J-A25001-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BERNARD WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 166 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 24, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-MD-0001715-1988

BEFORE: STABILE, McLAUGHLIN, and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 20, 2019

Appellant Bernard Williams appeals nunc pro tunc from the July 24, 2018 

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin 

County (“trial court”) following a resentencing hearing held pursuant to Miller 

v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. 

Ct. 718 (2016).1 Upon review, we affirm. 

The facts and procedural history of this case are uncontested and fully 

recounted by the trial court. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/19 at 1-18; 

Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 514 Harrisburg 1989, unpublished 

____________________________________________

1

In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that “mandatory life without 

parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the 

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.” Miller, 

132 S.Ct. at 2460. In Montgomery, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Miller

was a new substantive rule that, under the United States Constitution, must 

be retroactive in cases on state collateral review. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 

736.
J-A25001-19

- 2 -

memorandum, at 1-5 (Pa. Super. filed July 3, 1990) (citation omitted). 

Briefly, in connection with the bludgeoning death of State Representative 

William Telek, Appellant was charged and convicted, among other things, of 

first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Appellant, who was seventeen 

years and seven months old at the time of Representative Telek’s murder, to 

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”). 

On August 23, 2012, years after Appellant’s judgment sentence became 

final, he filed a petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46, requesting relief under Miller. Appellant 

argued that his sentence of LWOP for first-degree murder was unconstitutional 

because he was under the age of eighteen at the time of Representative 

Telek’s murder. On March 22, 2016, Appellant amended his PCRA petition to 

note that Miller applied retroactively on collateral review consistent with 

Montgomery. The PCRA court agreed, and scheduled a resentencing hearing 

on the first-degree murder conviction.2 On August 7, 2017, Appellant’s 

counsel, Andrea Haynes, filed a detailed sentencing memorandum, wherein 

she noted:

[i]t wasn’t until he was able to see the rehabilitation side of jail 

that things truly changed for him. After years of being denied 

programming as a lifer, [Appellant] has taken advantage of 

programs and classes and has hope for the first time that his life 

could be something more than his past. 

____________________________________________

2 Moreover, on May 25, 2016, the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of Pennsylvania granted Appellant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

and, in so doing, vacated his mandatory life sentence under Miller and 

Montgomery. 
J-A25001-19

- 3 -

Sentencing Memorandum, 8/7/17 at 5. On this basis, counsel argued against 

the re-imposition of a LWOP sentence. Specifically, she argued that Appellant 

is not “one of the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crime reflects permanent 

incorrigibility, irreparable corruption, or irretrievable depravity.” Id. at 8. In 

support, she pointed out that Appellant “focused on changing his life for the 

better by participating in therapeutic communities and victim awareness 

classes. He has devoted significant time to Bible study since 2012 and 

completed multiple courses with the Crossroad Bible Institute.” Id. Attached 

to Appellant’s sentencing memorandum were nine certificates, indicating his 

participation in therapeutic support groups, victim’s awareness class, and 

Bible study.3 

On December 5, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a “Motion for a Mental 

Health Examination of [Appellant],” requesting that the trial court direct 

Appellant to submit to an examination by the Commonwealth’s expert. 

Appellant filed an answer to the motion, noting that “he does not intend at 

this time to subject himself to ay psychiatric or psychological evaluation by a 

defense retained expert.” On December 19, 2017, the trial court denied the 

Commonwealth’s motion. 

On July 24, 2018, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing, at 

which the Commonwealth first presented the testimony of Dr. John O’Brien, 

____________________________________________

3 We observe that with the exception of the May 13, 2013, and September 17, 

2014 certificates for his participation in Bible study, all of Appellant’s other 

certificates post-dated the Supreme Court’s January 25, 2016 issuance of 

Montgomery. 
J-A25001-19

- 4 -

board certified in general psychiatry and forensic psychiatry. N.T. 

Resentencing, 7/24/18, at 4-6. Despite being unable to conduct a direct 

examination of Appellant, Dr. O’Brien reviewed “over [one] thousand pages” 

of Appellant’s records to determine whether Appellant was “permanently 

incorrigible.” Id. at 13-16. Dr. O’Brien in particular testified that Appellant 

had used a weapon in the murder of Representative Telek, his subsequent 

assaults of correctional officers in 1993 and 1999 and his aggravated assault 

of a prison inmate in 2015. Id. at 17-20. Dr. O’Brien opined to a reasonable 

degree of medical certainty that Appellant suffers from “antisocial personality 

disorder.” Id. at 14, 23. Dr. O’Brien explained that “sometimes individuals 

with antisocial disorder and other personality disorders can exhibit a 

mollification of their personality disorder symptoms with age, and I do not see 

that in [Appellant’s] case in terms of my review of his records.” Id. at 23-24. 

Dr. O’Brien added that Appellant 

has an untreatable and unchanging condition. It’s my opinion that 

he is not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation in the 

correctional system, and that from a legal perspective in my 

opinion, he does exhibit and his crimes reflect and that includes 

the offense and crimes since his entry into custody permanent 

incorrigibility, irreparable corruption, and irretrievable depravity.

Id. at 24-25. The trial court next heard statements by Representative Telek’s 

daughters. Appellant declined his right to allocution or offer any expert 

testimony in counter Dr. O’Brien’s opinion. The trial court resentenced 

Appellant to LWOP. In so doing, the trial court explained that its decision was 

based specifically on:
J-A25001-19

- 5 -

the 36 assaults just from 1997 to 2017, plus all of those that 

occurred in the first nine years of which we don’t have a record of 

other than the August 1993 shank assault of a corrections officer. 

Also based on the subsequent crimes of violence from ’93 to ’99 

and as recently as just a few years ago in April 2015. So his 

extreme assaultive history has been established beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Id. at 65. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied 

on August 7, 2018. On September 7, 2018, the thirty-first day after the denial 

of his post-sentence motion, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. On October 

15, 2018, we sua sponte quashed as untimely Appellant’s appeal at docket 

number 1510 MDA 2018. On December 26, 2018, Appellant filed a PCRA 

petition requesting nunc pro tunc reinstatement for his direct appeal rights. 

The PCRA court granted relief and Appellant timely filed the instant appeal. 

Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant raises two issues for our review:

I. Was not the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the factual/legal predicates for 

imposing a [LWOP] sentence on a person who was a juvenile 

at the time of the commission of the offense?

II. Was not the reimposition of a [LWOP] sentence clearly 

unreasonable, so manifestly excessive as to constitute an 

abuse of discretion, and inconsistent with the protection of 

the public, the gravity of the offense, and [Appellant’s] 

rehabilitative needs?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). In support of his 

first issue, Appellant argues that, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the 

Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is one of 

those exceedingly rare and uncommon juveniles who are permanently 
J-A25001-19

- 6 -

incorrigible.4 With respect to his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial 

court abused its discretion in failing to consider mitigating factors when 

fashioning his LWOP sentence. Specifically, Appellant claims that the LWOP 

sentence is excessive because the trial court did not account for his successful 

participation in various programs.5 

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Appellant argues that Dr. O’Brien failed to consider certain 

documents evidencing his participation in various programs, such argument is 

waived because Appellant failed to include it in his Rule 1925(b) statement or 

question presented. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“[i]ssues not included in 

the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be 

considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly 

suggested thereby.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the 

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). 

5 We have “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate 

consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for 

our review.” Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 

2010)); see Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 545 (Pa. 

Super. 1995) (“[a]n allegation that a sentencing [judge] ‘failed to consider’ or 

‘did not adequately consider’ certain factors does not raise a substantial 

question that the sentence was inappropriate,”), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 

1195 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Bershad, 693 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (finding absence of substantial question where appellant argued 

the trial court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors and to impose 

an individualized sentence). Thus, consistent with the foregoing cases, 

Appellant’s claim does not raise a substantial question for our review. Even if 

we were to review the merits of Appellant’s sentencing claim, he still would 

not be entitled to relief. It is well-settled that “[w]here the sentencing court 

had the benefit of a presentence investigation (‘PSI’), we can assume the 

sentencing court ‘was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s 

character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory 

factors.’” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Here, as explained in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court not only reviewed 

Appellant’s PSI, but also examined his sentencing memorandum which 
J-A25001-19

- 7 -

After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude 

that the trial court accurately and thoroughly addressed the merits of 

Appellant’s issues in this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/19 at 18-23. 

With respect to Appellant’s sufficiency argument,6the trial court determined 

that Appellant was not amenable to rehabilitation because of his permanent 

____________________________________________

detailed his efforts at rehabilitation. Additionally, the trial court’s finding that 

Appellant simply is not amenable to rehabilitation irrespective of the steps 

that he may take toward that goal is supported by the record. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 3/29/19 at 23 (finding that “that there is no possibility that 

[Appellant] can be rehabilitated at any point later in his life, no matter how 

much time he spends in prison and regardless of the amount of therapeutic 

interventions he receives.”). 

6 “A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.” 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).
J-A25001-19

- 8 -

incorrigibility which was established beyond a reasonable doubt at the 

resentencing hearing. The trial court reasoned:

[Appellant] has an extreme violent assaultive history, and over 

thirty prison misconducts between 1997 and 2017. The credible 

and unrebutted evidence established that [Appellant] suffers from 

antisocial personality disorder. Furthermore, it is well-established 

that this disorder is untreatable or as Dr. O’Brien described, “is a 

permanent part of an individual’s behavior—characterological 

fabric.” While such a disorder is potentially subject to mollification 

in later years, the evidence presented showed absolutely no 

indication [Appellant] is currently less prone to violence than he 

was when he was younger. Notably, a few years ago he attacked 

and stabbed a prisoner with a bolt, unprovoked, and expressed no 

compunction against killing him.

Id. at 22. With respect to Appellant’s second issue, the trial court concluded 

that it did not abuse its discretion in resentencing him to LWOP “because the 

record clearly established that [Appellant’s] threat to public safety is serious.” 

Id. at 23. Appellant “is incapable of change and should never be afforded the 

chance of leaving prison.” Id. The trial court determined that “rehabilitation 

is impossible.” Id. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s July 24, 2018

judgment of sentence. We further direct that a copy of the trial court’s March 

29, 2019 opinion be attached to any future filings in this case.

Judgement of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/20/2019