* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 31 2001 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATE OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. TOMAS GUZMAN-OTERO,

Defendant-Appellant. No. 00-1197 (D.C. No. 99-CR-87-D) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before EBEL, KELLY, and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. In this direct appeal, defendant-appellant Tomas Gu zman-Otero challenges his 121-month sentence following conviction of cons piracy to possess with intent2 U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 adopts verbatim 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f )(1)-(5). -2- to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U. S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Specifically, defendant ass erts that the district court erred in (1) finding him ineligible for a downward depart ure for minimal participation as provided in U.S.S.G. § 3(b)1.2; (2) finding him ineligible for the safety value relief afforded under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); 2 and (3) finding his criminal history category to be two as a result of being on probatio n for a number of traffic violations at the time of the drug offense. We hav e jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.
I. Background On March 1, 1999, defendant, along with two codefen dants, was arrested in the King Soopers grocery store parking lot near Hampden Avenue and Monaco Parkway in Denver, after selling approximately two pounds of methamphetamine to a confidential source. A subsequent search of t he truck in which the defendants were traveling revealed a loaded Ruger 9 mm pistol in the rear passenger seat. Defendant, who was sitting in the rear passenger seat of the truck, had in his possession an ammunition magazine for the pistol. It was later determined that the weapon belonged to one of the c odefendants.-3-

Defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby he entered a plea of guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess and di stribute methamphetamine, and in return, the government agreed to dismiss the thr ee remaining counts of the indictment. He was sentenced to the statutory mini mum of 121 months’ imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and a$100 special assessment. Because defendant stipulated to possession of a fir earm during the course of the drug offense, the sentencing court enhanced his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) and rejected his request for sentenci ng under the “safety valve” provision of the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Because we find no error in either of these sentencing decisions, w e have no need to reach defendant’s remaining claims of error.

II. Discussion “The Sentencing Guidelines provide for an offense l evel enhancement of two points ‘[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a fi rearm) was possessed’ during a drug conspiracy.” United States v. Vaziri , 164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir. 1999) ( quotingU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)). “‘The [enhancement for w eapon possession] should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.’” Id. ( quotingU.S.S.G. § 2D1.1., comment., (n.3)).-4-

To establish possession of a firearm for the purpos e of enhancing a drug sentence, the government bears the burden of provin g by a preponderance of the evidence that the gun was physically proximate to t he drug offense. United States
v. Contreras , 59 F.3d 1038, 1040 (10th Cir. 1995). This burdenis met if the government presents evidence “that a temporal and s patial relation existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” United States v. Roederer , 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993) (further quotat ions omitted). This nexus may be established by showing that the weapon was located nearby the general location “where drugs or drug pa raphernalia are stored or where part of the transaction occurred.” Id . at 983 (citation omitted). Once the government establishes that the gun was possessed i n proximity to the drug transaction, the burden shifts to the defendant to “show it is clearly improbable that the weapon was related to the offense.” United States v. Robertson , 45 F.3d 1423, 1449 (10th Cir. 1995) (further quotation omitted). “We review factual findings under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1 ) for clear error; we give due deference to the application of the Guidel ines to the facts; [and] we review purely legal questions de novo.” Vaziri , 164 F.3d at 568. On appeal, defendant, in a convoluted manner, argues that, alt hough the sentencing guideline computation section of the plea agreement indicates a two-level enhancement for possession of the gun, there was never any proof th at defendant actually3 Defendant’s brief is woefully lacking in authority and adequate proof

reading. We expect counseled briefs to be readable , grammatically correct, and well-reasoned. We also remind counsel of his duty to support his arguments with authority. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). -5- possessed the gun, and therefore, the district court’s two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) was error. 3 It was undisputed that the weapon was discovered in the rear passenger seat of the truck where defendant was sitting at the time of the drug trafficking transaction. At t he time of his arrest, defendant was in possession of a magazine of ammunition for the gun. See United States v. Roberts , 980 F.2d 645, 647 (10th Cir. 1992) (inferring con nection between weapons and drug possession where guns and ammuniti on were “close at hand” to large amount of marijuana). As this court has previously noted, enhancement und er § 2D1.1(b)(1) is designed to reflect the increased danger of violenc e when drug traffickers add firearms to the mix. See Contreras , 59 F.3d at 1040. The government satisfied its burden by showing “mere proximity” of the weapo n to the offense. Roberts , 980 F.2d at 647. Although defendant averred and th e government admitted that the weapon did not belong to defendant, this does n ot establish that the weapon was not connected to the conspiracy. Vaziri , 164 F.3d at 568. Consequently, defendant failed to meet his burden of proof under Robertson by establishing that it was clearly improbable that the pistol in the re ar passenger seat of the truck had4 The few cases cited by counsel in defendant’s brief in support of this argument appear to support an argument that the district c ourt’s enhancement for possessing a weapon in connection with the drug off ense was in error based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137 (1995). This argument is utterly without merit. Baileymodified only the interpretation and application of the term “use” as applied to firearm s. See United States v. Hallum , 103 F.3d 87, 89 (10th Cir. 1996). Because defendan t’s sentence was enhanced for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug trafficking crime, his Baileyargument fails. -6- any relation to his possession of the large quantity of methamphetamine. 4 We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in enhancing defendant’s offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(1). “Section 3553(f) was enacted as a ‘safety valve’ to permit courts to sentence less culpable defendants to sentences unde r the guidelines, instead of imposing mandatory minimum sentences.” United States v. Acosta-Olivas , 71 F.3d 375, 378 (10th Cir. 1995). This provision allows the sentencing court to depart from the statutory minimum sentence if it fi nds that the defendant meets certain criteria including that “the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other d angerous weapons (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with th e offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(2). We review the district court’s interpretation of § 3553 and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 de novo. See United States v. Gigley , 213 F.3d 503, 505 (10th Cir. 2000). Because of our conclusion that the districtcourt did not err in determining-7-

that defendant possessed a weapon in connection with a drug trafficking offense, we also conclude that the district court did not er r in finding defendant ineligible for application of the safety value provision. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge