NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANGEL FELIPE PEREZ-PEREZ, AKA 

Lopez, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-70938 

Agency No. A202-069-682 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 5, 2021**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and CARDONE,*** District 

Judge.

Petitioner Angel Felipe Perez-Perez, a Guatemalan native and citizen of 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the 

Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 9 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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indigenous Mayan descent, seeks review of an order entered by the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of 

his application for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality 

Act, and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review.

“Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also adds its own 

reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision

upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 

2019) (citing Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011)). We review 

legal questions de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. Conde 

Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020). Whether a particular social 

group is cognizable is a question of law, but whether that group is socially distinct

is a question of fact. Id. at 1242.

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner 

was insufficiently likely to suffer persecution on account of his family membership

to be entitled to withholding of removal. “[W]hen similarly situated members of 

the petitioner’s family live without incident in the alleged danger zone, such family 

evidence and the inferences drawn from it does substantially support the agency 

decision . . . .” Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation marks, modifications, and citation omitted), abrogated on other 
3 

grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 

Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner’s parents have “remained unharmed” in his

hometown. See id. And they are similarly situated because they helped file the 

police report that Petitioner merely encouraged, and they too received unfulfilled

threats of violence. While the IJ erroneously assumed that Petitioner’s sister also 

remained in Guatemala, the BIA expressly declined to rely on that part of the IJ’s 

reasoning. See Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1027–28 (noting that we review only 

those parts of the IJ’s decision on which the BIA relied). And despite Petitioner’s 

suggestions otherwise, the BIA gave adequate attention to his individual risk of 

persecution, but simply found that risk insufficient. Substantial evidence 

supported that conclusion. See Santos-Lemus, 542 F.3d at 743–44; see also 

Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Unfulfilled threats are very 

rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution . . . .”) (citing Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 

319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

There is also substantial evidence that Petitioner’s Mayan ethnicity was not 

“a reason” members of MS-13 attacked him in 1999. See Barajas-Romero v. 

Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358–60 (9th Cir. 2017). Petitioner’s assailants never 

mentioned his ethnicity, and Petitioner testified that he was attacked because of his 

resistance to recruitment, not because he is Mayan. The expert witness did not 

testify otherwise. The record thus does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner 
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was attacked because he is Mayan. See Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164 

(9th Cir. 2017) (finding no causal nexus where petitioner testified he was attacked 

for a reason other than a statutorily protected ground and attackers never 

mentioned that ground).

The BIA also reasonably found incognizable Petitioner’s proffered social 

group of “Mayan men who have actively resisted gang recruitment.” See

Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1087. The record does not compel the conclusion 

that Guatemalan society views that group as “sufficiently separate or distinct.” See

Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pirir-Boc v. 

Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014)). Rather, substantial evidence 

established that gang violence is widespread, and that the gangs target anyone they 

deem advantageous. See id. at 981.

2. Substantial evidence also supports the finding that Petitioner’s fear of 

torture is speculative, see Xiao Fei Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 

2011), or based on a generalized fear of violence and corruption, see DelgadoOrtiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the BIA

adequately considered the aggregate risk of torture. See Quijada-Aguilar v. Lynch, 

799 F.3d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 2015) (“CAT claims must be considered in terms of

the aggregate risk of torture from all sources, and not as separate, divisible CAT 

claims.”) (citing Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2011)). The IJ 
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considered “the totality of the testimony and the other evidence in the record,” and

concluded that it was insufficiently likely Petitioner would be tortured if removed 

to Guatemala. That was enough to deny Petitioner CAT protection.

The petition for review is DENIED.