U.S DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RECEIVED 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC JUL -7 2014 

HEARING DOCKET 

In the Matter of: 

Joseph R. Maridon, Sr., 

Respondent 

Administrative Law Judge Richard C. Goodwin 

DOCKET NO. FAA 2014-0116 

FAA CASE NO. 2012WP190142 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

Respondents Reply to FAA's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Request to Find Opposition 

Timely Filed 

Comes now, Respondent by and through his counsel and submits this reply to the FAA's 

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. With leave of the Court, said Reply is made and based on all the 

pleadings and papers on file herein and the argument of counsel . 

FAA's Untimely Response Should be Denied and Stricken. 

The FAA admits that its response is untimely and argues that service by mail is only a 

presumption 13.211(h). It ignores the fact that 13.11(d) states the date of mailing shown on the certificate 

of Service or if none the date on the postmark controls. The Court received and filed the original on June 

3, 2014, a full nine days before the FAA stamped its envelope. (Exhibit I from Hearing Docket) 

(undersigned counsel received Complainant's current pleading on June 27, 2014. It is postmarked June 

24, 2014) The argument for additional time is without merit regardless of whether counsel has 5 or 10 

days to respond. Indeed, FAA Counsel's affidavit does not state when the FAA received it. It merely 

states when it was received by regional counsels' office, as evidenced by the envelope. Furthermore, it 

does not allege who stamped received on the envelope. It is very highly likely, given the size of the FAA 

that there is an internal FAA mailroom, which either picks up or receives all mail from the post office and 

routes it internally to the regional counsel's office. This is consistent with the fact that it was sent to the 

FAA's post office box. Counsel's affidavit makes no reference to internal mail handling procedures at 

the FAA's Western Pacific Regional Office nor does it contain an affidavit from a person with knowledge 

of those procedures. There is no attempt to establish or explain an internal chain of custody. This 

omission is crucial, without further detailed explanation, the FAA has not shown good cause for an 

untimely response and the Court should presume that it was properly delivered to the FAA's post office 

box by the post office in a timely marmer. 14 C.F.R. § 13.211(h) The FAA's argument contains glaring 

unresolved omissions. The FAA therefore bears responsibility for the delay. The response is untimely and 

should be stricken and the motion to dismiss granted with prejudice.1 

1 Respondent normally would not oppose an untimely response, submitted within a reasonable period of several 

days and adequately explained. However, an untimely response of this magnitude that is essentially unexplained is 

unacceptable. 

1 
The Complainant's Substantive Response 

The FAA's substantive response to Respondents argument consists oflegally and logically 

unsupported conclusions, misstatements and implications of vexatious litigation2 Most glaring of the 

factual misstatements is on p. 3, ~1: 

" ... because Respondent relied on publications from the airport operator that he believed reflected that 

Clark County alone, as airport operator would have sole jurisdiction over his conduct." 

That statement is blatantly misleading since Respondent clearly stated that he relied on FAA 

Advisory Circular AC No: 150/5210-20 and cited it twice in argument and affidavit: 

"FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 150/5210-20, GROUND VEIDCLE OPERATIONS ON AIRPORTS, addresses 

the issue of vehicular control. "3. APPLICABILITY. The overall responsibility for the operation of vehicles on an 

airport rests with the airport operator. .. " (Respondent's Motion p.3 '\[ 4, p.4'\[4); 

"! am further aware that vehicular land operations on an airport are within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the 

Response note 1 p.OPERATIONS ON AIRPORTS on which I have relied and continue to rely." (Exhibit A, to 

Motion to Dismiss, Affidavit of Joseph R. Maridon, Sr. '\[2). 

Complainant attempts to assert concurrent jurisdiction, but cites no authority and makes no 

argument for that proposition. FAA simply makes a conclusory statement that there is "at least 

concurrent jurisdiction" in an attempt to salvage its delegation of jurisdiction to airport operators. 

This is contrary to the published representation in FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 150/5210-20 

cited above. It does not address, and thus concedes Respondents preemption argument. 

The Complaint relies on an unpublished interpretation of14 C.F .R. §91.11 based on dicta in the 

Federal Register, 76 FR 76611, 76612 (Dec. 8, 2011) Interference With a Crewmember via Laser in 

an attempt to expand its jurisdiction beyond the bounds oflegal elasticity.3 Indeed, the very title of 

that publication serves clear notice of the limitation on its interpretation to the use of Lasers and does 

not extend 14 C.F .R. §91.11 to the facts alleged in the complaint. As applied in the complaint, it is 

vague and does not give notice of prohibited conduct (except as to lasers) or the assertion of 

jurisdiction. In FAA v. Moesser, _ DMS No. F AA-20 11-1286 at p. 5~5 the Court stated: 

A cornerstone of the principle of due process is the duty of adequate notice. In 

the context before us, it requires affected parties to be given fair warning of regulated 

conduct. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489,503 (1982). From 

this precept the "vagueness" doctrine derives. Laws and regulations, the doctrine states, 

"[must] give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 

prohibited, so that he may act accordingly" (Graynedv. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 

(1972)). As such, liability may not be imposed when the regulation either "forbids or 

2 More egregious is the gratuitous, footnote from which one can imply a veiled threat to engage in vexatious 

litigation. Moreover, it is a not so subtle attempt to use pressure to encourage or coerce Respondent to settle this 

case in a manner favorable to the FAA. Response note 1 p.4 

3 It can be argued that since the publication of Federal Register, 76 FR 76611, 76612 (Dec. 8, 2011) Inteiference 

With a Crewmember via Laser was "part of a specific media effort" the intent was not to prohibit even the use of 

lasers but to draw media attention to their improper use. See, Complainant's Response p.3 '\[2 L 13 

2 
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must 

necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application" (US. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 

259, 266-267 (1997)). 

The complaint clearly engages in an unpublished interpretive overreach that does not give 

notice or fair warning that the alleged conduct is prohibited by the FAA or has altered its official 

position on vehicular jurisdiction. 

In opposition to Respondent's estoppel argument, Complainant states, "However, 

Respondent cannot cite to any contradictory previous position taken by the agency indicating that it 

will not enforce 14 C.F .R. §91.11 as it is in this case." (Response p5 '1[2, 11.5). 

This statement is misleading and a strawman .Complainant does not cite to any published 

opinion that takes the position that it will enforce 14 C.F .R. §91.11 as it is in this case. Complainant's 

statement is thus misleading. The position to which Respondent was clearly referring was the ceding 

of the jurisdiction to the airport operator set forth in FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 15015210-20 as 

cited above. 

Complainant cites City of Arlington v. F.CC 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013)for the proposition that 

the FAA has the authority to decide its jurisdiction. The citation is inapposite, the question here is not 

its authority to decide its jurisdiction but whether it has ceded it to airport operators as published in 

FAA Advisory Circular AC No: 150/5210-20. That is clearly a contradictory position to the one 

taken in the instant complaint. Simply, to give clear notice of prohibited conduct or a change in 

jurisdiction an interpretation must be published. 

Complainant also argues that Respondent makes an unsupported assertion that it is in the 

public interest that vehicles on the airport be controlled by the airport operator. Response p 5'1[2 llll. 

Complainant's statement is misleading because it ignores the support for the assertion in 

Respondent's quotation and citation to City of Spokane v. Williams, 288 P. 258, 157 Wash. 120 

(Wash. 1930) which predates the existence of the FAA. (Respondents motion p.4'1[2.) 

Finally, Complainant's argument that the Respondent's truck constituted a danger when the flight 

crew clearly saw it and stopped is without merit. In Smith v. Penn Line Service, Inc., 113 S.E.2d 505, 

145 W.Va. I (W.Va. 1960). The court stated in syllabus: 

5. Where a truck is lawfully parked on a city street at night with sufficient light from street lights to render 

such truck clearly discernible to the driver of an approaching vehicle at such distance as to enable him to 

stop in the exercise of reasonable care and it is struck in the rear by another motor vehicle) the proximate 

cause of such accident is the striking of the truck by the other motor vehicle, and the owner ofthe parked 

truck is not liable in damages to a guest passenger riding in the other motor vehicle. 

See also, Duffv. Lykins, Ky.,306 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1957); Powell v. General Accident, Fire & Life 

Assur. Corp., La.App., 18 So.2d 921, 922; Scottv. Hoosier Engineering Co., 117 W.Va. 395, 

397, 185 S.E. 553, 554 (W.Va. 1936) 

3 
Thus, the danger was not from Respondent's truck (clearly visible in broad daylight) but 

from the inattentiveness of the flight crew while taking a short cut. 

Conclusion 

Complainants request to fmd opposition timely filed should be denied. The Opposition to Motion to 

Dismiss should be stricken and the Complaint dismissed with prejudice. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/S/ Joseph R. Maridon, Jr. 

Joseph R. Maridon, Jr. 

Attorney at Law 

Counsel for Respondent 

6130 Elton Ave. 

Las Vegas. NV 89107 

Walter L. Ayers 

Attorney at Law 

Counsel for RespQifJ.d,ent 

13435 North Whitehouse Court 

Spokane, W A 99208 

DATED?~~ ~j/ 

4 
u.s DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REcEIvE 0 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

JUN 03 2014 

In the Matter of: 

HEARING DOCKET 

Joseph R.. Maridon, Sr. FAA DOCKET 

Respondent FAA CASE NO. 2012WP190142 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

................ Administrative Law Judge.Richard .. C .. Goodwin ... 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

The Respondent files his Motion To Dismiss for failure of the allegations in the notice of 

proposed action and complaint to state a violation of the FAA Actor of this chapter 14 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations, pursuant to the Rules of Practice (14 C.F.R 13.49) This Motion is 

made and based upon the affidavit attached hereto, argument of counsel and all of the pleadings 

and papers on file herein. Respondent states as follows: 

L Factnal Background 

The complaint alleges that on or about September 29, 2012 Respondent parked his vehicle on an 

active taxiway and thereby prevented a Vision Airlines aircraft from taxiing for takeoff. It further 

alleges the vehicle would interfure with the taxiing of the aircraft and thereby interfered with the 

flight crewmembers' performance of their duties aboard the aircraft. It does not allege essential 

allegations of an entry, touching, or any contact whatsoever with the aircraft. Furthermore, it 

does not allege a safety violation. 

II. Argument 

The complaint is insufficient on its face because of an erroneous interpretation of the 

FAA's authority. The FAA lacks jurisdiction to proceed under the facts alleged. Jurisdiction lies 

with the airport operator as FAA regulations do not preempt the airport operator's jurisdiction 

over vehicles on the ground on an airport. The FAA should be estopped from proceeding on the 

facts and circumstances of this case. 

The FAA bases its overly broad use ofl4 C.F.R. §9l.ll in this case on an interpretation 

published in 76 FR 76611, 76612 (Dec. 8, 2011) dealing with Interference With a Crewmember 

via Laser. That publication is limited to whether an individual on the ground can interfere with a 

Crewmember with a laser. 
U.S DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION RECEIVED 

In the Matter of: 

Joseph R. Maridon, Sr. 

Respondent 

Richard C. Goodwin Administrative Law Judge 

JUL -7 2014 

HEARING DOCKET 

FAA DOCKET FAA-2014-0116 

FAA CASE NO. 2012WP190142 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE rz;;rj··· 

I certify that on th~ da:y of.;:;;~fl.:S.._.L_::_., 2014, I have sent by facsimile 

where indicated and deposited in the U. ail where indicated, with postage fully prepaid, 

certified mail a true and correct copy of: 

Respondents Reply to FAA's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and Reqnest to Find Opposition 

Timely Filed 

addressed to the following: 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

(U.S. Mail on 6/30/2014) 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur-Wright Building-Suite 2W1 000 

ONE COPY 

Joseph Maridon, Sr., Respondent 

9212 E. Frederick Ave 

Spokane, WA 99206-4303 

Joseph R. Maridon,Jr., Respondent's Counsel 

Attorney at Law 

6130 Elton Ave 

Las Vegas, NV 89107 
Naomi Tsuda, Complainant's Counsel 

Office of the Regional Counsel, A WP-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Western-Pacific Region, 

P.O. Box 92007 

Los Angeles, CA 90009-2007 

TEL: 310-725-7100 

FAX: 310-725-6816 

(Served by Facsimile on 6/29/2014; U.S. Mail on 6/30/2014)) 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-5121 Staff Assistant 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

(Served by FacsimillleH ~14; U.S. Mail on 6/30/2014) 

Dated: June 30,2014 

Is/