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THE FUTURE OF U.S.–TAIWAN RELATIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 11, 2016

Serial No. 114–153

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Susan A. Thornton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State ................................................... 8

Mr. Randall Schriver, president and chief executive officer, Project 2049 Institute ........................................................................................................................ 24

Ms. Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia, director of China Power Project, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 32

Shelley Rigger, Ph.D., Brown professor and assistant dean for educational 

policy, Davidson College ...................................................................................... 43

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Susan A. Thornton: Prepared statement ........................................................ 10

Mr. Randall Schriver: Prepared statement ........................................................... 27

Ms. Bonnie Glaser: Prepared statement ................................................................ 34

Shelley Rigger, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 45

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 58

(1)

THE FUTURE OF U.S.–TAIWAN RELATIONS 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. Subcommittee will come to order. 

First of all and foremost, my heart goes out to Taiwan as it deals 

with the aftermath of the shocking magnitude 6.4 earthquake on 

February 6th that claimed 63 lives and injured 551, and that was 

in the city of Tainan, where I lived for 7 months, and I have a really special place in my heart for the people of Tainan. 

I am so saddened to hear about the damage that the earthquake 

wreaked and I know I am joined with my colleagues of the subcommittee in continuing to support Taiwan in this difficult time. 

Today, we celebrate Taiwan’s democracy, given its recent Presidential and parliamentary elections in January. In this regional 

context, Taiwan’s free and fair elections, vibrant free market economy and open society have definitely set an example for the region 

and for the world. 

With the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP, victory, the party 

has won its first ever absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan 

which until—which has until now been controlled by the Kuomintang, KMT. President-elect Tsai Ing-wen will also be Taiwan’s 

first female President and I think that is pretty exciting. 

This third peaceful transfer of executive power is an indication 

of the maturation of Taiwan’s democracy. The recent election presents the United States with more opportunities to improve our political security and economic relationship with Taiwan. 

We are here to parse out the priorities of President-elects Tsai’s 

administration and understand the prospects and potential for the 

U.S., Taiwan and the cross-Strait relationships and to discuss how 

the United States can continue to honor our commitments to Taiwan. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses on 

these important issues. 

The cross-Strait relationship has been relatively stable under the 

sitting Kuomintang President Ma Ying-jeou. President Ma took 

strides to build closer relationships with China, especially in trade. 

To his credit, President Ma negotiated the Economic Cooperation 

Framework Agreement, ECFA, with China in 2010 and this paved 

2

the way for Taiwan’s expanded trade ties under similar economic 

cooperation agreements with New Zealand and Singapore. 

The suspension on the cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement, 

TISA, as a result of domestic protests in 2014 may have indirectly 

contributed to China’s tightening on further trade agreements between Taiwan and other countries. 

With slow economic development, untapped potential due to political constraints and heavy reliance on trade, I look forward to 

hearing from our distinguished panels, especially our administration witness, about Taiwan’s economic and trade prospects and how 

the United States can help Taiwan overcome some of these challenges. 

I also worry about the potential for cross-Strait stability as 

China has not hesitated to remind us that it is still willing to use 

military force against Taiwan. 

Of note, China continues to press President-elect Tsai and her 

administration to acknowledge the 1992 consensus, something 

President Ma has adhered to. 

President-elect Tsai will continue to face pressure here, given her 

party’s own interpretation of the agreement. Despite underscoring 

her intention to maintain the status quo and saying there won’t be 

provocation and there won’t be surprises, we cannot say the same 

for China. 

A steady stream of threats toward Taiwan’s national security are 

an everyday reality for Taiwan and its people and I hope our panelists can shed light on how we can continue to support Taiwan’s security under the Taiwan Relations Act and through increased cooperation. 

I admire outgoing President Ma and all that he was able to accomplish for Taiwan. I look forward to seeing how we can continue 

to work with President Tsai for the mutual benefit of the United 

States and Taiwan. 

Members of Congress have always shared a strong interest in 

supporting Taiwan’s security and democracy. Having lived there for 

a few years myself while serving a church mission, I am one of its 

big supporters—hopefully, its biggest. 

At a time when Taiwan’s presence in the international arena is 

constantly being threatened, at a time when Taiwan’s security is 

not insured from coercion and potential attacks, I urge our administration to continue to support Taiwan. 

We must prioritize Taiwan’s active and meaningful participation 

on the global stage, ensure its self-defense capabilities are sufficient and ensure that its economy continues to grow vibrantly and 

compete with other major powers in the region. 

Members present today are going to be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official hearing record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow for statements, questions and extraneous material subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

And I am going to recognize Chairman Royce and then Ranking 

Member Sherman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Chairman Salmon. 

And let me first say on behalf of our members here we have all 

visited Tainan and been in Taiwan and our hearts go out to the 

3

people of Taiwan, to the victims of this earthquake. Fifty-nine perished so far. Hundreds and hundreds have been injured. There is 

a great knowledge here in the United States in terms of how much 

the Taiwanese go to the rescue with volunteers all over the world 

after international incidents whenever an earthquake or some 

other disaster hits. We saw how quickly the authorities, but also 

how quickly the volunteers, rushed to the scene to begin to rescue 

people. 

So we have traveled—our committee together since I have been 

chairman—has traveled three times down to Taiwan in the last 3 

years. We visited Kaohsiung and we have visited Tainan, as I mentioned, and Taipei, of course, and we are just devastated to see the 

destruction. But the American people stand by the Taiwanese people in their time of need and we are ready to assist in any way we 

can. 

Taiwan is one of our most important friends to the U.S. in the 

Asia Pacific and I know that supporting Taiwan is a critical issue 

for members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. As chairman, I have 

made the strengthening of this relationship with Taiwan one of the 

committee’s top priorities. 

I want to again congratulate the people of Taiwan for their free 

and fair elections last month. I think the U.S. and Taiwan share 

a very important commitment to democracy, to human rights, to 

the rule of law and these values, I think, serve as a bedrock to the 

U.S.-Taiwan relationship. And I think the election demonstrated 

the strength and vibrancy of Taiwan’s democracy and their democratic system, hopefully serving as a model for other countries in 

the region. 

Last year, Chairman Salmon joined me, as I said, in the delegation where we spent some time in Taipei working to strengthen the 

U.S.-Taiwan relationship. We met with the sitting President, Ma. 

We met with President-elect, Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, and as the Taiwan 

Government changes hands during its transition period it is important that the U.S. continues to emphasize its steadfast commitment 

to Taiwan and that the players in Taiwan also make responsible 

decisions that are in the best interest of the people of Taiwan. 

A stable and prosperous Taiwan is, of course, in the best interests of the United States and that is why I look forward to working 

closely with President-elect Tsai’s new government to strengthen 

all aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan bilateral relationship. And in particular I have a enthusiasm—I have long been an advocate for Taiwan’s inclusion into the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Taiwan’s economic security is just as important as its physical security, so its 

inclusion in the second round of the agreement will be critical to 

Taiwan’s stability. I know that Dr. Tsai will be willing to do the 

work in Taiwan needed to seriously begin a bilateral investment 

agreement with the United States with an eye toward TPP and so 

I encourage the administration to work with the new government 

to create a pathway for Taiwan to be integrated into these trade 

deals. 

I am also committed to upholding the letter and spirit of the Taiwan Relations Act, which has underpinned the relationship now for 

37 years. 

4

Last year, we worked tirelessly to pressure the administration to 

finally follow through with the arms sales that it had promised 

Taiwan. The sales were finally set in motion in December but I remain deeply skeptical about the administration’s delays that needlessly drag out the arms sales process for Taiwan. 

So over the next year both the U.S. and Taiwan will be working 

on these types of issues, and I thank Chairman Salmon again—he 

is among the strongest friends of the Taiwanese people—and I also 

thank Congressman Brad Sherman and the other members of this 

committee for their engagement on the issue of Taiwan. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

The chair recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Chairman, thank you for holding these hearings. 

I know we have a classified briefing for the full committee on the 

same subject as these hearings and then I know that we have 

votes. 

So we will have a limited amount of time here in this room. Our 

hearts go out to the people of Taiwan and I join with your statement, the statement of our full committee chair, in sympathy for 

the people of Taiwan where this disaster has cost 60 lives. 

And as the chairman noted, the people of Taiwan are there again 

and again and again when there is a disaster elsewhere in the 

world. 

While the regime in Beijing is currently engaged in a concerted 

effort to restrict human rights, we look only at Taiwan as a country 

where democracy flourishes, and we will once again see the peaceful and democratic transfer of power from one party to another. 

The United States has a strong interest in supporting the people 

of Taiwan and those interests are enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act, which is an important statement that the U.S. to resolve 

that the people of Taiwan will be able to determine their own fate 

permanently and peacefully. 

The clear message should be that the United States believes in 

the power of dialogue and we unequivocally support the right of the 

people of Taiwan to determine their own fate. 

In that spirit, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for bringing up the 

Taiwan Naval Support Act and I thank the administration for finally delivering the frigging frigates. 

While our commitment to our friends in Taiwan should not be 

doubted, I was very impressed to meet Dr. Tsai when she was in 

opposition on the trip led by Chairman Royce and I am confident 

that the people of Taiwan will rejoice when they inaugurate their 

first woman President and it is a joy that I look forward to the 

American people experiencing just a year later. 

And I know the people of Taiwan will enjoy living under a 

woman President and I know my constituents look forward to that 

joy as well. 

I look forward to hearing how we can help diversify the economy 

of Taiwan so it is less reliant on and dependent on and subject to 

manipulation by the People’s Republic of China. 

I support Taiwan joining TPP if that is what the people of China 

want—the people of Taiwan want. What I don’t support is the 

United States joining TPP, and I will point out that every canVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:50 Apr 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\021116\98605 SHIRL
5

didate for President that is able to get more than 3 percent of the 

vote has taken a stance against TPP because they know that the 

American people wouldn’t dream of seriously considering a candidate that supported this trade pact which will hurt the American 

people so significantly while helping the People’s Republic of China 

establish that the rules of trade for the world are that currency 

manipulation is, as my people say, kosher. 

It is a tremendous negotiating victory for the People’s Republic 

of China to enshrine in the rules of the road that their practices 

of currency manipulation are to be sacrosanct, not to mention the 

fact that the rules of origin are of such tremendous assistance to 

the People’s Republic of China. 

Taiwan could play a useful and larger role in international organizations, sharing its expertise, sharing its experience. 

The United States needs to continue to advocate broader participation for in Taiwan international organizations, whether it be 

those organizations like Interpol, that keep us safe from dangerous 

criminals, and that’s why I have cosponsored legislation to direct 

the President to develop a strategy to obtain observer status at 

least for Taiwan and Interpol. 

Similarly, I have advocated Taiwan’s participation in other international organizations. There is no reason why the fine points of 

international sovereignty should get involved in the practicality of 

Taiwan’s membership in WHO. 

Even the People’s Republic of China has it in their interest to 

stop criminals and stop disease and the practical way to do that 

is to involve Taiwan to the maximum extent in the international 

organizations that are focused on human health and international 

crime. 

So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses here in this open 

setting and to then adjourning for the classified briefing. 

And I don’t know if anyone else on our side has an opening statement. But I hope the chairman would indulge at least one member 

on our side. 

Mr. SALMON. Sure. I think Mr. Chabot has an opening statement. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this important hearing. Considering the recent elections in Taiwan, I want to commend the subcommittee for calling this hearing. 

I met with President-elect Tsai several times in the past, both 

here and in Taiwan, and I congratulate her and the people of Taiwan for their continued support of democracy. 

And I want to say that I agree with my colleague, Mr. Sherman, 

which sometimes we agree and sometimes we don’t, but I certainly 

agree with his sentiment about how wonderful it is that Taiwan 

has its first woman President. 

As far as here in the U.S., I also share the sentiment of having 

the first woman President sworn in next year except that unfortunately——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Here in the United States? 

Mr. CHABOT [continuing]. Because of New Hampshire Tuesday 

evening Carly Fiorina already dropped out. But in any event——

Mr. SHERMAN. Hence, there is only one way to achieve the goal 

that you and I both have for the United States. 

6

Mr. CHABOT. And we may both have them this year. You never 

know. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Gee, Mr. Chairman, I was just about to give Mr. 

Chabot a big hug. 

Mr. CHABOT. There you go. 

Mr. SALMON. Yeah. He was talking about a brokered convention. 

I’m sorry. 

Mr. CHABOT. But getting back to Taiwan, I would like to quickly 

address the restrictions on high-level visits by high-ranking Taiwanese officials, something that I have always felt was both insulting and counterproductive. 

Years ago, I joined a number of my colleagues and we flew to 

New York City one evening to meet—after votes here to meet with 

then President Chen, who is a great friend of America. 

We had to travel to New York because President Chen was not 

allowed to enter Washington, DC. This is U.S. policy, our own selfimposed restrictions, and I have long said that this policy is nonsense and should be changed. 

In fact, then Foreign Minister Mark Chen when he was in the 

legislature I had met with him in Washington. He was appointed 

foreign minister and a few weeks later when we were going to get 

together I had to drive to Baltimore to meet with him there because he wasn’t allowed—since he was one of the four top officials 

wasn’t allowed to meet here in Washington, DC. That is outrageous. It is an insult to Taiwan and the United States should 

change this immediately. 

I also urge the administration to have direct dialogue with the 

democratically-elected President of Taiwan and, as you all know, 

international diplomacy face-to-face meetings are an important 

component in ensuring a sustainable relationship. 

And finally, I would like to note that I introduced H. Con. Res. 

88 last fall. This legislation reaffirms that Taiwan Relations Act 

and the six assurances together form the cornerstone of U.S. relations with Taiwan. I would urge my colleagues to join in that support. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just real briefly, as a member of the committee and subcommittee and also as the co-chair of the Taiwan caucus, this is a 

very important hearing and events in the Strait are also very important. 

We all can celebrate free and democratic elections that led to the 

change in government from one party to another and with the first 

female President of Taiwan, both welcome developments, and to 

watch the free transfer of power is a very powerful model in the 

region, one we hope will evolve and be replicated. 

I agree with Mr. Chabot that the cornerstone of our relationship 

is the Taiwan Relations Act and the six assurances and that act 

includes interalia, a defensive military support posture on the part 

of the United States, to ensure that peace prevails in the Taiwan 

Straits and that whatever the evolution politically it will be a 

peaceful one, not any other kind of kinetic option. 

7

So these are important hearings. Lots of changes going on including, tragically, the earthquake in Tainan and the loss of life there, 

and I am happy to be here and joining in these hearings. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking member, Mr. 

Sherman, for holding them. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Ms. Meng. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, to our Ranking Member Sherman and all our distinguished witnesses who are here 

today. Thank you for attending this important hearing. 

Before I go forward with my remarks, I also want to take a moment to acknowledge the earthquake in Taiwan this past Saturday. 

It was a terrible tragedy and I know people, not just in Taiwan 

and around the world, but my constituents in New York are very 

concerned as well. 

I know that rescue efforts are ongoing and I too want to thank 

all the volunteers and people who have come forward to help. 

Both my colleagues and I will be keeping a close eye on the 

progress. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to assess the future of U.S.-Taiwan relations, particularly in light of the January 16th Presidential elections, and I too want to extend my congratulations to 

Dr. Tsai as the first female President in Taiwan. 

I congratulate the people of Taiwan for their steadfast adherence 

to democracy and I look forward to improving our robust relationship. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Bera, if you would like to make a quick opening 

statement. You good? 

Mr. Lowenthal, did you want to make a quick statement? 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. I concur. First, I thank you for being here. You 

know, and I also want to extend my condolences to the families of 

all those that were killed and injured by the earthquake. I want 

to congratulate the people of Taiwan on the successful elections. 

It is a welcome example of democracy in a region that at the 

same time has seen a great backsliding on human rights. That is 

not true in terms of Taiwan. 

We have seen the gradual improvement in the relationships between the cross-Strait relations. 

I think it is beneficial for the security of all to have that stability 

and I look forward to the hearing today. Thank you, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. 

We are going to go ahead and introduce our first panelist. Thank 

you so much for being here today, Ms. Thornton. 

We are pleased to have Ms. Susan Thornton here today, deputy 

assistant secretary of state in the State Department’s Bureau of 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs. And we would like to have you give 

your opening statement and have some questions and then we will 

excuse you and we will seat the next panel. 

You understand the lighting system. Not real complicated. When 

it goes amber you got a minute and when it goes red, most of the 

time people keep talking around here, but you should stop. 

Thank you. Ms. Thornton. 

8

STATEMENT OF MS. SUSAN A. THORNTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members 

of the subcommittee for having me here today and giving me the 

opportunity to discuss our very strong relationship with Taiwan. 

The story of Taiwan is, of course, an impressive one. People on 

Taiwan have built a prosperous, free and orderly society with 

strong institutions worthy of emulation and envy. 

And before I go any further, I would also like to offer my sincere 

condolences to everyone in Taiwan that was affected by the recent 

earthquake, especially the families of those who were injured or 

lost their lives. The American people stand with the people on Taiwan during this difficult time. 

Last month’s free and fair elections were yet another victory for 

Taiwan’s vibrant democracy. These elections not only represent 

Taiwan’s third peaceful transition of Presidential power and the 

first transfer of power in its legislature but, as has been already 

remarked, will also lead to the inauguration of Taiwan’s first female President. 

In this administration we have worked to strengthen and deepen 

the bonds between the people of the United States and Taiwan to 

build a comprehensive, durable and mutually beneficial partnership. 

As one of Taiwan’s strongest partners, we are working side by 

side to increase our mutual economic prosperity, tackle global challenges and ensure effective security to support continued stability 

and dynamism for Taiwan and the region. 

On trade issues, Taiwan has developed a well-earned reputation 

for having a diversified economy that has built its prosperity on the 

openness of the global trade system. 

Taiwan has grown to become our ninth largest trading partner 

and our seventh largest destination for agricultural exports. In 2015, our two-way trade in goods with Taiwan reached $66 

billion, up 41⁄2 percent in just the last 2 years. The United States 

has also moved up to be Taiwan’s second largest trading partner 

in the last year. 

Aside from these big business links, people-to-people ties between 

the United States and Taiwan also continue to grow. Travel for 

business and pleasure from Taiwan to the United States jumped 35 

percent in 2013 alone after Taiwan became a member of the U.S. 

visa waiver program in November 2012. 

The United States remains committed to supporting Taiwan’s 

confidence and dignity through increased participation in the international community and enhanced security. 

We continue to support Taiwan’s membership in organizations 

that do not require statehood and to urge meaningful participation 

in those that do. 

At a time when pressure to squeeze Taiwan out of international 

organizations is growing, we are finding new ways for Taiwan to 

earn the dignity and respect that its contributions to global challenges merit. 

These include new innovations such as the establishment of our 

Global Cooperation and Training Framework. The GCTF is a vehiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:50 Apr 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\021116\98605 SHIRL
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cle for the United States to help showcase Taiwan’s strengths and 

expertise by making it a hub for helping other countries to address 

global and regional concerns. 

At the same time, we remain just as committed to Taiwan’s 

meaningful participation in organizations like Interpol, ICAO, 

WHO and the U.N. climate framework. 

We will continue to match Taiwan’s growing capacity to serve the 

international community with equally innovative approaches to enabling and highlighting Taiwan’s contributions. 

On the security front, the United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to maintain 

a sufficient self-defense which is consistent with our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. 

During the Obama administration, we have notified Congress of 

over $14 billion in arms sales to Taiwan including a sale of $1.83 

billion that was notified in December of last year. 

Our efforts at supporting Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities extend beyond arms sales, however. We also support Taiwan’s capacity-building efforts through visits, maintenance programs, and exchanges. 

Due in part to these stepped-up contacts and strong U.S. partnership, Taipei has gained more confidence in its engagements 

with Beijing. 

In recent years, the two sides have pursued constructive dialogue 

to reach agreements on economic and people-to-people exchanges 

that promote peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. 

Last year in November, we welcomed the meeting between leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the historic improvement in cross-Strait relations that it symbolized. 

The United States remains committed to our one-China policy 

based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations 

Act, a policy that has remained consistent over several decades and 

many administrations. 

We will continue to call on both sides of the Strait to engage in 

dialogue on the basis of dignity and respect after Taiwan’s new administration takes office in May. 

In conclusion, we have developed a vital partnership with Taiwan that is filled with many opportunities for cooperation in the 

future. 

We are committed to ensuring that this relationship will continue to thrive as we find new ways to deepen our unofficial ties. 

The innovative spirit, democratic dynamism and courageous vision of the people on Taiwan make us proud to be their friend and 

partner. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I would like to 

thank you again for inviting me here today and I’m happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Thornton follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Ms. Thornton. 

Regarding the recent earthquake, what kind of assistance are we 

planning to offer them as they look to find missing people or rebuild? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for that 

question. 

We have already in the process of last weekend’s earthquake received a declaration of the disaster from the authorities on Taiwan 

and have responded to that with a contribution that we are making 

through the Taiwan Red Cross that will go to help the families of 

those affected by the earthquake. 

We have also had a member of our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance regional team fly to Tainan to inspect the work that was 

ongoing and to keep coordination with people in the Taiwan authorities to see if there is any additional assistance that would be 

needed. 

So far, the judgment has been made that the Taiwan rescue authorities are fully capable of conducting the onsite rescue. But we 

are maintaining close contact with them. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

In your opening statement at the close, you were reaffirming our 

commitment to the one-China policy as spelled out in the three 

communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act and I really appreciate 

that. I think that is valuable. 

Let me just quote—right after Secretary of State John Kerry had 

his first meeting with his Chinese counterpart, the Foreign Minister, after the elections he said this to reporters:

‘‘Let me just say with respect to one of the issues that the Foreign Minister raised on Taiwan that since they just had an 

election and a new party has won, the United States does reaffirm the three communiques, which have been the basis of our 

policy, we remain committed to a one-China policy but we encourage cross-Strait dialogue for resolution of that issue.’’

Now, in his comments he didn’t mention the Taiwan Relations 

Act, that our one-China policy is not just based on the three communiques but also the Taiwan Relations Act. 

As you aptly pointed out, the Taiwan Relations Act states that 

it is U.S. policy to consider any effort to determine the future of 

Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to peace and security of the Western Pacific area and a grave concern to the United 

States. 

How significant, if at all, do you consider the omission to have 

been and what if any are the implications? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I would say that Secretary Kerry, in speaking at the press conference, if he omitted the mention of the Taiwan Relations Act in 

that construct it was certainly unintentional. 

We, as a matter of constant practice when we are describing our 

one-China policy, always try to pair the adherence to the three 

joint communiques with our strong commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act as a cornerstone of our policy and as, really, the framework within which we conduct our unofficial relationship with Taiwan. 

15

Of course, it also provides for the establishment of the American 

Institute in Taiwan, which provides for a cadre of experts both in 

Taiwan and here in Washington, to pursue this relationship with 

a laser focus on trying to expand our cooperation. 

So I want to assure you that Secretary Kerry’s omission, if it 

happened, was completely inadvertent. We have seen President 

Obama, standing next to President Xi at least twice since I’ve been 

in this job at a press conference, mention the Taiwan Relations Act. 

So I know that it is firmly, you know, part of our——

Mr. SALMON. And we wanted to give you the opportunity to make 

sure that that was part of the package, that that is a strong commitment and that is a strong part of our policy. 

After President Tsai got elected, she said that maintaining the 

status quo is her commitment to the people of Taiwan regarding 

the cross-Strait relations and the international community and 

there won’t be provocation and there won’t be surprises. 

Meanwhile, directly after the election, China broadcast images of 

archived live-fired military drills. How confident are you, if at all, 

that the DPP and the Chinese leadership have workable communication channels that might help them avoid misunderstandings 

and manage the tensions? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you very much for that very important 

question. 

As you know, in the lead-up to the elections, the United States 

hosted both of the major Presidential candidates. And in that respect we were able to have a very good conversation with Dr. Tsai 

about her plans for her administration, about her positions on 

things like cross-Strait negotiations. And she reaffirmed for us that 

she is committed to continuing the status quo, that she understands the obligation to continue to pursue a policy that will enable 

cross-Strait peace and stability and that she intends to work with 

the authorities in Beijing to try to continue in the manner under 

which President Ma Ying-jeou has managed to pursue cross-Strait 

relations. 

We also have been, of course, in touch with Chinese officials. As 

you noted, Secretary Kerry was there just recently meeting with 

the Foreign Minister and also with President Xi Jinping. 

The week before that Deputy Secretary Tony Blinken was also 

in China meeting with his counterparts and we had a chance in 

those discussions also to make our very strong desire to see a continuation of cross-Strait stability but also cross-Strait exchanges 

continue. 

We, in those exchanges, counselled restraint, creativity, flexibility in working with the new administration in Taiwan to come 

up with a basis upon which to continue those negotiations. 

And they indicated that they were looking to see what Dr. Tsai 

was going to propose in that regard. So I am hopeful that they will 

be able to come up with such a basis for continuing these exchanges. 

I think there is a will on both sides to do so. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Sherman. 

16

Mr. SHERMAN. With the notable exception of our own State Department, every foreign ministry I have talked to—almost everyone—has said that their number-one goal is trade and exports. 

And we have a persistent double digit in billions trade deficit 

with Taiwan. What has the State Department done? What have 

you personally done to create a circumstance where we are running 

a trade surplus with Taiwan, at least one that will—a surplus for 

enough years to the—so that our trade relationship this century 

will be at a balance? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman, for 

that question. 

And I hope that the State Department has not left you with the 

misimpression that we are not serious about promoting trade. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I will relate to you something that happened in 

this subcommittee. 

The person who—I now mention his name to you privately—

probably is the most respected Assistant Ambassador we have had 

in Asia sat there and said that when he was the Ambassador to 

South Korea he helped America by putting out on the lawn, and 

he listed a number of cars that he thought were made in America, 

and one of the cars he was promoting was 99 percent made in Germany. It had an American nameplate on it. 

So and this was someone who hadn’t made a stupid mistake in 

20 years. Anybody who actually cared about promoting our exports 

would know whether the car they were trying to get South Koreans 

to buy was built in America or just labelled in America. 

But when you don’t care, you know, things fall through the 

cracks. So yes, indeed, I have a belief that the State—So what have 

you done, when are we going to get a trade surplus with Taiwan? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you. Having many years ago worked on 

auto negotiations with the South Koreans I can well appreciate 

where you are coming from. But turning to Taiwan, one of the—

I mean, I talked a bit in my opening statement about our focus 

with Taiwan on expanding our economic ties. We work with Taiwan——

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. We will point out almost always when I talk 

about the State Department of economic ties, they are more—they 

are as interested in creating more imports as more exports and I 

have had State Department officials testify that the trade deficit 

isn’t a problem for American families and that in fact expanding 

imports is just as wonderful as expanding exports. So please don’t 

talk about trade ties. Talk about exports. 

Ms. THORNTON. Okay. I mean, the other thing that the Taiwans 

have been doing in recent years that we have seen is significant 

inbound-to-the-United-States investment, creating a lot of U.S. jobs 

here by building manufacturing plants, by creating ties with technology companies in California, et cetera. 

But we work on expanding access—market access for U.S. exports to Taiwan through our Trade and Investment Framework 

Agreement with Taiwan. This is ongoing intensive dialogue that we 

have to try to——

Mr. SHERMAN. So we have this intensive dialogue but we’re failing every year. Every year we run a trade deficit. Do you know 

17

why we are failing? Do you think of it as failure? Or is it success 

to run a trade deficit? 

Ms. THORNTON. No. I mean, this is a constant ongoing problem 

that we’re working on. We are working every year to try to break 

down additional barriers. 

We are working on—for example, this last round in October that 

Deputy USTR Holleyman led in Taiwan we made some progress on 

IPR issues that had been posing market barriers to some U.S. exports. We made some progress on pharmaceutical market access on 

financial services access, so——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am going to reclaim my time. I mean, we are 

working hard. We are making progress. We are failing every year 

and we do not have a target date that you can reveal as to when 

we will reach a trade balance. We will continue to work hard. We 

will continue to fail. 

What additional weapons assistance has Taiwan requested an 

opportunity to buy in the United States? This is both in the interest of preserving the rights of the Taiwanese people. 

I know it is juxtaposed with my question about a trade deficit. 

Doesn’t hurt there either. What have they asked for that we have 

not green lighted yet? 

Ms. THORNTON. Yes, thank you very much for that question. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Including what they have asked for informally 

and you have told them not to ask for formally. 

Ms. THORNTON. As I mentioned in my statement, we have sold over $14 billion worth of arms to Taiwan in this administration to 

date. 

We are, of course, making available to Taiwan those articles that 

are necessary for its self-defense. So we do that in closed consultation with the Taiwanese themselves. And try to base proposals for 

sales and requests on things——

Mr. SHERMAN. I know all that. Can you answer the question? 

What are they asking for formally or informally? 

Ms. THORNTON. Well, we don’t comment actually—yeah, I mean, 

I can’t really comment on ongoing——

Mr. SHERMAN. Will the classified briefing tell me this or will the 

process of not letting me know be consistent both for——

Ms. THORNTON. I would be happy try to address in more detail 

in the classified meeting but we don’t generally talk about things 

that are under——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. But how are we doing on the F–16s, the 

mine sweepers? I believe my time has expired. But those are the—

I got an answer from my staff. I hope to get an answer from you. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Royce—Chairman Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, one of the issues that I have become concerned about 

over time is this issue of the lack of regularity or consistency in the 

discussions between U.S. and Taiwan on the Taiwan Relations Act 

requirements to provide for the articles for Taiwan’s defense needs. 

I head the legislation to reaffirm the act that passed the House and 

transferred the four guided missile frigates to Taiwan and I have 

been down on some of those frigates, one of them, to see it outfitted 

and so we are moving forward. But there isn’t any consistency to 

18

this dialogue, and under the act I would interpret it as sort of requiring that. So I would urge the administration to look at that. 

But there are a couple aspects of this. When you look at cyber attacks, no country is more targeted than Taiwan and so there is an 

area also where the United States, I think, has a certain responsibility to assist in helping Taiwan deter these cyber attacks. 

I just give you an opportunity to comment on that, if you want. 

And then I know on the discussion to support Taiwan’s indigenous 

submarine program with the Navy, is there a plan to allow the 

U.S. Navy and defense industries here to support Taiwan’s indigenous program there? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess what I would mention with regard to the ongoing conversations in the defense area, I mean, we have more than doubled 

the number of sort of working level contacts that we have with Taiwan in this space. 

We also have, under the Obama administration and, you know, 

which is coincident, of course, with the administration of Ma Yingjeou in Taiwan we have also increased markedly the number of 

high-level exchanges that we’ve had back and forth. And on the defense sector in particular, I think I would prefer to respond to your 

questions in detail in the closed session. 

But let me assure you that we are working with Taiwan very 

closely on all of the issues that you raise. 

Mr. ROYCE. And the F–16 issue that Mr. Sherman also raised, 

I think, is also of concern. 

One of the objectives that I think we have all had who have 

looked at Taiwan’s economic strength is that its inclusion in TPP 

would allow Taiwan greater diversification in terms of its exports 

of Kaohsiung and Tainan. You know, you see what they produce 

and also would allow for greater imports around the Pacific Rim 

and also, obviously, if Taiwan gets a seat at the table for the second round you could also help Taiwan protect its long-term interests should we do a trans-Atlantic agreement with Europe because 

then it could be folded in eventually, if it’s folded into the Pacific 

Rim. 

I assume the long-term goal here, as I understand it, is an agreement with very high standards and a high standard agreement 

serves the interest of the United States. There are really two different competing theories on liberalized trade. 

One theory—for those who believe in trade—one theory is that 

you will try to drive policies of free trade and no standards. The 

United States doesn’t benefit under that. 

We benefit under the rule of law, the establishment of the rule 

of law. And in Taipei also, Taiwan is advantaged by high standard 

agreement. 

Increasingly, as we travel—and I think we’ve had four trips of 

our delegation to Asia in the last 3 years—we hear this feedback 

across southeast Asia and east Asia that, you know, somebody 

needs to be pushing this concept to very high standards on intellectual property protections and all the indigenous innovation, all 

these issues that we’re mutually concerned about and that the Europeans are also concerned about. 

19

And if we get a major trans-Atlantic and Pacific Rim agreement 

we will have the ability to enforce that. 

But if Taiwan doesn’t have that seat at the table and doesn’t get 

to diversify its imports and exports, then I think this would be 

problematic. That is why I keep encouraging our administration 

and the government to move forward on getting the base bilateral 

investment agreement done. 

How do things look on that front? 

Ms. THORNTON. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

We do know, of course, that Taiwan has expressed interest in 

joining high standards trade agreements, regional agreements in 

part because it is so good at enforcing and holds itself up to a high 

rule of law standards, also because of the concern that they have 

about diversification of their economy, wanting to ensure that they 

are integrated into the region and also that they expand their network of trading partners so they don’t become overdependent on 

one particular trading partner, and we certainly support that objective, generally, that strategic objective that they have. 

As far as sort of our working with them, what we have said is 

that we want to work with them to get them ready to exceed to 

a high standard trade and investment agreement in the future and 

that is what we have been doing for the Trade and Investment 

Framework Agreement is they have already recognized that they 

have certain structural changes that they need to make in order to 

move in that direction. And we have told them that we will be 

happy to help them with that first by working on some of the structural and market access barriers that they already have that are 

going to be an impediment to them joining these high standards 

trade agreements, and then further down the road helping them to 

prepare for that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ms. Thornton. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me begin by besides welcoming you, Ms. Thornton, agreeing with Chairman Royce. We need a high standard liberalized 

trade regime and I would add, and I know the chairman would 

agree, three more words—enforceable and enforced—because only 

then is free trade credible here at home and abroad. 

But in my view, there is no question that our helping to set those 

high standards is far preferable to the alternative in the Trans-Pacific Region and I certainly look forward to supporting the agreement. 

Taiwan, Ms. Thornton, should it be—if it asks should it be incarnated into the TPP? What is the U.S. position? Could you speak 

into the mic a little? 

Ms. THORNTON. Yes. So, I mean, our position has been to welcome Taiwan’s interest in the TPP and, as I mentioned in response 

to the chairman’s question, to let them know that they have a 

number of things that they need to do to prepare and get ready to 

accede to a high standards trade agreement and that we are willing to work with them on sort of moving ahead on reforms that 

20

they need to make in order to be ready and make themselves an 

attractive partner for other members in those high standards——

Mr. CONNOLLY. But what I hear you saying is, given its status, 

the U.S. position is not to exclude its potential membership in the 

TPP. 

Ms. THORNTON. That is not our position, correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. You would agree that the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 codifies the relationship with Taiwan post recognition of China and included in that codification is a defensive 

military support framework, correct? 

U.S. is committed to providing defensive military support, correct? 

Ms. THORNTON. Well, there is—I mean, it is very clear in the 

TRA but yes, we are committed to providing defensive articles to 

maintain Taiwan’s self defense. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, Taiwan has requested, among other items, 

mine sweeping capability, F–16 combat aircraft, diesel submarines 

and frigates, which we are providing. 

How long ago did Taiwan make those defensive military requests 

to the United States Government? 

Ms. THORNTON. I am going to have to defer, I think, this to the 

closed session. I am sorry. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, it is a matter of public record, Ms. Thornton. 

It is not a matter of closed anything. 

When, for the record, did Taiwan ask for those—that equipment? 

There’s nothing classified about it. Been in the newspapers. And by 

the way, that hearing has been cancelled so you can’t—I’m not 

going to let you do that. I mean, I wouldn’t ask you a classified 

question. It’s not classified. Matter of public record. 

Ms. THORNTON. There are stories in the media about things that 

Taiwan desires to procure from the United States but as far as——

Mr. CONNOLLY. The question was when did they first request 

these equipment—this equipment. 

Ms. THORNTON. To my knowledge, some of these things have not 

been requested formally. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Evasive, Ms. Thornton. Did Taiwan—let’s pick 

one. How long ago did Taiwan—because we do know this one—ask 

for diesel submarines? 

Could the clock—Mr. Chairman, could I just ask the indulgence 

of the chair while apparently the witnesses have to consult? 

Ms. THORNTON. So yes, my assist from the rear says that we announced in April 2001 that we were going to cooperate with Taiwan on developing a plan for diesel submarines. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Okay. Fifteen years ago. Why has it 

taken 15 years to adjudicate that request, one way or the other? 

Kind of a long time, wouldn’t you think? 

Ms. THORNTON. It is a long time and we’ve been working on it 

for 15 years and we’re continuing to work on it today. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, well. We’re all reassured, Ms. Thornton. 

Well, let me just say for Members of Congress I think on both 

sides of the aisle it does raise questions about who’s making U.S. 

policy and who’s writing the answers to legitimate defensive military requests from the Government of Taiwan pursuant to a statVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:50 Apr 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\021116\98605 SHIRL
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ute that you yourself just acknowledged does indeed undergird the 

relationship. 

And included in that statute is a codification of our support for 

defensive military equipment to ensure that whatever the ultimate 

resolution is in the Taiwan Strait is a peaceful one and I think 

you—would you not agree that a 15-year wait for any answer on 

any item on that list seems to be an awfully long time? 

Ms. THORNTON. I certainly agree that it’s a long time but I’ll just 

say that it is complicated and that I could go into more detail in 

the closed session if we ever have that opportunity. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I appreciate that. But we do understand this 

complication but, you know, the king of Siam used to say it’s a puzzlement. But 15 years—my goodness. 

Okay. Final question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. What is the U.S. 

position with respect to Taiwan joining, being accepted into international organizations? Do we support that bid? 

Ms. THORNTON. Yes. We support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where statehood is not a requirement for 

membership and we support their active participation in organizations where they do require statehood for membership. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do we support Taiwan’s bid to be a member of 

Interpol? 

Ms. THORNTON. We support Taiwan’s active participation in 

Interpol and we have been working on that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Status to be determined? 

Ms. THORNTON. Yeah. I mean—yeah. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Got it. Because obviously that’s one that’s 

very practical irrespective of status and we want more cooperation. 

Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time. 

Mr. SALMON. Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Thornton, let me follow up on my colleague from the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Connolly, on the submarine and defense issues in general. 

As a former chairman of this committee and as one of the cofounders of congressional Taiwan caucus and a long time friend of 

Taiwan, my recollection is with respect to the submarines in particular. 

One of the problems is nobody makes diesel submarines any 

more, that we know. I think there was some talk about maybe the 

French could still do it but that was one of the problems, you know, 

with nuclear submarines. 

But in order—because of the expense, the fact that you don’t necessarily need nuclear submarines in that part of the world, et 

cetera, that diesel—in fact, I saw the—I guess they have a World 

War II era submarine out there. 

I think it was down at the naval base in Kaohsiung, I believe is 

where I saw that—I’ve seen a few nodding of heads in the audience 

with folks who know a lot more out this than I do. 

But in any event, I know that was one of the problems. But here 

is my question to you about this whole thing. You know, the planes 

and the anti-missile system and the submarines, improving the defensive abilities of Taiwan in case the PRC did decide to get even 

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22

ple of decades, it’s critical that Taiwan does strengthen their military and their defenses. 

But one of the problems—you know, we had a hard time getting 

this stuff through here but when we finally did we ran into a roadblock with Taiwan because even though you had a DPP President, 

President Chen Shui-bian, who wanted to move ahead with this, 

you’ve had KMT who has controlled the legislature, you know, 

since martial law, I believe. 

Is that correct? And Speaker Wong, I think, would try to get it 

through the legislature and just couldn’t get it. When we weren’t 

willing to act, you know, they wanted it and when we finally got 

around to doing it then they couldn’t get it through there, and I’m 

seeing some nods from some of your assistant folks here too. 

So is that one of the issues that we face? And then I guess the 

real question is this. We just had a pretty important election in 

Taiwan recently and the DPP now is not only going to have the 

presidency but they’re also going to control the Legislative Yuan for 

the first time ever. 

So is there maybe some light at the end of the tunnel in actually 

getting this defense that Taiwan so desperately needs and actually 

make it happen? Do you want to comment on it? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you. Yeah, no, no. That’s an excellent 

comment and thank you for the question. 

You know, we certainly work very closely with the Taiwan side 

to make sure that the capabilities that we’re providing are augmenting its asymmetric and innovative security approach. 

And so within that we have to look at different systems and see 

which things are going to make the most sense for what Taiwan 

needs. 

It is true that the expenditures that they have to dedicate to 

these capabilities do, you know, have to be factored in on the Taiwan side and I’ll just note that, you know, $14 billion in arms sales 

over the last several years is a considerable amount to absorb and 

to, you know, to fund through their defense budget. 

Of course, Taiwan has also recently gone to an all-volunteer 

force, which has also expanded its personnel costs and caused it to 

need to do some restructuring of its budget so——

Mr. CHABOT. If I could cut you off there for just a minute. I have 

only got 1 minute left. I had two more things I wanted to ask you 

real quickly. If I could get a quick response. 

Can you think of any other countries that we deal with that we 

bar their top four leaders from coming to our capital, Washington, 

DC? 

Ms. THORNTON. I am not sure. But I just want to point out on 

that note that we have actually—you know, we have Presidential 

transits for the safety, dignity, comfort and security of the traveler. 

We had the Vice——

Mr. CHABOT. Right. They can go to—they can go to San Francisco, they can go to New York. 

Ms. THORNTON [continuing]. Vice Premier in California earlier 

this year. 

Mr. CHABOT. President Tsai isn’t going to be able to come here 

to Washington, DC, unless we change our policy. Is that correct? 

Ms. THORNTON. That has been the policy. 

23

Mr. CHABOT. We ought to change our policy. 

And then finally, I got 10 seconds left. President Chen Shui-bian 

was finally released about a year ago on medical parole. How is he 

doing? 

Ms. THORNTON. As far as I understand, he’s doing well and he’s 

still on medical parole as far as I know. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I yield back my time. 

Ms. MENG. Ms. Thornton, there is a sense that part of the momentum toward President-elect Tsai’s election was a response to a 

slowing of Taiwan’s economy, particularly with exports and imports. 

President-elect Tsai has specifically mentioned plans to have a 

closer economic relationship with the United States. 

However, U.S. businesses in Taiwan report facing inadequate or 

outdated laws, government bureaucracy, inconsistent regulatory interpretations and a lack of regulatory transparency, et cetera, as 

barriers to further economic development. 

What is your sense of the political will of President-elect Tsai 

and the newly-elected DPP majority in the Legislative Yuan to address these issues directly? 

Ms. THORNTON. Thank you very much for that question. 

In our conversations with Dr. Tsai and with her team, it is my 

sense that this is an area that she is very well aware of that is inhibiting Taiwan’s economic potential and that she is looking to 

move as a priority once she takes office to try to address. 

And we have been very keen to work with her under—in the new 

administration, again, through our Trade and Investment Framework Agreement process which her team is well aware of and has 

been briefed on to try to move forward on some of the intractable 

market access barriers that we’ve seen in Taiwan and also some of 

these regulatory problems that do create a lot of constraints for our 

businesses and our potential investors. 

Ms. MENG. And my second question on a different topic, our relation to the South China Sea. How do recent reports of possible joint 

naval patrols by the U.S. and India in the South China Sea work 

into the U.S.’s priority to de-escalate tensions there? 

Ms. THORNTON. Yes. I can’t really comment on the story about 

the joint patrols between the U.S. and India. As far as I am aware, 

there is no concrete plan in that regard. 

But certainly the U.S. policy for the South China Sea is to call 

on all of the claimants and regional players to try to reduce tensions, to preserve freedom of navigation and overflight and to try 

to resolve disputes peacefully and conduct themselves in accordance with the rule of law. 

And I don’t—so I don’t think that there’s a—I mean, our presence in that part of the world has been longstanding. It’s a part 

of our security presence in that region, which has helped maintain 

peace and stability in Asia for—ever since the second—end of the 

second World War and I think we don’t see any problem with patrols or other things that are in keeping with freedom of flight and 

freedom of navigation. 

Ms. MENG. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you, Ms. Meng. 

That will conclude the first panel. 

24

We will have the second panel be seated. I just also wanted to 

say that we are trying to reschedule the classified briefing because 

we are going to have votes called in about 15 minutes. 

We might just get through the testimony of the second panel 

when we get called for votes. But thank you so much, Ms. Thornton, for coming and thank you for all your attention. So we’ll seat 

the next panel now. 

I think we’ll go ahead and move on with introductions. I know 

we’re kind of clearing the room out but we want to make sure we 

get your testimony before we have to go vote. 

We are really pleased to be joined today by three excellent panelists. First, Mr. Randall Schriver, president and CEO of the Project 

2049 Institute; Ms. Bonnie Glaser, good to see you again, senior advisor for Asia and director of the China Power Project and Center 

for Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Shelley Rigger, Davidson University’s political science department. 

We are really grateful for these witnesses joining us today to 

lend their expertise and we’ll start with you, Mr. Schriver. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL SCHRIVER, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much appreciate 

the invitation and I appreciate being seated alongside Dr. Rigger 

and Ms. Glaser, who I have enormous respect for as well. 

I want to join others who express condolences and thoughts and 

prayers. Certainly, it’s a difficult time and we wish them well in 

the recovery efforts. 

It’s a very timely hearing, as has been noted, due to the recent 

election and I think it’s appropriate that we acknowledge the significance of this event. 

It’s a young democracy. They are under tremendous pressure. So 

just carrying out a free and fair election is something worthy of our 

praise. 

In your instructions you asked me to speak specifically about economic and trade issues, which I will do. Before doing that I think 

it’s also appropriate to note President Ma and the fact that he’s 

coming to the end of his tenure. 

He’s been a great friend of the United States, has done a terrific 

job promoting peace and stability in the region, I think often not 

given credit for his South China Sea peace initiative—the East 

China Sea peace initiative. 

So as we move into a new administration we should reflect on 

his accomplishments. Dr. Tsai is somebody who’s very experienced 

on trade matters. She herself has been a trade negotiator and I 

think she campaigned on economic reform and promoting trade. I 

think that gives us opportunities that we would be very smart to 

seize upon. 

As mentioned by others, she has a keen interest in joining TPP. 

I’m of the view that we should not only welcome that interest but 

be very clear that we want Taiwan in a second round, should there 

be one, and I hope there is, and that we will work with them to 

identify a clear pathway to entry. 

I listened carefully to the administration statement. We welcome 

their interest. I believe we should welcome more than their interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:50 Apr 28, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\021116\98605 SHIRL
25

est. I think we should work with them to have a concrete path to 

inclusion in TPP. 

I agree with previous comments made about the investment environment and the need for a bilateral investment agreement. Taiwan is a significant investor in the United States and, of course, 

vice versa. 

That can be strengthened. There are too many barriers still in 

place so we should keep these delegations going but more to the 

point work through the various fora to try to create a better environment for mutual investment. 

I think there are other areas of our economic relationship that 

could also be strengthened. I think defense industrial cooperation 

is something we should consider. 

There were, I think, some very good questions about the submarine program—why 15 years. Certainly, if Taiwan does determine to go the path of an indigenous diesel electric submarine, 

there are opportunities for our industry to get involved in that and 

I think the administration could send clear signals that we welcome that kind of defense industrial cooperation and it could really 

give a boost to this program and maybe it won’t be another 15 

years until we see a submarine there in Taiwan. 

I think in the S & T area as well this has been one of the past 

areas of success. Taiwan is a very innovative country. They are a 

global leader in patents and, to use an overused phrase, there are 

a lot of win-win opportunities, I think, if we really strengthen our 

S & T cooperation not only in defense but beyond that and into 

that high-tech sector. 

This is all going to unfold under an environment where I expect 

there to be increasing pressure, not only military pressure in the 

missiles that we’re all aware of but there are rumors that China 

is preparing for a more coercive path, cutting back tours, cutting 

back flights, et cetera. 

We can do these things irrespective of the positions China takes 

but, of course, it becomes more challenging, at least politically and 

diplomatically, to do that in face of more pressure. 

But I think we have to remember to keep the onus on Beijing. 

They are the ones who have a policy that’s failing. They’re the ones 

that have the military posture opposite Taiwan, threatening them 

and intimating the people there and they are the ones that also 

need to show some flexibility 

So people regard this election as a potential inflection point but 

we need to remember that the real core of the problem is Beijing’s 

intransigence and the positions that they’re taking. 

So just to conclude very briefly, I think there are five things. I 

think TPP in a very clear path is important. I think more on bilateral investment to include not only the bilateral agreement but the 

promotion of these delegations. I think on the defense side, there 

is much more that can be done and I think several of the systems 

were mentioned—F–16s, mine sweepers. But I have a particular interest in the submarine program because I think there’s an opportunity for defense industrial cooperation. The S & T area is a 

fourth area I think is very promising and then finally in our diplomacy keep some balance. This election is one of the reasons we’re 

here talking. But if you pull that thread too far some people might 

26

be oriented toward blaming democracy or blaming Taiwan for the 

instability. 

The problem is in Beijing and we need to keep that in mind as 

we go forward and continue to put our emphasis on their need to 

de-escalate, to demilitarize and to have some flexibility. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Ms. Glaser. 

STATEMENT OF MS. BONNIE GLASER, SENIOR ADVISER FOR 

ASIA, DIRECTOR OF CHINA POWER PROJECT, CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Ms. GLASER. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member 

Sherman and distinguished members of the committee. I too would 

like to offer my thoughts and prayers to the people of Taiwan as 

they recover from this earthquake. 

The United States has a deep and abiding interest in the preservation of Taiwan’s security and democracy. The Taiwan Relations 

Act remains an important touchstone for Congress, for policy makers and the executive branch and to ensure Taiwan’s security the 

U.S. Government must actively seek to use all the tools of U.S. policy and implement not only the letter but also the spirit and the 

intentions behind the TRA. 

I have been asked to address my remarks to Taiwan’s security 

and the threats to Taiwan’s security are numerous and they are 

growing. 

Efforts to sustain the island’s economic prosperity which is a 

critically important component of national security are facing challenges. 

Taiwan is largely excluded from the Asia Pacific regional economic integration process. The U.S. can and should do more to advocate for Taiwan’s increased participation in international organizations and especially those that would enhance the safety and 

welfare of Taiwan’s citizens and I commend Chairman Salmon for 

introducing the legislation that urges the Obama administration to 

support Taiwan’s efforts to obtain observer status in Interpol from 

which it was expelled in 1984. 

Without question the greatest and most direct threat to Taiwan’s 

security is, of course, posed by the Chinese military. U.S. security 

assistance including but not limited to arms sales to Taiwan is 

vital to deter China from coercing or attacking Taiwan and to enable Taiwan’s armed forces to fight effectively in all possible contingencies. 

Cooperation with China reviewing presents important opportunities for the United States, for example, to reverse global warming 

and prevent nuclear proliferation, and the U.S., of course, should 

seek to work with Beijing to address regional and global challenges 

where possible. 

However, it is harmful to American interests to be so eager for 

Chinese cooperation that it appears willing to sacrifice Taiwan for 

better U.S.-China ties. Such an approach sends the wrong signal 

to Beijing. 

It creates anxiety in Taiwan and it fosters doubt throughout the 

region about America’s willingness to withstand Chinese pressure 

in support of its commitments. 

The KMT defeat in the election Tsai Ing-wen created some uncertainty about the future of cross-Strait relations. The mainland insists that Tsai Ing-wen accept its definition of the existing political 

foundation, which is essentially opposition to Taiwan independence 

and support of the 1992 consensus. 

33

Tsai Ing-wen has recently defined this existing political foundation differently. For her, it includes a historical fact of the 1992 

talks, the prevailing Republic of China constitutional order, the accumulated outcome of more than 20 years of cross-Strait interaction and importantly democratic principles and the will of the 

Taiwanese people. 

The U.S. Government can play a role, I believe, to help narrow 

the gap between mainland China and Taiwan by encouraging each 

side to provide assurances to the other to assuage their respective 

fears. 

The U.S. should strongly discourage Beijing from using coercive 

measures to pressure Tsai and the DPP to concede to its demands. 

Punitive actions by China could compel Tsai Ing-wen to respond 

and perhaps result in a negative spiral that could produce a crossStrait setback and even a crisis. 

Beijing appears to be deliberating how to respond to the DPP’s 

return to power in Taiwan. I think the Xi Jinping has not yet made 

a decision. But if he adopts the more coercive and even aggressive 

approach to Taiwan, the U.S. response will be widely viewed as an 

indicator of the credibility of American commitments. 

And not only Japan but also countries in Southeast Asia would 

be alarmed if Washington fails to provide to Taiwan in the face of 

Chinese coercion or aggression. 

For more than two decades the U.S. has insisted the decisions 

about Taiwan’s future must have the assent of the people of Taiwan in a democratic manner and public opinion polls show that a 

majority of the people of Taiwan yes, they favor talks with mainland China but dwindling numbers favor reunification. In 2015, a 

record low of 9.1 percent of respondents in Taiwan favoured unification either now or in the future. 

And this polling data, combined with the outcome of the election, 

suggests that there could be a realignment of political forces and 

attitudes underway in Taiwan and it is imperative that the U.S. 

help Taiwan to preserve the autonomy that its people desire and 

ensure that the differences between Taipei and Beijing be managed 

peacefully. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Dr. Rigger. 

STATEMENT OF SHELLEY RIGGER, PH.D., BROWN PROFESSOR 

AND ASSISTANT DEAN FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY, DAVIDSON COLLEGE 

Ms. RIGGER. Thank you very much for allowing me to be here. 

It’s a pleasure to have this opportunity. 

Taiwan’s January elections were a watershed in the island’s 

democratic development. For the first time, the Kuomintang lost 

control of both branches of the national government. 

The DPP has won national elections only twice before when Chen 

Shui-bian was elected President in 2000 and 2004, and many in 

Washington remember the Chen presidency as a time of turbulence. 

Chen began his presidency with efforts to reach out to Beijing 

and to the KMT but both the PRC and the KMT stonewalled and 

he eventually gave up on seeking their cooperation and began pursuing an agenda aimed more at pleasing his core supporters. 

Nonetheless, the Chen presidency left many voters feeling disillusioned and that helped give the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou an easy win 

in 2008. 

Under Ma, the Taiwan Strait has been relatively calm. Taiwan 

has signed almost two dozen economic agreements with the PRC 

while cross-Strait trade, investment and people to people flows 

have increased to unprecedented levels. 

So now that the DPP is about to return to power, people are asking whether we are about to enter another era of tension in the 

Taiwan Strait. 

While I understand why these questions are being asked, I do 

not believe we are about to enter an era of confrontation. Under 

Tsai’s leadership, the DPP has adopted moderate positions that 

align with the preferences of Taiwan’s people. 

Throughout her campaign she made it clear that her goal is to 

preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. She does not intend 

to move Taiwan toward independence but neither does she intend 

to rush headlong into Beijing’s embrace, either politically or economically. 

So, in short, the January elections affirmed Taiwan’s democracy 

and confirmed the fundamental rationality of Taiwan’s electorate. 

Promoting democracy is a core interest and objective of U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, Taiwan’s Government persuaded 

the U.S. to overlook its authoritarian nature but in the ’70s and 

’80s U.S. officials, especially Members of Congress, joined with democracy activists in Taiwan to urge the KMT-led government to 

implement democratic reforms. Taiwan’s democratization was 

achieved with almost no bloodshed or instability, making it an example to other nations. 

Supporting Taiwan’s democracy is an important element of U.S. 

policy, therefore, and it is critical that we not confuse Taiwan’s people’s active defense of their democracy with trouble making. 

An overwhelming majority of Taiwanese recognize that pursuing 

formal independence is both unnecessary and risky but they have 

no interest in being absorbed into the People’s Republic of China. 

44

Their goal is to remain a self-governing democratic entity while 

working toward peaceful and cooperative relations with their 

neighbors on the Chinese mainland. 

These goals, which are represented well now that Tsai has been 

elected the U.S. should redouble its efforts to keep channels of communication open. 

U.S. policy precludes Washington from engaging in high-level official interactions with Taipei, although it seems that not everyone 

in this room thinks that’s a good policy. 

But the U.S. is free to choose a less restrictive interpretation of 

its policy. Overly rigid adherence to the one-China policy will not 

serve the U.S. well in a period of uncertainty and transition. 

The task for the U.S. in the next few years will be to support 

Taiwan’s continued democratic development. Washington should 

recognize and reward the DPP-led government’s moderate positions 

and encourage all parties to seek opportunities for cooperation and 

avoid confrontation. 

Given Taipei and Beijing’s incompatible goals in some areas, a 

degree of tension is unavoidable. However, attentive management 

can prevent that tension from ripening into conflict. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rigger follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

When I first came to Congress in the ’90s, Warren Christopher 

was the Secretary of State and I remember him coming before one 

of our committees and testifying that our policy with China and 

Taiwan was one of strategic ambiguity. 

I thought that was the stupidest thing I’d ever heard in my life, 

and my understanding is that’s still our policy. Is it or isn’t it? Dr. 

Rigger, do you want to take a stab at that? 

Ms. RIGGER. Sure. Yes, it is our policy and the—I think part of 

the reason it continues to be our policy is that it has—whatever its 

merits on the face of it actually served us very well for a long time. 

So it might not be the policy that a political scientist would design but I don’t recommend government by a political scientist. So 

I think in practice it has allowed the U.S. to calibrate its actions 

and positions toward both the PRC and Taiwan in ways that have 

successfully maintained the balance in the Strait. 

Mr. SALMON. But what it’s yielded is really idiotic policies like 

when Lee Teng-hui couldn’t visit his alma mater at Cornell and we 

had to pass special legislation encouraging or allowing him to do 

so. 

Or Taiwan virtually being kicked out of every international body 

and now we have to try to assert in the name of common sense 

that they be allowed to participate in bodies like Interpol when 

we’re all—we want all hands on deck to fight international terrorism and international crime and trafficking—in human trafficking. 

It just makes sense to have all hands on deck. And why in the 

world would anybody in Taiwan ever want to follow up on China’s 

offer of peaceful reunification with a one-China two systems when 

they see how they hoodwink the people of Hong Kong? 

Universal suffrage—you know, the folks in Hong Kong believe 

that claptrap that Beijing was throwing at them that, you know, 

it’s going to be one-China, two systems when in reality the leader 

of Hong Kong gets picked by Beijing. Why would Taiwan ever want 

to yield to that? 

Ms. Glaser, do you have any thoughts? 

Ms. GLASER. Well, I think that that’s exactly the reason why the 

polls show that the people of Taiwan—very few of them actually 

support reunification as they observe Hong Kong, as they witness 

the crackdown on dissent and the squeezing of the ability of average people on the mainland just to access Internet, to conduct protests, to publish their views. 

I think it’s clear that people in Taiwan do not want to be part 

of the mainland and do not support one country, two systems. 

Mr. SALMON. Oh, and in Taiwan proselytizing is legal. People can 

share their religious views freely. They have freedom of the press. 

You have peaceful transitions from one, you know, party to the 

next in leadership and the President’s office and in the seat of government, and they see the vast differences when you speak about 

your—with conviction. 

I guess you can believe in something as long as you don’t really 

believe it in China and that’s—you know, that’s the problem. If you 

really believe in something then you’re a fanatic and you get imprisoned. 

50

And so, you know, the people of Taiwan watch this stuff happening and they’re very cautious. Look, I was as concerned as anybody with some of the statements that Chen Shui-bian was making, you know, later on in his administration. 

But Tsai Ing-wen has said that she intends to promote the status 

quo. She’s not trying to upset the apple cart but she’s made it clear 

that her first interest and first duty is to the people of Taiwan, not 

to the people on mainland China. I don’t think that’s all that extreme. I think that’s just common sense. 

And so as they go forward, how can we monitor, you know, in 

our relations with the cross-Strait? What indicators should we be 

monitoring for a sense of how the cross-Strait relationship is being 

handled between China and the DPP, whether or not they’re going 

to stonewall her like they did Chen Shui-bian? 

I guess that’s one thing we could probably see pretty readily. But 

the other one is what do you expect will happen to current formal 

official contact between the two sides of the Strait? Do you think 

there’s going to be any degradation of that? 

Ms. GLASER. Thank you, Congressman Salmon. 

I think those are very important questions. As to indicators, one 

of the early indicators we can look at is whether the mainland is 

restricting tourists that are travelling to Taiwan. There are already 

some signs of that. This could damage Taiwan’s economy and the 

mainland, of course, claims some deniability. They say oh, maybe 

the people of mainland just don’t want to go. But we know that this 

is in fact government control. 

I particularly worry about the possibility of Beijing trying to 

steal away some of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. Taiwan now has 22 

and there are some countries who have indicated a desire to shift 

their diplomatic allegiance. 

So far Beijing has respected this tacit diplomatic truce. But I 

think that this could put pressure on President Tsai once she is inaugurated to respond in a negative way that could lead to that 

downward sort of negative spiral that I talked about. 

As for the formal communications, I think that so far Beijing has 

not said publically that they are going to cut those off but privately 

there are some indications that the semi-official white glove organizations, SEF and ARATS on both sides of the Strait could be suspended and also the communications between the Taiwan affairs 

office and the mainland affairs council where they recently set up 

a hotline and those could also be suspended. I think any suspension of communication and dialogue channels would be a very negative sign. 

Mr. SALMON. I’m just going to close with this and then yield to 

Mr. Sherman. But, you know, a position of strategic ambiguity 

would be when a Member of Congress asks the panelist, you know, 

how do you feel about Taiwan participation in the second round of 

the TPP and the answer coming back, we welcome their interest 

in that, that’s a position of strategic ambiguity out there in the 

ozone. 

A strategic clarity statement would be yes, we welcome their involvement, their participation—not their interest. But we—like you 

said, Mr. Schriver, would you agree with that? 

51

Mr. SCHRIVER. Absolutely, and I think that a lot has changed 

since Warren Christopher was secretary of state and I think the 

very positive developments on Taiwan should be recognized and rewarded but also the threat posture that China poses I think would 

be served with more clarity when it comes to defense commitments 

and security in a whole host of areas including these trade agreements and international organizations. 

I think ambiguity maybe had its time and place but more clarity 

is probably appropriate at this juncture. 

Mr. SALMON. Yes, let’s just stop parsing words and say what we 

mean. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I’ll make a couple of political science comments. 

First, in defense of strategic ambiguity, Donald Trump is not 

known for has ambiguity yet he has spoken often in favor of not 

saying what he would do because that gives—would give him—a 

Trump presidency—more leverage in the negotiations. 

The problem with it I find with strategic ambiguity is that it 

means that if you’re going to keep the foreign power guessing as 

to what our policy is then you cannot inform the American people 

of what. 

So I think if we had a dictatorship there would be—in the United 

States it would fit with strategic ambiguity and I don’t know if 

that’s what Mr. Trump has in mind but he doesn’t talk to me. 

Mr. SALMON. He doesn’t talk to me either. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Also, the second political science comment is political scientists live in this world where you figure out what is the 

interest of the country as if this was a game of Risk or something 

where the country was a single entity determining its interests. 

My own belief is that countries make foreign policy decisions to 

respond to short-term domestic political needs, and right now 

China needs nationalism to explain why a party that is no longer 

the vanguard of the proletariat should continue to rule in the absence of 71⁄2 percent growth. 

Dr. Rigger, what—putting pressure on Taiwan, is that popular 

with Joe Six-pack in Shanghai? 

Ms. RIGGER. It’s extremely difficult for us to know what is popular with the citizens of the People’s Republic of China because it 

is not an open information environment. 

What is more troubling even than that though is that there is 

a certain kind of Joe Six-pack in the mainland who is allowed to 

speak and is allowed to speak loudly and perpetually. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, we know that nationalism over the islets or 

rocks or whatever we’re going to fight World War III about in the 

South Pacific that’s popular nationalism. Is it consistent with popular nationalism in China to say we’re going to be tough on Taiwan 

or—I mean, you’re being tough on Chinese people. 

So is a—does it fit with jingoistic popular nationalism in China 

to try to kick Taiwan out of Interpol? 

Ms. RIGGER. It does. But it’s hard for—it’s impossible to understand what that really means in terms of China’s long-term domestic political situation because——

52

Mr. SHERMAN. You need to study political science by running for 

office. There are no long-term political objectives. There are shortterm political objectives. 

Ms. RIGGER. Can I explain though what my logic is? So the problem is that in China there are few things that you can say out loud 

and all of them are I hate Japan, we should be more aggressive in 

the South China Sea, Taiwan must be reunified with the mainland. 

But we don’t know whether people would be saying those things 

as loudly and energetically as they are if they could say other 

things. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Ms. RIGGER. But because they can’t say other things, these are 

the things they say. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What—okay. Ms. Glaser talked a little bit about 

the things China can do to show its displeasure with the fact that 

the Taiwanese people voted for what they consider to be the wrong 

political party. 

Those all seem like little nitpicking. Is there anything China 

might do to Taiwan in the next year that is more significant than 

trying to get a Latin American country to cut off diplomatic relations or giving Taiwan the cold shoulder and stopping communication with various mainland entities? Anything——

Ms. RIGGER. Within the next year, probably not. But those small 

things, especially added together, can have a really profound effect 

on the confidence of Taiwan people and their ability to go forward 

strongly and to advocate for their own interests. So they do matter. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If five Embassies closed in Taipei from countries 

that many Taiwanese could not find on a map would that shake 

confidence? 

Ms. RIGGER. Yes, and if ten closed that would be half of Taiwan’s 

diplomatic partners in the world. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, that’s why I asked about five. 

Ms. RIGGER. And that would deeply shake people’s confidence, 

absolutely. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Ah, there are a few islands that are so small that 

they would appreciate even modest aid from Taiwan. New Embassies could be opened by countries that are even harder to find on 

a map. 

Okay. What factors do you believe contributed to the DPP winning the elections and, just as significantly, the KMT’s weak showing? 

Ms. RIGGER. I think the biggest issues were domestic issues for 

Taiwan. Economic issues—the sense that Taiwan’s economy can 

produce aggregate growth at a slow but reasonable rate but that 

it can’t produce jobs or the kinds of jobs that Taiwanese people are 

preparing themselves to do as they emerge from school and it can’t 

produce the kind of egalitarian distribution of income and wealth 

that Taiwanese have come to expect as the fruit of development. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Sounds like Bernie Sanders won the election. 

Ms. RIGGER. Well, I think that the problems that Taiwan faces 

are not Taiwan’s alone. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. And what can the DPP Government and 

Taiwan in general do to lessen its dependence on mainland China? 

53

Ms. RIGGER. This is the great task facing Taiwan to figure out 

the answer to this question. The DPP has published lots of white 

papers and statements about what they plan to do. But most of 

those are pretty vague and piecemeal. 

The best thing that Taiwan could do, I think, is to improve its 

accessibility to international trade and investment. Taiwan still 

has a lot of parts of its market and economy that are not very open 

and I think that’s really what we are talking about when we talk 

about getting ready for TPP. 

The international business community has been asking a long 

time for Taiwan to open its economy more and I think perhaps Taiwan can make some progress there. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I have gone over time. I don’t know if the other 

witnesses have any quick comments. 

Ms. GLASER. I would just make one quick comment and that is 

that the mainland China has a pretty robust toolbox to use to pressure Taiwan. 

There’s economic tools, there’s preferences that they give to Taiwan businesses on the mainland, there’s fish that they buy from 

southern Taiwan fisherman. 

They can cut all of these. Only two countries have been really 

permitted, and I put that in quotation marks, to negotiate bilateral 

free trade averments with Taiwan. 

That’s Singapore and New Zealand, and there are other countries 

that had started informal talks, those who want to begin talks, and 

Beijing has basically shut that down. 

They have diplomatic economic influence directly on Taiwan and 

then indirectly through other countries so—and then, of course, 

there’s the whole toolbox of military coercion. So I think there’s a 

lot to be concerned about. 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Briefly on that last point, we shouldn’t forget 

about the military piece of this because throughout this 8-year period of peace and stability what has China done on the military 

side? 

They have continued to build up more missiles, more capabilities, 

more training. They have a mock-up of the presidential palace that 

they’re exercising against. I mean, countries that equip, train, prepare——

Mr. SHERMAN. They have a mock-up of Taiwan’s presidential palace so they can train special forces into how to go in and seize the 

President or something like that? 

Mr. SCHRIVER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Oh. I might point out, if we really cared about 

Taiwan’s defense we would just amend the law that provided most 

favoured nation status to China and say this law is void if China 

takes military action against Taiwan, its ports and its shipping. 

And some of us tried to do that back when we first gave affirmative MFN—that it’s not too late. That one—they wouldn’t need the 

frigates if we did that. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the panel. This has been very, very, very 

helpful. Thank you very much. 

One just last question. You had mentioned that there were four 

things and I think we got three. Would the fourth be Tibet? 

54

I mean, are they still—because every time I ever met with senior 

Beijing officials the two things that, you know, was like drilling on 

their teeth without novocaine was Taiwan Strait and Tibet. Is that 

still pretty much the same thing. 

Ms. RIGGER. You can say anything you want to about those 

issues and not get in trouble. So if you want to speak out on those 

topics, it’s fine. 

Mr. SALMON. Right. Right. 

Well, thank you very much. I really appreciate the panel and 

thank the ranking member. It’s been very edifying and I want to 

congratulate the people of Taiwan again on a wonderfully successful and peaceful election and transition that’s about to happen and 

also let them know that we’re with you in spirit and in every other 

way in relationship to rebuilding after the earthquake. 

So thank you very much. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I agree. 

Mr. SALMON. This committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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