1 

2023 IL App (5th) 220144-U 

NO. 5-22-0144 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

TYLER REAKA, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 21-MR-61 

 ) 

CAPTAIN D’S, LLC, ) Honorable 

 ) Julie K. Katz, 

Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Welch and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition 

for entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 

where defendant made full payment of the Commission’s final award prior to the 

filing of plaintiff’s petition. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff, Tyler Reaka, appeals the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that granted 

his petition for enforcement of judgment, pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers’ Compensation 

Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2020)), and interest on the unpaid portion of his workers’ 

compensation award, pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 

5/2-1303 (West 2020)), arguing that the court erred by denying his requests for section 2-1303 

interest on the total award from September 9, 2015, attorney fees, penalties, and to depose prior 

counsel for defendant, Captain D’s, LLC. Defendant cross-appeals, arguing that the court erred by 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 04/28/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

ruling that defendant owed additional compensation when the court denied defendant’s motion to 

dismiss, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2020)). Alternatively, 

defendant argues that the court erred by ruling that it owed section 2-1303 interest. For the 

following reasons, we reverse the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacate the 

court’s judgment against defendant.

¶ 3 I. Background 

¶ 4 The following procedural history and facts are derived from the pleadings and exhibits 

contained in the record on appeal. We note that this case has a lengthy procedural history as a 

result of multiple appeals and numerous filings in the section 19(g) proceedings. We recite only 

those facts necessary to our resolution of this appeal.

¶ 5 On December 30, 2003, plaintiff filed an application for adjustment of claim, seeking 

benefits under the Act for injuries he allegedly sustained to his neck, cervical spine, and left knee 

while working for defendant on January 3, 2001. The matter ultimately proceeded to an arbitration 

hearing on February 8, 2011. 

¶ 6 On March 24, 2011, the arbitrator issued a decision denying plaintiff benefits for his 

cervical spine injury but awarding him benefits for his left leg injury. Specifically, the arbitrator 

awarded plaintiff medical expenses in the amount of $21,407.47, pursuant to section 8(a) of the 

Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a) (West 2010)), and permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits in the 

amount of $51,615 ($516.15 per week for 100 weeks), representing 50% loss of the use of the left 

leg, pursuant to section 8(e) of the Act (id. § 8(e)). The arbitrator also ordered defendant to pay 

penalties in the amount of $10,859.49 under section 19(k) of the Act (id. § 19(k)) and attorney fees 

in the amount of $4281.49 under section 16 of the Act (id. § 16), based on defendant’s 

unreasonable and vexatious nonpayment of medical benefits related to plaintiff’s left leg injury. In 
3 

total, the arbitrator awarded plaintiff $88,163.45. The arbitrator further ordered defendant to pay 

plaintiff interest, if any, at a rate of 0.15% under section 19(n) of the Act (id. § 19(n)). 

¶ 7 Defendant did not file a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the Illinois 

Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). Defendant instead paid plaintiff $88,163.45, 

the total amount of the arbitrator’s award, on April 19, 2011. 

¶ 8 Plaintiff filed a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the Commission after 

he received defendant’s payment.1 The Commission issued a decision on February 2, 2012, 

affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s decision. The Commission ordered defendant to pay 

plaintiff interest under section 19(n) of the Act, if any. The Commission also ordered that 

defendant “shall have credit for all amounts paid, if any, to or on behalf of [plaintiff] on account 

of said accidental injury.” 

¶ 9 Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court of St. 

Clair County. The court entered an order on September 9, 2015, setting aside the Commission’s 

decision and remanding the matter back to the Commission to award plaintiff benefits for his 

cervical spine injury. 

¶ 10 Defendant appealed the circuit court’s order to the workers’ compensation division of the 

appellate court (appeal No. 5-15-0425WC). Plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant’s appeal, 

asserting that the court’s September 9, 2015, order was interlocutory and not appealable. The 

appellate court granted plaintiff’s motion and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on 

March 3, 2016.2

 

1

Plaintiff alleged in the petition for review that he placed the petition in the mail on April 27, 2011, 

and the petition was file-stamped by the Commission on June 9, 2011.

2

The appellate court did not issue a Rule 23 order or an opinion. 
4 

¶ 11 On April 4, 2017, the Commission issued a decision and opinion on remand in accordance 

with the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. Despite finding no basis in law or fact for the 

court’s order, the Commission found that plaintiff’s cervical spine condition was causally 

connected to his January 3, 2011, work accident. Accordingly, the Commission awarded plaintiff 

PPD benefits in the amount of $103,230 ($516.15 per week for 200 weeks), representing 40% loss 

of use of the person as a whole, pursuant to section 8(d)(2) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (West 

2016)), and medical expenses in the amount of $147,961.17, pursuant to section 8(a) of the Act. 

The Commission also awarded plaintiff PPD benefits in the amount of $51,615 ($516.15 per week 

for 100 weeks), representing 50% loss of use of the left leg, pursuant to section 8(e) of the Act. 

The Commission ordered defendant to pay plaintiff interest under section 19(n) of the Act, if any. 

The Commission further ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $125,595.58 as a penalty under section 

19(k) of the Act, $10,000 as a penalty under section 19(l) of the Act (id.§ 19(l)), and $50,238.23 

for attorney fees under section 16 of the Act. In total, the Commission awarded plaintiff 

$488,639.98. 

¶ 12 On April 27, 2017, defendant sought judicial review of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, 

decision and opinion on remand before the circuit court. Plaintiff filed a motion to quash summons 

and dismiss judicial review. The court subsequently denied plaintiff’s motion, finding sufficient 

compliance with section 19(f) of the Act (id. § 19(f)) to perfect jurisdiction. 

¶ 13 On April 26, 2018, the circuit court entered an order confirming the Commission’s April 

4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. Defendant appealed the court’s order to the workers’ 

compensation division of the appellate court (appeal No. 5-18-0288WC). Plaintiff filed a motion 

to dismiss the appeal, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the 

Commission’s decision. The appellate court ordered that plaintiff’s motion be taken with the case. 
5 

¶ 14 On May 30, 2019, the workers’ compensation division of the appellate court issued an 

unpublished decision finding that defendant failed to strictly comply with the procedural 

requirements set forth in section 19(f)(1) of the Act, and thus, failed to confer the circuit court with 

subject-matter jurisdiction. Captain D’s, LLC v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 2019 

IL App (5th) 180288WC-U, ¶ 30. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the circuit court’s April 

26, 2018, order confirming the Commission’s decision on remand was void. Id. Defendant filed a 

petition for rehearing, which the appellate court denied on June 27, 2019. 

¶ 15 Also, in June 2019, defendant issued various payments to plaintiff. Specifically, defendant 

paid plaintiff $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, $185,833.51 on June 26, 2019, $147,961.17 on June 26, 

2019, $103,030 on June 27, 2019, $55.71 on June 28, 2019, and $200.30 on June 28, 2019. In 

total, defendant paid plaintiff $442,078.76 in June 2019.

¶ 16 On March 8, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition for enforcement of judgment and interest on 

the Commission’s award pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act. Plaintiff attached to the petition a 

certified copy of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. Plaintiff 

alleged that defendant made partial payment of the Commission’s award. Plaintiff further alleged 

that he “requested full payment of the award and all accrued interest on the total award at 9%.” 

Plaintiff requested that the circuit court enter judgment against defendant in the amount of $51,615 

for PPD benefits awarded by the Commission, in addition to “interest at 9% on the total award 

from September 9, 2015.” Plaintiff additionally requested that the court order defendant to pay 

attorney fees, penalties, costs, and any other relief the court deemed appropriate for defendant’s 

“knowingly and willfully improper and illegal appeals, responses, motions and petitions.” 

¶ 17 On April 6, 2021, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619 of the 

Code. Defendant alleged in the motion that it tendered full payment of the Commission’s award, 
6 

and that its tender of full payment constituted a defense to a section 19(g) petition. Defendant 

attached as an exhibit to the motion a copy of the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision awarding 

plaintiff $88,163.45 in benefits under the Act, including PPD benefits in the amount of $51,615 

for his left leg. Defendant alleged that it paid plaintiff $88,163.45—the full amount awarded by 

the arbitrator on March 24, 2011—on April 19, 2011, which included the $51,615 award of PPD 

benefits for plaintiff’s left leg. Defendant further alleged that, after it unsuccessfully attempted to 

appeal the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, it paid plaintiff a total of 

$442,048.76 in the following installments: $4998.07 on June 21, 2019; $185,833.51 on June 26, 

2019; $147,961.17 on June 26, 2019; $103,000 on June 27, 2019; $200.30 on June 28, 2019; and 

$55.71 on June 28, 2019. 

¶ 18 In support of its allegations regarding payment, defendant attached the affidavit of Paula 

Williams, the payment history records custodian for the third-party administrator of the workers’ 

compensation benefits for defendant in plaintiff’s claim. Williams attested that the payment history 

records related to plaintiff’s claim revealed that the third-party administrator paid plaintiff 

$88,163.45 on April 19, 2011, $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, $185,833.51 on June 26, 2019, 

$147,961.17 on June 26, 2019, $103,000 on June 27, 2019, $200.30 on June 28, 2019, and $55.71 

on June 28, 2019. Williams attached as exhibits to her affidavit redacted payment ledgers that 

listed the payment amounts, payment dates, and corresponding check numbers. The exhibits 

attached to the affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 for “Permanent 

Disability” on April 19, 2011, and $103,0303 for “Permanent Disability” on June 27, 2019. 

3

While defendant’s motion to dismiss and Williams’s affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff 

$103,000 on June 27, 2019, the documents attached to Williams’s affidavit indicated that defendant paid plaintiff 

$103,030 on June 27, 2019.
7 

¶ 19 In addition, defendant alleged that plaintiff’s appeals following the arbitrator’s March 24, 

2011, decision involved only the cervical spine injury. In support, defendant attached as an exhibit 

to the motion a copy of plaintiff’s brief to the Commission, wherein plaintiff stated that his “appeal 

involve[d] only the cervical spine injury and issues.” Defendant further alleged that counsel for 

plaintiff confirmed during argument before the circuit court on December 18, 2017, that defendant 

paid all benefits the arbitrator awarded on March 24, 2011, including the PPD benefits totaling 

$51,615 for plaintiff’s left leg injury. In support, defendant attached as an exhibit a copy of the 

transcript from the December 18, 2017, hearing, wherein counsel for plaintiff stated “when they 

found out what the award was on the knee, they didn’t appeal or anything. They just paid it, all the 

penalties and everything.” Thus, defendant argued that the court should deny plaintiff’s request 

for PPD benefits of $51,615 for his left leg, because defendant satisfied its obligation regarding 

the PPD benefits “long ago.” 

¶ 20 Defendant also alleged that it paid the award in full in June 2019, including interest at a 

rate of 0.15% pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act. Defendant claimed it owed $834.09 for section 

19(n) interest through June 20, 2019, which was 0.15% of “$251,191.17 ($103,230.00 for [PPD] 

benefits for the neck/cervical spine and $147,961.17 for medical benefits for the neck/cervical 

spine).” Defendant claimed it paid $4998.07 on June 21, 2019, and $55.71 on June 28, 2019, for 

section 19(n) interest. Thus, defendant argued that the circuit court should deny plaintiff’s request 

for additional section 2-1303 interest because it overpaid the interest owed on the award.

¶ 21 On April 22, 2021, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff 

disagreed that defendant “satisfied its [PPD] obligation in the Remand Decision dated April 4, 

2017, because it paid a PPD award in an earlier Arbitrator Decision dated March 24, 2011.” 

Plaintiff asserted that the case involved two separate decisions issued six years apart, which were 
8 

based on different facts and circumstances. According to plaintiff, “the March 24, 2011, decision 

was not a final decision” and the payments for that award were not before the circuit court. 

(Emphasis in original.) Plaintiff maintained that his section 19(g) petition pertained to the 

Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, which was “a separate, new and 

distinct decision from the March 24, 2011, decision and it has not been paid in full.” (Emphasis in 

original.) Plaintiff noted that defendant appeared “to imply the Commission erred by awarding the 

same PPD in the April 4, 2017, Remand Decision that the Arbitrator awarded in the March 24, 

2011, decision.” According to plaintiff, defendant should have requested that the Commission 

recall and correct the decision or raised the issue before the circuit court, as permitted by section 

19(f) of the Act. Plaintiff further asserted that defendant waived review of the issue by failing to 

raise the issue in the prior proceedings. 

¶ 22 In addition, plaintiff argued that he was entitled to interest at a rate of 9% of the total 

amount of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand, pursuant to section 

2-1303 of the Code, from the date of the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. Thus, plaintiff 

requested that the court deny defendant’s motion to dismiss and allow him to proceed with his 

section 19(g) petition. Plaintiff also requested that the court allow him to depose prior counsel for 

defendant on the issue of penalties and sanctions. 

¶ 23 On August 6, 2021, after receiving additional filings from both parties, the circuit court 

entered an order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss in part and granting the motion in part. 

Relying on Patel v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 103217, and Estate of Burns v. 

Consolidation Coal Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140503, the court found that it lacked discretion to 

modify the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision, and that it lacked authority to award defendant 

credits or offsets. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss to the extent it 
9 

alleged that plaintiff’s section 19(g) petition should be dismissed because defendant tendered full 

payment of the award. However, the circuit court dismissed the portion of plaintiff’s section 19(g) 

petition that requested “interest at the rate of 9% per annum from any date prior to the entry of 

judgment herein, pursuant to section 19(g).” In doing so, the court found that the appropriate 

interest rate was 0.15%, pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act, and that the 0.15% interest rate 

applied to the unpaid PPD benefits. The court also dismissed plaintiff’s request for penalties and 

sanctions, noting that section 19(g) allowed it to award reasonable costs and attorney fees, not 

additional penalties or sanctions. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff’s request to depose prior 

counsel for defendant on the issue of penalties and sanctions. The court set the matter for a status 

conference on September 17, 2021.

¶ 24 On September 17, 2021, following the status conference, the circuit court entered an order 

directing the parties to submit argument and supporting documentation that addressed the issues 

left unresolved by the court’s August 6, 2021, order, including the appropriate amounts of interest, 

attorney fees, and costs. 

¶ 25 On October 8, 2021, plaintiff filed his argument in support of the section 19(g) petition. 

Regarding the issue of interest, plaintiff again argued that he was entitled to section 2-1303 interest 

at a rate of 9% on the entire amount of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision from September 

9, 2015, to June 30, 2019. Plaintiff further argued that he was entitled to 9% interest on the unpaid 

amount of the Commission’s decision from June 30, 2019, to the date of the court’s “final 19(g) 

Order.” In addition, plaintiff again argued that he was entitled to sanctions and penalties for 

defendant’s actions after the proceedings before the Commission. Plaintiff also requested that the 

circuit court “reconsider” its denial of his request to depose prior counsel for defendant.
10 

¶ 26 On October 29, 2021, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s argument supporting the 

section 19(g) petition. Defendant asserted that plaintiff improperly sought reconsideration of the 

circuit court’s August 6, 2021, order, which was beyond the scope of the court’s September 17, 

2021, order. Defendant argued that the court properly determined that section 19(n) interest at a 

rate of 0.15% applied, and that such interest applied to the unpaid portion of the award from April 

4, 2017. Defendant claimed it owed approximately $354.23 in section 19(n) interest (0.15% 

interest on $51,615 from April 4, 2017, through October 29, 2021). Defendant maintained, 

however, that it previously overpaid interest and owed no additional interest to plaintiff. Defendant 

maintained that it did not owe the $51,615 in PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg but, assuming it 

owed that amount, “and further assuming judgment is eventually entered by this Court pursuant to

Plaintiff’s 19(g) Petition, then [it] would owe approximately $21,254.07 in interest at the time the 

judgment is entered by this Court pursuant to Plaintiff’s 19(g) petition (9% interest on $51,615.00 

from April 4, 2017 through October 29, 2021 is $21,254.07, before deducting any overpayment of 

the 19(n) interest outlined above).” Defendant further asserted that the court should deny plaintiff’s 

request for attorney fees and costs, because plaintiff failed to provide a specific amount and 

documentation in support of his request. 

¶ 27 On November 4, 2021, following a hearing, the circuit court entered an order directing the 

parties to submit proposed orders consistent with the court’s prior rulings. The court noted that if 

plaintiff submitted a fee petition with his proposed order, defendant would have 30 days to respond 

and “no judgment to be entered without any fee petition being responded to by Defendant.”

¶ 28 On December 3, 2021, defendant filed a motion to supplement the record. Defendant 

alleged in the motion that it tendered a check to plaintiff in the amount of $51,967.65 on November 

23, 2021. According to defendant, the check represented payment for 50% loss of the use of 
11 

plaintiff’s left leg ($51,615) and section 19(n) interest ($361.65). As such, defendant asserted that 

it paid all compensation owed to plaintiff. Thus, defendant requested that the circuit court grant its 

motion to supplement the record, find that it paid all compensation due and owing, and grant any 

other relief the court deemed proper. 

¶ 29 On December 8, 2021, plaintiff filed an objection to defendant’s motion to supplement the 

record. Plaintiff alleged that, during a prior hearing before the circuit court, defendant agreed that 

it owed $51,615 and interest at a rate of 9% per annum pursuant to section 2-1303 from the date 

of the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision to the date of payment, which totaled approximately 

$21,500. Plaintiff asserted that it was unnecessary for the court to find defendant paid all 

compensation due and owing on a motion to supplement, that defendant’s request amounted to an 

admission it owed compensation since April 4, 2017, and that defendant’s motion served no 

purpose where both parties previously submitted proposed orders to the court. Thus, plaintiff 

requested that the court deny defendant’s motion to supplement the record. 

¶ 30 On December 9, 2021, defendant filed a response to plaintiff’s objection. Defendant 

asserted that plaintiff’s objection included multiple misstatements of defendant’s “positions and 

arguments regarding the 50% of the left leg ($51,615.00) and interest owed.” Defendant claimed 

it never conceded that it was liable for 50% of the left leg and any additional section 19(n) interest 

awarded in the April 4, 2017, decision on remand. Defendant further claimed it never conceded 

that it was liable for section 2-1303 interest at a rate of 9% per annum, “unless and until this 

Honorable Court enters judgment on any unpaid amounts.” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant 

clarified its position that only section 19(n) interest applied, and section 19(n) interest only applied 

to unpaid PPD and medical benefits. Defendant maintained that the court’s August 6, 2021, order 

required it to pay PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg ($51,615) and section 19(n) interest ($361.65) 
12 

from April 4, 2017, through December 3, 2021. Defendant claimed that it issued a check to plaintiff 

for those amounts and, thus, it paid all compensation due and owing. Thus, defendant argued that 

the court should dismiss plaintiff’s section 19(g) petition with prejudice “because there is nothing 

to award Plaintiff in this 19(g) proceeding.” 

¶ 31 On December 10, 2021, plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s response. Plaintiff alleged 

that defendant was required to show it made full payment of the award prior to the filing of the 

section 19(g) petition. Plaintiff asserted that defendant “agree[d] the award of 50% of a leg and 

Section 19(n) interest was unpaid on March 8, 2021, the date the 19(g) Petition was filed.” Plaintiff 

disagreed with defendant’s claim that it could avoid section 2-1303 interest by paying the unpaid 

balance of the award at any time before the circuit court entered a final order on the petition. 

¶ 32 On February 4, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on all pending matters. The court 

entered an order allowing defendant time to respond to caselaw provided by plaintiff. The court 

indicated that the matter would be taken under advisement after it received defendant’s response. 

¶ 33 On February 18, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order that addressed all issues left 

unresolved by the August 6, 2021, order. In the order, the court declined plaintiff’s request to 

reconsider its ruling on the issue of penalties and sanctions. The court also declined plaintiff’s 

request to reconsider its denial of the request to depose prior counsel for defendant. However, the 

court reconsidered its prior ruling on the issue of interest and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff an 

additional sum for interest, finding that plaintiff was entitled to section 2-1303 interest at a rate of 

9% per annum on the unpaid portion of the award ($51,615) from the date of the Commission’s 

April 4, 2017, decision to the date defendant made payment. The court also granted defendant’s 

motion to supplement the record and found that defendant paid section 19(n) interest in the amount 

of $361.65 on November 23, 2021. Accordingly, the court credited defendant the amount of 
13 

interest paid and ordered defendant to pay interest in the amount of $21,313.14 ($21,674.79 - 

$361.65) within 30 days of the entry of the order. The court denied plaintiff’s request for attorney 

fees and costs, finding a good-faith disagreement existed as to the amount owed. 

¶ 34 On March 11, 2022, defendant filed a second motion to supplement the record. Defendant 

alleged in the motion that it tendered a check to plaintiff in the amount of $23,023.12 on March 9, 

2022, representing “9% interest on $51,615.00 from April 4, 2017, through March 18, 2022.” 

Defendant indicated that it “need[ed] the record to reflect all the payments made to Plaintiff.”

¶ 35 On March 14, 2022, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s February 18, 

2022, order. On March 17, 2022, defendant filed a notice of cross-appeal. 

¶ 36 II. Analysis 

¶ 37 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred by denying his requests for section 

2-1303 interest on the total award, attorney fees, penalties, and to depose prior counsel for 

defendant. On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the court erred by denying its section 2-619 

motion to dismiss and granting the section 19(g) petition because it paid the full amount of the 

Commission’s award. Defendant also argues that the court erred by ordering it to pay section 2-

1303 interest on the Commission’s award. 

¶ 38 Because the issue is dispositive, we consider only whether the circuit court erred by 

denying defendant’s section 2-619 motion to dismiss. Defendant maintains that the court 

incorrectly ruled that it owed the additional PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg injury. Defendant 

asserts that it paid plaintiff the full amount of the PPD benefits awarded for his left leg injury prior 

to the filing of the section 19(g) petition. We agree. 

¶ 39 This court reviews the circuit court’s ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss de novo. 

Patel, 2012 IL App (1st) 103217, ¶ 8 (citing Simmons v. Homatas, 236 Ill. 2d 459, 477 (2010)). 
14 

Our resolution of this issue also requires us to construe section 19(g) of the Act, which presents a 

question of law subject to de novo review. Id. (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 386 Ill. App. 3d 522, 

534 (2008)).

¶ 40 A section 2-619 motion to dismiss raises affirmative matters that negate a claim and does 

not challenge the allegations set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Provenzale v. 

Forister, 318 Ill. App. 3d 869, 878 (2001)). “This motion admits the legal sufficiency of a 

complaint, but asserts affirmative matters that avoid or defeat the allegations contained in the 

complaint.” Id. (citing Miner v. Fashion Enterprises, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 405, 413 (2003)).

¶ 41 Section 19(g) of the Act provides that “either party may present *** a certified copy of the 

decision of the Commission when the same has become final, *** whereupon the court shall enter 

a judgment in accordance therewith.” 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2020). “When an employer fails 

or refuses to pay a final award, section 19(g) provides a statutory remedy for a claimant to reduce 

the award to an enforceable judgment in the circuit court.” Estate of Burns, 2015 IL App (5th) 

140503, ¶ 17 (citing Aurora East School District v. Dover, 363 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054 (2006)). 

Section 19(g) is “designed to permit speedy entry of judgment on an award, and the requirements 

for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction are strictly construed.” Aurora East School District, 363 

Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The circuit court’s inquiry in such proceedings is limited to determining 

whether the requirements of section 19(g) have been met. Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d 

259, 268 (1978). The court cannot question the jurisdiction of the Commission, question the 

legality of the Commission’s actions, review the Commission’s decision, or “otherwise construe 

the Act, even if the decision appears too large on its face.” Aurora East School District, 363 Ill. 

App. 3d at 1055. “The only defense to a section 19(g) petition is full payment of the final award.” 
15 

Dallas v. Ameren CIPS, 402 Ill. App. 3d 307, 312 (2010) (citing Aurora East School District, 363 

Ill. App. 3d at 1055). 

¶ 42 In the present case, the arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011, denying plaintiff 

benefits for his cervical spine injury but awarding him benefits for his left leg injury. The arbitrator 

awarded plaintiff a total of $88,163.45, which included an award of PPD benefits in the amount of 

$51,615. The arbitrator also ordered defendant to pay interest at a rate of 0.15% under section 

19(n) of the Act. Defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 on April 19, 2011. The Commission 

subsequently affirmed and adopted the arbitrator’s decision. The circuit court thereafter reversed 

the Commission’s decision and remanded the matter back to the Commission to award plaintiff 

benefits for his cervical spine injury. The Commission ultimately issued a decision and opinion on 

remand on April 4, 2017, awarding plaintiff benefits totaling $488,639.98. The Commission’s 

decision awarded plaintiff $147,961.17 in medical expenses and $103,230 in PPD benefits for his 

cervical spine injury, in addition to the $51,615 in PPD benefits for his left leg injury. The 

Commission also ordered defendant to pay interest pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act, if any. In 

June 2019, following an unsuccessful attempt to appeal the Commission’s decision and opinion 

on remand, defendant paid plaintiff $442,078.76. Defendant paid plaintiff a total of $530,242.21 

from April 19, 2011, to June 28, 2019. 

¶ 43 Plaintiff filed a section 19(g) petition on March 8, 2021, alleging that defendant failed to 

pay the full amount awarded by the Commission in its April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on 

remand. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to pay $51,615 in PPD benefits for his 

left leg injury, as well as interest at a rate of 9% per annum on the total award from September 9, 

2015. Defendant filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, asserting that it tendered full payment of 

the final award. Defendant claimed it paid plaintiff $88,163.45, which included the $51,615 in 
16 

PPD benefits, on April 19, 2011, after the arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011. 

Defendant further asserted that it overpaid interest under section 19(n) of the Act when it tendered 

full payment of the award in June 2019. 

¶ 44 After carefully reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the circuit court 

erred by denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the section 19(g) petition, where the record reveals 

that defendant paid the full amount of the final award prior to the filing of the petition. As an initial 

matter, we note that plaintiff did not allege in the section 19(g) petition that defendant failed to 

pay section 19(n) interest. Plaintiff alleged only that defendant failed to pay $51,615 in PPD 

benefits and requested section 2-1303 “interest at 9% on the total award from September 9, 2015.” 

As plaintiff recognizes in his brief to this court, “[i]f the employer pays the full award and all 19(n) 

interest to the claimant before the claimant files a section 19(g) petition, the employer does not 

owe any interest under section 2-1303.” See Dobbs Tire & Auto v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation 

Comm’n, 2018 IL App (5th) 160297WC. Because plaintiff did not allege that defendant failed to 

pay section 19(n) interest, we consider only whether defendant failed to pay the $51,615 in PPD 

benefits prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition. 

¶ 45 We again note, and plaintiff does not dispute, that defendant paid plaintiff $88,163.45 on 

April 19, 2011, which included a sum of $51,615 for PPD benefits awarded for claimant’s left leg 

injury. Despite this, plaintiff maintains that defendant failed to pay the full amount of the 

Commission’s April 4, 2017, award. Although difficult to discern, plaintiff appears to assert that 

defendant’s prior payment of PPD benefits pertained to the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision 

and did not pertain to the benefits awarded in the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and 

opinion on remand. Plaintiff also appears to assert that defendant failed to properly raise the issue 
17 

of its prior payment as provided in section 19(f) of the Act and that it is precluded from raising the 

issue in a section 19(g) proceeding. We disagree with plaintiff’s assertions.

¶ 46 We reject plaintiff’s claim that this case involves “two final awards.” As noted, the 

arbitrator issued a decision on March 24, 2011, denying plaintiff benefits for his cervical spine 

injury but awarding plaintiff benefits for his left leg injury, including an award of PPD benefits in 

the amount of $51,615. Plaintiff filed a petition for review of the arbitrator’s decision with the 

Commission; thus, the arbitrator’s decision was not a final decision. See 820 ILCS 305/19(b) 

(West 2020) (providing that an arbitrator’s decision becomes the final decision of the Commission 

unless a party files a petition for review within 30 days of receiving the arbitrator’s decision). The 

Commission issued a decision affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s decision on February 2, 

2012. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the circuit court; thus, the 

Commission’s February 2, 2012, decision was not a final decision. See id. § 19(f)(1) (providing 

that the Commission’s decision becomesfinal and conclusive unless reviewed by the circuit court). 

¶ 47 The circuit court entered an order on September 9, 2015, setting aside the Commission’s 

decision and remanding the matter back to the Commission to award benefits for plaintiff’s 

cervical spine injury. Defendant sought to appeal the court’s decision, but the workers’ 

compensation division of the appellate court dismissed the appeal because the circuit court’s order 

remanding the matter back to the Commission was not a final and appealable order. See Pace Bus 

Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1066 (2003) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction 

where the circuit court’s order remanding the case back to the Commission was not a final, 

appealable order). The Commission issued a decision and opinion on remand on April 4, 2017, 

reversing its prior decision affirming and adopting the arbitrator’s March 24, 2011, decision in 

accordance with the circuit court’s September 9, 2015, order. The Commission awarded plaintiff 
18 

benefits for his cervical spine injury, including PPD benefits, in accordance with the court’s order 

in addition to the PPD benefits awarded for his left leg injury. The Commission’s April 4, 2017, 

decision and opinion on remand became the sole final decision and award after defendant failed to 

successfully appeal the decision as provided under section 19(f) of the Act. Thus, contrary to 

plaintiff’s assertion, the present case involves only one final decision and award.

¶ 48 Next, we reject plaintiff’s assertion that he is entitled to a windfall on a technicality, 

because defendant failed to properly address the issue of its prior payment before the Commission 

and circuit court as required by section 19(f) of the Act. It appears from the record that defendant 

did not raise an issue regarding its prior payment of benefits because both parties agreed that 

defendant paid all benefits related to plaintiff’s left leg injury, and that the only remaining issues 

related to plaintiff’s cervical spine injury. Notably, plaintiff’s petition for review filed with the 

Commission indicated that he only sought review of the arbitrator’s denial of benefits for his 

cervical spine injury. Moreover, counsel for plaintiff agreed that defendant paid all benefits 

relating to plaintiff’s left leg injury at a subsequent hearing before the circuit court. Under these 

circumstances, we find it proper to consider the payment defendant made prior to the issuance of 

the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand.

¶ 49 We also reject plaintiff’s assertion that it was “unlawful” to raise the issue of whether 

defendant paid all compensation due and owing under the Commission’s April 4, 2017, decision 

and opinion on remand before the circuit court or this court. Plaintiff’s assertion is premised upon 

his distortion of defendant’s arguments. According to plaintiff, defendant’s argument that it made 

a full payment of the award “seem[ed] to imply the Commission erred by awarding the same PPD 

in the April 4, 2017, Remand Decision that the Arbitrator awarded in the March 24, 2011 decision.” 

However, defendant did not argue that the Commission erred, it merely argued that it paid the full 
19 

amount awarded by the Commission—the sole defense to a section 19(g) petition. See Dallas, 402 

Ill. App. 3d at 312 (“The only defense to a section 19(g) petition is full payment of the final 

award.”). 

¶ 50 We find the cases cited by plaintiff and the circuit court inapplicable to the present case. 

See Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469 (1994) (holding that an employer cannot seek

to recover the amount of an overpayment of benefits by filing a claim under section 19(g) of the 

Act); Patel, 2012 IL App (1st) 103217 (holding that an employer cannot apply credit for 

overpayment of TTD benefits to avoid entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act); 

Estate of Burns, 2015 IL App (5th) 140503 (holding that the employer was not entitled to offset 

the amount of a federal claim against the state workers’ compensation benefits under section 19(g) 

and that the employer was not entitled to offset the amount of the Commission’s award pursuant 

to an alleged oral settlement agreement). In the instant case, defendant has not filed a section 19(g) 

petition seeking to recover the amount of an overpayment, nor has it sought to apply credit for 

overpayment of TTD benefits to avoid entry of judgment pursuant to section 19(g). In addition, 

defendant has not asserted that it is entitled to an offset for the amount of a federal claim or that it 

is entitled to offset the amount of the Commission’s award pursuant to an oral settlement 

agreement. Defendant instead asserts that it made full payment of the final award—a proper 

defense to a section 19(g) proceeding—when it paid plaintiff $51,615 in PPD benefits for his left 

leg injury. In our view, the caselaw does not prohibit consideration of this payment in determining 

whether defendant made full payment of the final award in a section 19(g) proceeding. 

Accordingly, we find it proper to consider the $51,615 payment defendant made to plaintiff on 

April 19, 2011, in determining whether defendant made a full payment of the Commission’s final 

award. 
20 

¶ 51 We find our decision consistent with public policy and the purpose of the Act. Specifically, 

the employee should not receive a windfall at the employer’s expense due to the employer’s 

prompt payment of benefits. See Messamore v. Industrial Comm’n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 351, 359 

(1999) (“In drafting the Act, the legislature was careful to protect injured workers and to encourage 

employers to make prompt payments before the amount of liability is certain.”). Denying an 

employer the ability to assert that it made payments of benefits prior to the issuance of a final 

decision of the Commission in a section 19(g) proceeding would encourage delays as employers 

attempt to resolve every ambiguity before paying benefits. 

¶ 52 In sum, the record reveals that the Commission awarded plaintiff benefits totaling 

$488,639.98 in its April 4, 2017, decision and opinion on remand. The record also reveals that 

defendant paid plaintiff a total of $530,242.21 from April 19, 2011, to June 28, 2019.4 Defendant’s 

payments included a payment of $51,615 for PPD benefits for plaintiff’s left leg on April 19, 2011. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that he received such payments from defendant prior to filing his section 

19(g) petition. Thus, the record demonstrates that defendant tendered full payment of the final 

award prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition.

¶ 53 Because the record demonstrates that defendant tendered full payment of the final award 

prior to the filing of the section 19(g) petition, we hold that the circuit court erred by denying 

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s petition. It follows that the court should not have reached 

the additional issues raised by the parties regarding section 2-1303 interest, attorney fees, and 

penalties.

 

4

The record also reveals that defendant made additional payments to plaintiff during the section 

19(g) proceedings. 
21 

¶ 54 III. Conclusion 

¶ 55 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the St. Clair County circuit court’s order denying 

defendant’s motion to dismiss and vacate all orders entered by the court following its denial of the 

motion to dismiss. 

¶ 56 Reversed.