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i 

97–492 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–58] 

UPDATE ON THE F–35 JOINT STRIKE 

FIGHTER PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

OCTOBER 21, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces .................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C., USAF, Program Executive Officer, F–35 

Joint Program Office, U.S. Department of Defense .......................................... 2 

Harrigian, Maj Gen Jeffrey L., USAF, Director, F–35 Integration Office, U.S. 

Air Force ............................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bogdan, Lt Gen Christopher C. ....................................................................... 31 

Harrigian, Maj Gen Jeffrey L. ......................................................................... 55 

Turner, Hon. Michael R. .................................................................................. 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 76 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 80 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 73 

(1) 

UPDATE ON THE F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER 

PROGRAM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 21, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. I call this hearing to order of the Subcommittee on 

Tactical Air and Land Forces. 

The subcommittee meets today in open session to receive testimony on the current status of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] 

program. I would like to welcome our witnesses, Lieutenant General Christopher Bogdan, F–35 Program Executive Officer; and 

Major General Jeffrey L. Harrigian, Director of the Air Force F– 

35 Integration Office. Thank you both for your service, and we look 

forward to your testimony today. 

This hearing continues the committee’s ongoing oversight of the 

F–35 program since the program officially began in 2001. We all 

know that the F–35 is a complex program that has experienced 

issues with cost, schedule, and performance throughout its development. 

This subcommittee has held numerous hearings and briefings to 

better understand the critical need for the fifth-generation strike 

fighter capability, and to understand the issues facing the program. 

Most recently, the subcommittee visited Eglin Air Force Base 

where we were able to meet with both pilots and maintenance personnel of the Joint Strike Fighter. It is through this ongoing committee oversight that we have identified issues relating to the program, and in turn, have worked with the Department to help develop corrective actions to ensure the program remains on track. 

For example, in the fiscal year 2014, the subcommittee learned of 

software development problems and recommended legislation that 

would establish a team to review the F–35 software development 

program and make recommendations to fix these problems. 

For fiscal year 2015, the committee recommended legislation that 

would continue the Government Accountability Office, GAO’s assessments and analysis of the development, testing, and production 

of the F–35 program. During our visit at Eglin, the subcommittee 
2 

learned of issues with the F–35 maintenance system known as the 

Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS, A–L–I–S. 

As a result, the subcommittee included a provision in its mark 

of National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2016 

that would require the GAO to review the ALIS program and provide a report to the congressional defense committees by April 1, 

2016. 

The committee also recommended a provision that would require 

a review of the F–35 engine program by a federally funded research and development center to ensure that future engines will 

not be subject to the failure that caused an F–35 engine fire on 

takeoff just last June. 

Each of the subcommittee’s legislative recommendations over the 

past 3 years have been adopted in the annual National Defense Authorization Act. In the past month, the subcommittee has learned 

that the ejection seat does not meet the design specifications for 

lighter weight pilots. The specification for the ejection seat is that 

it needs to be able to accommodate a safe escape at pilot weights 

of 103 to 245 pounds. We understand that until this deficiency is 

corrected, pilots weighing less than 136 pounds will not fly the F– 

35 due to a high risk of serious injury that could result from having to eject. We look forward to our witnesses addressing this issue 

today and the plans to get this problem corrected. 

In closing, while strong oversight of the F–35 remains necessary, 

the value of the fifth-generation stealth aircraft is absolutely assured, like the F–35. In future conflicts, it is absolutely critical to 

successfully address these emerging threats and maintain air dominance in any overseas contingency operation. 

I look forward to all of our witnesses today and expect to hear 

from them what follow-up actions the program is undertaking to 

address the issues identified as a result of our delegation’s visits 

to Eglin. 

Before we begin, I would also like to thank all of our colleagues. 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez has been detained. But as ranking member, 

when she returns if she would like at that point to offer her opening statement we will get to her opening statement. 

With that, we will begin then with General Bogdan. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN CHRISTOPHER C. BOGDAN, USAF, 

PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER, F–35 JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General BOGDAN. Thank you, sir. Chairman Turner and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity 

to address you regarding the F–35 Lightning II program. I am 

pleased to be joined today by General Harrigian, the Air Force’s F– 

35 Integration Office lead. 

The F–35 Lightning II is of vital importance to our national security. And as the program executive officer [PEO] and program director, I’m committed to delivering an affordable, reliable, and sustainable fifth-generation fighter to our warfighters. The F–35 will 

form the backbone of U.S. air combat superiority for decades to 

come. It will replace legacy tactical fighter fleets of the Air Force, 
3 

Navy, Marine Corps with a dominant multirole fifth-generation aircraft capable of projecting U.S. power and deterring potential adversaries. 

For our international partners and foreign military sales customers who are participating in the program, the F–35 will become 

a linchpin for future coalition operations and will help to close a 

crucial capability gap that will enhance the strength of our security 

alliances. 

The F–35 program today is executing well across the entire spectrum of acquisition to include development and design, flight test, 

production, fielding and base standup, sustainment of fielded aircraft, and building a global sustainment enterprise. 

The program is at a pivot point today where we are moving from 

slow and steady progress to what I call a rapidly growing and accelerating program. However, the program is not without risks and 

challenges, as these come with any program of this size and complexity. I’m confident that the current risks will be resolved and we 

will be able to overcome any future problems and deliver the full 

F–35 combat capability, including the U.S. Air Force [USAF] and 

Navy initial operating capability [IOC] declarations, in the future. 

Since the last time I appeared before this committee, the program has successfully completed a number of important events, not 

the least of which was helping the U.S. Marine Corps declare initial operating capability this summer. A few of this year’s accomplishments include the beginning of our Block 3F, our final version 

of software, in flight test. Two successful ship trials, one for the 

U.S. Marine Corps above the USS Wasp, and one for the U.S. Navy 

on the USS Eisenhower. 

We delivered the first three IOC aircraft to the Air Force at Hill 

Air Force Base last month and delivery of the U.K. [United Kingdom] and Dutch aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base for participation in operational tests this summer. 

The rollout of the first flight, in-flight of the Italian F–35A from 

our FACO [fabrication, assembly and checkout], which is our fabrication and checkout facility in Italy last month. We also rolled 

out our first Norwegian aircraft. We have also completed the qualification of Australian and Italian air refueling tankers with the F– 

35. We have also started the ground testing of our 25 millimeter 

cannon months earlier than we originally planned. 

And just recently, we started U.S. Air Force and partner training 

at Luke Air Force Base. These are just a few of the accomplishments since the last time I spoke with you. 

Overall, the program has made good progress in development 

and flight tests. We are now about 75 percent complete with the 

entire flight test program. We still have technical deficiencies to 

correct, including the ejection seat, which we will talk about today, 

the Autonomic Logistics Information System, or ALIS, which I plan 

on talking about today, and various fuel system and structural 

shortfalls. But we have corrections in place for all of these issues 

and will be able to implement the solutions in the near future. 

With respect to aircraft production, the production line is becoming more efficient each and every day, and the price of all three 

variants continues to drop lot after lot. I expect this trend to continue well into the 2020s, and still believe that we can achieve our 
4 

price target of an F–35A model with an engine, with fee, in fiscal 

year 2019 dollars, of about $80- to $85 million. 

We are closely monitoring the supply base as we begin to prepare 

for a ramp-up in production from 59 airplanes in lot 8, to 104 airplanes in lot 9, to 123 airplanes in lot 10, up to a final production 

rate of nearly 170 airplanes per year in the early 2020s. 

We are also seeing some improvements in the reliability and 

maintainability of the aircraft as a result of focused efforts on the 

supply chain, the repair cycle time of spare parts, spare part availabilities, and improved maintenance procedures. We are also on 

track with our organic depot standup, both in the United States, 

and in the Pacific and European regions. We have began the requirements validation and the initial acquisition planning for a follow-on modernization program that will begin at the end of our 

current development program in October of 2017. 

I am committed to establishing a lean, effective, modernization 

program with the appropriate government control and oversight to 

ensure that remains both affordable and transparent, while at the 

same time, effectively enhancing the F–35’s capability for decades 

to come. 

With respect to risk and challenges, I see the completion of mission systems software development, ALIS development, and the 

previously mentioned fuel system and ejection seat deficiencies as 

our most prominent, current, technical risks. Our ability to stand 

up four separate reprogramming labs that create mission data files 

in time for all of our customers, and our ability to complete all the 

weapons envelope testing for Block 3F, as well as our ability to 

start OT, on time, are the major schedule risks to the program 

today. 

I will close by saying that I believe the programming is in a better position today than it was 1, 2, or 3 years ago. It is a growing 

and accelerating program that is making solid progress. The weapon system design is sound. The program is fundamentally on track. 

We remain confident that we will be able to deliver the full F–35 

capability within the time and the money we have been given. 

As with any big, complex program, new discoveries, challenges, 

and obstacles will occur. However, we believe the combined government-industry team has the ability to overcome our current deficiencies and deal with future issues should they arise in order to 

successfully deliver on our commitments. 

The Joint Program Office [JPO] will continue executing with integrity, discipline, transparency, and accountability, holding ourselves accountable for the outcomes on this program. We recognize 

the responsibility the program has been given to provide the backbone of future U.S. and allied fighter capability for generations to 

come. We also recognize that our sons and daughters and our 

grandsons and granddaughters may some day take this weapon 

system into harm’s way to defend our freedom and way of life. It 

is a responsibility that we never forget in the Program Office. 

Thank you again for this opportunity and I look forward to answering all your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Bogdan can be found in the 

Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thanks. General Harrigian. 
5 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JEFFREY L. HARRIGIAN, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, F–35 INTEGRATION OFFICE, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General HARRIGIAN. Thank you, sir. Chairman Turner, distinguished members of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on 

the United States Air Force’s progress toward delivering initial operating capability, IOC, for the F–35A. 

A combination of F–35 lethality, survivability, and adaptability, 

make it our platform of choice for operations in a highly contested 

threat environment. The aircraft state-of-the-art sensor fusion, network interoperability, and broad array of advanced air-to-air and 

air-to-surface munitions, enable unmatched lethality well into the 

21st century. 

The F–35’s exceptional survivability is achieved through a combination of low-observable technologies, advanced electronic attack 

and electronic protection, and shared situational awareness. It will 

form the backbone of future joint and combined air operations enabling future joint force commander success. 

Today, sir, we have 79 F–35As delivered, and they have flown 

over 21,000 hours in our Air Force. The program is on the road to 

IOC for the Air Force. Specifically within the last 2 months, we received our first three aircraft at Hill Air Force Base, and are flying 

them now at a high rate. 

This month, Air Force operational testers are flying with our IOC 

software load and building F–35 tactics, techniques, and procedures. We have work to be done, though. Specifically, we are concerned about the software capability we will get in our IOC load, 

ALIS software delivery, and the modification schedule for our jets 

at Hill. All that notwithstanding, we expect to declare IOC as 

planned in 2016. 

However, this is still a program in development, and challenges 

remain. We will continue to work closely with the Joint Program 

Office, Lockheed Martin, to ensure we achieve full warfighting capability. While IOC is an important milestone for the program, we 

must not lose sight of the goal of full warfighting capability. The 

program must develop and deliver 3F software on time. And we 

need to invest now in Block 4 follow-on modernization to provide 

the warfighter with the most current and relevant capabilities required to meet the future threat. 

The capability advantage that the Air Force had enjoyed over potential adversaries is closing fast. And in modern warfare, if the 

Air Force fails, the joint force fails. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to discusses the F–35. I 

look forward to answering your questions. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Harrigian can be found in 

the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. TURNER. I thank both of you. I have just got a couple of 

questions to get things started off. We have a number of members 

who have questions; want to make sure we get through everyone. 

General Bogdan, the ejection seat. Obviously it is not performing. 

This is supposed to be life-saving, not life-threatening. Could you 

share with us more information about this? What is the problem? 

How is it being fixed? And what does it takes to implement the correction? 
6 

General BOGDAN. Yes, Congressman. If you will indulge me, it is 

a complex problem, so I will spend a little bit of time trying to clear 

up some of the misinformation that you might have. 

First and foremost, safety is always paramount in the program 

for me and my team. I would never, ever ask a pilot to do anything 

that I wouldn’t do myself. And the airworthiness authorities that 

work with me on the Navy side and the Air Force side feel and act 

the same way. So we take this deficiency with the ejection seat and 

the safe escape very, very seriously. And let me explain what the 

problem is and what we are doing about it. 

So as we begin, as you said, Congressman, the ejection seat we 

have in this airplane was designed to cover the widest range of 

pilot weights and sizes that we have ever had in a fighter airplane. 

The seat and the ejection system is designed to deal with pilots 

down to 103 pounds all the way up to 245 pounds as you said. But 

it is also designed for different size pilots from the smallest pilots 

anthropometrically to the largest pilots. And the combination of the 

weight and the size means that we will be able to put more pilots 

in this airplane than any other legacy airplane before it. 

We do have deficiencies. We have found those deficiencies 

through the normal testing process. We have a number of deficiencies with the ejection seat, not all of which were found just recently. We have been testing the ejection seat for many, many 

years. And when you start testing a system like the ejection seat, 

what you do is you start from what we call the center of the envelope of that ejection seat, meaning the average weight, the average 

speed, the average altitude, and then you work your way outside 

to the edges of that envelope. And as you get out to the edges of 

the envelope in terms of speed and in terms of the weight of the 

pilots, things become more severe and are harder to achieve in 

terms of safety. 

The test that occurred on 27 August of this year that resulted in 

the Air Force and the Navy restricting pilots below 136 pounds was 

a test at the very edge of that envelope. It was a low-speed test, 

with the lowest weight pilots we have. And if you drew that envelope, it would be on the very, very corner of it. So it is a difficult 

place to be able to design the ejection seat for. But having said 

that, after that test, we recognized that there was a deficiency. 

That is a different deficiency than a few of the other deficiencies 

I am going to talk about which encompass all of the problems that 

we are having with the ejection seat. So let me start and talk about 

a few of the other issues that we have had on the seat that we are 

in the process of fixing, and then I will get to the last problem, the 

one in which resulted in restricting pilots less than 136 pounds, because all the other problems that I am going to talk about came 

with no restrictions. We continued to fly with all sizes and all 

weights of pilots. 

So, in the ejection sequence, there are three important portions 

of that process. The first is what we call catapult, when the seat 

gets blasted out of the airplane. For a lightweight pilot today, less 

than 136 pounds, when he or she goes up the rails of the airplane 

in that catapult, his or her neck gets pushed down like that. 

When we initially did the testing on that condition, what we 

found was if the pilot has the helmet on his head or her head, and 
7 

that helmet weighs more than 4.8 pounds, then the neck loads for 

that lightweight pilot, by a very little bit, exceed what we would 

consider to be perfectly safe. So what did we do? The first thing we 

did was we began taking weight out of the helmet to ensure that 

every helmet we have is going to be weighing less than 4.8 pounds. 

Today, our helmets weigh about 5.1 pounds, so we are talking 

about 6 ounces of weight to get out of the helmet. We are developing that new helmet that weighs less than 4.8 pounds today. We 

never had to restrict lightweight pilots for that catapult phase because the neck loads that they would experience with that, even 

with that heavier helmet, were so close to the safety limits that the 

airworthiness authorities thought that that risk was quite acceptable. And I agreed with that. I did the risk assessment with my 

team and I give it to the airworthiness authorities, and they decide. So that was problem number one, which we are fixing with 

a lighter weight helmet today that resulted in no restrictions on 

who could fly the airplane. 

The second problem is once the ejection seat leaves the airplane, 

you get wind blast, that is because the ejection seat is moving at 

hundreds of miles an hour, and as it comes away from the airplane, 

it is almost as if you put your hand out of your car as you are driving and you feel that wind blast. 

In this instance here, the pilot’s head gets forced backward instead of forward. Once again, in our testing what we found out was 

if a lightweight pilot, less than 136 pounds, has a helmet that 

weighs more than 4.8 pounds, then that neck stress going backwards is higher than what we would like it to be, but not so high 

as that we would need to have restricted pilots from flying the airplane. 

So the solution to both those problems, the catapult problem and 

wind blast problem, are to reduce the weight of the helmet. We 

have been ongoing with the development of the new helmet and the 

new weight for about 6 months. It will take about another year for 

us to finish that to ensure that every helmet is less than 4.8 

pounds. 

We did have one pilot at this period of time that was flying the 

airplane that was less than 136 pounds. And the reason why that 

pilot could continue to fly, even with those known risks, was because we hand-built him a helmet that weighed 4.7 pounds. We 

cannot manufacture today on the production line in any mass 

quantity a helmet that weighs less than 4.8 pounds, that is why 

we are redesigning it. But for that particular pilot, we took pieces 

and parts and we fabricated a helmet that weighed less than 4.8 

pounds; that was why that pilot, even during this known-risk area, 

was able to continue to fly. So those are two problems being solved 

with one solution that we should have done in about a year. 

The third problem we found during normal testing occurs in 

what we call the opening shock phase of the ejection when the 

parachute on the back of the seat comes out. In this instance here, 

when that parachute comes out, once again, the pilot’s head moves 

forward. In this instance here, the only pilots that are affected by 

the opening shock being too strong and causing the neck loads to 

be above what we would consider safe is, once again, that lightweight pilot. 
8 

The risk of that happening, though, was low enough that the airworthiness authorities felt that it was not significant enough to 

have to restrict anybody from flying the airplane when we found 

that problem. But when we did find that problem, and we found 

that one probably about 8 or 9 months ago in normal testing, we 

already began a solution. 

The solution to that problem for the lightweight pilot is just to 

delay that parachute coming out by a fraction of a second. Because 

as the seat comes out and hits the wind blast, it begins to decelerate. And if you wait just a fraction of a second before you put 

that main chute out, the seat has decelerated enough so that the 

force when the parachute comes out isn’t as severe. To get to that 

solution, we are putting a little switch on the side of the ejection 

seat that when the pilot climbs up into the cockpit, can set that at 

heavyweight or lightweight. 

There were a number of ways we could have solved that problem. 

We could have put an automatic sensing system into the seat, 

much like when you sit in your car on the passenger side and the 

seat knows you are there and the air bag gets energized. We also 

could have put a switch on the seat that would have had the maintainers put it in the heavy- or lightweight position. We went back 

to the warfighters and we said, What solution do you want? Because we can solve this problem in a number of ways. And they 

said ‘‘we want the pilot to be responsible for moving that switch. 

We want he or she to be responsible for ensuring that it is in the 

right position for their safety.’’ Thus, we are building that switch 

on the side of the seat; as the pilot climbs up, they can go light or 

heavy. 

Mr. TURNER. General, as I said, we have a number of people who 

want to ask questions, so I am going to cut you off at that point. 

General BOGDAN. Okay. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for the in-depth description of that issue 

and problem. Obviously there are two aspects of it. One, finding a 

solution; and two, its implementation of the solution. So we are 

looking forward to both your confirmation of if all the problems 

have been identified, and two, the implementation of the solutions 

in a manner where our committee can be satisfied that those really 

will address the issues. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Now, General Harrigian, the—everybody on the 

committee recognizes the need for F–35 capability, everybody recognizes that not having the F–35 capability goes to an issue of our 

no longer having air dominance. It is we win versus we lose. Everybody recognizes that one of the difficulties and problems with this 

program has been the concurrency, that we are both inventing at 

the same time that we are producing, and that as a result of that, 

we will have delays, cost overruns, and at times, there will be problems that will have to be identified that then need to be fixed, as 

General Bogdan was just testifying. There have been obviously a 

number of those. 

But the biggest concern that we all have is not as problems arise, 

can they be addressed, but an assurance that when we get to the 

end, that this F–35 capability that we all know we need is actually 
9 

the capacity that we demanded, that that plane performs as it is 

supposed to. 

Now, January 25 flight tests demonstrated that the F–35 was 

not as maneuverable as an F–16, that the aircraft is supposed to 

replace in a dogfight. Can you comment on the conclusions of that 

test and the implications of the F–35 in combat? 

General HARRIGIAN. Yes, sir, Chairman. To go back to that flight 

test, as a reminder, that was one of the very first developmental 

test sorties that were flown to better understand the slow-flight 

characteristics of the airplane. Since that initial sortie, we have 

now been able to put the airplane in the hands of our operational 

testers. So these are the folks that are now ringing out the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for how we will fly the airplane in combat. 

In fact, sir, over the course of the last month, they have been developing some specific exercises to better understand the characteristics of the airplane, and that would include post-stall acceleration, how the airplane turns, to prepare them to do what we would 

call basic fighter maneuvers, which is where they fight one against 

one to see how the airplane performs in both an offensive and defensive perspective. 

Sir, the results of that, and I can share with you that I just 

talked with them last Friday, is they have been very pleasantly 

surprised on how the airplane is performing, it has been very positive. What they are finding is that as they arrive in the post-stall 

regime, the airplane is extremely stable, so stable, in fact, that as 

they began the testing, they initially had 150 knots minimum air 

speed requirement. They have since removed that. And that is how 

we are going to go out and train, with no minimum air speed requirement, which is really a testament to how well the airplane is 

performing. 

In that environment we will continue to learn. What I would 

offer to you is that we are still in the nascent phases of fully understanding how the airplane will employ in that environment. But 

that capability, in my mind, is going to be there. 

I would offer to you that as one of the early F–22 pilots that I 

was, we had some of the same learning curve issues. We had to go 

out and fly the airplane and fully understand across the regime of 

where we were going to employ it, how to best get the most out of 

the airplane. That is what we are going to do, and I think the airplane is going to deliver, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate your reference to that. Even the 

Wright brothers, after they invented the plane, had to learn to become pilots. We appreciate that process. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members, which currently include Ms. Speier and Mr. Lamborn, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing, and Mr. Cooper. After all 

subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. 

If I hear no objections, non-subcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. Turning now to the 

next questioner, which will be Mr. Walz. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Generals, thank you 

for taking the time to come and for continuing to update us on this. 

I think it is critically important. 
10 

I want to go back to April’s hearing, because I think it is important for us to build on what we asked and to get on. And in that 

hearing, I asked what is our next hearing going to look like when 

we come? And at that point in time, Secretary Stackley said, ‘‘We 

will have the United States Marine Corps version, completion of 3i 

testing and 3F testing, and we will be able to see the end of R&D 

[research and development] costs.’’ Are those things panning out? 

General BOGDAN. The Marine Corps has declared IOC and is flying operational missions at Yuma today, sir, so I would put a check 

in that box. We are completed with all mission system testing for 

3i. We intend on delivering that 3i software to the field in January. 

As General Harrigian said, we have already handed that software 

to the OT [operational testers] testers so they can wring it out. So 

I would put a check mark there. 

For 3F, I am not sure if Mr. Stackley was referencing when we 

would have 3F done. But I have always contended and always told 

this committee that I thought that the schedule for 3F had about 

4 to 6 months of risk in it. 

I just recently did another schedule risk analysis and took a look 

at our schedule and our plans. What I will tell you is that that 4- 

to 6-month risk is now down to about 3 to 4 months. And we believe that the full 3F software capability on this airplane for the 

A model will be out into the field in August of 2017. That is a good 

year before the Navy needs it for IOC, and a good 6 months before 

the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] has to certify that the airplane 

is going to be fully 3F capable. 

So I think that risk is working its way down. As we get out of 

the business of testing 2B, which we are done with, and 3i, the entire test fleet now is being transferred over to 3F, and therefore, 

I think we are going to be catching up. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, General, that is helpful. I think it is important for us to see where we are at, and it is hard to get exactly 

right. Can you explain to me what the concurrence is with the Marine Corps on where I am getting the folks that there is a little bit 

of controversy on what they are saying, they are flying their IOC. 

That is for their mission what they need to have done. It is good 

with them. 

General HARRIGIAN. Yes, sir. In fact, I would say that they are 

now flying the airplane operationally. They are out employing the 

airplane in the missions that they had described for their IOC. And 

I think the result has been very positive and the feedback from 

them has been well received. 

General BOGDAN. Sir, I might add that the services defined for 

me what they need to declare IOC. And the U.S. Marine Corps 

takes a look at the legacy airplanes that they have and how they 

intend on employing the airplane, and they created a list of criteria 

that they needed to meet to declare IOC. The Air Force has done 

the same thing. They are different lists, because the Air Force intends on using the F–35 differently than the Marine Corps. 

My promise to the Air Force is, I will give them everything they 

need to declare IOC by August of 2016. But they will fly the airplane differently and use it in a different way than the Marine 

Corps. 
11 

Mr. WALZ. Okay. And General Bogdan, you did a nice job last 

time of explaining to a layman what happened with that June 23 

fire, the heat issue and all of that. Where is that at, at this point, 

in terms of corrections? 

General BOGDAN. Sir, we have already validated the full correction to the engine problem. Every engine coming off the production 

line since about 7 months ago had the fix in it so we are producing 

fully capable engines right on the production line. We have 134 airplanes out in the field today. Sixty-one of them have been retrofit 

with the new parts so that there is no longer a restriction on them, 

that is about 44 percent. By June of 2016, all 134 fielded airplanes 

will have the same fix in them that the production airplanes are 

now going down the production line with. So in my mind, it was 

a problem, it was unfortunate, but we are putting it behind us. 

Mr. WALZ. Did we learn anything that goes beyond the specific 

issue in that in terms of the testing standard in that of what we 

can extrapolate going forward from that incident? 

General BOGDAN. Yeah, one of the things that we did learn was 

that the design of that portion of the engine is very similar to other 

fighters that we have, and there was an assumption made that 

since those other fighters didn’t have this problem, that the F–35 

wouldn’t have this problem. So some of the engineering analysis I 

won’t say it was shortcut, because that is not the right word, but 

some of the assumptions that they made in the original engineering analysis assumed that the engine was going to react as if it 

were in the other airplane, and that was not the case. And that 

was not the case because the F–35 maneuvers differently than any 

other airplane, and the engine actually shifts and moves and bends 

differently than that other airplane, causing that. 

Mr. WALZ. So will that change now as we go forward? I hate to 

use the term—we assume that they will not do that in the future, 

that they will go back to the beginning? 

General BOGDAN. So part of what we did was we ensured that 

the models that both the government and the engine manufacturer, 

Pratt & Whitney, was using, incorporated the new knowledge 

about the F–35 and the assumptions that we made when we first 

designed it. So at least for this engine, sir, we are not going make 

that same kind of mistake, and Pratt & Whitney has learned that 

lesson. 

Mr. WALZ. I thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Mr. Cook. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Generals, there was an 

election this week in Canada, and it appears Mr. Trudeau is going 

to be the winner of that election. Correct me if I am wrong, but I 

believe he made some preelection statements that Canada would 

not purchase the F–35s, and I think they were in for 65. So the 

question is about affordability. If a partner drops out of that, and 

I don’t even know—I am not a lawyer, I am dangerous enough as 

a Marine at one time—is that going to have an impact on cost, or 

what have you? 

General BOGDAN. I am pretty sure this is my question. So let me 

start off by saying, it wouldn’t be appropriate for me to speculate 

what Canada will or won’t do, so I won’t provide any opinion about 

that. But—and I will also tell you that I have received no official 
12 

notification from Canada about the change in status for them 

today. 

Having said that, I am prepared to tell you what the impact to 

the program would be if that were the case and let me explain that 

to you. So first, the current development program that ends in 

2017 would have—there would be no effect whatsoever if Canada 

were no longer a partner, because they had paid all the money into 

the development program, and all the services have already paid, 

and we intend on finishing the development program with the 

money we have. So there would be no effect on the current development program. 

Not the case for production and the price of the airplane. If any 

partner, or any service, moves airplanes to the right or takes airplanes out, the price of the airplane for all the other partners and 

all the other FMS [foreign military sales] customers, and all the 

other services goes up a little bit. 

In this instance, if there are 65 less A model airplanes in that 

production profile from any country, whether it be Canada or someone else, we have estimated that the increase in price to everyone 

else is about .7 to 1 percent. For an A model today that is about 

$1 million a copy for everybody else. So there is an impact to the 

price of the airplane for everyone else if 65 airplanes are removed 

from the production flow. 

There are other impacts. Going forward, we have a follow-on 

modernization program, and we have future sustainment of the airplane that the partnership shares in that cost. Canada’s share of 

that cost was 2.1 percent. So if Canada is no longer in the program, 

that 2.1 percent cost of future sustainment and follow-on modernization will have to be spread among the other partners and the 

other U.S. services, because that is a cost that has to be paid and 

it wouldn’t be paid by a partner who is no longer a partner. 

The last one has to do with industrial participation. Today, there 

are many Canadian companies building pieces and parts for the F– 

35 program. We do not have a set rule as to what happens to that 

industrial participation if a partner reduces airplanes, adds airplanes, or even leaves the program. There are no set rules. But it 

is my opinion that the remaining partners and our industry partners are going to have a discussion about what to do with all of 

the industry in Canada that is building pieces and parts for the 

airplane. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, General. I have one more question. I 

apologize for the nature of the question, this is an infantry guy who 

is going to ask a logistics question. I did have to serve as a logistics 

officer, and it left an indelible mark on me, and not very good, I 

might add. You know we get more and more briefs about the engine, everything else, and I am thinking about the maintenance of 

a brand new fifth-generation aircraft that, I guess would be fourth 

and fifth maintenance, or degrees of maintenance that we would 

have to do. Do we have the parts and the technicians that are in 

place right away to handle this very, very sophisticated piece of 

gear, or are we going to have to change on the fly, and is there 

money available for that? 

General BOGDAN. So I will answer the first part of that and I will 

let General Harrigian give you the Air Force’s perspective. As the 
13 

airplane continues to mature, we are building a maintenance force 

through training at Eglin Air Force Base that continues to have to 

understand the changes we make to the airplane, because we are 

not done developing it. And older airplanes, believe it or not, are 

being maintained differently than the newer airplanes, because 

quite frankly, the newer airplanes are in better shape. So we will 

have to continue to update the maintenance manuals, the parts 

supply chain and things until we get the fleet of airplanes up to 

a common standard. 

It is a problem that occurs on most programs. We have it a little 

more severe because of the level of concurrency we have. But you 

are right, Congressman, that we will have to continue to train our 

workforce as we continue to change the airplane, and I don’t think 

that will change for quite a while. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Moulton. 

Mr. MOULTON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen thank you 

very much for your service and for taking on this difficult project. 

I know you haven’t been asked to bring the best looking date to the 

dance, and that is not an easy thing to do. 

You know, I am new to this relatively, my background is also as 

an infantryman. And I have always taken the perspective on the 

F–35 that there are a lot of mistakes that have been made, there 

have been an awful lot of cost funds that have been arguably wasted over the years. This is far more expensive than any of us anticipated. But we are far enough down the line now where we just 

have to make it work. Would you agree with that statement? 

General BOGDAN. Sir, I would agree that without armchair quarterbacking or trying to figure out why decisions were made in the 

past, that we have incurred significant schedule and cost increases 

in the past on the program. Some of them are normal to programs, 

others were results of decisions that were made. 

What I would like to add, though, is since we rebaselined the 

program in 2011, we have not had a single cost increase and we 

have not asked the Congress or the partners for an added penny 

since 2011. So I believe—— 

Mr. MOULTON. It is a great achievement, but it is quite a baseline. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir. I would agree with you that in 2011 

when we rebaselined, we added 2 years and a few billion dollars 

to the program. 

Mr. MOULTON. Now several of the analysts I have spoken to have 

commented that one of the fundamental mistakes may have been 

trying to incorporate so many mission capabilities into a single aircraft, rather than having aircraft built for more specific specifications. I mean, the F–22 program in contrast to the F–35, I think 

most folks think is quite successful. Would you agree with that 

statement as well? 

General BOGDAN. I know very little about the F–22 program, so 

I will ask General Harrigian, who flew the airplane, to maybe comment on that. 

General HARRIGIAN. Sir, the only comment I would offer to you 

is that in the early years of F–22, we had some of the very similar 

types of problems from software fusions, taking software from the 
14 

lab and making it work in the airplane. And quite frankly, I think 

that is why the Chief asked me to do this job, because there were 

some lessons that we needed to make sure were brought forward 

into the F–35. 

So my response would be while single-mission airplanes which 

initially we thought the F–22 was going to be, we ended up making 

it multi-mission because we needed it for capacity across the joint 

fight. My perspective would be as we looked at the F–35, we needed it to be able to accomplish several mission sets, so that as we 

looked into the future we had the capacity we needed to execute 

all those different missions for the joint force commander. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you. I guess where I am coming at fundamentally is that there are an awful lot of folks here on the committee I think, and in Congress in general, who feel like we have 

invested a lot of money, and we have got to make sure this thing 

works. But at a basic level you don’t make economic decisions 

based on sunk cost. I mean, that is a pretty fundamental economic 

principle. And so my question is, who in the Air Force is looking 

at this project from a much higher level and saying, is this still the 

best decision to buy the number of airplanes that we have, or 

should we be talking about potentially, not for certain, but potentially devoting resources to accelerating the development of the 

next generation of aircraft, or perhaps accelerating the development of the next generation of aircraft, multiple, that would fulfill 

different mission sets, and maybe not be susceptible to the same 

problems this program has encountered? 

General HARRIGIAN. Yes, sir. In fact, the Chief has directed, and 

they are actually reporting to him, what is called an enterprise capability team to get exactly after your question of as we look into 

2030, what should this look like? As we go forward, and we look 

at the required mix of what capabilities we need versus the future 

threats that we envision out there, what is the right mix of capabilities that the Air Force will need? They are there to report out 

to him in the early part of next year, and I think that will be a 

real good opportunity to get a better understanding of how we see 

ourselves moving forward. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully request that we entertain that discussion as part of our 

debate about the F–35, because I think it is very easy in this environment to get so consumed with the challenges and problems of 

this one program, to not be thinking ahead from a perspective that 

we shouldn’t be basing decisions on sunk costs, and think about 

what the best decisions are going forward to meet the threats of 

2030, which could, indeed, include cutting back on the current program. Thank you very much. And I yield my time. 

Mr. TURNER. And I will invite you. We go down to Eglin on a regular basis to actually look at the operation of the plane, and we 

have a number of classified briefings that will give you a greater 

fidelity of what this plane actually does, and what the needs and 

threats are. And I think at that point, you will probably be very 

satisfied. I appreciate that we continuously ask that question. It is 

not a question that we should never stop asking, but I do think as 

you become more familiar with both what the operational capabilities of this plane are, and the current threats which is what this 
15 

plane is designed to address as they’re evolving, that you will similarly come to the same conclusion that we did in the National Defense Authorization Act. 

Mr. MOULTON. We shall see, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. I am going to Martha McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you gentlemen. Let me first say that I am one of those pilots that would be 

at the quote, unquote, ‘‘edge of the envelope’’ of what you talked 

about there. Would have to gain about 15 pounds in order to be 

able to fly the F–35 today. Just so I understand, the little switcheroo thing you are talking about that the pilots are going to have 

to move, delaying the chute coming out, is that putting them at increased risk though, in, like, a zero-zero situation, where obviously 

every nanosecond actually counts? 

General BOGDAN. Yeah, actually as it turns out, ma’am, for a 

lightweight pilot, delaying the opening of the chute until the seats 

slows down does not increase at all the risk of ground impact or 

that pilot getting out of the seat because a lightweight pilot in a 

catapult phase gets shot up higher. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay, got it. 

General BOGDAN. We had margin 

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it. Okay. Thank you. And let me first say, like 

the chairman said, we need a fifth-generation fighter capability, 

strong supporter of us developing this capability. As an airman myself, people take, I think sometimes for granted air superiority and 

what that takes, with our near peers in making sure we have denied access. I have been to the factory myself and strongly support 

us developing this capability for national security and our warfighter. But I am concerned about this airplane is replacing all of 

our legacy fighters and the whole ‘‘jack all trades, master of none,’’ 

and specifically, it replacing the A–10 in the close air support 

[CAS] missions that it uniquely brings to the fight. 

When we talked in April, we had a discussion about some limitations in that replacement of the unique capability in close air support. And I will just run through them just as a reminder. In the 

A model, some of these were night capability, lack of the ability to 

pass nine lines via data, time on station being 20 to 30 minutes. 

But then even in the follow-on capabilities, the munitions only 180 

bullets, time on station being only 45 minutes, and Dr. Gilmore 

agreed that the F–35 would not be able to survive a direct hit like 

the A–10 can, and still allow the pilot to at least fly to friendly territory so that they are not taken POW [prisoner of war] and lit on 

fire in a cage like we have seen happen to the Jordanian pilot. So 

these are really important capabilities. 

So the shortfalls were identified in the April hearing. I was glad 

to see that in August, Dr. Gilmore announced that there would be 

a head-to-head test against the A–10 and the F–35, but I don’t 

want to put words in your mouth. I think you were not supportive 

of that test, and I think you said it wasn’t a good use of taxpayers’ 

money. I disagree with you there, General Bogdan. I think it is a 

very good use of taxpayers’ money. 

And if the F–35 is going to replace the A–10, we need to identify 

whether we are going to have a decrease in the unique capabilities 

in that mission set, and that includes the loiter time, the lethality, 
16 

1,174 bullets, the ability to take a direct hit, and all that the A– 

10 brings to the fight. 

So I just wanted to get your perspective on the record about the 

head-to-head test, how that came about. And also, I am skeptical 

about it, quite frankly, with all the things we have seen the Air 

Force trying to do to go against the will of this Congress and back 

door retiring the A–10. You can set up a test to have any sort of 

result you want, you know. So is the test going to specifically address not high-end, high-sophisticated air defense circumstances, 

but where we have air superiority and those unique capabilities of 

the loiter time, the lethality, the maneuverability, and to do a continuous cast and take a direct hit, will that be a part of that test? 

General HARRIGIAN. Ma’am, if you don’t mind, I will come back 

first. I think—probably familiar that the Chief came back and said 

we are supportive of executing comparative testing. 

Ms. MCSALLY. After he called it silly, but yes. 

General HARRIGIAN. And so at this point right now, we are working closely with our Air Force Operational Test Center [OTC] folks. 

We are working closely with DOT&E [Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation] to formulate exactly what that test will look like. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

General HARRIGIAN. Specifically looking at multiple scenarios, 

both in contested and permissive environments, looking at different 

ranges, time to arrive on target, loiter time, all those types of 

things will be incorporated for the appropriate analysis to ensure 

that at the end of the day, we are delivering the platform that is 

effective and suitable in the environments we are going to operate 

it in. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. I am interested in continuing to interact 

and see how that test is going. 

General Bogdan, do you have anything else to add? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, ma’am. What you described just now was 

exactly what I think should be done with the F–35, and that is, 

test it in a realistic operational environment for the CAS mission 

that the Air Force intends the F–35 to do, not the CAS mission 

that the Air Force intends the F–35 to do looking like an A–10. 

The problem that I have is, that money that I am going to spend 

doing the testing on the A–10 could be used elsewhere, and I know 

the outcome of that test. 

I will give you an example. You have a decathlete in the Olympics, and you have a 100-meter sprinter. If I put the 100-meter 

sprinter and the decathlete on the starting line for a 100-meter 

sprint, I don’t have to run that race to know who is going to win 

it. I don’t need to test the A–10 to figure out what the F–35 can 

do in a close air support role. What I would prefer to do is test the 

F–35 in its close air support role as the Air Force sees the requirements for that mission for the F–35. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I hear you, and I am out of time, but I think us 

envisioning that we are never going to have close air support where 

guys are on the run, they are out of ammo, they are doing a mirror 

flash into your eye, they don’t have time to do standoff CAS because of the complex circumstances. If we think that is never going 

to happen again, I think we are—— 

Mr. TURNER. You are correct, you are out of time. 
17 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. Ranking Member Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and first of all thank 

you for holding this, because as you know, you and I have been 

through a lot of growing pains on this F–35 program and I know 

people have mentioned they have been down to the factory. Well 

we have been to the factory, and we have been to the factory overseas, and we have been to see them in action, and we have been 

to talk to the pilots, and we have been and we have been and we 

have been. So what we have on our hands is the fact this is going 

to be our production plane for the future, and so we have to make 

sure that it is the best that we have, the best that we need. I think 

the gentlelady from Arizona is correct in saying that, you know, 

that she supports this. 

And I also am glad for her knowledge of fighter planes, and I 

don’t know if I am glad for your persistence on keeping the A–10, 

I don’t know where I am on that really, but I am glad that you are 

on and you are asking the questions and that you keep hitting it 

because we need to. As well—I am sorry for coming late, but I also 

heard the gentleman from Massachusetts have some concerns and 

some follow-up, so that is the role of this subcommittee. 

So thank you to my fellow colleagues for continuing to push and 

continuing to push our program people to make sure that we get 

the best plane that we need. That is what we all want. 

So I just have a couple of questions, gentlemen. The first one has 

to do with something that the chairman brought up before I got 

into the hearing, and this is the whole issue of the 136-pound 

weight limitation. I have been one of the people on this committee 

that has pushed for women in more roles in the military, and the 

gentlelady from Arizona acknowledged that she weighs a lot less 

than I do, and I—my question is, I am concerned with the longterm weight limitation, and if it disadvantages our female pilots 

and their eligibility to fly the F–35, because our women do tend to 

be lower in weight. And so if the 136-pound weight limitation remains in place for more than a few more weeks, how is that going 

to impact the follow-on on the cadres of the female pilots that we 

have in the Air Force? And have any of our female pilots already 

been sort of diverted off of going towards the F–35 because of this 

weight limitation? 

General BOGDAN. Ma’am, I will answer the technical part of that, 

and let General Harrigian answer the part about specifically about 

Air Force pilots. We have known fixes to the problems that currently restrict the pilot population to less than 136 pounds. They 

include a lighter helmet; they include a weight switch on the seat; 

and they include a pad on the back of the risers of the parachute 

that prevent anybody’s neck from moving forward or aft too much. 

All those solutions should be in place within the next 12 to 18 

months. And at that point in time, the restriction should be removed, and we will go down to 103-pound pilot, as well as the size 

of the pilot is not an issue, but we design the seat for the smallest 

and the lightest folks. 

So I think you will find that in the next 18 months or so we will 

make this ejection seat as safe as we possibly can for the entire 

population. 
18 

I will let General Harrigian talk about the pilot throughput and 

female pilots. 

General HARRIGIAN. Thanks, ma’am. So we had one pilot that 

was less than 136 pounds. In fact, it was a male. So he is no longer 

flying the F–35. And due to where he was in his career, his leadership decided it is best we move him to another airplane so he can 

continue his career. We have a female that is flying the airplane 

right now. She is still flying the airplane right now. But to your 

point, I think that the longer term is, we didn’t have anybody in 

the pipeline right now that was impacted. But certainly, if this 

takes 12 to 18 months, there may be a person or persons out there 

that it could impact. And so that is something we are going to have 

to take a look at. As you are well aware, the Secretary and the 

Chief have made it clear that 103 pounds to 245 is our requirement. And General Bogdan knows that that is where we need to 

go. And he is working very hard to meet that requirement as quickly as he can. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Let’s hope we fix it in the next few weeks. 

Because I would hate for that to be the reason for our women to 

not be able to move forward—— 

General BOGDAN. Congresswoman, can I make one other—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. With what is our next real generation 

plane for the next 20 or 30 years. Yes? 

General BOGDAN. Can I make one other comment? We have partners and FMS customers in the program that are equally concerned about this problem, because much of their population of pilots, whether they be male or female, are on the lower end of the 

scale. And so I have heard from many partners, many FMS customers, as well as the Air Force, Navy, and the Marine Corps 

about how important this is to fix. And it has my full attention, 

ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Thank you, General. My last question is 

about the follow-on development for the F–35. And so while the initial engineering, manufacturing, and development stage of the F– 

35 program is supposedly going to be wrapping up in the next 2 

years, there is another, more potentially and very expensive followon development that we already have slated for the future of this 

program. And the follow-on effort is mostly software upgrades that 

I can tell as I read through everything. It is mostly software upgrades to incorporate additional weapons and electronic capability 

into the aircraft. But even though it is just an upgrade effort, the 

budget is not small. I mean, when I look at it, through 2020, I see 

more than $2.6 billion in research and development on that effort 

projected. 

And to be clear, that is on top of the baseline F–35 development 

effort that has seen years of delay and cost overruns. And I don’t 

want to go over all of that because you have heard me pounce on 

that for a long time now. 

I know that these further upgrades are essential. But I think it 

is important for us to try to get a handle on this before it gets out, 

gets out of whack as we have seen initially this project from the 

very beginning. 

So I have some specific questions about the follow-on effort. 

First, before the program starts, this major effort, it obviously 
19 

needs a clear set of prioritized requirements from the U.S. military 

services and from our foreign partners that are involved in this. 

And so does the F–35 program have a prioritized list from the U.S. 

military services with respect to what it really wants in the followon development? And if not, why not? 

General BOGDAN. Yes, ma’am. You have boiled this down to the 

essence of one of the issues with follow-on development today. With 

14 different customers, we have a large amount of requirements 

that I, today, believe are unaffordable. So as we validate the CDD 

[capability development document], the capability document, 

through the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council [AFROC] 

and then up to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC], 

and I go to what I call my board of directors for the partners, we 

have asked them to prioritize that list of requirements. Because 

today, I believe that trying to achieve all those requirements in the 

next 8 to 10 years will be unaffordable. 

So the process has begun. We believe in December we will get 

our first look at that set of priorities. And then in the springtime, 

when the AFROC and the JROC meet to validate the requirements, I believe that is where we will finally join all of this together to get what I would consider to be a reasonable amount of 

requirements that are affordable. Because I do not disagree with 

you, ma’am. I have learned a lot of lessons in 3 years on what the 

original EMD [engineering and manufacturing development] program looked like. I don’t want the follow-on program to look anything like that, 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Because the follow-on, as you know, I mean, we 

have really gone through very painful, on both sides, very painful, 

this has been a painful process. And that is a nice word for it. So 

this development and what everybody wants and how it interacts 

and what it gets I think is incredibly important to have that priority list. So I will look forward to that in December 2015. And I 

will look forward to it after your capability document validation. 

Second, you know, in other similar upgrade programs, Congress 

has required the DOD to designate them as major subprograms or 

completely separate programs actually. And the reason for that has 

been so that we can actually see the cost visibility and we can actually track what is going on. So should Congress do the same thing 

with this follow-on effort for the F–35? And if not, why not? 

General BOGDAN. The simple answer is no, ma’am. And I will tell 

you why not. So first, my pledge to this committee and to the other 

defense committees and to my partners and to the services is we 

will set up the follow-on modernization program with every level of 

visibility and transparency that you and they believe they need for 

that appropriate oversight. We will put the earned value management pieces in there. We will cost separate in the contracts so you 

can see how we are spending the money. But to make this a separate program, or even to make it a separate program brings a 

whole host of administrative burdens that Mr. Kendall wants to try 

and avoid to become more agile in terms of acquisition. 

I agree with him. I think we can set up a program that satisfies 

the needs of everyone in terms of transparency and understanding 

when the program is on track and not on track without designating 

it as its own program. My promise to the committees is if you don’t 
20 

believe when we get our acquisition strategy in place, that you 

don’t like that, then we will come and talk to you and figure out 

what you do like. I have asked your staffs to help us in what you 

would like to see in that modernization program in terms of reporting. Because we can do that. We can do that without setting up a 

separate program. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, we will have to talk to our staff and see, you 

know, what we will look at. Maybe a program, a separate line 

might be required if we are really going to track this. I just have 

the scars from the initial program, even before the 3 years you 

have been in. So thank you very much for your information. We 

will try to work with you. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

General HARRIGIAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to that. As 

the warfighter, ma’am, understanding the programmatics and the 

importance of ensuring we have got our prioritized requirements, 

which we are working hard as a service with the other services to 

make sure we have got it right. I think it is important to remember 

that the threat is not sitting on their hands. And they continue to 

evolve. So from our perspective, it is imperative that we have a stabilized, thoughtful, follow-on modernization program that brings 

new capabilities to this airplane so we stay ahead of the curve. 

And, ma’am, that is all I would like to ensure that the committee 

remembers as we work our way through this. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask you 

about the helmet, too. I know that you want to make changes to 

the helmet so it is more compatible for all the pilots in the Air 

Force. I know that that is going to be a really big priority for you. 

But I wanted to ask you about the HMDS [Helmet Mounted Display System], because I know that is a big part of what makes the 

F–35 special is the helmet itself, and that there has been a lot of 

technology put into it. And one of the things that we have heard 

in previous hearings that we have had on sequester was that being 

able to implement new technology under a sequester system can be 

tough. So knowing that we are working under the sequester, how 

quickly can changes be made to the helmet? 

General BOGDAN. The changes and the improvements that we 

are making to the helmet, Congressman, are part of the broader 

SDD [system development and demonstration] program. And because our SDD program is incrementally funded, even with a CR 

[continuing resolution] or a sequestration, we would still be able to 

continue those critical development activities like the helmet. We 

would ensure that those kind of things are not impacted. There are 

many other things that would be impacted. But in this respect, finishing the development program and creating the capability that 

we promised the warfighter is our number one priority. And I think 

we can do that. There is many other impacts, but not that one. 

Mr. VEASEY. And one more question about the helmet itself. 

Again, I know just the incredible technology that has gone into developing the helmet and, again, being able to make quick changes 

to that helmet so everyone can fly, is it more realistic to make 

changes to, like, the head support panel or delaying the deployment of the parachute in order to make it to where all the pilots 
21 

can fly the plane instead of actually trying to make very complicated technology changes to the helmet? 

General BOGDAN. Congressman, the simple answer to your question is no. We need a lighter helmet. It is as simple as that. All 

the other things that you talked about are also needed to ensure 

that we have safe escape for the whole pilot population. But we do 

have to take weight out of the helmet. The one point I would like 

to make about taking weight out of the helmet is we are not changing any of the electronics. We are not changing any of the sensors 

in the helmet. To remove the 6 ounces that we need from the helmet to get it under weight, what we are doing is we are taking the 

material that is used for the strapping and for the cushioning of 

the helmet and changing that material to something lighter and 

stronger. 

And the second thing that we are doing is today’s helmet has a 

dual visor on it, a daytime visor and a nighttime visor. We are 

going to remove the double visor and put a simply daytime visor 

on it such that if the pilot needs to change to the nighttime visor, 

just like our legacy airplanes, he or she will reach into their pocket 

and they will take the daytime visor off and put the nighttime 

visor on. Those two are fairly simple things to do. Now, I never 

want to say anything is easy in the F–35 program because nothing 

is ever easy. But in this instance here, I think we got it just about 

right. Because we are not going to mess with any of the high-technology things that make that helmet what it is. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Graham. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 

your service. Thank you for being here. As a north Floridian, both 

Eglin and Tyndall, incredibly important. And your service and the 

service of so many men and women who live in north Florida is 

greatly appreciated. So thank you. When we had a CODEL [congressional delegation]—and, Mr. Chairman, when did we go on that 

CODEL? When was it? In March? 

Mr. TURNER. In March. 

Ms. GRAHAM. And it was so informative and really impressed 

with the F–35. There was one area that, though, there was consistent concern both with the pilots and with the maintenance, 

those that maintain the airplanes. And I am not going to use an 

acronym because I have learned to not use acronyms. But it has 

got a snappy one. But it is Autonomic Logistics Information System, aka ALIS. So there were real concerns about false, you know, 

errors reporting. And I am just curious, have we resolved some of 

the software issues that ALIS was facing? Thank you so much. 

General BOGDAN. I will give you the technical answer. And I will 

let General Harrigian give you the warfighter’s perspective. So 

since your visit down there, we took a look at that health reporting 

code problem. And we have done a number of things since then 

that have improved the situation. The first thing we did was we 

put a new increment of software and capability into the ALIS system. We call it ALIS 2.01. That fixed some of the problem. 

Another part of the problem was that we did not have a complete 

list of those codes that were false, so to speak, at the time. And 

we were worried that if we made the list too big, that a code that 
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really wasn’t false would get overlooked. We have a lot more time 

on the airplane now and a lot more maturity on the airplane. So 

we were able to upgrade that list. The bottom line here is the 80 

percent number that you heard down at Eglin, which was accurate, 

for the entire fleet today is about half that now. 

That is not the best part of the story. Because that is the whole 

fleet. The best part of the story is that Lot 6 and Lot 7 airplanes 

that we are fielding today, because they have many of the R&M 

[repair and maintenance] improvements that we made over the last 

2 years, they are only seeing a very small handful, like 1’s and 2’s, 

when they land each and every day. So that 40 percent now that 

used to be 80 percent includes all the older airplanes that until 

they are upgraded, that they are still going to have that issue. But 

the newer airplanes, much better. General Harrigian has some experience with the new Lot 7 airplanes at Hill Air Force Base that 

they have been using. And he might be able to tell you a little 

more. 

General HARRIGIAN. So those airplanes, ma’am, we have three of 

them up there. And they have not lost a sortie since they delivered 

them. So as we have delivered these newer airplanes, they are performing really, really well. And Eglin still has some of the older 

ones, so they struggle with some of the older systems that the Program Office has continued to update over time, even since last 

March, as General Bogdan points out, so that it continues to improve. 

Now, having said that, there is still going to be challenges as we 

understand ALIS and put our maintainers in the field working 

through that system with the Program Office. And I will tell you 

one of the things that we did is we had our senior logistic leaders 

from all the F–35 bases and folks from the JPO coming together 

to talk about what are the big issues. This, of course, was one of 

them. And so we provided a list of some specific things, this fault 

reporting code issue being one of them, that we have worked very 

closely with the Program Office to get the feedback from our airmen in the field, and get those to the Program Office so they can 

work through, prioritize those, and get after the most important 

issues to ensure we are fixing the right things on the airplane. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Well, that is really great to hear, because I could 

hear the frustration, that they were faced with all these false negatives that they were having to deal with. You mentioned other airplanes. Are they using the same software system? They are using 

ALIS? 

General BOGDAN. Yes. All the airplanes in the fleet are using 

ALIS. It is just the newer airplanes have many of the fixes in 

terms of software and hardware that we learned from the older airplanes. So if you went to Eglin today, what you would find on their 

flight line is airplanes that are in what we call the Block 1 configuration, believe it or not, and the 2A configuration. When those airplanes get upgraded to the 2B configuration or the Block 3 configuration like we have at Hill or at Nellis, you are going to find a lot 

of those problems have gone away. We just haven’t had time to 

backfit and modify those older airplanes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Great. And my time has expired. But thank you 

very much. A good, positive update. Thank you. 
23 

Mr. TURNER. Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the accommodation. 

And thank you, Generals, for your presentation and for your service. I wanted to be clear, did you say in your opening testimony 

that you have accepted, you have received 79 F–35s to date? 

General HARRIGIAN. Yes, ma’am. In the Air Force, we have. 

Ms. SPEIER. So with the 79 that you have received, do they all 

have this ejection seat issue? 

General HARRIGIAN. Yes, ma’am. Every airplane. 

Ms. SPEIER. Now, I understand that you tested the ejection seat 

on lighter—on a mannequin that was 135 pounds. I have also understood that more recently, you have tested it on a 245-pound 

mannequin. But it has not been tested on a mannequin between 

the weight of 135 and 245, is that correct? 

General BOGDAN. In the development test program, we do have 

those test points planned out. But you are correct, as of today, we 

have done the high end and the low end. 

Ms. SPEIER. So my concern is this: If we know there is a problem 

on the low end, we haven’t tested it for those who are likely to be 

most pilots between the weight of 135 and 245, and we have them 

in these planes now testing them, are we putting any of them at 

risk? 

General BOGDAN. The answer to that is no, ma’am. Because we 

have done the risk analysis on the test points that we have had 

on the ejection seat. And what we have found is the only area 

where we have a problem today is with the lightweight pilot below 

136 pounds. Because when we have tested throughout the envelope, you can’t test every point for every weight, but the areas that 

we have tested indicate that in the heart of the envelope for the 

heart of the pilot population, there is not any increased risk of injury at all. And I can show you that analysis, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

General HARRIGIAN. Ma’am, from the service perspective, we 

have a Life Cycle Management Center that is part of our airworthiness organization. And they have—and, ma’am, to be clear, I have 

talked with the guys who have been working this for 30 years, because clearly, this is an important issue for us. And we share and 

talk very closely with the Program Office with this. And exactly 

what General Bogdan said is how it was communicated to us. In 

fact, they have shown us the chart, how it lays out, and what the 

risk levels are. And so, as General Bogdan said, there is certain 

risk there. We have accepted it, accept that the low end beneath 

136 pounds. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, there has been some report that there has 

been a memo that you accepted, General Bogdan, that, accepted a 

1-in-4 risk of death, with—a problem with the ejection system as 

being a risk that is worth taking I guess. Is that correct? 

General BOGDAN. Ma’am, that is incorrect. The data that you 

have came from a reporter who got a copy of an official use only, 

internal DOD document that my team put together to assess the 

risks of a lightweight pilot and a pilot between 136 and 165 

pounds. That document should have never been publicly released. 

I have an investigation ongoing to figure out how that reporter got 
24 

it. But the worst part of this is, the reporter did not know how to 

read the report, ma’am. So let me give you the actual facts. 

Today, a pilot that weighs less than 136 pounds, if he steps to 

the airplane, he or she has a 1-in-50,000 chance of hurting their 

neck from an ejection. A pilot between 136 pounds and 165 pounds 

has a 1-in-200,000 probability of having neck injury from ejection. 

The individual who reported on this is not an expert in system 

safety. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. My time is running out. As I understand it, 

the test was done under ideal circumstances. Is there any reason 

to feel that the results would be any different in circumstances 

where it was going not at ideal speeds, but—and not going straight 

but going up? 

Mr. TURNER. Your time has expired. Generals, I want to thank 

you for being here. You have continued to provide the information 

as required by this committee. And we will continue to hold this 

program accountable and provide oversight, not just because there 

are issues or problems that have arisen, which there are, but because this program is so incredibly important. It needs to be safe 

for our pilots. It needs to be safe for our country. And it needs to 

be able to perform at the level it has been asked to perform, because the gap that this plane is going to fill is incredibly important. 

With that, I thank you both for your service. And I know that you 

both know that we will continue to work both through the committee hearing structure and throughout the calendar year to both 

inquire and to work with you to ensure this plane can deliver. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

OCTOBER 21, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

OCTOBER 21, 2015 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

OCTOBER 21, 2015 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The committee is concerned that the Follow-on Development program requirements are unbridled and will evolve into the magnitude of the current 

System Development and Demonstration. What are you doing to keep Follow-on Development within reason? 

General BOGDAN. The Program Office agrees with the concern of unaffordable requirements in Follow-on Modernization expressed by Congressman Turner. In the 

F–35 case, 11 major stakeholders, the US Services eight (8) Partner nations, are ultimately responsible for future F–35 requirements. All of the stakeholders are acutely aware that there are affordable, practical limits to the F–35 modernization effort 

and are cooperating fully to constrain Block 4 to affordable and technically realistic 

increments. Affordability assessments from the US Services and Partner’s Ministry 

of Defenses serve as significant elements of that effort. 

The process used to define the Follow-on Modernization program requirements includes a significant screening/gating process that evaluates each of the proposed capabilities based on warfighter priority, technical maturity, risk and readiness for integration, schedule and cost. Once the US Services and Partners define the affordable set of Block 4 capabilities, these capabilities will be ‘‘frozen’’ and only through 

a well-defined governance process spelled out in the well-established F–35 US Service and Partner Memorandum of Understanding, can these requirements change, 

grow, or be removed. 

Mr. TURNER. The Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act included 

a legislative provision that limits F–35 procurement until the Secretary of the Air 

Force certifies that F–35A’s delivered during FY2018 will have full Block 3F capability. What is the impact of this provision and what is your plan to address it? 

General BOGDAN. The Joint Program Office (JPO) has initiated action to ensure 

full capability is received prior to FY18. The low rate initial production (LRIP) 9 

contract, currently being negotiated with the contractor, contains requirements for 

full 3F capability in delivered jets beginning in August 2017. The subsequent LRIP 

10 contract includes this same requirement—full 3F capability—for jets to be delivered in FY18. The JPO is working with the Air Force to obtain Secretary of the Air 

Force certification should this provision become law. 

Mr. TURNER. We are now operating under a continuing resolution. What are the 

impacts of this and what would the impacts be if we have a yearlong CR? 

General BOGDAN. While the F–35 program is able to function under a short term 

continuing resolution (CR) without driving significant impacts to the program, a 

long-term CR would be detrimental to the F–35 production ramp-up and drive increased costs for the United States and our International Partners. It would restrict 

the government’s ability to award the full quantity of U.S. F–35 aircraft to be procured in the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 10 contract until the 2016 defense 

budget is approved. Should the program operate at fiscal year 2015 budget levels, 

for a long period of time the Department would be unable to provide 16 F–35As for 

the U.S. Air Force and three (3) F–35Bs for the U.S. Marine Corps. If the Department is unable to procure these 19 aircraft on the LRIP 10 contract, there would 

potentially be increased costs for not only the 19 US aircraft but also for the other 

aircraft in LRIP 10 as the JPO would have to modify the current LRIP 10 contract 

to remove those 19 aircraft, resulting in cost increases for all the aircraft. A longterm CR would also negatively impact the program’s ability to move forward with 

early planning of F–35 Follow-on Modernization, which is the next phase of the program once System Development and Demonstration (SDD) ends in October 2017. Up 

to a year’s delay of Follow-on Modernization Program could result from an extended 

CR. 

Mr. TURNER. Please share with us your current thinking on a Production Block 

Buy. What is your strategy? What are the major decision points? Do you have ‘‘buy 

in’’ from the International partners/services? What savings are currently projected? 

What authorization are you expecting from us? 

General BOGDAN. The Joint Program Office (JPO) is working to obtain approval 

to enter into a future Block Buy Contract (BBC) for more than 400 aircraft. BBC 

savings are obtained primarily through Economic Ordering Quantity (EOQ) funding 
74 

that allows the contractors to purchase materials in quantities greater than those 

required for a single year’s production. EOQ is similar to Advance Procurement 

funding in that it is funding required one year early; it is not an additional investment. 

The JPO received Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) proposals from Lockheed 

Martin (LM) and Pratt & Whitney (P&W) for BBC. JPO’s assessment of the ROMs 

reflected that if the Partners/Services provide 4% Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) 

funding (4% of the total contract cost for all the aircraft) and provide $300M in Cost 

Reduction Initiatives (CRI) funding; a cost savings in excess of $2B will result. 

RAND Corporation (Project Air Force) has been put on contract to conduct an independent assessment of cost with final results being provided March 2016. RAND’s 

interim assessment of LM’s ROM estimate was that LM’s savings estimate was reasonable but conservative. RAND believed that it is possible to achieve overall greater savings than LM estimated through a more thorough analysis of the entire supply chain. This is understandable because LM had limited time to complete the 

ROM and thus, LM could not investigate the lower tiers of the supply chain. 

The Congress will be asked to authorize both a Block Buy Contracting strategy 

and EOQ purchase the year prior to the first year of the Block Buy. Using aircraft 

quantities from the current program of record, the draft proposed language reads: 

The Secretary of Defense may award block buy contracts to cover three production lots of up to 60 F–35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and 

F135 engines for the Marine Corps, and up to 30 F–35C Lightning II Joint 

Strike Fighter aircraft and F135 engines for the Navy; up to 180 F–35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and F135 engines for the Air Force; and 

up to 222 F–35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and F135 engines, 

and up to 22 F–35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and F135 engines 

for international customers. Such contracts may include the procurement of materiel and equipment in economic order quantities. 

Mr. TURNER. The F–35 program plans to ramp up aircraft production over the 

next 4 years. What is the readiness level of the prime contractor and the engine 

contractor to meet production requirements, and how are you assuring their readiness to do so? 

General BOGDAN. While there is moderate risk in delivering approximately 120 

aircraft in Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 11 (four years from now), the technical and production risks have been identified, are manageable, and considered acceptable to proceed in production. The F–35 Program’s ability to transition to higher 

production rates continues to be demonstrated, having delivered over 142 aircraft. 

Potential risks to get to higher production rates are continually monitored and managed through multiple forums such as formal Production Readiness Reviews (PRRs), 

informal PRRs, and through standard supply chain management (SCM) contractor 

oversight business practices. 

Formal PRRs are contractually required and conducted annually. They are focused on the top high risk suppliers and prime contractors. Sub-tier supplier reviews are led by the prime contractors with the Government acting as an active participant. Prime contractor PRRs are led by the Government. Informal PRRs are conducted by the prime contractors on the next level of risk suppliers and follow a similar format as the formal PRR but may be tailored to the supplier under review. The 

rest of the supply chain is managed through standard SCM oversight. The JPO can 

provide the PRR results for the past few years to the Defense Committees if requested. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the status of completing the long-term fix for the F–35’s engine problem discovered during the engine fire and failure in June 2014? When will 

all aircraft be modified with the long-term fix for this problem? 

General BOGDAN. The F–35 Joint Program Office (JPO) was able to determine 

root cause for the engine failure, and developed an interim solution: a ‘‘pretrenched’’ rub material that has been implemented in the field and on the production line. Retrofit of the entire fleet is over 50 percent complete and will be completed in spring of 2016. Production cut-in began in April 2015. Pratt & Whitney 

has agreed to cover the costs for the repairs to engines in the field and the cut-in 

of the solution to the production line, while the program office will pay for the design activity as per the development contract. The corrective action team studied 

several re-design options including the interim pre-trench solution and determined 

that the pre-trench design was the best performing and most affordable solution for 

the long term. 

Mr. TURNER. Our visit to Eglin AFB in March, both pilots and maintenance personnel reported problems with the Autonomic Logistics Information System or 

‘‘ALIS.’’ The pilots were concerned about the time it takes to get information for debrief and the maintenance personnel were concerned about the false reporting codes. 
75 

Please provide an update on how the F–35 Program Office is addressing those 

issues. 

General BOGDAN. The F–35 air system is experiencing some ‘‘false’’ Health Reporting Codes (HRC) generated by the aircraft, then downloaded and filtered in 

ALIS. This is manifested in the early software versions (Block 1B and Block 2A) 

of the F–35 software, which are being used at Eglin Air Force Base. Many of the 

aircraft-generated HRCs do not require maintenance action (false codes) but do generate work orders that cause unnecessary administrative burden for maintainers 

and pilots to close out the action. The release of Block 2B software has resulted in 

an improvement cutting these false codes over earlier Block 1B/2A versions in half. 

The ‘‘80% false positive’’ figure is related to the work-orders that ALIS automatically generates after each flight. As an example, a given aircraft may generate 20 

HRCs after a flight. Of those 20, any number of them (50%, or 10, in this example) 

may be automatically flagged as not valid and removed by systems within ALIS— 

this function is called the Nuisance Filter List (NFL). The remaining 10 HRCs 

would result in work-orders requiring maintenance personnel action. This is where 

the reports of ‘‘80% false positives’’ come into play—eight of these work-orders are 

potentially false positives and require a maintainer to take administrative steps to 

close. The final two would be ‘‘legitimate’’ work-orders that warrant maintenance actions. 

Both the aircraft (false HRCs) and ALIS (proper filtering) contribute to this issue. 

Valid HRC software fixes are being addressed in the aircraft software via Software 

Product Anomaly Reports. With these software updates, ‘‘false’’ work orders for the 

maintenance personnel will continue to be reduced with each aircraft software release. The Joint Program Office (JPO) is also updating the ALIS software to improve correlation of HRCs and consolidation of work orders. The ultimate goal with 

the improvements of both the aircraft off-board prognostics health monitoring system and ALIS software is negligible false positives by the end of 3rd Quarter of 

2017. 

Mr. TURNER. Recently, Martin-Baker experienced injury risk exceedances on two 

ejection seat sled tests related to neck loadings. Can you please describe the failures, what they mean and the Air Force response to these recent failures? 

General HARRIGIAN. Both of these exceedances were during slow speed (∼160 

knots) ejections, one with a 103 pound manikin, and one with a 136 pound manikin. 

In both cases, the exceedances were caused by over rotation of the seat, causing an 

improper body position relative to the risers at opening shock, resulting in a whiplash-like motion force that exceeded injury risk criteria. The risk is ‘‘High’’ for the 

lightest weight pilots and ‘‘Serious’’ for pilots up to 165 pounds. For the heavier category, that risk has been deemed acceptable based on the overall hazard risk index 

(consequence coupled with probability). For the lighter weight category, we have restricted pilots weighing less than 136 pounds from flying the F–35A and will continue to do so until the ejection system is fixed to an acceptable risk level. We are 

committed to providing an ejection system that meets requirements for the entire 

pilot demographic. 

Mr. TURNER. The Marine Corps recently declared initial operational capability 

(IOC) in July 2015 with their version of the F–35. The Air Force is the next service 

in line to declare IOC in the Fall of 2016. Can you please give an overview on how 

the Air Force is progressing towards IOC and what, if any concerns you have in 

meeting the currently IOC timeline? 

General HARRIGIAN. We are making steady progress toward IOC next year, and 

I am confident we will make IOC between 1 August and 31 December. There are 

three concerns we have for achieving IOC by 1 August 2016: 1) completing required 

aircraft modifications, especially the fuel overpressure modification, prior to 1 August, 2) delivering ALIS 2.0.2 software version to fully train operations and maintenance personnel on its deployed use, and 3) delivering one of the mission data files 

required for deployed operations (according to the current schedule) in time for a 

1 August IOC declaration. We are diligently working with the Joint Program Office, 

Lockheed-Martin and Air Combat Command to mitigate these delays and achieve 

IOC on time. 

Mr. TURNER. There has been spirited dialog in the press between the Air Force 

Chief of Staff, General Mark Welsh III, and the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation (DOT&E), Dr. Michael Gilmore with respect to F–35 Comparative Testing during Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). Can you please describe the Air Force position on Comparative Testing and how the planning is going 

for the F–35 Comparative Tests? 

General HARRIGIAN. We fully support comparative testing during F–35 Initial 

Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E). As The Department of Defense’s independent test organization, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, his staff 
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and Joint Operational Test Team at Edwards are working to include comparative 

testing in the IOT&E plan without undue impact on schedule and cost. We fully 

support that effort. 

Mr. TURNER. A January 2015 flight test demonstrated that the F–35 was not as 

maneuverable as an F–16, the very aircraft it’s supposed to replace, in a dogfight. 

Can you comment on the conclusions of that test and the implications for F–35s in 

combat? 

General HARRIGIAN. Both operational and developmental testing continues for the 

F–35. The F–35 is designed to be comparable to current tactical fighters in terms 

of maneuverability, but the design is optimized for stealth and sensor superiority. 

News reports on the F–35’s performance against an F–16 was an early look at the 

F–35’s flight control authority software logic, and not an assessment of its ability 

in a dogfight situation. The Operational Test Wing has just completed the first two 

phases of the within visual range (WVR) Tactics Investigation (TI) consisting of Aircraft Handling Characteristics and Basic Fighter Maneuver exercises. Comments 

from the operational testers state that the ‘‘Initial handling results are generally 

positive at this stage of tactics development and are comparable to current tactical 

fighters.’’ Operational units are just starting to train their pilots on these first two 

stages of WVR tactics. 

The F–35 has been optimized for the current trends in air warfare, where the 

enemy is engaged and defeated from long distances, but it will still be able to maneuver aggressively when required to defeat and kill threats. 

Mr. TURNER. At our hearing in mid-April, General Bogdan reported improvement 

in aircraft availability rates to around 55 percent, and improvement in the aircraft’s 

mission capability rate to about 65–70 percent. What are the goals for aircraft availability and mission capability rates for the operational use of the F–35, and do you 

agree with this assessment and do you see aircraft availability and mission capability rates improving to meet your requirements? 

General HARRIGIAN. The USAF minimum (threshold) targets for aircraft availability and mission capability rates to support operational squadrons are established 

via a Bilateral Annex between the USAF and the F–35 Joint Program Office as part 

of the F–35 Performance Based Arrangement. Threshold rates to support USAF F– 

35 Initial Operating Capability (IOC) in 2016 are 60 percent for both aircraft availability and mission capability. Following IOC, threshold and objective aircraft availability and mission capable rates are specified in the Performance Based Arrangement for 2017 through 2019 for training, non-deployed and deployed aircraft. The 

rates are required to increase for all three categories across this time period. By 

2019, threshold aircraft availability requirements for training/non-deployed/deployed 

aircraft will be: 65%/70%/75%. Objective aircraft availability requirements will be: 

85%/90%/95%. In 2019, threshold mission capability requirements for training/nondeployed/deployed aircraft will be: 80%/80%/85%. Objective mission capability requirements will be: 90%/90%/95%. 

During FY 15, the USAF fleet has achieved an aircraft availability rate of 55 percent and a mission capability rate of 66 percent. The USAF and Joint Program Office continue to drive readiness improvements into the fleet. Mission capability rates 

already exceed the 60 percent threshold and we are confident that air system performance trends and targeted efforts to improve air system availability will meet requirements to support IOC in 2016. The ability to meet increasing performance requirements following IOC is difficult to predict as the fleet is still maturing to a 

stable configuration and full rate production. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

Mr. JONES. What was the original budget projection in 2001 for the F–35 program? 

How much have we invested thus far in the F–35 program? 

How much is this over the original budget projection? 

General BOGDAN. The original cost estimate for F–35 was $226,458.3M (Selected 

Acquisition Report (SAR) from 2001). This included the cost to develop and procure 

2,866 F–35 aircraft through the life of the program. 

From FY01 thru FY15 appropriations, the amount invested is $95,779.9M 

(RDT&E, Procurement, & MILCON). 

The current estimate reported in SAR 2014 is $391,134.7M or a 72% increase over 

the 2001 original cost estimate of $226,458.2M. However, the program was rebaselined after the Nunn- McCurdy breach in 2012. Since the re-baseline, the program has maintained control of costs. In fact, projected costs have decreased by ap-
77 

proximately 1.1% from the 2012 Acquisition Program Baseline (re-baseline) to the 

latest 2014 SAR (from $395,711.8M to $391,134.7M). 

Mr. JONES. What was the original budget projection in 2001 for the F–35 program? 

How much have we invested thus far in the F–35 program? 

How much is this over the original budget projection? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Has the F–35 program completed a full end-to-end cybersecurity testing of the F–35’s operational system, and if not, when will it do so? 

Has the F–35 program completed a full end-to-end cybersecurity testing of the F– 

35’s operational system, and if not, when will it do so? 

General BOGDAN. Cyber testing is a robustly-resourced and recurring activity that 

is foundational to the program’s development. We constantly work with various 

agencies and experts to ensure survivability in a cyber-threat environment. The JPO 

has supported more than 2,000 cyber tests across all spectrums of the program including air vehicle, training systems, mission software, reprogramming laboratories 

and logistical support systems and has conducted close to 300 related tests this year 

alone. 

The program conducts on-going independent Certification and Accreditation 

(C&A) activities to maintain current Authorities to Operate (ATOs) and Authorities 

to Connect (ATCs) on all DOD networks. These C&A activities include independent 

vulnerability and adversarial testing on production representative equipment. The 

F–35 program is in compliance with DOD Directive 8500.1 ‘‘Information Assurance’’ 

and views cyber testing as a core responsibility fundamental to mission success. 

Operational Test (OT) continues to provide ongoing and continuous testing of each 

major increment of release of ALIS and Air Vehicle capability. OT has already completed separate and distinct Cooperative Vulnerability Penetration Assessments 

(CVPA) of the ALIS 1.0.3 Squadron Kit (at Edwards AFB) and ALIS 2.0.0.2 Squadron Kit (aboard the USS Wasp). This testing was followed by CVPAs of the ALIS 

2.0.1 Squadron Kit (at Edwards AFB) and US Operational Central Point of Entry 

(CPE) (at Eglin AFB). Further testing will be accomplished in the spring of 2016 

with end to end CVPA and Adversarial Assessments (AA) of the ALIS 2.0.1 system 

and integration of cooperative testing vignettes of the Block 2B Air Vehicle. Operational testing will continue with planned end to end testing of the ALIS system 

at release 2.0.2 and 3.0 as well as with the Block 3i and 3F Air Vehicle. 

Ms. SPEIER. Does the Martin-Baker Water Activated Release System (MWARS) 

currently pose a ‘‘serious risk’’ to pilots’ lives, and if so when will this system be 

retrofitted to reduce that risk? 

General BOGDAN. Aircraft deliveries with ejection seats having MWARS installed 

started on LRIP 5 (2014). For aircraft delivered prior to LRIP 5, the JPO is currently retrofitting those aircraft with MWARS. The projected completion date is 

March 2016. A System Safety Risk Assessment was performed for those aircraft flying without MWARS, identifying a Medium level risk—one order of magnitude 

lower than a Serious risk. This risk was accepted by the US Services after coordination with Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC). 

Ms. SPEIER. Have any tests of the F–35 ejection seat been done in ‘‘off-nominal’’ 

conditions, simulating the impact on a pilot when the airplane is not flying straight 

at a relatively optimal speed? If so, what is the risk to pilots from performance in 

‘‘off-nominal conditions’’? If not, when will these tests be done? 

General BOGDAN. Ejection seat tests have been conducted at ‘‘off nominal’’ speeds 

using both test sleds and an aircraft used by the Escape System community to test 

the ejection seat airborne. The F–35 specification, and corresponding development 

and qualification program, do not have any requirements for escape system sled 

testing to be performed in ‘‘off nominal’’ orientations. There are requirements to perform testing at ‘‘off nominal’’ speeds. The most common ejection speed is ∼170 kts. 

Less than 10% of ejections occur above 400 kts. However the F–35 program has conducted more than 45 ejection tests above 400 kts to ensure the robustness of the 

system design. 

Ms. SPEIER. When will ejector seat testing be completed using dummies weighing 

between 136 and 244 pounds? 

General BOGDAN. 32 tests have been performed by the F–35 with manikins in 

that range. Six (6) additional tests will be performed as part of the qualification ef-
78 

forts of the ejection seat redesign over the next 24 months with ejection seat qualification testing expected to complete in 3rd Quarter CY 2016. 

Ms. SPEIER. The JPO has stated that the ejector seat and helmet will be fixed 

to eliminate risk to pilots by summer 2017. What will the consequences be if this 

risk is not eliminated on schedule? 

General BOGDAN. If the risk is not eliminated on schedule, the Services will have 

to make a decision on maintaining the weight restriction limiting the F–35 pilot 

population to only pilots that weigh more than 136lbs. If the restriction is maintained, the safety risk will not increase over the risk currently assessed and accepted. 

Ms. SPEIER. Is there an indemnity clause in the F–35 contracts that would render 

the U.S. government responsible for any deaths or injuries caused by these systems? 

General BOGDAN. No, there is no indemnity clause in the F–35 contracts. 

Ms. SPEIER. Regarding the acceptance of risk for the F–35 ejection seat, are there 

other comparable risks to the lives of U.S. service members that General Bogdan 

has signed off on and accepted? 

General BOGDAN. Risk for in-service aircraft is accepted by the services, not the 

F–35 programs. Other escape system risks associated with the F–35 program include: 

– A Serious level risk of fatal pilot injury with a probability of 0.7 per ten million 

flight hours for ejections outside of the Terrain Clearance Envelope. 

– A Medium level risk of fatal pilot injury with a probability of 9 per ten million 

flight hours with ejections above 550 knots. 

– A Medium level risk of severe pilot injury with a probability of 4 per ten million 

flight hours during ejection due to a design issue on the ejection seat shoulder 

harness. 

– A Medium level risk of severe pilot injury for ejections above 450 knots when 

wearing a Gen III helmet (please note that this risk is not attributable to the 

design of the ejection seat. Injury could occur as a result of visor loss (9 per ten 

million flight hours) or head and neck loas (7 per million flight hours). 

Each of these risks were recommended for Service acceptance by the Joint Program Office (JPO) and each Service followed its risk acceptance processes to evaluate (and accept) the risk. 

Ms. SPEIER. Have the F–35 pilots currently flying the aircraft been notified of this 

‘‘serious risk’’ of death, and what is the process by which they have acknowledged 

and accepted this risk? 

General BOGDAN. This question is better answered by the US. Air Force and will 

be addressed in the same QFR sent to Maj Gen Harrigian. 

Ms. SPEIER. What responsibility does Martin-Baker have for the ejection seat 

problem? 

General BOGDAN. Martin-Baker is responsible for providing the ejection seat portion of the Escape System that provides a safe escape from the aircraft as required 

by the F–35 Specification. Lockheed Martin is responsible for the overall escape systems. The current escape system issues are caused by the combination of both seat 

performance and the Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) configuration. It is MartinBaker’s responsibility to resolve the issues that are caused by the ejection seat— 

namely, the sequencer and the parachute Head Support Panel are solutions designed by and incorporated by Martin-Baker to address the seat performance. It is 

Lockheed Martin’s responsibility to provide an HMD configuration that addresses 

escape system issues caused by the HMD. Industry is paying for the design and test 

of these fixes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Did considerations about U.K. participation in the F–35 program motivate the decision to award the contract to Martin-Baker? 

General BOGDAN. No. The Joint Program Office (JPO) does not have a contract 

with Martin-Baker for the ejections seats. Martin-Baker is a subcontractor to British Aerospace (BAE), who is in turn a subcontractor to Lockheed Martin. The selection criteria for awarding the ejection seat to Martin-Baker were determined by 

Lockheed Martin and BAE during the source selection phase at the start of the program. 

Ms. SPEIER. AT&L is proposing a block buy of over 400 F–35 aircraft in FY19 and 

FY20. Do you consider this a block buy, and if it were enacted, what incentive would 

the contractor have to fix problems like the ejection seat and mission fusion issues 

in aircraft that have already been purchased? 

General BOGDAN. The Joint Program Office (JPO), in coordination with AT&L, is 

working to enter into a future Block Buy Contracting effort. The JPO intends to 

award a performance based specification for aircraft procured under a Block Buy 

Contract. Correction of deficiencies associated with any component will be required 

by industry in order for the contractor to meet contract specifications. The JPO will 
79 

not accept items that are deficient to contract specifications, and require industry 

to correct the deficiencies either before after acceptance of the aircraft. 

Ms. SPEIER. Has the F–35 program completed a full end-to-end cybersecurity testing of the F–35’s operational system, and if not, when will it do so? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Does the Martin-Baker Water Activated Release System (MWARS) 

currently pose a ‘‘serious risk’’ to pilots’ lives, and if so when will this system be 

retrofitted to reduce that risk? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Have any tests of the F–35 ejection seat been done in ‘‘off-nominal’’ 

conditions, simulating the impact on a pilot when the airplane is not flying straight 

at a relatively optimal speed? If so, what is the risk to pilots from performance in 

‘‘off-nominal conditions’’? If not, when will these tests be done? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. When will ejector seat testing be completed using dummies weighing 

between 136 and 244 pounds? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. The JPO has stated that the ejector seat and helmet will be fixed 

to eliminate risk to pilots by Summer 2017. What will the consequences be if this 

risk is not eliminated on schedule? 

General HARRIGIAN. Based on data analysis, the Air Force made the decision to 

restrict F–35 pilots weighing below 136 pounds (high risk for serious or fatal injury). 

This policy only affected one pilot. We will continue this risk mitigation until the 

ejection system is fixed and the risk level is acceptable. Martin Baker is currently 

working on permanent and potential interim solutions. We have set the requirement 

for the ejection system to accommodate the entire pilot demographic from 103 to 245 

pounds. Ultimately, the Air Force wants a seat that meets that requirement. 

While cost and schedule could be factors in finding a solution, the performance 

of the ejection system is a priority to ensure the survivability of our pilots. 

Ms. SPEIER. Is there an indemnity clause in the F–35 contracts that would render 

the U.S. government responsible for any deaths or injuries caused by these systems? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Regarding the acceptance of risk for the F–35 ejection seat, are there 

other comparable risks to the lives of U.S. servicemembers that General Bogdan has 

signed off on and accepted? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Have the F–35 pilots currently flying the aircraft been notified of this 

‘‘serious risk’’ of death, and what is the process by which they have acknowledged 

and accepted this risk? 

General HARRIGIAN. The commanders of all Air Force Wings currently flying the 

F–35A have notified their pilots of the serious risk. Additionally, to ensure understanding of the risk information, a Flight Crew Information File (FCIF) was disseminated to all F–35 flying units. Pilots are required to acknowledge any FCIF 

prior to flying. This FCIF contained the information from the Air Force Airworthiness Authority System Safety Risk Assessments for both serious risk acceptances 

as well as Air Combat Command direction restricting pilots weighing less than 136 

pounds from flying until further notice. 

Ms. SPEIER. What responsibility does Martin-Baker have for the ejection seat 

problem? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. Did considerations about U.K. participation in the F–35 program motivate the decision to award the contract to Martin-Baker? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 

Ms. SPEIER. AT&L is proposing a block buy of over 400 F–35 aircraft in FY19 and 

FY20. Do you consider this a block buy, and if it were enacted, what incentive would 

the contractor have to fix problems like the ejection seat and mission fusion issues 

in aircraft that have already been purchased? 

General HARRIGIAN. This question is in the oversight and jurisdiction of the Joint 

Program Office and I defer to their answer of the same question. 
80 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Could you please provide complete data of ejection seat envelope 

testing (whether each test was successful or unsuccessful at various pilot weights 

and airspeeds): one for all testing performed with the Gen II helmet, and the other 

for all testing performed with the Gen III helmet? I am particularly interested in 

what testing has been done in the middle of the envelope versus the edges. 

General BOGDAN. Ejection testing is typically performed for one of two reasons: 

1) as a development test to evaluate the performance of concept under consideration 

or 2) to demonstrate performance of a planned flight configuration to support airworthiness certification of the system. Tests done under the first objective are not 

given formal success/failure designations, whereas tests performed under the second 

objective are. Tests that are not accepted as supporting airworthiness certification 

or are accepted but result in a need to get formal risk acceptance are considered 

unsuccessful. Tests that are accepted as supporting airworthiness certification without the need for risk acceptance are considered successful. Tests in which insufficient data was collected or the test method compromised the test are considered notests. 

Figure 1 below depicts the weights and speeds at which Gen II and Gen III Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) ejection tests have been performed. Testing has been 

performed at different pilot weight and ejection speed conditions, including the middle of the envelope. The aircraft development program has included multiple seat 

and HMD configurations. From May 2007 to Dec 2010 forty-five (45) ejection tests 

were performed utilizing a Gen II HMD. From Oct 2013 to the present, twelve (12) 

ejection tests have been performed for the Gen III HMD. The forty-five (45) tests 

performed with the Gen II HMD break out as follows: 

• 7 development tests done with the System Development and Demonstration 

(SDD) version of the ejection seat (no pass/fail) 

• 1 failure with the SDD version of the ejection seat, which was addressed by a 

seat design change 

• 1 failure with the SDD version of the ejection seat that required risk acceptance 

• 4 successful tests with the SDD version of the ejection seat 

• 10 development tests done with the production version of the ejection seat (no 

pass/fail) 

• 2 no-tests (no pass/fail) 

• 1 failure with the production version of the ejection seat, which was addressed 

by a seat design change 

• 19 successful tests with the production version of the ejection seat 

Five of the tests with the SDD seat and four of the tests with the production seat 

were conducted with mid-weight manikins. The airworthiness certification for the 

Gen II HMD in the LRIP ejection seat included 19 successful tests conducted with 

manikins weighing from 103,136, and 245 lbs at speeds ranging from 0 to 550 kts. 

Of the twelve (12) Gen III tests conducted to date, seven (7) tests have been unsuccessful. These test failures have resulted in aircrew restrictions and risk acceptance for the impacted pilot weights. Design changes to the HMD and the ejection 

seat are being pursued. The failed tests will be repeated with the design changes 

in place. [See Figure 1 next page.] 
81 

Figure 1—Gen II and Gen III HMD Ejection Tests 

Mr. LAMBORN. Could you please provide a summary of how many ejection seat 

sled tests have been performed to date, the period of time that encompasses, and 

the total cost incurred by the U.S. taxpayer to date? How many additional sled tests 

will be required to certify the current F–35 ejection seat as fully qualified, as well 

as validate the three proposed solutions, and what will be the corresponding cost 

to the U.S. taxpayer? 

General BOGDAN. Ejection testing began in 2005 and has carried through 2015. 

These tests included: 

• Eight (8) tests in 2005 performed as proof of concept testing, utilizing Gen I 

HMDs and other early model/legacy helmets. These tests were not performed 

with Gen II or III HMDs. 

• Sixteen (16) tests in 2006 developing and certifying the -1 seat for use in the 

first F–35 aircraft. These tests utilized Gen I HMDs or legacy helmets (not Gen 

II or III HMDs). 

• 31 tests between 2007 and 2009 developing and certifying the -2 seat for use 

in the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) aircraft, 13 of which 

were performed using Gen II HMDs. None were performed with Gen III HMDs. 

The rest utilized Gen I HMDs or legacy helmets. 

• 32 tests between 2009 and 2010 developing and certifying the -4 seat for use 

in the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft, all of which utilized Gen II 

HMDs. 

• Four (4) tests between 2012 and 2014 assessing potential seat changes, utilizing 

Gen I or legacy helmets. 

• NOTE: These 4 were Design Verification Tests run completely by MartinBaker. The F–35 JPO was not involved in those tests and did not fund those 

tests. 

• Twelve (12) tests between 2012 and 2015 developing and certifying the Gen III 

Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) for use in SDD and LRIP aircraft, all of which 

utilized Gen III HMDs. 

The current plan is to perform approximately 25 ejection tests to qualify the final 

ejection seat/HMD solution. At approximately $500K per test, the cost of 99 funded 

tests to date is approximately $49.5M, and $12.5M for the remaining planned tests. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Regarding the ‘‘Light or Heavy’’ switch, what would be the consequences if a pilot ejects with the switch inadvertently in the incorrect position? 

General BOGDAN. If a pilot ejects with the switch inadvertently in the incorrect 

position they would have an elevated risk of injury during a particular phase of the 

ejection sequence based on their weight: 

If a light weight aircrew ejected with the switch in the heavy weight setting, they 

would have an elevated risk of injury due to parachute opening shock. It is expected 

that the risk of injury would be of a similar order of magnitude to the risk of injury 
82 

to a similar weight aircrew ejecting from legacy aircraft with a Helmet Mounted 

Display (HMD). 

If a heavy weight aircrew ejected with the switch in the light weight setting, they 

would be at increased risk of impacting the ground prior to the parachute decelerating them to a safe descent velocity if they were to eject at low altitude. It is 

expected that the risk of injury would be of a similar order of magnitude to the risk 

of injury to similar weight aircrew ejecting from legacy aircraft. There is not increased risk to a heavy pilot ejecting at higher altitudes if the switch were improperly set to the light weight setting. 

The hazards associated with inadvertent or incorrect selection will be reviewed to 

ensure controls are implemented to minimize the realization of this risk. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Could you please provide your corresponding analysis that leads 

you to conclude that there is not any increased risk of injury for pilots weighing 

more than 136 pounds? 

General BOGDAN. The analysis performed does show a slightly increased level of 

risk for pilots in the 136–165 lbs weight range, but that injury potential is significantly lower than for the < 136 lbs weight population. The analysis, contained in 

a System Safety Risk Assessment, assesses the risk at the Serious level. This is a 

conservative assessment based upon a set of worst case assumptions to determine 

the appropriate level within the Department of Defense at which the risk acceptance 

needed to be made. This approach assures that the safety risk is not underestimated 

and provides a worst case assessment of the pilot risk. 

This risk was recommended by the Program Executive Officer, Lt Gen Bogdan for 

US Service acceptance. Both the USAF and USN/USMC have accepted the risk associated with this pilot population. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Who exactly are the ‘‘air-worthiness authorities’’ making risk assessments and decisions for the F–35 ejection seat? 

General BOGDAN. Airworthiness is a DOD/Service responsibility that flows from 

US Code Title X to DOD, and then to the commanders of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC). For 

fielded aircraft, airworthiness authority resides with VADM Grosklags, Commander, 

NAVAIR for F–35Bs and F–35Cs, and Lt Gen Thompson, Commander, AFLCMC for 

F–35As. 

For test aircraft in the Development program, the F–35 Program Executive Officer (PEO), currently Lt Gen Chris Bogdan, is the airworthiness authority. Gen 

Bogdan uses his Program Office staff and the NAVAIR and AFLCMC engineering 

staffs to make recommendations on the airworthiness of the Developmental test 

fleet. 

Æ