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20-2969-cr

U.S. v. Robinson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 27th day of May, two thousand twenty-one.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

Circuit Judges.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee, 20-2969-cr

v.

DARREN CLAY ROBINSON, AKA Mountain, AKA

Darren Charles Robinson,

Defendant-Appellant,

JOSE GILBERTO HARRIS, AKA Jose Hernandez, 

LASHAUNDA TARVER, AKA Shaunda, YUSEF

BOOTHMAN, AKA Rocket, BOBBY R. GRAHAM,

SHENIKA D. BOYD, AKA Misses, MARTY

HUMPHREY, JALESSA SCOTT, WILLIE C. HAYES, 

AKA Man, KIMBERLY PETTIES

Defendants.

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The Clerk of Court is directed to modify the caption of this case as shown above.
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: DARREN ROBINSON, pro se, Joint Base 

MDL, NJ.

FOR APPELLEE: MICHAEL S. BARNETT, RAJIT S. DOSANJH,

Assistant United States Attorneys, for

Antoinette T. Bacon, Acting United States 

Attorney for the Northern District of 

New York, Syracuse, NY.

Appeal from an August 13, 2020 order of the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of New York (Mae D’Agostino, Judge.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that the August 13, 2020 order of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Darren Robinson, pro se and incarcerated, appeals from the denials of his 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for compassionate release and subsequent motion for 

reconsideration. Robinson claimed that his vulnerability to COVID-19 infection justified a sentence 

reduction. The District Court denied compassionate release on the grounds that (1) Robinson had 

failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction under 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, note 1(D), and (2) even if Robinson had demonstrated an extraordinary and 

compelling reason, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against compassionate 

release. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the 

case, and the issues on appeal.

“We typically review the denial of a motion for a discretionary sentence reduction for abuse 

of discretion.” United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020). When a district court

premises its decision “entirely on statutory interpretation,” we review de novo. Id. We review the 

denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moreno, 789 F.3d 72, 

78 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015). 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may, “after considering the factors set forth 

in [18 U.S.C.] Section 3553(a),” reduce a prisoner’s term of imprisonment if the court finds 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United 

States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 2020). Those sentencing factors include, inter alia, “the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and 

“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 

for the law, [] to provide just punishment for the offense[,]” to deter criminal conduct, and to 

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2). In Brooker, we 

made clear that, when a prisoner—rather than the Bureau of Prisons—moves for a sentence 

reduction, courts are free to consider “the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons,” and 
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that “[n]either Application Note 1(D), nor anything else in the now-outdated version of Guideline § 

1B1.13, limits the district court’s discretion.” 976 F.3d at 237.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinson’s motion for a sentence 

reduction. It is true that, not having the benefit of our decision in Brooker when it ruled on 

Robinson’s motion for reconsideration, the District Court erroneously permitted U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, 

note 1(D) to constrain its discretion in determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons 

existed. Remand is nonetheless not warranted here, because the District Court’s reasonable 

evaluation of the Section 3553(a) factors is an alternative and independent basis for denial of 

compassionate release. The District Court’s Section 3553(a) inquiry focused on Robinson’s 

underlying conduct, which “gravely endangered the community” by distributing highly addictive 

substances; his history of drug dealing spanning over 38 years; and his extensive criminal history, all 

of which, in the court’s view, presented a “substantial danger to the community.” Gov’t App’x at 

133. The court also determined that, because Robinson had served less than 30% of his sentence, 

release would not “reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, or provide

just punishment for the offense.” Id. (quoting § 3553(a)(2)(A)). We find no abuse of discretion in 

this analysis.

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CONCLUSION

We have considered all Robinson’s arguments and find them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the August 13, 2020 order of the District Court. 

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

1 In a recent case, we came to a similar conclusion. See United States v. Butler, 845 F. App’x 74, 76-

77 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming a district court’s “discretion to consider how much time an inmate has 

already served of his overall sentence when the court is weighing whether a release for extraordinary 

and compelling circumstances is consistent with the Section 3553(a) factors,” and ruling, based on 

the defendant’s four-decade-long criminal history that his service of less than 30% of his 92-month 

sentence did not provide sufficient deterrence or obviate the danger to the public).