Filed 10/21/14 Opinion following remand CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JEFFREY ALLEN WHITMER,

Defendant and Appellant. B231038 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA079423)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County, Candace Beason, Judge. Reversed in part , affirmed in part, and remanded with

directions. Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, A ssistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Noah P. Hill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________2 Appellant Jeffrey Allen Wh itmer challenges his convictions on 20 counts of grand theft and 20 counts of making false fi nancial statements. He contends he was unlawfully convicted of grand theft a nd making false financial statements; in addition, he maintains that his judgment of conviction must be reversed due to insufficiency of the evidence, instructiona l error, sentencing error, and ineffective

assistance of counsel. In our original opinion ( People v. Whitmer (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 122, review granted May 1, 2013, S208843), we determined that appellant had shown reversible error only with respect to certain counts of making false financial statements. In rejecting appellant’s ot her contentions, we concluded that under People v. Bailey (1961) 55 Cal.2d 514 ( Bailey ), a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on sepa rate and distinct acts of grand theft committed pursuant to a single scheme. Because other appe llate courts had adopted a contrary interpretation of Bailey , we urged the Supreme Court to clarify the holding in Bailey

. After granting appellant’s petition for review, the Supreme Court limited its

review to our dete rmination regarding Bailey . In People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 735 ( Whitmer ), the Supreme Court agreed with our conclusion that

under Bailey , “a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate and distinct acts of thef t, even if committed pursuant to a single overarching scheme.” The c ourt nonetheless determined that its holding could not be applied to appellant, due to prior appellate decisions that had “reached a conclusion contrary to ours . . . .” ( Id. at p. 742.) Finding appellant entitled to the benefit of the law as prev iously construed, the cour t held that he could be convicted of only one count of grand theft. ( Ibid. ) Following remand of the matter, we have examined appellant’s remaining contentions in light of Whitmer . We conclude that gra nd theft of an automobile3 does not encompass the theft of motorc ycles and motorized dirt bikes, but determine that appellant su ffered no prejudice from the charging of grand theft of an automobile based on the taking of motorc ycles, motorized dirt bikes, and related

vehicles. We further concl ude that appellant has shown reversible error only with respect to 14 counts of making false financia l statements. We therefore reverse his convictions under those counts, as well as all but one of his convictions for grand theft, and remand the matter fo r resentencing.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On July 20, 2010, an information wa s filed, charging appellant with 21 counts of grand theft of an automobile (Pe n. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)), 7 counts of making false financial statements (Pen. Code, § 532a), and 14 counts of theft of

access cards or account informati on (Pen. Code, § 484e, subd. (d)). 1 Accompanying the charges was an allegati on that appellant took, damaged, or destroyed property valued at more than $200,000 (§ 12022.6). Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegation. At the prosecutor’s request, the trial c ourt dismissed one count of grand theft

of an automobile and one count of maki ng false financial statements. After the presentation of evidence at the jury trial, the trial court amended the information to replace the charges of theft of access card s or account information (§ 484e, subd. (d)) with charges of making false financia l statements (§ 532a). The jury found appellant guilty on all counts, as amended, and found the special allegation to be

true. The trial court sent enced appellant to a total term of imprisonment of 12 years. In imposing the sentence, the c ourt stayed punishment under all the counts of making false financial statements (§ 654).4 FACTS

A. Prosecution Evidence

1. Overview The prosecution submitted evidence that appellant, while acting as manager for a motorcycle dealership, arranged fo r the fraudulent sale of 20 motorcycles, motorized dirt bikes, all terrain vehicles (ATVs), and similar recreational vehicles. In collaboration with Mordichi Mor, appellant arranged fra udulent sales to fictitious buyers, using falsified financ ing agreements and credit purchases, resulting in monetary losses to the dealership. 2

2. Background Jerome Gilding owned Temple City Po wer Sports, a business located in San Gabriel that sold and serviced motorcycle s, motorized dirt bikes, ATVs, and jet skis. Because Gilding devoted most of his time to dealer ships he owned in Temecula and other locations, he empl oyed a sales manage r to operate the dealership, maintain its inventory, a nd supervise the sales staff, including employees in its finance department. Customers of the dealership negotiate d purchases with salespersons. The dealership made sales to customers who en tered into financing agreements or paid

with credit cards. In such cases, after the salesperson reached an agreement with the customer regarding an item and the manner of payment, the transaction was

referred to the sales manager for approval. If approved, the transaction was sent to the dealership finance department, which collected the information necessary to

1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise indicated.

2 Mor’s name is stated in different ways in the record. For simplicity, we refer to him as Mor or Mordichi.5 process the financing agreement or credit car d sale. When the dealership sold an

item to a customer who failed to make the loan payments or used a bad credit card, the dealership incurred a “c harge back,” that is, took responsibility for the loss on the transaction. According to Gilding, to prevent charge backs, the dealership’s policy was to require customers to make purchases in person and to present two

forms of identification. Ordinarily, when credit card purchases were made, the card was swiped through a credit card machine, which inst antaneously sent in formation regarding the purchase to the pertinent bank. An approval or denial was received from the bank within a few seconds. In contrast, if the machine was set for an “offline” or “forced” sale, the machine reco rded the transaction but sent no information to the bank. As a result, no immediate credit a pproval or denial was generated; instead, information regarding the transaction was transmitted to the bank at the end of the business day. Gilding did not permit o ffline sales. Associated with each vehicle sold by the dealership is a document known as the “manufacturer certificate of origin” (M SO). The vehicle’ s original MSO can

be used to establish title to the vehicle in other states and countri es. The dealership retained the original MSO after a sale unle ss the vehicle was sold to an out-of-state purchaser or transferred to another d ealer. The dealership had contractual obligations to several manufacturers not to sell vehicles for exportation outside the

United States. In 2009, appellant was the dealership’s sales manager, a nd Alex Barrera was employed as a salesperson. Eric Van Hek worked in the financial department until August or September 2009, wh en he was replaced by Ri chard Carlos. In late August or early September 2009, Gilding told appellant not to deal with Mordichi Mor, who had engaged in a fraudulent tran saction at the deal ership in 2008.6 3. Offenses

Carlos testified that he was a finance manager at the dealership for six to eight months. He had little prior experien ce with financial operations. According to Carlos, appellant ran the dealership and directed his activities. In the fall of 2009, Carlos often saw a person he knew as “M ordichi” talking to appellant in the dealership. After meeting with Mordichi, a ppellant directed Carlos to process sales transactions involving customers Carlos had never met, contrary to the dealership’s policy. Whenever the transaction involved a credit card, appella nt told Carlos to process it as an offline sale. Carlos pr epared the paperwork for each transaction and gave it to appellant, w ho returned the documents with the customer’s signature to Carlos. Carlos heard appellant direct other employees to deliver the purchased

vehicles to Mordichi’s home and obtain th e customers’ signatures there. In December 2009, when Carlos received phone calls from banks attempting to locate the customers, he brought the calls to the attention of appellant, who said

he would take care of them. After a fraud inquiry began, Carlos overheard appellant suggest to investigating police o fficers that appellant did not know Mor’s full name. Later, Carlos saw appellant shredding some documents. Appellant directed Carlos not to place the shredded documents in the dealership’s dumpster, but to dispose of them el sewhere. Angela Wilcox, a dealership employee, testified that during the fall of 2009, she saw appellant with Mor many times in the dealership. At appellant’s request, she gave appellant original MSOs from th e dealership’s files related to deals appellant arranged with Mor. Later, she overheard appellant tell police officers that he was unsure of Mor’s name, ev en though Mor was a well known customer

whose name and address were in the deal ership’s computer system. Afterward, Carlos told her that appellant had asked him to dispose of shredded documents off the dealership’s premises.7 Gilding testified that in mid-Decemb er 2009, a credit card company told him that credit card usage had increased at th e dealership, and that he should expect charge backs. He initiated an inquiry that uncovered 20 pot entially fraudulent sales of motorcycles, motorized dirt bike s, ATVs, and recreational vehicles at the dealership from August 4 to December 8, 2009. Barrera was the salesperson in all the sales, each of which involved one of seven purported buyers. None of the purported buyers was Mor. The first tw o sales were proce ssed by Van Hek, and the remaining sales were processed by Ca rlos. Fourteen of the transactions involved offline credit sales, and six involved financing agreements. The dealership incurred a charge back on each sale ranging from $9,100 to $21,479.80, resulting in losses exceeding $250,000. In addition, the original MSOs for the vehicles in the dealership’s files had been replaced by copies, even though the transactions were not of the type that requir ed the dealership to transfer the original MSO to the purchaser. Shortly after Gilding discovered the potential fraud, Barrera stopped appearing for work. On December 15, 2009, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Detective David Swanson interviewed appellant regarding the potential fraud. Appellant described Mor as a person who “hung around” the dealership, but denied that Mor was his fri end. Appellant further stated that Mor had introduced the actual buyers to him and recommended them as customers. Later, El Monte Police Departme nt Detective Armando Valenzuela

determined that the identification informa tion provided for the buyers on the sales documents was false, and that the existence of the buyers could not be established.

He also discovered that severa l of the vehicles had been shipped to Israel. On February 16, 2010, Detective Valenzuela, accompanied by El Monte Police Department Detective Brian Vill a, interviewed appe llant. Appellant initially stated that “somebody named Mord ichai” had referred the purchasers, who8 appeared in person at the dealership. Wh en the detectives replied that they had information establishing that appellant pe rsonally knew Mor, he became agitated and asked, “Am I under arrest?” The detec tives then arrested him. After receiving

Miranda warnings, 3 appellant stated that Mor had “got[ten] the ball rolling” on the transactions, that Van Hek had taught him how to do offline transactions, and that he had participated for “personal gain” be cause he faced “some bad times at home economically.” Appellant also acknowledged that none of the purchasers came to the dealership.

B. Defense Evidence Appellant testified that he had only a professional relationship with Mor,

who often brokered transactions at the deal ership. Appellant denied that Gilding warned him not to do business with Mor, that he arranged the fraudulent sales with Mor, or that he directed employees to deli ver the vehicles to Mor. He also denied any knowledge that the sale s were fraudulent when they were transacted. According to appellant, Carlos had pr imary responsibility for the financial aspects of the transactions. Appellant’s role in a transaction was limited to approving the salesperson’s initial agreemen t with the customer before it moved to a financial manager. If the customer c hose to pay by credit card, the financial manager was responsible for collecting the paymen t through the credit card machine; if the customer c hose to finance the purchase, the financial manager was responsible for obtaining the relevant docum entation. In each case, the purchase

documents were then transmitted to Gild ing’s Temecula dealership for final processing before they were returned to Temple City Power Sports.

3 Miranda v. Arizona (1996) 384 U.S. 436.9 Appellant further testifie d that after the fraud was discovered, he told police

officers that he was unsure of Mor’s na me because people referred to Mor in different ways. Later, in February 2010, when appella nt met with Detectives Valenzuela and Villa, Villa acted in an insulting a nd threatening manner. Appellant denied having admitted any misconduct during the interview. 4 Ryan Morgan testified that in the fall of 2009, appellant directed him to

deliver vehicles to the home of someone he knew as “Mordichi.” In signing for the deliveries, Mordichi used the name of the person identified in the contract. Stephen Valdez, a dealership salesperson, testified that he accompanied Morgan during one such delivery.

DISCUSSION As explained above, our Supreme Court has determined that appellant may suffer only one conviction for grand theft. ( Whitmer

, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 734, 742.) Appellant’s remaining contentions ar e (1) that he was unlawfully convicted of grand theft of an automobile, (2) th at he was unlawfully convicted of making false financial statements, (3) that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, (4) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on aiding and abetting liability, and (5) that he received ineffec tive assistance of counsel. As explained below, we conclude that appe llant has established reversib le error with respect to 14 of his 20 convictions for making false financial statements. We reject his remaining contentions.

4 Appellant acknowledged telling the detectiv es that the purchas ers had personally appeared in the dealersh ip, but testified that in saying th is he was relying on information from other people.10 A. Grand Theft of an Automobile Appellant contends he was unlawfully convicted of grand theft of an

automobile because that crime does not encompass motorcycles, off road dirt bikes, ATVs, and other recreational vehicles . He thus argues that the information improperly charged him with the crime, that the jury received erroneous instructions regarding it, and that the jury ’s verdicts fail for want of sufficient evidence. As explained belo w, we agree that the crime is limited to the theft of automobiles, but conclude that the errors in the information, instructions, and verdict forms were not prejudicial.

1. Grand Theft Our inquiry requires us to examine the statutory scheme regarding grand theft. Generally, “the crime of theft is divided into two degrees, grand theft and petty theft. (§ 486.) Grand theft, therefor e, is not a separate offense, but simply the higher degree of the crime of theft. [¶] Section 487 defines grand theft to include theft of property worth more th an $400 (subd. (a)) and the theft of an automobile (subd. (d)[(1)]).” ( People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 696, italics omitted, disapproved on another ground in People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228.) Under the statute, theft of an au tomobile constitutes gr and theft regardless of its value. ( People v. Thomas (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 862, 870.)

2. Underlying Proceedings The information initially charged appe llant with 21 counts of grand theft of an automobile (§ 487, subd. (d)(1)), one of which was later dismissed at the beginning of the trial. During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence that appellant orchestrated the theft of 20 moto rcycles, motorized dirt bikes, ATVs, and other recreational vehicles, each of which wa s valued at no less than $9,100.11 In instructing the jury, the trial court stated that appellant was charged with grand theft in violation of section 487. 5 The court further told the jury: “If you

conclude that the defendant committed a theft, you must decide whether the crime was grand theft or petty theft. [¶] The defendant committed grand theft if he stole property worth more than $400 . Theft of an automobile or a motor vehicle is grand theft.” (Italics adde d.) Later, during closing arguments, the prosecutor

stated that each stolen vehicle was the subject of a “[section] 487 charge” or “grand theft auto” charge, and maintained that the term “auto” encompassed motor vehicles, including motorcycles and ATVs. The verdict form for each grand theft count asked the jury to determine whet her appellant was guilty of “grand theft auto, in violation of . . . [s]ection 487[, subdivision] (d)(1)” regarding a specified vehicle. (Uppe r case omitted.) The record discloses no objection by appellant to the instructions, prosecutor’s argument, or verdict forms. The jury found appellant guilty on all the counts, and also found that he ha d taken property worth more than $200, 000.

3. “Automobile” The initial question we confront is whet her the term “automobile,” as used in subdivision (d)(1) of section 487, is equiva lent to the term “motor vehicle,” as the instructions and the prosecutor informed the jury. We conclude that the term “automobile” does not encompa ss all motor vehicles. Because our research has disclosed no decision addressing the question before us, we confront an issue of stat utory interpretation. “‘In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature’s intent and purpose for the

5 The trial court initially stated that appe llant was charged with grand theft under section 484, but later corrected this error.12 enactment. [Citation.] We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it said. [Citation.] . . .’ [C itations.] We examine the statutory language in the context in whic h it appears, and adopt the construction

that best harmonizes the stat ute internally and with rela ted statutes. [Citations.]” ( People v. Palmer (2005) 133 Cal.App.4t h 1141, 1149, quoting People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172.) In add ition, we may examine the statute’s legislative history. ( People v. Palmer, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1149.) The term “automobile,” as commonly understood, does not encompass all motor vehicles. The term is ordinarily de fined to mean a particular type of motor vehicle, namely, a four-wheeled self-p ropelled vehicle intended to transport people. (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Di ct. (2002) p. 148 [“a us[ually] 4-wheeled automotive vehicle designed for passenger transportation on streets and roadways and commonly propelled by an internal-combus tion engine using a volatile fuel (as gasoline)”]; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Di ct. (1995) p. 78 [“a . . . four-wheeled automotive vehicle designed fo r passenger transportation”].) Nor does subdivision (d)(1) of section 487 disclose any legislative intent to attach a broader meaning to the term . Generally, under the principle of expressio

unius est exclusio alterius , “‘the expression of certain th ings in a statute necessarily involves exclusion of other things not expressed. . . .’ [Citation.]” ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 13). Here, subdivision (d)(1) of section 487 stat es that grand theft is committed when “the property taken is any of the following: [¶] . . . An automobile, horse, mare, gelding, any bovine animal, any caprine animal, mule, jack, jenny, sheep, lamb, hog, sow, boar, gilt, barrow, or pig.” It is well established that the Legislature’s intent regarding this provision was to de signate theft of the enumerated items as13 grand theft regardless of their value. ( People v. Thomas

, supra , 43 Cal.App.3d at p. 870.) Because the items following th e term “automobile” are carefully and precisely specified, the provision exhibits no intent to use the term “automobile” broadly to mean “motor vehicle,” for pur poses of proving grand theft without a

demonstration of the stolen item’s value. Our conclusion finds additional support in the legislative history of section 487, subdivision (d)(1), and related statut es. As enacted in the 19th Century, the predecessor of section 487, subdivision (d )(1), exempted only animals from the proof of value requirement. (See People v. Townsley (1870) 39 Cal. 405, 406.) In 1905, the Legislature enacted former Pe nal Code section 499b, the so-called ““joyrid[ing] statute,’” which establis hed as a crime the act of driving or temporarily using “any automobile, bicycle, motorcycle or other vehicle ” without the owner’s consent. (Stats. 1905, ch . 90, § 1, pp. 184-185, italics added; People v.

Thomas (1962) 58 Cal.2d 121, 125, ove rruled on another ground in People v.

Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 135, fn. 9.) In 1913, the Legislature created a similar offense in enacting the statutor y predecessor of Vehicle Code section 10851, which established as a crime the ac t of driving any “motor vehicle” without the owner’s consent, and e xpressly defined “‘automob ile’” to mean “all motor

vehicles excepting motorcycles .” (Stats. 1913, ch. 326, § 1, p. 639, italic s added.) Not until 1927 did the Legislature am end the predecessor of section 487, subdivision (d)(1), to include “automobiles” among the enumerated items. (Stats. 1927, ch. 619, § 4, p. 1047.) Later, in 1996, the Legislature amended section 499b to eliminate from it all provisions dupl icative of Vehicle Code section 10851, which addresses the driving or taking of a “vehicle.” (Stats. 1996, ch. 660, §§ 1-3, pp. 3669-3670.) Under the Vehi cle Code, the term “‘vehi cle“” is defined broadly to mean “a device by which any person or property may be pr opelled, moved, or14 drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary ra ils or tracks.” (Veh. Code, § 670.) In view of this history, the term “automobile” in section 487, subdivision (d)(1), cannot be regarded as equivalent to “motor vehicle.” The Legislature, in establishing the related crimes, used the term “automobile” in a manner that excluded -- at a minimum -- motorcycles. Furthermore, after amending the predecessor of section 487, subdivision (d)(1 ) to include the term “automobile,” the Legislature has undertaken no action suggesting that the term encompasses motorcycles or is equivalent to the broad term “vehicle,” as de fined in the Vehicle

Code. Appellant was thus improperly charged with grand theft of an automobile under subdivision (d)(1) of section 487, as the charges were clearly erroneous to the extent they involved mo torcycles or dirt bikes. 6 However, for the reasons explained below, it is unnecessary for us to determine the full extent of the charging error, as appellant suffered no prejudice from it.

4. Grand Theft of Property Exc eeding $400 in Value In view of the trial proceedings, we further conclude that appellant was properly convicted of a different type of grand theft under subdivision (a) of section 487, that is, the theft of property worth more than $400.

6 We do not address or decide whether the charges were erroneous with respect to the ATVs and other recreationa l vehicles because the record contains little or no evidence regarding their desi gn and function.15 a. Informal Amendment of the Information To the extent appellant argues that he lacked notice that he was charged with grand theft under subdivision (a) of section 487, his contention fails in light of the so-called “informal amendment doctrine,” which constitutes a judicial recognition that an information may be amended without written alterations to it. ( People v.

Sandoval (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 111, 113 ( Sandoval )). Generally, the purpose of an accusatory pleading is “‘to provide the accused with reasonable notice of the charges.’” ( Sandoval

, supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, quoting People v. Ruiloba (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 674, 689-690.) Nonetheless, the Penal Code permits accusatory pleadings to be amended at any stage of the proceedings “for any defect or insufficiency” (§ 1009), a nd bars reversal of a criminal judgment “by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of fo rm which does not prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the merits” (§ 960) . In view of these provisions, “[t]he proceedings in the trial court may cons titute an informal amendment of the accusatory proceeding, when the defenda nt’s conduct or circumstances created by him amount to an implied consent to the amendment.” (4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Pretrial Proceedings, § 213, p. 418.) 7 An instructive application of the doctrine is found in People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 973, disapprove d on another ground in People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 568, fn. 3. There, the information charged the defendant with attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. ( Toro , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 972.) In addition to these offenses, the jury was instructed regarding the offense

7 As explained in Sandoval , “[t]he informal amendment doctrine makes it clear that California law does not attach any talismani c significance to the existence of a written information. Under this doctrine, a defe ndant’s conduct may effect an informal amendment of an information without th e People having formally filed a written amendment to the information.” ( Sandoval

, supra , 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.)16 of battery with serious bodily injury, wh ich the instructions and verdict forms erroneously described as a lesser incl uded offense of attempted murder. ( Id . at p. 973.) The defendant’s counsel raised no objection to the instructions and verdict form regarding battery with serious bodily injury, or to the jury’s consideration of the offense. ( Id . at pp. 977-978.) Noting that such failure to object may be “‘“regarded as an implied consent to treat the information as having been amended

to include the offense on which the sent ence was imposed,”’” our Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had implie dly consented to the submission of the charge to the jury, and had forfe ited any contention of error. ( Id . at pp. 976-977, quoting People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 75.) Here, the jury was instructed that appe llant could be convicted of grand theft under section 487 if it found that “he stole property worth more than $400” or took

“an automobile or a motor vehicle.” Although the prosecutor referred to the “section 487” offense as “grand theft auto ,” and the verdict fo rms cited subdivision (d)(1) of section 487, nothing in the pr osecutor’s argument or the verdict forms suggested that the propriety of a c onviction for grand theft hinged on the classification of the stolen property as an automobile or motor ve hicle. Rather, the instructions informed the jury that it c ould convict appellant under each count of grand theft if he stole property exceeding $400. The instructions thus effectively presented the jury with two distinct theo ries of grand theft. Because appellant never raised any objection to the instructi ons before the trial court, he impliedly consented to the submission of both theories to the jury. 8

8 We recognize that an amendment to th e information is improper when no evidence supporting the amended charges was presen ted at the preliminary hearing. ( People v. Tallman (1945) 27 Cal.2d 209, 213.) Here, howev er, evidence that the value of each pertinent vehicle exceeded $400 was presented at appellant’s preliminary hearing.17 b. No Reversal Based on Erroneous Theory The remaining question concerning the charges against appellant is whether the presentation of a legally erroneous theo ry of grand theft to the jury requires a reversal of the grand theft convictions. The error here is subject to the rule propounded in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, reve rsed on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 234, and in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, and People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116. Under the

Guiton

- Green rule, “if a jury is presented with multiple theories supporting conviction on a single charge and on review one theory is found legally defective, that is, the theory does not present a lega lly sufficient basis for conviction, reversal is required unless substantial reasons exis t to find that the verdict was based on a legally valid theory.” ( People v. Llamas (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1729, 1740.) However, “[a]n instructional error presenting the jury with a legally invalid theory of guilt does not require reversal, . . . if other parts of the verdict demonstrate that the jury necessarily found the defenda nt guilty on a proper theory.” ( People v.

Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 727.) Under the rule, we will reverse unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. ( People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201.) Here, the record demonstr ates that the jury necessa rily found appellant guilty under a legally correct theory. In connec tion with the 20 grand theft counts, the prosecutor presented evidence as to the value of each vehicle, including that no vehicle was valued at less than $9,100. As this evidence was never challenged or disputed at trial, no rational jury could have rejected it. ( People v. Nicholson (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 823, 833.) Accord ingly, in convicting appellant under the grand theft counts, the jury could not ha ve determined that appellant took the vehicles without concluding that each vehicle was worth more than $400. Furthermore, in finding appellant guilty on all counts, the jury made a special18 finding that he had taken property worth mo re than $200,000. As no single vehicle was shown to be worth more than $21,4 79.80 -- the maximum va lue attributed to the most expensive vehicle -- the jury ’s finding necessarily reflected its

determination that each of the vehi cles was worth more than $400. (See People v.

Guiton , supra , 4 Cal.4th at p. 1131 [stating that other portions of verdict may show that jury necessarily found defendant guilt y on a proper theory].) In sum, none of appellant’s grand theft convictions must be reversed due to defects in the information, prosecutor’s closing argument, or verdict forms.

B. Lesser Included Offense Appellant contends he was unlawfully convicted of making false financial statements under section 532a, subdivision (1), because that offense was necessarily included within the offense of grand theft charged against him. The jury convicted him of 20 counts of maki ng false financial statements, each of which was related to a specifi c count of grand theft. A ppellant maintains he cannot be convicted under any count of making fals e financial statements because the jury received instructions on grand theft by tric k and by larceny. He argues that making

false financial statements wa s a lesser included offense of the associated types of grand theft, as set forth in the instruc tions. For the reasons discussed below, we disagree. Generally, “multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses.” ( People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355, italics omitted.) For purposes of this rule, courts apply the so- called “‘elements’” test to decide whether an offense is necessarily included within a charged offense. ( People v. Reed,

supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1227-1228.) “Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of the greater offe nse include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.” ( Ibid .)19 The application of the elements te st to grand theft thus requires an examination of the statutory scheme gove rning theft. In 1927, the Legislature

consolidated several former ly distinct offenses into the single crime of theft defined in section 484. ( People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 304-305 ( Davis ).) Those offenses include larceny and theft by trick. ( Ibid .; People v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 258.) The consolidation simp lified pleading the crime of the theft, but neither changed the elements of the consolidated crimes nor eliminated the substantive distinctions among them. ( Davis , supra , 19 Cal.4th at pp. 304-305; People v. Nazary (2010) 191 Cal.App.4t h 727, 740-741.) Our research has disclosed no publis hed decision addressing whether the elements test attaches simply to the statutory definition of grand theft of property exceeding $400, or also requires a consider ation of the elements of theft by trick and by larceny. However, it is unnecessary for us to resolve this issue, as appellant’s contention fails in light of the elements of each offense. The statutory elements of grand theft of property exceeding $400 do not include the statutory elements of making a false financial statement. The elements of the former offense are “the taking of personal property [valued at more than $400] from the owner[] into the possession of the criminal without the consent of the owner or under a claim of right, [and ] the asportation of the subject matter [with] the specific intent to deprive the owner of his property wholly and permanently.” ( People v. Walther (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 310, 316; § 487, subd. (a).) Under section 532a, subdivision (1 ), a defendant commits the offense of making a false financial statement by “kno wingly mak[ing] or caus[ing] to be made . . . , any false statement in writing , with intent that it shall be relied upon, respecting the financial conditio n, or means or ability to pa y, of himself or herself, or any other person, firm or corporation, in whom he or she is interested, or for whom he or she is acting, for the purpos e of procuring in any form whatsoever,20 either the delivery of persona l property, the payment of cash, [or] the making of a loan or credit . . . .” (Italics added.) Because grand theft of property exceeding $400 can be accomplished without a written st atement, appellant’s contention fails. The same is true of grand theft of property exceeding $400 accomplished by larceny or trick. Theft by larceny “is committed by every person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to steal the property, and (6) carries the property away. [Citations.]” ( Davis , supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 305.) It requires no written statement. Similarly, to constitute theft by trick, “the following elements must be present: (1) there must be a taki ng; (2) there must be an asportation of the thing taken; (3) the thing taken must be the property of another; and (4) the taking and carrying away must be with an intent , without claim or pretense of right or justification, to deprive the owner of his property wholly and permanently [citation].” ( People v. Woolson (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 657, 668.) No false writing is required. In short, neither type of theft requires a written false financial statement. Appellant’s contention thus fails because making false financial statements is not an offense necessarily included within the offense of grand theft charged against him. 9

C. Substantial Evidence Appellant contends that his convicti ons for grand theft and some of his

9 People v. Gonda (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 774, u pon which appellant relies, is inapposite. There, the appellate court held th at grand theft by false pretenses necessarily includes the crimes defined in Corporations Code section 31110 and 31201, which make it an offense to sell franchises without proper registration or to make specified reports containing false statem ents or omitting material information. ( People v. Gonda, supra, at pp. 778-779.) As the appellate court did not apply the elements tests in reaching these conclusions (see ibid .), it does not constitute persuasive authority on the issue before us.21 convictions for making false financial st atements fail for want of substantial evidence. For the reasons explained belo w, we reject his contention regarding the convictions for grand theft, but conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the pertinent convictions for making false financial statements. 10

1. Grand Theft Convictions

For the reasons set forth in Whitmer , appellant may convicted only of a single count of grand theft. We noneth eless observe that there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction on each count of grand theft, viewed as a separate crime. With resp ect to the grand theft convic tions, appellant argues there

was no direct evidence that he intentiona lly participated in the fraud activities related to the taking of each vehicle. He directs our attention to the evidence that Mor was a direct participant in the sche me, and maintains that the trial evidence also supports the reasonable infe rence that Carlos was Mor’s “insider.” Appellant’s argument misapprehends our role in reviewing the record for substantial evidence. We do not engage in independent factfinding, but instead affirm the jury’s determinations if they are supported by any logical inferences grounded in the evidence. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11-14.)

10 “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction . . . , ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewi ng the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] Under this standard, ‘an appellate court in a criminal case . . . does not ask itself whet her it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Rather, the reviewing court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of so lid value -- such that a reasona ble trier of fact could find the defendant guilty be yond a reasonable doub t.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Vy (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1224.)22 Furthermore, we are guided by the princi ple that “[t]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgmen t even if it is contradicted by other evidence . . . . [Citations.]” ( In re Frederick G. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 353, 366, fn. omitted.) There was ample evidence that appellant directly perpetrated the thefts. Carlos testified that appellant authorized the offline credit card sales and other violations of dealership policies, obtaine d the false signatures from the fictitious buyers on the sales document s, and arranged for the de livery of the vehicles. Furthermore, according to Detective Valenz uela, appellant admitted that Mor had “got[ten] the ball rolling” on the thefts, th at Van Hek had instructed appellant how to do offline transactions, and that appellant had participated for “personal gain.”

This evidence was sufficient to establish th at appellant supervised and directed the

thefts within the d ealership.

2. False Financial Statement Convic tions Based On Credit Card

Transactions Appellant also challenges his convi ctions for making false financial

statements under the counts based on cred it card transactions (Counts 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, and 42). Regarding the credit card transactions, appellant maintains there is no evidence he arranged for falsified buyer signatures to be placed on any wr itten sale documents affirming the buyer’s financial condition or ability to pay. We agree. 11

11 Appellant does not dispute the existence of substantial eviden ce to support the remaining counts of making false statements (Counts 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 22), which involved transactions based on financing agreements.23 To commit the offense of false financial statement (see pt. C., ante ), a defendant must “knowingly make or cause to be made . . . , [ a ] false statement in writing , with intent that it shall be relied upon, respecting the fi nancial condition, or means or ability to pay, of himself or herself, or any other person, firm or corporation, in whom he or she is interested , or for whom he or she is acting . . . .” (§ 532s, subd. (1), italics added.) Th e offense is rendered a felony when a

fictitious name is used in connection w ith the false financial statement (§ 532a, subd. (4)). However, as explained in People v. Vincent (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 696, the use of a fictitious name by itself does not establish the offense, absent a false written statement regarding an individual’ s financial condition or means or ability to pay. There, the defe ndant opened two bank account s using a false name, and then attempted to obtain funds from the bank by depositing a forged check in one of the accounts. ( Vincent , supra , 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 698-699.) After the defendant was convicted of forgery and making false financial statements, we

reversed her conviction for the latter offense, as the documents she signed to open the accounts contained no representations “regarding [her] business or financial condition . . . or her means or ability to pay.” ( Id . at pp. 702-703.) Here, the documents executed by the purported buyers in connection with

the credit card transactions also disclo se no such representations. Although each purported buyer executed a sales agreement, the agreements themselves state only that the buyer is obliged to pay for th e vehicle. Respondent has identified no language in the sales documents -- and we have found none -- containing any statement affirming the buyer’s ability to pay. For this reason, appellant’s convictions under the pertinent counts fail for want of substantial evidence.24 Accordingly, the convictions must be reve rsed, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court stayed the imposition of punishment on them (§ 654). 12

D. Aiding and Abetting Instruction Appellant contends the trial court erre d in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on aiding and abetting liability. He is mistaken. Gene rally, “[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or ai d and abet in its commission, . . . are principals in any crime so committed.” (§ 31.) As our Su preme Court has explai ned, “[i]nstructions on aiding and abetting are not required where ‘[t]he defendant wa s not tried as an aider and abettor, [and] there was no ev idence to support such a theory.’” ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1201, quoting People v. Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 404.) Thus, the jury n eed not receive instructions on aiding and abetting when the prosecutor tries the case on the theory that the defendant was one of the direct perpetra tors of the crimes, neither side relies on an aiding and abetting theory, and no evidence is presen ted suggesting that the defendant acted merely as an aider and ab ettor of the crimes. ( People v. Sassounian , supra , 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 404.) That is the case here. Although the prosecutor argued that Mor “perpetrated” the fraud, he ma intained that appellant wa s Mor’s partner within the dealership. As noted above (see pt. C.1. ante ), the prosecution evidence established that appellant was directly responsible fo r the fraudulent transactions

12 In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessa ry to address appellant’s contentions that the counts in question were ne ver properly amended to assert charges under section 532a, and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by faili ng to object to the defective amendments and absence of evidence regardi ng the amended charges. Our determination renders these contentions moot.25 inside the dealership. Ther e is otherwise no evidence suggesting that appellant was merely an aider and abettor. At trial, appellant denied any role in the crimes, and never advanced the theory that he merely aided and abetted th em. Accordingly,

there was no instructional error.

E. Remedy In Light of Decision in Whitmer Although we reject appella nt’s challenges to his convi ctions for grand theft, our Supreme Court has conc luded on other grounds that appellant may suffer only

one conviction for grand theft. ( Whitmer

, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 734, 742.) Under the circumstances, the appropriate re medy is to affirm the judgment as to the grand theft charged in Count 3, which th e trial court identified as the base term, reverse the remaining grand theft counts, and remand the matte r for resentencing, including imposition of the enhancem ent on Count 3 (§ 12022.6). (See People v.

Brooks (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 24, 32, di sapproved on another ground in Whitmer

, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 739-741; People v. Packard (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 622, 627, disapproved on another ground in Whitmer

, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 739-741; People v. Bowie (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 143, 157.)26 DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed with respect to appellant’s convictions for grand theft, with the exception of the grand thef t charged in Count 3, which the trial court

identified as the base term. Also revers ed are appellant’s convictions for making false financial statements (§ 532a, subds. (1), (4)) under Counts 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, and 42. Th e matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to resentence appellant on Count 3, to impose the enhancement under section 12022.6, and to impose sent ence on the remaining counts of making false financial statements (Counts 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 22). The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Followi ng resentencing, the superior court is directed to prepare an am ended abstract of judgment reflecting the resentencing, and to forward a copy of the amended ab stract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.