U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

98–313PDF 2016

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA’S

NUCLEAR PROVOCATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 13, 2016

Serial No. 114–148

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Victor Cha, Ph.D., senior adviser and Korea chair, Center for Strategic and 

International Studies ........................................................................................... 7

Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 19

Ms. Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia, Director of China Power Project, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Victor Cha, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 10

Mr. Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement .............................................................. 21

Ms. Bonnie Glaser: Prepared statement ................................................................ 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 70

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 71

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 72

(1)

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA’S 

NUCLEAR PROVOCATIONS 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. On the evening of January 6, North Korea likely 

conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test. North Korean leader 

Kim Jong Un claimed that the test was a fusion reactive hydrogen 

bomb. Most experts are skeptical, given seismic evidence and North 

Korea’s penchant for overstatement. But it is, nonetheless, incredibly concerning. 

We convene this hearing today not only to join the international 

community in condemning the test, but to work to find a feasible 

lasting solution to address the North Korean nuclear threat. 

For many in the United States, if we think of North Korea it is 

usually the butt of a joke, reference to either The Interview or 

Team America movies. Despite repeated calls from both respectable 

civilian thinkers and top military leadership citing North Korea as 

a top threat in the Pacific theater, North Korea seems to have been 

off the Obama administration’s radar. 

Instead, they have dismissed the imminent threat by employing 

its so-called ‘‘strategy of patience’’—or, excuse me, ‘‘strategic patience.’’ For our allies in the region, North Korean provocations 

mean so much more, and it should for the United States as well. 

History has proven that North Korea has every intention to continue advancing its nuclear program. In an effort to strengthen 

both domestic and international positions, the United States has 

shown a willingness to negotiate with North Korea if it is simply 

willing to first take steps toward denuclearization. North Korea 

has shown no interest in doing so, but it has successfully extracted 

food assistance and other foreign assistance from us by threatening 

nuclear activity. This is an unacceptable cycle that cannot continue. 

Due to North Korea’s nuclear threat and proximity to our allies, 

South Korea, and Japan, our response options are limited, but they 

largely fall into two categories—sanctions and information flow. 

Some argue for United Nations sanctions, but others say that 

would exert little pressure on North Korea, largely due to China’s 

2

lack of enforcement. Some speak of North Korea as the most heavily sanctioned state in the world, but that is simply not the case. 

For example, Iran is subject to sanctions under 18 U.S. executive 

orders, and North Korea is subject to six. I applaud Chairman 

Royce for his work on the North Korea sanctions legislation which 

passed the House yesterday. I am proud to vote for that, and I 

think it is a good start. But I think much more to be done, and that 

is why we are here today. 

China’s relationships with North Korea continues to be a problem. China favors North Korea’s status quo over the demise of the 

Kim regime, which it fears could mean a unified United States allied Korea as a neighbor and a sizeable flood of refugees crossing 

their border. 

These vested interests are why China continues to prop up this 

pariah state with food, oil, and assistance. I am deeply disappointed that China continues to allow North Korea to destabilize 

the region in this manner. China must tighten sanctions and really 

enforce the sanctions that are in place and apply the unique pressure that only it—North Korea’s patron—can provide. 

While a nuclear test quickly draws the world’s attention toward 

North Korean leadership, we must remember that there are 24 million people living in this closed-off state, starved of basic necessities. Furthermore, citizens are brainwashed into believing that 

their leadership is actually helping them. 

The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 initiated radio 

broadcasting to provide basic knowledge of the outside world to the 

people of North Korea. Twelve years have since passed and technological advances have been made, and our policies should reflect 

that reality. I intend to introduce legislation that would update this 

program this provide greater, more useful information to inform 

and empower their citizens. 

In 2006, North Korea was removed from the State Sponsor of 

Terrorism List in an attempt to bring it to the negotiation table 

and ultimately halt its nuclear program. Congress has debated this 

issue, and many members believe it should be put back on the list. 

Count me in that category. 

Given the Sony cyberattacks, the shelling of South Korean ships, 

North Korea’s alleged ties to Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, and now 

this fourth nuclear test, perhaps—maybe perhaps nuclear should 

be placed back on the list. 

The leaders of North Korea, as well as China, should understand 

that every Pyongyang provocation will induce a congressional response in an attempt to alter North Korea’s ways. There is calamity across the globe blurring our focus, but the Obama administration’s employment of ‘‘strategic patience’’ comes, I believe, at our 

peril. Let’s be done with ‘‘strategic patience.’’ It is time for strategic 

clarity. We must be proactive in our efforts, and I look forward to 

this important discussion of any recommendations this distinguished panel can offer. 

Members present will be permitted to submit written statements 

to be included in the official hearing record. And without objection, 

the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow 

statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, 

subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

3

And I would like to turn the time over to the ranking member 

for any comments that he might make. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. North Korea probably tested a hydrogen-boosted device, one that made use of hydrogen isotopes but did 

not get its power from the fusion of hydrogen atoms. That being 

said, it is perhaps half a decade or a decade before North Korea 

tests a genuine thermonuclear weapon. I am sure our witnesses 

will be able to clarify and give us a more precise estimate. 

We have throughout this century, which is now in its 16th year, 

had a policy which has completely failed us as foreign policy, but 

has achieved what some would argue is the guiding force behind 

foreign policy, which is meeting domestic political concerns. We 

have not—neither the last administration nor this administration—

slowed down North Korea’s nuclear program for any significant 

time, and continuing this policy, or repeating what we have done 

but only in a louder voice, is not going to yield a different result. 

But our policy has allowed us at times—for various times—to 

seem tough, and we have avoided offending Wall Street. These are 

important domestic political objectives which have been fully 

achieved. So if viewed from the standpoint of being popular domestically, our policy is a success. If we want to protect the world from 

North Korean nuclear weapons, it has been a complete failure. 

In terms of what we could do if sounding tough wasn’t important, 

we could make it clear to China that, if there was a unified Korea, 

American forces would not be north of the 38th parallel and might 

even be further south. There would be less reason for them to be 

there. 

We do not have any military forces defending any other China 

neighbor from China. Our troops in South Korea are there to defend South Korea from North Korea. We could offer North Korea 

a package of aid—that has been done before—but a non-aggression 

pact that they asked for and we refused to provide, because Dick 

Cheney imagined invasion, or at least didn’t want to give up that 

opportunity sometime in the future. 

But the most important thing we need to do, and the thing we 

are least likely to do, is to make it clear to China that their access 

to U.S. markets depends upon them getting tough with North 

Korea. Wall Street would be aghast if we actually did it, so we 

won’t. So we are likely to continue the current circumstance. China 

is indeed miffed by what North Korea has done, but is unwilling 

to change its policy, and, of course, China has been miffed by North 

Korea many times in the past. 

China will not change its policy unless the reality changes, and 

the current reality is they have free access to U.S. markets and 

that won’t be changed if they choose to continue the policy that 

they have continued throughout this century, which is to subsidize 

North Korea. 

So if we want a policy that doesn’t meet domestic political objectives, but simply maximizes the carrots and sticks on North Korea, 

it would be a matter of a non-aggression pact on the 38th parallel, 

and the threat of tariffs on Chinese goods if China continues—

while always questioning—it but continues a policy of subsidizing 

North Korea. 

4

So my guess is that we will simply continue to pull our hair 

out—obviously, I have done more of that than most of the witnesses—in worry about North Korea, and talk tough, and do nothing that offends Wall Street. And if you keep doing the same thing 

for now a 16-year-old century, and expect a different result, that 

is the definition of insanity. 

And a final thing I will ask our witnesses to comment on is 

whether we would actually get somewhere if we consent—if we 

agreed that North Korea could have a very limited number of 

atomic but not thermonuclear weapons, or is there a real prospect 

of getting them to be a nuclear-free state. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. I just wanted to comment for the ranking member, 

I think that many of the issues that you raised are thought-provoking and reasonable, and I would like to extend a hand across 

the partisan divide to work with you in any way, shape, or form 

to not just pull our hair out but actually get some results. 

And if that offends some folks, some special interests, then so be 

it. I think the more important goal is to have success. I think all 

of the world expects success. And so I just want to say that I think 

you have raised some legitimate issues that need to be explored, 

and I intend to work with you to do that. Look forward to it. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for holding this hearing at a very significant moment. 

Our relations with both Koreas go back a long way, and I have 

a long memory. I still remember sitting right here in this room 

when the Clinton administration was proposing to us that we 

have—that we cut a deal, basically, with North Korea, that we 

would be providing them food and fuel for an agreement not to do 

what they apparently have been doing, which is—I don’t care if you 

want to call it a hydrogen booster device or a hydrogen nuclear 

weapon; the fact is they obviously have been spending their money 

on developing ways of mass murdering other people while we have 

been providing them the money for their food and fuel. 

To say that that is absolutely unacceptable is to put it mildly. 

And, at that time, I indicated, and several other Republicans, I 

might add, and a couple of other Democrats as well, I might add, 

pointed out that that is what would happen, and here it has. Surprise, surprise. They have used their resources to develop weapons 

of mass destruction. We have subsidized them in using our money 

to provide them food and fuel, which should be coming out of their, 

how do you say, hydrogen boosting device development budget. 

Let me suggest that this nuclear explosion, and the continued—

the obvious continued work that North Korea is doing on nuclear 

military devices, that should at least put us into a mindset that we 

have to do something different than what we have been doing. 

And let me note that President Abe of Japan has made it very, 

very clear that there are threats to the Pacific, and I would applaud President Abe for reaching out to South Korea at this moment. President Abe of Japan has gone the extra mile to address 

sensitivities in South Korea that are left over way from World War 

II. 

5

And he needs to be applauded for that, and he needs to also be 

encouraged to rebuild Japan’s military strength, so that he can 

work with the United States of America in preserving the peace in 

that part of the world, instead of having the United States having 

to carry the entire load on our own. 

So with that said, I would finish by saying the other factor is, 

which the chairman mentioned, China. Just as it was obvious that 

the North Korea regime, as corrupt and belligerent and as repressive as it is, would be using their money to develop weapons while 

we provided them food and fuel, it is just as evident that they have 

a relationship with Beijing that puts Beijing into a position of influence in North Korea, if not dominance of North Korea. 

So let us, again, to the point that we applaud President Abe for 

reaching out and policies that are going to ultimately bring more 

stability to that part of the world, let us condemn Beijing for not 

using its influence in a way that would bring more stability and 

peace to that region. 

So we need to work together on this, and, Mr. Chairman, thank 

you for calling this hearing. Looking forward to hearing for specifics and information from the witnesses that will help us develop 

our policy now as we start into this new era. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the gentleman from California. 

Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the 

timeliness of this hearing. A few weeks ago I had a chance to visit 

the Republic of Korea, visit with our troops, and spend a few days 

around Christmas with our troops, also visiting with the Korean 

foreign secretaries, national security folks, et cetera. 

I also had a chance to go up to the demilitarized zone and, you 

know, chat with our troops, see the Republic of Korea troops. The 

demilitarized zone is an oxymoron. This is one of the most heavily 

militarized zones in the world, and it is a constant reminder that 

we are in a cease fire. we are not in a state of peace. 

You know, listening to the remarks of my colleagues, I think it 

is important for us to learn from what we have tried in the past, 

and so forth. But the conundrum is North Korea is not easy, and 

it will require a partnership with the countries in that region. 

And, in many cases, we all land at the same place, that China 

really does have to take a leadership role here. China is the one 

country that does have some leverage with North Korea, but it will 

take a partnership between, you know, the Chinese Government, 

the Russians, Japan, our Korean allies, along with U.S. leadership, 

in order to address this. 

It is in all of our interest to deescalate tensions, to try to bring 

North Korea into the 21st century. And the other goal that I think 

many Koreans have of seeing reunification, you know, it is not 

going to be easy. It will take world leadership. It will take the nations, along with the United States, in that region working together, but it can be done if we put our minds to it. And we have 

to; there is an urgency now, as indicated by the recent North Korean nuclear tests. 

It is complicated, and, you know, the President talked about the 

threats that, you know, we face in the Middle East. But those are 

6

not threats to our very existence as a nation, and North Korea, 

with the hydrogen bomb, with ballistic missile and ICBM capabilities, are a threat to world stability, and we have got to direct this. 

There is the urgency of now. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you to kind 

of navigate this path forward, and it is incredibly important. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. I mean, there is no question that the world has had a problem for a long time with respect 

to North Korea, particularly their leadership. Whether the grandfather or the father or the son now, they are all equally as crazy, 

I am afraid, particularly the newest one. 

But their own people continue to suffer and to starve. They are 

the most politically isolated country on the globe. Despite that, 

they continue—they have absolute contempt for most of the rest of 

the world, including their neighbors. And with this fourth now in 

the last number of years nuclear tests, and we have reason to believe it is hydrogen, although that hasn’t been confirmed necessarily yet, but, nonetheless, it is terribly disturbing. 

I think every administration, from the Clinton administration to 

the Bush administration to the Obama administration has failed 

with respect to North Korea, and that is most unfortunate. And 

now with the increasing sophistication of their missile systems, the 

United States is at risk as well. But two countries that are even 

more at risk at, obviously, South Korea and Japan. 

And as my colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher from California indicated, 

China is the key here. China is the only country that has any real 

influence over North Korea. And the only thing that is going to get 

China’s attention is if those two countries, Japan and South Korea, 

seriously consider nuclear programs of their own. That is the only 

thing that is going to get China’s attention. It is the last thing 

China wants. 

And so I would urge those two countries to think seriously about 

this. I am not encouraging them to do it, but even thinking about 

it and discussing it I think will get China’s attention. And maybe 

China will finally act to put the pressure on North Korea necessary 

to get them to back off this insanity of one of the poorest countries 

in the world spending all their money on nuclear weaponry to 

threaten the rest of the world. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the gentleman. Is there anybody else that 

seeks recognition on the panel before—yes, Mr. Lowenthal. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing. 

I find this very interesting. I think the focus of what you have 

heard a lot is China, what are we going to do to deal with China 

in terms of the pressure that China has. To me, there are a couple 

of questions I would like to understand before we get into what we 

have to do to press China, or to do anything else; that is, what does 

China want? Where is China at this—not because of our pressure. 

Two, I have seen over the past year or so some articles, especially in the New York Times, about Chinese officials, former military officials, retired, talking about the unsustainability of the Kim 

7

regime, and that there is a real concern in China about instability 

in North Korea. I would like to hear that discussion, that there is 

going to be pressure from the bottom up. People cannot live under 

those conditions, and the Chinese know this. The Chinese know, 

and there are real worries about the Chinese, about what that instability is going to lead to in terms of them. 

So that leads us to the third point; that is, when we talk about 

China, knowing that China—it is not getting China involved. 

China is very involved with what are the consequences. It may 

have its own agenda about what it wants to do with this. The question is, besides pressure on China—and we have heard a lot, and 

I am not saying that that is not a potential—what are the ways 

of partnership with China? What do you see as the opportunities 

at this moment to be dealing with? 

Thank you very much, and I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank Mr. Lowenthal. Very insightful thoughts 

and questions. 

If there are no other opening statements, then I am going to 

move to the panel, first of all introducing three great experts on 

this dicey issue. First is Dr. Victor Cha, senior adviser and Korea 

chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It is 

good to see you again, Dr. Cha. Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation. And 

Ms. Bonnie Glaser, who is the senior adviser for Asia and director 

of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

We are thrilled to have all of you here today, and thank you for 

making the time available. First, I will introduce Dr. Cha. 

STATEMENT OF VICTOR CHA, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISER AND 

KOREA CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. CHA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Sherman, 

and members of the committee. It really is an honor to speak to 

you today about a very difficult topic, and that is North Korea. 

You mentioned—both the chairman and Congressman Bera mentioned urgency, and I think there is a great deal of urgency. There 

are elements of deterrence and crisis instability that derive from 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons status that I don’t think the North 

Koreans fully comprehend. And it can also be the case that the 

North Korean leader, this young North Korean leader, views nuclear weapons as usable weapons rather than as strategic elements 

of deterrence, valuable only in their non-use. 

So the urgency is that the result could be a disaster at the cost 

of tens of thousands of lives, at which point the world is going to 

wonder why the United States did nothing to stop this before it 

was too late. 

So what have we done? In the administration’s own words, strategic patience, the policy of strategic patience, had two objectives. 

The first was to break the cycle of provocations for negotiations 

that was the flaw of past administration’s policies. 

Second, the concept was that this idea of pressure and non-dialogue would eventually cause the North Koreans to feel compelled 

to come back to negotiations genuinely willing to cut a deal. When 

8

this did not work, the administration did try to reach out and engage, but all of these offers had been spurned by the regime. 

So we are in the worst of all worlds right now. There is no diplomacy. There are more tests, a growing program, a new cycle of 

provocations. We have had four nuclear tests, three of them during 

the Obama administration, two of them before the President’s 

State of the Union speech. And at the rate we are going, this issue 

is just going to get punted to the next administration, and it is 

going to be an exponentially worse problem. 

So a new approach to North Korea has to focus on what Bob 

Gallucci and I described in the New York Times last week as asymmetric pressure points. In my experience, being involved in the negotiations in the previous administration, there were only two 

times where I felt like the North Koreans were truly caught off 

guard, uncertain of how to respond. 

The first of these was in September 2005 when the Treasury Department took actions that led to the freezing of North Korean assets at a bank in China. And the second was in February 2014 in 

the aftermath of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry report 

of which the major recommendation was referral of the North Korean leadership to the ICC for crimes against humanity. 

These were the only two times that I really felt the North Koreans were frazzled, and I think a new strategy has to build on these 

pressure points. Let me just highlight a couple of these. 

First is sanctions, and I know Bruce will talk about this as well. 

As the chairman said, it is a policy myth that North Korea is the 

most sanctioned country in the world, and the chairman cited some 

of the statistics for how the sanctioning against Iran is much higher than that against North Korea. So there is plenty more space 

to operate there. 

Secondary sanctioning should also be given positive consideration. I know that this has been talked about within policy circles 

as a significant escalation, and this will certainly complicate our relationships with China, the European Union, Southeast Asia, 

South America, and Africa. But it is also certain that many of 

these entities will comply when given the choice of dealing with 

North Korea or losing access to the U.S. financial system. 

We should also give serious consideration, as the chairman said, 

to putting North Korea back on the State Sponsor of Terrorism 

List. I know that there will be lawyers who will dispute the legal 

criteria for putting North Korea back on the list, and here I would 

only urge that particular attention be given to North Korea’s cyber 

capabilities. We did research at CSIS that shows that the activities, these cyber activities, are instigated by the same agencies, entities within the North Korean Government that have been responsible in the past for terrorist acts. 

Human rights has to complement sanctions as part of an asymmetric strategy. One of the potential targets would be North Korean slave labor. There are over 50,000 workers in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Russia, and China, that are operating in subhuman conditions that are being paid nothing. Their revenues all 

are going back to the North Korean Government. There are different estimates, between $250 million to over $2 billion of hard 

currency. So this is certainly something that should be targeted. 

9

Another useful asymmetric pressure point is the Kaesong Industrial Complex. This project now provides $90 million in hard currency to North Korean authorities, with little wages actually going 

back to the factory workers. The South Korean Government will 

probably be opposed to something like this, because even conservative governments have grown attached to the Kaesong industrial 

complex, but difficult times call for difficult measures. 

Lastly, on information, North Korea under Kim has proven to be 

hypersensitive to external criticism with renewal of the North Korean Human Rights Act, and I entirely agree with the chairman on 

the idea of trying to increase funding and basically think about 

new ways of bringing information into the country. 

As some of the work that we have done with the Bush Institute 

has shown, the United States and South Korea can come up with 

a comprehensive strategy for breaking down North Korean information barriers, because in the end we need to improve the human 

condition of the people in North Korea. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cha follows:]

10


98313a-1.eps
11


98313a-2.eps
12


98313a-3.eps
13


98313a-4.eps
14


98313a-5.eps
15


98313a-6.eps
16


98313a-7.eps
17


98313a-8.eps
18


98313a-9.eps
19

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Klingner. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW FOR NORTHEAST ASIA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. KLINGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Sherman, and other distinguished members of the panel. It truly 

is an honor to be asked to appear before you on such an important 

issue to our national security. 

North Korea’s recent nuclear test has again triggered widespread 

calls to do something tougher on North Korea. But we have been 

here many times before, and each time administration claims of 

tough action were taken at face value, pledges to be even tougher 

the next time were issued, and interest was eventually diverted 

elsewhere. 

More effective action was also hindered by several widely accepted myths about North Korean sanctions. The first myth is that 

sanctions can’t affect an isolated country like North Korea. Targeted financial measures, which are a law enforcement mechanism, 

are directed against specific entities that violate U.S. laws. Even 

the most isolated regime, criminal organization, or terrorist group 

is tied into the global financial order. 

The vast majority of all international financial transactions, including those of North Korea, are denominated in dollars, which 

means they must go through a U.S. Treasury Department regulated bank in the United States. That gives the United States tremendous power and leverage to freeze and seize assets, to impose 

fines such as a $9-billion fine imposed on a French bank for improper financial transactions with Cuba, Iran, and Sudan, and also 

to deny access to the U.S. financial system. 

As you already pointed out, Mr. Chairman, a second myth is that 

North Korea is the most heavily sanctioned country in the world. 

President Obama claims North Korea is the most isolated, the most 

sanctioned, the most cutoff nation on Earth. That is simply not 

true. The U.S., the European Union, and the U.N. imposed far 

more pervasive and compelling measures against Iran than North 

Korea. 

Also, unilaterally, the United States has targeted far fewer North 

Korean entities than those of the Balkans, Burma, Cuba, Iran, and 

Zimbabwe. The U.S. has sanctioned more than twice as many 

Zimbabwean entities as North Korean entities. We have also designated Iran and Burma as primary money laundering concerns, 

but not North Korea, which is counterfeiting our currency. 

The U.S. has sanctioned officials from Burma, Burundi, Congo, 

Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, for human rights violations, 

and sanctioned by name the Presidents of Belarus and Zimbabwe, 

but not yet sanctioned a single North Korean entity for human 

rights violations nearly 2 years after a U.N. Commission of Inquiry 

report concluded the regime was conducting such egregious human 

rights violations as to constitute crimes against humanity. 

The U.S. has also frozen the assets of Sudan, Iranian, and Syrian, but not North Korean, officials and entities for censorship. The 

list goes on and on, and I have included other examples in my written testimony. 

20

A third myth is there is nothing more the U.S. can impose on 

North Korea. After he left office, former Assistant Secretary of 

State Kurt Campbell commented, ‘‘It would be possible for us to 

put more financial pressure on North Korea. We can make life 

much more difficult through financial sanctions on North Korea.’’ 

And he also pointed out he was surprised when he was in government to find out that there were about 10 times as many sanctions 

on Burma as there were on North Korea. 

President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and other officials have made similar statements indicating that there are other 

measures that the U.S. could impose but hasn’t. 

A fourth myth is that sanctions don’t work. As Dr. Cha already 

pointed out, tougher measures were effective when applied. In 

2005, the U.S. designated the Macao-based bank Banco Delta Asia 

as a money laundering concern for facilitating North Korean illicit 

activities. As a result of Washington belatedly enforcing its laws, 

as well as a series of sub rosa meetings by U.S. officials throughout 

Asia, two dozen financial institutions voluntarily cut back or terminated their business with North Korea. 

And a North Korea negotiator admitted to a senior White House 

official, ‘‘You finally found a way to hurt us.’’ Instead, what the 

U.S. should be doing is implementing the Iran model against North 

Korea. Just as strong international measures induced Tehran back 

to the negotiating table, more robust measures are needed to leverage North Korea. 

While implementing new sanctions measures is important, fully 

implementing and enforcing already existing, far-reaching measures is also critical. The U.S. has the tools; we have just lacked the 

resolve to fully use them. 

For years the Obama administration has been hitting the snooze 

bar on sanctions. It has pursued a policy of timid incrementalism 

by holding some sanctions in abeyance to be rolled out after the 

next North Korean violation or provocation. The U.S. instead needs 

to sharpen the choices for North Korea by raising the risk and cost 

for those violating laws and U.N. resolutions, not only North Korea 

but also those that facilitate its actions. 

In my written testimony, I provided a lengthy list of very specific 

recommendations for U.S. and South Korean actions that should be 

implemented against North Korea. Neither sanctions nor diplomacy 

alone is a panacea. Both are essential and, along with fully funding 

U.S. defense requirements, should be mutually reinforcing elements of a comprehensive integrated strategy. 

I will conclude my presentation with the same question I posed 

to this committee 2 years ago. Why has the United States hesitated 

to impose the same legal measures against North Korea that it has 

already used against other countries for far less egregious violations of U.S. and international law? 

Thank you again for the privilege of appearing before you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]

21


98313b-1.eps
22


98313b-2.eps
23


98313b-3.eps
24


98313b-4.eps
25


98313b-5.eps
26


98313b-6.eps
27


98313b-7.eps
28


98313b-8.eps
29


98313b-9.eps
30


98313b-10.eps
31


98313b-11.eps
32


98313b-12.eps
33


98313b-13.eps
34


98313b-14.eps
35


98313b-15.eps
36


98313b-16.eps
37


98313b-17.eps
38

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Ms. Glaser. 

STATEMENT OF MS. BONNIE GLASER, SENIOR ADVISER FOR 

ASIA, DIRECTOR OF CHINA POWER PROJECT, CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. GLASER. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sherman, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to have 

the opportunity to testify today on this very important issue. 

As so many of you have already pointed out, cooperation from 

China, North Korea’s main benefactor, is essential to achieving a 

nuclear-free peninsula. China is North Korea’s biggest trading 

partner. It accounts for 90 percent of North Korea’s global trade, 

provides at least 70 percent of North Korea’s crude oil requirements, some 80 percent of its consumer goods, approximately 45 

percent of its food, and Chinese investment accounts for almost 95 

percent of foreign direct investment in North Korea. 

The U.S. should not expect Beijing to completely abandon its ally 

and forge a common strategy with Washington to squeeze North 

Korea until it gives up its nuclear weapons or collapses. But it may 

be possible to persuade China to strictly comply with its existing 

international commitments to further tighten sanctions on North 

Korea and to reduce its support or make continued support contingent on specific actions by Pyongyang to return to its 

denuclearization pledges. 

To elicit greater cooperation, the U.S. must attach high priority 

to North Korea on the U.S.-China agenda, especially in summit 

meetings between our Presidents, U.S. and Chinese leaders. Cooperation on North Korea should be identified as a litmus test of 

the proposition that the United States and China can work together where their interests overlap, and the U.S. should then take 

the following steps. 

First, the U.S. should call out China for its failure to enforce existing U.N. sanctions. North Korea has deep networks with Chinese companies and uses these relationships to procure prohibited 

items from all over the world, routing them through China before 

onward shipment to North Korea. Designated North Korean entities continue to do business with Chinese companies and visit Chinese ports. North Koreans are reportedly still able to conduct banking transactions in small banks operating in Northeast China along 

the border. China does not enforce the ban on luxury goods. 

Second, the U.S. should press Beijing to agree to the designation 

of more North Korean individuals and entities in new U.N. Security Council resolution. 

Third, the U.S. should encourage Beijing to use its leverage over 

North Korea in targeted ways to pressure for change in its behavior. China could refuse to engage in new economic projects with 

North Korea until the government returns to negotiations in good 

faith. Beijing could reduce the flow of Chinese tourists to North 

Korea, which has become a significant source of foreign exchange. 

Fourth, the United States should encourage China to leverage its 

assistance to North Korea to influence its behavior. So to deter 

North Korean long-range missile launches and nuclear tests, China 

could agree to warn Pyongyang that future provocations would be 

39

followed by a cutback in Chinese aid. Beijing could also insist that 

Pyongyang return to its commitments under the Six Party talks or 

face substantial reductions in deliveries of crude oil, kerosene, diesel, and gasoline. 

And, fifth, the U.S. should press China to not obstruct discussion 

in U.N. bodies on human rights abuses in North Korea. And my 

colleague, Victor Cha, has already underscored North Korea’s sensitivity to this issue. 

Securing cooperation from China to increase pressure on North 

Korea may be more feasible than in the past. Xi Jinping is a decisive and bold leader who has a clear vision of what is needed to 

achieve what he calls the ‘‘Chinese dream,’’ the great rejuvenation 

of the Chinese nation. And under Xi’s leadership, China has embarked on an effort to end the special relationship of the past between Beijing and Pyongyang and replace it with a normal stateto- state relationship. 

Widely viewed as the most powerful leader China has had since 

Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping has sufficient clout to overrule opposition from potent constituencies in China that would resist a tougher stance toward North Korea, especially in the party and the military. 

Beijing is not prepared to assume sole responsibility for addressing the North Korean nuclear threat, but China might be willing 

to do more along the lines that I have outlined if it believes that 

the U.S. has an effective strategy, is prioritizing the goal of creating a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, and does not seek to use the 

Korean peninsula to harm Chinese interests. 

What does China want? A balance of power in Northeast Asia 

that is favorable to Chinese interests, and certainly does not 

threaten Chinese interests. 

I believe China does not adamantly oppose Korean unification, 

but the known burdens and dangers of the status quo today are 

less risky for China than the uncertainty that unification may 

bring for Chinese interests. 

And I look forward to the discussion. Thank you again. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]

40


98313c-1.eps
41


98313c-2.eps
42


98313c-3.eps
43


98313c-4.eps
44


98313c-5.eps
45


98313c-6.eps
46


98313c-7.eps
47


98313c-8.eps
48


98313c-9.eps
49


98313c-10.eps
50

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. I would like to thank the distinguished 

panel members very much for making the time to be here today. 

You know, it is kind of unnerving when Seth Rogen gets more reaction out of the North Koreans than our American policies do. He 

certainly hit a nerve, you know, when he put that movie out, a lot 

more than any of the blustering that has been coming out of Washington, DC. 

It has been a conundrum, as pointed out by my colleague, Dana 

Rohrabacher, that is not new. It is not an issue that was resolved 

at one time and has degraded. It has never been resolved. And 

every time I have spoken with any expert about how to get North 

Korea to start living with accepted international norms, especially 

when it comes to proliferation, every one of those conversations always involves China, because they are the 800-pound gorilla when 

it comes to dealing with North Korea, because of North Korea’s dependence on them for food and energy. 

And, Ms. Glaser, you have made some very I think astute observations on what China could do. But how do we motivate them 

properly to get that done? There have been a lot of things talked 

about—maybe targeted sanctions that involve Chinese banks that 

fund North Korea. Maybe that is something we can look at. I spoke 

to Mr. Sherman about that, maybe looking at that in a bipartisan 

way. 

Mr. Klingner, you have said that in your submitted speech, your 

written speech, you are going to be talking about several of the 

sanctions that maybe could and should be on the table. I would like 

us to really look at entertaining those. I think that the bill that 

was passed yesterday on the House floor was a good move. I think 

it moves the ball up the field. But I think there is even more to 

be done. 

You have pointed out, rightly so, Mr. Klingner, that we haven’t 

even considered or done similar things that we have done to far 

less egregious offenders in the world today. And I think that is 

abominable. I think we should put all things on the table. 

I would like to ask you, Mr. Klingner, why do you think that 

there has been such restraint on dealing with North Korea in the 

same way that we have dealt with far less offenders? What is the 

rationale? It doesn’t make any sense to me. Why have we been so 

reticent to do so? 

Mr. KLINGNER. That is an excellent question, sir, which I really 

don’t have an answer to. It really is counterintuitive. You know, if 

you just compare Iran and North Korea, Iran remains in the NonProliferation Treaty. North Korea is out. Iran claims that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes. North Korea quite clearly 

says it is to incinerate the U.S. and its allies. Iran, you know, has 

not exploded a nuclear device. North Korean has done four. 

And Iran has oil. One would think that we would have more 

pressure on North Korea than Iran, but we haven’t. There are perhaps the concerns as to how North Korea will respond if we impose 

additional measures. I don’t think we should be hesitant to enforce 

our laws because of the concerns of what the criminal will do if we 

enforce them. 

Similarly, as has already been talked about, is how will China 

respond? When I advocated additional measures against North 

51

Korea, I have said, ‘‘Let the law enforcement people go where the 

evidence takes them.’’ And someone once commented to me that, 

‘‘Oh, so you want to sacrifice the all-important U.S.-China relationship over North Korea?’’

I said, ‘‘Well, no. What I am saying is I don’t want to give China 

immunity from U.S. law simply because they are China.’’ So we 

should go where the evidence takes us. We should sanction whatever entities are violating U.S. and international law and U.N. resolutions, not because they are Chinese but because they are violating our laws and the resolutions. 

Mr. SALMON. I think that your answer kind of dovetails with the 

opening statement of the ranking member, and I think that these 

comments really have a lot of bearing on going forward. I think 

that there really shouldn’t be any sacred cows when it comes to enforcing our laws. And protection of special interests or, you know, 

ongoing concerns over a bilateral relationship with China, these 

are serious issues. And China has not stood up for its obligations, 

I believe, in this realm. 

One thing that has been mentioned that might get China’s attention, and I think it is also just good policy, is what about the U.S. 

bolstering our support for a missile defense system for South Korea 

at the least, and maybe Japan? What do you think about that, Dr. 

Cha and Mr. Klingner? 

Mr. CHA. So I think that is a great idea. On the China piece of 

it, first, as Bruce said, when there was a Section 311 against a Chinese bank in Macao in 2005, that was a law enforcement action. 

It was a Chinese bank. And, in the end, the U.S.-China relationship survived. So, and it was an effective—it was a very effective 

measure. And it actually may take things like that to actually motivate China. We are almost self-deterring in that sense, supposed 

equities in the relationship. 

With regard to measures with other countries in the region, I 

think absolutely this—all of North Korea’s activities speak to the 

need for a much more robust and networked missile defense system 

in Asia, including the United States, Japan, and South Korea. As 

was mentioned, the relationship between Japan and Korea has 

gone through some rough periods, but it is on the mend, and there 

are I think opportunities here, particularly in South Korea, to talk 

about more missile defense as well as better intelligence and information-sharing among the three countries. 

These have been on our agenda with our allies for quite some 

time, and we haven’t been able to push them forward. And unfortunate as it is, you know, when we were working on the policy every 

time North Korea did something bad, the motto in the office was, 

‘‘Well, let’s make lemonade out of this lemon.’’ And one of the ways 

to make lemonade out of this lemon is to really consolidate our defense alliances, and that also complicates the environment for 

China and may motivate them to do more. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Klingner. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes. Last year I wrote a detailed research paper 

that South Korea should allow the U.S. to deploy THAAD, the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense System. To date, the South Korean administration has not even wanted to publicly discuss it. 

And, as I pointed out in the paper, THAAD is better than anything 

52

the South Koreans have or will have for decades to come. It is more 

much capable. 

Also, I point out that the Chinese claims that it will impair their 

ability to assault the United States or our allies with missiles, they 

are red herrings. The THAAD is very effective against North Korean missiles, but it will have no constrainment on Chinese missiles. Therefore, China’s objections are politically based. 

So I think the U.S., in consultation with our allies, should deploy 

THAAD. It will improve the defense of not only our forces there, 

but of South Korea, and also, as Dr. Cha said, to have South Korea 

integrate its system into the more comprehensive, effective allied 

system with Japan, because we are all in this together. You know, 

the same North Korean missile could be aimed on the same trajectory toward South Korea, U.S. Forces in Korea, or U.S. Forces in 

Japan, which are critical for the defense of the Republic of Korea. 

Mr. SALMON. It is no secret that the relationship between China 

and South Korea has blossomed over the last several years, and 

they have tried to do everything they can to improve trade, and all 

aspects of that bilateral relationship. It is also no secret that China 

has lobbied, and I think that is the understatement of the universe, 

South Korea against THAAD. 

And I think it is time for us, as leaders in the region, to step up 

our voices and our commitment to security in the region by support 

for things like that and try to reignite some support for those 

things, because maybe, just maybe, besides being good policy, from 

our strategic interests, self-strategic interests, it might be a really 

good motivation factor for China to finally get off its duff and do 

something about this serious global problem. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Usually it is the witnesses that answer questions. 

But one question has come up, and that is, why did we do it in Iran 

and not North Korea? So I think I will answer the question. When 

Congress passed the sanctions laws, they provided secondary sanctions, which is the only way you go after these regimes. If the law 

had been enforced it would have made Iran’s trading partners very 

angry. 

Administrations refused to enforce those laws, gave Iran a lot 

more time to get very close to a nuclear weapon, but they began 

to persuade Iran’s trading partners that they should go along with 

this pressure. And only to the extent that we could carry out the 

sanctions regime without angering Iran’s major trading partners 

did we carry it out. 

And we used persuasion. And who were we persuading? Europe. 

So we had sanctions on Iran only to the extent that we could get 

Europe not to be terribly angry if we forced them to go along. 

As to China, persuading them will be considerably more difficult. 

And so the chairman and I are talking about, for example, sanctions on Chinese banks. That will make China angry. In dealing 

with Iran, the administration got as far as it did without making 

anybody really angry, any of Iran’s trading partners. I think this 

North Korean nuclear program is significant enough that we 

should be willing to make China angry. 

Now, I might talk about a tariff on their goods that would make 

them angrier than I could persuade my colleagues in Congress to 

53

go along with. But they will be pretty angry with the banking sanctions. 

Dr. Cha, you say there are some who doubt that North Korea is 

legally a terrorist state. One act of terrorism is when you see civilian hostages, and that act of terrorism continues at least until you 

release the hostages. And if you seize Japanese homemakers and 

hold them hostage for decades because you want somebody to teach 

you how to pour tea, that is an act of terrorism. 

Dr. Cha, is there any doubt that North Korea is engaged in terrorism until they release the hostages they have seized? Or their 

bodies, for those who have died? 

Mr. CHA. You have no disagreement from me there. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. CHA. Congressman, I think that there have been many actions in that vein, almost a regular state practice of detaining innocent individuals, Americans and other nationalities, in the country 

for no apparent reason, and that is just unacceptable. 

My only point was that I think that the other area that we could 

investigate in terms of criteria for putting them back on the list is 

the cyber area. The——

Mr. SALMON. The cyber terrorism is bad enough. But when you 

seize people and hold them for decades because you want somebody 

to teach you a tea ceremony, I have one comment and that is North 

Korea is very status conscious. 

And, of course, the biggest boost to your ego is to have a nucleartipped ICBM. The cheesy way to deliver a nuclear weapon is to 

smuggle one. But I will point out that you can smuggle a nuclear 

weapon inside a bale of marijuana, and a missile defense program 

isn’t going to stop that. 

And, in fact, you have the additional advantage of having plausible deniability or a delay. So retaliation doesn’t occur in cold 

blood. It doesn’t occur after a 90-day investigatory process. 

I want to go to one more line of questioning. Al-Kibar in Syria, 

North Korean technology. Just a quick question, does any of our 

witnesses have any guess as to how much money North Korea was 

given for cooperating with al-Kibar? I am not seeing any witnesses. 

But we do—the estimates have been in the hundreds of millions of 

dollars. 

We know two things. Iran wants a nuclear weapon. Iran is about 

to get its hands on $130 billion. Would North Korea be willing to 

sell not—they have already proven they are willing to sell nuclear 

weapons kits, if you will, or equipment and plans. Does North 

Korea have enough atomic weapons that they would be willing to 

sell one or two of them? And is this a multi-billion dollar cost for 

whoever wants to buy them? Do we have—Mr. Klingner. 

Mr. KLINGNER. I was going to address your comment about 

North Korea as a terrorist nation, if I could. In my written testimony, I have a long list of actions that North Korea has taken 

which I think fulfill the legal obligation for relisting them as a terrorist nation. There are a number of U.S. statutes. Perhaps the 

most relevant is 18 U.S. Code 2331, which defines international 

terrorism as ‘‘involving violent acts that would be a violation of 

criminal laws of the U.S., and that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.’’

54

I think the threats of a ‘‘9/11-type attack’’ for citizens of the U.S., 

or inhabitants of the U.S. to go to theaters to watch that movie, 

you know, is considered trying to coerce the population. And there 

have been a number of items that I have listed of North Korean 

attempts at assassination and kidnapping and that have been recognized by South Korean courts. So I think any one of those should 

have put North Korea back on the U.S. list, and certainly cumulatively. 

As for whether North Korea would sell a nuclear weapon, as you 

correctly point out, they have shared and sold nuclear and missile 

technology with a list of rogue nations. I question whether they 

would sell a completed weapon, though. I think it might go beyond 

what they would be willing to do, but I certainly could be very 

wrong on that. Certainly, as they develop a larger arsenal, they 

might be more willing to do something. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What I have said in this room is they need their 

first 12 atomic weapons to defend themselves from us. The 13th 

doesn’t go on eBay, but could be available for sale. 

Dr. Cha. 

Mr. CHA. Well, there is certainly a history there. I mean, every 

major weapon system the North Koreans have ever developed they 

have sold. And I am——

Mr. SHERMAN. And they haven’t drawn the line at nuclear. I 

mean, had things gone as planned, Syria or Iran operating in combination at al-Kibar would have a plutonium nuclear device. And 

it is not that North Korea says, ‘‘Oh, that is so immoral; we 

couldn’t participate in that.’’

Mr. CHA. So it is definitely a concern in the case of—as you know 

well, their missile sales, that has certainly been the case. And, you 

know, I think part of their effort at trying to develop longer range 

and more accurate missiles aren’t to sell them. So you can’t put it 

past them in terms of the nuclear site. 

But even aside from the sort of overt proliferation, just by virtue 

of the fact that they have a nuclear arsenal that is growing, creates 

all sort of very serious crisis and stability problems for the United 

States. I mean, the notion that they can keep a dozen or two dozen 

bombs, and as long as we deter them we are safe, is completely 

wrong, because should any crisis develop on the peninsula, North 

Korea is developing these nuclear capabilities at the expense of 

massive degrading of their conventional capabilities. 

And so what that means is if we are ever in a military crisis, we 

immediately have to shoot up the escalation ladder, and that immediately forces us to consider preemption. So it is a highly unstable situation that I think gets lost among the general public, because as the chairman said——

Mr. SHERMAN. Doctor, I have gone way over time. I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. I did, too, so I was looking the other way. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will try not to go over time. First of all, let 

me thank the witnesses. Your testimony has been of great value to 

me and to this committee, and the points that you have made, all 

of you, I mean, you have made some very serious points and given 

us information that we will utilize in this coming year as we try 

to come up with a policy that can deal with this threat. 

55

It is ironic that we seem—I believe the United States and the 

world is entering a new era. The Cold War is being left behind, a 

long way, and even the post-Cold War era is being left behind now. 

And what the new era will be, what is the parameters of how we 

operate in the world, is going to be different. 

And, ironically, the country that may be and the government 

that may be forcing us into a new definition of what our responsibilities are and what we are going to do is one of the most anachronistic regimes in the world. I mean, they don’t even fit into the 

Cold War, I mean, the way they handle themselves. 

I really appreciate the information also about the specifics that 

the North Korean Government is doing, and the actual people who 

are running the North Korean Government put up with in terms 

of the idea of slavery, that they are actually engaged in slavery, 

which I think there is an important—you have made an important 

point today. I mean, this is what—that type of activity is intolerable, and those thousands of North Korean workers that are being 

sent overseas, and all of their salary being given to the government, that is, I believe, virtual slavery. 

And thank you for drawing our attention to that. That is something we should be able to deal with, and something we should be 

able to work with and with international organizations. Let me 

note that I agree with—and am very pleased that the ranking 

member, Mr. Sherman, has pointed out that the North Koreans are 

still holding Japanese hostages after decades. And I agree with 

him, that should not just be overlooked as if that is a past issue. 

The fact that the North Koreans are holding—kidnapped and are 

holding Japanese civilians in North Korea is something that should 

be a matter that is not relegated to the past, as long as they are 

holding these people. And that should be part of what we are looking at. 

Whatever we know, whatever era we are entering, we know it is 

going to be different. And I think that what may come of all of this 

is that we may find that reunification of Korea becomes a reality 

after all of these decades, and that reunification will itself create 

a new world that we have to deal with. We are talking about historic moments in the world. That is where we are at, and it is 

being brought about by this crazy regime up in North Korea, is 

forcing these changes upon us. 

I would also like to mention that we are now entering an era also 

where our technology is not just being utilized for offensive weapon 

systems. And thanks to Ronald Reagan, we started down a path of 

building and focusing on defensive systems, which make a lot more 

sense to me, even especially in cases like this where—and let me 

note there are several new technologies being developed that will 

give us even a greater ability to defend ourselves against a missile 

attack. And we certainly should make that available to South 

Korea and to Japan, and that would certainly be a message there. 

Let me ask again for some more information from you folks. 

Somewhere in the back of my mind is an action that we took, and 

I believe—and I don’t know if it was a covert action, maybe I am 

just disclosing something—to prevent a transfer of money that was 

going to specific individuals in the North Korean Government. 

56

We know that North Korea, with all of its poverty and the lack 

of food, hasn’t prevented luxury cars and booze and very expensive 

consumer items to going to their very elite. And I seem to remember that there were banking transactions that we challenged in 

some way that had an impact on North Korean policy. 

Could you refresh my memory on that? And is that a methodology that we should try to look at now to reestablish that policy 

toward the new challenge that we face? Dr. Cha. 

Mr. CHA. Yes. I think what you are referring to, Congressman, 

is the Section 311 by the Treasury Department in 2005 that advised U.S. financial institutions not to deal with a particular bank 

in Macao——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Macao. 

Mr. CHA [continuing]. Because of money laundering concerns. 

And in the press it is always talked about how we sanctioned 

North Korea financially. What we did was we advised U.S. financial institutions to be wary of business with a particular bank, and 

that then created a ripple effect that you described where many 

other banks that had North Korean accounts decided, well, we are 

going to freeze these, or we are going to investigate them. 

Bank presidents, regulators all started to target these accounts, 

and it had the effect of completely shutting North Korea off from 

the international financial system. They could not do a wire transfer. They could not access bank accounts through ATMs. It was 

really quite a powerful and forceful thing. 

And in answer to your question, yes, I think that we can do that 

again. North Korea has since tried to adjust, but at the same time 

they still are able to operate in the financial system, and there are 

things that we can do to make that much more difficult. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are we talking about bank accounts that are 

being controlled and who operate for the benefit of the leadership 

of—specific leaders of North Korea and decisionmakers there? 

Mr. CHA. I can’t give you the answer to that question here. What 

I can say is that when that action happened, the North Korean negotiators, when they came back to the negotiation table, had only 

one demand, and that was to unfreeze the $25 million that was sitting in that bank in Macao. They did not want to talk about anything else under the sun. They didn’t want to talk about peace 

treaty. They didn’t want to talk about anything else. All they wanted to talk about was that, which gives you a sense of how important it was to them. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do the other witnesses have any comment on 

that? 

Ms. GLASER. Congressman, I think that this also takes us back 

to the issue of China where there are so many of these small banks 

that exist along the border, and sometimes they shut down and 

they pop up someplace else, maybe even, you know, half a mile 

down the road. 

There are some journalists who have gotten into some of these 

banks and pretended to make transactions just to demonstrate how 

easy it is to transfer money to North Korea. So, again, this goes 

back to the issue you raised earlier of shutting down these banking 

transactions, putting sanctions on these banks. 

57

It is just essential to get the Chinese to comply with the sanctions that are already on the books that the Chinese have supported in the United Nations. And when it comes to things like luxury goods, just inspections along a border, they are episodic. There 

are times that the Chinese appear to want to signal the North Koreans that they are dissatisfied with something, and then they go 

back to business as usual. 

Mr. KLINGNER. If I could just add, we talk about Chinese resistance, the Chinese Government resistance to actions. But we can actually get Chinese banks to work in our interests. With the Banco 

Delta Asia issue, as I mentioned before, the U.S. sent officials 

throughout Asia, including to the Bank of China, to talk and point 

out that under Section 311 they could face seizure of their assets 

in the United States and be precluded from accessing the U.S. financial system, which really is the kiss of death for any financial 

institution. 

Even though the Chinese Government was urging the Chinese 

banks to resist any pressure, the banks themselves had to worry 

about their own reputational risk, their own access to the international system. So they complied. They severed—Bank of China, 

for example, severed its relationship with North Korea, even if the 

Chinese Government didn’t want it, but they had to take those actions themselves to maintain, you know, the Bank of China as an 

entity. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our 

panel. I begin by taking issue with the ranking member’s narrative 

with respect to Iran in comparing it to North Korea. My narrative 

would be that this administration took up from the neglect and 

fecklessness of the previous administration with respect to Iran. 

And, whether you like it or not, the agreement, the nuclear agreement, is working. They are complying. 

And if you want to remove an existential threat to Israel, that 

is the way we did it, and it is—you know, in my view, it has the 

best probability of working of any solution offered on the table. 

Maybe one doesn’t like that. Maybe one would have preferred a different alternative. But this is the one the United States Government pursued. I am glad they did. And I think in the long run it 

will be the best alternative for peace in the region and for taking 

the nuclear option with respect to Iran off the table. 

Now, one of the pieces of leverage we had, in addition to sanctions, was choking off Iran’s ability to sell the one product it really 

has, and that is oil. When it comes to North Korea, we don’t have 

an analogous situation other than weapons. I am not quite sure 

what it is the North Koreans really have to sell that we can choke 

off. 

Would that be a fair statement, Ms. Glaser? 

Ms. GLASER. Yes. Yes, I would agree with you, Congressman. I 

don’t know what North Korea has to sell that we can choke off, 

but——

58

Mr. CONNOLLY. But that is a real big difference between—I 

mean, to analogize North Korea and Iran, I just think is apples 

and oranges, because start with the fact that Iran has got oil; 

North Korea doesn’t have anything, other than maybe weapons. 

Ms. GLASER. There are some very important differences, of 

course, between North Korea and Iran, beginning with the fact that 

North Korea has nuclear weapons and has tested them and Iran 

has not. But, at the same time, I would agree with the points that 

have been made by Bruce Klingner and Victor Cha that there are 

mechanisms that we have used, sanctions that we have used, executive authorities we have used, against Iran that exist that we 

have not used against North Korea. 

So there are many more ways that we could pressure North 

Korea, that we have applied to Iran I believe fairly successfully, 

but have not applied to North Korea. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, let me ask that question, and I welcome 

Dr. Cha and Mr. Klingner, but it is a devil’s advocate question. I 

am not promoting it, but is that the best way to try to restrain and 

shape North Korean behavior, tighten sanctions, tighten economic 

consequences, because they will have to scream ‘‘uncle’’ at some 

point? Is that really what history tells us about North Korea? Ms. 

Glaser? And then, the other—both of the other panelists are free 

to comment as well. 

Ms. GLASER. My view is that it must be part of any strategy. In 

itself, if we are not offering North Korea some positive vision of the 

future, then pressure/sanctions are unlikely to work. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Alone. 

Ms. GLASER. Alone. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. 

Ms. GLASER. But I believe that the United States, under this administration and prior administrations, had made it quite clear to 

North Korea that there are many things that we can put on the 

table, security assurances, assistance, diplomatic relations. There is 

such thing as a—if you want to call it a grand bargain. 

The North Koreans are aware that there would be benefits for 

them if they give up their nuclear weapons. So pressure, by itself, 

of course will not work, but pressure/sanctions must be part of any 

strategy. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Cha? Mr. Klingner? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes, I agree. And even though my comments 

today have focused on sanctions, when I have talked about these 

in other fora in the past, I have always emphasized the context 

that it is one instrument. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And not always an effective one. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Right. Just as diplomacy has not been effective. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Right. 

Mr. KLINGNER. So, we often get into a binary debate of sanctions 

versus engagement, and we need both. I mean, it is part of a comprehensive integrated strategy. So we need continued offers of conditional engagement based on conditionality, reciprocity, transparency. 

Unfortunately, we have had many agreements, four agreements, 

for them never to pursue nuclear weapons, and then four agreements to give up the weapons they promised never to build in the 

59

first place. Additional pressure, and then also those two tracks we 

hope will convince North Korea to alter its behavior, and then you 

also need the third track of having to ensure that you have sufficient defenses for yourself and your allies. 

But when people say sanctions don’t work because North Korea 

hasn’t cut up its weapons, well, diplomacy was equally unable to 

do that. But sanctions have a number of other purposes. One is to 

enforce U.S. law. Two is to impose a penalty, a cost or pain when 

someone violates our law or international law or U.N. resolutions, 

and hopefully a deterrent to other would-be violators. 

Three is to put into place mechanisms to impede the inflow of 

prohibited items, components for their nuclear missile programs, 

and the money from illicit activities. Four, to prevent or at least 

constrain proliferation. And, five, the most difficult, is to alter their 

behavior. 

I would argue on four of the five that they have had some success. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thoughtful. Thank you. 

Dr. Cha. 

Mr. CHA. Okay. Very quickly, Congressman, on the question 

about, what do they export that is of value? I mean, truly, what 

is of value to them? And so a couple of things come to mind in addition to the things that Bruce has already talked about. 

One, as I mentioned before, is this issue of slave labor. That is 

providing income to them. It is something that is clearly in violation of ILO standards, even though they are not a signatory to the 

ILO, and that is certainly one area where it is not Iranian oil, but 

it is something that certainly is of value to them. 

The other is there are a lot of raw materials actually in North 

Korea, and China since 2008 has extracted a lot of that for their 

two inland provinces. And when people are in Pyongyang, the capital city of North Korea, they say things look pretty good there 

now. That is all because of Chinese money from these contracts, 

and that is another area. 

On the diplomacy side, I don’t think anybody on this panel is 

against diplomacy. I think we all believe diplomacy is important, 

but I have to say that having been—having participated in negotiations for the last agreements with North Korea, the nuclear agreements, and knowing a lot about the Clinton administration agreements and President Obama’s, we have put—I mean, as Bonnie 

said, they know what they get. We put everything on the table. 

And the issue right now is that this young leader is not interested, and he is looking to build his programs because he wants to 

confront the next administration here. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. If the chair would allow me one more question, and I will try to ask Ms. Glaser to be brief. But talk a little 

bit more about—it seems to me the one sort of inflection point we 

have got, if we have got leverage on North Korea, it is through 

China. It is in our relationship with China and their relationship 

with Pyongyang. 

How much leverage do the Chinese really have? Because from a 

distance it looks like the Chinese are in a conundrum themselves. 

They have got relationships they don’t want to walk away from. 

They don’t want to even unwittingly destabilize the peninsula and 

60

have to deal with that mess. I mean, if you gave them truth serum, 

they would probably love a peaceful reunification organized by the 

south. But that is so far away, you know, they can’t really effectuate that. 

So how much leverage do the Chinese have, and how well are we 

pressuring them to try to effectuate better behavior from the North 

Koreans? 

Ms. GLASER. Well, the Chinese, as I said in my earlier remarks, 

have enormous potential leverage. They are unwilling to use it. 

And because the Chinese are fearful of instability in North Korea, 

the leverage they have in essence becomes North Korea’s leverage 

over them. Kim Jong Un and even his father I think have done 

quite a good job of playing a very weak hand, not only with the 

United States and other countries but particularly with China. 

And so the North Koreans I think occasionally cause trouble for 

China in a variety of ways along the border, and in terms of the 

threats that they make toward South Korea. The Chinese need I 

think to be motivated to use the pressure that they have, and I 

don’t think we have done a very good job of doing that. 

I agree that we should not be self-deterred in putting pressure 

on China. We should not be worried that if we put pressure on 

China on this issue that they will somehow not cooperate with us 

on climate change, or Iran, for example. We can use pressure, if 

properly applied and well-timed, I think can have an impact on 

Chinese behavior. 

And I would cite the example of when Xi Jinping was preparing 

to come to the United States last September, and the administration considered imposing cyber sanctions and had the executive authorities to do so. And the Chinese got very motivated to set up a 

new mechanism to send a standing member of the Politburo to discuss this issue. 

Now, this may not in the end solve the problem of the cyber 

hacking and cyber-enabled theft, and I think we certainly have to 

keep their feet to the fire on that issue. But the point is that when 

you threaten sanctions, when you have the executive authorities to 

do so, and the Chinese take you seriously, that, yes, you can motivate their behavior. 

There was also the discussion earlier about bolstering missile defense in the region, and I do think that taking steps that defend 

American interests and the interests of our allies, and if they happen to create a more negative security environment for China in 

the region, that may motivate the Chinese to do more as well. This 

is not something that they want to see. It doesn’t benefit their interest. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Connolly raised the issue that they don’t really 

have much to export. Possibly they could export some cyber hacking training seminars. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. DesJarlais. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 

our panel of witnesses for your thoughtful insight today. Dr. Cha, 

I wanted to ask you, do you believe that North Korea would use 

their nuclear weapons for aggressive actions? 

61

Mr. CHA. I don’t think it is the intent of any nuclear weapon 

state, including North Korea, to use them purposely for aggressive 

purposes. Having said that, there are easily contingencies one can 

imagine where a country, especially North Korea, can miscalculate. 

And I can draw out some of those scenarios for you in which they 

have no intent to use nuclear weapons, but because of military calculations they are then compelled to. And that is what is so inherently destabilizing about the current situation. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. I just want to talk a little bit about perception. 

I have not been to South Korea. I have not been to Japan. Do 

South Koreans and Japanese feel the same threat from North 

Korea that, say, Israel does with Iran? 

Mr. CHA. I certainly think that Japan feels mortally threatened 

by the developments in North Korea, their missile program as well 

as their nuclear program. It is the clearest existential threat to 

Japan today. 

With regard to South Korea, they have always been under the 

fear of artillery attack from North Korea. Artillery tubes are only 

seconds away from the capital city of Seoul. And I think there is 

now a growing concern about the broader nuclear question. 

Again, if you have been under conventional military threat, biochemical, artillery shells, all your life, you can get a little jaded. 

But I think that there is a growing concern about the broader strategic implications of North Korea’s nuclear program. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. And I am going somewhere with this. My 

sense is that, you know, here in this country we have a country, 

the only one in this century, testing nuclear weapons, detonate a 

nuclear weapon a week ago. But after the news comes out, it is 

like, oh, well, it wasn’t a thermonuclear weapon; it was just a fission weapon, and, therefore, we don’t need to worry about it. 

We are having a hearing today, but I will tell you that every 

Member of Congress understands the threat Israel feels from Iran. 

It is something that Israel has done to raise that perception, and 

I think that everyone has learned to respect that threat. And I am 

not sure that is the same with North Korea. 

And, you know, maybe our problem is that we need to raise that 

perception. Every Member of Congress, Democrat or Republican, 

generally takes a trip to Israel when they first go to Congress, and 

they see and they feel that threat. You know, maybe that is something Japan and something South Korea and other nations that 

feel threatened in the region should do to help increase that perception here in Congress, because honestly right now, I mean, you 

hear the news about Syria, you hear the news about ISIS, you hear 

about the Iran deal. It is sucking up all the oxygen, and that is 

what people are paying attention to. 

So you all have a lot of great ideas of what to do, but how do 

we get action? And that is, you know, why we are here today. So, 

in your opinion, what do we do to elevate the reality that this is 

a real threat? Because it just—I have been sitting here with my 

colleague, Mr. Perry, talking about, you know, this problem should 

just be solved, but yet it is not happening. 

And it doesn’t seem that hard, but apparently it is. So what 

would you suggest? And I will give each of the panelists a chance 

to respond, 30 seconds each. 

62

Mr. CHA. So I would entirely agree with you, Congressman, that 

I think outside of this chamber, more broadly in the American public, there is a tendency to downgrade, discount, dismiss North Korean activities as basically a crazy regime that blows up bombs in 

a cave somewhere near China, and that we don’t have to worry 

about that, and I think that is completely the wrong attitude. 

In part, it has been because there was a feeling that the United 

States sometimes overreacted in the past to North Korean actions 

and played into their hand. I think we are now in a period in which 

we are underreacting, and I think that is very dangerous. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you. 

Mr. Klingner. 

Mr. KLINGNER. North Korea is easy to ridicule, and it is easy to 

make the butt of jokes, as members of the panel have pointed out. 

It is a very real threat, a nuclear threat, a biological/chemical 

threat, that conventional forces, cyber threat, human rights threat, 

it runs the gamut, and it is not only against our allies, but increasingly to the United States. 

Last year three U.S. four-star commanders said that North 

Korea has a nuclear weapon that could hit the United States today. 

They must know something. A year or so ago, South Korean press 

had a lot of articles from defectors about Kim Jong Un had directed 

a new war plan be implemented after—or created after he came 

into office, so that North Korea could take over the peninsula in 

7 days before the U.S. could flow reinforcements there. That would 

require, as directed in that war plan, the use of nuclear weapons. 

It is a real threat. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you. 

Ms. Glaser. 

Ms. GLASER. It is also disheartening to me that there is an 

underappreciation for how much of a threat North Korea’s nuclear 

weapons poses, and of course Israel does such a terrific job in Congress and in the American public at large, I think more can be 

done in the area of public education, and certainly hearings such 

as this and on North Korea’s human rights record I think would 

be very important in highlighting this issue. 

More actions up at the United Nations as well to get more people 

involved in this discussion. Help people to understand that we need 

to really—to dissect what the threat is, see that it is increasingly 

an existential threat, and not just put this on the back burner. So 

I completely agree with—I share your concern. 

Mr. DESJARLAIS. I thank the panel, and thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Mr. 

DesJarlais bringing up this issue and each of you expressing your 

shared concerns about this underappreciation and really a lack of 

understanding about the threat. I represent Hawaii’s 2nd District 

here. And as you can imagine, being out there in the middle of the 

Pacific, every time North Korea starts making threats, launching 

these tests, this is something knowing, as you said, Mr. Klingner, 

Hawaii and the west coast, at a minimum, already are within 

range of North Korea’s capabilities, both of an ICBM as well as a 

nuclear weapon. 

63

So this is something that really rings true and is deeply understood by folks in my state who recognize the need for stronger missile defense, who recognize the need for taking this threat with the 

seriousness that it deserves. 

I have got a few questions. The sanctions bill that we passed yesterday, particularly as it relates to hard currency, do you believe 

that it will have the same effect as in 2005 when it was first put 

in place? For whomever would like to answer. 

Mr. CHA. I think the bill is great, and I think that the mechanism is still there to carry out the same sorts of targeted financial 

sanctioning. North Korea, since 2005, has tried to circumvent this. 

But, again, a lot of it depends on what entities we choose to sanction, what individuals we choose to target, and Chinese compliance 

with that. 

Having said that, I can easily imagine things that we can do that 

would not collapse the U.S.-China relationship or, as Mr. Sherman 

said earlier, not have a major effect on Wall Street. So there is 

plenty of room to operate. 

Ms. GABBARD. That will directly impact their pocketbooks. 

Mr. CHA. Yes. 

Ms. GABBARD. So along those lines, I mean, look back to what 

happened in 2005 and what led to their agreement in 2007 when 

those sanctions were lifted. 

I would just like to hear your thoughts on what you see is a viable path forward should that end be reached, should these sanctions be so effective that we get to a point where we have got an 

opportunity there, understanding, really, that North Korea sees 

their nuclear program as an insurance policy against regime 

change, seeing what they learned from what happened in Libya 

with Gaddafi, and really what caused their—I think that window, 

frankly, to close, where they wouldn’t trust—that if there was an 

agreement to denuclearize that the United States wouldn’t go after 

them to try to implement the regime change. 

So I would just like to hear your thoughts on engagement with 

North Korea and how understanding this climate there is a path 

forward. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Just commenting on yesterday’s bill, it closes a 

number of loopholes. It elevates a number of existing executive orders or regulations to legislation giving it additional power. It 

makes a number of implementations mandatory rather than discretionary. So I think it has—will provide a number of benefits to the 

U.S. effort. 

But the bill, as well as existing measures, it is dependent on the 

implementation and our willingness to use the powers we already 

have. Last year the executive order that was released in January 

allows the U.S. to sanction North Korean officials simply for being 

North Korean officials. We don’t even have to provide evidence that 

they have conducted illegal activity. That gives us tremendous 

power. The U.S. sanctioned 16 Russian officials for being Russian 

officials after the Crimea incursion. We haven’t used that power as 

much as we could. 

The target has changed. Banco Delta Asia was very effective because it was a very large conduit. North Korea has adapted since 

then. But it is sort of like the cockroach theory of law enforcement. 

64

You go into a kitchen, you turn on the light, you see where the 

cockroaches are, and where they run off to. If you take out the first 

node, the Plan A of North Korea, you then alert your intelligence 

and law enforcement authorities, so they watch where the money 

gets redirected, where the cockroaches go. 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. 

Mr. KLINGNER. It is then you go after the Plan B. 

Ms. GABBARD. Right. 

Ms. GLASER. On the issue of engagement, Congressman, as we 

talked about earlier, we have to have a strategy that deals with—

that is composed of engagement as well as coercive steps. As far 

as I understand, the United States engages with North Korea. We 

have the channel in New York. We do talk to the North Koreans. 

But I think we have to be careful about agreeing to revive, you 

know, the Six Party talks mechanism, as the Chinese often encourage us to do, in the absence of some return to the commitments 

that the North Koreans made under the 2005 and other agreements. 

Now, the North Koreans want to engage in dialogue so that they 

can get a peace treaty and be recognized as a nuclear weapon state. 

I think that is a bad outcome for the United States and our interests and our allies. 

So we have to engage North Korea in a way that they understand that there are steps that they have to take. They have to go 

back to these commitments of giving up nuclear weapons. And if 

they are willing to go ahead with a freeze as a first step toward—

with the understanding that the goal is that they eventually give 

them up, then I think the United States has always been willing 

to work with that. 

I don’t think there are signs that under Kim Jong Un that the 

North Koreans are willing to engage in serious negotiations with 

the end goal of denuclearizing the peninsula. So I think that engagement, yes, but we have to be careful about how we use it. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and for continuing to help increase awareness on North Korea’s threat. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes Brigadier General Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Congressman Perry will be fine. Thank you. Thanks 

to the chairman. Thanks to the panel. 

A list of questions here, maybe just all at once, and if you would 

comment, you know. I understand that we are reportedly in talks 

with South Korea regarding the reintroduction of nuclear weapons, 

United States’ nuclear weapons onto the peninsula. What is the 

status of that, if you know? Why wouldn’t South Korea be interested? 

Regarding the introduction of THAAD, the missile defense interceptor system, why not? Is South Korea concerned that it would be 

too provocative? Why wouldn’t they want that? 

Regarding curtailing conventional arms sales, how would that be 

done? Again, you know, I have been listening, as everybody else 

has, the whole time saying, ‘‘Why aren’t we doing this?’’ And you 

folks are the experts and you don’t know, but maybe you can give 

me some insight into that. 

65

And regarding increasing the pressure on their human rights 

atrocities, which are just unimaginable to me, what is the best 

way? What is the best way to do that? And from my standpoint, 

I, like you folks, don’t understand at all why we are not imposing 

these financial sanctions out of hand, like with your morning coffee. To me, the President should just sign that and on with—and 

move on to the next terrain feature, but that is my perception. 

What would be the response to some of these things from our allies and trading partners in the region? Thank you. 

Mr. CHA. I will take a piece of those, and then I will look to 

Bruce to take other pieces of it. In terms of the why, you know, 

why haven’t we done more question, one aspect of this is China, 

and we have had a very full discussion on that. I think the other 

part of it is that it is priority and commitment. 

This has not been a priority, unfortunately, even though, as I 

said, it is a very dangerous situation. And there has to be a political commitment to make the North Korean regime feel like there 

are costs to their behavior. There has been a political commitment 

to create the machinery, but there hasn’t been a political commitment to implement. 

I think part of the reason there hasn’t been that is that there has 

always been some hope that there is a chance for diplomacy, like 

with Iran, like with Cuba, or like with Myanmar. But I am of the 

view that we are not going to see any diplomacy until the end of 

this administration. 

Mr. PERRY. If I can interrupt you, is there a downside risk? Because I don’t see a whole lot of downside risk. I understand that 

there is no commitment to going the upside, and you might expend 

some capital or whatever. I just don’t see any—like what do we lose 

by doing this? 

Mr. CHA. Well, I think the primary downside has to do with 

China and the relationship with China. At least that is the perceived downside. And then there is a degree of inertia. I think 

there really is a degree of inertia, because this is an issue traditionally that administrations want to put on the shelf. They don’t 

necessarily want to commit to solve it. They want to put it on the 

shelf. 

And so there is almost a pattern to this. They do a provocation, 

we issue a statement, we slap a sanction on them, and everybody 

goes back to dealing with other issues. And that is a rapidly deteriorating situation. 

Mr. KLINGNER. If I could address them in reverse order. On 

human rights atrocities, as I have included in my statement, a 

number of cases where we have imposed sanctions and measures 

on other countries for their human rights violations but not North 

Korea, we have the authority to do so, obviously. We have done it 

to other countries. And also, the executive order of last January, 

which gives us the authority to sanction someone for being a member of the government. 

You know, tomorrow with his morning coffee the President could 

add 50 North Korean entities, including Kim Jong Un by name, as 

well as every agency named in the U.N. Commission of Inquiry report, as well as the heads of all of those agencies. I don’t know why 

we don’t do that. 

66

Curtailing conventional arms sales—the U.N. resolutions not 

only cover the nuclear and missile programs, they also prevent 

trade on conventional arms. There have been at least three interceptions of conventional arms shipments from North Korea to other 

nations, but apparently in the resolution sanction-busting hierarchy, they are not worth enforcing because they didn’t even convene U.N. meetings about those violations. 

So one thing we should be pushing for at the U.N. is Chapter 7, 

Clause 42 authority, which allows military enforcement of the U.N. 

resolutions. That doesn’t mean attack, it doesn’t mean invasion, 

but it provides the authority for, say, Coast Guard interception of 

ships. 

We have had cases where the U.S. warships have been trailing 

North Korean freights for hundreds of miles, because we didn’t 

have the authority to board or inspect them. On THAAD, I can 

send you a copy of my report on THAAD, South Korea has been 

hesitant, I believe, because of Chinese pressure and economic 

blackmail. 

But last night during a major speech President Park Geun-hye, 

I think for the first time her administration said they want to discuss with the United States the possible deployment of THAAD to 

the peninsula. 

And reintroducing nuclear weapons, that is very contentious. 

Both the U.S. and South Korean Governments have said they don’t 

see a military necessity of putting U.S. nuclear weapons on the 

ground in South Korea, because we have sea-based and air-based 

weapons which can do the job and wouldn’t provide a sort of preemptive target in South Korea for North Korea. 

Ms. GLASER. If I could just add briefly, Congressman, President 

Park has attached a great deal of priority to China, hopes to gain 

China’s support ultimately for reunification, but also in the near 

term for putting more pressure on China. And I agree with my colleagues that I think that is the main issue with THAAD. I don’t 

think that President Park is unmovable on this issue, and with the 

growing threat she may agree. 

But the Chinese seek to weaken U.S. alliances, and this is a 

major problem in trying to deal with the North Korea problem. Unless we can have a bigger strategy with the Chinese, make this a 

priority, and perhaps give China some of the reassurances that 

Congressman Sherman was talking about earlier, if we really have 

a reunified peninsula and we don’t need to necessarily have troops 

along China’s border. 

The Chinese are very concerned, though, that the situation could 

be far more detrimental to them today than—in the future than it 

is today. 

I also think there is an issue with the United States giving 

China credit for very small steps it takes—for example, supporting 

a U.N. Security Council Resolution—that it has diluted, prevented 

the application, for example, of economic sanctions, banking sanctions, just because the United States wants to isolate North Korea, 

and that is a valuable goal. 

Yes, we should seek to isolate North Korea, but at the same time 

we should be putting far greater pressure on China to do more. 

And the Chinese believe that the United States is not prioritizing 

67

this issue. They see us as having put this on the back burner, and 

so little incentive for them to attach a priority to it either. 

Mr. PERRY. Yes. I think we just continue to reward bad behavior. 

And as much as the Chinese are I think doing a delicate dance 

with their economy and their political system, at the end of the day 

I think that it serves their purpose to have North Korea remain 

communist or totalitarian. They are communists at their heart, and 

that is what they want to maintain. 

And with all due respect to South Korea and the President, I understand what she is trying to get to. But at their heart, they are 

communists, and that is who they are. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing. 

Mr. SALMON. I would like to really thank the panel members. I 

think that this has been an incredibly productive hearing. 

Congressman Perry, you asked a lot of questions I think that a 

lot of us have been entertaining ourselves. You know, a lot of the 

whys, why—you know, is North Korea less of a threat than they 

were several years ago when there was tons of media attention and 

concern across America. And just 3 short years ago in the Presidential debates it was front and center, one of the most important 

issues of our time. 

And the only thing that kind of comes to mind is an old adage, 

if a tree falls in the forest and nobody hears it, did it make a 

sound? And we just haven’t focused the attention—when I say 

‘‘we,’’ I don’t think it has been a priority for the last 3 years. 

Mr. PERRY. The question I have is, what is it going to take? 

Mr. SALMON. Well——

Mr. PERRY. And that is scary. 

Mr. SALMON. And I think that is why we are here today, because 

in the absence of leadership on this issue I think that that realm 

falls to us, that we have a responsibility then to stand up and try 

to take matters into our hands, whether it is trying to influence 

South Korea on THAAD, or whether it is looking at potential new 

sanctions or, at the very least, redeclaring North Korea a terrorist 

state. 

There are lots of options I think that are on the table, and that 

is the reason that we did the hearing today, not just to shine light, 

not just to talk, but I think our goal is to try to put together legislation—a bill or several bills—that will try to move us in the right 

direction. 

And my intention is to work with the panelists to try to craft 

that legislation and mark it up for a full committee hearing, because while other parts of the globe are in jeopardy, that doesn’t 

diminish the threat that this part of the globe holds. And just because we are not paying attention to it doesn’t mean that it is not 

a serious threat. 

And I think that it is time that we focus our attentions on this 

serious, serious, serious issue that poses a threat to not just our 

national security, our allies in national security, but global national 

security. The threat of a nut job like Kim Jong Un having deployment capabilities with a nuclear weapon is incredibly frightening. 

I think one of the things we didn’t talk about today, what about 

the possibility—even if it is remote, what about the possibility of 

a partnership between North Korea and Iran? With all the money 

68

that Iran now has, or will have, and nuclear capabilities in North 

Korea, what about the possibility of joining forces to become an 

uber threat to everything that we hold dear. 

So I think that this hearing is not an ending place. It is a beginning place for what needs to take our attention. I think, Mr. Chairman, you wanted to make a comment. 

Mr. SHERMAN. As to our attention, they say in journalism if it 

bleeds, it leads. The Middle East, therefore, gets the attention, and 

it deserves some attention. But this North Korean problem is a 

threat to Asia and the United States. 

And then as to the possible connection between North Korea and 

Iran, we need an agreement with China that there are no nonstop 

flights between North Korea and Iran. They would all go over Chinese airspace. We don’t have to make a big political deal, just inform the planes that if they want to fly over your airspace, they 

have got to stop in a Chinese city for refueling. It would be unsafe 

for them to go that extra mile all the way without stopping for refueling. And if that happens, I am sure the Chinese will take a look 

at the plane. If we don’t have that, the money is there on the one 

hand, the desire for nuclear weapons, and the 12th—the 13th nuclear weapon goes on eBay. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. I think what is really clear is that we have to break 

outside the existing paradigm, and the status quo is not working. 

And so we have to be creative and start coming up with some 

maybe old ideas with oomph or some new ideas, and I am open. 

And so thank you very much for the panelists. Thank you, Ranking Member, and the committee members as well. 

This meeting is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:49 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(69)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

70

f


98313n.eps
71

f


98313m.eps
72


98313d-1.eps
73

Æ


98313d-2.eps