NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Na me: 12a0184n.06 No. 10-1973 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT SUE FRITZ , P laintif f-App ellant,

v. CHART ER TOWNSH IP OF COMSTOCK, a pub lic body; TIM HUDSON, ind ividu a l l y and in his offi cial capacity as the supervisor for the Charte r Town ship of Comst ock, Defendan ts-Appellees. / ON AP P EAL F ROM THE UN ITED STATE S DISTRICT COURT F OR THE WEST ERN DISTRICT OF MIC HIGAN

BEFORE: COLE, CLAY, and COOK, Cir cuit Judges. CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Sue Fr itz , a former insurance age n t wi t h Fa rm Bur eau I nsuranc e (“F arm Bur eau” ), appea ls the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt pursuant to Rule 56 of the Fe dera l Rules of Civi l Procedur e to Def endants Charter Township of Comstock (the “Township”) and Tim Hudson (“H udson”). Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nts eng ag ed in unlawf

ul reta liation ag ainst her under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for exercising her First Amendment rig ht to publicly criticize the re sidents and Township offic ials of Comstock. For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the dec ision of the district court.No. 10-1973 BACK GR OUND I n Fe bruar

y 2005, Plaintiff enter ed into a contra ct with Fa rm Bur eau to become an independe nt a g ent aff

iliated with F arm Bur eau. Her application for employ ment was approve d by Richard Keilen (“K eilen”) , an ag ency manag er with Fa rm Bur eau, an d she beca me an “at will”

em p l o y ee with the company . I n May of 2005, Plaintiff purcha sed a single -fa mily home in the

re s i d en tial are a of Comstock Township with the intent of conver ting the residenc e into a h o m e office . Be cause Plaintiff’s house was zoned f or re sidential purposes, she a pplied for a

varia nce to the Comstock Township Z oning Boa rd. The Township eventua lly amende d its zoning ordinanc e to include “insuranc e office ” under the definition of and restric tions applicable to “home occupation.” T h e following month, the Planning Commi ssion approve d Plaintiff’s application for a Speci al Ex ception Use Permit, which allowed her to opera te her business as a home office in a single family home. Despite rec eiving permission to opera te her insurance office in a residential district, Plaintiff was sti ll require d to comply with the Township’s zoning ordinances, which place d restric tions on signa g e, parking , employ ees, and altera tions to the office , and also require d her to use the home as her residenc e. Shortly afte r Plaintiff rec eived approva l fo r h er home office , she place d a “F ritz Ag ency ” sign on her front lawn and a second sign on her car parke d on the drivewa y . The Township issued Plaintiff a signa g e violation for a non-comply ing sign. Plaintiff then reque sted a sign varia nce and attended a Z oning Boa rd of Appea ls meeting at which P l aint iff’s reque st was denied. She alleg ed that at the zoning board meeting , sever al false statements wer e made ab o u t her and her business by

residents a

nd officia ls of Comstock.

2No. 10-1973

Many of Plaintiff’s neig hbors raised conce rns with the Township and Fa rm Bur eau about the appea ranc e of her house and the signa g e. Residents complained that Plaintiff’s house appea red “too business looking” and that she failed to comply with the zoning require ments. Keilen stated at his deposition th at he rec eived a number of complaints from residents in the community

. He also lear ned that the neig hbors planne d t o circ ulate a petition in the community to remove Plaintiff’s home office from the neig hborhood. Keilen wanted to maintain g ood public rela tions with the community and attempted to alleviate some of the conflict betwee n Plaintiff and h er neig hbors. Keilen contac ted Robert L ux more (“L

ux more” ), the reg ional direc tor of ag encie s for Fa rm Bur eau, t o discuss the issues around Plaintiff’s home office

. L ux more advised Keilen to contac t t h e Township supervisor, Tim Hudson. Keilen contac ted Hudson on J uly 28, 2006, reg arding Plaintiff’s home office and asked a series of questions about the Township ordinanc e, whether Plaintiff wa s in compliance with the ordinanc e, and the residents’c omplaints. Keilen took notes to document the phone conversation. During this conver sation, Keilen an d Hudson also discussed Plaintiff’s comments in planning commission meeting s, a petition in the neig hborhood ag ainst Plai n t i ff, and a letter to the editor written by Plaintiff in which Hudson alleg ed that she “bashe d” Comstock. Hudson alleg edly complained about Plaintiff’s attendanc e at Comstock meeting s as well as her publi c co m m ents. Hudson war

ned Keilen that “F arm Bur eau’ s prese nce in Comstock was in jeopar dy beca use of Ms. Fr itz ’s speec h and conduct

. . . and that Comstock was alleg edly in an uproar about it.” (R.1: Compl. ¶ 34–35.) Hudson alleg edly stated to Keilen that there would be “adve rse conseque nces to her and Fa rm Bur eau from a public rela tions perspe ctive.” ( Id

. at ¶ 32.) Hudson also alleg edly stated that

3No. 10-1973

if Plaintiff “ would tone down her speec h and remove her sig n, her pr oblems might g o awa y .” ( Id

. at ¶ 27.) Shortly afte r Keilen’ s conver sation with Hudson, Ke ilen contac ted Plaintiff to discuss a number of conce rns raised by the Township residents a nd also to addre ss whether Plaintiff was in compliance with the Township ordinanc es. Keilen reque sted Plaintiff to take down the sign in front of her house and to pa

rk the c ar in the g ara g e whe n she is at home. Ac cording to Keilen, Plaintiff ignor ed his sug g estions for the rea son that she thought they wer e “foolish and [she] wasn’t g oing to comply with any of them.” ( R.66–5: Keilen Dep. 43.) Fa rm Bur eau also conducte d a separ ate investiga tion into Plaintiff’s home office

. I n November 2006, Be th G oodman (“G oodman”) , a former manag er of commerc ial proce ssing at Fa rm Bur eau, in it ia te d a s e p ara te investiga tion into some of the residents’ complaints about Plaintiff’s h o me o f f ic e . She also contacted Tim Hudson to further investiga te the complaints rec eived by Fa rm Bur eau inquiring whether Plaintiff’s office was in compliance with the Towns h i p o rdi nance . During Goodman’s conver sation with Hudson, she lear ned for the first time about the Township zoning ordinanc e and was conce rned that some of the Township’s policies wer e in direc t conflict with Fa rm Bur eau’ s insurance require ments. I n addition, Goodman also contac ted Ken Sparks, the Township attorney , to further investiga te the complaints. I n J anuar y 2007, Goodman rec eived a phone call from Sparks about complaints from the neig hborhood about Plaintiff’s home o ff ice. Sparks also wanted to know if Fa

rm Bur eau was internally handling the situation involving Plaintiff. Goodman acknow ledg ed that “at that point [she] knew that the township’s require ments and our require ments

wer en’t g oing to wor

k toge ther.” (R. 69–19: Goodman Dep. 36.)

4No. 10-1973

I n addition to Plaintiff’s contentious rela tionship with the Township residents, Plaintiff was also strug g ling to per fo rm h er j o b at an acc eptable level. Plaintiff sent an email to Keilen on Septem b er 2 6, 2006, which Keilen interpre ted as unprofe ssional, unacc eptable, and close to insubordination. The email discussed Plaintiff’s intention to stop working for the rema inder of the month b ecause she felt unmotivated to work. Keilen notified Plaintiff that her email and attitude could be g rounds for termination and that her behavior would n o t b e t o l erated by Fa rm Bur eau. Plaintiff acknow ledg ed in her deposition that many of these email exchang es with Keilen wer e true and ac cura

te. The following month, Plaintiff and Keilen met in-person and Plaintiff expressed h er frustra tion over being an ag ent and that she found the work to be v er y demanding

. Keilen also discovere d that Plaintiff failed to apply herse lf at car eer school, which all insurance ag ents wer e require d to attend. I n addition, Plainti ff f ailed to follow compa

ny proce dures a

nd her attitude and conduct towa

rds clients and othe r ag ents was una cce ptable. (R.66–5: Keilen D ep 55–57.) On Marc h 22, 2007, L

ux more terminated Plaintiff’s employ ment with Fa

rm Bur eau. The termination letter state d the following : The rea sons for this termination rela te to y our working rela tionship with employ ees of t h e C o m p an y and/or other Fa rm Bur eau I nsuranc e companies and to y our controve rsial community rela tions with y our n ei gh b o rs and with the local g overnme ntal u n it. Their comments and complaints have led the Company to conclude that y our prac tices and methods are r e s u lting in contentious and undesirable public controve rsy . The Company is conce rned tha t this detracts fr om the public’s imag e and perc eption of the Company , in p ar t icular and the Fa rm Bur eau org anization, in g ener al. As a result, the Company has conclude d that it is not in the best interest of the Company to continue y our Ag ent Employ ment Ag ree ment. (R.66–9: Br. in Supp. of Sec ond Mot. for Summ. J . Ex .11.)

5No. 10-1973

Plaintiff filed thi s 4 2 U. S

. C

. § 1983 action on Dec ember 14, 2007, seeking damag es, injunctive relief

, and attorney s’ fee s. She alleg ed in her complaint that the Chart er T o wn ship of Comstock and its supervisor, Tim Hudson, made disparag ing and false statem en t s ab out her in reta liation for Plaintiff exercising her First Amendment rig hts to speak critica lly of them in the press and in public meeting s. Plaintiff also alleg ed state law claims of tortious interfe renc e with contra ct, tortious interfer ence with business relationship or expectanc y , and def amation. On May 8, 2008, Def

endants filed a mot ion for summ ary judgme nt ag ainst Plainti ff. The district c ourt trea ted the motion for summary judgme nt as a motion for judg ment on the pleading s under Rule 12(c) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e in-as-muc h as Def endants relied upon that rule and did not offe r any matters for consideration bey ond the p l ea d ings. The district court dismiss ed Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim for failure to state a claim and her supplemental state law claims wer e dismiss ed without prejudice

. Plaintiff appea led on J anuar y 28, 2010. The district court’s dismi ssal of P laintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim was r ever sed bec ause this cour t found that Plaintiff’s alleg ations in her complaint wer e sufficie nt to state a claim for reta liation under § 1983 and rema

nded for further proce eding s. See Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock , 592 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff’s state lawclaims wer e dismissed without prejudice. On rema nd, Def endant s fi l ed a second motion for summary judgme nt on Plaintiff’s First Amendment reta liation claim on May 5, 2010. The district court gra n t ed De fe ndant’s motion, finding no evidenc e in the rec ord to suppor t Plaintiff’ s claim for the adver se ac tion element of he r reta liation claim. Plainti ff timely filed this appea l.

6No. 10-1973 DISCUSSIO N I. Stand ard of Review We r eview a district c ourt’s g rant of summary judgme nt de novo

. Rodgers v. Monume ntal Life Ins. Co. , 289 F.3d 442, 448 (6th Cir. 2002). Summary judgme nt is appropr iate if the pleading s, discovery , and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits “show that there is no g enuine dispute as to any materia l fac t and the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P

. 56(a)

. An issue of fac t is “g enuine” if the evidenc e is s u ch that a rea sonable jury could return a verdic t for the non-moving party

. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). After the mo v i n g p arty has satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth “spec ific fac ts showing that there is a g enuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A. F irst Am endm ent Re taliation Plaintiff arg ues that Hudson made adver se and reta liatory comments with the intent to harm her business reputa tion and economic interests for exercising her Firs t Amendment rig hts. She claims that Hudson’s comments wer e a motivating fac tor in her dismiss al from employ ment at Fa

rm Bur eau. I n order to survive summary judgme nt on a First Amendment reta liation claim, Plaintiff must prese nt sufficient e vidence to cre ate a triable issue of f

act a s to eac h of the following elements: (1) the plaintiff eng ag ed in constitutionally protec ted conduct; (2) an adver se action was taken ag ainst the pl aintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to eng ag e in that conduct; and (3) the adver se act i o n wa s motivated at least in part by

the plaintiff’s pr otected c onduct.

7No. 10-1973

Mezibov v. Allen , 411 F.3d 712, 717 (6th C i r. 2 0 0 5 ). T h is inquiry is context driven and “the underlying conce pts that [t he elements] signify will vary wi t h t h e setting- whether activity is ‘protec ted’ or an action is ‘adve rse’ will depend on context.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter , 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)

. “[I ]f the plaintiff establishes the three elements, the burden of production then shifts to the def en d an t s to show that their actions would not have been differ ent absent the plaintiff’s protec ted conduct.” Smith v. Craven , 61 F.App’ x 159, 161 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Thaddeus-X

, 175 F.3d a t 400)). 1. P rote cte d Cond uct Under the first ele ment, Plaintiff must establish t hat she was eng ag ed in conduct prote cted by the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X , 175 F.3d at 394–95. I t is undisputed that Plaintiff’s public speec h at publ ic m ee t i n gs and in the newspapers would be considered protected speech under the First Amendment. See Paige v. C oyner , 614 F.3d 273, 280 (6th Cir. 2010) (fin d i ng that a private citizen “eng ag ed in p ro t ec t ed activity by attending the Port Authority hear ing and voicing her opinion conce rning a proposed interstate projec t” constituted protec ted speec h). See also Glasson v. C ity of Louisvill e , 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975) (finding that “fr eedom of expression upon public questions is secure d by the Fir st Amendment”). Def endants contend, howeve r, that Plaintiff’s “per sonality and inappropria te conduct are not constitutionally protec ted .

. . and that one cannot shield their offens i v e p er s onality or conduct by eng ag ing in protec ted speec h at the same time.” (De fs.’ Br

. 45.) We find that such a n ar row distinction by Def

endants is unw arr anted and does not a ffe ct the dispositi on of this case . Some of

8No. 10-1973

the s peec h at i ssue i n this appea l was made in the contex t of publ ic Township meeting s, which as stated above trig g ere d protec tion under the F irst Amendment. 2. Adverse Act ion After establishing th at Plaintiff’s conduct is protec ted by the First Amendment, we then deter mine whether Def

endants’ alleg ed conduct was sufficie nt to state a claim for an adver se action. To deter mine whether an adver se action exis ts require s a “re asonable trier of fac t [t o] conclude that

a re t al i atory act [aga inst Plaintiff] would deter a person from exercising his rig hts. Siggers–El v. B a r l o w , 412 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005). The deter rent eff ect of the adver se action, howeve r, “nee d not be g rea t in order to be actionable .” Thaddeus-X , 175 F.3d at 397 (quoting Bart v.Telford , 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982.)) “The plaintiff' s evidentiar y burden is mere ly to establish the fac tual basis for his claim that the reta liatory acts amounted to more than a de minimi s injury .” Bell v. Johnson , 308 F.3d 594, 606 ( 6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff contends that the district court err oneously g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of the Township and Hudson wher e Hudson’s statements alleg edly provided a basis for her termination from Fa rm Bur eau. The district court revie wed an d summarized matters from three telephone

conver sations wher e Fa

rm Bur eau employ ees, Keilen and Goodman, contac ted Hudson and Hudson alleg edly made f alse a nd/or misleading statements. A. July 28, 2006 Plaintiff stated that Keilen’ s notes from his J uly 28, 2006 conver sation with Hudson reve aled false statements, which c o n s ti tu te d an adver se action ag ainst her. I n particula r, the alleg ed comments stated that Plaintiff was “ver y antag onistic ag ainst the Township” and that she had “wr itten a nasty

9No. 10-1973

article to the editor bashing the Township.” (Pl. Br

. 24.) Hudson alleg edly stated that Plaintiff was “say ing things in Planning Commi ssion meeting s that she should never say ” and if Plaintiff “would tone it down and remove her sign then her problems with the Township would g o awa y .” ( Id

. at 24–25.) B. Novem ber 15, 2006 During the November 15, 2006 conve rsation betwee n Hudson and Goodman, Hudson alleg edly stated that “Ms. Fr itz pushes the envelope as far as she can and that the neig hborhood was not happy .” I n addition, Hudson stated that the “neig hborhood was up in arms and that Fa rm Bur eau neede d to be conce rned beca use of the publicity reg arding Ms. F ritz and Ms. Fr itz ’s conduct about its reputation.” (

Id . at 11–12.) C. Marc h 1, 2007 Goodman had an additional pho n e conver sation with Hudson on Marc h 1, 2007, wher e Hudson alleg edly “complain ed i n a frustrated matter to her that Ms. Fr itz had the Township in an uproar and that he was about to lose his (Township) Boa rd over it.” (

Id

. at 1 1

. ) Huds on further stated that he was “sick of Ms. Fr itz and her video came ra.” ( Id

. at 12.) He also indicated that “Ms. Fr itz can’ t be selling insurance beca use of the extent of her other activities that he had just ref ere nced and that people ref

used to talk to her.” (

Id .) I n viewing the notes in a light most favor able to Plaintiff, the district court assumed that all of the notes ref

lected Hudson’s statements. Hudson’s statements answe red questions reg ar d i ng complaints Fa

rm Bur eau rec eived from Plaintiff’s neig hbors and citizens of C omstock, as well as article s that appea

red in the loc al media.

10No. 10-1973

The district court conclude d that there was insufficient evidenc e to prove an adver se action by Hudson ag ainst Plaintiff. I n doing so the district court relied on g uidance provided by this court in Fritz , wher e we stated: I f Def endant Hudson in fac t made statements that wer e desig ned to communicate to Fa rm Bur eau that i t would be in the business’ interest in terms of its dealing s in Comstock to reig n i n Plaintiff’s exercise of her First Amendment rig hts, or that it would be better

for F arm Bur eau to c ance l its contra ct with Plaintiff, that would be an adve rse a ction sufficie nt to support a claim of re taliation. 592 F.3d a t 725. We ag ree with the di strict court that there is no evidenc e of a threat by Hudson direc ted at Fa rm Bur eau. I

n rea ching this conclusion, we have also revie wed the te rmination letter presented to Plaintiff. Although the letter ref ers to “contr oversial community rela tions with her neig hbors and with the g overnme ntal unit,” there is no dispute among the parties that it was Fa rm Bur eau, and not Hudson or Comstock, rea cting to neig hbor conflicts and newspa per acco u n t s , t h at initiated Fa rm Bur eau’ s investiga tion of P l ai n t iff. I n addition, there is no evidenc e that could rea sonably be construed a s a di rec tive from C omstock or Hudson that Fa rm Bur eau should alter its employ ment rela tionship wi t h Plaintiff. There was, howeve r, evidenc e that Plaintiff’s working rela tionships, i n cl uding her unwillingness to follow her supervisor’ s instruction as to her behavior i n t h e community , wer e sig nificant fa ctors in Plaintiff’s termination. I n Paige v. Conyer , a rec ent decision by this court, we wer e prese nted with a lleg ations that the county officia l reta liated ag ainst the plaintiff by callin g her employ er and say ing false things about a speec h made by the plaintiff at a public hear ing. 614 F.3d at 276–7 7

. T h e p l aint iff’s employ er, which was involved in the development of commerc ial proper ties in the county , alleg edly

11No. 10-1973

fired the plaintiff as a result of the county officia l’s call, which was the county o ff i ci al ’s d es ired result. This court rever sed t he gra nt of a 12( b)(6) motion to di smiss and remande d the ca se to the district court for

further proce eding s. Id . at 284. The inquiry in this case as to whether Hudson’s statements amount to an adver se action also require s us to c onsider Hudson’s First Amendment rig ht to respond to the resident complaints and Plaintiff’s criticisms of the Town ship ordinanc e. I n Mezibov , we found that a criminal defe nse attorney ’s alleg ed speec h fell within the constitutionally protec te d r ig ht to respond. 411. F.3d at 722. We stated that I t would be inconsistent with core First Amendment principles and basic notions of fairne ss not to allow [a g overnme nt official] to respond to [allegations of unethical conduct] to the extent his out-of-c ourt comments wer e not def amatory , even if

that response was (quite natura lly ) prompted by constitutionally protec ted speec h by [t he plaintiff]. Id

. We are fac ed with a simil ar situation in this case . Unlike the fac ts prese nted in Paige , the majority of the comments by

Hudson wer e made in r esponse to K eilen and Goodman’s questions a bout the issues involving Plaintiff’s home office

. Keilen had been instructed by his superior at Fa rm Bur eau to conduct an investiga tion. As part of this investiga tion, Keilen initiated a private communication with Hudson focusing solely on the issues conce rning the complaints made by the residents; and to better understand the Township’s specia l exception ordinanc e for Plaintiff’s home office

. Hudson stated his opinion in response to K eilen’s questions. Hudson’s answe rs also included response s to criticism that Plaintiff made in public.

12No. 10-1973

A lthough we have previously rec og nized that in some case s “injury based on embar rassment, humiliation, and emotional distress” is sufficie nt to be actionable under § 1983, see Bloch v. Ribar , 156 F.3d 673, 679–80 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Barrett v. Harrington , 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1997),

cert. denied , 523 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct

. 1517, 1 4 0 L

. E d

. 2 d 670 (1998), we find that such circ umstances did not exis t in the prese nt case . For example, in Bloch , the defe ndant police office r

reve aled to the media

intimate a

nd humiliating details about the victim’s ra pe. I n Barrett , a judg e reta liated ag ainst a defe nse counsel by issuing press stat em en t s that falsely acc used the lawy er of stalking. We find such case s inapplicable as the conduct was extreme and the alleg ations are distinct from the a lleg ations in the prese nt case . Her e, Hudson’s speec h did not amount to any outlandish alleg ations. See Thaddeus-X , 175 F.3d at 398 (empha siz ing that “ce rtain threa ts or depriva tions are

so de minimi s that they do not rise to the level of being constitutional violations, [and that] this threshold is intended to wee d out only inconseque ntial actions, and is not a mea ns wher eby solely eg reg ious reta liatory acts are allowed to proce ed past summary judgme nt”). We further note that d u r in g o ral arg ument, Plaintiff had trouble identify ing statements that amounted to the adver s e a c ti o n of terminating Plaintiff’s contra ct with Fa rm Bur eau. There fore , we cannot conclude that Hudson’s actions would “dete r a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to eng ag e in that conduct.” Id

. at 394. We there fore believe that the district court appropr iately conclude d that Plain t i ff ca n not prove a n actionable adver se ac tion. 3. Causal Conn ect ion The third element that Plaintiff must satisfy is whether “ther e is a causa l connec tion betwee n elements one and two—that i s , t h e adver se action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiffs

13No. 10-1973

protec ted conduct.” Id. This e lement require s us to subje ctively consider Def endant’ s motivation for his state ments. Id

. at 399. We note that “bec ause of the difficulty in pr oviding direc t e vidence of an officia l’s reta liatory motive, circ umstantial evidenc e can suffice .” Hill v. Lappin , 630 F.3d 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2010) (c iting Holzeme r v. City of Mem phis , 621 F.3d 512, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2010) ). We find no causa l connec tion betwee n Plaintiff’s protec ted speec h and the adver se action of her termination. As an initial matter, Hudson did not “have the authority to take any township action ag ainst Fa

rm Bur eau” as h e wa s m er ely a Township Supervisor and was not part of the administrative body

. (De fs.’ Br

. 55.) We have previously held that a may or could not be held liable

u n d er a § 1983 claim ag ainst a city council cler k when the may or lacke d control or could n o t adver sely aff

ect the cler

k’s employ

ment. See Poppy v. City of W illoughby H

ills , 96 F.App’ x 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that since the may or “wa s not the decisionmak er , he cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the City Council’s decisions reg arding [P laintiff’s] terms and conditions of employ ment”). Hudson was not in a position to terminate Plaintiff f rom Fa rm Bur eau and lacke d authority to take adve rse a ction ag ainst her. We also find insufficient evidenc e in the rec ord to support Plaintiff’s contention that Hudson wanted Plaintiff terminated from her position at Fa rm Bur eau. Keilen’ s deposition tes t i mony established that Hudson did not want to take any action ag ainst Plaintiff. The following exchang e took place at Keilen’s de position: Q: I ncidentally , did Tim Hudson ever a sk y ou to fire Sue F ritz? A: No. Q: Did he eve r try

to encour ag e y ou to fire Sue F ritz? A: No. Q: Or discha

rg e her ? A: No. 14No. 10-1973

Q: Or take any

disciplinary

action ag ainst her? A: No. (R.66–5: Keilen Dep. 46.) Keilen’ s testimony supports the conclusion that Hudson never reque sted that Plaintiff be terminated from her position. Hudson did not take action or threa ten to take action ag ainst Fa

rm Bur eau or

Plaintiff during the cour se of Plaintiff’s tenur e as a n insurance ag ent. L u x more, a supervisor at Fa rm Bur eau further supported Keilen’ s testimony that nei t h er Hudson nor the Township bore any responsibility for Plai n t i ff’ s termination. L ux more stated the following : Q: Did y ou ever

fee l pressure by

. . . the township to fire or disc ipline Sue Fritz? A: Township does not make the decision to terminate e mploy ees. Q: The township was not involved in that dec ision? A: Absolutely

not. Q: And y ou never

felt any pressure influence d by the township to take that action? A: I didn’t fee l the pressure . What I did fee l is just the whole corr espondenc e of what was transpiring as far

as ca n I have an office , can I have staff people, not ha ve staff people. So f

rustration from that end, y es, but a bsolutely no way did I fee l that I was forc ed to terminate as a r esult of [the Township.]

. . . . Q: So agai n , wo uld y ou have terminated Sue Fr itz irrespe ctive of her rela tionship with Comst ock Township?

. . . . A: I did not terminate or r ecommend termination beca use of the conflicts with Mr. Hudson or the township, et c eter a. (R.69–15: L ux more De p. 69–70.) Although the termination letter, prepa red by Fa rm Bur eau’ s leg al counsel and signe d by L ux more, ref

ere nced Plaintiff’s pract i ces, methods, and contentious rela tionship with the

commu n i t y , L u x m o re stated that the decision to dismiss Plaintiff was based on her working rela tionship with h er insurance supervisor and also conce rns about Fa rm Bur eau prese rving a

15No. 10-1973

favor able reputa tion in the community

. Def endants are not require d to acc ept Plaintiff’s conduct and have pr esente d sufficie nt evidence of a le g itimate rea son for Plaintiff’s ter mination. We find that Plaintiff has n o t sustained her burden to prove the alleg ed reta liatory acts committed by Hudson amounted to an ad v er s e action, nor can Plaintiff prove the requisite causa l

co n n ec t i on betwee n her protec ted speec h and the alleg ed adver se action, or that the rea sons articula ted by

Def endant a re pr etextual in nature.

CONCLUSION For the re asons stated a

bove we AF F IRM the dec ision of the district court.

16