Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-598 | August 16, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Carlos I. Carrillo

Greenwood, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lee M. Stoy, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Thomas Lee Campbell,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 16, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-598

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Randy J. Williams, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D01-1705-F5-67

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-598 | August 16, 2018 Page 2 of 10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Thomas Lee Campbell (Campbell), appeals his 

conviction for domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, 

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3 

[2] We affirm. 

ISSUES

[3] Campbell presents three issues on appeal, which we restate as: 

(1) Whether the trial court’s merger of the charges Campbell was found 

guilty of with his battery conviction was adequate to cure any potential 

double jeopardy concerns; 

(2) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable 

doubt to support Campbell’s conviction; and 

(3) Whether Campbell’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and his character. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] On May 20, 2017, after going to the grocery store and the laundromat, Jill 

Vestal (Vestal) returned to the home that she shared with her then-boyfriend of 

two years, Campbell. They had been living together for six months in 

Lafayette, Indiana. When Vestal arrived, Campbell was drunk, and a few 

hours later, he “passed out.” (Transcript p. 8). While Campbell was passed 

out, Vestal changed the channel on the television. Campbell woke up and 
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began “screaming” about changing the TV channel. (Tr. p. 9). Vestal 

eventually walked to the kitchen, and was followed by Campbell, who grabbed 

a knife with a wooden handle and jagged edge. As Campbell swung the knife 

at Vestal, she managed to jump back, only sustaining a small puncture wound 

and a scratch on her chest. “[H]e [was] yelling and swearing when he was 

chasing [Vestal] around the residence with the knife.” (Tr. p. 27). Vestal took 

her car keys and cell phone and ran out of the house. Once inside her car, she 

called 911.

[5] Lafayette Police Officer Blake Barker-Switzer (Officer Barker-Switzer) 

responded to the 911 call. After arresting Campbell, Officer Barker-Switzer 

conducted a protective sweep of the house and “[a]s [he] was walking through 

the kitchen [he] [saw] a wooden handled serrated kitchen knife sitting on the 

stove.” (Tr. p. 32). “When [he] examined the knife closer, [he] found it 

covered in grease with the exception of the very, very, very, very tip of the 

blade.” (Tr. p. 36). After close examination of Vestal’s injury, Officer BarkerSwitzer determined it was the result of a puncture wound. 

[6] On May 25, 2017, the State charged Campbell with Count I, domestic battery 

by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3; Count II, 

battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(c); 

Count III, intimidation, a Level 5 felony, I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a); Count IV, 

criminal recklessness, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-2; and Count V, domestic 

battery, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a). On January 10, 2018, the trial 

court conducted a bench trial. During the trial, Campbell testified that he did 
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not touch Vestal but that she had scratched herself repeatedly on the chest while 

she sat in her truck. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Campbell 

guilty on all Counts. 

[7] On February 8, 2018, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing during 

which the trial court entered judgment and conviction as to the Level 5 

domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon and merged the other guilty 

Counts into that conviction. The trial court sentenced Campbell to five years at 

the Department of Correction with one year executed, two years suspended to 

community corrections, and one year suspended to probation.

[8] Campbell now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Merger of Counts

[9] Campbell first contends that the trial court should have vacated Campbell’s 

convictions for Counts II through V to remedy any potential double jeopardy 

concerns. A double jeopardy violation occurs when judgments of conviction 

are entered and cannot be remedied by the practical effect of concurrent 

sentences or by merger after a conviction has been entered. Gregory v. State, 885 

N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Thus, “[a] trial; court’s act 

of merging, without also vacating the conviction is not sufficient to cure the 

double jeopardy violation.” Id. However, “a merged offense for which a 

defendant is found guilty, but on which there is neither a judgment nor a 

sentence, is unproblematic as far as double jeopardy is concerned. Green v. 
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State, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006); See also Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 

414, 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (If a trial court does not formally enter a 

judgment of conviction on a jury verdict of guilty, then there is no requirement 

that the trial court vacate the conviction, and merger is appropriate to cure any 

double jeopardy issues). 

[10] At the close of the bench trial, the trial court found Campbell guilty as charged. 

During the sentencing hearing and in its sentencing order, the trial court 

sentenced Campbell for Count I only, with all other Counts merging into Count 

I.1

 There is no evidence before us that the trial court entered judgment of 

conviction for Counts II through V. Accordingly, merger was adequate to 

remedy any potential double jeopardy concerns. See Green, 856 N.E.2d at 704.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Next, Campbell contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt to support his conviction for domestic battery by 

means of a deadly weapon. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative 

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Drane v. State, 867 

N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate 

courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine 

 

1 During the sentencing hearing, the trial court explicitly noted “so we will show Judgment of Conviction 

entered then as to Count 1 Domestic Battery with a Deadly Weapon, a Level 5 Felony, as the parties agree 

that all of the remaining Counts merge into that Count.” (Tr. p. 71). 
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whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Id. To preserve this structure, 

when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must 

consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. Appellate courts affirm 

the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is therefore not necessary that 

the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. The 

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support 

the judgment. See id. Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the 

evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 

433, 435 (Ind. 2002).

[12] To convict Campbell of a Level 5 felony domestic battery by means of a deadly 

weapon, the State was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Campbell knowingly or intentionally touched a family or household member 

with a deadly weapon in a rude, angry or insolent manner. See I.C. § 35-42-2-

1.3(a)(1) & (c)(2). Not contesting any specific element of the charge, Campbell 

focuses on the discrepancies between the witnesses’ testimonies. Specifically, 

he asserts that Vestal, Officer Barker-Switzer, and Campbell all presented 

different statements about the nature of the injury. Vestal claimed that she was 

cut in a bottom to top motion, whereas Officer Barker-Switzer believed it was a 

top to bottom angle, and Campbell testified that he had observed Vestal 

scratching herself with her fingernails. In other words, Campbell’s argument 

amounts to a request to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. “It is for the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-598 | August 16, 2018 Page 7 of 10

decide which witnesses to believe or disbelieve.” Kilpatrick v. State, 746 

N.E.2d 52, 61 (Ind. 2001). 

[13] Moreover, considering the evidence most favorable to the judgment, the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain Campbell’s conviction. Vestal testified that after 

changing the TV channel, Campbell started screaming at her. After the 

followed her into the kitchen, he picked up a knife, “swung it at [her] and [she] 

jumped back.” (Tr. p. 24). By moving out of the way, Vestal only sustained a 

small puncture wound on her chest. Officer Barker-Switzer affirmed the 

presence of the knife in the kitchen and Vestal’s puncture wound. Accordingly, 

we affirm Campbell’s conviction for battery by means of a deadly weapon.

III. Appropriateness of Sentence

[14] Next, Campbell complains that the sentence imposed is inappropriate. This 

court has the authority to revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision,” the court finds that the sentence is 

“inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” See Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “The 7(B) appropriateness inquiry is a 

discretionary exercise of the appellate court’s judgment, not unlike the trial 

court’s discretionary sentencing determination.” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 

1291-92 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 978 (2015). “On appeal, though, we 

conduct that review with substantial deference and give due consideration to 

the trial court’s decision—since the principal role of our review is to attempt to 

leaven the outliers, and not to achieve a perceived correct sentence.” Id. at 
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1292 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the question under 

Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; 

rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Conley v. 

State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

defendant has the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. 

King, 894 N.E.2d at 267.

[15] “‘[R]egarding the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting 

point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime 

committed.’” Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 (Ind. 2016) (quoting

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). The advisory sentence of a Level 5 felony is 

imprisonment “for a fixed term of between one (1) months and six (6) years, 

with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial 

court sentenced Campbell to five years in the Department of Correction with 

one year executed, two years suspended to community corrections, and one 

years suspended to probation. 

[16] In the heat of a trivial domestic argument about a TV channel, Campbell 

escalated the discussion by picking up a weapon and using it. Although 

Campbell asserts that “Vestal’s injury did not require hospitalization and/or 

treatment,” the only reason the injuries were rather minimal was because Vestal 

was able to jump back when Campbell thrust the knife at her. (Appellant’s Br. 

p. 13). Accordingly, the extent of Vestal’s injury was not a result of Campbell 

showing “restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 

111, 122 (Ind. 2015). 
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[17] When considering the character of the offender prong of our inquiry, one 

relevant consideration is the defendant’s criminal history. Rutherford v. State, 

866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The significance of a defendant’s 

prior criminal history will vary “based on the gravity, nature and number of 

prior offense as they relate to the current offense.” Smith v. State, 889 N.E.2d 

261, 263 (Ind. 2008). Campbell’ criminal history spans more than forty years. 

During this time, Campbell has collected twenty misdemeanor convictions, and 

fourteen felony convictions. He was convicted of domestic battery in 2000. 

Even though there is a fourteen-year gap between the instant offense and the 

commission of Campbell’s last offense, Campbell was not leading a law abiding 

life as he admitted to smoking marijuana twice per week between the ages of 

sixteen and fifty-eight. As pointed out by the trial court during sentencing, 

“when you are using and possessing illegal drugs during this entire period of 

time, [] it negates the position that it is a good and lawful behavior for a good 

period of time.” In order to support his addiction habit, he started writing bad 

checks; however, it should be noted that he has paid restitution on every bad 

check since then. Campbell had six petitions to revoke his bond filed against 

him and, while on bond in the current case, he committed another crime. 

Despite a guilty finding after a bench trial, Campbell continued to blame Vestal 

and thinks “she is all about herself.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 18).

[18] In light on the evidence before us, Campbell has not met his burden of 

persuading this court that the nature of the offense and his character make his 

sentence inappropriate. We affirm the trial court’s sentence.
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CONCLUSION

[19] Based on the foregoing, we hold that (1) merger of the charges Campbell was 

found guilty of with his battery conviction was adequate to cure any potential 

double jeopardy concerns; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt to support Campbell’s conviction; and (3) Campbell’s

sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his 

character

Affirmed.

Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur