BUILDING PARTNER 

CAPACITY

U.S. Agencies Can 

Improve Monitoring of 

Counter-Firearms 

Trafficking Efforts in 

Belize, Guatemala, 

and Mexico

Report to Congressional Requesters

January 2016

GAO-16-235

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-235, a report to 

congressional requesters

January 2016

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

U.S. Agencies Can Improve Monitoring of Counter- Firearms Trafficking Efforts in Belize, Guatemala, and 

Mexico

Why GAO Did This Study

Trafficking of illicit materials, including 

firearms, is widespread across 

Mexico’s more than 700-mile southern 

border with Guatemala and Belize. 

Such trafficking presents a challenge 

for law enforcement in all three 

countries and for U.S. security 

interests. State and other U.S. 

agencies, such as ATF, have provided 

support to build the capacity of their 

counterparts in these three countries to 

address problems related to firearms 

trafficking. GAO was asked to review 

U.S. support to the governments of 

Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico to stem 

firearms trafficking across their shared 

border. This report examines, for these 

three countries, (1) the activities 

undertaken by U.S. agencies to build 

partner capacity to combat firearms 

trafficking and the extent to which they 

considered key factors in selecting the

activities and (2) progress the United 

States has made in building such 

capacity. GAO analyzed program 

documentation and conducted 

interviews with U.S., Belizean, 

Guatemalan, and Mexican officials. To 

examine progress, GAO selected a 

nongeneralizable sample of eight key 

activities based on a number of factors, 

including whether the activity 

addressed firearms trafficking.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that (1) ATF 

establish and document performance 

targets for its key counter-firearms 

trafficking activities in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico, as 

appropriate, and (2) State work with 

other U.S. agencies and implementers 

to help ensure that progress reports 

identify key challenges and plans to 

address them. ATF and State agreed 

with these recommendations.

What GAO Found

U.S. agencies and their implementing partners have undertaken a number of 

capacity-building activities that support counter-firearms trafficking efforts in 

Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico. The figure below outlines examples of the areas 

of effort under which these activities fall. Selected, in part, based on partner 

country needs, these activities include efforts to provide support in using the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) web-based firearms 

tracing system (eTrace) and providing forensics training, including on ballistics.

Some of these activities, such as firearms identification training, relate directly to 

firearms trafficking, while others broadly support antitrafficking or border security 

efforts for which stemming the trafficking of firearms is one of many goals.

Presidential Policy Directive 23 highlights key factors, including partner country 

needs, absorptive capacity, sustainability, and other U.S. and other donor efforts, 

as important in planning security sector assistance. Agencies considered these 

factors in determining what activities to fund.

Examples of Areas of Effort for U.S. Counter-Firearms Trafficking Activities in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico, Based, in Part, on Each Partner Country’s Identified Needs

U.S. agencies and implementing partners have achieved many of their goals for 

eight key counter-firearms trafficking activities GAO reviewed, but could enhance 

their efforts to measure and report on progress. Agencies and implementers 

established performance measures and targets for five of these eight activities. 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that managers 

should compare actual performance against expected results, highlighting the 

importance of such measures and targets. ATF tracks its activities but has not 

established performance targets for them, without which it is difficult to measure

the success of its efforts. Two of the five activities GAO reviewed that established

metrics and targets are ongoing and are meeting their goals, while three other 

activities were completed and met or partially met their goals, according to 

Department of State (State) and implementer reports. For activities it funds, State

requires implementers to include a discussion of key challenges and strategies to 

address those challenges in quarterly reports. However, implementers’ reports

for activities GAO reviewed were inconsistent and did not always identify 

challenges or strategies for addressing them. Without this information, agencies 

risk not fully meeting their goals and may be unable to maximize the use of U.S. 

resources.

View GAO-16-235. For more information, 

contact Jessica Farb at (202) 512-6991 or 

farbj@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Letter 1

Background 3

U.S. Agencies Provide a Variety of Counter-Firearms Trafficking 

Capacity-Building Assistance and Considered Key Factors in 

Selecting Activities 7

U.S. Agencies and Implementers Achieved Many of Their Goals 

for Counter-Firearms Trafficking Activities We Reviewed, but 

Efforts to Track and Report on Progress Are Inconsistent 16

Conclusions 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments 26

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28

Appendix II Comments from the U.S. Department of State 31

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Tables

Table 1: Status of Key Counter-Firearms Activities GAO Reviewed 

in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico in Establishing Targets 17

Table 2: Status of Key Ongoing Activities to Counter Firearms 

Trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, as of the 

Second Quarter of Fiscal Year 2015 20

Table 3: Status of Completed Key Activities to Counter Firearms 

Trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico 23

Figures

Figure 1: Areas of Effort for U.S. Counter-Firearms Trafficking 

Activities in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, Based, in 

Part, on Each Partner Country’s Identified Needs 8

Figure 2: Distribution of U.S. Funding for Capacity-Building Efforts 

to Counter Firearms Trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and 

Mexico, by Location and by Source Account, Fiscal Years 

2010 through 2014 12

Contents
Page ii GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

CARSI Central America Regional Security Initiative

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

IBIS Integrated Ballistics Identification System 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs 

NADR Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

Programs 

OAS Organization of American States 

PGR Procuraduría General de la República (Government of 

Mexico’s Office of Attorney General)

PM/WRA Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons 

Removal and Abatement 

PPD 23 Presidential Policy Directive 23 

State Department of State

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

January 13, 2016

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel

Ranking Member

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jeff Duncan

Chairman

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere

Committee on Foreign Affairs

House of Representatives

Trafficking of illicit materials, including firearms, is widespread across 

Mexico’s more than 700-mile southern border with Guatemala and Belize. 

This trafficking is closely linked to the activities of transnational criminal 

organizations that are engaged in violent activities throughout the region. 

For example, from 2007 to 2014, there were more than 70,000 homicides 

related to criminal violence in Mexico. Similarly, fighting among criminal 

organizations over contested trafficking routes in Central America has 

fueled violence in Guatemala and Belize, which, according to the United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, had two of the highest homicide rates 

in the world in 2012, the last year for which comprehensive data are 

available. This violence, accompanying the flow of drugs throughout the 

region, perpetuates the demand for firearms and presents a broader 

challenge for law enforcement in all three countries, as well as for U.S. 

security interests in the region.

U.S., Belizean, Guatemalan, and Mexican officials have all noted that 

countering firearms trafficking is a priority for the region. The 

governments of Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico have recognized the 

need to improve the capacity of law enforcement organizations and other 

criminal justice sector institutions to combat illegal firearms trafficking and 

have initiated efforts to enhance their abilities to fight transnational 

organized crime. The President of the United States has also 

acknowledged the need to stem the flow of firearms to the region and has 

committed U.S. support for these efforts. The Department of State 

(State)—primarily through programs such as the Merida Initiative and the 

Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)—and other U.S. 

agencies, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), have 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

provided support to build the capacity of their Belizean, Guatemalan, and 

Mexican counterparts to address problems related to firearms trafficking.

You asked us to review U.S. support for the governments of Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico to stem firearms trafficking across their shared 

border. This report examines (1) the activities undertaken by U.S. 

agencies to build partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico and the extent to which they considered key 

factors in selecting the activities and (2) the progress the United States 

has made in building partner capacity in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico 

to combat firearms trafficking.

To address these objectives, we analyzed information from State, ATF, 

CBP, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

(ICITAP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as well as 

funding data for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 for programs that directly 

or indirectly addressed firearms trafficking.1 We interviewed U.S. officials 

and officials from the Organization of American States (OAS) in 

Washington, D.C., and U.S. and Mexican officials in Mexico. Additionally, 

we conducted interviews with Guatemalan and Belizean officials. We 

compiled a list of activities that included combatting firearms trafficking as 

at least one goal, but because other activities may also indirectly touch on 

firearms trafficking, the list may not be comprehensive. To determine the 

extent to which U.S. agencies considered key factors in selecting 

capacity-building activities, we analyzed Presidential Policy Directive 23 

(PPD 23), a directive on security sector assistance, and identified the key 

factors it instructs agencies to consider when planning security sector 

activities. We then analyzed agency documentation and interviewed U.S. 

and foreign government officials to determine whether U.S. agencies that 

conducted counter-firearms trafficking capacity-building activities 

considered these factors.

To assess U.S. progress in building partner capacity in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico to combat firearms trafficking, we examined a 

subset of capacity-building activities. Our review of these activities is not 

generalizable to all activities conducted by U.S. agencies and their 

implementing partners. Each of the eight key activities we reviewed (1) 

 1

We also interviewed officials from other Department of Justice and Department of 

Homeland Security components and from the Department of Defense and determined that 

they did not conduct activities relevant to the scope of this review. 
Page 3 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

included a specific component or objective that addresses firearms 

trafficking, (2) had a substantial portion of funds directed to the activity, or 

(3) was identified by U.S. and foreign officials as a key effort in building 

partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking. We reviewed State and 

implementing agency or organization progress reports that assessed 

progress against the performance measures and targets set for each 

activity. Based on interviews with knowledgeable agency officials and a 

review of State’s relevant internal controls, we determined that data on 

funding for these activities provided by State and ATF were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. For more information on our scope 

and methodology, see appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2015 to January 

2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In Mexico, where, according to U.S. officials, the commercial sale or 

purchase of a firearm is prohibited and strict controls limit citizens’ access 

to firearms, illicitly trafficked firearms fuel drug trafficking violence, as we 

reported in 2009.2 According to data from ATF’s web-based firearms 

tracing system, eTrace, the majority of the guns seized and traced in 

Mexico—about 70 percent from 2010 through 2014—have origins in the 

United States.3

 2

GAO, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face 

Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709 (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2009). 

3

Because of the illicit nature of firearms trafficking, the exact number of firearms trafficked 

through Belize, Guatemala and Mexico is not known. Some firearms seized by law 

enforcement and other authorities may not consistently be submitted for tracing the same 

year they were seized, or may not be submitted at all. However, ATF uses the number of 

firearms seized and traced as an indicator to estimate the volume of and trends in illicit 

firearms trafficking more generally. For a more in-depth discussion of trends in firearms 

trafficking to Mexico, see Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking 

to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain, GAO-16-223

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2016).

Background
Page 4 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

As we also reported in 2009, the Mexican government initiated a new 

national security strategy in 2006 to combat the growing power of criminal 

organizations and curb their ability to operate with impunity in certain 

areas of Mexico. The organizations countered government pressure with 

increased violence against law enforcement entities and the 

government’s efforts also appeared to result in increasing conflicts among 

criminal organizations over lucrative drug trafficking routes.4 The United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has noted that the Mexican 

government’s shift in strategy also affected trafficking routes in Central 

America.5 As it became more hazardous for traffickers to ship drugs, 

particularly cocaine, directly to Mexico via air and waterways, an 

increasing share of the drug trade began to move overland through 

Central America. Those routes entered Mexico through its shared

southern land border with Guatemala and, to a lesser extent, Belize.6

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, this change 

in trafficking patterns resulted in increased competition for territorial 

control among local organized crime groups. Over time, Mexican criminal 

organizations also increasingly moved south into Central America to gain 

control of trafficking routes. As a result, violence increased substantially in 

countries throughout Central America. In recent years, the people of 

Central America and Mexico have cited violent crime as one of the most 

important issues facing their countries. Many of the criminal organizations 

involved in the drug trade also traffic firearms across the region.

Although most of the firearms seized and traced in Mexico transited 

across its northern border with the United States, firearms also travel in 

both directions across Mexico’s southern border. It is difficult to ascertain 

the volume of firearms trafficked across Mexico’s border with Guatemala 

and Belize; however, according to the Mexican government, firearm 

seizure rates in Mexico’s southern border states are low in comparison to 

those of northern border states and the rest of the country. According to a 

binational assessment conducted by U.S. and Mexican officials, many 

Central American countries lack the capability to trace firearms 

 4

GAO-09-709. 

5

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in Central 

America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment (Vienna, Austria: 2012). 

6

Maritime trafficking also remains a concern in Belize, where criminal organizations traffic 

drugs and other illicit goods over the Caribbean Sea. 
Page 5 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

independently, which makes it difficult to determine the percentage of 

weapons seized and traced in Mexico that have an origin in Central 

America. Also, according to ATF officials, unlike Mexico, both Guatemala 

and Belize allow for the commercial sale and purchase of firearms, so the 

availability of legal firearms differs considerably across the three 

countries. Guatemala and Belize are much smaller countries than Mexico,

and ATF data on seized and traced firearms indicate that the volume of 

firearms seized and traced in these countries is also much smaller than 

that in Mexico. For example, from 2010 to 2014, Mexico seized and 

traced about 83,000 firearms, while Guatemala seized and traced about 

7,000 firearms and Belize seized and traced about 300 firearms.

A number of U.S. agencies provide capacity-building assistance in the 

three countries to help address concerns associated with firearms 

trafficking, among other things.

• State: State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs (INL) manages most of the funding for the Merida Initiative and 

CARSI, the two primary initiatives through which the U.S. government 

funds and manages activities to help address the problem of 

increasing crime and violence in Mexico and Central America, 

respectively. In cooperation with several other U.S. agencies, State is 

also responsible for the overall implementation of these two initiatives.

State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal 

and Abatement (PM/WRA) works to reduce the harmful, worldwide 

effects of at-risk, illicitly proliferated, and indiscriminately used 

conventional weapons of war, including small arms and light 

weapons. PM/WRA supports programs around the world that assist 

governments in securing or destroying abandoned or stockpiled 

munitions, with a goal of curbing illicit trafficking.

In most cases, State does not directly implement counter-firearms 

activities but instead provides funding for other U.S. agencies or other 

implementers, such as international organizations or 

nongovernmental organizations, to implement the activities. As the 

funding organization, State maintains responsibility for oversight of 

these efforts.
Page 6 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

• Department of Justice: For over 45 years, ATF has implemented 

efforts to combat arms trafficking within the United States and from 

the United States to other countries as part of its mission under the 

Gun Control Act.7 ATF is responsible for investigating criminal and 

regulatory violations of federal firearms laws, among other 

responsibilities. ATF traces U.S. and foreign manufactured firearms 

for international, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, to 

link a firearm recovered in a criminal investigation to its first retail 

purchaser. It is the only entity within the U.S. government able to trace 

firearms recovered from crimes in Mexico.8 ATF has four offices in 

Mexico and an office in El Salvador that provides assistance 

throughout Central America, including in Guatemala and Belize. 

Through these offices, ATF provides an international liaison to support 

ATF’s mission to interdict and prevent illegal firearms trafficking and 

combat violent criminal gangs.

ICITAP works with foreign governments to develop professional and 

transparent law enforcement institutions that protect human rights, 

combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and 

terrorism. ICITAP provides a wide range of public safety development 

expertise, including assistance in areas such as organizational 

development, criminal investigations, and forensics.

• Department of Homeland Security: CBP coordinates and supports 

foreign initiatives, programs, and activities with its external partners 

around the world. CBP strives to protect U.S. borders by 

implementing programs and initiatives that promote antiterrorism, 

global border security, nonproliferation, export controls, immigration, 

and capacity building.

For over 30 years, ICE—and previously the U.S. Customs Service—

has implemented efforts to enforce U.S. export laws. ICE agents and 

other staff address a range of issues, including combating the illicit 

smuggling of money, people, drugs, and firearms. ICE has offices in 

 7

Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213. Oct. 22, 1968, as amended; 

codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.

8

Firearms tracing is the systematic tracking of the movement of a firearm recovered by 

law enforcement officials from its first sale by the manufacturer or importer through the 

distribution chain (wholesaler/retailer) to identify the first retail purchaser. ATF’s paperless 

firearm trace submission system, eTrace, is accessible through the Internet; through 

which users can submit, retrieve, query, and store firearms trace information, as 

applicable.
Page 7 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Mexico and Guatemala whose missions are to support domestic 

operations by coordinating investigations with foreign counterparts, 

disrupt criminal efforts to smuggle people and materials into the 

United States, and build international partnerships through outreach 

and training.

U.S. agencies and other implementing partners have undertaken a 

number of capacity-building activities that directly or indirectly support 

counter-firearms trafficking efforts in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico. 

Figure 1 outlines the areas of effort under which these activities fall.

U.S. Agencies 

Provide a Variety of 

Counter-Firearms 

Trafficking CapacityBuilding Assistance 

and Considered Key 

Factors in Selecting 

Activities

U.S. Agencies Provide a 

Variety of CounterFirearms Trafficking 

Capacity-Building 

Assistance in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico
Page 8 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Figure 1: Areas of Effort for U.S. Counter-Firearms Trafficking Activities in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, Based, in Part, on 

Each Partner Country’s Identified Needs

Note: According to U.S. and Organization of American States officials, the Mexican government has 

not requested assistance with stockpile management or firearms marking equipment and training.

As discussed below, these activities were selected based, in part, on the 

needs of each country. Some of these activities relate directly to firearms 

trafficking, such as ATF firearms identification training, while others 

broadly support antitrafficking or border security efforts that include efforts 

to stem the trafficking of firearms as one of many goals. For example, 

State has provided nonintrusive inspection equipment to Mexico that can 

be used to scan vehicles and containers for drugs or other contraband, 

including firearms. These activities are largely funded by State and 

implemented by other U.S. agencies or other implementing partners, 

including international organizations or nongovernmental organizations. 

The activities include the following:

• Firearms training: ATF has an attaché in Mexico and a regional 

attaché in El Salvador who supports activities throughout Central 

America, including in Guatemala and Belize. Among their 
Page 9 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

responsibilities is managing a series of training courses for local 

officials. In fiscal year 2014, ATF’s Mexico office managed 27 courses 

that trained over 1,200 students. These training courses covered a 

number of topics related to firearms and explosives and included 10 

firearms identification courses. In the same year, ATF’s Central 

America office managed 3 courses that trained nearly 200 students. 

All 3 courses covered eTrace and 1 also covered investigative 

techniques.

• Provision and support of eTrace: ATF helps partner country 

governments improve their use of the eTrace system. In 2009, ATF 

launched a Spanish-language version of the system, which is used in 

Guatemala and Mexico. Belizean officials use the English version of 

eTrace. ATF officials work with host country officials to ensure that 

they understand how to use the system and to encourage them to 

input all crime weapons seized within the country into the system for 

tracing.

• Stockpile management: From 2010 through 2012, PM/WRA 

provided a grant to the OAS to assist in the destruction of excess 

firearms and ammunition in Guatemala.9 In 2012, PM/WRA also 

provided funding for enhanced physical security of stockpile storage 

facilities in Belize.

• Firearms marking equipment and training: Under a PM/WRA 

grant, from 2009 through 2014, the OAS implemented a program to 

help facilitate the tracing process by distributing firearms marking 

machines throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, including in 

Guatemala and Belize. The program also included training on how to 

use the equipment. The program provided five machines to 

Guatemala and one machine to Belize, based on an assessment of 

the needs of each country.

• Forensic training and assistance: The United States initiated 

several efforts to enhance the capacity of forensics labs, including 

their ability to conduct ballistics work, in each of the three countries. In 

 9

The OAS is an international organization created in 1948 among American States in 

order to “achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen 

their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their 

independence.” Within the United Nations, the OAS is a regional agency. Thirty-five 

countries are members of the OAS, including the United States. 
Page 10 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Mexico, INL and ICITAP have provided support at the national and 

state levels, through two separate programs, to help forensics labs 

meet international standards. In Central America, INL supported a 

regional program in forensics training. Additionally, INL officials noted 

that INL has provided bilateral support to the forensics labs in both 

Guatemala and Belize, including bringing a ballistics expert to Belize 

for a yearlong detail in its forensics lab.10 According to INL officials, 

INL intends to extend this detail by another year.

Additionally, the United States has supported the use of the Integrated 

Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) in forensics labs in each country. 

IBIS is designed to capture, file, and compare images of bullets and 

cartridge casings. Investigators can use the system in examining 

crime-related guns. INL has provided equipment, training, or both in 

all three countries to initiate or enhance the use of IBIS and has 

encouraged the countries to link their systems to those of neighboring 

countries to enhance law enforcement capabilities throughout the 

region.

• Support for specialized units: In all three countries, INL and other 

U.S. agencies have supported antitrafficking law enforcement units. In 

Guatemala, ICE has supported the creation and sustainment of a 

Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit—a unit of local law 

enforcement officers who receive training and work closely with ICE 

agents in investigating transnational crimes, including firearms 

trafficking. With support from INL, ICE’s Mexico office also established 

two Transnational Criminal Investigative Units in 2015, according to 

U.S. officials. In Belize, INL and CBP have supported the creation and 

sustainment of a mobile interdiction team that combats trafficking of 

all illegal substances and materials, including firearms.

In Guatemala, INL and ATF have also provided support to the 

Attorney General’s office, including to a firearms-specific group within 

its organized crime unit. For example, Guatemalan officials noted that 

ATF has provided technical guidance and expertise on firearmsrelated investigations. According to U.S. and Guatemalan officials, 

INL and ATF have also provided training and equipment to support 

the creation of a firearms and explosives unit within the Guatemalan 

National Police.

 10Officials noted that ATF has also provided technical support on firearms-related issues 

to the national forensics lab in Guatemala. 
Page 11 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

• Nonintrusive inspection equipment: In Mexico, INL has provided 

nonintrusive inspection equipment and training at border ports of entry 

and other strategic locations to allow the Mexican government to scan 

and inspect passenger vehicles, cargo containers, and freight rail for 

firearms, among other things. CBP has also provided training on the 

use of this equipment.

• Specialized canines: In Mexico, INL, in coordination with CBP, has 

provided specialized canines with the ability to detect smuggled 

firearms, among other things, and CBP has also provided training in 

their use. In Guatemala, an INL official noted that INL has provided 

support to a local canine training school that has outfitted government

units with canines capable of detecting firearms and drugs, among 

other things.

A number of other U.S. efforts may touch on combatting firearms 

trafficking without having this as an explicitly stated goal. For example, 

Belizean officials noted that support provided by the U.S. Coast Guard 

has helped them interdict firearms trafficked along the Caribbean coast. 

Additionally, the United States has provided justice sector support in 

Mexico that is intended to improve the judicial system’s ability to 

prosecute crimes of all types, including those related to firearms 

trafficking. Additionally, U.S. agencies, including CBP and ICE, provide 

assistance to each of the countries to strengthen border security. These 

efforts do not have a specific goal to counter firearms trafficking but 

complement antitrafficking efforts, according to Department of Homeland 

Security and State officials.

In total, U.S. agencies obligated about $191 million in fiscal years 2010 

through 2014 to support these efforts, most of which went to activities that 

were not specifically focused on countering firearms trafficking but 

included it as one of many goals (see fig. 2).11 State’s INL provided the 

majority—over 90 percent of total obligations reported by U.S. agencies—

of this funding through the International Narcotics Control and Law 

Enforcement appropriations account. Additionally, about 93 percent of the 

total funding, or about $177 million, went to activities in Mexico. Most of 

this—about $149 million—is attributable to two activities in Mexico that 

are not specifically focused on countering firearms trafficking: (1) the 

 11Some activities and agreements extended into fiscal year 2015, so some of the 

obligations reported by agencies may have been made in fiscal year 2015.
Page 12 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

provision of nonintrusive inspection equipment and training and (2) 

assistance to the Mexican federal and state forensic laboratories. In total, 

U.S. agencies obligated about $23 million for activities that specifically 

focused on countering firearms trafficking. This includes about $8 million 

from INL to support activities in all three countries, nearly $14 million that 

ATF provided in support of its activities in Mexico, and about $2 million 

that PM/WRA provided for some of the efforts in Guatemala and Belize 

through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related 

Programs (NADR) appropriations account. About $7.5 million of the 

overall total went to regional activities in Central America that included 

other countries in addition to Guatemala and Belize.

Figure 2: Distribution of U.S. Funding for Capacity-Building Efforts to Counter Firearms Trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and 

Mexico, by Location and by Source Account, Fiscal Years 2010 through 2014

Note: Funding data represent total obligations.
Page 13 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Consistent with PPD 23, U.S. agencies considered key factors in 

selecting counter-firearms trafficking activities. In PPD 23—a directive 

governing U.S. security sector assistance, including firearms trafficking—

the administration laid out policy guidelines for planning, implementing, 

and monitoring security sector assistance. PPD 23 asserts that U.S. 

agencies should consider several key factors in planning security sector 

assistance, including partner country needs, absorptive capacity, 

sustainability, and other donor and other U.S. efforts.

U.S. counter-firearms trafficking capacity-building efforts in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico have largely focused on identified partner country 

needs. We found that the issues of concern to the governments of Central 

American countries, such as Guatemala and Belize, differ in some ways 

from those of the government of Mexico, while other concerns exist in all 

three countries.12 Guatemala, for example, like some other Central 

American countries, has leftover stockpiles of weapons and ammunition 

from past conflicts, resulting in more arms than are needed for military 

and law enforcement purposes. Additionally, in both Guatemala and 

Belize, some stockpiles are aging—and are, therefore, more volatile—or 

are poorly secured. Firearms originating in or imported into Central 

America have often lacked markings that allow law enforcement to trace 

their origins. In all three countries, the ability to trace firearms has been a 

concern. Countries did not have systems for tracking the source of 

firearms and either lacked access to or did not regularly use ATF’s 

eTrace system. Additionally, capacity gaps in investigating firearmsrelated crimes and the porous borders between Belize, Guatemala, and 

Mexico have been concerns in all three countries.

U.S. agency activities have largely focused on these needs. For example, 

agencies undertook stockpile management and firearms marking 

activities in both Guatemala and Belize and have initiated efforts to 

improve firearms tracing and investigations, as well as border security, in 

all three countries. U.S. and foreign government officials noted that they 

regularly meet to discuss how U.S. assistance can meet partner country 

needs. In Mexico, U.S. and Mexican officials instituted a practice under 

the current Mexican administration, through which all proposals for 

Merida Initiative assistance are discussed in regular meetings with 

 12We identified issues of concern based on interviews with U.S. and foreign government 

officials as well as a review of U.S. government documents and international

organizations’ reports. 

U.S. Agencies Considered 

Key Factors in Selecting 

Counter-Firearms 

Trafficking Activities

Partner Country Needs
Page 14 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

representatives of a single office within the Mexican Interior Ministry. This 

provides a single contact through which all Merida Initiative assistance is 

coordinated and approved. In Guatemala and Belize, U.S. and host 

country officials described a process in which they meet to discuss needs 

on a regular basis.

Our analysis of State and implementing partner documents shows that 

State and implementers considered absorptive capacity in selecting and 

designing programs. For example, in choosing not to recommend one 

proposal for a forensics program in Central America, INL noted that the 

proposal focused too heavily on advanced technological approaches, 

which may not be appropriately tailored to host country capabilities. In the 

interagency agreement between INL and ICITAP for a forensics program 

in Mexico, ICITAP said that it met with Mexican officials to discuss needs 

and assess the existing capacity of Mexican state labs in designing the 

program. Additionally, CBP noted that trainees for its nonintrusive 

inspection equipment training program would be selected based on their 

proficiency in using nonintrusive inspection equipment and on their work 

performance and developed a series of courses to build this expertise 

over time.

Our analysis of documents and interviews with agency officials shows 

that agencies considered sustainability for counter-firearms trafficking 

activities, with some officials noting that ensuring sustainability can be 

challenging. Most of the interagency agreements we reviewed had a 

section on sustainability, indicating that U.S. agencies and other 

implementers considered how to create a sustainable program. In Mexico 

and Guatemala, U.S. officials noted that it can be difficult to sustain 

enhanced capacity because of regular turnover among host country 

officials. However, in some cases, U.S. agencies incorporated efforts to 

address this concern into their programs’ design. For example, in Mexico, 

agencies have instituted train-the-trainer programs in which they train 

host country officials who then train others within their organizations. The 

goal of such programs is to establish a level of expertise among some 

officials to help ensure long-term sustainability of U.S. training efforts.

The long-term sustainability of equipment has been a concern in the 

firearms marking program in Central America. In particular, an OAS 

official stated that the marking equipment provided in Central America

began requiring maintenance shortly into the program, but no funding had 

been allocated by State for that purpose. PM/WRA officials noted, 

however, that the memorandums of understanding established with 

Absorptive Capacity

Sustainability
Page 15 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

recipient countries noted that maintenance was the countries’

responsibility.

Foreign officials said that the United States is often the only donor 

supporting these types of counter-firearms trafficking efforts. 

Nonetheless, State officials said that they meet with other donors to 

ensure that efforts are not duplicative or conflicting. State also includes an 

assessment of other donors’ efforts in some strategic planning documents 

to ensure that planned U.S. efforts do not overlap with ongoing or 

planned programs by other donors.

U.S. agencies indicated that they have generally considered other U.S. 

efforts in their planning. According to U.S. officials, coordination among 

U.S. government officials within each of the three countries is generally 

good. They noted that U.S. agencies within each country meet regularly 

and discuss ongoing activities to ensure that they are sharing information 

and coordinating efforts. In one case, a lack of communication between 

PM/WRA officials in Washington, D.C., and embassy officials in Belize

resulted in delays to a program’s implementation. In 2012, PM/WRA 

provided $300,000 in obligated NADR funds to the U.S. Embassy in 

Belize for stockpile management, but less than one-third of it was 

expended by the embassy. State officials noted that embassy officials in 

Belize were unaware of the remaining obligated but unexpended funds 

until relevant officials informed them in spring 2015 that the funding 

needed to be spent or deobligated.13 PM/WRA officials noted that it is 

unusual for them to transfer funding directly to an embassy. They said 

they typically would provide the funding directly to a contractor or other 

implementing partner but provided it to the embassy in this case for the 

sake of expedience. Once they were aware of the unexpended NADR 

funds, embassy officials identified unmet needs for which these funds 

could be used and submitted a proposal to PM/WRA to provide additional 

security equipment to the Belizean government.

 13NADR funds that are obligated within the initial 2-year period of availability for obligation 

remain available for obligation for an additional 4 years. See Consolidated Appropriations 

Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7011, Dec. 23, 2011. 

Other Donor and Other U.S. 

Efforts
Page 16 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

U.S. agencies and other implementers established performance 

measures and targets for five of eight key activities we reviewed that 

assist in building capacity to combat firearms trafficking in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico. According to Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government, managers should compare actual performance 

against planned or expected results and analyze significant differences.14

In PPD 23 the administration also highlights the importance of monitoring 

and evaluating security sector assistance efforts to make resource 

allocation decisions. As we have previously reported, performance 

measurement allows organizations to track progress in achieving their 

goals and gives managers crucial information to identify gaps in program 

performance and plan any needed improvements.15 Table 1 outlines eight 

key counter-firearms trafficking activities in Belize, Guatemala, and 

14GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999). GAO recently revised and reissued Standards for Internal

Control in the Federal Government, with the new revision effective beginning with fiscal

year 2016. See GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2014).

15GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and 

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).

U.S. Agencies and 

Implementers 

Achieved Many of 

Their Goals for 

Counter-Firearms 

Trafficking Activities 

We Reviewed, but 

Efforts to Track and 

Report on Progress 

Are Inconsistent

Agencies Established 

Performance Measures 

and Targets for Most but 

Not All Key CounterFirearms Trafficking 

Activities We Reviewed
Page 17 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Mexico—within the broader areas of effort presented in figure 1—and 

notes whether performance targets were established for each activity.16

Table 1: Status of Key Counter-Firearms Activities GAO Reviewed in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico in Establishing Targets

Area of effort Activity Implementer Location Dates

Performance 

targets established

Forensic training and 

assistance

Forensic assistance to 

Attorney General

ICITAP Mexico Ongoing Yes

Forensic assistance to 

Mexican states

ICITAP Mexico Ongoing Yes

Firearms training Firearms training ATF Belize, Guatemala, 

Mexico 

Ongoing No

eTrace support and 

training

eTrace support and 

training

ATF Belize, Guatemala, 

Mexico

Ongoing No

Stockpile 

management

Physical security and 

stockpile management

U.S. Embassy 

Belize

Belize Ongoing No

Stockpile destruction OAS Guatemala Sept. 2010 to June 

2012

Yes

Firearms marking 

equipment and 

training

Firearms marking OAS Belize, Guatemala Sept. 2009 to June 

2014

Yes

Nonintrusive 

inspection 

equipment

Nonintrusive inspection 

equipment training

CBP Mexico Apr. 2013 to Dec. 

2014

Yes

Legend: ATF = Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection; ICITAP = International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program; OAS = Organization of American States.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State and Department of Justice documents and agency interviews. | GAO-16-235

Agencies and other implementers that established performance metrics 

and targets for these key activities did so as part of a broader 

performance management framework. They articulated an overall 

objective or goal for the activity and, to track progress toward these 

 16These eight key activities are a subset of the activities discussed earlier in the report. 

We selected these as key activities because each of them (1) included a specific 

component or objective that addresses firearms trafficking, (2) had a substantial portion of 

funds directed to the activity, or (3) was identified by U.S. and foreign officials as a key 

effort in building partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking.
Page 18 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

objectives and goals, developed performance metrics and targets that 

monitored specific actions that supported the objectives and goals.17

All of the performance measures and targets agencies and other 

implementers established for the key activities we reviewed were 

assessable. State guidance on establishing performance metrics outlines 

a variety of options for measuring success in various activities, such as 

training courses and advising or mentoring. The types of performance 

measures used for these activities varied in their degree of specificity. For 

example, one of the performance measures for CBP’s activity to train 

Mexican agency officials on the use of nonintrusive inspection equipment 

is that trainees will demonstrate proficiency through an evaluation of 

practical exercises. The firearms destruction activity in Guatemala, 

managed by the OAS, identified specific numbers for the amounts of 

expired or unstable ammunition and weapons the program intended to 

destroy.

Some agencies established performance measures for some of the key 

activities we reviewed but did not establish targets for them. As a result, 

we were unable to assess whether these activities met their goals. For 

example, although ATF tracks data on firearms-related training and 

outcomes associated with eTrace in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, the 

agency has not established performance targets for these activities, 

making it difficult for ATF managers and other decision makers to 

determine whether its counter-firearms trafficking efforts are successful. 

ATF officials noted that measuring the overall success of capacitybuilding activities is difficult because the efforts rely on actions taken by 

other governments. Additionally, they noted that the activities they 

undertake may differ from year to year, depending on partner country 

needs. State also did not initially establish measures and targets for its 

physical security and stockpile management program in Belize, but has 

since done so for the use of the program’s remaining funding. Additional 

information about these activities follows.

• Firearms training (ATF): For firearms-related training, ATF tracks the 

number of training courses it manages in a fiscal year and the number 

of students who participate. ATF produces weekly activity reports for 

 17PM/WRA funded the two OAS-implemented activities through grants to the OAS. The 

grant agreements between the OAS and PM/WRA laid out the goals and targets of each 

effort as well as the reporting requirements. 
Page 19 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

its efforts in Central America that recount law enforcement activities, 

referrals, and training or proposed training, among other things. ATF 

also collects student course evaluations and feedback provided by the 

students to the instructors. However, ATF has not established targets 

for these activities, such as the number or type of courses it plans to 

hold in a year. Doing so could help ATF leverage the existing 

feedback it collects, such as requests for longer courses or that ATF 

offer a second, more in-depth course on a given topic. Targets could 

also help to ensure that ATF is providing enough of the specific types 

of courses that it and partner countries determine to be most 

important for countering firearms trafficking activities.

• eTrace support and training (ATF): ATF tracks the number of 

seized weapons traced through eTrace in each country, as well as the 

number of eTrace training courses conducted. ATF also tracks 

referrals that result from traces performed with eTrace. According to 

ATF officials, referrals are firearms traces that lead to investigations in 

the United States. In the past, ATF and State established targets for 

expanding the use of Spanish-language eTrace in Mexico in countrywide strategic planning documents. However, ATF officials noted that 

these targets were specific to the years following the rollout of 

Spanish eTrace and are no longer used. ATF currently does not have 

any targets related to the use of eTrace in Mexico or Central America. 

State officials noted that without information against which it can 

measure progress, it can be difficult to determine whether the 

investment in promoting the use of eTrace in Central America is 

worthwhile. ATF officials stated that it can be difficult to set targets for 

eTrace referrals because it relies on host country officials inputting 

these data. However, this does not preclude it from establishing other 

targets related to eTrace, such as targets for expanding or 

consistently using eTrace. Tracking data against performance targets 

could potentially help ATF and State better understand the value of 

these efforts.

• Physical security and stockpile management (State): In 2012, in 

response to a weapons pilferage incident, the Department of 

Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency reviewed the condition 

of Belize’s munitions storage facilities and made a number of 

equipment recommendations to bolster security. PM/WRA provided 

$300,000 in obligated NADR funds to the U.S. Embassy in Belize to 

implement these recommendations. As of September 2015, less than 

one-third of the $300,000 award had been expended and not all 

recommended equipment had been purchased. PM/WRA officials 

stated that they typically require implementers to develop 
Page 20 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

performance measures and targets but could not provide evidence of 

whether targets were developed in this case. Officials stated that 

some of the funds were obligated but not expended because staff at 

the embassy were unclear about the remaining availability of funds 

following the initial procurement in 2012. The embassy developed a 

plan for expending the remainder of the funds in summer 2015 to

avoid deobligation of the funds. The plan includes a clear target of 

procuring and installing a new storage container at one Belizean 

military site.

As of the second quarter of fiscal year 2015, agency reports show that 

implementing agencies and organizations of the five activities that 

established performance targets had met or partially met their targets for 

all measures. Two of these activities are ongoing and three have been 

completed.18 Through interagency agreements or grant agreements, 

State requires the implementers it funds to submit quarterly reports on the 

progress of their activities. Our review of these assessments, as well as 

assessments completed by State, indicates that the two ongoing activities 

were meeting established goals for the firearms-related component of 

their training as of the second quarter of fiscal year 2015, as shown in 

table 2.

Table 2: Status of Key Ongoing Activities to Counter Firearms Trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, as of the Second 

Quarter of Fiscal Year 2015

Activity Implementer Location

Activity 

dates Primary objective

Status of 

effortsa

Forensic 

assistance to 

Attorney 

Generalb

ICITAP Mexico Dec. 2010 to 

Sept. 2016

To support the firearms and tool markc analysis 

capabilities of the Mexican Attorney General’s forensic 

laboratories to ensure application of consensus 

guidelines and compliance with international standards. 

Meeting 

goals

Forensic 

assistance to 

Mexican statesb

ICITAP Mexico May 2012 to 

Sept. 2016

To enhance the firearms and tool mark analysis 

capabilities of the Mexican state laboratories to ensure 

the application of consensus guidelines and compliance 

with international standards.

Meeting 

goals 

Legend: ICITAP = International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State documents. | GAO-16-235

a

Our assessment of the status of efforts is based on the Department of State’s and implementers’

progress reports.

 18We reviewed ongoing efforts and completed efforts separately since ongoing efforts 

would not be expected to have met all of their goals prior to the program’s completion. 

Two Ongoing Activities Are 

Meeting Their Goals, and 

Three Completed Activities 

Met or Partially Met Their 

Goals, According to 

Agency and Implementer 

Reports
Page 21 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

b

Forensic assistance to the Mexican Attorney General’s and Mexican states’ laboratories includes 

multiple components. We reviewed assessments of the firearms and tool marks component to 

determine if the effort was meeting its goals because of its direct relationship with firearms trafficking.

c

Tool mark identification determines if a tool mark left at a crime scene was produced by a particular 

suspect tool. Microscopic comparisons are conducted of striations on a tool (such as a bolt cutter or 

screwdriver) to evidence marked by that tool (such as a pad lock or pried open door to a home) 

recovered from a suspect. According to ICITAP, tool mark examinations are not common in Mexico, 

but they can be very useful for solving a variety of criminal cases, especially robberies and burglaries, 

which are state-level offenses. Tool mark analysis is generally placed under the firearms units 

because they require comparative analysis similar to those conducted on firearms.

These activities are part of the U.S. government’s efforts to increase the 

capacity of federal and state-level Mexican forensics laboratories, as 

described below.

• Forensic assistance to the Attorney General (ICITAP): ICITAP’s 

2014 Interagency Agreement with INL outlines performance measures 

for its assistance to the Forensic Laboratory of Mexico’s Procuraduría 

General de la República, or Office of Attorney General (PGR). Each of 

the components that make up the project has a number of 

performance measures; however, we evaluated the firearms and tool 

marks component because of its direct relationship with firearms 

trafficking. As of the second quarter of fiscal year 2015, State 

assessed that this component was on target.19 The overall objective 

of the project is to achieve international accreditation for the PGR 

forensic laboratory in five core disciplines, including ballistics. One of 

the main goals for the firearms and tool marks component is 

compliance with international standards for testing laboratories. As of 

December 2015, according to ICITAP officials, ICITAP was preparing 

for an accreditation audit and projected that this component would be 

in compliance with international standards early in 2016. Initiated in 

2010, the project made significant progress until the end of 2012, 

according to ICITAP. The project was slowed from December 2012 

until May 2014, following the change in the Mexican presidential 

administration.

• Forensic assistance to Mexican states (ICITAP): ICITAP initiated 

this project providing assistance to Mexican states’ forensics 

laboratories in June 2013. ICITAP’s 2014 Interagency Agreement with 

 19This project includes seven components, one of which covers firearms and tool marks. 

According to State’s assessment, two of the seven components of the project were “on 

target” as of the second quarter of fiscal year 2015, including the firearms and tool marks 

component; the other five were assessed as “below target” or “slightly below target.”
Page 22 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

INL outlines performance measures for this assistance. Each of the 

components that make up the project has a number of performance 

measures; however, we evaluated the firearms and tool marks 

component because of its direct relationship with firearms trafficking. 

State’s fiscal year 2015 second quarter and ICITAP’s fiscal year 2015 

third quarter progress reports do not explicitly provide an assessment 

of the firearms and tool marks component. However, State officials 

noted that in their judgment, this project is meeting its goals for the 

firearms and tool marks component.20 The overall objective of the 

project is to enhance the capabilities of the forensic laboratory system 

at the state level to adhere to international standards for testing 

laboratories and use forensic-specific standards, where appropriate, 

as the basis for development, resulting in up to 10 fully accredited 

forensic laboratories—1 or 2 in each political region of the country. 

The planned life of this project is 4 years, following which ICITAP 

intends for all 32 state labs to have initiated the process to move 

toward accreditation.

According to State’s and implementers’ progress reports, one of three 

completed activities for which performance measures and targets had 

been established fully met its goals. As shown in table 3, the OASmanaged firearms marking effort fully met its goals, and implementers 

partially met established goals for the other two activities.

 20This project includes eight components, one of which covers firearms and tool marks. As 

of the second quarter of fiscal year 2015, State assessed the overall program as being 

“below target,” noting that activity had occurred in six of the eight components and that the 

activity was limited to a few states even though the interagency agreement called for 

assistance to all 32 Mexican states. State’s assessment noted that in order to reach all 

performance measures before the period of performance ends, ICITAP would need to 

significantly increase its efforts and activities.
Page 23 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Table 3: Status of Completed Key Activities to Counter Firearms Trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico

Activity Implementer Location

Activity 

dates Primary objective

Status of 

effortsa

Nonintrusive 

inspection 

equipment 

training

CBP Mexico Apr. 2013 to 

Dec. 2014

To improve and develop the Mexican government’s capacity in 

operating nonintrusive inspection equipment by providing 

advanced training.

Partially 

met goals

Firearms 

marking

OAS Belize, 

Guatemala

Sept. 2009 

to June 2014 

To contribute to the prevention of firearms trafficking and help 

reduce armed violence in the region.

Met goals

Stockpile 

destruction

OAS Guatemala Sept. 2010 

to June 2012

To eliminate stockpiled weapons and ammunition to reduce 

the risk of transfer to unauthorized persons or groups and 

diminish the possibility of accidental explosions at storage 

facilities.

Partially 

met goals

Legend: CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection; OAS = Organization of American States.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State and Organization of American States documents. | GAO-16-235

a

Our assessment of the status of efforts is based on the Department of State’s and implementers’

progress reports.

The progress made by agencies and implementers in achieving their 

established goals for these activities is described below.

• Nonintrusive inspection equipment training (CBP): CBP’s goals 

for this activity were partially met. As of September 2014, State 

assessed that this program was performing slightly below target. 

Although the project was meeting most of its benchmarks and 

timeline, it was unclear whether one of the project’s four performance 

targets would be met—incorporating successfully trained personnel 

into Mexico’s cadre of instructors. CBP’s 2013 Interagency Agreement 

with INL outlines performance measures for technical assistance and 

training on nonintrusive inspection equipment designed to interdict 

contraband, including firearms. One initial target was to train a cadre 

of 24 Mexican instructors; by the end of fiscal year 2014, CBP 

certified 13 instructors who planned to train 400 Mexican officials in 

the 2015 calendar year. State noted that the 13 instructors were well 

qualified with extensive experience in border management. However, 

as of the end of fiscal year 2014, it was unclear whether Mexican 

agencies would incorporate the successfully trained participants into 

their cadre of instructors. This project was initiated in April 2013 and 

ended in December 2014.

• Firearms marking (OAS): This OAS-managed regional project to 

promote firearms marking in Latin America and the Caribbean 

achieved all of its goals. The program was initiated in 2009 and 

completed in 2014 and included the participation of Guatemala and 
Page 24 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Belize. The goals of the project included creating a regional study of 

firearms marking laws and practices, distributing at least one firearm 

marking machine to every participating country, organizing a regional 

workshop on firearms marking, and organizing a roundtable on 

firearms marking. Guatemala was provided five marking machines—

more than any other country in Central America—and Belize was 

provided one machine. According to State officials, Guatemala was 

provided more machines because of the high number of weapons in

that country. In June 2014, the OAS reported that it had met all of the 

project’s goals.

• Stockpile Destruction (OAS): An OAS-implemented stockpile 

destruction program in Guatemala achieved one of its two goals. 

Initiated in September 2010, the project’s goals were to destroy 250 

tons of expired or unstable ammunition and 12,000 small arms/light 

weapons belonging to the Ministry of Defense. By December 2011, 

about 269 tons of ammunition had been destroyed, exceeding the 

goal. In February 2012, the Guatemalan government announced its 

plans to create two new military brigades to counter illegal drug 

cartels, shifting the plans of the Ministry of Defense in relation to 

stockpile destruction and rendering the second objective unattainable. 

In total, 2,091 weapons were destroyed—representing 17 percent of 

the goal of destroying 12,000 weapons.

State has a process for identifying and addressing challenges to 

achieving program goals, but these efforts were not consistently 

documented in implementing agency assessments of the key activities we 

reviewed, as required. State’s agreements with implementing agencies 

and organizations require that quarterly reports include a summary of any 

critical issues or challenges and a plan of action in response to them. 

According to State officials, an implementer may also communicate 

significant challenges to the State official overseeing its activity via 

conversations, meetings, and correspondence. For example, in Central 

America, agencies meet weekly to discuss program activities, which may 

include a discussion of any challenges. As a result, State officials noted 

that implementers may not include challenges in quarterly reports if they 

have been discussed in another venue. However, challenges and 

potential solutions should also be articulated in quarterly reports, 

according to State officials.

We found that implementers’ progress reports on the key counterfirearms trafficking activities we reviewed were inconsistent in identifying 

Assessments of the Key 

Activities We Reviewed 

Did Not Consistently 

Identify Challenges to 

Meeting Program Goals or 

Strategies for Overcoming 

Them
Page 25 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

key challenges or presenting strategies to address these challenges. For 

example, a quarterly report for the OAS-managed firearms destruction 

effort in Guatemala discussed a shift in host government priorities that 

resulted in the delay of the destruction of firearms belonging to one 

government agency. In response, implementing officials modified their 

focus to instead destroy weapons managed by another branch of the 

Guatemalan government. Although the goal was not fully satisfied, this 

quarterly report comprehensively documented the challenge, the strategy 

for resolving the challenge, and the final outcome.

In other cases, quarterly reports we reviewed did not identify challenges 

or plans for addressing them. For example, ICITAP’s fiscal year 2015 

third quarter report for its assistance to the PGR laboratories did not 

discuss any challenges in delivering the assistance. Although State 

assessed the firearms and tool marks component of this program as 

meeting its targets, it also noted that other components of the program 

were below target. However, the quarterly report did not discuss any 

challenges or reasons why these components were not on target. 

Additionally, a State assessment of the nonintrusive inspection equipment 

training effort indicated that the biggest challenge to the program’s 

success was securing support from host government agencies to 

continue to allow the program’s trainees to train host country officials as a 

group and to assess whether Mexican agencies would incorporate the 

training into their internal curricula. CBP’s fiscal year 2014 fourth quarter 

report mentioned a challenge associated with interagency 

communication; however, it did not identify concerns about the host 

country integrating the training into its curricula as a challenge.

According to State officials, agency quarterly reports are important for 

understanding the progress of an activity toward meeting its goals. They 

noted that including a discussion of challenges in quarterly reports helps 

to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are aware of potential issues. 

State officials noted that balancing resources across competing priorities 

can be difficult and also said they use implementers’ quarterly progress 

reports to inform resource allocation decisions. For example, if an activity 

is not meeting its goals, State may look to end the program and allocate 

resources to a different priority. Alternatively, if an activity is particularly

successful, State may look for opportunities to expand it. Without 

information about challenges and plans for their resolution, State is 

missing an opportunity to gain valuable knowledge that could help 

facilitate future decision making about efforts to counter firearms 

trafficking.
Page 26 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Building capacity to counter firearms trafficking is a priority for the U.S. 

government and the governments of Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico. The 

United States has worked well with partner countries to implement a 

variety of capacity-building activities focused on partner country needs. 

U.S. agencies have established performance metrics and targets for most 

of the eight key counter-firearms trafficking efforts in Belize, Guatemala, 

and Mexico that we reviewed, but ATF has not set targets by which it can 

measure progress for its activities to provide firearms training and support 

the use of eTrace. Without such targets, ATF management and other 

decision makers may have difficulty evaluating the success of these 

efforts and ensuring that they are focusing on the most pressing needs. 

According to State’s and implementers’ reports, other U.S. agencies 

funded by State have made progress toward key activities to counter 

firearms trafficking, but they have not consistently reported on key 

challenges to meeting their goals or on the strategies they intended to 

use to address these challenges. Consistently identifying challenges and 

mitigation strategies in quarterly progress reports ensures that all relevant 

parties are aware of program risks and are able to make decisions with 

full information. Without this information, implementers may not fully meet 

their goals. Additionally, without this information, State, as the primary 

funder of these activities, is limited in its ability to ensure that it is able to 

maximize the use of U.S. resources.

We recommend the following two actions to enhance U.S. agencies’

performance monitoring of counter-firearms trafficking activities:

• The Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives should establish and document performance targets for 

the bureau’s key counter-firearms trafficking activities in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico, as appropriate.

• The Secretary of State should work with other U.S. agencies and 

implementers to help ensure that quarterly progress reports identify 

key challenges and plans to address them.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State, Justice, 

and Homeland Security and OAS for comment. In its written comments, 

reproduced in appendix II, State generally concurred with our 

recommendation and stated that it will work with other agencies to 

implement it. The Department of Justice’s ATF provided its comments via 

email and stated that it concurred with our recommendation and plans to 

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments
Page 27 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

implement it. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice also 

provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. OAS 

did not provide comments.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General of the United 

States, the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives, and the OAS Secretary General. In addition, the report will be

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-6991 or farbj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

Jessica Farb

Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 28 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

In this report, we examined (1) the activities undertaken by U.S. agencies 

to build partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking in Belize, 

Guatemala, and Mexico and the extent to which they considered key 

factors in selecting the activities and (2) the progress the United States 

has made in building partner capacity in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico 

to combat firearms trafficking.

To determine what activities U.S. agencies have undertaken and the 

extent to which U.S. agencies considered key factors in determining what 

activities to undertake to build partner capacity to combat firearms 

trafficking in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, we first identified U.S. 

activities that either directly or indirectly addressed firearms trafficking. 

We interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State), Justice,

and Homeland Security—and their component agencies, as 

appropriate—and collected documentation on U.S. activities.1 We 

compiled a list of relevant activities based on these interviews, interviews 

with host country officials, and our review of documentation. We included 

an activity in the scope of our review if it specifically included firearms 

among the issues it was intended to address. Because other activities 

may also indirectly touch on firearms trafficking, the list may not be 

comprehensive.

To understand broader strategies underlying these activities, we reviewed 

strategic planning documents specific to Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, 

including State’s Integrated Country Strategies, as well as several 

interagency strategic and planning documents regarding U.S. 

engagement with Central America, including the U.S. Strategy for 

Engagement in Central America, the U.S. Strategy to Combat 

Transnational Organized Crime, and the National Southwest Border 

Counternarcotics Strategy. We collected funding data from State and the 

Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (ATF) for these activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 

and, based on interviews with knowledgeable agency officials and a 

review of State’s relevant internal controls, determined that these data 

were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.

 1

We also interviewed officials from the Department of Defense and determined that the 

department did not conduct activities relevant to the scope of this review. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

We identified key factors for agencies to consider in Presidential Policy 

Directive 23, a presidential directive covering security sector assistance, 

including firearms trafficking. To determine whether agencies considered 

these factors, we reviewed agency documentation and interviewed U.S. 

and foreign officials. We interviewed U.S. officials and officials from the 

Organization of American States in Washington, D.C., and U.S. and 

Mexican officials in Mexico. Additionally, we conducted interviews with 

U.S. and host country officials in Guatemala and Belize and with the ATF 

Regional Attaché in San Salvador, who supports counter-firearms 

trafficking efforts in both Guatemala and Belize.

To determine what progress the United States has made in building 

partner capacity in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico to combat firearms 

trafficking, we identified eight key activities from the activities presented in 

the first objective. Our review of these eight key activities is not 

generalizable to all activities conducted by U.S. agencies and their 

implementing partners. We defined an activity as a key activity if (1) the 

activity had a specific component or objective to address firearms 

trafficking, (2) a substantial portion of funding was directed to the activity, 

or (3) U.S. or foreign officials identified the activity as a key effort to 

building partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking.

For each key activity, we reviewed program documentation—including 

grant agreements, interagency agreements (where applicable), and 

progress reports—and interviewed agency officials to determine whether 

the funding and implementing agencies had developed performance 

measures and targets for the activity. If an agency had developed 

performance measures and targets, we reviewed State’s and 

implementers’ progress reports to determine whether the agency had met 

its goals for the program. We reviewed ongoing efforts and completed 

efforts separately since ongoing efforts would not be expected to have 

met all of their goals prior to the program’s completion. For both ongoing 

and completed efforts, we based our assessment of whether the activity 

was on track for meeting its goals on agency and State progress reports. 

We did not independently verify the data included in these reports. We 

reviewed State’s interagency agreements and grant agreements with 

implementing partners to determine what reporting requirements existed 

for State-funded programs. We reviewed agency and other implementers’

quarterly reports to determine whether the reporting requirements were 

met.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 30 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

We conducted this performance audit from February 2015 to January 

2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 31 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State
Appendix II: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 32 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity
Appendix III: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 33 GAO-16-235 Building Partner Capacity

Jessica Farb, (202) 512-6991 or farbj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Juan Gobel (Assistant Director), 

Kara Marshall, Qahira El’Amin, Julia Jebo Grant, Lynn Cothern, Charles 

Michael Johnson, Jr., Ashley Alley, Oziel Trevino, and Justin Fisher made 

key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100071)
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