put in less than they want would seem 

disloyal and so they would be conflicted. 

 When the Studebaker workers lost their pension in a town I happen to live in now, Congress 

saw fit to restrict the investments or mandate diversification in defined benefit plans to 10 percent.

I know there are celebrity companies that have a high percentage of their employee stock into 

401(k)s, but on average it's about 15 percent. So I do think there should be a mandate, because the 

employee with just education has too many other conflicting urges not to take good advice. 

Mr. Isakson. I know you used some individual psychology in your explanation. So your response 

is that to some of the employees the appearance of disloyalty in their minds would force them to 

waive the 20 percent prohibition and go ahead and put more in. Is that correct? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Some employees, though, would realize they could be loyal to the company and 

also be diversified in their fund. 

Mr. Isakson. I want to ask this question. In the end, though, isn't the integrity of the management 

of the company the ultimate decider in that factor? And by that, I mean if a company would make 

an employee feel intimidated and not loyal because they didn't waive the mandatory diversification, 

it might be the same type of a company that would have purported to be in far better shape than it 

really was. Isn't that probably true? 

Mr. Isakson. Oh, the Enron-type situation would be an exception? 

Mr. Isakson. No. The point is the integrity of the management ultimately would be the decider. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. I know you want yes or no, and I think it depends. 

Mr. Isakson. We don't ever answer yes or no, so I can understand why you wouldn't. I yield back, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time is expired. 

 The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Holt, for five minutes. 

Mr. Holt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
150

Ms. Olson, the Chairman and Mr. Roemer and others have made much of the fact that you 

took this memo in August seriously, or at least seriously enough to set up a meeting with the CEO 

of this corporation whose time I'm sure was precious. And yet you didn't take this to your advisory 

committee that had a fiducial responsibility for looking at the assets of the employees. 

 You also said that you had, it sounded to me, at best, casual introduction to your fiducial 

responsibilities. No one sat you down. No lawyer met with you. No official from an outside 

agency presented you with a course or even a booklet on your fiducial responsibilities. Is that true? 

Ms. Olson. Not that I can recall. 

Mr. Holt. So it sounds like it was at best casual. At least it didn't make much of an impression, if 

it existed at all. 

 Is there anything that would have helped you exercise your fiducial responsibilities if it had 

existed earlier, perhaps in regulation? 

Ms. Olson. Potentially more information. 

Mr. Holt. Okay. Did your group ever talk about the need, the desire to provide investment advice 

but you felt constrained because the ERISA regulations prohibited a provider offering investment 

advice? 

Ms. Olson. We didn't talk about that in the Administrative Committee, but the benefits department 

spent a lot of time trying to push diversification within the company. A lot of the brochures and 

materials were sent out to employees, and we also held a benefit fairs. Several years ago we had 

some actual investment seminars, but in the benefits area, we always felt like there was a fine line 

that we shouldn't cross with respect to providing independent investment advice to our employees. 

Mr. Holt. Thank you. 

Ms. Ghilarducci, is there anything in practice or theory that suggests there's a reason why 

executives should have different rights to adjust their portfolios, just to buy or sell, or to have 

different lockout periods than workers? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. No. 

Mr. Holt. And with regard to the percentage of company stock in a parent company, you said all 

academic experts in the field would agree that there should be some limit. Could you say a bit 

more about that? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Oh, yes. Despite Mr. Boehner saying that I've come here a lot, I only came here 

once before, and there was a panel of academic experts. 

Chairman Boehner. It must have been because you're so memorable. 
151

Ms. Ghilarducci. You were here, too. There was a whole panel of us on very different spectrums 

of economic ideology and methodology, John Shoven from Stanford, and we all agreed that there 

should be some diversification in retirement plans because those are tax deferred and they're for 

long-term savings. The productivity issue that was raised is really produced by Congress through 

the ESOP plans and that's different. 

Mr. Holt. Okay. Mr. Peterson, I see the time is moving along, so, just quickly, who would have 

the most motivation to provide genuine balanced investment advice to employees? And what 

would give an advisor the appropriate motivation to provide it? 

Mr. Peterson. Maybe I can answer with an example of what Hewitt & Associates does in our own 

plan. We've made investment advice available to our associates through an independent provider. 

Mr. Holt. And what provides the motivation to do that? 

Mr. Peterson. That provider, they have no other relationship with us or with any of the investment 

managers. 

Mr. Holt. And who pays them to do it? 

Mr. Peterson. Hewitt Associates does. 

Mr. Holt. And why does Hewitt pay them to do that? 

Mr. Peterson. I think it's just supporting the notions we've been talking about here this morning of 

having this be something that Hewitt Associates has decided is appropriate for our people, for our 

employees. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time is expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Tiberi, for five minutes. 

Mr. Tiberi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Padgett, we heard a little bit about your situation. You've been with Enron ten years, I 

understand?

Mr. Padgett. Yes, sir. Ten years, but with thirty years credited service. 

Mr. Tiberi. Thirty years credited service. And you lost, according to Mr. Roemer's question, 

$600,000 in your 401(k) plan? 

Mr. Padgett. I lost a little over $600,000. 
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Mr. Tiberi. During your ten years with Enron, were you provided with stock options as Ms. Olson 

was? 

Mr. Padgett. Yes, we were. In 1994, I believe it was, Enron granted hourly paid employees some 

stock options. 

Mr. Tiberi. And so you were offered stock options? 

Mr. Padgett. Yes. 

Mr. Tiberi. Have you exercised those stock options? 

Mr. Padgett. I exercised a portion of the first grant to buy my wife a new vehicle, and the rest of 

them I left in there because I had until 2004 before they expired. So with all that management was 

telling us as far as the price of the stock going up, I felt like I'd leave them there until it got even 

higher.

Mr. Tiberi. When did you exercise the portion? 

Mr. Padgett. The portion I exercised was in 2000, I believe. 

Mr. Tiberi. What was the worth of the stock then? Do you recall? 

Mr. Padgett. The stock was worth I want to say $80-something a share. 

Mr. Tiberi. And how much did you cash out, how many shares? 

Mr. Padgett. I cashed out about 800 shares. 

Mr. Tiberi. And how much was that worth at the time? 

Mr. Padgett. Oh, gosh, about $60,000. 

Mr. Tiberi. And how much stock do you have remaining? 

Mr. Padgett. I've got about 2,150 shares left of that first grant. They also gave us two other 

grants. One, I don't remember the exact dates, was when the price of the stock was about $83 or 

$86 a share. I believe that was in 2000. Then when the stock dropped to $36 a share, they gave us 

another grant at $36 a share. So it probably gives me a total of around 3,000 shares of stock 

options.

Mr. Tiberi. And what is the value of that today? 

Mr. Padgett. Zero. Worthless. 
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Mr. Tiberi. Ms. Olson, you were a member of the Administrative Committee for Enron. That's 

been established today. What would you say your role was as a member of that committee? 

Ms. Olson. We saw our role as threefold: to ensure that the 401(k) had adequate investment 

options, to monitor the pension investments, and to take any grievances. 

Mr. Tiberi. As a member of the committee, do you believe the committee had a role in designing 

the plan, and, if not, who designed the plan? 

Ms. Olson. The board of directors was in charge of plan design. 

Mr. Tiberi. Could the committee add or subtract options? 

Ms. Olson. The committee could recommend changes to the plan design. 

Mr. Tiberi. And the final authority was with? 

Ms. Olson. The final authority was with the board of directors. 

Mr. Tiberi. How often did the committee, during your period of time with the committee, 

recommend changes? 

Ms. Olson. During that period of time, I didn't see any recommendations coming from the 

committee. 

Mr. Tiberi. Did the committee offer or recommend to the board any design with respect to Enron 

stock? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Tiberi. It never did while you were there. Did the committee, other than walking through the 

building and watching the TV or in the elevators, have a formal role in monitoring Enron stock? 

Ms. Olson. I don't believe so. 

Mr. Tiberi. So you did not monitor Enron stock as a committee? 

Ms. Olson. Not as a committee. Each individual, I'm sure, monitored Enron stock. 

Mr. Tiberi. Did the committee ever discuss informing Enron employees about allocation of Enron 

stock in their plan? 

Ms. Olson. No. I don't recall us ever discussing that. 
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Mr. Tiberi. And the committee then also never talked about providing information to Enron 

employees about diversification in their plan? 

Ms. Olson. I don't recall discussing that as a committee. We did as a benefits department. 

Mr. Tiberi. But not the Administrative Committee? 

My time is almost expired. Ms. Rath, as a benefits department, what did the committee 

determine was the appropriate role for your office in providing information about diversification? 

Ms. Rath. My office would monitor recent legislation. We would monitor employee requests, and 

then we would either make recommendations to the Administrative Committee to consider, or we 

would be asked by the Administrative Committee to do certain functions or to provide information 

to them. 

Mr. Tiberi. I have just one final question. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 

Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney. 

Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Olson, back in the period between the last month of the year 2000 and March of 2001, 

you testified I think yesterday that you sold 83,000 shares of Enron stock for $6-1/2 million.

Correct?

Ms. Olson. No. Over those years I sold $6-1/2 million from 1996 through 2001. 

Mr. Tierney. And was there a period of time when your sales were heavier than others? 

Ms. Olson. Yes, in late 2000 and 2001. 

Mr. Tierney. Now, did you get any advice from somebody as to whether or not to hold your 

shares in Enron or to diversify or to sell? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. 

Mr. Tierney. Who did you go to for advice, somebody within the company or someone outside? 

Ms. Olson. I went to someone outside the company. 

Mr. Tierney. And who in particular would that be? 

Ms. Olson. His name was Dean Lane with Compass Bank. 
155

Mr. Tierney. And is advising his business, or is he just a friend? 

Ms. Olson. No. He's in the business of advising. 

Mr. Tierney. Why did you go to such an individual outside the company? 

Ms. Olson. I was thinking about leaving the company. I'm close to fifty. My husband and I were 

looking at retiring, and we just felt like it was important to take a look at our financial position. 

Mr. Tierney. What was going on in the company at that time that led you to think that you had to 

worry about whether you held your stock in the fashion it had been held for some period of time or 

change that plan? 

Ms. Olson. It wasn't what was going on with the company. It was what was going on with me 

personally in the company. 

Mr. Tierney. When you met with your advisor, what did you share with him about the condition 

of Enron at that time? 

Ms. Olson. It was a great company. I thought the stock was going to go up. 

Mr. Tierney. And yet, regardless of that comment, he still advised you to diversify? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. He said I was way too emotionally involved in my stock and he had had other 

clients in similar positions with Compaq and Lucent stock. He highly advised me to think about 

diversifying.

Mr. Tierney. Okay. Mr. Padgett, did you have anybody advising you as to whether or not to hold 

your Enron stock or to diversify? 

Mr. Padgett. No, sir. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Tierney. You did have communications, however, from Mr. Lay and others within the 

company about holding the stock or about investing in the stock? 

Mr. Padgett. Yes, sir. We were constantly encouraged to invest in the stock. 

Mr. Tierney. And how were you encouraged? Was it oral communication or written in some 

form? 

Mr. Padgett. It was usually through e-mail communications. 

Mr. Tierney. I've read in the testimony and in comments that you made elsewhere that you 

thought at some point in time the company may have changed or deleted some aspects of the 

e-mail. 
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Mr. Padgett. It appears so. 

Mr. Tierney. How does it appear that the company altered the e-mails that led you to keep your 

investments in Enron stock? 

Mr. Padgett. I don't know if I understand the question or not. 

Mr. Tierney. Well, the indications were that you thought the e-mails had been altered in some 

regard.

Mr. Padgett. Some of the e-mails had been deleted. 

Mr. Tierney. Entirely. 

Mr. Padgett. From my e-mail computer, they were. 

Mr. Tierney. From your memory, what were the contents of some of those e-mails? 

Mr. Padgett. They were conditions or statements of the company. 

Mr. Tierney. Such as? 

Mr. Padgett. Such as the company was in great shape. 

If I remember correctly, one of the e-mails was from Mr. Lay and stated that the company 

was in the best shape it's been in years. 

Mr. Tierney. And did other individuals within the company give that advice in addition to Mr. 

Lay? 

Mr. Padgett. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tierney. And who were they, if you remember? 

Mr. Padgett. Mr. Horton. 

Mr. Tierney. What's his position? 

Mr. Padgett. I don't know exactly what his position was. I think at one time he was CEO of our 

division, which was the clean fuels division. 

Mr. Tierney. At any time, were you ever provided with access to a non-conflicted adviser, 

somebody that could advise you with respect to your holdings that didn't have a simultaneous 

interest in Enron? 
157

Mr. Padgett. No, sir, not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Tierney. Do you think, Mr. Padgett that having a non-conflicted adviser would have been of 

use to you with respect to how you maintained your retirement account? 

Mr. Padgett. Yes, sir. I believe it would have. I believe it would have given me more 

information to work with. 

Mr. Tierney. And obviously I think from the circumstances you just indicated, that getting advice 

from somebody that's conflicted with the company wasn't very useful to you at all, was it? 

Mr. Padgett. No, sir it wasn't. 

Mr. Tierney. And you relied on that conflicted advice, obviously, to your detriment. 

Mr. Padgett. Absolutely. We trusted management. We trusted the company. 

Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Well, point that out. My time is running out. The sole purpose of that is 

the one individual here who had contact with a nonconflicted adviser managed to diversify her 

portfolio and do substantially quite well. You, on the other hand, did not have anything except for 

conflicted advice, and only you suffered from that. 

 Part of the legislation the Administration proposed would in fact support the Chairman's 

bill, another bill that would allow for conflicted advice. Many of us, Mr. Padgett, have had to 

believe that advice is great, it ought to be provided, but it ought not to be conflicted. There's no 

reason at all for conflicted advice. I think that you're the poster child for that, unfortunately. 

Mr. Padgett. Absolutely. 

Mr. Tierney. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. [Presiding] Thank you. 

Ms. Woolsey, could I ask one question? 

Ms. Woolsey. I suppose. 

Mr. Johnson. Bless your heart. You're a sweetheart. 

Mr. Peterson, a witness before the Senate committee complained that the blackout period 

lasted longer than November the 13th for some plan participants. Do you know anything about 

that? Can you discuss those difficulties? 

Mr. Peterson. No, sir, I can't. The services we were providing were available starting on 

November 13th. 
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Mr. Johnson. Do you know, Ms.Rath? 

Ms. Rath. No, sir. We had sent out a postcard to all of our participants telling them to either 

watch the Internet or call a recorded line so that we could notify them of the early date. 

Mr. Johnson. So, according to your information, there was no extension. 

Ms. Rath. No extension. We went live the morning of November 13th. 

Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Woolsey, you're recognized. 

Ms. Woolsey. Thank you very much. 

This is so hard for me, because twenty years before I got here, I was a human resources 

professional. From 1969 to 1980, I was part of a start-up company. I was the number six 

employee, and when I left, we had over 700 employees. Now, 700 versus 23,000, there's a big 

difference. But I keep thinking that when I first went into the business of human resources, it was 

at the beginning of ERISA, and that was when ESOPs first came to the forefront. We did all that 

because it was a telecom and actually has become a Fortune 300 company now. 

 So I keep thinking what I would have done if what happened to Enron was happening to my 

company. And I can hear my voice. I would not have let up until the president of that company 

paid attention to what was happening to the employees, their benefits, their futures and their 

livelihoods. But I know there's a difference between 700 and 23,000 employees. 

 Ms. Olson, I want to know if you would tell us how far removed were you from Mr. Lay in 

the reporting, in the hierarchy? Did you report directly to him? 

Ms. Olson. I report directly to him. 

Ms. Woolsey. Okay. So in your interactions with him in his “we'll put it off until tomorrow” 

decisions, what was that doing to you? I mean, I don't see how you could live with yourself. I'd 

have been frantic, because that was my job. I knew my job was to actually protect the people, and 

also the reputation of my company. You're a vice president in community relations. What a 

terrible thing for your company to be known for now. 

I want to tell you, I can't bear the thought of you ending up being responsible for all of this.

Somebody else really is. Who do you think that is? 

Ms. Olson. I can't say. There are so many investigations. A report was just issued. The courts 

will decide. I don't know. 
159

Ms. Woolsey. Do you think it was your responsibility? Are you going to end up holding the bag 

on this? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Ms. Woolsey. Does anybody else want to comment on who they think was responsible? No? 

Well, when we're all through with this, if a vice president ends up holding the bag and the 

people above end up going free, we really, really have a problem in this country. So I hope you 

participate fully in the investigation so people know exactly what happened and who ultimately 

made the decisions. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Andrews from New Jersey, the Ranking Member, Subcommittee for EmployerEmployee Relations. 

Mr. Andrews. Thank you. I thank all the witnesses for what I'm sure has been a very difficult 

process. We thank you for coming and testifying. 

Truthfully, as you know, Ms. Olson, on June 25th of 2001, you were present for a meeting 

of the Administrative Committee. As I read the minutes of the meeting, the purpose of it was to 

choose among three candidates to be the large cap manager for, I assume, the cash balance plan. 

Ms. Olson. It was for the pension fund. 

Mr. Andrews. Okay, for the pension fund. And you made a motion to approve one of the three 

applicants and the motion was approved. Without being real specific as to why you supported that 

one applicant, what was your reasoning for choosing one of the applicants over the other two? 

Why did you do it? 

Ms. Olson. As I recall, Jim Neugard, who works in our Treasury Department and came to every 

Administrative Committee meeting, provided us with information about these advisers. And we 

were working with Cowan & Associates as well. I believe it was Swiss Bank. 

Mr. Andrews. Yes. To be honest with you, it's sort of beside the point. I assume what you did is 

make a choice among three people. What was the basis of that choice? 

Ms. Olson. They just appeared to be better. Their returns were better. 

Mr. Andrews. Right. Better for whom? 

Ms. Olson. For the participants. 

Mr. Andrews. For the participants in the plan. 

Ms. Olson. Right. 
160

Mr. Andrews. And that's really the essence of fiduciary duty, and I know that you understand it. I 

know that that's something that has meaning to you as a professional. A lot of the questions today 

have been about other circumstances over the last fifteen months or so. Where it's baffling to an 

observer is why you didn't do some other things that would have been in the best interest of the 

participants. 

 You know, in the beginning of this whole process, to look at a situation where participants 

in a 401(k) plan have all of their assets in the company stock, as Mr. Padgett did, raises some 

questions about education for investors. In March of 2001 when the Fortune magazine article 

appeared about the company being in grave and dire straits, I think I understand from your 

testimony that you didn't discuss that magazine article with any of the other members of the 

Administrative Committee. Correct? 

Ms. Olson. No. We didn't discuss it. 

Mr. Andrews. And at the time that you sold many of your own shares of the stock, for whatever 

reason, you didn't discuss any possible financial trouble Enron had with any other members of the 

Administrative Committee. Right? 

Ms. Olson. No. That was a personal decision. 

Mr. Andrews. And when you received this now infamous memo from Ms. Watkins in August of 

2001, as Mr. Roemer said, it was of such magnitude that this fairly mid-level employee, one of 400 

people at her level, gets to see the boss of the company. It must have been a major, major deal. 

But it's my understanding from your testimony that you didn't discuss that memo with other 

members of the Administrative Committee. Correct? 

Ms. Olson. Correct. 

Mr. Andrews. And you didn't change the education program so that people like Mr. Padgett 

would know that at least it was an issue that people thought the company might be in trouble. Is 

that correct? 

Ms. Olson. That's correct. 

Mr. Andrews. Mr. Padgett, during that time, outside of any popular media, any mass media, did 

the company tell you anything about any problems it might be having? 

Mr. Padgett. No, sir, they did not. 

Mr. Andrews. Okay. Now, Ms. Olson, it is obvious to me that you are an accomplished 

professional, that you have earned your way to a very high position in your profession, and that you 

are someone who knows what she is doing. I would like to follow up on Ms. Woolsey's line of 

questioning, because it seems to me that there's another story behind why a person of such 

outstanding achievement would make oversights or fail to do things that seem to be pretty 
161

obviously need to be done. 

 I think the reason might lie in this: What would have happened if in April of 2001, you had 

gone to a meeting of the Administrative Committee and suggested that an e-mail be sent out, 

suggesting that there were significant reportings that Enron stock was losing great value and the 

company might be in some severe financial trouble? If you had made that recommendation to the 

Administrative Committee, what would have happened to you in your position as an employee of 

the company? 

Ms. Olson. I honestly don't feel like I would have been at risk. 

Mr. Andrews. You think that you wouldn't have been at risk? You think your career would have 

been in any way compromised or jeopardized by making that kind of disclosure? 

Ms. Olson. That's hard to say. 

Mr. Andrews. Did anyone ever tell you not to make such a disclosure? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Andrews. Did anyone ever suggest that it would be in your best interest not to make such a 

disclosure? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Andrews. Did you ever discuss the possibility of making such a disclosure with one of your 

superiors at the company? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Mr. Andrews. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Boehner. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. Scott of Virginia, you are recognized. 

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I said yesterday, and I'll say again today, that I'm not as offended as some 

other people are about the idea of some regulation over these pension funds. We have Social 

Security, which is a safety net, and private investing where you can do whatever you want. There's 

an expectation from pension funds that's different from the ordinary investment accounts, even to 

the point where the Federal Government guarantees some of the pension funds. 
162

So like I said if there's some limitation on investment options and on company stock, if in 

the fullness of time most of the value is capital gains, I'm not offended. There are some 

calculations that question whether or not you're better off outside of a taxable account, because 

when you draw it out of a 401(k), you have to pay ordinary income tax, whereas if you just cash it 

out, you're paying at the capital gains rate. 

 Having said that, Mr. Peterson, I notice that you called your function, I think, record keeper. 

Mr. Peterson. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Scott. Which is different from administrator and fiduciary, which will have other 

implications. Did you have a fiduciary obligation? 

Mr. Peterson. No, we did not. We did not exercise any discretion in the process. 

 Sir, if I may, just to clarify something that was said earlier and make sure that it's certain it's 

clear; we are not trustee of the plan. We do not control the assets themselves. 

Mr. Scott. You have a list up on the board that says investment options available under the 401(k) 

plan. Who decides what the investment options are? 

Mr. Peterson. Enron decides those. 

Mr. Scott. Enron makes those decisions. 

 Who at Enron makes those decisions? 

Mr. Peterson. I'll defer to the folks on my right. 

Ms. Rath. Those investment options are determined by recommendation, either from an 

investment adviser, such as Cowan & Associates, or through a recommendation from the Benefits 

Department to the Admin Committee. 

Mr. Scott. Who has the fiduciary responsibility to make sure that whatever the investment options 

are, are in fact appropriate for pension funds? Does anybody have that fiduciary responsibility? I 

mean you've got a limited list of options. Anybody? Is there any screening process to determine 

whether or not the things that you can buy in the pension fund are in fact appropriate for pension 

funds? 

Ms. Olson. I believe the Administrative Committee does. 

Mr. Scott. You believe? 

Ms. Olson. Yes. 
163

Mr. Scott. You're saying that they do in fact have a fiduciary responsibility to ascertain whether or 

not the investment options are appropriate for pension funds? They do? 

Ms. Olson. To make sure that the investment options that we offer in our pension funds are good 

options.

Mr. Scott. Okay.

Mr. Peterson, in your function as record keeper, you indicated that you're charging fees that 

are in the ten basis points range. Some of the investment options of mutual funds charge annual 

fees in the sixty to one hundred and fifty basis points range. Does anybody get a commission or 

anything like that if people buy one of the funds that charge those kinds of fees? 

Mr. Peterson. Hewitt Associates and other record keepers sometimes receive contributions toward 

our fees, which are used to reduce the fees that are otherwise paid by the plan or by the plan 

sponsor from the fund managers. 

Mr. Scott. Does that create a conflict of interest if some are kicking back more than others; you'd 

have an interest in getting those on the board? 

Mr. Peterson. No, sir, because it reduces fees that are otherwise paid by the plan sponsor or by the 

participants. 

Mr. Scott. We're kind of fraught over what is happening, and nobody has taken responsibility. I'd 

just like to say that somebody is going to have criminal or civil liability for this. 

 My time is running out. I wanted to ask a quick question on the blackout period. I notice 

on our own Thrift Savings Plan we have a blackout period for 6 weeks. If we don't get in a request 

to change allocation or something by the 15th of the month, it will be 6 weeks later before it 

becomes effective. What are normal blackout periods in other thrift savings, 401(k)-type plans? 

Mr. Peterson. Would you like me to respond to that? 

Mr. Scott. Yes, please. 

Mr. Peterson. It sounds to me like the period that you describe is something that's on a regular 

ongoing basis. What we've been discussing in the context of the Enron situation that does occur 

regularly has to do specifically with changing a record keeper or trustee or something like that. As 

to your question about duration, very significantly depending on the circumstances we've seen, 

blackout periods that are as short as a few days to a week and other times where it's several weeks, 

over a month long. 

Mr. Scott. Up to a month long? 

Mr. Peterson. Even over a month long. 
164

Mr. Scott. Is 6 weeks unusual? 

Mr. Peterson. I've seen situations where a blackout is 6 weeks. I'd say today that's on the high 

side.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Boehner. Thank you.

Ms. Rivers, do you want to question? 

Ms. Rivers. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to the panel.

One of the things that strikes me with such magnitude today is the seeming, and I use the 

word “seeming”, indifference to what was going to happen to employees here. Ms. Olson, maybe I 

do not understand exactly.

What it seems like I'm hearing is that a memo came through suggesting that there were big 

problems. You passed that information on but didn't feel any responsibility to do anything about it. 

Internal and external information was becoming available that there was a problem with Enron 

stock. The company was continuing to push its stock with its employees, and you didn't feel any 

responsibility to say anything about that. You at the same time were selling your own stocks for 

personal reasons, but usually divesting yourself of the potential liability.

What strikes me is what seems to be total indifference on your part to the potential impact 

of what was going on could have on people in the company. Can you explain that? I mean, weren't 

you concerned about people? 

Ms. Olson. Absolutely. I was concerned about people. That was one of the reasons why Sherron 

Watkins came to me. I was an employee advocate, and I felt very comfortable that what she 

wanted was to be heard by Mr. Lay and that she wanted an investigation kicked off by Vinson & 

Elkins. She told me that her allegations were not substantiated. 

Ms. Rivers. So you felt her needs were being met, but what about the needs of the other 

employees? 

Ms. Olson. I didn't even link the two. 

Ms. Rivers. I see.

Are you familiar with the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire from 1911? The Triangle 

Shirtwaist Factory went up in flames, and the floors above the first two were where all the workers 

were and the doors were locked, and the workers couldn't leave, and they either perished in the 

flames or they jumped to their death. They were all women. The first two floors were where the 

executives were, and they walked out to safety.
165

If someone came into your office and said there’s a fire downstairs, could you feel 

comfortable sending them on to another office and doing nothing yourself? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Ms. Rivers. Would you feel an obligation to warn people that there was a fire even though you 

hadn't confirmed it yourself? 

Ms. Olson. Probably. 

Ms. Rivers. Probably. Would you feel that if the company was telling people there are sprinklers 

all through this building and you don't have to worry and you knew there weren't any sprinklers and 

there was a fire, would you tell people not to believe what the company is saying and that they 

should get out? 

Ms. Olson. If I knew that for sure, yes. 

Ms. Rivers. And would you think it was right to keep the doors locked so that people couldn't get 

out in the case of a fire? 

Ms. Olson. No. 

Ms. Rivers. Thank you. 

Ms. Olson. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify a question that I answered earlier, please? 

Chairman Boehner. You may proceed. 

Ms. Olson. When asked if the Administrative Committee had ever discussed selling Enron stock, I 

answered no. And we hadn't before November 1st. I just want to clarify my answer. 

Chairman Boehner. All right. The Chair will recognize himself and we'll begin a second round 

of questions. 

 For the benefit of my colleagues, we should understand that when it comes to the fiduciary 

duty regarding a 401(k) plan, the duty revolves around the setting up of the plan, a broad enough 

options of investment for employees, but there's no fiduciary duty assigned to how employees 

invest in their own 401(k) plan. And to the extent that there was, at least in my view, a mixing of 

apples and oranges, there's no fiduciary duty with regard to what employees would or wouldn't do 

with their stock.

Now, we have a horrible situation at Enron, and I don't believe that the Enron employees 

that we have before us are those responsible for whatever did happen. I do appreciate the concern 

that many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have over whether Ms. Olson acted properly 

or was with sufficient haste given an unsubstantiated memo. But at least from my view of it at this 

point, there was no concrete data. And secondly, even if there had been with regard to the 401(k) 
166

accounts, I don't believe there was a fiduciary duty to have done anything with regards to how 

those monies and those plans were investigated. 

 With that, let me yield to my colleague from Texas, Mr. Culberson, who has a district in 

Houston and has, I know, additional questions. 

Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if I could follow up on some of the 

questions I began to ask earlier, and ask if perhaps Mr. Peterson might be able to enlighten us.

I mentioned earlier there was a separate deferred compensation plan. I understand Ms. 

Olson and Ms. Rath don't have any personal knowledge of the rabbi trust. I wanted to ask Mr. 

Peterson or any other witnesses if you have any knowledge about that trust and whether or not 

during the lockdown period, any of the executives at Enron made any withdrawals from that 

deferred compensation plan known as the rabbi trust? 

Mr. Peterson. Yes. As part of being engaged by Enron, we also are the record keeper for the 

deferred compensation program. The timing of our taking responsibility for that was concurrent 

with the other activities that we performed. 

Mr. Culberson. Could you please tell us who made withdrawals from the deferred compensation 

plan and approximately how much and when? 

Mr. Peterson. I don't have that information. 

Mr. Culberson. Would you provide that to me, please, and to the Committee? 

Mr. Peterson. In terms of specific individuals, we have a confidentiality agreement with Enron, as 

we do with all of our clients. Today we're here voluntarily, and we don't feel we can provide 

information about that within that context. 

Mr. Culberson. I understand. These things are important to establish for the record. I hope you 

understand.

Mr. Peterson. Sure. 

Mr. Culberson. Then is it your testimony that there were CEOs, executives at Enron, who 

withdrew funds from the rabbi trust, the deferred compensation plan, during the blackout period in 

which regular Enron employees could not withdraw money from their own 401(k). Is that your 

testimony, sir? 

Mr. Peterson. What I can tell you is that I know as part of the conversion process we were 

informed about certain accounts that in fact had been paid out. 

Mr. Culberson. Paid out during the blackout period? 
167

Mr. Peterson. We were informed that was during the blackout period. We don't know when the 

payments themselves were made. They occurred before the time we began the record keeping 

process.

Mr. Culberson. Okay, very good. 

Would any of the witnesses here have any knowledge about which Enron employees have 

been classified as section 16(b) executives under the Securities Code? Do any of you here have 

any knowledge of that? Who would be classified as a 16(b) executive, whose trades would be 

disclosed as a matter of public record? 

Ms. Olson. Currently? 

Mr. Culberson. Either currently or during 2001 and 2000. 

Ms. Olson. I don't recall everyone that was. 

Mr. Culberson. Do you know if during the year 2001 any options were exercised by any of the 

executives who were not 16(b) employees? In other words, could you tell us the names of any 

executives at Enron, who were not required to publish their trades publicly who were involved in 

selling off significant portions of Enron stocks during 2001, but were not required to discuss that 

publicly? 

Ms. Olson. I don't have that information. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. I offer the gentleman the three minutes 

that I had left remaining on my time. 

Mr. Culberson. Thank you. 

Chairman Boehner. But my goal here is to satisfy the Members who are remaining. 

 The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Kildee, for five minutes. 

Mr. Kildee. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for having this hearing today. It's 

been very, very helpful.

In response to one of my questions to Ms. Ghilarducci, we find that there is possible 

malfeasance and neglect within the Enron Corporation, and if that be the case, that could be a basis 

for a civil suit. But our job here is to hopefully update the law so that things like this will not occur 

in the future. We have an obligation to protect people like you, Mr. Padgett, and I certainly hope 

that from this hearing we will find how we can update the law that was passed many years ago and 

protect people. 

 And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 
168

Chairman Boehner. Are there any Members seeking recognition? 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Roemer. 

Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to thank you for holding two days' worth 

of meetings, and again thank the witnesses for the many hours of helpful testimony this morning. 

Ms. Olson, let me return to a question or two that I was asking you during the previous 

round. With respect to the Watkins memo that was passed on to Mr. Lay on August the 15th, that's 

a pretty explosive memo, a pretty interesting piece of information regarding a lot of serious 

allegations within the company. Having seen it, I would think that would generate some talk and 

interest on your part, to request not only Mr. Lay to sit down and meet with Ms. Watkins, as you 

did, but also to possibly talk to other people about something with that kind of ramification. 

 Did you talk to other people within Human Resources or Community Affairs about that 

particular memo? 

Ms. Olson. I can't recall. 

Mr. Roemer. You can't recall? 

Ms. Olson. I can't recall if I talked to anyone else about that memo. 

Mr. Roemer. So it's a memo that is sharp enough and vivid enough in your mind to call the CEO 

up and get some time with him, but you can't recall if you mentioned it to anybody else within the 

purview of your fiduciary responsibility within the pension system? 

Ms. Olson. The reason I had her go to Mr. Lay was because she wanted to go to Mr. Lay and ask 

him to have an investigation done. 

Mr. Roemer. How about another vice president of the company? Did you have a discussion with 

somebody in an elevator or in an executive meeting that, gee, I've got this memo from Sherron 

Watkins. It's pretty explosive. What do you think about this? 

Ms. Olson. I may have. 

Mr. Roemer. So you may have talked about it to more vice presidents or more executive vice 

presidents? 

Ms. Olson. I can't recall. 

Mr. Roemer. Do you know a senior lawyer at Enron by the name of Jordan Mintz? 

Ms. Olson. Yes, I do. 
169

Mr. Roemer. There's a front-page article today showing that he issued warnings to Enron 

employees a year before the explosion at Enron. So he was warning Enron employees even before 

Ms. Watkins. Did you talk to him about these types of memos and warnings as well? 

Ms. Olson. No, I didn't. 

Mr. Roemer. What were your discussions with Mr. Jordan Mintz? 

Ms. Olson. I don't recall. He's a friend and an acquaintance. 

Mr. Roemer. So you have a meeting, a confluence here with two of the people in the company 

that are sending the memos to the highest levels of Enron saying we've got a big problem, and 

you're not discussing these problems with Mr. Mintz or with Ms. Watkins, or other people within 

the company, other than to set up this meeting with Mr. Lay? 

Ms. Olson. I don't have a financial background. I can't really discuss those memos with any kind 

of correctness. 

Mr. Roemer. Even though you're running the pension fund and the 401(k) fund? 

Dr. Ghilarducci, let me ask you a question, and I don't mean to be facetious at all. There is 

something called the errors and omissions or the fiduciary insurance for companies like Enron. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Right. 

Mr. Roemer. What is the typical amount of insurance that a company like this takes out? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. As I understand it, it's about $25 million. 

Mr. Roemer. Do you understand Enron's commitment in this regard? How much did they take 

out for insurance for errors and omissions? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. I've heard it's much higher. It's about $85 million. 

Mr. Roemer. And why would that be? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. I don't know. Maybe they thought they were more at risk. That's why people 

take out insurance. I just don't know. 

Mr. Roemer. Ms. Olson, do you have any comment on the amount of errors and omissions 

insurance that Enron has? 

Ms. Olson. I have no knowledge of that. I'm not sure how much it is. 

Mr. Roemer. But $25 million is standard, and $85 million is abnormally high? 
170

Ms. Ghilarducci. That's what I understand in the business. 

Mr. Roemer. Would workers like Mr. Padgett get access to that money to get reimbursed? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Maybe through a court case, but it's for the fiduciaries if they are malfeasant. If 

they're criminal, then that doesn't cover it, but if you just run the pension fund in a malfeasant 

manner that would cover you. 

Mr. Roemer. So that covers the executives that make the decisions rather than helping the 

employees who lost all their money? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes. Whereas the PBGC will cover everybody in the cash balance plan. 

Mr. Roemer. So the PBGC has no insurance over these kinds of 401(k) plans? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. That's right. 

Mr. Roemer. So the insurance doesn't cover them? The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation 

does not cover the 401(k)s. Once again, the executives are off the hook, and the workers get stuck 

with the pain and the problems. 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes, the executives who run the plan for very specific behaviors. 

Chairman Boehner. The gentleman's time has expired. Does any Member seek recognition? 

Mr. Roemer. Mr. Chairman, I just forgot. Can I ask unanimous consent to have the following 

materials placed into the record for Mr. Miller? 

Chairman Boehner. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. Roemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Johnson. Let me ask what the materials are. 

Chairman Boehner. Would the gentleman from Indiana give us a brief description of the 

document? 

Mr. Roemer. Yes, Mr. Chairman. They are a description of the minutes of the Enron Corporation 

employee stock ownership plan meetings. They have been referred to three or four times in our 

conversation.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you. 

Chairman Boehner. Without objection, so ordered. 
171

 The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Minnesota, Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. McCollum. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have a document that was provided by Hewitt. Is this 

yours? 

Mr. Peterson. Yes, ma'am. 

Ms. McCollum. And in here I believe there is a printout of the Enron web site, “Money in 

Motion”.

Mr. Peterson. Yes. 

Ms. McCollum. Okay. The pages really aren't numbered, but there's a date of October 4th on the 

top of it. I'm wondering if that is the date that this was pulled off the web site. 

Mr. Peterson. Actually, I think what is included here is a copy of a communication that we 

assisted Enron in sending to employees. It was described in one of the testimonies earlier. October 

4th is the date it was mailed. 

Ms. McCollum. October 4th is the date it was mailed. What was Enron stock doing around 

October 4th when this was mailed? Was it stable? Was it falling? I'm sure Ms. Olson knows. 

Ms. Olson. It was going down. 

Ms. McCollum. It was going down. And here it says with no excuses, “the savings plan is a great 

benefit”. It goes on to say a few more things about Pre-Tax including, “the company match is like 

receiving free money”. Did anyone from the company, Ms. Olson, after Enron stock started 

falling, discuss what was going to happen with all of this free money that the employees were 

going to have during the blackout period as the stock was falling? Were you concerned as one of 

the people who was involved in oversight of the plan that this kind of language was being delivered 

to people's homes? 

Ms. Olson. No. We didn't have a crystal ball. We didn't know where the stock was ultimately 

going to go. 

Ms. McCollum. Okay. Mr. Padgett you're representing thousands of employees. Thank you for 

sitting here in public for what must be a very painful personal time for you. In your testimony, you 

said, “the top management of the company constantly encouraged us to invest our stock in Enron”.

You received documents such as I mentioned printed by the company quite often, did you not? 

Mr. Padgett. Yes, ma'am. 

Ms. McCollum. And you took the fact that the company was matching your savings plan with 

only Enron stock as further endorsement that the stock was safe as a retirement investment. In fact, 

the company told you it was like receiving free money, did they not, sir? 
172

Mr. Padgett. Yes, ma'am. 

Ms. McCollum. It might also be more of a comment, Mr. Chair, but I put it to our scholar here on 

the panel. By providing tax breaks indirectly, as you point out, taxpayers are subsidizing 

companies offering pension plans. And we do that so it's a win-win situation for everyone, win for 

the company, and win for the employee. 

 But because we're endorsing that by having opportunities for companies to write off tax 

breaks, as you point out, there's an implicit responsibility, that high ethical standards and that 

looking at one another in the corporate community and employees, there's going to be care, 

nurturing and understanding. And it appears in the case of Enron and with the people who have 

testified here today that that was rather lacking. In fact, in my opinion, it was rather negligent. 

 Ms. Ghilarducci, I would like you to comment on what we need to do, or if we can legislate 

responsibility when putting out brochures like that. I'm sure their marketing people knew, because 

they wanted employees to retain stock. I've been a member of an employee stock program myself. 

Could you just reiterate again what retaining stock means to people's psychology because I think 

this is so important; having been a member of an employee pension plan myself, this is critical. 

This goes to the heart of the matter because you want to be loyal. You want to be successful. You 

want to believe. You're working hard, and you expect that there's high corporate ethics. So could 

you once again summarize how this critically interplays? 

Ms. Ghilarducci. Yes. The psychology is that employees are given a chance to show loyalty and 

dedication to their firm by investing in stock in their 401(k), and so the psychology is to want to 

give that signal to the employer. 

 I believe that it makes sense for Congress to encourage workers to have stakes in their 

company through ESOPs, but it's also the responsibility of Congress to regulate retirement plans 

differently and just to extend the logic you have for defined benefit plans to 401(k) plans. Restrict 

how much employer stock is in the 401(k)s, and also prevent the employers from saying you can't 

sell until you're age fifty. 

If there was really true fiduciary responsibility just to the participants, I, if I were on that 

Pension Administration Committee, would have advocated for those kinds of restrictions to be 

lifted, and to advocate really pushing for the diversification requirement or standard. 

Chairman Boehner. The time of the gentlewoman has expired. 

 Let me thank our witnesses for a very long day. Excuse our interruptions. Thankfully, we 

finished voting several hours ago, so we didn't have to be interrupted again. The Members and I 

appreciate your willingness to come and testify before our Committee. 

 This hearing is adjourned. 
173

Whereupon, at 2:32 p.m., the Committee was adjourned. 
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Table of Indexes 

Chairman Boehner, 96, 98, 99, 102, 103, 105, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 119, 125, 148, 149, 150, 

151, 154, 161, 165, 167, 168, 170, 172 

Mr. Andrews, 159, 160, 161 

Mr. Ballenger, 129, 130, 131 

Mr. Castle, 134, 135, 136, 137 

Mr. Culberson, 139, 140, 141, 166, 167 

Mr. Holt, 149, 150, 151 

Mr. Isakson, 122, 123, 124, 125, 148, 149 

Mr. Johnson, 119, 120, 121, 122, 143, 144, 145, 157, 158, 159, 164, 170 

Mr. Kildee, 98, 137, 138, 167 

Mr. Miller, 98, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 

Mr. Owens, 132, 133, 134 

Mr. Padgett, 110, 111, 122, 124, 125, 132, 143, 146, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 160, 171, 172 

Mr. Payne, 141, 142, 143 

Mr. Peterson, 123, 124, 134, 151, 157, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 171 

Mr. Roemer, 98, 146, 147, 148, 168, 169, 170 

Mr. Scott, 161, 162, 163, 164 

Mr. Tiberi, 151, 152, 153, 154 

Mr. Tierney, 154, 155, 156, 157 

Ms. Ghilarducci, 124, 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 138, 148, 149, 150, 151, 169, 170, 172 

Ms. McCollum, 171, 172 

Ms. Olson, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 

135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 142, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 

163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171 

Ms. Rath, 111, 112, 113, 120, 121, 122, 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 154, 158, 

162

Ms. Rivers, 164, 165 

Ms. Woolsey, 157, 158, 159 

The Chairman, 125, 129, 132, 138, 141, 143, 146