THE STRUGGLE

FOR AIR FORCE

INDEPENDENCE

1943-1947

Herman S. Wolk

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Wolk, Herman S., 193 1-

The Struggle for Air Force Independence, 1943-47.

Bibliography

Includes index.

1. United States. Air Force-Organization.

2. United States. Army Air Forces-History.

I. United States. Air Force. Air Force History and Museums Program.

II. Title

UG773.W64 1982 358.4'13'0973 82-22398

Revised edition of Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-

1947, published in 1984 by the Office of Air Force History.

The Cover: Photo montage includes (clockwise from upper left) Dwight D.

Eisenhower, Carl A. Spaatz, James V. Forrestal, Stuart Symington, Henry

H. (Hap) Arnold, Lauris Norstad, Hoyt Vandenberg, and Ira C. Eaker.

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14. ABSTRACT

A revision of the 1984 work, Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947, this book describes the struggle by Army

airmen to become an independent United States Air Force. The narration covers the story from the post-World War II period to

September 1947, when the U.S. Air Force was established. It focuses on the political, military, and technological context of the

struggle for air independence. Highlighted are the roles played by Arnold, Spaatz, Symington, Truman, Norstad, and Eaker.

416 pp., diagram, photos, notes, appendices, bibliographies index

GPO Stock No.008-070-00723-1 ISBN: 0-16-049066-9

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a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE ABSTRACT OF Richard I. Wolf

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Foreword

This masterful work has already gained stature as the definitive accounting of the creation and establishment of the United States Air Force. As such,

it is fitting that it is now released in a new and expanded edition, in honor of

the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the USAF as a separate military

service.

As author Herman Wolk demonstrates, the creation of the USAF was

hardly the product of casual intent. The creation represented the fulfillment

of both a desire and a need dating back to the experiences of the Army Air

Service in the First World War, the doctrinal controversies of the interwar

years, and the crucible of global combat in the Second World War. It was this

legacy of struggle and effort that shaped the service and its leadership. If for

no other reason than this, the creation of the United States Air Force can thus

be seen as far more than merely the result of the emergence of atomic weaponry and a bipolar post-Second World War global environment, or that of

enthusiastic impulse bome of America's wartime air power experience.

But if the Air Force necessarily represented the product of a long tradition

of air power thought and activity, it had nevertheless purchased its birthright

with the blood and sacrifice of innumerable air and ground crews in combat

around the world. In 1943, General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of

the U.S. Army, had seen fit to issue the then-Army Air Forces with its Declaration of Independence: FM 100-20, which recognized the co-equality of air

and land power. Two years later, his successor, General of the Army Dwight

D. Eisenhower, was one of the strongest proponents of Air Force independence. He was in a position to know: in June 1944,'after D-Day, he had

remarked to his son John (a newly minted Army second lieutenant visiting

his father in Normandy), "Without air supremacy, I wouldn't be here." It was

the Army Air Forces that had secured that air supremacy. Given the significance of air power in the modem world, he well recognized that the best

means of projecting that air power and meeting the increasing global requirements thrust upon the United States was via a strong, well-led, wellequipped, and well-trained independent Air Force.

Today the United States Air Force reaches globally to project power and

presence, and Air Force-launched and managed space-based systems provide

iii
global air force, and it is America's "911" for responding to crises and contingencies anytime, anywhere. That it is so is a tribute to those who labored

long and hard to create it. Their story is admirably told in this remarkable

book.

Richard P. Hallion

Air Force Historian

June 26, 1996

iv
Preface

World War 11 marked a culminating point in the long struggle of the Army

airmen to establish an independent Air Force. The impressive contribution to

allied victory made by the United States Army Air Forces (AAF) provided a

decisive impetus to the drive to create a United States Air Force. Despite the

retrospective judgement that the formation of a separate Air Force after

World War 11 was all but a foregone conclusion, the fact remained that a

great deal of difficult work needed to be accomplished in 1945-1947 in order

to make this a reality.

World War Il had uncovered shortcomings in the organization of military

forces which fortunately were overcome by the genius of American productivity, the outright skill of military leadership, and the tenacity and courage of

the American fighting man. The postwar period was unprecedented in

American military history, a time when the administration and the nation decided to build a permanent peacetime military establishment based upon the

concept of deterring war.

General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, Commanding General, AAF, with prescience, laid the conceptual framework for the postwar Air Force. Early in

the war, he recognized the critical need to plan an organizational structure

that would be appropriate for the postwar Army Air Forces. Moreover, in the

compact pre-war Army Air Corps, Arnold from his long experience made it a

top priority to identify those who would be well-suited to key command and

planning positions. He accelerated this planning after the war in Europe

erupted and President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered a military buildup.

In the spring and summer of 1943, General Arnold directed the formation

of formal planning groups in the Headquarters Army Air Forces. These were

the post War Division and the Special Projects Office. Arnold also had created an Advisory Council in 1942 which, among other issues, considered the

subject of postwar planning.

Although in 1943-45 General Arnold was under great pressure in Washington to produce results in the theaters of war commensurate with the substantial resources being devoted to the AAF, he nonetheless placed

considerable emphasis upon this planning for the postwar Air Force. Arnold,

v
his successor, Gen. Carl A. (Tooey) Spaatz, and Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander, AAF, were among those who had fought the bureaucratic

battles for more autonomy from the War Department during the interwar

years. Once the war was over in 1945 the AAF leaders were determined to

succeed with the establishment of an independent Air Force. The passage of

appropriate unification legislation was only one of the many crucial concerns

facing the Army Air Forces after the war. Setting reorganization and planning force structure were extremely vital parts of the AAF drive for autonomy, as was the question of roles and missions. This story focuses on these

concerns and seeks to show the connections between them.

When the Army Air Forces reorganized in March 1946, it did so in such a

way that when the AAF became an independent service, it did not have immediately to revamp its major commands once again. This major reorganization of 1946, creating the basic combat commands of the Air Force, grew out

of discussions and eventual agreement between Spaatz and Gen. Dwight D.

Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff. The key issue to be settled between them

was how to organize the AAF's tactical air elements. Similarly, Spaatz and

Eisenhower had discussed the idea of forming an Air Board to advise the

Commanding General, AAF, on air policy. Spaatz ordered the establishment

of the Air Board-marking the beginning of the modern postwar Air Board

system-in February 1946. These events illuminated a salient feature of this

period of Air Force history: namely, that frequently relatively few men were

involved in the process by which crucial decisions were made.

Planning for the 400,000-personnel, 70-group program had in the final

analysis been ordered by the War Department and had been progressively

scaled down from much higher figures. The airmen viewed the 70 groups as

the minimum structure for the standing postwar Air Force. As the reader will

understand, it was specifically this view which put the AAF leaders in conflict with the War Department hierarchy over the universal military training

(UMT) program.

This concerted postwar planning-for unification and a separate Air

Force, roles and missions, force structure, and reorganization-took place

amid the confusion of massive immediate postwar demobilization. It is no

exaggeration to say that the air planners sought to build and tear down their

forces at the same time. Their tasks were tremendously complex. Plans had to

be drawn rapidly and yet without concrete guidance as to the shape of future

domestic and foreign policies. "Almost every endeavor was interrelated to

every other action," noted General Jacob E. Smart, who after the war was

Secretary to the Air Staff. "Plans and programs were in a state of flux and

frustration was the normal condition."

vi
Perhaps the only recognizable certainty was that austerity would mark the

postwar milieu. Yet, even here the AAF and War Department officials differed in their estimates and definitions of postwar austerity. The War Department reflected the view of Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff,

that the American public would not sustain a large standing army. Moreover,

he did not believe it could be recruited by the military in the first place.

This detailed narrative of the resolution of the 70-group program, the postwar reorganization of 1946, and the Headquarters reorganization of October

1947 are stories that have not previously been related, stressing the interrelationship between them. As will be seen, this interplay was often the result of

unusually close relationships between the top wartime commanders. For example, Arnold, enjoyed a long-lasting friendship with Marshall going back

before World War I. They understood each other and worked well together.

Even so, this did not stop Arnold from opposing Marshall on UMT, arguing

that in the future a substantial standing Air Force should not be sacrificed to

the UMT program. Similarly, General Eisenhower thought highly of General

Spaatz and indeed considered him as his own airman. These particular relationships were crucial to the postwar creation of the United States Air Force

(USAF).

General Eisenhower was in a very real sense a founder of the Air Force.

Returning to the War Department in Washington after leading the "Great

Crusade" in Europe, he emphasized to the Congress that in his view "no sane

person" could any longer reject the idea of an independent United States Air

Force. Based on the experience of World War II, the Army air arm deserved

coequality with the land and naval forces. Eisenhower's advocacy was also

based upon his conviction that unity of command had become absolutely essential and that a unified defense establishment would foster economy. In

peacetime, the nation could no longer afford the brutal competition for resources.

Also of great importance to the autonomy drive were the history of the Air

Corps between the wars and the airmen's ideas about air power and air organization as formed over the decades since World War I. These had great

influence after World War II on the collective frame of mind of the airmen

and their approach to the question of air independence.

However, it was the cataclysmic events of the second World War that propelled the AAF into what the air leaders deemed a pre-eminent position.

With the war over, the air leaders felt that the AAF had replaced the Navy as

"the first line of defense." The war had given them the chance to demonstrate

the effectiveness of air power. They thought their war record entitled them to

vii
a position coequal with the Army and Navy. Their resolution of the questions

of force structure, internal reorganization, and roles and missions, first took

into consideration the belief that the Army air arm had become the premier

component of the defense phalanx. The organizational and force planning accomplished by the airmen in 1943-47 were enormously complicated. It was

not only the substance of the issues themselves which was so difficult; the air

planners also had to coordinate and gain approval for force deployment plans

through the War Department. Subsequently, of course, final approval would

have to be won through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Along with planning internal reorganization, the end result of this lengthy process was the air leaders

had the Air Force relatively in place when the United States Air Force was

formed in September 1947.

Generals Henry H. Arnold and Carl A. Spaatz, successive commanders of

the AAF, gave heavy responsibilities to Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad. Having

planned air campaigns in North Africa and Italy during the war, and then

serving as Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force, that conducted the B-29

campaign against Japan, Norstad brought experience and an appropriate temperament to these postwar tasks. During 1945-47, Norstad played a key role

in planning and organizing the postwar Air Force and in negotiating with naval leaders the unification legislation that led to the National Security Act of

1947.

Not surprisingly however, troubles failed to disappear with the creation of

the USAF. To the contrary, the roles and missions controversy with the Navy

grew more bitter and intense; difficult aircraft production decisions lay

ahead; and the Air Force faced a period of two years during which critical

support functions would have to be transferred from the War Department.

Nevertheless, Stuart Symington, the first Secretary of the Air Force, and

General Spaatz, the first Air Force Chief of Staff, enthusiastically assembled

their staffs and began to organize and operate the Department of the Air

Force and Headquarters USAF.

The author has not tried to describe the many organizational changes

within AAF Headquarters or in the commands. The approach has been primarily to center on the crucial roles played by Air Force leaders and officials

in the overall organizational planning of the postwar Air Force. A new epilogue describes important national security legislation and Air Force organizational changes in the half-century since the establishment of the Air Force.

New material has also been interspersed in the various chapters throughout

this book. The appendices include major sequential documents that were important to the establishment of the conceptual framework and organizational

structure of the USAF.

viii
Acknowledgments

Dr. Richard P. Hallion, the Air Force Historian, reviewed and commented on

this manuscript. Mrs. Anne Johnson Sachs edited and formatted the manuscript. Cynthia Wyche Umstead scanned the original edition and cleaned the

files. Lori Crane designed the book cover and Protean Gibril created the electronic photo montage.

The following colleagues commented on the manuscript: Thomas A. Sturm,

John Greenwood, Jack Neufeld, Charles Hildreth, Richard Kohn, Maj. Gen.

John Huston, Marcelle Knaack, H. 0. Malone, Stanley L. Falk, Lt. Col. Drue

DeBerry, Col. John Schlight, Warren Trest, and Prof. Edward Homze.

The following reviewed parts of the manuscript and provided important

insights: Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington, Gen. Ira C. Eaker,

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Maj. Gen. Haywood Hansell, Jr., John F. Loosbrock,

Robert Childress, Robert M. Kipp, Gerald Cantwell, Gerald Hasselwander.

Eugene Sagstetter edited the original edition.

ix
The Author

Herman S. Wolk is the Senior Historian at the Air Force History Support

Office in Washington, D.C. Before joining the Headquarters Air Force history program, he was an historian at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters (1959-1966). He holds BA and MA degrees from the American

International College, Springfield, Massachusetts, and studied at the Far

Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, under a Ford Foundation Grant. In 1974-1975 he served as a member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Special Project on the History of the Strategic Arms

Competition. He is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed

Forces and Society. Among his many publications are Strategic Bombing:

The American Experience (1981), Evolution of the American Military Establishment Since World War II (co-author, 1978), and several essays on the career and contributions of General George C. Kenney. He is also the author of

"General Arnold, the Atomic Bomb, and the Surrender of Japan," to be published by the Louisiana State University Press, in The Pacific War Revisited

(1997).

x
Contents

F O REW O RD .......................................................... iii

PREFACE ................................................. V

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, 1997 EDITION .............................. ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................... x

ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................... Xviii

1. ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION .................................... I

Early Air Organization ...................................... 3

General Headquarters Air Force .............................. 12

Air Organization in World War II ............................. 22

Anticipating Postwar Reorganization ........................... 34

2. PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS .................................... 49

Early Postwar Planning ..................................... 49

Marshall Orders a Resurvey .................................. 56

AAF Protests Resurvey ...................................... 59

The War Department and UMT ............................... 63

Establishing the 70-Group Goal ............................... 67

Jamison 's Dissent to Bessell Committee ........................ 74

Arnold Urges 70 Groups ..................................... 76

Final Approval for 70 Groups ................................ 81

70 Groups vs UM T ......................................... 83

3. UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE ......................... 87

Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee Report ................... 89

The Navy's View of the Report ................................ 93

Views ofArnold and Marshall ................................ 97

Forrestal on Autonomy ...................................... 100

Eisenhower Supports a Separate Air Force ...................... 103

Truman Advocates a Coequal Air Force ........................ 107

The AAF Plans for Unification ................................ 109

xi
4. ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE ...................... 123

Continental Air Forces ..................................... 124

Strategic Striking Force .................................... 128

Postwar Organization of Major Commands ..................... 135

Planning the Headquarters Organization ....................... 150

Establishment of the Air Board ............................... 154

War Department Circular 138 ............................... 157

5. MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY ............................. 161

Truman Increases the Pressure ............................... 163

Norstad and Sherman Draft a Plan ........................... 167

Agreement between Patterson and Forrestal .................... 174

Struggle over Roles and Missions ............................. 178

Executive Order 9877 ...................................... 184

National Security Act of 1947 ................................ 185

6. INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION ........................ 195

"At Long Last" .. ......................................... 196

Establishing the Air Force .................................. 199

Organizing the Headquarters ................................ 205

Planning the Technical Services .............................. 212

Transfer of Functions ...................................... 222

7. EPILOGUE .............................................. 227

A PPENDICES .............................................. 251

1. Operational Plans Division, Air Staff: Extract from a Study to

Determine the Minimum Air Power the United States Should Have

at the Conclusion of the War in Europe, April 1943 ............ 253

2. Extract from War Department Basic Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment, March 29, 1945 ......................... 260

3. Extract from Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense, April 1945 ......... 268

4. Minority Report of AAF Member of Special War Department

Committee on the Permanent Military Establishment (Bessell

Committee), 28 Nov 1945 ................................. 278

5. Letter, The Adjutant General's Office, War Department, AG 322

(21 Mar 46) OB-1-AFCOR-(971 (d))-M, to Commanding

Generals, Army Air Forces and Continental Air Forces, subject:

Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air .

xii
Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air

Forces and Certain Other Army Air Forces Units; Activation,

Inactivation and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units,

21 M arch 1946 .......................................... 281

6. Memorandum, Office of the Chief of Staff, War Department, for

President, Board of Officers on Organization of the War Department (Lieut. General W. H. Simpson) et al, subject: Statement of

Approved Policies to Effect Increased Autonomy of the Army Air

Forces within the War Department Structure, 4 April 1946 ....... 285

7. Extract from Report to Chief of Staff, United States Army, on

Army and Air Force Organizational Matters under Unification

M arch 14, 1947 ......................................... 293

8. Executive Order 9877, Functions of the Armed Forces,

July 26, 1947 ........................................... 297

9. The National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253-80th

Congress), (Chapter 343-1st Session), (S. 758) ................ 301

10. Army Air Forces/United States Air Force-Headquarters Staff.. 320

11. Public Law 216, August 10, 1949, Chapter 412. An Act to

Reorganize Fiscal Management in the National Military

Establishment to Promote Economy and Efficiency, and for

Other Purposes ......................................... 325

N OTES .................................................. 335

GLOSSARY .................................................... 361

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE .......................................... 371

IN D E X ............................................................... 3 89

xiii
Illustrations

Photographs

Generals Carl A. Spaatz and Henry H. Arnold ...................... xxiv

Lt. Henry H. Arnold in a Wright "B" airplane, College Park, Maryland; Maj. Arnold examines the first Liberty engine ................ 4

Maj. Thomas DeW. Milling and Maj. Arnold fly an Army observation

plane ..................................................... 5

Brig. Gen. H. H. (Hap) Arnold: Maj. Carl Spaatz; Capt. Ira C. Eaker .... 10

Wreck of the dirigible Shenandoah; Brig. Gen. William (Billy) Mitchell

and Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, 1922 .......................... 11

President Franklin D. Roosevelt ................................. 13

Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews; Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois and Brig.

Gen. Henry C. Pratt ......................................... 17

Gen. Douglas M acArthur ...................................... 20

M aj. Gen. Oscar W estover ..................................... 21

Maj. Gen. Hap Arnold and Gen. George C. Marshall, Randolph

Field, 1941 ................................................ 24

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson .............................. 25

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, Col. Paul T. Cullen, and Commodore Ben H. Wyatt examine photographs of the fourth atomic bomb

burst, Bikini Atoll; Admiral Ernest J. King; Admiral William D. Leahy 39

Scientific advisor Dr. Theodore von K~xmdn ....................... 42

Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz confers with Maj. Gen. Ralph Royce, Maj. Gen.

Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr; Lt. Gen. Hap

Arnold and Brig. Gen. James Doolittle .......................... 44

Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter; RAF Marshal Viscount Trenchard, and

Maj. Gen. Ira Eaker, England, 1943 ............................. 45

Brig. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson; Army Chief of Staff George C.

M arshall .................................................. 53

Thom as T. Handy ............................................ 56

Gen. Hap Arnold and Gen. George C. Marshall, Cairo, 1943; Lt. Gen.

Barney M. Giles and Brig. Gen. Russell E. Randall, 1944 ........... 61

xiv
Maj. Gen. William F. Tompkins Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, Maj.

Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, and Brig. Gen. M. W. Marston, Hickam

Field, 1945 ................................................ 65

Lt. G en. Ira Eaker ............................................ 70

M aj. Gen. Lauris Norstad ...................................... 71

Brig. Gen. Glen C. Jamison .................................... 76

President Harry S. Truman and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower .......... 77

Assistant Secretary of War Robert A. Lovett; Brig. Gen. Haywood

H ansell ................................................... 9 1

Admiral James 0. Richardson; Admirals Ernest J. King, Chester W.

Nimitz, and Raymond A. Spruance aboard the USS Indianapolis,

1944 ..................................................... 96

Army Air Forces Commanding General H. H. Arnold ................ 99

Adm. Ernest J. King and Gen. George C. Marshall .................. 100

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Fleet Admirals Ernest J.

King and Chester W . Nimitz .................................. 104

President Truman signs the proclamation for Air Force Day, with Gen.

Carl A. Spaatz and Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker attending ................. 108

Col. Jacob E. Smart; Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker and Gen. Hap Arnold ....... 111

Lt. Gen. Alexander M . Patch ................................... 115

AAF Commanding General Henry H. Arnold rides with Gen. Carl A.

Spaatz and Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg ....................... 119

Brig. Gen. Leon W .Johnson .................................... 128

An Army separation center, 1945; soldiers flood a separation center after

V -J D ay .................................................. 129

B-29 in flight ............................................... 134

Brig. Gen. William F. McKee; Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, and Maj.

Gen. Earle E. Partridge confer over a scale model of Bikini Atoll ..... 136

Brig. Gen. William F. McKee; Maj. Gen. Samuel A. Anderson, and

Brig. Gen. Edwin J. Backus, 1945 .............................. 137

Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett and Major Banfield ..................... 142

Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada .................................... 143

Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Maj. Gen. Donald

Wilson, Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Gen.

George C. Kenney, Lt. Gen. Harold L. George, Lt. Gen. George E.

Stratemeyer, and Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada .................. 144

Gen. Hap Arnold, Assstant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett,

and Brig. Gen. Grandison Gardner at Eglin Field, Florida ........... 151

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gen. Carl Spaatz and

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker ........................................ 156

xv
M aj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr ....................................... 157

President Harry S. Truman; Adm.William D. Leahy ................. 164

Vice Adm. Arthur W .Radford .................................. 165

Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder after

the Casablanca Conference; Viscount Trenchard and Maj. Gen.

W illiam E. Kepner .......................................... 168

Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman; Brig. Gen. Lauris Norstad ............ 171

Army Maj. Gen. William E. Hall ............................... 176

AAF Commanding General Carl A. Spaatz ........................ 180

Assistant Secretary of War Robert A. Lovett; Brig. Gen. Haywood S.

H ansell ................................................... 181

James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy; W. Stuart Symington and Air

Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder ............................... 182

The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal ..................... 190

Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington and Secretary of the

Army Kenneth C. Royall; Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan being

sworn in by Chief Justice Fred Vinson ........................... 191

Hon. W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, and Gen. Carl

Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, announce the new organizational

set-up for the Department of the Air Force ....................... 200

Maj, Gen. Hugh Knerr; Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild ................. 208

M aj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge .................................... 216

Maj. Gen. Malcolm C. Grow ................................... 221

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Secretary of the Air Force

W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and

Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, March 1949 ............... 226

Secretary of the Air Force Symington with Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court Fred Vinson, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan,

and Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, September 1947 ...... 236

President Truman aboard a B-36, Andrews AFB, 1949 .............. 237

Kenneth C. Royall being sworn in as Secretary of the Army by

Robert P. Patterson .......................................... 239

Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg takes the oath of office in the presence of

Chief Justice Fred Vinson, James Forrestal, Gen. Carl Spaatz, and

W . Stuart Symington ........................................ 240

Secretary of Defense James Forrestal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and other military leaders: Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Gen. Hoyt

Vandenberg, Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, Gen. Omar Bradley,

Adm. Louis Denfeld, Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, and Maj. Gen.

Alfred M . Gruenther ......................................... 241

xvi
Charts

Army Air Forces Organization, 24 December 1941 .................. 27

Army Air Forces, March 9, 1942 ................................ 30

Army Air Forces, October 1943 ................................. 36

Estimated Aircraft Requirements for 70-Group Peacetime Air Force .... 78

Proposed Reorganized Armed Forces, Collins Committee, October 1945 105

Air Staff, M arch 21, 1946 ...................................... 145

AAF Military Personnel Distribution: March 1946 .................. 146

AAF Tactical Groups and Separate Squadrons, March 1946 ........... 147

Army Air Forces, June 11, 1946 ................................. 158

Department of the Air Force .................................... 202

Air Staff, Headquarters United States Air Force, 10 October 1947 ...... 211

Major Air Commands, October 10, 1947 .......................... 214

xvii
THE STRUGGLE

FOR AIR FORCE

INDEPENDENCE

1943-1947
Generals Carl A. (Tooey) Spaatz and Henry H. (Hap) Arnold,

architects of the postwar Air Force.
1

Roots of AAF Organization

I don't believe any balanced plan to provide the nation

with an adequate, effective Air Force... can be obtained,

within the limitations of the War Department budget, and

without providing an organization, individual to the

needs of such an Air Force. Legislation to establish such

an organization. . .will continue to appear until this

turbulent and vital problem is satisfactorily solved.

Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews

Commanding General

General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force

April 1937.

The roots of Army Air Forces' (AAF) planning for post-World War II organization, the 70-group force, and independence lay mainly in the AAF's experience

in World War II and in the history of the Air Corps between the two world wars.

To the air leaders, World War II and its alleged lessons determined the character

of formative postwar planning in 1943-45. The work of AAF planners over these

years formed the foundation for later decisions leading to the postwar reorganization in March 1946 and to the establishment and organization in September 1947

of the Department of the Air Force and Headquarters United States Air Force

(USAF).*

*As it appears in the title of this chapter, the word "organization" is defined in a broad

sense. During 1943-47, the term "organization" became inseparable from the subjects of

force levels and the struggle for autonomy.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Wartime planning also afforded the basis for actions in 1945-46 which fixed

force levels. Although the AAF's 70-group goal evolved at the direction of the

War Department in August 1945, force planning had begun in the summer of

1943. Similarly, while the major peacetime reorganization of March 1946 set the

combat commands as the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command

(TAC), and Air Defense Command (ADC), definitive planning for the command

structure had begun in 1944. Moreover, planning for legislation leading to a National Military Establishment including a separate Air Force began to take shape

during 1943-45. The impetus came from studies by the military services and the

pressure of Congressional hearings.

Despite the importance of the war experience to the drawing of postwar plans,

no discussion of the ideas and concepts behind postwar organization would be

complete without an understanding of the history of the Army air arm between

the two world wars.* This history played a crucial part in the gestation of the air

leaders' ideas about a separate air organization and the role of air power. Between the wars the air leaders refined air doctrine, tested new aircraft and equipment, and became convinced of the need for a separate air force. The movement

for air autonomy was well under way long before the start of World War II.

Among the major issues confronted by the Air Corps before the war were the

same two questions to be dealt with by the Army Air Forces during and after

World War II: To the airmen, the seeming validity of the independent mission;

*Among the works of Air Force history that consider the interwar period are these:

Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939 (Washington, D.C., 1987); Martha

Byrd, Chennault: Giving Wings to the Tiger (Tuscaloosa and London, 1987); R. Earl

McClendon, Autonomy of the AirArm (Maxwell AFB Ala., 1954) [new edition by the Air

Force History and Museums Program, 1996]; DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains,

(Garden City, N.Y., 1980); John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-

1935 (Washington, D.C., 1982); Alfred Goldberg, ed., A History of the United States Air

Force, 1907-1957 (New York, 1957); Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A

History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB,

Ala., 1971); Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm,

1917-1941 (USAF Hist Study 89, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1953); Henry H. Arnold, Global

Mission (New York, 1949); Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of

Claire Lee Chennault (New York, 1949); Benjamin D. Foulois and Carroll V. Glines,

From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts: The Memoirs of Major General Benjamin D.

Foulois (New York, 1968). The most comprehensve work on the AAF in World War 11 is

Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War 11, 7 vols

(Chicago, 1948-1958, reprinted Washington, 1984). A more broad, popular approach,

quite useful and readable, is Geoffrey Perret, Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in

World War ! (New York, 1993).

2
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

and the shape of potential legislation to make the air arm independent. And a

striking continuity is also apparent in the air leaders themselves. The men who

led and organized the Army Air Forces in the drive for independence after World

War II had fought the bureaucratic, political, organizational, and technological

battles of the 1920s and 1930s. General Henry H. Arnold, who headed the Army

Air Forces in the second World War, gained his early flying experience from the

Wright School in Dayton, Ohio, and was himself an air pioneer. He held key

command and staff positions between the wars and in 1938 became Chief of the

Air Corps after Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover died in an air crash.

General Carl A. Spaatz, who in World War II commanded the United States

Strategic Air Forces in Europe and briefly the United States Strategic Air Forces

in the Pacific, had distinguished himself in command and combat during World

War I. Likewise an air pioneer, he performed important command and staff duties in the Air Corps through the 1920s and 1930s. With Arnold's retirement in

early 1946, General Spaatz became Commanding General, AAF; spearheaded

the postwar drive for an independent Air Force and for internal air organization;

and eventually was named the first Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, AAF Deputy Commander in 1945-47, flew with the

Air Corps in the 1920s and 1930s and occupied significant staff positions over

these years. During the war, he successively commanded the VIII Bomber Command, Eighth Air Force, and the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Returning to

AAF headquarters in the spring of 1945, Eaker was in the forefront in developing

force structure, redeployment plans, and organizational plans for the postwar Air

Force. Arnold, Spaatz, and Eaker were the top men in command in 1945-47,

when the AAF fought the successful battle for a separate Air Force. Among

many other prominent airmen and air advocates who made vital contributions to

AAF organizational planning in 1944-47 were: Stuart Symington, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, 1946-47, and the first Secretary of the Air Force in September 1947; Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, 1941-45; Lt.

Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments and Requirements, and successor to Spaatz in 1948 as Air Force Chief of

Staff; Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, in 1945, who

later helped draft a unified command plan and unification legislation; and Maj.

Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, 1943-45.

Early Air Organization

The United States Army air arm antedated the first World War, having been

created in 1907 as the Aeronautical Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer,

"to take charge of all matters pertaining to military ballooning, air machines and

all kindred subjects." As originally formed, the Aeronautical Division consisted

3

General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold

An aviation pioneer, General Arnold began his flying career when aircraft

were in their infancy. He is shown in a Wright "B" airplane at the Army's first

flying field, College Park, Maryland, in 1911 (adjacent page, top). At San Diego

Air Depot, he examines the first Liberty engine, built by the Ford Company in

World War I (adjacent page, bottom). Maj. Thomas DeW. Milling, another

military aviation pioneer, appears with Arnold (below) to celebrate a reunion

by flying together in an army observation plane in 1930.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

of one officer and two enlisted men. In 1913, the first bill to recommend a

change in the status of military aviation was introduced into the House of Representatives. It proposed to remove aviation from the Signal Corps and establish an

Aviation Corps under the Army Chief of Staff. One officer and former pilot, Lt.

Paul W. Beck, supported this legislation, observing that aviation did not belong

in the Signal Corps.* Lt. Benjamin D. Foulois, to become Chief of Air Corps,

193 1-35, opposed this bill, noting that military aviation had not yet sufficiently

advanced to be organized into an Aviation Corps. The War Department opposed

this legislation. In July 1914 the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps was established by Congress with authorized strength of 60 officers and 260 enlisted men.

Due chiefly to the potential shown by the airplane in World War I, the Air Service was formed in May 1918.

Although air power's wartime contribution had been minor, some airmen considered the airplane an ultimately decisive instrument to wage war. Aircraft had

been used in World War I primarily for observation and support of ground units.

Potentially however, aircraft could strike the enemy's war-sustaining resources

(transportation, communications, industry and population) and break his will to

resist. This became known as the independent or strategic mission, as opposed to

the tactical mission of attacking the enemy's ground or naval forces.t In future

conflicts the trench slaughter of World War I could be avoided. As bombers of

much better performance were developed, air leaders even more intensively advocated the independent mission, connecting it directly to their advocacy of

autonomy.

Also, airmen knew that Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF) had been created

during World War 1. While in 1916 Winston Churchill had declared in the House

of Commons that "ultimately, and the sooner the better, the Air Service should

be one unified, permanent branch," it had taken the German air attacks on England of 1917 to impel the drive for separation. Following these raids, a commit-

*Beck, one the earliest flyers, who also appreciated the potential military application

of aviation, was removed from flying status in 1932 becuase of the so-called "Manchu

Law." This act of Congress required that officers alternate between line and staff positions

for specified periods. Beck served with the Infantry in World War 1, returning to aviation

after the war. Lt. Col. Beck was commanding Post Field at Ft. Sill, Okla., in April 1922,

when he was shot and killed by a friend during an altercation generated by Beck's relationship with his friend's wife.

'Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, commander of Britain's Royal Flying Corps, in 1918

had established an Independent Air Force. This force was not under the command of division, corps, or army commanders, but could conduct operations against industry, transportation, communications, and supply centers.

6
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

tee headed by Lt. Gen. Jan C. Smuts recommended to the British cabinet that an

Air Ministry be formed. Further, since independent air operations gave promise

of becoming a major means of conducting warfare, a separate air service should

be set up.

The Smuts report afforded Prime Minister Lloyd George needed support to silence conservative military opposition. On January 1, 1918, the Air Ministry was

organized and on April 1, 1918, the Royal Air Force came into being, combining

the Army's Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. After the war,

the British army and navy attempted to regain their air arms, but failed.* In retrospect, the RAF's Air Marshal Sir John C. Slessor described this battle to maintain the RAF as fought "tooth and nail against the most powerful, the most

determined and sometimes the most intemperate obstruction by the forces of

military conservatism." Arnold, Spaatz and Eaker remembered this British military history. It tremendously influenced their thinking about autonomy. 1 They

kept in touch with their RAF counterparts, especially after World War II. Nonetheless, in the United States the prevailing opinion was that air forces should be

trained and maintained to support field armies. The postwar Dickman Board, appointed by Gen. John J. Pershing, came to such a conclusion as did Secretary of

War Newton D. Baker, Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell, and Army

Chief of Staff Gen. Peyton C. March.

As U.S. Army commanders understood, the support of the ground troops was

a useful role for the Air Service. When airmen argued that sustained bombardment of the enemy's war-making industry had not really been tried and that

trench warfare was self-defeating they were deemed visionaries. As General

Eaker recalled: "We were just sort of voices in the wilderness. A great many

military people considered us crackpots.'2 The wartime Chief of Staff, General

Peyton March, concluded: "The war had taught many lessons; the principles of

warfare, however, remained unchanged. It was not won, as some had predicted it

would be, by some new and terrible development of modem science; it was won,

as had every other war in history, by men, munitions and morale." 3

Army Command and General Staff School textbooks described the airplane's

role as being observation. Although eight bills to establish a Department of Aeronautics had been introduced in Congress during 1916-20, the Reorganization Act

of 1920 recognized the Air Service only as a combatant branch of the U.S. Army.

The Navy, with its battleships, remained the first line of defense. However, men

like Brig. Gen. William (Billy) Mitchell, the Army's flamboyant airman of

*That both the Army and Navy air arms were integrated into the RAF would not be

lost upon the postwar leaders of the U.S. Navy. The Royal Navy regained its air arm prior

to World War II.

7
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

World War I, argued that the airplane was more economical and militarily effective than the battleship and that an independent air service was the best way to

exploit aircraft.* In June-July 1921, Mitchell seemed to prove his point. Bomber

planes under his command destroyed some obsolete warships off the Virginia

capes, including the allegedly unsinkable battleship Ostfriesland with its four

layers of steel and watertight bulkheads.

After the war the Army's airmen refined their doctrine, based on what they

considered to be the war's lessons. Major Carl Spaatz,' Commanding Officer, I st

Pursuit Group (Selfridge Field, Mich.), in 1923 stressed in an unpublished study

the part of military aviation known as "Air Force." Whereas aviation observation

forces worked with the ground armies, Air Force comprised pursuit, bombardment, and attack aviation. Spaatz defined pursuit aviation as the branch that

sought to destroy the enemy's air force. Its mission was to gain air supremacy.

The branch called attack aviation attempted to strike enemy forces and military

objectives on the ground or water with machine gun fire. Bombardment forces

tried to destroy military objectives by bombing targets on the ground and on

water.

4

Spaatz observed that since the war the concept of Air Force continued to develop. He pointed to advances in the design of aircraft, bombs, and machine

guns. As far as using bombing as a means to defeat the enemy, Spaatz noted that

this was undertaken only late in the war. However, in his opinion the results were

so successful that they demanded an air force role apart from support of the armies on the ground.

Instructors at the Air Service Field Officers School (established at Langley

Field, Va., in October 1920) also promuliated air doctrine based principally upon

the idea of independent air operations. In 1926 the tactical school published

Employment of Combined Air Force (subsequently revised under the title Air

Force), which for the first time formally articulated the idea that the basic air objectives were the enemy's "vital centers" and his air force. Contemporary scholarship suggests General Giulio Douhet's influence, an English translation of his

Command of the Air (1921 edition) being available at the school as early as 1923.

Employment of Combined Air Force borrowed heavily from Douhet, stressing

*During the war, Mitchell was successively chief of air service for several units of the

American Expeditionary Force. He was promoted to brigadier general in October 1918

and made Chief of Air Service for First Army Group.

"IAt this time Spaatz actually spelled his name "Spatz." He changed it to Spaatz in

1938 because people frequently pronouned it "spats" rather than "spots."

**In November 1922, the school's name was changed to the Air Service Tactical

School, and in 1926, when the Air Service became the Air Corps, to the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS). In July 1931, it moved from Langley to Maxwell Field, Ala.

8
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

that attacks on "morale" (population) should be made at the outset of war. Also

like the Italian theorist, it underscored the importance of neutralizing the enemy's

air force. 5

Meanwhile, in the 1920s several boards studied the organization of military

aviation. Maj. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, Chief of the Air Service, favored air

autonomy within the War Department structure. He opposed permanent assignment of air units to the ground forces. The Lassiter Board report of 1923, which

approved the idea of a General Headquarters Air Force, marked the Army's first

acknowledgment that the independent air mission might serve a useful role. Nevertheless, the Morrow Board report of November 1925 opposed establishment of

a Department of Aeronautics. This board---convened in the wake of Mitchell's

protestations that the air arm was unprepared for war-remarked that air power

had yet to prove the value of independent operations. Such missions could better

be done under the command of Army or Navy officers. Moreover, as to air defense, the United States had no reason to fear an enemy attack:

No airplane capable of making a transoceanic flight to our country with a

useful military load and of returning to safety is now in existence .... with

the advance in the art... it does not appear that there is any ground for anticipation of such development to a point which would constitute a direct

menace to the United States in any future which scientific thought can now

foresee .... The fear of such an attack is without reason.6

In December 1925 the Lampert Committee recommended that a Department

of National Defense be created under a civilian secretary. Implied was the idea of

three coequal services. Neither the War Department nor Congress acted. The Air

Corps Act of 1926 created the Army Air Corps from the Army Air Service. The

act also sanctioned Air Corps representation on the War Department General

Staff (WDGS). In addition, the Office of Assistant Secretary of War for Air was

created (first held by F. Trubee Davison), only to be abolished in 1933 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.* These were years of the depression, military budgets were held to a minimum by Congress, and international commissions were

convened to pass resolutions restricting planes in wartime to attacking only military targets. Besides, protected by oceans, American citizens saw little need for

increased military strength. The Navy remained the first line of defense.

*Just prior to graduation from Yale in 1918, Davison, whose father was a partner of J.

P. Morgan and Company, had suffered permanent damage to his lower legs in a plane

crash. He received a law degree from Columbia University and in 1922 was elected to the

New York State Assembly. He had resigned in the fall of 1932 to run for Lieutenant Governor of New York. In June 1933 the Roosevelt administration announced that the position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air would not be filled. This news did not displease

the War Department General Staff.

9
E

E

Military aviation advocates during the interwar years: Brig. Gen. H. H. (Hap)

Arnold (above, left); Maj. Carl A. Spaatz (above, right); and Capt. Ira C.

Eaker (below).
Wreck of the dirigible Shenandoah in September 1925.

Brig. Gen. William

(Billy) Mitchell, a strident supporter of air

power, with Maj. Gen.

Mason M. Patrick, Chief

of the Air Service, 1922.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Meanwhile, Billy Mitchell's attacks grew more intense. After naval aviation

disasters involving disappearance of an aircraft in the Pacific and the crash of the

dirigible Shenandoah, he charged that the War and Navy Departments were

guilty of "incompetency, criminal negligence and almost treasonable administration of the National Defense." 7 As a result, President Calvin Coolidge himself

preferred charges and the War Department announced that Mitchell would be

court-martialed. The trial began in October 1925 and the guilty verdict with sentence of five years suspension without pay was delivered in December, two

weeks after the Morrow Board report appeared. Afterwards, Coolidge lessened

the verdict to five years at half pay. On February 1, 1926, Mitchell resigned.

Ahead of his time, Billy Mitchell was a brilliant technologist, impatient because

others would not share his confidence in machines that had yet to demonstrate

their decisiveness in war. After Franklin D. Roosevelt became President,

Mitchell tried to influence a change in air policy-more money and resources

should be devoted to the air arm-but failed. Roosevelt in fact had opposed a

separate air arm ever since 1919, when he served as Assistant Secretary of the

Navy. Mitchell died in February 1936, convinced to the end that in any future

war air forces would ultimately prove decisive.

General Headquarters Air Force

In October 1933 the Drum Board,* among other things, determined the

Army's responsibility for the coastal air defense mission and recommended formation of a General Headquarters Air Force. The basic idea was to have a unified

air strike force directly under a General Headquarters. This strike force could

either be used for independent strategic operations or in support of ground

troops.' However, the Drum Board report emphasized that the Air Corps should

stay under Army control. Following a series of air crashes after the Air Corps

was suddenly ordered to take over mail routes,** a board was created under for-

*Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps, was the sole airman on the

board. Other members were Maj. Gen. Hugh Drum, War Department Deputy Chief of

Staff; Maj. Gen. George S. Simonds, Commandant of the Army War College; Brig. Gen.

Charles E. Kilbourne, Assistant Chief of the War Plans Division, and Maj. Gen. John W.

Gulick, Chief of the Coast Artillery. ,The Air Corps had advocated the mission of strategic bombardment and the destruction of the enemy's fleet. Advocacy of the coastal air defense mission was less controversial. Army aviators considered the coastal defense mission as important and legitimate.

The bomber could strike aircraft carriers as well as the the enemy's airfields and industry.

"**For an excellent discussion of the Air Corps' tribulations in flying the mail, see John

12
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

<

0•

U

President Franklin D.

Roosevelt, long-time opponent of a separate air

arm.

mer Secretary of War Baker to investigate the organization of military aviation.

This board was against an independent air mission and separate air arm, accenting that independent operations could not decide wars. It opposed creation of a

Department of Aviation or a Department of National Defense, but did recommend setting up a GHQ Air Force. James H. Doolittle* filed a dissent to the majority report:

F. Shiner, Foulois and the Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air

Force History, 1982), Chapter V.

*When the Baker Board report was published, Doolittle was a major in the Air Corps

Reserve. Commissioned a second lieutenant in the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps in

March 1918, he resigned from the Air Corps in December 1930 to become manager of the

Aviation Department of the Shell Petroleum Corporation. An aeronautical engineer and a

crack racing pilot, Doolittle set a number of important aviation records in the 1920s and

early 1930s. During World War II, he achieved fame as the leader of the Tokyo raid of

April 1942. He went on to command the Twelfth Air Force, North African Strategic Air

Forces, Fifteenth Air Force, and the Eighth Air Force.

13
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

I believe that the future security of our nation is dependent upon an adequate

air force. This is true at the present time and will become increasingly important as the science of aviation advances. I am convinced that the required

air force can be rapidly organized, equipped and trained if it is completely

separated from the Army and developed as an entirely separate arm.8

Doolittle and the Air Corps leaders were well aware that Air Corps strength had

lagged behind the objectives of the 1926 Air Corps Act. Mid-1932 should have

marked the end of the Air Corps' five-year expansion program. By that time the

Air Corps had about 1,300 officers, 13,400 enlisted men, and 1,646 aircraft

rather than the 1,650 officers, 15,000 enlisted men and 1,800 serviceable planes

called for in the Air Corps Act. But, noted Doolittle, should the Air Corps remain

part of the Army, it ought to have its own budget and promotion list and be removed from General Staff control. The desire for a separate budget and promotion list subsequently became a sustained theme of the air leaders.

The Drum and Baker Board reports supplied the crucial impetus to the drive

for a GHQ Air Force. Another vital force was Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois,

Chief of the Air Corps, who had long fought for a separate Department of Aeronautics.* After repeated attempts, he had finally convinced the War Department

by 1933 of the need to assign the aerial coast defense mission to the Air Corps.

Foulois' recommendation was approved in January 1933 by Army Chief of Staff

Gen. Douglas MacArthur.9

Based on the Baker Board Report, the GHQ Air Force was created on March

1, 1935, with Brig. Gen. Frank M. Andrews named commanding general.' Andrews was a former commandant of the Advanced Flying School and had been

chief of the Training and Operations Division in the Office of the Chief of the

Air Corps (OCAC). He had served with the War Department General Staff before becoming General Headquarters Air Force commander. Formation of a

GHQ Air Force in peacetime was unprecedented. During World War I the Air

Service's offensive aircraft were organized under a single officer, responsible to

the commander of Army Field Forces. As mentioned, in 1923 the Lassiter Board

recommended organization of bomber and pursuit planes directly under General

Headquarters. Also, Army Regulations 95-10 (March 1928) described bomber

and pursuit aircraft organized into "GHQ aviation" under command of an air officer reporting to the commander of Army Field Forces. Notwithstanding, the

Army had not shaped its air element this way.10

*Foulois in 1913 had opposed a separate department.

'The post of Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, was made a major general's slot.

Andrews became commander as a brigadier general because the 1926 Air Corps Act restricted temporary promotion to two grades above an individual's permanent rank.

14
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

Air Corps units in the United States had been under operational control of

Army corps area commanders in whose territory they were stationed. There were

nine such corps areas, each commanded by a ground officer. In similar fashion to

the Chief of Infantry and other Chiefs of Arms or Services, the Chief of the Air

Corps had been responsible for support of his units-the design and procurement

of aircraft, personnel, training, and doctrine. The Chief of the Air Corps was

therefore not really an operational commander. With establishment of GHQ,

General Andrews gained operational control of tactical units, which were formed

into three wings.* Brig. Gen. Henry H. Arnold commanded the 1st Wing at

March Field, Calif.; Col. Henry Conger Pratt headed the 2d Wing at Langley

Field, Va.; and Lt. Col. Gerald C. Brant commanded the 3d Wing at Barksdale

Field, La. The Chief of the Air Corps and the GHQ commander were on the

same echelon of command, and each reported separately to the War Department.

Here was a situation in which the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps controlled

funds, personnel, and procurement of equipment. GHQ Air Force was responsible for combat efficiency and results, but did not have the controlling voice to

gain the means to accomplish this end. Administratively, tactical bases were under the Army corps area commanders. Thus, when handling air matters, the

Army Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff dealt with the commander of GHQ Air Force, the Chief of the Air Corps, and the corps area commanders.

Obviously, this type of organization severely divided authority between the

Office of the Chief of the Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force. Consequently, the

air arm found it difficult to establish a single position when dealing with the War

Department. In January 1936 the Air Corps' Browning Board' report noted:

This organization has damaged Air Corps morale and has split the Air Corps

into two factors (OCAC and GHQ Air Force) .... the board believes that the

present organization is unsound .... a consolidation of the Air Corps under

one head will permit the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force to devote

his maximum effort to training and a minimum to administration.]'

The Browning Board proposed that the GHQ Air Force be consolidated under

the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. The board's report also recommended

placing "all AAF stations and all personnel and units solely under the Air Force

chain of command.'12 General Andrews of course firmly supported this last proposal. The War Department approved it in May 1936, thereby exempting Air

*The three wings together consisted of nine groups of thirty tactical squadronstwelve bombardment, six attack, ten pursuit, and two reconnaissance.

'After Col. Williams S. Browning of the Air Corps Inspector General's Office who

headed the study.

15
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Corps stations from corps area control.13 However, no immediate action was

taken on the recommendation to place GHQ Air Force under the Chief of the Air

Corps.

Determined to make GHQ a combat-ready striking force, General Andrews

increased the flying time of GHQ pilots. A fine flyer himself (Eaker called him

perhaps the best blind-flying pilot in the Air Corps) and convinced of the importance of an all-weather force, he insisted that pilots be qualified to fly by instruments. He inherited a force in which few pilots could do so, but after a year of

GHQ almost all flyers were instrument qualified. Aerial navigation without use

of known reference points and night flying were also emphasized. "The Air

Force," General Andrews observed, "cannot be improvised after war is imminent. It takes years to build bases and airplanes and to train personnel."'14 Thus

GHQ stressed combat readiness. The keys were mobility and effectiveness. A

unit should be able to take off from its home station with all planes within fortyeight hours, fly to a specified area with minimum stops for fuel and oil, and then

take off on a combat mission within twenty-four hours. 15

Mobility of this "striking force of the air" called for rapid concentration of

force in the Army's major corps areas. Strenuous training was designed to prepare forces to repel an enemy approaching U.S. coasts if the Navy could not cope

with the situation (the Army and Navy had fought a constant battle over the

coastal air defense mission). Also, GHQ would be set to strike enemy ground

forces should they approach U.S. borders. Formation of GHQ was significant because it gave airmen the chance to coordinate air operations with ground forces.

This was a step towards unified direction. Thus, the objectives, organization, and

training of the General Headquarters Air Force were in a way harbingers of the

development of air power and air organization during World War II. Of more immediate importance, creation of GHQ Air Force marked a workable compromise

between those airmen who advocated an independent air arm and those on the

War Department staff who continued to argue that the function of Air Forces was

to support the ground element. Some Army officers thought forming GHQ Air

Force would deflate the airmen's advocacy of a separate Air Force. After Andrews was reassigned in February 1939, GHQ was finally placed under the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. This was a major move that seemed to solve a

problem that had afflicted Army air organization since formation of the GHQ Air

Force. Functions of the GHQ Air Force commander were unaffected, but his immediate responsibility was to the Chief of the Air Corps and not to the War Department Chief of Staff.

During his command of GHQ, Andrews made clear his conviction that air

power should be separately organized and that bombardment aviation should be

the basic element of the air forces as the infantry and battleship were the primary

divisions of the ground and sea forces. Among other things, the development of

the B-17 long-range bomber in the 1930s persuaded him that bomber forces

16
(Above) Commander of GHQ Air Force, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews.

(Below) Maj. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps, with Brig.

Gen. Henry C. Pratt, during the Ft. Knox, Kentucky, exercises.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

would play an important role in wars of the future. "Though both the Army and

Navy have a requirement for auxiliary aviation to complete their combat teams,"

Andrews stressed,

it must be remembered that the airplane is not just another supporting

weapon .... It is the only weapon that can engage with equal facility land,

sea, and other air forces. It is another means, operating in another element,

for the same basic furpose as ground and sea power-destruction of the enemy's will to fight.

He further argued that an adequate air defense could not be built under the existing organization. The United States was a secondary air power, this being true of

any Air Corps that was an integral part of an Army or Navy. 17 The Air Corps,

with its own budget, should be organized under the Secretary of War on a basis

coequal in authority with the Army.*

General Andrews' views had brought him into conflict with the Chief of the

Air Corps, General Westover, who opposed separation from the Army."

Westover thought that in the years after World War I, when the budget was

slashed, all branches had suffered, not primarily the Air Corps. He considered

much of the criticism of the War Department by his airmen unjust. These years

were difficult, he insisted, and would have been so even if a separate agency had

control of Army aviation. Westover remarked that the Army had made a good record in support of aviation. He charged that critics both within the military and

without, who vigorously criticized the War Department, were in fact professional

agitators. Additional criticism came from those who were ignorant of the issues

or misunderstood the facts. To Westover, the War Department "need not feel

ashamed of the showing it made in the air."'t8

Meantime, while the battle raged in the 1930s over organizing the Army's air

arm, the Air Corps itself did not neglect doctrine. In the Air Corps Tactical

School and elsewhere, the precision daylight bombing doctrine gained ascendancy and air theorists debated whether or not escort fighters were necessary. By

1935 bombardment officers accented speed, range, and altitude, and believed that

fighter escorts would not be required. With an austere budget and better bomber

*After his tour as Commanding General, GHQ Air Force, Andrews reverted to his permanent rank of colonel. General Marshall then brought Andrews to the War Department

General Staff as Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, promoting him to

brigadier general. Andrews was the first Air Corps officer ever to hold this position. Later

on, Andrews became CG, Panama Canal Air Force; CG, Caribbean Defense Command;

CG, U.S. Forces in Middle East; and in February 1943 CG, U.S. Forces in European

Theater. In May 1943, Lt. Gen. Andrews was killed in air crash in Iceland.

IWestover was killed in an air crash in 1938 and was succeeded by Arnold.

18
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

performance, pursuit aviation lost ground. By 1932 the Air Corps had started to

test the Boeing B-9 and Martin B-10 bombers. The B-10 was an all-metal

monoplane with a speed over 200 miles-per-hour, a ceiling of 21,000 feet, and a

900-mile range. This craft would open the way for development of larger and

faster bombers.

By 1934 the Air Corps had started engineering studies and announced design

competition to build a long-range, multi-engine bomber capable of carrying a

2,000-pound bombload. Only the Boeing Airplane Company submitted a design

for a four-engine aircraft. Its Model 299, featuring great range, substantial carrying capacity, and high speed, became the prototype of the B-17 Flying Fortress.

The XB-17 went through flight testing in 1935, and on August 20, 1935, it flew

from Seattle to Dayton at an average speed of 252 miles-per-hour, setting a nonstop record for the 2,100 miles. By August 1937, thirteen YB-17s had been delivered to the Air Corps.

As mentioned, air leaders were of course aware of the gap separating doctrine

from available weapons. Geography and technology continued to be constricting

factors. An enemy attack on the United States would have to be made by an expeditionary army supported by naval units or by aircraft launched from bases in

the Western Hemisphere. As noted, the defensive mission of the bomber had

drawn Army aviation into conflict with the Navy over the responsibility for aerial coastal defense.

This interservice dispute erupted after the war and lasted through the 1920s

and 1930s. In January 1931 a meeting between Army Chief of Staff Gen.

Douglas MacArthur and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. William V. Pratt led to

an informal agreement spelling out the services' responsibilities. Naval air was to

conduct missions directly connected with fleet movements; land-based Army air

would defend the home coasts (and overseas possessions) and conduct reconnaissance and offensive operations beyond the lines of ground forces.

However, the MacArthur-Pratt understanding did not endure because Pratt's

successor, Adm. William H. Standley, repudiated the agreement. And in 1934 the

Joint Board, in "Doctrines for the Employment of the GHQ Air Force," stated

that the fleet maintained primary responsibility for coastal defense and implied

that the Army air arm would be used solely in cases of insufficient naval power

to deal with a situation at sea.

In May 1938 this dispute broke dramatically when, during joint maneuvers,

three B-17s flew six hundred miles into the North Atlantic to intercept the Italian

liner Rex, bound toward New York. It was located and the Air Corps made cer-

*Also, development of the Norden (1931) and Sperry (1933) bombsights gave bomber

advocates what they needed for precision bombing.

19
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

t:

0

.)

Gen. Douglas MacArthur,

Army Chief of Staff.

tain that details of this operation found their way to the press.* The fury of naval

authorities prompted the War Department to issue a verbal directive prohibiting

Army air operations more than one hundred miles from the coast. Gen. Malin

Craig, who replaced MacArthur in October 1935, sought to limit the Air Corps'

coast defense activities. He wanted the Air Corps to concentrate on the support of

Army field forces. Craig made a personal agreement with the Chief of Naval Operations in 1938 limiting the Air Corps to operational flights of no more than one

hundred miles from shore.

Meanwhile, as noted, bombardment theorists at the Air Corps Tactical

School-confident that long-range bombers carrying heavy bomb loads would be

produced-had formulated the high-altitude daylight precision concept. The idea

was to attack the enemy's economic structure and ultimately, if necessary, mo-

*A similar escapade had occurred in August 1937 when the War Department and

Navy agreed to a secret exercise to determine if Air Corps bombers could locate and

bomb Navy ships. In a test, Gen. Andrews' bombers spotted the U.S. Navy's battleship

Utah and successfully "bombed" it. Subsequently, the secrecy of the contest was violated

when a newscaster announced the verdict. Navy officers were outraged.

20
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

Chief of the Air Corps, Maj.

Gen. Oscar Westover, opposed

separating the Air Corps from

the Army.

rale. Instructors at the school stressed that "no barrier can be interposed to shield

the civil populace against the airplane." The objective was "to force an unwilling

enemy government to accept peace on terms which favor our policies. Since the

actions of that hostile government are based on the will of the people, no victory

can be complete until that will can be molded to our purpose."19 This meant using air power strategically. American airmen had been trained to sink ships, and

Mitchell's demonstration against obsolete warships seemed to prove that precision bombing would work. Even so, aircraft were not yet able to bomb effectively at night, and illuminated bombsights would not be developed until World

War II. Despite these drawbacks, precision bombing was also stressed because of

the public's aversion to population bombing.*

In the 1930s then, with better performing bomber and pursuit planes being developed and produced, and with doctrine being refined, the debate over how to

*Air historians have often observed that the precision concept owed much to the

American tradition of marksmanship. This may have been a factor, but a more persuasive

case needs to be made for the climate of opinion in the 1920s and 1930s which was

strongly opposed to bombing cities. General Arnold, a perceptive judge of opinion, was

impressed with this public feeling.

21
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

organize air forces intensified. Traditionalists in the War Department still refused

to accept strategic bombing as a way to avoid the carnage of the battlefield. The

War Department General Staff believed that air autonomy would result in decreased funds for the rest of the Army's components. The leadership of the War

Department held that independence for the air element would mean less than adequate air support for the ground Army. On the other hand, the aviators felt that

only when they administered and controlled their own forces could aviation experience the requisite growth. In retrospect, Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.,

instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School, AAF war planner, and World War II

commander, noted that "proponents of the two ideas soon lost all sense of proportion in the very intensity of their zeal. There was a tendency of the airmen to

advocate strategic bombing to the exclusion of all else; and of the ground soldiers to view bombardment simply as more artillery." Hansell added that if the

General Staff belittled the airmen's claims, "it must also be admitted that at least

in some very small measure we may possibly have overstated our powers and understated our limitations.'20

Air Organization in World War H1

However, these arguments were giving way to the pressure of events. With

Britain in a desperate struggle against Nazi Germany, air operations were already

becoming important to U.S. war planning. President Roosevelt had ordered a

huge expansion of aircraft production. "Military aviation," he said. "is increasing

at an unprecedented and alarming rate." Nonetheless, the airmen received a setback in November 1940, when the GHQ Air Force was removed from the jurisdiction of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. In July 1940, Gen. George C.

Marshall had activated a General Headquarters under the command of Maj. Gen.

Lesley J. McNair, to train tactical units through the four field armies. The Army

Chief of Staff then asked General Arnold to submit his ideas on organization. Arnold recommended three Deputy Chiefs of Staff for the Army-ground, air, and

service forces. The Deputy Chief for Air would command all OCAC and GHQ

air forces except those in the war theaters. Arnold's proposal was opposed by the

War Department General Staff. In October 1940, Marshall decided to appoint

Arnold as Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, a position from which he could

mediate between OCAC and GHQ Air Force. However, GHQ Air Force was assigned to the ground-controlled General Headquarters and placed under the direct

control of the Commander of Army Field Forces. Also, air station complements

again came under the control of corps area commanders. With Arnold as Deputy

22
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

Chief of Staff for Air, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett became Acting Chief of the Air

Corps.*

Thus the drive for air independence suffered a blow. This reversion to split

command would exist until June 1941, when the Army Air Forces would be established, with Arnold as Chief. Still, the impact of this setback of November

1940 was somewhat softened by Arnold's close relationship to General Marshall,

Army Chief of Staff, and by the appointment in December 1940 of Robert A.

Lovett as Special Assistant to the Secretary of War (to be redesignated as Assistant Secretary of War for Air in April 1941). Meanwhile, the difficulty of getting

prompt action on air matters from the War Department General Staff induced

General Marshall and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to consider reform of

air administration. Arnold had already informed Marshall of the need for decisions to accelerate the arduous task of rapidly building up the air arm. Action

must be taken, Stimson directed,

to place our air arm under one responsible head and... plans should be

worked out to develop an organization staffed and equipped to provide the

ground forces with essential aircraft units for joint operations while at the

same time expanding and decentralizing our staff work to permit Air Force

autonomy in the degree needed.21

Accordingly, in late March 1941, Marshall ordered General Arnold, Deputy

Chief of Staff for Air, to coordinate all air matters. Marshall wanted a simpler

system with direct lines of authority. In April, Marshall, Arnold, and Lovett, now

Assistant Secretary of War for Air, agreed that for the time being, quasi-autonomy for the air arm was preferable to separation from the Army. They did not

want to generate a harsh debate when the Air Corps faced the formidable task of

expanding its forces. Hence, a compromise was reached through a revision of

Army Regulations (AR) 95-5. On June 20, 1941, the Army Air Forces was established, the first major organizational step toward autonomy since formation of

the GHQ Air Force in 1935.

Army Regulations 95-5 stipulated that the AAF "shall consist of the Headquarters Army Air Forces, the Air Force Combat Command, the Air Corps, and

,22 all other air units." The Chief of Army Air Forces-also to be Deputy Chief of

Staff for Air-would be directly responsible to the Secretary of War and the

*Brett graduated from the Virginia Military Instutute in 1909, joined the Cavalry in

1911, and turned to aviation in 1915. He commanded airfields after World War I, built a

reputation in the materiel field between the wars, and was appointed commanding officer

of the 19th Composite Wing in mid-1936. Prior to becoming Acting Chief of the Air

Corps, he had been Chief of the Materiel Division at Wright Field and then also held the

top materiel position in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps.

23
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Army Chief of Staff for making aviation policies and plans. He would also coordinate the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps agencies and an Air Force Combat

Command (AFCC), a redesignated GHQ Air Force. According to AR 95-5, the

Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, when directed by the Chief

of the Army Air Forces, was to prepare plans for defense against air attack on the

continental United States. The AFCC was further responsible for operational

training and development of air doctrine.2 3 The Chief of the Air Corps would supervise research and development, procurement, supply and maintenance. He

would in addition supply the War Department with the "basis for requirements of

personnel, equipment and stores to be furnished by arms and services to the

Army Air Forces." 24

Also, the Air Council was created to review periodically all Army aviation

projects and matters of aviation policy. The council comprised the Assistant Secretary of War for Air; the AAF Chief (President); Chief, War Plans Division

(War Department General Staff); Commanding General, Air Force Combat

Command; and the Chief of the Air Corps. From the AAF's view, AR 95-5 was

Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold and

Gen. George C. Marshall at

Randolph Field, Texas,

1941. The close relationship

between the two advanced

the cause of strengthening

the air arm.

24
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

t.

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, advocated

limited autonomy for the

Air Corps.

just an interim solution to the problem of gaining even more autonomy, although

this directive gave the new AAF chief an Air Staff. The utility of the Air Staff

lay in its assisting the Chief of the Army Air Forces to deal with aviation matters

and to form air policy. Creation of the Air Staff could be seen to stem from Stimson's desire to afford the Air Forces more autonomy.

The Army Air Forces also enhanced its authority on July 10, 1941, when the

Joint Army-Navy Board added to its members the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air

as well as the Navy's Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Perhaps the most

meaningful gain occurred in August 1941 when General Arnold accompanied

President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Atlantic Conference meeting with British

Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Arnold was present because the British were

represented by their air, ground, and naval chiefs (the Royal Air Force was an independent service), and it was therefore necessary for Roosevelt to have his chief

airman there. But it was equally true that the President had ordered a substantial

expansion of aircraft production and that American airmen were drafting major

offensive air plans. Thus, when the war began, Arnold took his place as a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Anglo-American Combined

25
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Chiefs of Staff (CCS). * This implied recognition that the Air Forces had become

the equal of land and sea forces.

While this air buildup was proceeding, the Air Corps had taken a number of

actions designed to strengthen its forces. The War Department had formed an Air

Defense Command in early 1940 under Brig. Gen. James E. Chaney. This command was a planning agency; responsibility for continental air defense remained

with the GHQ Air Force. In the spring of 1941, the War Department established

the Northeastern, Central, Southern, and Western Defense Commands to plan for

the complete defense of these areas. At the same time, air districts were redesignated the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Air Forces. They were given the responsibility for air defense planning and organization along the east coast; in the

northwest and the mountain areas; in the southeastern region; and along the west

coast and in the southwest. In late 1940 and early 1941, moves were also taken to

strengthen the air forces in such places, among others, as the Caribbean and Hawaii. A Caribbean Defense Command was created and in Hawaii the Hawaiian

Air Force was activated.

Of enduring importance to the AAF's rising influence in high councils was

the personal relationship of Arnold to Marshall, resting on mutual respect and

confidence. They had come to know each other in 1914 during their Army service in the Philippines. Marshall trusted Arnold's judgment in air matters and

what General Arnold proposed, Marshall, if possible, usually accepted. As Marshall noted, during the war he had tried to make Arnold "as nearly as I could

Chief of Staff of the Air without any restraint although he was very subordinate.

And he was very appreciative of this."25 Marshall remarked that one of his problems early in the war was the immaturity of Arnold's staff. He referred not necessarily to age, but to lack of experience in staff work. Additionally, Marshall took

exception to the airmen's agitating over promotions (they were not coming rapidly enough) and the need for a separate air force. Separation, asserted Marshall,

"was out of the question at that time. They didn't have the trained people for it at

all ..,. When they came back after the war, the Air Corps had the nucleus of very

able staff officers but that wasn't true at all at the start.'6

General Marshall linked the air leaders' desire for more freedom with his own

conviction that it was time to decentralize the General Staff's operating responsibilities. The staff, he noted, had "lost track of the purpose of its existence. It had

become a huge, bureaucratic, red tape-ridden, operating agency. It slowed down

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff commenced formal meetings in February 1942. During the

war, an official charter establishing the U. S. Joint Chiefs was never promulgated. For a

succinct consideration of the development of the Joint Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs of

Staff, see Ray S. Cline, The War Department, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington, 1951), pp 98-106.

26
@

Alll jj 4 "

°Li . .I

ow]

-~
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

everything.'27 Many staff officers had to coordinate on papers winding their way

through the echelons of the War Department. The chief and his three deputies

had become mired in detail and paperwork. Marshall was determined to replace

the horizontal bureaucratic structure with a vertical one. He could then devote his

time to planning strategy and directing the war. And Arnold, of course, looked

upon AR 95-5 as just another step in the direction of autonomy. The Air Staff

still had to answer to the War Department General Staff. The AAF did not control its own budget and promotion system, a constant frustration to the airmen.*

Relations between the Air Force Combat Command and AAF continued to be

unsatisfactory just as those between the Chief of the Air Corps and GHQ Air

Force had been divisive.

Arnold wanted to reorganize to eliminate these troubles and guarantee the

proper exploitation of air power by air officers. In October 1941, with Arnold's

approval, Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff, recommended that

the War Department create three autonomous commands-air forces, ground

forces, and service forces. Although the War Department rejected this proposal.

Arnold in November suggested a similar reorganization. This plan centered on

the complementary relationship of ground and air forces in modern warfare. In

an unprecedented passage, stressing the interdependence of the principles of

strategy and organization, General Arnold emphasized the unity of command:

The development of the Air Force as a new and coordinated member of the

combat team has introduced new methods of waging war. Although the basic Principles of War remain unchanged, the introduction of these new methods has altered the application of those Principles of War to modern combat.

In the past the military commander has been concerned with the employment

of a single decisive arm, which was supported by auxiliary arms and services .... Today the military commander has two striking arms. These two

arms are capable of operating together at a single time and place, on the battlefield. But they are also capable of operating singly at places remote from

each other. The great range of the air arm makes it possible to strike far from

the battlefield, and attack the sources of enemy military power. The mobility

of the air force makes it possible to swing the mass of that striking power

from those distant objectives to any selected portion of the battle front in a

matter of hours, even though the bases of the air force may be widely separated.2

8

*One reason why the Air Corps wanted a separate promotion list was that advancement in the Army depended on length of commissioned service. Most aviators, being relatively young, ranked considerably down the Army's single promotion list. Also, flyers

underwent longer training than ground officers prior to commissioning. This meant the

airmen as a group fell behind in the promotion cycle.

28
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

According to Arnold, unity of command had in effect been achieved within

the AAF, but not yet between the ground forces and air forces. A "superior"

commander was now required to determine the proper use of forces for maximum results. Also needed was a superior coordinating staff, embracing both air

and ground personnel. Arnold further recommended that the air forces and

ground forces should have equal access to the common services and supply

arms.29

The War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff approved Arnold's plan in principle, but before action could be taken the Japanese attacked

Pearl Harbor and the United States was at war. However, partly owing to Arnold's proposal, Marshall in January 1942 appointed Maj. Gen. Joseph T.

McNarney of the Air Corps to head a War Department Reorganization Committee. Serving under McNarney were Col. William K. Harrison, Jr., and AAF Lt.

Col. Laurence S. Kuter.*

Out of this committee's deliberations came War Department Circular 59, War

Department Reorganization, March 2, 1942, by which the Army Air Forces under Arnold achieved the kind of autonomy that Stimson and Marshall had envisioned. Effective March 9, this reorganization was for the duration of the war

plus six months under the First War Powers Act of December 18, 1941. Most important from the AAF view, Circular 59 made the Army Air Forces one of three

autonomous Army commands, along with the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and

the Services of Supply [subsequently Army Service Forces (ASF)], the structure

that had been recommended by Arnold and Spaatz. General Marshall remained

as Chief of Staff of the War Department. Below the Chief of Staff were Lt. Gen.

*Kuter, a 1927 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, had taught at the Air Corps

Tactical School in the late 1930s and had functioned as a planner with the War Department General Staff from 1939-42. His intellectual capacity was highly regarded by senior

officers. Marshall had been impressed by Kuter as a young staff officer. He had asked Arnold why he didn't make Kuter a general. According to Marshall, General Arnold had replied that he could not becaus- _e would lose all his staff. They would all quit on him if a

man that young was made a general. So, recalled Marshall, "the next list that came in, I

just wrote the officer's name on it. Within one month he was a lieutenant colonel. A

month after that he had his first star." (Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and

Hope (New York, 1966), p 291.) General McNarney was a distinguished officer, a graduate of West Point who had been commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry in 1915.

In World War I, McNarney served with the 1st Aero Squadron. He saw service with the

War Department General Staff and in the early 1930s was commandant of the Primary

Flying School, March Field, Calif. In 1935 he went to Langley Field, Va., as Assistant

Chief of Staff, to help organize the GHQ Air Force. Prior to World War II, he was a member of the War Plans Division, WDGS.

29
-"H]

FHi
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Lt. Gen. Lesley J.

McNair, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces; and Maj. Gen. Brehon B.

Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply. The functions of the Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command and the Chief of the Air Corps

were transferred to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.* Circular 59 described the mission of Army Air Forces as "to procure and maintain equipment

peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units properly organized, trained and equipped for combat operations. Procurement and related functions will be executed under the direction of the Under Secretary of War." 30

Among duties assigned to Army Air Forces were the operation of replacement

training centers and schools; organization of tactical units as directed by the War

Department; development of tactical and training doctrine, tables of organization,

military characteristics of aircraft, weapons, and equipment, and operational

changes needed in equipment, aircraft, and weapons of the Army Air Forces; and

also development (jointly with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces)

of ground-air support, tactical training, and doctrine in conformity with policies

prescribed by the War Department Chief of Staff.3 1 After March 1942, the Air

Corps-which had been established by law-remained the chief component of

the AAF, but the OCAC and AFCC were abolished, their functions taken over by

AAF Headquarters. Officers continued to be commissioned in the Air Corps.

This so-called "Marshall reorganization" enabled the Chief of Staff to plot strategy and direct global forces while the commands controlled administration and

executed policy. McNarney observed that decisions would now be based upon a

more deliberate consideration of the issues. Thus, the AAF had attained a substantial measure of autonomy within the structure of the War Department, a reorganization that Maj. Gen. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., of the War Department General

Staff called "the most drastic and fundamental change which the War Department had experienced since the establishment of the General Staff by Elihu Root

in 1903."32 But this setup would expire six months after the close of the war, in

accordance with the First War Powers Act of December 18, 1941.

Despite this restructuring, administrative problems persisted. Coordination

within Headquarters AAF at times suffered since it was hard to fix final responsibility for various actions. Complaints from the field continued, the most prevalent being that the headquarters organization was confusing. With the AAF

buildup going on, even more decentralization became a major objective. In consequence, after several headquarters studies, and proposals by General Arnold, a

major reshuffling ensued. This new organization of March 29, 1943, abolished

*After this March 1942 reorganization, General Arnold, Commanding General, AAF,

formed an Advisory Council-separate from the Air Staff-to report directly to him. See

Chapter 2.

31
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

directorates and combined policymaking with control of operations in six reconfigured Assistant Chief of Air Staff (A-staff) offices: Personnel; Intelligence;

Training; Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution; Operations, Commitments

and Requirements; and Plans. In addition, there were three deputy chiefs of air

staff formed in 1943 and four from 1944 on.33 The AAF reorganization of March

1943 was the last major wartime headquarters realignment.

As noted, the status of Army Air Forces had been enhanced by Arnold's

membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, where

the AAF Commander was privy to-and could attempt to influence-policy and

plans.* The AAF's status and prestige received another boost from publication of

War Department Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Command and Employment of Air

Power, July 21, 1943. This manual established the strategic, tactical, and air defense roles as the primary functional missions of the air forces. General Kuter

played a significant part in drafting this manual, having shown the interdependence of ground and air forces in North African operations and having convinced

the War Department of the need to state this in such a publication.' "Land power

and air power," stated FM 100-20,

are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other...

the gaining of air superiority is the first requirement for the success of any

major land operation .... Land forces operating without air superiority must

take such extensive security measures against hostile air attack that their mobility and ability to defeat the enemy land forces are greatly reduced:.

The key tenet was that air forces should be used primarily against the enemy's air

forces until air superiority was gained.

Based on the evolving experience of World War II, especially in the North

African theater, this War Department directive defined command of air and

ground forces in a theater of operations. Control of air power, it pointed out,

must be centralized and command exercised through the air force commander.

As for the responsibility of a theater commander:

*For an assessment of Arnold's wartime leadership, see Maj. Gen. John W. Huston,

"The Wartime Leadership of Hap Arnold," in Air Power and Warfare, Proceedings of the

8th Military History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy, October 18-20, 1978 (Washington, 1979).

,Brig. Gen. Kuter was named Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, in May 1943. Previous to this assignment, Kuter was Commanding General, Allied Tactical Air Forces and

then American Deputy Cmmander under Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, Commander in Chief of the North African Tactical Air Forces. They successfully demonstrated the concept of unity of command of all air elements under a single air commander,

working closely with the ground forces.

32
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

The command of air and ground forces in a theater of operations will be

vested in the superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of forces through the

air force commander and command of ground forces through the ground

force commander. The superior commander will not attach Army Air

Forces to units under his command except when such ground force units

are operating independently or are isolated by distance or lack of communication.35

Usually there would be one air force-the largest AAF tactical unit-in a theater of operations. Normal composition of an air force, under FM 100-20, included strategic, tactical, air defense, and air service elements. AAF tactical

(offensive and defensive) air units were designated flight, squadron, group,

wing, division, command, and air force.* The major aim of the strategic air

force was to defeat the enemy nation. Selection of strategic objectives was done

by the theater commander. He would as a rule assign a broad mission to the

strategic air force commander and follow with specific directives.

FM 100-20 stipulated five kinds of tactical aviation: bombardment, fighter,

reconnaissance, photographic, and troop carrier. Basic tasks of combat operations included: Destroy hostile air forces; destroy existing bases; operate against

hostile land and sea forces; wage offensive air warfare against sources of enemy

strength, military and economic; and operate as part of task forces in military

operations.36 Until the close of the war, FM 100-20 was the definitive War Department directive on employment of air power in joint operations. Mostly, it

defined the tenets of unity of command in theaters of operations. The issue of

unity of command in theaters and in the various headquarters in Washington,

entwined as it was with roles and missions, would become a key issue during

the postwar unification struggle.

*The flight, the basic tactical unit, consisted of two or more planes, the squadron

comprised three or more flights; the group was composed of three or more squadrons;

two or more wings formed an air division; an air command, which was both tactical and

administrative, might have divisions, wings, groups, and service and auxiliary units. The

group, made up of three or four squadrons and support elements, was the basic AAF

combat unit. The group would consist of 35-105 planes and from one thousand to two

thousand men. During the war, reflecting the influence of the RAF, the command became the major en- tity for coordination between the air commander and his groups. The

wing served chiefly for tactical control.

33
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Anticipating Postwar Reorganization

Thus, although changes in the organization of the War Department and the

Army Air Forces had been made; and the importance of unity of command had

been recognized and at least in part acted upon; the global scope of this conflict,

with its concomitant organizational demands, forced military leaders to anticipate

even more sweeping changes once the war ended. General Marshall held strong

opinions on the subject of organization.

For the postwar period, he favored a single Department of Defense with coequal ground, air, and naval elements. In November 1943, Marshall had formally

approved the basic idea of a single department and referred it to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. "'The lack of real unity of command," his War Department planners said,

"has handicapped the successful conduct of this war." Unified command at top

echelons had been pursued by means of joint committees to coordinate Army and

Navy policies. Given separate military departments, these committees were perhaps the best solution possible during the war. But neither the War Department

nor the AAF considered them to be a completely satisfactory answer to a thorny

problem. The War Department argued that: "Any system which depends upon

committee action for high-level military decisions in time of stress is unsatisfactory, as it lacks the quality of prompt and decisive action that springs only from

true unity of command."' Both the War Department and the Army Air Forces

wanted a single department headed by a strong administrator with substantial

powers at his command. Navy Department officials supported improvement of

the existing system of coordination within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

As mentioned, the War Department General Staff had been impressed by the

necessity for combined ground, air, and sea operations whose success depended

on unity of command under a single commander. Moreover, as stressed in FM

100-20, effective coordination must not only exist at the highest level, but down

through the command chain to task force commanders who directed forces of

more than one service. The United States had entered the war unprepared for

large-scale combined operations. Since the exigencies of war had forced the services into combined, coordinated operations, the single department conceivably

could be the answer in the postwar period.39

During the war, General Marshall had frequently said that the postwar environment would be austere. He recalled the chaos created by demobilization after

the first World War, and remembered that Congress in 1916 and again in 1920

had rejected the concept of a large standing army. So in November 1941, Marshall had brought Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer out of retirement, at the age

of 71, to be his personal adviser on organization and to serve as liaison with the

*See Chapter 3.

34
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

the National Guard. Marshall and Palmer had served together with General

Pershing. Marshall knew that Palmer, unlike some Regular Army men, believed

that in wartime the Army should be a citizen army, drawn from the reserves. Palmer advocated the citizen army approach and a system of universal military

training (UMT). After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Palmer devoted

nearly all of his time to postwar planning.40 While Marshall, Palmer, and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson strongly backed UMT, the Army staff opposed reliance on the citizen reserve Army.TYet, as long as Marshall was Chief of Staff,

the War Department firmly supported UMT in its official positions and before

the Congress. Marshall did not believe that the public would go along with a

postwar army larger than 275,000 men. Set on having peacetime plans ready for

congressional consideration, Marshall in June 1942 formed a Post-War Planning

Board to deal with the question of organization. And in April 1943, Marshall instructed General Somervell to begin a study of demobilization planning.

Somervell set up a Project Planning Division in the Office of the Deputy Commanding General for Service Commands to recommend an appropriate organization to supervise demobilization. Then in May the War Department General

Staff's Special Planning Division (SPD) was created to review postwar organization.

Too, War Department Circular 347 of August 1944, prepared by Palmer, prescribed that in its postwar plans the War Department would adhere primarily to a

"professional peace establishment" of trained militia-the National Guard and

Reserve forces. 4 1 This circular mirrored Marshall's views, describing a temporary standing army in the immediate postwar period. It defined the permanent

military establishment as those forces related to a later period "when the future

world order can be envisaged.'42 The peace establishment would be based upon

a system of universal training. The large standing army organization, such as

flourished in Germany and Japan, had no place in the United States. This country, with its democratic heritage, required forces no larger than necessary to meet

normal peacetime needs. As viewed by General Marshall, the advantage of the

small standing army was that its leadership could be drawn from the whole of society. 43 However, the Army staff generally favored a larger standing army than

Marshall thought realistic and it was also known that General Dwight D. Eisen-

*For a consideration of John McAuley Palmer, see Irving B. Holley, Jr., General John

M. Palmer, Citizen Soldiers, and the Army of a Democracy (Westport: Greenwood Press,

1982).

,For a detailed treatment of the the views of Marshall and the Army staff, see James E.

Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-

1963 (Washington, 1975), pp 136-37.

35
ii';I

LdL dI ii

I IIt' Ill 4Uli'

IiI 

ill ,' Ili'f Ix I,,~jj1~~1

-1i L. TF,

I'iij'ii i
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

bower, to become Army Chief of Staff in November 1945, regarded Marshall's

postwar planning figures as inadequate. 44

According to War Department planners, austerity would require a determined

elimination of overlapping functions. For example, economy would demand centralized control of military supplies in peacetime. 45In late 1943 the planners recommended that a single Department of War should be headed by a Secretary of

War with four Under Secretaries, organized into Ground Forces, Air Forces, and

Naval Forces. There would be a common Supply Department. They also suggested a Chief of Staff to the President, a post held during the war by Adm. William D. Leahy. 'Me Chief of Staff would head a General Staff composed of the

three services (and the Chief of Supply). 4

6

The planners urged the War Department to propose through the Joint Chiefs

to the President the appointment of a commission. It would survey in detail the

Army and Navy establishments and make recommendations for efficient and

economical operation under a single department. 47 This should be done when

consideration of such a proposal would not adversely affect the prosecution of

the war.* Doing away with duplication and the importance of crusading for economy became recurrent War Department themes. Brig. Gen. William F. Tompkins, Marshall's top postwar planner and Director, Special Planning Division,

testified in April 1944 to the House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy (Woodrum Committee):

We realize that in the post-war era this Nation will be struggling under the

burden of a large public debt and that while the Nation will require adequate

national security it will also demand that measures for this security be such

as to provide for maximum efficiency and economy in the elimination of

overlapping and duplication and competition between agencies. 4

By 1945, with the war in its final stages, General Marshall (like General Eisenhower) thought that the most meaningful lesson of the war was that unified

command had become a necessity. The way to assure unity of command was to

create a single Department of National Defense. This view had been espoused by

the War Department before the Woodrum Committee. Since then, Marshall had

become more certain than ever that the single Department was the best way to

achieve unification. Defense problems were not susceptible to solution by independent action of each service. Duplication could be held to a minimum and major economies realized by unification through standardizing policies and

procedures in fields such as procurement, supply, and construction. 49 Mainte-

*In 1944 the Joint Chiefs formed a JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense. In its April 1945 report the committee recommended a single Department

of Defense with a separate Air Force. See Chapter 3.

37
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

nance of a large standing peacetime army would not be possible. The military

would rely upon a system of universal military training. The postwar military establishment would comprise the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Reserve. 50 The UMT system would furnish the trained manpower

reserve. Marshall's concept was for Reserve officers to train young men in the

UMT program. Thus, a substantial Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)

would be needed as well as officer candidate schools.51

Both Marshall and Eisenhower supported a separate Air Force.* However, because Eisenhower became Army Chief of Staff in November 1945, he would

carry the burden of the Army's postwar leadership in advocating an independent

Air Force. General Eisenhower had become convinced that there should be an

Air Force coequal to the Army and Navy. He called this the principle of the

"three-legged stool," with each leg equally important0Army, Navy and Air

Force. Eisenhower's opinion was based upon his own experience as Supreme

Commander in Europe, where he had witnessed the effectiveness of air forces in

both the tactical and strategic roles. He was quick to remind people that the successful invasion of the European continent would have been impossible without

air superiority.52 Also, Eisenhower had enjoyed an especially fine relationship

with his top airman, General Spaatz, and the Supreme Commander appreciated

the vast capabilities of air power under theater command.

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, who as AAF Deputy Commander was instrumental in

the planning and organizing of the postwar Air Force, observed that the relationship between Eisenhower and Spaatz "undoubtedly was primary" in the support

that General Eisenhower gave to the drive for air autonomy.53 Eisenhower admired Spaatz' quiet competence, dedication to mission, and loyalty. Beyond

question, Eisenhower was now an advocate for air power. In addition, he firmly

believed that unification was needed to ensure American security and to reduce

the duplication so prevalent during the war. Upon returning from Europe, Eisenhower told his staff and commanders that he expected them to support the defense reorganization program, including a separate Air Force.

However, naval leaders thought otherwise. Before the end of the war, the

Navy had taken a firm position opposed to unification (a single Department of

National Defense) and an independent Air Force. James V. Forrestal, Secretary

of the Navy, Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and Adm. William

D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt, argued that sufficient unity of

command had been secured during the war. Evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

*While during the war Marshall generally submerged this view to the paramount goal

of winning the war, there is no doubt that he favored a separate Air Force coequal to the

Army and Navy. See Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-

1945 (New York, 1973), Chap IV; memo, Eaker to Wolk, Feb 3, 1977.

38
Naval leaders opposed unification of the armed services

and establishment of an independent Air Force. Above:

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (second from left)

examines photographs of the fourth atomic bomb burst

on Bikini Atoll. With the secretary are Col. Paul T.

Cullen (left) and Commodore Ben H. Hyatt (right, bending).

Uo

.o_ (Left) Adm. Ernest

z J. King, Chief of

Naval Operations.

0

(Right) Adm. William D. Leahy,

Chief of Staff to the

President.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

itself and creation of the various JCS committees, which allegedly fostered coordination, rendered undesirable what the Navy termed "revolutionary" reorganization. In the various and increasingly frequent proposals for unification and a

separate Air Force, naval leaders detected a distinct threat to the existence of the

Fleet Air Arm and the Marine Corps. The Navy likewise feared that eventually

decisions on naval weapons and naval affairs would he made by officials without

the requisite knowledge, or even worse by people who would not have the

Navy's best interests foremost in mind. To men like Forrestal, King, and Leahy,

these issues were real and threatening. They were determined generally to preserve the wartime organization.

General Arnold also held firm views on postwar organization. He naturally

championed a separate Air Force coequal with the Army and Navy. He agreed

with Marshall on the need for a military structure geared to unity of command.

Both men wanted to avoid the chaos that accompanied demobilization after

World War I. In April 1943, Arnold had set up the Special Projects Office to

evolve postwar plans and to coordinate them with the War Department. And in

July 1943, he had directed Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of Air

Staff, Plans, to form a Post War Division.* Whereas Marshall saw the need for

universal military training as opposed to a large standing army, Arnold promoted

the idea of a substantial Air Force in being that could swiftly expand.

The question of a large postwar standing arm versus the concept of UMT had

not been confronted by the services during the early part of the war. But as the

conflict reached the final phase, this matter naturally grew more active and controversial.' In the spring of 1945, Arnold tackled this issue head-on. He informed

Marshall that UMT should not be substituted for an M-day force, i.e., an adequate standing Air Force. Reserves simply could not match combat units which

should be instantly ready for employment. In case of war, rapid expansion of

forces should be anticipated and therefore a sizable standing training establishment would be needed. 5 4 With approval of the 70-group program in August

1945, a reduction from a 105-group plan, the leadership of the Army Air Forces

would staunchly oppose the UMT program, ultimately championed by both General Marshall and President Harry S. Truman.

Arnold had other matters on his mind reinforcing his resolve to move ahead

with postwar plans and eventually to gain independence for the Army air arm. He

and the other AAF leaders were products of what they considered to have been

*See Chapter 2.

See Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore,

1970). Smith broke new ground with this insightful book, although it should be emphasized that the 400,000-man figure was basically directed by the War Department rather

than selected by the Army Air Forces.

40
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

the unfulfilled years between the wars. They well remembered the bureaucratic

and organizational battles with the War Department and the struggles in the Congress as to how military air power should be organized. World War II gave these

airmen the chance to show the potency of air power and to prove their case for

autonomy. The air leaders made the most of their opportunity. Air powerostrategic, tactical and supportovitally contributed. The road had been hard,

and the AAF commanders had found it necessary to change doctrine and strategy

when their plans were not working. In March 1945, for example, Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay commanding the XXI Bomber Command, was pressured by Arnold

to achieve results. Realizing that high-altitude daylight bombing was not succeeding against Japan, LeMay switched to low-altitude, night incendiary bombing. The results were dramatic.

Illustrative of his abiding faith in conventional bombardment forces, General

Arnold in July 1945 at Potsdam, took the view that it was not necessary to drop

the atomic bomb to end the war. 55 He thought that Japan would capitulate by October 1945 under the continuing conventional bombing assault which was smashing its war industries and urban areas. For years air leaders had argued that air

power could defeat nations. Invasions were not required. The atomic bombs, Arnold wrote, "did not cause the defeat of Japan, however large a part they may

have played in assisting the Japanese decision to surrender." Japan fell, in his

view, "because of air attacks, both actual and potential, had made possible the

destruction of their capability and will for further resistance .... Those... attacks

had as a primary objective the defeat of Japan without invasion." 56

Airmen were convinced their weapon had proved to be the indispensable instrument of modem warfare. Nonetheless, despite air power's achievements in

the European and Pacific theaters, General Arnold remained apprehensive that

this impressive record had not been sufficiently recognized. "We were never

able," he wrote Spaatz, "to launch the full power of our bombing attack .... The

power of those attacks would certainly have convinced any doubting Thomases

as to the capabilities of a modem Air Force. I am afraid that from now on there

will be certain people who will forget the part we have played." 57 Nevertheless,

beyond a doubt, the American public and press were in fact impressed by the

contributions of the Army Air Forces. The New York Times noted that "the place

of air power in war now is... well recognized." The paper emphasized, "just how

great a part" the AAF had taken in victory.

Arnold was also haunted by the fact that the United States had not been prepared for war. Victory had not come easily:

As a nation we were not prepared for World War II .... we won the war, but

at a terrific cost in lives, human suffering and materiel, and at times the margin of winning was narrow. History alone can reveal how many turning

points there were, how many times we were near losing and how our ene41
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Scientific advisor Dr.

Theodore von Kfirmfin led

the planning of a longrange research and development program for the

Army Air Forces.

mies mistakes often pulled us through. In the flush of victory some like to

forget these unpalatable truths.58

He was determined to do all he could to make certain that the Air Force would

not again be caught unprepared. Long before the war ended, Arnold started to

plan for the future. He called upon Dr. Theodore von Kdrmdn, the scientist. They

had been close friends since the early 1930s when Arnold commanded March

Field and von Kfirmfn headed the California Institute of Technology's rocket research project. In 1940, von Kdrmfn was appointed a part-time consultant to Arnold and a special adviser at Wright Field. Whenever Arnold needed help with a

difficult scientific problem, he often requested von Kd.rmfin's advice.

In November 1944, Arnold asked von Kdrmdn to form a scientific group to

chart a long-range research and development program for the Air Force. "I am

anxious," Arnold wrote von Kdrmdn,

that the Air Forces post war and next war research and development programs be placed on a sound and continuing basis. These programs should be

well thought out and contain long range thinking. They should guarantee the

security of our nation and serve as a guide for the next 10-20 years.59

42
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

In November, General Arnold formally established the AAF Scientific Advisory Group to create a long-range research and development program. The

group's report, Toward New Horizons (33 volumes), was given to Arnold on December 15, 1945. Von K.rmin's introductory volume attempted to chart the Air

Force's future research and development requirements and to make recommendations as to the organization of research and development. The report was distributed to the Air Staff in January 1946, Arnold calling it the first of its kind

ever published. So before being succeeded by Spaatz in February 1946, Arnold

warned that the Army Air Forces must stress plans for the future. The country

needed to rely on technology rather than manpower. "The weapons of today," he

admonished, "are the museum pieces of tomorrow." 6 1

General Spaatz, who had commanded the Strategic Air Forces, had no doubt

about strategic air power's effectiveness and its future role. In this view, he generally had wide support from the public and the press. The New York Times, noting the Army Air Forces' record in the war and the existence of the atomic bomb,

observed editorially that "the era of continental bombing is with us.'62 Spaatz

thought that the major lesson of the war was that prolonged ground wars of attrition could now be relegated to the past. Other airmen of course shared this view,

outstanding among them being Marshal of the Royal Air Force, the Viscount

Trenchard, who in World War I had created the Independent Air Force. He

pointed up the difference between the two world wars. The First World War featured the stalemate of trench warfare. In Trenchard's thinking, the relatively

lower casualties of the western democracies in the Second World War were

chiefly due to the impact of air power. What he termed this war of "movement

and maneuver" signaled a fundamental change in the nature of warfare." 63

To Spaatz, strategic air power was the key: "Strategic bombing is thus the first

war instrument of history capable of stopping the heart mechanism of a great industrialized enemy. It paralyzes his military power at the core.'64 Spaatz said the

concept of strategic warfare was to shorten the conflict by striking directly at the

enemy's industrial, economic, and communications organizations.65 The prototype of a postwar force with such a mission was the Twentieth Air Force, which

had pressed the B-29 strategic bombing campaign against Japan.* This force

should be closely controlled, under command of the Commanding General,

Army Air Forces, and should operate directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as

had the Twentieth Air Force.

The United States had come out of the war as the most powerful nation in the

world, possessor of the atomic bomb. Even before the atomic bombs were

dropped on Japan and the war ended, Army Air Forces leaders adhered to the be-

*See Herman S. Wolk, "The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japanese Surrender," Air

Force Magazine, February 1975

43
(Above) In England during World War II, Lt.

Gen. Carl Spaatz (center)

confers with other generals of his command. They

are (left to right) Maj.

Gen. Ralph Royce, Maj.

Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg,

and Maj. Gen. Hugh J.

Knerr.

(Left) Air power proponents Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold and Brig. Gen. James

Doolittle, ca 1942.
(Left) As a major general, Laurence

S. Kuter proposed that the nation's

strategic air forces be placed under

the total authority of an independent

Air Force.

(Below) Royal Air Force Marshal

Viscount Trenchard and Maj. Gen.

Ira Eaker in England, 1943. The

RAF leader believed that the rise of

air power was transforming the very

nature of warfare.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

lief later voiced publicly by Assistant Secretary of War for Air Stuart Symington:

"To ever relegate strategic air again to a secondary position under the Army

would be to insure the failure of adequate national defense." This was self-evident, he said, to "anyone who has no axe to grind."66

In June 1945, Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter-from his post as Deputy Commanding General of the AAF, Pacific Ocean Areas-wrote Arnold to stress the

importance of having the Strategic Air Forces recognized as on the "same level"

with the Army and the Navy. In General Kuter's view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

had in fact made a "gesture" towards the AAF by establishing the Twentieth Air

Force under the direct control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

What was now required, according to Kuter, was complete logistical and administrative authority for the Strategic Air Forces. Administrative control meant the

Strategic Air Commander could make his personnel requirements known directly

to the War Department. As things now stood, for example, such requirements

were screened in the Pacific by General MacArthur. Logistical control was exercised by the JCS and the best that Kuter could hope for here was that the Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces, be given equal representation

with the Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific and the Commander in

Chief, Pacific Command (CinCAFPAC and CinCPAC). What Kuter emphasized

to Arnold was that the postwar Strategic Air Force should be completely independent of the War Department and the JCS and should be under the total authority of the Commanding General of the Air Force.

The airmen were now agreed that an air power revolution had been consummated. World War II had been the costliest war in men and materiel in the history of the United States. Air leaders avowed that air power had been established

as decisive in modern warfare. Scientific reports, such as von Kdrm~in's, forecast

an increasingly destructive role for air power in future conflicts. Not only was the

atomic bomb a harbinger of potentially an even more destructive war, but scientists alluded to the future development of guided missiles and rockets equipped

with atomic warheads. Nonetheless, for the present the long-range bomber remained the most effective carrier of the atomic weapon. Another of the war's lessons stressed by the AAF was that modern wars almost always began with air

offensives and counteroffensives. Future conflicts would be decided in the air,

not by mass armies on the ground, nor by naval forces on the high seas.

Army Air Forces leaders believed that a future war would start inevitably with

an air offensive against the United States, perhaps over the so-called polar frontier. They claimed that the best way to prevent such an attack was to maintain an

Air Force in being strong enough to deter the potential enemy from launching

one. The Air Force, not the Navy, was the first line of defense. As Lt. Gen. James

H. Doolittle stressed to Eaker:

46
ROOTS OF AAF ORGANIZATION

It is obvious the Navy is aware that the capital ship is not the "First Line of

Defense" of the future and, in order to maintain its prestige, is determined to

retain and augment its air arm and ground component.

It is also apparent that the Navy fears an autonomous Air Force which would

absorb the Navy's land-based aviation, and particularly fears a Single Department of National Defense which would apportion the drastically reduced

defense appropriations between the services, according to their value and

importance to National Security. 67

The airmen contended that the nation's safety hinged upon having an independent Air Force coequal with the Army and Navy. It was to this task that they

dedicated themselves.

47
2

Planning for 70 Groups

Two years of planning in the Air Staff have resulted in

the firm conviction that the 70 Group Air Force (which

excluding overhead for training civilian components has

been squeezed into a 400,000 tentative Troop Basis) is

the bedrock minimum with which the Air Force can

accomplish its peacetime mission.

Brig. Gen. Glen C. Jamison

Army Air Forces Member

Special War Department Committee on

Permanent Military Establishment

November 1945

Early Postwar Planning

In 1943, Army Air Forces' Headquarters began concerted postwar planning.

Between 1943-46, this activity involved a number of offices and sections and

was primarily concerned with three kinds of planning: Force level and deployment planning, eventually culminating in August 1945 with establishment of the

70-group objective; legislative planning for a single department of national defense and an independent Air Force; and planning to organize Air Force Headquarters and the major commands. Postwar planners from several offices worked

on these programs concurrently; indeed, the work was interlocking, the force

planning, for example, impacting upon plans for a separate Air Force and for organizing the major commands. Especially at the higher echelons, planners

worked simultaneously on more than one program. This work was immensely

complex, frequently tentative, and influenced by the diverse views of the planners as well as by unforeseen events. The difficulty of this planning was height49
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

ened in 1945-46 by the rush of events-the end of the war and the concomitant

beginning of the atomic era-and the need for speed in resolving the major planning issues. Although considerable postwar planning had been accomplished in

1943-44, some of it ultimately had to be discarded as unrealistic because of anticipated postwar austerity. Also, after the war, the confluence of massive demobilization and the requirement to plan the AAF's force in consonance with War

Department projections made the planners' task even more complicated.

As mentioned, these Army Air Forces plans were subject to War Department

scrutiny. Both the AAF and the War Department had their own postwar planning

sections. Although ultimately liaison usually existed between these sections,

draft plans were sometimes published independently and thus at first there was

not always a great deal of compatibility between them. For example, the War Department several times ordered the AAF to scale down its force structure recommendations. Sometimes contradictions could be worked out at higher echelons,

and in the most important cases it would be left to Generals Marshall and Arnold

to settle the differences.

Thus, the character and substance of postwar planning in the War Department

and the Army Air Forces were influenced by varied assumptions and opinions

not always in harmony. Ingrained attitudes had been reinforced by experience.

Simplistically, these differing attitudes were best exemplified by Marshall and

Arnold. Naturally, divergent ideas and conclusions were also apparent between

the War Department General Staff and the Air Staff. Finally, the march of events

frequently influenced the planners in ways they could not have foreseen.

The Army Air Forces' major goal in the postwar period was to establish an independent Air Force. Other key considerations such as force planning, had to be

judged on their relation to the objective of a separate Air Force. Postwar planning

of organization and forces was also primarily based upon the lessons of the war

as seen by the airmen, and on expected occupation responsibilities. General Arnold was determined that the air arm gain autonomy and he realized the necessity

of wartime planning towards this end. Consequently, he gave high priority to detailed plans for organization, force structure, and deployment of the postwar Air

Force. Moreover, the intense interest of Congress in postwar military organization (reflected, for example, in the Woodrum Committee hearing of 1944) put

additional pressure on the AAF to produce postwar plans. The Army Air Forces

required firm positions on postwar organization and structure to present to the

War Department and Congress, and to ensure an independent Air Force.

In 1943, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall had directed the

War Department to begin detailed, sustained, postwar planning. General Arnold

created two offices in the Air Staff to do most of the AAF's postwar planning.

He formed the Special Projects Office under Col. F. Trubee Davison in April

1943 to coordinate planning with the War Department. In July 1943, Brig. Gen.

Laurence S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, established a Post War Di50
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

vision under Brig. Gen. Pierpont M. Hamilton.* However, Hamilton headed the

Post War Division for only a few months. His successor, Col. Reuben C. Moffat,

served in this position throughout the war.t Eventually, as the Special Projects

Office became increasingly involved with demobilization plans, the Post War Division assumed the bulk of postwar force planning. In addition to the planners

working under Davison and Kuter, Arnold's personal staff, called the Advisory

Council, actively engaged in postwar planning during 1942-44. Among the

members at various times were Cols. Jacob E. Smart, Fred M. Dean, Emmett

O'Donnell, Jr., Charles P. Cabell, and Lauris Norstad.

The Advisory Council, formed by Arnold in March 1942, consisted of several

carefully chosen officers, reporting directly to the Commanding General, AAF.

They were General Arnold's idea men, and as such they had no specified assignments. Arnold, at times uncomfortable with his large Air Staff, felt free to call

upon members of the council for ideas and suggestions. Many years later, General Jacob Smart recalled that General Arnold had admonished him to spend absolutely all of his time "thinking." However, after Arnold had upon one specific

occasion failed to convince General Marshall of something or other, Arnold emphasized to Smart: "From now on, you spend thirty percent of your time thinking

and seventy percent on how to sell an idea."'1

Actually, as early as April 1943, Brig. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson, Assistant

Chief of the Air Staff for Operational Plans,** had afforded perhaps the first detailed view of Air Staff postwar thinking. His work, "A Study to Determine the

Minimum Air Power the United States Should Have at the Conclusion of the

War in Europe," dated April 1943, concentrated upon a recommendation for the

proper AAF structure after Germany's surrender. The study did not try to describe a complete postwar AAF in terms of personnel, planes, and deployment.

"Military forces," wrote General Anderson, "are justified only as a necessary

means of implementing national policies for the accomplishment of national objectives." He pictured U.S. postwar objectives as avoidance of chaos in Europe;

restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those forcefully deprived

of them; creation of Western Hemisphere solidarity and security under United

States' leadership; assurance of permanent world peace and a stabilized world

economy through use of an international military force; and an orderly transition

from wartime to peacetime of the industrial organization of the United States and

*Hamilton had won a Medal of Honor for heroism in action in North Africa in November 1942.

.Moffat attended Cornell University for three years during World War I. He then enlisted in the Army and became a flyer. A graduate of the Air Corps Tactical School and

the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Moffat was seriously hurt

in an aircraft accident early in the war and never returned to flying status.

**In June 1943, this office became known as the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans.

51
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

the world.2 According to Anderson, American influence would depend upon

military strength, the extent to which the U.S. shared in the control of formerly

Axis areas, and the contribution the United States could make to the war-torn

countries of Europe.

Upon Germany's surrender, the United States should be prepared to contribute the principal portion of the air component (chiefly bombers) of the United

Nations' force. His idea was to offset Soviet ground forces by what he termed

preponderant air strength. 3 The Soviets' postwar objectives, he emphasized, were

as yet unknown.

After the war in Europe, General Anderson proposed there should be an AAF

air strength of 6,000 heavy bombers, 4,000 medium and light bombers, 7,000

fighters, and 7,500 cargo craft. He noted that a powerful air offensive was the

most practicable means to win the war in Europe and the Pacific, with a minimum loss of life.4

Within the War Department, the Operations Division and the Special Planning

Division took over demobilization and postwar organizational planning. At Marshall's direction, the War Department's Special Planning Division in the summer

of 1943 developed a tentative outline of a permanent military establishment.*

This outline was sent to General Marshall in October 1943. Maj. Gen. Thomas T.

Handy, Chief of the War Department's Operations Division, had remarked that

this plan would not

provide expeditionary or task forces... for prompt attack in any part of the

world in order to crush the very beginnings of lawless aggression, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations .... To crush the very beginnings of

... aggression requires a force in being, not a potential one.5

Marshall's written reply to this was that formation of a substantial ground expeditionary force would be impractical. "Having air power," he observed, "will be

the quickest remedy."6 Handy noted that the tentative outline seemed to have taken the view of the Ground Forces:

Although it may be considered that the outline covers Air Forces as well as

Ground Forces, I believe the Army should be divided into these two categories and covered separately, since their •roblems particularly as to reserves,

training and equipment are not identical.

Marshall agreed with Handy's comment.

Based on the Special Planning Division's outline (and Marshall's reaction to

it), General Arnold, on November 8, 1943, requested Kuter to prepare a study on

*General Arnold appointed Col. F. Trubee Davison as air advisor to the Director, Special Planning Division.

52
(Above) Brig. Gen. Orvil

A. Anderson prepared a

detailed study on the degree of air strength

needed to ensure peace in

the postwar period.

(Left) Army Chief of Staff

Marshall - the impetus

for post-war planning in

the AAF.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

the organization and composition of the postwar air force. This preliminary

study, submitted to the Chief of Air Staff on November 13, proposed an M-day

(first day of mobilization) force of 105 groups, deployed in five Air Forces

(changed to six in December). It assumed that fifty percent of the active duty Mday force should consist of professional soldiers and career officers and fifty percent universal service enlisted personnel and short-term officers.8 A December

1943 revision of the preliminary study delineated troop requirements of 530,000

officers and enlisted men for a force of 105 combat groups:9

Atlantic- Pacific U.S.-AlaskaPacific Far East Caribbean Total

Bomb, Very Heavy 10 25 5 40

Bomb, Heavy 0 I 1 2

Bomb, Light 0 0 4 4

Fighter 10 25 10 45

Reconnaissance 0 1 2 3

Troop Carrier I 6 4 I1

21 58 26 105

Drawing on Kuter's study, the Army Air Forces forwarded to the War Department in February 1944 the first tentative plan for a postwar Air Force. Known as

Initial Postwar Air Force-I (IPWAF-I), this plan was influenced by Handy's

guidance that an estimate of the interim forces (Army) six months after Japan's

defeat and eighteen months after Germany's defeat would be about 1,571,000

with 105 air groups. The Army Air Forces IPWAF-1 comprised one million men

(with an additional million in an Organized Air Reserve) in 105 air groups, distributed the same as above, according to aircraft type.

Approved by Arnold on February 5, 1944, IPWAF-l was portrayed by Kuter

as recommending a large force "according to former peacetime standards, and

large in proportion to the conventional concepts of ground forces and naval establishments, but it is what we foresee will be needed to keep us out of a new war

during the initial period of peace."' 0 As Kuter admitted, AAF planners paid no

attention to cost because in their view the alternative eventually might well be

another war. I In other words, the planners proceeded on the assumption of proposing whatever they thought necessary to avoid future hostilities.

However, the War Department requested a more modest and less expensive

plan based on a new outline for a permanent military establishment with a peacetime Air Force ceiling of 700,000 men and a 900,000-man Air Reserve. This second AAF plan, PWAF-2, envisioned a postwar Air Force of 635,000 (75

groups), contingent upon the existence of an international security organization

to regulate world armaments. According to Kuter, it was presumed that such a

world organization would be functioning at some unspecified future date. Only at

that time could the final step be taken in progressive demobilization from war

54
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

strength to complete peacetime status. Thus, in this early plan the Army Air

Forces relied heavily upon the assumed policing powers of a world security organization. The Special Planning Division accepted this condition as a planning

premise and the 75-group plan was incorporated into the War Department's postwar troop basis-I1.7 million men-of August 11, 1944.12 Kuter commented that

both these plans were predicated upon "continued standards of quality, Air Force

autonomy within a single Department of National Defense, universal military

training and integration into the Air Force of the ASWAAFs (Arms and Services

with Army Air Forces) and anti-aircraft artillery."' 13

Meanwhile, even though postwar planning (including demobilization and redeployment plans) remained a major function of both the Special Projects Office

and the Post War Division, the Air Staff recognized the duplication and jurisdictional problems latent in this split responsibility. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff,

Operations, Commitments, and Requirements also frequently contributed to postwar planning. And, as noted, General Arnold's Advisory Council likewise took

part. Further, duplication abounded between the several offices in the Air Staff

involved in the AAF's operational planning.

In September 1944, Brig. Gen. Byron E. Gates. the AAF's Chief of Management Control, proposed to Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles, Deputy Commander, AAF,

and Chief of Air Staff, that these defects be corrected by creating what Gates

termed an "AAF OPD." Gates' idea was to form a single AAF agency above the

level of the Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff to correspond to the War Department

General Staff's Operations Division. Gates stressed that this would correct,

among other things, the overlap in logistical and personnel planning. Logistical

planning and the determination of total personnel requirements should be transferred to the office charged with operational planning. Gates suggested naming

this new activity the Operational Plans Office. It would be directly under a Deputy Chief of Air Staff. 1

4

At the same time, Gates suggested formation of a Special Plans Office to handle postwar civil aviation and demobilization planning. This office would parallel the War Department's Special Planning Division and would take over the

duties performed by the AAF's Special Projects Office under Davison. Gates

said this entire concept assumed that the Air Staff office responsible for fighting

the war need not and should not be responsible for developing postwar plans, and

that normal staff coordination would link the two functions. When the hostilities

were over, the two functions would join in an office similar to the War Plans Division.15 Giles and Arnold did not approve Gates' plan, preferring the present organization. They thought that the basic functional division, despite duplication,

still served the AAF's major purposes as well as any other recommended organization. Arnold had previously made clear that he considered the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, as the primary planning agency in the Air Staff.

55
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Thomas T. Handy, one of

General Marshall's chief

post-war planners, as a lieutenant general.

The Special Projects Office would continue to be the point of contact with the

War Department's Special Planning Division.

Marshall Orders a Resurvey

In December 1944, General Marshall decided that the cost of this Army (a total of 4.5 million troops with reserves) was prohibitive, and a force of this size

would be impossible to attain by voluntary enlistments in peacetime. He directed

creation of a committee to "resurvey" postwar planning and to come up with a

new troop basis, contingent in his view on a more realistic opinion of what Congress and the citizenry would support. The Army Chief of Staff ordered that this

resurvey be based upon a Universal Military Training program, which he deemed

absolutely vital to the success of any postwar military program. General Handy,

acting on Marshall's guidance, had the Special Planning Division make UMT a

basic assumption. No mention was made of an international security organization. 16

The resurvey committee adopted these ideas in the "War Department Basic

Plan for the Post-War Military Establishment," approved by General Marshall on

March 13, 1945. This plan defined the postwar establishment as that organization

56
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

to be in existence with the return to peacetime. The document was not meant to

describe the requirements of the period of transition from war to peace. While

agreeing that the United States needed adequate military forces, the War Department planners insisted that such adequacy would hinge upon the character of the

postwar world. They could not foresee what postwar international obligations the

United States would have to meet. This plan stated that the postwar military establishment would maintain the security of the continental United States during

the initial phases of mobilization, support international obligations, defend strategic bases, and, when required, expand rapidly to full mobilization.17

Central to the War Department's plan for a postwar establishment was Marshall's familiar and oft-repeated concept of a "professional peace establishment."

This meant a military structure no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements, to be reinforced promptly during an emergency by units from

a citizen Army Reserve. The plan emphasized that the War Department would

support a Universal Military Training Act to institute the principle that every

"able-bodied American is subject to military training, and to furnish a reservoir

of trained Reserves." 18 The War Department included a section, "Post-War Relationship Among the Principal Nations." Its major assumptions embraced the

creation of an international organization, controlled by the major powers, to keep

the peace and to control armaments. There were to be major power spheres of influence, each power to control its own strategic area.19 The character of future

conflict was described in these terms:

the actual attack will be launched upon the United States without any declaration of war; that the attack will represent an all out effort on the part of the

enemy; that the war will develop into a total war; that the United States will

be the initial objective of aggressors in such a war and will have no major allies for at least 18 months. However, it will be further assumed that the

United States will have cognizance of the possibility of war for at least one

year, and during this year preparatory measures will be inaugurated.20

The War Department's basic plan presumed that Congress would enact a

UMT program whereby young men would serve in the Reserves for a reasonable

time after being trained. The plan also supposed that after M-day the military establishment could quickly expand to 4,500,000 troops.21 General Marshall's advocacy of universal training was rooted in his philosophy and experience. The

practice and tradition of democracy signified that the people of the United States

would not support a large standing peacetime army. Nations like Germany and

Japan maintained huge peacetime forces. Such a practice produced formidable

military strength, but the Army Chief believed it would not be tolerated by members of a democratic state. Here at home a large peacetime force would be looked

upon as a threat to our democratic foundations. Marshall further argued that the

inevitable postwar slashing of the budget by the Congress, under pressure from

the public, would thrust economy on the military services. Military forces would

57
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

be reduced. Austerity would be imposed.22 This happened after World War I and

Marshall was absolutely certain that this cycle would be repeated.

Hence a system of Universal Military Training would be required:

As all our great wars have been fought in the main by citizen armies, the

proposal for an organized citizen Army reserve in time of peace is merely a

proposal for perfecting a transitional national institution to meet modem requirements which no longer permit extemporization after the outbreak of

war. 23

According to this view, in a crisis the citizen Reserve could be swiftly mobilized.

Thus, one advantage of UMT would be an Army not composed exclusively of

the professional military class. The War Department expected the Congress to be

receptive to this point.

Marshall and Maj. Gen. William F. Tompkins,* Director of the War Department's Special Planning Division, envisioned that sometime between the ages of

seventeen and twenty, youths would enter the UMT program. During this training, they would not be part of the armed forces. Afterwards, they could only be

called up for service during a national emergency declared by Congress. Registration, examination, and selection of trainees would be administered by civilian

agencies. The training itself, given by the military services, would last one year.

After completion, trainees would become members of the Reserves for five years

or could enlist in one of the Regular military services, the National Guard or the

Organized Reserve.24 The Army Chief and some of his WDGS planners had little doubt that UMT would prove popular with Congress as an alternative to large

standing forces. They fully counted on a UMT program being enacted. As a result, the War Department did not immediately draw definitive, detailed plans

based upon UMT's possible failure.

In early 1945 the preliminary report of the War Department resurvey committee recommended a postwar troop basis containing a small, token Air Forceonly 16 groups. Handy approved the report as a basis for additional planning;

General Marshall noted this without formally approving the report himself. As a

planning factor, the committee used an estimate from various economists that

just $2 billion would be available annually for defense. While the committee

later used a $5 billion figure as the maximum available (also for funding UMT),

it funded merely $1.1 billion for the Regular Army of 155,000 and an Air Force

of 120,000 men, enough for only 16 air groups. 2

*Tompkins was Arnold's classmate in 1929 at the Command and General Staff

School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.

58
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

AAF Protests Resurvey

As would be expected, Headquarters Army Air Forces strongly disapproved

of the resurvey committee's report. The AAF charged that the report's authors

had failed to weigh the task to be performed; had not considered phased reduction in the size of the postwar Army in line with probable world developments

and the domestic situation; and in addition had not provided for alternate plans to

meet various possible major contingencies. Kuter suggested to Arnold that UMT

might weaken the Regular, standing forces:

Assuming a limited peacetime appropriation for aviation, if too great a proportion of the total effort is devoted to building up.. .a reserve of trained

personnel... then it may be that the resulting regular establishment will be

found in a sudden emergency to be too small to prevent a serious set-back...

therefore the reserve components can be successfully mobilized and brought 26 into action.

In January 1945, General Giles, AAF Deputy Commander, and Chief of Air

Staff, had reacted to the survey, based on a draft paper written by Colonel Moffat, head of the Post War Division. Giles informed General Tompkins, Director,

Special Planning Division, that the postwar Army's size should not be grounded

in an estimate of the peacetime national budget (assuming UMT and a balanced

budget). Rather, the military should first set forth their minimum needs and then

Congress should arrive at the budget. The AAF could not agree, Giles asserted,

that planning predicated on limited men and funds was realistic if such plans

failed to recognize the requirements of national defense.27 Moffat had noted in

his draft that there were known national commitments for defense, both of the

Western Hemisphere and American interests in the Pacific. These dictated the

minimum requirements for the peacetime Regular military establishment, when

approached with an appreciation of possible developments in the world's military

and political situation. 28

An Air Force of 16 groups, Giles averred, would be incompatible with the

War Department's UMT program to train 200,000 enlisted Reserves annually in

the Army Air Forces. It would take additional groups to train the Reserve force.

Eighteen months was needed to train a pilot for an operational squadron. And

more training would be required for a Reserve officer pilot, for assignment in an

emergency without further training. Moreover, Giles contended that an Air Force

of 16 groups could not carry out its mission. He was likewise disturbed by the assumption that in the future the Navy would need a larger share of military funds

than the Army. The size of the Air Force should not be tied to a split, "however

generous, of the Army's traditional short end of the peacetime defense appropriations.,

29

59
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

General Giles recommended that before plans were drawn for the peacetime

military establishment a political and military estimate should be prepared, so

that the War Department could ascertain its minimum peacetime requirements

and then draw up an appropriate plan. Such a plan should include forces ample

for an Air Force to maintain peace by being prepared for action against a first

strike by a potential enemy, and to repel attacks over a longer period while forces

were mobilized and deployed. 30

The 16-group proposal also aroused General Arnold's ire. The AAF Commander thought that the time had arrived to take his case directly and forcefully

to General Marshall. As he saw it, UMT was becoming a threat to the necessity

of maintaining an Air Force sufficient in numbers and overall strength to perform

its mission. "There exists," Arnold said,

a clear and inescapable requirement that a realistic basis for planning the

postwar Air Force be found and agreed upon....At this moment we can do no

more than set up a schedule of progressive demobilization based on definite

phases which can be foreseen. But we should not do less.3'

He told Marshall that the peacetime Air Forces should be able to support a quality M-day task force-mobile, effective, and capable of rapid expansion. Sixteen

groups would not be nearly enough, seeing that the President had approved a

Joint Chiefs' proposal to build a network of bases for hemispheric defense, now

being negotiated by the State Department. It was contradictory to plan such a

system of bases without an adequate force to protect them. To Arnold, national

defense and hemispheric defense were synonymous. This 16-group proposal, Arnold charged, "would amount to virtual disarmament in air strength." An Air

Force so small would be merely a token force, acceptable under world conditions

which seemed highly improbable. 32

The AAF Commander next turned to a point that had greatly troubled him and

General Giles-the potential substitution of UMT for the M-day force. Arnold

avowed that Reserve elements could not be equated with Regular combat units

ready for M-day employment. Training was the critical factor. In the event of

war, the need for a quick expansion of forces would demand a substantial training establishment to ready aircrews and operational units. UMT should not be regarded as the major ingredient in the military structure:

If an aggressor is allowed to mount and launch a surprise attack, it is unlikely that there will be opportunity for our gradual mobilization....Our

elaborate mobilization plan could be buried .... UMT... is a good thing, but

only insofar as it supplements other military measures in proper proportion.

If it can only be maintained at the expense of so great a portion of the peacetime regular establishment that the available M-day force will he unable to

prevent our quick overthrow before the nation can be mobilized, then universal military training will defeat its purpose. 3

60
(Above) Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. George C. Marshall, Cairo, 1943. (Below)

Chief of Air Staff, Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles (left) and Brig. Gen. Russell H.

Randall seated in a liaison plane, July 1944.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

If war came the United States could well be the target of a surprise attack. Consequently, there might be too little time to mobilize. Trained Reserves might never

have a chance to enter the battle. The way to prevent such a failure, Arnold

stressed, was to counteract it at once with superior air power. 34 An Air Force of

16 groups would be insufficient to train the 200,000 airmen each year, desired by

the War Department under the UMT program. Aircrew training was geared to the

number of units in the standing Air Force.

The Air Force had to be fully trained, ready to react in an emergency. Regarding the danger of a large peacetime force to the nation's economy and democratic

tradition, it was judged secondary to a grave external threat to the country. Arnold, like Giles, noted that it took eighteen months to train individuals plus another year's experience in a tactical squadron; thus these men could not be

expected to be effective upon mobilization. Reserve units could not be deemed

equivalent to an M-day force. The AAF in no way accepted UMT as an alternative to a solid group program. There was no choice in the AAF's view between a

large Regular force, ready to act instantly, and a much smaller force buttressed

by UMT. 35 General Arnold's opposition to universal training, stated directly to

Marshall, marked a significant departure. This was the first time that Arnold had

presented his detailed case against reliance on UMT in writing to the Army Chief

of Staff. This reluctance had obviously been due to General Marshall's strong,

long-time support for AAF autonomy. Also, of great importance in March 1945,

operations in both the European and Pacific theaters were entering critical phases

that lent emphasis to postwar planning in Washington. Arnold, acutely sensitive

to the connection between operations--especially the impact of major air campaigns-and postwar plans, felt this was the time to raise the crucial UMT issue

with Marshall. Put simply, the AAF perceived UMT as endangering its plans for

a large standing Air Force.*

At War Department direction the AAF would go on planning for UMT (in addition to 70 groups) over the next several years. But in 1945 it was already becoming clear in the Congress that, given the proven wartime potency of air

forces, the AAF's opposition was going to make passage of a UMT program

much more difficult than Marshall and the War Department planners had foreseen.

Arnold argued that should UMT be the only plan presented to Congress by the

War Department, then "people may well look to the Navy to provide total secu-

*In September 1944, Arnold had told the American Legion convention in Chicago that

the military required trained men prior to the outbreak of war. The way to accomplish

this, he said, was to accept "the policy of universal training .... We may not always have

time to prepare." (excerpt from address by Arnold to American Legion National Convention, Chicago, Sep 18, 1944, in Gen. H. H. Arnold Collection, Box 45, Post War Planning

Folder, LC.)

62
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

rity in the air, as already advocated by many Navy enthusiasts." He could not

imagine that the War Department would propose or condone a policy which

might lead to the Navy's providing the M-day air force. Arnold suggested that

the Army ascertain the composition being planned for naval aviation and what

assumptions should be jointly agreed upon for naval aviation's peacetime mission. Arnold recommended an outline plan to serve as a model for demobilization of the armed forces. It specified three phases of air strength. In the first

phase, before the defeat of Japan, the Army Air Forces would need 215 air

groups with 14,092 tactical aircraft. The second phase (Initial Postwar Air

Force), after the defeat of Japan but prior to creating an effective World Security

Organization, would demand no fewer than 105 groups and 7,296 aircraft. Phase

III, distinguished by an effective world organization, would require 75 groups

with 4,233 aircraft. Arnold concluded that the War Department should accept his

demobilization plan in successive phases as a model and should evolve a program around his premises.36

The War Department and UMT

In May 1945, Army Deputy Chief of Staff Handy responded to General Arnold. The reply-based upon opinions from Tompkins' Special Planning Division-as well as the Operations Division-was for the most part a restatement

mirroring Marshall's view of what the public would likely support in the postwar

milieu. Handy agreed with Arnold that planning should embody a progressive

demobilization with reduction only as justified by world events. Once this initial

postwar period had ended, Handy echoed Marshall's long-held view that the

military would then face a situation similar to post-World War I. This meant austerity, paying off the public debt. Handy warned:

Military appropriations will be greatly reduced. The burden of our national

debt, the pressure to greatly reduce taxes and the necessity for the use of

available funds for nonmilitary purposes will quite likely force the Congress

into this position (austerity) even though Congress itself may desire something better in the way of national security.37

So postwar planning realistically should shape a military establishment to conform with such an environment. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff saw only a

slight chance of having a standing Army in peacetime that could furnish the kind

of national defense that the country deserved.38 Thus, the War Department (with

what it thought would be support from Congress) looked to UMT for the requisite military strength. This view, of course, clashed with General Arnold's conviction that the military should make clear what it needed, even in the face of

63
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

possible austerity. The key to the AAF's view was provision for an M-day striking force which could fulfill international commitments.

General Handy contested Arnold's opinion that Reserves could not be considered equal to a ready M-day force. The War Department, Handy reasoned,

would lack the funds to keep a Regular Army big enough to field a strong M-day

force. Clearly the critical question was how well could the Reserve units be expected to perform. The War Department's position pivoted upon the potential existence of a successful UMT program with Reserve components trained and

equipped to become part of the available M-day force. If this should prove to be

the case, Handy said, then the Army would have a larger and less expensive Mday force than without UMT, depending entirely on what size Regular Army the

Congress would approve.39

Arnold insisted that national security called for a statement of minimum military requirements (Congress and the public had a right to know), no matter what

funds might be obtainable. Handy countered that it was impossible to predict future needs. It was the War Department's stand that after the war there should be a

gradual demobilization with the Army being reduced only as justified by world

events. Handy thought this would elicit congressional support for perhaps several

years after the war so long as occupation forces stayed overseas and the world

situation was fluid. Later on, however, the Army would find itself in the same

position as after World War I-a sharp cutback in standing forces. To Handy and

Marshall, the crucial element was still funds. Based on past experience, they

were absolutely certain money for the military would be in very short supply.

Tompkins had pointed out that an Army Air Forces Of 16-20 groups appeared

to be as much as the peacetime national budget would allow. It also approached

the ceiling which could be supported by recruiting. The cost of the postwar establishment-330,000-man Army, UMT, and support for the Reserves-was estimated by Tompkins at about $2.8 billion. This amount, he observed, "together

with cost allocable to the Navy, represent a charge against the national budget

which it is expected will be exceedingly difficult for the Congress to support • , 4 0 with appropriations. Nonetheless, the War Department was going to prepare a

tentative alternate troop basis (composition) for the Permanent Postwar Army,

resting on the premise that UMT would fail to become a reality.41 As to the

AAF's fear that after the war there would continue to be an even split in funds

between the War Department and the Navy, Handy agreed that planning assumptions should be worked out with the Navy. And General Tompkins cautioned that

the War Department should not permit itself to be placed in an inferior position

relative to the Navy. Thus, the details of the permanent postwar Army troop basis

should not now be disclosed. At this time, Tompkins emphasized, the War Department should not commit itself publicly on the composition of the postwar

Army.

42

64
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

General Tompkins claimed that the root problem of the postwar military organization was how to speed sufficient reinforcements to a small peacetime

Army. 43 In May 1945, Tompkins outlined the foundations of the War Department's postwar program: An in-being postwar military establishment comprising

the Regular Army, National Guard, and the Organized Reserve, to form the nucleus for initial mobilization if Congress declared a national emergency; Universal Military Training to mobilize a reserve of trained manpower during a national

emergency; an adequate military intelligence network; an efficient industrial mobilization plan; and a satisfactory research and development program.44

The War Department's stance, as reiterated by Tompkins, was that American

military tradition did not countenance a large standing peacetime Army, nor had

the Congress over many years backed one.45 On the other hand, the War Department did not want to see anything like pre-World War II Army strength: "In

1935, for example, we could have placed all the Regular Army in the continental

United States, including the non-combat elements, in the Yankee Stadium and

still have had empty seats. We will need a real force."• However, in May 1945

Maj. Gen. William F. Tompkins (second from left) meets with (left to right)

Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, and Brig. Gen.

M. W. Watson, Hickam Field, February 1945. General Tompkins was then

director of the War Department's Special Planning Division.

65
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

with the war still going on, the War Department planners admitted that too many

unknown factors persisted to settle on the precise size of the postwar Army.

Although the War Department could not calculate the postwar Army's size, it

harbored no doubt about the need for UMT. Without Universal Military Training, the standing Regular Army would have to be expanded. This larger force

would be costly, voluntary enlistments could not sustain it, and it would not be in

harmony with American ideals and tradition. Only by peacetime conscription or

by financial inducements to encourage voluntary enlistments could such a large

force be maintained. General Marshall, of course, did not consider either of these

methods feasible. Tompkins accordingly turned to a system of UMT as the logical answer to the problem:

In the event of a national emergency, we must place our principal reliance,

as in the past, on our citizen soldiers. However, it is essential that these citizen soldiers be ready and effective if and when the necessity for mobilization arrives, and our plans for the size and com osition of the post-war army

must be based on these fundamental principles.

As part of its postwar planning, the War Department highlighted the National

Guard. Tompkins said the National Guard should be capable of immediate expansion to wartime strength, able to furnish units trained and equipped for service anywhere in the world. Eventually, the Guard should be able if necessary to

help the Regular Army defend the United States.48 Again, the key was UMT,

which could place the National Guard in a position to recruit volunteers who had

completed their year's training under the UMT program. In addition, the War

Department was planning an Active as well as Inactive Reserve. In case of emergency, the Active Reserve would contribute units for rapid mobilization and deployment. The Inactive Reserve would supply manpower for assignment as

needed. Reserve officers would aid in training young men in the UMT program.

49

Even so, the Army Air Forces held to its previously stated view that the potential Universal Military Training program depended upon available aircrews

and aircraft. Ground crews and technicians were but part of a balanced Air Force.

Therefore, in planning for expansion and the most efficient use of UMT trainees,

a proper ratio of aircrews must be trained. 50

The Air Force portion of the 4,500,000-man Army to be mobilized within

twelve months after M-day was 1,500,000. This would require the Air Force to

train 200,000 men a year, absorbing nearly the whole Army of 330,000 proposed

by General Tompkins' Special Planning Division. The AAF argued that the projected Army of 330,000 would not yield the M-day force essential for meeting

possible international commitments. 5 1

66
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

Establishing the 70-Group Goal

Meanwhile, with the war in Europe over, the War Department General Staff

in the spring of 1945 started planning for an interim force to undertake occupation duties in Europe and subsequently in the Far East, after Japan's anticipated

capitulation. For his part, General Arnold, determined to assign the appropriate

officers to key postwar planning positions, reassigned Maj. Gen. Laurence S.

Kuter from his planning post in Washington to become Deputy Commander of

the AAF, Pacific Ocean Area. Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad replaced Kuter as Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans. In 1942, as a colonel, Norstad had served on General Arnold's Advisory Council. Next, he was a planner for the Twelfth Air

Force and the Northwest African Air Forces. From January to June 1944, he was

Director of Operations for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. In 1945, based in

Washington as Chief of Staff of the Twentieth Air Force, he worked directly under Arnold in planning the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. Norstad,

in fact, was a protege of Arnold's. When Arnold summoned him from the Mediterranean to become Chief of Staff of the Twentieth in Washington, Norstad proclaimed his reluctance, not wanting to leave the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces

just when the end of the war was in sight. General Arnold made clear to Norstad

that as Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, he should take the lead in planning the

postwar organization and make certain that it would be compatible with an independent Air Force.

Also, Arnold transferred Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker from his Mediterranean command to Washington, as Deputy Commanding General, AAF, and Chief of Air

Staff. In his new post, Eaker would control planning for the AAF's interim and

permanent force structures. He would likewise have a dominant role in establishing the AAF's position on unification legislation. On May 31, 1945, Eaker approved and sent to the Special Planning Division an Interim Air Force plan

consisting of 78 groups and 32 separate squadrons, totaling 638,286 military personnel. This plan was designed for the period from the end of demobilization to

V-J Day plus three years. Still another plan, called the "V-J Plan," was created

by Brig. Gen. Davison's Special Projects Office in mid-July. This demobilization

plan, to be activated upon the defeat of Japan (which was assumed to be August

31, 1945), set the 78-group figure as the point at which demobilization would

end. It called for 78 groups, 32 separate squadrons, and a total of 654,000 en- 52

listed and officer personnel. In completing these plans, Eaker was complying

with War Department guidelines, stipulating that the Air Force would receive

one year's notice of impending war. The important thing was for the Air Force to

retain enough men to build an effective in-being force.

Meantime, in the summer of 1945, Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal proposed legislation to increase the permanent postwar strength of the Navy and

Marine Corps. Forrestal's move disturbed both Marshall and President Truman.

67
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

It followed by a short time the publication of a report by the JCS Special Committee on Reorganization (Richardson Committee), scoring the absence of interservice coordination as one of the major deficiencies in wartime.* Marshall

observed that Forrestal's attempt to enlarge naval strength by statute was a prime

example of a military service going its own way and a demonstration of the need

for unification once the war ended. Truman reacted by directing his personal

military adviser, Adm. William D. Leahy, to order all the military services to rethink their requirements. "This review," the President said, "should consider our

international commitments for the postwar world, the development of new wea3pons, and the relative position of the services in connection with these factors.'5

As a result of Truman's request, the services quickly defined and formulated

their postwar requirements. General Arnold instructed Spaatz, Vandenberg, Norstad, and Eaker to set the AAF's permanent peacetime force objective. On August 28, 1945, General Eaker approved the goal of a 70-group Air Force

(550,000 men), a reduction from 78 groups. This landmark decision was not

solely arrived at by deliberations of the AAF leaders. It reflected the War Department's decision of August 27 that the AAF would have to settle for a 70-group

program within a 574,000-man figure. The 70-group, 574,000-man figures were

broken down by the War Department as follows:54

Total AAF Number of

Area Military Personnel AAF Groups

Pacific 174,000 29

Alaska 14,000 3

China-Burma-India 12,000 0

Africa/Middle East 1,000 0

Europe 97,000 20

North Atlantic 4,000 0

South Atlantic 18,000 5

Continental U.S. 194,000 3

Strategic Reserve 60,000 10

574,000 70

The Army Air Forces disagreed with the location of specific AAF groups; for example, it was reconfiguring the number of groups to be stationed in Europe.55

This War Department personnel ceiling of 574,000 was specified for the Interim Air Force as of July 1, 1946, exclusive of students and replacements. The

AAF was enjoined to reduce this number to 550,000 including students and replacements, as soon as possible thereafter. 56 At the same time, Eaker directed

that the AAF would accept about 100 B-29s which were virtually completed.

*See Chapter 3.

68
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

Production of all other B-29, P-47, and P-51 aircraft not needed to meet the 70-

group program would be canceled. General Eaker decided on 25 very heavy

bomb groups of B-29s in lieu of the previously planned 40 groups. Of the already scheduled 40 very heavy bomber (VHB) groups, 28 were to be deployed to

Asia (including the western Pacific), 4 to Hawaii, I to Alaska, 2 to the Caribbean,

and 5 in the United States. 57 This deployment change by Eaker in late August

meant that 12 very heavy bomb groups would be kept in the Pacific (25 VHB

groups were there at the end of August); 1 VHB would be stationed in Alaska, 2

in the Caribbean, 5 in the United States, and 5 sent to Europe.58 Very heavy

bomb groups picked for Europe were the 44th, 93d, 448th, 467th, and 485th. Departure of these five units, scheduled for October 1945, was postponed to December and then to summer 1946. The delay was due to the need to replace many

personnel of these groups lost through demobilization. 59 The War Department

approved Eaker's very heavy bombardment deployment plan on September 1,

1945.60

The rest of the very heavy bombers would be used in the training program or

kept in depots as a reserve. Long-range reconnaissance needs were to be met by

rotating one squadron of each VHB group. Subject to reductions that might be

necessary to meet the 70 groups, there would be 25 fighter groups, 5 of them flying P-80s.61 In September the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed the 70-group figure,

to be reached by July 1, 1946.

Also in September, Norstad explained the rationale that would be used to justify the 70-group Air Force. Two considerations were paramount. First, a substantial standing Air Force would have to be maintained because of the

increasing American interest in international economics and politics. Norstad

called this the "broadening" of the U.S. sphere of influence. Second, the time

when an Air Force or an Army could be equipped and trained almost overnight

was gone. "In the next war," General Norstad emphasized, "we will be in the

midst of an all-out war from the start." Norstad specified the AAF's requirements

as long-range reconnaissance, strategic bombing, air defense, support of ground

forces, and the contribution of air forces to a United Nations organization. Perhaps the major consideration, he noted, would be the state of the postwar economy. To support a postwar Air Force of 550,000 would be inexpensive compared

to the cost of conducting a future war.

In November, General Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations

and Training, apprised Eaker that the War Department General Staff had designated only 400,000 troops for the AAF. If accepted by the AAF, Vandenberg

said, the War Department would freeze this figure until February 1947, when reductions might occur if Congress cut the Army's overall one million-man ceiling. Vandenberg approved of the 400,000 level, asserting that the War

Department would permit 70 groups if strict economy ruled in the use of personnel.

6 2

69
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

While these important decisions were being made, General Davison's Special

Projects Office phased out in September 1945. Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air

Staff, Plans, had assumed a far larger role in the planning process and would now

monitor changes in the size and composition of the postwar Air Force. Davison's

Special Projects became the Special Planning Division (under Col. Reuben C.

Moffat) of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans.63

With the war ended and Eaker having formally established the AAF goal of

400,000 men as directed by the War Department, Headquarters AAF revised its

V-J Plan on September 19, 1945. This revision of "Assumptions and Ground

Rules" specified three periods: I, July 1945 to September 2, 1945 (V-J Day

which had already passed); II, from September 2, 1945 to July 1, 1946; and III,

from July 1946 to July 1948. The revision delineated an Interim Air Force during

Periods I and II of a size and composition necessary to furnish occupational

forces in Asia and Europe; provide a firstline defensive striking force and a strategic reserve; supply a military air transport service, operated bthe Air Force

for all the services; and maintain training and research facilities. The strategic

reserve was defined as that part of the Interim Air Force to be available immediately to reinforce units anywhere in the world.65 The Mobilized Air Force referred to the 1,500,000 personnel for forming 131 groups that could be mobilized

within twelve months during an emergency.

Thus, the Interim Air Force would exist until July 1, 1948, composed of

574,000 personnel exclusive of students and replacements. It would stabilize as

As Deputy Commander

and Chief of Air Staff, Lt.

Gen. Ira Eaker played a

key role in planning the

structure of the postwar

Air Force.

70
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad.

A member of the AAF's

peace-time planning team,

he foresaw the need for a

large standing Air Force.

soon as possible thereafter at a period III strength of 550,000 including students

and replacements. The September 19, 1945 plan also stated that the Interim Air

Force would be organized so as to "facilitate early implementation of the basic

recommendations of the Richardson Committee with respect to the establishment

of a single Department of National Defense.'' 66 This September 1945 plan in

large measure bore the stamp of General Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air Staff,

Plans. He suggested that the AAF take the lead in proposing a military air transport service, and encouraged Eaker to plan for the eventual integration of

ASWAAF personnel into the Air Force. These recommendations fit into Norstad's larger framework calling 67 for greater attention to planning for the transition

to the peacetime Air Force. Moreover, Norstad emphasized that the thrust of

all postwar planning would be to foster the early implementation of the recommendations of the Richardson committee to create a single Department of National Defense and a separate Air Force coequal with the Army and Navy.

After President Truman had asked for the services' requirements, the War Department in August had created the Special War Department Committee on the

Permanent Military Establishment, headed by Brig. Gen. William W. Bessell,

*See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the recommendations of the Richardson Committee.

71
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Jr.* The Bessell Committee's report (revised many times in September and October) underscored that its recommendations should in no way compromise the

goal of a single Department of the Armed Forces, if that is what should be decided upon. This committee also stated that the United States would undoubtedly

keep a peacetime force and, in the event of an emergency, mobilize industry and

the citizen army. The Regular establishment would be supported by the National

Guard and the Organized Reserve. Adequate manning and training of these Reserve components could only be done by a system of Universal Military Training.

68

The committee acknowledged the difficulty of planning the future organization of the military establishment as well as defining roles and missions:

It is impossible at this time to envisage precisely the nature of the military

establishment with which we will enter the next war. In the first place the

decision as to whether or not there will be a single Department of Armed

Forces will have a profound effect. In the second place the rapid strides

which are currently being made... in the research and development of new

weapons are such that our present concept of military organization, tactics

and strategy may have to be materially altered. In the third place National

Policy, on which military policy is based, is itself fluid.69

The committee's report thought it unlikely that the atomic bomb would be employed except in a conflict with a major power. For other wars, forces would be

organized to use conventional weapons. So, a series of arbitrary assumptions

were made as to what the Army must deliver: minimum forces to protect strategically located bases in outlying areas of responsibility; sufficient air and ground

striking forces in the United States, able to move rapidly to any area; and a nucleus of trained officers and men held in reserve in the United States. 7 1 General

Marshall, however, found the committee's interim report unrealistic in that he

was convinced that the cost to support such a permanent military establishment

would not he voted by a peacetime Congress. Furthermore, personnel to support

such a program could not be obtained by a voluntary enlistment program. Brig.

Gen. Henry I. Hodes, War Department Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, told the

Bessell Committee in October that its suggested figures were unnecessarily large

since the committee had yet to weigh the thrust of UMT. Hodes said that once a

UMT program had been established, National Guard units could be ready on or

shortly after M-day. Organized Reserve units could be made combat ready more

*Besides Chairman Bessell from the Operational Plans Division, the committee included Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Chamberlain, G-3; Brig. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, Army

Ground Forces; Brig. Gen. Glen C. Jamison, AAF; and Brig. Gen. Henry C. Wolfe, Army

Service Forces.

72
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

quickly than before, and the strength of a "skeletonized" Regular Army could be

expanded as need be. He asserted that

the requirement for an air force in being and strategically deployed, as well

as for a high percentage of technical and specialized training, will require a

corresponding increase in strength. Those units serving overseas may have

to be manned at greater strength than those stationed within the continental

limits of the U.S. 72

Hodes directed that the special committee should emphasize: the effect of the

atomic bomb and new weapons on warfare and the resultant changes in unit

needs; an analysis of how many personnel might be procured by voluntary enlistment; the demand for stringent economy; the impact of Universal Military Training; maximum "skeletonization" of units in the permanent establishment; and

maximum use of civilians. Hodes also wanted the special committee to keep in

touch with the Patch Board, which was conducting hearings to recommend a reorganization of the War Department. 73

In line with Hodes' directive, General Bessell advised the committee that

AAF planning should be guided by the policy that air units in the continental

United States would either be kept at 50 percent strength or the number of groups

would be reduced. Overseas air units would be held at 80 percent or less or similarly the number of units would be pared. Bessell next presented figures totaling

435,000 men: Army Air Forces, 150,000; Army Ground Forces, 100,000; Army

Service Forces, 60,000; overhead, 15,000; training, National Guard, Organized

Reserve, and UMT, 110,000. 74 Bessell's guidance of course conflicted with the

AAF's objective of a 70-group, 400,000-man Air Force.

In early November 1945, General Bessell pressed for a Regular Army ceiling

of 500,000 with 200,000 of this figure allocated to UMT, National Guard, and

the Organized Reserve. The remaining 300,000 would be divided as follows:

AAF, 165,000; AGF, 100,000; and ASF, 35,000.75 At this juncture, Brig. Gen.

Glen C. Jamison, the AAF committee member, apprised General Norstad of Bessell's guidance which fell far short of what the AAF believed it needed. Norstad

(now the primary focus for Air Staff planning since General Davison's departure

from the Special Projects) Office) ordered Jamison to draw up a formal reply to

Bessell's request. This meant assisting the committee with such information as

needed. Nevertheless, Norstad instructed Jamison that under no circumstances

would the AAF accept less than 70 groups and 400,000 personnel. The ceiling of

165,000 would in no way be a recommendation of the Army Air Forces nor

would the AAF accept such a figure.76 General Jamison followed Norstad's direction and on November 17 sent the committee information supporting a plan

for an Air Force of 22 groups and 34 separate squadrons. Simultaneously. Jamison stressed the AAF's adherence to the 400,000-man, 70-group program.

73
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Jamison's Dissent to Bessell Committee

On November 29, 1945, having revised its figures once again, the Bessell

Committee proposed to General Marshall a War Department troop basis of

562,700 including 203,600 AAF personnel, organized into 25 1/2 groups in the

United States and 8 1/2 groups overseas. General Jamison filed a minority report

suggesting acceptance of the 400,000 AAF troop basis.78 Jamison noted that so

far attempts by the AAF to receive approval for its force structure of 400,000 had

failed. Typically, the War Department continued to recommend a ceiling considerably below what the Army Air Forces considered to be the minimum. Jamison

pointed out that "after the second major war in this century and the costliest ever

suffered by this nation, it is desperately necessary that we lay well-conceived

plans for a military security force that will effectively guarantee the peace and

safety of the U.S."79 Like General Arnold, Jamison argued that the AAF would

fail to fulfill its obligations if it did not make plans, aside from arbitrary budget

estimates. The Army Air Forces owed the nation a realistic assessment of air requirements. Two considerations were paramount. The first was national security

and the second was the economy. Air Staff plans since 1943, Jamison asserted,

"have resulted in the firm conviction that the 70-Group Air Force (which .... has

been squeezed into a 400,000 tentative Troop Basis) is the bedrock minimum

with which the Air Force can accomplish its peacetime mission.'8° Reduction of

Air Force strength from 400,000 to 203,600 meant a considerable diminution of

the striking force. It was simply not acceptable to the Army Air Forces.

Jamison depicted the peacetime mission as building a ready striking force that

could operate instantly on a global scale and at the same time protect mobilization at home. Overseas bases (with intermediate fields) would likewise be

needed. It was contradictory to plan a network of overseas bases, as the administration was doing, and yet simultaneously slash the AAF below 70 groups, thus

neglecting to allocate the requisite units to maintain such bases. Moreover, "stripping the Air Force of the units needed for its mission will be an admission that

this country must rely for security in the air on the Naval Air Forces, which is a

more expensive and less effective way of attacking the problem of air security.''8 The proposed Regular Air Force would be too small to meet its major responsibility-replying to a surprise, all-out attack. And again bearing down on

one of the AAF's chief arguments, a point which General Arnold refused to compromise: a thoroughly trained combat force was required. The number of pilots

having experience in combat units before entering the Reserves must be balanced

with the output from UMT.82

Meanwhile, the long-time proponents of UMT, of whom General Marshall

had been the most important and conspicuous, received a tremendous boost from

74
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

the President.* Mr. Truman, who profoundly respected Marshall, was known to

favor universal training. At a press conference in June 1945, he had pointedly

mentioned that he held strong views on this subject, which he said he would subsequently make known. On October 23 the Commander in Chief delivered a formal address on UMT to a joint session of Congress. He said that the war just

ended had made one point clear: If attacked in the future, the United States

would not have time to adequately arm itself. Consequently, Truman said that the

nation could either maintain a large standing Army or rely on a small Army supported by trained citizens, able to be speedily mobilized. To President Truman,

the proper course was clear. The country should depend on

a comparatively small professional armed force, reinforced by a well-trained

and effectively organized citizen reserve. The backbone of our military force

should be the trained citizen who is first and foremost a civilian, and who

becomes a soldier or a sailor only in time of danger-and only when Congress considers it necessary. This plan is obviously more practical and economical. It conforms more closely to long-standing American tradition. The

citizen reserve must be a trained reserve. We can meet the need for a trained

reserve in only one way-by universal training.83

Truman recommended that the postwar military organization consist of comparatively small Regular forces, a strengthened National Guard and Organized

Reserve, and a General Reserve composed of all male citizens who had received

Universal Military Training. The General Reserve, as proposed by Truman,

could be quickly mobilized, but would not be obliged to serve unless called up

by an Act of Congress. To man the General Reserve, he proposed adoption of

UMT, under which citizens would be trained for one year. Young men would enter training upon graduation from high school or at the age of eighteen, whichever was later. The President argued that this system would give the nation "a

democratic and efficient military force." The atomic bomb, he stressed, was of

little value without a strong Army, Navy, and Air Force. Truman urged Congress

to pass UMT legislation promptly.84

*Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson was also an advocate of UMT. He generally

supported Marshall's views and also emphasized the way UMT would stimulate a sense

of responsibility and of duty on the part of the nation's youth. Patterson believed that

"service in the ranks should be obligatory before young men could qualify for officers'

commission." (Ltr, Patterson to Herbert Pell, Nov 29, 1945, in Patterson Papers, MD, LC,

Box 21.)

75
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Arnold Urges 70 Groups

Arnold, however, was not deflected from promoting the 70-group program.

To the contrary, he renewed the AAF's attack on UMT and the Bessell Committee report. In December 1945, he underscored to Army Chief of Staff General

Eisenhower that Headquarters AAF concurred with Jamison's minority report. A

203,600-man Air Force would yield a force in being that could neither sustain

national security nor properly support ground and naval operations. Until the reorganization or unification of the armed forces, the minimum strength of the

AAF to discharge its postwar mission was 70 groups with at least 400,000

men.85

Besides, Arnold strenuously objected to the way in which postwar requirements were being drafted by the services. President Truman had requested in August 1945 that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the Navy's demands relative to the

peacetime needs of all the services. Truman wanted nothing less than a comprehensive plan, but the question was how to develop it. Arnold opposed devising

this plan by having each of the services independently arrive at their wants and

afterwards forcing them to make minor revisions. The AAF Commander reiterated that the President wanted the Joint Chiefs first to consider the postwar miliBessell Committee memher, Brig. Gen. Glen C.

Jamison, AAF, attacked

the committee's recommendations and supported

the 70-group, 400,000 military personnel program.

76
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

-0.

0

z

President Truman and Gen.

Dwight D. Eisenhower. The

president favored maintaining a small standing Army,

supported by trained citizen

reserves.

tary organization the country needed, and then to figure out the forces required

for such an establishment. Having the services work out their needs on their own,

Arnold argued, was bound to spawn duplication and excessive requirements. It

was simply not an efficient way to do business. As an example, Arnold pointed

to the existence of two air transport services, the Navy's and the AAF's.* Such

duplication was costly and Arnold suggested that the money would better be

spent on research and development.86 Over and above all other considerations,

he thought the AAF might not receive the forces it required if the services continued independently to assess their needs. He wanted air requirements to be generally recognized as preeminent.

General Arnold repeated his preference for a single Department of National

Defense as recommended by the April 1945 report of the JCS special committee.

He said that this committee, whose sole purpose was to suggest a postwar organization for the nation's defense, consisted of members from all the services. He

also emphasized that forces being proposed by the War Department for the post-

*They would be combined in June 1948, with creation of the Military Air Transport

Service, under General Kuter. See Chapter 7.

77
ESTIMATED AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

FOR 70-GROUP PEACETIME AIR FORCE

Air National Guard,

Regular Air Force Air Reserve, Air ROTC

Unit Equipment Unit Equipment

Combat 4925 Combat 2657

Transport 496

Training 2040 Training 3000

Utility 697 Utility 500

Total 8158 Total 6157

Aircraft Reserve Aircraft Reserve

Combat 2634 Combat 266

Transport 50

Training 204 Training 300

Utility 70 Utility 50

Total 2958 Total 616

Total All Components

Combat 10,482

Transport 546

Training 5,544

Utility 1,317

Total 17,889

Estimated New Aircraft per Year

Combat 2,600

Other Types 1,100

Total 3,700
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

war Air Force were wholly inadequate. Due to War Department restrictionswitness the Bessell Committee deliberations-the AAF lacked the latitude to

draw up its own requirements, thus giving the Navy an unfair advantage in stating its aviation needs. In addition, the AAF had to have ample forces to support

the planned international Air Force under the United Nations.87

The positions put forth by General Arnold and other AAF leaders were persuasive. They were highlighted in November 1945 when AAF and War Department planners discussed the overall War Department troop basis and the Army

Air Forces' contribution to it. General Staff members, no doubt swayed by the

new Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower's view on the significance of air warfare,

became persuaded that the AAF must have sufficient forces to accomplish its

postwar tasks. They agreed to the 400,000-man ceiling, to encompass students,

"pipeline population," and other personnel in support of the 70-group program.88

The 400,000 would be frozen from June 30, 1946, until February 1, 1947, when a

reduction might be dictated should Congress then decrease the Army below one

million personnel. Army Air Forces planners assented to this approach with the

understanding that 400,000 would remain constant unless selective service or enlistments failed to meet the overall troop program.

However, UMT persisted as a major concern. The Army Air Forces wanted to

be sure it would not have to support UMT out of the 70-group program. The

AAF estimated a need for 70,000 additional men to support UMT, National

Guard, and the Reserve. General Arnold regarded 400,000 as the minimum for

70 groups. The extra 70,000 would therefore have to be met from other

sources. Arnold next met with Eisenhower, who approved the AAF's position

that 400,000 would not embrace UMT or other civilian components. This number would support the 70-group program, including essential support units. Military personnel returning to the United States for discharge or hospitalization

would be charged to the War Department's troop basis.9 1

With Eisenhower's concurrence in the 70-group, 400,000-man program, the

AAF Special Planning Division (part of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans), published on December 26, 1945, a definitive plan for the peacetime force. Titled

"Assumptions and Ground Rules Pertaining to the Interim and Peacetime Air

Forces Plans," it superseded the September 19,1945, plan called "Revision of the

Assumptions and Ground Rules of the AAF VJ Plan of 15 July 1945." Distributed throughout the AAF, the new plan pointed out that the Army Air Forces was

chiefly concerned with occupation activities in Germany and Japan, with demobilization, and with readjustment from war to peacetime requirements. The Interim Period would be the time during which these needs were being met, with

the Air Force being known as the Interim Air Force.92

The December 1945 plan defined the postwar military establishment as the organization in being when the military returned to full peacetime status. This establishment was therefore not designed to meet the demands of the transition

79
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

period from war to peace. But when the interim period ended and Congress

passed legislation to put the Air Force on a peacetime footing, it would be known

as the Peacetime or Permanent Air Force. And in time it would be termed the Air

Force and would comprise the Regular Air Force, Air Reserve, and the Air National Guard.93

This plan described the Regular Air Force as the "professional component of

the Air Force." In addition to the Regular Air Force, a volunteer Reserve Officer

Training Corps system in civilian schools would produce a qualified reserve of

air officers. Universal Military Training, once in force, would furnish a trained

reserve of enlisted men. The so-called General Reserve was depicted as that part

of the interim or peacetime Air Force "available for immediate reinforcement of

units which may be committed to action in any part of the world." 9 4 The M-day

Air Force consisted of combat units ready for action on the first day of mobilization. These units included the peacetime Regular Air Force (including Reserves

on active duty, and that portion of the Air National Guard (ANG) available for

immediate action.*

What became known as the Mobilized Air Force was the Air Force to be created within one year after a future M-day. As of December 1945, it was presumed that with a system of UMT and the resulting million-man reserve in the

Peacetime Air Force, the Mobilized Air Force would total 1,500,000 organized

into 131 groups (not including antiaircraft artillery). The 131 groups would be

formed by 70 Regular groups, 27 from the Air National Guard, and 34 from the

Organized Air Reserve.95

According to the December 1945 plan, the mission of the Air Force was

to develop, train and maintain a military force. . .capable at any time,

through the immediate sustained, and increasing exercise of air power, of

defending the integrity of the United States and its strategic areas, of supporting US international obligations, and of cooperating with ground and naval forces similarly engaged.?6

The same troop basis and group strength applied to both the Interim and Peacetime Air Forces: 400,000 military personnel and 70 combat groups. With Eisenhower's acceptance of the Peacetime Air Force, the "training overhead" of UMT

would require another 70,000 Reserves on extended active duty. Composition of

70 combat groups would be 25 very heavy bomb groups, 25 fighter groups, 5

medium and light bomber groups, 10 transport groups, and 5 tactical reconnaissance groups. The plan also specified a Department of the Armed Forces with

three branches-Army, Navy, and Air Force. Also in the postwar Air Force or-

*The December 26, 1945, plan presupposed that twenty of twenty-seven Air National

Guard groups would be on hand for instant action.

80
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

ganization was a Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Scientific Research and Development.97 In November 1945, Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay had been appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development.

The plan additionally called for an "Air Force School" offering Tactical,

Command and Staff, and Air War courses, and for creating an Air Force Institute

of Technology under the Air Technical Service Command. Antiaircraft artillery

and Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces would be integral parts of the

Peacetime Air Force. The ratio of rated to nonrated officers in this force was put

at 70 to 30.98

Final Approval for 70 Groups

Definitive AAF postwar planning forced General Bessell in December 1945

to once again revise his committee's report. This time it afforded an Army Air

Forces of 70 groups and 419,355 personnel (53,584 officers and 365,771 enlisted

men). Eisenhower approved these figures in the War Department's Tentative

Plan for a Permanent Peacetime Army, endorsed by the JCS in late January

1946.99 As previously directed by President Truman, this plan would have to be

integrated with the Navy's program. Hence, after nearly two and a half years of

planning, a postwar of Air Force 70 groups and 400,000 men was finally approved by the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although some

scholars* have written that 70 groups was basically an arbitrary figure, this objective should he considered as a culmination of two and a half years of intensive

work. As we have seen, the Army Air Forces had at first asked for numbers far

exceeding 70 groups and 400,000 men.' The 70-group program had evolved in

the face of War Department disapproval of the 105-group proposal. Recommendations for the AAF peacetime force structure had reached as low as 120,000

men, a suggestion of the Bessell Committee. Between the summer of 1943 and

August 1945, when the AAF set 70 groups as the goal, several postwar air plans

had been drafted. As noted, the 70-group figure was set by the AAF only after

the War Department had compelled the Army Air Forces to shape its group program to a 574,000 force.

The Army Air Forces took a firm stand on the 70 groups as the minimum

force structure. General Norstad argued that the AAF had been under "great pres-

*For example, Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in

National Politics (New York, 1961)

tGroup Strength during World War II peaked at 232 in early 1945. By September

1945 the group figure stood at 201; in October, 178; November, 128; December, 109. By

January 1946 the AAF was down to 89 groups and in August 1946 to 52 groups.

81
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

sure" from the War Department to accede to a figure less than 400,000. As to the

idea that voluntary recruitment could not support a force of 400,000, Norstad

countered:

We believe that we can maintain a voluntary force of 400,000 at no sacrifice

to the other services if we have certain conditions such as an autonomous

Air Force, a separate Air Force recruiting program, extra Air Force inducements such as education programs and increased incentives which would be

common throughout all services.la)

In essence, the AAF's rigid position for 70 groups revolved around the concept

that this was the least number that could administer active duty training for Reserves to achieve the final mobilization target of one and a half million men

within one year after M-day. Fewer than 70 groups could not keep aircraft production at a sufficient rate to meet mobilization needs.10 1 The AAF further contended that it would take 70 groups to man the key bases "for protection of the

country's interests." 10 2

The rationale for the 25 very heavy bomb groups, as part of the 70-group program, was that "the western hemisphere and the Pacific are directly our responsibility and the VHB offers the only strategic coverage." A proposed mobile

striking force would be built around the 25 VHB groups. Army Air Forces planners reasoned that in the event of war, attrition of heavy bombers would be substantial during the first year. The planners said that fighter, medium, and light

bombers were supplied "in proportion to the requirement for short range responsibilities, tactical operations, and escort of the VHB force." 10 3

Besides, the 70-group proposal recognized that it would be necessary to contribute to an air force under international auspices. The foremost factor, however,

was the AAF's conviction that air power was now dominant. The United States

needed an Air Force in being that could retaliate at once in case of a massive surprise attack.

So on December 26, 1945, simultaneously with publication of the plan for the

Interim and Peacetime Air Forces, General Arnold directed that 70 groups and

400,000 men (70,000 more for UMT, National Guard, ROTC, and Reserve), be

set as goals for both the interim and peacetime or permanent Air Force. From this

point on, all AAF planning centered on 70 groups. The Mobilized Air Force

would be reached within a year of M-day (first day of mobilization), and would

total one and a half million men. Its 131 groups were apportioned as follows:

Regular Army, 70; Air National Guard, 27; and Organized Air Reserve, 34.I04

Of the 25 very heavy bomb groups, 5 were scheduled for deployment to

Europe, 13 to the Pacific area, 2 to the Caribbean area, and 5 to be assigned to

the Strategic Striking Force (SSF) in the United States. Seven of the 35 fighter

groups would be in the European theater, I I in the Pacific, 2 in the Caribbean, 2

in Zone of Interior (ZI) training, and 3 (long-range escort) in the SSF. Two me82
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

dium and light bomber groups were earmarked for Europe, 2 for the Pacific, and

1 for the SSF. Four transport groups would go to Europe, 3 to the Pacific, I to ZI

training, and 2 to the SSF. One tactical reconnaissance group would be in the

European theater, 2 in the Pacific, I in ZI training, and 1 in the SSF. 10 5

The air forces in the Pacific were to discharge the dual mission of what was

termed United States security and the occupation of Japan. The AAF would be

organized into an occupation air force for Japan and Korea, and a mobile and defensive force for security of the Pacific area. Units of the Fifth Air Force would

be responsible for the occupation of Japan and Korea, under the direct command

of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Other AAF units in the Pacific would be based in the Philippines, Ryukyus, Marianas, Bonin Islands, and

Hawaii. These forces would be consolidated under the U.S. Army Strategic Air

Forces, under the Commanding General, AAF, acting as executive agent for the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.106 The following is a breakdown of the planned 400,000-

man Air Force: 10 7

Function Strength

Combat Striking Force 42,188

Technical Service 73,527

Flight Service 43,052

Operational Support Service 19,300

Engineer Service 46,958

Ordnance Service 1,208

Air Transport Service 46,305

Special Services 6,264

Air Defense 14,785

Training 67,143

General Overhead 39,260

Total 399,990

70 Groups vs UMT

By the end of 1945, it had become clear that the Army Air Force's 70-group,

400,000-man program was being seen in Congress as an attractive alternative to

Universal Military Training. This was true even though during 1943-45 the War

Department, spurred by General Marshall, continued to plan for a citizen army

which could be quickly mobilized in the event of war. Moreover, all through the

war, postwar planners in the War Department presumed that Congress would enact the UMT program. And of course President Truman was a strong advocate of

UMT. He had in fact once told a reporter that he had favored UMT since 1905,

upon first joining the National Guard. However, despite the manifest difficulty

which UMT encountered in Congress, the Army Air Forces needed to comply

with War Department directives to plan for a UMT program since it might be

83
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

legislated by Congress. Thus, in 1946 the AAF simultaneously planned for a

situation with or without a UMT program.

By early 1946 the War Department realized that chances were increasing that

UMT legislation might not be enacted. Despite President Truman's having urged

Congress to pass UMT legislation quickly, the lawmakers had failed to respond.

And General Marshall's entreaties, prior to his retirement as Army Chief of Staff,

had proved no more successful. The New York Times pointedly noted that Marshall had mounted a "virtual crusade" in behalf of the UMT program, adding that

"the Army geared up its entire public relations machinery." Nevertheless, it

had become evident that Congress was not disposed to enact the President's program. 109

In January 1946 the War Department sent a study to Headquarters AAF titled

"Mobilization of the 4.5 Million Army without Universal Military Training."

This plan was based upon voluntary enlistment for ten years, the first two years

being active duty and the remainder to be served in Reserve status. Those in the

Reserves from the third to tenth years would create a pool of trainees which

could be mobilized in the same fashion as the pool established under a UMT program.

The AAF concluded that this plan was unsound because: (!) Sufficient men to

meet requirements could not be enlisted under a ten-year contract; (2) it would be

impossible to maintain the proficiency of so many men in their specialities during eight years in the Reserves; and (3) it was highly probable that men separated

under this plan would not form a proper distribution of military occupational specialties.t II

For these reasons, the Army Air Forces proposed that mobilization be based

on maximum use of skills directly available from the civilian labor force. During

and after the war it was assumed that nearly everyone inducted into the services

required training for a specific military occupational specialty. However, if accurate information were available, men could be called to active duty at the time

they were needed. The AAF estimated that from fifty to seventy-five percent of

initial AAF needs could be filled from men already qualified in the required military occupational specialities as a result of their civilian training and experi- 112

ence.

The AAF believed that mobilization planning should he extended to civilian

war industry, to the extent of detailing production schedules for critical items to

plants so that contractors could prepare estimates of manpower needs by occupational specialty. Government agencies would supplement these with industrywide estimates of manpower requirements for production of less critical items.

The AAF recommended a selective service system under which registration

would include information on occupational specialty, certified to local selective

service boards by employers. In addition an enlisted Reserve technician training

program should be started,

84
PLANNING FOR 70 GROUPS

similar to the presently planned program for rated officers, in which men

would be separately recruited for training in specific technical fields, trained

in a special status similar to aviation cadets, serve a short period in the military service, and return to civilian life with an obligation to continue in a reserve status and maintain technical proficiency through short periods of

active duty and extension courses. It is believed that such a program can be

conducted entirely on a voluntary basis, and together with the proposed plan

for advance mobilization planning, will meet all mobilization requirements.

11

3

In the summer of 1946 the War Department published a draft UMT plan

stipulating the trainees be given six months training, and spend the remaining six

months obligation in the UMT corps or by selecting one of the options which

would furnish the equivalent of another six months training." 4

Later, the AAF issued a supplement to this plan affording the Air Force

186,000 trainees a year. There would be 46,500 trainees inducted quarterly, each

to be sent to one of these training courses: administration; airplanes, engines, and

accessories; armament, ordnance, chemical; communications; nonspecialist;

manual trades; medical; photography; or special equipment.]15

With the AAF's planning for a permanent postwar Air Force having finally

reached the 70-group, 400,000-man goal, the time had come to translate these

figures into a permanent organization. While air planners had been struggling

with the complexities of force structure, they had likewise been tackling the

problems of deciding on the composition of postwar Air Force headquarters and

the major field commands. The question of organization was closely tied to the

paramount objective of an independent Air Force, coequal with the Army and

Navy. General Spaatz, who was to become Commanding General of the Army

Air Forces in February 1946, believed that this first major postwar reorganization

should produce a structure suited to a separate Air Force, once this was established by law.

The movement towards a unified defense establishment and a separate Air

Force had gathered impetus in April 1945 with the issuance of a special JCS

committee report recommending a single Department of National Defense and an

independent Air Force. Once the war ended, congressional hearings were held on

unification. By this time, it was apparent that the Navy opposed formation of a

single department and a coequal Air Force.

Frustrated by the absence of agreement between the Navy and War Department, and with his patience wearing thin, President Truman in December 1945

told the Congress that the time for action was now. Staking a position opposed to

the Navy's, Truman stressed that the JCS committee system, a vehicle for collaboration in strategic planning and operations during the war, would undoubtedly fail to satisfy peacetime defense requirements. The future security needs of

the nation would best be ensured by creation of a Department of National Defense, with three coequal services-Army, Navy, and Air Force.

85
3

Unification and a Separate Air Force

True preparedness now means preparedness not alone in

armaments and numbers of men, but preparedness in

organization also. It means establishing in peacetime the

kind of military organization which will be able to meet

the test of sudden attack quickly and without having to

improvise radical readjustment in structure and habits.

President Harry S. Truman

December 19, 1945,

Special Message to the Congress

In 1944-45, while the Army Air Forces was planning postwar organization

and force structure that set the 70-group objective, the debate over armed forces

unification and the desirability of a separate Air Force grew more intense. During

the spring of 1944, the Woodrum Committee held hearings on the question of

unification.* In April 1945, a report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense touched off heated discussion about

postwar reorganization and in October and November 1945 unification hearings

were convened before the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Meanwhile, the

War Department had created boards (first under Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch,

Jr., subsequently headed by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson) to propose an appropriate peacetime organization until such time as unification was achieved. The

AAF emphasized that at the least it wanted to preserve what it had gained during

the war. Then, in December 1945, President Harry S. Truman's special message

*The Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy of the House of Representatives,

Clifton A. Woodrum, Democrat, Virginia, Chairman.

87
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

to Congress recommended establishment of a Department of National Defense

and creation of a separate Air Force, coequal with the Army and Navy.

In the months preceding Truman's message, much of the testimony by military and civilian officials to congressional committees had focused on unity of

command. Unified command of land, sea, and air forces had been realized in the

various theaters under the impetus of the requirements of war. The matter of an

independent Air Force had become linked to unity of command. It was not a

question whether unity of command was necessary. All agreed that the war had

demonstrated beyond doubt that unified command was indispensable to successful theater operations. The controversy centered on the best way to organize for

it. The Navy opposed a separate Air Force and advocated the status quo, coordination being accomplished by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their committees. The

Army favored unification (a Department of National Defense) and an independent Air Force. During the last two years of the war, General Marshall (and

also General Arnold) led the War Department's drive for legislation to form a

Department of National Defense. Marshall argued that in the future the United

States would not have sufficient time to mobilize. Consequently, unification in

peacetime was imperative to ensure rapid, effective, unified command in wartime. Once the present war ended, he asserted, unified policies, operations, and

command would be much more difficult to attain.

Thus, before the war ended, the AAF and the War Department anticipated a

battle over unification and creation of a coequal Air Force. Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, put it this way to General Spaatz:

There is bound to be tremendous upheaval after the defeat of Germany. ...

our planning has been well done on the whole but we must be prepared for a

bitter struggle with the High Command and particularly with the Navy in

getting the postwar set-up properly made so that airpower is recognized as a

coequal arm.'

In November and December 1945, the unification cause received a substantial

boost from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower who had succeeded Marshall as Army

Chief of Staff. Having just returned from Europe where he had led the Allied

forces to victory, Eisenhower made clear that, based on the lessons of war, there

was no doubt that unification and an independent Air Force were required. He

admonished his commanders in this regard and told the Congress that he supported a strong unification bill and a separate Air Force.

First Marshall and then Eisenhower appointed boards in 1945 to shape the

War Department's postwar organization prior to unification. Generals Arnold

and Spaatz advocated that the AAF be coordinate with the War Department General Staff. In effect this would have created two Chiefs of Staff, one for air and

one for the ground forces. To the chagrin of air planners, the Eisenhower-appointed Simpson Board placed the Army Air Forces coordinate with the Army

88
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

Ground Forces, under the War Department General Staff. This arrangement, in

its main lines, obtained until formation of the United States Air Force in September 1947. However, the Simpson Board recognized the principle of granting

more autonomy to the Army Air Forces. It further stated that the Commanding

General, AAF, would nominate from the Army Air Forces about fifty percent of

the personnel of the War Department General and Special Staff divisions.

In addition the AAF Commander would keep his place on the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. The Office of Assistant Secretary of War for Air was retained. Although

Arnold and Spaatz failed to receive all they wanted, they realized they had Eisenhower's firm pledge to support establishment of an independent Air Force.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee Report

In April and May 1944, with the Allies preparing to launch the cross-channel

attack, the Woodrum Committee addressed the complex problems of postwar organization. The committee's objective was to study the principle of unity of command to examine its relevance to future military policy and organization. Among

those testifying was AAF Brig. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Chief of Staff,

Twentieth Air Force. Hansell stressed that, like World War II, future wars would

undoubtedly feature combined operations in which ground, sea, and air units

would be coordinated by a single staff under one overall command. The Army

Air Forces, he said, advocated a single unified organization. As for unity of command:

In one form or another we have acquired a degree of unity of command in

all the theaters of war .... However, the achievement of that unity on the

field of battle has been reached with great difficulty, and has resulted in delay with its attendant wastage. Furthermore, unity of command on the field

of battle is not enough. In order to achieve real unity of effort the foundations for that must stem from unity in basic training doctrine and equipment.

2

The testimony of War Department officials, including Secretary Stimson and

Assistant Secretary of War for Air Lovett, paralleled that of Hansell. Lovett

noted that the lessons of the war clearly meant that conflicts in the future would

be distinguished by combined operations:

I assume that airlift for sea forces and ground forces will be allocated and

disposed in the interest of national defense by a combined and unified staff

consisting of the top ground, sea and air officers in this country, and not on

the tortured interpretation of antiquated documents dealing with vague theories and doctrines which have to be thrown away the moment war breaks

out.3

89
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

He also accented long-range bombers, undreamed of years ago, the result of an

industrial system peculiarly suited to the American temperament. It was Lovett's

opinion that the Navy should maintain its specialized fleet air arm.4

Naval leaders refused to support a single department of national defense without considerable additional study. They wanted to keep the Navy strong. The naval air arm was central to their concept of future naval growth and strength. For

example, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, Artemus L. Gates, insisted that

a strong naval air arm could contribute significantly to keeping the postwar aircraft industry alive. The naval air element, he averred, must be kept the best in

the world. 5 With the war nearing a crucial turning point, the Woodrum committee concluded that the time was not right to consider legislation. It recommended

that prior to subsequently considering reorganization the Congress should examine the views of military commanders. Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson told Secretary of War Stimson that the Woodrum hearings should be shelved

because they were distracting from the business of winning the war.6

Influenced by the Woodrum Committee's hearings and a desire for some kind

of organizational plan, the Joint Chiefs in early May 1944 appointed their own

committee. The JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense

conducted a ten-month study, interviewing commanders in the major theaters of

operations and in Washington. Issued on April 11, 1945, the committee's majority report was signed by Maj. Gens. William F. Tompkins (WDGS) and Harold

L. George (AAF); Rear Adm. Malcolm F. Schoeffcl; and Col. F. Trubee Davison

(AAF). Although the report was accompanied by a dissenting opinion by the

committee's chairman and senior naval member, Adm. James 0. Richardson,* its

recommendations had wide impact and determined the basis for future discussion

and debate. The emphasis would be on an organization designed to ensure integration of land, sea, and air forces. 7

Of course, how best to organize military air forces had been the subject of

controversy since World War I.' In the intervening years, congressional committees debated reorganization and the military produced numerous organizational

studies. Deliberations of the JCS committee adhered to several basic assump-

*Adm. James 0. Richardson was Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific

Fleet from January 1940 until his relief in January 1941. He had angered President

Roosevelt in September 1940 by telling him that "the senior officers of the Navy did not

have the trust and confidence in the civilian leadership of this country that is essential for

the successful prosecution of a war in the Pacific." Richardson was replaced by Adm.

Husband E. Kimmel. Admiral Richardson had argued the case for basing the fleet on the

west coast rather than in Hawaii. See Adm. James 0. Richardson (as told to Vice Adm.

George C. Dyer), On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James 0.

Richardson (Washington, 1973), especially, Chapters XV, XX.

"See Chapter I.

90
Key War Department officials addressed the Woodrum Committee. Assistant Secretary of War for

Air, Robert A. Lovett

(right) and Brig. Gen.

Haywood S. Hansel], Jr.,

Twentieth Air Force Chief

of Staff, (below) testified

that future wars would require a unified command

on the field of battle.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

tions. Committee members concluded that the Navy should retain its air element

and that the Marines would remain as part of the Navy Department. The Army

would keep its own "integral" aviation units which were essential to the ground

forces. And the committee stated the premise that a United States Air Force

should be created, coequal with the Army and Navy.8 A separate Air Force

would include aviation which was not inherent to the land or sea forces. Naval

aviation would remain integral to the sea forces. Liaison, tactical reconnaissance,

and artillery-spotting, aircraft would be a necessary part of the ground forces. 9

Save for Admiral Richardson, members of the committee endorsed a single

Department of National Defense headed by a civilian Secretary, backed by an

Under Secretary responsible for departmental business matters. This single department would not merge the services. It would place the Army, Navy and Air

Force under a Secretary of the Armed Forces and a single Commander of the

Armed Forces. The Army and the Air Force would each be headed by a Commanding General and the Navy would be commanded by an Admiral of the

Navy. Excepting Richardson, members believed that the Secretary of the Armed

Forces would have more influence as a member of the cabinet than two or three

independent secretaries representing the services with their conflicting intersts.10 The Commander of the Armed Forces would also serve as Chief of Staff

to the President, a position held during the war by Adm. William D. Leahy. It

was reasoned that this position would overcome the defects of the JCS organization which functioned by unanimous agreement.II Further, the committee was

concerned lest the President's war powers expire before implementation of a

statutory reorganization. Expiration would have caused the War and Navy Departments to revert to their prewar organization. Consequently, the committee endorsed preparation of enabling legislation to be sent to the Congress to create a

single department of defense. 12

Thus, the pressure for statutory change in military organization was increased

by the Woodrum hearings, by the ongoing experience of World War II, and by

the fact that the President's war powers would expire six months after war's end.

The JCS committee commented that the United States entry into the war had

forced reorganization in Washington and in the field. War powers granted the

President by Congress in December 1941 had permitted swift changes. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff was established and the War and Navy Departments were reorganized (AAF became coequal with Army Ground Forces and the Services of

Supply in March 1942). The principle of unity of command was adopted. Supreme commanders were appointed. The Joint Chiefs structured a broad strategic

and operational framework within which operations could be effectively conducted. The JCS special committee referred to this as "enforced teamwork." 13

The services came to understand that success stemmed from integration of land,

sea, and air operations. Nonetheless, the committee warned of potential retrogression once the war ended: "If peace should find the armed forces still operating

92
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

under the present system, with no wartime compulsion to get together, even the

existing degree of cooperation can be expected to disappear. This situation will

be aggravated by the forced readjustment to peace-time conditions."' 14 As Marshall often underlined, the postwar period would undoubtedly be marked by austerity. The military budget would become very tight. Under these conditions,

parochialism tended to increase, teamwork to lessen.

According to the committee, the required integration had not been realized because each Army and Navy component within a specific theater belonged and

owed allegiance to a separate department. Hence, the theater commander could

not carry out his command decisions as efficiently as he wanted. Significant additional progress was impossible under the existing system. A single Department

of Defense at the outset of war would have fostered much better coordination and

teamwork between the services. The present system would not work nearly as

well in peacetime as in war.

The Navy's View of the Report

Admiral Richardson, senior Navy member of the committee, filed a minority

report opposing the recommendation for a single Department of National Defense. He argued that the plan was "theoretically better than any yet proposed,

but from a practical point of view it is unacceptable."'15 Richardson favored the

status quo, arguing that the lessons of war were not yet clear. After the war the

military would face the monumental task of demobilization, and for this reason it

would also be inappropriate to reorganize prematurely. 16

Richardson contended that the effectiveness of combat forces in the field bore

no direct relation to the existence of a single department in Washington. Nor did

he support the proposals for a Secretary of the Armed Forces and a Commander

of the Armed Forces. He was wary of such powerful positions, fearful of their

adversely affecting the Navy. Richardson likewise found himself in opposition to

an Air Force coequal with the Army and Navy.17 He freely admitted that his

chief concern was that the Navy would lose its air arm to the Air Force.

Though against the creation of a single department, Admiral Richardson advocated that the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (along with wartime organizational changes by the War and Navy Departments) be perpetuated by

statute. A joint secretariat should be set up and the subject of reorganization

given further study. This reflected the Navy's view that for coordination the services should rely on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various JCS committees.

Other members of the special committee disagreed with the Navy, observing that

matters referred to the Joint Chiefs or to a joint secretariat would then be sent to

subcommittees and to groups within the departments. The committee doubted

that efficiency could be attained by this kind of group action.18 Also, it had

93
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

weighed and discarded the idea of having the Chairman, JCS, act as the Chief of

Staff to the President, to decide controversial issues. Under this system, the committee felt that the Chief of Staff to the President would have authority to decide

matters but not be charged with their execution. Furthermore, the Chief of Staff

would not have to report to the Secretary of National Defense, thus infringing

upon the responsibilities and powers of the service secretaries. 19

Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of

Naval Operations, and Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific

Fleet, all thought that the committee's recommendations were radical. They resisted the concept of a "super-secretary" claiming that one man could not effectively administer the Army and Navy. Neither economy nor enhanced efficiency

would accrue under a single department system. Besides, in their view the 1ý 20 Navy's power and influence would suffer under such a reorganization. They

recalled that in 1918 Britain's Royal Naval Air Service had been fused into the

Royal Air Force. The reorganization put forth by the special committee would

subject the Navy's requirements to review by officials who had no responsibility

for their initiation. Ultimately, sea power would be weakened by people who did

not understand its potentialities. 1

Appointment of a Commander of the Armed Services-who would double as

Chief of Staff to the President-would be a serious mistake. Leahy and King asserted that single command of land, sea, and air forces would be beyond the capacity of one man. They raised anew the specter of "the man on horseback."

Instituting this position rested on the premise that unity in the field came from

unity of command in Washington-an incorrect assumption.* The Joint Chiefs

had proved themselves able to ensure unified command in the field. Field commanders had said they were satisfied with interservice cooperation.22 On the

*After the war, Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, former commander of the 12th, 15th, and

8th Air Forces, testified before the Senate Military Affairs Committee. Doolittle stressed

unity of command: "I have seen the contention made that you can have effective unity of

command in the field in wartime without having unity of control in peacetime. I believe

this is wrong. . . When a war is over the commands in theaters of operation are, of course,

liquidated and nothing remains except the home organization. If there is no unity there,

there is no unity at all. It is the form of the home organization that will control the training, the tactics, the doctrine, the thinking and the habits of the men who we will train to

fight the next war .... If they are trained in two departments, we will have the same makeshifts and fumblings in attempting to get a required unity of command in theaters of operations that we had at the outset of the war just past; and we will have commanders who

still do not understand the two arms of the service in which they were not fundamentally

trained." [Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, Senate, Departments of

Armed Forces and Military Security: Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482, Statement by LA.

Gen. James H. Doolittle, on Nov 9, 1945, 79th Cong, Ist sess (Washington, 1945), pp

294-95 (hereafter cited as Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482).]

94
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

other hand, single command of forces from all the services for a specified operation (task forces) was appropriate. However, should a Commander of the Armed

Services be appointed, he should not simultaneously be Chief of Staff to the

President. The latter position should be held by a member of the JCS so that the

advice of the Joint Chiefs could routinely be passed to the President.23

King and Nimitz claimed that the burden of proof rested with the proponents

of change. It had not been shown that a single department would provide a military establishment that could meet the test of war.* Procurement problems would

not be solved by a single department. To the contrary, the Navy thought it possible that establishment of three departments could lead to even more waste in procurement. As Nimitz saw it: "Should the Strategic Air Force be set up as a

separate entity, with its own administrative and supply systems, the duplication

in services and facilities which is frequently advanced as a reason for merging

the Army and Navy, would become a possibility of triplication."24 Admiral

Nimitz argued that the Army Air Forces should stay part of the War Department,

where the AAF could be smoothly integrated into the administration and supply

of the department.25 As for strategic air power, he said the Navy's submarine

forces operated strategically; yet submarine units were merged into the Navy's

logistic and administrative network. The submarine force had not been made independent, noted Nimitz.26

King objected to what he believed to be a lack of objectivity in the proposal

for a coequal Air Force. This recommendation should not have been assumed as

a starting point, King emphasized, because it was a major point "to be proved or

disproved and which is perhaps the matter on which there is the greatest question."27 The reasons advanced for and against a coequal Air Force should have

been presented and debated. He disagreed with the view that there had been

grave concern about organization, and that previous studies had been judged less

than comprehensive because they had not proposed formation of a separate Air

Force.

28

King pressed for decentralization, pointing out that placing the Army, Navy,

and Air Force into a single department would, paradoxically, further separate 29

them because it would inevitably breed friction. Moreover, a single department

could lead to what he called the "dangers of orthodoxy." The methods currently

*Naval leaders all along stressed the success of wartime operations. For example, Vice

Adm. Charles M. Cooke, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, told the Senate Military

Affairs Committee on November 8, 1945: "The joint amphibious operations conducted

under the existing arrangement in this war have surpassed in extent and success those of

all previous wars .... It is my view that this success can be continued in the future without

strait-jacketing the Navy into the status of an Army Auxiliary and thus destroy its effective role in support of our national policy and in the preservation of national security."

[Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482, p 279.]

95
(Right) JCS Special Committee

member, Admiral James 0.

Richardson reflected the Navy's opposition to organizing a single Department of National Defense. He

opposed creating an independent

Air Force.

(Below) Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief

of Naval Operations, (center) with

Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

(left), and Adm. Raymond A.

Spruance, Commander, Fifth Fleet,

(right), aboard the USS Indianapolis, July 1944. King and Nimitz

cited the naval successes in the Pacific as grounds for opposing unification. The naval establishment,

they asserted, was meeting the test

of war. 

-
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

being used in World War II could well be considered sacrosanct long after their

usefulness was over. He thought that somehow the job of countering this S30kind of

orthodoxy would be harder to do in a single department organization. Both

Leahy and King advocated retention of the two-department system, with each department having a civilian secretary. The Marines could continue to be part of the

Navy and among other elements, the Navy would retain ship and land-based

aviation to operate against targets at sea, to reconnoiter, and to support landing

attacks. Admiral King summed up to the Military Affairs Committee: "if the

Navy's welfare is one of the prerequisites to the nation's welfare-and I sincerely believe that to be the case-any step that is not good for the Navy is not

good for the nation." 32

Views of Arnold and Marshall

In contrast to Leahy and King, General Arnold of course supported unification

under a single department and favored an Air Force coequal to the Army and

Navy. His major thrust was that "fundamental" air power should become coequal

with land and sea power. Fundamental air power did not encompass all forms of

air power: "certain manifestations of air power will continue as auxiliaries of

land and sea power. But I do mean emphatically that development of primary and

fundamental air power must be carried out-under supreme overall directionby a service having this as its major responsibility." 3 3

Arnold noted that in the 1920s and 1930s the Air Corps had been denied

autonomy because of two obsolete concepts: First, that unity of command could

only mean either unified Army command on land or unified Navy command on

sea; hence coordinate status for the air would cut across essential unity of command. Second, that the inherent limitations of the airplane made the air arm

merely an auxiliary to land power and naval power.34

The importance of the March 1942 reorganization of the War Department, Arnold asserted, lay in the air arm's becoming coequal with the Ground Forces.* In

every theater during the war, an autonomous, coequal air force emerged under

supreme command: "Only with coequal status could the air commander authoritatively present before the Supreme Commander what he could accomplish, assume the responsibility for its accomplishment and be free to carry out that

responsibility with full appreciation of air capabilities and limitations."3 5 Once

again he underscored the need for the air arm to present its budget on an equal

footing with the land and sea forces. He felt that substantial coordination had

been achieved in wartime through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other joint boards

*See Chapter I.

97
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

and committees. But he believed there were many basic matters on which agreement had not been reached. 36

Arnold took issue with King's charge that the committee published a report

lacking in thought and depth. The report was an interservice effort, the AAF

Commander observed, backed by interviews with leading field commanders and

staff officers in Washington. All knew the organizational limitations of the War

and Navy Departments and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Whereas King saw the

proposed Secretary of the Armed Forces as a barrier between the President and

the military services, General Arnold viewed the Secretary as precisely the

authority required below the President to foster economy and efficiency. This

was far preferable to the committee system which slowed agreement on important issues of consequence to more than one service.37 Arnold's view, supportive

of a strong Secretary of the Armed Forces, would later be echoed during the unification battle by General Spaatz and Assistant Secretary of War for Air Stuart

Symington.

Arnold emphasized that throughout the war the Army Air Forces had proved

the destructive power of air attacks and in general had gained recognition as being equal to the ground and naval forces. Postwar aircraft and weapons development would add to the importance of the air forces. In order to perform its

mission, the Air Force needed to be coequal with the Army and Navy. According to Arnold, this entailed equal access to and standing before Congress; an

equal opportunity to present the air view to the top policy level; and an equal

chance to tender the Air Force's funding requirements.:

Mindful of naval leaders' fear of an attempt to merge the fleet air arm into the

Air Force, General Arnold made clear that he was against any move to bring carrier aviation under the Air Force. As for land-based aviation, Arnold admitted the

existence of "twilight zones," areas where the Navy and the Air Force disagreed

as to functions and control. This was exactly the type of issue that a single armed

forces secretary should decide. The alternative was jurisdictional discord and duplication of equipment.40

General Marshall had long advocated a single Department of National Defense. He noted that the Navy had clearly stated its view that coordination could

be accomplished by the JCS and other joint committees without unification. Marshall did not support this proposal, saying it was no substitute for unification. 4 1

The Army Chief of Staff thought that the Joint Chiefs of Staff by itself could not

be effective as a peacetime coordinating agency. Even during wartime, Marshall

felt that agreement had been reached in the JCS only by numerous compromises

and after long delays.42 However, should the services be integrated into a single

department, he desired that the Joint Chiefs continue as a planning staff. Divorced from administrative and operating responsibilities, the JCS would formulate military policy, strategy, and budgetary requirements. The Joint Chiefs

98
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

would submit these recommendations through the Secretary of National Defense.

43

Marshall accented the importance of the unification principle: "My own experience in resolving difficulties of unity or direction and of unity of command in

this war has been that the problem of the details at first obscured the fundamental

principles, but once a favorable decision was reached regarding the latter the difficulties could usually be quickly resolved."'44 There had always been a penchant

in each military department for self-sufficiency. He said that under the present

setup the Navy had presented its postwar plan without coordinating it. This procedure, the Army Chief asserted, was not in the national interest. 45 The result

was certain duplication. During the war, he avowed, time not money was the

governing factor. In peacetime, money would be the controlling element.46 The

military must conduct its affairs on a sound, businesslike basis. A single department was needed to resolve complex issues and to work out a comprehensive

plan prior to forwarding requirements to the Bureau of the Budget and to the

Congress. This was a point which Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson also underlined. Unification would enable the armed forces to furnish Congress a single,

comprehensive budget request:

U

Army Air Forces Commanding General H. H. Arnold was convinced that the

proposed Secretary of the Armed Forces would foster more efficient use of

costly resources among the services.

99
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

The Army and Navy took

opposing positions on the

issue of creating a single

Department of Defense.

Adm. Ernest J. King (left)

believed that unifying the

Army, Navy, and Air

Force would breed friction among the services.

Gen. George C. Marshall

(right), however, argued

that unification would be

necessary for comprehensive planning in peacetime.

We ought not to tolerate in our military budget overlarge sums for one purpose and insufficient sums for another which inevitably result from a lack of

single direction over the planning of all the constituent service elements. The

combination of the armed forces in a single department is business-like and

will bring economy. The savings will not perhaps be realized at once.47

Respected segments of the press reinforced Patterson's opinion. Terming parity

of the Air Force with the land and sea forces as "imperative," The New York

Times dwelt on the possible economies under unification.48

Forrestal on Autonomy

Meantime, the Navy in the summer of 1945 had commissioned a special report on defense reorganization. Upon the suggestion of Senator David I. Walsh

(Democrat, Mass.), chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, Secret100
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

ary of the Navy Forrestal had asked his friend Ferdinand Eberstadt* to study

whether a coordinating agency would be preferable to a single Department of

National Defense. Eberstadt sent his study to Forrestal on September 25, 1945.

Although proposing Departments of War, Navy, and Air, Eberstadt recommended against a single Department of National Defense: "It seems highly

doubtful that one civilian Secretary, with limited tenure of office, could successfully administer the huge and complex structure resulting from a unification of

our military services." 49 The Navy would retain its Fleet Air Arm and the

Army would keep air units integral to its mission. The three coordinate des artments would be tied together by committees, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Testifying in October 1945 before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,

which was considering unification legislation, Forrestal said he had not accepted

the recommendations of the Eberstadt report.t Unification proposals, including

Eberstadt's, had given insufficient attention to effective coordination between departments. They were simplistic approaches to a complex problem.51

Forrestal suggested formation of a National Security Council with the President as ex officio chairman. Such a group would assure coordination between the

State, War, and Navy Departments. He also proposed creation of a National Security Resources Board (NSRB)-to coordinate planning for industrial mobilization-a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and a Military Munitions Board.

This was part of his concept of "new organizational forms." Like King and

Leahy, he wanted the duties and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs delineated by

statute. As for an independent Air Force, Forrestal said the Eberstadt report had

advocated a separate Department of Air, coequal with the Army and Navy. Forrestal stressed that he was opposed to a separate Air Force, but that steps must be

taken to prevent the AAF from reverting automatically to its prewar status. 52

Forrestal was worried that Congress would pass unification legislation without adequately studying ramifications of such a sweeping reorganization. He

therefore recommended that a blue ribbon commission study the problem. Like

other naval officials, Forrestal charged that the JCS special committee report was

simplistic and devoid of the kind of searching inquiry the matter required.53

*Eberstadt had been chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and vice chairman of the War Production Board.

Stuart Symington has recalled that in early 1946, after he was appointed Assistant

Secretary of War for Air, he asked Forrestal whether he would support the Eberstadt report, which called for a separate Air Force. Symington had called it a Navy report. Forrestal had replied that it was not a Navy report, it was the Eberstadt report. Eberstadt

himself told Symington that if the Army Air Forces would agree to coordination as

against administration, then Eberstadt would persuade Forrestal to support the report. According to Symington, he turned Eberstadt down cold. [Intvw, Hugh A. Ahmann,

AFSHRC, and author with Stuart Symington, Washington, D.C., May 2, 1978.1

101
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Moreover, he firmly opposed having a Secretary of the Armed Forces because it

would concentrate excessive power in the hands of one man. This super secretary

would bring superficial knowledge to the department he was supposed to administer: "He would have authority without knowledge, and authority without

knowledge must inevitably become impotent.'54 Forrestal also argued that civilian control of the military would be compromised. The influence of the President, the contemplated civilian secretaries, and the Congress would be diluted.

Unification would amount to a revolutionary change, a drastic revision of the

American system of defense. 55 He favored a deliberate and orderly transition

over a longer time.

Forrestal then turned to a point that proponents had been pushing with marked

success-unification would save money and promote efficiency.* Not so, insisted the Secretary of the Navy. When organizing naval procurement, he had

found it necessary to disperse procurement through the bureaus instead of consolidating. This resulted in savings. "If you put the Army, Navy and Air Force

procurement under one head," asserted Forrestal, "it cannot possibly work, except by the immediate splitting and resplitting of functions."56 The most telling organizational trend had not been in the direction of merger, but toward

breaking down large activities into one manageable and relatively autonomous

one. Forrestal said the best example of this had been the "separation" of the

Army Air Forces from the Army. He added that the AAF had created its own Air

Judge Advocate, Air Surgeon, and Air Inspector General. 57

At the same time, General Marshall had appointed a committee headed by Lt.

Gen. J. Lawton Collins (Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff, Army

Ground Forces) to come up with a comprehensive plan for organizing a single

Department of the Armed Forces. In mid-October 1945, Collins handed the committee's report to General Marshall and on the thirtieth he explained the plan to

the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Based on the April 1945 report of the

JCS committee on reorganization of national defense, the Collins Committee's

plan specified an independent Air Force, a Joint Chiefs of Staff, a single Secretary of the Armed Forces, an Under Secretary, and a single Chief of Staff of the

Armed Forces in lieu of a Commander of the Armed Forces.t Also, the Collins

*Gen. George C. Kenney testified on November 2, 1945, to the Military Affairs Committee: "I do not hold with those who maintain that inter-service rivalry .... is a necessary

prerequisite for excellence in equipment and training .... It would be as logical as trying

to build a winning football team by fostering rivalry between the backs and the line. I feel

that tremendous economies can be accomplished by eliminating parallel agencies with a

gain rather than a loss in operational efficiency in war and peace." [Hearings on S. 84 and

S. 1482, p 2321

1'The Collins Committee observed that the President was the commander of the U.S.

armed forces.

102
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

Committee recommended Chiefs of Staff for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as

well as a Director of Common Supply and Hospitalization. Budget recommendations of the JCS would pass through the Secretary of the Armed Forces to the

President, the secretary appending his comments.5 8

The Air Force would control all land-based air forces, save those allocated to

the Army and Navy for reconnaissance, gunfire spotting, and command and messenger service. The Air Force would likewise supervise all air transport. The

Army would comprise all ground forces, except the Marine Corps, and would coordinate all land transportation. The Navy would consist of all sea forces including the Fleet Air Arm, the Marines, and sea transport. The Collins Committee

rejected the idea that the Navy be divested of the Marines.* The committee advocated that theater commanders should operate directly under the Chief of Staff of

the Armed Forces.59

Eisenhower Supports a Separate Air Force

Just returned from commanding the victorious allied forces in Europe, General Eisenhower reinforced the opinions of Marshall and Arnold, and the Collins

report. He strongly supported a single Department of Defense with three coequal

services, telling the Military Affairs Committee that it would foster economy and

unity of command. Though not easily achieved, unified command (as opposed to

joint command) was absolutely vital to success. Eisenhower believed the difficulty in achieving unity of command was due to the traditional separation of the

Army and Navy. Unified command had to be generated from the top down, beginning at the Washington command level.60

According to his own retrospective account, General Eisenhower was surprised and disappointed upon his return to discover that not all military leaders

thought the way he did. To the contrary, he found that unification of the services

had become a subject of intense controversy. To Eisenhower, these conflicting

views had burgeoned beyond reasonable proportion.61

In his support of a single defense establishment and a separate Air Force, Eisenhower recognized the need for postwar economy. He strongly believed in what

*As Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins put it: "There is no question but that the Navy has set

up a little army within the Navy. The Marines now consist of six divisions, which is a sizable force, and the Navy right now is advocating a Marine Corps almost as big as the prewar Army and Air Force combined .... we feel that any needless duplication would be

resolved as soon as we got this single Secretary of the Armed Forces. The Marine Corps

has done a magnificent job, it has a hold on the public, and it would be silly if we tried to

take it away from the Navy." [Presentation of the Collins Committee Report to the Army

Staff and the Chief of Staff, in RG 165, Decimal File 320, Sep-Dec 46, MMB.]

103
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Naval leaders stood united in their opposition to unification legislation.

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (center) favored the formation of a

National Security Council to enhance coordination among the separate

departments. Fleet Admirals Ernest J. King (left) and Chester W. Nimitz

(right) also warned of the dangers of proceeding too quickly with a sweeping

reorganization of the military establishment.

he called the principle of "the three-legged stool," each service mutually dependent upon the other. It was no longer feasible, Eisenhower emphasized, "to arrive

at the size and composition of each arm without simultaneously considering the

others. Each arm supplements the other and no single service can be independently considered."* A single department of defense was required presiding

over three coequal military services. The concept of the three-legged stool was

tied to the need for strict economy during peacetime. Should the War and Navy

Departments stay under separate administration from the top, duplication would

persist. Requirements of the services could no longer be treated separately. While

admitting that competition between the services to develop weapons was a good

*Testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Nov 16, 1945.

104
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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

thing, Eisenhower commented that "competition is like some of the habits we

have-in small amounts they are very, very desirable; carried too far they are ruinous."'62 Without unification, the military services would continue to compete

for money before the various congressional committees. With integration, the nation could buy more security for less.

One of General Eisenhower's strongest convictions was that an independent

Air Force should be created. "No sane officer of any arm," he said, "would contest that thinking.'63 He added:

The Normandy invasion was based on a deep-seated faith in the power of

the Air Forces in overwhelming numbers to intervene in the land battle, i.e.,

that the Air Forces by their own action could have the effect on the ground

of making it possible for a small force of land troops to invade a continent

.. .Without that Air Force; without its independent power, entirely aside

from its ability to sweep the enemy air forces out of the sky, without its

power to intervene in the ground battle, that invasion would have been fantastic .... unless we had faith in air power as a fighting arm to intervene and

make safe that landing, it would have been more than fantastic, it would

have been criminal.64

Eisenhower in December 1945 convened, and impressed his deeply felt opinion

on, the Army staff. He said the air arm had shown beyond any doubt it was equal

to the other arms. He reiterated his view that an independent Air Force should be

formed. Even if the requisite laws were not passed, within the Army the air arm

should be largely independent. In other words, the Chief of Staff stated:

the Air Commander and his staff are an organization coordinate with and coequal to the land forces and the Navy. I realize that there can be other individual opinions .... But that seems to me to be so logical from all of our

experiences in this war-such an inescapable conclusion that I for one can't

even entertain any longer any doubt as to its wisdom.65

In the interim, he enjoined his staff to vigorously support forthcoming directives,

anticipated from the Simpson Board, which would give the AAF as much autonomy as possible short of complete coequality. 66

As to the contention of naval leaders that the job of the proposed civilian secretary was beyond the capacity of one man. General Eisenhower told the Military

Affairs Committee that if that were the case, then no one should become President of the United States.67 Regarding the Navy's fear that reorganization would

subordinate one service to another he said that experiences in Africa and Europe

had proved such fears groundless.68

The testimony of War Department and Navy officials revealed that a wide gap

still remained on unification. This was reflected in the failure of the Senate Military Affairs Committee to agree on potential legislation.

106
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

Truman Advocates a Coequal Air Force

Before the end of the war, President Harry S. Truman had made up his mind

that the military had to be reorganized. He wanted the services unified and the air

arm to have parity with the Army and Navy. "One of the strongest convictions

which I brought to the Presidency," Truman recalled,"was that the antiquated defense setup .... had to he reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future

safety and preserving world peace."'*69 From the Pearl Harbor hearings, the

Chief Executive concluded that the December 7, 1941 tragedy had been "as

much the result of the inadequate military system which provided for no unified

command, either in the field or in Washington, as it was any personal failure of

Army or Navy commanders.''t 7° So the United States needed a national security

organization, the President emphasized, ready to operate instantly in an emergency. Truman's view attracted wide support. An editorial in The New York

Times, for example, attributed the disaster at Pearl Harbor chiefly to a system

not geared to cope with a surprise attack. The answer, according to the Times.

was a "set-up to simplify and speed up procedure, eliminate rivalry and assure

the same kind of coordination in peace which necessity compelled in war." 7 1

Truman was well aware that the conflict had bared serious flaws in the ability

of the United States to react to total war. At the start of the war, no satisfactory

system existed to mobilize manpower, materiel, and production. Logistical shortages hampered execution of strategic plans. There was substandard planning for

materiel, requirements, duplication in procurement, and inadequate Army-Navy

coordination.

Absence of a Navy-War Department agreement on unification and failure of

the Military Affairs Committee to report a bill convinced the President to act. In

his special message to the Congress of December 19, 1945, Truman said he had

previously recommended to Congress a Universal Military Training program.

UMT would give the nation citizen-soldiers who could be mobilized when

needed to support a small professional military establishment. Besides UMT, it

would be necessary to create a single Department of National Defense. He

*In retrospect, Navy officials speculated on the twist of fate that brought Harry S. Truman to the presidency. Truman it was well known, favored unification and had written an

article for Collier's magazine on this subject. Naval leaders thought that Truman's accession to the presidency set in motion "a set of consequences for the postwar Navy different

from what might have been anticipated under a postwar Roosevelt." [Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), p 118.]

"tIt should also be noted that during World War II Truman served as chairman of the

Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. This experience gave

him a close view of military inefficiency and duplication.

107
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Demonstrating his commitments to U. S. air power, President Truman signs

the proclamation designating August 1, 1946, as Air Force Day. The date

marked the 39th Anniversary of military aviation. On hand for the occasion

are Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, AAF Commanding General, (center) and Lt. Gen. Ira

C. Eaker, Deputy Commander.

stressed that lessons of the war demanded unified direction of land, sea, and air

forces.

72

Truman remained especially sensitive that on December 7, 1941, the United

States had been without a system of unified command. The Japanese success left

an indelible blot on the American conscience, and he was determined there

would be no more Pearl Harbors. In 1941 the War and Navy Departments had

lacked a tradition of collaboration. Also, at that time air power was not organized

coequal with the ground and sea forces. The Chief Executive observed that formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was meant to correct these defects. Although

coordination of strategic planning and operations had been carried out through

joint committees under the JCS, this could not be considered a form of unification.

73

In the theaters, unified commands were set up. "We came to the conclusion,

soon confirmed by experience." Truman said, "that any extended military effort

required over-all coordinated control in order to get the most out of the three

armed forces. Had we not early in the war adopted this principle of a unified

command for operations, our efforts, no matter how heroic, might have failed." 74

Nevertheless, leadership in Washington stayed divided. And even in the field,

108
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

there were differences in doctrine, training, communication, and in supply and

distribution systems.

Basically it was a matter of organization. The President sided with the Army

(and the JCS Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense) and

against the Navy on the question of whether the JCS system would suffice for

postwar organization. He emphatically thought it was not good enough. The Joint

Chiefs of Staff was a committee-not a unified command. While the Joint Chiefs

cooperated during the war, this would not be the case in peacetime. The Commander in Chief decided there had been sufficient studies of military organization. It was time for action. In his eyes, there was simply no question about the

need for unification. He was not going to stand for each of the services continuing to plan programs in their own splendid isolation. The divisive competition for

funds must cease.75 And Truman favored parity of air power:

Air power has been developed to a point where its responsibilities are equal

to those of land and sea power, and its contribution to our strategic planning

is as great. In operation, air power receives its separate assignment in the

execution of the over-all plan. These facts were finally recognized in this

war in the organizational parity which was granted to air power within our 76 principal unified commands.

Despite the success engendered by unified command, it was just as clear there

had been shortcomings. These were essentially due to a lack of understanding between the services.

In proposing a Department of National Defense headed by a civilian Secretary

of National Defense (and also an Office of Chief of Staff of the Department of

National Defense), Truman stressed that unification would be a long-term task.

Many difficulties lay ahead. "Unification is much more than a matter of organization," the President said: "It will require new viewpoints, new doctrine, and

new habits of thinking throughout the departmental structure." 77

The AAF Plans for Unification

As we have seen, Arnold had assigned a high priority to planning for postwar

organization and to drafting legislation for an independent Air Force. By the end

of the war, Col. Reuben C. Moffat's Post War Division (under Maj. Gen. Lauris

Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans), had written a potential bill to create

a Department of the Air Force and a United States Air Force. The Post War Division had also began to study various possible organizational forms for a separate

Air Force. On September 18, 1945, Col. Jacob E. Smart, Secretary of the Air

Staff, concerned over intensified interest in defense organization and with the absence of concrete AAF plans, recommended to General Eaker that the AAF be109
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

gin to prepare comprehensive draft legislation for formation of a separate Air

Force. Such legislation should guarantee that an independent Air Force would

from its inception "'receive all of the benefits that now accrue as an agency of the

War Department, and none of the disadvantages that result from the entangled

masses of laws which now affect all components of the War Department.' 78 This

endeavor, Smart observed, would demand scrutiny of existing legislation and

careful planning by many of the AAF's most capable officers. He urged that action be taken immediately so that legislation would be ready if and when a separate Air Force became a reality. 79

Smart advocated that the Army Air Forces start drafting legislation to create a

single Department of National Defense unshackled by restrictions which had

been imposed upon the War Department. Even though this matter would eventually undergo joint study, Colonel Smart thought by promulgating the original

proposal the AAF would seize the initiative. The War and Navy Departments

would then have to start with the AAF's recommendation as a basis for their

80 own.

After receiving Smart's memorandum, General Eaker suggested that Norstad

frame at once legislation for a separate Air Force, if he were not already doing

so.8 1 Norstad replied that the Post War Division had finished a draft bill, but the

required legislation stipulating the makeup of the Air Force (termed a "consolidated code") had not yet been prepared. He recommended that the Air Judge Advocate's office draw up the appropriate legislation, monitored by the Post War

82 Division. Eaker agreed, instructing the Air Judge Advocate to study existing

legislation in order to draft a law creating an autonomous Air Force and a single

Department of National Defense. The Post War Division would oversee this

work.83

As the Congress deliberated on unification legislation and the Air Judge Advocate commenced his task, Headquarters Army Air Forces kept its major field

commanders informed of "the fight that is brewing" on postwar organization. A

number of general officers in AAF headquarters wrote to these commanders.

They explained that the Navy opposed a single Department of National Defense.

Navy leaders feared that unification and a separate Air Force would deprive them

of their air arm. These AAF officers also said that the recommendations of the

majority report of the JCS special committee were the best the AAF could expect

from any such board. If implemented, these proposals would afford the AAF coequal status and achieve unification. Success in the unification fight would extend to the Air Force "'the same opportunity as the other components to present

our financial requirements. We will be subject to only that administrative control

that is applicable to all three components and we will have the same standings as

the other services in Congress" 84

In the face of determined Navy opposition, General Arnold in October 1945

felt confident that an independent Air Force would ensue. He reminded Eaker

110
(Right) Secretary of the Air Staff, Col.

Jacob E. Smart urged General Eaker to

take the initiative in drafting legislation

setting up a single Department of National Defense and an Air Force coequal

with the Army and Navy.

(Below) Anticipating the birth of the Air

Force, General Arnold (right) directed

General Eaker (left) to prepare plans for

the organization of the new department.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

that as Commanding General, AAF he had publicly expressed strong approval of

the JCS committee's majority report and its recommendation for unification and

a coequal Air Force. Assuming this eventual turn of events, Arnold wanted plans

prepared so the AAF would be ready to meet its responsibilities. He directed

Eaker to appoint a board of officers to make a comprehensive study, setting forth

required AAF actions when defense reorganization occurred. At that time, Arnold said, it would be necessary to determine the Air Force's mission, functions,

and organization, as well as its relationship with land and naval forces. Moreover, since the Air Force would be breaking away from the War Department, it

would be imperative to fix precise responsibility in personnel, intelligence, supply, and other areas.85

During November and December the Office of the Air Judge Advocate

worked on reorganization legislation, with General Norstad approving each step.

Three plans emerged, in order of priority: (1) a separate Air Force coequal with

the Army and Navy and represented in the cabinet by a Secretary of the Air

Force; (2) a single and completely unified department; and (3) status quo, with a

two-department organization.86

Meanwhile, as Congress weighed unification and a separate Air Force, the

Army Air Forces strove to preserve the substantial autonomy it had accumulated

during the war. Arnold of course appreciated the freedom that Marshall allowed

him as Commanding General, AAF. In 1942 the Army Air Forces had won stature equal to that of Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces. Also, as a

member of the Joint Chiefs and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the AAF commander had a voice in matters of grand strategy. In general he had been given a

free hand in shaping the AAF. At Arnold's direction, the AAF had built its own

formidable support forces in such vital areas as research and development, logistics, and engineering.

Consequently, immediately after the war, General Arnold turned his attention

to preserving the AAF's freedom and at the same time waging the battle for AAF

autonomy. Arnold's immediate worry was that the War Department's organization, under which the AAF had gained quasi-autonomy, would automatically expire six months after the end of the war. This structure had originally been

authorized by President Roosevelt's executive order, issued under the War Powers Act of December 18, 1941.

Thus, on August 28, 1945 (the same day that Eaker set 70 groups as the

AAF's goal),* Arnold recommended to Marshall that a bill be introduced in the

forthcoming Congress to extend the War Department organization until permanent legislation could be secured for the postwar military establishment. Arnold

supported his proposal by emphasizing that the present structure was a great im-

*See Chapter 2.

112
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

provement over the prewar one---especially insofar as the AAF was concerned.

A return to the postwar setup would result in chaos.87

Marshall disagreed with Arnold's proposal, noting that the War Department

had not yet defined its views on postwar organization. Introduction of a legislative proposal at this time would therefore be premature. Besides, if time permitted, it would be preferable to submit legislation for the desired War Department

structure affording the AAF increased autonomy, rather than Arnold's so-called

"interim" bill which would have frozen the current organization.88 Accordingly,

on August 30, 1945, Marshall appointed a board of officers under Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, Jr.,* to examine the War Department organization and to recommend an appropriate peacetime structure.

General Arnold continued to advocate continuation of the wartime structure

pending submission of permanent legislation. Keeping the present organization

would avoid changing now and even again later. There was also the question of

duplication. As before, Arnold pointed to separate facilities, procurement, hospitals, and depots. The country could not stand the expense. In addition, he wanted

to remove the command function from Army Service Forces and to make it a

procurement agency for common items. The ASF, in Arnold's view, had arrogated excessive prerogatives.89 The board appointed by Marshall-first chaired

by Patch and, after his death, by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson--was deliberately weighted against the Army Service Forces.** The members were drawn

chiefly from technical services and from General Eisenhower's staff. They opposed continuance of ASF because they felt it had become far too large and had

wielded excessive power. Further, they believed a separate supply command violated the principle of unity of command. Realizing Eisenhower would be the next

Chief of Staff, the Patch Board paid special attention to his opinions.90

Eisenhower's reorganization idea featured a plan to divide a small planning

group at the top and functional operating directorates for technical supervi-

*Patch was a combat veteran without General Staff experience.

tGeneral Simpson commanded the U.S. Ninth Army during World War II. He formally received four-star rank in 1954.

** The Patch Board was constituted "to examine into the present organization of the

War Department and to propose an organization appropriate for peacetime adoption... .The

organization proposed will be based upon the continuance of the present overall organization of the Armed Services into two departments-the War and Navy-however, the

Board should have in mind the practicability of fitting the proposed organization into a

single Department of National Defense." [Stmt of Gen. Patch to the Bd, Sep 10, 1945,

prior to intvw of Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, in RG 165, Rcrds of the WD Gen and Sp

Stfs, Army C/S, Patch/Simpson Bd File, MMB, NA.]

113
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

sion.*91 Below these, AAF, AGF, and technical services would exercise command functions. Eisenhower had long thought that the War Department General

Staff needed reorganization:

As I see it, our General Staff has gotten into a very bad state for this reason:

we set up a General Staff to be thinkers, advisers and coordinators, but not

operators. But we found under our system that following up and the issuing

of detailed orders were necessary, and that is "operations," so the General

Staff enters into it. So I said; "How can I remove from the General Staff

what it is doing now in the way of operations?" Then we could have a small

General Staff in its original conception and still have the power somewhere

to do this following up in detailed operation on a pretty high level, and we

know we have to do it.92

In their testimony before the Patch Board, Spaatz and Eaker echoed Arnold's

view that the War Department should be organized towards eventual creation of

a Department of National Defense. Otherwise, noted Spaatz, it would be necessary to reorganize twice. 93 General Spaatz wanted the AAF formed with its own

promotion and personnel systems.94 The AAF advocated a separate promotion

system to compensate for the "dissimilar personnel requirements of flying personnel as compared to non-flying personnel.'"9 5 The average useful life of the

flying officer was shorter than that of the nonflyer. Flying officers must be

younger to meet the physical and mental requirements of piloting modern aircraft. Furthermore, flyers had other important responsibilities. For example, a B29 group commander who

*Eisenhower also informed the Patch Board that it was time to use a "sledge hammer

on the empire builders." Eisenhower had reference to "this spirit of bureaucracy [which]

has manifested itself too long in the governmental services, and I think it is high time that

we in the Army and the Air just set our faces against it and ruthlessly uproot it; the spirit

of never letting go of anything that you have ever had hold of." This thought had also

been stressed to the Patch Board by Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett.

According to Lovett, one of the major problems in the War Department was the existence

of "little armies within the Army-isolated activities or empires which were being sponsored by their Chief without regard to the overall good of the Army." On the other hand,

another of his concerns was that safeguards should be set up against "vegetation" of senior officers. Many of these officers in the War Department, Lovett said, espoused a philosophy that had evolved from the years when economy was the watchwork. These

officers were unreceptive to the advanced methods of big business which would be required to operate the postwar Army. [Stint of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Patch Bd,

Sep 23, 1945, in RG 165, Rcrds of the WD Gen and Sp Stfs, Army C/S. Patch-Simpson

Bd File , Box 927, MMB, NA; testimony of Robert A. Lovett, Asst Secy of War for Air,

to Patch Bd, Sep 6, 1945, in RG 65, Rcrds of the WD Gen and Spl Stfs, Army C/S, PatchSimpson Bd File, MMB, NA.]

114
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

habitually leads 18 to 72 airplanes (and frequently a whole air force )....He

commands in his group approximately 300 officers and 150 enlisted men,

and in addition to normal equipment found in ground units of similar size, he

is responsible for 20 million dollars worth of aircraft. Also he is very often

base commander in addition to his duties as group commander.96

In consequence, the case for a separate Air Force promotion system rested

squarely on flying itself. Overall, the AAF wanted control of its own personnel

policies.

When asked for his opinion on the General Staff, Spaatz replied that the General Staff should be a policymaking and coordinating agency, "with the smartest

Air, Ground and Service Forces men we can find to put on it.'"97 As far as antiaircraft artillery (AAA) was concerned, he thought it should be operated and controlled by the Air Force so long as integration between fighter aircraft and AAA

remained. Combined training of AAA and fighters

should come under the operation and control of the Air and also when it

comes to war and the enemy Air is the threat, but when that threat is done

away with and you reduce the number of antiaircraft outfits that cover you

against air attacks, they should be able to go into the Ground Army and be

set up and used as artillery. 98

Lt. Gen. Alexander M.

Patch, Jr., headed a board

of officers charged with

examining the current organization of the War Department and recommending a structure suitable

for peacetime defense.

115
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

On October 18, 1945, the Patch Board sent its report to General Marshall who

routed it through the War Department staff for comment. General Arnold was

disappointed with the Patch report because it ignored his recommendation that

the Air Staff should be coequal with the War Department General Staff until the

unification question was decided. In effect, the AAF Commander wanted two

chiefs of staff in the postwar period, one for the Ground Forces and the other for

the Air Forces. Spaatz, at Arnold's direction, had told the Patch Board that reorganization should be sufficiently complete so little reorganization would be

needed when the time came for the Air Force to assume coequal status. 99

The report suggested expanding the size, functions, and responsibilities of the

War Department General Staff, and making the Army Air Forces coequal with

Army Ground Forces under the Chief of Staff and the War Department General

Staff. The Board's plan divided the War Department and Army into four echelons: Office of the Secretary of War; General and Special Staffs for planning and

direction; administrative and technical services restored to their prewar autonomy; and on the operating level, the AAF, AGF, and Overseas Departments. 1

00

Arnold apprised Marshall that the Army Air Forces would not respond in detail to the Patch report. He said its recommendations could not be reconciled with

the War Department's proposals for a single Department of the Armed Forces,

nor with the need for coequal status of the Army Air Forces. 10 The AAF Commander emphasized the special relationship that he and his staff enjoyed during

the war with General Marshall and the War Department General Staff. Marshall

had recognized the special difficulties faced by the Army Air Forces and delegated many responsibilities to Arnold. Naturally, General Arnold wanted the

head of the Air Force to stay a member of the Joint Chiefs. 10 2 The Patch report,

by positioning the AAF under the General and Special Staffs, would have kept

the AAF from formal (organizational) participation in General Staff planning.

Throughout the war, the Air Staff had taken part in such planning. The structure

recommended by the Patch Board should "perpetuate this participation by the

Army Air Forces organizationally in order that the terms of the reorganization

can not be used to demonstrate that such a relationship no longer exists." 1°

3 Air

Staff participation at all planning levels must be confirmed. Hence, the current

structure should be kept until the unification question was resolved. 104

When General Patch died on November 21, 1945, General Eisenhower-who

had succeeded Marshall as Army Chief of Staff on November 19-appointed a

new board headed by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson. The Simpson Board's task

was to review comments on the Patch report, to make revisions, and to draft executive orders to put a reorganization into effect which would permit the AAF

subsequently to separate from the Army. General Arnold named Norstad as liaison between the Simpson board and Army Air Forces Headquarters. General

Norstad emphasized to the board that the Air Staff should coordinate with the

War Department General Staff and that the AAF responsibility for anti-aircraft

116
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

artillery should be recognized. In December Arnold made his argument to General Simpson: that the Patch Board, by proposing that AAF be coequal with

AGF, had failed to see the need for the Air Staff to be on a coordinate level with

the War Department General Staff. Moreover, the board's recommendations

would make more difficult an eventual transition to a single department. Also,

the board wanted to abolish the Office of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, a

position established by the Air Corps Act of 1926 (and first held by F. Trubee

Davison).* Arnold opposed this and in addition objected strongly to the recommendation to assign antiaircraft artillery to the Army Ground Forces. 105

Previously, in December 1944, Spaatz had informed Arnold:

The development of all the weapons for coordinated defense should be

pushed. Antiaircraft artillery is making rapid strides in effectiveness. Radar

equipment... is proving extremely effective not only in defense, but as a

method of offense and control. All measures for defense should be coordinated under our control including radar and counter-radar, interceptors .... as

well as antiaircraft in order that we can get behind research and development

in the field.°6

Postwar planners under Kuter and Davison in 1944 had recommended that the

postwar Air Force include an antiaircraft artillery force of 140,000 men. Although the War Department made no reply to this proposal, Arnold proceeded on

the assumption that it would be approved. Moreover, the AAF Commander

wanted to place nonrated AAA personnel in command of postwar air defenses

worldwide. He wished to guarantee the artillerymen the same opportunity to

reach high rank as given to flyers.

The Patch-Simpson Board's decision not to integrate antiaircraft artillery into

the Army Air Forces mirrored the Army Ground Forces' view. That is, the AAA

mission was defense of ground troops and installations, a mission more relevant

to ground and service forces than to the Air Forces. If AAA should be integrated

into the AAF, War Department and AGF leaders feared its principal development

would tend toward defense of Air Force installations. Ground leaders advanced

the idea that the Air Force "faces a tremendous future task of its own in the development of new aircraft for offensive and other purposes. The problem faced

*High-ranking members of the War Department also desired to keep the position of

Assistant Secretary of War for Air. According to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, Assistant Chief of

Staff, Operations Plans Division, the Navy had an Assistant Secretary of War for Air and

thus it would be a "very retrogressive step for the War Department to eliminate the Assistant Secretary of War for Air." Besides, civil aviation required a conduit to military aviation and this had been handled by an Assistant Secretary of War for Air. Finally, public

criticism would be directed at the War Department should this office be done away with.

[Memo for DCSA fr Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, ACS/OPD, USA, subj: Report of Board of Officers on Organization of the War Department, Nov 5, 1945.]

117
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

by the AAA of the future is in itself too great in magnitude to be thrust upon the

Air Force as an additional problem."'10 7

Ground generals pointed to the effective use of AAA in the war, achieved by a

coordinated area defense organization under a single commander. During the

war, assignment of chief responsibility for air defense to an Air Force sector

commander was based on the employment of defensive fighter aircraft. The advent of atomic weapons and long-range rockets would render fighter aircraft obsolete as instruments of defense. Vital installations would depend on wellorganized ground defenses using radar and radar-controlled defensive weapons.0 AAA personnel should be trained as part of the ground forces:

AAA troops should be trained with a view of their ultimate assimilation for

combat or other roles in the Ground Forces .... they should be considered

and trained from the outset as a part of the Ground Forces. In the development of their weapons consideration should be given to their use, when not

required for defense, for offensive purposes in support of ground operations.

This desirable versatility was well demonstrated in World War I.l')9

As noted, General Arnold's major objective between the end of the war and

passage of unification legislation was to solidify Army Air Forces' gains. The

Patch Board proposals could not be reconciled with this goal nor with the War

Department's own recommendation for a single Department of the Armed

Forces.1 10 In December 1945, Spaatz-in the process of taking over from Arnold-also made clear to General Simpson that the Patch Board, by not making

the Air Staff coordinate with the War Department General Staff, had slowed the

transition of the AAF from a part of a two-department system to a single-department one.Ill Spaatz wanted the current War Department structure, based on

presidential executive order, to be continued in the interim by legislation as Arnold had first advocated in August 1945.

The Simpson Board gave General Eisenhower its report on December 28,

1945. It was revised on January 18, 1946, and promptly approved by the Army

Chief for planning purposes. On February 1, just before succeeding Arnold,

Spaatz expressed his doubts on the Simpson report to Eisenhower. Like Arnold,

Spaatz deemed the suggested organization inconsistent with unification proposals. Its adoption would "place in question, in the public mind and in the minds of

opponents of unification, the War Department's adherence to these basic principles and will, in my view, seriously jeopardize the unification program."'H2

Spaatz said that in general the unification proposals envisioned a small policymaking and planning staff for the proposed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Simpson report indicated that policy and planning formulation at the staff

level could not be divorced from operations. It recommended a General Staff

composed of Directors having authority throughout the establishment.t 13

Thus, General Spaatz asserted that the board's report--despite espousing an

autonomous Air Force-subjected the AAF to a General Staff consisting of Di118
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

AAF Commanding General Henry H. Arnold (left) rides with his successor,

Gen. Carl A. Spaatz (center), and Ninth Air Force Commander Hoyt S.

Vandenberg.

rectors with "directive authority." Among them was a Director of Service, Supply, and Procurement, who besides staff duties would direct the functions of the

Army Service Forces. Spaatz urged a full reconsideration of the report and its

recommendations.] 14

Previous to the actual reorganization, the War Department issued a memorandum on April 4, 1946, explaining the Simpson Board's proposals. Then Executive Order 9722, May 13, 1946 (amending Executive Order 9082, February 28,

1942) authorized reorganization of the War Department, effective June 11, 1946.

On May 14, 1946, War Department Circular 138 promulgated reorganization of

the War Department effective June II (subsequently termed the "Eisenhower Reorganization").

Though the Simpson report retained the Patch Board recommendation that the

Air Staff should be coordinate with the Army Ground Forces staff (rather than

with the War Department General Staff), it assented to the principle of granting

the AAF more autonomy and set forth proposals favored by the Army Air

Forces. For example, the report stated that the Commanding General, AAF,

119
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

would nominate about fifty percent of the members of the War Department General and Special Staff divisions from Army Air Forces personnel, a point long

sought by the AAF. The report additionally stipulated that this goal would be

reached as soon as practicable.115

According to the report, AAF officers could be required to serve in the Offices of the War Department Chiefs of Technical and Administrative Services, as

desired by the Commanding General, AAF, and by arrangement with the chiefs

of these services. Ideally, the Simpson Board said, the War Department should

be regarded as neither "Ground" nor "Air," but as an agency which serves both.

Officers with the General Staff, Special Staff, and technical and administrative

staffs and services, should deal with broad War Department functions, not with

the interests of a particular branch. 116

Turning to another point of AAF interest, the Simpson report stated that as

Army Service Forces functions were transferred to AAF, a commensurate proportion of personnel (performing these duties) would be moved to the Army Air

Forces. Which functions and how many troops would be decided by the War Department after reviewing AAF requirements. The report added that Eisenhower

wanted the AAF to have just those technical and administrative services needed

for servicing troops. Hospitals and ports, for example, would be run by the

Army. So long as the AAF stayed under the War Department, the bulk of administrative and technical officers would be furnished to the AAF by the technical

and administrative services. When the AAF became a separate service, there

would have to be a specific quota of technical and administrative officers who

would be permanent members of the Air Force. Further, according to the Simpson Board,

additional increments of Regular Officers which may in the future be authorized by Congress will include a proportion, to be later determined, of promotion-list technical and administrative officers commissioned in the Air

Corps, to provide in part for eventual complete autonomy. Also, at such time

as complete autonomy is achieved, it will be proper and necessary to transfer

an appropriate proportion of the officers of the Technical and Administrative

Services of the Army to the autonomous Army Air Forces.' 17

Transfers of nonrated officers to the Air Corps-if mutually agreed upon by

the Commanding General, AAF, the Chiefs of Technical and Administrative

Services, and the individual officers-would still be approved. Prior to Air Force

autonomy, officers of the technical and administrative services on duty with the

AAF would remain under command of the AAF Commander. The Chiefs of

Technical and Administrative Services would handle the long-range career planning of these officers. For proper schooling they would be returned periodically

to control of the chiefs of services. Also, the Simpson Board authorized the Commanding General, AAF, membership on the technical committees of the techni120
UNIFICATION AND A SEPARATE AIR FORCE

cal services in numbers the AAF Commander felt necessary to represent the interests of the Army Air Forces. 118

The AAF attempt to win control of antiaircraft artillery was thwarted.* The

Simpson Board recommended that artillery be combined under Army Ground

Forces, but AAA units could be trained and attached to AAF units. Together the

Commanding Generals, Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces, would develop tactics for AAA when used by the AAF. They would also determine the

"technique of fire at aerial targets," military characteristics of weapons and

equipment, and tables of organization and equipment for AAA units. 119

In advance of the Simpson report's actual publication in April, General Spaatz

(having replaced Arnold) officially forwarded his comments to the War Department Deputy Chief of Staff. Spaatz knew the paramount issue was whether AAF

would be coordinate with the War Department General Staff or Army Ground

Forces. However, since Eisenhower had approved the AAF's being placed coequal with AGF, Spaatz commented on other issues. He was also aware of statements by General Staff officers during meetings with Air Staff members. They

had clearly said that if the AAF failed to achieve independence, the Air Force

would be made equal to the General Staff and be given its own promotion list.120

Perhaps foremost in Spaatz' mind was the status of the AAF's medical service, which he thought would be weakened by the Simpson recommendations. He

objected to the wording in the report that The Surgeon General would exercise

technical and administrative supervision and inspection of subordinate units of

the medical service not commanded by him and not under his immediate control.

Spaatz wanted this changed to read that the Commanding General, AAF, would

exercise "command responsibility for all medical installations and units of the

AAF and for all medical personnel assigned to the AAF.''121

The board agreed with Spaatz and defined The Surgeon General's major

task-as a technical officer of the War Department and chief medical officer of

the Army-as setting Army policies for hospitalization, evacuation, and care of

the sick and wounded. Moreover, based on Spaatz' comment, the Simpson Board

stated that directives would be issued to major subordinate commanders under

the War Department "through the proper channels of command, and not directly

from the Surgeon General to the corresponding Medical Staff Officer in a subordinate major command." 12 2

*However, the AAF had not made an all-out attempt to secure control of the antiaircraft artillery mission because it "did not want to antagonize an element of the War Department. . .when we need every friend we can possible get to assist in pushing over

unification." [Fourth Meeting of Air Board, Dec 3-4, 946, in RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd Interim Rprts and working Papers, Box 15, MMRB, NA.]

121
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

The Surgeon General would command all general hospitals. The Commanding General AAF, would be charged with determining the strength, organization,

composition, equipment, and training of medical units assigned to the AAF.

Also as General Spaatz suggested, the regional hospital at Coral Gables, Fla.,

would be redesignated a general hospital and would be an exempted station. This

would make the hospital a "specialized hospital," for admission of Air Corps personnel needing hospitalization and convalescent care incident to their tactical

mission.123

There were additional advances for the AAF in the Simpson report. The Commanding General, AAF, would be responsible for preparing budget estimates and

justifying these estimates before the Budget Advisory Committee of the War Department and other appropriate agencies.* Money for operation of Army Air

Forces and for procurement of special items for the AAF would be allocated directly to AAF headquarters by the War Department budget officer. The AAF

would also be represented on the Communications Advisory Board. Installation,

maintenance, and operation of the Army Airways Communications System

would be the responsibility of the AAF Commander. 1

24

The Simpson Board, appointed by Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower to succecd

the Patch Board, established the basic War Department structure under which the

AAF would remain until it became a separate service in September 1947.

*The AAF had desired to be represented on the Budget Advisory Committee itself.

This committee (under the War Department budget office) reviewed estimates of War Department agencies before submitting them to the Bureau of the Budget. Without a representative on this committee, the AAF had no assurance that its needs would be properly

considered. Nor could it make direct contact with congressional appropriations committees, several of which had made decisions adverse to AAF programs. [Memo to Lt. Gen.

Ira C. Eaker, by Brig. Gen. L. W. Miller, Ch, Budget and Fiscal Ofc, AAF, subj: Air

Force Representation Budget Advisory Committee and Committee of Congress, Nov 29,

1945.]

122
4

Organizing the Postwar Air Force

To reorganize now in one form and then reorganize

again would be just an awful lot of wasted effort

and time.

Gen. Carl A. Spaatz,

before the Patch Board,

September 1945

For the Army Air Forces, the period between the end of the war and the

March 1946 major reorganization was extremely hectic, even confusing. The

AAF leaders simultaneously confronted many crucial issues. These included redeployment; demobilization; determination of postwar force structure; potential

impact of the atomic bomb on forces and organization; planning future research

and development; probable reorganization of the defense establishment; and finally, creation of the AAF's own postwar organization.

General Spaatz identified three significant steps that were necessary to make

the postwar Air Force an effective reality. A Department of National Defense had

to be established, in which the Air Force would achieve parity with the Army and

Navy. The AAF's major commands required reorganization. And AAF headquarters needed recasting to facilitate policymaking.

As with the planning for 70 groups, the events leading to the March 1946 reorganization began before the war ended. With the successful invasion of the

European continent in June 1944 and the surrender of Germany in May 1945, Air

Staff planners had to consider organizational changes in the light of redeployment to the Pacific and conversion to B-29 very heavy bomb units. Also, they

had constantly to bear in mind and plan for the eventuality of a separate Air

Force.

123
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

The major decision to be made concerned the most effective way to organize

the three primary missions-strategic, tactical, and air defense.* In June 1945 the

newly created Headquarters Continental Air Forces (CAF) began to assume its

responsibilities. Continental Air Forces was engaged in redeployment planning

and was assigned the mission of air defense of the continental United States. In

addition, CAF concentrated on postwar plans to form a strategic air reserve and

to provide tactical air support to Army Ground Forces as well as directing units

to participate in potential joint training with the Navy.

During 1945, Headquarters Army Air Forces was intensely involved in postwar organizational planning. Various plans were studied. Among them was a

proposal for a separate Training Command along with the formation of an Air

Force Combat Command. Another plan specified that Continental Air Forces retain the Training Command and that the Combat Command consist of long-range

heavy bombers, escort fighters, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft. This plan

contained the concept of a global striking force. This idea came to fruition in

January 1946 when Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg proposed a global atomic striking force. Vandenberg stressed that such a force should be based in the United

States, ready for instant deployment. This recommendation was approved by

General Eaker.

Moreover, General Spaatz made several landmark decisions. In January 1946,

after discussions with Army Chief of Staff General Eisenhower, Spaatz decided

to create three major combat commands (Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air

Command, and Air Defense Command) as part of the AAF's postwar reorganization. This move was influenced by Eisenhower's opinion that the Army required

a separate tactical air force to support its ground armies. Also, air leaders held the

view that if the AAF failed to furnish tactical air support, the Army would try to

secure its own "integral" air units. In February 1946, Spaatz ordered the founding

of an Air Board to set long-range policy. By the middle of 1946, the Army Air

Forces' postwar reorganization had been codified by War Department Circular

138. Likewise in 1946, Spaatz directed the planning in the newly-formed Air

Board, that would eventually bring a Deputy Chief of Staff system to Air Force

headquarters.

Continental Air Forces

Following the Allied invasion in June 1944, in which air power played a crucial role, the war in Europe entered its final phases. Simultaneously, the United

States pressed the drive against the Japanese in the Pacific. In 1944, U.S. forces

*These missions had been described in 1943 in War Dcpartment Field Manual 100-

20. See Chapter I.

124
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

landed in the Mariana Islands. The AAF anticipated having bases from which B29 very long range bombers could strike the heart of Japan. By late summer of

1944, the Marianas were being prepared for the arrival of the first B-29s. These

events demanded organizational changes.

In August 1944, Kuter and Maj. Gen. Howard A. Craig, Assistant Chief of

Air Staff for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (ACAS-3), stressed

that developments in Europe and the Pacific dictated reorganization of continental (home) air forces to resolve expected redeployment problems and to capitalize

on the evolving cutback in training. Changes were also essential to facilitate conversion of heavy bomb groups (B-17, B-24) to very heavy bomb groups (B-29).

General Craig recommended creation of a Headquarters Continental Air Command to be responsible for all training, distribution, and redeployment and that

Headquarters Training Command be abolished with its personnel being used to

staff Headquarters Continental Air Command. Also, the First, Second, Third, and

Fourth Air Forces, the Troop Carrier Command, Eastern Training Command,

Central Training Command, Western Training Command, and Personnel Distribution Command should be placed under Headquarters Continental Air Command.*'

One of the principal problems had been the absence of training standardization in the home air forces; this could be remedied by putting these air

forces under a continental command. Other chief concerns were conversion and

redeployment. Craig thought that his recommendations were flexible enough to

meet redeployment needs. His plan called for the First Air Force to receive and

organize all units arriving from the European theater. The Second Air Force

would administer the requisite training for conversion of heavy bomb groups to

very heavy bomb groups. The Fourth Air Force would process and dispatch units

to the Pacific theater. The Third Air Force would be charged with all replacement

training which, after the war, would be at a low level.2

General Arnold agreed with his staff that changes were required. He informed

Marshall that the Air Staff was laboring under a heavy load which would grow

even more burdensome with redeployment and commencement of the complex

task of conversion. He therefore advocated to Marshall creation of a Headquarters Continental Air Forces at Camp Springs, Md. (near Washington, D.C.), to

*During the war, the continental or home air forces were primarily responsible for

training and air defense. At the start of the conflict, the First Air Force was assigned to the

Eastern Defense Command and the Fourth Air Force to the Western Defense Command.

The Second and Third Air Forces were responsible for unit training. By September 1943

the training forces were better than twice the size, in men and planes, of the air forces engaged in air defense. On September 10, 1943, the AAF gained complete control of the

First and Fourth Air Forces. Later on, training became the main activity of the four air

forces.

125
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

have command over the four continental air forces and the Troop Carrier Command. Arnold proposed that Headquarters CAF be responsible for the organization and training of units for deployment (or redeployment) overseas; for the

establishment of a continental strategic air reserve; for the supervision of joint

air-ground training; and for the air defense of the continental United States. 3

After conferring with General Marshall, Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Army

Deputy Chief of Staff, replied to Arnold. He concurred in the Army Air Forces'

setting its own organization and thought decentralization was a good idea. Handy

suggested, however, that Training Command be combined with the proposed

Continental Air Forces ("the primary mission of the Air Forces in the United

States at this time is training"). And in light of General Marshall's desire to move

personnel out of Washington, Headquarters CAF should be located outside of the

nation's capital. The Army Deputy Chief further questioned the future relationship of Headquarters AAF with Headquarters Continental Air Forces: "I have the

impression that considerable difficulty was encountered when we had the Army

Air Forces Combat Command with headquarters at Boiling Field." 4 Handy

stressed that no increase in the troop basis would be approved for this reorganization.

Arnold admitted that he had seriously considered assigning Training Command to the Continental Air Forces. Nevertheless, Training Command had the

mission of training individuals, whereas CAF needed to integrate these people

into combat crews and units. Besides, Continental Air Forces would have to retrain and reequip units for redeployment or for assignment to the strategic reserve. Regarding Handy's point about a potential rise in personnel, Arnold

responded that Headquarters Continental Air Forces would be organized at Camp

Springs, Md. without enlarging the military strength of the Washington area.

This could be done by trimming the size of Headquarters Army Air Forces and

by transferring the Fighter Replacement Training Unit at Camp Springs out of

the Washington area. Command relationships would be sound. Headquarters

AAF would deal directly with Headquarters CAF, Training Command, the AAF

Personnel Distribution Command, Air Transport Command (ATC), and the Air

Technical Service Command. Headquarters Continental Air Forces would have

authority over the four continental air forces and the Troop Carrier Command. 6

On November 17, 1944, General Marshall approved a continental Air Forces

and on December 15 the Headquarters Continental Air Forces was activated. 7 Its

responsibilities were: command of the four continental air forces, I Troop Carrier

Command, and all units assigned to them; air defense of the continental United

States; joint air-ground training; organization and training of service and combat

units and crews for deployment or redeployment to overseas theaters; supervision

of redeployment, including scheduling, determination of aircraft requirements,

and movement of units to staging areas; and on completion of redeployment, formation, and command of the continental strategic reserve.8

126
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

As mentioned, among Arnold's reasons for setting up Headquarters Continental Air Forces was to assist in redeployment of forces.* It was likewise probable

that for postwar organization the Commanding General, AAF, envisioned Continental Air Forces on the same command line as the Army Ground Forces. The

Air Staff could then be placed on a par with the War Department General Staff,

all under the Chief of Staff. In April 1945 the four home air forces and the Troop

Carrier Command were formally assigned to Headquarters CAF, although the

latter did not assume its full responsibilities until June. 9 As with Twentieth Air

Force, Arnold himself retained control of Continental Air Force, appointing Maj.

Gen. St. Clair Streett as Deputy Commanding General, CAF. So in reality General Arnold now had two major entities doing postwar planning, the Air Staff and

Headquarters Continental Air Forces.

Nonetheless, at war's end, CAF found itself confronted with the immediate

and tremendous task of demobilization. After V-J Day, it became apparent in

August 1945 that the separation centers operated by Army Service Forces could

not handle the volume of personnel waiting to be processed. Consequently, at Arnold's direction, the Continental Air Forces in September 1945 built a network of

twenty-seven separation centers. In late October this number rose to forty-three.

By December 1945, 500,000 personnel had been separated. In the middle of

January 1946, the number of centers was reduced to nine, processing 2,800 daily.

A total of 734,715 had been separated when the AAF's demobilization program

terminated on February 20, 1946.10 Brig. Gen. Leon W. Johnson, Chief, Personnel Services Division, noted in late 1945: "We didn't demobilize; we merely fell

apart .... we lost many records of all the groups and units that operated during

the war because there was no one to take care of them. So, it was not an orderly

demobilization at all. It was just a riot, really." 1

In June 1945, Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson and Brig. Gen. Byron E. Gates of the

Air Staff had proposed that Continental Air Forces activate two air defense commands with the same boundaries as the two remaining wartime defense commands. These would act as receiving and training agencies for fighter groups,

aircraft warning and control units, and antiaircraft artillery units returning from

*Between May and August 1945, under the so-called "White Plan," more than 5,400

aircraft were flown to the United States from the European and Mediterranean theaters.

Also, between May and July, the AAF's "Green Project" returned over 100,000 military

and civilian passengers from Europe and the Mediterranean by Air Transport Command

aircraft. [Chauncey E. Sanders, Redeployment and Demobilization (USAF Hist Study 77,

Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1953), pp 46-57.]

'General Johnson won the Medal of Honor for his exploits in the Ploesti raid. As for

demobilization, the AAF reached a peak of 2,411,294 military personnel in March 1944.

By December 31, 1945, this had been reduced to 888,769. In March 1946 the figure had

shrunk to 500,472 and to a postwar low of 303,614 in May 1947.

127
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

AAF Personnel Services

Chief, Brig. Gen. Leon W.

Johnson criticized the demobilization as inefficient

and disorderly.

L

Europe. They would train National Guard and Reserve troops in AAA and aircraft control and warning.12 Wilson and Gates asserted that, since the Air Staff

now regarded air defense as relatively unimportant compared to early in the war,

the emphasis within the two commands would be rescue and flight control.

Continental Air Forces rejected this plan as being premature. It opposed investing in World War 1I air defense equipment, recommending that the AAF

concentrate on developing equipment to locate and track missiles like those the

Germans launched against Britain. In addition, CAF questioned the idea of establishing commands which would be subordinated to ground commanders. 3 In

lieu of focusing on air defense restructuring, CAF was chiefly concerned with

creating a strategic reserve to, among other missions, furnish tactical air units to

support the Army Ground Forces. Meanwhile, General Streett knew that General

Arnold was weighing an Air Staff proposal to set up a strategic air force separate

from and on line with Continental Air Forces.

Strategic Striking Force

In the summer of 1945, the War Department directed the AAF to form a strategic or General Reserve of air units to support the Army's overall strategic re128
ENFOR

In the aftermath of V-J

Day, Army separation .

centers were flooded with T-T44s

personnel anxious to return home (below). To

meet the demand, the ..

Continental Air Forces set v..

up additional separation

centers around the country (right).

... .
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

serve consisting of ground and air units. Based in the United States, these air

forces in the General Reserve would move overseas quickly in an emergency.

They would reinforce occupation forces in Europe and Asia, form a combat force

overseas if required, and help maintain internal security in the United States and

its possessions.14 Thus, the General Reserve would largely be used for tactical

support of the Army Ground Forces. By mid-September 1946 these mobile Reserve units and their support elements would be trained and equipped to high

combat efficiency. The commanders of the AAF's major combat commands

would inform the AAF Commander of the units designated for the General Re15

serve.

The size of the strategic reserve had fluctuated. In early 1945 the Joint Chiefs

had authorized a continental United States strategic reserve of as many as

twenty-nine AAF groups and additional separate squadrons. During late July

1945, General Arnold sanctioned an AAF Continental United States (CONUS)

reserve of thirteen groups-two heavy bomb, two medium bomb, five fighter, • 16

three troop carrier, and one reconnaissance. The AAF troop basis was amended

in early August to reflect this thirteen-group strategic reserve.

Shortly thereafter, on September 8, 1945, the War Department approved a

Strategic Striking Force to be kept in the United States as part of the General Reserve. Units would be picked for this force. Besides the SSF, Army Air Forces

would specify units to be deployed overseas and others to be retained in the

United States for training.17 From September 1945 on, the AAF constantly

changed the composition of the striking force, adding and deleting units as required depending on which ones were being returned from overseas or were being inactivated. Also in September, additional tactical units were moved to the

SSF since two armies would be retained in the CONUS and the AAF would have

to furnish a tactical air command for each.18 On November 17 the War Department ordered that units of the Strategic Striking Force should henceforth be con-

' 9 sidered and designated as General Reserve. By the close of 1945, five very

heavy bomb groups had been assigned to the General Reserve, including the

40th, 444th, and 509th, comprising the 58th Very Heavy Bomb Wing.* 2 °

Plans had also been devised to put the striking force under an Air Force Combat Command. In December 1945, Col. Robert 0. Cork, Office of the Assistant

Chief of Air Staff, Plans (ACAS-5), presented two plans to the newly appointed

Ad Hoc Committee on Reorganization of the Army Air Forces. The first suggested a separate Training Command with an Air Force Combat Command replacing the Continental Air Forces. The second recommended that CAF keep the

Training Command with the AFCC having long-range heavy bombers, escort

fighters, and long-range reconnaissance. 2'

*Each group consisted of four squadrons.

130
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

Another proposal put forward for the Air Force Combat Command reflected

the concept of Col. Reuben C. Moffat, now head of the Special Planning Division and a member of the ad hoc committee. In presenting his plan for a Combat

Command, he said that "such an organization must be prepared to move .... tactical organizations to bases throughout the continental United States, the territories

and possessions in order that the responsible commander under a system of unified command may have a striking force competent to meet the trend of international relations."'22

Colonel Moffat pointed out that if all long-range very heavy bombers were

permanently assigned to continental U.S. commands and the theaters, there

would be insufficient flexibility for the AAF to carry out its mission. The theaters

and Continental Air Forces should have ample units to assure the air defense of

these areas. These units would be equipped with interceptor and night fighters,

perimeter reconnaissance aircraft, and planes to support ground and naval forces.

The Air Force Combat Command, reporting directly to the AAF Commander,

could move a striking force of sufficient size anywhere to assist units in specific

regions.23

The AFCC would encompass all units of the Strategic or General Reserve in

the continental United States. Movement of these units would be the task of the

Combat Command. In peacetime, this striking force would be controlled by the

area or theater commander (after movement) for training or in anticipation of

hostilities. During war, this force would become an integral part of the theater

commander's forces. This, said Moffat, was the concept of unified command as

developed during the war. He urged that Continental Air Forces take in the Air

Force Training Command and be charged with training National Guard, Reserve,

and tactical units to support ground and naval forces, air defense, and perimeter

reconnaissance.

24,

Meantime, following the end of the war, the AAF leadership at once began

concerted thinking about the potential effects of the atomic bomb on strategy, organization, and force structure. To look into this matter, General Arnold directed

formation of the Spaatz Board (comprising Spaatz, Vandenberg, and Norstad).

The board's report of October 1945 recommended that the AAF exploit atomic

technology to the utmost, and that "an officer of the caliber of Maj. Gen. Curtis

E. LeMay" be made Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development. The

board concluded that the atomic bomb did not call for a change in the current

size, organization, and composition of the postwar Air Force.25

Coincident with issuance of the Spaatz Board report, a study by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS concluded that, when other nations got the

atomic bomb, United States security would be greatly impaired. The Soviet Un-

*Colonel Moffat, long active in postwar planning, died on May 18, 1946.

131
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

ion was identified as a potential enemy. Inasmuch as its industrial and population

centers were strung out over vast areas, the United States needed a network of

overseas bases. The committee set the American atomic lead at about five years.

To keep this advantage, it recommended American or allied control of the major

sources of uranium and acceleration of U.S. scientific research and development.

Further, the committee advocated accrual of an adequate atomic stockpile and a

policy of the strictest secrecy in the atomic bomb program. This meant refusal to

give atomic information to any nation or international organization. Finally, conventional weapons would still be needed. The committee saw no reason for major modification of the military organization.26

General LeMay, Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development,

had also been thinking about the A-bomb. In January 1946, the War Department

Equipment Board, pondering the results of the atomic revolution, called LeMay

to testify. Atomic weapons, he said, changed basic military concepts. The nation

would not have time to mobilize once war began. An atomic attack would be impossible to stop. "Our only defense," he stressed, "is a striking power in being of

such size that it is capable of delivering a stronger blow than any of our potential • ,, 2 7

enemies. He was certain that conventional bombs would be needed against

dispersed industrial targets.

At the same time, General Vandenberg advised maintaining in the United

States a global atomic striking force in constant readiness, poised for instant deployment. In early January 1946, Vandenberg drafted a detailed plan, approved

by Eaker, for a force, "sufficient in size, to fully exploit the expected availabilit

and effectiveness of new bombardment weapons including the atomic bomb.'"2ý

Manned by the best personnel, this striking force would employ the most advanced aircraft and equipment. Moreover, elements of the force should be located near the Manhattan Engineer District's (MED's) assembly and storage area

at Albuquerque, N. Mex., to ensure close coordination with the bomb manufacturing, development, and assembly center.29

General Vandenbcrg wanted the 509th Bomb Group to be the nucleus of the

Atomic Air Force. Having returned from the Pacific, the 509th was now at

Roswell Army Air Field, N. Mex. There should be a single agency, said Vandenberg, to direct the AAF's atomic units and to establish and maintain the strategic

striking force. He accordingly pressed for a wing organization consisting of

Headquarters 58th Wing and three VHB groups, the 40th, 444th, and 509th. This

organization should be a standard very heavy bomb wing, augmented by personnel and units for handling atomic bombs. It could deploy one or more of its

groups. The wing headquarters would take care of training, technical support,

and liaison with the Manhattan Engineer District.:3

General Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, believed that ideally the

atomic force should include the AAF's standard units supplemented by special

personnel and equipment. Still, it would be impossible to move personnel and

132
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

equipment among all of the VHB units. He agreed with Vandenberg that one basic unit should exploit the atomic bomb. Such a unit demanded highly trained

people. Norstad underscored the importance of communicating to the War Department and the Congress that the existence of the atomic bomb did not mean

that whole portions of the AAF could be abolished. The single atomic wing, Norstad insisted, was chiefly a mobile striking force. Its personnel would be rotated

for training. "The individual components," he said, "would be used as part of the

VHB striking force." 3 1 Vandenberg added that the limited projected troop basis

would allow just three groups of four squadrons each, one squadron having

atomic modified B-29s. Conceivably, each VHB group S might 32 ultimately contain

at least one squadron that could deliver the atomic bomb.

Col. John G. Moore, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel, recommended to Eaker that solely a single standard wing, without a special atomic designator, be organized at this time. He deemed it easier to obtain funds for

equipping a small unit and keeping it ready, than to try to equip all units. When

atomic bombs became more plentiful, more units could be converted.33 Moore

suggested there were many targets not calling for the atomic bomb. Therefore,

the AAF would still have to stockpile the standard bombs that had been so effective during the war.34

Brig. Gen. John A. Samford, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Intelligence, agreed that a specific wing should be made the atomic wing. He cautioned, however, that a term like "atomic bombing force" should be avoided:

"The missions of the wing should include the development of practices and organization that will permit the easiest possible adaptation of any similar bombardment wing to the task of atomic bombing." 35 Should a wing be designated as

"atomic," Samford thought it would be "vulnerable to control by interests whose

proper authority over atomic matters may be completely foreign to the use of

atomic energy as a weapon.,' 36 The best tactic, then, would be to designate this

wing as a Bomb Wing (Special). 37

In June 1946, Headquarters AAF approved the role of the 58th Bomb Wing as

the first unit of the atomic strike force. The wing's mission, adopted from SAC's,

was "to be capable of immediate and sustained very long range offensive operations in any part of the world, either independently or in cooperation with land ,,38

and naval forces, utilizing the latest and most advanced weapons. In addition

the 58th Wing would help the Manhattan Engineer District conduct tests, when

appropriate, as well as handle AAF liaison with MED on atomic matters.*

*Liaison on policies pertaining to potential use of the atomic bomb and to atomic information would in time be transferred to the Air Materiel Command. This would be done

after SAC had elicited sufficient atomic information to enable it eventually to employ the

bomb, if need be.

133
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

B-29 in flight. General Norstad advocated that one unit or wing of these

aircraft should be capable of delivering the atomic bomb.

In general the AAF's atomic program had been slow to evolve due to redeployment and demobilization problems after the war. The Air Staff had been occupied with postwar organization planning, while the 58th Bomb Wing (Brig.

Gen. Roger M. Ramey, Commander) was caught up in the "Crossroads" atomic

tests.

39

At the same time that the AAF planned its atomic striking force, Maj. Gen.

Leslie R. Groves, MED head, wrote a memorandum clarifying his thinking about

the impact of the atomic bomb on military organization and strategy. Groves

thought it unlikely that the world's major nations would reach an arms control

agreement. Should this prediction materialize, the United States must keep its supremacy in atomic weapons for immediate use in the event of an atomic attack.n4

Like many military leaders and governmental officials, Groves played up the importance of the United States having a worldwide intelligence network.

Groves was skeptical of the War Department's postwar mobilization planning.

He wrote that in an all-out war, with atomic weapons used on one or both sides,

there would not be time to mobilize, train, and equip a large army. Yet, he argued

that the atomic bomb was not an all-purpose weapon: "One would not use a pile134
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

driver for driving tacks when a tack hammer would do a better and cheaper

job.''41 He opposed relying exclusively on the atomic bomb. Balanced military

forces were required, able to react instantaneously. 42

Meanwhile, the Army Air Forces was unhappy over its arrangements with the

Manhattan Engineer District. General LeMay wished to take from MED the responsibility for procurement, storage, assembly, and transportation of the atomic

bomb. This would leave the district with the missions of research and development and fabrication and delivery to the AAF of components manufactured by

MED. 43 In LeMay's view, the split responsibility between the AAF and MED

violated the principle of unity of command. This issue would become more troublesome in the future as the AAF gained even more autonomy.44

Postwar Organization of Major Commands

The previously mentioned Ad Hoc Committee on Reorganization of the Army

Air Forces was established by Eaker on December 11, 1945, to examine postwar

organization and missions.* At the start the committee members differed, among

other things, on the proposed functions of the Combat Command, Strategic Striking Force, Continental Air Forces, and Training Command. Committee members also disagreed on how to set up the technical services. The Assistant Chief

of Air Staff, Supply, advocated a functional staff structure with little visibility for

the technical services, such as ordnance, engineers, quartermaster, and chemical

warfare. On the other hand, the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, recommended a semicorps or service-type structure in which specialized activities

would be represented by special staff agencies through the command up to the

top. The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, also favored representation by special staff agencies.46 Unable to concur on command structure, the committee forwarded several alternatives to Eaker for possible approval.47

In early January 1946, General Spaatz approved one of the recommended organizations for planning purposes. With minor revisions, this plan could have

been appropriate to any of the conceivable plans for reorganizing the national defense structure, including a single department with coequal Army, Navy, and Air

Force. General Norstad saw the plan as a compromise between the views of Air

*Members of the committee were: Col. Reuben C. Moffat, Plans (A-5), steering

member; Col. Bourne Adkison, Training and Operations (A-3); Col. Robert E. L. Eaton,

Personnel (A-I); Col. Harris B. Hull, Intelligence (A-2); Col. John G. Salsman, Supply

(A-4); Col. J. B. Hill, Air Judge Advocate's Office; Lt. Col. William P. Berkeley, Plans;

Col. Keith K. Compton, Continental Air Forces; Brig. Gen. Glen C. Jamison, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, monitoring the study's development; and Maj. C. F.

Byars, Plans, recorder.

135
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Staff members. Designed for 70 groups, it could be adapted to any size force if

the major missions remained the same.48 Under this suggested compromise, there

were the Air Force Combat Command, comprising the strategic, tactical, and air

defense forces; the Air Technical Service Command; the Air Transport Command; and the Training Command. 49 Norstad said the relationship between theater air commands and AAF headquarters "is designated by a dotted line to

indicate the administrative, logistical, training, and tactical supervision exercised

by the Commanding General, AAF. Dependent upon the organization of the military service, this line may in some cases be solid to indicate command and complete control."' 50

Despite the recommendations of the ad hoc committee, Eisenhower and

Spaatz convened definitive discussions on the subject of tactical air support. As

mentioned, General Eisenhower had become Army Chief of Staff in November

1945. Even though General Arnold would not retire until February 1946, Spaatz

41

The development of the atomic force raised many issues for postwar planners.

In the early stages of atomic testing, AAF observers (left to right) Brig. Gen.

William F. McKee, Maj. General Curtis LeMay and Maj. Gen. Earle E.

Partridge confer over a scale model of Bikini Atoll. The AAF participated in

the tests as part of the Joint Army-Navy Task Force.

136
(Right) Stressing the importance of tactical operations in

future operations, Brig. Gen.

William F. McKee recommended forming two tactical

air commands, one to service

the Army Ground Forces and

a second to train AAF personnel.

Maj. Gen. Samuel A. Anderson (left) with Brig. Gen. Edwin J. Backus in

France, 1945. After the war, General Anderson served as Chief of Staff for

Continental Air Forces and became a strong advocate for strengthening

tactical air support capabilities within Army Air Forces.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

had shouldered important portions of Arnold's workload since November, when

the AAF Commander, in ill health, announced to the Air Staff that he would be

retiring. In fact, between November 1945 and February 1946, Spaatz spearheaded the AAF drive for unification and a separate Air Force. On November 14,

1945, Arnold had directed Eaker to give Spaatz the job of determining the permanent status of the Army Air Forces. 5 1 Thus, until Spaatz succeeded Arnold in

February, he would function officially as his deputy. As architect of AAF plans

pointing to permanent status, Spaatz would keep in close touch with the War Department and of course could call on any Air Staff office for assistance.52

Tactical air support of Army Ground Forces was one of the most important

and pressing postwar issues facing the Army Air Forces. As noted, the ad hoc

committee in December 1945 was studying formation of an Air Force Combat

Command, embracing the AAF's strategic, tactical, and air defense forces. Also,

a proposal to lodge all combat air power in the Continental Air Forces had been

weighed. General Arnold knew that the Army's ground forces would conduct

postwar training maneuvers in which tactical air support would be required.

When Eaker had set the 70-group goal in late August 1945, he had also approved

for planning purposes an Air Staff proposal that light and medium bomber and

certain fighter groups be formed into a model tactical air force acceptable to the

Army Ground Forces.53 Army ground commanders deemed air superiority crucial to the success of the ground forces.54 Leaders of the AAF of course agreed

with AGF commanders that tactical experience in World War II had shown that

ground troops must move under the cover of air superiority.

In the meantime, CAF headquarters recommended to Arnold that the First Air

Force be made into an "operational" air force composed of two tactical air commands. The First's training function would then be split among the other three

continental air forces.55 Aware of the proven importance of tactical air support,

Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson, Chief of Staff, Continental Air Forces, pointed

out to Arnold that the Army Ground Forces had advocated support aviation

within their own units. The AGF had argued that Army Air Forces had given low

priority to equipping and training units designed to support ground operations.

Hence, to preserve its tactical mission, Anderson emphasized, the AAF should

create a headquarters at Air Force level to administer air-ground and joint training operations.

56

In August 1945, General Vandenberg endorsed the proposition that one of the

four numbered air forces be redesignated and consist of two tactical air commands. Brig. Gen. William F. McKee, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff for

Operations, proposed in late October that this tactical air force be integrated in

the AAF's postwar plan. The AAF view was that "new developments may

change the employment of Tactical Air Forces, but cannot diminish its necessity.

Whenever AGF units are employed, cooperating tactical air units are necessary."'57 However, the Army Air Forces expressed concern lest the AGF establish

138
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

organic air units. The AAF therefore acted on the assumption that, if AGF postwar tactical air requirements were not met, the AGF would try to satisfy them on

its own.* The proposed tactical air force would meet AGF needs. McKee recommended that the first or "model" Tactical Air Command be organized at full

strength. It would support the AGF's proposed mobile striking army and would

be ready for immediate action in event of an emergency. The second or "skeleton" command should be formed at reduced strength. The skeleton command

would be a training TAC, to relieve the model TAC from the responsibility for

training with the AGF in joint Army-Navy exercises.58

Agreeing in principle with McKee, Colonel Moffat said that his Post War Division had included a tactical Air Force headquarters in its plan for organization

of a permanent Air Force. Moffat assumed that such a headquarters would be

sufficiently flexible to accommodate one or more "skeletonized" Tactical Air

Commands.59 Nevertheless, he noted that the plan for a 70-group Air Force with

400,000 men would force all units to be only at half-strength at best. 60

But McKee believed the model Tactical Air Command would be organized at

full strength with all the requisite elements for air-ground operations. McKee's

idea was to make the model TAC highly mobile to meet the Army's ground force

needs. The model command would be a fully trained striking force set for instant

action. The skeleton TAC would be organized at reduced strength to be used

chiefly as a training command. It would in addition give technical training to aircraft control and warning personnel. Though approved in August 1945, this

plan was not implemented. The surrender of Japan caused the Air Staff to forego

*Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, commanding general of the IX Tactical Air Command during World War II (who would become CG, Tactical Air Command, in March

1946), held what was a common view among the AAF leadership in the postwar period:

"There is a strong tendency within the Army-in my mind, the Army and Ground Forces

are the same-to gain control and command of tactical forces .... I've learned that

through my close association with Devers [Gen. Jacob L. Devers, CG, Army Ground

Forces] and his Army commanders, corps commanders and division commanders. They

have picked up very cleverly our own suggestions. The Navy should continue control of

its carrier-based aircraft to support fleet operations. So they, likewise, say that the Army

should have control of its tactical air forces to support land operations." [Fourth Meeting

of the Air Board, Dec 3-4, 1946, p 185, in RG 340, SAF, Air Bd Mtgs, Box 16, MMB.]

Interestingly, General Kenney (to be CG, Strategic Air Command), did not even like to

use the words "tactical" and "strategic." He thought that all types of aircraft and air organizations would do both kinds of missions. He felt that to divide AAF organizations

into tactical and strategic was to help the Army in its attempts to obtain an "integral" air

force. Kenney noted that some ground officers compared tactical air to artillery. [Memo

for Gen. Arnold fr Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, ACAS-3, subj: Daily Activity Report

of the AC/AS-3, Aug 27, 1945, in RG 18, AAG 319.1, OC&R, 1945, ox 369; Fourth

Meeting of Air Board, Dec 3-4, 1946, p 179.]

139
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

immediate organizational changes and, along with the War Department's planners to attempt to chart even more intensely the permanent postwar structure.

Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson proposed in September 1945 that Continental

Air Forces be responsible for a global striking force, tactical air units for all training conducted with Army and Navy forces, planning for the air defense of the

continental United States, and training combat units and crews for overseas.62

Then in mid-November, Maj. Gen. St. Clair Streett, CAF deputy commander recommended that Continental Air Forces be organized into Eastern and Western

Air Commands for air defense, a Central Air Command for training, and a Tactical Air Command. Streett stressed that strategic forces would operate under the

Commanding General, Army Air Forces, in an M-day Strategic Air Task

Force. 63 Even before the war ended, General Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air

Staff for Plans, had pressed for a postwar Strategic Air Force that would include

all the very heavy bomb units.64 And in December, the ad hoc committee on reorganization advocated that four air forces (one strategic, one tactical, and two

air defense) be created under Continental Air Forces. One thing was certain-the

eventual postwar organization of the Air Force would include units to carry out

training maneuvers with the ground forces and to undertake tactical operations in

case of emergency.65

However, as noted, General Eisenhower had made a strong point to Spaatz on

the importance of a separate tactical air organization to support the Army Ground

Forces. 66 The Army Chief had long held firm views on tactical air support of

ground forces. The Army, said Eisenhower, had always accepted without reservation the idea of mutual dependence between the services. World War II had attested to the effectiveness of the unified command principle. The concept of

complementary roles-air, ground, and sea-meant that no single service should

have the forces or equipment to carry out joint missions by itself, if these forces

or equipment duplicated those in the other services.67 The war confirmed the

need for air superiority over the battlefield if ground operations were to be successful. Control of the air, Eisenhower argued, was most economically gained by

employment of air forces operating under a single command. He was emphatic in

his conviction that the Army's dependence on tactical air support had been

matched by the AAF's effectiveness in furnishing it. Nonetheless, the Army

Chief's position did not rest solely upon the manifested efficiency of such support:

Basically, the Army does not belong in the air - it belongs on the ground

.... Control of the tactical Air Force means responsibility... for the entire

operating establishment required to support these planes. This includes the

requisite basic air research and development program necessary to maintain

a vital arm and the additional specialized service forces to support the army

S.... assumption of this task by the Army would duplicate in great measure

the primary and continuing responsibilities of the Air Force and, in effect,

would result in the creation of another air establishment. 6

8

140
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

Spaatz, now Arnold's deputy but actually operating for him, agreed with Eisenhower on the need for a separate tactical air structure. In mid-January 1946,

Spaatz thus turned away from the idea of having the combat air forces under

CAF. He directed the demise of CAF and instead formed three major combat air

commands-the Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and the Air

Defense Command.69 General Spaatz would later recall that "Eisenhower and I

thought along the same lines about this thing. I certainly would not call it pressure.'7° Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, named TAC commander in March 1946,

recalled:

Bradley and Eisenhower were assured by Spaatz that the Air Force would always honor and always meet its commitments to the Army and provide

strong tactical air forces. Spaatz made that commitment to Eisenhower and it

was a very strong commitment. Eisenhower was persuaded by it; Spaatz

meant it .... He made strong promises to Eisenhower to the effect that the

tactical air forces would remain intact .... They would honor their commitment and their obligation to provide that service to the Army. It was to a

large extent that that commitment by Spaatz permitted Eisenhower to support a separate air force. I think without it he wouldn't have.7

'

The other AAF commands would be the Air Materiel Command (formerly the

Air Technical Service Command), Air Training Command, Air University, the

Air Proving Ground Command, Air Transport Command, and the theater commands. The ad hoc committee on reorganization commented that the restructuring was not arrived at by the committee's deliberations, but rather by a command

decision: "as such, the Ad Hoc Committee has no bone to pick with the command organization.'72 By January 29, 1946, Eisenhower and Spaatz had formally approved this reorganization plan and it was distributed within the Air

Staff. It was originally to become effective on February 15, 1946.73

With dissemination of the plan to the Air Staff, the objectives of the ad hoc

committee changed. The first priority became distribution of materials to realize

the new organization. The second priority was to adjust the implemental plans to

the Simpson Board's recommendations, which would eventually involve the

AAF's assuming additional functions with commensurate personnel.*74

The peacetime reorganization implemented by General Spaatz on March 21,

1946, followed functional lines, the AAF forming a major command to conduct

each of the air roles specified in Field Manual 100-30. SAC, TAC, and ADC

were established as the three major combat commands. This was in line with a

previous proposal by Vandenberg and Norstad to form a separate "strategic Air

Force." The Army Air Forces really wanted to create just two commands, a Continental Air Forces and a long-range strategic bomber force. The AAF reasoned

*For details on the Simpson Board's recommendations, See Chapter 3.

141
St. Clair Streett (left) and Major

Banfield on the beach of Los Negros Island. As a major general,

Streett proposed reorganizing

Continental Air Forces into separate commands for air defense,

training, and tactical air support.

Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada

headed Tactical Air Command,

first in Florida and later at Langley

Field, Virginia.
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

that the CAF would occupy the same command line as the Army Ground Forces.

With this arrangement, the Air Staff would then be on the same line with the War

Department General Staff, under the Chief of Staff. However, Eisenhower and

Gen. Jacob L. Devers' Army Ground Forces desired air forces specifically designated for air-ground operations. Since Eisenhower was such a strong proponent

of a separate Air Force, Spaatz was not disposed to contest this issue. Had a Tactical Air Command not been formed, the ground generals would probably have

acted in concert to achieve their own tactical aviation. No doubt Eisenhower

stressed this last point to General Spaatz.

The March 1946 peacetime reorganization, implemented by an order signed

by The Adjutant General of the War Department, placed the major commands directly under the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. 75 This restructuring

embodied the principle that numbered air forces would be intermediate headquarters in the chain of command, between the major commands and wings or the

equivalent.76 This type of arrangement, relying on the major commands below

the top headquarters, reflected the RAF influence. Headquarters Continental Air

Forces was redesignated as Headquarters Strategic Air Command under Gen.

George C. Kenney, located at Boiling Field, Washington, D.C., then moved to

Andrews Field, Md., in October 1946.* Headquarters Air Defense Command

was activated at Mitchel Field, N.Y., under Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer.

Headquarters Tactical Air Command was activated at Tampa, Fla., under Maj.

Gen. Elwood R. Quesada. Subsequently, Quesada moved TAC headquarters to

Langley Field, Va., near the Army Ground Forces headquarters at Fort Monroe,

Va., and the Navy's Atlantic Fleet headquarters at Norfolk. Quesada said that

TAC would stress mobility and flexibility and would he prepared to cooperate

with the AGF. 77 His idea of air support for the ground forces was to do the job so

well "that the Army would be the first to admit that the tactical air command

forces under the jurisdiction of the United States Air Force was to their benefit.•"

78

Locations of the supporting commands and their commanders were: Air Materiel Command (a redesignated Air Technical Service Command), Wright Field,

*In August 1946, SAC was issued orders to move to Colorado Springs, Colo. Within a

week these orders were canceled because of "lack of funds." [Charles R. Rowdybush,The

History of Boiling Field, Anacostia, D.C., 1917-1948 (Masters Thesis, American University, Mar 57).] Sometimes referred to as "MacArthur's airman," for his ability to get

along with Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Kenney had a distinguished record in World War II.

Fifty-seven years old, he was appointed a member of the United Nations' Military Staff

Committee and thus did not command SAC until October 1946. His deputy, Maj. Gen. St.

Clair Streett, commanded until October.

143
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Gathered around AAF Commanding General Carl A. Spaatz are the

commanding generals of the reorganized air forces. Standing, left to right: Lt.

Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Air Materiel Command; Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson,

AAF Proving Ground Command; Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, Air

University. Seated, left to right: Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Air Training

Command; Gen. George C. Kenney, Strategic Air Command; General Spaatz;

Lt. Gen. Harold L. George, Air Transport Command; Lt. Gen. George E.

Stratemeyer, Air Defense Command; and Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada,

Tactical Air Command.

Ohio, Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining;*79 Air Transport Command, Washington,

D.C., Lt. Gen. Harold L. George; Air Training Command, Barksdale Field, La.,

Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon; Air University, Maxwell Field, Ala., Maj. Gen. Muir

S. Fairchild; AAF Proving Ground Command (formerly the AAF Center), Eglin

Field, Fla., Maj. Gen. Donald Wilson.

In this reorganization, eleven of the AAF's wartime air forces were assigned

to the three new combat commands: SAC took control of the Eighth and the Fifteenth; TAC received the Third, Ninth, and Twelfth; ADC got the First, Second,

*In February 1946, there had been discussions in the Air Staff to change Air Technical

Service Command to "Air Service Command." General Twining, the ATSC commander,

objected, insisting that the name, Air Materiel Command, "had more appeal." General

Spaatz agreed. [Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, CG, ATSC, to Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Feb 1I,

1946, in RG 18/AAG, Eaker Personal and Reading File, ACAS-5, File/6.]

144
AIR STAFF

MARCH 21,1946

General Carl A. Spaatz, Commanding General, AAF

Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker Deputy Commander & Chief of Air

Staff

Lt. Gen. Harold L. George* Director of Information

Maj. Gen. Charles C. Chauncey DCAS, Administration

Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay DCAS, Research & Development

Maj. Gen. Fred L. Anderson ACAS-1, Personnel

Brig. Gen. George C. McDonald ACAS-2, Intelligence

Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge ACAS-3, Operations & Training

Maj. Gen. Edward M. Powers ACAS-4, Materiel

Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad ACAS-5, Plans

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr Secretary-General of the Air Board

Maj. Gen. Junius W. Jones Air Inspector

*Also Commanding General, Air Transport Command.
AAF MILITARY PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION: MARCH 1946*

CONUS

TOTAL 328,079

Strategic Air Command 84,231

Tactical Air Command 25,574

Air Defense Command 7,218

Air Proving Ground Command 7,295

Air Training Command 128,742

Air Materiel Command 25,070

Air Transport Command 21,304

Air University 3,867

Personnel Distribution Command 4,002

Other 20,776

OVERSEAS

TOTAL 172,393

European Theater 47,554

Mediterranean Theater 2,555

Caribbean Air Command 4,279

Pacific Air Command 71,959

China Theater 7,668

Alaskan Air Command 2,740

Air Transport Command 35,015

Other 623

*USAF Statistical Digest, 1947, pp 46, 53.
AAF TACTICAL GROUPS AND SEPARATE SQUADRONS*

MARCH 1946

GROUPS SQUADRONS

TOTAL: 71 212

Very Heavy Bomber 21 66

Heavy Bomber 7 24

Medium Bomber 2 7

Light Bomber 2 7

Fighter 22 63

Reconnaissance 3 4

Troop Carrier 12 37

Composite 2 4

LOCATION: At Home 21 64

Overseas 50 148

SEPARATE

SQUADRONS

TOTAL: 72

Heavy Bomber 5

Fighter 6

Night Fighter 9

Reconnaissance 22

Troop Carrier 8

Liaison 10

Emergency Rescue 7

Geodetic Control 1

Tow Target 4

LOCATION: At Home 19

Overseas 53

*USAF Statistical Digest, 1946, pp 4-5.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth, aligned geographically to match the

Army's six continental United States army areas.80

Overseas air forces were deployed and commanded as follows: Fifth Air

Force, Nagoya, Japan, Maj. Gen. Kenneth B. Wolfe; Sixth Air Force (became

Caribbean Air Command, July 1946), Albrook Field, Panama, Maj. Gen. Hubert

R. Harmon; Seventh Air Force, Hickam Field, Hawaii, Maj. Gen. Thomas D.

White; Thirteenth Air Force, Fort McKinley, Luzon, Philippines, Maj. Gen.

Eugene L. Eubank; Twentieth Air Force, Harmon Field, Guam, Maj. Gen. Francis H. Griswold. The Fifth, Thirteenth, and Twentieth Air Forces operated under

Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead's Far East Air Forces (Tokyo, Japan). Tactical Air

Forces in Europe operated under Maj. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards' United States Air

Forces in Europe (Wiesbaden, Germany). The Alaskan Air Command (formerly

Eleventh Air Force) was under Brig. Gen. Edmund C. Lynch, at Adak. The

chain of control of air units abroad ran from Headquarters AAF to numbered air

force headquarters and then to bombardment and fighter groups. The fighter

units, with radar and communications furnished by new tactical control groups,

would perform the air defense and tactical air missions. This elimination of intermediate headquarters and assignment of dual missions to fighter groups enabled

Army Air Forces to meet overseas requirements with a minimum of personnel.81

As far as missions were concerned, General Spaatz assigned the Strategic Air

Command with the interim mission of being prepared to carry out long-range

global operations on their own or with land or naval forces. SAC was also responsible for maximum-range reconnaissance.82 The Tactical Air Command

should be ready to operate jointly with ground or naval forces and, if required, to

assist Air Defense Command with air defense operations. And, if necessary, it

would help the Army Ground Forces train airborne units.83

Air Defense Command's official interim mission was to defend the continental United States, one air force being assigned to each of six air defense areas. In

addition ADC would be prepared to cooperate with the Navy against hostile

forces or to protect coastal shipping. Besides, it would train the Air National

Guard, administer and train the Air Reserve, and instruct and train the Reserve

Officers Training Corps.'84

*There had been discussion in the Air Staff aimed at forming an Arctic theater. This

failed to materialize. [R&R Comment, I, Maj. Gen. Charles C. Chauncey, DCAS-5

(plans), subj: Creation of Arctic Theater, Apr 24, 1946, in RG 18/AAG Eaker Personal

and Reading File, ACAS-5, File/6.] "Air Defense Command would likewise handle AAF's contacts with the civilian community. Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Deputy Commander, AAF, explained ADC's mission in

these words: "In the last war we found that when the emergency developed, the trained

commanders and their staffs went away to war and we were left at the most critical period

in our history with the necessity of reorganizing the home establishment which had to do

148
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

Air Proving Ground Command was responsible for improving operational

suitability. The command would further make recommendations on the establishment of military characteristics and requirements for operational systems and

materiel.85 The Air University would supervise and operate the Air War College,

the Air Command and Staff School, and other schools and courses as called

for.

86

The Air Transport Command would provide air transport for all War Department agencies (except those served by Troop Carrier Command and local services required by overseas area commands or occupation forces) and for any other

governmental agency, as required or directed. Moreover, ATC was responsible

for air evacuation of sick and wounded from overseas theaters and between

points within the United States, as well as control and operation of aerial ports.

Additional responsibilities of this command were: Air Transport Service (new),

Air Rescue Service (new), Air Weather Service (old AAF Weather Service), Air

Communications Service (old Army Airways Communications Service), Aeronautical Chart Service (old Aeronautical Mapping and Chart Service), Flight

Services (old AAF Flight Service), and Flying Safety Service.87

The Air Materiel Command would undertake research and development essential to the AAF mission and conduct all required experimental static and flight

tests. It would also be charged with quality control and acceptance of materiel

procured by the AAF, modification of aircraft, industrial mobilization planning,

and depot supply operating functions.88 The Air Training Command would train

all airmen-from recruits to flying officers and technicians, mechanics, and

maintenance personnel. 89

Spaatz asserted that the AAF could accomplish its mission only by maintaining an Air Force of adequate size and proper composition, "strategically deployed and in a high and constant state of readiness." The next war would begin

in the air. The AAF could discharge its responsibility most effectively only if

granted coequal status with the ground and naval forces. General Spaatz also

stressed that nonflying officers would have the chance to hold command and

staff positions for the first time.90

Despite Spaatz' retention of the sixteen air forces, the AAF lacked the resources to man them. Spaatz therefore allocated personnel as best he could prior

to deciding what part of the 70 groups the three new combat commands would

receive, when the Army Air Forces reached the 70-group objective. Meantime,

the AAF would strive to rebuild as swiftly as possible. The missions of the Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command enabled them at once to begin

all our procurement and train two million airmen. We believe we have obviated this condition in the establishment of the ADC. Tactically, it is charged with the Air Force portion of

the defense of the United States." [Address, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker to National War College,

Jun 5, 1947.]

149
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

forging combat readiness. The Air Defense Command, on the other hand, had not

been authorized to conduct air defense activities in any meaningful sense. Consequently, it focused on Reserve and other geographic duties. As the Simpson

Board had recommended, General Stratemeyer changed the wartime boundaries

of the First and Fourth Air Forces and adjusted the boundaries of the other air

forces to coincide with the six ground armies. Air Force commanders would have

their subordinate units administer the Air Reserves in the various areas. General

Devers and his six Army commanders, and Spaatz, through Stratemeyer and his

six ADC air force commanders, were equally responsible for air defense of the

United States. 9 1

Planning the Headquarters Organization

As mentioned, with the war apparently entering its final phases, General Arnold began to lay the foundation for the transition from war to peace. In January

1945, he promulgated three principles to govern future activities of the Air Staff

and the major commands. The first was that operating functions would be decentralized. Amid the wartime expansion, Headquarters AAF had devised operating

procedures leaving little room for the unfettered exercise of command by subordinate levels. This system of "rigid control," as Arnold called it, was necessary in

the early years of the war. Maximum decentralization was now in order. Too

many people in AAF headquarters were spending time and effort on command

matters. These tasks should be done by the Continental Air Forces and the major

commands. The Air Staff must be divorced from daily operating duties.92

Arnold's second principle specified that the Air Staff become more deeply involved in planning and policy development. He felt strongly about this concept.

Although not possible earlier in the war, ideally he had thought of the Air Staff

as a compact organization, devoting most of its time to planning. Moreover, the

Army Air Forces had already started postwar planning. To the Air Staff, Arnold

emphasized the importance of this work. It would determine the organization and

deployment of the postwar Air Force, and could only be successful if done by an

Air Staff free from the pressures of daily operations. 93

Third, Arnold observed that technology in the future would be more important

than ever to the air arm's success. The evolution of radar and guided missiles was

a harbinger pointing to entirely new modes of warfare. Hence, no longer need officers be rated to hold key positions in the Air Force. Regulations restricting the

responsibilities and careers of nonrated officers must be changed. As directed by

General Arnold, these three principles would be carried out by each Air Staff

agency. They would be adhered to in manning the Continental Air Forces and in

decentralizing operating functions to field commands. 94

150
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

Gen. Hap Arnold, Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett, and

Brig. Gen. Grandison Gardner on an inspection tour at Eglin Field, Florida.

In 1945, Mr. Lovett advised General Arnold to create an Office of the Air

Comptroller, which would apply sound business practices to the defense

mission. General Gardner became the first comptroller general in June 1946.

After the end of the war, on September 15, 1945, Arnold ordered a revamping

of the headquarters structure, the first major realignment since March 1943.*

This reordering would last until October 1947, following establishment of the

United States Air Force.

The March 1943 organization had provided for six assistant chiefs of air staff,

including an Assistant Chief for Training and also one for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements. The September 1945 restructuring combined Training

and Operations under a single Assistant Chief of Staff. This reorganizationanalogous to the War Department General Staff system-included five assistant

chiefs of air staff: Personnel (ACAS-I), Intelligence (ACAS-2), Training and

Operations (ACAS-3), Supply (ACAS-4), and Plans (ACAS-5). The Air Sur-

*Though created on August 23, 1945, this new organization did not become effective

until September 15, 1945.

151
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

geon and Air Judge Advocate were transferred to ACAS-I. Special Assistants

for Air Communications and for Antiaircraft Artillery were eliminated and instead subordinated to ACAS-3.

Also, the Special Staff was abolished. The Air Inspector and the Budget and

Fiscal Officer were assigned to the Commanding General, AAF. Special Projects, Legislative Services, Headquarters Commandant, and the Office of the Historian were transferred to Statistical Control and Program Monitoring in the

Office of the Secretary of Air Staff.9 5

Research and Development, which had been under Operations, Commitments,

and Requirements, was put under ACAS-3. In December 1945, Arnold, concerned about future weapons development, and acting on recommendations made

in October by the Spaatz Board, directed formation of the Office of the Deputy

Chief of Air Staff, Research and Development. Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay was

assigned to head this new office which would handle the AAF's overall research

and development program. Earlier, in September 1945, Arnold had made $10

million available over the next three years to Douglas Aircraft Corporation to

study future warfare. This marked the beginning of the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation. 96

More changes were being planned in late 1945. After creation of the new

Headquarters structure, Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air,

suggested that General Arnold form a new office, which ultimately became the

Office of the Air Comptroller. A banker prior to entering the War Department in

1940, Lovett during the war had been interested in applying advanced management practices to AAF production. He played an important role in solving many

complex production problems and thereby gained Arnold's confidence.

Lovett warned Arnold in October 1945 that the evolving and inevitable reduction of defense funds ("the cycle of sharp contraction"), combined with keener

competition between the services, might in time place the AAF at a disadvantage.

He reminded Arnold that the AAF had made outstanding progress in adapting

business principles to the needs of wartime operations. These principles and procedures had to be refined during the coming peacetime austerity. The AAF demanded the best possible business management. Every dollar would count. 97

Such sound business practices called for a system to produce a completely organized, coordinated, and budgeted program. The AAF leadership should be prepared to successfully justify its requests for appropriations. Lovctt consequently

emphasized that the AAF was a large business which demanded corporate support systems. The Commanding General needed systematically developed and

coordinated information. Lovett recommended that an Office of Air Comptroller

General be organized under a senior officer who would report directly to the

Commanding General, Army Air Forces.9 8

The Office of Air Comptroller General would absorb the functions of the Office of Program Monitoring, the Office of Statistical Control, and the Budget and

152
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

Fiscal Office. As Lovett envisioned it, the new office would have these responsibilities:

To organize and to unify the operational plans of other staff sections into

a single coordinated program; to check the phasing and proper balance of all

components of that program; and to analyze actual AAF performance

against the scheduled standards;

To operate a reporting system and to analyze the status and operational

data of personnel, supplies, facilities and activities, making continuing studies of the relationships among these various factors;

To reduce the physical programs to monetary terms; to allocate the funds

among various activities; to supervise all budget functions, including representation of the AAF on all matters pertaining to appropriations and expenditures;

To act as liaison with industry, educational institutions, and research

foundations on new developments in business methods applicable to Air

Force operations; and to aid in organizing the curriculum for institutions participating in post war AAF officer training in these specialties.

In Lovett's view, this office would ensure a more orderly evolution of postwar

programs, a more persuasive presentation of AAF requirements, and thus greater

confidence in these programs on the part of the Commanding General and the

Chief of the Air Staff. The Assistant Secretary of War for Air termed the overall

objective of the Air Comptroller General's office as "continuous business control."9 He stressed that this position demanded an officer of the highest caliber.

To Arnold he said that the AAF, among the services, had set the pace in advanced business practices. He felt that creation of an Air Comptroller would

merely anticipate what the other services would someday do under the twin pressures of economy and efficiency. 1°°

Arnold discussed Lovett's proposal with Eaker and Spaatz. They agreed that

this agency should be set up as soon as possible. They also agreed that, although

activities like the Statistical Control Unit and the Program Monitoring Unit

would be affected by the loss of wartime officers, the AAF should send young

officers to specialized schools to replace such losses. Eaker in early November

apprised Lovett that Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay would be selected to organize

and head the Office of Air Comptroller General.10 1

However, by November 29 Arnold had changed his mind about LeMay and,

in line with the Spaatz Board report, made LeMay the first Deputy Chief of Air

Staff for Research and Development.102 Not until June 15, 1946, was the Office

of the Air Comptroller established,* headed by Brig. Gen. Grandison Gardner

*In January 1946, Lovett was replaced as Assistant Secretary of War for Air by Stuart

Symington, who actually arrived on the job in February. In February 1946, Spaatz succeeded Arnold as Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

153
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

who reported directly to the Commanding General, AAF. He was replaced in

November by Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Rawlings.* As initially conceived by Lovett,

the Office of the Air Comptroller combined the functions of the Offices of

Budget and Fiscal, Statistical Control, and Program Monitoring.

Establishment of the Air Board

Between the end of the war and organization of Headquarters USAF in October 1947 (following creation of the Department of the Air Force and the United

States Air Force), General Spaatz made one of his most significant decisions. He

announced his intent to form an Air Board with Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr as its

first Secretary-General.103 This board was to play an important part in shaping

the organizational structure adopted by the Air Force in October 1947. Also, in

1946-47, it would help frame the AAF's position on unification as eventually reflected in evolution of the National Security Act of 1947.104

Spaatz intended to create this Air Board in order to have "somebody off in a

cloistered cell doing a little thinking and not doing the routine of the Air

Staff."'10 5 Spaatz conferred with General Eisenhower who thought an Air Board

was a good idea, so on March 5, 1946, the board was formally established (the

old AAF Board was inactivated on July 1, 1946). Eisenhower had told Spaatz

that the Army might create a similar group (with representatives from the Ground

Forces, Air Forces, and Service Forces) to concentrate on formulating overall

Army policy.106 Based on his own experience at the pinnacle of command, the

Army Chief had long felt that the Army badly needed a group that did nothing

but think and frame potential policy. Eisenhower thought the Army had been

weak in one aspect of organization: "We have not kept a body free for thinking.

Everybody is an operator with us .... and we have had no body which is compelled by the very nature of its organization and function to do nothing but think.",,1Y7

Spaatz' long experience convinced him that policy should be deliberately considered and made at the top of the organization. Thus, the Air Board should have

some of the best minds, complemented with operational commanders and should

have direct access to the AAF Commander. Spaatz was determined to avoid de-

*Born in 1892, Gardner earned a Master of Science degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1928. He was one of the AAF's observers in England in 1940. He

progressed through several positions as an armament expert and then headed the AAF

Proving Ground Command, 1942-45. Before becoming the Air Comptroller, he had been

deputy to the chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. Rawlings was born in 1904

and won a Master of Business Administration degree from Harvard in 1939. He was regarded as one of the AAF's foremost production and procurement experts.

154
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

veloping policy at lower levels where it later tended to rise to the top for approval-a mass of evidence to be weighed by the AAF Commander. He had

carefully considered these views and had talked to Eisenhower about them. He

knew that General Knerr, to be Secretary-General of the Air Board, supported

and encouraged them.* 1

08

Since February 1946, Knerr had been Spaatz' special assistant for reorganization. Knerr's own view proceeded from his judgment, similar to Lovett's, that the

AAF was in essence a big business. Policy could not be formed by one person,

no matter how able.109 Corporations, for example, had their boards of directors.

Knerr said that some officers mistakenly regarded the staff as kind of a board of

directors. The staff, he noted:

actually occupies the status of vice-presidents, charged with specialties. The

staff, if given command responsibility as well as the authority inherent in

their positions should operate the military business within the bounds of announced policies created by the Air Board, which then functions as a Board

of Directors."()

The Air Board reported to the Commanding General, AAF, who in turn answered to the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. The Commanding General, of

course, could not delegate to the Air Board his responsibility to the assistant secretary. He would accept or reject policies proposed by the board, which of necessity needed his full confidence.1 I The board would interpret policy, secure its

approval, and disseminate it to the staff without the fear of having it diluted or

changed by other echelons or agencies. Policy should be broad and avoid detail. 112 As an integral part of his office, the Air Board would spare the Commanding General time and effort. The board could not be a staff agency and

survive.

General Knerr saw the Air Board providing continuity, competence, and

broad vision. "Modem war," he said "is an industrial cataclysm. It had passed beyond the capacity of the military-trained mind to manage, just as certainly as it

had passed beyond the capacity of the industrially trained mind to technically

control." 14 Knerr and Spaatz conceived the board as affording perspective and

*Knerr, born in 1887, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1908. He commanded the 2d Bomb Group at Langley Field (1927-30). He was Chief of Staff, GHQ Air

Force, under Frank Andrews from 1935-38. A strong outspoken advocate of autonomy

for the air arm, he was ostracized by the War Department to the post of Air Officer, VIII

Corps Area, Fort Sam Houston, Tex. Knerr was thus given the same job, and even the

same office, that Billy Mitchell had received when exiled. Retired in March 1939, Knerr

was recalled to active duty in October 1942, appointed Deputy Commander, Air Service

Command, and subsequently, Deputy Commander, Eighth Air Force Service Command.

155
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower (left) with the top AAF leaders,

Gen. Carl A. Spaatz (right) and Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, June 1947.

eschewing dogma-an idea rooted in the board's composition. From the beginning, General Spaatz insisted that the board include commanders of the major

commands. As active commanders, they would understand command problems

and could anticipate the potential consequences of various policies. Others on the

Air Board were the Secretary-General (Knerr),* retired and Reserve officers, and

civilians as appropriate. 115

Architects of the Air Board hoped to circumvent the eventual time-consuming

resolution by higher authority of conflicting policies established at lower levels.

Frequently, a higher commander found that policies were not in line with his

own or even with those of commanders above him.116 General Spaatz also created this board to deal with the unique and thorny problems of the immediate

postwar years. Foremost among these were the evolving struggle over unification; establishing the Air Force as a separate service; and identifying and forming

the proper organization for what was to become the United States Air Force.

Spaatz's memorandum of April 1946 described the board's purpose:

I take it we are of the common belief that war ought to be avoided if possible, but we must plan in such a way that if war comes, we shall meet the en-

*With a rank corresponding to that of the head of the Navy General Board.

156
ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

emy with maximum effectiveness, with the least possible injury and violence

to our people and in a manner which will avoid waste. To this end, I have

created the Air Board.. .to assist me in establishment of top air policy. 117

At its first meeting he directed the board to give top priority to post-unification

organization of the Air Force, air defense policy, and research into the history

and lessons of the war. The AAF Commander urged the board to examine major

defects in the existing AAF structure and make recommendations to improve

it. 18

War Department Circular 138

The War Department formally reflected the Spaatz reorganization, as part of

the Department structure, in Circular 138, May 14, 1946. This circular reorganized the department, effective June 11, 1946, in accordance with the Simpson

Board proposals. In general, it enlarged the size and responsibility of the General

Staff. The Army Air Forces was made coordinate with Army Ground Forces under the Army Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff. Headquarters

Army Service Forces and the service commands were abolished. The Chief of

Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr

served as the SecretaryGeneral of the Air Board. .

157
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ORGANIZING THE POSTWAR AIR FORCE

Staff would serve directly under the Secretary of War. Directly under the Chief

of Staff were the General Staff with its directorates (Personnel and Administration; Intelligence; Organization and Training; Plans and Operations; Service,

Supply, and Procurement and Research and Development), the Special Staff

(support divisions, e.g., Legislative Liaison, Information and Education, Historical, Budget, etc.), and the Technical and Administrative Staffs and Services

(Quartermaster, Engineers, Medical, etc.). 119

Basically, this restructuring under Circular 138 followed the ideas of General

Eisenhower. These concepts reflected Eisenhower's convictions as they had been

refined in the war. The major tenets were economy and efficiency. The War Department staff should implement the Chief of Staff's directives quickly and effectively. According to Circular 138, the War Department General Staff would deal

primarily with policy and planning. The staff must be kept simple with as few

people as possible answering directly to the Chief of Staff or his Deputy. 120

Decentralization would be rigorously applied: "No functions should be performed at the staff level of the War Department which can be decentralized to the

major commands, the Army areas, or the administrative and technical service

without loss of adequate control by the General and Special Staffs."'12 1 Circular

138 stressed that the General Staff should delegate sufficient authority to commanders and the heads of the administrative and technical services. While accenting decentralization, the focus would also be on minimizing duplication and

overlapping between commands and services. This would become increasingly

important as the Army Air Forces was progressively given more autonomy

within the War Department structure. 1

2 2

Based on the Simpson Board report and the Eisenhower-Spaatz agreement,

Circular 138 stated that the AAF "must be provided with the maximum degree of

autonomy permitted by law without permitting the creation of unwarranted duplication in service, supply and administration."'123 The circular recognized the

AAF reorganization of March 21, 1946, forming the three major combat air commands. It noted that the Commanding General, AAF, would establish Headquarters Strategic Air Command at Andrews Field, Md.; Headquarters Tactical Air

Command at Langley Field, Va.; Headquarters Air Defense Command at Mitchel

Field, N.Y.; and other commands as necessary.124

The circular said that among the chief responsibilities of the Commanding

General, AAF, was to direct operations and training of the continental air commands. In addition, he would determine organization, composition, equipment,

and training of the AAF's combat and service units. He would present the AAF's

budget estimates to the War Department and would initiate research and development requirements. He would conduct the AAF's part of the UMT program (under War Department directives) and supervise and inspect training of the air

components of the ROTC, National Guard, and the Organized Reserve.125

159
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

By late 1946, with President Truman determined to pry unification legislation

from the forthcoming Congress, Eisenhower and Spaatz believed that reorganization should largely adhere to Circular 138 until unification. In mid-November

1946, the War Department's General and Special Staff Divisions recommended

significant reorganization. However, Eisenhower rejected this report. He favored

the proposals in Circular 138, with some revisions to eliminate duplication. He

opposed substantive amendments while unification legislation was pending in

Congress.126 The Army Chief of Staff felt that Circular 138 was flexible enough

to accommodate any possible unification bill. If unification legislation failed, he

made clear that he would then support a reorganization of the War Department.

Since returning from Europe after the war, Eisenhower had emphasized to the

War Department General Staff that the Army air arm had proved itself in the war

and deserved to be a separate service, equal to the Army and Navy. Should the

appropriate legislation not be passed by Congress, Eisenhower than favored making the air arm "largely" equal to the land and sea forces, by going "just as far as

we can within the legal limits imposed on us."'!27 Always concerned about duplication, after unification he wanted the War Department's technical services to

continue to procure and distribute supply items common to the air and ground

forces.128 Thus, with minor revisions, Circular 138 remained in effect until passage of the National Security Act and formation of the National Military Establishment.

As mentioned, the air planners were disappointed with the result of the Simpson Board report which reorganized the AAF on the same level with Army

Ground Forces. Nevertheless, General Spaatz had not vociferously protested to

Eisenhower. The major goal was an independent Air Force. Although the AAF

had been placed on a line coordinate with the Ground Forces (there would not be

two Chiefs of Staff, one for air and one for ground), Spaatz would be a member

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as Arnold had during the war. Also, there would be

an Assistant Secretary of War for Air, a position assumed by Stuart Symington in

February 1946. Moreover, the Army Chief assured Arnold of his strong support

for a separate Air Force. Spaatz knew very well that, despite Navy opposition,

General Eisenhower's backing would virtually assure an independent Air Force.

In the unlikely event that the AAF failed to become a separate service, the

War Department General Staff said it would advocate that the Air Staff be put on

the same level with the General Staff; that a separate AAF promotion list be created; and that the AAF be granted technical and professional independence by

giving it appropriate personnel and functions of the technical and administrative

corps and branches of the Army.

The Simpson Board had issued its report and Circular 138 had implemented

its recommendations. The AAF, as part of the War Department, had in 1946 settled on and executed its own postwar reorganization, and had already begun assigning and training forces under this new structure.

160
5

Moving Toward Autonomy

A co-equal or autonomous Air Force able to do its own

planning in such wise as to guarantee the security of the

country can be the only primary objective of Air Force

and other enlightened personnel. We do not have such an

Air Force now .... Public sentiment, as a force, is such

that we have one more opportunity for success. If we fail

this time it is unlikely that there will ever be another

opportunity so favorable.

Col. Harold W. Bowman, AAF

Deputy Director of Information

September 1946

President Truman's 1945 recommendation to Congress to form a Department

of National Defense under a civilian secretary had included establishment of a

United States Air Force, coordinate with the Army and Navy.* The Navy would

retain its carrier aviation and also the Marines as part of the Navy Department.

The President's program received the full support of Army Chief of Staff General Eisenhower. Eisenhower made clear to Congress and to his subordinate commanders that the Army Air Forces' wartime record demanded that the AAF be

given parity with the Army and Navy. He argued that such equality was mandatory for the nation's postwar security. Generals Arnold and Spaatz firmly backed

the President's position.

The Navy opposed Truman's plan, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal commenting: "As the President knows, I am so opposed to the fundamental concept ex-

*See Chapter 3.

161
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

pressed in the message that I do not believe there is any very helpful observation

that I could make on the draft you referred to me. " Thus, Forrestal had not

changed his mind. He continued to believe deeply that unification would hurt the

Navy and would damage the best interests of the country. He advocated a gradual

approach, deeming effective coordination far preferable to the hasty solution of

unification (including formation of a separate Air Force). As would be expected,

the leading naval commanders shared Forrestal's opinion.

As January 1946 dragged on, it became even more apparent that irreconcilable

differences divided the Army and Navy. There had been no evidence of real progress since Truman had presented his unification plan to Congress. The Navy

feared that the Air Force would take over naval aviation and that the Army would

grab the Marine Corps. Naval leaders were also apprehensive that the Army and

Air Force would frequently work together on major issues at the expense of the

Navy's interests. In the final analysis, they thought that decisions on naval requirements would be made by those unfamiliar with the Navy's needs.

Meanwhile, Congress reacted to Truman's unification message. In January

1946 Senator Elbert D. Thomas, chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, created a subcommittee to write a unification bill. Besides himself, he appointed Senators Warren R. Austin and Joseph Lister Hill to the subcommittee.

Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, and Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford, newly appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), were

named as advisers to assist the subcommittee in writing the legislation. In early

April the subcommittee reported a bill (S. 2044) to the Military Affairs Committee combining features of the Eberstadt report and the Collins plan.* In May

1946, the committee recommended to the Senate that S. 2044 be approved.

This proposed Common Defense Act of 1946 called for a Department of

Common Defense with three coequal services. There would be a civilian Secretary of Common Defense, an Under Secretary, and three service secretaries. The

bill further recommended a Chief of Staff of Common Defense to be military adviser to the President. Norstad was generally pleased with S. 2044 (it satisfied the

fundamental principle of a single department of national defense with three coequal services). While he expected the Navy to mount delaying tactics during

subsequent congressional hearings, Norstad was confident of ultimate passage of

the legislation. 2

*See Chapter 3.

162
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

Truman Increases the Pressure

During subsequent hearings on S. 2044, naval officials opposed the provisions

for a Secretary of Common Defense, a Chief of Staff of Common Defense, and

an independent Air Force. They reiterated that enactment of such a bill would

open the way for the loss of the naval air arm and the Marine Corps. Naval leaders, including Forrestal, repeatedly pointed to the experience of the British Navy

which had lost its fleet air arm to the Royal Air Force.*

President Truman became more and more impatient at what seemed to be an

evolving impasse. In mid-May he invited Patterson and Forrestal, together with

military leaders, to the White House. Truman underscored the urgency of passing

unification legislation saying he was not disposed to wait indefinitely while the

Army and Navy consistently failed to resolve their differences. He asserted that

the time had come to stop this controversy. He told Patterson and Forrestal that

he had decided against a single Chief of Staff. He then directed them to break the

impasse and to have on his desk by May 31 a satisfactory compromise solution.3

The Commander in Chief informed Admiral Leahy that he was tired of the

Navy's criticism of his stand on unification. He asked Leahy to try at once to silence this carping by naval officers. 4 In view of Truman's desire to resolve the issue, General Spaatz instructed AAF officers to make no remarks "critical of the

Navy or its personnel or accomplishments." 5 He also ordered a ban on statements

referring to the eventual possibility of an AAF integration of administrative and

technical services, guided missiles, or antiaircraft artillery.6 A sustained effort

must be made to reach agreement.

Spaatz and Symington realized that unification negotiations were entering a

crucial and most sensitive phase. They thought that the AAF should avoid doing

anything to heat the atmosphere. Subsequently, Symington admonished General

Kenney, SAC commander, that everything possible should be done to keep opponents of the bill from believing that the Air Force was attempting to prove that

strategic bombing was the way to win a war.7 It was a fact, said Symington, that

people in high positions felt that the Air Force often "popped off." 8

Following Truman's direction, Patterson and Forrestal went to work, helped

by Symington and Eberstadt. While the two sides concurred on a number of noncontroversial issues, they failed to agree on air organization and on the amount of

authority to be afforded the Secretary of National Defense. It was apparent to

Patterson that the Navy would not "face up to the issue." The Navy was reluctant

to give up any of its authority to a single administrator. Conversely, Patterson,

Spaatz and Symington wanted someone to operate, supervise, and control the

Department of National Defense.9 On May 31, Patterson and Forrestal submitted

*See Chapter 1.

163
4)

Frustrated by the impasse

Son the unification legisla0 tion, President Truman

(left) asked the Chief of

Staff to the President,

Adm. William D. Leahy

(below) to quell the oppo-

* sition among naval officers.

.0_

z

41

0 .......
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

their report to the President. In relation to S. 2044, they agreed on eight points

and disagreed on three crucial areas. Points of agreement were: no single military

Chief of Staff; formation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff; a National Security Resources Board; a Council of Common Defense; a Central Intelligence Agency; an

agency for Procurement and Supply; an agency for Research; and an agency for

Military Education and Training. The areas -' disagreement were long-standing,

major items of contention: creation of a sinL Department of National Defense;

organization of the Army and Navy air arms; and status of the Marine Corps. 10

In their letter to the Chief Executive, the two service secretaries detailed their

major differences. The War Department wanted a single department headed by a

civilian with the power of decision. The Navy wished a system of strengthened

coordination that preserved "sound administrative autonomy and essential service morale." The Navy resisted a single department of national defense with

three coequal services, asserting that naval aviation had been completely integrated into the Navy. Naval officials advocated that the Army similarly integrate

its air and ground components.1 1

Forrestal contended that no one knew the Navy's aviation needs better than

the naval leaders themselves. A principal reason why the Navy stoutly contested

a single department was what it considered to be the AAF's constant chipping

0

U

Vice Adm. Arthur W.

Radford was the Navy's

representative to the Senate subcommittee preparing defense unification

legislation.

165
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

away at naval aviation. Naval leaders felt that this would ultimately impair sea 12

power.

The Army Air Forces, on the other hand, clearly stated that the Navy should

control water-based aircraft for training and for essential internal administration

and air transport "over routes of sole interest" to the Navy. It was the War Department's view, held by Eisenhower, that the military services should not be

self-sufficient. They ought to be mutually supporting.13 In general, the Navy persisted in the fear of losing its freedom of operation. Naval leaders were also upset

over the AAF position that the Army Air Forces could conduct long-range reconnaissance for the Navy as well as for the Army. Moreover, the AAF argued that

it could take care of the air mission for antisubmarine warfare. 14 The air leaders

were convinced that AAF aircraft possessed the characteristics to accomplish

search and antisubmarine operations. Equipped with the most modern radar and

electronic devices, these aircraft could deliver the necessary munitions. According to Spaatz:

The primary function of the Strategic Air Force is to destroy the enemy's

munitions making capability, as well as his will to wage war. Any or all of it

can be diverted, at the will of the Supreme Commander, to the anti-submarine problem, which must include attacking the submarines at their home

bases, as well as where they are manufactured, this just as the Strategic

Force was diverted to support the land campaign in France on many occasions in the course of the Second World War.15

Covetous of its traditional roles and missions, and bent on holding them, the

Navy stayed distrustful of a single department and a single civilian secretary

("the man on horseback," as King and Leahy put it). The Navy held that it required whatever personnel and equipment were necessary to carry out its mission, including long-range 16reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and support of

amphibious operations. The Army, led by Eisenhower, countered that such

self-sufficiency fostered tremendous duplication at prohibitive cost. Spaatz

claimed that using Navy aircraft for long-range reconnaissance, protection of

shipping, and antisubmarine operations would duplicate the AAF's land-based

air forces. Divided command responsibility would result.17

Between January and May 1946, this roles and missions debate went on in the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even though the JCS directed the Joint Strategic Survey

Committee to prepare a missions statement, the issue could not be resolved. Eisenhower concluded that further paperwork would be fruitless. He believed that

the matter would have to be confronted and settled at a higher level, namely by

the President. 18 By late May 1946, he firmly agreed with Admiral Nimitz, Chief

of Naval Operations, that the roles and missions question should be shelved by

the Joint Chiefs without further action.19 Norstad also thought that roles and missions would not be decided short of intervention by Truman. Showing some

pique himself, General Norstad wrote the recently retired Arnold that whereas

166
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

the Navy usually did not hesitate to criticize the Army, even during the war, naval officials always seemed to be offended at the criticism of their own service.20

At the same time, Truman welcomed as a significant achievement the agreement of Patterson and Forrestal on eight points, though they were plainly not crucial ones. 21 The three areas of disagreement had proved especially contentious

and would be extremely difficult to solve. After receiving the May 31 letter, Truman met with Patterson, Forrestal, and other Army and Navy officials. On June

15, 1946, he told Patterson and Forrestal that he was sure the remaining points of

contention could be worked out. He reiterated that a Department of National Defense should be created as set forth in S. 2044, headed by a civilian who would

be a cabinet member as well as a member of the Council of Common Defense.

Each of the military services would be controlled by a civilian secretary (not a

cabinet member) who would be in charge of administering his own department.

The services would be "coordinated," Truman emphasized, and they would be

coequal. Each would retain its autonomy subject to the overall direction of the

Secretary of National Defense. As to the appointment of four Assistant Secretaries (research, intelligence, procurement, and training), as specified in S. 2044,

this would not be necessary.

He thought the Air Force should have responsibility for development, procurement, maintenance, and operation of military air. These, however, would be

the Navy's responsibility: ship, carrier, and water-based aircraft essential for naval operations, including Marine Corps aircraft; land-type aircraft needed for internal and transport purposes over routes of sole interest to naval forces and

where the requirements could not be met by normal air transport facilities; and

land-type aircraft required for training. The President additionally decided that

land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine operations, and the

protection of shipping should be under Air Force control. The Marines would be

23 kept as part of the Navy Department. 2

In Truman's mind, the main lines of the unification question had now been

settled. Legislation could be drafted. The framework for an integrated national

security program could be erected. There was no intention, he observed, to erode

the integrity of the services: "They should perform their separate functions under

the unifying direction, authority and control of the Secretary of National Defense. The internal administration of the three services should be preserved in order that the high morale and esprit de corps of each service can be retained." 24

Norstad and Sherman Draft a Plan

Yet the Navy still objected. Even though S. 2044 was amended to correspond

with Truman's views, naval officials testifying before Congress opposed this revised version. Ever since the Commander in Chief had announced his unification

plan in December 1945, naval officials considered him, in Admiral Radford's

167
(Above) Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz

and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder after having attended the Roosevelt-Churchill

conference at Casablanca. After

the war, Tedder lent Spaatz his

support in the struggle for an independent air force.

(Left) Viscount Trenchard with

Maj. Gen. William E. Kepner,

Commanding General of the

VIII Fighter Command in England. Known as the father of the

RAF, Trenchard helped AAF

leaders develop a strong case for

an autonomous air arm.
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

words, to be "a hard-line Army man" who "had put us in a very difficult position.,, 25 Basically, Admiral Leahy and other naval officers believed that Truman

was now trying to compromise and primarily wanted the cabinet-level Secretary

of National Defense. On the other hand, naval authorities readily admitted that,

as Leahy observed, "the War and Navy Departments remained in essential disagreement because each is suspicious of the other's motives."* 26

In the meantime, the AAF solicited opinions on appropriate strategy and tactics to be used in seeking eventual passage of satisfactory unification legislation.

Leaders of the Royal Air Force proved helpful. In late 1946 and early 1947, responding to the request of Symington and Spaatz, Lord Trenchard, Lord Tedder,

Lord Portal, and Sir John Slessor sent material regarding the RAF's historical

fight for independence. They also offered suggestions to aid the AAF in its struggle. Trenchard underlined the importance of making the case in easily understandable language. He cautioned Spaatz that the AAF should know

27 exceptionally well the arguments of the opposition. Secretary of War for Air

Symington had been concerned about the statements of unification opponents

that the Coastal Command's success during the war was due to its controlling its

own operations. However, Tedder and Slessor pointed out that the RAF actually

controlled the Coastal Command's plans and operations.28

An analysis by Norstad's staff showed that the crux of Tedder's position was

that "only by employing a unified Air Force can the Air Force attain the flexibil- C, 29 ity so vital to the successful employment of air power." Air Marshal Tedder

listed the chief elements of this flexibility as simplicity of command, close cooperation among lower commanders, and economy of force. The War Department

found that Tedder's observations and conclusions accorded with the concepts it

had advocated in thc drive for unification and which were embodied in S.

2044.30

Norstad's staff warned that proponents of S. 2044 should guard against two

possible "violations" of Tedder's principles-allowing the Navy to keep a large

land-based force for antisubmarine warfare and reconnaissance, and acceding to

a large tactical air force for support of the Marines. 3 1

The British were likewise engaged in creating a Ministry of Defence. The

Minister of Defence would report to the Cabinet and to the Parliament. He would

*Adm. Marc A. Mitscher, a World War II carrier and task force commander (he commanded the carrier Hornet for Doolittle's Tokyo raid in April 1942), told Forrestal that

naval air had been attempting to protect itself from within and without for twenty-five

years. The Army's air element had been trying to take over the Navy's air arm since Billy

Mitchell's time. The AAF's ultimate objective, Mitscher said, was complete control of all

military air forces. [Diary, Vol VI, Oct 46-Mar 47, entry, Dec 5, 1946, Forrestal Papers,

in OSD Hist Ofe.]

169
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

monitor preparation of a unified defense policy and distribution of resources between the services. The Chiefs of Staff Committee would frame strategic policy.

Some U.S. naval officers had stated that the British reorganization would be

along the lines of the Eberstadt plan. But Spaatz and Symington saw the potential

new British system as a move towards unified control, modeled more on the defense reorganization pending before the U.S. Congress.32

In this connection, Secretary Patterson said he could accept legislation that

confined the Secretary of National Defense to carrying out broad policy. Eisenhower agreed with Patterson that such an approach would be more acceptable to

the Navy. The Army Chief of Staff noted that the Navy would have nothing to

fear from a Secretary of National Defense: "I believe that intelligent men can

make almost any organization work as time goes on, if your law isn't too

rigid." 33 Patterson and Forrestal therefore met once again with their military

leaders. As a result, the JCS in July 1946 appointed Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad

(now Director of Plans and Operations for the War Department General Staff)

and Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman (Nimitz' Deputy for Operations) to draft a

unification plan upon which the Army and Navy could agree. Sherman replaced

Admiral Radford, considered a "hard liner" even in the Navy. Forrestal and

Nimitz had come to agree that Sherman, who was not opposed to establishment

of an independent Air Force, could work more effectively with Norstad. Radford

would subsequently admit that Sherman and Norstad broke the impasse between

the services.

In the meantime, Norstad and Symington continued to work, checking with

Patterson and meeting with Forrestal, Ferdinand Ebcrstadt, and Radford. Norstad

enjoyed a close working relationship with Symington: "I have put my heart and

my lungs in your hands," Symington told him. To Norstad, speaking of

Symington and Vandenberg, "there was a long time when we had reason to believe perhaps the only people we could really trust were each other."35

Norstad's move from AAF Headquartcrs to Dircctor of Plans and Operations

for the War Department gave him more leverage in the unification talks and a

clear mandate to represent the views of Patterson and Eisenhower. Moreover,

General Eisenhower had specifically requested Norstad, showing his confidence

in the airman and also indicating to the Army staff the maturity, as Ike saw it, of

the air arm.

Mceting in the summer of 1946, Norstad and Sherman divided their deliberations into three categories:* national security organization, service functions, and

*Also participating in these discussions were Symington, Vice Adm. Arthur W. Radford. and Maj. Gen. Otto P. Weyland. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans, who had replaced Norstad in this position. Norstad wrote the retired Arnold in July 1946 that

Admiral Radford had a tendency to "work himself up" on the subject of land-based air.

170
Vice Adm. Forrest P.

Sherman was chosen to

help draft a defense unification plan, which would f

address the problems of

combined operations,

among other issues.

Sherman's partner in

developing a unification plan was Maj.

Gen. Lauris Norstad.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

the matter of unified commands. Organization of unified commands in overseas

theaters was of some urgency. This was due to the press of occupation responsibilities and the fact that unified command in the Pacific had never been worked

out. Command arrangements in the Pacific was the major hurdle to be surmounted. Representing the War Department, Norstad argued that command arrangements should be made on the basis of functions. The Navy preferred to

keep its flexibility by emphasizing geographical areas.36 During the war, clashing service interests had ruled out unified command in the Pacific. In preparing

for the invasion of Japan, the JCS in April 1945 had designated General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Army Forces, Pacific. At the same time, Admiral

Nimitz was named Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. After the war, the Army

and Navy took differing views of command responsibility in the Pacific. In general, the Army wished to emphasize unity of command of forces while the Navy

stressed unity of command according to specific areas. This arrangement, which

the Navy insisted upon, allowed it to maintain control of its own forces over an

entire geographical area.

The Joint Chiefs approved the command plan drafted by Norstad and Sherman, forwarding it to President Truman on December 12. The plan envisioned a

system of unified command in which a single commander would control land,

naval, and air operations within a given area.: This so-called "Outline Command Plan," actually the first of its kind, was based on the war experience in

which unified command had evolved by necessity. Both Army and Navy leaders

agreed that unified command was central to successful combined operations.

General Norstad described unified command organization as "an idea whose time

had come." He recalled that he and Sherman sought a solution which seemed reasonable to themselves and therefore to the services they represented.38 For the

most part, they concurred in a system of unified command for all theaters. They

defined it as a theater commander responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a

joint staff and three service commanders under him. The fact was that prior to the

end of the war the Joint Chiefs had decided to have a peacetime unified command structure. Also taking note of occupation requirements, the JCS resolved to

establish these unified commands: Far East Command; Pacific Command; Alaskan Command; Northeast Command; Atlantic Fleet; Caribbean Command; and

European Command. The Joint Chiefs further observed that a Strategic Air Command had been created, composed of strategic air forces not otherwise assigned.

39

Norstad said he thought that Truman appreciated the AAF's not getting caught up in a

running argument on this matter. [Ltr, Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, WD Dir, Plans & Ops,

to H. H. Arnold, Jul 21, 1946 in H. H. Arnold Collection, Box 33, Norstad folder, LC.]

172
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

Normally, there would be two or more service components assigned to each

unified command, each commanded by an officer of that particular component.

The joint staff of each unified commander would be drawn from the service components under his jurisdiction. The JCS would exercise strategic direction over

the unified commands and assign them missions and tasks. The component commander would deal directly with his own service on matters of administration,

supply, training, finance, and construction. For each command operating under

missions prescribed by the JCS, either the Army Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval

Operations, or the Commanding General, AAF, would be made executive agent

for the Joint Chiefs.40

With President Truman's approval of this command plan on December 14,

1946, the Norstad-Sherman conferences bore their first fruit.41 Acceptance of the

plan, however, did not mean automatic creation of the above commands. By

March 1947 the Far East Command, Pacific Command, Alaskan Command, and

the European Command had been set up. By December 1947, all of the commands had been formed except Northeast Command, which would not be established until October 1950.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Unified Command Plan of December 1946, as approved by the President, stated: "There is established a Strategic Air Command

composed of strategic air forces not otherwise assigned. These forces are normally based in the United States. The commander of the Strategic Air Command

is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as are other commanders provided for

in this plan." 42 Admiral Nimitz had at first assumed that strategic air forces

based overseas would be under the unified commands. He had in mind what he

deemed to have been the organizationally confusing experience of the Twentieth

Air Force, controlled by General Arnold in Washington rather than by Nimitz on

Guam. This kind of organization was anathema to Nimitz' philosophy of unified

command. Even so, General Spaatz took the position that SAC should be under

the control of a single commander, worldwide. Spaatz suggested a statement that

SAC would operate independently or in cooperation with other components as

ordered by the Commanding General, AAF, acting as executive agent for the

Joint Chiefs. After 1946 the Commanding General, AAF and later the Air Force

Chief of Staff acted as executive agent for the JCS. Nevertheless, not until January 4, 1949, did the Joint Chiefs officially designate the Air Force Chief of Staff

as executive agent for the Strategic Air Command. 43 And not until April 13,

1949, did the SAC commander receive a directive from the JCS. It noted that the

Commanding General, SAC, would "exercise command over all forces allocated

to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other authority."44 Missions would include

strategic or other air operations as instructed by the Joint Chiefs, with the support

of other commanders under the JCS. 45 Actually the December 1946 plan made

173
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

the Strategic Air Command a specified command, i.e., reporting directly to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff.*

Agreement between Patterson and Forrestal

Following approval of the Unified Command plan, Norstad and Sherman

worked with the Senate Military Affairs Committee to craft legislation for a new

national security organization. Their strategy called for them always to appear together before the committee. "We agreed," Norstad recalled, "that if one of us

was called .... one would notify the other and would also suggest to the committee that they call the other member .... Sherman and I were invited every time

.... It was clear that there were differences between us, certainly in degree, but

they never really split us on the the principles.'46 Norstad emphasized: "It was

characteristic of our relationship, due more to him than to me perhaps, that we

never wasted time rearguing established differences between the services. We

outlined the issues."'47 Working with the committee, they were able to agree on

service functions and on a draft of military organization.

Secretary of War Patterson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal sent a joint

letter to Truman on January 16, 1947. It said they had resolved the problems of

draft legislation and of a proposed executive order spelling out service functions.

The letter added that differences still existed on specifics of the proposed unification bill. A compromise was therefore required to achieve a structure that could

eliminate unnecessary duplication, afford a nucleus for integrated action, and secure the support of the three services. It was not a perfect draft. As with all compromises, it failed to satisfy completely any of the services or their advocates.

Nonetheless, it was probably the best bill attainable at the time.

Patterson and Forrestal agreed to support legislation to include a general

framework for a complete national security organization.48 There would be a

Council of National Defense, a National Security Resources Board, and a Central

Intelligence Agency. Also envisioned were an Office of the Secretary of National

*In a memorandum of November 10, 1948, to the Joint Chiefs, General Vandenberg

observed: "Paragraph 4 of J.C.S. 1259/27 (December II, 1946) establishes the Strategic

Air Command as a Specified Command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff." However, formal designation of SAC as a specified command did not appear in the unified command

plan until March 9, 1955. The term "specified command" was defined in Joint Action

Armed Forces, September 19, 1951: "A JCS Specified Command is a uni-Service command which has a broad continuing mission which is specified as a command operating

under JCS direction." [Joint Action Armed Forces, JCS, Sep 51; paper on SAC as a

specified command, Feb 79, sent to Wolk by Sheldon A. Goldberg, SAC archivist.]

174
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

Defense, and Secretaries of the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps and naval aviation), and Air Force, each with a military chief, under Departments of the

Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each military service would be headed by a Secretary and, under overall direction of the Secretary of National Defense, would be

administered as a separate entity. After informing the Secretary of National Defense, a service secretary could at any time present to the President a report or

recommendation relating to his department. In addition, a War Council would be

created consisting of the Secretary of National Defense as Chairman (with power

of decision), the service secretaries, and the military heads of the three services.

The council would handle matters of broad policy pertaining to the armed forces.

Provision was made for a Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprising the military heads

of the services. A Chief of Staff to the President would be appointed, if this

should prove desirable. Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of

National Defense, the JCS would give strategic direction to the armed forces and

would formulate strategic plans, assign logistic responsibilities to the services,

integrate military requirements, and as directed advise on integration of the military budget. Moreover, a full-time Joint Staff would be formed, consisting initially of not over a hundred officers to be furnished in equitable numbers by the

services. Operating under a Director, the Joint Staff would carry out policies and

directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As head of the armed forces establishment,

the Secretary of National Defense would be vested with the authority, under the

President, to establish common policies and common programs for integrated operation of the three departments.

Patterson and Forrestal acknowledged that the proper way to chart roles and

missions (functions) was by presidential executive order, to be issued concurrently with Truman's approval of unification legislation. Their letter to the President enclosed a draft executive order specifying roles and missions (eventually to

become Executive Order 9877, signed by the Chief Executive on July 26, 1947).

Truman replied that he was very pleased with the resolution of issues by Patterson and Forrestal. Noting that each of the services had compromised, he was convinced that the agreement would work. 49

Subsequent to the Patterson-Forrestal agreement, General Eisenhower requested and the War Department approved the convening of a board of officers

in January 1947. The board was to identify and then to recommend solutions to

major unification problems facing the Army in light of the joint agreement and

the evolving unification bill in Congress. 50 Members of the board were Maj.

Gen. William E. Hall, Chief of Staff, War Department Advisory Group, and

president of the board; Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr, AAF; Maj. Gen. Charles L.

Bolte, AGF; and Brig. Gen. Stanley L. Scott of the War Department's Directorate of Service, Supply, and Procurement.

The board believed that World War II had revealed major weaknesses in military organization. Also, serious deficiencies were evident in the relationships be175
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

tween the military and other agencies concerned with national security. These

were chiefly defects of communication and coordination. Further, there were

gaps between strategic planning and logistic implementation, between JCS planning and the military and civilian agencies responsible for industrial mobilization. Additional gaps existed

between and within the military services, principally in the field of procurement and logistics. [There were] gaps in information and intelligence, between the executive and legislative branches of the Government, between

the several departments and between government and the people. These...

defects of coordination were the result of inadequate direction and control

below the level of the President.51

In the board's view, the evolving unification bill reflected an organization capable of coping with the problems facing the military establishment. Naturally influenced by the Patterson-Forrestal agreement, the report concluded that an

organization featuring unified control over a coordinate structure with three departments, each headed by a civilian secretary, promised to foster efficiency and

Army Maj. Gen. William E. Hall chaired a War Department board whose

findings supported the Patterson-Forrestal compromise, in the light of

organizational problems encountered during World War II.

176
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

economy within the services.52 Moreover, this potential legislation had a chance

at least to ameliorate the roles and missions struggle.

The principal problem was preparedness. The board felt that the next war

would probably start with little or no warning, almost immediately achieving a

high level of destruction. Combined with the longer time needed to prepare the

defense establishment for a major war, this meant that a country not completely

ready would be at a critical disadvantage. The board's report called for preparedness, not only to react after being attacked, but more important to deter attack.

The deterrent value of preparedness was underscored. 53

Passage of the unification bill would be but a first, yet necessary step, in revamping the defense structure. As to the Patterson-Forrestal compromise agreement, the board found its terms the best attainable. The War and Navy

Departments saw this legislation serving the country's best interests.

Both departments presumed that the agreement and the proposed unification

bill would open a way to rid duplication and other inefficiencies from planning,

logistics, and operations. Mirroring Eisenhower's thinking, the War Department

contended that the unification bill should contain broad powers to allow the Secretary of National Defense to enhance economy and efficiency:

In any new organization the administrator (Secretary of National Defense

and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force) must be given a free

hand in the determination of existing faults and their corrections. It is impracticable and unsound administratively to attempt to fix by statute the details as to how an administrator is to accomplish this task.54

The War Department avoided advocating instant, drastic action which would

have upset present procedures and thrown the military into confusion. It judged

the details of reorganization so complex that the process would develop gradually with functions and personnel falling in place. Thus, the bill would prescribe

two years from date of passage as the time during which personnel, property, records, installations, agencies, activities, and projects would be transferred between the Army and the Air Force.

A major part of the rationale for unification was that, over a period of years,

tremendous savings would accrue by doing away with duplication in personnel,

procurement, intelligence, training facilities, storage, communications, and other

common services. These economies would not be forthcoming, however, until

functions had been assigned through specific agreement or by direction of the

Secretary of National Defense.

177
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Struggle over Roles and Missions

On February 27, 1947, while the Hall Board was in session, President Truman

sent to Congress a draft of the National Security Act of 1947. Truman noted that

the draft had been approved by Patterson, Forrestal, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It was introduced into the Senate as S. 758.* This legislation would create a National Defense Establishment comprising the Department of the Army, Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force. A Secretary of National

Defense would preside over the National Defense Establishment. With the birth

of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Army would of course

lose the functions of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The draft let

the Navy keep its aviation units and the Marine Corps. As recommended in the

Patterson-Forrestal draft executive order, the Navy's aviation forces would be responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of

shipping. As previously noted, Forrestal was prepared to accept legislation only

if it stipulated that the military departments would retain their individual autonomy insofar as administration was concerned, a point agreed to by Truman and

Eisenhower.

Still, the AAF basically wanted a strong unification bill. This entailed not only

an independent Air Force, but substantial authority vested in the secretary who

would head the military establishment. AAF leaders thought they could rely on a

strong Secretary of Defense to support, among other interests, the Air Force's

strategic mission. To the air leaders, this mission held the key to the Air Force's

receiving the largest slice of the defense budget. Spaatz and Symington felt they

could count on the President as Commander in Chief to make decisions in the nation's best interests. In March 1947, during unification hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Spaatz sought to counter the charge that

a "Super-Secretary" would arrogate excessive power:

The Secretary will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent

of Congress and further, the President prescribes the roles and missions of

the Army, Navy and Air Forces. The Secretary cannot change those roles

and missions without going to the President. There is another check on the

Secretary when he comes to Congress with his budget. Congress controls the

armed forces through the budget. 55

General Spaatz was asked what might happen if the Air Force Secretary testified to Congress contrary to the so-called "Super-Secretary." Spaatz replied that

"if he was right and the Secretary of National Defense was wrong, he would last;

if he was wrong and the Secretary of National Defense was right, he would not

*The designation in the House of Representatives was H.R. 2319.

178
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

last." The decision, he said, would depend on the merits of the case. The Air

Force would get what it needed if the requirements were justified. 56

Spaatz' strong support for unification stemmed from the lessons he learned in

the war. The United States did not want another Pearl Harbor. An organization

affording unified action was needed. The war taught that a separate Air Force

must be created. Spaatz said that all major nations had accepted this conclusion

and put their air forces on a parity with their armies and navies. Unification legislation should be supported because it would aid badly needed integrated planning

and unified action. It would provide an efficient and economical organization.

Spaatz conceded that carrier planes belonged to the Navy, but he opposed duplicating the Air Force's land-based planes, a point stipulated in the draft executive

order on roles and missions. 57

The AAF Commander had long been concemed over the Navy's land-based

aircraft, some of which he considered to be strategic bombers. He wanted the

Navy to have land-based planes which "formed a part of the Auxiliary Air Force

which travels with, fights with, and protects the fleet."58 Spaatz said the Air

Force looked on naval aviation as a secondary arm of the Navy organized to fight

with the fleet. The Army Air Forces fumished the Strategic Air Force of the

United States. He held that the Navy's patrol bombers had characteristics similar

to the AAF's long-range bombers. He did not object to the Navy having landbased planes so long as this did not require duplication of aircraft and their support complexes. Such support included building the necessary operating bases.

The Navy nevertheless pointed to its policy since World War I of striving to develop all the aircraft necessary for naval warfare. A paper prepared for the Chief

of Naval Operations in June 1946 said that during World War 11 the Navy had

discharged its responsibilities for defeating the German submarines, destroying

Japanese shipping, and conducting amphibious operations. This paper asserted

that land-based patrol planes remained indispensable for these kinds of activities.

The Navy, to fulfill future responsibilities, must provide for its own needs.60

Symington expressed his concern directly to Forrestal. From the moment he

had taken over as Assistant Secretary of War for Air he had attempted to blunt

apparent Navy encroachment on the Air Force's strategic bombing mission. He

explained to Forrestal that the AAF thought that the Navy might form its own

Strategic Air Force.61 Symington had made a point to Patterson that the Navy's

"die-hard attitude" over unification grew out of its conviction that strategic air

was the key to future defense funding. Consequently, he claimed, the Navy

would do anything except relinquish the right to build a strategic air force.*

*It is difficult to find direct statements about the AAF's alleged desire to gather all air

elements, including the Navy's, under its aegis. At a meeting of the Air Board in December 1946, Gen. George C. Kenney, commander of the Strategic Air Command, talked

179
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

A strong voice for unification, AAF Commanding

General Carl A. Spaatz

told the Senate Armed

Services Committee that

the proposed Secretary of

Defense would promote

efficiency and integrated

planning among the services.

Symington, emphasizing the AAF as part of the War Department, warned Patterson:

if the War Department loses strategic air, the days of the War Department

may well be limited under the conception of the new warfare and therefore,

it's of just as much importance to the War Department to maintain a solid

position against two strategic air forces-which would probably break the

American people-as it is to that component part of the War Departmentthe Air Forces. 62

As if to illustrate this point, Adm. John D. Price, commander of naval air

forces in the Pacific, was quoted in the press as having said that the Navy's patrol

bombers (PV-2s) were being modified to carry atomic bombs on long-range misabout having all strategic air elements under one group--the Strategic Air Command.

Kenney argued that the Navy was building large carriers and long-range reconnaissance

aircraft as part of an effort to structure a strategic air force. Kenney made clear his view

that after unification the Air Force should make a strong bid to gain control of all strategic

air elements. [Fourth Meeting of Air Board, Dec 3-4, 1946, p 184, in RG 340, (SAF), Air

Bd Interim Reports and working Papers, MMB, NA.]

180
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

sions. Symington protested to Clark M. Clifford, President Truman's special

counsel, that there was grave danger that the Navy was building a duplicate strategic air force. If this issue could not be worked out, Symington said, the result

would be a battle in the Congress during which both services and the administration would suffer.6 3

The Navy, desirous of keeping land-based reconnaissance and antisubmarine

missions, and despite the Forrestal-Patterson agreement, wanted roles and missions written into the unification legislation.* Spaatz and Army Chief of Staff

Eisenhower opposed the idea. Spaatz and other AAF leaders took the position

that roles and missions should be approved by the executive branch as a function

of the Commander in Chief. Should the legislative branch take responsibility,

this would withhold the means by which the authority of the Commander in

Chief could be executed. The AAF view was that the legislative branch obviously could not command military forces. Therefore, it could not withhold power

necessary to the function of the Commander in Chief. General Knerr, SecretaryGeneral of the Air Board, echoed the prevailing AAF opinion that proper war

planning demanded that decisionmaking be highly centralized and feature flexi- S. . ... .. . . 64 " i

bility in the assignment of military tasks and responsibility. Proper flexibility

could be achieved by executive order realigning roles and missions as circumstances required. This flexibility could not be had by resort to legislation. National security should take precedence over the desire of a single service. 65

Eisenhower agreed. The question of roles and missions, he said, could not be

solved by promulgating a statement or plan governing every phase of common

effort and dictating rules by which each service would operate. Legislation

should not be designed to resolve every intensely debated detail. Instead, it

should establish sound, fundamental principles. Eisenhower feared that attempts

by the Navy and its supporters to write functions into the bill would succeed

*A succinct appraisal of the Navy's view on roles and missions is in Lulejian & Associates, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972: U.S. Aircraft Carriers in

the Strategic Role (Supporting Study, Contract N00014-75-C-0237, Washington, 1975):

"The central issue in this conflict, as most naval officers saw it, was whether the unification of the armed services should be allowed to restrict what they perceived to be the traditional, professional military prerogatives of the Navy in preparing for and conducting

combat operations. The Navy.. .with the Marine Corps and naval aviation, was capable of

conducting warfare operations in 'three dimensions-sea, land, and air.' Such operations

.. .did not rival the Army's wartime responsibilities, but rather complemented them.

These conclusions had been reached after years of consideration and combat experience,

and the Navy was not about to give up the freedom to use its capabilities as it saw fit

within the general concept of future war plans. Unification threatened this freedom" (p 1-

61).

181
V -(Left) Secretary of the Navy

James Forrestal received Mr.

Symington's warning about

the dangers of forming a separate strategic force.

(Below) W. Stuart Symington

and Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. As Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Mr.

Symington opposed the Navy's

developing its own strategic

bombing capabilities.
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

solely in arousing resentment.66 He opposed this Navy ploy to structure a detailed "legislative pattern" for unification. 67

While the Army Chief of Staff wanted a single civilian head of military

forces, he was convinced that progress in coordinating functions should be permitted to evolve gradually. He knew coordination was difficult, each service covetous of its traditional organization and missions. Even so, the services could

present their problems to the Secretary of National Defense, whom

each service will learn to know and understand, one to whom they can go to

present their aspects of a problem, their point of view; I believe it will provide one who will bring to you [Congress] his recommendations. . . .then

and only then can you get a true complete picture of the National Defense

set-up on which, possibly, you could base detailed legislative study.69

Eisenhower presumed the services could accept decisions of a single Secretary

of National Defense who would be concerned solely with the security of the

country.69 He saw nothing to fear from a Secretary of National Defense. There

were sufficient checks by the Congress and the Chief Executive. So in March

1947, Eisenhower and Spaatz signed a Memorandum of Understanding saying

they desired to grant substantial power to a Secretary of Defense. In contrast,

Forrestal continued to espouse the concept of a Secretary as more of a coordinator than a figure with authority. This was the key issue. Forrestal insisted that the

Secretary could do an effective job of coordination-but that he should do no

more. Forrestal visualized a Secretary of National Defense acting through the

heads of the three departments. His assistants should be few. Forrestal thought

in terms of ten to fifteen top civilian assistants and twenty to twenty-five officers.

Symington advocated that the single Secretary be empowered to remove any of

the service secretaries. Forrestal dissented, saying that in the first place the Secretary should have the decisive voice in selecting the three secretaries.71

The Secretary of the Navy clung to his belief that the National Defense Establishment would be too large to be successfully administered by one man. Eisenhower resisted having a coordinator because it ran counter to his experience and

firm conviction. In preparing for global war, the United States needed a Secretary

with a great deal of authority to get things done. Although the services had cooperated fairly well during the war, there had been "plenty of division below and

above the surface and only a fool would suppose that everything was great and

that now no changes were necessary for peacetime, in the atomic era." Striking

a prophetic note, General Eisenhower averred that, as the services worked with

the Secretary over the years, the flow of centralization toward his office would

undoubtedly increase.

Hearings before the Senate and House committees went on, with leading military and civilian officials testifying. Then on June 5, 1947, the Senate Committee

on Armed Services approved S. 758 with amendments. Both the Senate and the

183
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

House approved the bill in July by voice vote. A conference committee worked

out the differences and on July 26, 1947, the President approved the unification

legislation known as the National Security Act of 1947. Among its provisions,

the act established the Office of the Secretary of National Defense and a United

States Air Force. On the same day, Truman signed Executive Order 9877 which

outlined the functions of the armed forces.

Executive Order 9877

This executive order was identical to the draft order that Patterson and Forrestal had sent to the Chief Executive in January 1947. Truman described it as an

assignment of primary functions and responsibilities. The order noted that the

Navy would retain naval aviation and the Marine Corps. Among the Navy's

functions were naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of

shipping. The air aspects of these activities would be coordinated with the Air

Force including aircraft development and procurement. Air Force personnel,

equipment, and facilities would be used "in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased.'73 Subject to this proviso, the Navy would not

be restricted as to aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes. Regarding

air transport, the Navy would have the aircraft necessary for internal administration and for flying routes of sole interest to the Navy where requirements could

not be met by normal air transport. 74

Air Force functions encompassed all military aviation, combat and service,

not otherwise assigned. Specific USAF functions were: air operations including

joint operations; gaining general air supremacy; establishing local air superiority;

responsibility for the strategic air force and strategic air reconnaissance; airlift

and support for airborne operations; air support to land and naval forces, including support of occupation forces; and air transport except for that furnished by

the Navy.75 The order further charged the Air Force with supplying the means to

coordinate air defense among the services. 76

The functions of the Army were to organize, train, and equip land forces for

operations on land, including joint operations; seizure or defense of land areas,

including airborne and joint amphibious operations; and occupation of land areas. In addition the Army was to develop weapons, tactics, and equipment for

combat and service forces, working with the Navy and the Air Force in areas of

joint concern to include amphibious and airborne operations. 77 The Army would

also assist the Navy and Air Force to accomplish their missions, including the

provision of common services and supplies. 78

The Air Force detected conflict in some cases between Executive Order 9877

and the National Security Act. For example, the act said that naval aviation

would embrace air transport essential for naval operations. The executive order,

184
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

however, authorized the Navy to provide the air transport necessary for only internal administration and for travel over routes of sole interest to naval forces. 79

The Navy held that the act was the appropriate authority whenever it and the executive order conflicted. The Navy accordingly argued that air transport essential

for naval operations was actually that which the Navy already had.8U

On the other hand, the Air Force deemed the executive order preeminent

where missions were in question. Congressional committees deliberating over the

act had stressed that the reason for injecting statements on naval aviation and the

Marine Corps into the act was to preserve the integrity of these elements of the

Navy. Delineation of roles and missions was properly a function of the executive

branch. The Air Force argued that differences over interpretation of the executive

order and the act should be resolved "through command channels provided by

the Act itself," namely by decision of the Secretary of National Defense or by the

President himself.8 1

National Security Act of 1947

In the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253), Congress declared its

intent to provide

a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Government relating to the national

security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the .... Marine

Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction

under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective

strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified

control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air

forces.8

2

The act created a National Military Establishment, to include the Departments

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (to be administered as individual executive departments) and to provide for coordination and direction by the civilian secretaries of these departments. The law stipulated that the Secretary of Defense would

be a civilian appointed by the President as his principal assistant for national security. 83

The powers of the Secretary of Defense were to establish general policies and

programs for the military establishment; to exercise general direction and control

over the three departments; to abolish duplication in procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research; and to supervise and coordinate the defense budget. These broad powers appeared to deliver on President Truman's

185
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

desire for firm civilian direction of the armed forces. Nevertheless, the following

proviso considerably negated the control and powers of the Secretary of Defense:

nothing herein contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the

President or to the Director of the Budget after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or recommendation relating to the Department 814 which he may deem necessary.

Since the law in effect made the President the arbiter of last resort, the final appeal became not only the right but the duty of the incumbent service secretary.

Nor could the President, in turn, refuse to hear such an appeal. By permitting appeal, the act implied the duty of the Chief Executive seriously to entertain it.*

Besides, the law circumscribed the powers themselves. It did this by stating

that powers and duties not specifically conferred on the Secretary of Defense

should be retained by the service secretaries. Having no residual power of his

own, the secretary was severely limited in the authority he had. The secretary's

charter to exercise "general direction" placed him at the start in a weak position.

The words reflected the Navy's idea of the secretary as a coordinator rather than

as an administrator. It revealed the naval leadership's fear of the secretary as a

potential man on horseback.

The act specified that the Navy took in the Marine Corps and naval aviation.

Naval aviation consisted of combat, service, and training forces, and embraced

"land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air

weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the...

Navy."'85 Too, the Navy would be "generally" responsible for naval reconnais-

*Following passage of the National Security Act of 1947, Clark M. Clifford, presidential adviser, informed Truman that a question had been raised as to whether the President

was Commander in Chief of the Air Force in the same way that he was Commander in

Chief of the Army and Navy. Clifford instantly asked the Department of Justice for an

opinion. On August 27, 1947, Clifford quoted the Justice Department's reply to the President: "It is clear that the President is Commander in Chief of all the armed forces of the

United States comprised within the National Military Establishment. . . .The phrase

"Army and Navy" is used in the Constitution as a means of describing all the armed

forces of the United States. The fact that one branch of the armed forces is called the 'Air

Force,' a name not known when the Constitution was adopted, and the fact that the Congress has seen fit to separate the air arm of our armed forces from the land and sea arms

cannot detract from the President's authority as Commander in Chief of all the armed

forces." [Memo for the President fr Clark M. Clifford, subj: Scope of the President's

Authority as Commander in Chief, Aug 27, 1947, in RG 218, Rcrds of the US JCS,

Chmn's File 123, "Memos to and from the President," MMB, NA.]

186
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

sance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The National Security

Act required the Navy to develop aircraft, weapons, and tactics of naval combat

and service forces. Matters of joint concern would be coordinated between the

services. Like the Army and Navy, the Marine Corps would be allowed "such

aviation as may be organic therein." 86

According to the act, the United States Air Force

shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned.

It shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective

prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.87

Hence, the National Security Act used broad terms in setting up the United States

Air Force, affording the Air Force latitude in organizing its headquarters and

field structure. As mentioned, the Air Force-like the Army and Navy-would

be constituted as an executive department called the Department of the Air Force

and be headed by the Secretary of the Air Force. The Secretary would be a civilian, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Department of

the Air Force was further authorized an Under Secretary and two Assistant Secretaries, to be civilians appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.

As to USAF personnel and functions, formerly under the Department of the

Army or "as are deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable

for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air

Force, these shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force

and the Department of the Air Force.'88 For two years the Secretary of Defense

should direct the movement of personnel, property, and installations from the

Army to the Air Force.

The United States Air Force was established under the Department of the Air

Force. The act specifically directed that the Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, and

the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command) be transferred to the Air Force. A Chief of Staff, USAF, would be appointed by the

President for a four-year term. The functions of the Commanding General, GHQ

Air Force, of the Chief of the Air Corps, and of the Commanding General, AAF,

would be transferred to the Chief of Staff, USAF.89

All officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men of the Air Corps or Army Air

Forces would be transferred to the United States Air Force. Others serving in the

Army components, but under the authority or command of the Commanding

General, AAF, would be transferred to the control of the Chief of Staff, USAF.*

Under the act, the principal responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to

prepare strategic plans and give strategic direction to military forces, to prepare

joint logistic plans and to assign to the services logistic tasks in accord with such

187
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MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

plans, and when in the interest of national security to set up unified commands in

strategic areas. The Joint Chiefs would additionally act as the key military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.9 1

Aside from the military departments and the JCS, a War Council was formed,

consisting of the Secretary of Defense (chairman), the service secretaries, and the

military heads of the services. The council would advise the Secretary of Defense

on broad policy matters. 92

The act also created a National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President on national security and a Central Intelligence Agency to report to the NSC.

Also organized were a Munitions Board, a Research and Development Board,

and a National Security Resources Board. The NSRB would advise the President

on coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. Members of the

NSC included the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the

Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Chairman, National Security Resources Board. The NSC had the duty, under the President, to make sure

the United States had a military establishment strong enough to support the country's foreign policy. Thus, the NSC advised the President on the integration of

domestic, foreign, and military policies. Under the NSC the CIA coordinated all

intelligence activities and evaluated the intelligence collected.

The National Security Act of 1947 gave the Army Air Forces independence,

but it was not exactly what any of the services had originally wanted. Lt. Gen. Ira

C. Eaker said the act really "legitimized four military air forces." 93 However, the

architects of Public Law 253 had to maneuver within the realm of the possiblewhich meant compromise. In February 1947, Symington (to become Secretary of

the Air Force in September) had written James E. Webb, Director of the Bureau

of the Budget, that a better bill could have been drawn, but "a bill which was

considered better could not have gotten everybody's approval; and therefore

would not have given the President the opportunity to show agreement to the

Congress and the people. I don't say this is a good book, but I do say it is a good

chapter."94 It was a starting point, a first step toward a truly integrated establishment. To gain passage it had taken a long time, a great deal of effort, and

much give-and-take by all concerned. Symington differed with those critics who

believed that the Navy had succeeded in structuring the unification bill expressly

to suit its own purposes. Nor did he share the feeling of those who felt that Norstad had capitulated to the Navy's desires, regarding the fact that the post of Secretary of Defense was structured as a coordinator. Symington argued that under

the circumstances Norstad had done an outstanding job. It had not been easy.

Of all the Air Force participants, Symington said, "Norstad should get the most

credit for unification. In the days when it looked grim, he stuck to it." 9 6

In their deliberations on functions and organization, Norstad and Sherman

faced some hard realities. They realized that President Truman had laid out the

major tenets of unification organization, namely a single department of national

189
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

James Forrestal, the nation's first Secretary of Defense, in his office at the

Pentagon, September 1947.

defense and three coequal services including a separate Air Force. The Navy lost

on the issue of Air Force independence but won its point on the individual services maintaining their "integrity" and thereby their flexibility of action and administration. Under the National Security Act, the Secretary of Defense would be

a coordinator as the Navy wanted, not a strong administrator as desired by the

Army and the Air Force.

As War Department representative negotiating with the Navy, General Norstad found himself in the middle of sensitive and emotional issues. He and Sherman could not have completely satisfied both the War Department and the Navy.

Norstad's especially good relations with Sherman did not extend to the rest of the

naval hierarchy. In general the Navy fought unification legislation up to the final

bill and enactment.

Not surprisingly, Norstad came under fire within the War Department for his

unification role. It had been necessary for him to sometimes reject what he considered to be selfish interests within the War Department.97 Norstad recalled that

just prior to passage of unification legislation, General Devers, AGF commander,

told him that the Army thought he was deliberately compromising its best interests.98 There was some similar feeling within the Army Air Forces itself.

Failure of this antipathy to disappear after enactment of the legislation impelled General Norstad to ask Spaatz for a transfer out of Washington. Specifically, Norstad suggested that he leave Washington, preferably with a reduction of

190
President Truman's Defense Department appointments: Secretary of the Air

Force W. Stuart Symington (above, left); Secretary of the Army Kenneth C.

Royall (above, right); and Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan (below,

right) being sworn in by Chief Justice Fred Vinson.
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

one gde; or if kept on the Air Staff, that he not be promoted in grade or position. Spaatz and Symington turned down Norstad's recommendations. Even

General Arnold, now retired, expressed dissatisfaction to Norstad about the National Security Act; subsequently however, Arnold personally indicated to Norstad that he appreciated the difficult work and negotiations that General Norstad

had completed.

While the National Security Act was a major achievement, it was likewise an

obvious compromise in which the services yielded on matters of principle to

achieve a common goal. Neither the Army, the Army Air Forces, nor the Navy

was entirely satisfied with the legislation. The outcome left unsolved basic points

of disagreement between the services-roles and missions and the absence of

requisite authority in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Admiral Leahy

wrote in July 1947 after the unification bill cleared Congress: "if the history of

the British Royal Air Force is valid evidence, the removal of our Air Arm from

control by the Army will result in a definite reduction in the efficiency of our national defense establishment."'100 Still, the 1947 act was probably the best legislation that could have been secured at that time. It was clear to Spaatz, Symington,

and Eisenhower, among others, that in the future the defense establishment

would continue to evolve toward unification.

President Truman's first pick as Secretary of Defense was Robert P. Patterson,

the Secretary of War, a man highly respected in the defense community and in

the government. Patterson declined, explaining that his financial condition dictated that he leave the government. The President then named Forrestal to the position even though the Secretary of the Navy had fought determinedly against

unification and a separate Air Force. In certain important respects, however, Forrestal was a logical selection. He had headed the Navy Department, and as Secretary of Defense he might be expected not only to get along with the naval

leaders-men he knew and had worked with-but to enlist them as supporters of

unification. Having championed legislation featuring coordination as opposed to

administration, Forrestal now had the chance to head a National Defense Establishment in the major role of coordinator. The New York Times commented that

Forrestal was the logical choice and "the happiest one that could he made." Forrestal's selection

is the best guarantee that could be given that unification of the services will

be carried out intelligently and efficiently .... Selection of any other man

than the former Secretary of the Navy would have sent unification on its

way with a handicap. It has been painfully evident that all through the long

hearings and debate in Congress that there are many in the Navy who still

distrust the whole idea. With Mr. Forrestal as the Secretary, the Navy opponents of unification will know that there is at the top a man who has an intimate knowledge of their branch of the service and one to whom it will not

be necessary to spell out in detail their side of the case when difficulties

arise.""

192
MOVING TOWARD AUTONOMY

As Forrestal and the naval leaders desired, the services had managed not only to

preserve their integrity, but to hold in effect a veto power over the Secretary of

Defense. On the issue of defense itself, Forrestal had warned of the perils of instant demobilization. He believed deeply in a strong national defense.

After appointing Forrestal, Truman named Symington to be Secretary of the

Air Force; John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy; and Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army.* Having been Assistant Secretary of War for Air since January 1946, Symington brought topflight management credentials to his new post.

He had also shown uncommon ability to work effectively with the Congress.

Moreover, he nurtured an excellent working relationship with General Spaatz.

This combination of Symington and Spaatz held the promise of affording the

new independent Air Force unusually fine leadership.

*Symington had known Forrestal personally for years. Interestingly, Truman had

asked Forrestal about Symington. Forrestal told the President that frequently friends

found it hard to work with one another. [Walter Millis, ed. The Forrestal Diaries (New

York, 1951).1

193
6

Independence and Organization

No Air Force can be created by legislative action alone.

All the National Security Act of 1947 has done is to give

us the green light. It must be considered an opportunity

and not an accomplishment. . . .We cannot pass the

buck-to the War Department or to the Navy, or to the

Congress, or to the people. We certainly cannot afford to

rest on our laurels.

Secretary-Designate of the Air Force

Stuart Symington

to the First Annual Convention of the

Air Force Association

Columbus, Ohio

September 15, 1947.

The creation of the United States Air Force in September 1947 was both an

end and a beginning. It marked the end of the long fight for independence. It signaled the beginning of the effort to bring the Air Force to true parity with the

Army and the Navy. This meant that over several years the Air Force would have

to take on the functions and personnel that would enable it to operate completely

as an independent service.] Certainly as of September 1947 the Air Force was a

long way from commanding the kind of critical support services needed for true

independence. Consequently, the Air Force began immediately to plan for the

transfer of various functions and for establishing and expanding certain necessary

technical services. Of immediate concern, Secretary of the Air Force Symington

and Chief of Staff Spaatz had to organize and staff the Department of the Air

Force and the Headquarters United States Air Force. In October 1947 the headquarters was reorganized under a Deputy Chief of Staff system.

195
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Organization and transfer of functions and personnel were not the only critical

matters facing Symington and Spaatz. They viewed the ongoing struggle with the

Navy over roles and missions as a vital part of the drive for equality with the

other services. What some air leaders called the "liberal construction" of the National Security Act enabled the Air Force generally to organize as it wished. 2

Also, the act neither delineated functions nor gave the Secretary of Defense statutory power to control the National Military Establishment. As a result, the roles

and missions controversy not only continued, but was exacerbated by the administration's austerity program. Besides, the Air Force was especially sensitive to

the need to bring its forces to the 70-group goal. It seemed all too clear to the air

leadership that as an interim objective it would have to settle for considerably

less than 70 groups. Though not underestimating the magnitude of the tasks

ahead, the airmen did enjoy the realization that the long-sought goal of independencc had been achieved.

"At Long Last"

Establishment of the Department of the Air Force and the United States Air

Force on September 18, 1947, elicited a wave of exultation from USAF leaders.

These men-Arnold, Spaatz, Eakcr, Vandenberg, and all the rest-had fought for

an independent service prior to World War II, had led the AAF during the war,

and had brought the unification struggle to a successful conclusion. Now, after

many years and many battles, their faith, vision, and plain hard work had paid

off.

It was this belief in the idea of independence that brought out the best in the

airmen. They were struggling toward an objective of commanding importance. In

the sense that the air weapon was new and untested before the war, these men

were sometimes perceived as "revolutionaries." Basically pragmatic, they were

sure the development of better military aircraft would solidify the Air Force's position as the predominant service. They were apolitical in that they thought primarily in terms of advancing technology. The battle they waged over many years

was carried on by a relatively small band of men. Symington described them as

"a tight-knit group of activists." He added: "We were determined. It was a hard

fight and it was a good fight. We survived." 4

The war had afforded them the opportunity to prove their theories and they

made the most of it. They alleged that the effectiveness of air operations during

the war proved the case for independence. Air power could best be developed by

a separate Air Force, a point made by General Eisenhower himself. And the air

leaders were convinced they had earned the support of the public and Congress.

They accented the AAF's vital contribution to victory. Moreover, they asserted

196
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

that air power was now the most significant part of the nation's defense. National

security demanded a strong Air Force in being.

Not only airmen harbored these views. On the eve of the Air Force's creation,

the final report of the War Department Policies and Programs Review Board underscored that air power had become "the first line of defense.'"5 The nation

would support only a small peacetime Army. Traditions, the board noted, must

give way to facts. Foremost among these traditions was the emphasis on the importance of ocean barriers. In arriving at the size of the peacetime Air Force, "the

favorable psychological effect of air power in being and the adverse psychological effect of lack of air power are factors of much greater importance before the

initiation of hostilities than are the state of readiness or existence of other types

of forces."'6 Similarly, the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training concluded that the long range of aircraft and the existence of atomic weapons

made it imperative that the United States maintain a "counterattacking force."

This force should be able to retaliate instantly with the most powerful weapons.7

When Truman's UMT program bogged down in Congress, part of the reluctance

to accept UMT stemmed from the recognition of air power's value.

In the drive for independence, the airmen had received considerable help from

many military and civilian leaders. Foremost among these was General Eisenhower, whose thinking on the Air Force had remained constant since the end of

the war:

I am particularly anxious that the existing pleasant and friendly relations between ground and air personnel continue, and that every possible means be

adopted to insure that legal recognition of the autonomy of the Air Force

will serve only to bring us closer together in friendship and in performance

of duty.8

Complementing Arnold, Spaatz, and the other leading airmen, Lovett and Symington made sizable contributions. Both brought to the Air Force a sensitive, intelligent appreciation of the business practices of American corporations. They

were certain that the Air Force could be operated like a large corporation. During

the war Lovett had worked on production problems. He assisted Arnold in his attempt to make the AAF autonomous and he maintained a sound working relationship with Marshall. Late in the war, due in no small part to the efforts of

Arnold and Lovett, the Army Air Forces was in large measure operating as an

autonomous entity. General Marshall had assented to this arrangement. Lovett's

views on independence generally accorded with Arnold's and Spaatz's. Lovett

thought that the War and Navy Departments had been unable to orchestrate a

maximum war effort in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. 9 He firmly believed that the AAF deserved to be separate and to enjoy equal consideration in

the sharing of the defense budget. In his relations with the War Department and

other agencies, Lovett, like Arnold, felt that a certain amount of trust should exist

197
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

between friends and among the established departments.° These relationships

formed the cement with which to build solid programs.

Most men who had in one way or another participated in the negotiations over

the National Security Act believed with Lovett and Symington that it was a clear

compromise.* Here, too, these people concluded that the successful outcome of

the negotiations had hinged on trust between men in positions of leadership. This

was part of the collective frame of mind of the air leaders upon the creation of a

separate Air Force. In their own minds it had been a long, grueling struggle. On

September 18, Symington and Spaatz wired Arnold: "At long last the U.S. Air

Force came into being at noon today." I IGeneral Vandenberg noted that the airmen were now the "masters of our destiny."' 12 The air leaders savored the satisfaction resulting from so many years of hard work and belief in themselves. In a

real sense, the arduous striving had been an act of faith.

The majority of AAF leaders, Vandenberg included, realized it would take

several years for the Air Force to secure the requisite men and functions to be on

equal footing with the Army and the Navy.1 3 General Knerr told the Air Board in

September 1947: "As with any vigorous organization freed from onerous restraint there is danger of its feeling its oats and lashing out at all obstacles at the

very beginning. Such action would be a great mistake, for we simply do not have

the muscle on our bones to carry through with such desires."1 4

Spaatz and Symington also sounded a cautionary note before the first meeting

of the Aircraft and Weapons Board in August 1947. With the advent of air independence, the major problem for the Air Force had changed. Though it had

served the AAF well in the past, publicity was not now to be the main ingredient.

Caution was a must. First, the Air Force must make a record of accomplishment

for itself. The byword was action, deeds. The airmen had won the opportunity to

prove they deserved the independence they had so long fought for. 15 The

chief objective now was to build a strong, effective Air Force during a period of

austerity. This would not be easy. The Hall Board had shown the way toward a

potentially orderly transition from Army Air Forces to United States Air Force.

This meant using the two years allotted for the actual transfer of necessary functions. The National Security Act of 1947 did not confer instant parity on the Air

Force.

*There were also some in the Air Force and the War Department who thought too

much had been compromised away to the Navy as the price for the Navy's approval of the

National Security Act. Norstad was well aware of this feeling.

198
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

Establishing the Air Force

Together with General Spaatz, Secretary Symington epitomized the effective

transition between the fight over unification and the actual formation of an independent Air Force. It will be recalled that Secretary of War Patterson had given

Symington the job of shaping and driving through Congress the War Department's position on unification. Patterson had instructed all members of the War

Department's higher echelons to coordinate unification matters with Assistant

Secretary of War for Air Symington.6 Symington proved especially adept at

dealing with congressmen and in communicating AAF and War Department

thinking to the public. He maintained a heavy speaking schedule throughout the

country and lost no opportunity to voice his views in the halls of Congress.

Favorably impressed with Symington's administrative and business talents,

Truman in January 1946 proffered to him three possible positions: Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of State, or Assistant Secretary of War for

Air. Based on his background and interest in logistics, Symington chose the air

post and set about securing passage of unification legislation through Congress.

Symington's skilled and sensitive hand at logistics and procurement was sorely

needed by the new service. Being under the War Department, the AAF in World

War II had no opportunity to draw contracts and follow them through to fruition.

It was in this aspect of procurement that Symington knew he could make a contribution. After appointment, he plunged into the unification fray with characteristic energy and determination. Norstad, who worked closely with Symington,

wrote Arnold: "Symington has entered into this game, particularly unification,

with an inspiring enthusiasm .... He is doing a swell job .... He is very definitely

a leader and has the intelligence and experience to make it count. His peculiar

qualities make him an ideal man for the Air Forces at this time." 17

While not Forrestal's first selection, Symington was the natural choice to be

Secretary of the Air Force. Before the war they had been friends, but after the

war Forrestal and Symington clashed as they promoted the policies and views of

their respective services. In addition to Symington's experience as Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he and Spaatz had developed a close working and personal

relationship. As Secretary of the Air Force, Symington immediately began an intensive campaign to secure 70 air groups. The role of advocate fitted him well. A

deep believer in air power who knew logistics, procurement, managerial techniques, and congressional relations, he spearheaded the drive to steer Air Force

requirements through Congress. "My theory in functioning as a good secretary,"

he recalled,

was for them [the military] to make the balls and I'd roll them .... I had a

Chief of Staff, and it wasn't my duty to get into everything. He built the picture and I presented the picture because that was my job. I concentrated on

two things: on the logistics, to be sure the taxpayer got a good return on his

199
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

investment and on the presentation to Congress, so we could get what we

hoped to get."'

Secretary Symington was determined "to get as much of the pie as I could for the

Air Force." 19

Beyond strictly Air Force needs, but nonetheless related to them, Symington

saw the postwar years as posing a stiff challenge to the United States. The nation

had assumed a position of world leadership--in itself unique in American history-which required of the American people "a responsibility for strength, and

for sacrifice; and for the same resolute determination in peace that you displayed

in war.'2° The atomic age demanded a new concept of preparedness reflecting an

acceptance of this responsibility. However, Symington also knew that ultimately

the military would have to scale down its requirements:

we must face the constant compromise between what military authority considers necessary on the basis of maximum security and what is finally decided as the minimum requirement on the basis of a calculated risk .... This

must be the case, because the maintenance year after year of armed forces

certain to be adequate to handle any emergency would be such a constant

drain upon the American economy as to destroy the American way of life

just as surely as would conquest from without.2

'

Hon. W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, and Gen. Carl

Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, announcing the new organization set-up for

the Department of the Air Force, October 1, 1947.

200
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

Nevertheless, there remained a reasonable minimum below which national security would be endangered. Air needs had to be stated in terms of the task at hand.

To the Air Force this meant 70 air groups in being, capable of retaliatory attack

to deter potential aggressors. The United States would have to maintain an

atomic deterrent force to prevent general war.22 This called for an aircraft industry that could produce advanced aircraft at a satisfactory rate, and for an adequate

training establishment to turn out sufficient manpower.

As the first Secretary of the Air Force, Symington was given a recess appointment by President Truman and was sworn into office on September 18, 1947, by

Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson. Recess appointments were also received by Under

Secretary Arthur S. Barrows and by Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force Cornelius V. Whitney and Eugene M. Zuckert. They assumed their positions on September 25, 1947. The Senate confirmed these appointments on December 8,

1947, and Truman approved permanent commissions the next day.23

Under Secretary Barrows was a former president of Sears, Roebuck, and

Company. His duties would embrace procurement and production, research and

development, liaison with the Atomic Energy Commission, and industrial mobilization. Whitney would work with government agencies on civil and diplomatic

affairs. Zuckert would concentrate on programming, cost control, and organiza- 24 C

tional and budget planning. Selection of Barrows, Whitney, and Zuckert

showed Symington's penchant for picking experienced and highly qualified executives to serve in the Department of the Air Force. Symington also brought

with him personnel from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. At

the beginning, the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force had 121 personnel, 68

civilian and 53 military.25

Other services in the department were supplied by the Office of the Administrative Assistant, under the direct supervision of the Air Force Secretary. The appointment of John J. McLaughlin as Administrative Assistant was made

permanent on December 14, 1947.26 Symington also appointed a Director of Information, a General Counsel, and a Director of Legislation and Liaison. He later

set up a Secretary of the Air Force Personnel Council. 27

General Spaatz became the first Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.

Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Deputy Commanding General, AAF, and Chief of

the Air Staff, became Vice Chief of Staff, USAF. During the war, he had been

chief of staff of the Twelfth Air Force and the North African Strategic Air

Forces, and commanding general of the Ninth Air Force. After the war, he had

been Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements, had sat on intelligence committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Secretary of War, and subsequently headed the Central Intelligence Board. Brig.

Gen. William F. McKee was made Assistant Vice Chief of Staff. In 1943-45, he

had been Deputy to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations, Commitments, and Requirements.

201
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Secretary of the Air Force

Stuart Symington

Under Secretary of the Air Force

Arthur S. Barrows

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

Cornelius V. Whitney

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

Eugene M. Zuckert

Administrative Assistant

John J. McLaughlin

General Counsel

Brackley Shaw

Director of Legislation and Liaison

Brig. Gen. Ralph F Stearley

Director of Information

Stephen E Leo
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

With the Air Force now an independent service, General Spaatz instantly gave

high priority to personnel policies. A separate promotion list, one of the AAF's

major objectives of long standing, was finally achieved with passage of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law 381). Also called the "Promotion Bill,"

this law created a promotion system for career officers of all the services. Putting

the Air Force and the medical services on separate lists, promotion was by qualification and selection rather than by strict seniority.28 The Officer Personnel Act

permitted the Secretary of the Air Force to promote officers (Regular and Reserve) on active duty, to higher temporary grades. At the time of independence,

the Air Force was authorized twenty thousand Regular officers, not counting the

Regular officers serving in Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces. This

act let the Air Force Secretary fill vacancies in each grade permanently regardless

of length of service. 29

As Arnold before him, General Spaatz was bent on building a strong postwar

officer corps. Training highly qualified officers in various specialties would be

the key. An integrated system of officer training would be developed, centered at

the Air University at Maxwell Field.30 Nonrated officers would have every

chance to climb the career promotional ladder. Air Force leaders for some time

had been convinced that nonrated officers needed to be assured that they could

make decent careers for themselves in the Air Force. General Arnold emphasized

this often during the final phase of the war and also immediately prior to his retirement.31 In April 1947, Maj. Gen. Fred L. Anderson, Assistant Chief of Air

Staff, Personnel, said:

There is nothing in our present career planning which aims at guaranteeing

rated officers exclusive opportunities in the Air Force of tomorrow, yet we

know that the rated officer is less anxious as to his future than the non-rated

officer. I believe that the confidence of the latter group can only be enhanced

with time through the impartial implementation, when appropriate, of our

present plans and through the gradual elimination of unwarranted prejudice

barriers.32

The AAF also wanted to be able to attract United States Military Academy cadets who might be thinking about electing the Air Force upon graduation. Of

course, cadets who wished to fly would be attracted to the Air Force for that reason alone. Logically, an autonomous Air Force would offer more opportunities

for nonrated people than the Air Corps had in the prewar period. The end of

World War II witnessed a shift in the AAF's training emphasis. During the war

the major consideration was to bring each combat unit to high operational efficiency. Post-war, and in the United States Air Force, one of the primary objectives would be training individual officers to become important members of the

Air Force. Hence, the value of career development to these officers. In the future,

technology would dictate a trend toward specialization, especially in the higher

echelons of command and staff.33

203
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

In addition, the Air Force desired to forge strong career incentives for enlisted

airmen. Air leaders were aware they would have to compete with industry for

able young men. To keep competent airmen the Air Force would have to give

them the chance to advance. Professional and technical training courses would be

available at various Air Training Command schools. Spaatz was persuaded that

airman would have to be educated and trained beyond traditional military concepts. Airmen should be encouraged to make the Air Force a career.34

General Spaatz likewise directed plans to organize the AAF's civilian components. As noted, after World War 11 the War Department's basic plan for the

postwar military establishment included the Regular Army, the National Guard,

and the Organized Reserve Corps. The Active Reserve was part of the Organized

Reserve Corps. The War Department assumed that Congress would enact UMT

legislation.

Established after the second World War, the Air National Guard from the start

was deemed a significant element of the postwar Air Force. Before the war,

twenty-nine National Guard aviation observation squadrons had been activated,

manned by about forty-eight hundred personnel. The plan for a postwar Air National Guard essentially reflected General Marshall's conviction that the postwar

Army would have to depend upon a system of universal training.*

The original postwar ANG program specified 514 units-tactical, service, engineering, and communications. In April 1946 the 120th Fighter Squadron (Denver, Colo.) became the first ANG unit to be activated. It gained federal

recognition on June 30, 1946.' By the end of June 1947, the Air Guard's assigned strength totaled 10,341: 257 units had earned federal recognition. Although this seemed to be a reasonably good beginning, the ANG was far from

able to play its intended role. This was due partly to a reduced training program,

resulting from the Air Guard's budget having been slashed in February 1947.**35

The Air Defense Command, established in March 1946, had responsibility for

the organization and training of the Air Reserve.4 The first objective of the initial

plan was to activate 40 of 130 planned Reserve training bases. The aim was to

*See Charles Joseph Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard,

1943-1969 (Washington, D.C., 1985).

Federal recognition required twenty-five percent of officers and ten percent of airmen

present for duty.

**By May 1949 the ANG had organized the 514 units. Tactical organizations included

72 fighter and 12 light bomber squadrons. By February 1950 the Air Guard possessed

2,400 aircraft, 211 of them jet fighters. By the start of the Korean War in June 1950, the

Air National Guard had 44,728 personnel including 3,600 pilots. [Gross, pp 36-37.]

"tSee Chapter 4.

204
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

conduct a program which at the start might be described as "a flying club with no

objective or training other than pilot proficiency." 36

This program was revised by Air Defense Command in September 1946 to

encompass nonrated officers and enlisted men organized into combat and service

units. It called for 147,500 men (17,500 rated officers; 5,000 staff, administrative

and technical officers; and 120,000 enlisted men) to be trained at 70 bases. Also

others might be affiliated with the Inactive Reserve. However, as mentioned, the

February 1947 budget cuts forced a reduction in these plans and thus the elimination of 29 bases. But by June 30,1947, over 400,000 air reservists were enrolled

in the Inactive Reserve. Seventy of a planned 306 combat wings, groups. and

squadrons had been organized along with 15 of 278 service units. Following the

February 1947 reductions, 2,883 pilots and 1,330 aircraft comprised the Air Reserve program.37

Organizing the Headquarters

One of Spaatz's first principal decisions as Chief of Staff was to reorder the

headquarters under the Deputy Chief of Staff system. So in its main lines the

AAF headquarters reorganization of September 1945* lasted until October 1947.

Between these dates, Spaatz, the Air Staff, and the Air Board mounted a major

study of postwar organization. The five Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (A-Staff),

or so called General Staff system, had generally served the AAF adequately-but

no better than that. Anticipating unification, Spaatz in April 1946 ordered General Knerr, Secretary-General of the Air Board, to have the board begin a detailed

study of Air Force headquarters organization. If it should then be decided that a

different structure would be more effective, reorganization at the time of unification would be directed. 38

The board's natural point of departure was the AAF experience in World War

II.t During the war, the absence of clear lines of authority handicapped the command of air forces. The difficulty of eliciting decisions from AAF headquarters

impeded the smooth functioning of subordinate commands. Because this traditional staff system was not flexible enough, attempts were made during the war

to delegate authority to lower units. 39

At the AAF headquarters level, a sharp delineation of function and responsibility was required, with sufficient delegation of authority. During April 1946 the

Air Board began moving to the conclusion that a Deputy Chief of Staff system

*See Chapter 4.

The AAF expanded from 25,000 men and 1,200 aircraft in 1930 to over 2,400,000

men and 80,000 planes in 1943.

205
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

best met these needs. The deputy system achieved this (at Headquarters Air Materiel Command, for example) by adopting vertical control as the basic principle

of organization as opposed to the traditional General Staff system that led to lateral dispersion of responsibility. Hence, the deputy arrangement would tend to

eliminate the appended position of the special staff.

In AAF headquarters, the staff structure gradually evolved toward a functional

division of responsibility. Within their own specialties, deputies and directors

emerged from the status of staff advisers and participated directly in the command function. The war, for example, stressed the significance of support services (supply, medical, weather) and in Europe these were elevated to directorates.

Supply and maintenance were eventually united on a vertical command basis,

cutting through all echelons. 4 1

This concern about authority and responsibility was another way of noting

that under the staff system AAF leaders were anxious about how much time it

took to get a top-level decision. In March 1946, immediately after creation of the

Air Board, General Knerr wrote Spaatz. He said that, when the French general

staff structure had been adopted by the U.S. War Department, land armies were

decisive in warfare. Wars were fought at a slower tempo. Usually time was of

secondary significance. With the tremendous increase in the speed and destructive power of modem weapons, air leaders wanted a post-unification organization that would sharply reduce the time required to make decisions. Among

time-consuming factors were no clear policy, split responsibility and authority,

excessive coordination, and reluctance to accept responsibility. 42

Knerr indicated that military organizations might be structured in one of three

ways: a "one-man show," a general staff system, or a deputy system. He quickly

discarded the idea of an organization completely controlled by one man. And he

asserted to Spaatz that the deputy system would be more adept at filling a policy

vacuum because a deputy holding responsibility and authority would "not remain

in jeopardy through lack of a policy to cover his actions. A general staff, on the

other hand, having no command responsibility, is too often content to let the matter slide." 43 Addressing the possibility of split responsibility and authority, again

Knerr suggested the deputy structure because the staff system required cross-coordination through a central point-the Chief of Staff, which usually became a

chokepoint. The deputy system combined responsibility and authority in one person. From top to bottom, each commander had to deal with only two or three

people to have something executed promptly. Regarding reluctance to accept responsibility, Knerr observed that the staff structure nurtured people

who like to "pass the buck". . . it is a source of despair to those who are not

so constructed but who find themselves in staff positions. The deputy system

is a barren prospect for "do it tomorrow" people. Caught in such a system

they stand out as the choke-points causing delay, self-labeled for elimination.44

206
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

The staff system also suffered from jurisdictional confusion. This would not be a

problem under the deputy structure wherein each deputy operated under a charter

clearly delineating his jurisdiction.

Deputies would have the authority to decide promptly which matters should

be considered by the Chief of Staff. Experience with deputies during World War

II in the European theater and at Wright Field revealed that three deputies-Personnel, Materiel, and Operations-might provide the basic organization. Fundamental to this system was the idea that no intermediary be established between

the Commanding General and his deputies. The function of directing the flow of

business to and from the Commanding General should be done by an administrative assistant, assigned to the commander's office and without command responsibility or authority.45 Thus, in 1946 the Air Board and Air Staff agreed that

operation of the Air Staff was unsatisfactory "in speed and efficiency to fight the

next war."'46 General Knerr and Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Commanding General, Air Materiel Command, advocated the Deputy Chief of Staff system. Knerr

had also made his views known to Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, Air University

commander, who then organized a major study of this subject (under Maj. Gen.

Orvil A. Anderson) by faculty and students of the Air War College.

Study findings were first presented to Knerr and on December 3, 1946, formally to the Air Board. The report concluded that reorganization should be

guided by the principles of big business. Foremost among these principles was

simplicity--everyone should be able to understand their position in the organization. The structure should have unity of command ("there must be one commander and one boss") and must be compatible with the mission, featuring

delegation of authority coequal with responsibility. 47

The Air War College study recommended three deputies: Deputy for Personnel and Administration, Deputy for Materiel and Logistics, and Deputy for Plans

and Operations. It further proposed creation of an Air Combat Command, comprising SAC, TAC, and ADC, emphasizing that these three commands should be

controlled by one individual. The report suggested that conceivably air defense

forces might be used for tactical purposes and that tactical units might be employed in air defense or strategic operations.48 This recommendation stood

counter to the existing organization, featuring SAC, TAC, and ADC. Since

Spaatz and Eisenhower had come to concur in this structure, there was little likelihood it would be changed.

General Knerr supported that portion of the report calling for three deputies

under the Commanding General. He said the commander should delegate a certain amount of his responsibility, "because one man is not capable of taking care

of all of the command functions. . .above the air force level without killing

him.'49 The Commanding General and his three deputies represented the command function. Under the general staff system, this function had been divided

among members of the staff. As mentioned, this parceling out was unsatisfactory

207
z

Maj. Gen. Hugh Knerr,

Secretary General of the 0

Air Board, recommended

structuring Air Force headquarters under a deputy

system, in which a commander would delegate

authority to two or three individuals.

As a major general, Muir S.

Fairchild conducted a major study of the proposed

deputy system. The Air

War College study advocated establishing three

deputies under the Air

Force Commanding General.
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

because many people worked on the same problem without arriving at a solution.50 The deputy system was an attempt to free the Commanding General from

a substantial part of his workload. Ideally, the commander and his deputies

should know each other well enough so that the deputy might implement what he

knew to be the commander's wishes.5 1

After the Air War College's presentation, the Air Board agreed in December

that three deputies would be the best system to adopt under unification. The

board informed General Spaatz of this conclusion. While there was no consensus

of the Air Staff, most of the staff favored the status quo--a lateral staff structure.

Once more Knerr pointed out that the A-Staff was adequate for 'the leisurely

study of problems, but it could not handle what would be required of it in the future.

52

General Kenney, SAC commander, General Twining, and others backed

Knerr's stand. They underscored the need to delegate authority. What Kenney

liked best was that the deputy system placed control at the top; it decentralized

operations: "too often we see the top crowd trying to operate as well as do the

primary job of organizing.5.. This organization [deputies] ... decentralizes operations to the operator."*53 Twining said the deputy structure (which he commanded at Air Materiel Command and which Spaatz had set up in Europe during

World War II) proved especially sound because it produced decisions. On the

other hand, the A-Staff system slowed decisions.54

The Air Board saw the three-deputy system as most suitable for a large headquarters. These deputies in effect should be commanders, issuing orders in the

name of the Commanding General. Each deputy should have directors under

him, on a "staff' level. In this way, the staff function would be put directly below

the command level. Unlike the numbered A-Staff, these deputies would have

functional titles such as Personnel, Operations, and Materiel. As General Knerr

put it: "When we come to the autonomous air force...we are not going to keep

our hands tied to the old archaic system of numbering and lettering they have in

the War Department staff; we are only doing it now because it is expedient.'55

By using three deputies, the Air Board and the Air War College aimed to

avoid a purely advisory staff whereby the Commanding General made nearly all

decisions. In contrast, the deputies would be delegated considerable authority.

Consequently, on December 4, 1946, the Air Board proposed to General Spaatz

"that the organization of the autonomous Air Force be based upon the principle

of decentralized operation as set forth in the study submitted by the Air War Col-

*Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, ADC commander, agreed with Kenney: The deputy

organization would "get these people out of this operating business, and we are annoyed

with it every day of the world." [Fourth Meeting of Air Board, Dec 3-4, 1946.]

209
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

lege. The essence of this principle is the delegation of command authority

through deputies." 56

Subsequently, after Forrestal and Patterson had reached agreement on potential unification legislation, Spaatz in June 1947 directed General Vandenberg,

Acting Deputy Commanding General and Deputy Chief of Air Staff, to form a

team to integrate the recommendations of the Air Board, the Air War College,

and Air Staff. It was Vandenberg's idea-having accepted the deputy conceptto combine Operations and Plans at the director level. He also advocated that the

Air Comptroller be placed on line with the deputies. The Commanding General

would be called the "Chief of Staff of the Air Force" and he would have a "Vice

Chief of Staff." Under them would be the deputies, supported below by directors.

57

Based for the most part on work done by the Air Board and the Air War College, Vandenberg's report to Spaatz bore fruit on October 10, 1947, when the

headquarters reorganized. As planned, this new structure relieved the Chief of

Staff of much work. The number of officers reporting directly to the Chief of

Staff, USAF, was reduced from thirteen to seven,* as follows: Vice Chief of

Staff (Vandenberg); Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel (Lt. Gen. Howard A. Craig);

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad); Deputy Chief of

Staff, Personnel and Administration (Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards); Air Comptroller (Lt. Gen. Edwin W. Rawlings); Air Inspector' (Maj. Gen. Junius W.

Jones); and Secretary-General of the Air Board (Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr). The

last two were not directly in the chain of command. Thus, this reduction of the

number of people reporting directly to General Spaatz fulfilled the idea of giving

these few deputies authority as well as responsibility.**

In their own spheres of specialization, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff actually

spoke for the Chief of Staff. The Deputy Chiefs made policy and supervised their

directorates. Under the Deputy Chiefs and the Air Comptroller, there were

twelve directorate offices and four special offices (see Chart)., In the several

years after the October 1947 reorganization, the headquarters structure would

*Eight, if the Chairman of the Scientific Advisory Board was included.

IRedesignated the Office of the Inspector General on January 6, 1948.

**Brig. Gen. Reuben C. Hood, Jr., described the new headquarters organization as a

consolidation and streamlining "into a business like organization designed for efficiency

of operation according to the highest standards of American business." [Address, Brig.

Gen. Reuben C. Hood, Jr., ChlOrgn Div, Dir/tng & Rqmts, DCAS/Ops, "Organization of

the Headquarters U.S. Air Force," to Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Dec 15,

1947.]

hThe Air Comptroller would be redesignated as the Office of the Comptroller on December 30, 1947.

210
LL Ij

•1s

.h

U) 1114

"(I I -~

jil

c)

r ~i ~4j

I~ ED a 1
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

change considerably as more functions, some of them new, needed access to the

Chief of Staff.

Planning the Technical Services

While occupied with organizing the headquarters, Spaatz laid plans to assure

the Air Force adequate special service support. The War Department's Hall

Board, which had convened in January 1947, took pains to stress that an independent Air Force would not set up separate special services. e.g., its own medical corps.* This point had been previously accepted by Eisenhower and Spaatz.

The board's report stated that the War Department would continue to support the

Air Force logistically after unification. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense

would be in the best position to make any desirable changes. 58

The Hall Board suggested that each department should have a chaplain organization and the minimum medical service for basic needs, i.e., organic medical service for troop units and installations. There would be no duplication in the

general hospital or medical supply system, both to be operated by one department for the others.59

Some in the AAF, like General Knerr, were wary that the War Department's

technical services were trying to keep the Air Force dependent upon them after

unification.60 Hearing of the AAF's fear of not having proper support from the

War Department, General Eisenhower reminded Spaatz of their agreement on

separate services for the Air Force:

I have repeatedly stated that if there develops an intention, either in Congress or elsewhere, to set up such completely separate special services, I will

oppose the whole plan with all the emphasis I can possibly develop. In this

you have agreed with me unreservedly, and yet it appears that many others

interpret certain features of the Hall board report as announcing such an intention.6

'

The Army Chief of Staff was particularly disturbed about the medical corps.

He endorsed the consolidation of medical organizations and he opposed the specialization of aviation medicine. Regulations to assign specialized personnel to

the Air Force should come from the Secretary of National Defense, who Eisenhower emphasized-would be solely guided by national security and not by any

special interest.62 In talks with Eisenhower on March 24, 1947, Spaatz reaffirmed that he had every intention of adhering to their agreement on separate

*See Chapter 5.

212
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

services. He then reminded the Air Staff that the Hall Board report called for unification, not duplication.63

Meanwhile, Secretary of War Patterson was perturbed over a statement in the

report that "the proposed legislation neither specifically prohibits nor authorizes

the creation of common supply, procurement, or distribution of services." The report also underscored that if common staff agencies were created, they should be

established by contributions from the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air

Force, and not by creation of independent or common departmental logistic entities to support the three service departments. Furthermore, the Patterson-Forrestal

agreement made clear that each department should use personnel, equipment, facilities, and services of other departments in cases where economy and effectiveness would be enhanced. Patterson reiterated to Eisenhower that the War

Department was committed to common services. Any service, he feared, might

build and control all resources required for a specific mission, instead of relying

on resources and means already available in another service. Opposing duplication, he recommended to Eisenhower that the Hall Board reconsider its report.

General Hall told Eisenhower he was in accord with Patterson's views. The

board had not intended to propose organizing more supply and technical services.

What it meant to advocate was cross-procurement and cross-servicing. It had advised organic medical service for troop units and installations while one department operated the general hospital and medical supply systems. As to

quartermaster service, it urged that common quartermaster activities above base

level be performed by one department for the others. However, it did call for

each department to have its own chaplain. After unification, the Air Force would

still handle the logistic functions it now performed. Air Force officers, or officers

transferred to the Air Force, would continue to discharge their logistic duties in

the new Department of the Air Force. But the board also intended that the Air

Force would not duplicate organizations now in the Army providing services for

both the Army and Air Force. This applied to construction, real estate, operation

of ports, general hospitalization, and depots. 65

Nevertheless, Patterson did not think that separate chaplains were needed or

even such quartermaster services as the board suggested. Besides, he thought the

board should be reminded that doing away with competing services and facilities

was the common aim. "It is not enough," the Secretary of War said, "to declare

an intention as a matter of policy. It must be supported by specific recommendations without equivocation.'66 He insisted to Eisenhower that the report's wording be changed.

General Hall accordingly wrote Eisenhower that, while the board knew its report rested on the principle of abolishing duplication, there were statements

which had been interpreted as violating this principle. He therefore recommended that the Office of the Chief of Staff send this statement to recipients of

the report:

213
MAJOR AIR COMMANDS

October 10, 1947

Air Defense Command Air Proving Ground Command

Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer Brig. Gen. Carl A. Brandt

Air Materiel Command Air Training Command

Gen. Joseph T. McNarney Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon

Air Transport Command 7th Air Force

Maj. Gen. Robert W. Harper Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Wooten

Air University Alaskan Air Command

Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson

Boiling Field Command Caribbean Air Command

Brig. Gen. Burton M. Hovey Maj. Gen. Hubert R. Harmon

Strategic Air Command Far East Air Forces

Gen. George C. Kenney Lt. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead

Tactical Air Command United States Air Forces in Europe

Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

In no case will this report be interpreted to violate either of these basic provisions: (1) The Air Force will not set up additional technical services as an

immediate result of Unification and (2) Service support of the Air Force by

the Army will continue following unification with the understanding that the

Secretary of National Defense will effect such changes in services as later

prove desirable.67

The key word was "immediate." In time the Air Force expected to establish its

own services.68 General Hall's statement was disseminated and in June 1947

General Spaatz directed that the structuring of the Air Force upon unification

should adhere to the principles of the Hall Board report. 69

The 70-group, 400,000-man postwar Air Force had been approved by Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs.* Even so, Spaatz knew there could not be complete

autonomy until the Air Force gained additional functions and personnel. Entailed

were all kinds of functions, embracing such basics as laundry, salvage and repair,

and commissary. At the end of 1946, the War Department's major components

had been broken down as follows: Army Air Forces-400,000 troop basis of

which over 28,000 were ASWAAF; Army Ground Forces-340,000 with 64,000

personnel of the arms and services. Army Air Forces leaders wanted the postwar total of service personnel to be counted above the 400,000 figure rather than

as part of it. If not then in effect the Air Force would be required to accept a reduction from its 400,000-man force.

In the words of Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge, Director of Operations: "We do

not feel that we are now autonomous because we can't support ourselves .... The

number of people transferred to us determines the state of our independence. If

we get the functions without the people we are lost. We can't perform these functions without reducing something else.'"7 1 Partridge said that in the last analysis

the AAF would have to work with the War Department to transfer entire functions along with personnel. The problem from the AAF standpoint was that the

War Department remained reluctant to transfer military and civilian spaces to the

AAF concurrent with the transfer of certain functions. The War Department controlled the technical and administrative personnel assigned to the Army Air

Forces. The progression of these career officers was managed by the technical

and administrative services. The AAF's objective was of course to have its sup- S 72

port personnel actually serving in the Air Force. But prior to the achievement

of independence, the AAF avoided pressing this matter so as not to antagonize

Eisenhower and the War Department toward the paramount issue of autonomy. 73

Historically, control of the technical services had varied. Before March 1942,

when War Department Circular 59 established the Army Ground Forces, Army

Service Forces (Services of Supply), and the Army Air Forces, all units of the

*See Chapter 2.

215
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

As Director of Operations,

Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge realized that to be

truly independent, the

AAF needed to gain both

the basic support functions and the personnel to

perform them.

technical services were governed by these services themselves. They were responsible for tables of organization and equipment, troop basis, activation, and

training. From March 1942 to July 1943, divided responsibility existed. Frequcntly, the AGF, ASF, and AAF activated identical service units. In some cases,

service units allocated in the troop basis to Army Ground Forces and Army Air

Forces were activated by Army Service Forces and the technical services. These

units were trained by the technical services of ASF.74

With very few exceptions, split responsibility for identical service units ended

in July 1943 for AGF and ASF. Tables of organization and equipment, troop basis, and activation and training responsibility were assigned to either the Army

Ground Forces or the Army Service Forces. The AAF went on duplicating a

number of units allotted each of the other forces. Technical services and ASF

continued to train AGF and AAF units on request. Where such units were not

trained for AGF and AAF, cadres were furnished by the technical service, and

the Army Service Forces. In addition to training units and providing cadre, the

technical services and ASF supplied or trained many technical specialists. Officer

procurement and training for administrative and technical services were also

done by the technical services and the Army Service Forces.75

216
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

Prior to creation of the United States Air Force, one of the major goals of

General Spaatz and the Air Staff was to keep officers of the administrative and

technical services who had been serving with the AAF and had been included in

the AAF troop basis. These ASWAAF officers worked in such specialties as adjutant general, chemical, finance, medical, engineers, and transportation. The

AAF also wanted to absorb functions being performed for Army Air Forces by

the administrative and technical services. 76

Spaatz in early 1947 repeated that ASWAAF officers should be considered an

integral part of the AAF (and eventually, the USAF). He did not want anyone to

feel that these officers were not members of the Air Force:

This feeling, if it becomes general, will be a serious blow to the Air Force. It

will insure that we do not get the best officers from other branches of the

service to serve with us and it will further insure that such officers will not

join up with the Air Forces as permanent personnel if unification, with full

autonomy for the Air Forces, becomes a reality. 77

Spaatz also wanted to be sure officers from other branches were used in their

specialty. With the advent of an independent Air Force, Spaatz noted that his

agreement with General Eisenhower specified that no officer would be transferred from the Army to the Air Force without authorization of his branch chief

and the approval of General Spaatz. In the event of disagreement, the Army

Chief of Staff would make the decision.78

As mentioned, Spaatz agreed unreservedly with General Eisenhower that,

upon separation from the Army, the Air Force would not at once duplicate many

of the Army's support services or corps. However, the Air Force did intend in

time to man its technical segments with its own personnel. The Air Force would,

for example, have its own engineer, logistical, and air communications career

fields. 79 General Knerr commented that under the present arrangement the Air

Force continued to be the "poor relative of the War Department." 80

The Air Force as an independent service, coequal with the Army and Navy,

planned after two years to organize its own technical and professional services.

Before September 1947 the Army Air Forces had set forth the policy that technical and professional services in the autonomous Air Force were needed for the

"high morale essential to an efficient Air Force." 8 1 A proper percentage in grades

of colonel and above on the single promotion list would be given to each segment to ensure command careers for officers in the technical and professional

fields. The fields ultimately to be created and their manning should be determined as circumstances dictated. 82

The question of which technical and professional segments the Air Force

would eventually have was sensitive and controversial. Air Staff members held

divergent views. Historically, the Army had formed corps and by September

1947 there were twenty-eight. The oldest corps were the Signal Corps and the

217
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Medical Corps. Several new corps came into being during World War I and its

aftermath, including the Air Corps. Over the years, new corps sprang up when a

need existed to accelerate development of a specialty whose growth was being

inhibited by absorption into the command staff structure. The tendency to neglect

an ongoing function seemed to justify a new corps. Special boards investigating

Army problems often recommended more corps as the solution.

The War Department General Staff had tried both to eliminate and consolidate

corps. It had little success. The Army's technical and administrative services desired to keep their corps, which had gained considerable influence. Throughout

World War II, however, the AAF had made a determined-and for the most part

successful-effort to integrate these services into functional organizations. Thus,

with creation of the United States Air Force, air leaders confronted a familiar

problem, laced with the unique aspect of the Air Force as an independent service:

It is not difficult to understand the sincerity which motivates recommendations of the specialists in each field of the Air Forces for the establishment of

segments representing their specialty with adequate authority and responsibility to insure the effective and efficient accomplishment of their specialized missions as members of the Air Force team .... however it must be

remembered that war experience has repeatedly taught the necessity of completely integrated and coordinate action.X3

Air leaders realized that, without corps, special functions were apt to be submerged. Career progression of technical and professional officers was impeded.

Moreover, cross-training had jeopardized the development of skilled specialists.

Even so, air officials judged the case against specialized segments persuasive. It

was based on the conviction that personnel were likely to become overly specialized and therefore not sufficiently qualified to perform general duties during national emergencies. Then, too, corps spawned duplication of functions and

frequently "empire-building"; allegiance to the unit was diluted by loyalty to

corps; corps tended to make services fail adequately to support overall operations; and the entire organization became vulnerable by allowing it to become

weaker than its elements. 84

Consequently, the Air Force in October 1947 decided on utmost integration of

its personnel while assuring some recognition of specialized functions. The Air

Force consensus was that there could be no question about placing the "controlling reins in the command structure where they belong rather than in separate

corps. The delegation of authority to a specialized segment should be the prerogative of the commander in each echelon whose operations its services are supporting." 85 On the other hand, though normal operation of segments should be

through the staff structure, agencies in the staff representing specialized functions

should have direct access to the commander in each echelon. 86

Also, training activities should emphasize that technical and professional services be given every consideration. A specialty's unsatisfactory performance

218
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

might be traced to its receiving too little support. For example, General Spaatz

felt that, when a new specialized activity had achieved recognition in the highest

but not in the lower command echelons, a temporary corps should be set up until

the specialty had reached proper stature. He thought it might be desirable for

guided missiles to be given corps status even though its personnel requirements

were still limited. He further contended that segments whose distinctive characteristics precluded cross-training should be delegated more authority than those

less specialized. The Medical Service, for example, might be given jurisdiction

over all personnel in its field. Career fields that might suffer from limited opportunities should not create unnecessary positions, but rather expand opportunities

to include duties in related segments and in the staff elements. 87

The Air Force planned for a specific percentage in the grades of colonel and

above in each specialized segment.88 Still, the allocation of senior grades should

not be in direct proportion to the number of officers in every field. The allotment

of space for colonel and above would be based on the scope of the specific function, amount of responsibility, supervisory positions required and finally the

number of officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel in each particular segment.

Highest grades should not be the same throughout these specialized fields. For

example, if requirements of the communications field justified a lieutenant general, this did not mean that other fields would likewise have lieutenant generals

as chiefs. Nor did it signify that chiefs and senior officers would be at least as

high rank as comparable officers in the Army and Navy. The Air Force view was

that the significance of a function was not the same between the services. The

Army Chief of Engineers might be a lieutenant general, but this would not justify

a similar grade for the Chief of Air Force Engineers. The weather specialty in the

Air Force might well call for a higher rank than in either the Army or Navy. 89

The Air Force opposed establishment of corps with responsibility for assignment and control of personnel vested in the corps commander. Responsibility

would remain in the normal staff structure with special functions subject to the

chain of command. In this manner the Air Force sought to avoid the Army's history of proliferation of powerful corps with strong vested interests, to the detriment of the overall organization. The Air Force accordingly organized to assign

officers to a command and guide their career growth either within a specialty or

broader progression in several fields. To prevent submergence of special functions, specialists would have access to the commander although normal operation

would be through the proper staff agency.90

The Air Force wished to encourage cross-training to develop personnel with

broad command experience. But a minority in each career field would limit their

specialty so as to ensure high professionalism in that particular field. In addition,

General Spaatz directed that separate corps organizations for physicians, lawyers

and chaplains would be authorized in a so-called Air Force Act "in order for

219
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

them to function under domestic and international law."91 There would be no

other exceptions.

As of October 1947, the Air Force planned to establish twelve major career

fields: medical, chaplain, justice, aeronautical engineering, electrical engineering,

automotive and armament, construction, personnel and administration, general

supply and procurement, information, flying, and nonflying tactical. 9 2

The status of the medical service presented a special problem to the Air Force

leadership. Spaatz had long thought to upgrade the medical service, once independence was a reality.* Air operations in the war had been to some extent

handicapped by the way medical support was set up in the various theaters of operations. Army Air Forces and Ground Forces personnel had been hospitalized

and evacuated through the same medical support system. The special needs of the

flyers were not considered. While the AAF operated station hospitals in the

United States, it did not participate in the management of general hospitals where

treatment was prescribed by physicians untrained in the practice of aviation

medicine. 93 The AAF believed that unification presented the opportunity to

change this system: "It is manifestly undesirable that the organization for Medical Service which so handicapped the Army Air Forces continue to operate to the

detriment of the United States Air Force. It is believed that unification affords an

opportunity for corrective action." 94 Interestingly, General Eisenhower thought it

"absolutely silly" to dwell on aviation medicine, a view reflecting his reluctance

to duplicate medical support facilities. As with other functions, he felt that the

Secretary of Defense should decide which ones were absolutely necessary for the

Air Force.95

The military services had presented their medical service plans during congressional hearings on unification. The Army Surgeon General recommended a

single medical command to operate a common hospital system for the military.

This command would be headed by a Director, responsible to the Secretary of

Defense. Conversely, the Navy proposed individual medical services for each of

the military services, coordinated through the Joint Chiefs. Like the Navy, Maj.

Gen. Malcolm C. Grow, the Air Surgeon, advocated separate medical services.

However, he suggested that coordination be done through a Medical Advisory

Board consisting of the three Surgeons General and their representatives.96

Seeking to reconcile the Army and Air Force plans, the Hall Board report recommended a separate medical service for the Air Force with general hospitals

staying under the Army. Yet, the board urged that Air Force medical service personnel take part in the management and in the training programs of general hospitals. The National Security Act of 1947 did not deal with the problem of

medical organization. Nonetheless, after assuming office, Secretary of Defense

*See Chapter 2.

220
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

Serving as Air Surgeon,

Maj. Gen. Malcolm C.

Grow contended that the

Air Force should operate

its own medical service.

The USAF Medical Service was established in

June 1949 and General

Grow became the first Air

Force Surgeon General.

Forrestal appointed an interdepartmental medical committee to study the organization of the military's medical services. The USAF stand was clear:

The Air Force has not attained parity so long as an operational veto remains

in the hands of the Army, whose failure or inability to provide the medical

attendance required by the Air Force in an emergency might jeopardize the

mission of the latter arm .... it is difficult to minimize the effect of the present organization upon the morale of these medical officers who have served

with the Air Force and contributed so much to the advancement of aviation

medicine.

97

Months of study by the Department of Defense, by the interdepartmental committee, and at the service level would finally result in creation of the USAF

Medical Service and in the establishment of the Office of the Air Force Surgeon

General in June 1949.

221
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Transfer of Functions

As noted, the National Security Act of 1947 established the United States Air

Force but did not automatically give the Air Force functions equivalent to the

Army and Navy. The Secretary of the Air Force inherited solely those functions

of the Secretary of the Army as were then assigned to or under the control of the

Commanding General, Army Air Forces. Over two years the Secretary of Defense was authorized to assign to the Department of the Air Force such other responsibilities of the Department of the Army as he deemed necessary or

desirable, and to transfer from the Army to the Air Force appropriate installations

personnel, property, and records.98 Thus through August and September 1947,

the Air Force had to figure out in each field what it needed in personnel, facilities, and funds to discharge new or enlarged duties.99 Since necessary business

could not be allowed to lapse during the transition period, the Air Force did not

intend to take over functions until ready to do so. In research and development,

the Army and the Air Force agreed in August that the War Department need no

longer approve the development of military characteristics for AAF equipment or

the testing of materiel used by the Army Air Forces alone. As in other functional

areas, the two services disagreed on the number of military and civilian spaces to

be allocated in research and development from the Army to the Air Force.100

Since the Army Air Forces had become substantially independent long before

passage of the National Security Act, separation of the AAF from the Army was

at first largely a matter of realigning departmental control and jurisdiction. Prior

to the National Security Act, the Hall Board had suggested solutions to the administrative and organizational difficulties of separating the AAF from the

Army. According to the Secretary of the Army, the board report "provided a general blue-print for the divorcement of the Air Force from the Army.''l1 Other

studies were completed in the Office of the Under Secretary of War. After enactment of unification legislation, these studies guided the Army Chief of Staff and

the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to promulgate policies for separation. These subsequently led to about two hundred agreements between the AAF

and the Army. The first, signed by Spaatz and Eisenhower, was published on

September 15, 1947.102

Based on the Hall Board's work, Spaatz and Eisenhower had directed their

staffs to work out specific transfer agreements. Eisenhower assigned his Deputy

Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, and Spaatz assigned his Deputy Commander and Chief of Air Staff, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, to prepare basic

agreements by which the Air Force would be established separate from the

Army. If problems arose, Collins and Vandenberg were ordered to present them

to Eisenhower and Spaatz.10 3 Agreements would not be implemented until the

Army and Air Force staffs said they were able to transfer a particular function. 104

However, agreements were reached and in mid-September Generals Eisenhower

222
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

and Spaatz forwarded a number of these to Secretary of War Kenneth C. Royall.

He in turn sent them for approval to Secretary-designate of Defense Forrestal.

Royall noted that both he and Secretary-designate of the Air Force Symington

were in accord with the agreements and believed that this procedure would prove

sound and sufficiently flexible. 10 5

Among other subjects, Vandenberg and Collins arrived at policy agreements

on service support organic services, and Regular Army officers. Regarding support the joint agreement stipulated that the Army would continue its support of

the Air Force:

Each department will make use of the means and facilities of the other department in all cases where economy consistent with operational efficiency

will result. Except as otherwise mutually agreed upon cross-servicing and

cross-procurement as now in effect will continue until modified by the Secretary of Defense.'16

The agreement on organic services held that a service unit organic to an Air

Force group or wing would be designated as an Air Force unit. One not organic

which performed a service common to both the Air Force and Army (e.g., an engineer battalion) would be considered an Army unit attached to the Air Force. 10 7

Army personnel attached as individuals or as units supporting solely the Air

Force would be listed in the USAF troop basis. 108 As for the agreement on Regular commissions, a total of twenty thousand Regular Army commissions would

be given the Air Force. Regular commissions for officers attached to the Air

Force, or with Army units servicing the Air Force, would be part of the Army's

allotment of thirty thousand.109 The Air Force found that the adjustment of personnel authorizations was one of the most difficult immediate aspects of this

separation process:

In view of personnel ceilings the obvious solution to provide for this increased load and at the same time keep our troop program intact is by allocation of authorizations from the Army to the Air Force. However, in many

cases the Army requirement is not decreased in the same amount as our requirement is increased. This leaves a net deficiency that must be made up

from Air Force resources. An interim solution is feasible to meet the need

for military personnel and the eventual solution must be sought through realistic programming, culminating in the presentation of our needs to the Secretary of Defense and to the Congress." 1

0

Civilian authorizations proved an even more critical problem because a low ceiling left little flexibility.

In specific fields, the Air Force and Army concurred that for at least a while

the Army would operate central examining and recruiting stations as well as induction stations. The Air Force would furnish a proportional share of personnel

223
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

for their operation.I'I There was some concern about the Army's operating recruiting stations. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, ADC commander contended:

We can get all the recruits we need if we enlist them ourselves and go out

and get them. But if we have to do it through the Army I don't know.... I'll

just issue a warning... whenever there is a chance, where they are going to

take something over we are entitled to, we have to step out and insist on our

rights and recommendations.12

In the case of central welfare funds, the Air Force would receive a proportionate

share of these funds as determined by the Central Welfare Board, to then be approved by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force. In the field of intelligence, it was agreed that the Air Force would assume responsibility for

mapping and photography, over which the War Department previously had final

review and control. It was further understood that the Air Force would provide

official liaison between military representatives of foreign governments and the

new Department of the Air Force. Both the Departments of the Army and Air

Force would operate, maintain, supervise, and control separate attache systems.

The two departments surveyed the field and decided that the Air Force would operate attache systems in twenty-one countries. 13

Unless otherwise directed, the Army Audit Agency-with USAF representation-would handle contract and industrial auditing and military property account auditing pertaining to supplies or property for the Department of the Army

or Air Force. The Air Force would continue to administer its existing disbursement, paying its own military and civilian personnel through USAF command

channels in accordance with accounting directives of the Army Chief of Finance

or such higher authority as might subsequently be designated. 114

The Department of the Air Force would design specialized technical facilities

for the Air Force. The Army and Air Force would ascertain their needs for personnel, material, and services and also business requirements within their separate budget estimates for repairs and utilities functions. Each department would

administer, direct, and supervise repairs and utilities at its own installations. The

Air Force would prepare and defend before Congress those budget estimates covering USAF personnel, services, and material. Where cross-procurement was affected, the using department would provide the procuring department the funds.

As to cross-servicing, the department receiving the service would furnish the department supplying the service the funds as mutually agreed upon." 15

Both departments would figure their own needs for real estate and construction and put them in their budget estimates. The Army would act as agent for the

Air Force in acquiring and disposing of real estate. Too, the Army was designated contract construction agent for the Air Force. The latter would fund such

construction, collaborate on specifications, and review and approve contracts

224
INDEPENDENCE AND ORGANIZATION

prior to awards. It was spelled out that if USAF requirements were not being met,

the Air Force could do the job itself or contract for the work.116

The Army-Air Force agreements by themselves did not transfer functions or

personnel. Following creation of the United States Air Force on September 18,

1947, and issuance of the joint agreements worked out by Collins and Vandenberg, Secretary of Defense Forrestal signed and published a series of implemental transfer orders.117 Forrestal emphasized that these orders would be mutually

agreed upon and written by the Army and Air Force. Orders entailing extensive

coordination by the Secretary of Defense would be disapproved. Transfers that

duplicated organizations would also be turned down unless these functions in

each service were absolutely essential (organic). In areas where Forrestal felt that

a reallocation of functions was in order, the services would be requested to submit recommendations. Transfer orders would be sent to the Secretary of Defense

by a joint memorandum signed by the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force.

Funding would be adjusted between the two services until the Air Force produced an appropriations plan approved by the Bureau of the Budget and the

proper congressional committees. '? 8

In 1947 the first major orders transferred personnel and some primary functions from the Army to the Air Force. The first transfer order was signed by Forrestal on September 26, 1947. It stipulated that functions of the Secretary of the

Army and the Department of the Army, which were assigned to or under the control of the Commanding General, AAF, would be transferred to the Secretary of

the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force. Also, most units under AAF

control were transferred to the United States Air Force.* The initial order stated

that the functions of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air Force

(Air Force Combat Command); of the Chief of Air Corps; and of the Commanding General, AAF, were transferred to the Chief of Staff, USAF.119

All officers commissioned in the Army Air Corps and officers holding commissions in the Air Corps Reserve were transferred to the Department of the Air

Force. All warrant officers and enlisted men under the Commanding General,

AAF (with some few exceptions) were transferred to the Department of the Air

Force.120 Officer and enlisted members of the Women's Army Corps, on duty

with the AAF, would remain assigned with the Army until enactment of legislation establishing procedures for the appointment and enlistment of women in the

United States Air Force. 121 In addition, the property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel under the jurisdiction, control, or

command of the Commanding General. AAF, would be continued under the jurisdiction, control, or command of the Chief of Staff, USAF.122

*The exceptions were chiefly some engineer and medical units.

225
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

As mentioned, transfer of functions, units, and individuals commenced with

the first transfer order. The last one (Transfer Order 4) was signed on July 22,

1949, by Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson. By June 30, 1948, sixty percent

of these transfer projects had been completed. They covered nearly every field of

military command and administration and included adjustments relevant to personnel administration, fiscal matters, intelligence, organization, training, research

and development, supply, procurement, operations, and other fields of special •• 123

staff and command activity. 1 By June the transfer orders signed by Forrestal

had given the Air Force jurisdiction and control over all its military and civilian

personnel. All separation projects were finished by the end of the two years

stipulated by the National Security Act.

According to Secretary of Defense Johnson, the forty transfer orders fulfilled

the intent of the Congress through the National Security Act, to grant a broad legal basis to operations of the Air Force. These orders, observed Johnson, had furnished the Air Force "a legal basis for operations comparable to that of the

Departments of the Army and Navy."'124 Provision had also been made for the

Army to go on performing common services for the Air Force in finance, hospital facilities, quartermaster administration, and transportation.

Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson (third from left) converses with three

Secretaries of the Armed Services following his first press conference after

taking office, March 1949. Left to right: Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart

Symington, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, Mr. Johnson, and

Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan.

226
7

Epilogue

In this day when a quick powerful counterattack is

America's only real answer to aggression, there can be

no question that we need the world's first Air Force. It is

only through the global, flashing mobility of the Air

Force that we can hold our counterattack poised. It is

only by continuing to improve and strengthen the Air

Force that the counterattack will have sufficiently

impressive substances and weight .... we feel, with deep

conviction, that the destiny of the United States rests on

the continued development of our Air Force. The

question of whether we shall have adequate American

air power may be, in short, the question of survival.

Secretary of the Air Force

Stuart Symington

to the University Club of New York City

January 10, 1948

The question of how best to organize the Army air arm had been debated as

far back as before World War I. Reorganization had become a bone of contention

soon after the formation of the Aeronautical Division as part of the Signal Corps.

Although air forces failed to play a major role in the first World War, they

showed sufficient potential to prompt some airmen, Billy Mitchell among them,

to think that the air arm should be reorganized and eventually given independence. For the air arm to develop and prosper, the airmen argued that they

should administer and control these forces, supported by adequate funding. Put

simply, air forces should be operated and controlled completely by airmen. Significant though its potential may have been, air power had not shown that it

227
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

could substantially affect the outcome of war. Between World Wars I and II, the

War Department leadership remained convinced that the airmen's missions

should be direct support of ground troops along with aerial coastal defense.

In the 1930s the Army and the Navy clashed repeatedly over the coast defense

mission. The Navy wanted control of all air operations over the water. The Air

Corps wished to be responsible for air defense up to three hundred miles out to

sea. Aside from this controversy, some airmen reasoned that the Air Corps had

an independent role, i.e., the strategic mission, to strike the enemy's war-supporting resources and to cripple his will to carry on military conflict. Nevertheless, in

the 1930s the concept of the independent mission was still nothing but theory.

For the Army airmen, World War II was the turning point in the autonomy

drive. After building up early in the war, the AAF in 1943-45 successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of air power. Changing doctrine and tactics when

called for, the AAF contributed greatly to the Allied victory in World War II.

This display of power furnished the air leaders the evidence they felt they needed

to win the campaign for an independent air arm. They insisted that, despite setbacks, in the final analysis their basic assumptions about air power had been

proved. In the ultimate test, the air arm had showed it could be decisive. Thus,

they reiterated a conviction expressed long before the war: decisions on air requirements ought to be made by airmen in total control of their own forces, with

their own budget and promotion list. This meant creation of a separate service.

Support for the AAF's cause came from several vital quarters. Army Chief of

Staff Marshall backed General Arnold, with whom he had worked closely during

the war. Marshall's successor, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, fresh from triumph

in Europe, threw his strong support to the drive for an Air Force, coequal with

the Army and Navy.* The public and the Congress also seemed to favor a separate Air Force.

During World War II, the AAF held in abeyance its major arguments for becoming an independent service. General Arnold had naturally agreed with Marshall and Lovett that winning the war was the top priority. Marshall had

promised that once the war was over he would support the drive for a separate

Air Force. So although during the war Arnold generally played a waiting game as

to the subject of independence, he encouraged and directed the AAF to make

plans for autonomy and postwar organization. He put great emphasis on this

*Norstad recounted a meeting with Eisenhower in May 1948. According to Norstad,

Eisenhower stated that he had been told by people in the Air Force that without his support and advocacy an independent Air Force would not have been possible. Eisenhower

was proud of the part that he had played in this effort. [MR, Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad,

DCS/Ops, subj: Conference with General Eisenhower, (I May 1948), May 7, 1948, Gen.

Lauris Norstad Papers, 1945-48, Box 6.]

228
EPILOGUE

planning, which proceeded in Washington simultaneously with wartime operations in various theaters. He and his planners thought this activity would culminate the many years of striving for independence. The idea of air independence

had driven the air leaders for many years. It had never been absent from their

minds. This was true during the war. Arnold never lost sight of what the "lessons" of the war might prove. He was certain they would buttress the cause of an

independent United States Air Force.

The air leaders stressed the preeminence of air power as the primary rationale

for independence. The advent of the atomic weapon and the achievements of air

power during the war meant that the roles of the ground and naval forces had diminished. The Air Force was now the "first line of defense." The oceans no

longer insulated America from the rude shocks of war. The advantages of time

and space vanished. The character of war had changed. Destruction caused by

years of bombing could now occur in a flash. "A world accustomed to thinking it

horrible that wars should last four or five years," wrote defense analyst Bernard

Brodie, "is now appalled at the prospect that future wars may last only a few

days."' Now even a few bombers penetrating enemy territory could leave tremendous destruction. It could be argued that the atomic bomb had resurrected

Giulio Douhet. War had become total. The United States was vulnerable to the

most devastating kind of warfare. There would no longer be sufficient time to

mobilize. The era of come-from-behind victories was over. The second World

War was the last of its kind. The greatest danger now stemmed from a possible

future surprise attack by atomic bombers flying across the northern polar regions

to targets in the industrial and population centers of North America.

Even so, military planners and AAF leaders acknowledged that the advent of

the atomic weapon had not made all weapons and strategies obsolete. The Army

Air Forces accented the importance of conventional weapons and warfare. Spaatz

no doubt agreed with the air power advocate Alexander P. deSeversky, who asserted that despite the A-bomb's demonstrated destructiveness, it did have

"known limitations." Writing to Secretary of War Patterson, deSeversky said the

essential concepts of military strategy still applied: "Human conflict, though

more destructive than ever before, will continue to be possible; that the one-hour

or one-day war of popular journalism is nonsensical; that those who see the end

of the world and the suicide of civilization reflect neither good science, good

logic nor good public policy.''

Fortunately, General Arnold had foresight, vision. He had known everyone in

the prewar Air Corps, and when war erupted, he had his fingers on the buttons.

He already had determined whom he wanted in critical command and operational

positions. He knew the strengths and weaknesses of his people and, like any superb leader, he did not hesitate to relieve commanders, to move them out when in

his judgment they were not performing well. This was a great strength in wartime. As General Ira Eaker put it, Arnold "had the faculty of leading all subordi229
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

nates to their highest possible effort; he picked many subordinates for prominent

positions when I well knew that he did not particularly care for them, but he

judged that they had the ability to do the job required."

Arnold had always stressed the connection between wartime operations and

postwar planning. He had led the vast buildup of the AAF in 1942-44. While

commanding worldwide air forces during the last two years of the war, he had set

his mind to assuring the success of the drive for independence and to completing

plans for the AAF's reorganization. He wanted to be sure that the broad outline

for the Air Force of the future was fixed prior to passing the mantle to Spaatz. In

his wartime command of the Army Air Forces and in his vision of a postwar Air

Force, Arnold displayed his considerable skill at relating the complex parts of a

mosaic. Though not a brilliant strategic thinker, he understood the relationship

between command and the many crucial support functions without which successful leadership was impossible. He had always kept his lines of communication open with leading American aviation industrialists and with the scientific

community. Moreover, he had the gift of recognizing leadership in his subordinates.

To his critics, he seemed an impatient promoter who lacked understanding of

the crucial details of operations. But Arnold had a far better grasp of the basics of

operations than many gave him credit for. He appreciated how necessary it was

for the AAF to show results. He was under tremendous pressure in Washington.

President Roosevelt had not only approved but had initiated a huge buildup of air

power. Direction of this expansion was an astonishingly difficult and complex

task. Results were slow in coming and during 1943 Arnold clearly became frustrated. However, he persevered, changing plans and strategy when necessary, and

commanders when in his judgment they failed to produce.

Having finally seen his forces unleash the awesome destructiveness of air

power, General Arnold was dead set on seeing that the Air Force would not again

be caught unprepared for war. He perceived that a future war might erupt with

dramatic suddenness. Hence the immense importance of a sound research and development program. He instructed his friend, Theodore von Karman, to form a

scientific group to chart the course of research and development for the Air

Force.

Arnold plotted the course for independence and internal reorganization of the

Air Force. He depended upon the skills of the unusually competent General Carl

A. Spaatz. Wartime commander of the strategic air forces, Spaatz would ensure

that the plans developed before the end of the war would bear fruit. Arnold knew

that in Spaatz he had a man he could trust and count on. Tooey Spaatz had earned

the respect of the new Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, who described

him as "the best operational airman in the world."* Spaatz and Eisenhower had

*General Kuter wrote Arnold in 1945 that Eisenhower had depicted Spaatz in this

230
EPILOGUE

worked extremely well together in the war. Both preferred quiet competence to

flamboyance and self-promotion. Their styles suited each other. More important,

they had long agreed on the crucial issues. Eisenhower backed air independence.

On the matter of tactical support of the ground armies, he and Spaatz could work

out a satisfactory organizational solution. After so long, the way would be

cleared for creation of the United States Air Force. Arnold and Spaatz appreciated that Eisenhower's strong support would assure success, despite the considerable opposition of the Navy and its congressional allies. This was an era when it

was still possible for a relatively few men to make the crucial decisions that

would affect military organization and forces for a long time. The process of immediate postwar AAF internal decision-making was a holdover from the war

years.

The Army Air Forces postwar planning started in 1943 and much had been

done by 1945. The AAF's 70-group program, however, had not been defined until August 1945. General Eaker set the 70-group goal in response to a directive

from the War Department. The air planners thought that the best guarantee of

preventing general war was a strong standing Air Force, coequal with the Army

and Navy. They viewed Marshall's advocacy of Universal Military Training as a

direct threat to the 70-group Air Force and the goal of autonomy. Reflecting

Marshall's opinion, the War Department felt certain that Congress would enact

UMT. The American people would not support large peacetime forces. The

standing peacetime Army would consist of volunteers. A system of UMT would

be the answer. But to the War Department's chagrin, Congress in effect backed

the 70-group Air Force as the best guarantor of peace and as a counterweight to

UMT.

The AAF officers engaged in postwar planning faced a tremendously difficult

task. Amidst the huge demobilization in 1945-46, they had simultaneously to deploy air forces, build a postwar force structure, reorganize the major commands,

and plan for an independent Air Force. They had to ready their plans without

knowing with any precision what shape United States foreign policy might take

and without knowing specifically what missions the postwar Air Force might

have to undertake. As far as American foreign policy was concerned, the immediate post-World War II period in which the Army Air Forces fought for independence was a time of crucial change in the evolution of foreign and military

policies. Airmen whose suspicions of the Soviet Union had been fueled by their

contacts with the Russians during the war considered that their fears had been

manner. Eisenhower had added that although Spaatz was not "a paper man," he could

make sound decisions and "he knew exactly what he was doing." [Ltr, Kuter to Arnold,

Jan 28, 1945, Gen. H. H. Arnold Collection, LC, Box 38, Folder, Correspondence-Commanders in the Field.]

231
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

confirmed by the evolution in eastern Europe of Communist "democratic governments."* Moreover, President Truman's own experience with the Soviets at

Potsdam in July-August 1945 convinced him that the Soviets were going to be

difficult. Then in October 1946 in London, the first meeting of the Council on

Foreign Ministers ended with bitter quarreling after Foreign Minister Vyacheslav

Molotov of the USSR insisted that the western powers recognize the Soviet satellites prior to writing peace treaties. Refusal of the USSR to withdraw its troops

from Iran at the close of the war also brought a strong reaction from the United

States and Great Britain. This issue was brought before the Security Council of

the United Nations in early 1946. Soviet troops were then withdrawn.

American policy was also heavily influenced by what had been termed "the

Pearl Harbor syndrome." The Japanese surprise attack, bringing the U.S. into

World War II, convinced even parsimonious congressmen that the nation must

not be caught unprepared again. Thus, the manner in which America entered the

war became a postwar counterweight against the tradition that was opposed to

large standing peacetime forces. Citizens came to believe that the "cold war" (a

term made popular by Walter Lippmann') or what Symington called the "tepid

war," was being forced on the country.

Meanwhile, despite the obvious complexity of the planning task, the AAF

planners stayed sufficiently sensitive to their paramount objective of independence and also to fluctuations in public opinion. As mentioned, the War Department had early become locked into General Marshall's advocacy of UMT as

the sole answer to the structuring of a postwar military establishment that the

public and Congress would accept. The Army Air Forces suffered no such constraint. The potential enactment of UMT stood in the way of the AAF's plan for a

large standing postwar force, which in turn was the key to air independence. Arnold and Spaatz easily grasped this situation and did not hesitate to confront

Marshall and the War Department with it. In this connection, both Arnold and

Spaatz kept a keen interest in the AAF's public relations program and its importance to the drive for a separate Air Force. They believed that the war had demonstrated that air power, i.e., the AAF, had become synonymous with national

*During the war, the Army Air Forces had more opportunities to deal with the Soviets

than the Army or Navy. The AAF's shuttle bombing-Operation FRANTIc-involved

missions into eastern Germany in which these bombers would "recover" at Russian bases.

The contacts with the Soviets afforded AAF leaders through these missions: through the

lend-lease aircraft program; and by negotiations to gain the release of AAF personnel who

had landed behind Russian lines, convinced the AAF that the Soviets were especially difficult to deal with. [See Richard Lukas, Eagles East: The Army Air Forces and the Soviet

Union, 1941-1945, (Tallahassee, Fla., 1970).l

*Political columnist and philosopher.

232
EPILOGUE

security. The AAF's public relations program was aimed at persuading the

American public that "the establishment of adequate air power is the key to victory in war and the maintenance of security in time of peace." 3

In retrospect, speculation centered on the idea that the Army had supported

the AAF in its fight for autonomy because it feared that the airmen would dominate the War Department during the postwar period. While conceivably this may

have been a factor, Eisenhower undoubtedly spoke for the prevailing view in the

Army hierarchy when he underscored that the AAF deserved independence on its

wartime record. As we have seen, Eisenhower himself felt strongly that the War

Department should make every effort to help the transition of the Army Air

Forces to an independent service. He constantly admonished his commanders

and staff to do their utmost to ensure successful implementation of the National

Security Act.4 Symington later recalled that Eisenhower was one hundred percent behind the concept of a separate Air Force.5 Some observers and historians

wondered if the AAF itself would not have been better off to stay as part of the

Army, ultimately perhaps gaining closer to one-half of the budget rather than

one-third. But this was never a considered alternative in the airmen's postwar

scheme of planning. The goal of independence, for so long all-consuming to the

air leaders, was preeminent.

Arnold in November 1945 had picked Spaatz to lead the effort to complete the

postwar status of the Air Force. Spaatz in early 1946-as Arnold had before

him-proposed that a Chief of Staff for Air be established, coequal with the

Army Chief of Staff. However, in deciding on the War Department's postwar organization, the Simpson Board made the AAF coequal to the Army Ground

Forces, under the Chief of Staff and the War Department General Staff.

Spaatz, in the postwar period, counted on Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad to help

him shape the postwar Air Force. Norstad himself had labored under the guidance of Arnold and Eisenhower. From Arnold, Norstad learned to take a concept,

mold it, and make it his own. He also appreciated Arnold's determination to get

things done. From Eisenhower, he took eternal optimism, the importance of reason, and the determination not to be defeated by detail. Over-arching principles

remained most important. The organization did not solve problems; people resolved problems.

Stuart Symington worked exceedingly well with Norstad. He also maintained

an excellent relationship with General Spaatz based on mutual respect and a

comfortable division of labor. Symington confessed to the Air Board in December 1946 that "I don't know anything about airplanes and operating them." He

made "a deal" with Spaatz that the latter would handle operational and force

structure issues and Symington would concentrate on "the business end of it" and

"spearheading" the unification program.

The business part of the program included shaping the AAF budget and controlling costs. "The more that we can impress the government that we are not

233
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

careless, that we're not just a bunch of fliers," Symington emphasized, "that we

are business people handling the taxpayers money carefully, that to the extent

that we can do that will be the extent to which we can develop our position."

For the Army Air Forces, the years 1945-47 were distinguished by considerable turbulence. After the war ended, demobilization broke out in full sway. The

mighty AAF was decimated. Between September 1945 and March 1946, the

AAF's combat capability plummeted. Yet 70 groups remained the fixed objective. Nevertheless, it became apparent in 1946-47 that this goal would be very

hard to achieve. Although the Truman administration never publicly opposed the

Air Force's aim, it imposed a ceiling on the defense budget that postponed the

70-group program.

By the close of 1946, Symington thought that cutbacks in defense funds

threatened to wreck the AAF's planned program. The War Department approved

a fiscal 1948 budget sufficient only for 55 operational groups. General Spaatz

therefore decided to activate 70 groups by mid-1947, but to keep 15 of them at

skeleton strength. The 70-group objective would not be abandoned. It should be

noted that overall American military strength at this time had been sharply pared.

In early 1947 the military numbered 1.56 million, of which 305,774 were in the

Army Air Forces. By March 1948 the totals were 1.35 million in the armed

forces with 367,332 in the Air Force. 6

In mid-1947, when a separate Air Force had been assured, Spaatz activated 70

groups: 21 very heavy bomber, 22 fighter, 5 light bomber, 4 tactical reconnaissance. 10 troop carrier, 3 all-weather fighter, 2 long-range photo-reconnaissance,

I long-range mapping, and 2 long-range weather reconnaissance. Of these 70

groups, 55 were manned, with the remaining 15 on a skeleton basis. Of the 55

manned groups, 36 were operational: 8 very heavy bomber, 15 fighter, 3 light

bomber, 2 tactical reconnaissance, 6 troop carrier, I long-range photo reconnaissance, and I long-range mapping.7

In late 1947, Symington continued fervently to explain why the Air Force

needed 70 operational groups. As he saw it, the problem was first to consider 70

groups the "bedrock minimum," then to weigh the cost against the possible consequences from not meeting this requirement. In the event of war, Symington

contended, "the Air Force must be prepared to carry out the air defense of the

United States .... it must be prepared to undertake immediate and powerful retaliation, a capacity which is itself the only real deterrent to aggression in the world

today.'"8 Symington averred that anything under 70 groups would seriously impair the Air Force's capacity to retaliate. Under present and anticipated funding,

the Air Force could not make more than 55 groups operational. More money

would be needed. 9

Worse news broke in 1947. The administration's authorized budget estimate

for fiscal 1949 made it doubtful that the Air Force could bring even 55 groups to

operational status. Symington protested in the strongest terms to the White

234
EPILOGUE

House, to Forrestal, and to James E. Webb, Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

Symington repeated that 55 groups fell far short of national security needs. An

Air Force in being could not be assured without adequate aircraft production and

without a satisfactory research and development program. Keenly sensitive to the

problems of industrial preparedness, he admonished the administration that after

the war the nation had "resolved that we would never allow any country to outstrip us in the development of new and superior weapons .... not one airplane

whose development started after Pearl Harbor was ever used in combat."' 10

Should the administration's authorized budget estimate not be changed, the

Air Force would only be able to make something less than 55 groups operational.

The 70-group program, supported by the Joint Chiefs, required an estimated $5.2

billion for fiscal 1949. Cognizant of the necessity for economy, the Air Force

submitted an estimate for $4.21 billion. The Bureau of the Budget authorized the

Air Force only $2.904 billion. Symington's reaction was pointed: "We are more

shocked at this decision of the Bureau than at anything that has happened since

we came into Government."'1 1

Supporting 70 groups were the President's Air Policy Commission (Finletter

Commission) and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board (Brewster-Hinshaw

Board). Even so, the Air Force in early 1948 saw little hope of reaching its goal.*

"We believe," the Finletter Commission declared, "that self-preservation comes

ahead of economy.'12 Both reports increased congressional and public support

for the Air Force's objective. General Eisenhower, among others, noted this and

emphasized the "tremendous obligation" it placed upon the Air Force. This support weakened the backing for Truman's UMT program. All the military services were aware of this trend. In a thoughtful memorandum to the Army Chief of

*The Air Policy Commission's report was not greeted with praise in all quarters. Walter Millis charged that the commission was "responding mainly to the Air Force's somewhat parochial view of problems." Believing the report's mention of naval aviation to be

an afterthought, Millis observed: "Given a Navy which was already carrying a large proportion of its firepower on wings, it would seem that any study of 'air policy' should have

given closer attention to what constituted an 'adequate' naval component. There were

many, not only in the Navy but outside it, who were not convinced that all strategic wisdom resided in the young generals of the Air Force." [Walter Millis, Harvey C. Mansfield,

and Harold Stein, Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy (New

York, 1958), pp 67.]

The War Department proceeded to update its UMT plan. In June 1947 this plan was

revised, as always based on the assumption that Congress would eventually enact UMT

into law. [Ltr, Maj. Gen. Edward F. Witsell, TAG to CGs AAF, AGF, et al, subj: WD

Plan for UMT, Jun 1I, 1947, in RG 340, Air Board Gen File, 1945-48, Box 12.]

235
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Secretary of the Air Force Symington (left) with Fred Vinson, Chief Justice

of the Supreme Court; John L. Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy; and Kenneth

C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, September 1947. In the days of defense

austerity, Symington continued to fight for increased funding for the

fledgling U. S. Air Force.

Information, Army Col. S. L. A. Marshall commented that increasingly the basis

for war planning was "confidence in the decisive character of air power."

Congressional opinion, he said, supported "the belief in stronger air power as

a substitute for UMT, as a guarantor of the continuing peace of the country, and

equally as a move for preparedness of war." 13 Marshall pointed out that the

credibility of UMT was dwindling at the same rate that support for air power was

gaining. He suggested that in light of congressional opinion, the Army should

consider withdrawing its support of the UMT program.14

Meanwhile, even rising cold-war tensions, fueled by the Czechoslovakian

coup of February 1948, failed to budge the administration from its austerity program. Not that President Truman failed to acknowledge the threat to peace. In an

extraordinary speech to Congress in March 1948 he named the Soviet Union, as

the principal threat to world peace. 15 Yet the administration's stringent economies continued seriously to affect the military budget. Truman was quick to detect the difference between a strictly military requirements point of view and the

larger, national perspective. He cited the danger of "explosive inflation" should

additional, large military procurement programs be tacked to the budget. Therefore, a rise in military expenditures should he carefully weighed. As President, he

would not approve any program that he thought would undermine the econ236
EPILOGUE

omy.16 His UMT program in deep trouble, Truman in early 1948 also evinced

growing frustration over service rivalry. He admonished the military to suppress

its parochial service preferences. Truman wrote Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg that "there are still some of you who are thinking more of representing interests and objectives of your individual service than of interpreting the broad

national program and its requirements to your subordinates and to the Congress."'

17

Believing that the expanding importance of air power made it "the first line of

defense," the Air Force thought it merited more than the roughly one-third slice

of the defense budget it was getting. Both Webb and Forrestal continued to insist

on a balanced force program, a defense budget practically split three ways. By

December 1947 the Air Force had manned and equipped 47 groups with varying

degrees of operational efficiency. It was clear that it would be difficult to reach

55 groups.

Symington saw that the chances for reaching 70 groups had slipped away for

the foreseeable future. He kept pressing for an Air Force in being, which he insisted was the opposite of an Air Force that might be ready months after war

erupted. By this time, the Secretary of the Air Force preferred the term Four-Year

Program to the 70-group program. "I believe," he said, "that this name (70

groups) is undescriptive, and for that reason I consciously avoid its use. It is true

President Truman aboard a new B-36, during a demonstration of the

aircraft at Andrews AFB, Maryland, February 1949. Though concerned

about the Soviet threat, the president was cautious in approving large

military expenditures.

237
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

that the program is built around 70 combat groups of aircraft; but the number of

groups, while essential, is not its distinctive feature. 18,, Of greater importance,

the Four-Year Program provided for replacement of obsolescent aircraft and

made possible a dynamic research and development program. Further, it promised an effective long-range striking force and it included plans to sustain the

military aircraft industry. The major point according to Symington was that the

United States could no longer afford what he termed stop-and-start planning.19

The key here was a steady flow of orders to enable the industry to modernize

plants and train manpower, thus permitting rapid expansion in case of war.20

Symington had become increasingly perturbed, not the least of all at Forrestal.

In light of the worsening international situation, the Secretary of the Air Force

felt that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not given a solid hearing to

the Air Force program. Forrestal stuck to a balanced force program, denying the

Air Force's claim to sufficient funds to equip 70 groups. Symington informed

Forrestal directly that, regarding the Air Force's requirements, "Spaatz and myself never had a chance to present our position to you or even your staff and this

is especially unfortunate in that nobody who ever served a day in the Air Force

was .... a member of your permanent top staff."2 1 Or as Brig. Gen. W. Barton

Leach, USAFR, observed:

These civilian officials are not prejudiced against the Air Force, nor are they

unwilling to learn. But an instinctive understanding of Air Force problems is

not in their blood; they do not naturally seek the association of Air Force

people; and when the chips are down it too often happens that the Air Force

gets the short end of those very important decisions that are controlled by

the staff of the Secretary of Defense. . . .For the most part OSD has been

staffed with able men. But ability is not enough. A Supreme Court comprising the nine ablest lawyers in the country would not be acceptable if it

turned out all nine came from Wall Street firms..2

Thus in the spring of 1948, an increasingly contentious atmosphere existed between the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Norstad pointed

to a lack of confidence between the two.23

Transfer of functions and personnel from the Army, and meeting the 70-group

objective, were not the only problems confronting the newly independent Air

Force. The roles and missions dispute between the Navy and the Air Force had

not been settled in July 1947 by Executive Order 9877.* Before the war ended,

the Navy had laid postwar plans to rely on air and undersea forces. Task force

commanders were enthusiastic about building carriers larger than the Midway

class. Naval air would become the foremost combat element of the fleet. Naval

leadership would soon be dominated by airmen bent on commanding forces that

*See Chapter 5.

238
EPILOGUE

A

Kenneth C. Royall is sworn in as Secretary of the Army by Robert P.

Patterson, the retiring Secretary of War. Mr. Royall shared the Air Force

view that the services should be mutually dependent in time of war.

could deliver the atomic bomb. In December 1947, Rear Adm. Daniel V. Gallery

(Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Guided Missiles) proposed "an aggressive

campaign aimed at proving that the Navy can deliver the Atomic Bomb more ef- C, 24 fectively than the Air Force can." The Air Force should be relegated to the primary mission of air defense.

Such a campaign, suggested Gallery, would take the Navy off the defensive

where it had been since the end of the war. Gallery said that the Navy had been

put in the position of replying to the argument that navies were obsolete. Delivery systems were the key. He noted that the B-29 was restricted by its operational range. It had to operate from oversea bases. The B-36 would have longer

range but would be vulnerable to interceptors. In Gallery's opinion, it would continue to be true "that you can build better performance into a short range bomber

than you can into a transoceanic bomber, and that is where the Navy will always

have the edge over the Air Forces." 25

Aside from the issue of atomic bomb delivery, the fundamental conceptual

difference between the Army-USAF view and the Navy persisted. This differ239
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

ence antedated and accented this roles and missions dispute. Basically, as Eisenhower pointed out, the Navy emerged from the war convinced that it required

self-sufficiency in its forces. This was the idea of the World War II balanced task

force. On the other hand, the Army believed in three service components mutually dependent upon each other. General Norstad, Director of War Department

Plans and Operations in October 1947, put it this way:

Under the three service concept, the Army does not agree with the thought

that each service should have all the resources necessary for a balanced combat task force without assistance from the other services .... The experiences

of this war have certainly indicated that in many if not the majority, of specific operational missions, the task was of necessity accomplished by contributions from two or three services acting under the principles of unified

command.

26

Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall agreed with the Air Force view. The

Navy, he asserted, went on building its integrated striking forces-land, sea, and

air. The Navy intended to discharge its mission without relying on the Army or

Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg being administered the oath of office as Air Force

Chief of Staff by Chief Justice Fred Vinson, April 30, 1948. General

Vandenberg succeeded Gen. Carl Spaatz (center). Also present are James

Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, (left) and W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of

the Air Force.

240
EPILOGUE

Air Force.a7 On his part, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan stressed that the

Navy had kept integrated forces for many years and wanted to go on doing so.28

By 1948 the auguries were clear that the roles and missions clash would heat

up. 2The Key West conference of March 1948, convened against the backdrop

of rising international tension, in retrospect failed to ameliorate the roles and missions disagreement. To the contrary, the controversy escalated. Symington was

especially displeased with an attack on the Air Force by Rear Adm. John W.

Reeves, Jr., Commander of the Naval Air Transport Service. Testifying before

the House Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations in March 1948, Reeves cast

doubt on the Air Transport Command's capacity, thereby questioning the viability of the coming merger establishing the Military Air Transport Service. The effect, Symington wrote Forrestal, was to furnish the groundwork for a return of

the Naval Air Transport Service to the Navy. This attack, said the Air Force

Secretary, undercut efforts at mutual understanding and exemplified "clear and

flagrant disloyalty-both to you and our government." 3 1

In spite of the continuing controversy, Secretary Forrestal in May 1948 directed the Navy and Air Force to merge their air transport services to create the

Military Air Transport Service. This organization was the first of the National

Secretary of Defense James Forrestal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other

military leaders at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, August

1948. Left to right: Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad, USAF; Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg,

USAF; Lt. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, USA; Gen. Omar Bradley, USA; Mr.

Forrestal; Adm. Louis Denfeld, USN; VAdm. Arthur W. Radford, USN; and

Maj. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, USA.

241
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Military Establishment to combine personnel from two of the services under a

unified command. Forrestal ordered that the Military Air Transport Service be

commanded by an officer appointed by the Air Force Chief of Staff. Chosen as

the first commander was Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, who had been instrumental in planning the organization of the postwar Air Force, and who afterwards

commanded the Atlantic Division of the Air Transport Command. Rear Adm.

John P. Whitney was appointed vice commander.33

The basis of Forrestal's rationale to combine the Air Transport Command and

the Naval Air Transport Service was essentially the pursuit of economy. Forrestal

wanted desperately to show that the promise of economy in the defense establishment could be delivered. He also wanted to demonstrate that regardless of the

controversy over roles and missions, the services could in fact work together. He

knew it would take time for the Navy and Air Force to complete a true consolidation of their transport services.*

Meanwhile, Secretary Symington and General Spaatz (to retire and to be replaced as Chief of Staff by Vandenberg in April 1948) believed that the National

Security Act should be changed. "After nine months," Symington informed

Clark Clifford, "it is now my considered opinion that the present National Security Act must be changed in order to work."34 The Air Force had supported the

act as a first step although it had advocated stronger legislation. Specifically, to

break the deadlocks in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Symington wanted a military

Chief of Staff who "ranked" the three service chiefs. He felt that had such a position been created from the start, there would not have been so great a controversy 35 C

over the 70 groups. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense himself needed more

authority and more personnel to make the National Military Establishment work.

The overburdened secretary required clearly delineated responsibilities and a

Deputy Secretary. Symington had not changed his opinion that the Navy had succeeded in so wcakening the legislation establishing the National Security Act that

the Secretary of Defense (the former Navy Secretary) could not do his job. Forrestal was a coordinator but he should be an administrator.3 6 Changes to the Na-

*As approved by Forrestal, the Military Air Transport Service charter directed this

new consolidated command to transport personnel and cargo for all agencies of the National Military Establishment and also for other governmental agencies, as authorized.

Forrestal's directive allowed the Navy and Air Force to use their aircraft to evacuate sick

and wounded when required. To advise him on transport policy, Forrestal established a

Military Air Transport Board comprising one representative from each of the military

services. The board would also arbitrate and make recommendations to the Secretary of

Defense when any department complained about an alleged failure to receive satisfactory

service. [Memo for SA, SAF, and JCS fr James V. Forrestal, May 3, 1948.]

242
EPILOGUE

tional Security Act should therefore develop more along the lines of what the

Army and the AAF wanted in the first place.

Spaatz endorsed a much stronger Office of the Secretary of Defense, with an

Under Secretary and whatever Assistant Secretaries were needed. The Defense

Secretary should additionally have a military Chief of Staff and a General Staff.

The civilian secretaries heading the three military departments should be abolished. The military heads of the services should be designated Commanders instead of Chiefs of Staff. Spaatz was also for eliminating the Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

37

Belief in a stronger Office of the Secretary of Defense was not uncommon

among leaders of the military establishment. Along with Symington, Spaatz, and

Forrestal, Eisenhower insisted that the office was far too weak to cope with the

problems of the postwar years. Norstad thought that Forrestal should have one

senior officer as a military assistant, of the stature of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, who

commanded the respect of the three services.

So just as passage of the National Security Act and establishment of the Air

Force did not at once solve the basic issues of unification, neither did these

events automatically resolve the internal and external problems afflicting the Air

Force. While the goal of 70 operational groups had not changed since August

1945, it had not been achieved. Chances to reach this objective in the near future

seemed dim. Furthermore, the Air Force continued to remind Congress that without adequate aircraft production, the desired Air Force in being could not be

built. At the same time, the Air Force in 1947-48 continued to have functions and

personnel transferred from the Army. Even though the Officer Personnel Act of

1947 gave the Air Force a separate promotion list, many personnel policies had

yet to be worked out. And over all this hung the roles and missions battle with

the Navy.

Yet, the fact remained that a United States Air Force had been created. No

matter what crises lay ahead, the central objective had been won. After the war,

General Arnold proclaimed a separate Air Force to be the highest priority. He

had given Spaatz the responsibility for seeing this mission through to the finish.

General Spaatz had not disappointed Arnold, his mentor. Having achieved independence for the Air Force, Spaatz himself retired in April 1948 in favor of General Vandenberg. The concerted AAF postwar planning which had started in the

summer of 1943, and which had gone through numerous convolutions under the

War Department's lash, had resulted in a 70-group goal and a solid Air Force

command organization.

243
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Nonetheless, Stuart Symington was correct when he emphasized that the National Security Act of 1947 was a good first chapter, but certainly not a book.

Symington's frustration focused on the fact that the Secretary of National Defense remained a coordinator rather than an administrator, this having been a

contentious issue in 1946-47 between the Army airmen and the Navy prior to enactment of the National Security Act. From the start, the airmen had favored a

strong Secretary of National Defense. However, Symington and the AAF leadership understood that compromise was required in order to pass legislation. To the

Army airmen, the creation of an independent Air Force was most important. On

the negative side, the National Security Act, as General Eaker noted, established

four air forces and failed to give the Secretary of National Defense requisite

authority over the National Military Establishment.

Recognizing the validity of Symington's point, the Congress passed legislation in 1949 strengthening the hand of the Secretary of Defense and followed this

in the 1950s with two reorganizations that also gave the Secretary more power

and authority. Yet it is important to note that these changes, made in response to

weakness in the nation's top security organization, kept intact the major framework of the 1947 Act. The three service departments remained coequal, each

headed by a civilian secretary, under the Department of Defense. The legislative

imperative, in the late 1940 and 1950s, that strengthened the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the service departments, would continue in subsequent decades, and call into question whether this trend had gone too far.

This centralization of authority was in large part a clear response to the evolution of nuclear technology and the concomitant dispute over roles and missions

which played a key part during 1945-47 in the unification struggle. In the late

1940s, however, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal himself recognized that he

operated from a position of weakness. In his 1948 report on the National Military

Establishment, Forrestal called for strengthening the Office of the Secretary by

giving it more power over the military services. The result became the 1949

Amendments to the National Security Act. This important legislation downgraded the services to military departments, removed the service secretaries from

the National Security Council, and designated the Department of Defense as an

executive department. The Secretary of Defense was thus empowered with "direction, authority, and control" over the Defense Department and became the

President's primary voice on defense issues. Supported by Secretary of the Air

Force Symington, this 1949 legislation marked a turning point in American military organization, starting the inexorable flow of power and centralization from

the services to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The 1949 amendments became law literally during one of the most bitter and

public interservice feuds in American military history-the so-called "Revolt of

the Admirals." Triggered by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's cancellation

of construction of the aircraft carrier, United States (Forrestal had resigned in

244
EPILOGUE

early 1949, in deep mental stress, and subsequently jumped to his death from the

sixteenth floor of the Bethesda, Md., Naval Medical Center), at the heart of the

confrontation was the struggle between the fledgling Air Force and Navy over

the atomic deterrent mission during a period of budgetary cutbacks. Despite two

years of experience with the National Military Establishment, the Navy had yet

wholeheartedly to accept the concept of unification.

Additional flow of centralized civilian control to OSD occurred in 1953 under

President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 eliminated

the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board and created six

Assistant Secretaries of Defense. This process of placing more power and authority within OSD with the resultant diminution of the authority of the service secretaries greatly accelerated with passage of the 1958 Reorganization Act. This

legislation effectively removed the service secretaries from the operational chain

of command, which now ran from the President and the Secretary of Defense

through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified and specified commanders. As

with previous reorganizations, the Air Force supported the 1958 changes. General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, noted that the 1958 reform gave "unequivocal" authority to the Secretary of Defense. This reorganization was the

most significant reform since passage of the National Security Act of 1947.

The Army Air Forces in mid-1946 maintained control over training and operations of air forces, within the United States, including the Strategic Air Command (SAC). With promulgation of the Outline Command Plan [later the Unified

Command Plan] in December 1946, the JCS were authorized strategic direction

over all elements of the armed forces. The primary function of the Army Air

Forces became training rather than operations. Unified commands would undertake operations, as well as SAC, all under the control of the Joint Chiefs. This defense organization, shaped in the late 1940s and 1950s, basically remained in

place until the mid-1980s. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act

marked the first significant defense reorganization since 1958. Similarly, in the

realm of Air Force organization, the March 1946 postwar reorganization remained in place for 46 years, until the USAF 1992 reorganization of its combat

commands.

Echoes of the roles and missions debate of the late 1940s continued to resonate in the 1980s and 1990s. The major difference was that, unlike the 1940's,

the debate in the 1990s was not primarily carried out in the glare of congressional

hearing rooms. It would be difficult in the 1990s to contemplate another "Admirals' Revolt." In the almost half-century since the Navy's 1949 challenge to the

unification concept, the services have learned generally to fight their budgetary

and weapons battles from the inside and formally before the Congress. In the

early 1980s, members of Congress and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Air

Force General David Jones, thought that changes were required to strengthen the

Chairman's position as well as the commanders of the combatant commands.

245
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

"We need to spend more time on our warfighting capabilities," Jones emphasized, "and less in intramural squabbles for resources."* Mounting criticism from

such powerful figures as Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed

Services Committee, also significantly influenced the debate. The critics charged

that service parochialism had gone too far, affecting the authority of the unified

commanders. When the final version of Goldwater-Nichols was signed by President Ronald Reagan, in October 1986, Senator Nunn commented that this legislation fulfilled President Eisenhower's vision with the 1958 Reorganization Act.

Goldwater-Nichols designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the

principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would be responsible for overall strategic planning;

assessing service budget requests; forwarding budget recommendations to the

Secretary of Defense; and supervising joint staff activities. The law also created a

four-star vice chairman's post who could not be from the same service as the

chairman. The chairman and vice chairman could serve as many as three terms, a

total of six years, as opposed to the prior limit of four years.

Importantly, this legislation strengthened the authority of the combatant commanders. The chain of command ran from the President through the Secretary of

Defense to the combatant commanders. The services continued to be responsible

for training, equipping, and organizing their forces while the combatant commanders were in charge of directing operations. Goldwater-Nichols directed that

the chairman conduct reviews of the mission and force structures of the unified

and specified commands and every three years submit a report on the subject of

roles and missions.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, in fact subsequently issued a report that Congressional critics, including Senator Nunn, charged failed

to address fundamental roles and missions and had been influenced by parochial

service interests. In the wake of General Powell's report, in the spring of 1994,

Secretary of Defense Perry appointed a Commission on Roles and Missions of

the Armed Forces. In May 1995, the Commission's report called for meeting a

proper balance between the competition among the military services and the need

for downsizing and reducing costs. This echoed General Eisenhower's 1945 observation that competition between the services generally was productive, but

carried too far could be "ruinous." "We must find the best way," the Commission

noted, "to provide a fighting force in the future that is not bound by the constraints of the roles and missions outlined in 1948." The Commission emphasized

that Army and Marine Corps capabilities were complementary and that "inefficiencies attributed to the so-called 'four air forces' were mostly in the infrastruc-

*Drew Middleton, "Army Chief of Staff Urges a Broad Reorganization," The New

York Times, 31 March 1982, p 19.

246
EPILOGUE

ture, not on the battlefield." Fully supporting the Goldwater-Nichols report, the

Commission called for its full implementation, including improved joint warfighting capabilities. Consistent with its findings on "the four air forces," the

Commission deemed it appropriate that all of the services perform close air support. No savings could be realized from subtracting any of the services' capabilities without weakening overall warfighting ability.

In the 1990s, the issues of organization and direction of America's military

forces, inseparable from the question of roles and missions, again took center

stage, accelerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the resultant end of the

cold war, and by the stunning success of American arms in the war with Iraq.

The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a major downsizing of America's

military forces. In the decade from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the Air

Force budget shrunk 40 percent and personnel declined from 600,000 to about

400,000. This downsizing, coupled with the experience of the Gulf War, which

evidenced a blurring of the Air Force's strategic and tactical missions, resulted in

a reorganization of air commands. This historic move was the first major combat

command reorganization since the post-World War II reorganization of March

1946.

From the end of World War II until the onset of the 1990's, the Strategic Air

Command (SAC), had been pre-eminent within the United States Air Force.

Formed in March 1946, along with the Tactical Air Command and the Air Defense Command, SAC under General Curtis E. LeMay, evolved into an elite

force, the premier nuclear deterrent force of the free world, poised as a ready

force in-being to counter any nuclear attack by Soviet long-range forces.*

The experience of the Korean war in the early 1950s and the conflict in Southeast Asia (SEA) in the 1960's, pointed to the increased importance of tactical

forces in the cold war era. The success of SAC in the nuclear deterrent role

meant that the Air Force's tactical air elements would most likely be the forces

engaged in actual conflicts, although in both Korea and Southeast Asia, strategic

air power came into play. In Southeast Asia, B-52s struck the enemy in jungle

terrain while fighters attacked the enemy's capital. Overall, the Korean, Southeast Asian, and Gulf War conflicts indicated a gray area between tactical and

strategic missions, bringing to mind General George Kenney's emphasis in 1946

on the blurring of the strategic and tactical missions.

Congressional and public pressure to downsize, in the wake of the breakup of

the Soviet Union and the experience of the Gulf War, was quickly followed in

June 1992 by the USAF reorganization. The Air Force combined the Tactical Air

Command with most of SAC and a small piece of the Military Airlift Command,

*See Walton S. Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force (Washington, D.C., 1996).

247
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

to create the Air Combat Command with headquarters at Langley AFB, Virginia.

At the same time, most of the Military Airlift Command's resources combined

with some key SAC resources to form the Air Mobility Command. Also, the Air

Force Materiel Command was established, a combination of Air Force Systems

Command and the Air Force Logistics Command. This marked the first time

since 1946 that the Air Force was bereft of a Combat Command devoted solely

to strategic operations. This reorganization was also distinguished by a return in

nomenclature, if not totally in functions, to another benchmark of 1946, namely,

the Air Materiel Command. Too, the nomenclature of Air Combat Command

could be traced to 1942.

Nonetheless, the concept and thrust for this new organization remained clearly

future oriented. Underlying the shift in force structures reflected in the organization was the fundamental Air Force concept for the 1990s-Global ReachGlobal Power. This white paper, published in 1990, charted how the USAF

contributed to national security and the ways in which the service would continue

dynamically to support American policy through the turn of the century. Global

Reach-Global Power emphasized that air forces could accomplish both tactical

and strategic roles, depending upon the mission, and relying on the unique Air

Force attributes of speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality.

Although the military services continue their painful downsizing, restructuring, and conceptualization of doctrine for the future, this activity and thinking

connect to the legacy of the past. The immediate post-World War II period is the

snapshot most evident in the shifting sands of 1990s roles and missions issues.

The major questions affecting the military immediately after World War II were

downsizing, restructuring, reorganization, competing roles and missions, and the

challenge of advancing technology-all in the shadow of strict budget limitations.

Too, the military establishment after the war had completely to revise its

thinking towards deterrence and maintaining forces in-being. Ironically, fifty

years later, as the end of the century approaches, the American military is once

again faced with a major task of rethinking and reorganizing; this time the challenge is to turn away from emphasis upon deterrence in order to stress conventional warfighting capabilities.

Thus, the 1946 experience remains painfully relevant for the new century because it indicates that now, as then, the only certainty is that a continuum of shifting service doctrine and force structure will apply into the foreseeable future. In

this regard, it is instructive to consider the words of General George C. Marshall,

when he opened the Air Corps Tactical School semester in October 1938 at Maxwell Field, Alabama:

Military victories are not gained by a single arm. . .. but are achieved

through the efforts of all arms and services welded into a team.

248
EPILOGUE

The most difficult problem .... is the determination of the best organization

S.... within the limits of the funds available.

.... it is literally impossible to find definite answers for such questions as:

who will be our enemy in the next war; in what theater of operations will

that war be fought; and what will be our national objective at the time?

Now it is a very simple matter to say that we need a balanced force, but the

headache develops when we work out the detailed composition of such a

force that is within the financial means available.

There are no series of facts that will lead to the one perfect solution, and

short of war, there is no method for testing a solution.

At the close of World War II, General Henry H. Arnold observed that "today's aircraft are the museum pieces of tomorrow." The challenge for the Air

Force is to keep its doctrine and weapons current, able to best any force in the

world. This is dependent upon leadership. Today's Air Force leaders can do no

better than to study the post-World War II Army Air Forces leadership. The

leaders who founded the Air Force were men of perspective, clear thinkers, and

direct in crafting their objectives. They were in a real sense visionaries and,

above all, true to themselves.

249
Appendices
Appendix 1

A Study to Determine the Minimum Air Power the United

States should have at the Conclusion of the War in Europe*

April 1943

1. Statement of Problem:

"Prepare a secret study very definitely arriving at the minimum air power

this country should have in being when an armistice is signed."

Discussion:

2. The Armistice. Neither the present world conflict, nor United States participation therein, will likely be concluded by a single armistice. Japan is not so related to the European Axis that the defeat of either may be expected to force, or

induce, the immediate capitulation of the other. And it is entirely possible that an

armistice between the United Nations and one or more of the Axis satellite nations may precede, for a substantial period of time, the collapse of German resistance. The United Nations strategy is directed toward a defeat of the European

Axis and Japan in the order named. This paper will therefore attempt to reach a

logically supported conclusion as to what the strength of the United States Air

Forces should be when Germany signs an armistice. That point will probably

mark the peak of our requirements.

3. Criteria. Military forces are justified only as necessary means of implementing national policies for the accomplishment of national objectives. A determination of the desired ultimate strength of our air arm therefore hinges upon a

discovery and appreciation of our national objectives related in point of time to

(1) the signing of the German armistice, and (2) the immediately succeeding period of treaty conferences, and European postwar readjustments. The latter will

probably proceed concurrently with the final phase of the war with Japan, unless

unforeseen developments alter our present overall strategic program.

4. Reference to Tab "A". In Tab "A" are gathered pertinent extracts from

authoritative utterances of the President and Secretary of State, and senatorial

comment, relative to our national objectives, the accomplishment of which will

be involved at the time of the armistice terminating the war in Europe, and during the formulation of treaties governing postwar reorganization.

*Operational Plans Division, Air Staff, Extract.

253
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

5. Our National Objectives. On the basis of such official statements as those

quoted in Tab "A", our national objectives, after the defeat of our enemies, appear to include:

(a) Avoidance of chaos in Europe.

(b) Restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those who have

been forcibly deprived of them.

(c) Establishment of Western Hemisphere solidarity, and security, under

United States leadership.

(d) Insurance of permanent world peace, and a stabilized world economy;

to be achieved by use of an international military force.

(e) Accomplishment of an orderly transition of the industrial organization

of the United States, and of the world, from a wartime to a peacetime basis. This

process should be initiated to the extent necessary to absorb surplus war production and military personnel (if any), concurrently with the prosecution of the final

phase of the war in Asia.

6. Probable Situation in Europe (National Objectives "(a)" and "(b)." ).

Conditions are ripe for unprecedented chaos to sweep over Axis occupied Europe

(centering in Germany) upon the collapse of the German military power. Unless

Great Britain and the United States are in position to join her in doing so, Russia

may have sufficient provocation to alone occupy and assume control of not only

all of Germany, but all of Central and Eastern Europe now under Axis domination. Therefore she might be disposed to amend her recently announced intentions as to territorial expansion. We do not know by what national policies or

objectives she may be guided. She has not taken us into her confidence. Having

been afforded the least possible information as to her current operations, her present capabilities or her future plans, we have no assurance that she will even participate in our peace negotiations with the Axis powers-in which negotiations

the United Nations (with or without Russian cooperation) will doubtless invite

the Axis conquered states to participate.

7. To win the Peace. To implement its policies, and lend convincing force to

its arguments, the United States should be in the strongest practicable military

position at the time of the armistice with Germany, and during the period of

treaty negotiations. The strength and mobility of our armed forces (relative to

those of our allies) with which we are in position to immediately support our

views expressed at the peace table, will have much to do with the reception

which those views receive. A record of past industrial usefulness (measured by

contributions of weapons and supplies) will entitle us to the kindly consideration

of our allies, but will no more command attention to our points of view than it

has currently won the confidence of Russia. As between the Allied Nations the

weight of our counsel will depend upon:

(1) Our current military strength.

(2) The extent to which we have contributed, by combat, to the victory.

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(3) The extent to which we at the time share in the military control of areas

lately under Axis domination, or key bases for future military control of the

world, the disposition of which will be under consideration.

(4) Our probable future economic usefulness.

8. Control of Controversial Areas. Russia will likely have borne the brunt of

land warfare, will have suffered most, and geographically conquered most. She

may have a huge army in central Europe. British Empire ground forces will probably predominate in the army of occupation of Western Europe. Our preoccupation in the Pacific will prevent our supporting a large land army in Europe, or

dispersed in North African or Mediterranean areas. With available shipping, we

can support a substantial air force in Atlantic, European, North African and

Mediterranean areas. An air force, with limited ground security forces, can, like

artillery, but with vastly greater range, control large areas without fully occupying them. Its capabilities for massing heavy concentrations of fire, and the range

of its threat, will depend upon its strength in heavy bombardment units.

9. U.S. Air Arm Requirements in Europe and Adjacent Areas. For the reasons

above indicated, the United States should plan not only to conduct the major air

offensive operations which will contribute to the ultimate defeat of the European

Axis, but should be prepared, at the time of the German armistice, to furnish the

major portion of the air component of the armed forces of the United Nations

which will occupy or patrol and control, during the peace negotiations, all of

presently Axis dominated Europe, and critical adjacent areas. Its air arm should

be characterized by a preponderance of heavy bombardment, with adequate

range. By preponderant offensive air strength we should offset the preponderant

ground forces of Russia and England in position to influence the situation in

Europe. For the purpose of minimizing her own bloodletting, Germany may, toward the end, do what she can to favor a conquest and occupation from the West.

10. Requirements in Western Hemisphere. In support of our policy for Western Hemisphere solidarity and security it will be desirable that during the period

of European peace negotiations the United States, as leader of the Western Hemisphere group of nations, be in possession of and controlling by mobile air forces,

as many key island bases as practicable in the Atlantic and Caribbean areas.

11. To Support Our International Security Force Policy. If and when an international military force is established, we must be in position to immediately contribute substantially to manning and equipping it; since the extent of our

influence in its management and control will probably be in direct proportion to

our military investment therein. To be effective, within reasonable bounds as to

aggregate strength, it must be highly mobile. To be highly mobile it must be predominantly an air force, with sufficient surface forces to provide local security

and logistic support for international bases, and to temporarily garrison recalcitrant areas. Its principal offensive weapon will be the heavy bomber, of medium

(present "long range") and long range. At the outset it is believed desirable that

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

we be in position to provide approximately 50% of the aggregate air component

of the international force for Europe and the Western Hemisphere; and to proceed, meanwhile, with operations for the defeat of Japan, with less than equal

participation by Great Britain and her dominions. There is no assurance, or present indication, of Russian participation against Japan. If she does participate voluntarily, it will probably be only when Japan is near the point of collapse, or it

appears that we and our allies will, unless assisted, be forced to withdraw from

the field, short of victory, leaving Japan so powerfully entrenched as to be in position to dominate Eastern Asia. Our air forces required for the purposes stated in

paragraphs 6 to 10, inc., above, should become available to serve our purposes in

the establishment of an international armed force; first in the Western Hemisphere and Europe-in Asia and the Pacific after our defeat of Japan.

12. To Facilitate Establishment of Post War Air Commerce. In the control of

the world trade, following this World War, air transportation will supplement,

and to a substantial degree compete with, merchant shipping. It has been the traditional policy of the United States to provide American transportation for the

distribution of American industrial products and surplus commodities throughout

the world. Lately a policy to emphasize interAmerican trade has been indicated.

For these purposes, immediately following the defeat of Germany, the United

States will desire to rapidly expand its commercial air transport services,

throughout the Western Hemisphere and to Europe and Africa, and to increase its

military transport services to the Far East and Pacific Areas. To this end no

means is more appropriate than having, at the conclusion of the European war, a

large air force, particularly strong in long range bombardment and air transport

equipment. Suitably trained pilots, navigators, maintenance, communications and

administrative personnel will be available for gradual absorption in commercial

activities; also surplus military airplanes suitable for conversion to commercial

cargo and transport aircraft. Manufacturing plants not required to provide replacements in the Pacific will be suitably equipped and experienced to support

the rapidly expanding air lines.

13. Limiting Factors. Factors limiting the ultimate strength of our air arm are

our resources in manpower and raw materials, our plant production capabilities,

and the extent to which these may be directed to the support of our air forces

without encroaching upon the other requirements of the United States and her allies essential to the successful prosecution of the war and to the maintenance of

national economic and social stability. All these factors have been taken into account in developing our present airplane production program. This program, for

which our national industry is already geared, is expected to reach its peak at or

shortly following the end of 1943, with a capacity to supply to our Air Arm approximately 135,000 airplanes annually. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is

believed that it would be unwise and economically unsound to decrease this production program.

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APPENDIX 1

14. Present Air Production Program Should Not be Reduced. Decisive superiority over our enemies in the air, and a powerful air offensive against vital targets in the heart of Axisoccupied Europe, and the Japanese Empire, successively,

afford the most apparent, and for the United States certainly the most practicable,

means of winning the war (both wars), at minimum cost in human life, time, and

natural resources. These means must of course be used in connection with naval

action for which we are rapidly becoming equipped. and land operations by such

ground forces as we will be able to transport to and logistically support in the

critical theaters. For economy in total expenditure of our national resources, our

armed forces, particularly our air arm, should be brought to ultimate strength as

early as practicable-not later than 1945. A reduction of our present aircraft production program is therefore not warranted. The remaining paragraphs are to the

effect that no increase in the production program is required.

15. Air Strengths of Allies. Taking into consideration the present production

program of each of the nations involved, airplanes received from other sources,

airplanes expected to be allocated to allies, and attrition expected on the basis of

accumulated experience, there has been compiled in the office of Statistical Control, of the Air Staff, estimates of the comparative air arm strengths of each of the

principal allies of the United States as of the end of each year, 1943 to 1946 inclusive, assuming that the war will continue that long both in Europe and in the

Pacific. These estimates are shown in Tab "B".

16. Japanese Air Strength. Data with reference to Axis and Japanese air

strength are shown in Tab "C".

17. Desired Air Arm Strength. On the basis of the entire foregoing discussion,

with particular reference to the probable strengths of the air arms of our allies, it

is believed that at the time of conclusion of the war in Europe, the strength of the

air arm of the armed forces of the United States should be substantially as hereunder indicated, and that this strength should be reached in 1944, or as soon

thereafter as practicable:

Desired Ultimate Strength of the Air Arm of the U.S. in Tactical Type Airplanes

Airplane Type Number

Bombers, Heavy (B-17 and B-24 or equivalent) and Very Long Range 6,000

Bombers, Medium, Light, Dive and Torpedo 4,000

Fighters 7,000

Troop Carriers 1,500

Cargo-Transports 7,500

Total Tactical Unit Initial Issue Strength 26,000

For Operational Reserve, "Pipe Line" Requirements, Modification 13,000

Center and Depot Repair "Back Log"

For Combat Crew Training Establishments 6,000

Aggregate 45,000

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

18. Comparison of Allied Nations Air Forces. A comparison of the desired

strength of the air arm of the United States, with the strengths of the air arms of

its principal allies predicted as of December 31. 1945, appears in Tab "D". It is

believed that an increased tempo of offensive operations, and an increased rate of

attrition, will likely produce a leveling off of the air strengths of our allies, as

well as our own, not later than the end of 1945.

19. Naval Air Strength Not Involved. Neither in Tab "D", nor elsewhere in this

paper, is there taken into consideration the requirements of our Navy for carrierborne or such other aircraft as it may need to support its surface forces, in the

performance of the Navy's mission. It is believed best to leave a discussion of

such needs to appropriate Naval authorities.

20. The 273 Group Program. The Army Air Forces "273 Group Program" has

been fitted into our present war production program, and is well under way toward accomplishment with completely trained and equipped units in 1944. Its

unit equipment implications are shown in Tab "E". Given some augmentation of

group strength, and an appropriate operational reserve of combat aircraft, the

"273 Group Program" can absorb the entire tactical air strength indicated in paragraph 17 (above) to be desired. The extent, if any, to which this strength can not

be built up and maintained by our aircraft production program without curtailment of the minimum needs of the Navy for its own air coverage, may be met by

reduction of the operational, pipe line and depot reserves to a figure lower than

the desired 50% minimum.

21. Post-Armistice Deployment of Air Arm. It is believed that 50% to 60% of

the projected strength of the principal air arm of the United States would be sufficient, at and after the conclusion of the war in Europe, for the control of key

bases in the Western Hemisphere, and to represent the United States in the combined United Nations armies of occupation to control hostile, turbulent, controversial and key areas in Europe, Africa and the Mediterranean region, during the

period of the armistice. The remaining 40% to 50% would be adequate, in cooperation with our land and naval forces then available, to complete the defeat of

Japan.

22. Lend-Lease Allocations. The estimates shown in Tab "D" contemplate a

continuation of lend-lease allocation on substantially the present scale. From

U.S. aircraft production in 1943 we are allocating to our allies 18,146 airplanes,

of which 12,450 are combat types. (See Tab "F" for further detail.) Under this

program, Great Britain, after fully utilizing her personnel resources for air force

expansion, has been enabled to build up and maintain a greater percentage of reserve combat aircraft than we have as yet even planned. Russia is receiving a

very substantial flow of combat aircraft of types suitable for the close support of

her heavily engaged ground forces. Under present conditions China has not the

facilities or organization to produce an effective Air Force of substantial strength.

It is believed that we should retain for our own use our heavy bomber and sub258
APPENDIX 1

stantially all our air transport production; and that we should not at this time

commit ourselves to any material increase in lendlease allocations of any types.

Some increase of our allocation of air support type airplanes to Russia and China

should be anticipated if and when actual increase in our production has made it

clear that it can be done without detriment to our own air forces program.

23. Conclusion and Recommendation:

That the United States should have in being when an armistice is signed signifying the defeat of Germany, a principal air arm of the strength of approximately

45,000 tactical airplanes, with a relative composition by types, as indicated in

paragraph 17, above.

s/O. A. ANDERSON

Brig. General, U.S.A.

Asst. Chief of the Air Staff, Operational Plans

259
Appendix 2

War Department Basic Plan

for the Post-War Military Establishment*

March 29, 1945

Introduction

A. Purpose of this plan. The War Department Basic Plan is designed to furnish such general plans, policies and concepts relating to the postwar military establishment as are essential to permit further and more detailed planning. In final

form the completed plan will furnish a comprehensive presentation of the character of the contemplated postwar military establishment. The War Department Basic Plan will be followed by the plans of the Army Air, Ground and Service

Forces. When the latter plans are approved, they will be combined with the War

Department Basic Plan to form the War Department Plan for the Post-War Army.

B. Use. Implementation of this War Department Basic Plan will mean significant changes from the pre-war military establishment, with resulting changes in

existing laws and regulations. Also, unless such legislation is secured, the Army

will revert to its pre-war organization generally. Consequently, it will be assumed that such alterations of or additions to present legislation and regulations

as may be necessary to carry into the peacetime establishment the general structure of the existing establishment and to implement this plan will be secured.

However, while this War Department Basic Plan will be used for all post-war

planning, care must be exercised that no commitment, either actual or implied, is

made to an individual or group except by express authority of the War Department. Legislation which will be necessary to implement planning is under study

by appropriate staff agencies.

C. Definition of Post-War Military Establishment. The post-war military establishment is that organization which will be in existence when the Armed

Forces of the United States return to a full peacetime status. In keeping with the

foregoing, the post-war military establishment is designed to meet the requirements of peacetime, including preparation for future possible emergencies. It is

not designed to meet the requirements of the transition period from war to peace.

*Extract.

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Part I

Section I-General Concepts

1. The security of the United States requires the establishment and maintenance of adequate military forces. "Adequacy" must depend basically upon the

nature of the postwar world which will result from the present conflict. The exact

form of international organization, and the specific international commitments

which may be entered into by the United States following the present conflict

cannot be anticipated in detail at this time. It may be assumed, however, that the

conclusion of peace will require an American military establishment capable of:

a. Maintaining the security of the continental United States during the initial phases of mobilization;

b. Supporting such international obligations as the United States may assume;

c. Holding strategic bases to ensure our use of vital sea and air routes;

d. Expanding rapidly through partial to complete mobilization.

2. Basis of Composition of Post-War Military Establishment. National tradition and the demands of economy unite to require that the post-war military establishment conform to that type of military institution through which the

national manpower can be developed, based upon the conception of a professional peace establishment (no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime

requirements), to be reinforced in time of emergency by organized units drawn

from a citizen Army Reserve, effectively organized for this purpose in time of

peace; with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to acquire practical

experience through temporary active service and to rise by successive steps to

any rank for which they can definitely qualify; and with specific facilities for

such practical experience, qualification and advancement definitely organized as

essential and predominating characteristics of the peace establishment.

3. The Congress will authorize and direct the employment of the entire naval

and military forces of the United States and the resources of the government to

carry on war against an enemy government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, the Congress will pledge all of the resources of the country.

In this connection, the War Department will support a Universal Military Training Act in order to establish the principle that every able-bodied American is

subject to military training and in order to provide a reservoir of trained Reserves.

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APPENDIX 2

Section II-Basic Principles and Assumptions

1. Post-War Relationship Among the Principal Nations. For planning purposes it may be assumed that the following relationship will exist among the

principal nations:*

a. An international organization for the maintenance of world-wide peace

and security and for regulation of armament is in full and effective operation.

b. Such international organization to be controlled by major powers, one of

these being the United States.

c. Other nations to contribute to such organization to the extent found necessary and/or desirable by the major powers.

d. Control of the sea and air throughout the world to be a primary responsibility of the major powers, each power having primary control in its own strategic areas.

e. Total power of such world organization to be adequate to ensure peace

against any potential aggressor, including one of the major powers.

f. The strategic area over which the United States is to exercise primary

control will be as covered in J.C.S. 570/2 and succeeding documents. Control of

the rest of the world is to be divided between other major powers.

2. Nature of the Next War. For purposes of planning, it will be assumed that

for the next war, the actual attack will be launched upon the United States without any declaration of war; that the attack will represent an all out effort on the

part of the enemy; that the war will develop into a total war; that the United

States will be the initial objective of aggressors in such a war and will have no

major allies for at least 18 months. However, it will be further assumed that the

United States will have recognizance of the possibility of war for at least one

year, and during this year preparatory measures will be inaugurated.

3. Universal Military Training. It is assumed for purposes of planning that the

Congress will enact, (as the essential foundation of an effective national military

organization), that every able-bodied young American shall be trained to defend

his country; and that for a reasonable period after his training, (unless he volunteers for service in the regular establishments of the Armed Forces), he shall be

incorporated in a reserve, all of any necessary part of which shall be subject to

active military duty in the event of an emergency requiring reinforcement of the

Regular Army. (See para. 3.a.(4) below)

a. The Army and Navy have agreed to a set of principles in the following

terms to be applied in connection with a program of Universal Military Training:

*In this connection, the time of transition to the post-war military establishment will be

assumed to be contingent upon these relationships being firmly established.

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General Principles

(1) Every citizen owes to his country the duty to defend it.

(2) Because of the scope and speed of modern war, defense of the United

States will require a reserve of young men trained in military practices. In the considered judgment of the Army and Navy an adequate

reserve can be created only by adoption of universal training for all

able-bodied male citizens.

(3) The Army and Navy assume that the peacetime professional Army

and Navy will be no larger than necessary to discharge peacetime responsibilities. Therefore, in emergencies. they must be reinforced

promptly by previously trained civilian reserves.

(4) Young men should enter universal military training for training only.

During their training they should not be an integral part of the Armed

Forces. Neither should they be available for combat or other operational requirements which may arise during peace. After their prescribed training they should not be subject to call for service or for

further training except during a national emergency expressly declared by Congress.

Principles Governing Training

(5) Training should be truly universal. It should be applied impartially so

that no young man capable of contributing to the nation's defense

will be exempt, except for bona fide religious scruples.

(6) This training should occur in youth. The age most favorable for military training is from 17 to 20 years. In determining when an individual begins his training, consideration should be given to his

educational status. (For example, young men who will be graduated

in the 18 and 19-year age groups should start military training on the

first induction date following graduation. High school and preparatory school graduates in the 17-year age group should be accepted

for training only if they volunteer and have their parental consent.

Trainees who have not entered a preparatory or high school upon

reaching 18 years should start their training on the first induction

date after they reach 18.)

(7) Registration, examination and selection of trainees should be administered by civilian agencies. After induction the program should be

administered by the military and naval services.

(8) The program should be undertaken solely to provide adequate military training and should not be diluted by training for other purposes.

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APPENDIX 2

(9) Training should be for one continuous year. This is the minimum

time required to develop the skills demanded of fighting men in

modern warfare.

(10) Men eligible for training in the Armed Services should, within

quota limitations, receive training in the Service of their choice. Otherwise, trainees should be allotted to the Army and Navy, (including

Marine Corps), in proportion to the approved strength of these Services.

(II ) Standards governing acceptance of trainees should be the same for

both the Army and Navy.

(12) Qualified young men may enlist in the Regular Army, Navy and

Marine Corps and in the Coast Guard either before or during training. Trainees completing the prescribed year of training may apply

for further training leading to promotion in all grades to and including a commission in the Armed Services or their Reserves. After

completing the prescribed year of training, each trainee should become a member of the Army's Enlisted Reserve Corps or the U. S.

Naval Reserve remaining in this status for five years but being subject to call only as outlined in par. 4.a.(4) above. In lieu of these five

years in a special reserve, trainee might voluntarily enroll in the National Guard, the Organized Naval or Marine Corps Reserve, or the

Regular Army, Navy or Coast Guard.

4. Basic Composition of Post-War Military Establishment. The post-war military establishment will consist of the Regular establishment, one-year trainees,

the National Guard of the United States. and the Organized Reserve Corps. All

components of the establishment will be liable for entry into the Army of the

United States and for overseas service upon the declaration of an emergency.

5. Peacetime Industrial Organization for an Emergency.

a. Research and Development: An adequate program of military scientific

research and development in the post-war period will be of large importance to

the future military security of this nation and must form an integral part of the

broad plans for the post-war military establishments of the Armed Forces. There

must be an intimate relationship between the Armed Services and industry, university laboratories and general government laboratories.

b. General Materiel Mobilization Scheme. The general materiel mobilization plan of the post-war military establishment must be designed to meet the anticipated demands of the next war. The following requirements and assumptions

are furnished therefore and for planning purposes:

(I) The next war will be a "total" war.

(2) Preparation for materiel mobilization for the next emergency will require retention in pilot production, or in standby reserve, of such

government-owned facilities and equipment for the production of

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

non-commercial items as may be necessary to provide for continued

development of techniques and for the availability of adequate production capacity to ensure future military security.

(3) Detailed plans will be developed and revised from time to time by

the War Department agencies concerned to integrate private industry

with the materiel mobilization scheme for the next emergency. Close

liaison of research and development programs will be required and

experimental and development contracts issued.

(4) The War Department War Reserve is to consist of those items of

military supply and equipment of commercial and non-commercial

types which are essential to equip, supply and maintain the armed

forces either in training or in active operations, and which cannot be

obtained from normal civilian industry or from government-owned

manufacturing facilities of all types of sufficient quantities upon mobilization and during the period required for industry to make sufficient deliveries. Equipment will be maintained in the hands of

permanent forces and in war reserve so that a total of 4,500,000 men

can be mobilized effectively within one year following M-day.

6. Time Factors.

a. Initiation of Post-War Military Establishment.

(1) Three years will be the duration of the period between the defeat of

Japan and the return of United States to a full peacetime status. Personnel and materiel provision for the post-war military establishment

will be planned accordingly.

b. Length of Next Emergency. It is assumed for planning purposes that the

next war will be of five years duration.

c. Rate of Expansion from Post-War Military Establishment to Emergency

Establishment. The prescribed expansion of the Army of the United States by activation of its then authorized Reserves subsequent to M-day in any future emergency will be assumed to occur over a period of one year in equal monthly

increments.

7. Targets of Expansion for Next Emergency.

a. Personnel. It shall be assumed that following Mday the personnel of the

active military establishment will be capable of rapid expansion to 4,500,000

trained and equipped troops.

b. Industrial. It shall be assumed that the maximum required annual rate of

production in the next war will be equivalent to the rate of production in the year

1943.

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APPENDIX 2

Section Ill-Missions

General Statement

The post-war military establishment must be prepared at all times to protect

the vital interest of the United States by successful implementation of national

policies with such Armed Forces as may be required. Specifically, it must prepare to carry out the national will for the first year of a major war.

1. Combat

a. Offensive. The post-war military establishment must be capable both of

assuming the strategic and tactical offensive in time to prevent any sustained attack on our vital bases and lines of communication, thereby shielding completion

of the full military and industrial mobilization of the country, and of subsequently maintaining that offensive.

b. Defensive. In conjunction with assuming the offensive, the post-war

military establishment must be prepared at all times to protect outlying bases,

lines of communication and the continental United States against any sustained

and unpredicted attack.

c. The post-war military establishment must be capable of complementingthe efforts of our Naval Forces in upholding the interest of the United States by

carrying the war to the enemy for a conclusive victory in a minimum of time.

2. Training. In conformity with the combat mission, the training doctrine of

the postwar military establishment must stress, both in the immediate and in the

long-run employment of forces, preparation to assume the offensive at the earliest possible moment and maintain it to final victory.

Section IV-General Deployment

I. Overseas Forces. The peacetime military establishment will be organized

to provide overseas forces at peace strength. These forces will be composed of

Regular enlisted personnel. A proportion of the officer personnel may consist of

Reserves on temporary active duty. In an emergency, overseas forces will be

brought to war strength as required by movement of fillers.

2. Home Forces. These forces will be composed of:

a. Administrative, supply, development and instructional overhead not assigned to units, composed of Regular personnel reinforced as necessary and practicable by Reserve officers on temporary active duty. A proportion of officer

candidates on temporary active duty may be included.

(1) Air Forces. For planning purposes, it will be assumed that the permanent Air Forces will be organized administratively into a headquarters and such Air Forces, Commands and other elements as may be

provided within the established troop ceiling.

(2) Ground Forces. For planning purposes it will be assumed that the

permanent Ground Forces will be organized administratively into a

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

headquarters and such Army Corps headquarters and separate Commands as may be provided within the established troop ceiling.

(3) Service Forces. For planning purposes it will be assumed that the

permanent Service Forces will be organized administratively to support the requirements of the Ground and Air Forces.

b. Strategic Reserves, (immediate action force). During the transition stage

from war to peace or peace to war, the maintenance of strategic reserves in the

United States will be desirable. For this purpose, Regular officers and non-commissioned officers at cadre strength will be provided for in the permanent establishment. Normally, there will be at least a few mobile tactical units available for

reinforcement of overseas forces or other emergency uses.

c. Training Forces. Each unit in the training forces will consist of an overhead, (administrative, supply and instructional), and the trainees. Each unit will

be maintained at war strength plus one cadre. Regular personnel will be limited

to cadre strength and reinforced as necessary by Reserve officers, officer candidates, and Reserve noncommissioned officers on temporary active duty. Where

"on-the-job" training is indicated, it may be conducted within regularly constituted units within the United States; this will apply even though such units are

earmarked for overseas deployment.

267
Appendix 3

Report of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Special Committee for

Reorganization of National Defense*

April 1945

Statement of the Problem

1. To recommend the best practicable organization of the Armed Forces of the

United States for their most effective employment in time of war and their most

efficient preparation for war, in time of peace.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. This problem has been a matter of grave concern since World War I. During this period a number of bills to effect some major reorganization of our

Armed Forces have been considered by Congressional committees and more than

twenty-six departmental studies have been submitted, all without any comprehensive result. The Select Committee of the House of Representatives on PostWar Military Policy is now actively concerned with this problem and looks to the

War and Navy Departments for a solution. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Special

Committee has studied this problem for ten months. It has visited the major commands in the field and obtained their views.

Summary of Conclusions

3. The Special Committee, excepting the senior Naval member, is unanimously in favor of a single department system of organization of the Armed

Forces of the United States. This view is supported by Generals of the Army

MacArthur and Eisenhower, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Halsey, a substantial

number of other commanders in the field, and many officers in Washington.

4. After carefully weighing many conflicting considerations, the Special Committee agreed upon the organization shown in the attached Chart, Enclosure "A."

*Extract.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

The organization proposed is along the lines upon which the independent colonies were united into a federal union. Strong differences of opinion will exist

with respect to details of the organization. Therefore, the Special Committee, in

the analysis of the proposed organization, Enclosure "B," discusses alternative

solutions of specific issues and the reasons for its conclusions in each case. The

Special Committee urges that the proposed organization be viewed as a whole

and that its basic principle be approved regardless of differences of opinion of individual provisions.

5. The Special Committee adopted certain basic agreements, as set forth in

Enclosure "B." It believes that the inclusion of these agreements in the proposed

legislation will clarify the position of aviation, and of the Marine Corps, and will

secure the support of the services of this legislation.

6. Before the expiration of the war powers of the President, there must be a

thorough statutory internal reorganization of both the War and Navy Departments in order to retain the improvements effected by executive orders and administrative action. Almost without exception, the "witnesses voiced deep

concern lest, through inaction, we revert to the departmental organizations and to

the inter-service relationships that existed before Pearl Harbor." The Special

Committee believes that any further organizational changes made in either department prior to the enactment of legislation should be designed to facilitate the

creation of a single department.

7. The Special Committee believes that enabling legislation for the creation of

a single department should be enacted without delay and that overall reorganization should be effected by direction of the President not later than six months after the end of the war.

8. The Special Committee believes that a council composed of representatives

of the Department of the Armed Forces and Department of State should be established, as set forth in Enclosure "B," in order to correlate national policies and

military preparedness.

Recommendations

9. The Special Committee recommends:

a. That the single department system of organization of the Armed Forces,

as shown in Enclosure "A," be adopted, and that the preparation of the enabling

legislation for presentation to the Congress be undertaken under the general direction of the Special Committee.

b. That this legislation include the Special Committee's agreements with

respect to the position of aviation, and the Marine Corps, set forth in Enclosure

"B ."

c. That any further organizational changes made in either department, prior

to the enactment of legislation, have in view the creation of a single department.

269
APPENDIX 3

d. That the council described in Paragraph 8 above be created.

s/M. F. SCHOEFFEL s/H. L. GEORGE

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy Major General, U.S. Army

Member Member

s/W. F. TOMPKINS s/F. TRUBEE DAVISON

Major General, U.S. Army Colonel, AUS

Member Alternate

The dissenting views of Admiral J. 0. Richards n are attached hereto marked

Minority Report.

s/J. 0. RICHARDSON

Admiral, U S Navy (Ret.)

Senior Member

270
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Special Committee for

Reorganization of National Defense

Minority Report of

Admiral J. 0. Richardson, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

1. I do not concur in the recommendations contained on page two of this report.

2. After considerable objective study, and after careful consideration of the

views of many officers, I am convinced that it is not now in the best interests of

the Nation to adopt a single department system of organization of the Armed

Forces.

3. If those in authority decide to establish a single department system I can at

this time, conceive of no better plan than that proposed by the Special Committee. It is theoretically better than any yet proposed, but from a practical point of

view it is unacceptable.

4. Among the considerations which have led me to dissent, the following are

briefly noted:

In General

a. The present organization of the War and the Navy Department are the result of over one hundred and fifty years experience. Existing organizations of

such magnitude should be changed only as a result of the most indisputable evidence that the proposed change is desirable and will accomplish the ends sought.

I believe that the two department system under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the

addition of a Joint Secretaryship, will provide a satisfactory organization of the

Armed Forces in the foreseeable future.

b. The lessons of this war must be thoroughly digested before they can be

applied properly to postwar organization. Some of these lessons are now well understood; others are only indicated; many are yet to be learned.

c. At the present, the nature and size of our post-war Armed Forces required to preserve the peace and prepare for war is not known. It is too early to

design an organization to meet the needs of the post-war Armed Forces whose

characteristics are so indistinct.

d. At the termination of the war the Army and Navy will be faced with tremendous problems of demobilization. It would be unwise at that time to undertake major reorganization. I believe that the present organization is best suited to

demobilize successfully and to deploy our forces to meet the needs of the postwar world order.

271
APPENDIX 3

e. Many of the officers whose opinions should be of most value in seeking

a solution to this problem stated that they were so fully occupied in the prosecution of the war that they had been unable to give the subject the study which its

importance merited.

Regarding the Single Department.

f. I am not convinced as to the validity of many reasons advanced to support the thesis that there should be a single department. For example, I do not

agree that the effectiveness of the effort of the forces in the field depends upon

the existence of a single department in Washington.

g. Many proponents of the single department system assert that if a single

department is not created, then the only solution is to create a three department

system. This might be true if it were necessary to create a coordinate Air Force.

h. Because the interests and activities of the Army and Navy are so divergent, so great in magnitude, and so distinct in mission, I believe that a single department system would inevitably hamper the full and free development of each.

Regarding the Form of the Single Department Proposed.

i. I believe it unwise to give power proposed herein to one Secretary and

one Commander of the Armed Forces. Aside from the difficulty in finding men

capable of discharging those vast duties acceptably, there is real danger that one

component will be seriously affected by the decisions of one man to the detriment of the effectiveness of the Armed Forces as a whole.

j. I am far from convinced that there will be an increase in the effectiveness

or the economy of the Armed Forces by the adoption of this proposal. The components are granted such autonomy as is consistent with teamwork. This is vague

and may result in three separate services being farther apart than are the Army

and Navy today; especially in the field of logistics.

k. I am not convinced that an Air Force should be set up on a basis coordinate with the Army and Navy. Proponents of this idea assert that this is necessary

for full development of air power. Naval air power has developed within the

Navy. I fear that the creation of an Air Force on a basis coordinate with the Army

and Navy would inevitably draw the Naval Aeronautical Organization out of the

fabric of the Navy into which it is now intimately woven. Such disintegration of

the Navy would be prejudicial to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces as a

whole.

I. I foresee practical difficulties in the functioning of the Staff of the Commander of the Armed Forces. The Commander will desire a staff which, in his

judgment, will best assist him in discharging his duties. Throughout the years,

the Army and Navy have differed fundamentally on the composition and duties

of major staffs. Initially, at least, the staff which would be suitable for a Naval

272
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

officer in command of the Armed Forces could not be expected to be acceptable

to an Army officer in the same capacity. Thus, when the Commander drawn from

one component is succeeded by a Commander drawn from another, the successor

will be forced either to carry on with an unfamiliar staff organization or upset the

whole department by reorganizing his staff.

m. I would expect the staff to be very large and inevitably operate three

components. This would surely develop if one or more of the components had, in

being, a force capable of conducting operations while the other component, due

to the lack of such a force, was primarily concerned with education and planning.

n. The Commander and his staff will be required to resolve with the Under

Secretary and his Office so many problems concerning the military aspects of

business matters that they may be fully occupied with material things to the

prejudice of their higher responsibilities of thinking and planning on the highest

level. The same will be largely true with respect to the Commanders of the three

components.

o. In time, the Office of the Under Secretary will either be the master rather

than the servant of the Armed Forces, or become impotent. If the former, each

component will lose control of its logistic support and be unable to demand and

receive munitions of war it deems best for its own peculiar needs. If the latter, a

major claimed advantage for the single department will disappear.

5. I propose, instead of reorganization of the Armed Forces,

a. That the present Joint Chiefs of Staff organization be continued after the

war by statute.

b. That the reorganizational gains of the War and Navy Departments made

possible by Executive Order and administrative action be continued after the war

by statute.

c. That study of reorganization of the Armed Forces be continued in the

light of our war experiences.

That the advisability of establishing a Joint Secretaryship in the present organization be fully explored.

s/J. 0. RICHARDSON

Admiral, U S. Navy (Ret)

273
APPENDIX 3

Enclosure "B"

Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for

Reorganization of National Defense*

Section I

Introduction

Studies Since World War I.

101. The problem of overall reorganization of the armed forces has been of

concern for many years. Since World War I, numerous bills which would either

merge the War and Navy Departments or create a separate Air Force have been

introduced in Congress and considered by Congressional committees. During

that time no less than twenty-six Departmental reorganization studies have been

made. Not one of these bills or studies has produced comprehensive results.

Congressional Activity.

102. The Congress is again actively concerned with this problem and looks to

the military profession for definite proposals. Unless an acceptable solution is developed by the Armed Services, Congress may take the initiative and adopt its

own. Bills for reorganization were introduced in the present Congress before it

had been in session for one month.

103. In April and May of 1944 the House of Representatives Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy, under the chairmanship of Representative Woodrum, held hearings on a proposal to establish a single Department of the Armed

Forces. Senior officers and officials of the War and Navy Departments testified.

In general, the Army witnesses favored the establishment of a single Department

of the Armed Forces. Practically every Navy witness either definitely expressed

the view or conveyed the impression that his mind was not made up; that the

matter should be seriously studied; that the lessons of the war largely remained to

be learned, and that no decisions should be reached until the views of the commanders in the field had been considered. The Woodrum Committee was in accord with the almost unanimous view of the witnesses that no comprehensive or

revolutionary changes should be made at that critical period in the war. In its report, (House Report No. 1645, 78th Congress, 2nd Session) it commented favorably upon the action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in establishing this Special

Committee to study and make recommendations concerning the reorganization of

national defense.

*Extract.

274
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

The Situation.

104. At the outset of the war the Army and Navy were far apart in their thinking and planning. Initial operations were conducted on a basis of cooperation.

Because each knew so little of the capabilities and limitations of the other, adequate mutual understanding which is so essential to unity of effort was lacking to

an alarming degree. Moreover, the War and Navy Departments were organized

along cumbersome and inefficient lines which hindered rather than facilitated cooperation. It became evident immediately that radical reorganization, both in

Washington and in the field was necessary. Fortunately. the broad war powers

granted the President by Congress permitted immediate action. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff came into being as an agency to direct the broader phases- of the conduct

of the war. The War and Navy Departments were substantially reorganized by

Executive Orders. The principle of unity of command in the field was adopted

and supreme commanders were appointed in the combat area; but this did not

produce complete integration of effort within theaters of operations.

105. During the progress of the war great strides have been made in bringing

the services closer together. Within the framework of Executive Orders, improvements continue in departmental organization; and, under the Joint Chiefs of

Staff our armies, air forces, and fleets have vastly improved in effectiveness. The

broad strategy of the War and the logistic support of our Armed Forces are now

sufficiently effective for the successful prosecution of the war. Great progress

has been made toward satisfactory relationships between the civilian parts of our

government and the Armed Forces. And, most important of all, and because war

has compelled it, the services are beginning to understand each other and as a

team. This enforced teamwork, in operations on a scale hitherto not attempted,

has convinced them that no service is sufficient in itself. They know that success

results from the effective integration of the efforts of land, sea, and air forces.

106. At the end of three years of war the Special Committee has observed that

even in areas where unity of command has been established, complete integration

of effort has not yet been achieved because we are still struggling with inconsistencies, lack of understanding, jealousies and duplications which exist in all theaters of operations. That these handicaps have been overcome in any degree is due

to the stature of our leaders at home and abroad. It is not to be expected that any

reorganization will automatically cure the defects which continue to hamper the

Army and Navy. The first step is to set up that form of organization whose

framework is such as to be most conducive to the development of complete integration of effort. Then there must follow joint education and training of the

Armed Forces aimed to develop in all ranks and ratings a knowledge and understanding of the capabilities and limitations of each other, without which no form

of organization can be effective. Without exception all officers heard placed

great emphasis on this point.

275
APPENDIX 3

War Powers.

107. The major changes in the organizations of the War and Navy Departments since December 1941 were made under the war powers of the President.

Those powers lapse six months after the war. Unless comprehensive statutory

changes are made before those powers lapse, the Departments will revert to their

pre-war organizational status and the services will lose the gains in efficiency

and cooperation which these changes made possible. Almost without exception.

the witnesses voiced deep concern lest, through inaction, we revert to the departmental organizations and to the interservice relationships that existed before

Pearl Harbor.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Directives

108. Pertinent parts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to the Special Committee as contained in paragraph 12 of J.C.S. 749/7 are quoted below for convenience:

"12 b. That a Special Committee consisting of two officers of the Navy

and two officers of the Army be constituted to make a detailed study and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the most efficient practicable organization of those parts of the executive branch of our government which are

primarily concerned with national defense....

"c. That the Committee, in carrying out the above directive be guided

by the concept that the basic organization must be designed primarily to insure

the efficiency and overall integration of effort of the land, sea and air forces; secondly, to obtain effective integration of land-sea, land-air, and sea-air combinations of forces; and thirdly, to provide land, sea, and air forces, each organized,

manned and equipped to perform most effectively its part as an essential component of the overall military organization.

"d. That in its studies the Committee include a thorough examination

of the relative advantages, disadvantages, and practicability of the following basic systems of organization:

(1) Two departments-War and Navy.

(2) Three departments-War, Navy, Air.

(3) One Department of War (or of Defense).

"e. That particular emphasis be placed on eliminating unwarranted duplications. "f That conclusions reached on a theoretical basis can be adjusted to

practical considerations, as may appear necessary.

"g. That in any plan involving a change. consideration be given to a

period of transition in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff in so far as practicable,

would be in a position to guide the development from the present to the new

military organization.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

"k. That in its final recommendations, it will indicate what legislation if

any is considered necessary, together with particular comment on the practicability of supporting such legislation on the basis of efficiency and economy."

Agreements

109. In order to establish workable points of departure the Special Committee

agreed upon the following fundamentals which would be applicable in the consideration of a Single Department System of organization:

First; there shall be maintained as an integral part of the Navy an aeronautical organization commensurate with its needs, including requisite numbers

and types of aircraft.

Second; there shall be maintained as an integral part of the Navy the Marine Corps, including the Fleet Marine Force.

Third; there shall be maintained as an integral part of the Army such specialized aviation as forms an integral and essential part of its ground forces.

Fourth; there shall be maintained as the United States Air Force, coordinate with the Army and the Navy, that part of the aeronautical organization of the

Armed Forces of the United States which does not form an integral part of the

Army or of the Navy.

110. These agreements are basic in that they fix the position of aviation and of

the Marine Corps in accordance with the beliefs of the Special Committee as to

their proper roles in the organization of the Armed Forces. As the lessons of the

war are more fully digested, as teamwork is more completely realized, as technological development progresses, modification of these agreements may be advisable. In order to settle these questions which have been the subject of controversy

for years, it is deemed essential that these agreements be incorporated in the enabling legislation for reorganization, with the proviso that during the ten years

subsequent to the enactment of the legislation, the United States Chiefs of Staff

by unanimous action may modify these agreements with the approval of the

President. The legislation should permit modification of the agreements thereafter by the Commander of the Armed Forces, with the approval of the Secretary of

the Armed Forces.

277
Appendix 4

Minority Report of AAF Member of Special

War Department Committee on the

Permanent Military Establishment

(Bessell Committee)

28 Nov 45

1. Plans for the composition and deployment of the 203,600 man regular Air

Force have been furnished the Special War Department Committee on the Permanent Military Establishment under directive from the Committee. However, it

is desired to emphasize that the Army Air Forces does not in any sense concur

with the concept that limits the AAF to the figures shown therein. Submitted at

this time are the considered recommendations of the Army Air Forces for the

minimum size Air Force that will, in conjunction with other components of the

armed forces, provide national security for the United States during the foreseeable future.

2. At this time, after the second major war in this century and the costliest

ever suffered by this nation, it is desperately necessary that we lay well-conceived plans for a military security force that will effectively guarantee the peace

and safety of the U.S. It is with this in view that these proposals are submitted. In

these, the first and governing consideration has been the national security; the

next consideration has been the national economy and minimum interference

with civil life.

3. Each attempt of the Army Air Forces to portray its strength requirements

for accomplishment of its post-war mission has been met with an artificial allocation in the neighborhood of 200,000 personnel, considerably lower than the minimum considered adequate. It is the belief of the AAF that insufficient time has

elapsed since the initiation of the Army Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act of

1945 to determine definitely the capabilities of voluntary recruitment and it is

held entirely possible that further exploration in this field may show a larger

yield forthcoming. While the AAF agrees that an Army of greater size will certainly increase the share of the Federal Budget normally allotted to national defense, it nevertheless feels that the nation, given the awareness of the real threat

to its security, will approve and find the means to meet such a threat. This headquarters at least would feel remiss in its duty if it failed because of arbitrary estimates in budgetary terms to make realistic plans. And to be realistic these plans

278
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

must envision accurately the character of future warfare. V-1 and V-2 type missiles, atomic power, and 5,000 mile bombers-in enemy hands-would leave us

no time for even miraculous manpower and materiel mobilizations.

4. Even under the broad assumptions of the report, a standing regular Air

Force of 203,600 is inadequate to meet its first responsibility, namely, to meet

aggression with immediate destruction of the aggressor's vitals. The destructiveness of strategic air warfare which transcends front lines with conventional or

atomic explosives is a matter of minutes and hours rather than weeks and

months. The assumption of superior intelligence in the report is not based upon a

practical assurance, nor does it provide the actual will to build up the Air Force

in time, even though the assumed Universal Military Training may provide part

of the air crews within a few months of the initial warning.

5. Reference is made to the attached chart (Appendix D) which indicates the

lapse of time of some two to four years between decision to expand and effective

application of air units in combat (expressed in bomb tonnage). It is reiterated

that a sudden strike against the U.S. requires immediate action by an Air Force in

being. A year's warning does not provide means for building up the tiny Air

Force allocated in this study to an Air Force effective against any major power or

combination of major powers. With Universal Military Training we would be assured of obtaining in time the enlisted specialists only.

6. Two years of planning in the Air Staff have resulted in the firm conviction

that the 70-Group Air Force (which, excluding overhead for training civilian

components, has been squeezed into a 400,000 tentative Troop Basis) is the bedrock minimum with which the Air Force can accomplish its peacetime mission.

This mission includes the following factors:

a. Need for a ready striking .force to operate immediately anywhere in the

world, and capable of sufficient sustained effort to protect mobilization at home.

b. Need for overseas bases with intermediate fields and flight services to

provide mobility for our forces and denial of an enemy to our vital routes and to

our homeland.

c. For a minimum sized thoroughly trained force of first line combat units

to provide development of new equipment and techniques, and to maintain the

ability of the aircraft industry to rapidly improve, modify, and expand.

d. Need for a sufficient number of units to give reserve personnel, especially air crews, experience in operating units at home and overseas to enable

rapid reinforcement in an emergency. The output of military pilots, who must

have operating experience in combat units before going into the Reserve, must be

balanced with the output of Universal Military Training.

7. In connection with the factor pertaining to overseas bases, it is noted that

the Committee Report does not differentiate between air and other types on a

"caretaking status." Air bases die on the vine if not used by aircraft. When used,

even on a caretaking status, they involve more than a few plumbers, electricians,

279
APPENDIX 4

and guards. They involve additional personnel and equipment for airdrome maintenance, communications, navigational aids, crash fire fighting, and fuel servicing. In addition, whether these bases are maintained operationally as

recommended herein, or on a caretaking status, their advanced location makes

them more vulnerable to destruction than their allocation of defensive antiaircraft

by the Committee Report would seem to indicate. To justify their yearbyyear expense it is to be expected that these bases should withstand the first blow and

permit our immediate employment. Therefore, regardless of whether antiaircraft

remains as part of the AGF or is integrated with the AAF it is recommended that

antiaircraft allotments to advanced bases be further strengthened in consonance

with their vulnerability.

8. Reduction of Air Force strength from the recommended 400,000 to 203,600

means largely a reduction of the striking force of the Air Forces, Certain fixed

functions of an Air Force having global responsibilities cannot be reduced in

manpower requirements proportionate to the reduction in total strength. It should

be noted that reduction of air striking forces below 70 groups in effect denies the

units necessary to maintain the base facilities required for and essential to the national interest. Also, stripping the Air Force of the units needed for its mission

will be an admission that this country must rely for security in the air on the Naval Air Forces, which is a more expensive and less effective way of attacking the

problem of air security.

9. Therefore, the AAF Member of the Committee recommends:

a. That portions of the interim plan contained in Inclosure A as pertain to

the Army Air Forces be disapproved for War Department planning purposes and

that it not be furnished the Army and Army Air Forces members of the Joint

agencies charged with preparation for the President of a comprehensive plan for

the peacetime establishment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. That the AAF plan for the permanent military establishment attached

hereto be approved for War Department planning purposes and that it be furnished the Army and Army Air Forces members of the Joint agencies charged

with the preparation for the consideration of the President of the comprehensive

plan for the peacetime establishment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

s/G. C. JAMISON

Brigadier General, USA

AAF Member, Special War Department

Committee on Permanent Military

Establishment

280
Appendix 5

War Department

The Adjutant General's Office

Washington 25, D.C.

AG 322 (21 Mar 46)

OB-I -AFCOR-(971 (d))-M

SUBJECT: Establishment of Air Defense, Strategic Air and Tactical Air Commands; Redesignation of the Headquarters, Continental Air Forces

and Certain Other Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inactivation

and Assignment of Certain Army Air Forces Units.

TO: Commanding Generals,

Army Air Forces

Continental Air Forces

1. Letter, this office, AG 322 (11 Mar 46) OD-I-AFOOR-(930(d))-M, 13

March 1946, subject as above, is revoked. (Distribution withheld).

2. Effective this date:

a. The following Commands are established under the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Strategic Air Command

Tactical Air Command

Air Defense Command

b. The Headquarters, Continental Air Forces is redesignated as the Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, with station at Boiling Field, Washington,

D.C. This Headquarters will move from its present station to Andrews Field,

Maryland, on or about 1 July 1946, as directed by the Commanding General,

Army Air Forces.

c. The Headquarters, Tactical Air Command is constituted, assigned to the

Army Air Forces and will be activated at Tampa, Florida, on or before 31 March

1946.

(1) The Commanding General, Tactical Air Command is authorized to

designate, organize and discontinue Army Air Forces Base Units within the

block of numbers 300 to 399, inclusive, and within the bulk allotment of personnel authorized his command.

281
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

d. The Headquarters, Air Defense Command is constituted. assigned to the

Army Air Forces and will be activated at Mitchel Field, New York, on or before

31 March 1946.

(1) The Commanding General, Air Defense Command is authorized to

designate, organize and discontinue Army Air Forces Base Units within the

block of numbers 100 to 199, inclusive, and within the bulk allotment of personnel authorized his command.

e. Personnel will be authorized in accordance with bulk allotment of personnel as published in Army Air Forces letters of the 150-series.

f. Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance

with T/A 201, as amended.

I g. The Headquarters, Ninth Air Force is assigned to the Tactical Air Command and will be activated by the Commanding General thereof at Biggs Field,

El Paso, Texas, on or before 31 March 1946.

(1) Personnel for manning the Headquarters, Ninth Air Force will be

furnished from the bulk allotment of personnel authorized the Tactical Air Command and as directed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 201, as amended.

h. The Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force is assigned to the Strategic Air

Command and will be activated by the Commanding General thereof, at Colorado Springs, Colorado, on or before March 1946.

(1) Personnel for manning the Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force will be

furnished from the bulk allotment of personnel authorized the Strategic Air Command, and as directed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 201, as amended.

3. Effective this date:

a. The Headquarters, Second Air Force is relieved from its present assignment, assigned without change of station to the Strategic Air Command, and will

be inactivated by the Commanding General thereof on or before 31 March 1946.

Concurrently with its inactivation, this unit is assigned in an inactive status to the

Air Defense Command.

(1) Personnel and equipment will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in manning and equipping the Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force.

(2) Records of the inactivated unit will be disposed of and reported in

accordance with provisions of AR 15-15, 20 September 1945 and TM 12-259.

b. The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, XIX Tactical Air Command is relieved from its present assignment, assigned without change of station

to the Tactical Air Command, and will be inactivated by the Commanding General thereof on or before 31 March 1946.

282
APPENDIX 5

(1) Personnel and equipment will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in manning and equipping the Headquarters, Ninth Air Force.

(2) Records of the inactivated unit will be disposed of and reported in

accordance with provisions of AR 1515, dated 20 September 1945, and TM

12259.

c. The Headquarters, Third Air Force is relieved from its present assignment and assigned to the Tactical Air Command, and will be transferred, less

personnel and equipment, from its present station to the Greenville Army Air

Base, Greenville, South Carolina, on or before 31 March 1946, as directed by the

Commanding General, Tactical Air Command.

(1) Personnel for remanning the Headquarters Third Air Force will be

furnished from the bulk allotment of personnel authorized the Tactical Air Command and as directed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Administrative and housekeeping equipment is authorized in accordance with T/A 201, as amended.

d. The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, IX Troop Carrier Command is relieved from its present assignment, assigned to the Tactical Air Command without change of station, and will be inactivated by the Commanding

General thereof on or before 31 March 1946

(1) Personnel and equipment will be utilized to the fullest extent practicable in remanning and reequipping the Headquarters Third Air Force.

(2) Records of the inactivated unit will be disposed of and reported in

accordance with provisions of AR 1515, 20 September 1945, and TM 12259.

4. Effective this date:

a. The following units are relieved from the control of the War Department

and assigned in an inactive status to the Commands indicated below:

Unit Command

Hq & Hq Sq, Tenth Air Force Air Defense Command

Hq & Hq Sq, Twelfth Air Force Tactical Air Command

Hq & Hq Sq, Fourteenth Air Force Air Defense Command

Hq & Hq Sq, 53d Troop Carrier Wing Tactical Air Command (for further

assignment to Third Air Force)

b. The following units are relieved from their present assignments and assigned without change of station to the Commands indicated below:

Unit Command

Hq, First Air Force Air Defense Command

Hq, Fourth Air Force Air Defense Command

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

c. The units listed in the attached inclosure are relieved from their present

assignments and assigned to the Tactical Air Command without change of station:

(1) The current group assignments of the units listed in inclosure I are

not affected by this action.

d. All units currently assigned to the Continental Air Forces and not specifically assigned by this letter are assigned to the Strategic Air Command without change of station.

5. The funds of the Continental Air Forces will be assumed by the Strategic

Air Command until suitable distribution between the Air Defense Command,

Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Air Command can be provided under

the provisions of AAF Letter 3025, 4 August 1945.

6. Twenty (20) copies of the order issued pursuant to this letter will be forwarded to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Attention: Publication

Division, Air Adjutant General); in addition to the distribution directed in paragraph 17c, AR 31050. No other distribution will be made to offices of Headquarters, Army Air Forces.

7. When the actions directed herein have been accomplished a report will be

submitted to this office by letter and copies furnished the Service Commander

concerned.

8. Obligate the appropriate allotment published in Section III, Circular No

178, War Department, 1945, as amended, to the extent necessary.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

/s/ Edward F. Witsell

Major General

The Adjutant General

284
Appendix 6

War Department Office of the Chief of Staff

Washington 25, D.C.

4 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: PRESIDENT, BOARD OF OFFICERS ON ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT (LIEUT.

GENERAL W. H SIMPSON)

CHIEFS OF WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL

AND SPECIAL STAFF DIVISIONS

COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR

FORCES

COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY GROUND

FORCES

COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY SERVICE

FORCES

CHIEFS OF ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL SERVICES.

SUBJECT: Statement of Approved Policies to Effect Increased Autonomy of the

Army Air Forces within the War Department Structure.

1. The following approved policies, designed to effect increased autonomy for

the Army Air Forces within the structure of the War Department, in accordance

with the recommendations of the Simpson Board Report, are published for the

information and guidance of all concerned. They will be implemented to the fullest degree possible, beginning with the effective date of the reorganization of the

War Department contemplated in that report.

2. Representation on War Department Staffs.

a. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, will nominate approximately 50 per cent of the members of War Department General and Special Staff

Divisions from Army Air Forces personnel. This goal will be reached as soon as

practicable. The officers nominated will be qualified to perform the duties of the

Division for which nominated, and will be acceptable to the Director or Chief

thereof.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

b. Army Air Forces officers may be detailed to duty in the offices of Chiefs

of Technical and Administrative Services as desired by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and by arrangement with the Chiefs of these Services in

each instance.

c. It is to be emphasized that the War Department, including the General

Staff, Special Staff and the Technical and Administrative Staffs and Services,

should be looked upon as neither "Ground" nor "Air" but as an overall agency

which controls and serves both. All officers on duty with these staffs should deal

with broad functions at the War Department level, rather than with the interests

of a particular force or branch.

3. Allocation of Service Troops.

a. The War Department recognizes the interests of the Army Air Forces in

that part of the War Department troop basis now indicated as Army Service

Forces and Army-wide activities.

b. As functions now performed by the Army Service Forces are transferred

to the Army Air Forces, a proper proportion of personnel performing these functions will also be transferred to the Army Air Forces troop basis.

c. The determination of functions and troops to be transferred will be

worked out over a period of time by the War Department, with full consideration

being given to the needs of the Army Air Forces.

d. In making such adjustment, the general principle will be followed that

services which are required with the field armies or the Air Forces are included

in the Ground Force and Air Force portion of the troop basis respectively, and

that those elements which perform functions in support of both ground and Air

will be provided in a separate War Department section of the troop basis. It is the

Chief of Staff s conviction that both now and in the future, the Army Air Forces

should have only those amounts of ordinary technical and administrative services needed for actual servicing of troops; hospital systems, ports, etc., to be run

by the Army.

4. Supply of Officers of The Technical and Administrative Services.

a. While the Army Air Forces remain within the War Department, and under the ceiling on commissioned personnel and methods of commissioning by

branch imposed by existing law, considerations of avoidance of duplications and

economy in personnel dictate that the bulk of administrative and technical officer

personnel continue to be furnished to the Army Air Forces by the Technical and

Administrative Services.

b. It is recognized that when the Army Air Forces become completely

autonomous, they will require a quota, to be later determined, of Technical and

Administrative Officers who will be permanent members of the autonomous Air

Forces.

Additional increments of Regular Officers which may in the future be

authorized by Congress will include a proportion, to be later determined, of pro286
APPENDIX 6

motion list technical and administrative officers commissioned in the Air Corps,

to provide in part for eventual complete autonomy. Also, at such time as complete autonomy is achieved, it will be proper and necessary to transfer an appropriate proportion of the officers of the Technical and Administrative Services of

the Army to the autonomous Army Air Forces.

During the present period of preparation of the Army Air Forces for autonomy, the transfers of individual nonrated officers of the promotion-list services to

the Air Corps, as mutually agreed upon by the Commanding General, Army Air

Forces, the Chiefs of Technical and Administrative Services and the individual

officers concerned, will, in general, continue to be approved.

c. During the present period, officers of the Technical and Administrative

Services assigned to duty in the Army Air Forces will continue to be under the

command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces. The Chiefs of Technical and Administrative Services will continue to be responsible for the long range

career planning of these officers over the entire period of their commissioned

service. In order that their schooling and proper rotation of duties may be provided for, they will be returned to the control of the Chiefs of Services from time

to time, in accordance with policies to be determined by the War Department.

5. Representation on Technical Committees. The Commanding General,

Army Air Forces, is authorized membership on the Technical Committees of the

Technical Services in such numbers as he deems necessary to represent the interests of the Army Air Forces.

6. Command Communication System.

a. The Chief Signal Officer of the Army under the direction of the Chief of

Staff and the General Staff is responsible for the installation, maintenance and

operation of a single domestic and overseas integrated military communications

system known as the Army Command and Administration Network. The size of

this system will be based on military traffic requirements and individual circuits

will be allocated to the using services for control and use as required. Where established facilities to meet specific emergency operational requirements do not

exist, the Chief Signal Officer, upon the recommendation of the Communications

Advisory Board, may authorize the installation, operation and maintenance of additional facilities by the agencies having primary interest. The Chief Signal Officer is responsible for the movement of all command and administrative traffic

over this system except the movement of such traffic over allocated facilities

which is a responsibility of the using service.

The Communications Advisory Board to the Chief Signal Officer will consist of the Chief, Army Communications Service and the Air Communications

Officer of the Army Air Forces.

In the interest of economy, the Chief Signal Officer, upon the recommendation of the Communications Advisory Board, will delegate to the Command287
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

ing General, Army Air Forces, responsibility for the operation of any designated

system station.

The installation, maintenance and operation of the Army Airways Communication System will be the responsibility of the Commanding General, Army

Air Forces. Traffic handled over this system will be operational and weather traffic pertaining to the movement of aircraft and such administrative traffic as is

authorized by the Chief Signal Officer upon the recommendation of the Communications Advisory Board. Such administrative traffic originating on the Army

Airways Communication System will be routed into the Army Command Administrative network at designated gateways.

b. The provisions of Circular 388, War Department, 1944, in respect to

communications, will remain in effect. All questions involving the application of

the provisions of this Circular on the lease of communications services not covered therein will be resolved by the Chief Signal Officer upon the recommendation of the Communications Advisory Board.

c. There will be one contracting agency for the War Department for obtaining commercial communications services. The Chief Signal Officer has already

been designated this function and will apply this authority in accordance with

Circular 388, War Department, 1944, and recommendations of the Communications Advisory Board.

d. Based on the requirements as stated by the Commanding General, Army

Air Forces, the Chief Signal Officer will be responsible for the defense of all

funds and for the procurement of all common items of communications equipment.

e. All funds for the procurement of communications services for the Army

Air Forces will be obtained and obligated by the Chief Signal Officer based on

requirements submitted by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

f. Pertinent Army Regulations and War Department Circulars will be reviewed by the Army Air Forces and Signal Corps and amended to reflect the

above approved principles.

7. Determination of Items of Communications and Radar Equipment Peculiar

to the Army Air Forces. War Department Circular 429, dated 3 November 1944,

will be the general guide in determining communication and radar equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces. The application of the general principles set up in

this circular to specific items will be decided by the Director of Service, Supply

and Procurement, after consultation with the Commanding General, Army Air

Forces, and the Chief Signal Officer.

8. Responsibilities of the Army Air Forces in Connection with Anti-Aircraft

Artillery.

a. The Commanding General. Army Ground Forces, is charged with the

development and determination of the tactics of antiaircraft artillery when employed by the Ground Forces.

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APPENDIX 6

b. The Commanding General. Army Ground Forces, in cooperation with

the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, is charged with the development

and determination of special tactics as are necessary for antiaircraft artillery

when employed by the Air Forces.

c. The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, in cooperation with

the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, is charged with the development

and determination of the technique of fire at aerial targets, with prescribing military characteristics of weapons and equipment, and with the preparation of tables

of organization and equipment for units of antiaircraft artillery.

The Army Ground Forces will continue the assignment of three battalions

of antiaircraft artillery for employment at Army Air Forces Schools, so long as

the troop basis continues to make this assignment possible.

9. Responsibilities of the Army Air Forces in Connection with Research and

Development.

a. The Army Air Forces are responsible for the conduct of research and development of aeronautical materials, associated equipment, accessories and supplies procured by the AAF, and of such other materials as may be allocated to the

AAF for research and development.

b. The Army Air Forces will conduct all experimental, static and flight

tests necessary to the development of such material.

10. Responsibility of the Army Air Forces in Connection with Supply and Procurement. The Army Air Forces are responsible for:

a. Determination of qualitative and quantitative requirements of items peculiar to the Army Air Forces and items assigned to the Army Air Forces for procurement, and for recommendations or requirements for common items.

b. Procurement of all items peculiar to the Army Air Forces or which are

assigned to the Army Air Forces for procurement.

c. Storage, and distribution to all Army Air Forces units, facilities and personnel of AAF procured material, and such other items as are assigned by the

War Department to the Army Air Forces for storage, maintenance and issue.

d. Preparation of all Army Air Forces logistical planning factors.

11. Responsibility of Army Air Forces in Connection with Repairs and Utilities Functions.

a. Repair and maintenance of Army Air Forces real property and the operation of the Army Air Forces utilities is a command responsibility of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

b. As a Technical Staff Officer of the War Department, the Chief of Engineers is responsible for:

(1) Preparation and submission to the Director of Service, Supply and

Procurement, for the latter's approval and publication, or uniform technical procedures, policies and standards of Army-wide application for the performance of

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

repair and utility functions. Such action will be coordinated with the Major Commands concerned prior to publication.

(2) The conduct of technical inspections on the War Department level to

assure that prescribed standards, procedures and policies are being followed.

(3) Prescription of Army-wide cost and accounting methods, the review

of estimates and rendering of technical advice thereon.

c. The Chief of Engineers will make available to the Commanding General,

Army Air Forces, qualified officers of the Corps of Engineers for the performance of repair of utilities duties, subject to their availability in the Corps of Engineers, and subject to their being requested by the Commanding General, Army

Air Forces.

12. Responsibilities of the Army Air Forces in Connection with Estimation,

Defense and Control of Funds. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

will be responsible for the preparation of budget estimates for the appropriation

"Air Corps, Army" and the justification of such estimates before the Budget Advisory Committee of the War Department and other appropriate agencies. Funds

for the operation of the Army Air Forces and for the procurement of the items

peculiar to the Air Forces will be allocated directly to Headquarters, Army Air

Forces, by the Budget Officer for the War Department.

Activities at Army Air Forces installations, not peculiar to the Air Forces,

but, which are under the Air Force's command jurisdiction, will be financed by

an allocation of funds from the Budget Officer for the War Department to Headquarters, Army Air Forces. Requirements of funds for these activities will be included in the estimates of the various appropriate War Department

appropriations. An example of this type of activity is: Repair and Utilities at

Army Air Forces installations.

13. Army Air Forces Responsibilities in Connection with Hospitalization,

Evacuation and Care of the Sick and Wounded.

a. The Commanding General, AAF has command responsibility for all

medical installations and units of the AAF, and for all Medical personnel assigned to the AAF.

b. The Surgeon General, in his capacity as a Technical Staff Officer of the

War Department, is Chief Medical Officer of the U.S. Army and Medical advisor

to the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and War Department General and Special

Staffs. As such he has primary responsibility for the formulation of Army-wide

policies of hospitalization, evacuation, and care of the sick and wounded, which

policies are reviewed, revised as necessary, and promulgated by appropriate General Staff Divisions.

Directions or instructions will habitually be issued to major subordinate

commands under the War Department through the proper channels of command,

and not directly from the Surgeon General to the corresponding Medical Staff

Officer in a subordinate major command. However, the duties of the Surgeon

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APPENDIX 6

General, acting in his capacity as a Technical Staff Officer of the War Department, will include such technical supervision and inspections of Armywide

medical activities as the Chief of Staff may prescribe.

In his capacity as a Chief of a Technical Service, the Surgeon General will

command all General Hospitals. The Surgeon General performs these duties in

the interests of the Army as a whole, and not in the interests of a particular force

or branch (See pare 2c above).

c. (1) The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, will be responsible for

the determination of the strength, organization, composition, equipment, and

training of Medical Units assigned to the Army Air Forces. The Commanding

General, Army Air Forces, will continue to exercise technical supervision and

control over research and training in all matters that have to do with flying personnel.

(2) The Surgeon General will be responsible for all technical training of

Medical Department personnel, including Flight Surgeons, except for training at

the Flight Surgeon School which is the responsibility of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

d. Upon completion of the task of caring for overseas patients in general

hospitals, it will again become possible to transfer Zone of the Interior patients

from station hospitals to general hospitals. At that time, it is desired that regional

hospitals be eliminated from the system of hospitalization. Accordingly, the regional hospital at Coral Gables, Florida, now operated by the Army Air Forces

will be redesignated a general hospital, and this installation will be classified as

an exempted station operating under the command of the Surgeon General. An

adequate number of Flight Surgeons will be detailed to the staff of this hospital.

This hospital will be considered a specialized hospital, particularly for the admission of Air Corps personnel requiring hospitalization and convalescent care incident to their tactical mission, as Fitzsimmons General Hospital at Denver,

Colorado, is a specialized center for tubercular cases.

e. (1) The Surgeon General will have command responsibility to include

responsibility for assignment and reassignment, for Medical personnel on duty in

installations under command of the Surgeon General.

(2) Assignment to and relief from major forces or overseas commands

of Medical officers will be the responsibility of the Central Officers Assignment

Division, operating under the direction of the Director of Personnel and Administration, after coordination with the Major Commands. The primary interest of

the Surgeon General in the overall career planning of Medical officers, including

Flight Surgeons, will be recognized by the Director of Personnel and Administration, and Medical officers will be returned to the control of the Surgeon General

as required by consideration bearing on the advancement of their professional

education and experience. The peculiar requirements of the Army Air Forces

with respect to Medical officers, including Flight Surgeons, will be recognized

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

by the Director of Personnel and Administration and the Surgeon General in all

career planning affecting Medical personnel.

14. Responsibilities of the Army Air Forces in Connection with Air Transport.

a. The Army Air Forces are responsible for control and operation of all Air

Transport and related facilities.

b. Determination of policies pertaining to movement and priorities of passengers and freight on transport aircraft of the ATC, and commercial transport

aircraft in conformity with the overall transportation program prepared by the

General Staff is a function of the War Department.

15. Communications in the Field with Navy Commanders. Direct communication between field commanders of the Army Air Forces and the Navy, as requircd on operational matters requiring coordinated action of both forces is

authorized.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

/s/H. I. HODES

Brigadier General, GSC

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff

292
Appendix 7

Report to Chief of Staff,

United States Army

on Army and Air Force Organizational Matters

Under Unification*

March 14, 1947

(Report submitted by: Maj. Gen. William E. Hall, GSC; Maj. Gen. Hugh J.

Knerr, USA; Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, GSC; Brig. Gen. S. L. Scott, GSC.)

Why A Unification Measure is Necessary

World War II has been fought and won by the superior performance of our

military forces. The superb home front support provided by labor, industry, agriculture-in fact, by every important element of our civilian life-was a glowing

testimony to the vitality of democracy.

We hope never again to become involved in a great war. Should we be compelled to fight another war, we must enter that war well prepared to marshal our

national resources promptly and effectively in our defense. We are engaged in

considering the measures necessary to secure the peace and to provide most effectively for our national security. In order to plan wisely for our future security,

we must measure our proposals against two standards:

What weaknesses revealed by World War II should be corrected?

What new dangers must we anticipate and guard against? It is no reflection

upon the character or the ability of the men who directed the prosecution of the

recent war to acknowledge that mistakes were made. Rather, it is evidence of

their integrity that they should promptly call attention to those errors and propose

corrective measures.

Defects in our security structure revealed by World War II were:

Our foreign policy and military policy were not always closely integrated.

There was no adequate machinery for the adjustment of our civilian economic life to meet the military requirements of total war.

*Extract.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

When the war started, there was no adequate machinery for the mobilization of our material resources, productive capacity and manpower.

There were gaps in the translation of strategic plans into plans for material and personnel.

There were weaknesses in planning of material requirements and duplication in procurement both within and between the military departments.

The coordination and integration of military and other war budgets were

not as thorough and detailed as desirable.

Coordination between the Army and Navy was inadequate. The first test

of any plan for national security is the extent to which it applies the

lessons of the past in the development and execution of corrective

measures for the future. A plan which neglects this requirement is

misconceived, and a plan which fails to fulfill this requirement must

be judged inadequate. We must determine the answers to the following questions:

WHAT CHANGES IN THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIPS OF THE

MILITARY SERVICES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS HAS OUR WAR EXPERIENCE INDICATED AS DESIRABLE TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND ELIMINATE THE

DEFECTS OUT LINED ABOVE?

WHAT FORM OF ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND MAINTAINED TO ENABLE THE MILITARY

SERVICES AND OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

AND AGENCIES EFFECTIVELY TO PROVIDE FOR AND PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY?

With reference to the first question: Experience in the last war has revealed

serious weaknesses in our present organizational setup-weaknesses between

and within the services, as well as in their relationships to other important elements concerned with our national security.

For the most part, they were defects of direction, control and coordination.

Gaps between foreign and military policy-between the State Department and

the Military Establishments. Gaps between strategic planning and its logistic implementation-between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military and civilian

agencies responsible for industrial mobilization. Gaps between and within the

military services-principally in the field of procurement and logistics. Gaps in

information and intelligence-between the executive and legislative branches of

our Government, between the several departments and between Government and

the people. These gaps and defects of coordination were the result of inadequate

direction and control below the level of the President.

We have concluded that these faults were also due to lack of appropriate and

seasoned mechanisms and of adequate plans, policies, and procedures for coordi294
APPENDIX 7

nation; lack of clear understanding and appreciation by one group or individual

of the relation of others to the overall job. These ills are susceptible of cure and

can be corrected by a unification measure which will provide control and direction at the Cabinet level.

The Bill proposes a form of military organization which we think is adapted

to dealing with the problems that face us, viz, a unified control over a coordinate

organization having three departments-Army, Navy, and Air Force--each

headed by a civilian secretary and tied together by strong interorganizational

links under the control and direction of a Secretary of Cabinet rank.

This form will, in our opinion, foster civilian and congressional influence and

control over the military departments. It will favor sound and efficient balance in

the development of each arm of the service; it will furnish a broader basis for

considerations of military and foreign policy and will be more responsive to new

developments in the scientific field.

In answer to the second question: The question of the form of organization of

our military forces must be viewed in its proper perspective as only one part of a

much larger picture encompassing many elements, military and civilian, governmental and private, which contribute to our national security and defense.

Our goal should be to bind them together in such a way as to achieve the most

productive and harmonious whole. This calls for coordination as well as command; for parallel as well as subordinated effort. Where to use one and where to

use the other are questions of balanced judgment and adjustment to be determined by the principles and traditions of our form of government, the lessons of

experience and the basic policies and objectives to be achieved.

The necessity of integrating all these elements into an alert, smoothly working

and efficient machine is more important now than ever before. Such integration

is compelled by our present world commitments and risks, by the tremendously

increased scope and tempo of modern warfare and by the epochal scientific discoveries culminating in the atomic bomb.

This involves organizational ties between the Department of State and the

Military Establishment: ties between the military departments in strategy and logistics; ties between the Military Establishment and the agencies responsible for

planning and carrying out mobilization of our industrial and human resources;

between the gathering of information and intelligence and its dissemination and

use; between scientific advances and their military application.

The next war will probably begin with little or no warning and will almost immediately achieve its maximum tempo of violence and destruction. Contrasting

with the shortened opportunity for defensive preparation is the increased length

of time necessary to prepare the complicated offensive and defensive weapons

and organizational structure essential to modern warfare. The nation not fully

prepared will be at a greater disadvantage than ever before.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

The great need, therefore, is that we be prepared always and all along the line,

not simply to defend ourselves after an attack but through all available political,

military and economic means, to forestall any such attack. The knowledge that

we are so prepared and alert will in itself be a great influence for world peace.

Much has been said about the importance of waging peace as well as war. The

proposed organizational structure is adapted to both purposes.

In view of the critical state of affairs in the world today we cannot delay necessary measures required to put our house in order. There is a lot of hard work

and much study needed to put our Armed Forces in condition to meet our responsibilities as a World power and, if necessary, to defend our way of life at a moment's notice.

A unification measure is a first step in the reorganization of the National Defense Establishment. It is a necessary step which will affect the safety of our

country more than anything else short of abolishing war itself.

In support of the above a joint agreement has been reached between the War

and Navy Departments and, although it is a compromise agreement, it is supported by each. Both Departments believe that the terms of the agreement are the

best possible solution attainable at this time. Both Departments believe that the

terms of the agreement, as expressed in the Bill, will work: that it will serve the

best interests of the Nation and that it is a necessary measure for improving National Security.

296
Appendix 8

Executive Order 9877

Functions of the Armed Forces

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the

United States, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of

the Armed Forces of the United States, I hereby prescribe the following assignment of primary functions and responsibilities to the three armed services.

Section I-The Common Missions of the Armed Forces of the United States

are:

1. To support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic.

2. To maintain, by timely and effective military action, the security of the

United States, its possessions and areas vital to its interest.

3. To uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United

States.

4. To safeguard the internal security of the United States as directed by higher

authority.

5. To conduct integrated operations on the land, on the sea, and in the air necessary for these purposes.

In order to facilitate the accomplishment of the foregoing missions the armed

forces shall formulate integrated plans and make coordinated preparations. Each

service shall observe the general principles and fulfill the specific functions outlined below, and shall make use of the personnel, equipment and facilities of the

other services in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased.

Section HI-Functions of the United States Army

General

The United States Army includes land combat and service forces and such

aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained

and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations

on land. The Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for

the effective prosecution of war, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobili297
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

zation plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the

needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Army are:

1. To organize, train and equip land forces for:

a. Operations on land, including joint operations.

b. The seizure or defense of land areas, including airborne and Joint amphibious operations.

c. The occupation of land areas.

2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of

Army combat and service elements, coordinating with the Navy and the Air

Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious

and airborne operations.

3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national

policies and interests of the United States.

4. To assist the Navy and Air Forces in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by

proper authority.

Section Ill-Functions of the United States Navy

General

The United States Navy includes naval combat and service forces, naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. It is organized, trained and equipped

primarily for prompt and sustained combat at sea. The Navy is responsible for

the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war, and

in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the

peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Navy are:

I. To organize, train and equip naval forces for:

a. Operations at sea, including joint operations.

b. The control of vital sea areas, the protection of vital sea lanes, and the

suppression of enemy sea commerce.

c. The support of occupation forces as required.

d. The seizure of minor enemy shore positions capable of reduction by

such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet organization.

e. Naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The air aspects of those functions shall be coordinated with the Air Force,

including the development and procurement of aircraft, and air installations located on shore, and use shall be made of Air Force personnel, equipment and facilities in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased.

Subject to the above provision, the Navy will not be restricted as to types of aircraft maintained and operated for these purposes.

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APPENDIX 8

f. The air transport necessary for essential internal administration and

for air transport over routes of sole interest to naval forces where the requirements cannot be met by normal air transport facilities.

2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of

naval combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and the Air

Force in all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious

operations.

3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national

policies and interests of the United States.

4. To maintain the U.S. Marine Corps whose specific functions are:

a. To provide Marine Forces together with supporting air components,

for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and

for the conduct of limited land operations in connection therewith.

b. To develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force those

phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique and

equipment employed by landing forces.

c. To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy.

d. To provide security detachments for protection of naval property at

naval stations and bases.

e. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national policies and interests of the United States.

5. To assist the Army and the Air Force in the accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by

proper authority.

Section IV-Functions of the United States Air Force

General

The United States Air Force includes all military aviation forces, both combat

and service, not otherwise specifically assigned. It is organized, trained, and

equipped primarily for prompt and sustained air offensive and defensive operations. The Air Force is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary

for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime

components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

The specific functions of the United States Air Force are:

1. To organize, train and equip air forces for:

a. Air operations including joint operations.

b. Gaining and maintaining general air supremacy.

c. Establishing local air superiority where and as required.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

d. The strategic air force of the United States and strategic air reconnaissance.

e. Air lift and support for airborne operations.

f. Air support to land forces and naval forces, including support of occupation forces.

g. Air transport for the armed forces, except as provided by the Navy in

accordance with paragraph If of Section III.

2. To develop weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of

Air Force combat and service elements, coordinating with the Army and Navy on

all aspects of joint concern, including those which pertain to amphibious and airborne operations.

3. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such missions and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national

policies and interests of the United States.

4. To provide the means for coordination of air defense among all services.

5. To assist the Army and Navy in accomplishment of their missions, including the provision of common services and supplies as determined by proper

authority.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

The White House

July 26, 1947

300
Appendix 9

The National Security Act of 1947

(Public Law 253-80th Congress)

(Chapter 343-1st Session)

(S.758)

An Act

To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for

a National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department

of the Navy and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the

activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and

agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN CONGRESS

ASSEMBLED.

SHORT TITLE

That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947".

Table of Contents

Sec. 2 Declaration of policy.

Title I-Coordination for National Security

Sec. 101. National Security Council

Sec. 102. Central Intelligence Agency.

Sec. 103. National Security Resources Board.

Title II-The National Military Establishment

Sec. 201. National Military Establishment.

Sec. 202. Secretary of Defense.

Sec. 203. Military Assistants to the Secretary.

Sec. 204. Civilian personnel.

Sec. 205. Department of the Army.

Sec. 206. Department of the Navy.

Sec. 207. Department of the Air Force.

Sec. 208. United States Air Force.

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Sec. 209. Effective date of transfers.

Sec. 210. War Council

Sec. 211. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sec. 212. Joint Staff.

Sec. 213. Munitions Board.

Sec. 214. Research and Development Board.

Title Ill-Miscellaneous

Sec. 301. Compensation of Secretaries.

Sec. 302. Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.

Sec. 303. Advisory committees and personnel.

Sec. 304. Status of transferred civilian personnel.

Sec. 305. Saving provisions.

Sec. 306. Transfer of funds.

Sec. 307. Authorization for appropriations.

Sec. 308. Definitions

Sec. 309. Separability.

Sec. 310. Effective date.

Sec. 311. Succession to the Presidency.

Declaration of Policy

Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a

comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, to provide

for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments,

agencies and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to

provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the

Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps),

and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the

armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

Title 1-Coordination For National Security

National Security Council

Sec. 101. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council").

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council:

PROVIDED, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to

preside in his place.

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The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the

integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the

national security.

The Council shall be composed of the President; the Secretary of State, the

Secretary of Defense, appointed under section 202; the Secretary of the Army,

referred to in section 205; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air

Force, appointed under section 207; the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, appointed under section 103; and such of the following named officers as the President may designate from time to time: The Secretaries of the

executive departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board appointed under

section 213, and the Chairman of the Research and Development Board appointed under section 214; but no such additional member shall be designated

until the advice and consent of the Senate has been given to his appointment to

the office the holding of which authorizes his designation as a member of the

Council.

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct,

for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the

departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it

shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council-

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the

United States in relation to our actual and potential military power in the interest

of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President

in connection therewith; and

(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments

and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to

make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

(c) The Council shall have a staff to be headed by a civilian executive secretary who shall be appointed by the President, and who shall receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a year. The executive secretary, subject to the direction

of the Council, is hereby authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the

Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of

such personnel as may be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed

by the Council in connection with the performance of its functions.

(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and

such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President

may require.

Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council

a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence, who shall

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be the head thereof. The Director shall be appointed by the President, by and

with the advice and consent of the Senate from among the commissioned officers

of the armed services or from among individuals in civilian life. The Director

shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.

(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Director then-

(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, he shall be subject to no

supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than

would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected

with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department

of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof;, and

(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control powers, or

functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to exercise, as Director) with respect to the armed services or any component thereof,

the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of

the Air Force, or any branch, bureau, unit or division thereof, or with respect to

any of the personnel (military or civilian) of any of the foregoing.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of

Director of a commissioned officer of the armed services, and his acceptance of

and service in such office, shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade

he may occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, perquisite,

right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of any such status, office,

rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office

of Director, receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case

may be) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service and

shall be paid, from any funds available to defray the expenses of the Agency, annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which $14,000 exceeds the

amount of his annual military pay and allowances.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912

(37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelligence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or

advisable in the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the right of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any

other department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment by the United States Civil Service Commission.

(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several

Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it shall

be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council304
APPENDIX 9

(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the

national security;

(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the

Government as relate to the national security;

(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security

and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the

Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: PROVIDED, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers. or internal security functions: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the departments

and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: AND PROVIDED FURTHER,

That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines

can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time

direct.

(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the

Government, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall

be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intelligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments and

other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be made

available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation, and

dissemination: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That upon the written request of the

Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of shall make

available to the Director of Central Intelligence such information for correlation,

evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the national security.

(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken

office-

(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February

5, 1946) shall cease to exist; and

(2) the personnel, property and records of the Central Intelligence Group

are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency and such Group shall cease to

exist. Any unexpected balances of appropriations. allocations or other funds

available or authorized to be made available for such Group shall be available

and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner for expenditure by

the Agency.

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National Security Resources Board

Sec. 103. (a) There is hereby established a National Security Resources Board

(hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board") to be composed of the

Chairman of the Board and such heads or representatives of the various departments and independent agencies as may from time to time be designated by the

President to be members of the Board. The Chairman of the Board shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.

(b) The Chairman of the Board, subject to the direction of the President, is

authorized, subject to the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as

amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may be necessary to assist the Board in carrying out its functions.

(c) It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the

coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including-

(]) policies concerning industrial and civilian mobilization in order to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's

manpower in the event of war;

(2) programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation's natural

and industrial resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and

stabilization of the civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of

economy to war needs and conditions;

(3) policies for unifying, in time of war, the activities of Federal agencies

and departments engaged in or concerned with production, procurement, distribution, or transportation of military or civilian supplies, materials, and products;

(4) the relationship between potential supplies of, and potential requirements for, manpower, resources, and productive facilities in time of war;

(5) policies for establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical material, and for the conservation of these reserves;

(6) the strategic relocation of industries, services, government, and economic activities, the continuous operation of which is essential to the Nation's

security.

(d) In performing its functions, the Board shall utilize to the maximum extent

the facilities and resources of the departments and agencies of the Government.

Title ll-The National Military Establishment

Establishment of the National Military Establishment

Sec. 201. (a) There is hereby established the National Military Establishment,

and the Secretary of Defense shall be the head thereof.

(b) The National Military Establishment shall consist of the Department of the

Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, together with all other agencies created under title II of this Act.

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Secretary of Defense

Sec. 202. (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed

from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: PROVIDED, That a person who has within ten years been on active duty as

a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services shall not

be eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense

shall be the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. Under the direction of the President and subject to the provisions

of this Act he shall perform the following duties:

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein;

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments

and agencies;

(3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research;

(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the

departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the

Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies under the applicable appropriation Act: PROVIDED, That nothing herein contained

shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or to the Director of the

Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary: and PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the

Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual

executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties

relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.

(b) The Secretary of Defense shall submit annual written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the

National Military Establishment, together with such recommendations as he shall

deem appropriate.

(c) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a seal of office to be made for the

National Military Establishment, of such design as the President shall approve,

and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

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Military Assistants to the Secretary

Sec. 203. Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty as assistants

and personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but he shall not establish a military staff.

Civilian Personnel

Sec. 204. (a) The Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint from civilian

life not to exceed three special assistants to advise and assist him in the performance of his duties. Each such special assistant shall receive compensation at the

rate of $10,000 a year.

(b) The Secretary of Defense is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws

and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such other civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of

the functions of the National Military Establishment other than those of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Department of the Army

Sec. 205. (a) The Department of War shall hereafter be designated the Department of the Army, and the title of the Secretary of War shall be changed to Secretary of the Army. Changes shall be made in the titles of other officers and

activities of the Department of the Army as the Secretary of the Army may determine.

(b) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions relating to the Department

of War or to any officer or activity whose title is changed under this section shall,

insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to

relate to the Department of the Army within the National Military Establishment

or to such officer or activity designated by his or its new title.

(c) The term "Department of the Army" as used in this Act shall be construed

to mean the Department of the Army at the seat of government and all field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under

the control or supervision of the Department of the Army.

(d) The Secretary of the Army shall cause a seal of office to be made for the

Department of the Army of such design as the President may approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

(e) In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army,

shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be

responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint

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mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to

meet the needs of war.

Department of the Navy

Sec. 206. (a) The term "Department of the Navy" as used in this Act shall be

construed to mean the Department of the Navy at the seat of government; the

headquarters, United States Marine Corps; the entire operating force of the

United States Navy, including naval aviation, and of the United States Marine

Corps, including the reserve components of such forces; all field activities, headquarters, forces, bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or

supervision of the Department of the Navy; and the United States Coast Guard

when operating as a part of the Navy pursuant to law.

(b) In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy,

shall include naval combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt

and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the

preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except

as otherwise assigned, and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization

plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the

needs of war.

All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof

within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat and

service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in

the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder

of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and

equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to

these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the

Navy.

(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall

include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic

therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide

fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components,

for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and

for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of

a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations

which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing

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forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organiza- tions for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall

perform such other duties as the President may direct: PROVIDED, That such

additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which

the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible,

in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans for the expansion of

peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Department of the Air Force

Sec. 207. (a) Within the National Military Establishment there is hereby established an executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force

and a Secretary of the Air Force, who shall be the head thereof. The Secretary of

the Air Force shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with

the advice and consent of the Senate.

(b) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes is amended to include the Department

of the Air Force and the provisions of so much of Title IV of the Revised Statutes

as now or hereafter amended as is not inconsistent with the Act shall be applicable to the Department of the Air Force.

(c) The term "Department of the Air Force" as used in this Act shall be construed to mean the Department of the Air Force at the seat of government and all

field headquarters, forces, reserve components, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) There shall be in the Department of the Air Force an Under Secretary of

the Air Force and two Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate.

(e) The several officers of the Department of the Air Force shall perform such

functions as the Secretary of the Air Force may prescribc.

(f) So much of the functions of the Secretary of the Army and of the Department of the Army, including those of any officer of such Department as are assigned to or under the control of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, or

as are deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be necessary or desirable for the operations of the Department of the Air Force or the United States Air Force,

shall be transferred to and vested in the Secretary of the Air Force and the Department of the Air Force: PROVIDED, That the National Guard Bureau shall, in

addition to the functions and duties performed by it for the Department of the

Army, be charged with similar functions and duties for the Department of the Air

Force, and shall be the channel of communication between the Department of the

Air Force and the several States on all matters pertaining to the Air National

Guard: AND PROVIDED FURTHER, That, in order to permit an orderly transfer. the Secretary of Defense may, during the transfer period hereinafter pre310
APPENDIX 9

scribed, direct that the Department of the Army shall continue for appropriate periods to exercise any of such functions, insofar as they relate to the Department

of the Air Force, or the United States Air Force or their property and personnel.

Such of the property, personnel, and records of the Department of the Army used

in the exercise of functions transferred under this subsection as the Secretary of

Defense shall determine shall be transferred or assigned to the Department of the

Air Force.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force shall cause a seal of office to be made for

the Department of the Air Force, of such device as the President shall approve

and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

United States Air Force

Sec. 208. (a) The United States Air Force is hereby established under the Department of the Air Force. The Army Air Forces, the Air Corps, United States

Army, and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Command),

shall be transferred to the United States Air Force.

(b) There shall be a Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a

term of four years from among the officers of general rank who are assigned to or

commissioned in the United States Air Force. Under the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, shall exercise

command over the United States Air Force and shall be charged with the duty of

carrying into execution all lawful orders and directions which may be transmitted

to him. The functions of the Commanding General, General Headquarters Air

Force (Air Force Combat Command), and of the Chief of the Air Corps and of

the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be transferred to the Chief of

Staff, United States Air Force. When such transfer becomes effective, the offices

of the Chief of the Air Corps, United States Army, and Assistants to the Chief of

the Air Corps, United States Army, provided for by the Act of June 4, 1920, as

amended (41 Stat. 768), and Commanding General, General Headquarters Air

Force, provided for by section 5 of the Act of June 16, 1936 (49 Stat. 1525), shall

cease to exist. While holding office as Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, the

incumbent shall hold a grade and receive allowances equivalent to those prescribed by law for the Chief of Staff, United States Army. The Chief of Staff,

United States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff,

United States Air Force, shall take rank among themselves according to their

relative dates of appointment as such, and shall each take rank above all other officers on the active list of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: PROVIDED, That

nothing in this Act shall have the effect of changing the relative rank of the present Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the present Chief of Naval Operations.

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(c) All commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, commissioned, holding warrants, or enlisted, in the Air Corps, United States Army, or

the Army Air Forces, shall be transferred in branch to the United States Air

Force. All other commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, who

are commissioned, hold warrants, or are enlisted, in any component of the Army

of the United States and who are under the authority or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued under the authority or

command of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, and under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Air Force. Personnel whose status is affected by

this subsection shall retain their existing commissions, warrants, or enlisted

status in existing components of the armed forces unless otherwise altered or terminated in accordance with existing law; and they shall not be deemed to have

been appointed to a new or different office or grade, or to have vacated their permanent or temporary appointments in an existing component of the armed forces,

solely by virtue of any change in status under this subsection. No such change in

status shall alter or prejudice the status of any individual so assigned, so as to deprive him of any right, benefit, or privilege to which he may be entitled under existing law.

(d) Except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, all property, records, installations, agencies, activities, projects, and civilian personnel

under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, shall be continued to the same extent under the jurisdiction, control, authority, or command, respectively, of the Chief of Staff, United

States Air Force, in the Department of the Air Force.

(e) For a period of two years from the date of enactment of this Act, personnel

(both military and civilian), property, records, installations, agencies, activities,

and projects may be transferred between the Department of the Army and the

Department of the Air Force by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

(f) In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both

combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and

equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in

accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the

peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.

Effective Date of Transfers

Sec. 209. Each transfer, assignment, or change in status under section 207 or

section 208 shall take effect upon such date or dates as may be prescribed by the

Secretary of Defense.

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War Council

Sec. 210. There shall be within the National Military Establishment a War

Council composed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chairman, who shall have

power of decision; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The War Council

shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad policy relating to the

armed forces, and shall consider and report on such other matters as the Secretary

of Defense may direct.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Sec. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the National Military Establishment the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chief of Staff,

United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United

States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be

one.

(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of

Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-

(]) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of

the military forces;

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified

commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the

military forces;

(6) to review major material and personnel requirements of the military

forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) to provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee

of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the

United Nations.

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall act as the principal military advisers to the

President and the Secretary of Defense and shall perform such other duties as the

President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as many as prescribed by

law.

Joint Staff

Sec. 212. There shall be, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed one hundred officers and to be composed of approximately

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equal numbers of officers from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff,

operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall

perform such duties as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director

shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Munitions Board

Sec. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the

"Board").

(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head

thereof, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three

military departments, to be designated in each case by the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive

compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.

(c) It shall be the duty of the Board under the direction of the Secretary of Defense and in support of strategic and logistic plans prepared by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff-

(1) to coordinate the appropriate activities within the National Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of the departments and agencies comprising the

Establishment;

(2) to plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization;

(3) to recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among the

several military services and to plan for standardization of specifications and for

the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment

and common use items on the basis of single procurement;

(4) to prepare estimates of potential production procurement and personnel

for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations;

(5) to determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military

procurement programs;

(6) to supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities;

(7) to make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of procurement production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

(8) to maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper

correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material and maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and to make recommendations as

to policies in connection therewith;

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(9) to assemble and review material and personnel requirements presented

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those presented by the production, procurement,

and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Defense: and

(10) to perform such duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the Joint

Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and

facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

Research and Development Board

Sec. 214. (a) There is hereby established in the National Military Establishment a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in this section referred

to as the "Board"). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the

head thereof, and two representatives from each of the Departments of the Army,

Navy, and Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from civilian life by the President,

by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall receive compensation

at the rate of $14,000 a year. The purpose of the Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate provision for research and

development on scientific problems relating to the national security.

(b) it shall be the duty of the Board, under the direction of the Secretary of

Defense-

(1) to prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;

(2) to advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national

security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress:

(3) to recommend measures of coordination of research and development

among the military departments and allocation among them of responsibilities for

specific programs of joint interest;

(4) to formulate policy for the National Military establishment in connection with research and development matters involving agencies outside the National Military Establishment;

(5) to consider the interaction of research and development and strategy,

and to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith; and

(6) to perform such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may direct.

(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office the Joint

Research and Development Board shall cease to exist and all its records and personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Board.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel and

facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the performance of its functions.

Title Ill-Miscellaneous

Compensation of Secretaries

Sec. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

(b) The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of

the Air Force shall each receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of

executive departments.

Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries

Sec. 302. The Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the

Navy, and the Air Force shall each receive compensation at the rate of $10,000 a

year and shall perform such duties as the Secretaries of their respective departments may prescribe.

Advisory Committees and Personnel

Sec. 303. (a) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the National Security

Resources Board, and the Director of Central Intelligence are authorized to appoint such advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions

of this Act, such part-time advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in

carrying out their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their

control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for

which they receive compensation while serving as members of such committees

shall receive no additional compensation for such service. Other members of

such committees and other part-time advisory personnel so employed may serve

without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $35

for each day of service, as determined by the appointing authority.

(b) Service of an individual as a member of any such advisory committee, or

in any other part-time capacity for a department or agency hereunder, shall not be

considered as service bringing such individual within the provisions of section

109 or 113 of the Criminal Code (U.S.C. 1940 edition, title 18, secs. 198 and

203), or section 19 (e) of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944, unless the act of

such individual, which by such section is made unlawful when performed by an

individual referred to in such section, is with respect to any particular matter

which directly involves a department or agency which such person is advising or

in which such department or agency is directly interested.

316
APPENDIX 9

Status of Transferred Civilian Personnel

See. 304. All transfers of civilian personnel under this Act shall be without

change in classification or compensation, but the head of any department or

agency to which such a transfer is made is authorized to make such changes in

the titles and designations and prescribe such changes in the duties of such personnel commensurate with their classification as he may deem necessary and appropriate.

Saving Provisions

Sec. 305. (a) All laws, orders, regulations, and other actions applicable with

respect to any function, activity, personnel, property, records, or other thing

transferred under this Act, or with respect to any officer, department, or agency

from which such transfer is made, shall except to the extent rescinded, modified,

superseded, terminated, or made inapplicable by or under authority of law, have

the same effect as if such transfer had not been made; but, after any such transfer,

any such law, order, regulation, or other action which vested functions in or otherwise related to any officer, department, or agency from which such transfers

was made shall, insofar as applicable with respect to the function, activity, personnel, property, records or other thing transferred and to the extent not inconsistent with other provisions of this Act, be deemed to have vested such function in

or relate to the officer, department, or agency to which the transfer was made.

(b) No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against the

head of any department or agency or other officer of the United States. in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties, shall abate by

reason of the taking effect of any transfer or change in title under the provisions

of this Act; and, in the case of any such transfer, such suit, action, or other proceeding may be maintained by or against the successor of such head or other officer under the transfer, but only if the court shall allow the same to be maintained

on motion or supplemental petition filed within twelve months after such transfer

takes effect, showing a necessity for the survival of such suit, action, or other

proceeding to obtain settlement of the questions involved.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the second paragraph of section 5 of title I of the First War Powers Act, 1941, the existing organization of the War Department under the provisions of Executive Order Number 9082 of February 28,

1942, as modified by Executive Order Number 9722 of May 13, 1946, and the

existing organization of the Department of the Navy under the provisions of Executive Order Numbered 9635 of September 29, 1945, including the assignment

of functions to organizational units within the War and Navy Departments, may,

to the extent determined by the Secretary of Defense, continue in force for two

years following the date of enactment of this Act except to the extent modified

by the provisions of this Act or under the authority of law.

317
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Transfer of Funds

Sec. 306. All unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by or

on behalf of the Army Air Forces or officers thereof, shall be transferred to the

Department of the Air Force for use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such other unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, nonappropriated funds, or other funds available or hereafter made available for use by the

Department of War or the Department of the Army in exercise of functions transferred to the Department of the Air Force under this Act, as the Secretary of Defense shall determine, shall be transferred to the Department of the Air Force for

use in connection with the exercise of its functions. Unexpended balances transferred under this section may be used for the purposes for which the appropriations, allocations, or other funds were originally made available, or for new

expenditures occasioned by the enactment of this Act. The transfers herein

authorized may be made with or without warrant action as may be appropriate

from time to time from any appropriation covered by this section to any other

such appropriation or to such new accounts established on the books of the

Treasury as may be determined to be necessary to carry into effect provisions of

this Act.

Authorization for Appropriations

Sec. 307. There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be

necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions and purpose of this Act.

Definitions

Sec. 308. (a) As used in this Act, the term "function" includes functions, powers and duties.

(b) As used in this Act, the term "budget program" refers to recommendations

as to the apportionment, to the allocation and to the review of allotments of appropriated funds.

Separability

Sec. 309. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person

or circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and of

the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be

affected thereby.

318
APPENDIX 9

Effective Date

Sec. 310. (a) The first sentence of section 202 (a) and sections 1, 2, 307, 308,

309, and 310 shall take effect immediately upon the enactment of this Act.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), the provisions of this Act shall take

effect on whichever of the following days is the earlier: The day after the day

upon which the Secretary of Defense first appointed takes office, or the sixtieth

day after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Succession to the Presidency

Sec. 311. Paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of section I of the Act entitled "An

Act to provide for the performance of the duties of the office of President in case

of the removal, resignation, death, or inability both of the President and Vice

President", approved July 18, 1947, is amended by striking out "Secretary of

War" and inserting in lieu thereof "Secretary of Defense", and by striking out

"Secretary of the Navy."

Approved July 26, 1947.

319
Appendix 10

Army Air Forces

United States Air Force

Headquarters Staff

Chief ofAir Corps

Maj Gen George H. Brett Maj Gen Walter R. Weaver [Acting]

May 30, 1941-Dec 8, 1941 Dec 8, 1941-Mar 9, 1942

Assistant Chief ofAir Corps

Brig Gen Davenport Johnson Brig Gen Muir S. Fairchild

Oct2, 1940-Aug 8, 1941 Aug 8, 1941-Mar 9, 1942

Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command

Lt Gen Delos C. Emmons Maj Gen Carl A. Spaatz

Mar 1, 1939-Dec 17, 1941 Jan 27, 1942-Mar 8, 1942

Maj Gen Millard F. Harmon [Actg]

Dec 17, 1941-Jan 26, 1942

Chief Army Air Forces

Maj Gen/Lt Gen Henry H. Arnold

June 20, 1941-Mar 9, 1942

320
APPENDIX 10

Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Lt Gen/Gen Henry H. Arnold* General Carl A. Spaatz

Mar 9, 1942-Feb 9, 1946 Feb 9, 1946-Sept 26, 1947

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

General Carl A. Spaatz

Sept 26, 1947-Apr 30, 1948

Vice Chief of Staff

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg

Oct 10, 1947-Apr 28, 1948

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

Maj Gen William F. McKee

Sept 27, 1947-May 11, 1953

Chief of Air Staff;

Deputy Commander and Chief of Air Staff

Brig Gen Carl A. Spaatz Maj Gen/Lt Gen Barney M. Giles!

Jun 20, 1941-Jan 26, 1942 Jul 26, 1943-Apr 30, 1945

Maj Gen Millard F. Harmon Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker

Jan 27, 1942-Jul 6, 1942 Apr 30, 1945-Aug 31, 1947

Maj Gen George E. Stratemeyer

Jul 6, 1942-Jul 26, 1943

Deputy Chief of Air Staff

Maj Gen Charles C. Chauncey Brig Gen Reuben C. Hood

June 2, 1945-Oct 1, 1947 Jan 18, 1945-Feb 19, 1947

*Became General of the Army (temporary) December 21, 1944. Appointed to permanent rank of General of the Army, March 25, 1946, and appointed General of the Air Force

May 7, 1949, both actions by Act of Congress.

TGiles was Chief of Air Staff, July 1943-Apr 1945. He became Deputy Commander as

well as Chief of Air Staff, in May 1944.

321
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Deputy Chiefs of Staff*

Brig Gen Laurence S. Kuter Brig Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr.

Mar 9, 1942-Oct 17, 1942 Oct 23, 1943-Aug 20, 1944

Brig Gen Thomas J. Hanley Brig Gen Patrick W. Timberlake

Oct 17, 1942-Jun 25, 1943 Apr 29, 1944-Jul 3, 1945

Brig Gen LaVerne G. Saunders Brig Gen Donald Wilson

Mar 29, 1943-Aug 25, 1943 May 10, 1944-Sept 2, 1944

Brig Gen William E. Hall Brig Gen Roy L. Owens

Mar 29, 1943-Sep 4, 1944 July 3, 1944-May 15, 1945

Brig Gen Edwin S. Perrin Brig Gen/Maj Gen Lauris Norstad

Jun 25, 1943-Apr 29, 1944 Aug 20, 1944-May 8, 1945

Brig Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg Brig Gen Frederick H. Smith

Aug 25, 1943-Mar 16, 1944 Sept 2, 1944-Jan 15, 1945

Deputy Chief of Staff, Research & Development

Maj Gen/Lt Gen Curtis E. LeMay

Dec 5, 1945-Oct 9, 1947

Chief Plans; Assistant Chief Air Staff, Plans

Lt Col/Col Harold L. George Brig Gen Joe L. Loutzenheiser [actg]

Jun 20, 1941-Mar 9, 1942 May 8, 1945-June 27, 1945

Col Howard A. Craig Maj Gen Lauris Norstad

Mar 9, 1942-Jul 18, 1942 Jun 27, 1945-Jun 15, 1946

Col/Brig Gen Orvil A. Anderson Brig Gen Frank F. Everest

Jul 18, 1942-Jul 8, 1943 Jun 15, 1946-Jun 27, 1946

Brig Gen/Maj Gen Laurence S. Kuter Maj Gen Otto P. Weyland

Jul 8, 1943-May 8, 1945 Jun 27, 1946-Oct 9, 1947

Director of Information

Lt Gen Harold L. George Brig Gen Emmett O'Donnell, Jr.

Mar 12, 1946-Aug 13, 1946 Aug 13, 1946-Sept 28, 1947

*The number varied through the years.

322
APPENDIX 10

Secretary-General, The Air Board

Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr

Mar 4, 1946-Jan 1948

Assistant Chief, Air Staff,

Operations, Commitments and Requirements;

Assistant Chief, Air Staff, Operations and Training

Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg Maj Gen Earle E. Partridge

Jun 25, 1945-Jan 26, 1946 Jan 26, 1946-Oct 9, 1947

Assistant Chief Air Staff, Personnel

Brig Gen Ralph P. Cousins Maj Gen Hubert R. Harmon

Jul 7, 1941-Jan 12, 1942 Feb 20, 1945-Jun 7, 1945

Col F. Trubee Davison Maj Gen Frederick L. Anderson

Jan 12, 1942-Mar 29, 1943 Jun 7, 1945-Sept 30, 1947

Brig Gen/Maj Gen James M. Bevans

Mar 29, 1943-Feb 20, 1945

Assistant Chief, Air Staff, Intelligence

Brig Gen Martin F. Scanlon Brig Gen Thomas D. White

Jun 20, 1941-Feb 21, 1942 Jan 5, 1944-Sept 2, 1944

Col Robert L. Walsh Maj Gen James P. Hodges

Feb 21, 1942-May 30, 1942 Sept 2, 1944-Jul 7, 1945

Brig Gen Hume Peabody Maj Gen Elwood R. Quesada

May 30, 1942-Jun 22, 1942 Jul 7, 1945-Feb 1946

Col/Brig Gen Edgar P. Sorensen Brig Gen George C. McDonald

Jun 22, 1942-Oct 21, 1943 Feb 1946-Oct 9, 1947

Maj Gen Clayton L. Bissell

Oct 21, 1943-Jan 5, 1944

Assistant Chief, Air Staff, Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution;

Assistant Chief, Air Staff, Materiel and Services;

Assistant Chief, Air Staff, Materiel

Col Edgar P. Sorensen Col/Brig Gen Thomas J. Hanley

Jun 20, 1941-Jan 4, 1942 Jan 4, 1942-Oct 17, 1942

323
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Col Richard H. Ballard Brig Gen/Maj Gen Edward M. Powers

Oct 17, 1942-Mar 29, 1943 Apr 27, 1945-Oct 9, 1947

Maj Gen Oliver Echols

Mar 29, 1943-Apr 27, 1945

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration

Lt Gen Idwal H. Edwards

Oct 10, 1947-Apr 28, 1948

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

Lt Gen Lauris Norstad

Oct 10, 1947-Mar 1, 1950

Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel

Lt Gen Howard A. Craig

Oct 10, 1947-Sep 15, 1949

Air Inspector

Brig Gen Herbert A. Dargue Maj Gen Follet Bradley

Jun 20, 1941-July 24, 1941 Mar 28, 1943-Jul 13, 1943

Col Edmund W. Hill Brig Gen/Maj Gen Junius W. Jones

Jul 24, 1941-Jul 18, 1942 Jul 13, 1943-Oct 9, 1947

Col John F. Whiteley

Jul 18, 1942-Mar 28, 1943

Air Adjutant General

Col William W. Dick Lt Col H. H. Hewitt [Acting]

Jun 20, 1941-Sept 19, 1942 Dec 15, 1943-Dec 27, 1943

Col Fred Milner Col T. A. FitzPatrick

Sept 19, 1942-Sept 28, 1943 Dec 27, 1943-May 8, 1944

Col John B. Cooley Col Hugh G. Culton*

Sept 28, 1943-Dec 15, 1943 Jun 8, 1945-Oct 9, 1947

*No AAG from May 8, 1944, to Jun 8, 1945.

324
Appendix 11

[63 Stat.]

PUBLIC LAW 216-August 10, 1949

Public Law 216 Chapter 412

An Act

To reorganize fiscal management in the National Military Establishment to promote economy and efficiency, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States

of America in Congress assembled.

SHORT TITLE

Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "National Security Act Amendments

of 1949".

Sec. 2. Section 2 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a

comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide

for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments,

agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to

provide three military departments, separately administered, for the operation

and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the

United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and

service components; to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified

direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge

them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for

their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient

team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over

the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff)."

325
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

CHANGE IN COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Sec. 3. The fourth paragraph of section 101 (a) of the National Security Act of

1947 is amended to read as follows:

"The Council shall be composed of-

"'(1) the President;

"(2) the Vice President;

"(3) the Secretary of State;

"(4) the Secretary of Defense;

"(5) the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and

"(6) The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, the Chairman of the Munitions Board, and the Chairman of the Research and Development

Board, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure."

CONVERSION OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT INTO

AN EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Sec. 4. Section 201 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec. 201. (a) There is hereby established, as an Executive Department of the

Government, the Department of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense shall be

the head thereof.

(b) There shall be within the Department of Defense (1) the Department of

the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, and

each such department shall on and after the date of enactment of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 be military departments in lieu of their prior

status as Executive Departments, and (2) all other agencies created under title II

of this Act.

"(c) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec. 158. The provisions of this title shall apply to the following Executive

Departments:

"First. The Department of State.

"Second. The Department of Defense.

"Third. The Department of the Treasury.

"Fourth. The Department of Justice.

"Fifth. The Post Office Department.

"Sixth. The Department of the Interior.

"*Seventh. The Department of Agriculture.

"-Eighth. The Department of Commerce.

"Ninth. The Department of Labor.

326
APPENDIX 11

"(d) Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, provisions of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended should be

applicable to the Department of Defense."

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Sec. 5. Section 202 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, is further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 202. (a) There shall be a Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed

from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: Provided, That a person who has within ten years been on active duty as a

commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services shall not be

eligible for appointment as Secretary of Defense.

"(b) The Secretary of Defense shall be the principal assistant to the President

in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Under the direction of the

President, and subject to the provisions of this Act, he shall have direct authority,

and control over the Department of Defense.

"(c) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the combatant functions assigned to the military services by sections 205 (e), 206 (b), 206 (c), and

208 (f) hereof shall not be transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated.

"(2) Military personnel shall not be so detailed or assigned as to impair such

combatant functions.

"(3) The Secretary of Defense shall not direct the use and expenditure of

funds of the Department of Defense in such manner as to effect the results prohibited by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.

"(4) The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force shall be separately

administered by their respective Secretaries under the direction, authority, and

control of the Secretary of Defense.

"(5) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection no function

which has been or is hereafter authorized by law to be performed by the Department of Defense shall be substantially transferred, reassigned, abolished or consolidated until after a report in regard to all pertinent details shall have been

made by the Secretary of Defense to the Committees on Armed Services of the

Congress.

"(6) No provision of this Act shall be so construed as to prevent a Secretary of

a military department or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting to

the Congress on his own initiative, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relating to the Department of Defense that he may

deem proper.

"(d) The Secretary of Defense shall not less often than semiannually submit

written reports to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, work

and accomplishments of the Department of Defense, accompanied by (1) such

recommendations as he shall deem appropriate, (2) separate reports from the

327
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

military departments covering their expenditures, work and accomplishments,

and (3) itemized statements showing the savings of public funds and the eliminations for unnecessary duplications and overlappings that have been accomplished

pursuant to the provisions of this Act.

"(e) The Secretary of Defense shall cause a seal of office to be made for the

Department of Defense, of such design as the President shall approve, and judicial notice shall be taken thereof.

"(f) The Secretary of Defense may, without being relieved of his responsibility therefor, and unless prohibited by some specific provision of this Act or other

specific provision of law, perform any function vested in him through or with the

aid of such officials or organizational entities of the Department of Defense as he

may designate."

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE;

ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE;

MILITARY ASSISTANTS; AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Sec. 6 (a) Section 203 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read

as follows:

"Sec. 203. (a) There shall be a Deputy Secretary of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate: Provided, That a person who has within ten years been on active duty

as a commissioned officer in a Regular component of the armed services shall

not be eligible for appointment as Deputy Secretary of Defense. The Deputy

Secretary shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of

Defense may prescribe and shall take precedence in the Department of Defense

next after the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary shall act for, and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense during his absence or disability.

"(b) There shall be three Assistant Secretaries of Defense, who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate. The Assistant Secretaries shall perform such duties and exercise such

powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe and shall take precedence in

the Department of Defense after the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary

of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force.

"(c) Officers of the armed services may be detailed to duty as assistants and

personal aides to the Secretary of Defense, but hc shall not establish a military

Staff other than that provided for by section 211 (a) of this Act."

"(b) Section 204 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec 204. The Secretary of Defense is authorized, subject to the civil service

laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, to appoint and fix the compensation of such civilian personnel as may be necessary for the performance of

328
APPENDIX I11

the functions of the Department of Defense other than those of the Departments

of the Army, Navy, and Air Force."

CREATING THE POSITION OF CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF

STAFF AND PRESCRIBING HIS POWERS AND DUTIES

Sec. 7. (a) Section 210 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to

read as follows:

"Sec. 210. There shall be within the Department of Defense an Armed Forces

Policy Council composed of the Secretary of Defense, as Chairman, who shall

have power of decision; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the

Army; The Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of

Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The Armed

Forces Policy Council shall advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad

policy relating to the armed forces and shall consider and report on such other

matters as the Secretary of Defense may direct."

"(b) Section 211 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the

presiding officer thereof but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United

States Army, the Chief of Naval Operations: and the Chief of Staff, United States

Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the

President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

"-(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary

of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall perform the following duties, in addition to such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct:

"(1) preparation of strategic plans and provision for the strategic direction of the military forces;

"(2) preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment to the military

services of logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

"(3) establishment of unified commands in strategic areas;

"(4) review of major material and personnel requirements of the military

forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans;

"(5) formulation of policies for joint training of the military forces;

"(6) formulation of policies for coordinating the military education of

members of the military forces; and

"(7) providing United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the

Charter of the United Nations.

"(c) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereinafter referred to as the

'Chairman') shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and con329
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

sent of the Senate from among the Regular officers of the armed services to serve

at the pleasure of the President for a term of two years and shall be eligible for

one reappointment, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, except in

time of war hereafter declared by the Congress when there shall be no limitation

on the number of such reappointments. The Chairman shall receive the basic pay

and basic and personal money allowances prescribed by law for the Chief of

Staff, United States Army, and such special pays and hazardous duty pays to

which he may be entitled under other provisions of law.

"(d) The Chairman, if in the grade of general, shall be additional to the number of officers in the grade of general provided in the third proviso of section 504

(b) of the Office Personnel Act of 1947 (Public Law 381, Eightieth Congress) or,

of [sic] in the rank of admiral, shall be additional to the number of officers having the rank of admiral provided in section 413 (a) of such Act. While holding

such office he shall take precedence over all other officers of the armed services:

Provided, That the Chairman shall not exercise military command over the Joint

Chiefs of Staff or over any of the military services.

"(e) In addition to participating as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the

performance of the duties assigned in subsection (b) of this section, the Chairman

shall, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of

Defense, perform the following duties:

"(I) serve as the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

"(2) provide agenda for meetings of the Joint Chicfs of Staff and assist

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prosecute their business as promptly as

practicable; and

"(3) inform the Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate as determined by the President or the Secretary of Defense, the President, of

those issues upon which agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff

has not been reached."

"(c) Section 212 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to

read as follows:

"'Sec. 212. There shall be, under the Joint Chief of Staff, a Joint Staff to consist of not to exceed two hundred and ten officers and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

from each of the three armed services. The Joint Staff, operating under a Director thereof appointed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall perform such duties as

may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director shall be an officer junior in grade to all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO THE MUNITIONS BOARD

Sec. 8. Section 213 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

330
APPENDIX I 1

"Sec. 213. (a) There is hereby established in the Department of Defense a Munitions Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Board").

"(b) The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head

thereof and who shall, subject to the authority of the Secretary of Defense and in

respect to such matters authorized by him, have the power of decision upon matters falling within the jurisdiction of the Board, and an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments, to be designated in

each case by the Secretaries of their respective departments. The Chairman shall

be appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with advice and consent

of the Senate, and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year.

"(c) Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, the

Board shall perform the following duties in support of strategic and logistic plans

and in consonance with guidance in those fields provided by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, and such other duties as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe:

"(1) coordination of the appropriate activities with regard to industrial

matters, including the procurement, production, and distribution plans of Lbc Department of Defense;

"(2) planning for the military aspects of iiuastrial mobilization;

"(3) assignment of procurement responsibilities among the several military

departments and planning for standardization of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation of purchase authority of technical equipment and common use items on the basis of single procurement;

"(4) preparation of estimates of potential production, procurement, and

personnel for use in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations;

"(5) determination of relative priorities of the various segments of the

military procurement programs;

"(6) supervision of such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to

consider the subjects falling within the scope of the Board's responsibilities;

"(7) regrouping, combining, or dissolving of existing interservice agencies

operating in the fields of procurement, production, and distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy;

"(8) maintenance of liaison with other departments and agencies for the

proper correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in regard to the procurement or disposition of strategic and critical material

and the maintenance of adequate reserves of such material, and making of recommendations as to policies in connection therewith; and

"(9) assembly and review of material and personnel requirements presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the production, procurement, and distribution agencies assigned to meet military needs, and making of

recommendations thereon to the Secretary of Defense.

331
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

"(d) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the

Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board shall cease to exist and all its records and

personnel shall be transferred to the Munitions Board.

"(e) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel

and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the

performance of its functions."

CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD

Sec. 9. Section 214 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec 214. (a) There is hereby established in the Department of Defense a Research and Development Board (hereinafter in this section referred to as the

'Board'). The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall be the head

thereof and who shall, subject to the authority of the Secretary of Defense and in

respect to such matters authorized by him, have the power of decision on matters

falling within the jurisdiction of the Board, and two representatives from each of

the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to be designated by the Secretaries of their respective Departments. The Chairman shall be appointed from

civilian life by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,

and shall receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year. The purpose of the

Board shall be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in assuring adequate

provision for research and development on scientific problems relating to the national security.

"-(b) Subject to the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense, the

Board shall perform the following duties and such other duties as the Secretary

of Defense may prescribe:

"(1) preparation of a complete and integrated program of research and development for military purposes;

"(2) advising with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security and the measures necessary to assure continued and increasing

progress; "(3) coordination of research and development among the military departments and allocations among them of responsibilities for specific programs;

"(4) formulation of policy for the Department of Defense in connection

with research and development matters involving agencies outside the Department of Defense; and

"-(5) consideration of the interaction of research and development and

strategy, and advising the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith.

332
APPENDIX 11

"(c) When the Chairman of the Board first appointed has taken office, the

Joint Research and Development Board shall cease to exist and all its records and

personnel shall be transferred to the Research and Development Board.

"(d) The Secretary of Defense shall provide the Board with such personnel

and facilities as the Secretary may determine to be required by the Board for the

performance of its functions."

COMPENSATION OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPUTY SECRETARY

OF DEFENSE, SECRETARIES OF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, AND

CONSULTANTS

Sec. 10. (a) Section 301 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to

read as follows:

"Sec. 301. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall receive the compensation prescribed by law for heads of executive departments.

"(b) the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall receive compensation at the rate

of $14,000 a year, or such other compensation plus $500 a year as may hereafter

be provided by law for under secretaries of executive departments. The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force

shall each receive compensation at the rate of $14,000 a year, or such other compensation as may hereafter be provided by law for under secretaries of executive

departments."

(b) Section 302 of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec. 302. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Under Secretaries and

Assistant Secretaries of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force shall each receive

compensation at the rate of $10,330 a year or at the rate hereafter prescribed by

law for assistant secretaries of executive departments and shall perform such duties as the respective Secretaries may prescribe."

(c) Section 303 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended to read as

follows:

"(a) The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National Security

Council, acting through its Executive Secretary, are authorized to appoint such

advisory committees and to employ, consistent with other provisions of this Act,

such parttime advisory personnel as they may deem necessary in carrying out

their respective functions and the functions of agencies under their control. Persons holding other offices or positions under the United States for which they receive compensation, while serving as members of such committees, shall receive

no additional compensation for such service. Other members of such committees

and other parttime advisory personnel so employed may serve without compensation or may receive compensation at a rate not to exceed $50 for each day of

service, as determined by the appointing authority."

333
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

REORGANIZATION OF FISCAL MANAGEMENT TO PROMOTE

ECONOMY AND EFFICIENCY

Sec. 11. The National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting at the end

thereof the following new title:

[Ed. Note] Material omitted (Title IV) can be found in: Alice C. Cole, et al,

eds., The Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978, (Washington, D.C.: OSD Historical Office, 1978), pp. 100-

106, or in: Joint Army and Air Force Bulletin Number 22, 22 August 1949.

334
Notes

Chapter 1

Roots of AAF Organization

1. Memo, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker to Her- tary Aeronautics, 1935-1945 (AAF Hist

man S. Wolk, Feb 3, 1977. Study 46, Washington, 1946).

2. Intvw, Lt Col Joe B. Green with Lt 12. Ibid.

Gen Ira C. Eaker, Washington, D.C., Feb 13. File, AG 320.2 (5-5-36) Misc

11, 1967. (Ret)-MC, May 8, 1936, cited in AAF Hist

3. Gen Peyton C. March, USAF, "Les- Study 46, p3 .

sons of World War I," War Department 14. Ltr, Maj Gen Frank M. Andrews,

Annual Reports, 1919 (Washington, 1920), CG, GHQ Air Force, to TAG, Apr 26,

pp 471-78. 1937, in Personal Papers of Maj Gen Hugh

4. Maj Carl A. Spaatz, "An Air Force," J. Knerr, Air Bd Gen File, RG 340, SAF,

1923, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, Colin, MD, LC. Box 10, MMB, NA.

5. Raymond R. Flugel, "United States 15. "The Air Force Crucible," Air

Air Power Doctrine: A Study of the Influ- Corps Newsletter, Jun 15, 1935, in Ofc/AF

ence of William Mitchell and Giulio Hist.

Douhet at the Air Corps Tactical School, 16. Ltr, Andrews to TAG, Apr 26,

1921-1935" (Ph.D. dissertation, University 1937.

of Oklahoma, 1965), p 185. 17. Ibid.

6. Aircraft in National Defense, Senate 18. Maj Gen Oscar Westover, "The

Documents, 69th Cong, 1st sess (Washing- Army Is Behind Its Air Corps," Air Corps

ton, 1926), p 29. Newsletter, Oct 1, 1937, pp 1-5.

7. Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: 19. Lecture, Maj Muir S. Fairchild, "Air

Crusader for Air Power (New York, 1964, Warfare," ACTS, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Oct

pg 101. 39, Gen Muir S. Fairchild Colin, Box 15,

8. James H. Doolittle Dissent to Final MD, LC.

Report of War Department Special Corn- 20. Lecture, Brig Gen Haywood S.

mittee on Army Air Corps (Washington, Hansell, Jr., "The Development of the

1934), Baker Board Report, RG 18, MMB, United States Concept of Bombardment

NA. Operations," AWC, AU, Maxwell AFB,

9. Maj John F. Shiner, "Birth of the Ala., Sep 19, 1951.

GHQ Air Force," Military Affairs, Oct 78, 21. Ltr, Secy of War Henry L. Stimson

pp 113-120. to Chmn, House and Senate Mil Affairs

10. AR 95-10, Air Corps Troops, Mar Cmtes, in AAF Hist Study, 46, p 19.

10, 1928, RG 18, 321.9, MMB, NA. 22. AR 95-5, Army Air Forces, Jun 20,

11. Report of Browning Board, Jan 7, 1941, para 2(a).

1936, AAG 334.7, Boards General, cited in 23. Ibid., para 4(d).

Chase C. Mooney, Organization of Mili- 24. Ibid., para 5(c).

335
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

25. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Mar- ministration, 1900-1963 (Washington,

shall: Ordeal and Hope (New York, 1966), 1975), Chap IV.

p 290. 45. App, WDGS, subj: A Single De26. Ibid. partment of War, n. d., RG 218, Rcrds of

27. Summary of Patch-Simpson Board JCS, CCS, 040, 11/2/43, Sec I, MMB, NA.

Interview with Gen Marshall, Sep 5, 1945, 46. Ibid.

Patch-Simpson Bd Files, RG 165, MMB, 47. Ibid.

NA. 48. Hearings before the Select Commit28. General Arnold's plan is published tee on Post-War Military Policy, House of

in Maj Gen Otto L. Nelson, Jr., USA, Na- Representatives, Proposal to Establish a

tional Security and the General Staff Single Department ofArmed Forces, Testi-

(Washington, 1946) pp 337-342. mony of Brig Gen William F. Tompkins,

29. Ibid., pp 338-39. USA, Dir/Sp Ping Div, WDGS, in Apr 44,

30. WD Cir 59, War Department Reor- 78th Cong, 2d sess (Washington, 1944), pt

ganization, Mar 2, 1942, pp 4-5, para 6(b). I, p 23.

3 1. Ibid., pp 5-6, para 6(c). 49. Report of the Chief of Staff to the

32. Nelson, p 335. Secretary of War, atch to memo, Maj Gen

33. Wesley F. Craven and James L. William F. Tompkins USA, Dir/Sp Ping

Cate, eds, The Army Air Forces in World Div, WDGS, to CSA, May 9, 1945, RG

War II, 7 vols (Chicago, 1948-1958), Vol 165, ACS, 319.1, Sec I, Case 7, Box 193,

VI: Men and Planes (1955), p 23. MMB, NA.

34. FM 100-20, Command and Em- 50. Ibid.

ployment of Air Power, Jul 21, 1943, Sec I, 5 I. Ibid.

para I. 52. Testimony of Gen Dwight D. Eisen35. Ibid., Sec I, para 3. hower, USA, in Oct 45 before the Senate

36. Ibid., Secs 1, 11. Committee on Military Affairs.

37. Memo, CSA, subj: A Single Depart- 53. Memo, Eaker to Herman S. Wolk,

ment of War in the Post-War Period, n.d., Feb 3, 1977.

atch to memo, Col William T. Sexton, 54. Memo for CSA fr Gen H. H. ArSecy, WDGS, for Secretariat, Joint US nold, CG, AAF, subj: Re-Survey of the

Chiefs of Staff, subj: A Single Department Troop Basis for the Post-War Army, Mar

of War in the Post-War Period, Nov 2, 31, 1945, RG 18, AAF, AAG, Mail &

1943; App, WDGS, to Sexton memo, Subj: Rcrds Div, Decimal File 1945, 381, Box

A Single Department of War, n.d., RG 218, 189, Postwar File, Vol 2, MMB, NA.

Rcrds of the US JCS, MMB, NA. 55. Intvw, Herman S. Wolk with Lt

38. App, WDGS, subj: A Single De- Gen Ira C. Eaker, Washington, D.C., Aug

partment of War, n.d., RG, Rcrds of JCS, 27, 1974; intvw, Herman S. Wolk with Maj

CCS, 040, 11/2/43, Sec I, MMB, NA. Gen Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., Washington

39. Ibid. D.C., Oct 7, 1974; ltr, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker.

40. Ltr, Prof. I. B. Holley, Jr., to Her- to Herman S. Wolk, Oct 22, 1974; Marman S. Wolk, Aug 10, 1980. garet Truman, Harry S. Truman (New

41. WDCir 347, Aug 25, 1944, p 5. York, 1973), p 273.

42. Ibid., p 4. 56. Henry H. Arnold, Third Report of

43. Ibid., p 5. the Commanding General of the Army Air

44. James E. Hewes, Jr., Front Root to Forces to the Secretary of War (Baltimore,

McNamara: Army Organization and Ad- 1945), p 33.

336
NOTES

57. Ltr, Gen Henry H. Arnold to Gen 63. Report by Marshal of the Royal Air

Carl A. Spaatz, Aug 19, 1945, Spaatz Force the Viscount Trenchard, The PrinciColln, Box 21, File Aug 45, MD, LC. ples of Air Power on War, May 45, Lt Gen

58. Gen Henry H. Arnold, "Air Power Ira C. Eaker Colln, Box 26, MD, LC.

and the Future," in Third Report of the 64. Gen Carl A. Spaatz, "Strategic Air

Commanding General of the Army Air Power: Fulfillment of a Concept," Foreign

Forces to the Secretary of War, Nov 45. Affairs, Apr 46, pp 385-396.

59. Memo for Dr. Theodore von Kar- 65. Memo, Spaatz to Asst Secy of War

man fr Gen Henry H. Arnold, subj: AAF for Air, subj: United States Contribution to

Long Range Development Program, Nov United Nations Security Forces, Feb 4,

7, 1944, Spaatz Colln, Box 58, MD, LC. 1947, OSAF 7a, Size and Composition of

60. Thomas A. Sturm, The USAF Scien- the Air Force, Bk I, 1945-49, MMB, NA.

tific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty 66. Address, Asst Secy of War for Air

Years, 1944-1964 (Washington, 1967), Stuart Symington to Oklahoma City ChamChap 1. ber of Commerce, Dec 9, 1946.

61. Arnold, Third Report of the Com- 67. Memo, Lt Gen James H. Doolittle

manding General of the Army Air Forces to Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Oct 25, 1945,

to the Secretary of War. Eaker Colln, MD, LC.

62. The New York Times, Oct 6, 1945, p

12.

Chapter 2

Planning for 70 Groups

1. Ltr, Gen Jacob E. Smart to H. S. War Air Force, Dec 12, 1943, RG 18, Box

Wolk, 17 Jul 1996. 189, MMB, NA; for Gen Henry H. Arnold

2. Brig Gen Orvil A. Anderson, A fr Brig Gen Laurence S. Kuter,

Study to Determine the Minimum Air ACAS/Plans, subj: Post War Air Force,

Power the United States Should Have at Dec 24, 1943, RG 18, Box 189, MMB,

the Conclusion of the War in Europe, Apr NA.

43, RG 18, AAF, OC/AS, Scientific Advsy 9. Memo for Arnold fr Kuter, Dec 24,

Gp 1941-Aug 47, Box 12, MMB, NA. 1943.

3. Ibid. 10. Memo for Gen Henry H. Arnold fr

4. Ibid. Maj Gen Laurence S. Kuter, ACAS/Plans,

5. Memo for Dep Cmdr, AAF, and subj: Status of Plans for the Post-War Air

Ch/Air Stf fr Maj Gen Laurence S. Kuter, Force, Jan 17, 1945, RG 18, Box 189,

ACAS/Plans, subj: Re-Survey of the Troop MMB, NA.

Basis for the Post-War Army, Mar 30, 11. Ibid.

1945, RG 18, AAF, AAG, Mail & Rcrds 12. See note 5.

Div, Decimal File 1945, Box 189, Postwar 13. See note 10.

File, Vol 2, MMB, NA. 14. Memo for Ch/Air Staff fr Brig Gen

6. Ibid. Byron E. Gates, Ch, Mgt Con, subj: Or7. Ibid. ganization to Accomplish Redeployment

8. Memo for Brig Gen Laurence S. Plans, Sep 4, 1944, RG 18, AAG, Mail &

Kuter by Col Reuben C. Moffat, subj: Post Rcrds Div, Decimal File, Jun 1944-1946,

337
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Folder "325 Optns 5 Post War Planning, Army, May 5, 1945, RG 18, Box 189,

June Through Sept 1944," Box 1515, MMB, NA.

MMB, NA. 38. Ibid.

15. Ibid. 39. Ibid.

16. See note 10. 40. Memo for Dep CSA fr Maj Gen

17. War Department Basic Plan for the William F. Tompkins, Dir/Sp Ping Div,

Post-War Military Establishment, Mar 13, subj: Attached Report of the Commanding

1945, p 2, RG 18, 1945, AAG 381, Post- General AAF-Re-Survey of the Troop

war, MMB, NA. Basis for the Post-War Army, Apr 7, 1947,

18. Ibid, p 3. RG 18, Box 189, MMB, NA.

19. Ibid. 41. Ibid.

20. Ibid. 42. Ibid.

21. Ibid. 43. War Department Views Concerning

22. Paper by Gen George C. Marshall Single Department of National Defense,

for Biennial Report of the Secretary of atch to memo, Maj Gen William F. TompWar, May 9, 1945, RG 165, 319.1, May kins, Dir/Sp Ping Div, subj: Attached re45, MMB, NA. port of the Commanding General

23. Ibid. AAF-Re-Survey of the Troop Basis for

24. Ibid. the Post-War Army, Apr 7, 1945, RG 18,

25. See note 5. Box 189, MMB, NA.

26. See note 5. 44. Ibid.

27. Memo for CSA (Attn: Sp Ping Div) 45. Presentation, Maj Gen William F.

fr Lt Gen Barney M. Giles, Dep Comdr, Tompkins, Dir/Sp Ping Div, to Senate

AAF, and Ch/Air Stf, subj: Report of Pro- Armed Svcs Cmte, May 1, 1945, RG 18,

gress on Re-Survey of the Troop Basis for 325, UMT Gen, MMB, NA.

the Post-War Army, Jan 15, 1945, RG 18, 46. Ibid.

Box 189, MMB, NA. 47. Ibid.

28. Draft memo, Col Reuben C. Moffat 48. Ibid.

to CSA (Attn: Sp Ping Div), subj: Report 49. Ibid.

of Progress on Re-Survey of the Troop Ba- 50. AAF Study, Universal Military

sis for the Post-War Army, Jan 14, 1945. Training, May 45, RG 18, 325, UMT Gen,

29. Ibid. MMB, NA.

30. Ibid. 51. Ibid.

31. Memo for CSA fr Gen Henry H. 52. Memo to Ch/Air Stf Ping Div,

Arnold, CG, AAF, subj: Re-Survey of the WDSS, fr Brig Gen F. Trubee Davison,

Troop Basis for the Post-War Army, Mar Ch/Sp Projs Div, AAF, subj: AAF V-J

31, 1945, RG 18, AAF, AAG, Mail & Plan as of July 1945, Jul 26, 1945, RG 18,

Rcrds Div, Decimal File 1945, 381, Box 1945, AAG 370.01 Conc-Mob-Demob,

189, Postwar File, Vol 2, MMB, NA. Vol 3/175; memo for Maj Gen Orvil A.

32. Ibid. Anderson fr Col William P. Berkeley, Exec

33. Ibid. to DCAS/Plans, subj: Chronological Sum34. Ibid. mary of Pertinent Documents, Available in

35. Ibid. AC/AS-5, on Air Force Troop Basis and

36. Ibid. Organization, Sep 19, 1946, RG 341, Plans

37. Memo for CG, AAF, fr Gen & Ops 320.2 (Apr 4, 1944), 129A, MMB,

Thomas T. Handy, Dep CSA, subj: Re- NA.

Survey of the Troop Basis for the Post-War

338
NOTES

53. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol II: 60. R&R Sheet, Cmt 1, Maj Gen Lauris

Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, Norstad, ACAS-5, subj: Proposed OrganiN.Y., 1956), p 48. zation and Deployment of the Post-War

54. Memo for Gen Henry H. Arnold fr Air Force (70-Group Program), Sep 11,

Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, ACAS-3, 1945, RG 18, AAG 370, Employment,

subj: Daily Activity Report of the AC/AS- 1945, Vol 5/174, MMB, NA.

3, Aug 28, 1945, RG 18, AAG 319.1, 61. MR, Col Jacob E. Smart, subj: DeOC&R DARs, 1945/369, MMB, NA. cisions Reached at Meeting in Gen Eaker's

55. Ibid. Office with Respect to Budget Estimates

56. Memo to Ch/Air Stf fr Maj Gen for Army Air Forces Program, Aug 28,

Lauris Norstad, ACAS/Plans, subj: AAF 1945.

V-J Plan, Sep 5, 1945, 145.86-52 [45-46], 62. R&R Sheet, Col John S. Hardy,

AFSHRC; memo to Ch/Air Stf fr Brig Gen ACAS-1 (Mil Pers Div), to ACS-3 (Orgn

F. Trubee Davison, subj: AAF V-J Plan, Div), subj: AAF Troop Program for 1 July

Aug 31, 1945, 145.86.52, AFSHRC; memo 1946, Nov 26, 1945, RG 18, 1945 AAG

for Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 320.2, AAF Prgm/91, MMB, NA; memo

ACAS/OC&R, fr Col Joseph J. Ladd, subj: for Anderson fr Berkeley, Sep 19, 1946;

Period II Troop Basis, Aug 27, 1945, RG R&R Sheet, Col Joseph J. Ladd, ACAS-3

18, 1945 AAG 320.2, Troop Basis, Vol 3, (Orgn Div), to ACAS-1, subj: AAF Troop

Box 96, MMB, NA; see note 53. Program for 1 Jul 1946, Nov 21, 1945 RG

57. Memo for Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vanden- 18, 1945 AAG 320.1, AAF Prgm/91,

berg fr Brig Gen George McCoy, Jr., subj: MMB, NA.

Bombardment Program in Interim Air 63. Memo, Davison to Ch/Air Staff, 31

Force, Aug 21, 1945, RG 18, AAG 1945, Aug 31, 1945; memo, Norstad to Ch/Air

452.1, Vol 4/231, MMB, NA; memo for Staff, Sep 5, 1945; Assumptions and

Gen Henry H. Arnold fr Lt Gen Hoyt S. Ground Rules Pertaining to the Interim and

Vandenberg, ACAS-3, subj: Deployment Peacetime Air Forces Plans, Dec 26, 1945.

of VHB Groups to European Theater, Aug 64. Revision of Assumptions and

24, 1945, RG 18, AAG 370, Employment Ground Rules of AAF VJ Plan as of 15

1945, Vol 5/174, MMB, NA. July 1945, Sep 19, 1945, AFHRA 145.86-

58. Memo for Dep CG, AAF, fr Lt Gen 90, AFHRA.

Hoyt S. Vandenberg, ACAS-3, subj: VHB 65. Ibid.

Deployment, Aug 30, 1945, RG 18, AAG 66. Ibid.

370, Employment 1945, Vol 5/174, MMB, 67. Memo fr Dep Comdr, AAF, fr Maj

NA. Gen Lauris Norstad, ACAS-5, subj: Com59. Memo for Lt Gen Hoyt S. Vanden- ments on "AF V-J Plan of 15 July 1945,

berg fr Brig Gen William A. Matheny, 145.86-52 (1045-46), AFHRA.

Ch/Commitments Div, ACAS-3, subj: 68. Interim Report of the Special War

Item of Interest for Gen Arnold, Oct 1, Department Committee on the Permanent

1945, RG 18, AAG 300.6, Memoranda and Military Establishment of the Army of the

Notes, 1945, Vol 3, MMB, NA; memo for United States (Bessell Committee), Sep 45,

Gen Henry H. Arnold fr Maj Gen Harold RG 165, SPD, 334, Sp WD Cmte on PME,

M. McClelland, Actg ACAS-3, subj: Daily MMB, NA.

Activity report of AC/AS-3, Dec 27, 1945, 69. Ibid.

RG 18, AAG 319.1, OC&R DARs, 70. Ibid.

1945/369, MMB, NA. 71. Ibid.

339
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

72. Memo for Brig Gens William E. 84. Ibid., p 410.

Bessell, Jr., Edwin W. Chamberlain, Gor- 85. Memo for CSA fr Gen Arnold, Dec

don E. Textor, Glen C. Jamison, Reuben E. 4, 1945.

Jenkins, and Henry C. Wolfe fr Brig Gen 86. Ibid.

Henry I. Hodes, Asst DCSA, subj: Strength 87. Ibid.

of Permanent Military Establishment, Oct 88. AAF Sum Sheet for Ch/Air Stf fr

15, 1945, 145-86-50, AFHRA. Brig Gen Reuben C. Hood, Jr., subj: JCS

73. Ibid. 1478/6 (Postwar Military and Naval

74. Tab A to memo for Sp Cmte on Str Strength), Dec 3, 1945, RG 341, P&O, PD

of PME, fr Brig Gen Henry 1. Hodes, Asst 009 (Aug 17, 1945), Annex 1/22, MMB,

DCSA, subj: Procedures and Policies for NA; memo for Ch/Air Stf Brig Gen Wilthe Preparation of Revised Report, Oct 15, liam F. McKee, Dep ACAS-3, subj: JCS

1945, 145-86-50, Oct-Dec, AFHRA. 1478/6 (Postwar Military and Naval

75. Memo, Brig Gen Henry I. Hodes, Strength), Nov 26, 1945.

Asst DCSA, subj: Special Committee on 89. Ibid.

the Strength of the Permanent Military Es- 90. Memo for CG, AAF, fr Maj Gen Idtablishment, Nov 6, 1945, 145.86-50, Oct- wal H. Edwards, ACS/G-3, WD, subj: JCS

Dec 45, AFHRA. 1478/6 (Postwar Military and Naval

76. Ibid. (Brig Gen Glen C. Jamison's Strength), Dec 14, 1945, RG 18, 1945,

handwritten comment on margin); MR, Col AAG 381, Postwar File, Vol 2, Box 189,

Jacob E. Smart, Secy of Air Stf, subj: Min- MMB, NA; memo for Ch/Air Stf fr Gen

utes of Staff Meeting, Oct 18, 1945, RG McKee, Nov 26, 1945.

18, AAG-37, 1945, Vol 9/156, MMB, NA. 91. AAF Sum Sheet for Ch/Air Stf fr

77. Memo for Brig Gen Edwin W. Gen Hood, Dec 3, 1945.

Chamberlain fr Brig Gen Glen C. Jamison, 92. Assumptions and Ground Rules

subj: Special Committee on the Strength of Pertaining to the Interim and Peacetime Air

the Permanent Military Establishment, Nov Forces Plans, Dec 26, 1945, RG 18, AAG

17, 1945, 145-86-50, Oct-Dec 45, AF- Central File 391, File War Plans Misc Nat

HRA. Def, Vol 2, Box 189, MMB, NA.

78. Minority Report of AAF Member of 93. Ibid.

Special War Department Committee on the 94. Ibid.

Permanent Military Establishment, enclo- 95. Ibid.

sure to memo for CSA fr Gen Henry N. 96. Ibid.

Arnold, CG, AAF, subj: Revised Report on 97. Ibid.

the Strength of the Permanent Military Es- 98. Ibid.

tablishment, Dec 4, 1945, RG 341, P&O 99. Memo for Anderson fr Berkeley,

320.1 (Apr 4, 1944), Sec 2/129A, MMB, Sep 19, 1946.

NA. 100. Memo for Brig Gen Glen C. Jami79. Ibid. son fr Lt Col Kenneth L. Garrett, subj: Ma80. Ibid. terial for Briefing of Generals Arnold and

81. Ibid. Eisenhower, Dec 8, 1945, 145.86-50, AF82. Ibid. HRA.

83. Address Before a Joint Session of 101. Ibid.

the Congress on Universal Military Train- 102. Ibid.

ing, Oct 23, 1945, in Public Papers of the 103. Ibid.; Ltr, Maj Gen Lauris NorPresident of the United States: Harry S. stad, ACAS-5, to Gen George C. Kenney,

Truman, 1945 (Washington, 1961), p 406. CG, PACUSA, Dec 17, 1945.

340
NOTES

104. Memorandum to Asst Sec of War 107. Tab C, "Breakdown of the 400,000

for Air, CG, AAF, Dep Cmdr, AAF, Chief Troop Program," to Memorandum for the

of Air Staff, et al, from Col R. C. Moffatt, Chief, Requirements Division, by Col P. T.

Chief Special Planning Div (by command Collen, Chief, Policy and Tactical Employof Gen Arnold), 26 Dec 1945, subj: As- ment Br., 19 Feb 1946, subj: Post War Air

sumptions and Ground Rules Pertaining to Force, in RG 18, AAG 321, Interim and

the Interim and Peacetime Air Forces Plan Peacetime Air Forces, Box 603, MMB,

(26 Dec 1945), in RG 18, AAG 381, Post- NA.

war File 1945, MMB; AAF Ltr 20-91, Lt 108. The New York Times, Oct 28, Sec

Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep Cmdr to Major AAF IV, p 10.

Commands and CGs and Commanders of 109. Ibid.

Independent Air Force Facilities, 15 Dec 110. Memorandum for the Chief of

1945, subj: Interim and Peacetime Air Staff, Feb 14, 1946, subj: Mobilization in a

Force Plans, in RG 18, 321, Interim Post- National Emergency Without Universal

war & Peacetime AFs, Box 603. Military Ti,.ining, in RG 341, AAF File,

105. Atch, Composition and Develop- MMB, NA.

ment of Interim Air Force, Postwar Div, 21 111. Ibid.

Nov 1945 to AAF Ltr, 20-91, 14 Feb 1946 112. Ibid.

(Supersedes previous Ltr 20-91), in RG 113. Ibid.

18, AAG, 321, Interim Postwar and Peace- 114. Draft, "Universal Military Traintime Air Forces, Box 603. ing," Dec 46, War Dept Training Division,

106. R&R Sheet, Maj Lauris Norstad, in RG 28, Decimal File 325, UMT, GenAC/AS-5 to Chief of Air Staff, Oct 3, eral, MMRB, NA.

1945, subj: Interim Command Organiza- 115. Ibid.

tion of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, in

RG 18/1945, 321, AAF-2/97.

Chapter 3

Unification and a Separate Air Force

1. Ltr, Robert A. Lovett, Asst S/W for nation, 78th Cong, 2d sess (Washington,

Air, to Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG; USAFE, 1944), pp 533-34.

Mar 25, 1945, Spaatz Colin, File Mar 45 6. Memo, Robert P. Patterson, Under

Personal, Box 21, MD, LC. S/W, to S/W, May 4 1944, Robert P. Pat2. Hearings before the Select Commit- terson Papers, Folder Postwar PIng 2, Box

tee on Post-War Military Policy, House of 162, MD, LC.

Representatives, Proposal to Establish a 7. Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Single Department of Armed Forces, 78th Special Committee for Reorganization of

Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1944), pt 1, p National Defense, Apr 11, 1945, p 1, RG

71. 340, Air Board General File, 1945-48, Box

3. Ibid., p 50. 12, MMB, NA.

4. Ibid., p 49. 8. Ibid., p 7.

5. Hearings before the War Contracts 9. Ibid., p 18.

Subcommittee, Committee on Military Af- 10. Ibid., Encl B, p 14.

fairs, Senate, Hearings on Contract Termi- 11. Ibid., Encl B, p 12.

341
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

12. Ibid., p 

2 . 34. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p5. 35. Ibid. Also see note 61, Chap I;

14. Ibid., p 10. memo for CSA fr Gen Henry H. Arnold,

15. Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CG, AAF, subj: Revised Report on the

Special Committee for Reorganization of Strength of the Permanent Military EstabNational Defense, Apr 11, 1945. Minority lishment, Dec 4, 1945, RG 341, P&O

Report of Admiral James 0. Richardson, p 320.2 (Apr 4, 1944), Sec 2/129A, MMB,

45. NA.

16. Ibid. 36. See note 33. See also memo, Gen

17. Ibid. Henry H. Arnold to Dep Cmdr, AAF, Subj:

18. Ibid., Encl B, p 12. Reorganization of National Defense, Oct

19. Ibid. 22, 1945, RG 18, 1945, 321, AAF 2/97,

20. Reorganization of National De- MMB, NA.

fense, memo, CSA to CINC Army and 37. Reorganization of National DeNavy, Encl B to memo for Pres fr Adm fense, memo, CG, AAF, Encl E to memo

William D. Leahy, C/S to CINC of Army for Pres fr Adm William D. Leahy, C/S to

and Navy, Oct 16, 1945, RG 218, Rcrds of CINC of Army and Navy, Oct 16, 1945,

US JCS, CCS 040, Nov 2, 1943, Sec 3, RG 218, Rcrds of US JCS, CCS 040, Nov

MMB, NA; Reorganization of National 2, 1943, Sec 3, MMB, NA; Also see memo

Defense memo, CNO, Encl D to memo for for Gen George C. Marshall fr Gen Henry

Pres fr Adm William D. Leahy, C/S to H. Arnold, subj: Required Legislation is

CINC of Army and Navy, Oct 16, 1945, Obtained for Permanent Post-War EstabRG 218, Rcrds of US JCS. lishment, Aug 28, 1945, Gen Henry H. Ar21. See note above. nold Colin, MD, LC.

22. See note 20. 38. Arnold, Third Report of the Com23. See note 20, Encl B. manding General of the Army Air Forces

24. Hearings before the Committee on to the Secretary of War, (11), Integration

Military Affairs, Senate, Department of of Air Power into National Defense.

Armed Forces and Military Security: 39. Reorganization of National DeHearings on S. 84 and S. 1482. Statement fense, memo, CG, AAF, Encl E to memo

by Fleet Adm Chester W. Nimitz, on Nov for Pres fr Adm William D. Leahy, C/S to

17, 1945, 79th Cong, Ist sess (Washington, CINC of Army and Navy, Oct 16, 1945.

1945), p 383 [hereafter cited as Hearings 40. Ibid.

on S. 84 and S. 1482]. 41. Statement by General of the Army

25. Ibid. George C. Marshall, Oct 18, 1945, Hear26. Ibid. ings on S. 84 and S. 1482.

27. See note 20, Encl D. 42. Ibid.

28. See note 20, Encl D. 43. Ibid.

29. See note 20, Encl D. 44. Ibid.

30. See note 20, Encl D. 45. Memo CSA, atch to memo for Secy,

3 1. See note 20, Encl D. JCS, fr Lt Col F. T. Newsome, Asst Secy,

32. Statement by Adm Ernest J. King, WDGS, subj: Reorganization of National

CNO, Oct 23, 1945, Hearings on S. 84 and Defense, Sep 26, 1945, RG 165, Rcrds of

S. 1482. WD Gen and Sp Stfs, Sp Plng Div, WDSS

33. Statement by General of the Army 334, Ping Bd for Postwar Posts to Sp Nat

Henry H. Arnold, Oct 19, 1945, Hearings DefComnsn, MMB, NA.

on S. 84and S. 1482. 46. See note 41.

342
NOTES

47. Statement by S/W Robert P. Patter- Stfs, ACS, Patch-Simpson Bdm Minutes

son, Oct 17, 1945, Hearings on S. 84 and and Comments, Box 922, MMB, NA. Also

S. 1482, p 14. see intvw, William R. Porretto, hist, ATC,

48. The New York Times, Oct 6, 1945, p with Lt Gen Barney M. Giles, San Anto12. nio, Tex., Oct 21, 1966. According to

49. Unification of the War and Navy Giles, Eisenhower's view was that "the Air

Departments, a Report to the Secretary of Force boys should keep their shirts on and

the Navy James V. Forrestal by Ferdinand start planning for separate air power."

Eberstadt, Sep 25, 1945, p 3, OSD Hist Ofc 66. Memo, Eisenhower to ACS, G-1, et

Archives. al, Dec 10, 1945.

50. Ibid., pp 6-8 67. Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482, p

51. Statement by SECNAV James V. 361.

Forrestal, Oct 22, 1945, Hearings on S. 84 68. Ibid.

and S. 1482, p 97. 69. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol II:

52. Ibid., p 99. Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City,

53. Ibid., p 99. N.Y., 1956), p 46.

54. Ibid., pp 100-101. 70. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p 101. 71. The New York Times, Aug 31, 1945,

56. Ibid., p 102. p 16 .

57. Ibid., p 102. 72. Special Message to the Congress

58. Presentation of Collins Committee Recommending the Establishment of a DeReport to the Army Staff and the Chief of partment of National Defense, Dec 19,

Staff, subj: Conference on Outline of Pro- 1945, in Public Papers of the Presidents of

posed Organization of a Unified Depart- the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945

ment of Armed Forces, Lt Gen J. Lawton (Washington, 1961), p 547.

Collins, presiding, Oct 16, 1945, RG 165, 73. Ibid.

320, Sep-Dec 46, MMB, NA. 74. Ibid., p 548.

59. Ibid. 75. Ibid., p 551.

60. Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482, p 76. Ibid., p 555.

362. 77. Ibid., p 559.

61. Hearings before the Committee on 78. Memo for Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker fr

Armed Services, Senate, National Defense Col Jacob E. Smart, Secy of Air Stf, Sep

Establishment (Unification of the Armed 18, 1945, RG 18, AAG, 320.2. File PostServices): Hearings on S. 758, Statement of war, 1945, MMB, NA.

Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower on Mar 25, 79. Ibid.

1947, 80th Cong, 1st sess, (Washington, 80. Ibid.

1947). 81. R&R Sheet, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker,

62. Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482, p Dep Comdr, AAF, to ACAS-5 (Maj Gen

363. Lauris Norstad), subj: Study on Single De63. Ibid., p 367. partment of National Defense and/or a

64. Ibid., p 360. Separate Air Force, RG 18, AAG 320.2,

65. Memo, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, File Postwar, 1945, MMB, NA.

to ACS, G-1, et al, subj: Responsibilities 82. R&R Sheet, Maj Gen Lauris Norof Staff Officers, Scope, Approach and stad, ACAS-5, to Dep Cmdr, AAF, subj:

Execution (Comments of Chief of Staff be- Study on Single Department of National

fore Staff Officers, 5 Dec 1945), Dec 10, Defense and/or a Separate Air Force, Oct

1945, RG 165, Rcrds of WD Gen and Sp 10, 1945, MMB, NA; memo, Maj Gen

343
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Lauris Norstad, ACAS/Plans, to Air Judge ganization of the War Department, Sep 10,

Advocate, subj: Study on Single Depart- 1945, in Hewes, p 149.

ment of National Defense and/or Separate 92. Statement by Gen Dwight D. EisenAir Force, Nov 13, 1945, RG 18, 1945, hower to Patch Bd, Sep 23, 1945, RG 165,

AAG 381, War Plans Misc, Nat Def Vol Rcrds of WD Gen and Sp Stfs, CSA,

2/189, MMB, NA. Patch-Simpson Bd File, Box 927, MMB,

83. R&R Sheet to ACAS-I, 2, 3, 4, 5, NA.

and Air Judge Advocate fr Lt Gen Ira C. 93. Testimony of Gen Carl A. Spaatz to

Eaker, Dep Comdr, AAF, fr Col Desmond Patch Bd, Sep 17, 1945, RG 165, Rcrds of

O'Keefe, Air Judge Advocate, Nov 19, WD Gen and Sp Stfs, CSA, Patch-Simpson

1945, RG 8, 1945, AAG 381, War Plans Bd File, Box 927, MMB, NA.

Misc, Nat Def Vol 2/189, MMB, NA. 94. Ibid.

84. Ltr, Brig Gen Frank F. Everest to Lt 95. Memo for ACAS-l fr Col NewGen Nathan F. Twining, CG, Twentieth comer, subj: Promotion of AAF Officers,

AF, Oct 20, 1945, RG 18, AAG 322, Dec 7, 1945, RG 18, 1945, AAG 21, InMMB, NA. terim Postwar and Peacetime Air Forces,

85. Memo, Gen Henry H. Arnold to 2/99, MMB, NA.

Dep Comdr, AAF, subj: Reorganization of 96. Ibid.

National Defense, Oct 22, 1945, RG 18, 97. See note 93.

321, AAF 2/97, MMB, NA. 98. See note 94.

86. Memo for Gen Henry H. Arnold fr 99. MR, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, Sep 17,

Maj Gen Lauris Norstad, ACAS/Plans, 1945, Spaatz Colin, File Sep 45, Box 22,

subj: Daily Activity Report, Dec II, 1945, MD, LC.

RG 18, AAG 319.1, Plans Daily Activity 100. Memo for CSA fr Gen Henry H.

Rprts, 1945, 370, MMB, NA. Arnold, CG, AAF, subj: Report of Board

87. Memo for Gen George C. Marshall, of Officers on Recognition of the War DeCG, AAF, subj: Required Legislation to In- partment, Nov 14, 1945, RG 165, ACS,

sure the Continuation of Present War De- Patch-Simpson Bd, Minutes and Compartment Organization Until Legislation is ments, Box 922, MMB, NA.

Obtained for Permanent Postwar Estab- 101. Ibid.

lishment, Aug 28, 1945, Gen Henry H. Ar- 102. Ibid. Also see memo for Ch/Postnold Colln, MD, LC. war Div fr Brig Gen Charles P. Cabell,

88. Memo for Gen Henry H. Arnold fr Ch/Strategy & Policy Div, ACAS-5, subj:

Gen George C. Marshall, CSA, subj: Leg- Comments on Patch Report, Nov 6, 1945,

islation, Aug 30, 1945, RG 165, ACS, RG 341, P&O, PD 020 (11-2-43), Sec

Patch-Simpson Bd, Minutes and Corn- 2/23A, MMB, NA.

ments, Box 922, MMB, NA. 103. Memo for Ch/Postwar Div fr Ca89. Intvw, Patch Bd with Gen Henry H. bell, Nov 6, 1945.

Arnold, CG, AAF, Sep 18, 1945, RG 165, 104. See note 100.

Rcrds of WD Gen and Sp Stfs, CSA, 105. Memo for Lt Gen William H.

Patch-Simpson Bd Files, MMB, NA. Simpson fr Gen Henry H. Arnold, subj:

90. Hewes, Front Root to McNamara, Statement of the Position of the Army Air

pp 148-49. Forces Concerning the Reorganization of

91. Memo, Gen Thomas T. Handy, Dep the War Department, Dec 21, 1945, RG

CSA, to Lt Gen Alexander M. Patch, Jr., 341, P&O, PD 020 ( 1-23-43), Sec 2/23A,

subj: General Eisenhower's Plan for Reor- MMB, NA.

344
NOTES

106. Ltr, Spaatz to Arnold, Dec 3, 1944, 115. Memo for Lt Gen William H.

Spaatz Papers, Box 58, MD, LC. Simpson, Pres, Bd of Offs on Orgn of the

107. Statement of My Personal Opinion WD, CG, AAF, CG, AGF, CG, ASF, et al,

as to Why AAA Should Not be Integrated fr Brig Gen Henry I. Hodes, Asst DCAS,

with the Air Forces, Brig Gen Aaron Brad- subj: Statement of Approved Policies to

shaw, Jr., to Patch Bd, Sep 17, 1945, RG Effect Increased Autonomy of the AAF

615, Rcrds of WD Gen and Sp Stfs, CSA, Within the War Department Structure, Apr

Patch-Simpson Bd File, MMB, NA. 4, 1946, RG 165, ACS, Patch-Simpson Bd,

108. Ibid. Box 922, MMB, NA.

109. Ibid. 116. Ibid.

110. See note 105. 117. Ibid.

11. Memo, Gen Carl A. Spaatz to Lt 118. Ibid.

Gen William H. Simpson, subj: Statement 119. Ibid.

of the Position of the AAF Concerning the 120. Memo, Brig Gen Glen C. Jamison,

Reorganization of the WD, Dec 45, Spaatz DCAS-5, to Maj Gen Lauris Norstad,

Colin, File Dec 45, Box 24, MD, LC. ACAS-5, subj: The Simpson Board Rec112. Memo for CSA fr Gen Carl A. ommendations for the Reorganization of

Spaatz, subj: Relationship of Program for the War Department, May 3, 1946, RG

Single Department of Common Defense 341, P&O, PD 020 (Nov 2, 1943), Sec

Sponsored by the President and the War 2/448, MMB, NA.

Department to Proposed Implementation of 121. Memo for DCAS fr Gen Carl A.

Simpson Board Report, Feb 1, 1946, RG Spaatz, CG, AAF, subj: Statement of Ap165, ACS, Patch-Simpson Bd, Box 922, proved Policies to Effect Increased AutonMMB, NA. Also see memo to Ch/Air Stf fr omy of the Army Air Forces Within the

Brig Gen John A. Samford, DCAS-2, subj: War Department Structure, Mar 28, 1946,

Air Force Autonomy Within the War De- RG 165, ACS, Patch-Simpson Bd, Box

partment, May 23, 1946, RG 341, P&O, 922, MMB, NA.

PD 020, MMB, NA. 122. See note 115.

113. See note above. 123. See note 115.

114. See note 112. 124. See note 115.

Chapter 4

Organizing the Postwar Air Force

1. R&R Sheet, Maj Gen Howard A. 3. Memo for CSA fr Gen Henry H. ArCraig, ACAS-3, to Mgt Con (Brig Gen nold, CG, AAF, subj: Activation of HeadByron E. Gates), subj: Reorganization of quarters Continental Air Force, Oct 22,

Zone of Interior Command Organization, 1944, RG 18, 1945, AAG 321, CAS/98,

Aug 23, 1944. MMB, NA.

2. Ibid.; R&R Sheet, Maj Gen Laurence 4. Memo for Gen Henry H. Arnold fr Lt

S. Kuter, ACAS/Plans, to Mgt Con (thru Gen Thomas T. Handy, Dep CSA, subj:

Gen Craig), subj: Reorganization of Zone Activation of Headquarters Continental Air

of Interior Command Organization, Aug Forces, Oct 25, 1944, RG 18, 1945, AG

21, 1944, RG 18, 1945, AAG 321, 321,CAF/98, MMB, NA.

CAF/98, MMB, NA.

345
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

5. Memo for Lt Gen Thomas T. Handy, 15. Ltr, Col Godwin Ordway, Jr.,

Dep CSA, fr Gen Henry H. Arnold, CG, Ch/Troop Con Sec, OPD, WDGS, to CGs

AAF, subj: Activation of Headquarters AAF, AGF, and ASF, subj: General ReContinental Air Forces, Oct 28, 1944, RG serve, Apr 12, 1946.

18, 1945, AAG 32 1, CAF/98, MMB, NA. 16. Memo for Asst Ch/Air Stf and Ops

6. Ibid. Plan Div fr Brig Gen Reuben C. Hood, Jr.,

7. Notation by Gen Handy, Nov 17, Dep Ch/Air Stf, subj: Army Air Forces

1944, to memo for Handy fr Arnold, Oct Strategic Reserve, Jul 31, 1945, RG 18,

18, 1944; AAFL 20-9, to CGs, All AFs 320.2, Orgn and Tac Units, Vol 9, MMB,

and All Independent and Subordinate AAF NA.

Comds, fr Lt Gen Barney M. Giles, Dep 17. Memo for CGs AAF, AGF, and

Comdr, AAF, and Ch/Air Stf, Activation ASF fr Maj Gen Idwal H. Edwards, ACS,

of Headquarters Continental Air Forces, G-3 (Orgn and Tng), subj: Strategic StrikDec 16, 1944. ing Force and Inactivation of Units, Sep 8,

8. AAFL20-9, Dec 16, 1944. 1945, RG 18, 322, Orgn and Tac Units,

9. AAFR 20-1, Jun I, 1945, in Chase Vol 9, MMB, NA.

C. Mooney and Edward C. Williamson, 18. MR, Col Bourne Adkison, Actg

Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935- Ch/Orgn Div, Asst Ch/Air Stf, subj: Strate1945 (USAF Hist Study 10, Maxwell AFB, gic Striking Force and Inactivation of

Ala., 1956), p 58. Units, Sep 25, 1945, RG 18, 322.....; Itr,

10. Chauncey E. Sanders, Redeploy- Col Bourne Adkison, Actg Ch/Orgn Div,

ment and Demobilization (USAF Hist to G-3, WDGS, subj: Strategic Striking

Study 77, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1952), Force and Inactivation of Units, Sep 14,

pp4O-43; Albert E. Haase, Manpower De- 1945, RG 18, 322 .....

mobilization (Offutt AFB, Nebr., 1946). 19. Memo for CGs, AAF, AGF, and

II. intvw, Arthur K. Marmor with Maj ASF fr Maj Gen Idwal H. Edwards, ACS,

Gen Leon W. Johnson, Apr 14, 1954, Ofc/ G-3 (Orgn and Tng), subj: Reserve, Nov

AFHist. 17, 1945, RG 18, 322....

12. Memo, Maj Gen Donald Wilson, 20. Ltr, Brig Gen William A. Matheny,

ACAS-3, to Brig Gen Byron E. Gates, Ch/Commitments Div, ACAS-3, to CG,

Ch/Mgt Con, AAF: Organization of Conti- AAF, subj: VHB, Units for SSF and Gennental Air Defense Commands, Jun 6, eral Reserve, Dec 27, 1945, RG 18, 322 .....

1945; ltr, Gates to CG, CAF, subj: Organi- 21. Minutes of the Second Meeting of

zation of Continental Air Defense, Jun 15, Ad Hoc Committee on AAF Reorganiza1945. tion, Dec 12, 1945, RG 18, AAG 319.1,

13. Third Ind, HQ CAF to CG, AAF, PDAR 1945, 370, MMB, NA.

Oct 10, 1945, to ltr, HQ 3d AF to CG, 22. Memo to ACAS/Plans, and Ad Hoc

Eastern Defense Command, subj: "Joint Cmte on AAF Reorgn of the AF, fr Col

Air Defense" Eastern Defense Command, Reuben C. Moffat, subj: Establishment of

Gulf Sea Frontier, Aug 20, 1945. the Air Force Combat Command, Dec 13,

14. Memo for CG, AAF, fr Brig Gen 1945, RG 18, AAG 319.1, PDAR, 1945,

George L. Eberle, Actg ACS/OPD, 370, MMB, NA.

WDGS, subj: Statement of Composition 23. Ibid.

and Interim Mission of the General Re- 24. Ibid.

serve, Mar 28, 1946, RG 18, AAG 326, 25. Spaatz Bd Rprt, Effect of the

Misc 1946-47, Vol 1/607, MMB, NA. Atomic Bomb on Employment, Size, Organization, and Composition of the Post346
NOTES

war Air Force, Oct 23, 1945, RG 341, ing, CG, AMC, Jun 18, 1946, RG 341,

AFOAT 1945, 334, Spaatz Bd/l. AFOAT 1946, S 322, Kirtland AFB/2,

26. Rprt by At Strat Sur Cmte, Overall MMB, NA.

Effect of Atomic Bomb on Warfare and 40. Memo, Maj Gen Leslie R. Groves,

Military Organization, Oct 26, 1945. MED, subj: Our Army of the Future-As

27. Testimony of Maj Gen Curtis E. Le- Influenced by Atomic Weapons, Jan 2,

May before the War Department Equip- 1946, in Foreign Relations of the United

ment Board, Jan 3, 1946. States, 1946, I, 1198.

28. Memo for Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker fr Lt 41. Ibid., 1199.

Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, ACAS-3, subj: 42. Ibid., 1199.

The Establishment of a Strategic Striking 43. Memo for CG, MED, fr Maj Gen

Force, Jan 2, 1946, File 145.86-90 (45-6), Curtis E. LeMay, DCAS/R&D, subj: InterAFHRA. Branch Responsibility for the Atomic

29. Ibid. Bomb Project, Jul 1, 1946, RG 341,

30. Ibid. AFOAT 1946, 312.1, Manhattan District/2,

31. R&R Sheet, Cmt 2, Maj Gen Lauris MMB, NA.

Norstad, ACAS-5, to Dep Cmdr, AAF, 44. Ibid.

subj: Atomic Bomb Striking Force, Dec 45. Memo to Gen Henry H. Arnold fr

14, 1945, RG 18/471.6, Bombs, Vol Maj Gen Lauris Norstad, ACAS-5, subj:

7/1945, Box 259, MMB, NA. Daily Activity Report, Dec It, 1945, RG

32. R&R Sheet, Cmt 2, Lt Gen Hoyt S. 18, AAG 319.1, Plans Daily Reports,

Vandenberg, ACAS-3, to Dep Comdr, 1945/370, MMB, NA.

AAF, subj: Atomic Bomb Striking Force, 46. Second Meeting of the Air Board,

Dec 17, 1945, RG 341, AFOAT 1945, 322, 4-6 June 1946, p 170, RG 340, Meetings

ABSF/I, MMF, NA. of the Air Board, Box 13, MMB, NA.

33. R&R Sheet, Cmt 2, Col John G. 47. R&R Sheet, Cmt 1, Brig Gen Glen

Moore, Dep ACAS-4, to Dep Comdr, C. Jamison, Dep ACAS-5, subj: CommitAAF, Subj: Atomic Bomb Striking Force, tee on the Reorganization of the Air

Dec 11, 1945, RG 341, AFOAT 1945, Forces, Jan 2, 1946, RG 18, 1944-46, AAG

ABSF/I, MMB, NA. 334, Jan-Mar 46, Jan 1-Feb 15,

34. Ibid. 1946/1555, MMB, NA.

35. R&R Sheet, Cmt 2, Brig Gen John 48. Ltr, Maj Gen Lauris Norstad,

A. Samford, Dep ACAS/ Intelligence, subj: ACAS-5, to Lt Gen John K. Cannon, CG,

Atomic Bomb Striking Force, Dec 6, 1945, USAFE, Jan 17, 1946, RG 18, 1944-46,

RG 18, AAG 370.22, Campaigns and Ex- AAG 320, WD Jul 45-1946/1442, MMB,

peditions, 1945/178, MMB, NA. NA.

36. Ibid. 49. Ibid.

37. R&R Sheet, Cmt 2, ACAS-3, to 50. Ibid.

Comdr, AAF, subj: Atomic Bomb Striking 51. Ltr, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep

Force, n.d. Comdr, to Gen Carl A. Spaatz, subj: Spe38. Ltr, Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, cial Organizational Planning for the AAF,

DCAS/R&D, to CG, SAC, subj: Mission Nov 14, 1945, RG 18, AAG 321, AAF,

of the 58th Bombardment Wing, Jun 13, Vol 2/97, MMB, NA.

1946, RG 18, 1946-47, AAG 320, Misc 52. Ibid.

Vol 1/632, MMB, NA. 53. See note 60, Chap 2.

39. Ltr, Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, 54. DF, Col Alfred D. Starbird,

DCAS/R&D, to Lt Gen Nathan F. Twin- Ch/European Sec, Theater Gp, to ACS, G347
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

3, subj: Answers to Questionnaire for Key subj: Strategic Striking Force and InactivaCommanders on the Effects of Strategic tion of Units, Dec 6, 1945, RG 18, 1945,

and Tactical Air Power on Military Opera- 322, Units Misc, MMB, NA.

tions, ETO, Sep 18, 1945, RG 165, 66. Intvw, Herman S. Wolk with Lt

WDGS, O&T Div, G-3 WDGCT 452.1 Gen Ira C. Eaker, Aug 27, 1974; Itr, Lt

(Sep 18, 1945)/127, MMB, NA. Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep Comdr, AAF, to Air

55. Ltr, Maj Gen Samuel E. Anderson, Staff and Major Commands, subj: OrganiC/S, CAF, to CG, AAF, subj: Formation of zation-Army Air Forces, Jan 29, 1946,

an Operational Air Force in the United RG 18, CAF, 221, Box 114, MMB, NA.

States, Jun 20, 1945, RG 18, AAG Central 67. Memo for SECDEF fr Gen Dwight

File, 322, Box 104, MMB, NA. D. Eisenhower, subj: Tactical Air Support,

56. Ibid. Nov 3, 1947, RG 18, AAG, 322, Box 104,

57. Memo, Brig Gen William F. MMB, NA.

McKee, Dep ACAS-3, to ACAS-5, subj: 68. Ibid.

Requirement and Organization of Postwar 69. Ltr, Eaker to Air Staff and Major

Tactical Air Commands, Oct 29, 1945, RG Commands, Jan 29, 1946.

18 (AAF), AAG, Decimal File, 322, Box 70. Intvw, Brig Gen Noel F. Parrish and

104, MMB, NA. See also memo for Alfred Goldberg with Gen Carl A. Spaatz,

ACAS-3 fr Brig Gen Alfred R. Maxwell, Feb 21, 1962; R&R Sheet, Cmt 2, Maj Gen

Ch/Rqmts Div, ACAS-3, same subj, Oct 5, Lauris Norstad, Jan 30, 1946, RG 18,

1945, RG 18 (AAF), AAG Box 104, 1944-46, RG 18, 1944-46, AAG 320.3,

MMB, NA. Charts 1487, MMB, NA.

58. See note above. 7 I. lntvw, Lt Cols Steven W. Long, Jr.,

59. Memo, Col Reuben C. Moffat to and Ralph W. Stephenson, with Lt Gen ElBrig Gen William F. McKee, subj: Re- wood R. Quesada, Washington, D.C., May

quirement and Organization of Postwar 12, 1975, USAF Oral Hist Tape

Tactical Air Commands, Oct 30, 1945, RG K239.0512-838, AFHRA.

18....Box 104. 72. Second Meeting of the Air Board,

60. Ibid. 4-6 June 1946, p 177, RG 340, Meetings

61. Discussion, arch to memo, Brig Gen of the Air Board, Box 113, MMB, NA.

William F. McKee, Dep ACAS-3, to 73. Memo, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep

ACAS-5, Oct 29, 1945, RG 18 Comdr, AAF, to A-5, Sp Stf, et al, subj:

(AAF).....Box 104. Organization-Army Air Forces, with

62. Ltr, Maj Gen Samuel E. Anderson, atch, Organization Chart, RG 18, 1944-46,

C/S, CAF, to CG, AAF, subj: Interim Air AAG 321, Charts 1487, MMB, NA.

Force, Sep 8, 1945, RG 18.....Box 104. 74. R&R Sheet, Cnit I, Brig Gen Glen

63. Ltr, Maj Gen St. Clair Streett, Dep C. Jamison, Dep ACAS-5, subj: CommitCG, CAF, to CG, AAF, subj: Proposed tee on Reorganization of the Air Force, Feb

Army Air Forces Structure, Nov 14, 1945, 14, 1946, RG 18/AAG Eaker Personal,

HD 145.86-36, AFHRA. Reading File ACAS-5, MMB, NA.

64. Ltr, Maj Gen Lauris Norstad, 75. Ltr, AG 322 (Mar 21, 1946), OBACAS-5, to Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep I-AFCOR-(971-d)-M, Maj Gen Edward

Comdr, AAF, subj: AAF VJ Day Plan as of F. Witsell, TAG, to CGs AAF and CAF,

15 July 1945, Aug 10, 1945, HD 145-86- subj: Establishment of Air Defense, Strate52 (1945-46), AFHRA. gic Air And Tactical Air Commands; Re65. R&R Sheet, Col Reuben C. Moffat, designation of the Headquarters,

Ch/Sp Ping Div, to ACAS-3 (Orgn Div), Continental Air Forces and Certain Other

348
NOTES

Army Air Forces Units; Activation, Inacti- 92. Memo for Ofcs of the Air Stf,

vation and Assignment of Certain Army ACASs, Sp Ofcs of Air Stf, Chs/Divs, fr Lt

Air Forces Units, Mar 21, 1946, RG 18, Gen Barney M. Giles, Dep Comdr, AAF,

MMB, NA. and Ch/Air Stf, subj: Principles for AAF

76. Ltr, Maj Gen Charles C. Chauncey, Future Action, Jan 29, 1945.

Dep Ch/Air Stf, to CG, CAF, subj: Organi- 93. Ibid.

zation-Army Air Forces, Mar, 1946, RG 94. Ibid.

18, AAG, 322, Box 104, MMB, NA. 95. See Chase C. Mooney and Edward

77. Ltr, Maj Gen Elwood R. Quesada, C. Williamson, Organization of the Army

CG, TAC, to CG, AAF, subj: Organiza- Air Arm, 1935-1945 (USAF Hist Study 10,

tional Plan of the Tactical Air Command, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1956), p 62.

Apr 12, 1946, RG 18, 322 (Apr 12, 1946), 96. Memo, Dr. Edward L. Bowles to

MMB, NA. Gen Henry H. Arnold, Nov 26, 1945; ltr,

78. Quesada intvw, May 12, 1975. Maj Gen Laurence C. Craigie, Ch/Engrg

79. Ltr, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker to Lt Gen Div, Wright Field, to Aero Bd, USN, subj:

Ennis C. Whitehead, CG, PACUSA, Apr 3, Project RAND, Oct 11, 1946.

1946, RG 341, Air OPD 312.1 (Nov 21, 97. Memo for Gen Henry H. Arnold fr

1945), Box 72, MMB, NA. Robert A. Lovett, Asst S/W for for Air,

80. See note 75. subj: A. Need for Improved and Increased

81. Army Air Forces Monthly Organi- Business Management Procedures; B. Sozation Chart, Apr 46, RG 18.....Box 104. lution Through Establishment of Office of

82. Ltr, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG, AAF, Air Comptroller General, Oct 5, 1945, RG

to CG, SAC, subj: Interim Mission, Mar 18, 322, 11-7-45, MMB, NA.

12, 1946. 98. Ibid.

83. See notes 75 and 77. 99. Ibid.

84. See note 75; Second Meeting of the 100. Ibid.

Air Board, Jun 4, 1946, pp 4-5. 101. Memo for Robert A. Lovett, Asst

85. AAFR 20-14, Organization-AAF S/W for Air, fr Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep

Proving Ground Command, Mar 7, 1946. Comdr, AAF, Nov 7, 1945, RG 18, 322,

86. AAFR 20-61, Organization-Air 11-7-45, MMB, NA; memo for Maj Gen

University, Apr 5, 1946. Curtis E. LeMay fr Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker,

87. Ltr, Dep Comdr, AAF, to CG, Air Nov 7, 1945, RG 18, 322, 11-7-45, MMB,

Transport Command, subj: Mission of the NA.

Air Transport Command, Mar 18, 1946. 102. Memo, Col Jacob E. Smart, Secy

88. Ltr, Maj Gen Charles C. Chauncey, of Air Stf, subj: Minutes of Air Staff MeetDep ChIAir Stf. to CG, AMC, Apr 10, ing, Nov 29, 1945, RG 18, AAG 337, Conf

1946, RG 18, 322, Commands and Organi- 1945, Vol 9/156, MMB, NA.

zation, MMB, NA. 103. Memo for Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr

89. Ltr, Dep Comdr, AAF, to CG, ATC, fr Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep CG, AAF,

subj: Mission of the Air Training Com- subj: Air Force Board, Feb 12, 1946, RG

mand, Mar21, 1946. 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Interim Rprts and

90. Army Air Forces Announcement Working Papers, 1946-48, Box 20, MMB,

(Gen Spaatz), Mar 12, 1946, Spaatz Colin, NA.

File Feb 46, Box, 25, MD, LC. 104. Memo for Air Stf, AAF, Cen, fr

91. WD Cir 138, War Department Re- Col Harry E. Wilson, C/S, AAF Cen, subj:

organization, May 14, 1946, p 15. Organizational and Functional Charts, Mar

5, 1946; General Order 1, APGC, Jul 17,

349
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

1946, in Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, in First Interim Report of the Air Board,

Doctrine: A History of Basic Training in Interim Rprts and Working Papers, 1946-

the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 48, Box 20, MMB, NA.

(Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1974), p 106. 118. Ibid.

105. See note above; remarks by Lt Gen 119. WD Cir 138, May 14, 1946, paras

Ira C. Eaker, Dep CG, AAF, to First Meet- I, 2.

ing of the Air Board, in Report of the First 120. Ibid., para 2.

Meeting of the Air Board, Apr 16, 1946 121. Ibid., para 2(b).

(Verbatim Report), RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, 122. Ibid., para 10 (d).

Minutes of Mtgs, 1945-48, Box 13, MMB, 123. Ibid., para 2.

NA. 124. Ibid., para 30.

106. See note above. 125. Ibid., Appl, para I.

107. Statement by Gen Dwight D. Eis- 126. Memo, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG,

enhower to Patch Board, Sep 23, 1945, RG AAF, to Lt Gen Charles P. Hall, Dir/Orgn

165, Patch-Simpson Board File, MMB, and Tng, WDGS, subj: Organization of the

NA. War Department, Nov 22, 1946, RG 165,

108. See note 103; Notes on Proposed WDGS, Ops and Tng Div, G-3, 320 (Nov

Air Board by Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, in 15, 1946), CSN 640-8, Box 215, MMB,

First Interim Report of the Air Board, Apr NA.

16, 1946, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Interim 127. Memo, Brig Gen Henry I. Hodes,

Rprts and Working Papers, 1946-48, Box DCSA, to Dirs of Pers and Admin, Intel, et

20, MMB, NA. al, subj: Reorganization of the War Depart109. Notes on Proposed Air Board. ment, Nov 15, 1946, RG 165, Orgn and

110. Ibid. Tng Div, G-3, 320 (Nov 15, 1946), CSN

I ll. Ibid., pt II. 640-8, Box 215, MMB, NA.

112. Ibid., pt II. 128. Memo, Brig Gen Glen C. Jamison,

113. Ibid., pt II. Dep ACAS-5, to Maj Gen Lauris Norstad,

114. Ibid., pt II. ACAS-5, subj: The Simpson Board Rec115. Ibid., pt II. ommendations for the Reorganization of

116. Ibid., pt II. the War Department, May 3, 1946, RG

117. Memo, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG, 341, P&O, PD 020 (Nov 2, 1943), Sec

AAF, to members of Air Bd, Apr 16, 1946, 2/448, MMB, NA.

Chapter 5

Moving Toward Autonomy

I. Ltr, SECNAV James V. Forrestal to 3. Memo for all Div Chs fr Maj Gen

Samuel Rosenman, Dec 18, 1945, in Rich- Lauris Norstad, subj: Unification, May 15,

ard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: 1946, RG 341, P&O, PD 020 (Nov 2,

Harry S. Truman as Commander-in-Chief 1943), Sec 2/448, MMB, NA.

(Baton Rouge, La., 1973), p 98. 4. Diary of Fleet Admiral William D.

2. Ltr, Maj Gen Lauris Norstad, Leahy, Feb 8, 1946, William D. Leahy PaACAS/Plans, to Gen Henry H. Arnold, pers, MD, LC.

Mar 20, 1946, Gen Lauris Norstad Colin, 5. See note 3.

MMB, NA.

350
NOTES

6. Memo for Br Chs fr Col Elmer J. Ro- PD 020 (Nov 2, 1943), Sec 2/448, MMB,

gers, Jr., May 21, 1946, RG 341, P&O, PD NA.

020 (Nov 2, 1943), Sec 2/448, MMB, NA. 22. Ibid.

7. Ltr, Stuart Symington, Asst S/W for 23. Ibid.

Air, to Gen George C. Kenney, CG, SAC, 24. Ibid.

May 30, 1947, Spaatz Colin, Box 28, MD, 25. Stephen Jurika, Jr., ed, From Pearl

LC. Harbor to Vietnam: The Memiors of Admi8. Ibid. ral Arthur W. Radford (Palo Alto, 1980), p

9. Minutes of War Council Meeting, 83.

May 16, 1946, folder War Council Meet- 26. Diary of Fleet Admiral William D.

ings, Box 23, Robert P. Patterson Papers, Leahy, Jun 4, 1946, William D. Leahy PaMD, LC. pers, MD, LC.

10. Ltr, Robert P. Patterson, S/W, and 27. Memo for Stuart Symington, Asst

SECNAV James V. Forrestal, to Pres S/W for Air, fr Col John B. Montgomery,

Harry S. Truman, May 31, 1946, RG 319, Nov 1, 1946, RG 18, AG Bulky File, 381,

Rcrds of the Army Stf, P&O 320, Sec VIII, Unification, MMB, NA.

Cases 32-45, MMB, NA. 28. Ibid.

I 1. Ibid. 29. Analysis of Notes, atch to Sum

12. Ibid. Sheet, Maj Gen Lauris Norstad, WD

13. Ibid. Dir/Plans and Ops, subj: The Unified Air

14. JCS 1478/10, Memorandum by CG, Force, Jan 9, 1947, RG 319, P&O 320, Sec

AAF, Mar 15, 1946, RG 218, CCS 370 (8- XII, Cases 62-78, MMB, NA.

19-45), Box 121, MMB, NA. 30. Ibid.

15. Ltr, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG, AAF, 31. Ibid.

to James E. Webb, Dir/Bureau of Budget, 32. Ibid.; memo for Col Sims fr W. StuDec 6, 1946, Papers of James E. Webb, art Symington, Asst S/W for Air, Nov 18,

Truman Library. 1946, RG 319, P&O 320, Sec XII, Cases

16. JCS 1478/9, Memorandum by Chief 62-78.

of Naval Operations, Mar 6, 1946, RG 218, 33. Gen Eisenhower's Testimony beCCS 370 (8-19-45), Sec 3, Box 121, fore the Patch Board, Sep 23, 1945, RG

MMB, NA. 165, Patch-Simpson Board File, MMB,

17. See note 14. NA.

18. JCS 1478/11, Memorandum by 34. Intvw, Hugh Ahmann with Gen

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Mar 16, 1946, Lauris Norstad, USAF, Ret, Feb, Oct 1979.

RG 218, CCS 370 (8-19-45), Sec 3, Box K239.0512-1116.

121, MMB, NA. 35. Ibid.

19. JCS 1478/17, Memorandum by Act- 36. Ltr, Maj Gen Lauris Norstad,

ing Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, May 14, Dir/Plans and Ops, to Lt Gen J. E. Hill, HQ

1946, RG 218, CCS 370...Sec 5...NA; JCS AFMIDPAC, Sep 6, 1946, Gen Lauris

1478/19, Memorandum by Chief of Naval Norstad Colin, MMB, NA.

Operations, May 23, 1946, RG 218, CCS 37. JCS 1259/26, Dec 5, 1946, RG 218,

370...Sec5...NA. 323.361, 1946-47 (2-26-45), MMB, NA;

20. Seenote2. JCS 1259/27, Dec 11, 1946, RG 218,

21. Ltr, Pres Harry S. Truman to S/W 323.361, 1946-47 (2-26-45), MMB, NA.

Robert P. Patterson and SECNAV James 38. Gen Lauris Norstad, "The National

V. Forrestal, Jun 15, 1946, RG 341, P&O, Security Act of 1947: Implications and Interpretations," in Paul R. Schratz, ed, Evo351
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

lution of the American Military Estab- Services): Hearings on S. 758, 80th Cong,

lishment Since World War II (Lexington, Ist sess (Washington, 1947), RG 340

Va, 1978), pp 24-25. (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File, 1945-48, Box 12,

39. Outline Command Plan, atch to MMB, NA.

memo for Pres fr Fleet Admiral William D. 62. Ibid.

Leahy, C/S to CINC, Dec 12, 1946, para 4. 57. Ibid.

40. Ibid., paras 5-6. 58. See note 15.

41. Ibid., handwritten signature by 59. See note 15.

Harry S. Truman, Dec 14, 1946. 60. Paper for Chief of Naval Opera42. JCS 1259/27, Joint Chiefs of Staff, tions, subj: Naval Shore-Based Aviation

Unified Command Plan, Dec II, 1946, for Naval Reconnaissance and Anti-Subpara 4, RG 218, 323.361, 1946-47 (2-26- marine Warfare, Jun 4, 1946, RG 218,

45), MMB, NA. Rcrds of the US JCS, Chmn's File 124,

43. JCSM-34-49, Memorandum for the MMB, NA.

Chief of Staff, USAF, from Joint Chief of 61. Diary of James V. Forrestal, Vol

Staff, Jan 7, 1949. VI, Oct 46 to Mar 47, Entry Nov 12, 1946,

44. Msg, JCS to CG, SAC, WARX- Forrestal Papers, OSD Hist Ofc.

87110, Apr 13, 1949, cy in SAC Hist Ofc. 62. Memo for S/W fr W. Stuart

45. Ibid. Symington, Asst S/W for Air, Oct 15,

46. See note 34. 1946, RG 340 (SAF), 321, Unification,

47. Ibid. MMB, NA.

48. Ltr, Robert P. Patterson, S/W, and 63. Ltr, Stuart Symington to Clark M.

SECNAV James V. Forrestal, to Pres Clifford, the White House, Dec 14, 1946,

Harry S. Truman, Jan 16, 1947. Papers of James E. Webb, Truman Library.

49. Ltr, Pres Harry S. Truman to S/W 64. Memo for Gen Carl A. Spaatz fr

Robert P. Patterson and SECNAV James Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, Secy-Gen, Air Bd,

V. Forrestal, Jan 16, 1947. subj: Roles and Missions, Apr I1, 1947,

50. Memo for CG, AAF, CG, AGF, et RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Secy-Gen File,

al, fr Brig Gen Henry I. Hodes, WD Asst 1942-49, Maj Gen Knerr's Personal PaDep C/S, subj: Board of Officers to Deter- pers, Box 10, MMB, NA.

mine Army and Air Force Organizational 65. Ibid.

Matters Under Unification, Jan 20, 1947, 66. See note 61, Chap 3.

RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File, 1945-48, 67. See note 61, Chap 3.

Box 12, MMB, NA. 68. See note 61, Chap 3.

5 1. Report to Chief of Staff, USA, on 69. Memo, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower,

Army and Air Force Organizational Mat- CSA, to Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG, AAF,

ters Under Unification, Mar 14, 1947, Sec Mar 21, 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen

A [hereafter referred to as Hall Board Re- File, 1945-48, Box 12, MMB, NA.

port], RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File, 70. See note 61.

1945-48, Box 12, MMB, NA. 71. See note 6 1.

52. Hall Board Report, pt I, Sec A, pp 72. See note 61, Chap 3.

2-3. 73. EO 9877, Functions of the Armed

53. Ibid., p 5. Forces, Jul 16, 1947, Sec III, para le.

54. Ibid., p 7. 74. Ibid., Sec 111, para If.

55. Hearings before the Committee on 75. Ibid., Sec IV, para l a-g.

Armed Services, Senate, National Defense 76. Ibid., Sec IV, para 4.

Establishment (Unification of the Armed 77. Ibid., Sec II, paras I, 2.

352
NOTES

78. Ibid., Sec II, para 4. 92. Ibid., Sec 210, War Council.

79. Ibid., Sec III, para 1 (f). 93. Intvw, Thomas A. Sturm and Her80. Sixth Meeting of the Air Board, man S. Wolk with Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker,

"Roles and Missions," Sep 9-10, 1947, RG Nov 17, 1972.

340 (SAF), Air Bd Gen File, Box 18, 94. Ltr, Stuart Symington, Asst S/W for

MMB, NA. Air, to James E. Webb, Bureau of the

81. Ibid. Budget, Feb 3, 1947, C4-3 Folder, Papers

82. The National Security Act of 1947, of James E. Webb, Truman Library.

Jul 26, 1947, Sec 2, Declaration of Policy. 95. Intvw, Hugh A. Ahmann and Her83. Ibid., Sec 202(a), Secretary of De- man S. Wolk with Stuart Symington, May

fense. 2, 1978.

84. Ibid., Sec 202(a), Secretary of De- 96. Ltr, Stuart Symington, Asst S/W for

fense. Air, to Lt Gen Ennis C. Whitehead, CG,

85. Ibid., Sec 206(a), Department of the FEAF, Sep 10, 1947, Spaatz Colln, Box

Navy. 264, File SAF, LC.

86. Ibid., Sec 206(a), Department of the 97. MR, Lt Gen Lauris Norstad, subj:

Navy. Conference with General Eisenhower, May

87. Ibid., Sec 208(f), United States Air 1, 1948, Gen Lauris Norstad Colln, MMB,

Force. NA.

88. Ibid., Sec 207(a), (d), (f), Depart- 98. Ibid.

ment of the Air Force. 99. Ibid.

89. Ibid., Sec 208, United States Air 100. Diary of Fleet Admiral William D.

Force. Leahy, Jul 16, 1947, William D. Leahy Pa90. Ibid., Sec 208c, United States Air pers, LC.

Force. 101. The New York Times, Jul 27, 1947,

91. Ibid., Sec 211(a), Joint Chiefs of Sec IV, p8.

Staff.

Chapter 6

Independence and Organization

1. Ltr, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG AAF, to 4. Intvw, Thomas A. Sturm and HerVannevar Bush, May 14, 1946; memo for man S. Wolk with Stuart Symington,

Dir/Orgn and Tng, WDGS, fr Lt Gen Ira C. Washington, D.C., Feb 18, 1972.

Eaker, Dep Comdr, AAF, Nov 1, 1946. 5. Final Report of the War Department

2. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Policies and Programs Review Board

Air Board, Sep 9-10, 1947, p 28, RG 340 (Washington, 1947), p 22, RG 340 (SAF),

(SAF), Air Bd, Gen File, 1945-48, Box 18, Meetings of the Air Bd, Interim Rprts and

MMB, NA. Working Papers, Box 22, MMB, NA.

3. Intvw, Thomas A. Strum and Her- 6. Ibid., p 24.

man S. Wolk with Col Kenneth F. Gantz, 7. Annex G to Final Report of the War

USAF, Ret, Montgomery, Ala., Feb 15, Department Policies and Programs Review

1972. Board, Extracts from the Report of the

President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National

353
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Security, May 29, 1947 (Washington, stal, Apr 21, 1948, OSAF File 520, A53-

1947), RG 340 (SAF), Mtgs of the Air Bd, 307, Sp File 9, MMB, NA.

Interim Rprts and Working Papers, 1946- 23. Hist, OSAF, Sep 18, 1947-Jun 30,

48, Box 22, MMB, NA. 1950,1, 1-2.

8. Memo, Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower 24. Ibid., 2; Sixth Meeting of the Air

to All Members of the Army, Jul 26, 1947, Board, "Roles and Missions," Sep 9-10,

RG 165, Rcrds of the WD Gen and Sp Stfs, 1947, p 26, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen

320, Bk 1, Cases 1-15, MMB, NA. File, Box 18, MMB, NA.

9. Hearings before the Select Commit- 25. Annual Report of the Secretary of

tee on Post-War Military Policy, House of the Air Force, FY 1948 (Washington,

Representatives, Proposal to Establish a 1948); hist, OSAF, Sep 18, 1947-Jun 30,

Single Department of Armed Forces, State- 1950, 1, 3.

ment of Robert A. Lovett, Asst S/W for 26. Hist, OSAF, Sep 18, 1947-Jun 30,

Air, on Apr 26, 1944, 78th Cong, 2d sess 1950, 1, 4.

(Washington, 1944), RG 107, Rcrds of the 27. Ibid., 2.

Asst S/W for Air, MMB, NA. 28. Sixth Meeting of the Air Board, Sep

10. Ibid. 9-10, 1947, p 5.

I1. Msg to Arnold fr Symington and 29. Stf paper, The Officer Personnel

Spaatz, AGACG 650, Sep 18, 1947, Ar- Act of 1947, Sep 47, RG 340 (SAF), Air

nold Colin, Box 25, File Independent Air Bd, Gen File, Box 10, MMB, NA.

Force, MD, LC. 30. Gen Carl A. Spaatz, Tomorrow's

12. Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Soldier Must be Different, Air Bd Working

Air Board, Sep 9-10, 1947 p I. Papers, Box 13, MMB, NA; see note 29.

13. Ibid., p I. 31. Memo for Lt Gen Barney M. Giles,

14. Ibid., p 2. Dep Comdr, AAF, and Ch/Air Stf, to Ofcs

15. First Meeting of the Aircraft and of Air Stf, Asst Chs/Air Stf, et al, subj:

Weapons Board, Aug 19, 1947, RG 341, Principles for AAF Future Action, Jan 29,

DCS/Rqmts, Box 18 1, MMB, NA. 1945.

16. Memo for Asst S/W for Air fr S/W 32. Ltr, Maj Gen Frederick L. AnderRobert P. Patterson, subj: Unification, Apr son, ACAS-l, to Col Marvin F. Stalder,

II, 1946, RG 341, P&O, PD 020, See Dep Ch/Procurement See, Pers and Admin

3/23A, MMB, NA. Div, WDGS, Apr 25, 1947, RG 18, AAG

17. Se note 2, Chap 5. 008, Policy 1946-47, Box 561, MMB, NA.

18. Flora Lewis, "The Education of a 33. Air Force Officer Opportunities UnSenator," The Atlantic, Dec 71, p 56. der Unification, encl to memo, Brig Gen

19. Ibid. Reuben C. Hood, Jr., Dep Ch/Air Stf, to

20. Address to the First Annual Con- Ch/Air Stf, subj: Assignment of Responsivention of the Air Force Association, Co- bility for Service Units, Dec 10, 1945.

lumbus, Ohio, Secretary-Designate of the 34. Ibid.

Air Force Stuart Symington, Sep 15, 1947; 35. Annual Rprt, Ch/NGB,, FY 1947,

Symington intvw, May 78. pp 102-103; AAF Plan for the National

21. Address to the First Annual Con- Guard, Jun 47, App B; Itr, Lt Col Cecil J.

vention of the Air Force Association. Looke, Jr., Exec, ACAS-3, to ADC, subj:

22. Ibid.; Secy Symington's statement Interim Ceiling on National Guard Organibefore the President's Air Policy Commis- zation, Mar 14, 1947.

sion, Nov 26, 1947, Spaatz Colin, Box 36. Army Air Forces Plan for the Air

263, MD, LC; Symington memo to Forre- Reserve, Jun 19, 1946, approved by WD,

354
NOTES

Jul 12, 1946; ADC Plan to Activate the Air 58. Hall Board Report, p 4.

Reserve Program, May 14, 1946. 59. Ibid., pt I.

37. Hist, ADC, Mar 46-Jun 47, pp 61- 60. Memo for Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep

75; DOD Selected Manpower Statistics, CG, AAF, fr Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr,

May 78, p 98; Annual Report of the Secre- Secy-Gen, Air Bd, n.d. [ca. Mar 47], Air

tary of the Air Force, FY 1948, p 165. Bd, Gen File, 1945-48, Box 12, MMB,

38. Memo for Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, NA.

Secy-Gen, Air Bd, fr Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, 61. Memo for Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG,

Dep CG, AAF, Apr 16, 1946, RG 340 AAF, fr Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, CSA,

(SAF), Air Bd, Interim Rprts and Working Mar 21, 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen

Papers, Box 20, MMB, NA. File, 1945-48, Box 12, MMB, NA.

39. Air Board Review and Comment on 62. Ibid.

Organization, in First Interim Report of Air 63. Memo for Air Stf fr Lt Gen Ira C.

Board, Apr 16, 1946, RG 340 (SAF), Air Eaker, Dep CG, AAF, Mar 25, 1947, RG

Bd, Interim Rprts and Working Papers, 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File, 1945-48,

Box 20, MMB, NA. Box 12, MMB, NA.

40. Ibid. 64. Memo for CSA fr S/W Robert P.

41. Ibid. Patterson, subj: Army and Air Force Or42. Memo, Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, ganizational Matters Under Unification,

Secy-Gen, Air Bd, to Gen Carl A. Spaatz, Apr 11, 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen

CG, AAF, subj: Post-Unification Organiza- File, 1945-48, Box 12, MMB, NA.

tion, Mar 22, 1946, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, 65. Memo, Maj Gen William E. Hall to

Interim Rprts and Working Papers, 1946- CSA, subj: Board of Officers to Determine

48, Box 20, MMB, NA. Army Matters Under Unification, Apr 18,

43. Ibid. 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File,

44. Ibid. 1945-48, Box 12, MMB, NA.

45. See note 42. 66. Memo for CSA fr S/W Robert P.

46. Second Meeting of Air Board, Jun Patterson, subj: Army and Air Force Or4-6, 1946, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen ganizational Matters Under Unification,

File, 1945-48, Box 13, MMB, NA. Apr 23, 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen

47. Fourth Meeting of Air Board, Dec File, 1945-48, Box 12, MMB, NA.

3-4, 1946, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen 67. Memo, Maj Gen William E. Hall to

File, 1945-48, Box 13, MMB, NA. CSA, subj: Army and Air Force Organiza48. Ibid. tional Matters Under Unification, Apr 25,

49. Ibid. 1947.

50. Ibid. 68. Memo for Dep Comdr, USAF, fr

51. Ibid. Maj Gen Hugh J. Knerr, Secy-Gen, Air Bd,

52. Fourth Meeting of Air Board, Dec Sep 25, 1947; ltr, Spaatz to Bush, May 14,

3-4, 1946, RG 340 (SAF) Air Bd, Gen 1946; memo for Dir/Orgn and Trig,

File, 1945-48, Box 13, MMB, NA. WDGS, fr Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep CG,

53. Ibid. AAF, Nov 1, 1946; Sixth Meeting of the

54. Ibid. Air Board, Sep 9-10, 1947, p 114, RG 340

55. Ibid. (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File, Box 18, MMB,

56. Ibid. NA.

57. Fifth Meeting of Air Board, Jun 5- 69. Memo to Air Stf fr Maj Gen Char6, 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File, les C. Chauncey, Dep Ch/Air Stf, subj: Or1945-48, Box 13, MMB, NA. ganization of the Air Forces Upon

355
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Unification, Jun 13, 1947, RG 340 (SAF), icy-Integration of Technical Services, Jul

Air Bd, Gen File, 1945-48, Box 12, MMB, 9, 1946, RG 18, AAG 008, Policy 1946-

NA. 48, Box 56 1, MMB, NA.

70. Briefing, Maj Gen Earle E. Par- 83. Fifth Meeting of the Air Board, Jun

tridge, ACAS-3, to Gen Carl A. Spaatz, 5--6, 1947.

CG, AAF, and the Air Staff, subj: Organi- 84. Ibid.

zation, Nov 6, 1946. 85. Ibid.

71. Ibid. 86. Ibid.

72. Memo for Dep Comdr, AAF, fr 87. Ibid.

Brig Gen August W. Kissner, Actg ACAS- 88. AAF Policy Letter, unnumbered, in

5, subj: Transfer of Functions and Person- Sixth Meeting of Air Board, Sep 9-10,

nel from Plans and Optns Div to the Air 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen File,

Force, Aug 28, 1947, RG 341, OPD 320.5, 1945-48, Box 10, MMB, NA; also see ltr,

Jul 14, 1947, Sec I, Box 130, MMB, NA; Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep Comdr, AAF, to

see note 32. ACAS-l, Jul 9, 1946.

73. See note 70. 89. Sixth Meeting of Air Board, Sep 9-

74. Assignment of Table of Organiza- 10, 1947.

tion and Equipment, Troop Basis, Activa- 90. Ibid.

tion and Training Responsibility for Units 91. Ibid.

of the Technical Services and Army Serv- 92. Ibid.

ice Forces Staff Divisions Having Troops, 93. Memo for Mr. Garver fr Lt Col

encl to memo for CSA, subj: Assignment Hayden W. Withers, Ch/Plans Br, Med

of Responsibility for Service Units, Nov Plans and Svcs Div, Ofc of Air Surgeon,

20, 1945. subj: Medical Service for the United States

75. Ibid. Air Force, Dec 12, 1947.

76. Ltr, Spaatz to Bush, May 14, 1946; 94. Ibid.

memo for Dir/Orgn and Tng, WDGS, fr Lt 95. See note 65, Chap 5.

Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep Comdr, AAF, Nov 96. Ibid.

I, 1946. 97. Ibid.

77. Ltr, Gen Carl A. Spaatz, CG, AAF, 98. The National Security Act of 1947,

to CG, SAC, subj: Air Force Attitude To- Jul 26, 1947, Sec 207 (a), (f), Sec 208;

ward Officers of Other Branches of the Sixth Meeting of the Air Board, Sep 9-10,

Service Serving with the Air Forces, Jan 2, 1947, pp 26-27.

1947. 99. For example, see memo for Lt Gen

78. Ibid. J. Lawton Collins, Actg WD Dep C/S, fr

79. Sixth Meeting of the Air Board, Sep Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, DCAS/R&D,

9-10, 1947, RG 340 (SAF), Air Bd, Gen and Cloyd H. Marvin, Actg Dir/R&D,

File, 1945-48, Box 10, MMB, NA; memo WDGS, subj: Proposed Action for Separafor Dep Comdr, USAF, fr Maj Gen Hugh tion of Army and Air Force Research &

J. Knerr, Secy-Gen, Air Bd, subj: Organi- Development, Aug 26, 1947, RG 341,

zation, Sep 25, 1947. OPD 320.5 (Jul 14, 1947), Sec I, Box 130,

80. Fifth Meeting of the Air Board, Jun MMB, NA.

5-6, 1947, Prefatory Remarks of Maj Gen 100. Ibid.

Hugh J. Knerr, p 2. 101. Annual Report of the Secretary of

81. Ibid. the Army, 1948 (Washington, 1949) p 30.

82. Ibid.; Itr, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, Dep 102. Army-Air Force Agreements: As to

Comdr, AAF, to ACAS- I, subj: AAF Pol- the Initial Implementation of the National

356
NOTES

Security Act of 1947 (Washington, 1947), pretation of Agreements Between Spaatz &

RG 165 (C/S 320-1947), MMB, NA. Eisenhower, Sep 2, 1947.

103. R&R Sheet, Lt Gen Hoyt S. Van- 110. Sixth Meeting of the Air Board,

denberg, Actg Dep Comdr, AAF, to Asst Sep 9-10, 1947, pp 48-49.

Chs/Air Stf, et al, subj: Recent Agreements 111. Memo for CG, AAF, fr Brig Gen

Concerning Adjustment Between the Army John E. Upston, DCAS-I, and Maj Gen

& Air Force under the Unification Act, Willard S. Paul, GSC, Dir/Pers and Admin,

Aug 22, 1947, RG 341, OPD 320.5 (Jul 14, subj: Separation of the Air Force from the

1947), Sec 1, Box 130, MMB, NA. Army, Aug 25, 1947, RG 341, OPD 320.5

104. Memo, Lt Gen J. Lawton Collins, (Jul 14, 1947), Sec 1, Box 130, MMB, NA.

WD Dep C/S, to Dirs/WDGS Divs, et al, 112. Sixth Meeting of the Air Board,

subj: Separation of Air Force from U.S. Sep 9-10, 1947, p 55.

Army, Sep 16, 1947, RG 341, OPD 320-5, 113. Ibid., pp 50-51.

(Jul 14,1947), Sec 1, Box 130, MMB, NA. 114. Ibid., p 54.

105. Memo for S/W fr Gen Dwight D. 115. Ibid., p 53.

Eisenhower, CSA, subj: Separation of the 116. Ibid., pp 61-62.

Air Force from the U.S. Army, Sep 15, 117. Memo, SECDEF James V. Forre1947; memo for Secretary-Designate of stal to Secys of Army and Air Force, Oct

Defense fr Kenneth C. Royall, S/W, subj: 14, 1947.

Separation of the Air Force from the U.S. 118. Policies and Procedures ApplicaArmy, Sep 15, 1947. ble to the Separation of the Air Force from

106. Army-Air Force Agreements. the Army, Dec 10, 1947, signed by Eisen107. Sixth Meeting of the Air Board, hower and Spaatz, RG 341, OPD 320.5

Sep 9-10, 1947, pp 48-49; Army-Air (Jul 14, 1947), Sec I, Box 130, MMB, NA.

Force Agreements; memo, Col Ralph P. 119. Transfer Order 1, SECDEF, Order

Swofford, Jr., Exec to Dep Comdr, AAF, Transferring Certain Functions, Personnel

to Air Staff, subj: Interpretation of Agree- and Property from the Department of the

ments Between Spaatz & Eisenhower, Sep Army to the Department of the Air Force,

2, 1947, RG 341, OPD 320.5 (Jul 14, Sep 26, 1947.

1947), Sec 1, Box 130, MMB, NA. 120. Ibid.

108. Memo for Dirs/WDGS Divs, 121. Ibid.

Chs/WDSS Divs, et al, fr Lt Gen J. Lawton 122. Ibid.

Collins, Actg WD Dep C/S, subj: Basic 123. Annual Report of the Secretary of

Agreements on the Preparation of the the Air Force, FY 1948 (Washington,

Army and the Air Force, Aug 29, 1947, 1948), p 21; memo, Lt Gen Lauris Norstad,

RG 341, OPD 320.5 (Jul 14, 1947), Sec I DCS/Ops, to Dir/Intel, et al, subj: Transfer

Box 130, MMB, NA. of Functions from the Army to the Air

109. Memo for Dirs/Pers and Admin, Force, Mar 17, 1948; memo, Gen Hoyt S.

R&D, et al, fr Lt Gen J. Lawton Collins, Vandenberg, VCS, to DCS/Ops, et al, subj:

Actg Dep CSA, Aug 4, 1947, RG 341, Transfer of Functions from the Army to the

OPD 320.5 (Jul 14, 1947), Sec 1, Box 130, Air Force, Mar 12, 1948, RG 341, OPD

MMB, NA; Army-Air Force Agreements; 320.5 (Jul 14, 1947), Sec I, Box 130,

memo, Col Ralph P. Swofford, Jr., Exec to MMB, NA.

Dep Comdr, AAF, to Air Stf, subj: Inter- 124. Transfer Order 40, SECDEF, Jul

22, 1949.

357
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Chapter 7

Epilogue

I. Bernard Brodie, "The Atomic Bomb Clark M. Clifford, Dec 16, 1947, Clifford

and American Security," Yale Institute of Papers, Truman Library.

International Studies, Nov 1, 1945. 12. Survival in the Air Age: A Report by

2. Ltr, Alexander de Seversky to S/W the President's Air Policy Commission

Robert P. Patterson, Oct 4, 1946, Spaatz (Washington, 1948),p 9 .

Colin, Box 264, MD, LC. 13. Memo for Ch/Info fr Col S. L. A.

3. Memo for Col Harold W. Bowman fr Marshall, subj: Present Doctrine of the

Maj Donald T. Sheehan, Plans and Plcys, Army, Apr 9, 1948, RG 218, CCS 020

Ofc of Info Svcs, subj: Public Relations (Oct 4, 1944), Sec I, MMB, NA.

"White Paper," sep 17, 1945, RG 18, AAF 14. Ibid.

Ofc of Info Svcs, Personal Narratives Div, 15. Public Papers of the Presidents of

1942-45, Folder Current and Future Public the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948

Relations Plan, MMB, NA. (Washington, 1964), pp 182-186.

4. Memo fr Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower 16. Memo, Harry S. Truman to SECto All Members of the Army, Jul 26, 1947, DEF, May 13, 1948, Gen Hoyt S. VandenRG 165, Rcrds of WD Gen and Sp Stfs, berg Colin, Box 40, MD, LC.

320, Bk I, Cases 1-15. 17. Memo fr Pres Harry S. Truman to

5. Intvw, Hugh A. Ahmann and Her- CSAF, May 13, 1948, Gen Hoyt S. Vanman S. Wolk with Stuart Symington, denberg Colin, Box 40, MD, LC.

Washington, D.C., Dec 12, 1978. 18. Annual Report of the Secretary of

6. First Report of the Secretary of De- the Air Force, FY 1948, p 4.

fense, 1948 (Washington, 1948), p 141. 19. Ibid., pp 4-5.

7. 70-Group Program, atch to Itr, Gen 20. Ibid., pp 4, 7.

Carl A. Spaatz, CSAF, to Lt Gen Ennis C. 21. Memo fr SAF Stuart Symington to

Whitehead, CG, FEAF, Oct 6, 1947, RG SECDEF James V. Forrestal, Apr 21,

18, AAG 312.1, Ops Ltrs 1946-47, Vol 2, 1948, RG 340, OSAF File 520, A53-307,

MMB, NA. Special File 9, MMB, NA.

8. Statement by Stuart Symington, SAF, 22. MR, Lt Gen Lauris Norstad,

to the President's Air Policy Commission, DCS/Ops, subj: Conference with General

Nov 26, 1947, Folder B 24-2, Box 16, files Eisenhower-May 1948, May 7, 1948,

of PAPC, Harry S. Truman Library. Gen Lauris Norstad Colin, 1945-48, Box

9. Ibid. 6, MMB, NA.

10. Ltr, Stuart Symington, SAF, to 23. Memo, Adm Daniel V. Gallery,

James E. Webb, Dir/Bureau of the Budget, Asst Ch/Naval Ops, Guided Missiles, to

Dec 16, 1947, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, Dep Ch/Naval Ops, Air, subj: Comment

Harry S. Truman Library. on Final Report "War Department Policies

II. Memo for SECDEF James V. For- and Programs Review Board" (Aug 11,

restal fr SAF Stuart Symington, Dec 16, 1947), Dec 17, 1947.

1947, Papers of Clark M. Clifford, Harry 24. Ibid.

S. Truman Library; ltr, Stuart Symington to 25. Memo for SA thru Dep CSA fr Lt

Gen Lauris Norstad, Dir/Plans and Ops,

358
NOTES

WD, subj: Differences Between the De- 30. Ibid.

partment of the Army and the Department 31. Memo for SA, SECNAV, SAF, and

of the Navy, Oct 2, 1947, RG 18, AAG JCS fr SECDEF James V. Forrestal, subj:

File F-750 thru F-1000, MMB, NA. Organization and Mission of Military Air

26. Memo to SECDEF fr SA Kenneth Transport Service (MATS), May 3, 1948.

C. Royall, Feb 28, 1948, RG 341, AAG 32. GO 1, MATS, Assumption of CoinFile, MMB, NA. mand, Jun 1, 1948.

27. Memo for SECDEF fr SECNAV 33. Ltr, Stuart Symington to Clark M.

John L. Sullivan, Mar 10, 1948, RG 341, Clifford, Jun 18, 1948, Clifford Papers,

AAG File, MMB, NA. Truman Library.

28. See memo for SECNAV John L. 34. Ibid.; ltr, Stuart Symington to FerdiSullivan fr SAF Stuart Symington, Mar 15, nand Eberstadt, June 30, 1948, Clifford Pa1948, RG 341, AAG File, MMB, NA; pers, Truman Library.

memo for SECDEF James V. Forrestal fr 35. Comments by Symington to EberSAF Stuart Symington, Mar 12, 1948, RG stadt Committee, atch to ltr, Symington to

341, AAG File, MMB, NA; memo to SEC- Eberstadt, Jun 30, 1948; memo to Stuart

DEF James V. Forrestal fr SA Kenneth C. Symington fr W. Barton Leach, Clifford

Royall, Mar 12, 1948; memo for SECDEF Papers, Truman Library.

James V. Forrestal fr SECNAV John L. 36. Questions and Answers, incl to ltr,

Sullivan, Mar 10, 1948, RG 341, AAG Gen Carl A. Spaatz to Ferdinand Eberstadt,

File, MMB, NA. Chmn, Cmte on Nat Scty Orgn, Washing29. Memo, SAF Stuart Symington to ton, D.C., Sep 16, 1948.

SECDEF James V. Forrestal, Apr 2, 1948, 37. MR, Norstad, May 7, 1948.

RG 340, OSAF Special File 9, MMB, NA.

359
Glossary

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery

AAF Army Air Forces

AAFL Army Air Forces Letter

AAFR Army Air Forces Regulation

AAG Air Adjutant General

ACAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff

ACAS/ Assistant Chief of Air Staff for

ACAS-1 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel

ACAS-2 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

ACAS-3 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments,

and Requirements.

ACAS-4 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Materiel

ACAS-5 Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

ACS Assistant Chief of Staff

ACTS Air Corps Tactical School

ADC Air Defense Command

admin administration

aero aeronautical

AF Air Force

AFB Air Force base

AFCC Air Force Combat Command

AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency, formerly

the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center,

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

AFMIDPAC United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific

AG Adjutant General

AGF Army Ground Forces

ALCOM Alaskan Command

AMC Air Materiel Command

ANG Air National Guard

361
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

APGC Air Proving Ground Command

app appendix

AR Army Regulations

ASF Army Service Forces

asst assistant

ASWAAF Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces

ATC Air Training Command

atch attachment

ATSC Air Technical Service Command

AU Air University

B-9 Two-engine, all-metal, low-wing monoplane bomber with

retractable landing gear. Four crewmembers (pilot, navigator/

bombardier, 2 gunners). Fitted with one .30-caliber machinegun

each in front and rear cockpits. Could carry 2,000 pounds of

bombs at a top speed of 186 miles-per-hour. Service ceiling,

20,000 feet. Combat range, 600 miles.

B-10 Besides design features of the B-9, this bomber had an

enclosed cockpit, front and rear turrets, and newly designed

engine cowling. Crew of four (pilot, radio operator, 2 gunners).

Armament consisted of one 30-caliber Browning machinegun

each in the nose and rear turrets and in the floor behind the

bomb bay. Bombload, 2,260 pounds. Top speed was around

210 miles-per-hour with a service ceiling of over 21,000 feet

and a combat range of 600 miles. The B-OB version's service

ceiling was 24,200 feet and its range was 1,240 miles.

B-17 Four-engine, midwing bomber, developed by Boeing. Used

widely during World War II in Europe and the Mediterranean

area. Nine crewmembers. The combat version of the B-17 gave

up the graceful lines of the YB-17. The slim rudder yielded to a

broad dorsal fin enclosing twin .50-caliber machineguns in the

tail. Top and belly turrets with jutting guns bulged from the

fuselage. Gunners stood at open side hatches to train their .50s

on enemy planes.

B-24 Four-engine, midwing bomber developed by Consolidated

Vultee and used in World War II. Eight to 10 crewmembers.

Flew in all combat theaters but was especially useful in the

Pacific theater where long-range missons were usual, serving as

a bomber tanker and transport. First model used operationally

by Army Air Forces units was the B-24D in 1942. The D had a

wing span of 110 feet, a length of 66 feet, 4 inches and a height

of 17 feet, II inches. Maximum takeoff weight, 60,000 pounds.

Top speed, 303 miles per hour at 25,000 feet. Service ceiling.

362
GLOSSARY

32,000 feet. Combat range, 2,850 miles. Later Ds carried ten

.50-caliber Browning machineguns and a bombload of 12,800

pounds. Some had a Briggs-Sperry two-gun ball turret aft of the

bomb bay. Others carried two 4,000-pound bombs externally

under each wing.

B-29 Built by Boeing, the B-29 featured a pressurized cabin, highly

advanced-remote gun-firing system, and a bomb capacity of

20,000 pounds. Powered by four Wright R-3350 radial engines

in low-drag nacelles. Ten crewmembers. The A-model had a

wing span of 141 feet, 3 inches. Length, 99 feet. Height, 29 feet

7 inches. Maximum takeoff weight, 141,100 pounds. Top speed,

358 miles-per-hour at 25,000 feet. Service ceiling, 31,850 feet.

Combat range, 4,100 miles. Armament was concentrated in

remotely controlled turrets, two above and two below the

fuselage, each containing two .50-caliber machineguns. Two

.50-caliber and one .20-mm (or three .50-caliber) guns in tail

turret. Technological breakthroughs of the B-29 presaged a new

era of strategic air power.

bd board

bk book

br branch

CAF Continental Air Forces

CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff

CDF central decimal file

cen center

CG commanding general

ch chief

Ch/ chief of

chap chapter

chmn chairman, chairmen

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CinCAFPAC Commander in Chief. Army Forces in the Pacific

CinCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

cir circular

cmte committee

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

colln collection

comd command

363
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

comdr commander

comsn commission

con control

conf conference

CONUS Continental United States

coord coordination

C/S chief of staff

CSA Chief of Staff, United States Army

CSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

DAR daily activity report

DCAS Deputy Chief of Air Staff

DCAS/ Deputy Chief of Air Staff for

DCS/ Deputy Chief of Staff for

DCSA Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army

def defense

dep deputy

DF disposition form

dir director

Dir/ Director of

div division

encl enclosure

engrg engineering

EO executive order

exec executive

FEAF Far East Air Forces

FM field manual

fr from

gen general

GHQ General Headquarters

GSC General Staff Corps

364
GLOSSARY

hist historical, history, historian,

HQ headquarters

H.R.

(with number) House Bill

ibid ibidem, in the same place

incl inclosure

indep independent

intel intelligence

intvw interview

IPWAF-I Initial Postwar Air Force

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JCSM Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum

LC Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

ltr letter

maint maintenance

MATS Military Air Transport Service

MD Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

MED Manhattan Engineer District

memo memorandum

mgt management

mil military

misc miscellaneous

MMB Modem Military Branch, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

MR memorandum for record

mtg meeting

NA National Archives (National Archives and Records Service),

Washington, D.C.

nat national

NGB National Guard Bureau

NSC National Security Council

NSRB National Security Resources Board

365
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

OCAC Office of the Chief of the Air Corps

OC&R operations, commitments, and requirements

OPD Operations Division (G3), War Department General Staff

Ops operations

organ organization

OSAF Office of the Secretary of the Air Force

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

P-47 Powered by a single radial engine, the P-47 was developed by

Republic and used in World War II as a fighter and fighterbomber. The D-model's wing span was 40 feet, 9 inches.

Length 36 feet, I inch. Height, 14 feet, 2 inches. Maximum

takeoff weight, 19,400 pounds. Top speed of 428 miles-per-hour

at 30,000 feet. Service ceiling, 42,000 feet. Combat range, 475

miles. Armament, eight .50-caliber machineguns and one 500-

pound bomb. One crewman. Affectionately known as the "Jug."

the P-47 was reputed to be the toughest fighter of the war, able

to absorb tremendous punishment.

P-51 Prop-driven low-wing monoplane, powered by a single liquidcooled engine. Buiit by North American and widely used in

World War 11. One crewman. Escorted B-17s and B-24s on

bombing missions over Germany. The D-model had a wing

span of 37 feet. Length, 32 feet, 3 inches. Height, 12 feet, 2

inches. Maximum takeoff weight, 11,600 pounds. Top speed,

437 miles-per-hour at 25,000 feet. Service ceiling, 41,900 feet.

Combat range, 950 miles. Armament, six .50-caliber machineguns and two 1,000-pound bombs. Designated as the F-51, the

Mustang served in the Korean War..

P-80 Developed by Lockheed, the P-80 was the first jet aircraft

accepted for operational service with the Air Force. A small

low-wing monoplane with a thin, laminar-flow wing section

and an air-intake on each side of the fuselage ahead of the wing

leading edge. The A-model's wing span was 39 feet, I I inches.

Length, 34 feet, 6 inches. Height, II feet, 4 inches. Maximum

takeoff weight, 14,500 pounds. Top speed of 558 miles-perhour at sea level. Service ceiling. 45,000 feet. Combat range,

540 miles. Armament, six .50-caliber machineguns.

One crewman.

PV-2 Prop-driven, twin-engine, Navy patrol bomber. Four crewmembers. Wing span, 75 feet. Length, 52 feet, I inch. Height,

13 feet, 3 inches. Maximum takeoff weight, 36,000 pounds.

Top speed, 282 miles-per-hour at 13,700 feet. Service ceiling,

23,900 feet. Combat range, 1,790 miles.

366
GLOSSARY

PACOM Pacific Command

PACUSA Pacific Air Command, United States Army

PAPC President's Air Policy Commission (Finletter Commission)

para paragraph

pers personnel

Ph.D. Doctor of Philosophy

ping planning

PME permanent military establishment

pres president

prgm program

prof. professor

proj project

pt part

PWAF Postwar Air Force

RAF Royal Air Force

RAND Research and Development (The RAND Corporation. Santa

Monica, California)

R&D research and development'

R&R routing and record

reorgn reorganization

RG record group

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps

rprt report

rqmt requirement

S. Senate Bill (with number)

SA Secretary of the Army

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAF Secretary of the Air Force

scty security

sec section

SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SECNAV Secretary of the Navy

secy secretary

367
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

SECNAV Secretary of the Navy

secy secretary

sp special

SPD Special Planning Division, War Department General Staff

SSF Strategic Striking Force

stf staff

stint statement

str strength

strat strategic

subj subject

sum summary

sur survey

sv service

S1W Secretary of War

tac tactical

TAC Tactical Air Command

TAG The Adjutant General

tech technical

tng training

UMT Universal Military Training

US United States (of America)

USA United States Army

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

USN United States Navy

USSAFE United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe

VCS vice chief of staff

VHB very heavy bomb

WD War Department

WDGS War Department General Staff

WDSS War Department Special Staff

368
GLOSSARY

XB-17 Boeing started work on the prototype for this four-engine, mid

wing bomber in 1934 and first flew it in 1935. The plane's

flying characteristics were outstanding for the time. It could

carry 2,500 pounds of bombs, 2,260 miles and could attack

closer targets with up to 9,000 pounds of ordnance. Accepted

by the military in January 1937 as the B-17 Flying Fortress,

the aircraft had a top speed of 256 miles-per-hour at 14,000

feet. Service ceiling was 30,600 feet. Loaded with 10,496

pounds of bombs, its maximum range was 1,377 miles.

ZI Zone of Interior

369
Bibliographic Note

Governmental Sources

National Archives of the United States

The major sources concerning planning for the post-World War II Army Air

Forces are to be found in the Modern Military Branch of the National Archives,

Washington, D.C.

This planning, done by the AAF during 1943-47, concentrated on the primary

objective of gaining independence for the Army Air Forces. The planning, including consideration of the 70-group program, and the March 1946 reorganization, was sustained and complex. The records reflect this.

Records pertaining to postwar planning in the Modern Military Branch, National Archives, are massive yet sometimes difficult to locate. This is because

pertinent clusters of documents have sometimes been filed under subjects unrelated to the general topic of postwar planning.

Nonetheless, the National Archives' record groups that have considerable

documentation on this subject are readily determined. They are RG 18, records of

Headquarters Army Air Forces; RG 165, records of the War Department General

and Special Staffs; RG 218, records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; RG 319, records of the Army Staff; RG 340, records of the Office of the Secretary of the

Air Force; and RG 341, records of Headquarters United States Air Force.

Record Group 18, Headquarters AAF, contains a wealth of material relating to

the AAF's postwar planning. The decimal correspondence files of the Office of

the Air Adjutant General (under the Office of the Chief of the Air Staff) have

documentation covering early postwar planning in 1943-44, done by the Post

War Division under Brig. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of Air Staff,

Plans. These files include considerable material describing the planning in 1945

for what eventually became the AAF's 70-group program. These decimal files

also contain correspondence on the War Department's Basic Plan for the PostWar Military Establishment and on the subject of Universal Military Training,

featuring correspondence between the War Department's Special Planning Division and AAF headquarters. Also, the subjects of postwar organization of Continental Air Forces and the major Army Air Forces' commands are in evidence

here. Further, there is material on the establishment of an atomic striking force.

371
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Among the relevant decimal files are 221, 300.6, 312.1, 319.01, 320.01, 320.1,

320.2, 320.3, 321,322, 325,334,370, 370.01,381,391,452.1, and 471.6.

The files of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans (RG 18) also

afford significant information on postwar planning of the Army Air Forces.

RG 165, records of the War Department's General and Special Staffs, documents the War Department's position on the various issues affecting postwar

planning. Here are the Patch-Simpson Board files; records of the Special War

Department Committee on the Permanent Military Establishment, known as the

Bessell Committee; and correspondence bearing on the Collins Committee report

regarding unification of the armed forces. The researcher will also find high-level

War Department papers on unification, including those reflecting Army Chief of

Staff Eisenhower's views during the 1946-47 period. The key decimal indicators

include 319.1, 320, 334, and 452.1.

Also crucial to the story of postwar planning is Record Group 218, documents

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Besides positions taken on unification and force

structure by the military services in the early phases of postwar planning, this record group has valuable papers describing the services' movement towards unified planning and the first so-called Unified Command Plan of December 1946.

The appropriate JCS numbered papers are in the JCS 521, JCS 1259, and JCS

1478 series. The numerical designators under RG 218 are CCS 020, CCS 040,

CCS 323.361, and CCS 370.

Records of the Army Staff (RG 319) contain some significant high-level

documents dealing with unification issues during 1945-46, which can be found

in 320, the Plans and Operations files.

Record Group 340 (Office of the Secretary of the Air Force) has been especially important in this study. Among the special documentary categories are the

records of the Air Coordinating Committee; the Air Board, 1946-48; minutes of

all Air Board meetings, 1946-48; as well as interim reports of board meetings

and working papers. The report of the board on Army and Air Force Organizational Matters Under Unification (Hall Board) is in RG 340. This record group

also contains the Report of the JCS Special committee for Reorganization of National Defense; the Final Report of the War Department Policies and Programs

Review Board; and personal papers of Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr, Secretary-General of the Air Board.

Moreover, of great interest to the historian is a large volume of correspondence between Secretary of the Air Force Symington and Secretary of Defense

Forrestal during 1947-49. These documents are among those of the Office of the

Administrative Assistant, Correspondence Control Division, OSAF File 520

("Special Interest" files).

Additional important material treating of the struggle for autonomy, force

structure, and organization exists under these decimals: Plans and Operations

372
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

009, 020, 312.1, 320.2, and particularly 320.5. On the atomic bomb striking

force, see AFOAT 1946, numbers 312.2 and 322.

The papers of General Lauris Norstad are also in the National Archives (as

well as on file in the Air Force History Support Office and the Air Force Historical Research Agency), a considerable collection depicting Norstad's role both in

the unification drive and AAF reorganization. These documents are noteworthy

in giving the historian an insight into some of General Norstad's keenly penetrating views on unification, roles and missions, and Air Force relations with the

Navy.

Library of Congress

The Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, holds the collections of the

Chiefs of Staff of the United States Air Force.

The General Henry H. (Hap) Arnold collection contains important documentation describing Arnold's, and the AAF's, role in the battle for an independent

Air Force. The collection also offers a wealth of material on postwar organizational planning. The General Carl A. Spaatz collection complements the Arnold

source material and gives the researchers a view of the interchange of ideas between Arnold and Spaatz. The latter's opinions on postwar organization and the

Air Force's struggle with the Navy over roles and missions are also evident.

Compared to the Arnold and Spaatz collections, there is less material on postwar planning in the Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Ira C. Eaker, and Muir S. Fairchild papers. The Vandenberg collection has interesting 1948 memorandums from

President Harry S. Truman to the service chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. In

them, Truman admonishes all concerned to put their disagreements aside for the

greater well-being of the country. The Fairchild papers have some reveling transcripts of lectures delivered to the Air Corps Tactical School, shedding considerable light on the ideas and doctrine of the Army Air Corps prior to World War II.

There are additional collections in the Manuscript Division that proved valuable to this study. The Robert P. Patterson collection includes documents pertaining to the autonomy drive and to roles and missions. Minutes of War Council

meetings are also available here. The Admiral William D. Leahy papers acquaint

the researcher with the sharp views on the roles and missions battle by President

Roosevelt's military adviser.

Harry S. Truman Library

Holdings in the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, cover the

immediate post-World War II years. The Clark M. Clifford papers and those of

James E. Webb were especially helpful to the chronicling of this study for the

373
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

years 1946-48. Both collections contain a number of letters from Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington that are particularly revealing of his opinions on the

budget and the Navy.

Air Force Historical Research Agency

The massive archives of the Air Force Historical Research Agency house

many documents pertinent to this work. This material is vital to the 1943-45 period when the Army Air Forces accomplished much early postwar planning, and

to the years 1946-47 culminating in establishment of the United States Air

Force. Much of the Agency Archives is on microfilm in the Air Force History

Support Office, Washington, D.C.

Historical Studies

Historical studies dealing with Air Force organization and doctrine, and the

development of aircraft have been useful, especially those published by the Historical Division of the Air University.

Bald, Ralph D., Jr. Air Force Participation in Joint Army-Air Force Training Exercises,

1947-50. USAF Historical Study 80. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala,: USAF Historical

Division, Air University, 1952

Finney, Robert. History of the Air Corps Tactical School, 1920-1940. USAF Historical

Study 100. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University,

1955.

Futrell, Robert F. Command of Observation Aviation: A Study in Tactical Control of Air

Power. USAF Historical Study 24, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Research Studies

Institute, Air University, 1952.

Gleckner, Robert F. The Development of the Heavy Bomber. USAF Historical Study 6.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1951.

Greer, Thomas H. The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941.

USAF Historical Study 89. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Historical Division,

Air University, 1953.

Holley, Irving B. Jr. Evolution of the Liaison Type Airplane, 1917-1944. USAF Historical

Study 44. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1946.

McClendon, R. Earl. Autonomy of the Air Arm. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Documentary Research Division, Air University, 1954. [Reprint, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996]

Mooney, Chase C. Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1935-1945, AAF Historical

Study 46. Washington: AAF Historical Office, 1946.

374
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Mooney, Chase C., and Layman, Martha E. Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907-

1935. AAF Historical Study 25. Washington: AAF Historical Division, 1944.

Mooney, Chase C., and Williamson, Edward E. Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-

1945. USAF Historical Study 10. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1956.

Sanders, Chauncey E. Redeployment and Demobilization. USAF Historical Study 77.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952.

Williams, Edwin L., Jr. Legislative History of the AAF and USAF, 1941-1951. USAF

Historical Study 84. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air

University, 1955.

Also useful in this study was: Haase, Albert E. Manpower Demobilization in the AAF.

SAC Historical Study, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebr.: Historical Office, Strategic Air

Command, 1946.

Reports

Annual Report of the Chief of the Air Corps, 1930s.

Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, Fiscal Year 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948.

Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army, 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1949.

Arnold, Henry H. First Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the

Secretary of War. Washington: War Department, 1944.

. Second Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the

Secretary of War. Washington: War Department, 1945.

___ Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the

Secretary of War. Washington: War Department, 1945.

Doolittle, James H. Dissent to the Final Report of the War Department Special Committee

on the Army Air Corps. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934.

Final Report of the War Department Policies and Programs Review Board. Washington:

War Department, 1947.

First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office,

1949.

March, Gen Peyton C. "Lessons of World War I." War Department Annual Reports,

1919. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920.

Survival in the Air Age: A Report by the President's Air Policy Commission. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1948.

375
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Regulations, Circulars, Letters, Orders

Air Corps News Letter, 1930s.

Army Air Forces Letter 20-9, December 16, 1944.

Army Air Forces Letter 20-9 1, February 14, 1946.

Army Air Forces Regulation 20-1, Army Air Forces. June 1, 1945.

Army Air Forces Regulation 20-14, AAF Proving Ground Command. March 7, 1946.

Army Air Forces Regulation 20-6 1, Air University. April 5, 1946.

Army Regulation 95-5, General Provisions. June 20, 1941.

Army Regulation 95- 10, Air Corps Troops. March 10, 1928.

Executive Order 9877, Functions of the Armed Forces. July 16, 1947.

Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power. July 21, 1943.

War Department Circular 59, War Department Reorganization. March 2, 1942.

War Department Circular 138, War Department Reorganization. May 14, 1946.

War Department Circular 347, Section 111, Military Establishment. August 25, 1944.

War Department Letter, AG 322, March 21, 1946.

Interviews

Selected oral history interviews have been important to the writing of this

study. Several deserve special mention. In the early 1970s, Lt. Col. Joe B. Green,

USAF, conducted a series of extensive interviews with Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker at

the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. In these interviews, General Eaker

provided many pertinent insights into the history of the Army Air Corps between

the wars; into strategy, operations, and command problems of the strategic air

war in the European theater during World War II; also into the major issues of

the immediate postwar years. Eaker's interviews can be recommended to anyone

with an interest in Air Force history.

I am personally grateful to General Eaker. On several occasions he gave most

generously of his time to this writer, recalling especially his command of air

forces in the European theater and describing his part during 1945-47 in planning for the postwar Air Force. He also responded with substantive memorandums to a number of specific questions that I posed following our interviews.

376
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Maj. Gen. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., was kind enough to recall with me his experience as a major war planner and bomber commander. He also gave numerous

insights into prewar air planning and training.

In addition, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay graciously granted me an interview in

Washington, wherein he cleared up a number of points relating to operations during World War II and to planning for the postwar Air Force.

The first Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, consented to an interview in May 1978 and another in December 1978. They were conducted by this

writer and Hugh A. Ahmann of the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center. Symington ranged over his career as industrialist and as a government official, dwelling on his years as Assistant Secretary of War for Air and as Secretary

of the Air Force, 1947-50.

Besides the above interviews, I found interviews with the following to be

most helpful (transcripts of almost all of them are available at the Air Force Historical Research Agency and in the Air Force History Support Office):

Maj. Gen. Edward P. Curtis Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle

Thomas K. Finletter Col. Kenneth F. Gantz

Roswell L. Gilpatric Maj. Gen. Leon W. Johnson

Gen. George C. Kenney Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Knerr

Gen. Laurence S. Kuter Robert A. Lovett

Gen. Earle E. Patridge Lt. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada

Gen. Carl A. Spaatz Gen. Otto P. Weyland

Eugene M. Zuckert

Congress

Most important to this study were congressional hearings of the 78th and 79th

Congresses. The House of Representatives Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy held hearings in 1944 on a Proposal to Establish a Single Department

of Armed Forces. High-ranking officials of the War Department and the Army

Air Forces presented their views on postwar military policy to this committee.

During the 79th Congress, War and Navy Department officials testified in

September and October 1945 before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,

relative to unification problems. Reports of these hearings contain much significant information. This brief list holds some of the most relevant testimony:

House. Hearings before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy. Proposal to

Establish a Single Department of Armed Forces. 78th Cong, 2d sess. Washington:

Government Printing Office, 1944.

Senate. Hearings before the War Contracts Subcommittee, Committee on Military Affairs.

Hearings on Contract Termination. 78th Cong. 2d sess. Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1945.

377
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs. Department of Armed Forces

and Military Security: Hearings on S. 84 and S. 1482. 79th Cong, Ist sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1945.

Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs. National Defense Establishment (Unification of the Armed Services): Hearings on S. 758. 80th Cong, I st sess.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.

Presidential Papers

Public Papers of the President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1945. Washington:

Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service. 1961.

Public Papers of the President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1946. Washington:

Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service. 1962.

Public Papers of the President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947. Washington:

Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service. 1963.

Public Papers of the President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948. Washington:

Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service. 1964.

Books

Brodie, Bernard, and Galloway, Eilene. The Atomic Bomb and the Armed Services. Public

Affairs Bulletin 55. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947.

Carter, Kit C., and Mueller, Robert. The Army Air Forces in World War 11: Combat Chronology, 1941-45. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1973.

Cline, Ray S. The War Department, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,

1951.

Cole, Alice C., Goldberg, Alfred, Tucker, Samuel A., Winnacker, Rudolph A., eds. The

Department of Defense: Documents on Establishment and Organization 1944-1978.

Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1978.

Condit, Kenneth W. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.- The Joint Chiefs of Staff and

National Policy, 1947-1949. Vol 11. Washington: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1977. (Also published by Michael Glazier, nc, Wilmington,

Del.).

Craven, Wesley F., and Cate, James L., eds. The Army Air Forces in World War 11. 7 vols.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948-1958.

Davis, Richard G. Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe. Washington: Center for Air

Force History, 1993.

378
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Emerson, William R. Operation Pointblank: A Tale of Bombers and Fighters. The Fourth

Harmon Memorial Lecture. Colorado Springs, Colo.: United States Air Force Academy, 1962.

Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United

States Air Force, 1907-1964. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 1974.

Gropman, Alan L. The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964. Washington: Office of Air Force

History, 1978.

Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration,

1900-1963. Washington: United States Army Center of Military History, 1975.

Holley, Irving B., Jr. Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces.

Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964.

Knaack, Marcelle S. Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems. Vol I:

Post-World War H Fighters, 1945-1973. Washington: Office of Air Force History

1978.

Matloff, Maurice. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944. [U.S. Army in

World War II, The War Department]. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959.

Maurer, Maurer. The U.S. Air Service in World War 1. 4 vols. Washington: Office of Air

Force History, 1978-1979.

Moody, Walton S. Building a Strategic Air Force, 1945-1953. Washington: Air Force

History and Museums Program, 1996.

Palmer, Michael A. Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the

First Postwar Decade. Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1988.

Rearden, Steven L. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Vol I: The Formative

Years, 1947-1950. Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense,

1984.

Schnabel, James F. The History of the Joint Chief of Staff: The Joint Chiefs and Staff and

National Policy, 1945-1947. Vol I. Washington: Historical Division, Joint Secretariat,

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979. (Also published by Michael Glazier, Inc, Wilmington,

Del.).

Sherry, Michael S. Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense,

1941-1945. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Shiner, John F. Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935. Washington: Office of

Air Force History, 1982.

Sturm, Thomas A. The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years, 1944-

1964. Washington: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967.

379
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Watson, George M., Jr., The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1947-1965. Center

for Air Force History, 1993.

Webster, Charles K., and Frankland, Nobel. The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945. 4 vols. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961.

Articles

Cate, James L. "Development of Air Doctrine, 1917-41." Air University Quarterly Review

I (Winter 1947).

Futrell, Robert F. "Preplanning the USAF: Dogmatic or Pragmatic?" Air University Review XXI (January-February 197 1).

Greenwood, John T. "The Emergency of the Postwar Strategic Air Force, 1945-1953."

Air Power and Warfare. Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, United

States Air Force Academy, October 18-20, 1978. Washington: Office of Air Force

History and the United States Air Force Academy, 1979.

Huston, John W. "The Wartime Leadership of Hap Arnold." Air Power and Warfare. Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy,

October 18-20, 1978. Washington: Office of Air Force History and the United States

Air Force Academy, 1979.

Maurer, Maurer. "The Constitutional Basis of the United States Air Force." Air University

Review XVI (January-February 1965).

Quesada, Elwood R. "Tactical Air Power." Air University Quarterly Review XI (Spring

1959).

Wolk, Herman S. "The Defense Unification Battle, 1947-50: The Air Force." Prologue:

Journal of the National Archives (Spring 1975).

"• "Men Who Made the Air Force." Air University Review XXIII (September-October 1972).

"• "The Uses of History in the Nuclear Age." Air University Review XXII (November-December 1971).

Non-Governmental Sources

Non-Governmental Sources

Books

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York:

W. W. Norton & Co, 1969.

380
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Ambrose, Stephen E. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. Baltimore:

Penguin Books, 1971. Paperback.

Arnold, Henry H. Global Mission. New York: Harper & Bros, 1949.

--. Winged Warfare. New York: Harper & Bros, 1941.

Arnold, Henry H., and Eaker, Ira C. This Flying Game. 3d rev ed. New York: Funk &

Wagnalls Co, 1936.

Baldwin, Hanson W. The Crucial Years, 1939-1941. New York, Harper & Row, 1976.

Barlow, Jeffrey G. Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950.

Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1994.

Berger, Carl. B-29: The Superfortress. New York: Ballantine Books, Inc, 1970.

Borden, Norman E., Jr. The Air Mail Emergency. Portland, Maine: The Bond Wheelwright Co., 1958.

Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton University Press, 1959.

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Buchan, Alastair. The End of the Postwar Era: A New Balance of World Power. New

York: E. P. Dutton & Co, 1974.

Butow, Robert J. C. Japan's Decision to Surrender. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press,

1954.

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Caraley, Demetrios. The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

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Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. 6 vols, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co,

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Coletta, Paolo E. The United States Navy and Defense Unification 1917-1953. Newark,

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Collier, Basil. A History of Air Power. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc, 1974.

Copp, Dewitt S. A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events that Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, 1980.

Davis, Burke. The Billy Mitchell Affair. New York: Random House, 1967.

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381
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Divine, Robert A. Roosevelt and World War 11. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969. Paperback.

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1949. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1991.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino Ferrari. 1942 ed. New

York: Arno Press, 1972. [Reprint, Office of Air Force History, 1991].

Edmonds, Walter D. They Fought With What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Forces

in the South West Pacific, 1941-1942. Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1951.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, 1952.

, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years. Baltimore: The Johns

Hopkins University Press. 1970.

Emme, Eugene M., ed. The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics.

Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co, 1959.

Feis, Herbert. The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War IH. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Forrestal, James. The Forrestal Diaries. Walter Millis, ed. New York: The Viking Press,

1951.

Foulois, Benjamin D., and Glines, Carroll V. From the Wright Brothers to the Astronauts:

The Memoirs of Benjamin D. Foulois. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1968.

Fredette, Raymond H. The Sky on Fire: The First Battle of Britain, 1917-1918, and the

Birth of the Royal Air Force. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976.

Freeman, Roger A. The Mighty Eighth: Units, Men, and Machines: A History of the U.S.

Eighth Army Air Force. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, 1970.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New

York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

Gardner, Lloyd C. Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy,

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Goldberg, Alfred, ed. A History of the United States Air Force, 1907-1957. Princeton: D.

Van Nostrand Co, Inc, 1957.

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382
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Hart, B. H. Liddell. History of the Second World War. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons,

1970.

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Hurley, Alfred F. Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power. New York: Franklin Watts, Inc.

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York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1949.

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& Sons, Inc, 1968.

LeMay, Curtis E. and Kantor, MacKinlay. Mission With LeMay: My Story. Garden City,

N. Y.: Doubleday & Co, 1965.

383
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Loosbrock, John F., and Skinner, Richard M., eds. The Wild Blue: The Story of American

Airpower, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961.

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Strategy. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 1966.

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Policy, 1945-1955. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1956.

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York: The Macmillan Co, 1963.

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1969.

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384
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

Sherwin, Martin J. A. World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance. New

York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1975.

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and Clara Winston. New York: The Macmillan Co, 1970.

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1967.

--. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc, 1973.

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Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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1921-1931. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1968.

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Articles

Bernstein, Barton J. "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation." Political Science Quarterly 90 (Spring 1975).

Brodie Bernard. "The Atomic Bomb and American Security," Yale Institute of International Studies, November 1, 1945.

"The Atomic Bomb as Policy Maker." Foreign Affairs, October 1948.

385
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Goldberg, Alfred. "General Carl A. Spaatz." Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver, ed. The

War Lords: Military Commanders of the Twentieth Century. Boston: Little, Brown &

Co, 1976.

Gorrell, Edgar S. "An American Proposal for Strategic Bombing in World War L." Air

Power Historian, April 1958.

Hansell, Haywood S., Jr. "General Laurence S. Kuter, 1905-1979." Aerospace Historian,

Summer 1980.

"Strategic Air Warfare." Aerospace Historian, Winter 1966.

Holley, I. B., Jr. "An Air Force General: Laurence Sherman Kuter." Aerospace Historian,

Summer 1980.

Hopkins, George E. "Bombing and the American Conscience During World War II." Historian, May 1966.

Krauskopf, Robert W. "The Army and The Strategic Bomber, 1930-1939." Military Affairs, Summer 1958.

Kuter, Laurence S. "How Hap Arnold Built the AAF." Air Force Magazine, September

1973.

Lewis, Flora. "The Education of a Senator." The Atlantic, December 1971.

Olson, Mancur, Jr. "The Economics of Strategic Bombing in World War II." Airpower

Historian, April 1966.

Ransom, Harry H. "The Battleship Meets the Airplane." Military Affairs, Spring 1959.

Shiner, John F. "Birth of the GHQ Air Force." Military Affairs, October 1978.

Spaatz, Gen Carl A., USAF. "Air Power in the Atomic Age." Collier's, December 8,

1945.

". "Strategic Air Power: Fulfillment of a Concept." Foreign Affairs, April 1946.

Taylor, Joe Gray. "They Taught Tactics." Aerospace Historian, Summer 1966.

Twining, Nathan F. "The Twentieth Air Force." Military Review 26 (June 1946).

Wells, Samuel F., Jr. "William Mitchell and the Ostfriesland: A Study in Military Reform." Historian, August 1964.

Wolk, Herman S. "Building the Peacetime Air Force." Air Force Magazine, September

1980.

". "Independence and Responsibility: USAF in the Defense Establishment." Paul R.

Schratz, ed. The American Military Establishment Since World War H1. Lexington,

Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1978.

". "Prelude to D-Day: The Bomber Offensive-The Overlord Air Dispute." Air

Force Magazine, June 1974.

"Roots of Strategic Deterrence." Aerospace Historian, September-October 1972.

386
BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

"* The B-29, the A-Bomb, and the Japanese Surrender." Air Force Magazine,

February 1975.

* The Strategic World of 1946." Air Force Magazine, February 1971.

"* "Founding the Force." Air Force Magazine, September 1996.

Ph.D. Dissertations

These Ph.D. dissertations were especially helpful in the writing of this study:

Boyle, James M. "The XXI Bomber Command: Primary Factor in the Defeat of Japan."

Saint Louis University, 1964.

Flugel, Raymond R. "United States Air Power Doctrine: A Study of the Influence of William Mitchell and Giulio Douhet at the Air Corps Tactical School, 1921-1935." University of Oklahoma, 1965.

Green, Murray. "Stuart Symington and the B-36." American University, 1960.

Gross, Charles J. "Origins and Development of the Air National Guard." The Ohio State

University 1976.

Legere, Lawrence J. "Unification of the Armed Forces," Harvard University, 1951.

Shiner, John F. "The Army Air Arm in Transition: General Benjamin D. Foulois and the

Air Corps, 1931-1935." The Ohio State University, 1975.

387
Index

Accounting services: 224 and strategic operations: 228

Adak, Alaska: 148 transfer to Air Force: 187

Adkison, Bourne: 135n units, command and control of: 14-16

Advisory Committee on Universal World War II organization: 22-33

Training: 197 Air Corps Act (1926): 9, 14-15, 117

Advisory committees: 316 Air Corps Tactical School: 8n, 18, 20-21

Advisory Council: 51,55 Air Council: 24

Aerial ports system: 149 Air defense

Aeronautical chart service: 149 Air Force mission: 184

Aeronautical Division, Office of the airmen's views on: 125-130, 149-150

Chief Signal Officer: 3. See also Army views on: 150

Air Corps; Air Service Army Air Forces in: 123-24, 127-128

Africa-Middle East Theater: 68 Army Ground Forces role in: 150

Air Board: 154-157, 205-210 of continental United States: 125-130

Air Combat Command: 207 GHQ Air Force mission: 26

Air Command and Staff School: 149 organization: 26

Air commands planning: 24, 26, 46-47, 127-128

in Army Air Forces: 127-128, of polar region: 46, 229

135-150, 159, 281-284 policy on: 9

combat commands: 1-3 Air Defense Command

Norstad on: 136 activated: 26, 142-144, 159, 207,

organization and structure: 33n, 85, 214, 281

123, 126, 141,214 forces assigned: 144

Air Comptroller: 152-153, 197, 210 and Army Air Forces: 141-144

Air Corps (see also Army Air Force; mission: 148-150, 204-205

Department of the Air Force; organization and reorganization: 2

Headquarters United States Air personnel strength: 146

Force; United States Air Force) Air districts. See Air Forces, numbered

Army control of: 12 Air division organization: 34

autonomy movement in: 7, 14-18, 22-25 Air evacuation service: 149

and coast defense mission: 12n, 14, Air Force: 8

16, 19-20, 228 Air Force Combat Command: 24, 28, 31,

command and control of: 12-13 130-131,135,136,187,225

established: 9 Air Force Institute of Technology: 81

expansion program: 14 Air Force Reserve (see also Reserve

history, 1918-1939: 2-22 components)

in mail service: 12 active-duty service: 80

officers transfer to: 120 aircraft, numbers proposed: 78

personnel strength: 6, 14 groups proposed for: 80, 82

schools of: 8 personnel strength: 79, 204, 205

and separate promotion for: 28n units assigned: 204

389
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Air forces Air Reserve: See Air Force Reserve;

command assignments: 143, 144, Reserve components

148, 149 Air Service: 6-7, 14

expansion programs: 40 Air Service Command: 143n

overseas assignments: 148 Air Service Field Officers School: 8

training programs: 125n Air Service Tactical School: 8n

in Tactical Air Command: 142-144 Air Staff

tactical organizations: 32-33 functions: 24-25

Air Forces (numbered) membership: 145

First: 26, 125, 138, 144, 150, 283 organization and reorganization: 32,

Second: 26, 125, 144,282 55, 150-153,206-207

Third: 26, 125n, 144, 283 parity for: 31-32, 55-56, 116-121,

Fourth: 26, 125, 144, 150, 283 141-142, 150-152, 160

Fifth: 148 planning duplication: 54-55

Sixth: 148 postwar organization planning: 50-51

Seventh: 148,214 subordination to General Staff: 26, 28

Eighth: 144 Air Technical Service Command: 126,

Ninth: 144,283 136, 141, 143

Tenth: 144, 283 Air Training Command: 125-126,

Eleventh: 144 130-131

Twelfth: 144, 283 activated: 214

Thirteenth: 148 Army Air Forces on: 136, 143

Fourteenth: 144, 283 mission: 149

Fifteenth: 144, 282 personnel strength: 146

Twentieth: 43, 46, 127, 148, 173 Air Transport Command: 127n

Air Force Combat Command: 126 activated: 214

Air-ground operations Army Air Forces and: 136, 143

coordination of: 16, 18, 28-29, 31-33 mission assigned: 149

training programs: 126 personnel strength: 146

Air Material Command: 133n Air transport missions: 5 1, 184-185,

activated: 214 187, 292

Army Air Forces and: 143, 290 Air units

mission assigned: 149 in Air National Guard: 204

personnel strength: 146 Army Air forces control of: 32-33

staff organization: 206 Army organic: 92, 138-139, 142, 277

Air National Guard (see also Reserve command an control of: 15-16,

Components) 22-23, 45-47, 83, 179-180

aircraft, numbers proposed: 78 number proposed: 54

established: 204 Air University

groups proposed for: 80, 82 Army Air Forces and: 141, 143

personnel strength: 146 established: 214

units assigned: 204 mission assigned: 149

Air Policy Commission: 235 personnel strength: 146

Air Proving Ground Command as training center: 203

activated: 214 Air War College: 149, 207-210

Army Air Forces and: 141, 144 Airborne operations and units training:

mission assigned: 148-149 149, 184

personnel strength: 146 Aircraft (see also by type and mission)

390
INDEX

in Air Force Reserve: 78 Anderson, Orvil A.: 53, 322

in Air National Guard: 78 aircraft number proposals: 51-54

bombers, numbers proposed: 52 on and headquarters and staff

cargo, numbers proposed: 52 organization: 207

command and control of: 14 and postwar organization: 51-53

development, testing and on United Nations support: 51-52

procurement: 2, 6, 16, 22, 24-25, Anderson, Samuel E.: 138-140

68-69, 167,184,187, 198, Andrews, Frank E.: 17 (see also General

230-231,243 Headquarters Air Force)

distribution by type: 147 appointed to General Staff: 18n

number proposed: 52, 63, 78, 257 and autonomy movement: 18

number in service: 14, 205 background: 14

redeployment: 127n on bomber role: 16, 18

in strategic missions: 6 bombing demonstration by: 20n

types. See Aircraft types commands GHQ Air Force: 14

types defined: 33 on organization: 1, 18

World War I employment: 6 on pilots training: 16

Aircraft carrier program: 238 on units, control of: 15

Aircraft types Andrews Field, Md.: 142, 159

B-9: 19 Antiaircraft units

B-10:19 command and control of: 117, 118

B-17: 16, 19-20,125 integration into Air Force: 80, 117-118

B-24: 125 integration into Army Air Forces:

B-29: 43, 68-69, 114-115,123-125, 115, 117-118, 121,127-128, 163,

133, 134,239 288-289

B-36:237,239 training programs: 118, 121, 128

Boeing Model 299: 19 Antisubmarine mission

P-47:69 airmen on: 166, 169

P-51: 69 Army Air Forces on: 166

P-80:69 Navy on: 166, 179, 180-181, 184,

PV-2: 180 187, 309

Wright B: 4 Arctic regions, air defense of: 46, 148n,

Aircraft and Weapons Board: 198 220

Aircrews training: 60, 62, 66 Arms and Services with the Army Air

Airlift missions: 184 Forces (ASWAAF)

Airmen integration into Air Force: 71, 80-81,

training program: 60, 62,204 187, 217

transfer to the Air Force: 225, 311-312 integration into Army Air Forces: 71,

Alaska, groups and personnel strength: 119-120

69 personnel strength: 215

Alaskan Air Command Army Air Forces (see also Air Corps;

activated: 214 Arnold, Henry H.)

personnel strength: 146 and air commands: 127-28, 135-150,

Alaskan Command activated: 172, 173 159, 281-284

Albrook Field, Canal Zone: 148 and Air Defense Command: 141-144

Albuquerque, N.M.: 132 and air defense missions and plans:

Amphibious operations: 166, 179 124, 127-128

Anderson, Fred L.: 203, 323

391
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

and Air Force Combat Command: established: 23-24, 29, 92, 215-216

135, 136 General Staff representation for: 9,

and Air Materiel Command: 141, 142 88-89, 119-121,285-292

and Air Proving Ground Command: groups. See Groups.

141, 144 headquarters and staff' organization:

and Air Staff parity: 141- 142, 160 150-153, 195,210,320-324

and Air Staff membership: 145 and industrial mobilization: 84

Air Staff organization: 31-32, 54-56, Interim Air Force: 79

150-153,206-207 Joint Chiefs representation for: 89-90

and Air Technical Service and Lend-Lease allocations: 259

Command: 136, 141, 143 maintenance and repair facilities:

and Air Training Command: 135, 224, 289-290

136, 141, 143 medical services: 290-291

air transport role: 292 and military occupation specialties:

and Air University: 141, 143 84-85

aircraft, number proposed: 78 mission defined: 3 I

aircraft, number in service: 205n mobilization plans: 66, 70, 82-85

aircraft redeployment: 127n and National Security Act: 192

and antiaircraft units integration: and naval aviation: 166

117-118,121, 127-128,289 Navy, cooperation with: 148, 292

and antisubmarine defense: 166 officers transfer to: 120

and arctic theater: 148n officers transfer to Air Force: 225

Army ground forces, parity with: organization, postwar. See

157, 160, 233 Organization, postwar

and Army organic units: 138-39 organization and reorganization: 28-47

and ASWAAF Integration: 7 1, passengers, number redeployed: 126n

119-120,217 peacetime missions outlined: 79-80

and atomic information security: 132 personnel, control of: H14, 120-121

and atomic strike force: 13 1-135 personnel distribution: 146

and autonomy movement: 49-50, personnel strength: 146, 2

05n, 215, 234

87-88, 109-112, 123, 159, personnel strength proposals: 52,

187-190, 228-229, 232-233 54-55, 73, 76, 79, 81-82

and bases overseas: 132 on pilots, requirements for: 114-115

budget estimates, role in: 64, 122, on postwar organization and troop

234-235,290 requirements: 49-50, 54-55,

budget limitations: 234-235 58-63, 68, 70-73, 79, 87, on combat readiness: 82 131-132, 135-150, 231, 143,

command and control in: 205-206 253-267, 278-280, 293-296

command structure, postwar: 85-149 as procurement and supply agency: 165

commanding general functions and and promotion policies: 114-115,

missions: 159 121, 160

commands air missions: 148 publication relations program: 232

and communications systems: 122 quartermaster services for: 165

and Continental Air Forces: 135, 138. and reconnaissance missions: 166

140-142 redeployment plans: 124-127

demobilization plans and operations: reorganization committee: 135

127, 129, 231-234 and research and development in:

deployment plans: 48, 258, 279 132,289

392
INDEX

on roles and missions: 141-142, Army Airways Communications

165-166, 173, 192, 297-300 System: 122, 287-288

Royal Air Force, advice from: 169 Army Audit Agency: 224

and Secretary of Defense powers: 178 Army Field Forces units, control of: 22

and selective service: 84 Army Ground Forces (see also United

and Service Command: 143n States Army)

service units for: 223 activated: 29, 92, 215, 216

seventy-five-groups plan: 49, 62, 73, air defense mission: 150

78-88, 31,234, 253, 259-280 and antiaircraft units assignment:

sixteen-groups plan: 54-55 117-118

Soviet Union, experiences with: 231-232 Army Air Forces parity with: 157,

staff organization and reorganization. 160, 233

See Air Staff; Headquarters and personnel strength: 73, 215

staff and Strategic Reserve: 128, 130

and Strategic Air Command: 141-142 tactical air support for: 7, 136, 138, 140

and strategic missions: 123-124, Army National Guard. See Reserve

127-128 components

and Strategic Reserve: 70, 75, 79-81, Army-Navy Joint Board

82-83, 120, 128, 130 and coast defense mission: 19

and strategic strike force: 128-135 composition: 25

supply and procurement services for: Army Reserve in postwar organization:

24, 289 38, 57. See also Reserve

and Tactical Air Command: 138-142 components

and tactical air support: 124, 136, 140 Army Service Forces

technical services complement for: activated: 29, 92-93, 215

120, 163, 177, 212-221 airmen on: 113

training programs. See Training inactivated: 157

programs personnel strength proposals: 73

transfer to Air Force: 187, 198-199, Arnold, Henry H.: 10, 24, 25, 44, 61,99,

222, 225 111, 119. See also Army Air Forces

and Transport Command: 136, 143 on Army Air Forces achievements: 39

troop strength, postwar. See Troop Advisory Council formed by: 51

strength, postwar and air arm autonomy: 7, 23, 97-98,

on unification: 34, 49, 71-72, 80, 109-112, 116, 161,196-198,

87-88, 109-110,154, 177-179, 228-230, 243

293-296 and air command structure: 126-127

and United Nations commitments: on Air Comptroller: 152-153

54, 64, 82, 255-256 on air defense: 125-126

units, control of: 32-33 on air forces expansion: 40

units, number proposed: 54 on air power as first line of defense:

on unity of command: 32-33 232-233

on universal military training: 64, 66, on air staff organization and parity:

79,83-84,159,232 31-32,55,116-118,127, 150-151

on uranium, control of: 132 on antiaircraft units integration: 117-118

and utilities services for: 224, 289-290 on Army Service Forces: 113

and warning systems: 127-128 on Assistant Secretary of War for

World War II organization: 22-33 Air: 117

at Atlantic Conference: 25

393
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

on atomic bomb decision and effect: on United Nations commitments: 63, 79

41,131-132 on unity of command: 28-29, 97

on autonomous forces: 28 on universal military training: 40,

background: 3 60-63, 76,232

becomes Acting Deputy Chief of on nonrated officers assignments:

Staff: 22 150, 203

becomes Chief of Air Corps: 3, 18n Assistant Secretaries: 187, 310, 316

becomes Commanding General, Assistant Secretary of War for Air (see

Army Air Forces: 23, 29, 321 also Lovett, Robert A.)

on Bessell Committee report: 76 office activated: 9, 89, 117

on combat readiness: 41-42, 74, office perpetuated: I 17n, 160

76-77 Atkinson, Joseph H.: 214

Combined Chiefs membership: Atlantic Conference (1941): 25

25-26, 32, 112 Atlantic Fleet activated: 142, 172

on command decentralization: 150 Atomic bomb

commands Ist Wing: 15 effect on warfare: 131-135, 229

on continental air defense: 125-126, information security: 132

127-128 Navy delivery of: 180-181, 238-239

demobilization plans: 62-63, 127 policy on use: 72, 75

and General Headquarters procurement: 135

organization: 22 Soviet acquisition: 13 1-132

headquarters reorganization: 151-152 strike force delivery: 132-133

on hemispheric defense: 60 Attache system: 224

Joint Chiefs membership: 25-26, 32, Attack aircraft. See Fighter aircraft;

112, 116 Tactical air support

Marshall, relations with: 22, 25-28, Audit services: 224

116 Austin, Warren R.: 163

on naval aviation: 97-98 Autonomy of air arm

on Navy peacetime demands: 79 airmen on: 3, 6-8, 12-18, 22-25, 28,

on postwar organization and troop 40-41, 46-47, 50, 54, 97-98,

requirements: 50-54, 55,60, 64, 109-112, 114-116, 138, 161, 169,

67-68, 76-79, 82, 109, 113,230 178-179, 189-190, 195-196,

and redeployment plans: 127 197-198, 227-230, 243

and research and development: Army on: 7,9, 26, 28, 38, 62, 88-89,

42-43, 77, 152, 230 103-106, 141, 159-161, 163,

and reserve components, reliance on: 62 196-197,228, 231,232-233

retirement: 136, 138 Army Air Forces on: 49-50, 87-88,

and seventy-groups plan: 40, 76-79, 109-112, 123, 159, 189-90,

82-83 228-229,232

and sixteen-groups plan: 60, 62 Baker on: 7

Spaatz, confidence in: 230-231, 233, 243 Congress and: 88, 90, 112, 228

on strategic striking force: 21n, 127 Crowell on: 7

on tactical air support: 138 Forrestal on: 101-102, 163-165

on training programs: 62, 74, 125-126 Joint Chiefs on: 37n, 85

on transport services: 77 Lovett on: 23, 88, 197, 228

and Twentieth Air Force: 173 Navy on: 7n, 38, 40, 85, 93-95, 97,

on unification: 40, 77, 79, 88, 97-99, 161-165, 169, 189-190

112, 161 planning for: 1-3

394
INDEX

Roosevelt on: 12-13 missions: 33

of Royal Air Force:6-7 procurement: 19

Stimson on: 23-25 speed records: 19

Symington on: 189, 195-199 Bombardment Groups

Truman on: 87-88, 107-109, 161 40th: 130, 132

War Department on: 3, 9, 16, 22, 26, 44th: 69

28, 88, 102, 116, 119-120, 93rd: 69

232-233 444th: 130, 132

Aviation Corps: 6 467th: 69

Aviation medicine: 212, 220-221. See 485th: 69

also Medical services 509th: 130, 132

Aviation Section, Signal Corps: 6 Bombardment Wing, 58th: 130, 132-135

Bombing operations

Backus, Edwin J.: 137 demonstration of: 7-8, 20n, 21

Baker, Newton D.: 7 precision bombing doctrine: 20-21

Baker Board: 12-14 techniques in: 41

Ballard, Richard H.: 323 Bombsights development: 19n, 21

Banfield, Major: 142 Bonin Islands, bases in: 83

Barksdale Field, La.: 15, 143 Bowman, Harold W.: 161

Barrows, Arthur: 201, 202 Bradley, Follet: 324

Bases, overseas: 59, 74, 82-83, 124, Bradley, Omar N.: 141,241,243

131-132 Brandt, Carl A.: 214

Beck, Paul W.: 6 Brant, Gerald C.: 15

Berkeley, William P.: 135n Brett, George H.

Bessell, William W., Jr.: 71 background: 23n

Bessell Committee (1945) becomes Acting Chief of Air Corps: 23

on atomic bomb use: 71-73 becomes Chief of Air Corps: 320

formed: 71-72 Brewster-Hinshaw Board: 235

and postwar organization and troop Brodie, Bernard: 229

requirements: 71-75, 80-82 Browning, William S.: 15n

and reserve components strength: 72-73 Browning Board (1936): 15

on thirty-four-groups plan: 74 Budget estimates and limitations: 64,

on seventy-groups plan: 80-81 122, 224, 235, 236-237, 290

unification: 72 Bureau of the Budget: 225, 234-235

on universal military training: 72-73 Byars, C. F.: 135n

Bevans, James M.: 323

Bissell, Clayton L.: 323 Cabell, Charles P.: 51

Boeing Airplane Company: 19 Camp Springs, Md.: 125-126

Bolling Field, D.C.: 142 Cannon, John K.: 142-143, 214

Bolling Field Command: 214 Cargo aircraft, numbers proposed: 54

Bolte, Charles L.: 175 Caribbean Air Command: 148

Bomber aircraft activated: 214

bombload capacity: 19 personnel strength: 82, 146

characteristics: 19 Caribbean Defense Command activated:

development and testing: 7, 16, 18, 172

21-22 Central Air Command: 140

groups, number in service: 147 Central Defense Command activated: 26

groups, number proposed: 52-54 Central Intelligence Agency

395
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

established: 189, 303 GHQ Air Force stress on: 16

Forrestal on: 101, 163, 165, 174 Symington on: 200-201

mission: 189, 303-305 Truman on: 87-88, 107-108

Patterson on: 163, 165, 174-175 War Department on: 175-177

Central Training Command: 125 Command of the Air (Douhet): 8

Central Welfare Board: 224 Command and control

Chamberlain, Edwin W.: 7In of Air Corps: 12-13

Chancy, James E.: 26 of Air Force: 206-207, 209

Chaplains: 215 airmen on: 205-207

Chauncey, Charles C.: 321 of Army Air Forces: 114-115, 121,

Chief of Air Corps (see also Arnold, 205-206

Henry H.; Foulois, Benjamin D.; by Chief of Air Corps: 15-18, 20, 31

Westover, Oscar) of GHQ Air Force units: 15, 22

administrative role: 15 of naval aviation: 161-162, 165-166,

in command chain: 15-16, 18,22, 31 167, 169, 170n, 178, 179-183,

Chief of Finance (Army): 224 184-185, 186-187,308-309

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force: 187 of Strategic Air Command: 130-131

Chief of Staff of Common Defense: Conimand and Employment of Air

162-163 Power (FM 100-20): 32-33

Chief of Staff to President, proposals Command and General Staff School

for: 93-95, 175 (Army): 7

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Commands. See Air commands

Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Marshall, Common Defense Act (1946): 162

George C. Communications services: 122, 149,

China-India-Burma Theater: 68 287-288

China Theater: 146 Composite groups, number in service:

Churchill, Winston: 6-7, 25-26 147

Civilian employees, transfer of: 223, Compton, Keith K.: 135n

226,317 Congress

Clifford, Clark M.: 180-181 and air arm autonomy: 88, 90, 112, 228

Coast defense mission Air Force activation: 79-80

Air Corps on: 12n, 14, 16, 19-21, 228 and Army strength authorization: 34-35

airmen on: 14, 20 Aviation Corps legislation: 6

Army in: 12-14, 16, 19-21 on combat readiness: 231

Navy on: 16, 19-20, 228 Department of Aeronautics proposed:

War Department on: 19, 227-228 7, 9

Cold War, emergence of: 232-232 and National Security Act: 178,

College Park, Md.: 4-5 183-184, 185-186, 301-314

Collins Committee: 102-103, 162 and postwar organization and troop

Collins, J. Lawton: 103n, 222 requirements: 50, 58, 64, 69,

Colorado Springs, Colo.: 142n 83-84, 90, 92

Combat commands and seventy-groups plan: 83-84, 231

organization-reorganization: 1-2 and unification: 9, 85, 110, 162,

Combat readiness 183-184, 274

airmen on: 41-42, 69, 74, 230-231 and unified commands: 88

Army Air Forces on: 82 and unity of command: 88

Congress on: 231 and universal military training:

Forrestal on: 192 57-58, 83-84, 197,204, 232

396
INDEX

Woodrum Committee: 50, 87, 89, 92 Denfeld, Louis: 241

Congressional Aviation Policy Board: Department of Aeronautics proposed: 8,

235 9

Construction programs: 224-225, 311 Department of the Air Force. See also

Continental Air Command: 125 Headquarters United States Air

Continental air defense. See Air defense Force; Secretary of the Air Force;

Continental Air Forces: 125, 126-127, United States Air Force

131,135, 140-142,281 established: 1,178, 185, 196, 310-311

Continental United States organization and reorganization: 1, 202

air defense of. See Air defense Department of the Army established:

groups and personnel strength 178, 308. See also United States

proposed: 68-69, 82-83 Army; War Department

personnel strength: 146 Department of Aviation proposed: 13

Cooke, Charles M., Jr.: 95n Department of Common Defense

Cooley, John B.: 324 proposed: 162

Coolidge, Calvin: 12 Department of [National] Defense. See

Coral Gables, Fla.: 122 also Forrestal, James V.; Johnson,

Cork, Robert 0.: 130 Louis A.; National Military

Corps, establishment of: 218-219 Establishment; Secretary of

Corps area commanders: 15, 22 Defense; Unification of armed

Council of Common Defense: 167 services

Cousins, Ralph P.: 323 on organization, postwar. See

Craig, Howard A.: 322 Organization, postwar

becomes Deputy Chief of Staff: 210, 324 proposals for: 9, 13, 34, 37, 55, 71,

on coast defense mission: 20 77, 85-88, 92, 98, 107-110, 114,

on continental air defense: 125 123, 161, 167

Cross-training: 219 on troop strength, postwar. See Troop

Crowell, Benedict: 7 strength, postwar

Cullin, Paul T.: 39 Department of Justice ruling: 1

8 6n

Culton, Hugh G.: 324 Department of the Navy established:

Czechoslovakia crisis (1946): 236 178, 185, 309. See also United

States Navy

Dargue, Herbert A.: 324 Department of State and overseas bases:

Davison, F. Trubee 60

on antiaircraft units integration: 117 Devers, Jacob L.

becomes Assistant Chief of Air Staff: on air defense mission: 149-150

323 on Army organic units: 138n

becomes Assistant Secretary for Air: on tactical air support: 142

9, 117 on unification: 190

appointed special planning adviser: 52n Dick, William W.: 324

demobilization plan: 67 Dickman Board (1920): 7

groups, number proposed by: 67 Doctrine formulation and testing: 2, 7-9,

on postwar organization and troop 19, 24, 31-33, 40-41

strength: 50, 55, 67 Doolittle, James H.: 44

on unification: 90 on air arm autonomy: 13-14

Dean, Fred M.: 51 background: 13n

Demobilization plans: 34-35, 64, 67, on GHQ Air Force: 14

127, 129, 231-234 on unity of command: 94n

397
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Douglas Aircraft Corporation: 152 on medical services: 212, 220-221

Douhet, Guilio: 8 on National Security Act: 233

Drum Board ( 1933): 12-14 on postwar organization and troop

requirements: 37, 79-80, 215

Eaker, Ira C.: 10, 45, 70, 108, 144 on roles and missions: 166, 181

as air advocate: 3 on Secretary of Defense powers: 169,

air arm supremacy: 7, 110-111, 189, 181, 183, 143

196 on seventy-groups plans: 79-80, 215,

on Air Comptroller: 152-153 235

on Air Defense Command mission: 148n and Simpson Board: 116-117

on aircraft procurement: 68-69 Spaatz, relations with: 38, 141, 160,

on ASWAAF integration: 71 230-231

becomes Deputy Command General and support services: 120

and Chief of Air Staff: 67, 321 on tactical air support: 136, 138, 140,

demobilization plan: 67 142, 231

on Eisen hower- Spaatz relations: 38 on technical services complement: 212

on groups assignments to theaters: 68--69 on unification: 38, 88, 103-104, 106,

groups, numbers proposed by: 68 1]4n, 160, 161, 166, 175, 178, 192

on postwar organization and troop on unity of command: 103, 140

strength: 67-68, 70, 135 and War Department reorganization:

on seventy-groups plan: 68, 112, 138, 159-160

231 Emmons, Delos C.: 320

on strategic strike force: 132 Employment of Combined Air Force: 8-9

on unification: 110, 114 Engine, Liberty: 4-5

Eastern Air Command: 140 Equipment Board: 132

Eastern Training Command: 125 Equipment development and testing: 2

Eaton, Robert E. L.: 135n Eubank, Eugene L.: 148

Ebcrstadt (Ferdinand) report: 101 n, European Command activated: 172, 173

162-163 European theater groups and personnel

Echols, Oliver P.: 323 strength: 68, 82-83, 146

Edwards, Idwal H. Everest, Frank F.: 322

becomes Deputy Chief of Staff. 210, 324

commands air forces in Europe: 1 48 Fairchild, Muir S.: 144, 208

Eglin, Field, Fla.: 1 44 becomes Assistant Chief of Air

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 77, 156 Corps: 320

as air advocate: 79 on headquarters and staff

on air arm autonomy: 38, 88-89, organization: 207

103-104, 106, 141,159-161I, heads Air University: 143-144, 214

196-197, 228, 230-231,233 Far East Air Forces: 148, 214

and Air Board: 154 Far East Command activated: 172, 173

on Army organic ground units: 140 Field commands. See Air commands;

and Army policy formulation: 154 Specified commands; Unified

on ASWAAF integration: 217 commands

on aviation medicine: 212, 220-221 Fielder, Kendall J.: 66

becomes Chief of Staff. 35, 37, 88, Fighter aircraft

116, 136 development and testing: 22

on functions transfer: 222-223 in escort role: 18-19

on General Staff reorganization: 114, 159 groups, number proposed: 54

398
INDEX

groups, number in service: 147 on naval aviation: 165-166

missions: 8, 33 on Navy postwar personnel strength: 67

Fighter Replacement Training Unit: 126 Patterson, agreement with: 174-178,

Fighter Squadron, 120th: 204 184, 213

Finance services: 224, 317 on Procurement and Supply Agency: 165

Finletter Commission: 235 on Research and Development

First air officer on General Staff: 18n Agency: 165

First Chief of Staff: 3 on roles and missions: 174-178, 184

First flying field: 5 on Secretary of Defense powers:

First Secretary: 3 174-175, 183, 243

First War Powers Act (1941): 29, 31, on security organization: 174-175

112,276 on service departments: 174-175

FitzPatrick, T. A.: 324 on service secretaries: 175

Flight organization: 33n on seventy-groups plan: 237-238

Flight services: 149 on single Chief of Staff: 165

Flying safety services: 149 on Strategic Air Force: 182

Force levels. See Troop requirements Symington, relations with: 193n, 199,

Foreign liaison service: 224 238

Foreign Ministers Conference: 232 on unification: 38, 40, 101-102,

Forrestal, James V.: 39, 104, 182, 190, 161-165, 166,174-175,184,210

240, 241 on War Council: 175

on air autonomy: 101-102, 162-163 Fort Knox exercises (1933): 17

on Air Force as first line of defense: 227 Fort McKinley, Philippines: 148

on Army Air Forces staff members: 102 Fort Monroe, Va.: 142

becomes Secretary of Defense: 192-193 Foulois, Benjamin D.: 6, 12-14, 17

on budget limitations: 237 Four-Year Plan: 238

on Central Intelligence Agency: 101,

165, 174 Gallery, Daniel V.: 239

on Chief of Staff to President: 175 Gardner, Grandison: 151, 153

on civilian employees transfer: 226 Gates, Artemus L.: 90

on combat readiness: 192 Gates, Byron E.: 55, 127-128

and Council of Common Defense: 165 General Headquarters: 22, 113-114, 159

and Council of National Defense: 174 General Headquarters Air Force (see

on Eberstadt Report: 101n also Andrews, Frank M.)

on functions transfer: 223, 225 activated: 15

on Joint Chiefs functions: 101, 163, 175 air defense mission: 26

on Marine Corps control: 165 combat readiness, stress on: 16

on Marine Corps personnel strength: 67 in command chain: 15-16

on medical services: 220-221 proposed: 9, 13

on Military Air Transport Service: training programs: 16

241-242 transfer to Air Force: 187, 225

on Military Education and Training units, command and control of: 15,

Agency: 165 22-23

on Military Munitions Board: 101 units organization: 15n

on National Security Act: 178 General Reserve

on National Security Council: 178 defined: 70

on National Security Resources mission: 128, 130

Board: 101,165, 174 plans for: 75, 79-80, 82, 128, 130

399
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

units and personnel strength Guided missiles. See Missiles and rockets

proposed: 68-69 Gulick, John W.: 12n

units assignment to: 130

General Staff. See War Department Hall, William E.: 176, 322

Geodetic control squadrons: 147 Hall Board

George, Harold L.: 144 on functions transfer: 222

becomes Chief of Plans Division: 322 on medical services: 220-221

becomes Director of Information: 322 on technical services complement:

commands Transport Command: 143 212-216

on unification: 90 on unification: 175, 198

Giles, Barney M.: 61 Hamilton, Pierpont M.: 51

becomes Chief of Air Staff. 321 Handy, Thomas T.: 56

on groups, number required: 60 on Continental Air Forces: 126

on staff organization: 55 demobilization plan: 63

on postwar organization and troop on postwar organization and troop

strength: 59-63 strength: 52, 55, 58, 63-64,

on sixteen-groups plan: 59 125-126

on universal military training: 60-62 on reserve components training: 64

Green Project: 127n Hanley, Thomas J.: 322, 323

Griswold, Francis H.: 148 Hansel], Haywood S. Jr.: 91

Groups on autonomy: 22

activated: 234 becomes Deputy Chief of Staff: 322

in Air Force Reserve: 80, 82 on unified commands: 89

in Air National Guard: 80, 82 Harmon, Hubert R.: 148, 214, 323

assignment of: 80 Harmon, Millard F.: 320,231

in Caribbean theater: 82 Harmon Field, Guam: 148

bomber, number proposed: 54 Harper, Robert W.: 214

bomber, in service: 147 Harrison, William K. Jr.: 29

in China-Burma-India theater: 68 Hawaii bases: 83

composite, number in service: 147 Hawaiian Air Force activated: 26

in continental United States: 68, 82 Headquarters Army Air Forces. See

conversion to very heavy bomber: Army Air Forces

123, 125 Headquarters and staff

in European theater: 68, 83, 146 Air Force: 90, 195, 199-210, 243,

fighter, number in service: 147 320-324

number assigned by type: 147, 234 Army Air Forces: 150-153, 195-2 10, number proposed: 54, 55, 58-60, 63, 320-324

67-69,80-81 reorganization: 15 1-152

number in service: 237 Headquarters United States Air Forces

organization: 33n established: I. See also Department

seventy-groups plan: 54 of the Air Force

seventy -five -groups plan: 55 Hemispheric defense: 60

in strategic operations: 81-83 Hewitt, H. H.: 324

theater assignment plan: 68-69, 82-83 Hickam Field, Hawaii: 148

World War If numbers: 8 1 n Hill, Edmund: 324

Groves. Leslie R.: 134-135 Hill, J. B.: 135n

Grow, Malcolm C.: 220-222 Hill, Joseph Lister: 162

Gruenther, Alfred M.: 241 Hodes, Henry 1.: 72

400
INDEX

Hodges, James P.: 323 inactivation proposed: 243

Hood, Reuben C. Jr.: 210n on interservice coordination: 67-68

House of Representatives. See Congress Japan invasion plans: 172

Hovey, Burton M.: 214 Joint Staff of: 313

Hull, John E.: 117n, 135n on Marine Corps status: 67, 90, 277

on medical services: 220

Independent air arm. See Autonomy of on National Security Act: 178

air arm on naval aviation: 90, 277

Industrial mobilization: 65, 72, 84 on Navy peacetime needs: 76

Instrument flying training: 16 Patterson and: 163, 174-175

Intelligence operations and systems: 65, on postwar organization and troop

224. See also Central Intelligence requirements: 81-82, 90, 215,

Agency 268-277

International peace-keeping force. See Richardson on: 93

United Nations on roles and missions: 166, 173

Iran, Soviet forces in: 232 on seventy-groups plan: 69, 81

on specified commands: 174, 174n

Jamison, Glen C.: 76 on Strategic Air Command: 172, 174

on Army Air Forces mission: 73-74 and strategic air forces control: 46

on bases overseas: 74 on strategic reserve: 130

Bessell Committee member: 7 In Truman on: 97-109

on combat readiness: 74 on unification: 34, 37n, 77, 79, 85,

on pilots training: 74 87, 90, 169, 268-277

on postwar organization and troop on unified commands: 172, 173, 187

strength: 73-75 on unity of command: 92, 95

reorganization committee member: 135n Joint operations: 184

on seventy-groups plan: 49, 73-74 Joint Strategic Survey Committee: 131,

Japan 166

air offensive against: 41,125 Jones, Junius W.: 324

invasion, plans for: 170

occupation mission in: 83 Kenney, George C.: 142

surrender by: 140 on air units, control of: 179n

Jenkins, Reuben E.: 7 In background: 142n

Johnson, Davenport: 320 commands Strategic Air Command:

Johnson, Leon W.: 127, 128 142,214

Johnson, Louis A.: 226 on headquarters and staff

Joint Army-Navy Board. See organization: 209

Army-Navy Joint Board MacArthur, relations with: 142

Joint Chiefs of Staff on Strategic Air Command: 179n

activated: 26n, 92, 313 on strategic bombing concept: 163

on Air Force autonomy: 37n, 85 on unification: 102n

Army on: 102 Kepner, William E.: 168

Army Air Forces representation on: 89 Key West Conference (1948): 241

and Army air units: 92, 277 Kilbourne, Charles E.: 12n

on bases overseas: 60 King, Ernest J.: 39, 96, 100, 104

chairman, functions of: 94 on air arm autonomy: 95, 97

functions and powers: 98, 101, on Secretary of Defense powers: 166

108-109, 163, 175, 187, 189 on unification: 38-40, 94, 95, 97

401
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

on unity of command: 94-95 bombing techniques: 41

Knerr, Hugh J.: 157, 208 commands Air Force in Europe: 214

background: 155n heads research and development:

on command and control: 206-207 152-153

on headquarters and staff joins Air Staff: 80

organization: 205-207 on strategic strike force: 131-132

heads Air Board: 154-157, 210, 323 Lend-Lease program: 259

on roles and missions: 181 Leo, Stephen F.: 202

on technical services complement: 217 Liaison squadrons in service: 147

on technical services organization: 212 Liberty engine: 4-5

on transition to Air Force: 198 Lippman, Walter: 232

on unification: 175 Lloyd George, David: 7

Korea, occupation mission in: 83 Loutzenheiser, Joe L.: 322

Kuter, Laurence S.: 34, 45 Lovett, Robert A.: 91, 152

on air arm autonomy: 54-55 on air autonomy: 23, 88, 197-198, 228

as air proponent: 3 and Air Comptroller: 152-153, 197-198

on antiaircraft units integration: H17 as air proponent: 3

background: 29n, 32n becomes Assistant Secretary for Air: 23

becomes Chief of Plans Division: 323 on National Security Act: 198

becomes Deputy Chief of Staff: 322 on reactionary officers: 1 14n

commands Military Air Transport on unification: I 14n

Service: 77n, 242 on unified commands: 89

on continental air defense: 125 Lynch, Edmund C.: 148

on doctrine formulation: 32

on postwar organization and troop MacArthur, Douglas: 20

strength: 40, 50, 52, 54-55,59 on coast defense mission: 14, 19

on strategic air forces control: 46 commands Army Forces, Pacific: 172

on unification: 54-55 Kenney, relations with: 142n

on United Nations commitment: 54-55 on strategic operations: 46

on universal military training: 54, 59 MacArthur-Pratt agreement (1931): 19

Mail service, Air Corps in: 12

Lampert Committee (1925): 9 Maintenance and repair services: 24, 224

Langley Field, Va.: 8, 15, 142, 159 Manchu Law: 6n

Lassiter Board (1923): 9, 14 Manhattan Engineer District: 132-135

Leahy, William D.: 37, 39, 164 Mapping service: 224

on air arm autonomy: 192 March, Peyton C.: 7

on Army-Navy rivalry: 169 March Field, Calif.: 15

as Chief of Staff to the President: 92 Mariana Island bases: 83, 125

on postwar organization and troop Marshall, George C.: 24, 53, 61, 100

strength: 68 on air arm autonomy: 23, 26, 38, 62,

on Secretary of Defense powers: 166 197,228

on unification: 40, 94, 97, 163 as air power advocate: 52

on unity of command: 94 Arnold, relations with: 23, 24-26, 28,

LeMay, Curtis E.: 136 116

on Air Comptroller: 153 on Continental Air Forces: 126

on atomic bomb effect: 132 demobilization plan: 34-35

on atomic bomb procurement: 135 on General Headquarters

becomes Deputy Chief of Staff: 322 organization: 22-23

402
INDEX

on General Staff reform: 26, 28 on Continental Air Forces: 131

on Joint Chiefs functions: 98-99 death of: 131n

on Navy-Marine Corps personnel heads Special Planning Division: 70

strength: 67-68 on postwar organization and troop

and Patch Board: 113 strength: 51, 59-63

on postwar organization and troop reorganization committee member: 135n

requirements: 34-37, 50, 52, on seventy-groups plan: 139

56-58, 63-66, 72, 93, 113 on strategic strike force: 131

on unification: 34, 37, 67, 88, 98-99 on tactical air support: 139

on universal military training: 35-38, on unification: 109

40, 56, 58-59, 63, 74, 83, 204, on unity of command: 131

231,232 Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 232

Marshall, S. L. A.: 236 Moore, John G.: 133

Maxwell, Russell L.: 66 Morrow Board (1925): 9

Maxwell Field, Ala.: 8n, 143 Munitions Board established: 189, 314

McDonald, George C.: 323

McKee, William F. Nagoya, Japan: 148

becomes Assistant Vice Chief of National Defense Act (1916): 35

Staff: 201, 321 National Defense Act (1920): 8, 35

on tactical air support: 136, 137-140 National Defense Establishment: 178

McLaughlin, John J.: 201, 203 National Guard. See Air National Guard;

McNair, Lesley J.: 22, 31 Army National Guard; Reserve

McNarney, Joseph T.: 29, 214 components

Medical services: 121-122, 212, National Military Establishment (see

220-222, 290-291 also Department of Defense)

Mediterranean theater personnel established: 185, 306

strength: 146 definition, composition and missions:

Midway, USS: 238 260-267,306

Military Air Transport Service: 77n, 241 legislation, planning for: 3

Military Education and Training National Security Act (1947)

Agency: 165 airmen on: 242

Military occupation specialties: 84-85 approved: 183-184

Milling, Thomas DeW.: 5 Army on: 192, 233

Millis, Walter: 235n Army Air Forces on: 192

Milner, Fred C.: 324 as compromise: 192

Missiles and rockets: 46, 278-279 Congress and: 178, 183-184, 185,

Mitchel Field, N.Y.: 142, 159 301-319

Mitchell, William: 11 Forrestal on: 178

on air arm autonomy: 7-8, 12, 227 Joint Chiefs on: 178

bombing demonstration by: 7-8, 21 Lovett on: 197-198

court-martial and resignation: 12 Navy on: 192

on Shenandoah disaster: 11 Patterson on: 178

Mitscher, Marc A.: 169n provisions: 185-193

Mobilization plans: 65-66, 70-72, Symington on: 197-198, 242

82-85,265 text: 301-319

Moffat, Reuben C. Truman on: 178, 183-184

on Air Force Combat Command: 131 National Security Council

background: 5 In established: 189, 302-303

403
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Forrestal and: 101 on postwar organization and troop

mission: 189, 202 strength: 51, 69-73, 81-82,

National Security Resources Board 135-136

established: 189, 303 on roles and missions: 166, 172, 175

mission: 305-306 on security organization: 170, 172

Patterson on: 163, 174 on seventy-groups plan: 69, 73,

Naval Air Transport Service: 241 81-82, 135-136

Naval aviation. See under United States on single Chief of Staff: 243

Navy Spaatz Board member: 131

Navigation training: 15 on strategic strike force: 132, 135,

Nelson, Otto L.: 31 140, 141-142

New York Times on Symington efforts: 199

on Army Air Forces achievements: 41 on unification: 162, 169-173, 189-190

on Forrestal appointment: 192 on unified command: 172-173, 240

on strategic operations: 43 North Atlantic theater: 68

on unification: 100, 107 Northeast Command activated: 172, 173

on universal military training: 84 Northeastern Defense Command

Night-flight training: 16 activated: 26

Nimitz, Chester W.: 96, 104. See also

United States Navy Observation aircraft missions: 8

on air arm autonomy: 95 Occupation missions and plans: 67, 83

commands Pacific Fleet: 172 O'Donnell, Emmett Jr.: 5I, 322

on roles and missions: 166 Office Chief of Air Corps. See Arnold

on strategic operations: 95-97 Henry H.; Chief of Air Corps;

on unification: 94-95 Foulois, Benjamin D.; Westover,

on unified commands: 173 Oscar

Norden bombsight: 19n Officer Personnel Act (1947): 203, 243

Norfolk, Va.: 143 Officers (See also Pilots)

Normandy campaign: 124 grades distribution: 219

Norstad, Lauris: 71, 171, 241 nonrated, policies on: 149-150,

on air arm autonomy: I10, 169 203-204, 287

as air proponent: 3 rated-to-nonrated ratio: 8 1

on antisubmarine defense: 169 training programs: 203, 204

on ASWAAF integration: 71 transfer to Air Corps: 120

background: 67 transfer to Air Force: 223-226, 238,

becomes Chief of Plans Division: 322 243,287-88, 311-312

becomes Deputy Chief of Staff: 210, transfer to Army Air Forces: 120

322, 324 Organization, postwar: 51-54

on combat readiness: 69 airmen on: 40-41, 50-51, 54-67,

criticized: 190, 198n 69-79, 81-83, 109-110, 113,

on field commands: 138 135-136, 229-230

joins Air Staff: 67 Army on: 34-37, 50, 52, 54, 55, 58,

on Marine Corps aviation: 169 64-66,72-73,79-80,92, 113,

military air transport service 126, 215

proposed: 71 Army Air Forces on: 49-50, 54-55,

on naval aviation: 169 59-63,68-69,70-73,77,79,87,

on Navy criticism: 166-167 131-132, 135-150, 230-231,243,

253-267,278-280, 293-296

404
INDEX

Army Reserve: 38, 57-58 on quartermaster services: 213

Congress and: 50, 58, 64, 69, 83-84, 90 on research and development agency:

Davison on: 50, 55, 67 165

Joint Chiefs on: 81, 90, 215, 268-277 on roles and missions: 174-177, 184

legislation affecting: 3 on Secretary of Defense powers: 163,

Navy on: 67-68 170,174-175

plans and studies on: 1-2, 9, 16, on security organization: 174

71-75, 80-82 on service departments and

reserve components: 38 secretaries: 175

Truman on: 68, 71-72, 75-77, 81 on single Chief of Staff: 165

War Department on: 50-51, 52, on technical services sharing: 213

54-55, 57-58, 64-65, 69, 72-74, on unification: 99-100, 163, 165,

79, 81-82, 114n, 116, 293-296 174-175,184,199,210

Organized Reserves. See Reserve on universal military training: 75n

components on War Council: 175

Ostfriesland: 8 on Woodrum Committee: 90

Owens, Roy L.: 322 Peabody, Hume: 323

Pearl Harbor, attack on: 29, 232

Pacific Air Command: 146 Perrin, Edwin S.: 322

Pacific Command activated: 172, 173 Pershing, John J.: 7

Pacific theater Personnel Distribution Command: 125

groups and personnel strength Personnel policies and services:

proposed: 68-69, 82-83 218-221, 223-241, 243. See also

operations in: 125 Officers; Troop strength, postwar

unity of command: 172 Philippines bases: 83

Palmer, John McA.: 34 Photographic aircraft mission: 33, 224

Partridge, Earle E.: 136, 215-216, 323 Pilots

Patch, Alexander M. Jr: 87, 113, 116 requirements for: 114

Patch Board (1945): 73, 87, 113-116, training programs: 16, 59, 74

117-119 Polar region air defense: 46, 229

Patrick, Mason M.: 9, 11, 163 Portal, Charles: 169

Patterson, Robert P.: 239 Post War Division, Army Air Forces:

in Central Intelligence Agency: 165, 174 109-110

on chaplains complement: 213 Powers, Edward M.: 324

on Chief of Staff to President: 175 Pratt, Henry Conger: 15, 16

on Council of Common Defense: 165 Precision bombing doctrine: 20-21

on Council of National Defense: 175 President as commander in chief: 186n

declines Secretary of Defense post: 192 Price, John D.: 180

Forrestal, agreement with: 174-177, Procurement and supply agency: 165

213,239 Promotion policies

and Joint Chiefs: 165, 175 Air Corps: 28n

on Marine Corps control: 165 Air Force: 203-204, 217, 243

on Military Education and Training Army Air Forces: 115, 121, 160, 203

Agency: 165 Public relations program: 148n, 232

on National Security Act: 178 Pursuit aircraft. See Fighter aircraft

on National Security Resources Pratt, William V.: 19

Board: 165, 174

on procurement and supply agency: 165 Quartermaster services: 163, 213

405
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Quesada, Elwood R.: 144 personnel strength proposals: 54-55, 73

on Army organic air units: 139n plans for: 35, 64, 66

becomes Assistant Chief of Air Staff: in postwar organization: 37-38

323 reliance on: 62

commands Tactical Air Command: Spaatz on: 204-205

142-143,214 training programs: 59, 64, 66, 72-73,

on tactical air support: 141, 142, 143 79-80,82,84-85,127-128, 131,

148, 159, 204-205

Radford, Arthur W.: 165, 241 Truman on: 75

on naval aviation: 170n Reserve Officers Training Corps: 38, 80,

on Truman intransigence: 167, 169 148, 159

on unification: 162, 170n Rex, SS: 19

Ramey, Roger M.: 134 Richardson, James 0.: 96

Randall, Russell H.: 61 on air arm autonomy: 93-94

Rawlings, Edwin W.: 154, 210 background: 90

Real estate transfer: 224, 312 on Joint Chiefs perpetuation: 93-94

Reconnaissance aircraft on unification: 92-94, 271-273

groups, number in service: 147 Richardson Committee (1945): 68, 71

groups, number proposed: 54 Rockets. See Missiles and rockets

mission: 33 Roles and missions

Reconnaissance missions Air Force: 184-185, 186-187,

by Air Force: 184 238-241,243, 297-300, 312

airmen on: 166 airmen on: 7-8, 166, 170, 174-175,

by Army Air Forces: 166 178-179, 181, 196-197

by Navy: 166, 179, 181, 184, 186, 309 Army on: 7, 166, 181

Recruiting services: 223 Army Air Forces on: 141-142, 166,

Reeves, John W. Jr.: 241 173, 192,297-300

Regular Army. See United States Army Joint Chiefs on: 166, 173

Reorganization plans. See Organization, Key West Conference: 241

postwar Navy on: 7,9, 165-166, 172, 175,

Repair and maintenance. See 178-179, 180-181, 184, 192,

Maintenance and repair service 238-240, 243, 297-300

Replacement training centers and Patterson on: 174-177

programs: 31, 125 planning for: 2-3

Research and development Truman on: 167, 175-176, 183-185

in Air Force: 222 War Department on: 228

airmen on: 42-43, 77, 152, 230 Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 13, 26

in Army: 222 on air arm autonomy: 12

in Army Air Forces: 131, 132, 289 at Atlantic Conference: 25

proposals for: 24, 65, 165 expands aircraft procurement: 22, 25,

Von Karman role in: 42-43, 46, 230 230

Research and Development Board on Assistant Secretary for Air: 9

established: 189, 315 Root, Elihu: 31

Research and Development (RAND) Roswell Army Air Field, N.M.: 132

Corporation: 152 Royal Air Force: 6-7, 94, 163

Reserve components (see also Air Force Royal Flying Corps: 7

Reserve; Air National Guard; Army Royal Naval Air Service: 7, 94, 163

National Guard; Army Reserve) Royall, Kenneth C.: 191, 236, 239

406
INDEX

becomes Secretary of Army: 191-193 transfer to the Air Force: 223, 225

on functions transfer: 222-223 transfer to Army Air Forces: 223

on unified command: 240 Services secretaries: 167, 175, 243

Royce, Ralph: 44 Services of Supply. See Army Service

Ryukyu Islands bases: 83 Forces

Seventy-five-groups plan: 55

Salsman, John G.: 135n Seventy-groups plan

Samford, John A.: 133 Air Force on: 81-82, 196, 235, 243-244

Saunders, LaVerne G.: 322 airmen on: 1-2, 40, 49, 68, 69,

Scanlon, Martin F.: 323 73-83, 112, 135-138, 139, 149,

Schoeffel, Malcolm F.: 90 231,234

School system: 82. See also by name Army on: 79-80, 215, 235-236

Scientific Advisory Group: 42 Army Air Forces on: 49, 62, 73,

Scott, Stanley L.: 175 78-87,231,239,253-259,279

Search-and-rescue service and Forrestal on: 237-238

squadrons: 147-149 Joint Chiefs and: 69, 81, 215, 235

Seattle-to-Dayton speed flight: 19 Symington on: 199-201, 234, 237-238

Secretary of the Air Force (See also Truman on: 234

Symington, W. Stuart) War Department on: 68-69, 81, 231

compensation: 316 Seversky, Alexander P. de: 229

functions and powers: 167, 178-179, Shaw, Brackley: 202

186, 187,225 Shenandoah, USS: 11, 12

office force and organization:201 Sherman, Forrest P.: 171

Secretary of the Army (see also on roles and missions: 172, 174

Patterson Robert P.; Royall, on security organization: 172

Kenneth C.) on unification: 170-173

compensation: 316 on unified commands: 172-173

functions and powers: 186, 187, 225 Simonds, George S.: 12n

Secretary of Common Defense: 163 Simpson, William H.: 87, 113n

Secretary of Defense: 178 Simpson Board: 87-88, 113, 116-122,

assistants: 307-308 141,150, 157, 159-160, 233

compensation: 316 Single Chief of Staff: 165, 242-243

established: 183-184, 307 Sixteen-groups plan: 59-60, 62, 64

functions and powers: 163, 165, 167, Slessor, John C.: 7, 169

170, 175-179, 180-183, 185-187, Smart, Jacob E.: 51, 109-111

192, 193, 196, 222, 142-143, Smith, Frederick H.: 322

307-308 Smuts, Jan C.: 7

Secretary of the Navy Somervell, Brehon B.: 35

compensation: 316 Sorenson, Edgar P.: 323

functions and powers: 167, 286, 187, 220 South Atlantic theater: 68

Secretary of War: 167. See also Southern Defense Command activated:

Patterson, Robertson P.; Stimson, 26

Henry L. Soviet Union

Selective Service System: 84 Army Air Forces experience with: 231n

Senate. See Congress atomic bomb acquisition: 132

Separate air force. See Autonomy of air forces in Iran: 232

arm as postwar threat: 52, 231-232

Service units

407
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Spaatz, Carl: 10, 44, 108, 119, 144, 156, on promotion policies: 203

168, 180, 200, 240 on reconnaissance missions: 166

on air arm autonomy: 7-8, 88, on reserve components: 204-205

114-115, 138, 161, 178-179, retired: 243

196-198, 223-234, 243 on roles and missions: 8, 179, 18 1,

and Air Board: 154-157 196

on air commands structure: 85, 123, 141 on Secretary of Air Force powers: 178

and Air Comptroller: 153 on Secretary of Defense powers: 163,

on air defense mission: 149-150 178-179, 183, 243

on Air Force as first line of defense: on services secretaries: 243

232-233 on seventy-groups plan: 149, 234

on air staff parity: 118-119, 121 on single Chief of Staff: 243

on airmen retention: 203-204 on Strategic Air Command: 166, 173,

on antiaircraft units integration: 115, 179

117,163 on strategic operations: 43, 166

on antisubmarine mission: 166 Symington, relations with: 199

on Army Air Forces parity: 160 on tactical air support: 138,

Arnold confidence in: 230, 233, 243 140-141,230

on ASWAAF integration: 217 on technical service complement:

background: 3 163, 212-221

becomes Chief of Air Staff: 321 training programs: 203

and Chief of Staff for Air: 233 on transition period: 199-205

becomes Chief of Staff, Air Force: 3, on unification: 98, 114-I 15,

43, 121,201,321 118-119, 123, 135-136, 138, 149,

and British organization: 169-170 161, 178-179, 192

commands Air Force Combat on unity of command: 28, 173

Command: 320 on universal military training: 232

commands Army Air Forces: 85, 321 on unrated officers assignments: 149

on Continental Air Forces: 141 on War Department reorganization: 160

on corps, establishment of: 219 Spaatz Board: 131

Eisenhower, relations with: 38, 141, Special Assistant to Secretary of War.

160, 230-231 See Lovett, Robert A.

on functions transfer: 222-223 Special Planning Division: 70, 79

on General Staff reorganization: I 15, Special Projects Office: 50-5 I, 55-56,

118-119 70

groups activated by: 234 Special War Department Committee on

on headquarters and staff the Permanent Military

organization: 195-210 Establishment. See Bessell

Joint Chiefs member: 160 Committee

on Joint Chiefs inactivation: 243 Specialists. See Technicians training

on medical services: 121-122, 220 Specified commands: 173-174, 174n

missions assigned by: 148-149 Speed records: 19

named changed: 8n Sperry bombsight: 19

on National Security Act: 242-243 Spruance, Raymond A.: 96

on naval aviation missions: 166, 179 Squadrons

and policy formulation: 154-157 number assigned by type: 147

on postwar organization and troop organization: 33n

strength: 67, 123, 135

408
INDEX

Staffs. See Air Staff; Headquarters and Army Air Forces on: 70, 75, 80,

staff; War Department 82-83, 128, 130

Standley, William H.: 19 Joint Chiefs on: 130

Stearley, Ralph F.: 202 units assignment to: 127-128, 130

Stimson, Henry L.: 25. (see also War War Department on: 128, 130-135

Department) Strategic strike force: 82. See also

on air arm autonomy: 23-24, 89 Strategic Air Command; Strategic

on universal military training: 35 operations

Strategic Air Command Stratemeyer, George E.: 144

activated: 159, 172, 173-174, 207, on air forces territorial boundaries: 150

214, 281 becomes Chief of Air Staff: 321

Air Force on: 184 commands Air Defense Command:

air forces assigned: 144 142, 214

airmen on: 128, 130-133, 135, 140, on headquarters and staff

141-142, 166, 173-174 organization: 209n

Army Air Forces on: 128, 130-135, on recruiting services: 223

141-142 Streett, St. Clair: 127

and atomic bomb delivery: 132-133 commands Strategic Air Command:

command and control of: 120-122 142n

Joint Chiefs on: 172, 173-174 on Continental Air Forces: 140-141

mission: 133-134, 148-149 on strategic strike force: 140

organization and reorganization: 1-2 Sullivan, John L.: 191, 236

personnel strength: 146 becomes Secretary of Navy: 191, 193

proposals for: 140 on unity of command: 240

Symington on: 179-182 Supply operations and systems: 24, 213,

training programs: 132-133 289

units assignment to: 130, 132-133 Support services. See Technical services

War Department on: 130-135 Supreme Commander for Allied Powers:

Strategic Air Forces: 83 83

Strategic air forces: 43, 46 Surgeon General (Air Force): 221

Strategic operations: 6. See also Surgeon General (Army)

Strategic Air Command functions and responsibilities: 121-122

Air Corps on: 228 on medical service: 220-221

airmen on: 43, 46, 163, 166 Symington, W. Stuart: 182, 191, 200,

Army on: 46 236, 240

Army Air Forces on: 123-124, 127 on air autonomy: 189, 195-198

groups assignment: 81-83 on air power as first line of defense:

missions: 8 234

Navy in: 95-97 on air proponent: 3

Navy on: 95-97 on air units, control of: 180

precision bombing concept: 18-19, on aircraft development and

20-21 procurement: 201

Symington on: 43, 46, 201 background: 193

target selection in: 33 becomes Secretary of War for Air:

War Department on: 22 153n, 160, 199

Strategic Reserve (see also General becomes Secretary of Air Force: 3,

Reserve) 191,193, 199-201,202

on British organization: 170

409
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

on budget limitations: 234-235 Tampa, Fla.: 142

on cold war period: 232 Target selection: 33

on combat readiness: 200-201 Technical Service Command: 126

and Ebcrstadt Report: 10In Technical services

Forrestal, relations with: 193n, 199, Air Force complement: 187, 195,

237-238 212-221,286-287

on Four-Year Plan: 237-238 Army Air Forces complement: 120,

on National Security Act: 198, 135, 163, 177,212-221

242-243 organization: 212

on naval aviation: 180, 182 training programs: 120-121,216,

Norstad on efforts by: 199 218-219

office force and organization: 201 Technicians training: 85, 139-140,

post offered to: 199 218-219

on roles and missions: 179-181, 196, Tedder, Arthur: 168, 169, 182

241 Thirty-four-groups plan: 74

on Secretary of Defense powers: 163, Thomas, Elbert D.: 162

242-243 Timberlake, Patrick W.: 322

on seventy-groups plan: 199-201, Tokyo: 148

234, 237-239 Tompkins, William F.: 66

on single Chief of Staff: 242 and budget, postwar: 64-65

Spaatz, relations with: 199 on National Guard training and

on staff organization: 195 expansion: 66

on Strategic Air Force: 180-182 on postwar organization and troop

on strategic operations: 46, 201 strength: 59-66

on training programs: 201 on sixteen-groups plan: 64

on transition period: 199-200 on unification: 37, 90

on unification: 98, 163, 170n, 192, on universal military training: 58, 66

198-200 Tow-target squadrons in service: 147

on unified commands: 174 TowardNew Horizons: 43

Training programs: 24

Tactical Air Command Air Corps: 8-9

activated: 142, 159, 207, 214, 281 Air Force: 203-205, 218-220

air forces assigned: 144 by air forces: 125n

Army Air Forces on: 138-142 air-ground cooperation: 126

mission: 148-149 airborne units: 149

organization and reorganization: 2 aircrews: 62, 66

personnel strength: 146 airmen: 62, 204

Tactical Air Command, XIX: 282-283 antiaircraft units: 117-118, 12 1,

Tactical Air Forces in Europe: 148 127-128

Tactical air support: 6-8 Army Air Forces: 62, 75, 125-126,

Air Force on: 184 203

airmen on: 135-141, 143, 230 cross-training: 219

Army on: 136, 138, 140-142, 231 GHQ Air Force: 16

Army Air Forces on: 124, 136, instrument flight: 16

138-140 medical units: 122

proposals for: 136-137, 139-140 navigation: 16

training programs: 139 night flight: 16

War Department on: 227-228 officers: 203

410
INDEX

pilots: 16 Truman on: 68, 71-72, 75-77, 80

replacements: 125 Vandenberg on: 68, 69

reserve components: 60, 64, 66, War Department on: 50, 52, 54,

72-73, 80, 82, 84-85, 127-128, 57-58, 64-66, 69, 74, 77, 79,

131,148,159,204-205 80-81, 113n, 116, 293-296

standardizing: 125 Truman, Harry S.: 77, 108, 164, 237

strategic strike force: 133 on air arm autonomy: 87-88,

Symington on: 201 107-109, 161-162

tactical: 31, 131 on aircraft procurement: 167

tactical air support: 139 on atomic bomb advantage: 75

technical services: 120-121, 216, on assistant secretaries: 167

218-219 on bases overseas: 60

technicians: 140, 219 on Chief of Staff: 163

Trenchard, Hugh M.: 6n. 42, 45, 168, on combat readiness: 87-88, 107-108

169 intransigence charged: 167

Troop carrier aircraft on Joint Chiefs functions: 108-109

groups, number proposed: 54 on Marine Corps control: 161, 167

groups, number in service: 147 on National Security Act: 178, 184

mission: 33 on naval aviation: 161, 167

Troop Carrier Command: 125, 127 on Navy-Marine Corps personnel

Troop Carrier Commands strength: 67-68

1: 126 on Navy peacetime needs: 76

IX: 282 parochialism criticized by: 237

Troop Carrier Wing, 53rd: 283 on postwar organization and troop

Troop strength postwar strength: 68-71-72, 74-77, 81

airmen on: 50-54, 55, 59-67, on President as commander in chief:

81-109, 113, 123, 135,228 186n

Army on: 34-35, 37, 52, 54-55, 58, on reserve components: 75

64, 79-80, 126, 215 on roles and missions: 167, 174-175,

Army Air Forces on: 49-50, 54, 183-185

59-63, 68-69, 70-73, 77, 79, 87, Secretary of Defense nominations: 192

131, 135-150, 231,243, 253-267, on Secretary of Defense powers: 167

278-280, 293-296 on services secretaries: 167

in Caribbean theater: 82 on seventy-groups plan: 234

in China-Burma-India theater: 146 on Soviet threat: 232, 238

in China theater: 146 Symington, posts offered to: 199

Congress and: 58-59, 64, 69, 83-84, on unification: 85-87, 107-109, 160,

90,92 161-167, 178, 184, 189

in continental United States: 146 on unified commands: 172, 173

Davison on: 50, 55, 67 on unity of command: 109

in European theater: 68, 82-83, 146 on universal military training: 40,

in General Reserve: 68 74-75, 83, 107, 197, 235-237

Joint Chiefs on:81, 90, 215, 268-277 Twining, Nathan F.: 144

in Mediterranean theater: 146 commands Materiel Command: 143

Navy on: 67 on headquarters and staff

plans and studies on: 2, 71-72, 80-81 organization: 207, 209

in reserve components: 54, 73

in Tactical Air Command: 146

411
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

Under Secretaries: 162, 187, 201, 310, Symington on: 174

324 Truman on: 172, 173

Unification of armed services United Kingdom defense organization:

airmen on: 40-41, 55, 71, 77, 88, 90, 172, 173

92, 97-98, 102n, 109-110 112, United Nations

114, 118-119 123, 135-136, 149, commitments to: 52, 63-64, 79, 256-257

161-162, 169-173, 175-177, and Soviet forces in Iran: 232

178-179, 190-192 United States, vulnerability of: 46-47,

Army on: 34, 37-38, 67-68, 88-89, 229

98-100, 103-106, 114n 160-161, United States Air Force (see also Air

166, 175-176, 177, 190-192 Corps; Army Air Forces;

Army Air Forces on: 34, 49-50 71, Department of the Air Force;

80, 87-88, 109-110, 154, Secretary of the Air Force; Spaatz,

178-179, 293-296 Carl; Symington, W. Stuart)

Congress and: 9, 85, 110, 162, air commands structure: 33n, 85, 214

183-184, 274 Air Corps transfer to: 187

Davison on: 90 air defense mission: 184

Forrestal on: 38-40, 100-103, air superiority, maintaining: 184

161-162, 165-166, 174-175, 184, air transport missions: 184

210 and airborne operations: 184

Gates on: 90 aircraft development and

Joint Chiefs on: 34, 37n 77, 85, procurement: 184, 243

87,90, 92 airlift missions: 184

Lovett on: 141n airmen transfer to: 225, 31 1-3 12

Navy on: 34, 38, 40, 85, 90, 92-97, antiaircraft units, integration into: 80

106, 110, 161-165, 166-169, Army Air Forces transfer to: 187,

170-173, 177, 189-190,271-273 198,222,225

New York Times on: 100, 107 Assistant Secretaries appointed: 201

Patterson on: 99-100, 163, 165, ASWAAF integration into: 71, 80,

174-175, 184-185, 199,210 187,217

proposals for: 9 attache system: 224

Symington on: 98, 163, 170n, 192, audit and accounting services: 224

199-200 bases overseas: 82-83

Thomas on: 162 budget estimates and limitations:

Truman on: 85-88, 107-109, 160, 224,236-237

161-167, 178, 184, 189 career fields adopted: 219-220

War Department on: 8-9, 34, 37, chaplains complement: 212

102, 106, 166, 169, 175-177,269, Chief of Staff established: 187

293-296 civilian employees transfer to: 223,

Unified commands 225, 317

activated: 172, 173-174 command and control in: 206-209, 218

airmen on: 89, 172-174, 240 communications facilities and

Congress on: 88 equipment: 287-288

Joint Chiefs on: 172, 173-174, 187, and corps, establishment of: 218-220

189 elements of: 80-8 I

Lovett on: 89-90 elements functions and strength: 82-83

Navy on: 170, 172-173 established: 79-80, 88, 122,

Royall on: 240 183-184, 196,225,311-312

412
INDEX

finance services: 224, 317 roles and missions: 184-185,

as first line of defense: 197, 227, 229 186-187, 238-241,243, 297-300,

foreign liaison functions: 224 312

functions transfer to: 222-226, 238, school system proposed: 80

243, 310 Secretary functions and powers: 167,

GHQ Air Force transfer to: 187, 225 185-186, 225

groups, assignment to components: and service units transfer: 222-223,

82-83 224-225

groups, number proposed: 80-81 and seventy-groups plan: 81-82, 196,

groups, number in service: 237 225,243-244

headquarters and staff organization: on Strategic Air Force: 184

80-81,195-196, 199-212, 243, supply services and operations: 213

320-324 tactical air support missions: 184

intelligence organization and technical services complement for:

functions: 224 212-221,286-287

and joint operations: 184 training programs: 203-205, 218-219

maintenance and repair services: 24, troop strength, postwar. See Troop

224 strength, postwar

mapping service: 224 Under Secretary appointed: 201

medical services: 212, 220-222 on unity of command: 207

and Military Academy graduates: 203 unrated officers, policies on:203, 287

mission defined: 80 utilities services for: 224

mobilization plans: 80, 82-83 warrant officers transfer to: 225,

mobilized Air Force plans: 80 311-312

occupation mission: 83 welfare funds: 224

officers, grades distribution: 219 Women's Army Corps element

officers, rated-to-unrated ratio: 81 transfer to: 225

officers transfer to: 222-226, 238, United States Air Forces in Europe

243,286-287,311-312 activated: 148, 214

organization and functions: 1-2, 187 United States Army (see also Army

on organization, postwar. See Ground Forces; Department of the

Organization, postwar Army; Eisenhower, Dwight D.;

personnel absorbed by: 187 Marshall, George C.; War

personnel policies and services: Department)

218-221,223, 243 Air Corps, control by: 12

personnel strength: 81-82 and air units, organic: 90, 138, 139,

photographic mission: 224 142,277

President as commander in chief: 186n and attache system: 224

promotion policies: 203-204, 217, 243 on coast defense mission: 12, 16,

quartermaster services: 213 19-21,228

real estate and construction: and functions transfer: 222-226

224-225,312 and Joint Chiefs functions: 102-103

reconnaissance missions: 184 on maintenance and repair services:

recruiting services: 223-224 224

Regular Air Force missions: 80 on medical services: 220-221

research and development in: 222 and National Security Act: 192, 233

on officers transfer to Air Force:

223-226

413
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

on organization, postwar. See and National Security Act: 192, 198n

Organization, postwar on naval aviation control: 98,

peacetime structure: 37-38 161-162, 165-167, 169, 170n,

personnel policies and services: 178-182, 184-185, 186-187,

223-224 308-309

on real estate and construction: on organization, postwar. See

224-225 Organization, postwar

on recruiting services: 223-224 personnel strength: 67-68

on research and development: 222 on reconnaissance missions: 166,

on roles and missions: 7-8, 103, 184, 179, 181,184,186-187,309

192 on roles and missions: 7, 12,

on secretary powers: 166 165-166,172,174-175, 178-179,

on service units transfer: 223 181-185, 192, 238-241,243,

troop strength: 35 297-300

troop strength, postwar. See Troop on Secretary powers: 167, 185-186,

strength, postwar 220

and unification: 88 on Secretary of Defense powers: 163,

and unity of command: 103, 140, 172 167

on utilities services: 224 on strategic air operations: 95-97

United States Marine Corps on unification: 34, 38, 40, 85, 90,

aviation, organic: 169, 186-187, 309 92-97, 106, 110, 162-165,

control of: 161-165, 167, 178, 166-169,177,189-190,271-273

184-185, 186-187,309 on unity of command: 92, 94-95,

Joint Chiefs and: 68, 92, 277 172, 240

personnel strength: 67-68 on universal military training:

status of: 103n 262-264

United States Military Academy: 203 Unity of command

United States Navy. (See also Forrestal, Air Force on: 207

James V.; Nimitz, Chester F.; airmen on: 28-29, 94n, 97, 131

Sullivan, John L.) Army on: 103-104, 140, 172

on air arm autonomy: 7n, 38-40, 85, Army Air Forces on: 32-33

161-163, 189-190 Congress and: 88

on air transport missions: 184-185, Navy on: 92, 94-95, 172,240-241

186 in Pacific theater: 172

aircraft carrier program: 238-239 Sullivan on: 240

on aircraft development and Truman on: 109

procurement: 184-185 War Department on: 34, 92, 118

on amphibious operations: 166, 179 Universal military training

on antisubmarine mission: 166, 179, airmen on: 40, 54, 57-63, 66, 71-73,

180,184-185,186-187,309 74-75,232

Army Air Forces cooperation with: Army on: 35-38, 40, 56, 57-58, 63,

148,292 74-75,83-84,203,231,232

Atlantic Fleet: 143, 172 Army Air Forces on: 62-63, 66, 79,

on atomic bomb delivery: 181, 239 83-84, 159, 232

on coast defense mission: 16, 19-21, 228 Congress and: 57-58, 83-84, 197,

on Marine Corps control: 161-165, 203,231

178,184-185,186,309 Navy on: 262-263

on medical services: 220-221 New York Times on: 84

414
INDEX

Patterson on: 75n on air promotion list: 121

Stimson on: 35 on air representation on staff: 9, 88,

Truman on: 40, 75, 83-84 107-108, 119-120,285-292

197, 235-236 on air staff parity: 119-120

War Department on: 34-35, 57-58, on antiaircraft units assignment:

60-66, 83-84, 203, 231-232, 117-118

23

5n, 262, 263 arms and services formation: 217-219

Uranium, control of: 132 and Army strength, postwar: 35-37

Utah, USS: 20n on coast defense mission: 21, 228

Utilities services: 224, 289-290 on combat readiness: 176-177

decentralization policy: 159

Vandenberg, Hoyt S.: 119, 243-244 demobilization plans: 64

on air autonomy: 196, 198 deployment plans: 266-267

as air proponent: 3 Equipment Board: 132

background: 201 future board characterized by: 57-58

becomes Assistant Chief of Air Staff: and General Staff reorganization:

323 116, 118-119

becomes Chief of Staff: 242-243 and GHQ organization and

becomes Deputy Chief of Staff: 322 reorganization: 22, 113-115, 159

becomes Vice Chief of Staff: 201, and General Reserve: 131

210, 321 General Staff activated: 31

on functions transfer: 222-223 General Staff reorganization: 28,

on headquarters and staff 157-159

organization: 210 and groups, assignments to theaters: 69

on postwar organization and troop inactivated: 308

strength: 68, 69 on industrial mobilization: 65

Spaatz Board member: 131 on intelligence operations and

on strategic strike force: 132-133, systems: 65

141,174n mobilization plans: 65-66, 83-85,

on tactical air support: 138 264-265

Vinson, Fred M.: 201, 236 on National Guard training and

Virginia capes bombing demonstration: expansion: 66

8 occupation plans: 67

Von Karman, Theodore: 42-43, 46, 230 on organization, postwar. See

Organization, postwar

Walsh, David I.: 100-101 reorganization of 1942: 29-31, 92,

Walsh, Robert L.: 323 118,215

War Council established: 175, 189, reorganization of 1946: 118-120,

312-313 157-160

War Department (see also Department on research and development: 65

of the Army; Patterson, Robert P.; reserve components, plans for: 35, 64, 66

Stimson, Henry L.; United States on Secretary of Defense powers: 177

Army on seventy-groups plan: 68-69,

on air arm autonomy: 6,9, 16, 22, 88, 81-82, 231

102, 116-117, 119-120,232-234 on seventy-five-groups plan: 55

on air arm mission: 228 on single Chief of Staff: 165

on Air Force as first line of defense: Special Planning Division: 35

196-197 on strategic bombing concept: 21-22

415
THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR FORCE INDEPENDENCE

and Strategic Reserve: 128-135 Western Training Command: 125

and strategic striking force: 128-135 Westover, Oscar: 3, 18, 21

on tactical air support: 227 Weyland, Otto P.: 170n, 322

on technical services complement: White, Thomas D.: 148, 323

177,213,215 White Plan: 127n

troop strength, postwar. See troop Whitehead, Ennis C.: 148, 214

strength, postwar Whiteley, John F.: 324

on unification: 9, 34, 37, 102, 106, Whitney, Cornelius V.: 201, 202

165-166, 170, 175-176, 269, Whitney, John P.: 242

293-296 Wiesbaden, Germany: 148

on United Nations commitments: 57 Wilson, Donald: 144

on units, control of: 15 on air defense plan: 127

on unity of command: 34, 93, 118 becomes Deputy Chief of Staff: 322

on universal military training: 35, commands Proving Ground

57-58, 60-66, 83-85, 204, Command: 144

231-232,237n, 262-264 Wings

War Department General Staff. See I st: 15

United States Army; War 2nd: 15

Department 3rd: 15

War Plans Division, WDGS. See War organization: 33n

Department Wolfe, Henry C.: 71

Warfare Wolfe, Kenneth B.: 148

atomic bomb effect on: 134-135, 229 Women's Army Corps: 225

changed character of: 58, 229, 262, Woodrum Committee (1944): 50, 88,

266, 278-279, 295-296 89-92

Warning systems: 128 Wooten, Ralph H.: 214

Warrant officers transfer to Air Force: World War 1, aircraft in: 6-7, 14

225,311-312 World War 11

Watson, M. W.: 66 air organization: 22-33

Weather service:. 149 lessons derived from: I-2, 41, 46-47,

Weaver, Walter R.: 320 138, 140

Webb, James E.: 189, 235, 237 Wright Field, Ohio: 143, 207

Wedemeyer, Albert C.: 241n Wyatt, Ben H.: 39

Welfare funds: 224

Western Air Command: 140 Zuckert, Eugene M.: 201, 202

Western Defense Command activated: 26

ISBN 0-16-049066-9

90000

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9 K101 601114906681 1