NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CHANDAN MANANSINGH, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-10229

D.C. No. 

2:16-cr-00140-RFB-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Richard F. Boulware, II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 12, 2018**

San Francisco, California

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge, and OLGUIN, ***

District Judge.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge for 

the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAY 14 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

The government appeals the district court’s grant of Chandan Manansingh’s

motion to suppress. We affirm. 

Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court’s findings with 

respect to potential violations of Manansingh’s supervised release conditions are 

supported by the hearing testimony and are permissible inferences drawn from that 

testimony. Specifically, the district court’s findings regarding Manansingh’s use of 

his girlfriend’s BMW, financial status, alternate sources of income, ability to pay a 

court-imposed fine, and living situation are not clearly erroneous. See United States 

v. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2015) (A factual “finding is clearly 

erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” (quoting 

United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010))). 

The district court also did not err in finding that the Probation Department 

(“Probation”) lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Manansingh’s 

residence. See United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 

1989). The factors Probation relied on – Manansingh’s operation of the BMW, his 

residence in a luxury apartment building, his finances and alleged failure to submit 

reports or otherwise disclose information to Probation, as well as his possession of 

vials of an unknown substance seven months prior to the search and positive steroid 

tests that were not linked to the relevant time period – merit little or no weight 

individually, and added together, are insufficient to justify the search. See United 
3

States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Reasonable suspicion is 

formed by ‘specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable 

inferences, form the basis for suspecting that the particular person . . . is engaged in 

criminal activity.’” (quoting United States v. Michael R., 90 F.3d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 

1996))). As the evidentiary hearing testimony showed, Probation’s asserted grounds

for reasonable suspicion were undermined by repeated confirmations that 

Manansingh was being truthful and had not demonstrably violated a condition of 

supervision. See United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(en banc) (Although reasonable suspicion standard “is not a particularly high 

threshold to reach . . . ‘a mere hunch is insufficient . . . .’” (quoting United States v. 

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002))); United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 

1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002) (requiring a “particularized and objective basis” for 

suspecting legal wrongdoing). 

AFFIRMED.