1 20

- 2 9 69

- cr U.S. v. Robinson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT



## SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the not ation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York , on the 27 th day of May , two thousand twenty

- one
.

PRESENT: J OHN M. W ALKER , J R

. , J OSÉ A. C ABRANES , R ICHARD C. W ESLEY , Circuit Judges

.

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Appellee , 20

- 2 9 69

- cr

v.

D ARREN C LAY R OBINSON , AKA Mountain, AKA Darren Charles Robinson,

Defendant

- Appellant , J OSE G ILBERTO H ARRIS , AKA Jose Hernandez, L

ASHAUNDA T ARVER , AKA Shaunda, Y USEF B OOTHMAN , AKA Rocket, B OBBY R. G RAHAM , S HENIKA D. B OYD , AKA Misses, M ARTY H UMPHREY , J ALESSA S COTT , W ILLIE C. H AYES , AKA Man, K IMBERLY P ETTIES
Defendant s

. *

* The Clerk of Court is directed to modify the caption of this case as shown above.2 FOR DEFENDANT

- APPELL ANT : D ARREN R OBINSON , pro se , Joint Base MDL, NJ.

FOR APPEL L EE : M ICHAEL S. B ARNETT , R AJIT S. D OSANJH , Assistant United States Attorney s, for Antoinette T. Bacon

, Acting United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse , NY.

Appeal from a n August 13, 2020 order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York ( Mae D’Agostino, J udge .).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the August 13, 2020 order of the D istrict C ourt is AFFIRMED

. Appellant Darren Robinson, pro se and incarcerated, appeals from the denials of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Robinson claimed that his vulnerability to COVID

- 19 infection justifi ed a sentence reduction. The D istrict C ourt denied compassionate release on the grounds that (1) Robinson had failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, note 1(D)

, and (2) even if Robinso n had demonstrated an extraordinary and compelling reason, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing f actors weighed against compassionate
release. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“ We typically review the denial of a motion for a discretionary sentence reduction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Holloway , 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020). When a district court premises its decision “entirely on statutory interpretation,” we review de novo

. Id. We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moreno , 789 F.3d 72, 78 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 1)(A ), a district court may, “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] Section 3553(a),” reduce a prisoner’s term of imprisonment if the court finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United
States v. Brooker , 976 F.3d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 2020). Those sentencing factors include, inter alia , “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to r eflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, [] to provide just punishment for the offense[,]” to deter criminal conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2). In Brooker , we made clear that, when a prisoner

— rather than the Bureau of Prisons

— moves for a sentence reduction, courts are free to consider “the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons

, ” and3 that “[n] either Application Note 1(D)

, nor anything else in th e now

- outdated version of Guideline §
1B1.13

, limits the district court’s discretion .” 976 F.3d at 237

.

The D istrict C ourt did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinson’s motion for a sentence reduction . It is true that

, not having the benefit of our de cision in Brooker when it ruled on Robinson’s motion for reconsideration, the District Court erroneously permitt ed U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, note 1(D ) to constrain its discretion in determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons existed

. R emand is no net heless not warranted here, because the District Court ’ s reasonable
evaluation of the Section 3553 (a) factors is an alternative and independent basis for denial of compassionate release

. The D istrict C ourt ’s Section 3553(a) inquiry focused on Robinson’s underlying conduct, which “gravely endangered the community” by distributing highly addictive substances; his history of drug dealing spanning over 38 years; and his extensive criminal history, all of which, in the court’s view, pres ented a “substantial danger to the community.” Gov’t App’x at
133. The court also determined that , because Robinson had served less than 30% of his sentence, release would not “reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide just punishment for the offense.” Id

. (quoting § 3553(a)(2)(A)) . We find no abuse of discretion in
this analysis

. 1

CONCLUSION

We have considered all Robinson’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the August 13, 2020 orde r of the D istrict C ourt

.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

1 In a recent case, we came to a similar conclusion. See United States v. Butler , 845 F. App ’ x 74, 76

- 77 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming a district court’s “discretion to consider how much time an inmate has already served of his overall sentence when the court is weighing whether a release for extraordinary and compelling circumstances is consistent with the Section 3553(a) factors,” and ruling, based on the defendant’s four

- decade

- long criminal history that his service of less than 30% of his 92

- month sentence did not provide sufficient deterrence or obviate the danger to the public).