63054 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding 

a new airworthiness directive to read as 

follows: 

2010–21–07 Eurocopter France: 

Amendment 39–16467; Docket No. 

FAA–2010–0779; Directorate Identifier 

2009–SW–84–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective on November 18, 2010. 

Other Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Model AS350B3 and 

EC130 B4 helicopters, certificated in any 

category, with the ARRIEL 2B1 engine with 

the two-channel Full Authority Digital 

Engine Control (FADEC), and with new twist 

grip modification (MOD) 073254 for the 

Model AS350B3 helicopter or MOD 073773 

for the Model EC130 B4 helicopter, installed. 

Reason 

(d) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) AD states 

that analysis shows a ‘‘dormant failure’’ of 

one of the two contactors, 53Ka or 53Kb, can 

occur following the introduction of MOD 

073254 or MOD 073773. Failure of a 

contactor can prevent switching from ‘‘IDLE’’ 

mode to ‘‘FLIGHT’’ mode during autorotation 

training making it impossible to recover from 

the practice autorotation and compelling the 

pilot to continue the autorotation to the 

ground. This condition, if not corrected, can 

lead to an unintended touchdown to the 

ground at a flight-idle power setting during 

a practice autorotation, damage to the 

helicopter, and injury to the occupants. 

Actions and Compliance 

(e) Before the next practice autorotation or 

on or before 100 hours time-in-service (TIS), 

whichever occurs first, unless accomplished 

previously, and thereafter at intervals not to 

exceed 600 hours TIS: 

(1) Inspect for the proper operation of 

contactors 53Ka and 53Kb by rotating the 

pilot and co-pilot throttle twist grip controls 

between the ‘‘IDLE’’ and ‘‘FLIGHT’’ position in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions, paragraph 2.B.2, of Eurocopter 

Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 05.00.61, 

dated November 16, 2009, for the Model 

AS350B3 helicopters or ASB No. 05A009, 

dated November 16, 2009, for the Model 

EC130 B4 helicopters, as appropriate for your 

model helicopter. 

(2) Test the pilot and co-pilot throttle twist 

grip controls for proper functioning. If the 

throttle twist grip controls are not 

functioning properly, repair the controls. 

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI 

AD 

(f) We refer to flight hours as hours TIS. 

Also, we refer to maintenance actions as 

inspections rather than checks. Finally, 

Other Information 

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, Safety Management 

Group, ATTN: DOT/FAA Southwest Region, 

Ed Cuevas, ASW–112, Aviation Safety 

Engineer, Rotorcraft Directorate, Safety 

Management Group, 2601 Meacham Blvd., 

Fort Worth, Texas 76137, telephone (817) 

222–5355, fax (817) 222–5961, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested, using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. 

Related Information 

(h) MCAI AD No. 2009–0256, dated 

December 2, 2009, contains related 

information. 

Joint Aircraft System/Component (JASC) 

Code 

(i) The JASC Code is 7697: Engine Control 

System Wiring. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(j) You must use Eurocopter Alert Service 

Bulletin ASB No. 05.00.61 or 05A009, both 

dated November 16, 2009, to do the actions 

required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact American Eurocopter 

Corporation, 2701 Forum Drive, Grand 

Prairie, Texas 75053–4005, telephone (800) 

232–0323, fax (972) 641–3710, or at http:// 

www.eurocopter.com. 

(3) You may review copies at the FAA, 

Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest 

Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth, Texas or at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/ 

cfr/ibr-locations.html. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on September 

29, 2010. 

Kim Smith, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service 

[FR Doc. 2010–25270 Filed 10–13–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2009–1229; Directorate 

Identifier 2009–NM–106–AD; Amendment 

39–16471; AD 2010–21–11] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, 

Inc. Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet 

Series 100 & 440) Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

originated by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) 

and NLG door selector valves, part number 

(P/N) 601R75146–1 (Kaiser Fluid 

Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had 

their end caps incorrectly lock-wired and/or 

incorrectly torqued during assembly. This 

condition can lead to the end cap backing off, 

with consequent damage to a seal and 

internal leakage within the valve. 

Subsequently, if electrical power is 

transferred or removed from the aircraft 

before the NLG safety pin is installed, any 

pressure, including residual pressure, in the 

No. 3 hydraulic system can result in an 

uncommanded NLG retraction and/or 

uncommanded opening of the NLG doors. 

There have been six cases reported on 

CL[-]600–2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted 

in the collapse of the NLG at the departure 

gate. 

* * * * * 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

November 18, 2010. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of November 18, 2010. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 

Docket Operations, M–30, West 

Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Cesar Gomez, Aerospace Engineer, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 63055 

Airframe and Mechanical Systems 

Branch, ANE–171, FAA, New York 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1600 

Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, 

New York 11590; telephone (516) 228– 

7318; fax (516) 794–5531. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on January 5, 2010 (75 FR 258). 

That NPRM proposed to correct an 

unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) 

and NLG door selector valves, part number 

(P/N) 601R75146–1 (Kaiser Fluid 

Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had 

their end caps incorrectly lock-wired and/or 

incorrectly torqued during assembly. This 

condition can lead to the end cap backing off, 

with consequent damage to a seal and 

internal leakage within the valve. 

Subsequently, if electrical power is 

transferred or removed from the aircraft 

before the NLG safety pin is installed, any 

pressure, including residual pressure, in the 

No. 3 hydraulic system can result in an 

uncommanded NLG retraction and/or 

uncommanded opening of the NLG doors. 

There have been six cases reported on 

CL[-]600–2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted 

in the collapse of the NLG at the departure 

gate. 

This [Canadian] directive mandates [an 

inspection of the NLG and NLG selector 

valves to determine the serial number and 

marking of the part and] a check [to 

determine the torque value and correct 

lockwire installation] of the [affected] NLG 

and NLG door selector valves installed on all 

aircraft in the Applicability section * * *. 

Depending on the results, replacement, 

rework and/or additional identification of the 

valves may be required. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

considered the comments received. 

Request for Model Designation 

Consistency 

Comair, Inc. states that in the NPRM, 

the Summary, Discussion, and 

paragraph (e), refer to the airplanes as 

Model ‘‘CL600–2B19’’ instead of ‘‘CL– 

600–2B19.’’ 

From this comment, we infer that 

Comair, Inc. requests that we revise the 

identified sections of the NPRM for 

model designation consistency. In the 

Summary, Discussion, and paragraph (e) 

of this AD, we are quoting from 

Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF– 

2009–19, dated April 29, 2009. 

However, for clarity, we have made the 

change to ‘‘CL[-]600–2B19’’ in the 

specified sections of this AD. 

Request To Revise Proposed Costs of 

Compliance 

Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the 

Costs of Compliance section of the 

NPRM indicates only the number of 

affected airplanes and does not take into 

consideration that there are two units 

installed on each airplane, making it a 

total of 1,304 affected components. 

From these statements we infer that 

Air Wisconsin Airlines is requesting 

that we revise the Costs of Compliance 

section of the AD to include the actual 

number of affected valves. We agree 

with Air Wisconsin Airlines that the 

Costs of Compliance needs to be revised 

to include the cost for both the selector 

valve of the NLG and the door selector 

valve. We have revised the cost of parts 

to $80 to reflect 2 valves per product 

($40 per valve). For clarification, the 

term ‘‘affected product’’ in the Costs of 

Compliance section of this AD refers to 

the affected number of airplanes of U.S. 

registry. 

Request for Credit for Compliance With 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–32– 

090 

Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the 

problem of the door selector valves of 

the NLG having their end caps 

incorrectly lock-wired and/or 

incorrectly torqued during assembly 

first came to its attention through 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–32– 

090. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–32– 

104, dated March 3, 2009, was issued to 

supersede Bombardier Service Bulletin 

601R–32–090 to expand the effectivity 

of the campaign. Air Wisconsin Airlines 

states that the proposed AD should give 

credit for those valves that have already 

complied with Bombardier Service 

Bulletin 601R–32–090. 

We agree with Air Wisconsin Airlines 

request to receive credit for actions 

completed in accordance with 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–32– 

090, Revision B, dated December 12, 

2006; and Revision C, dated March 3, 

2009. We have added new paragraph 

(f)(4) accordingly. 

Request To Revise the Applicability 

Air Wisconsin Airlines requests that 

we revise the applicability in paragraph 

(c) of the proposed AD to ‘‘NLG and 

NLG selector valves, P/N 750006000 

(601R75146–1) identified in Bombardier 

S/B 601R–32–104 dated March 3, 2009 

when installed on Bombardier * * * 

Model CL–600–2B19 * * * airplanes 

***’’ The commenter provides no 

justification for this requested change. 

We disagree with Air Wisconsin 

Airlines’ request to revise the 

applicability in paragraph (c) of this AD. 

We have determined that identifying 

each airplane by serial number and not 

by the valve serial number is the best 

way to control the airworthiness of the 

fleet and to ensure compliance with the 

AD. 

According to general FAA policy, if 

an unsafe condition results from the 

installation of a particular component in 

only one particular make and model of 

airplane, the AD should apply to the 

airplane model, not the component. The 

reason for this is simple: If the AD 

applies to the airplane model equipped 

with the item, operators of those 

airplanes will be notified directly of the 

unsafe condition and the action 

required to correct it. While we assume 

that operators can identify the airplane 

models they operate, they may not be 

aware of specific items installed on the 

airplanes. Therefore, specifying the 

airplane models in the applicability as 

the subject of the AD prevents an 

operator’s ‘‘unknowing failure to 

comply’’ with the AD. We recognize that 

an unsafe condition may exist in an 

item that is installed in many different 

airplanes. In that case, we consider it 

impractical to issue an AD against each 

airplane; in fact, many times, the exact 

models and numbers of airplanes on 

which the item is installed may be 

unknown. Therefore, in those situations, 

the AD would apply to the item and 

usually indicates that the item is known 

to be ‘‘installed on, but not limited to,’’ 

various airplane models. We have not 

changed the AD in this regard. 

Request To Extend the Compliance 

Time for the Inspection 

Air Wisconsin Airlines requests that 

we extend the compliance time for the 

inspection in the NPRM. Air Wisconsin 

Airlines states that the problem of the 

door selector valves of the NLG having 

their end caps incorrectly lock-wired 

and/or incorrectly torqued during 

assembly first came to its attention in 

2003 through Bombardier Service 

Bulletin 601R–32–090, which affected 

645 units. Air Wisconsin Airlines also 

states that Bombardier Service Bulletin 

601R–32–104, dated March 3, 2009, 

expanded the effectivity to include 

2,126 units. Air Wisconsin Airlines 

states that it has been working on this 

issue and it has a substantial number of 

valves in compliance, but since this 

issue has been around for almost 7 years 

without any regulatory influence, the 

short compliance time of within 1,600 

flight hours or 18 months after the 


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63056 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs first, cannot be justified. Air 

Wisconsin Airlines states that a longer 

compliance window should be given 

considering the number of units affected 

and the insufficient amount of spares 

available to ensure compliance within 

the time provided by a directive. 

We disagree with Air Wisconsin 

Airlines’ request to extend the 

compliance time for the inspection. In 

developing an appropriate compliance 

time for the inspection, we considered 

the safety implications, parts 

availability, and normal maintenance 

schedules for the timely 

accomplishment of the modification. 

We have determined that the 

compliance time will ensure an 

acceptable level of safety and allow the 

modification to be done during 

scheduled maintenance intervals for 

most affected operators. In addition, 

Bombardier, Inc. recommends a 

compliance time of 1,600 flight hours or 

18 months. We have determined that an 

adequate supply of valves is available in 

order for operators to accomplish the 

required actions within the compliance 

time specified in this AD. However, 

operators may apply for an alternative 

method of compliance (AMOC) in 

accordance with the provisions 

specified in paragraph (g)(1) of this AD. 

We have not changed the AD in this 

regard. 

Requests To Allow Review of 

Maintenance Records in Lieu of 

Inspection 

Comair, Inc. and Air Wisconsin 

Airlines request that a review of 

airplane maintenance records be 

acceptable in lieu of an inspection to 

determine serial number and 

identification markings of the selector 

valve. Air Wisconsin Airlines states that 

a records check is sufficient to locate 

valves requiring inspection. 

We agree with the commenters’ 

request that a review of airplane 

maintenance records is acceptable for 

determining the serial number and 

identification markings of the selector 

valve. We have changed paragraph (f)(1) 

of this AD to allow a review of 

maintenance records in lieu of the 

inspection required by that paragraph. 

Request To Clarify Paragraph (f)(2) of 

the NPRM 

Comair, Inc. proposes revised 

wording for paragraph (f)(2) of the 

NPRM. The suggested wording clarifies 

that either the selector valve of the NLG 

or the door selector valve could have 

certain serial numbers or identified 

markings since paragraph (f)(2) 

identifies both valves. 

We agree with Comair, Inc. that the 

suggested wording is more accurate. We 

have revised paragraph (f)(2) of this AD 

as suggested. 

Request To Remove Compliance Time 

of Before Further Flight From 

Paragraph (f)(3) of the NPRM 

Comair, Inc. and Air Wisconsin 

Airlines request that the compliance 

time of, ‘‘before further flight,’’ be 

removed from paragraph (f)(3) of the 

NPRM. 

Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the 

compliance time of ‘‘before further 

flight’’ specified in paragraph (f)(3) of 

the NPRM is not in Canadian 

Airworthiness Directive CF–2009–19, 

dated April 29, 2009, or in any of the 

service information listed in that 

Canadian AD. Air Wisconsin Airlines 

also states that there does not appear to 

be enough time and available spare 

parts in order to do the inspections, 

remove all the affected serial numbers 

which fail the test, and send them to the 

vendor for repair. 

Comair, Inc. states that a compliance 

time of ‘‘before further flight’’ seems 

contrary or restrictive when the actions 

specified in paragraph (f)(1) of the 

NPRM are done. Comair Inc. states that 

it has already performed a records 

review and determined which valves 

have a serial number range specified in 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–32– 

104, dated March 3, 2009, and which 

valves do not have a suffix ‘‘T’’ or 

‘‘SB750006000–1’’ marking, as 

documented on FAA Form 8130–3. 

Comair, Inc. also states that a 

compliance time of ‘‘before further 

flight’’ would require it to ground its 

airplanes on the effective date of the 

final rule because it has already 

determined which valves require action. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters. We agree that there could 

be a misunderstanding in reading this 

AD based on the understanding that 

paragraph (f)(3) of this AD is a standalone paragraph. However, we disagree 

with Comair Inc.’s statement that the 

compliance time of ‘‘before further 

flight’’ would require Comair Inc. to 

ground its airplanes. The intent of this 

AD is to permit operators to do the 

identification check within the specified 

compliance time of ‘‘within 1,600 flight 

hours or 18 months after the effective 

date of this AD, whichever occurs first.’’ 

We have revised paragraph (f)(3) of this 

AD for clarity. In addition, operators 

may apply for an AMOC in accordance 

with the provisions specified in 

paragraph (g)(1) of this AD. 

Request To Eliminate Ink Stamping of 

the Valve 

Air Wisconsin Airlines states that the 

requirement in Tactair Service Bulletin 

SB750006000–1, Revision E, dated July 

31, 2008 (which was referred to in 

Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–32– 

104, dated March 3, 2009, as an 

additional source of guidance), includes 

an instruction to ink stamp the service 

bulletin number on the valve. Air 

Wisconsin states that this action does 

not provide an added level of safety, 

and that this would only lead to 

confusion, and a meaningless issue of 

non-compliance should the marking 

ever become eradicated. Air Wisconsin 

also states that it is unnecessary to mark 

the valve. 

From these statements, we infer that 

Air Wisconsin Airlines is requesting 

that we revise the AD to eliminate 

unnecessary part markings. We disagree. 

Valves that are not inked-stamped must 

be inspected to fulfill the requirements 

of this AD. An ink-stamped valve 

demonstrates that the valve has been 

inspected and modified. We have not 

made changes to this AD in this regard. 

Explanation of Change Made To This 

AD 

We have revised this AD to identify 

the legal name of the manufacturer as 

published in the most recent type 

certificate data sheet for the affected 

airplane models. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data, 

including the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We determined that these changes will 

not increase the economic burden on 

any operator or increase the scope of the 

AD. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have required different 

actions in this AD from those in the 

MCAI in order to follow our FAA 

policies. Any such differences are 

highlighted in a NOTE within the AD. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 63057 

Explanation of Change to Costs of 

Compliance 

Since issuance of the NPRM, we have 

increased the labor rate used in the 

Costs of Compliance from $80 per workhour to $85 per work-hour. The Costs of 

Compliance information, below, reflects 

this increase in the specified hourly 

labor rate. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD will affect 

652 products of U.S. registry. We also 

estimate that it will take about 1 workhour per product to comply with the 

basic requirements of this AD. The 

average labor rate is $85 per work-hour. 

Required parts will cost about $80 per 

product (2 valves per product/$40 per 

valve). Where the service information 

lists required parts costs that are 

covered under warranty, we have 

assumed that there will be no charge for 

these parts. As we do not control 

warranty coverage for affected parties, 

some parties may incur costs higher 

than estimated here. Based on these 

figures, we estimate the cost of this AD 

to the U.S. operators to be $107,580, or 

$165 per product. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this AD will not 

have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this AD: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains the NPRM, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Operations office (telephone 

(800) 647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after receipt. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2010–21–11 Bombardier, Inc.: Amendment 

39–16471. Docket No. FAA–2009–1229; 

Directorate Identifier 2009–NM–106–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective November 18, 2010. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Bombardier, Inc. 

Model CL–600–2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 

& 440) airplanes, serial numbers 7003 and 

subsequent; certificated in any category. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 32: Landing Gear. 

Reason 

(e) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) states: 

A specific batch of nose landing gear (NLG) 

and NLG door selector valves, part number 

(P/N) 601R75146–1 (Kaiser Fluid 

Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had 

their end caps incorrectly lock-wired and/or 

incorrectly torqued during assembly. This 

condition can lead to the end cap backing off, 

with consequent damage to a seal and 

internal leakage within the valve. 

Subsequently, if electrical power is 

transferred or removed from the aircraft 

before the NLG safety pin is installed, any 

pressure, including residual pressure, in the 

No. 3 hydraulic system can result in an 

uncommanded NLG retraction and/or 

uncommanded opening of the NLG doors. 

There have been six cases reported on 

CL[-]600–2B19 aircraft, one of which resulted 

in the collapse of the NLG at the departure 

gate. 

This [Canadian] directive mandates [an 

inspection of the NLG and NLG selector 

valves to determine the serial number and 

marking of the part and] a check [to 

determine the torque value and correct 

lockwire installation] of the [affected] NLG 

and NLG door selector valves installed on all 

aircraft in the Applicability section * * *. 

Depending on the results, replacement, 

rework and/or additional identification of the 

valves may be required. 

Actions and Compliance 

(f) Unless already done, do the following 

actions. 

(1) Within 1,600 flight hours or 18 months 

after the effective date of this AD, whichever 

occurs first: Do an inspection to determine 

the serial number and identification 

markings on the selector valve of the NLG 

and the door selector valve of the NLG, in 

accordance with the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Bombardier Service Bulletin 

601R–32–104, dated March 3, 2009. A review 

of airplane maintenance records is acceptable 

in lieu of this inspection if the serial number 

and identification markings of the selector 

valve and the door selector valve can be 

conclusively determined from that review. 

(2) For any airplane having either the 

selector valve of the NLG or the door selector 

valve of the NLG that have a serial number 

outside the range 0001 through 2126 

inclusive, suffix ‘‘T’’ identification, or 

‘‘SB750006000–1’’ marking, no further action 

is required for that valve. 

(3) If, during any inspection required by 

paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, any selector valve 

of the NLG or any door selector valve of the 

NLG is found that does not have any serial 

number or identification marking specified in 

paragraph (f)(2) of this AD: Before further 

flight after doing the inspection required by 

paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, inspect to 

determine the torque value and correct 

lockwire installation of the valve, and modify 

(replace, rework, or re-identify) the valve, as 

applicable, in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Bombardier 

Service Bulletin 601R–32–104, dated March 

3, 2009. 

(4) For airplanes having part number (P/N) 

601R75146–1 (Tactair P/N 750006000), serial 


emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES
63058 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 198 / Thursday, October 14, 2010 / Rules and Regulations 

number 001 thru 0767: Modification of the 

valve accomplished before the effective date 

of this AD in accordance with Bombardier 

Service Bulletin 601R–32–090, Revision B, 

dated December 12, 2006; and Bombardier 

Service Bulletin Revision C, dated March 3, 

2009; are considered acceptable for 

compliance with the requirements of this AD 

for that valve. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI 

and/or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(g) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, New York Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), ANE–170, FAA, 

has the authority to approve AMOCs for this 

AD, if requested using the procedures found 

in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: 

Program Manager, Continuing Operational 

Safety, FAA, New York ACO, 1600 Stewart 

Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 

11590; telephone (516) 228–7300; fax (516) 

794–5531. Before using any approved AMOC 

on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your principal maintenance inspector 

(PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), 

as appropriate, or lacking a principal 

inspector, your local Flight Standards District 

Office. The AMOC approval letter must 

specifically reference this AD. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) has 

approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(h) Refer to MCAI Canadian Airworthiness 

Directive CF–2009–19, dated April 29, 2009; 

and Bombardier Service Bulletin 601R–32– 

104, dated March 3, 2009; for related 

information. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Bombardier Service 

Bulletin 601R–32–104, dated March 3, 2009, 

to do the actions required by this AD, unless 

the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 

and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., 400 CoˆteVertu Road West, Dorval, Que ́bec H4S 1Y9, 

Canada; telephone 514–855–5000; fax 514– 

855–7401; e-mail 

thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com; Internet http:// 

www.bombardier.com. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go 

to: http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 29, 2010. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2010–25458 Filed 10–13–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0734 Directorate 

Identifier 2010–CE–036–AD; Amendment 

39–16474; AD 2010–21–14] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; PIAGGIO 

AERO INDUSTRIES S.p.A Model 

PIAGGIO P–180 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD results 

from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

Due to a manufacturing error, some rivets, 

required by drawings, were not installed in 

the joints between two ceiling beams and the 

rear pressurized bulkhead. 

If left uncorrected, long term fatigue stress 

could locally weaken the structure, 

compromising the fuselage structural 

integrity. 

We are issuing this AD to require 

actions to correct the unsafe condition 

on these products. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

November 18, 2010. 

On November 18, 2010, the Director 

of the Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in this AD. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov or in person at 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Sarjapur Nagarajan, Aerospace Engineer, 

FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901 

Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, 

Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329– 

4145; fax: (816) 329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on July 23, 2010 (75 FR 43105). 

That NPRM proposed to correct an 

unsafe condition for the specified 

products. The MCAI states: 

Due to a manufacturing error, some rivets, 

required by drawings, were not installed in 

the joints between two ceiling beams and the 

rear pressurized bulkhead. 

If left uncorrected, long term fatigue stress 

could locally weaken the structure, 

compromising the fuselage structural 

integrity. 

This AD requires the accomplishment of 

Piaggio Aero Industries (PAI) Service 

Bulletin (SB) 80–0268 original issue, which 

contains instructions to rework the affected 

area, thus restoring the fuselage design 

strength as well as the fatigue specifications 

of the structure. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. We 

received no comments on the NPRM or 

on the determination of the cost to the 

public. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the available data and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 


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