[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-12089

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20216-JAL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

BRIGITH DAYANA GOMEZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(February 14, 2020)

Before JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and COOGLER,

* District 

Judge.

COOGLER, District Judge:

* Honorable L. Scott Coogler, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Alabama, 

sitting by designation.

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 1 of 17 
2

Brigith Dayana Gomez appeals her convictions, following a jury trial, for 

one count of conspiracy to transmit an interstate extortionate communication, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 875(d); three counts of transmission of 

extortionate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(d) and 2; and one 

count of traveling in interstate or foreign commerce with intent to promote the 

unlawful activity of extortion, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 836.05, and thereafter 

performing acts to promote that unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1952(a)(3) and 2. 

The evidence at trial showed that from approximately February 18, 2017,

through March 7, 2017, Gomez and her co-defendant, Carolina Del Carmen 

Roldan, threatened to release to the media personally damaging photos and videos 

of Ivan Gabriel Aguilera, the son of the famous, now-deceased Mexican singer 

Juan Gabriel, unless Aguilera paid them $50,000. Gomez and Roldan coordinated 

their extortionate plan as documented in text messages and then sent the threat via 

text to Aguilera. Aguilera showed the threat to his lawyer, who engaged in a series 

of recorded communications and negotiations with Roldan and Gomez. Ultimately, 

Aguilera and his lawyer alerted the FBI; the FBI recorded additional 

communications; Gomez flew from Los Angeles to Miami to collect the $50,000; 

and Gomez was arrested. Gomez consented to a search of her cell phone, which 

revealed substantial communications confirming the conspiracy. 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 2 of 17 
3

On appeal, Gomez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her 

convictions and the failure of the district court to give a jury instruction she 

requested regarding the 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) and 2 charge. After careful review 

and having had the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the jury had 

sufficient evidence to convict Gomez on all five counts and that the district court’s 

ruling on the jury instruction was correct. We thus affirm. 

I.

A.

In its case-in-chief at trial, the government undertook to establish the 

following. Beginning in approximately 2014, Aguilera partied with a group of 

women, including Roldan and Gomez, while he accompanied his father on his 

concert tours. Although he was married, Aguilera had affairs and exchanged 

sexually explicit photos with various women. 

When Gabriel died unexpectedly in August 2016, Aguilera began receiving 

intense media coverage, as he was reported to be the sole heir of his father’s 

fortune. Shortly thereafter, Gomez, Roldan, and other women in their social group 

began to discuss via text messages selling images and videos of Aguilera to the 

media. The women exchanged pictures and videos of Aguilera naked and kissing 

women. Gomez specifically wrote that they should describe to the media that 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 3 of 17 
4

Aguilera was exploiting his deceased father to maintain his lifestyle of “sex, 

extravagance [and] women.”

Ultimately, Gomez and Roldan decided to attempt an extortionate plan 

without the other women. Hoping to capitalize on Aguilera’s increased visibility, 

they timed their threatening communication with Aguilera to coincide with a large 

tribute concert that was to be held on February 18, 2017, to honor Gabriel’s legacy. 

On the morning of the concert, Gomez instructed Roldan to send Aguilera a text 

message threatening to reveal photos and videos to the media unless they were 

paid. Gomez further directed Roldan to attach videos “so that he sees that we are 

not playing games.”

Just before the concert was to begin on February 18, Aguilera received a text 

message on his cell phone that read:

Hello Ivan, how are you? You know, we have some information

on you which would be very interesting for the media, for social 

media, as well as for your wife and your wife’s brother. We are close 

to negotiating this information with Telemundo, but we decided to 

contact you first. There’s no point in reminding you not to try to do 

anything against the person receiving the exchange because someone 

else has everything and will disclose it to the public, meaning this is 

between you and me. The issue is that we have some very 

compromising videos and photos of you and your brother-in-law in 

Las Vegas; it would be a shame to reveal how you enjoy your father’s 

inheritance. May he rest in peace. I will send you a portion of what I 

have, only a portion because I have a lot more photos and videos. Do 

we negotiate with you or do you prefer that I go to the media?

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 4 of 17 
5

Attached to the text message were four videos showing Aguilera partying with a 

group of women, including Gomez and Roldan. 

Aguilera viewed the message as a threat to his reputation, his marriage, and 

his family’s business. He told his wife about the threat, and she echoed his fear that 

their family’s business would suffer. Aguilera showed the message to his lawyer, 

Guillermo Pous, and they decided that Pous would try to resolve the situation by 

responding that he was interested in negotiating. Meanwhile, Roldan told Gomez 

that she had sent the text as directed, and they both agreed not to “back down.”

On February 20, 2017, Pous and Roldan spoke on the phone three times, 

ultimately reaching a deal whereby Aguilera would pay $50,000 in exchange for 

Roldan and Gomez not releasing the photos and videos to the media. Roldan 

suggested to Pous that she was working for an unidentified “man” and refused to 

give him her full name, going by Carmen alone. 

Over the next two weeks, Roldan spoke on the phone with Pous nearly 

twenty times, with Gomez often directing Roldan’s strategy. As Pous attempted to 

buy time so that he could inform law enforcement authorities, Roldan and Gomez 

became increasingly aggressive in tone. For example, on February 28, Roldan told 

Pous that the “man” would release the materials to the media the next day.

During this time Gomez was also communicating with her sister via text

messages and phone calls, seeking advice on how to go about obtaining the money. 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 5 of 17 
6

In those communications, Gomez described what she and Roldan were doing as 

“blackmailing” Aguilera and referred to herself and Roldan as “swindlers.”

Gomez’s sister warned Gomez not to reveal her identity or to collect the money in 

person because that could mean going to “jail” for “extortion.” Gomez’s sister also 

recommended that Gomez and Roldan request wire transfers to two accounts so as 

not to raise red flags with any banks. However, Gomez told her sister that she 

wanted to fly to Miami herself to pick up the cash because getting another person 

involved to handle those aspects of the plan would mean they would have to split 

the profits further. 

On March 1, 2017, Gomez and Roldan traveled from Los Angeles to the 

Telemundo television network in Miami to try to sell the photos and videos. 

Telemundo offered only $5,000, so Gomez decided she would give Pous a few 

more days to come up with the $50,000. 

Pous ultimately reported Gomez and Roldan’s threats to FBI agents, who 

met with Aguilera and his wife and facilitated additional recorded phone calls. On 

March 6, 2017, Pous and Roldan spoke on the phone twice. Roldan revealed her 

full name and told him that she was working for Gomez. Roldan also gave Pous

Gomez’s phone number so Pous could call Gomez directly to coordinate Gomez’s 

travel to Miami to collect the money. When Pous called Gomez later that day, 

Gomez said that she had flown to Miami on her own expense the week before with 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 6 of 17 
7

the intent of getting paid, and therefore that she would return to Miami a second 

time only if Pous paid for her flight and guaranteed payment. Pous agreed, 

purchasing a plane ticket in Gomez’s name from Los Angeles to Miami for the 

next day and sent her an email confirming the details. Gomez then took the flight 

as planned and was arrested by the FBI about twenty minutes after she arrived at 

the Miami airport.

Following her arrest, Gomez consented to a search of her cell phone. The 

FBI found extensive written and audio communications with Roldan establishing 

the conspiracy dating back to September 2016.

B.

On March 23, 2017, a Southern District of Florida grand jury returned an 

indictment charging Gomez and Roldan, in Count 1, with conspiracy to transmit an 

interstate extortionate communication, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 875(d); 

in Counts 2-4, with transmission of extortionate communications, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 875(d) and 2; and in Count 5, with traveling in interstate or foreign 

commerce with intent to promote the unlawful activity of extortion, in violation of 

Fla. Stat. § 836.05, and thereafter performing acts to promote that unlawful 

activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) and 2.

Roldan pled guilty to Count 1 in exchange for the dismissal of the other 

counts against her. Gomez’s trial began on January 24, 2018. The government 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 7 of 17 
8

called Aguilera, his wife, Pous, and four FBI special agents involved in the 

investigation. Numerous audio and text messages and emails were admitted. The 

defense called two witnesses: Ricdamis Garcia, the producer for Telemundo who 

met with Gomez and Roldan during the conspiracy, and Ivonne Solorzano, one of 

the women with whom Aguilera had an affair. Gomez attempted to establish 

through their testimony and through cross-examination of government witnesses 

that she was not guilty of extortion because Aguilera’s reputation was already 

tarnished and that she played a minimal role in the offense.

Gomez was found guilty as charged of each count of the indictment. Postverdict, Gomez, reiterating the arguments she asserted after the close of the 

government’s case-in-chief, moved unsuccessfully for a judgment of acquittal.

On May 9, 2018, the district court sentenced Gomez to 20 months’ and 

fifteen days’ imprisonment as to Counts 1-5, all to run concurrently, followed by 

two years’ supervised release. Judgment was entered the following day. This 

appeal followed.

II.

A.

Gomez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all counts of 

conviction. This Court reviews de novo the sufficiency of evidence, accepting all

reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Diaz-Boyzo, 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 8 of 17 
9

432 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). “The evidence is sufficient so 

long as a reasonable trier of fact, choosing among reasonable interpretations of the 

evidence, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. 

Pineiro, 389 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2004)). We conclude that the evidence 

presented at trial was sufficient to convict Gomez on all five counts of the 

indictment.

Count 1 charged Gomez with knowingly and willfully conspiring to extort 

money from Aguilera by use of interstate communications, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §§ 371 and 875(d). The indictment specified the overt acts as including the

transmission of the first threat via text message to Aguilera on February 18, 

Gomez’s call on March 6 to Pous to arrange her travel to Miami, and Gomez’s 

flight from Los Angeles to Miami on March 6 to collect the cash. To prove the § 

371 conspiracy, the government was required to establish “(1) the existence of an 

agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the defendants’ knowing and 

voluntary participation in the agreement; and (3) the commission of an act in 

furtherance of the agreement.” United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1153 

(11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis removed).

The government presented overwhelming evidence of Gomez’s guilt at trial, 

much of it in the form of Gomez’s own words in written text messages and 

recorded calls establishing the extortionate plot and her willing participation in it. 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 9 of 17 
10

Gomez disclaims any criminal intent and attempts to minimize her role in the 

scheme, but the evidence showed that Gomez directed and assisted Roldan 

throughout the conspiracy. Gomez instructed Roldan on what to say in the first text 

message Roldan sent to Aguilera on February 18, after which the two agreed they 

were not “back[ing] down,” and over the next two weeks, Gomez stayed in close 

contact with both Roldan and her sister via text, discussing how to accelerate the 

timeline for payment. On March 6, Gomez spoke directly with Pous to finalize the 

deal and then traveled to Miami to collect the extortionate demand. Additionally, 

Aguilera, his wife, and Pous testified at length that they considered the text 

messages and other communications true threats to the reputation and livelihood of 

Aguilera and his family. The evidence clearly supports the guilty verdict on Count 

1. 

The record also supports the jury’s verdicts of guilt on Counts 2, 3, and 4, 

each of which charged Gomez with transmitting an extortionate threat in

interstate or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 875(d) and 2. Section 

875(d) provides:

Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or 

corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate 

or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to 

injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the 

reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee 

or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or 

imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 10 of 17 
11

18 U.S.C. § 875(d). To prevail under a theory of aiding and abetting pursuant to § 

2, the government was required to prove that “(1) the substantive offense was 

committed by someone; (2) the defendant committed an act which contributed to 

and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission.”

United States v. Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United 

States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Count 2 is based upon the first text message that Roldan sent to Aguilera on 

February 18 threatening to release images and videos if Aguilera did not pay. 

Although Roldan sent the message, the evidence of Gomez’s actions is sufficient to 

sustain Gomez’s conviction on this count under the aiding and abetting theory. 

Before Roldan sent the message, she and Gomez discussed their strategy and the 

substance of the message in detail and confirmed to each other after Roldan sent 

the message that they were not “back[ing] down.” 

Count 3 is based on three recorded calls on February 20 between Roldan and 

Pous, in which Roldan pretended to be working for an unidentified “man”—whom 

she later revealed was in fact Gomez—and specified that “he” wanted $50,000 in 

exchange for not turning over photos and videos of a compromising nature to the 

media. The evidence showed that Roldan and Gomez remained in close contact via 

text while these calls were happening. Also during this period, Gomez specifically 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 11 of 17 
12

discussed with her sister the mechanics of the plan. The record thus contains ample 

evidence of Gomez’s knowing facilitation of the February 20 threats.

Count 4 is based on three calls on March 6—the first two between Pous and 

Roldan and the third between Pous and Gomez. In those final calls, Roldan 

revealed to Pous her own and Gomez’s identities. Then, Gomez told Pous that she 

would return to Miami a second time only if Pous paid for her flight and 

guaranteed payment. Gomez asserts that she was merely making travel 

arrangements and nothing she said could be interpreted as a threat, but reasonable 

jurors could disagree and instead find that the purpose of these calls was to finalize 

the extortionate agreement.

Count 5 charged Gomez with violating the Travel Act, which, among other 

things, makes it a crime to “travel[] in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with 

intent to . . . promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, 

management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity, and thereafter 

[to] perform[] or attempt[] to perform [an act of unlawful activity].” 18 U.S.C. § 

1952(a)(3). The statute lists a number of predicate crimes that qualify as unlawful 

activities, including “extortion, bribery, or arson” in violation of state or Federal 

law. Id. § 1952(b)(2). The district court instructed the jury according to this 

Court’s pattern offense instruction, which listed the elements of 18 U.S.C. 

§1952(a)(3) as follows: (1) Gomez traveled in interstate or foreign commerce on or 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 12 of 17 
13

about the dates and between the places described in the indictment; (2) Gomez 

traveled with the specific intent to promote, manage, establish or carry on an 

unlawful activity; and (3) while traveling, Gomez knowingly committed an act to 

promote, manage, establish, or carry on an unlawful activity. See Eleventh Circuit 

Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases), 71 (2013). The jury was further 

instructed that “unlawful activity” includes “any business enterprise involving 

extortion,” and that “[u]nder [Florida] law [making an extortionate threat to a 

person’s reputation] is unlawful.” See id. 

Although Gomez characterizes her flight to Miami to collect the $50,000 as 

isolated and innocuous, reasonable jurors could instead infer from the evidence 

that over the course of several weeks, Gomez and Roldan threatened Aguilera with 

the release of compromising images if he did not pay, and that Gomez flew across 

the country at Pous’s expense with the specific criminal intent to collect the 

demand in person. We are satisfied that the jury’s verdict as to Count 5 is well 

supported by the evidence. 

B.

Gomez next contends that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the 

jury in accordance with instructions she requested. This Court reviews the district 

court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2009). “Such refusal constitutes 

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 13 of 17 
14

reversible error if: ‘(1) the requested instruction was a correct statement of the law, 

(2) its subject matter was not substantially covered by other instructions, and (3) its 

subject matter dealt with an issue in the trial court that was so important that failure 

to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to defend [herself].’” Id. at 

1247–48 (quoting United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 

2006)). We find no abuse of discretion here. 

Gomez’s requested instruction related to the applicable mens rea under 18 

U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), the Travel Act violation charged in Count 5. Gomez’s

argument at the charge conference was that by referencing Florida’s extortion 

statute, Fla. Stat. § 836.05 (2014), in the indictment, the government imposed on 

itself the burden of proving not only the mens rea required under § 1952(a)(3)—

knowingly traveling with the specific intent to promote the unlawful activity of 

extortion—but also that she acted with the state-specific mens rea of “actual 

malice,” which one Florida court had found necessary under Fla. Stat. § 836.05.1

The language Gomez proposed adding to the instruction was as follows:

[U]nder Florida law, making an extortionate threat to reputation is

unlawful. However, Florida law requires that the government prove

1 Fla. Stat. § 836.05 provides, in part: “Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed 

communication, . . . maliciously threatens an injury to the . . . reputation of another, or 

maliciously threatens to expose another to disgrace, or to expose any secret affecting another . . . 

with intent thereby to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatsoever . . . shall be guilty of 

a felony . . . .” Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal has defined the term “maliciously” under 

that statute as acting with “ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent.” Calamia v. State, 125 So. 3d 

1007, 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 14 of 17 
15

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made the extortionate

threat with actual malice. That means the government must prove the

defendant made the threat with ill will, hatred, spite, or an evil intent.

The district court denied Gomez’s request, instead instructing the jury using this 

Court’s pattern offense instruction, which specified that “unlawful activity” 

includes “extortion” and “[u]nder Florida law, making an extortionate threat to a 

person’s reputation is unlawful.”

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Gomez’s 

requested instruction because it was not a correct statement of the law. Jordan, 582 

F.3d at 1247. In a case where the relevant unlawful activity underlying the Travel 

Act violation was arson, the former Fifth Circuit rejected a defendant’s argument 

that the district court erred by not providing the jury with the state law definition of 

the offense. United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1051–52 (5th Cir. 1975)

(“There was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find that the appellant 

traveled in interstate commerce with intent to bomb and/or burn a Maryland 

building. There is no requirement that the jury be instructed on the Maryland 

definition of arson and there is no reversible error here.”).2 In so holding, the court 

relied upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 

Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969), which addressed the Travel Act’s prohibition 

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court 

adopted as binding precedent all the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 15 of 17 
16

against extortion. Conway, 507 F.2d at 1051–52. The defendants in Nardello were 

indicted for their participation in a scheme to obtain money from victims by threats 

to expose alleged homosexual conduct. 393 U.S. at 287. The indictments charged 

that the defendants traveled in interstate commerce to promote their activities, 

which the indictments referred to as “the unlawful activity of blackmail, in 

violation of the laws of the Common-wealth of Pennsylvania.” Id. at 287–88. The 

Pennsylvania statutes distinguished between “extortion” and “blackmail,” with 

“extortion” applicable only to the conduct of public officials. Id. at 288. The 

defendants argued that the indictments were defective because they were not public 

officials. Id. The federal district court agreed and dismissed the indictments. Id. On 

direct appeal to the Supreme Court by the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3731, id. at 288–89, the Court “decline[d] to give the term ‘extortion’ [in § 1952(b) 

such] an unnaturally narrow reading,” id. at 296. As the Court explained, so long 

as the acts for which a defendant has been indicted fall within the generic term of 

extortion as used in the Travel Act—which the Court defined as “obtaining 

something of value from another with his consent induced by the wrongful use of 

force, fear, or threats,” id. at 290—then such acts constitute a violation of the 

Travel Act’s prohibition, regardless of the specific state label given to that 

unlawful act. Id. at 296.

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 16 of 17 
17

We are bound by the holdings of Nardello and Conway. Accordingly, there 

is no requirement that the jury be instructed on the state-specific definition of the 

predicate crime. Conway, 507 F.2d at 1051–52; see also Martinelli, 454 F.3d at 

1313–14 (drawing from Conway in rejecting similar claim in money laundering 

context). “[T]he inquiry is not the manner in which States classify their criminal 

prohibitions but whether the particular State involved prohibits the extortionate 

activity charged.” Nardello, 393 U.S. at 295. Here, the district court properly 

instructed the jury that Florida law prohibits making extortionate threats to one’s 

reputation. No more was required of the district court. 

III.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

Case: 18-12089 Date Filed: 02/14/2020 Page: 17 of 17