FMFRP 12-15

Small Wars Manual

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 140 121500 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-0001

22 December 1990

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-15, Small

Wars Manual, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become

doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals.

FMFRP's in the 12 series are a special category of publications:

reprints of historical works which and are no longer in print.

2. SCOPE

Formerly available as NAVMC 2890, Small Wars Manual, was

originally printed in 1940. It is one of the best books on military

peacekeeping and counterinsurgency operations published before

World War II. It still can help Marines prepare for low-intensity

conflicts which in the 1930's were referred to as small wars.

3. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

7)S. P. CAULFjLD

Major General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commander for Warfighting

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Quantico, Virginia

DISTRIBUTION:

NAVMC 2890

LOCATOR SHEET

Subj: Small Wars Manual (1940 Edition)

Location:

(Indicate location(s) of copy(ies) of this Manual.)

ENCLOSURE (1)

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE. CORPS

1940

INDEX

VNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1910

REPRINT

For Information Only

SWM Ch. I

RESTR1CTE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940, is published in

15 chapters as follow's:

Chapter I. Introduction.

Section I. General characteristics: ' Par. Page

Small wars defined i—i 1 Classes of small wars 1—2 2

Some legal aspects of snial wars 1—3 2

Function of Headquarters Marine Corps 1—4 4

Phases of small wars 1-5 5

Summary 1—3 8

II. Strategy:

The basis of strategy 1—7 ii

Nature of the operations 1—8 12

National war 1—9 14

111. Psychology:

Foreword 1—10 17

Characteristics 1—11 19

Fundamental considerations 1—12 19

Revolutionary tendencies 1—13 19

Basic instincts 1—14 23

Attitude and bearing 1—15 27

Conductof ourtroops 1—16 27

Summary -. 1—17 32

IV. 1elationship with the State Department:

Importance of cooperation 1—18 33

Principles prescribed by Navy regulations.. - - 1—19 33

Contact with State Department represen tatives 1—20 34

V. The chain of command—Navy and Marine Corps:

Navy regulations 1—21 35

Control of joint operations 1—22 35

The directive 1—23 36

Naval officer commanding ashore 1- 24 37

Marine officer commanding ashore 1—25 37

Marine—Constabulary 1—26 39

Direct control by Navy Department 1—27 39

VI. Military—civil relationship:

Importance 1—28 41

Contact with national government officials_ - - 1—29 41

Cooperation with law-enforcement agencies - 1—30 43

Contact with the inhabitants 1—31 44

1
SWM Ch. II

TABLE OF CO1TE1TS

Chapter II. Organization.

Section I. The estimate of the situation: Psi. Page

General 2—1 1 The mission 2—2 2

Factors to be considered in estimating enemy

strength 2--3 2

Relative strength 2—4 6

Enemy courses of action 2—5 6

Own courses of action 2-6 7

The decision 2—7 7

Supporting measures 2—8 7

Campaign and operation plans 2-9 8

II. The staff in small wars:

Command and staff responsibility in small

wars 2--b 11

The force commander 2—11 12

Staff procedure 2—12 12

The chief of staff 2—13 15

The first section (Personnel) F—i 2—14 17

The second section (Intelligence) F—2 2—15 19

The third section (Plans and Training) F—3 - 2—16 32

The fourth section (Supply) F—4 2—17 34

The special staff 2—18 35

The adjutant 2—19 35

The inspector 2—20 36

The law officer 2—21 37

The officer in charge of civil affairs 2—22 37

The chaplain 2—23 38

The paymaster 2—24 38

The provost inarsha 2—25 38

The commanding officer of special troops.. - - - 2—26 39

The artillery officer 2—27 39

The air officer 2—28 39

The communications officer 2—29 39

The engineer officer 2—30 40

The surgeon 2—31 40

The quartermaster 2—32 41

The chemical officer 2—33 41

The tank officer 2—34 41

The munitions officer 2—35 41

The post exchange officer 2—36 41

The amusement and welfare officer 2—37 41

HI. Composition of the force:

General 2—38 43

Infantry 2—39 44

Infantry weapons 2—40 45

Infantry individual equipment 2—41 49

Mounted troops 2—42 50

Engineers 2—43 50

Tanks and armored cars 2—44 50

2
SWM Ch. III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter II. Organiza tioii—Continued.

Section III. Composition of the force—Continued. Par. Page

Transport. 2—45 51

Signal troops V-.. -- 2—46 51

Chemical troops .. 2—47 58

Medical troops ... 2—48 58

Artillery 2—49 60

Aviation 2—50 64

Chapter III. Logistics.

Section I. Iiitrocliiction.

II. Supply:

Influence of supply on a column 3—2 3

Supplyofficers .,... 3—3 4

Storage 3—4 4

Distribution.. . 3—5 5

Supply steps .. 3—6 8

Local purchases 3—7 8

Requisitions - .V 3—8 8

Depots, dumps, and distributing points 3—9 8

Chain of responsibility 3—10 9

Accountability 3—11 9

Public funds ., 3—12 10

Objective VV - - - - 3—13 11

Supervision of requisitions .. - 3—14 11

Accumulation of stores - - - . .. - 3—15 12

General ..... ... 3—16 12

Importance of supply 3—17 12

III. Transportation:

General 3—18 15

Railroad transportation. 3—19 16

Motor transportation 3—20 16

Tractor-trailer transportation 3—21 16

Transportation pools_ - - -. - -.. 3—22 17

Aviation transport .. - 3—23 17

Water transportation . 3—24 17

Animal transportation - 3—25 17

Important points in packing . 3—26 18

Packmules 3—27 19

Packhorses 3—28 19

Pack bulls 3—29 19

Phillips pack saddle 3—30 20

McClellan saddle .. - 3—31 21

Pack equipment - V 3—32 22

Native packers - VV 333 24

Marines as packers - -. 3—34 25

Bull carts 3—35 26

Trains with combat columns 3—36 30

3
SWM Ch. IV

TABLF OF CO1NTETS

Chapter IV. Training.

Section I. Character and purpose of small wars training: Par. Page

Relation to other training 4—1 3

Tactical training 4—2 4

Rifle company - 4—3 4

Machine gun company 4—4 6

Mortars and 37 mm. guns - - - -.. 4—5 6

Troop schools 4—6 7

11. Training during concentration:

Training objective 4—7 9

Scope of training 4—8 9

Disciplinary training 4—9 9

III. Training en route on board ship:

General 4—10 11

Shiproutine 4—11 11

Time available for troop training 4—12 12

Troop schools on board ship 4—13 12

Size of classes 4—14 12

Example of instruction assignments rifle

company 4—15 13

Subjects covered 4—16 14

Essential training 4—17 14

IV. Training in the theater of operations:

System of training 4—1 15

Facilities 4—19 15

Subjects covered 4—20 15

Training centers 4—21 15

Troop schools 4—22 16

Organization of training centers and troop

schools 4—23

\T Training programs and schedules:

Training instructions 4—24 19

Training programs - 4-25 19

Training schedWes 4—26 23

Chapter V. Initial operations.

Section 1. Neutral zones:

General 5—1 1 Purpose, occasion, and circumstances 5-2 2

Basic orders 5—3 3

Tnstruction 5-4 3

Zone force commander's order 5-5 3

Proclamation 5—B 4

II. Movement inland:

Point of departure 5—7 6

Mobile columns and flying columns 5—8 5

Strength and composition of columns 5—9 7

Protective measures covering movemenL - - - 5—10 8

Establishment of advanced bases inland 5—11 9

Movement by rail 5—12 10

4
SW Ch. VI

TABLE OF COITENTS

Chapter V. Initlul operations—Continued.

Section III. Military territorial organization: Par. Pn

Purpose 5—13 13

Influence, of the mission on territorial organization 5—14 13

Assignments of troops to areas 5—IS 14

Size and limits of areas 5—16 14

IV. Methods of pacification:

The nature of the problem 5-17 17

Methods of operation 5—18 17

Occupation of an area 5—19 17

Patrols ....-. 5—20 15

Roving patrols .. 5—21 19

Zones of refuge - - - 5—22 19

The cordon system ... - 5—23 19

The blockhouse system 5—24 19

Special methods 5—25 211 Chapter VI. Infantry patrols.

Section I. Small war tactics:

Tactics during initial phases 6—1 Tactics during later phases 6—2 1 Influence of terrain 6—3 2

The principle of the offensive 6—4 2

The principles of mass, movement, surprise,

and security 6—3

II. Orders and general instructions:

Written orders 6—6 5

Verbal orders 6—7 5

General illBtructions 6—8 5

III. Organizing the infantry patrol:

Definition . 6—9 7

Factors which govern its organization 6—10 S

Size of the patrol 6—11 S

Permanent roving patrols 6—12 9

Selection of units 6—13 9

Eliniination of the physically unfit 6—14 1(1

Patrol and suhordinat.e leaders 6—15 10

The riflesquad .. 6—16 10

The headquarters section 6—17 II

Attached units - - - 6—18 11

Guides and interpreters 6-19 11

Native transport personnel &—21) 12

Native troops 6—21 12

Prominent native civilians 6—2 12

Transportation 6—23 13

Weapons 6—24 13

Ammunition 6—25 14

Signal equipment 6-26 15

Medical supplies 6—27 15

0
SWM Cli. VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter VI. r iifntry patrols—Continued.

Scetion Ill. ( )rganz1ng the infantry patrol—Continued. ThI1•. 1'g

Miscellaneous equipment 6—28 15

Personal clothing aiid accessories .. 6—29 16

General preparations 6—30 17

1V. Feeding the personnel:

Responsibility of patrol leader 6—31 19

Mess equipment 6—32 19

Weightof rations.. 6—33 20

The field rat jon 6—34 21

Butchering on the march 6—35 22

Feeding native personnel .. 6—36 22

Emergency rations 6—37 22

V. The March:

General 6—38 23

11 our of starting . 6—39 23

Rate of march 6—40 23

Factors influencing march formations 6-41 24

Influence of terrain on march formation 6—42 25

Road spaces 6—43 25

Location of patrol and subordinate leaders in

march formation. 6—44 26

Location of the combat train 6—45 26

Descriptive march formations 6—46 26

March formations for a reenforced rifle

company 6-47 27

March formations for a reenforced rifle

platoon 6—48 29

March formation for a rifle platoon 6—49 30

March formation for a rifle squad 6—SO 31

March discipline ... - 6—51 31

March outposts .. 6—52 32

Campsites 6—53 32

Making camp 6—54 33

Shelter 6—53 33

Bivouac beds 6—56 34

V 1. Reconnaissance and security:

Methods of reconnaissance - . 6—57 37

Reconnoitering by scouts . 6—58 37

Careful visual reconnaissance . . 6—59 38

Hasty visual reconnaissance .. 6—60 38

Reconnaissance by fire .. 6—61 38

Reconnaissance by aviation personnel 6—62 39

Airplane reconnaissance by patrol leaders - - 6—63 39

Intelligence agents .. 6—64 39

Questioning inhabitants for information 6—65 39

Dogs on reconnaissance 6—66 39

Security on the march 6—67 39

Security at rest 6—68 40

6
SWM Ch. VII

TABLE 01? CONTENTS

Chapter Vi. I nfi nt ry pntrols—Continued.

Section VII. Laying tuubushes: Page

Definition 6—69 41

Selection of position 6—70 41

Usual characteristics of an ambush -. 6—71 41

Occupying the positioh 6—72 43

The ambush engagement 6—73 43

Employment of infantry weapons 6—74 44

VIII. Attacking ambushes:

Mental preparation 6—75 45

Prearranged schemes of maneuver 6—76 45

Spirit of the offensive 6—77 47

Fire and movement 6—78 48

Authority of subordinates to act on ovn iitiative 6—79 48

IX. Attacking houses and small bivouacs:

Attacking houses 6—80 51

Attacking small bivouacs 6—81 52

Destroying captured bivouacs 6—82 52

X. Stratagems and ruses:

Rules of land warfare 6—83 53

Clearing the station 6—84 53

Apprehending informers 6—85 53

Spies following a patrol 6—86 53

Guerrilla ruses and stratagems 6—87 54

XI. River crossings:

Introduction 6—88 55

Availability of means - -. - - 6—89 55

Swimming - - - - 6—90 55

Bridges 6—91 56

Boats 6—92 57

Ferries 6—93 57

Fords 6—94 58

Rafts 6—95 59

Crossing unfordable streams with usual infantry equipment 6—96 59

Crossing horses and mules - 6—97 63

XIL Special operations:

Trail cutting 6—98 67

Night operations 6—99 68

Chapter VII. Mounted detachments.

Section I. Introduction:

Purpose 7—1 1 Use of animals an expedient 7—2 1 Need for training in animal care and employment 7—3 1 Some difficulties in employing animals 7—4 2

7
SWM Ch. VII

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Cbnpter VII. Mounted detnehineni s—Continued.

Seetl.'n 11. Care of aninials Par. Page

Knowledge of animal inanagenient reqnired - 7—5 3

Nomenclature 7—6 3

Identification 7—7 3

Duties of officers charged with care of

animals .. 7—8 8

Rules for handling animals .. 7—9 8 Stables and corrals 7—10 9

Grooming .. 7—11 9

Forage 7—12 9

Principles of feeding 7—13 10

Watering 7—14 10

Conditioning 7—15 11

Management of animals on the march. - - - 7—16 11

First-aid treatment . - - - - 7—17 14 Communicable diseases - 7—18 16

Care of the feet 7—19 17

Veterinary supplies 7—20 17

III. Procurement of animals:

Necessity for local purchase.. -. 7—21 19

Procurement agents 7—22 19

Native dealers 7—23 20

Purchasing from native dealers 7—24 20

Minimum specifications for animals 7—25 20

Height qualifications 7—26 20

Age qualifications .. 7—27 21

Examination for soundness 7—28 22

Marking of purchased animals 7—29 24

Use of United States bred animals in small

wars 7—30 24

IV. Mounted detachments:

Value of mounted detachments 7—31 25

Basis for organization 7—32 26

A mounted rifle company 7—33 27

Machine gun and howitzer units - 7—34

Animals for mounted detachments .. - 7—35 28

Sparc mounts 7—36 28

Assignment of mounts - - - - 7—37 28

Horse equipment 7—38 29

Individual equipment 7—39 29

Arms and ammunition 7—40 30

Pack equipment 7—41 31

Training, general 7—42 81

Training for speoialist8.. 7—43 81

Time required for training 7—44 32

Combat training 7—45 32

Tactical uses of mounted detachments 7—46 32

Conduct of mounted patrols 6—47 33

8
SWM Ch. IX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter VII. Mounted detachments—Coat inued.

Section IV. Mounted (letlLChlflents—Cofltlflued. Par. Vage

Combat patrols 7—48 34

Ambushes 7_49 35

V. Hastily organized mounted patrols:

Definitionanduses 7—50 37

Discussion 7—51 39

Type of animal to employ 7—52 39

Other details 7—53 39

Chapter VIII. Convoys arid convoy escorts.

Section I. Definitions 8—l 1 Mission 8—2 1 Organization 8—3

Convoy types 8—4 2

March of convoys 8—5 3

Disposition of the escort on the iiiarch .. - - - 8—6 4

Defense of a convoy 8-7 5

Attack of a convoy 8—8 6

Security measures at the halt . 8-9 6

Chapter IX. Aviation.

Section 1. Introduction:

General 9—1 1 Special air tactics involved 9—2 1 II. Composition and organization:

Types 9—3 3

Reconnaissance aircraft 9—4 3

Combat aircraft 9—5 3

Transport aircraft 9—6 3

Organization 9—7 4

Movement to theater 9—8 4

III. Selection and preparation of bases:

Main airdrome 9—9 5

Auxiliary airdromes 9—10 6

Advancelandingfields 9—11 6

Emergency landing fields - 9—12 6

Specifications of landing fields 9—13 6

Minimum size of landing fields 9—14 7

IV. General conduct of air operations:

Control and command. 9—15 9

Details of operations 9—16 9

Reports - . . 9—17 10

V. Employment of reconnaissance aviation:

General considerations.. -. 9—18 13

Strategic (distant) reconnaissance 9—19 14

Tactical (close) reconnaissance 9—20 14

Theinfantrymission 9—21 15

Special combat mission .. 9—22 16

9
SWM Ch. X

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1X. Aviation—Continued.

Scetion VI. Combat support: Par. Page

General discussion. 9—23 17

Fighting aviation.. 9—24 17

Attack aviation 9—25 3.8

Bombing aviation 9—26 18

Attacks on troop columns and trains 9—27 18

Support of marching column 9—28 19

Attacks on hostile positions .. 9—29 20

Attacks on towns ..-. - -- - 9-30 20

Aviation as a mobile reserve 9—31 20

VII. Air transport:

General considerations 9—32 21

Troop transportation 9—33 22

Transportation of supplies 9—34 22

Dropping of supplies .. 9—35 23

Evacuation of sick and wounded 9—36 24

Chapter X. River operations.

Scctioii I. River operations in general:

Necessity for river operations 10—I

General characteristics of rivers 10—2

II. Types and characteristics of boats:

General -_-- 10—3 5

Coastwisecommunications -- 10—4 5

Nature of the river 10—5 5

Lower river boats 10—6 6

Middle river boats 10—7 6

Upper river boats 10—8 6

Types of boats available 10—9 6

Methodof propulsion 10—10 8

Influence of tactical principles 10—11 9

III. Preparation for river operations:

Introduction 10—12 11

Organizingtheriverpatrol 10—13 12

Crews 10—14 12

Boat procurement 10—15 13

Armamentandequipment 10—16 13

Loading boats 10-17 14

IV. Occupation of a river:

The mission 10—IS 17

Similarity to land operation 10—19 17

The day's march 10—20 18

Rate of movement 10—21 18

Boatformation - - - 10-22 19

Reconnaissance and security.. 10—23 20

Initial contact with the enemy 10—24 21

A typical ambush 10—25 21

The attack 10-26 22

Garrisoning the river .- - - - - - 10—27 22

10
SW1V.[ Ch. XII

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter X. River operations—Continued.

Section IV. Occupation of a river—Continued. Par. Page

Defensive rneaures 10—28 23

Passage of obstaclesl 10—29 23

Night operations ...... .. 10—30 23

Supportingforces 10—3! 24

Chapter XI. Disarmament of population.

SctionI. General 11—i

Estimate and plans 11—2 3

Laws, decrees, orders and instructions 11—3 5

Manner of collecting arms 11—4 6

Collecting agencies 11—5 7

Custody of arms - 11—6 9

Disposition 11—7 11

Permits 11—8 12

Control of sources of supply 11—9 13

Measures following disarmament 11—10 14

Chapter XJI. Arnied native organizations.

Section I. General:

Local armed forces 12—1 1 United States intervention 12—2 1 Restoration of authority to local go ernnient.. 12—3 2

Formation of a constabulary 12—4 2

II. Organization of a constabulary:

Planning agency 12—5 5

Approval of plans .. 12—6

Local creative law 12—7 6

United States creative laws 12—8 (1 Composition 12-9 7

Dutiesandpowers 12-10 S

Size of force 12—11 8

Administrative organization - - - 12—12 9

Supply and equipment . 12—13

Records and reports 12—14 12

Finances 12—15 13

Recruiting 12—16 14

Housingand shelter 12—17 14

Military courts 12—18 15

III. Operations and training:

Recruits 1219 17

Unittraining 12—20 18

Officers 12—21 18

Field operations 1222 18

Troop leading - 12—23 19

IV. Auxiliary forces:

Urban and rural agents 12—24 21

Specialagents 12—25 21

Auxiliary units 12—26 22

11
SWM Ch. XIII

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter XII. Armed native orgaiiizations—Conti ii ned.

Section V. Civil and military relationship: Par. Puge

Relation to civil power 12—27 23

Relation to United States forces 12—28 24

Chapter XIII. Military government.

Section 1. General:

General 13—1 1 Definitions 13—2 1 Authority for exercise of military government - 13—3 2

Functions of military government in generaL. 13—4 2

By whom exercised 13—5 3

How proclaimed - 13—6 3

II. Establishment and administration of military

government:

Jmportance of organization 13—7 5

Plans 13—8 5

The proclamation - 13-9 8

Supplemental regulations 13—10 9

Digest of information.. 13—11 11

Attitude toward local officials and inhabitants_ 13—12 13

Law-enforcement agencies and public services.. 13—13 14

Exceptional military courts 13—14 15

Control of civil and military administration - 13—15 15

Public utilities ..--- - - 13—16 16

Trade relationship .. 13—17 17

Mines and quarries 13—18 17

Public revenues - - 13—19 17

Requisitions and contributions 13—20 17

Public and private property 13—21 18

Employment of inhabitants 13—22 18

Police and elections 13—23 19

III. Applications of principles to situations short of

war:

General considerations 13—24 21

What laws apply 13—25 21

Chapter XIV. Supervision of elections.

Section I. General:

Introduction 14—1 1 Request for supervision - 14—2 2

Definitions 14—3 2

Responsibilities of electoral mission 14—4 3

Intimidation of voters 14—S 4

Military and police measures - - - - 14—C 4

Unethical practices - 14—7 6

II. Personnel:

Chairman 14-8 11

Electoral mission staff .. 14—9 11

Commissioned officers 14—10 12

Enlisted personnel 14—11 12
SWM Ch. XV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter XIV. Supervision of elections—Continued.

Section Ii. Personnel—Continued. Par. Page

Civilian personnel 14—12 13

Instruction of personnel 14—13 13

Replacements 14—14 13

Pay and allowances 14—15 14

III. Electoral mission:

Chairman -. 14—16 17

Vice Chairman ... 14—17 20

Executive oflicer .. 14—18 20

Secretary - . - - 14—19 21

Inspector 14—20 21

Intelligence and press relations officer., - - 14—21 21

Lawofficer .... 14—22 22

Communicationsofficer .... -- 14—23 23

Disbursingandsupplyofficer 14—24 24

Medical officer 14—25 25

Aides -- 14—26 25

Departmental board personnel 14—27 25

Cantonal board personnel 14—28 26

IV. National board of elections:

Members and staff.. - - - . 14—29 29

Duties 14—30 30

Secretary 14—31 30

Complaints, appeals, and petitions 14—32 30

Assembly - 14—33 32

V. Registration and voting:

Registration 14—34 33

Voting 14—35 33

Final reports 14—36 35

Chapter XV. Withdrawal.

Section 1. Introduction:

General is—i 1 Factors to be considered 15—2 1 Phases of withdrawal 15—3 1 II. Withdrawal from active military operations:

Concentration 15—4 3

Rights retained 15—5 3

Procedure 15—8 4

III. Final withdrawal:

General . - .. is—I 5

Plans and orders 15—8 6

Executive staff duties - 15-9 (1 First section 15—rn 7

Second section 15—11 8

Third section 15—12 8

Fourth section 15—13 8

Special staff duties .. 15—14 9

13
SWM Ch. XV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter XV. Withdrawal—Continued.

Section I U. Final withdrnwal—Contthued. Par. Page

Air officer .- 15—15 9

Engineer officer 15—16 9

Communications officer 15—Il 10

Surgeon 15—18 10

Quartermaster 15—19 10

14
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

RESTRICTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published ii

15 chapters, as follows:

Cwu'TiR I. INTRODUCTION.

I. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XL DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

Ii'

RESTRICTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Par. Page

SECTION I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 1— ito 1- 6 1— 9

II. STRATEGY 1— 7to 1— 9 1—16

III. PSYCHOLOGY 1—10 to 1—17 17—32

IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH STATE DEPARTMENT 1—18 to 1—20 33—34

V. THE CHAIN OF COMMAND—NAVY

AND MARINE CORPS 1—21 to 1—27 35—39

VI. MILITARY—CIVILRELATIONSHIP. 1—28 to 1—31 41—47

(V)

SWM 1—1

SECTION I

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Small wars defined 1—i

Classes of small wars 1—2 2

Some legal aspects of small wars 1—3 2

Function of headquarters Marine Corps 1—4 .1 Phasesofsmallwars 1—5 5

Summary .. 1—6 S

1—i. Small wars defined.—a. The term "Small War" is often a

vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. As

applied to the. United States, small wars are operations undertaken

under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with

diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state

whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the

preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the

foreign policy of our Nation. As herein used the term is understood

in its most comprehensive sense, and all the successive steps taken in

the development of a small war and the varying degrees of force

applied under various situations are presented.

b. The assistance rendered in the affairs of another state may vary

from a peaceful act such as the assignment of an administrative assistant, which is certainly nonmilitary and not placed under the classification of small wars, to the establishment of a complete military government supported by an active combat force. Between t1ese extremes may be found an infinite number of forms of friendly assistance

or intervention which it is almost impossible to classify under a limited number of individual types of operations.

c. Small wars vary in degrees from simple demonstrative operations

to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war. They are

not limited in their size, in the extent of their theater of operations

nor their cost in property, money, or lives. The essence of a. small

war is its purpose and the circumstances surrounding its inception and

conduct, the character of either one or all of the opposing forces, and

the nature of the operations themselves.

d. The ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps which does not

involve a major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate power

1
SWM 1—2

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

may be termed a small war. It is this type of routine active foreign

duty of the Marine Corps in which this manual is primarily interested. Small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of

the Marine Corps. During about 85 of the last 100 years, the Marine

Corps has been engaged in small wars in different parts of the

world. The Marine Corps has landed troops 180 times in 37 countries from 1800 to 1934. Every year during the past 36 years since

the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps has been engaged in

active operations in the field. In 1929 the Marine Corps had twothirds of its personnel employed on expeditionary or other foreign

or sea duty outside of the continental limits of the United States.

1—2. Classes of small wars.—a. Most of the small wars of the

United States have resu]ted from the obligation of the' Government

under the spirit of the. Monroe Doctrine and have been undertaken

to suppress lawlessness or insurrection. Punitive expeditions may

be resorted to in some instances, but campaigns of conquest are contrary to the policy of the Government of the United States. It is

the duty of our statesmen to define a policy relative to international

relationships and provide the military and naval establishments with

the means to carry it into execution. With this basis, the military

and naval authorities may act intelligently in the preparation of

their war plans in close cooperation with the statesman. There is

mutual dependence and responsibility which calls for the highest

qualities of statesmanship and military leadership. The initiative

devolves upon the statesmen.

b. The legal and military fatures of each small war present distinctive' characteristics which make the segregation of all of them

into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem. There are

so many combinations of conditions that a simple classification of

small wars is possible only when one is limited to specific features

in his study, i. e., according to their legal aspects, their military or

naval features, whether active combat. was engaged in or not, and

many other considerations.

1—3. Some legal aspects of small wars.—-a. According to international law, as recognized by the leading nations of the world, a

nation may protect, or demand protection for, its citizens and their

property wherever situated. The President of the United States as

the Chief Executive is, under the Constitution, primarily charged with

the conduct of foreign relations, including the protection of the lives

and property of United States citizens abroad, save insofar as the

Constitution expressly vests a part of these functions in some other

branch of the Government. (For example, the participation of the

2
SWM 1—3

GENERAL CHARACTERiSTICS

Senate in the making of treaties.) It has been an unbroken policy of

the President. of the United States so to interpret their powers, beginfling with the time of President Jefferson down to the present with

the exception of President Buchanan.

b. The following pertinent, extracts from U. S. Navy Regulations

are cited:

On occasion where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committed or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty

right, the Commander in Chief shall consult with the diplomatic representative

r consul of the UnIted States and take such steps as the gravity of the case

demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the navy all the facts. The

responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon

the commanding officer thereof.

The use of force against a foreign nd friendly state, oi against anyone within

the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, Is a

right which belongs to states as well as to Individuals, and in the case of states

it includes the protection Qf the state, its honor, and its possessions, and lives

and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or Impending,

whereby the state or its citizens may suffer Irreparable Injury. The conditions

calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined

beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who

are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance.

In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as

a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed.

Whenever, in the application of the above-ineiitionecl principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force In foreign territory on occasion of political

disturbance where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection

to life and property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, shall

first be obtained, if It can be done without prejudice to the Interests involved.

Due to the ease with which the Navy Department can be communicated from

all parts of the world, no commander In chief, flag officer, or commanding officer

shall Issue an ultimatum to the representative of any foreign government, or

demand the performance of any service from any such representative that must

be executed within a limited time, without first communicating with the Navy

Department except In extreme cases where such actioa Is necessary to save life.

(U. S. Navy Regulations. NH. 722, 723, and 724.)

c. The use of the forces of the United States in foreign countrie9

to protect the lives and property of American citizens resident in

those countries does not necessarily constitute an act of war; and is,

therefore, not equivalent to a declaration of war. The President, as

chief executive of the nation, charged with the responsibility of the

lives and property of United States citizens abroad, has the authority

to use the forces of the United States to secure such protection in

foreign countries.

3
SWM 1—4

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

d. The history of the United States shows that in spite of the

varying trend of the foreign policy of succeeding administrations,

this Government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other

states with remarkable regularity, and it may be anticipated that the

same general procedure will be followed in the future. It is well that

the United States may be prepared for any emergency which may

occur whether it is the result of either financial or physical disaster,

or social revolution at home or abroad. Insofar as these conditions

can be predicted, and as these plans and preparations can be undertaken, the United States should be ready for either of these emergencies with strategical and tactical plans, preliminary preparations,

organization, equipment, education, and training.

1—4. Functions of headquarters Marine Corps.—a. Small wars,

generally being the execution of the responsibilities of the President

in protecting American interests, life and property abroad, are therefore conducted in a. manner different from major warfare. In small

wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department

exercises a constant and controlling influence over the military operations. The very inception of small wars, as a rule, is an official act

of the Chief Executive who personally gives instructions without

action of Congress.

b. The President, who has been informed of a given situation in

some foreign country through the usual agencies at his disposal, makes

the decision concerning intervention. In appropriate cases this decision is communicated to the Secretary of the Navy. The senior naval

officer present in the vicinity of the disturbance may then be directed

to send his landing force ashore, or given authority to do so at his

discretion; the Marine Corps may be ordered to have an expeditionary

force ready to proceed overseas with the minimum delay. These

instructions are communicated to the Marine Corps via the Secretary

of the Navy or Assistant Secretary. Frequently a definite number of

men is called for and not a military organization; for example, 500

men (not one battalion). It is desirable, however, that a definite military organization which approximates the required strength and characteristics for accomplishing the mission be specified, such as one

infantry battalion; one infantry regiment (plus one motor transport

platoon), etc. The word often comes very suddenly and calls for the

immediate concentration of the forces, ready to take passage on a

certain transport which will be made available at a given time and

place. Generally there are no other instructions than that the force

shall report to * * * "the Commander Special Service Squad4
SWM 1—5

GENEFAL CHARACTERISTICS

ron," for example. Thereupon Headquarters Marine Corps designates

the force, its personnel, organization, arms, and equipment; all necessary stores are provided and orders issued for the commanding officer

of the force to report in person or by dispatch to the SOP or other authority in the disturbed area. With the present organized Fleet

Marine Force ready for movement at a moment's notice, the Marine

Corps now has available a highly trained and well equipped expeditionary force for use in small wars, thus eliminating in a large measure

the former practice of hastily organizing and equipping such a force

when the emergency arose. Accompanying these simple organization

and movement orders are the monograph, maps, and other pertinent intelligence data of the disturbed area, to the extent that such information is on file and can be prepared for delivery to the Force Commander

within the time limit. Thereafter Headquarters confines itself to the

administrative details of the personnel replacements and the necessary

supply of the force in the field.

c. The operations of the Force are directed by the Office of the Naval

Operations direct or through the local naval Commander if he is senior

to the Force Commander.

1—5. Phases of small wars.—a. Small wars seldom develop in

accordance with any stereotyped procedure. Certain phases of those

listed below may be absent in one situation; in another they may be

combined and undertaken simultaneously; in still others one may fina

that the sequence of events or phases may be altered.

The actual operations of small wars may be arbitrarily divided into

five phases as follows:

Phase 1. InitIal demonstration orianding and action of vanguard.

Phase 2. The arrival of reenforcements and general military operations In

the field.

Phase 3. AssumptIon of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with

the legislative and judicial agencies.

Phase 4. Routine police functions.

Phase 5. WIthdrawal from the Theater of Operations.

b. First pliase.—Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard.

(1) One of the most common characteristics of the small wars of the

Cnited States is that its forces "dribble in" to the countries in which

they intervene. This is quite natural in view of the national policy of

the gpvernment. It is not at war with the neighboring state; it proposes no aggression or seizure of territory; its purpose is friendly and

it wishes to accomplish its objectives with as little military display

as possible with a view to gaining the lasting friendship of the inhabi0
SWIvt 1—5

GENERAL CHAIIAC'TERISTICS

tants of the country. Thus our Government is observed endeavoring

to accomplish its end with the minimum of troops, in fact, with nothing

more than a deinonstrat ion of force if that is all that. is necessary and

reasonably sufficient. This policy is carried on throughout, the cantpgn and reenforcements are added by "driblets," so many companies

or a battalion, or a regiment at a time, until the force is large enough

to accomplish its miSSlOfl or until its its peacetime limitations in personiiel have been reached. Even after landing, instructions probably vilI

be received not to exert any physical force unless it l)ecornes absolutely

necessary, and then only to the minimum necessary to accomplish its

purpose. Thus orders may be received not to fire on irregulars unless

fired upon; instructions may be issued not to fire upon irregular groups

if women are present. with them even though it is known that. armed

women accompany ti me irregula us.

(2) During the initial 1)ltase small numbers of troops may be sent

ashore to assume the initiative, as a demonstration to indicate a determination to control the situation, and to prepare the way for any

troops to follow. This vanguard is generally composed of marine

detachments or mixed forces of marines and sailors from ships at the

critical points. Owing to its limited personnel the. action of the

vanguard will often be restricted to an active defense after seizing a

critical area such as an important seaport or other city, the capital of

a country or disturbed areas of limited extent.

c. iSeeond phase.—Tlme arrival of reenforcements and general military operations in the field.

During this period the theater of operations is divided into areas

and forces are assigned for each. Such forces should be sufficiently

strong t.o seize and hold the most important city in the area assigned

and to be able to send combat patrols in all directioims. If certain

neutral zones have not. been designated in the first phase, it may be

done at this time if deemed advisable. During this phase the organization of a natie military and police force is undertaken. In order

to release ships' personnel to their normal functions afloat, such personnel are returned to their ships as soon as they can be relieved by

troops of the expeditionary force.

d. Third phuse.—Assumpt.ion of control of executive agencies, and

cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies.

If the measures in phase 2 do not bring decisive results, it may be

necessary. to resort to more thorough measures. This may involve the

establishment of military government or martial law in varying degree from minor authority to complete control of the principal ageim6
SWM 1—5

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

cies of the. native government; it will involve the further strengthening of our forces by reenforcements. More detachments will be sent

out to take other important localities; more active and thorough

patrolling will be undertaken; measures will be taken to intercept the

vital supply and support channels of the opposing factions and to

break the resistance to law and order by a combination of effort of

physical and moral means. During this period the marines carry the

burden of most of the patrolling. Native troops, supported by marines, are increasingly employed as early as practicable in order that

these native agencies may assume their proper responsibility for restoring law and order in their own country as an agency of their government..

e. Fourth phae.—Routine police functions. (1) After continued

pressure of the measures in phase three, it is presumed that sooner or

later regular forces will subdue the lawless elements. Military police.

functions and judicial authority, to the extent that they have been

assumed by our military forces, are gradually returned to the native

agencies to which they properly belong.

(2) Our military forces must not. assume any judicial responsibility

over local inhabitants beyond that expressly provided by proper authority. The judicial powers of commanders of detached posts must

he clearly defined in orders from superior authority. Furthermore, as

long as the judicial authority rests squarely upon the shoulders of the

civil authorities, the military forces should continually impress and

indoctrinate them with their responsibility while educating the people

in this respect. Each situation presents certain characteristics peculiar to itself; in one instance officers were clothed with almost unlimited military authority within the law and our treaty rights; in

another, less authority was exercised over the population; and in the

third instance the forces of occupation had absolutely no judicial authority. The absence of such authority is often a decided handicap to

forces of occupation in the discharge of their responsibilities. If the

local judicial system is weak, or broken down entirely, it is better to

endow the military authorities with temporary and legal judicial

powers in order to avoid embarrassing situations which may result.

from illegal assumption.

(3) During this phase the marines act as a reserve in supportof the

native forces and are actively employed only in grave emergencies.

The marines are successively withdrawn to the larger centers, thus

affording a better means for caring for the health, comfort, and recreation of the command.

7

210—705 0 — 88 — 2 01. 3
SWM 1—6

GENERAL CHAIACTERIST!CS

f. Fifth pha8e.—Withdrawal from the. theater of operations.

Finally, when order is restored, or when the responsible native agencies

are prepared to handle the situation without other support, the troops

are withdrawn upon orders from higher authority. This process is

progressive from the back country or interior outward, in the reverse

order to the entry into the country. After evacuation of the forces of

intervention, a Legation Guard, which assumes the usual functions

of such a detachment, may be left. in the capital.

1—6. Summary.—a. Since the. World War there has been a flood

of literature dealing with the old l)ri1ciPles illustrated and the new

technique developed in that war: but there always have been and ever

will be other wars of an altogether different kind, undertaken in very

different theaters of operations and requiring entirely different

methods from those of the World War. Such are the small wars

which are described in this manual.

b. There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed

in small wars. However, there is probably no military organization

of the size of the U. S. Marine Corps in the world which has had as

much practical experience in this kind of combat. This experience.

has been gained almost entirely in small wars against, poorly organized

and equipped native irregulars. With all the practical advantages

we enjoyed in those wars, that. experience must not lead to an underestimate of the modern irregular. supplied with modern arms and

equipment. If marines have become accustomed to easy victories

over irregulars in the past, they must now prepare themselves for the

increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in the future.

The future opponent may be as well armed as they are; he will be

b1e to concentrate. a numerical superiority against, isolated detachnients at. the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have a.

thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the inhabitants;

and he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater extent than a white

man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and

modern armament. will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the marine forces in organization, equipment, intelligence.

and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good

judgment.

c. Although small wars present a special problem requiring particular tactical and technical measures, the immutable principles of

war remain the basis of these operations and require the greatest

ingenuity in their application. As a regular war miever takes exactly

8
SWM 1—8

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

the form of any of its predecessors, so, even to a greater degree is each

small war somewhat different from anything which has preceded it.

One must ever be on guard to prevent his views becoming fixed as to

l)rocedure or methods. Small wars demand the highest type of leader.

ship directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small

wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious

responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders

lacking specific instructions.

d. Formulation of foreign policy in our form of government is not a

function of the military. Relations of the United States with foreign

states are controlled by the executive and legislative branches of the

Government. These policies are of course binding upon the foAces of

intervention, and in the absence of more specific instructions, the commander in the field looks to them for guidance. For this reason all

officers should familiarize themselves with current policies. A know!-

edge of the history of interventions, and the displays of force and

other measures short of war employed by our Government in the past,

are essential to thorough comprehension of our relations with foreign

states insofar as these matters are concerned.

9

SWM 1—7

SECTION II

STRATEGY

Par. Page

The basis of the strategy 1—7 11

Nature of the operations 1—8 12

National war 1—9 14

1—7. The basis of the strategy—a. The military strategy of small

wars is more directly associated with the political, strategy of the

campaign than is the case in major operations. In the latter case, war

is undertaken only as a last resort after all diplomatic means of

adjusting differences have failed and the military commander's objective ordinarily becomes the enemy's armed forces.

Ii. Diplomatic agencies usually conduct negotiations with a view to

arriving at a peaceful solution of the problem on a basis compatible

with both national honor and treaty stipulations. Although the outcome of such negotiations often results in a friendly settlement, the

military forces should be prepared for the possibility of an unfavorable

termination of the proceedings. The mobilization of armed forces

constitutes a highly effective weapon for forcing the opponent to accede to national demands without resort to war. When a time limit

for peaceful settlement is prescribed by ultimatum the military-naval

forces must be prepared to initiate operations upon expiration of the

time limit.

c. In small wars, either diplomacy has not been exhausted or the

part.y that opposes the settlement of the political question cannot be

reached diplomatically. Small war situations are usually a phase of,

or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort.

The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the

negotions and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence

on the military, campaign. The military leader in such operations

thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy

and even as to the tactics of the campaign. This feature has been so

marked in past operations, that marines have been referred to as State

Department Troops in small wars. In certain cases of this kind the

State Department has even dictated the size of the force to be sent to

the theater of operations. . The State Department materially influ-

:ii
SW 1-8

STRATEGY

ences the strategy and tactics by orders and instructions which are

promulgated through the Navy Department or through diplomatic

representatives.

d. State Department officials represent. the Government in foreign

countries. The force generally nearest at hand to back up the authority of these agents is the Navy. In such operations the Navy is performing its normal function, and has, as a component part of its

organization, the Fleet Marine Force, organized, equipped, and trained

to perform duty of this nature. After the Force has landed, the commander afloat generally influences the operations only to the extent

necessary to insure their control and direction iii accordance with the

policy of the instructions that he has received from higher authority.

He supports and cooperates with the Force to the limit of his ability.

In the latter stages of the operation the local naval èommander may

relinquish practically all control in order to carry out routine duties

elsewhere. In such case the general operations plan is directed by, or

through, the office of the Naval Operations in Washington.

e. Wars of intervention have two classifications; intervention in the

internal, or intervention in the external affairs of another state. Intervention in the internal affairs of a state may be undertaken to

restore order, to sustain governmental authority, to obtain redress, or

to enforce the fulfilment, of obligations binding between the two states.

Intervention in the external affairs of a state may be the result of a

treaty which authorizes one state to aid another as a matter of political

expediency, to avoid.more serious consequences when the interests of

other states are involved, or to gain certain advantages not obtainable

otherwise. It may be simply an intervention to enforce certain opinions or to propagate certain dlo(:trines, principles, or standards. For

example, in these days when pernicious propaganda is employed to

spread revolutionary doctrines, it is conceivable that the United States

might intervene to prevent the development of political disaffection

which threatens the overthrow of a friendly state and indirectly influences our own security.

1—S. Nature of the operations.—a. Irregular troops may disregard, in part or entirely, International Law and the Rules of Land

Warfare in their conduct of hostilities. Commanders in the field

must be prepared to protect themselves against practices and methods

of combat. not sanctioned by the Rules of \Var.

b. Frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in order to

obtain supplies which are then secreted in remote strongholds. Seizure or destruction of such sources of supply is an important factor

12
SWM 1—8

STRATEGY

in reducing their means of resistance. Such methods of operation

must be studied and adapted to the psychological reaction they will

produce upon the opponents. Interventions or occupations are usually peaceful and altruistic. Accordingly, the methods of procedure

must rigidly conform to this purpose; but. when forced to resort to

arms to carry out the object of the intervention, the operation must

be pursued energetically and expeditiously in order to overcome the

resistance as quickly as possible. c. The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered. National policy and the precepts

of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples

be maintained on a high-moral plan. However, the military strategy

of the campaign and the tactics employed by the. commander in the

held must be adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the

mission without delay.

d. After a study has been made of the people who will oppose the

intervention, the strategical plan is evolved. The military strategical

plan should include those meaiis which will accomplish the purpose

in view quickly and completely. Strategy should attempt to gain

psychological ascendancy over the outlaw or insurgent element prior

to hostilities. Remembering the political mission which dictates the

military strategy of small wars, one or more of the following basic

modes of procedure may be. decided upon, depending upon the situation:

(1) Attempt to attain the aims of the intervention by a simple,

clear, and forceful declaration of the position and intention of the

occupying force, this without threat or promise.

(2) By a demonstration of the power which could be employed to

carry out these intentions.

(3) 'rue display of the naval or military force within the area

involved.

(4) The actual application of armed force. During the transitory

stage or prior to active military operations, care should be taken to

avoid the commission of any acts that might precipitate a breach.

Once armed force is resorted to, it should be applied with determination and to the. extent required by the situation. Situations may

develop so rapidly that the transition from negotiations to the use

of armed force gives the commander little or no time to exert his

influence through the use of the methods mentioned in subparagraphs

(2) and (3) above.

e. The strategy of this type of warfare will be stroiigly influenced

by the probable nature. of the contemplated operations. In regular

13
SWM 1—9

STRATEGY

warfare the decision will be gained on known fronts and probably

limited theaters of operations; but in small wars no defined battle

front exists and the theater of the operations may be the whole length

and breadth of the land. 'While operations are carried out in one

area, other hostile elements may be causing serious havoc in another.

The uncertainty of the situation may require the establishment of

detached posts within Email areas. Thus the regular forces may be

widely dispersed and probably will be outnumbered in some areas

by the hostile forces. This requires that the Force be organized with

a view to mobility and flexibility, and that the troops be highly

trained in the use of their special weapons as well as proper

utilization of terrain.

f. Those who have participated in small wars agree that these

operations find an appropriate place in the art of war. Irregular

warfare between two well-armed and well-disciplined forces will

open up a larger field for surprise, deception, ambuscades, etc., than

is possible in regular warfare.

1-.9. National war.—a. In small wars it can be expected that

hostile forces in occupied territory will employ guerilla warfare

as a means of gaining their end. Accounts of recent revolutionary

movements, local or general, in various parts of the world indicate

that young men of 18 or 20 years of age take active parts as organizers in these disturbances. Consequently, in campaigns of this nature

the Force will be exposed to the action of this young and vigorous element. Rear installations and lines of communications will

be threatened. Movements will be retarded by ambuscades and barred

defiles, and every detachment presenting a tempting target will be

harassed or attacked. In warfare of this kind, members of native

forces will suddenly become innocent peasant workers when it suits

their fancy and convenience. In addition, the Force will be handicapped by partisans, who constantly and accurate1 inform native

forces of our movements. The population will be honeycombed with

hostile sympathizers, making it difficult to procure reliable information. Such difficulty will result either from the deceit used by hostile

sympathizers and agents, or from the intimidation of friendly natives

upon whom reliance might be placed to gain information.

b. In cases of levees en masse, the problem becomes particularly

difficult. This is especially true when the people are supported by

a nucleus of disciplined and trained professional soldiers. This combination of soldier and armed civilian presents serious opposition

14
SWM 1—9

STRATEGY

to every move attempted by the Force; even the noncombatants conspire for the defeat of the Force. c. Opposition becomes more formidable when the. terrain is difficult, and the resistance increases as the Force moves inland from

its bases. Every native is a potential clever opponent who knows

the country, its trails, resources, and obstacles, and who has friends

and sympathizers on every hand. The Force may be obliged to move

cautiously. Operations are based on information which is at best

unreliable, while the natives enjoy continuous and accurate information. The Force after long and fatiguing marches fails to gain contact and probably finds only a deserted camp, while their opponents,

still enjoying the initiative, are able to withdraw or concentrate

strong forces at advantageous places for the purpose of attacking lines

of communication, convoys, depots, or outposts.

d. It will be difficult and hazardous to wage war successfully under

such circumstances. Undoubtedly it will require time and adequate

forces. The occupying force must be strong enough to hold all the

strategical points of the country, protect its communications, and at

the same time furnish an operating force sufficient to overcome the

opposition wherever it appears. Again a simple display of force

may be sufficient to overcome resistance. While curbing the passions

of the people, courtesy, friendliness, justice, and firmness should be

exhibited. e. The difficulty' is sometimes of an economical, political, or social

nature and not a military problem in origin. In one recent campaign

the situation was an internal political problem in origin, but it had

developed to such a degree that foreign national interests were affected; simple orderly processes could no longer be applied when it

had outgrown the local means of control. In another instance the

problem was economic and social; great tracts of the richest land

were controlled and owned by foreign interests; this upset the natural order of things; the admission of cheap foreign labor with lower

standards of living created a social condition among the people which

should have been remedied by orderly means before it reached a

crisis.

f. The application of purely military measures may not, by itself

restore peace and orderly government because. the fundamental causes

of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social. These

conditions may have originated years ago and in many cases have

been. permitted to develop freely without any attempt to apply corrective measures. An acute situation finally develops when condi15
SWM 1—9

STRATEGY

tions have reached a stage that is beyond control of the civil authorities and it is too late for diplomatic adjustment. The solution of

such problems being basically a political adjustment, the military

measures to be applied must be of secondary importance and should

be applied only to such extent as to permit the continuation of peaceful corrective measures.

g. The initial problem is to restore peace. There may be many

economic and social factors involved, pertaining to the administrative,

executive, and judicial functions of the government. These are completely beyond military power as such unless some form of military

government is included in the campaign plan. Peace and industry

cannot, be restored permanently without appropriate provisions for

the economic welfare of the people. Moreover, productive industry

cannot be fully restored until there is peace. Consequently, the

remedy is found in emphasizing the corrective measures to be taken

in order to permit. the orderly return to normal conditions.

h. In general, the plan of action states the military measures to be

applied, including the part the forces of occupation will play in the

economic and social solution of the problem. The same consideration

must be given to the part to be played by local government and

the civil population. The efforts of the different agencies must be

cooperative and coordinated to the attainment of the common end.

i. Preliminary estimates of the situation form the basis of plans

to meet probable situations and should be prepared as far in advance

as practicable. They should thereafter be modified and developed as

new situations arise.

16
SWM 1—10

SECTION III

PSYCHOLOGY

Par. Page

Foreword 1—10 17

Characteristics 1—11 19

Fundamental considerations 1—12 19

Revolutionary tendencies 1—13 19

Basic instincts 1—14 23

Attitude and bearing 1—15 26

Conduct of our troops - -. - 1-10 31

Summary 1—17 32

1-40. Foreword.—a. While it is improbable that a knowledge of

psychology will make any change in the fundamentals of the conduct of small wars, it will, however, lead to a more intelligent application of the principles which we now follow more or less unconsciously through custom established by our predecessors.

b. Psychology has always played an important part in war. This

knowledge was important in ancient wars of masses; it becomes more

so on the modern battlefield, with widely dispersed forces and the

complexity of many local operations by small groups, or even individuals, making up the sum total of the operation. Iii former times

the mass of enemy troops, like our own, was visible to and under the

immediate control of its leaders. Now troops are dispersed in battle

and not readily visible, and we must understand the psychology of

the individual, who operates beyond the direct control of his

superiors.

c. This difficulty of immediate control and personal influence is

even more pronounced and important in small wars, on account of the

decentralized nature of these operations. This fact is further emphasized because in the small wars we are dealing not only with our

own forces, but also with the civil population which frequently contains elements of doubtful or antagonistic sentiments. The very

nature of our own policy and attitude toward the opposing forces and

normal contacts with them enable the personnel of our Force to

secure material advantages through the knowledge and application

of psychological principles.

d. This knowledge does not come naturally to the average individual.

A study of men and human nature supplemented by a thorough knowl17
SWM 1-10

PSYCHOLOGY

edge of psychology should enable those faced with concrete situations

of this type to avoid the ordiiary mistakes. The application of the

principles of psychology in small wars is quite different from their

normal application in major warfare or even in troop leadership.

The aim is not to develop a belligerent spirit in our men but rather

one of caution and steadiness. Instead of employing force, one strives

to accomplish the purpose by diplomacy. A Forc.e Commander who

gains his objective in a small war without firing a shot has attained

far greater success than one who resorted to the use of arms. While

endeavoring to avoid the infliction of physical harm to any native,

there is always the necessity of preventing, as far as possible, any

casualties among our own troops. e. This is the policy with which our troops are indoctrinated; a

policy which governs throughout the period of intervention and finds

exception only in those situations where a resort to arms and the exercise of a belligerent spirit are necessary. This mixture of combined

peaceful and warlike temperament, where adapted to any single operation, demands an application of psychology beyond the requirements

•of regular warfare. Our troops at the same time are dealing with a

strange people whose racial origin, and whose social, political, physical

and mental characteristics may be different from any before encountered.

f. The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit

be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That

implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious,

and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for the

existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of

solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto

and the repercussion to be expected from any actions which may be

contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the success of the

undertaking assured.

g. The great importance of psychology in small wars must be appreciated. It is a field of unlimited extent and possibilities, to which

much time and study should be devoted. It cannot be stated in rules

and learned like mathematics. Human reactions cannot be reduced

to an exact science, but there are certain principles which should guide

our conduct. These principles are deduced by studying the history

of the people and are mastered only by experience in their practical

application.

18
SW1VI 1—11

PSYCHOLOGY

1—11. Characteristics.—The correct application of the principles

of psychology to any given situation requires a knowledge of the traits

peculiar to the persons with whom we are dealing. The individual

characteristics as well as the national psychology are subjects for intensive study. This subject assumes increasing importance in minor

operations. A failure to use tact when required or lack of firmness

at a crucial moment might readily precipitate a situation that could

have been avoided had the commander been familiar with the customs,

religion, morals, and education of those with whom he was dealing.

1—12. Fundamental considerations.—The resistance to an intervent ion comes not only from those under arms but also from those

furnishing material or moral support to the opposition. Sapping t.he

strength of the actual or potential hostile ranks by the judicious application of psychological principles may be just as effective as battle

casualties. The particular methods and extent of the application of

this principle will vary widely with the situation. Some of the fun-

(lamental policies applicable to almost any situation are:

1. Social customs such as class distinctions, dress, and similar items

should be recognized and receive due consideration.

2. Political affiliations or the appearance of political favoritism

should be avoided; while a thorough knowledge of the political situation is essential, a strict neutrality in such matters should be observed.

3. A respect for religious customs.

Indifference in all the above matters can oniy be regarded as a lack

of tact.

1—13. Revolutionary tendencies.—a. in the past, most of our interventions have taken place when a revolution was in full force or

when the spirit of revolution was rampant. In view of these conditions (which are so often encountered in small wars) it may be well to

consider briefly some of the characteristics of revolutions.

b. The knowledge of the people at any given moment of history

involves an understanding of their environment, and above all, their

past. The influence of racial psychology on the destiny of a people

appears plainly in the history of those subject to perpetual revolutions.

When composed large]y of mixed races—that is to say, of individuals

whose diverse heredities have dissociated their ancestral characteristics—those populations present a special problem. This class is always difficult to govern, if not ungovernable, owing to the absence of

a fixed character. On the other hand, sometimes a people who have

been under a rigid form of government may affect the most violent

revolutions. Not having succeeded in developing progressively, or in

19
SWM 1—13

PSYCHOLOGY

adapting themselves to changes of environment, they are likely to

react violently when such adaptation becomes inevitable.

c. Revolution is the term generally applied to sudden political

changes, but the expression may be employed to denote any sudden

transformation whether of beliefs, ideas, or doctrines. In most. cases

the basic causes are economic. Political revolutions ordinarily result

from real or fancied grievances, existing in the minds of some few

men, but many other causes may produce them. The word "discontent" sums them up. As soon as discontent becomes general a party

is formed which often becomes strong enough to offer resistance to the

government. The success of a revolution often depends on gaining

the assistance or neutrality of the regular armed forces. However, it

sometimes happens that the movement commences without the knowledge of the armed forces; but not infrequently it has its very inception

within these forces. Revolutions may take place in the capital, and

by contagion spread through the country. In other instances the general disaffection of the people takes concrete form in some place remote

from the capital, and when it has gathered momentum moves on the

capital.

d. The rapidity with which a revolution develops is made possible

by modern communication facilities and publicity methods. Trivial

attendant circumstances often play highly important roles in contributing to revolution and must be observed closely and given appropriate consideration. The fact is that beside the great events of which

history treats there are the innumerable little facts of daily life which

the casual observer may fail to see. These facts individually may be

insignificant. Collectively, their volume and power may threaten the.

existence of the government. The study of the current history of unstable countries should include the proper evaluation of all human

tendencies. Local newspapers and current periodicals, are probably

the most valuable sources for the study of present psychological trends

of various nations. Current writings of many people of different

classes comprise a history of what the people are doing and thinking

and the motives for their acts. Thus, current periodicals, newspapers,

etc., will more accurately portray a cross section of the character of

the people. In studying the political and psychical trends of a country, one must ascertain whether or not all news organs are controlled

by one political faction, in order to avoid developing an erroneous

picture of the situation.

e. Governments often almost totally fail to sense the temper of their

people. The inability of a government to comprehend existing condi20
SWM 1—13

PSYCHOLOGY.

tions, coupled with its blind confidence in its own strength, frequently

results in remarkably weak resistance to attack from within.

,f. The outward events of revolutions are always a consequence of

changes, often unobserved, which have gone slowly forward in men's

minds. Any profound understanding of a revolution necessitates a

knowledge of the mental soil in which the ideas that direct its course

have to germinate. Changes in mental attitude are slow and hardly

perceptible; often they can be seen oniy by comparing the character

of the people at. the beginning and at the end of a given period.

g. A revolution is rarely the result of a widespread conspiracy

among the people. Usually it is not a movement which embraces a

very large number of people or which calls into play deep economic

or social motives. Revolutionary armies seldom reach any great size;

they rarely need to in order to succeed. On the other hand, the military force of the government is generally small, ill equipped, and

poorly trained; not infrequently a part, if not all of it, proves to be

disloyal iii a political crisis.

it. The majority of the people, especially in the rural districts, dislike and fear revolutions, which often involve forced military service

for themselves and destruction of their livestock and their farm produce. However, they may be so accustomed to misgovernment and

exploitation that concerted effort to check disorderly tendencies of

certain leaders never occurs to them. It is this mass ignorance and

indifference rather than any disposition to turbulence .in the nation as

a whole, which has prevented the establishment of stable government

in many cases.

i. Abuses by the officials in power and their oppression of followers

of the party not in power, are often the seeds of revolution. The

spirit which causes the revolution arouses little enthusiasm among the

poor natives at large unless they are personally affected by such

oppression. tfl revolution, once started, naturally attracts all of the

malcontents and adventurous elements in the community. The revolution may include many followers, but its spirit emanates from a few

leaders. These leaders furnish the spark without which there would

be no explosion. Success depends upon the enthusiastic determination

of those whO inspire the movement. Under effective leadership the

mass will be steeped in revolutionary principles, and imbued with a

submission to the will of the leader and an enthusiastic energy to perform. acts in support thereof. Finally, they feel that they are the

crusaders for a new deal which will regenerate the whole country. In

extreme]y remote, isolated, and illiterate sections an educated revolu21
SWM 1—13

PSYCHOLOGY

tionary leader may easily lead the inhabitants to believe that they, in

the act of taking up arms, are actually engaged in repelling invasion.

Many such ruses are employed in the initial stages and recruiting is

carried on in this manner for long periods and the inhabitants are in

a state of ignorance of the actual situation.

j. How is this situation to be met? A knowledge of the laws relating to the psychology of crowds is indispensible to the interpretation

of the elements of revolutionary movements, and to their conduct.

Each individual of the crowd, based on the mere fact that he is one of

many, senses an invincible power which at once nullifies the feeling of

personal responsibility. This spirit of individual irresponsibility and

loss of identity must be overcome by preventing the mobilization or

concentration of revolutionary forces, and by close supervision of the

actions of individuals.

A,. Another element of mob sentiment. is imitation. This is particularly true in people of a low order of education. Attempt should

be made to prevent the development of a hero of the revolutionary

movement, and no one should be permitted to become a martyr to the

cause. Members of a crowd also display an exaggerated independence.

1. The method of approaching the problem should be to make revolutionary acts nonpaying or nonbeneficial and at the same time endeavor to remove or remedy the causes or conditions responsible for

the revolution. One obstacle in dealing with a revolution lies in the

difficulty of determining the real cause of the trouble. When found,

it is often disclosed as a minor fault of the simplest nature. Then

the remedies are also simple.

rn. The opposing forces may employ modern weapons and technique

adapted to regular organized units,but the character of the man who

uses these weapons remains essentially the same as it always was. The

acts of a man are determined by his character; and to understand or

predict the action of a leader or a people their character must be understood. Their judgments or decisions are based upon their intelligence

and experience. Unless a revolutionary leader can be discounteiianced in the eyes of his followers, it may be best to admit such

leadership. Through him a certain discipline may be exercised which

will control the actions of a revolutionary army; for without discipline, people and armies become barbarian hordes.

ii. In general, revolutionary forces are new levies, poorly trained,

organized, and equipped. Yet they can often be imbued with an

ardent enthusiasm and are capable of heroism to the extent of giving their lives unhesitatingly in support of their beliefs.

22
SWM 1—14

PSYCHOLOGY

1—14. Basic instincts.—a. It. is perfectly natural that the instinct.

of self-preservation should be constantly at work. This powerful

influence plays an important part in the attitude of the natives in

small wars. It is not surprising that any indication of intervention

or interposition will prompt his instinct of self-preservation to oppose this move. Every means should be employed to convince such

people of the altruistic intention of our Government.

b. Fear is one of the strongest natural emotions in man. Among

primitive people not far removed from an oppressed or enslaved

existence, it is eas to understand the people's fear of being again

enslaved; fear of political subjugation causes violent opposition to

any movement which apparently threatens political or personal

liberty.

c. Another basic instinct of man is self-assertion. This is a desire to be considered worthy among his fellow beings. Life for the

individual centers around himself. The individual values his contacts as good or bad according to how he presumes he has been

treated and how much consideration has been given to his own

merits. This instinct inspires personal resentment if his effort is

not recognized. Pride, which is largely self-assertion, will not tolerate contradiction. Self-respect includes also the element of selfnegation which enables one to judge his own qualities and profit by

the example, precept, advice, encouragement, approval, or disapproval of others. It admits capacity to do wrong, since it accepts

the obligation of social standards. In dealing with foreign peoples

credit should be readily accorded where merited, and undue criticism

avoided.

d. There are also peoples and individuals whose instinctive reaction in contact with external influence is that of self-submission.

Here is found a people who, influenced by the great. power of the

United States, are too willing to shirk their individual responsibility

and are too ready to let others shoulder the full responsibility for

restoring and, still worse, maintaining order and normalcy. In this

event, if the majority of the natives are thus inclined, the initial

task is quite easy, but difficulty arises in attempting to return the

responsibility tO those to whom it. rightfully belongs. As little local

responsibility as possible to accomplish the mission should be assumed, while the local government is encouraged to carry it full

capacity of responsibility. Any other procedure weakens the soyereign state, complicating the relationship with the military forces

and prolonging the occupation.

23
SWM 1—14

PSYCHOLOGY

e. States are naturally very proud of their sovereignty. National

policy demand& minimum interference with that sovereignty. On

occasion there is clash of opinion between the military and local civil

power in a given situation, and the greatest tact and diplomacy is

required to bring the local political authorities to the military point

of view. When the matter is important, final analysis may require

resort to more vigorous methods. Before a compromise is attempted,

it should be clearly understood that such action does not sacrifice all

the advantages of both of the opposing opinions.

f. The natives are also proud individually. One should not award

any humiliating punishments or issue orders which are unnecessarily

hurtful to the pride of the inhabitants. In the all-important interest of discipline, the invention and infliction of such punishments

no matter how trivial must be strictly prohibited in order to prevent

the bitterness which would naturally ensue.

g. In revolutions resort may be had to sabotage. Unless the circumstances demand otherwise, the repair of damage should be done

by civilian or prison labor. This will have a more unfavorable psychological effect on the revolutionists than if the occupying forces were

employed to repair the damage.

h. Inhabitants of countries with a high rate of illiteracy have many

childlike characteristics. In the guidance of the destinies of such

people., the more that one shows a fraternal spirit, the easier will be

the task and the more. effective the results. It is manifestly unjust

to judge such people by our standards. In listening to peasants relate

a story, whether under oath or not, or give a bit of information, it may

appear that they are tricky liars trying to deceive or hide the truth,

because. they do not tell a coherent story. It should be understood

that these illiterate and uneducated people live close to nature. The

fact that they are simple and highly imaginative and that. their background is based on some mystic form of religion gives rise to unusual

kinds of testimony. It becomes a tedious responsibility to elicit the

untarnished truth. This requires patience beyond words. The same

cannot be said for all the white-collar, scheming politicians of the

city who are able to distinguish between right and wrong, but who

flagrantly distort the truth.

i. 'rhe "underground" or "grapevine" method of communication is

an effective means of transmitting information and rumors with unbelievable rapidity among the natives. When events happen in one

locality which may bring objectionable repercussions in another upon

receipt of this information, it is well to be prepared to expect the

24
SWN 1—14

PSYCHOLOGY

speedy transmission of that knowledge even in spite of every effort to

keep it localized or confidential. The same means might be considered

for use by intelligence units in disseminating propaganda and favorable publicity.

j. Often natives refuse to give any information and the uninitiated

might immediately presume that they are members of the hostile forces

or at least hostile sympathizers. While the peasant iopes for the

restoration of peace and order, the constant menace and fear of guerrillas is so overpowering that lie does not dare to place any confidence

in an occasional visiting patrol of the occupying forces. When the

patrol leader demands information. the peasant should not be misjudged for failure to comply with the request, when by so doing, he

is signing his own death warrant.

Ic. Actual authority must not be exceeded in demanding information.

A decided advantage of having military government, or martial law

is to give the military authorities the power to bring legal summary,

and exemplary l)uuiSbrneflt. to those who give, false information. Another advantage of such government is the authority to require natives

to carry identification cards on their persons constantly. It. has been

found that the average native is not only willing and anxious, but

proud to carry some paper signed by a military authority to show

that he is recognized. The satisfaction of this psychological peculiarity and, what is more important or practical, its exploitation to

facilitate the identity of natives is a consideration of importance.

This also avoids most of the humiliating and otherwise unproductive

process often resorted to in attempting to identify natives or their

possible relationship to the opposing forces.

'1. There are people among whom the spirit of self-sacrifice does not

exist to the extent. found among more highly civilized peoples or

among races with fanatical tendencies. This may account for the

absence of the individual bravery in the attack or assault by natives

even where their group has a great preponderance of numbers; among

certain peoples there is not the individual combat, knifing, machete

attacks by lone men which one encounters among others. This may

be due to the. lack of medical care provided, lack of religious fanaticism, lack of recognition for personal bravery, or lack of provision for

care of dependents in case of injury or death. Psychological tudy

of the people should take this matter into consideration and the

organization, tactics, and security measures must be adapted

accordingly.

m. It is customary for some people to attempt to place their officials

under obligation to them by offering gifts, or gratuitous services of

25
SWM 1—15

PSYCHOLOGY

different kinds. This is their custom and they will expect it to prevail

among others. No matter how innocent acceptance may be, and in

spite of the determination that it shall never influence subsequent

actions or decisions, it is best not to be a party to any such petty

bribery. Another common result of such transaction is that the native

resorts to this practice among his own people to indicate that he is in

official favor, and ignorant individuals on the other hand believe it.

Needless to say, when it. is embarrassing, or practically impossible

to refuse to accept a gift or gratuity, such acceptance. should not influence subsequent decisions. To prevent subsequent. reque$s for

favors the following is suggested: Accept the gift with the proper

and expected delight; then, before the donor has an opportunity to

see you and request a favor, send your servant with a few American

articles obtainable in our commissaries and which are considered

delicacies by the natives. The amount should be about equal in.

value, locally, to the gift accepted; and usually the native will feel

that he has not Placed you under an obligation.

n. Sometimes the hospitality of the natives must be accepted, and

it is not. intended to imply that this should not be clone on appropriate

occasions. On the contrary, this social intercourse is often fruitful

of a better mutual understanding. Great care must be exercised that

such contacts are not limited to the. people of any social group or

political l)artY. This often leads to the most serious charges of discrimination and favoritism which, even though untrue, will diminish

the respect, confidence, and Support of all who feel that they are not

among the favored. If opportunities are not presented, they should

be created to clenionstrate clearly, to all, that contacts are not, discriminatory and that opinions and actions are absolutely impartial.

1—15. Attitude and bearing.—a. A knowledge of the character

of the people and a command of their language are great assets. Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign

people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the

average North American, are practically beyond the understanding

of persons who do not speak their language. If not already familiar

with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty

should study and acquire a working knowledge of it.

b. Lack of exact. information is normal in these operations, as is

true in all warfare. Lack of information does not justify withholding

orders when needed, nor failing to take action when the situation

demands it. The extent to which the intelligence service can obtain

information depends largely on the attitude adopted toward the.

26
SWM 1—15

P-YCHOL0GY

loyal and neutral population. The natives must be made to realize

the seriousness of withholding information, but at the same time they

must. be protected from terrorism.

c. From the very nature. of the operation, it is apparent that

military force cannot be ap)hed at the stage that would be most.

advantageous from a tactical viewpoint. Usually turbulent situations become extremely critical before the Government feels justified

in taking strong action. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance

to determine the exact moment when the decision of a commander

should be applied. In a gradually developing situation the "when"

is often the essence of the decision. Problems which illustrate the

results of too hasty or tardy decisions will be of value in developing

thought along these lines. The force commander should determine

his mission and inform all subordinates accordingly. Commands

should be kept fully informed of any modification of the mission.

The decisions of subordinate commanders should be strictly in accordance with the desires of their commanders. For the subordinate

commander, the decision may be to determine when he would be

justified in opening fire. For example, the patrol leader makes contact with a known camp and at the last moment finds that women

camp followers are present in the camp. Shall he fire into the group?

Insofar as it is practicable, subordinate military leaders should be

aided iii making such decisions by previously announced policies

and instructions.

d. Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept responsibility

for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always

be interpreted as a weakness. Such indecision will encourage further

disorder, and will eventually necessitate measures more severe than

those which would have sufficed in the first instance. Drastic punitive measures to induce surrender, or action in the nature of reprisals,

may awaken sympathy with the revolutionists. Reprisals and punitive measures may result in the destruction of lives and property of

innocent peol:le; such measures may have an adverse effect upon the

discipline of our own troops. Good judgment in dealing with such

problems calls for constant and careful surveillance. In extreme

cases, a commanding officer may be forced to resort to some mild

form of reprisal to keep men from taking more severe action on their

own initiative. However, even this action is taken with the full

knowledge of possible repercussions.

e. In dealing with the native population, only orders which are

lawful, specific, and couched in clear, simple language should be

27
SWM 1—15

PSYCHOLOGY

issued. They should be firm and just, not impossible of execution

nor calculated to work needless hardship upon the recipient. It is

well to remember this latter injunction in formulating all orders dealing with the native population. They may be the first to sense that

an order is working a needless hardship upon them, and instead of

developing their support, friendship, and respect, the opposite effect

may result.

f. An important consideration in dealing with the native population in mal1 wars is the psychological approach. A study of the

racial and social characteristics of the people is made to determine

whether to approach them directly or indirectly, or employ both

means simultaneously. Shall the approach be by means of decisions,

orders, pe'somil appeals, or admonitions, unconcealed effort, or a(lministrative control, all of which are calculated to attain the desired

end? Or shall indirect methods by subtle inspiration, propaganda

through uggestion, or undermining the influential leaders of the

o)pO5itiOfl be attempted? Direct methods will naturally create some

antagonism and encourage certain obstruction, but if these methods

of approach are successful the result may be more speedily attained.

Indirect approach, on the other hand, might require more time for

accomplishment, but the result may be equally effective and probably

with less regrettable bitterness.

g. Propaganda plays its part in approach to the people in small

wars, since people usually will respond to indirect, suggestion but

may revolt against direct suggestion. The strength of suggestion is

clepeident upon the following factors:

(1) La$t impression—that is, of several impressions, the last is most

likely to be acted upon.

(2) Freq'ueniiy—t hat is, repetitions, not one after another but

intervals separated by other impressions.

(3) Repetition—this is distinguished from frequency by being

repetitions, one after the other, without having other kinds of

impressions interspersed.

/z. 'The strongest suggestion is obtained by a combination of "frequency" and "last impressions." Propaganda at home also plays its

part in the public support of small wars. An ordinary characteristic

of small wars is the antagonistic propaganda against the campaign

or operations in the United States press or legislature. One cannot

afford to ignore the possibilities of propaganda. Many authorities

believe that the Marine Force should restricts publicity to a minimum

in order to prevent the spread of unfavorable and antagonistic prop-
SWM 1—15

PSYCHOLOGY

aganda at home. However, it is believed that when representatives

of the press demand specific information, it should be given to them,

if it. is not of a confidential nature or such as will jeopardize the

mission. Sometimes marines are pressed with the question: "Why

are you here ?" The best method to follow when a question of public

policy is involved is to refer the individual to appropriate civil

authorities.

1. There is an axiom in regular warfare to strike the hardest where

the going is the easiest. In small wars also, it is well to strike most

vigorously and relentlessly when the going is the easiest. When the

opponents are on the run, give them no peace or rest, or time to make

further plans. Try to avoid leaving a few straggling leaders in the

field at the end, who with their increased mobility, easier means of

evasion, and the determination to show strength, attempt to revive

interest by bold strokes. At this time, public opinion shows little

l)atieICe in the enterprise, and accepts with less patience any explanation for the delay necessary to bring the operation to a close.

j. In street fighting against mobs or rioters, the effect of fire is generally not due to the casualties but due to the fact. that it demonstrates the determination of the authorities. Unless the use of fire is

too long delayed, a single round often is all t.hat is necessary to carry

conviction. Naturally one attempts to accomplish his mission without firing but when at the critical moment all such means have failed,

then one must fire. One should not make a threat without the intention

to carry it out. Do not fire without giving specific warning. Fire

without specific warning is only justified when the mob is actively

endangering life or property. In disturbances or riots when a mob

has been ordered to disperse, it must be feasible for the mob to disperse. Military interventions are actually police functions, although

warlike operations often ensue. There is always the possibility of

domestic disturbances getting beyond the control of local police.

Hence the necessity of employing regular forces as a reserve or reenforcernents for varying periods after the restoration of normal conditions.

k. The personal pride, uniform, and bearing of the marines, their

dignity, courtesy, consideration, language, and personality will have

an important effect on the civilian attitude toward the forces of toccupation. In a country, for example, where the wearing of a coat, like

wearing shoes, is the outward and unmistakable sign of a distinct

social classification, it is quite unbecoming for officers who accept the

hospitality of the native club for a dance, whether local ladies and

29
SWM 1—15

PSYCHOLOGY

gentlemen are in evening clothes or not, to appear in their khaki shirts.

It appears that the United States and their representatives have lost

a certain amount of prestige. ivhen they place themselves in the embarrassing position of receiving a courteous note from a people ordinarily considered backward, inviting attention to this impropriety.

On the other hand, care should be. exercised not to humiliate the

natives. They are usually proud and humiliation will cause resentment which will have an unfavorable reaction. Nothing should be

said or done which implies inferiority of the status or of the sovereignty of the native people. They should never be treated as a conquered people.

1. Often the military find themselves in the position of arbiters in

differences between rival political factions. This is common in serving

on electoral missions. The individual of any faction believes himself

in possession of the truth and cannot refrain from affirming that anyone who does not agree with him is entirely in error. Each will attest

to the dishonest. intentions or stupidity of the other and will attempt

by every possible means to carry his point of view irrespective of its

merits. They are excitable, beings and prone to express their feelings

forcibly. They are influenced by personal partiality based upon family or political connections and friendship. Things go by favor.

Though they may appear brusque at times they feel a slight keenly,

and they know how to respect the susceptibilities of their fellows.

vi. In some revolutions, particularly of economic origin, the followers may be men in want of food. A hungry man will not be inclined to listen to reason and will resort to measures more daring and

desperate than under normal conditions. This should be given consideration, when tempted to burn or otherwise dest.roy private property or stores of the guerrillas.

v. In the interior there are natives who have never been 10 miles

from their home, who seldom see strangers, and much less a white

man or a foreigner. They judge the United States and the ideals and

standards of its people by the conduct of its representatives. It may

be no more than a passing patrol whose deportment or language is

judged, or it may be fairness in the purchase of a bunch of bananas.

The policy of the United States is to pay for value received, and

I)rOmPt payment of a reasonable price for supplies or services rendered

should be made in every instance. Although the natives of the capitals

or towns may have a greater opportunity to see foreigners and the

forces of occupation, the Marine Corps nevertheless represents the

United States to them also, and it behooves every marine to conduct

30
SWM 1—16

PSYCHOLOGY

himself accordingly. There is no servièe which calls for greater exercise of judgment, persistency, patience, tact, and rigid military justice

than in small wars, and iiowhere is more of the humane and sympathetic side of a military force demanded than in this type of operation.

1—16. Conduct of our troops.—a. In addition to the strictly military plans and preparations incident to the military occupation of a

foreign country, there should be formulated a method or policy

for deriving the greatest benefit from psychological practices in the

field. To make this effective, personnel of the command must be

indoctrinated with these principles. While it is true that the command will generally reflect the attitude of the commander, this will

or desire of the supreme authority should be disseminated among the

subordinates of all grades. The indoctrination of all ranks with

respect to the proper attitude toward the civilian population may

be accomplished readily by means of a series of brief and interesting

lectures prepared under the direction of the military commander

and furnished all units. These lectures may set forth our mission,

the purpose of our efforts, our accomplishments to date in the betterment of conditions, our objectives of future accomplishment, etc.

b. Uncertainty of the situation and the future creates a certain

psychological doubt or fear in the minds of the individual concerned; if the individual is entirely unaccustomed to it, and the

situation seems decidedly grave, his conduct may be abnormal or

even erratic. This situation of uncertainty exists, ordinarily to a

pronounced degree in small wars, particularly in the initial phases of

landing and occupation. The situation itself and the form of the

orders and instructions which the marine commander will receive

are often indefinite. In regular warfare, clear cut orders are given,

or may be expected, defining situations, missions, objectives, instructions, and the like, in more or less detail; in small wars, the initial

orders may be fragmentary and lack much of the ordinary detail.

However unfortunate this may be, or how difficult it may make the

task, this is probably the normal situation upon landing. In order

to be prepared to overcome the usual psychological reaction resulting from such uncertainty, studies and instructions in small wars

should be accompanied by practice in the issuance of orders.

c., The responsibility of officers engaged in small wars and the

training necessary are of a very different order from their responsibilities and training in ordinary military duties. In the latter case,

they simply strive to attain a method of producing the maximum

31
SWM 1—17

PSYCHOLOGY

physical effect with the force at their disposal. In small wars, caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results

with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss

of life. This requires recourse to the principles of psychology, and

is the reason why the study of psychology of the people is so important in preparation for small wars.

d. In major warfare, hatred of the enemy is developed among

troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and

kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass

of the population. There is nothing in this principle which should

make any officer or man hesitate to act with the necessary firnmess

within the limitation imposed by the principles which have been

laid clown, whenever there is contact with armed opposition.

1—17. Summary.—a. Psychological errors may be committed

which antagonize the population of the country occupied and all

the foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching

effect and it may require a long period to reestablish confidence,

respect, and order. Small wars involve a wide range of activities

including diplomacy, contacts with the civil population and warfare of the most difficult kim]. The situation is uften uncertain,

the orders are sometimes indefinite, and although the authority of

the military commander is at time in doubt, he usually assumes full

responsibility. The military individual cannot afford to be intimidated by the responsibilities of his positions, or by the fear that

his actions will not be supported. He will rarely fail to receive support if he has acted with caution and reasonable moderation, coupled

with the necessary firnuiess. On the other hand inaction and refusal

to accept responsibility are likely to shake confidence in him, eveii

though he be not directly censured.

b. The purpose should always be to restore normal government, or

give the people a better government than they had before, and to establish peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable.

Gradually there must be instilled in the inhabitants' minds the leading

ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and property. and

individual liberty. In so doing, one should endeavor to make selfsufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With tll this

accomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting

friendship and respect of the native population. The practical application of psychology is largely a matter of common sense.
SWM 1—18

SECTIoN IV

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Pai. Page

Importance of cooperation 1—18 33

Principles prescribed by Navy regulations 1—19 33

Contact with State Department representatives 1—20 34

1—18. Importance of cooperation.—a. One of the principal obstacles with which the naval forces are confronted in small war situations is the one that has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of

demarcation between State Department authority and military

authority.

b. In a major war, "diplomatic relations" are summarily severed

at the beginning of the struggle. During such a war, diplomatic

intercourse proceeds through neutral channels in a manner usually not

directly detrimental to the belligerents. There are numerous precedents in small wars which indicate that diplomacy does not relax its

grip on the situation, except perhaps in certain of its more formal

manifestations. The underlying reason for this condition is the desire

to keep the war "small," to confine it within a strictly limited scope,

and to deprive it, insofar as may be possible, of the more outstanding

aspects of "war." The existence of this condition calls for the earnest

cooperation between the State Department representatives and naval

authorities.

c. There are no defined principles of "Joint Action" between the

State Department and the Navy Department by which the latter is to

be restricted or guided, when its representatives become involved in

situations calling for such cooperation. In the absence of a clearly

defined directive, the naval service has for guidance only certain general principles that have been promulgated through Navy Regulations.

1—19. Principles prescribed by Navy Regulations.—a. The

principles referred to as set forth in Navy Regulations, 1920, are, for

ready reference, herein quoted

718 (1) The Commander in Chief shnll preserve, so far as possible. the most

cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United

States in foreign countries and extend to them the honors, salutes, and other

official courtesies to which they are entitled by these regulations.

33
SWM 1—20

RELATIONSHIP WIT1[ THE STATE DEPARTMENT

(2) He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or other cornmunication from any such representatives.

(3) Although due weight should he given to the opinions, and advice of such

representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely responsible to his

own Immediate superior for all official acts in the aclininistratioli of his command.

719. The Commander in Chief shall, as a general rule, when in foreign ports,

communicate with local civil officials and foreign diplomatic and consular authorities through the diplomatic or consular representative of the United States on

the spot.

b. The attitude of the Navy Department towards the relationship

that should exist.. between the naval forces and the diplomatic branch

of the Government is clearly indicated by the foregoing quotations.

Experience has shown that where naval and military authorities have

followed the "spirit" of these articles in their intercourse with foreign

countries, whether such intercourse is incident to extended nonhostile

interposition by our forces or to minor controversies, the results attained have met with he approval of our Government and have tended

towards closer cooperation with the naval and military forces on the

part of our diplomats.

c. It should be borne in mind that the matter of working in cooperation with the State Department officials is not restricted entirely to

higher officials. In many cases very junior subordinates of the State

Department and the Marine Corps may have to solve problems that

might involve the United States in serious difficulties.

1—20. Contact with State Department representatives.—The

State Department representative may be of great help to the military

commandr whose knowledge of the political machinery of the country

may be of a general nature. It is therefore most desirable that he

avail himself of the opportunity to confer immediately with the nearest State Department representative. Through the latter, the commander may become acquainted with the details of the political situation, the economic conditions, means of communication, and the

strength and organization of the native military forces. He will be

able to learn the names of the governmental functionaries and familiarize himself with the names of the leading officials and citizens in

the area in which he is to operate. Through the diplomatic representative the military commander may readily contact the Chief Executive, become acquainted with the government's leading officials and

expeditiously accomplish many details incident to the occupation of

the country.

34
SWM 1—21

SECTION V

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND—NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

Par. Page

Navy regulations 1—21 35

Control of joint operations 1—22 35

The directive 1—23 36

Naval officer commanding ashore 1—24 37

Marine officer commanding ashore 1—25 37

Marine—constabulary 1—26 39

Direct control by Navy Department - 1—27 39

1—21. Navy regulations.—a. Article 575, Navy Regulations, 1920

states: "When serving on shore in cooperation with vessels of the

Navy, brigade commanders or the officer commanding the detachment

of marines shall be subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief,

or, in his absence, to the orders of the senior officer in command of

vessels specially detailed by the Commander in Chief on such combined operations so long as such senior officer is senior in rank to the

officer commanding the brigade or the detachment of marines. When

the brigade commander or the officer commanding the detachment is

senior to the senior officer in command of the vessels specially detailed

by the Commander in Chief on such combined operations, or when,

in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, it is for any reason deemed

inadvisable to intrust such combined command to the senior officer

afloat, the Commander in Chief will constitute independent commands

of the forces ashore and afloat, which forces will cooperate under the

general orders of the Commander in Chief."

b. In article 576, it is provided that: "The brigade commander or

other senior line officer of the Marine Corps present shall command

the whole force of marines in general analogy to the duties prescribed

in the Navy Regulations for the senior naval officer present when two

or more. naval vessels are serving in company, but the commander of

each regiment, separate battalion, or detachment. shall .exercise the

functions of command over his regiment, battalion, or detachment in

like general analogy to the duties of the commander of each naval

vessel.?'

1—22. Control of joint operations.—In a situation involving the

utilization of a marine force in a small war campaign, the directive

35
SWM 1—23

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

for the marine force commander usually requires him to report to the

senior officer present iii the area of anticipated operations. The Major

General Commandant exercises only administrative control over the

marine force; its operations are controlled by the Chief of Naval Operations directly, or through the senior naval officer present, if he be

senior to the marine force commander. Consequently, no operation

plans or instructions with regard to the tactical employment of the

marine force originate in the office of the Major General Commandant.

1—23. The directive.—a. In situations calling for the use of naval

and marine forces in operations involving protection of life and property and the preservation of law arid order in unstable countries, the

burden of enforcing the policies of the State Department rests with

the Navy. The decisions with regard to the forces to be used in any

situation are made by the Secretary of the Navy as the direct representative of the President. Through the Chief of Naval Operations,

the Secretary of the Navy exercises control of these forces. The directive issued to the naval commander who is to represent the Navy

Department. in the theater of operations is usually very brief, but

at the same time, clearly indicative of the general policies to be followed. The responsibility for errors committed by the naval commander in interpreting these policies and in carrying out the general

orders of the Navy Department rests with such naval commander.

b. If, as is the usual situation, the naval commander is the senior

officer present in the theater of operations, his sole directive may be

in the form of a dispatch. A typical directive of this type is set forth

as follows:

INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION' IN (name of country) HAS REQUIRED

SENDING OF FOLLOWING NAVAL FORCES (here follow list of forces) TO

WATERS WITH ORDERS TO REPORT TO SENIOR NAVAL OFFI.

CER FOR DUT! POLICY OF GOVERNMENT SET FORTI IN OPNAV DISPATCHES ( ) AND ( ) YOU WILL ASSUME COMMAND OF ALL

NAVAL FORCES IN ( ) WATER AND AT ( AND IN FULLEST

COOPERATION WITH AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND CONSULAR OFFICERS WILL CARRY OUT POLICY OF US GOVERNMENT ST FORTH IN

REFERENCE DISPATCHES.

c. Under the provisions of the foregoing directive, a 'naval commander concerned would be placed in a position of great resj*nsibility and in accomplishing his task, he would necessarily demand

the highest degree of loyalty and cooperation of all those under his

command. The usual procedure, adopted by the naval commander,

would be first to make a careful estimate of the situation, then

36
SWM 1—24

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

arrive at a decision, draw up his plan based on this decision, and

issue the necessary operation orders.

1—24. NavaJ officer commanding ashore.—If the force to be

landed consists of naval and marine units and is placed under the

direct command of a naval officer, matters with regard to the relationship between the forces ashore and the naval commander afloat

will give rise to little or no concern. The naval officer afloat will,

under such conditions, usually remain in the immediate vicinity of

the land operations, maintain constant contact with all phases of

the situation as it develops, and exercise such functions of command over both the forces ashore and those afloat as he considers

conducive to the most efficient accomplishment of his task. Commanders of marine units of the landing force will bear the same

relationship toward the naval officer in command of the troops

ashore as it set down for subordinate units of a battalion, regiment,

or brigade, as the case may be.

1—25. Marine officer commanding ashore.—a. When the force

landed comprises, a marine brigade or smaller organization under the

command of a marine officer, and such forces become engaged in a

type of operation that does not lend itself to the direct control by

the naval commander afloat, many questions with regard to the relationship between the marine forces ashore and the naval forces

afloat will present themselves. The marine force commander, in this

situation, should not lose sight of, and should make every effort to

indoctrinate those under his command with the idea that the task

to be accomplished is a "Navy task"; that the responsibility for its

accomplishment rests primarily with the immediate superior afloat;

and that regardless of any apparent absence of direct supervision

and control by such superior, the plans and policies of the naval

commander afloat must be adhered to.

b. The vessels of the naval force may be withdrawn from the immediate theater of operations; the naval commander may assign

certain vessels to routine patrol missions along the coast; while he,

himself, may return to his normal station and maintain contact

with the marine' force and the vessels under his command by radio

or other means of communication.

c. The directive issued to the marine force commander will usually

provide that he keep in constant communication with the naval commander afloat in order that the latter may at all times be fully informed of the situation ashore. The extent to which the marine

force commander will be required to furnish detailed information

37
SWM 1—25

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

to the naval commander will depend on the policy established by the

latter. As a general rule, the naval commander will allow a great

deal of latitude in the strictly internal administration of the marine

force and the details of the tactical employment of the various units

of that force. He should, however, be informed of all matters relative to the policy governing such operations. In case the naval

commander does not, through the medium of routine visits, keep

himself informed of the tactical disposition of the various units of

the marine force. he should be furnished with sufficient information

with regard thereto as to enable him to maintain a clear picture of

the general situation.

d. '[sually the naval commander will be required to submit to the

Navy Department. periodically, a report embracing all the existing

economic, political, and tactical phases of the situation. The naval

commander will, in turn, call upon the marine force commander for

any reports of those matters as are within the scope of the theater

in which the force is operating. e. Estimates of this sort carefully prepared will often preclude the

necessity of submitting detailed and separate reports on the matters

involved and will greatly assist the naval commander in his endeavor.

through the coordination of the other information at his disposal,

to render to the Navy Department a more comprehensive analysis of

the situation confronting him.

/. When questions of major importance arise, either involving a

considerable change in the tactical disposition and employment of the

marine force, or the policies outlined by the naval commander, the

latter should be informed thereof in sufficient time to allow him to

participate in any discussion that might be had between the political.

diplomatic, and military authorities with regard thereto. It should

be remembered that in making decisions in matters of importance,

whether or not these decisions are made upon the advice of our diplomatic representatives, the marine-force commander is responsible to

his immediate superior afloat.

g. In addition to the principles that are necessarily adhered to incident to the "chain of command," a marine-force, commander on foreign

shore habitually turns to the Navy for assistance in accomplishing the

innumerable administrative tasks involved in the small-war situat ions.

Matters with regard to water transportation for evacuation of personnel, matters concerning supply, matters involving intercourse with

our diplomatic representatives ip countries in the vicipity of the

theater of operations, matters relating to assistance from the Army

38
SWM 1—26

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

in supply and transportation, and any number of other phases of an

administrative nature can be more expeditiously and conveniently

handled through the medium of the naval commander whose prerogatives and facilities are less restricted than those of the commander in

the field.

1—26. Marine—Constabulary.---When there is a separate marine

detachment engaged in the organization and training of an armed

native organization, the commanding officer of this detachment occupies a dual position. Although he is under the supervision of the

Chief Executive of the country in which he is operating, he is still a

member of the naval service. In order that there may be some guide

for the conduct of the relationship that is to exist between the marineforce commander and the marine officer in charge of the native organization, fundamental principles should be promulgated by the Secretary

of the Navy.

1—27. Direct control by Navy Department.—lf the naval vessels

that participate in the initial phases of the operation withdraw entirely from the theater of operations, the command may be vested in

the marine-force commander or in the senior naval officer ashore within

the theater. In such case, the officer in command on shore would be

responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. His relationship with the Chief of Naval Operations would then involve a combination of those prindiples laid down for the relationship that exists

between the forces on shore and the naval commander afloat, and the

relationship that the latter bears to the Navy Department as its representative.

39

SWM 1—28

SECTION VI

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

Par. Page

Importance 1—28 41

Contact with national government officials 1—29 41

Cooperation with law enforcement agencies 1—30 43

Contact with inhabitants 1—31 44

1—28. Importance.—a. All officers of the naval establishment,

whether serving with the force afloat, the forces ashore, or temporarily

attached to the national forces of another country, are required by

the Constitution and by Navy Regulations to observe and obey the

laws of nations in their relations with foreign states and with the

governments or agents thereof.

b. One of the dominating factors in the establishment of the mission

in small war situations has been in the past, and will continue to be

in the future, the civil contacts of the entire command. The satisfactory solution of problems involving civil authorities and civil population requires that all ranks be familiar with the language, the

geography, and the political, social, and economic factors involved in

the country in which they are operating. Poor judgment on the pa

of subordinates in the handling of situations involving the local civil

authorities and the local inhabitants is certain to involve the commander of the force in unnecessary military difficulties and cause publicity adverse to the public interests of the United States.

1-29. Contact with national government officials.—a. Upon the

arrival of the United States forces at the main point of entry the commander thereof should endeavor, through the medium of the United

States diplomatic representative, to confer with the Chief Executive

of the government, or his authorized representative and impart such

information as may be required by the directive he has received. Such

conference will invariably lead to acquaintance with the government's

leading officials with whom the military commander may be required

to deal throughout the subsequent operation.

b. Meetings with these officials frequently require considerable, tact.

These officials are the duly elected or appointed officials of the government, and the military commander in his association with them,

represents the President of the United States. These meetings or

conferences usually result in minimizing the number of officials to be

41
SWM 1—29

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

dealt with, and the way is thereby speeded to the early formulation

of plans of action by the military commander. When the mission is

one of rendering assistance to the recognized government, the relationship between its officials and the military commander should he

amicable. However, if animosity should be shown or cooperation be

denied or withdrawn, the military commander cannot compel the foreign government officials to act according to his wishes. Ordinarily

an appeal to the Chief Executive of the country concerned will effect

the desired cooperation by subordinate officials. Should the military

commander's appeal be unproductive, the matter should be promptly

referred to the naval superior afloat or other designated superior, who

will in turn transmit the information to the Navy Department and/or

the State Department as the case may be. c. In most of the theaters of operations, it will be found that th

Chief Executive maintains a close grip on all phases of the national

government. The executive power is vested in this official and is

administered through his cabinet and various other presidential

appointees. Some of these appointed officials exercise considerable

power within their respective jurisdictions, both over the people and

the minor local officials. Some of them exercise judicial as well as

executive functions, and are directly responsible to the President as

head of the National Government.

d. It follows, therefore, that in the type of situation which involves

the mission of assisting a foreign government, the military commander

and his subordinates, in their associations with national governmental

officials, as a rule will be dealing with individuals who are adherent

to the political party in power. This situation has its advantages in

that it tends to generate cooperation by government officials, provided

of course; the Chief Executive, himself, reflects the spirit of cooperation. At the same time, it may have the disadvantage of creating a

feeling of antagonism toward our forces by the opposite political

party, unless the military conimander instills in all members of his

command the necessity for maintaining an absolute nonpartisan attitude in all their activities.

e. Political affiliation in most countries is a paramount element in

the lives of all citizens of the country. Political ties are taken very

seriously and serve to influence the attitude and action of the-indi'cfidual

in all his dealings.

I. When subordinate military commanders are assigned independent missions which bring them into contact with local and national

governmental officials, they should make every effort to acquaint them42
SWM 1—30

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

selves with the political structure of the locality in which they are

to be stationed. The principal guide for the conduct of their associations with the civil officials will be, of course, the regulation previously

referred to which governs the relations between members of the naval

service and the agents of foreign governments. The amenities of

official intercourse should be observed and the conventions of society,

when and where applicable, should be respected. When assuming

command within a district or department, an officer should promptly

pay his respects to the supreme political authority in the area, endeavor to obtain from him the desired information with regard to

the economic situation in that locality and indicate by his conduct and

attitude that he is desirous of cooperating to the extent of his authority

with those responsible for the administration of the foreign government's affairs.

g. In giving the fullest cooperation to the civil authorities, the

military commander should insist, on reciprocal action on their part

toward the military forces. Interference with the performance of

the functions of civil officials should be avoided, while noninterference

on the part of those authorities with the administration of the military

forces should be demanded. In brief, a feeling of mutual respect and

cooperation between members of the military forces and civil officials

on a basis of mutual independence of each other should be cultivated.

1—30. Cooperation with law-enforcement agencies.—a. United

States forces, other than those attached to the military establishment

of the foreign country in which they are operating will not, as a rule,

participate in matters concerning police and other civil functions.

The military forces usually constitute a reserve which is to be made

available only in extreme emergency to assist the native constabulary

in the performance of its purely police mission.

b. The mission of our forces usually involves the training of native

officers and men in the art of war, assisting in offensive operations

against organized banditry and in such defensive measures against

threatened raids of large organized bandit groups as are essential to

the protection of lives and property. When the civil police functions

are vested in the native military forces of the country, these forces are

charged with the performance of two definite tasks—a military task involving the matters outlined above and a police task involving in general the enforcement of the civil and criminal laws. The native military forces control the traffic of arms and ammunition; they see that

the police, traffic, and sanitary regulations are observed; they assume

the control and administration of government prisons; and they per43
SWM 1—31

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

form numerous other duties that, by their nature, may obviously,

directly or indirectly, play an important part in the accomplishment

of the military mission.

c. It follows, therefore, that by cooperating to the fullest extent

of his authority with the native forces in the performance of civil

police functions, the military commander will, without. actually participating in this phase of the picture, be rendering valuable assistance towards the accomplishment of the ultimate mission assigned

to the combined military forces. Due to the fact that in most cases

the individuals occupying the important positions in those native

organizations performing police duties, are United States officers and

enlisted men, questions arising with regard to cooperation and assistance are easy of solution. Adherence, on the part of our personnel,

to the dictates of the local laws and regulations, and a . thorough

knowledge of the scope of authority vested in the native police force

is essential to the end that we do not hamper this force in the performance of its duty, and to the end that we maintain the respect

and confidence of the community as a whole.

d. With regard to the contact that is had with those connected

with the judicial branch of the government, very little need be said.

The magistrates and judges of the various courts are usually political

appointees, or are elected to the office by the national congress. Consequently, they are affiliated politically with the party in power,

national and/or local. In most situations, the civil courts will continue to function. Although this procedure is not always conducive

to the best interests of the military forces, it is a situation that normally exists and must be accepted. The manner in which the judiciary performs its functions may have a profound effect on the

conduct of a small war campaign. In the first place, the apprehension and delivery of criminals, including guerrillas, by the armed

forces to the courts will serve no useful purpose if these courts are

not in sympathy with the military authorities; and in the second

place, a lack of cooperation on the part of the courts, insofar as the

punishment of outlaws is concerned, may have a tendency to place

the local inhabitants in fear of assisting the military forces. In view

of this situation, every endeavor should be made to. generate a

friendly attitude on the part of these. law-enforcement officials in

order that their cooperation may be had.

1—31. Contact with inhabitants.—a. Whether a military commander be stationed at a headquarters in a metropolis or assigned

to the smallest outpost., he must necessarily come into contact with

44
SWM 1—31

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

the civilian population. By "contact" in this case is implied intercourse in daily life. The transaction of daily routine involves the

association with the civilian element, even in the most tranquil territory. The purchase of fresh provisions, fuel, and other necessities

of camp life involve the relationships with merchants, bankers, those

in charge of public, utilities, and many others. In relations with these

persons, whether they be business or social, a superiority complex on

the part of the military commander is unproductive of cooperation.

The inhabitants are usually mindful of the fact that we are there

to assist them, to cooperate with them in so doing, and while dignity

in such relationship should always obtain, the conduct of the military

authority should not be such as to indicate an attitude of superiority.

b. Association with civilians may be other than business or social.

The same daily occurrences that take place in the United States

between members of the naval forces and our own police and civilian

population frequently take place on foreign soil. Damage to private

property by the military forces is frequently the cause of complaints

by members of the civilian population. Dealings with civilians

making claims for damages incurred through the conduct of our

personnel should be as equitable as the facts warrant. Even where

the responsibility rests with the United States, the settlement of

such claims is necessarily protracted by the required reference to

the Navy Department, and the lack of facilities through which to

afford prompt redress is oftentimes the cause of bad feelings. If

the military commander were supplied with a fund to be used for

the prompt adjustment of limited cdms, the foregoing condition

might be materially improved. However, under existing laws and

regulations the amicable adjustment of matters involving injury and

damage to the civilian population and their property calls for the

highest degree of tact. and sound judgment.

c. Cordial relationship between our forces and the civilian population is best maintained by engendering the spirit of good will. As

previously stated, a mutual feeling of dislike and aversion to association may exist between members of rival political parties. Conservatives and liberals, or by whatever label they may be known, are

frequently prone to remain "die bards" when their political candidate is unsuccessful at the polls. It is, therefore, highly important

for a military commander to ascertain the party affiliation f the

persons with whom he comes into contact. The homely advice:

"Don't dabble in politics" is wise, and military authorities should

scrupulously avoid discussing the subject.

45
SWM 1—31

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

d. Akin to politics is the subject of religion. The people of many

countries take their religion as seriously as their politics. Consequently members of the United States forces should avoid any attitude that tends to indicate criticism or lack of respect for the religious

beliefs and practices observed by the native inhabitants.

e. Relations between our military forces and the civilians might

easily be disturbed if the former were to get into altercations with

the public press. Freedom of speech is another liberty of which the

inhabitants of many countries are not only proud, but jealous. Editors of the local newspapers are not always averse to criticizing the

actions of troops other than their own. Nothing can be gained by

the marine commander in jumping into print and replying to such

newspaper articles, other than possibly starting a controversy which

may make his further retention in that locality undesirable. When

a matter is so published and it is considered detrimental, the subordinate marine commander should bring it to the attention of his

immediate superior for necessary action by higher authority.

f. Every endeavor should be made to assure the civilian population

of the friendliness of our forces. No effort should be spared to demonstrate the advantage of law and order and to secure their friendly

cooperation. All ranks should be kept mindful of the mission to be

accomplished, the necessity for adhering to the policy of the United

States and of observing the law of nations.

g. Foreign nationals are often the underlying cause of intervention; almost invariably they are present in the country during the

occupation. Generally their concern is for the security of their lives

and property; sometimes they have an exaggerated opinion of their

importance and influence. Generally the condition of political unrest does not react directly against foreigners, and it often happens

that the foreign resident does not consider himself in any danger

until he reads of it in a foreign newspaper, whereupon his imagination becomes active. Foreign cooperation may at times be a greater

obstacle to success than the foreign mercenaries in a revolutionary

party, when, for equally unworthy purposes, they render aid openly

or secretly to the revolutionists in order to assure themselves of the

protection or favor of any new government. Any discontented

faction of natives can usually secure the sympathy or support from

some group of investors or speculators who think they can further

their own interests or secure valuable concessions by promoting a

revolution. In any event, in dealing with these corporations and in

46
SWM 1—31

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

receiving reports from them, it may often be wise to scrutinize their

actions carefully to determine if they have any ulterior motives. In

interventions, the United States accords equal attention to the security of life and property of all foreign residents.

0

47

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER II

ORGANIZATION

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940 is published in

fifteen chapters as follows:

CRAPTEB I. INTRODUCTION,

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

m

RESTRiCTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAFrER II

ORGANIZATION

Par. Page

SECTION I. Tm, ESTIMATE OF lirE SnUAT1ON_... 2— 1 to 2— 9 1— 9

II. Tm STAFF IN SMALL ARMS 2-10 to 2-37 11-42

III. COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE 2—38 to 2—ô0 48—64

V

SWM 2—i

SECTION I

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Par. Pa'e

General 2—i i

The mission 2—2 2

Factors to be considered in estimating enemy strength 2—3 2

Relative strength 2—4 6

Enemy courses of action 2—5 6

Own courses of action 2—6 7

The decision 2—7 7

Supporting measures 2—8 7

Campaign and operation plans 2—9 8

2—i. General.—a. It has been stated in the previous chapter that.

the President, as the Chief Executive, makes the decision which initiates small war operations and that this decision is promulgated

through the regular channels to the commander of the intervening

force. Upon the receipt of instructions from higher authority, it

is incumbent on each commander in the chain of command to make

an estimate of the situation to determine the best course of action

and how it is to be carried out.

b. This estimate follows the general outline of a normal "Estimate

of the Situation" although certain points which are peculiar to small

war operations should be emphasized. In particular decisions must

be made as to: the composition of the staff; the size of the force required to accomplish the mission, or how to employ the force available most advantageously; the proportion of the infantry, supporting arms and services best suited for the situation; and the requisition and distribution of special weapons and equipment which are

not included in the normal organization but which are considered

necessary.

c. If sufficient information of the probable theater of operations

has not been furnished, maps, monographs, and other current data

concerning the country must be obtained, including information on

the following: past and present political situation; economic situation; classes and distribution of the population psychological. nature

of the inhabitants; military geography, both general and physical;

and the military situation.

1
SWM 2—2

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

2—s. The mission.—In a major war, the mission assigned to the

armed forces is usually unequivocal—the defeat and destruction of

the hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. More often

than not, the mission will be to establish and maintain law and order

by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas

in which the interests of the United States have been placed in jeopardy, in order to insure the safety and security of our nationals,

their property and interests. If there is an organized hostile force

opposing the intervention, the primary objective in small wars, as in

a major war, is its early destruction. In those cases where armed

opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of

diplomacy rather than military. Frequently the commander of a

force operating in a small wars theater of operations is not given a

specific mission as such in his written orders or directive, and it then

becomes necessary for him to deduce his mission from the general

intent of the higher authority, or even from the foreign policy of

the United States. In any event, the mission should be accomplished

with a minimum loss of life and property and by methods that leave

• no aftermath of bitterness or render the return to peace unnecessarily

difficult.

2—3. Factors to be considered in estimating enemy strength.—

a. Political status.—(1) In the majority of our past small wars operations, intervention has been due to internal disorder which endangered foreign lives and property, or has been undertaken to enforce

treaty obligations.

(2) In the first instance, the chaotic condition usually has been

brought about as a result of th tyrannical measures adopted by the

party in control of the government, by the unconstitutional usurpation of power by a political faction for the sake of gain, or because

of intense hatred between rival factions which culminated in a revolt

against the recognized government. As the result of such action,

a state of revolution existed which was detrimental to internal and

external peace and good will. The intervening power was faced usually .with one of two alternatives; either to intervene between the

warring factions, occupy one or more proclaimed neutral zones, and

endeavor by pacific or forceful action to make the rival parties accept

mediation and settlement of the controversy; or to assist, by pacific

or forceful action, one side or the other, or even to support a new

party, in the suppression of the disorders.

2
SW1VI 2—3

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

(3) In the second instance, that of enforcing treaty obligations, the

immediate cause of intervention usually has been the neglect and repeated refusal of the local government to carry out its obligatiOns

under the terms of a commercial or political treaty. The intervening forces sought, by show of force or by actual field operations,

to enforce those obligations. If such action was unsuccessful, the

intervening power in some cases deposed the party in control and

established a de facto or de jure government which would carry out

the provisions of the treaty. This often resulted in active opposition

by the ousted party against the intervening forces who were giving

aid, force, and power to the new government.

(4) It is evident from the above that the internal political organization of the country concerned, the strength of the forces which may

oppose the intervention, and the external obligations of the country

as a member of the family of nations, should be carefully considered

in the estimate of the situation. In addition, the estimate must include the probable effect which the intervention will have upon the

public opinion of the citizens of the intervening power and upon the

good will of other countries. The latter, in particular, is of great

importance since the friendship and trade relations of countries which

are not sympathetic to the intervention may be alienated by such

action.

b. Economic 8tatus and logistic sup port atoailable.—The ability of

a hostile force to oppose the intervening force may be limited by the

availability of subsistence, natural resources, finances, arms, equipment, and ammunition. The forces opposing the intervention often

live off the country by forcing contributions of money, subsistence,

and other supplies from the peaceful inhabitants, or by donations

from local civilians sympathetic to their cause. Even though the

country concerned may be heavily indebted to their own citizens as

well as to foreign powers, funds are often diverted from the state

treasury or may be received from foreign sources for the purchase

of modern arms and munitions of war. As a result, the intervening

force usually finds the forces opposing them armed and equipped

with modern weapons and capable of sustaining themselves in the

field for an unlimited period. This is especially true if, as is usually

the case, the hostile forces resort to guerrilla warfare.

c. Geographical features.—That part of the estimate of the situation which considers the geographical features of the theater of operations is fully as important in small wars as in a major war. It

covers the general terrain features, the geographical divisions of the

3
SWM2—3

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

country as fixed by relief, suitable debarkation places, the character

and suitability of routes of communication, the distribution of population, the location of principal cities, the political divisions of the

state, and the strategical and tactical aspects of the frontiers. The

location and extent of plain, plateau, and mountain regions, and of

open, wooded, or jungle areas will affect the organization, equipment,

and field operations of the intervening force. If a state of revolution is the basic cause of intervention, the political divisions within

the country are particularly important and may in themselves, determine the strategic plan of operation. Of special significance, also,

are those areas in which the majority of foreign citizens and interests are concentrated, since the establishment of neutral zones and

similar protective operations usually will be initiated in those

localities.

ci. C'lirno tie covditwfl$.—Climatic conditions in the probable theater of operations will affect the organization, clothing, equipment,

supplies, health, and especially the operations of the intervening

forces. A campaign planned for the dry season may be entirely

different from one planned for the rainy season. This is particularly

true in countries where the road system is primitive, or where dependence is placed on river transportation for the movement of

troops and supplies. Weather conditions (luring certain seasons of

the year may increase the. difficulties of combat operations in the

theater of operations, but if 1)1operly evaluated, they should not be

considered as insurmountable obstacles.

e. Information and security sei'vThe of the enemi.—It can be stated

as an accepted premise that, in small wars, the intelligence service of

the opposing forces will be tiperior initially to that of the intervening force. From. the point of view of the intervening power, the

intervention is usually considered a friendly effort to assist the occupied country to reestablish peace and order within its boundaries.

From the viewpoint of the majority of the citizens of the occupied

country, however, this action by an alien power is an unfriendly one.

Although the majority of these inhabitants will not actively O1)POSC

the intervention, many of tlein will indirectly assist the native forces

with information relative to the movements of the intervening forces.

This is especially true of those citizens who have relatives among

the native forces operating in the field. To off-set this situation,

recourse must be had to propaganda clearly stating the definite purpose of the intervening forces in. order to show the friendly aid that

is being offered to the couitry. Friendships should be made with

the inhabitants in an honest and faithful endeavor to assist them to

4
SWM 2—3

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

resume their peaceful occupations and to protect them from the illegal demands made upon them by the malcontents. The liberal use

of intelligence, funds will be of assistance in obtaining information

of hostile intentions. Secrecy and rapidity of mOvements, the distribution of false information regarding proposed operations, and

the use of code or cipher messages will aid in preventing the hostile

forces from gaining information of contemplated movements of our

own forces. Routine patrols must be avoided. An effort must be

made to learn the terrain and to become familiar with and utilize

every road and trail in the theater of operations. Above all, an

active and aggressive campaign against the hostile forces in the field

is the most effective method of destroying their intelligence service.

A guerrilla band which is constantly harassed and driven from place

to place soon loses contact with its own sources of information; it

becomes confused and its intelligence system breaks down. As the

occupation continues, superiority in this respect will gradually be

obtained by the intervening forces.

f. Material characteritic8.—Irregulars in small wars are not encumbered with modern supply loads or other impedimenta which

reduce the speed t which troops can march. Their knowledge of

the terrain and their mobility permits them to move quickly and safely

to avoid combat and ther to launch an attack against a defenseless

village or some isolated outpost. In the past, these irregulars have

been armed with old types of weapons, most of which have been considered obsolete, while the intervening forces have been equipped with

superior modern weapons. Due to the ease with which modern arms

and equipment can be obtained from outside sources, it can be expected that, in the future, irregulars will have weapons and equipment equally as effective as those of the intervening forces. Except

for aviation, therefore, the decided advantage in arms and equipment

enjoyed by intervening troops in the past will seldom obtain in the

future.

g. Composition, condition, and di.position of ene'nvy forces.—When

the interveiing forces initially enter a small wars country, they usually find the opposing elements organized into fairly large groups

controlling certain definite areas. If these large groups can be engaged and decisively defeated, armed opposition to the intervention

may be brought to an end and an early peace achieved. If this fails,

the larger groups either retire to more remote areas, or are dispersed

into numerous small bands which remain in the same general locality,

and the action becomes one of protracted guerrilla warfare.

5
SWM 2-4

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

h. Rscial characteristics, m,orale, and sl€ill.—The leadership of the

opposing forces in small wars. must not be underestimated. Very

often the opposition is led by men who have been trained in the United

States or European military schools and who have had much experience in practical soldiering in their specialized type of warfare. Irregular forces in active operations always attract foreign soldiers of

fortune of varied experience and reputation whose fighting methods

influence the character of opposition encountered. (For further details, see Section III, Chapter I, "Psychology.")

2—4. Relative strength.—After considering the strength of your

own forces, always keeping the mission of the force in mind, the factors of the Enemy and Own Strength are compared in order to arrive

at a definite conclusion as to the relative combat efficiency of the

opposing forces.

2—5. Enemy courses of action.—TIie probable intentions of the

opposing forces will depend a great deal, initially, upon the causes

leading up to the intervention. In the majority of cases, their purpose will be to hold the area in which they are located as a section

seceding from that part of the country which is first occupied by the

intervening force. Even though under the control of a single leader,

they will seldom oppose the landings or engage in offensive action,

initially, against the forces of occupation. As the movement inland

begins, strong defensive action can be expected from the larger hostile groups. When these have been dispersed, smaller bands or groups

will operate actively not only against the intervening forces but also

against the towns and population then under control of the latter.

Finally, the opposition usually will degenerate into guerrilla warfare. So many small bands will be in the field that a definite conclusion as to the probable intentions of any one of them will be difficult to determine. Generally their intentions will .be to make surprise attacks against the intervening forces in superior numbers and

against undefended local villages and towns. To offset such action,

patrols must be strong enough in numbers and armament to withstand any anticipated attack or ambush, and the principal villages

and towns must be given adequate protection. Further, by energetic

patrolling of the area and vigorous pursuit of the hostile forces once

contact is gained, the irregulars should be forced to disband completely or to move to more remote and less fertile areas. The pursuit

of these small bands must be continuous.

6
SWM 2—6

THE STIMATE OF THE SITUATIOIc

2—6. Own courses of action.—The intervening force commander

must choose the best course of action to follow in order to accomplish

his mission. This will necessarily result in a scheme of maneuver, either strategical or tactical. To accomplish this mission, it may be

necessary to make a show of force in occupying the State capital, for

often the history of the country will indicate that he who holds the

capital holds the country. Again, he may be forced to occupy the

principal cities of the country, or a certain area, the economic resources of which are such that its possessor controls the lifeblood of

the country. More frequently, it will be necessary to initiate active

combat operations against the large groups of opposing forces which

occupy certain areas. The entire scheme of maneuver will frequeit1y

result in the occupation of the coastal area initially, with a gradual

coordinated movement inland, thus increasing the territory over which

control and protection may be established. As this territory extends,

it will be necessary' to create military areas within it under the control to subordinate commanders. The area commander in turn will

seek to control his area by use of small detachments to protect the

towns and to conduct active operations against irregular groups until

the area becomes completely pacified.

2—7. The decision.—When the force commander has finally selected

the best course of action and determined, in general terms, how

it may be executed, he makes his decision, which consists of a statement of his course of action followed by how it is to be carried out,

and why. The decision indicates the commander's general plan of

action as expressed in paragraph 2 of an operation order. The basic

principle underlying any decision in a small-wars operation is that

of initiating immediately energetic action to disband or destroy the

hostile forces. This action should hasten the return of normal peace

and good order to the country in the shortest possible time.

2—8. Supporting measures.—After the basic decision has been

reached, the Force Commander must consider carefully the supporting 'measures which are required to put it into effect. The mission;

the operations required to carry out the scheme of maneuver; the

organization, armament, and leadership of the opposing forces; the

terrain, geography, and climate in the theater of operations; the

natural resources and routes of communication within the counry to

be occupied; all must be considered and all will affect the formulation of the campaign and operation plans. These factors will determine the size and composition of the commander's staff; the organiza7
SWM 2—9

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

tion of the force; the type of infantry weapons and the proper

proportion of aircraft, artillery, and other supporting arms and services required; and the administrative and logistic details. When

these supporting measures have been determined, the commander

evolves his campaign and operation plans.

2—9. Campaign and operation plans.—a. In military operations

of small wars, strategical and tactical principles are applied to attain

the political objective of the government. The political objective

indicates the general character of the campaign which the military

leader will undertake. The campaign plan indicates the military

objective and, in general terms, the nature and method of conducting the campaign. It will set forth the legal aspects of the operations and the corelated authority and responsibilities of the force.

If military government or some form of political control is to be

instituted, the necessary directives are included in the campaign plan.

This plan also indicates the general nature of employment of the

military forces. It indicates what use, if any, will be made of

existing native forces or of those to be organized.

b. The operation plan prescribes the details of the tactical employment of the force employed and the important details of supply and

transportation for that force. It may indicate the territorial division

of the country for tactical or administrative control. It provides

also for the most efficient employment, maintenance, and development of the existing signal communication system. If the campaign

plan calls for the organization of a native constabulary, detailed

plans must be made for its early organization and training. If the

campaign plan calls for the employment of local armed civilians or

guards, or if such action is considered necessary or advisable, plans

must be made for the organization, training, equipment, supply, clothing, subsistence, pay, shelter, and employment of such troops.. If

the mission calls for the supervision of elections, this plan must include the necessary arrangements for the nonmilitary features of this

duty as well as the tactical disposition of the force in the accomplishment of the task. c. Tactical operations of regular troops against guerrillas in small

wars are habitually offensive. Even though operating under a strategic defensive campaign plan, regular combatants in contact with

hostile forces will emphasize the principle of the offensive to gain

psychological supremacy. Isolated forces exposed to possible attack

by overwhelming numbers must be well I)rotected in positions pre8
SW1YI 2—9

THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

pared to develop the greatest possible effect of their weapons. Reverses, particularly at first, must be avoided at all costs.

d. The initiation of a campaign before adequate preparations have

been made, may well be as fatal in a small war as in regular warfare. Prolonged operations are detrimental to the morale and prestige of the intervening forces. They can be avoided only by properly estimating the situation and by evolving as comprehensive, flexible, and simple a plan as possible before the campaign begins.

9

SWM 2—10

SECTION II

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

Par. Page

Command and staff responsibility in small wars 2—10 11

The force commander 2—li 12

Staff procedure 2—12 12

The chief of staff 2—13 15

The first section (personnel) F—i 2—14 17

'I'he second section (intelligence) F—2 2—15 19

The third section (plans and training) F—3 2—16 32

The fourth section (supply) F—4 2—17 34

Thespecialstaff 2—18 35

The adjutant 2—19 35

The inspector 2—20 36

The lawofficer 2—21 37

Theofficerinchargeofcivilaffairs 2—22 37

Thechaplain 2—23 38

Thepaymaster 2—24 38

Theprovostmarshal 2—25 38

The commanding officer of special troops 2—26 39

The artillery officer 2—27 39

The air officer 2—28 39

The communications officer 2—29 39

The engineer officer 2—30 40

The surgeon 2—31 40

The quartermaster 2—32 41

The chemical officer 2—33 41

The tank officer 2—34 41

The munitions officer 2—35 41

The post exchange officer 2—36 41

The amusement and welfare officer 2—37 41

2—10. Command and staff responsibility in small wars.—A force

engaged in small wars operations, irrespective of its size, is usually

independent or semi-independent and, in such a campaign, assumes

strategical, tactical, and territorial functions. Strategical decisions

and territorial control are usually matters for the, attention of the

high command in major warfare. In small wars the Force Commander must be prepared to make or recommend decisions as to the

strategy of the operation, and his staff must be able to function as a

GHQ staff. In short, the force must be prepared to exercise those

functions of command, supply, and territorial control which are

11
SWM 2—11

THE STAP]? fl SMALL WARS

required of the supreme command or its major subdivisions in regular

warfare. More extensive planning is required than would ordinarily

be expected of the same size unit that is part of a higher command.

For these reasons, it is obvious that a force undertaking a small wars

campaign must be adequately staffed for independent operations even

if the tables of organization do not specify a full staff complement.

Whether or not the executive staff is relieved of all operative functions will depend on the size and composition of the force and the

situation. It is possible to visualize an independent regiment in such

a situation that the demands placed upon the organization would

make it inadvisable for a member of the Executive Staff to operate

the various activities pertaining to his Executive Staff section. Likewise it is possible that the Executive Staff of a much larger force can

operate the activities of their sections after the situation is thoroughly

under control. The staff organization muse be fitted to the unit after

consideration of its size, composition, and the situation confronting it.

2—il. The Force Commander.—One of the first decisions of the

force commander must make is the size and composition of his staff.

He then considers the extent to which he will decentralize authority

to his staff and to subordinate commanders. This decision will

greatly influence his assignments of officers to specific staff and command duties. The assignment of officers according to their attainments, temperaments, and speciu:l qualifications, is one of the most

important measures to insure smooth and efficient operation of the

organizations or establishments. The larger the unit, the more important this becomes. The force commander must be able to issue

directives only, leaving the details to his subordinates. He contents

himself with seeing that the work is properly done and that the

principle of the directive is not departed from, always holding himself ready to rule on doubtful points and to advise subordinates who

are having difficulty.

2—12. Staff procedure.—a. The staff of a unit or organization consists of those officers specifically provided for the purpose of assistjng

the commander in exercising his command functions. It is divided

into two groups: the Executive, or General, Staff (Chief of Staff;

F—i, Personnel; F—2, Intelligence; F—3, Plans and Training; and

F—4, Supply), who comprehend all the functions of command; and

the Special Staff, which includes the heads of technical, supply; and

administrative services, and certain technical specialists. Usually,

the Executive Staff is not an operating agency; in a small force,

Executive Staff officers may, or may not, actually operate one or

12
SWM 2—12

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

more of the services under their sections. The organization of the

staff is shown diagrammatically in Plate 1. Staff principles and

functions, as defined in the "War Department Field Manual 101—5,"

remain fundamentally the same irrespective of the type of operation.

b. The staff, in close cooperation, works out the plans enunciated

by the commander, formulates the orders and instructions for putting

the plans into execution, and by observation and inspection insures

proper execution. Staff officers must keep themselves informed of

the situation at all times, and be able to place before the commander

information in such thoroughly digested form as will enable him

to come to a sound and prompt decision without having to consider

an infinite number of details.

c. Staff conferences, staff visits, staff inspections, measures to insure adequate liaison, and provision for administrative details are

the usual methods employed by all staff organizations to facilitate

the proper performance of their specific duties. This procedure unifies the efforts of the staff in furthering the accomplishment of the

will of the commander.

d. Administrative procedure and the details of the organization and

routine of the various staff offices are largely dependent on the requirements of the particular situation. It is important that essential information be immediately available and that every item coming under the cognizance of the staff section or special staff officer

concerned receive proper attention and be disseminated to individuals concerned. This entails the formulation of a systematic office

routine and proper allocation of duties to individuals. Executive

staff sections are not offices of permanent record. Each of these sections keeps a journal (Plate II) which is the daybook of the section.

It contains briefs of important written and verbal messages, both received and sent, and notations of periodic reports, orders, and similar

matters that pertain to the section. If an item is received or issued

orally, it is entered in detail; if written, the entry may be either a

reference to the file number of the document or a brief of its contents. A brief notation is also made of instructions and directions

pertaining to the section which have been given by the commander

r a member of the section to someone outside of the section. The

jurnal is closed when directed by the commander, at the end of the

lay, a phase, or other period. These journals are the permanent

records of the activities of the sections; combined, they form the record of events of the organization. For further details, see FM 101—5.

13
SWM 2—12

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

14

S0
SWM 2—13

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

The foregoing diagram shows the staff of a small wars force conslsitng of a reinforced

brigade. Special Staff Officers are here groupe under Executive Staff Sections under which they would normally perform the major portion of their functions. The diagram

presumes a situation in which the function of the Executive Staff is that of direction, and

the function of the Special Staff is that of operation.

Arrows indicate important functions with other staff sections.

Asterisks indicate assignments of staff officers in certain situations, although their functions may be assumed by other members of the staff If not of sufficient importance to

warrant the detail of a separate officer.

1 Eq (Unit. (Place.

(Date.) Fronv (Date and hour.)

To (l)ate and hour.)

Incidents, messages,

Time Serial No. Time

dated

orders, etc.

In Out

Dispositions Remarks

I Insert F—i, F—2, F—3, F—4, or "Consolidated," as appropriate.

I Refers to time of receipt or sending in the office keeping the journal. Refe to time the information was sent and thus calls attention to how old it is.

2.—13. The chief' of staff.—a,. In a force no greater than a regiment

or a reinforced regiment, the executive officer may perform all of the

duties of chief of staff. In larger forces, the chief of staff usually will

be an officer specially detailed for the purpose. His principal duties

are to act as military adviser to the commander and to coordinate the

activities of the staff. (See "War Department Field Manual 101—5.")

He conducts all routine business in order to enable the commander to

devote his time and efforts to more important matters. During the

temporary absence of the commander, the chief of staff makes such

decisions as the situation may demand; in each case he is guided by the

policies, general instructions, or his intimate knowledge of the commander's wishes.

b. The chief of staff prescribes the internal organization of the various sections so as to fix responsibility for the initiation and supervision

of work in order to secure efficiency and teamwork. He decides which

members of one staff section will understudy the members of another

staff section. He makes sure that the special staff is properly organized.

Each chief of section will be so engrossed in his own work that, at

times, one section will infringe on the duties of another. The chief of

15
SWM 2—13

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

staff must adjust this at once. His diplomacy and tact in adjusting

such situations at the start will have a favorable reaction on the entire

command.

c. As the organization progresses, it often develops that certain

duties should be shifçed from one unit to another. The chief of staff

should see that such hanges are made promptly. The map section of

the engineers has been shifted logically, at times, from that unit to the

second section. If a military government has not been established,

civil relations may be shifted from the first to the second section.

d. During the concentration period, the chief of staff will be particularly interested in the plans of the staff sections and their arrangements for:

(1) Receiving incoming details and individuals.

(2) Prompt issue of equipment.

(3) Prompt completion of medical and other administrative inspections.

(4) Facilities for training.

(5) Coordination of training of all units.

(6) Organization of the Intelligence Service to meet the probable

requirements of the situation.

(7) Organization of the Provost Service to meet adequately the

probable demands that will be made upon it in the theater of operations.

e. The chief of staff should supervise the plans for increasing the

intelligence personnel and for the establishment of provost services if

it can be foreseen that the operations may result in the occupation of a

country or a large section of it. The forces of occupation have four

weapons 'with which to act: (a) Moral effect of the presence of troops;

(.b) intelligence service; (c) provost service (including Exceptional

Military Courts); and finally (4) offensive action. The intelligence

and provost services should be carefully considered in connection with

"peaceful occupation." In the past, scant attention has been given to

these services in the preparation of operation plans for small wars

operations. As a rule, they have been established only when the necessities of operation forced it upon the higher command. In most cases

an increase of personnel in intelligence units will be required over that

allowed in organization tables when the operations include the complete occupation of a country or of large areas of it.

f. The provost service, including the exceptional military-court

system, represents the military government to the mass of the people,

with whom it comes in direct contact, and is the normal active instru16
SWM 2—14

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

ment for the maintenance of tranquillity, freeing the natives from

agitation and intimidation by their own countrymen. The provost

service, more than any other element of the forces except the Intelligence Service, should understand the people, their temperament,

customs, activities, and the everyday working of the average native

mind. It warrants a well-founded and complete organization, including provost marshals and judges with legal knowledge, good and

loyal interpreters, and sufficient clerical assistance to dispatch business with justice and celerity.

2—14. The first section (personnel)—F—1.——a. The assistant chief

of staff, F—i, coordinates the activities of those agencies performing

the funct.ions that he is charged with in the "War Department Field

Manual 101—5." He cooperates with the second section on matters

pertaining to prisoners of war, espionage, etc., and with the third and

fourth sections in regard to quartering, priorities of replacement,

and allotment of time for recreational work. He is responsible for

certain provisions of the administrative order, and must cooperate

with the fourth section in this matter. Because he is charged with

those functions which relate to the personnel of the command 'as

individuals, he is brought into close contacb with the adjutant, the

inspector, the chaplain, the law officer, the surgeon, the provost marshal, the paymaster, the communications officer, the exchange officer,

and the commanding officer, special troops.

b. The first section organizes the personnel of the staff sections

and makes assignments of the clerical personnel, orderlies, and

pecia1ists therein.

c. Prior to leaving the United States, this section formulates a

plan covering the replacements to accompany the force, numbers

and classes of replacements to be dispatched later, dates that such

replacements are desired, and priorities. This plan may appear as

an annex to an appropriate administration order. In determining

the number of replacements to be provided, the losses which may be

incurrad among the various classes of troops must be estimated.

An ample margin should be allowed for casualties in transit and

during the landing, and consideration given to the climatic and sanitary conditions en route and within the area of operations, the

types of operations contemplated, the branch of service, and the

time required for replacements to arrive. After arrival in the

theater of operations, F—i should insure by timely planning that

complete information as to the needs of the force reaches the appropriate headquarters in the United States in sufficient time 'for replace17
SWM 2—14

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

ments to arrive when needed. He should cooperate closely with the

third section in estimating, well in advance of actual needs, changes

in conditions that will require replacements, augmentation, or reduct.ion of the Force. When replacements or reenforcements are

recieved, they are distributed in accordance with priorities formulated by the third section. . F—i, in collaboration with the Commanding Officer, Special

Troops, is charged with the allocation of space to the various headquarters' offices. Whatever the contemplated duration of the occupation, force headquarters should be so located and space so allocated

thereat as to facilitate either the expansion or the reduction of its

activities. In selecting and allocating office space, the first section

confers with all members of the staff relative to their needs, and

particularly with the fourth section, which supervises rentals and

purchases. e. Until personnel is specifically designated to take active charge

of military government, the first section prepares plans as necessary for its establishment. Usually it will be advisable to organize

a special staff section for this purpose. If the military government

is an independent organization apart from the force, the first section acts as the liaison agent between the force commander and the

staff of the military governor. For details, see Chapter XIII, "Military Government."

1f. Since post exchanges are established for the welfare and convenience of the enlisted men, supervision of this activity comes

under the first section. See paragraph 2—36.

g. The first section is charged with the rendition of reports concerning, and the handling of, civilian prisoners or prisoners taken

from hostile forces. If a local constabulary is operating in cooperation with the. intervening force, such prisoners usually are

turned over to the former for trial by the constabulary courts martial or by civil courts; otherwise they are held at the disposal of

the force commander.

h. The first section prepares and promulgates regulations governing the conduct of personnel in their associations with friendly

natives in an effort to further cordial public relations. Social customs in countries in which small wars operations usually occur çliffer

in many respects from those in the United States. Violation of

these customs, and thoughtless disrespect to local inhabitants, tend

to create animosity and distrust which makes our presence unwelcome

and the task of restoring law and order more difficult.

18
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

i. The first section prepares and transmits to the fourth section

such parts of the force administiative orders as affect the activities of the first section. These are principally: Replacements; military

police; postal service; care and disposition of civilian prisoners and

prisoners taken from the hostile forces; payment of the command;

and post exchange supplies.

5. The records kept in the office of the first section should be reduced

to the minimum. See paragraph 2—12, d. The following documents

are needed in order to function efficiently:

(1) Section journal.

(2) A suspense file of orders, memoranda, and letters of instructions, which later are turned over to the adjutant.

(3) Copies of important communications which affect the force

continuously. (The originals are kept in the adjutant's files.)

(4) A situation map should be kept l)Osted, showing the status of

matters pertaining to the first section at all times.

2—15. The second section (intelligence) F—2.—a. General.—(1)

The assistant chief of staff F—2 constitutes the Bureau of Enemy

Information. This section must keep in close touch with all other

staff sections and is responsible for the dissemination of enemy information which may affect the operations of those agencies. This

includes not only information of the military situation, but the

political, economic, and social status of the occupied area, together

with the attitude and activities of the civil population and political

leaders insofar as those elements may affect the accomplishment of

the mission.

(2) The duties of the intelligence officer are outlined in "War Department Field Manual 101—5." In addition, the following are of

special importance in small wars operations:

(a) The names and descriptions of leaders, areas in which they

operate, and the methods and material means which they employ in

combat.

(b) Hostile propaganda in occupied territory, adjacent territory or

countries, and our own country; and the methods, means, and agents

used for its propagation.

(e) Liaison with government and local officials of the occupied

country or areas, and with the civil representatives of our own and

foreign governments therein.

(d) Close liaison with the commander of aviation in arranging for

aerial reconnaissance.

19
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

(e) Maintenance of cordial relations with the local, American, and

foreign press, and censoring of all press releases.

b. Duties prior to embarkation.—(1) During the concentration

phase prior to embarkation, the second section will be primarily concerned with obtaining all available information relative to the country in which it is proposed to operate. Monographs, maps, and other

pertinent information normally should be furnished by the Force

General Staff. In no type of warfare is the latest current information more vital. For this reason the second section should immediately establish liaison with the corresponding sections of the naval

and military services and with the nearest. representatives of the State

Department.

(2) The selection, organization, and training of the commissioned

and enlisted intelligence personnel of both the headquarters and

combat units should be carried on concurrently with the F—2 estimate

of the situation. (See paragraph 2—13, e.) Every effort should be

made to obtain personnel conversant with the language of the country. The force of interpreters will generally be augmented by the

employment of natives. The second section, in conjunction with F—4,

should compile and obtain approval of an "Allowance and Pay Table

for Interpreters," based on the scale of wages of the country concerned, and funds should be allocated for payment thereunder prior

to embarkation.

(3) A resumé of the available information of the theatre of operations should be completed as soon as practicable and reproduced and

disseminated throughout the command. The following form is suggested for compiling this information. Some items listed therein

may not be applicable in. every situation, and additional items may

be of great value in certain situations.

A FORM FOR A STUDY OF THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

1. PoLrrxcu..—a. Hi8tory.

b. System of Government.

(1) Form of government (dictatorship, republic, etc.).

(2) Organization and method of operation.

(3) PolItical subdivisions. C. Internal political 8itvation..

(1) Present government (head of state and other political leaders;

personalities).

(2) Political Issues.

(3) Analysis of parties.

(4) Regional and social differences.

(5) The press.

20
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

1. POLITICAL—a. History—Continued.

d. International politics.

(1) Bearing of internal political situation on International policies.

(2) Foreign policies.

(3) Foreign relations.

e. Summation (How does this affect the contemplated operations?).

2. EcoNoMIc.—a. 0 encral economic characteristics.

(1) Natural resources.

(2) Degree of economic development.

(3) Dependence on foreign trade.

b. National productive capacity.

(1) Agriculture.

(2) Mining.

(3) Manufacture.

(4) Shipbuilding.

c. Commerce.

(1) Domestic trade.

(2) Foreign trade.

d. Transportation.

(1) Railroads.

(2) Highways.

(3) Water.

(4) AIr.

e. Communication.

(1) Cables.

(2) Radio.

(3) Telegraph.

(4) Telephone.

f. Finance (method of financing government).

g. Population (economic aspects; present population analysis of population, labor, and social conditions).

h. Plans for industrial rnobili2ation.

i. Economic penetration by foreign. interest8.

5. Influence of economic situation on foreign relations.

Ic. General conclusions (reference to economic self-sufficiency, capacity

for production of war supplies and food supplies, and degree of dependence on maintenance of trade routes).

3. GEOORAPY (PRYsIcAL) .1—a. General topography and hydrography.

b. Rivers and nxiter supply.

c. Climatic conditions.

d. Critical areas (areas the loss of which would seriously hamper the

country under consideration).

e. Vital areas (areas essential to the country concerned).

(1) Routes of approach.

(2) Roads, trails, and railroads.

(3) Harbors and beaches near critical areas.

Such geographical items as have been considered under political or economic headings

should be omitted.

21
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

3. GOaAPEY (PnYSIOAL) .—a. General topography and lzydrography.—Contd.

(4) Conimunlcatiotis.

(5) General terrain considerations.

f. Conclusions (the effect of' general terrain considerations on operations. The most favorable theater of operation from it standpoint of

physical geography).

4. Psrcjiot.ooic4j. SITtJATION.2—a. General racial cliaracteristici; types, raeC8,

etc.

b. Education.

c. Religion.

d. Attitude of inhabitants toward foreigners.

c. Susceptibility to propaganda (Influence of church, press, radio, or

other agency).

f. Conclusions.

5. COMBAT ESTIMATE.— Coordination of national defense.

(1) Military forces (government and opposition).

(2) Supreme commander (government and opposition).

b. Personnel.

(1) Estimated strength of components of both governmeiit and hostile forces.

(2) Government forces and leaders.

(3) Hostile forces anti leaders.

c. Training, efficiency, and morale (government and hostile forces).

(1) Individual.

(2) Unit and combined training.

(3) TrainIng of reserves.

(4) System of promotion of officers.

(5) Efficiency.

(6) Morale.

d. Recruiting tnethod8.

(1) Government forces.

(2) Hostile forces.

e. Equipment and sup plie8 available.

(1) To government forces.

(a) On hand.

(b) Replacement possibilities and sources.

(2) To hostile forces.

(a) On hand.

(b) Replacement possibilities and sources.

f. Method of conducting combat.

g. Navy.

(1) Strength.

(2) OrganizatIon.

(3) TrainIng, efficiency, and morale.

h. Conclusions.

6. GEnERAL ConcLusion (Relative value should be given to all factors and final

conclusions must be based on the study as a whole).

I Discuss only suehitems as are not covered tufly elsewhere in the study. Refer to other

paragraphs where appropriate.
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

(4) (a) Available maps are usually inaccurate and of small scale;

their procurement is costly and the supply limited. They have often

proved so unreliable as to detail as to be valueless except for the purpose of correction. It is often more practical and economical to

obtain maps only for headquarters and executive staff sections of all

units, providing means for the reproduction and distribution of corrected sections or of new maps made after arrival in the theater of

operations. In small-wars operations where engineer troops have not

been present, map reproduction has been made a responsibility of the

second section; in other cases, the map-reproduction section of the

engineers, has been transferred to the force headquarters intelligence

section. In any event, the second section is responsible for the procurement and distribution of maps.

(b) Aerial photography, in addition to its other military uses, will

play an important part in the development of new maps and obtaining

accurate information for the correction of old ones after reaching the

theater of operations. The procurethent of an initial supply of film

and other materials for this purpose is essential.

(5) In order to establish favorable press relations at the start, and

to avoid the publication of harmful and incorrect information, a

definite policy must be adopted as to who will receive representatives

of the press, what information will be furnished, and what means will

be provided for obtaining it. Even though the campaign may be too

insignificant to have correspondents and photographers attached for

the entire operation, they will invariably be present at the beginning.

In some cases, officers have been permitted to act as correspondents;

if this is done, a definite agreement must be made relative to the class

of information which will be furnished.

(6) If a military government is not established, civil relations

with the local officials, native civilians, and foreign nationals, inclucling citizens of the United States, become a function of the

second section. Best results will be obtained if the policy for dealing with the various elements is established before the force arrives

in the theater of operations. After arrival, the local representatives

of the State Department should be consulted and such changes made

in the policy as appear to be desirable.

(7) Organizations which are opposed to intervention in the affairs

of other nations, regardless of the cause, have at times disseminated

their propaganda to the force. The second section i responsible for

guarding against this by locating the source and notifying, through

official channels, the proper civilian officials. An early statement of

23
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

the facts relating to the situation, by the commander, will usually

forestall any ill effects from such propaganda.

(8) Intelligence funds, which are not a part of the quartermaster

allotment, are required for the proper functioning of the second

section. F—2 is responsible for requesting the allotment of such

funds prior to the embarkation of the force.

c. Dutie8 in the theater of opera'tions.—(l) The F—2 section is

primarily an office for the consolidation of information supplied by

lower units, special agents, and outside sources; and for the prompt

distribution of the resulting information to other staffs, sections, and

organizations concerned. If circumstances require the second section to assume the duties of the officer in charge of civil affairs or

other functions, additional divisions must be organized within the

section under competent assistants.

(2) The following intelligence agencies are available to F—2 for

the collection of information: Secret agents, voluntary informers,

aviation, intelligence agencies of lower organizations (brigades, regiments, areas, etc.), other governmental departments.

(a) Secret agents, hired from among the inhabitants in the theater

of operations, have proved valuable collectors of information in the

past. They must be carefully selected and, once employed, a close

watch should be kept on their activities. Usually such agents have

been politically opposed to the native forces whose activities have

resulted in the intervention. If they attempt to use their position

for their own aggrandizement or to embarrass personal enemies,

they are useless as sources of information and handicap the intervening force in gaining the confidence of the population. However,

when reliable agents have been obtained in past operations, they have

provided extremely valuable information. It is often advisable to

pay them low regular wages and to reward them with bonuses for

timely and accurate information.

(b) The major portion of the information obtained from voluntary informers is often false, grossly distorted, or too late to be of

value unless the informer has personal reasons for making the report. Liberal cash payments for information that proved correct

and timely have sometimes brought excellent results. Hired agents

and informers have been of assistance in the past in uncovering the

hostile sources of supply. The source of the information must be

kept inviolable in order to protect the informers and to insure an

uninterrupted flow of information. The universal tendency of even

24
SWM 2-15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

reliable hired agents and voluntary informers is to protect anyone

with whom they are connected by politics, business, or blood.

(c) It is not improbable that high officials of both the party in

power and the opposition may secretly support insurrectionary activities in order to insure themselves an armed following in the field

in case the intervention should be ended suddenly. Such a condition increases the difficult task of securing agents who will report

impartially on tll disturbing elements.

(d) Excellent results have been obtained through the cooperation of

business establishments which maintain branches or other contacts

throughout the occupied areas. For financial reasons, the central

office of such concerns must have timely and impartial knowledge of

actual or prospective conditions throughout the country. In many

cases they are dependent upon the intervening forces for protection

of their personnel and property, and it is to their advantage to restore

peaceful conditions as rapidly as possible. In seeking to establish

such a contact, the intelligence officer should look for a business establishment with which the force normally does business. Liaison should

be maintained through members of the command who visit the business house in the routine course of duty and who are publicly known

to do so. It is unfair, as well as poor intelligence technique, to risk

the life or the bisiness career of a man in his community through carelessness or loose talk. Many companies have accurate and detailed

maps or surveys on file which may be obtained and reproduced to supplement the small-scale maps available to the force.

(e) Aerial reconnaissance is invaluable in locating large movements, encampments, and affected areas. When the opposition has

been broken into small groups, the lapse of time between gaining information and the arrival of a ground patrol is usually too great to

give effective results. The use of observation aviation in close support

of infantry patrols operating against small hostile forces is of doubtful value. The airplane discloses the presence and location of the

patrols and enables the hostile groups to avoid them or to choose the

time and place for making contact. Any ambush that can be located

from the air should be uncovered in ample time by the exercise of a

little care on the part of the patrol leader. Aerial photographic missions often will be the best or only means for securing accurate information of the terrain in the theater of operations. For further details,

see Chapter IX, "Aviation."

(f) Subordinate units provide the force commander with detailed

information on hostile activities, the terrain and geography, and the

25
SWN 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

political and economic situation in the areas in which they operate.

As combat intelligence for the purpose of gaining contact with and

destroying hostile armed opposition, such information usually will be

of value only to the unit first gaining it. But such information, when

collected from the entire theater of operations and transformed into

military intelligence, provides the commander with the information he

must have to dispose his forces in accordance with the situation and

to prepare for eventualities. F—2 should coordinate the activities of

the intelligence sections of subordinate units. The second section of

a subordinate organization, quartered in the same city or town as force

headquarters, should not be used as an appendage to the force intelligence section, but should be permitted and required to function in its

normal manner. However, F—2 should utilize every opportunity to

develop a close understanding and personal relationship with subordinate intelligence officers.

(g) F—2 should maintain close liaison with other agencies of our

government established in the theater of operations. Information

from such agencies concerning the higher officials of the government

of the occupied state and of the opposition party, as well as of the

economic condition of the state, may be accepted as sound. But because of the limited circle within which they move, as well as for other

reasons, their opinion concerning the effect of the national economy

on the peace of the state, and of political and social trends to which

the higher classes are unsympathetic, must be accepted with care. The

same applies to the opinions of America businessmen domiciled in

the country. An officer possessing a working knowledge of the language, a knowledge of the psychology of the people, good powers of

observation, and who has associated with the average civilian in the

outlying districts for a month, is in a position to possess a sounder

knowledge of the fundamental disturbing factors at work in the country that an official or businessman who may have spent years in the

capital only.

(ii) Close contact should be maintained also with representataives

of our government in bordering states, especially with naval and military attaches. This is particularly applicable when the affected area

borders the frontier.

(3) The same agencies for securing information are available to

brigade (if the, force consists of more than a reenforced brigade) and

regimental intelligence officers as are available to F—2, except that

it will be unusual for them to contact representatives of our own or

foreign governments directly. Reconnaissance aviation is usually

26
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

available on request. If a regiment is operating independe.t.ly in a

small wars situation, the regimental intelligence section should be

strengthened to fulfill adequately the functions of the F—2 section.

(4) (a) Even the battalion in small wars rarely operates as a unit.

Its companies often occupy the more important villages in the battalion area and, in turn, send out subdivisions to occupy strategically

located settlements and outposts. The battalion intelligence officer

should spend as much time as possible in the field in order that he

may become thoroughly familiar with the situation throughout the

area.

(b) As soon as it is established, every detached post or station must

organize and develop its own intelligence system. Each garrison

must initiate active patrolling for the purpose of becoming familiar

with the routes of communication, topography and geography of the

district, the inhabitants, and the economic and political forces at work

in the community. Routine patrols over the same roads or trails and

at regular intervals of time should be avoided; rather the objective

should be to discover new trails and to explore new areas with each

successive patrol and to confuse the qpponents by varying the dates

and hours of departure. Local garrisons must become so familiar

with their subdistricts that any changes or unusual conditions will

be immediately apparent. Local commanders and their noncommissioned officers should be able to proceed to any point in their

subdistrict via the shortest and quickest route and without the assistance of a guide or interpreter.

(c) Maps furnished from the higher echelons must be supplemented

by road sketches and the correction or addition of all pertinent military information. This work should be undertaken immediately upon

arrival, beginning with the most important unmapped roads or trails

and continuing throughout the occupation until accurate large-scale

maps are available of all subdistricts. A supplementary chart should

be compiled indicating the distances between all points of military

importance and the time factor involved for each type of transportation available and. for each season of the year. () A record should be kept of all prominent, citizens in the

locality, whether friendly or hostile to the intervention. Each record

should show: The full name of the individual as taken from the baptismal or birth certificate (both when these records differ); the :me

by which the person is customarily known; all known aliases, if any;

and his reputation, character, and activities. Additional information

should be entered on the record as it becomes available. Duplicates

27
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

are forwarded to the next. higher echelon. It is only by this means

that accurate and continuous information can be maintained, on. the

inhabitants of the occupied areas, which will prove invaluable when

questioning individuals, for orienting newly arriving officers, and

for preparing charges when it is desired to bring suspects to trial

for their activities.

(e) Intelligence activities are greatly handicapped if the officers

attached to battalions and smaller units in the field are not familiar

with the local language. This is especially true with Bn—2. Each

officer should endeavor to learn the language sufficiently well to en -

gage in social activities and to dispense with interpreters as soon a.

possible.

(f) Outpost commanders may obtain information by:

Establishing a service of information through the local mayor or

senior civil official;

Weekly reports from the senior civil official in each settlement

within the subdistrict;

Questioning commercial travelers;

Interrogating persons or the relatives of persons injured, or mo-

]ested by the hostile forces;

Close surveillance of relatives of hostile individuals;

Examination of prisoners; and

Constant observation of the movements of all able-bodied men iii

the district.

(g) Methods of extracting information which are not countenanced

by the laws of war and the customs of humanity cannot be tolerated.

Such actions tend to produce only false information and are degrading to the person inflicting them.

d. intelligence record8.— (1) Study of the theater of operationR.—

A thorough knowledge of the theater of operations in small wars is

highly important to all officers from the force commander to the

junior patrol or outpost commander. Information compiled prior to

arrival in the theater inust be supplemented by reconnaissance and

research on t.he ground. See paragraph 2—15, b.

(2) iSpeeia2 studies.—From time to time the intelligence officer may

be called upon to make special studies of particular localities, situations, or other factors arising during the course of the campaign.

(3) The intelligence annex.—A complete intelligence annex may be

issued at the beginning of the operations to accompany the campaigi

plan. Such an annex is not usually necessary in small wars operations

unless strong, organized resistance to the intervention is anticipated.

28
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

The form for the intelligence annex given in "War Department. Field

Manual 101—5" may be used as a guide.

(4) The intelligence eRtimate.—.-(a) The intelligence estimate during the early phases of intervention may closely parallel the F—2 estimate of a major war. It is that part of the commander's estimate of

the. situation which covers the hostile forces and their probable course

of action. The following outline may be used as a guide for such an

estimate:

F-2 ESTIMATE

(Heading)

File Xo.

Maps:

1. Hosiu. FoitcEs:

Dispositions; strength ; physical conditions; morale; training: composition ; supply and equipment ; nsslstaiice to be expected from other sources.

2. ENEMY'3 CAPABILITIES:

Enemy's mission ; plans open to cimemny ; analysis of courses open to the

enemy.

3. MOST PROBABLE COURSE OF ENEMY ACTION.

(Signature.)

(b) As the intervention continues and the hostile forces are dispersed into small groups, purely military operations usually become

ubordinate to civil problems. The following form may be used as

a guide for an F—2 estimate of the political, economical, and civil

situation

ESTIMATE OF THE POLITICAL, ECONOMICAL4 AND CIVIL SITUATION

From: Date and hour

To: Date and hour

Unit

Phtet'

I mate and hour

File No.

Maps:

I. Gxa.i. STA OF TKRBIORY OccUmD

State under the appropriate iiumber of suhparagraphs, a general sununary

of hostile activities as it exists in each sithdivision of time state or territory, • allotting a subparagraph to each geographic subdivision.

2. Arrr'rovE o Crvu. PoPvLIoN:

Discuss attitude of the leaders, whether political or military. The general

attitude of the population, whether frirnml)y, tolerant, apathetic, or hostile.

Local assistance or obstruction we may expect to our efforts.

29
SWM 2—15

'i'l{E STAFF N SMALL WARS

3. ECONOMIC SITI ATv)N:

Condition of lisii'.s. 1inpIt,yneiit situation. Price of foodstuffs. Condillon of crops. Influx or Outflow of Laborers. Conditions amongst laborers.

4. Poiac OPZRAnoN:

Police conditions. C&ipcratloii of native forces and native Cftil Police

with our own. Type of eiiiiie for which most arrests are made, whether

major or minor offenses. Amount and reliability of information furnished

by local force or police. Arias In use by local police, type and number. It

jiolice are subject to beau political leaders for their jobs. Sources of their

pay and a comparison of it With other salaried positions in the locality.

5. MujTy OPna.&uoN:

Either Itscuss or refer to B—2 Reports.

6. Potiict SrruT1oN:

A discussion of the local jwillticaui situation in various sections of the

state or territory, us It affects the state as a whole. A discussion of national poltics and political qiu'tions. The statements or actions of national

political lenders or the iuautiouual political governing body. Political situation in adjacent states which niay buve an Immediate bearing on the local

situation.

7. MIscgrLANEous:

Such Items of interest hearing on the political, economic, and civil situation

as does not come belong under the proceeding paragraphs. (s B

Major

F-2

(5) The Journal,—See paragraph —12, d..

(6) The Intel1igene Report.— (a) The information which has

been collected and evaluated during a given period is disseminated by

means of an intelligence report or an intelligence memorandum. The

period of time to be covered by the report is prescribed by higher authority, or by the unit commander. It. is issued by all combat units

down to and including the battalion or corresponding command for

the purpose of informing superior, adjacent, and subordinate organizations of the situation confronting the unit preparing the report. It

may be supplemented by a sit nation map or overlay. In small wars

operations, it may be advisable to prepare separate reports on the

military, economic, and political situations, or, if they. interlock, a

combined report may be submitted. The military report is similar to

that given in "War Department Field Manual 1O1-S." The following

form may be u'ed as a guide in preparing a combined report:

30
SWM 2—15

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

PERIODI C REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE

From: Date and hour

To: Date and hour

File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Heading)

1. ArriTuDu o' CIvIL PopulATioN TOWARD MILITARY GOVERNMENT OR OccuPATION:

Hostile, neutral, or friendly; by social classes.

2. POLITICAL Ac'nvn'IEs:

Activity of political parties during period—deductions.

3. Ecorcohuc CONDITIONS:

Condition of crops, prices of foodstuffs, if low or high, reason therefor,

pests, epidemics, disasters, labor and wages, economic conditions which

may tend to produce disorder an(1 unrest.

4. LOCAL DIslunaANcEs:

Agitation or disorder caused by rumors, secret organizations, disputes

over property, criminal element.

5. PnosaCiyrioiqs:

Prosecution of prominent people such as newspaper men, civil officials,

etc.

8. HOSTILE FoRcES:

Names of leaders, strength; number and kinds of at.ms, localities frequented—activity during period; normal or abnormal—deductions.

7. HOSTILE ACTIVITIES:

8. MILITARY OPES.&TIoNs:

Synopsis of military activity to offset hostile operations and unsettled

conditions

9. ARMs AND EQUI2MENT:

Number of arms and equipment captured, surrendered, or taken up, with

general locality.

10. MISCELLANEOUs.

11. CONCLUSIONS:

(a) General state of territory occupied.

(b) Possible future trend of events or courses of action open to the

opposition.

(c) Most probable future trend and course of action, based on a sound

estimate only.

(Signature.)

(b). Reports submitted by organization commanders in the field

should be complete and detailed. It is better to send in too much information than too little. A report which is meaningless to the commander of a small detachment may be essential to the next higher

echelon when considered with the information received from other

sources. On the other hand, F—2 reports to higher authority may be

31
SWM 2—16

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

in the form of brief summaries, omitting the mass of detail collected

by the combat organizations. 'Where the immediate transnission of

items of information is necessary, the most rapid means of communication available is employed.

(c) The rapid dissemination of military intelligence to all organizations concerned is fully as important as the collection of original

information. The distribution of intelligence reports should include

the smallest separate detachment in the field. Because of the wide

dispersion of troops in usual small wars operations, intelligenc& reports are often the oniy means by which a patrol commander can be

kept informed of hostile activities, or plan his operations to intercept

probable enemy movements.

(d) In view of the peculiar status of our forces in small wars operations, in which they frequently become involved for the sole purpose

of providing military aid to the civil power of a foreign nation in

order to restore peace within the boundaries of the state, the use of

the term "enemy" should be avoided in all records, reports, and other

documents.

(7) The iitelligeiwe wo'rk sheet.—As information is received by the

second section, it must be recorded in an orderly fashion preliminary

to the preparation of the intelligence report. This is done by means

of the intelligence work sheet. No form for this is prescribed, but a

convenient method is to classify the information as it is received

under the headings used in the intelligence report, starting each heading with a new sheet. This provides a satisfartory means for segregating the information, and greatly facilitates the preparation of the

intelligence report.

(8) The intelligence situatio'n map.—A. situation map, showing the

latest reported disposition of the hostile forces, is kept by the second

section.

2—16. The third section (plans and training).—F—3.-—a. The assistant chief of staff F—3 performs the specific duties outlined in

"War Department Field Manual 101—5."

b. One of the first duties of F—3 may be to prepare letters of intruction for the immediate subordinate organization commanders

as outlined by the force commander. Such instructions are secret.

They indicate the successive steps to be taken if the operations progress favorably, or contemplated plans in case of reverse or other

eventualities. In major warfare, letters of instruction are not common in units smaller than a corps but in small wars situations, which

are usually extremely vague and which present so many possibilities,

32
SWM 2—16

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

some. instructions of this nature will assist the commander's immediate subordinates in the execution of his scheme of maneuver and

campaign plan.

c. The. third section prepares the necessary organization, movement,

communications, and tactical plans. Organization of the combat

units includes the priority of the assignment of replacements, and

recommendations for desirable changes in armament. and equipment.

In conjunction with F—2, he estimates the strength, armament, equipment, and tactics of the opposing forces, and determines the necessity

for the attached supporting arms with the Force such as aviation,

artillery, tanks, etc., and the appropriate strength thereof. Every

available means of communication must be utilized; generally additional equipment and personnel will be required as a shortage of

communication material may influence the plan of campaign. The

prompt preparation of an air-ground liaison code is very important.

d. In conjunction with the special staff and F—4, the third section

determines the number of units of fire of normal and special ammunition to be carried with the force initially, and requests replacements

from the United States as necessary. e. F—3 prepares and issues orders for all troop movements. However. he prescribes only the general location and dispositions of the

technical, supply, and administrative units and the actual movement

orders for these units are issued by the staff section concerned after

consultation with and approval of F—3. In considering the combat

missions to be assigned to the various organizations, areas, or districts

in the theater of operations, he makes appropriate redistribution of

personnel or requests replacements when necessary. Because of the

time factor involved in the redistribution of men or the arrival of

replacements from the United States, troop movements must be

planned farther in advance in small wars operations than in regular

warfare.

f. In small wars, the units of the force are generally so widely distributed throughout. the theater of operations that the commander

may have difficulty in keeping abreast of the situations existing in

the various elements. Operations orders should usually be phrased

in general terms and the details of execution delegated to subordinate commanders. This necessary decentralization of authority is

simplified by partition of the theater and the organization of the

command into areas, districts, and subdistricts.

q. By intimate contact with other staff sections, F—3 keeps informed of all pertinent matters affecting the combat efficiency of the

33
SWM 2—17

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

force. He maintains close liaison with the special staff officers concerning all matters in which their duties, technical knowledge, and

functions will affect the operations. He coordinates the efforts of

subordinate units or the various area organizations, the supporting

arms (aviation in particular), and armed native organizations, to

the end that the greatest combat effectiveness is assured.

h. In addition to situation maps, overlays, and other data permitting a ready grasp of the tactical situation, the. third section

keeps a suspense file of all memoranda r orders emanating therefrom, and a work sheet and a section journal.

2—17. The fourth section (supply)—F—4.—---a. 'lie assistant chief

of staff F—4 is charged with the preparation of plans, policies, priorities, and decisions incurred in the supervision and coordination of

the technical, supply, and administrative services, in matters of supply, transportation, evacuation, hospitalization, and maintenance.

F—4 must so exercise his supervision of these services that the troops

will not be incapacitated by the lack of sufficient clothing, food, and

ammunition, and so as to relieve their commanders of the worry as

to whether these articles will be furnished. The specific duties of the

fourth section are outlined in "War Department Field Manual

101—5."

b. F—4, in conjunction with the third section, recommends changes

in types and amounts of individual, organization, combat, supplementary, and special equipment, and the units of fire of normal and

special ammunition to be carried initially. In cooperation with the

first. section, F—4 estimates the civilian labor needed and obtainable.

in the theater of operations, and the number arid composition of

specialists units to be attached to the force for the service of supply,

hospitalization, communication, and transportation. He determines

the amount of supplies that can be obtained from local sources and

prepares a schedule for shipment of replacements. The amounts and

types of transport to be taken will depend upon the tactical and

administrative requirements, the general nature of the terrain in the

theater of operations, and the availability and suitability of native

transport. In many situations, a large reduction in allowances or a

complete change in type from that specified in organization tables,

• or both, may be required. See Chapter III, "Logistics."

c. The fourth section normally coordinates, supervises, and directs

the supply services without in any way operating their specialities.

Ordinarily these services deal directly with F-4, who settles routine

matters and refers those which involve new policies to the chief of

staff for decision.

34
SWM 2-18

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

d. Since our relations with the local government in the theater of

operations is usually friendly, F—4 makes the necessary arrangements with the customs officials relative to the clearance of supplies

and material for the. force.

2—18. The special staff.—a. The special staff consists of all officers,

other than the executive staff (chief of staff, F—i, F—2, F—3, and F—4),

specifically provided for the purpose of assisting the commander in

exercising his command functions. This special group includes the

heads of the technical, supply, and administrative services, and certain technical specialists. in the Force, the executive staff and the

special staff are separate and distinct, while in lower units they

usually merge into each Other, one officer frequently being charged

with the duties of one or more special staff officers, as well as with

those of a member of the executive staff. Special staff officers normally assigned to a small wars force of a reinforced brigade or larger

organization are listed in the succeeding paragraphs.

b. Although the special staff sections usually function under the

coordination of the executive staff sections (See Plate I, paragraph

2—12, a), such staff officers are not precluded from dealing directly

with the chief of staff or the force commander when necessary. Special staff officers are not "under" any one officer of the executive staff

but function with any or all of them, and with each other.

2—19. The adjutant.—The functions of the adjutant correspond

with those. prescribed for the adjutant general in "War Department

Field Manual 101—5." In lower units, these functions are combined

with those of F—i.

b. (1) The Force postal service is operated, under orders of the

adjutant, by the postal officer, or enlisted mail clerk when no postal

qfficer is appointed. It is advisable, however, to place an officer in

charge of the post office, particularly when a large portion of the

force is in the field, and cash for the purchase and payment of money

orders must be handled by messenger.

(2) The postmaster at the point of concentration or port of embarkation should be consulted for information on the postal forms

required.

(3) Prior to sailing, and periodically thereafter as may be necessary, an order should be published giving the correct mailing address

of the command, and recommending that officers and men advise

their correspondents to send money only by domestic, rather than by

international money orders.

(4) If the prompt and efficient dispatch and distribution of mail

cannot be effected by the authorized postal section complement, the

35
SWM 2—20

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

adjutant should not hesitate to request the temporary or permanent

assignment of additional personnel. Officers and men of the command must be able to send and receive mail with facility; valuables

must be secure while in transit within the Force; and the mail clerk

must receive promptly the signed receipt of the addressee for registered and insured articles on the postal form provided for that

purpose.

c. Combat organizations conducting operations in the field should

be relieved of as much routine administrative work as possible. Company first sergeants and company clerks may be assembled at battalion

or area headquarters where, under the supervision of Bn—1, they are

responsible for the preparation of muster rolls, pay rolls, service

record-book entries, routine correspondence, etc.

2—20. The inspector.—a. In addition to the functions prescribed

in "War Department Field Manual 101—5," the inspector in small wars

operations is usually required to investigate claims for damages resulting from the occupation.

b. lnpectzon8.—(1) Inspections should not interfere with tactical

operations.

(2) 'When patrols escort the inspector from one outpost to another,

they should be of a reasonable strength; it is preferable that the inspector accompany ordinary patrols demanded by routine operations.

(3) The inspector assumes no authority while making his inspection

and issues no orders unless specifically authorized to do so by the force

commander.

(4) No report should be made of minor discrepancies which can be

and are corrected locally.

(5) When the inspector makes recommendations or notes deficiencies in his report, he should see that proper action is taken in accordance with the policy or orders of the force commander. This is particularly true wit.h reference to matters affecting the morale and efficiency of the troops.

C. Inve8tzgation8.—One of the most important duties of the inspector in small wars is to investigate matters which involve controversies

between individuals of the force and local inhabitants. These investigations should be promptly, thoroughly, and fairly made, bearing

in mind the interests of the individuals concerned and those of our

Government. The finding 9f facts should be recorded and filed for

future reference to meet those charges of impropriety which so often

follow our withdrawal from the theater of operations.

36
SWM 2—21

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

d. Cltims and dmages.—(1) Claims and damages may be a source

of embarrassment to the command if they are not investigated and

acted upon promptly. When a special claim board is not designated,

the inspector generally acts in that capacity.

(2) In every small war claims, involving personal injury or property damage, are presented which could be settled immediately and

at great savings to the Government if funds were made available for

that purpose.

(3) If an injury has been done to any individual or private property is damaged, it should be reported to the proper authority without

delay. The latter should order an immediate investigation even

though no claim has been presented. Damages which are the result

of neglect or misconduct on the part of members of the command

should be determined before the departure of the individuals concerneci from the locality. The investigation should determine whether

the damages are the result of a wilful act, negligence, accident, unintentional injury, or of ordinary wear and deterioration. Private or

public property occupied or employed by our forces should be inspected by the local commander or his representative and the native

inhabitants concerned and a record made of all deficiencies or irregularities. Such an inspection is made upon taking possession of and

upon vacating the property.

(4) Prior to withdrawal from lhe theater of operations, the force

commander may issue a proclamation indicating that all claims for

damages must be submitted to the designated authority before a given

date. This enables the investigation and adjustment of the claims

before the evacuation of the area. It has the disadvantage of encouraging a flood of unreasonable claims.

(5) No claims should be allowed for damage to property or for

personal injury which is incident to military operations or the maintenance of public safety, when no criminal intent or carelessness is

in question.

(6) Records of all data affecting claims, including receipts and

releases, should be retained with the files of the Force or otherwise

disposed of as directed by higher authority.

2—21. The law officer.—In small wars operations, the law officer is

the legal adviser to the force commander and his staff on questions

of local civil law, in addition to the functions prescribed for the

"Judge Advocate" in "War Department Field Manual 101—5."

2—22. The officer in charge of civil affairs.—See "War Department Field Manual 101—5."

37
SWM 2—23

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

2-23. The chaplain.—See "War Department Field Manual 101—5."

2—24. The paymaster.—a. The paymaster is charged with those

duties prescribed for "The Finance Officer" in the "War Department

Field Manual 101—5," which pertain to the payment of the command, including mileage and traveling expenses of commissioned

officers. In small wars operations, he must be prepared to advise

the force commander regarding the trend of foreign exchange, especially whether the command shall be paid in whole or in part in

United States currency or local currency.

b. The paymaster does not pay travel expenses of enlisted men,

except when travel by air is involved, nor does he handle the expenses of transportation of dependents, which payments are made

by the disbursing quartermaster. In the absence •of a disbursing

quartermaster, the paymaster may make disbursements of funds pertaining to the Quartermaster's Department, charging such disbursements to the quartermaster's appropriation involved.

2—25. The provost marshal.—a. In addition to the normal duties

prescribed for the provost marshal in "War Department Field

Manual 101—5," in small wars operations he has many functions

relative to the control of the local civilian population, some of which

are listed below:

(1) Control of circulation of civilian population.

(2) Detention of and bringing to justice offenders against the

Executive Orders and the Proclamation of Intervention.

(3) Repression of crime.

(4) Enforcement of the Executive Orders and execution of the

mandates of the military authority.

(5) Execution of sentences of military courts.

(6) Arrest and detention of suspects. Investigation of reports

bearing on civilian activities.

(7) Special investigation of complaints made by civilians against

the members of the occupation, municipal police, etc.

(8) Observe civil officials in performance of their duties and

report any official violation of this trust.

(9) Custody of certain prisons and their inmates; enforcement

of prison regulations; and supervision of prison labor.

(10) Issue and cancel firearms permits in accordance, with Force

Orders.

(11). Control the storage and release of firearms, ammunition, and

explosives imported into the country. The sale of ammunition to

persons possessing arms on permits in accordance with Force Orders.

38
SWM 2—26

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

b. Native prisoners should never be confined with personnel of the

intervening force; separate prisons should be used. F—2 is permitted

to have free access to all native prisoners for interrogation and examination. The first section is responsible for such action as may be

necessary concerning prisoners in the hands of hostile forces, and

for individuals who become embroiled with the friendly civil population or are arrested by the local authorities.

2—26. The commanding officer of special troops.—The commanding officer of special troops normally performs those duties prescribed

for the "Headquarters Commandant" in "War Department Field

Manual 101—5." In many cases he will also be the provost marshal,

and charged with the duties of that officer.

2—27. The artillery officer.—The artillery officer has the functions

set forth for the "Chief of Artillery" in "War Department Field

Manual 101—5," and, in addition, normally serves in the dual capacity

of commander of the artillery units with the force. If a landing

against opposition is anticipated, the artillery officer is responsible

for the artillery annexes attached to the operations orders.

2—28. The air officer.—See "War Department Field Manual

101—5." In his dual capacity of commander of the force aviation, he

is responsible for the execution of all duties and operations assigned

to such aviation by the force commander.

2—29. The communications Officer.—a. General duties.— (1) The

communications officer performs those functions prescribed for the

"Signal Officer" in "War Department Field Manual 101—5." In

addition he:

(a) Coordinates commqnication activities with the U. S. Naval

Forces, native communication agencies, and communication establishinents owned by commercial concerns.

(b) Assumes responsibility for all naval codes and ciphers.

(c) Supervises all encoding and decoding of dispatches.

(2) If the headquarters of the force is so located that its communication system becomes of primary importance in the chain of

Naval Communication and is the principal agency for handling

dispatches for the State Department, a separate communications

officer with rank corresponding to that of the chiefs of section of

the executive staff should be assigned to the special staff. This

officer would not necessarily have to be a communications technician.

By virtue of his rank and position he would be able to advise the

force commander relative to communication matters, and in general

39
SWM 2—30

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

execute the communication policy, leaving the technical details of

training and operation to a technical assistant or to the. commander

of the force communication unit.

b. Classes of cornmuni.cation..—The classes of communication to

be handled as wire or radio messages, and the classes to be handled

by letter, should be determined prior to embarkation. Authority to

handle class E (personal messages) by radio should be obtained.

e. Additional communicatkni personnel and equipnient.—Organization tables do not provide sufficient personnel or material, especially

radio equipment, to meet the normal requirements of small wars

operations. The communication officer is responsible for augmenting

the trained personnel and obtaining the additional equipment demanded by the situation.

d. Cominrunication poiicy.—(1) Irrespective of the size of the force,

there are certain duties relative to policy which fall to the communications officer in small wars. The more extended the force, the more

involved the policy will be. Part of the policy will be dictated by the

Naval Communication Service, as defined in Naval Communication

Instructions, while a part will be incident to the type of intervention.

(2) The communications officer should ascertain whether the communication facilities of the country concerned are privately or publicly owned and operated, their extent, and the communication agencies

employed. He should determine what, if any, communication agencies

are devoted exclusively to military activities, obtaining the call signs

and frequencies of the radio establishment. He should also ascertain

what communication facilities are owned and operated by foreign

companies. Upon arrival in the theater of operations, he should verify

this information.

2—30. The engineer officer.—See "War Department Field Manual

101—5."

2—31. The surgeon.—a. See "War Department Field Manual

101—5."

b. In small wars operations, when the force may be widely dispersed,

the force surgeon should consider:

(1) The necessity for additional medical personnel.

(2) Extra supplies of medical materials, quinine, and similar

medicaments.

(3) Portable dental outfits.

(4) The preparation of medical supplies for airplane drops.

40
SWM 2—32

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

2—32. The quartermaster.—Tn addition to the functions prescribed in "War Department Field Manual 101—5," the force quartermaster is charged with:

a. The operation of. sales stores.

b. .The procurement of local transportation, including riding, draft,

and pack animals, either by hire or purchase. c. Recommending changes in existing system of accountability,

when required.

d. Making estimates and requests for quartermaster funds, and

supervising the allotment of funds as approved by the force commander.

e. Custody and disbursement of quartermaster funds, and funds

from other branches of the naval service, as authorized.

f. Payment for supplies and services purchased; and for damages

and claims, when authorized.8

g. Payment for labor and transportation hired.3

2—33. The chemical officer.—See "War Department Field Manual

2—34. The tank officer.—The commanding officer of th tank unit

attached to the force is the technical and tactical advisor to the force

commander in all matters pertaining to the use of tanks or armored

cars, and to defense against mechanized forces.

2—35. The munitions officer.—The munitions officer performs

those functions specified for the "Ordnance Officer" and the "Munitions Officer" in "War Department Field Manual 101—5."

2—36. The post exchange officer.—The post exchange officer is a

distinct member of the force special staff. His duties are:

a. To obtain initial funds for establishment of the exchange.

b. To procure exchange supplies by purchase or on consignment.

c. To plan for the distribution of post exchange stores to outlying

garrisons.

d. To conduct the exchange in accordance with regulations.

2—37. The amusement and welfare officer.—-a. An officer may be

specifically designated as the amusement and welfare officer and assigned to the force special staff, or these duties may be delegated to a

staff officer in addition to his regular duties.

b. His duties are:

'If an officer other the force quartermaster Is designated as disbursing assistant quartermaster, the duties specified under e, t, and g are performed by that officer.

41
SWM 2—32

THE STAFF IN SMALL WARS

(1) To obtain amusement funds from proceeds of the post exchange, and from the government fund "Recreation for enlisted men."

(2) To procure and administer Red Cross and Navy relief funds.

(3) To establish libraries at the bases and hospitals.

(4) To purchase and distribute current periodicals.

(5) To obtain and distribute athletic equipment and material for

other forms of recreation. o. In the initial phases of a small wars operation, the duties of

the amusement and welfare officer often may be assigned to t1i

chaplain.

42
SWM 2—38

SECTION III

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

Par. Page General 2—38 43

Infantry 2—39 44

Infantry weapons 2—40 45

a. General.

b. U. S. Rifle, cal. .30, M 1903.

c. U. S. Rifle, cal. .30. M 1.

d. BAR, cal. .30, M 1917. e. BAR, cal. .30, M 1917 (mod.).

I. TSMG, cal .45, M 1928.

g. V. B. Rifle grenade, Mk I.

h. 60-mm. Mortar.

i. Hand Grenade, frag, Mk II.

j. Auto. Pistol, cal. .45, M 1911.

k. Bayonet, M 1905.

1. BMG, cal. .30, M 1917. m. BMG, cal. .50, M 2.

n. 81—mm. Mortar, M 1.

a. 37-mm. Gun, M 4 or M 1916.

Infantry individual equipment 2—41 49

Mounted troops 2—42 50

Engineers 2-43 50

Tanks and armored cars 2—44 50

Transport 2—45 51

Signal troops 2—46 51

Chemical troops 2—47 58

Medical troops 2—48 58

Artillery 2—49 60

Aviation 2—50 64

2—38. General.—a. It can be assumed that the Fleet Marine Force

in the Marine Corps, and the reenforced infantry or cavalry brigade

in the Army, will be the basic organizations for small wars operations.

Major changes in their strength, organization, armament, and equipment are neither essential nor desirable. However, some slight modifications in armament and equipment may be advisable, and the

proportion of supporting arms and services attached to the force may

• vary from the normal.

b. A force assigned a small wars mission should be tactically and

administratively a self-sustaining unit. It must be highly mobile,

43
SWIVI 2—39

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

and tactical units, such as the battalion, must be prepared to act

independently as administrative organizations. The final composition of the force will depend upon its mission, the forces available,

and the character of the operations.

c. The organization and armament of the opposing force may range

from small, roving, guerrilla bands, equipped only with small arms,

to a completely modern force armed with the latest types of material.

The lack of preponderance of any arm or weapon by the opponent

will be the material factor in determining what arms and weapons

will be required by the intervening force. The force must be of sufficient strength and so proportioned that it. can accomplish its mission

in the minimum time and with the minimum losses.

d. The terrain, climatic conditions, transportation facilities, and the

availability and source of supply will influence the types of arms and

equipment and especially the classes of transportation required by the

force.

2—39. Infantry.—a. Importance.—Infantry, the arm of close cornbat, has been the most important arm in small wars because, from the

very nature of such wars, it is evident that the ultimate objective will

be reached only by close combat. The policy that every man, regardless of his specialty, be basically trained as an infantryman has been

vindicated time and again, and any tendency to deviate from that

policy must be guarded against.

b. Traini'ng.—Infantry units must be efficient, mobile, light infantry, composed of individuals of high morale and personal courage, thoroughly trained in the use of the rifle and of automatic

weapons and capable of withstanding great fatigue on long and often

fruitless patrols. As they must assume the offensive under the most

difficult conditions of war, terrain, and climate, these troops must be

well trained and well led.

c. Rifle companie..—Sooner or later, it is inevitable that small wars

operations will degenerate into guerrilla warfare conducted by small

hostile groups in wooded, mountainous terrain. It has generally

been found that the rifle platoon of three squads is the basic unit best

suited to combat such tactics. Each platoon sent on an independent

combat mission should have at least one and preferably two commissioned officers attached to it. It is desirable, therefore, that the number of junior officers assigned to rifle companies be increased above the

normal complement authorized in the tables of organization. The

number of cooks in a rifle company should also be increased to provide one for each platoon as the company often may be divided into

44
SWM 2—40

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

three separate combat patrols or outpost detachments. The attachment of a hospital corpsman to each detachment is essential.

d. Machine gun conpanies.—The infantry machine gun company

fulfills its normal roles during the initial operations in small wars. In

the later phases of guerrilla warfare and I)acification, it will seldom be

used as a complete organization. Squads and sections often will be

attached to small combat patrols, or to detached outposts for the purpose of defense. In order to conserve personnel, some machine gun

units in past small wars operations have been converted into rifle

organizations, and their machine guns, minus the operating personnel,

distributed among outlying stations. This is not good practice. Machine gun organizations should be maintained as such, and the smaller

units detached to rifle platoons and companies as the necessity therefor arises. These remarks are also applicable to the 81 mm. mortar

and antitank platoons.

2—40. Infantry weapons.—a. General.—(1) The nature of small

wars operations, varying from landings against organized opposition

in the initial stages to patrolling the remote areas of the country

against poorly armed guerrillas in the later stages, may make some

changes in the armament of the infantry desirable. Whether these

changes should take place before leaving the United States, or

whether they should be anticipated and effected in the. theater of

operations, must be determined during the estimate of the situation

(2) The arming of the infantry for small war purposes is influenced by—

(a) Fighting power of the enemy, with particular reference to

numerical strength, armament, leadership, and tactics.

(b) The short ranges of jungle warfare.

(c) The necessity for small units to defend themselves at close

quarters when attacked by superior numbers.

(d) The method of transporting men, weapons, and ammunition.

(e) The strength of, and the offensive or defensive mission assigned

to, a patrol or outpost.

(f) The personal opinions of the officers concerned. A company

commander on an independent mission in a small war is generally

given more latitude in the arming of his company than he would be

permitted in a major war.

(3) Ammunition supply is a difficult problem in small wars operations. .A detached post or a combat patrol operating away from its

base cannot depend upon immediate, routine replacement of its ammunition expenditures. The state of training of the unit in fire dis45
SWM 2—40

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

cipline and fire control may be an influential factor in determining

the number and type of infantry weapons assigned.

b. The (I. S. rifle, caliber 30, M1903.—The bolt-action magazine

fed, U. S. Rifle, caliber .30, M1903, often erroneously called the

Springfield rifle, eventually will be replaced by the semiautomatic

rifle as the standard arm of the infantry. Its rate of fire, accuracy,

and rugged dependability in the field may influence its continued use

in small wars operations. When fitted with a rifle grenade discharger, this rifle acts as the propellant for the rifle grenade.

c. The U. S. rifle, caliber .30, M1.—The U. S. Rifle, Caliber .30,

Mi, is a gas operated, semiautomatic, shoulder rifle. It has been

adopted as the standard infantry weapon by the U. S. Army to replace the M1903 rifle. It weighs approximately a half pound more

than the M1903 rifle. Its effective rate of fire is from 16 to 20

rounds per minute as compared to 10 to 20 rounds per minute for the

bolt-action rifle. It is especially useful against low flying aircraft

and rapidly moving terrestrial targets. It requires more care and

attention than the M1903 rifle, the Browning automatic rifle, or the

Thompson submachine gun. It cannot be used to propel rifle grenades of either the V. B. or rod type. Whether or not it entirely

replaces the Mi903 rifle, the characteristics of the Mi rifle make it

• definitely superior to the Browning automatic rifle M1917, and the

Thompson submachine gun for small wars operations. A minimum

of two U. S. rifles, caliber .30, Ml, should be assigned to every rifle

squad engaged in small wars operations and, in some situations, it

may be desirable to issue them to every member of the squad.

d. The Rro'witing automatic rifle, caliber .30, M1917.—With the

advent of the Mi rifle and the adoption of the light machine gun

as an accompanying weapon for rifle units, the Browning automatic

rifle, caliber .30, M1911', with its cumbersome length, weight, and

ammunition supply, should no longer be seriously considered as a

suitable weapon for small-wars operations.

e. The Browning automatic rifle, caliber .30, M1917 (modified.)—

The Browning automatic rifle, caliber .30, M1917 (modified), is

essentially the same weapon as the BAR, fitted with a bipod mount

and a reduced cyclic rate of fire which convert the weapon into an

effective light machine gun capable of delivering accurate, full automatic fire. It can be carried by one man, and has the mobility of

a rifle, on the march and in combat. Two ammunition carriers are

required, the team of three men making up a light-machine-gun

group. Two groups, under a corporal, comprise a light-machine-gun

46
SWM 2—40

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

squad. Its characteristics make the Browning automatic rifle (modified) the ideal accompanying and supporting weapon for rifle units.

Pending the development and adoption of some other standard light

machine gun, two of these rifles should be provided for every rifle

platoon of three squads in small-wars operations.

/. The Thonvpson submachine gun, caliber .45, M11?d8.—(1) Because of its light weight and short over-all length which facilitate

carrying in wooded, mountainous terrain, the Thompson submachine

gun has been used extensively in small-wars operations as a partial

substitute for the Browning automatic rifle. It has the following

disadvantages as a standard combat arm: it uses the caliber .45

cartridge which is employed in no other weapon in the rifle company

except the pistol; special magazines must be carried, which are difficult to reload during combat if the supply of loaded magazines is

exhausted; its effective range is only 150 to 200 yards; the continuous danger space is quite limited; it is not particularly accurate.

With the development of a satisfactory semiautomatic rifle, the

Thompson submachine gun should no longer be considered as an

organic weapon in the rifle squad in small wars.

(2) The Thompson submachine gun may be issued to messengers

in place of the automatic pistol, and to a limited number of machine

gun, tank, transport, aviation, and similar personnel for close-in

defense in small-wars operations. In some situations it may be desirable as a military police weapon. The 20-round magazine is quieter,

easier to carry and handle, and is not subject to as many malfunctions

as the 50-round drum.

g. The V. B. rifle grenade, mark 1.—The V. B. rifle grenade has

been replaced by the 60-mm. mortar as an organic weapon of the

rifle company. However, it has certain characteristics which may

warrant its use in small-wars operations as a substitute for or sup-.

plementary to the mortar. The grenade weighs only 17 ounces as

compared to 3.48 pounds for the mortar projectile. An M1903

rifle, a grenade discharger, and the necessary grenades may be issued

to each rifle squad, thus tripling the number of grenade weapons

with a rifle platoon and eliminating the necessity for a separate

mortar squad. The range of the rifle grenade, using the service

cartridge is from 120 to 180 yards as compared to 75 to 1,800 yards

for the 60-mm. mortar. The effective bursting radius of both

projectiles is approximately 20 yards.

h. The 60-mm. mortar.—Two 60-mm. mortars are organically

assigned to the headquarters platoon of a rifle company. A squad

47
SW1I 2—40

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

of a corporal and 4 privates is required to carry one mortar and

30 rounds of amniunition therefor. A weapon of this type has

proved so valuable in previous small wars that at. least one mortar

should be available for eve.ry rifle platoon, or the V. B. rifle grenade

should be provided as a substitute weapon.

i. The hand grenade, fragmentation, mark 11.—See War Department Field Manual 23—30.

j. The automatic pi8toi, caliber .4J M1911.—See War Department Field Manual 23—35.

k. The bayonet, M1.905.—See War Department Field Manual

2—35.

1. The Browning machine gun, caliber .30, M1t717.—The employment of the Browning machine gun, caliber .30, .M1917, will be

normal during the initial phases of a small war. In the later phases

of the operations, the machine gun will be used principally for the

defense of outlying stations and the Browning automatic rifle (modified) will probably replace it as the supporting weapon for combat

patrols.

im. The Browning machine gun, caliber .50, M2.—The employment of this weapon as a.n antiaircraft and antitank weapon will be

normal.

n. The 81-mm. mortar, M1.—(1) The 81-mm. mortar is one of

the most valuable weapons in small wars operations. During the

landing phase and the early operations against organized forces, its

application will be similar to that in a major war. In some situations

in which hostile artillery is weak or lacking altogether, it may be

advantageous to increase the usual complement of mortars and to empioy them as infantry support in place of the heavier and more cumbersome field artillery. Because of its weight, mobility, and range,

the 81-mm. mortar is the ideal supporting weapon for combat patrols

operating against mountainous fortified strongholds of the enemy in

the later phases of the campaign. Squads and sections often may be

detached for the defense of small outposts scattered throughout the

theater of operations.

(2) The mortar may be fired from boats in the initial landing or

in river operations by seating the base plate in a pit of sandbags,

straddling the barrel, and holding and pointing it by hand as in

firing grenades from the rifle. The barrel should be wrapped with

burlap and the hands should be protected by asbestos gloves.

o. The 37-mm. gun, M4 or M1916.—The tactics and employment

of the 37-nun. gun do not vary in small wars from those of a major

48
SWM 2—41

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

operation. Opportunities for its use probably will be limited after

the completion of the initial phases of the intervention.

2-41. Infantry individual equipment.—a. Infantry units in the

field in small wars operations should be lightly equipped, carrying

only their weapons and essential individual equipment. Rations, packs

or rolls, and extra ammunition should be carried on pack animals or

other suitable transport. If the situation requires the men to carry

full packs, rations, and extra ammunition, their mobility is greatly

reduced and they are seriously handicapped in combat.

b. Entrenching tools are seldom required after the organized hostile

forces have been dispersed. In some. situations, they have been entirely

dispensed with during the period of pacification, patrolling, and guerrilla warfare which follows the initial operations.

c. The amount of ammunition carried in the belt is usually sufficient

for a single engagement. Even with a small combat patrol, the extra

anTmunition should be transported in the train, if possible. The cloth

bandolier is not strong enough to stand up under hard service in the

field. If the bandolier is carried, a considerable quantity of ammunition is lost which is generally salvaged by hostile troops or their

sympathizers. A small leather box, suspended from the shoulder and

large enough to carry one folded bandolier, has proved a satisfactory

substitute for the regular bandolier.

d. If field operations continue for a considerable length of time, it

may be necessary to reinforce the cartridge belts, magazine carriers,

and other web equipment with leather. This has been done in the

past by local artisans in the theater of operations.

e. Grenade carriers of leather or heavy canvas similar in design to

the Browning automatic rifle bandQlier, have been improvised in recent

small wars operations. Another satisfactory carrier, was made by

cutting off one of the two rows of five pockets on the regular grenade

apron and attaching the necessary straps. Empty .30 caliber bandohers are not satisfactory for grenade carriers.

f. The agricultural machete is far superior to the issue bob for

cutting trails, clearing fields of fire, building shelters in bivouac,

cutting forage and firewood, etc. in tropical countries. The minimum issue should be two per squad engaged in active patrolling in

such terrain.

g. The horseshoe roll may replace the regulation infantry pack

during field operations in small wars. It is lighter in weight and

sasier' to assemble than the regular pack; it can be easily shifted

49

210—705 0 — 88 — 5 : OL 3
SWM 2-42

COMPOSJTION OF THE FORCE

from place to place on the shoulders, quickly discarded at halts or

in combat, and readily secured to the riding or pack saddle.

h. Mounted men should not be permitted to carry rifles or other

shoulder weapons in boots nor to secure their arms or ammunition

to the saddles while passing through hostile areas in which contact

is imminent.

2—42. Mounted troops—Infantry companies, hastily converted

into mounted organizations, have played an important role in many

past operations. Experience has demonstrated that local animals,

accustomed to the climatic conditions and forage of the country, are

more suitable for mounts than imported animals. Preparation for

mounted duty will consist generally in training for this duty and the

provision of necessary equipment. For further details, see Chapter

VII, "Mounted Detachments."

2—43. Engineers.—a. Experience has demonstrated that the construction, improvement, and maintenance of routes of communication, including railroads, is one of the most important factors in a

successful small-wars campaign. This is a function of the engineers.

b. The lack of accurate maps and the limited supply of those available has handicapped all operations in the past. A trained engineer

unit supplemented by the aerial photographic facilities of aviation

is indispensable . Although much of the basic ground work will be

performed by combat organizations, the completion and reproduction

of accurate maps must be left to skilled engineer troops.

c. With the increased use of explosives in all trades and occupations as well as in military operations, demolition materials are

readily available to, and are extensively employed by, irregular forces.

A demolition unit is required for our own tactical and construction

iieeds, and for counter-demolition work.

d. Engineers are trained and equipped as light infantry. They

should not be so used, except in an emergency, but they form a potential reserve for combat, and for guard duty at bases and depots.

e. The proportion of engineer troops with the force will depend

largely upon the means of communication available in the theater of

operations, and the condition and suitability of the road net for the

contemplated campaign. in most small-wars situations, the necessary manual labor involved can be obtained locally.

2-44. Tanks and armored cars.—a. The morale effect of tanks

and armored cars is probably greater in small wars operations than

it is in a inaor war. The nature of the terrain in the theater of

50
SWM 2—45

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

operations will determine whether or not they can be profitably

employed.

b. When strong opposition to the initial landings is expected or

encountered, the employment of tanks will be a material aid and will

reduce the number of casualties. Tanks are particularly valuable in

assaulting towns and villages, and in controlling the inhabitants of

an occupied hostile city.

c. Armored cars can be employed to patrol the streets of occupied

cities, and to maintain liaison between outlying garrisons. With

suitable motorized infantry escorts, they are effective in dispersing

the larger hostile forces encountered in the early phases of the

occupation.

d. Except for the fact that tanks and armored cars can be used

more freely in small wars due to the lack of effective opposition, their

tactics will be basically the same as in a major war. As the hostile

forces withdraw into the more remote parts of the country, where

the terrain is generally unsuited for mechanized units, their usefulness in the field will rapidly disappear.

2—45. Transport.—See Chapter III, "Logistics."

2—46. Signal troops.—a. General.—Signal troops install, maintain, and operate any or all of the following cOmmunication agencies:

(1) Message center; (2) messenger service, including foot messengers,

mounted messengers, motorcycle messengers, and messengers using

motor vehicles, boats, airplanes, and railroads as a means of transportation; (3) radio service; (4) wire service, including telephone

and telegraph services operated both by military and civilian personnel; (5) visual service, including all types of flags, lights, and

pyrotechnics; (6) air-ground liaison; (7) pigeon service. Detailed

instructions governing the duties of signal troops will be found in

"War Department Field Manual 24—5."

b. Importance.—The importance of an efficient communication system cannot be overestimated. It is only through the communication

system that contact is maintained with detached garrisons and units

operating independently in the field. All officers and noncommissioned officers should be familiar with the capabilities and limitations

of the communication system in order that full use may be made of

it. In the smaller units, the commanding officer will act as his own

communications officer.

c. C'omnercial and Government servwes.—When commercial radio

and wire service is available, it may be convenient to execute contracts for handling certain official dispatches, particularly in the early

51
SW1VL 2—46

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

stages of an operation before all the communication facilities of the

force can be put into operation. However, military communication

facilities should be substituted therefor as soon as practicable. If the

local government operates its own radio and wire service, it is generally possible to arrange for transmission of official dispatches without charge. In some instances, the occupying force will find that an

agreement or protocol, covering the establishment and operation of

communication agencies by the occupying force, has been established

between our own country and the country involved. Such an agreement usually contains a clause stating that limited unofficial traffic

may be transmitted over the c(Ymmumcation system of the occupying

force in case of interruption in the commercial system.

d. Messengers.—The employment of military messengers, either

mounted or dismounted, between detached garrisons in areas of active

operations is to be considered an emergency measure only, due to the

hazardous nature and the uncertainty of this method of communication. In such areas, it may be advantageous sometimes to transmit

messages by civilian messengers. Persons who make regular trips

between the place of origin of the message and its destination should

be employed. Written messages entrusted to civilian messengers

should be in code or cipher.

e. Criptography.—Codes and ciphers are used by even the smallest

units in the field. It is apparent, therefore, that all officers must be

thoroughly familiar with the systems utilized. In general, the use

of code is simpler and more rapid than the use of cipher, due to the

ease of encoding and decoding. Codes and key words and phrases

for cipher messages are issued to using units to cover definite periods

of time. The necessity for changing them is dependent upon the

enemy's estimated ability in cryptanalysis.

f. Wire commnunication..— (1) In areas where the civilian population is hostile, telephone and telegraph wires are liable to be cut and

long stretches carried away. The enemy is likely to carry on such

operations immediately prior to hostile activities in a definite area.

'Wire may be taken by a resident civilian simply because he needs it

to fence a field or desires it for use in building a hut, and not because

he is hostile to our forces. All wire lines are subject to being "tapped"

by the enemy.

(2) If there is a commercial wire system available, each garrison

telephone communication system should be connected to the commercial system through their switchboards. Provided the commercial

system is connected with other towns in a large network separated

52
SWM 2—46

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

units may thus be put into communication with one another. In

small-war theaters, the commercial wire system will often be found

to be poorly constructed with little attention paid to insulation.

Rains will cause interruption in service for hours or even days at a

time, due to shorted and grounded lines. Ordinarily, the administration of the commercial telephone system is left to the civilian element normally in control of the systems, the forces of occupation cooperating to the fullest extent in the repair and maintenance of the

systems. In those cases where the telephone systems are owned and

operated by the government of the country concerned, the same cooperation in repair and maintenance is extended.

(3) Commercial telegraph systems will generally be found to be

owned and operated by the government. Although the general condition of the equipment and facilities may not measure up to the

standards of a modern system, the telegraph service usually will be

found to be very good. Most of the operators are capable men and

are quite willing to cooperate with the occupying forces. By judicious cooperation on the part of the military in the repair and

maintenance of the telegraph system, the confidence and respect of

the personnel operating the system are secured, with the result that

telegraphic communication is constantly improved. Except in cases

of extreme emergency, no attempt should be made to employ military

personnel to operate the telegraph system. In an area of active operations, it may be advantageous to do so for a limited period of time,

returning the system to civilian control and operation when the

period of emergency is ended. In regions where towns are far apart

but telegraph lines are readily accessible, civilian telegraph operators with small portable telegraph sets are a valuable assistance to

patrols having no radio set, particularly when weather conditions

preclude the operation of aircraft to maintain liaison.

g. Radio comiimun.ioation..—(1) The rapid development of radio as

a means of communication, in even the smaller countries of the

world, indicates that the forces encountered in small-wars situations

may be as well equipped for radio communication as are our own

forces. It is highly probable that the hostile forces will attempt the

interception of radio communications. This disadvantage necessitates the habitual employment of crytograms in transmitting dispatches of importance. By gaining a knowledge of our radio organization, the enemy is enabled to estimate the organization and distribution of our forces in the field. In order to offset this disadvantage,

it may be necessary to curtail the use of radio communications to

53
SWM 2—46

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

some extent, particularly in an area of active operations placing

temporary reliance on other means of communication.

(2) Radio furnishes the most dependable means of communication

with the continental United States, with naval radio statiois outside

the continental limits of the United Staths, and with ships at sea.

Commercial cable facilities and commercial radio stations may also

be available for exterior communication, but are employed only in

exceptional cases. Exterior communication is a function of the force

headquarters.

(3) American owned commercial radio stations in the theater of

operations have been utilized by agreement in the past when the

radio equipment with the force was limited. This is especially true

when the force has furnished military protection for the property

concerned.

(4) It will often happen in small wars situations, that the best

method of radio control is to establish a single net for the Force,

with all outlying stations a part of the same net. riiis is particularly applicable when the theater of operations is limited in area.

When the theater of operations necessitates the wide separation of

tactical units, subordinate nets are established.

(5) There are three types of radio equipment available for forces

engaged in small wars operations; semi-portable, portable, and ultraportable.

(a) Semi-portable radio equipment is of a size and weight to

permit easy handling when transported by ships, railroad, motor

truck, or trailers, and is intended for the use of brigades and larger

units.

Power 100 watts.

Frequency:

Transmitter 300 to 18,000 kilocycles.

Receiver 300 to 23,000 kilocycles.

Type of transmission Radio telegraph; radio telephone.

Range:

Radio telegraph 1, 500 miles.

Radio telephone 300 miles.

(b) Portable radio equipment is designed to permit easy handling

when transported by hand or on hand-drawp carts when operating

ashore. It is intended for the use of regiments and battalions.

Power. 15 watts.

Frequency:

Transmitter 2,000 to 5,000 kllocycles.

Receiver 2,000 to 20,000 kilocycles.

Type of transmission Radio telegraph; radio telephone.

54
SWM 2—46

COMPOSITION OF TITLE FORCE

Range:

Radio telegraph.. 400 miles.

Radio telephone 75 miles.

Weight 86 pounds.

(c) Ultra-portable radio equipment consists of a carrying case,

having a self-contained radio transmitter, receiver, and power supply

designed for transportation by one man. It is issued to units as

required and is particularly useful to mobile units, such as patrols

and convoy guards.

Power 1⁄2 watt.

Frequency 28 to 65 megacycles.

Type of transmission Radio telegraph; radio telephone.

Range:

Radio telegraph 10 mIles.

Radio te1hone 5 miles.

(6) Th demand for trained personnel will normally exceed the

number organically assigned to communication units. The wide

separation of small units in the usual small wars will require the

addition of numerous sets of radio equipment to those listed in

current equipment tables. The use of the ultra-portable radio equipment will also require additional operators. See paragraph 2—29.

(7) To take care of the widely separated radio equipment, each

battalion designates one man of the communication platoon as an

itinerant repairman. His duties are to make repairs in the field

to radio sets operated by the communication personnel of the battalion. Iii. areas of active operations, he joins patrols whose routes

will take them to the garrisons where the equipment is located.

He may be transported to outlying stations by airplane to make

emergency repairs. In many cases, he will find it advisable to take

an extra set with him to replace a set needing major repairs. No

system for making major repairs can be definitely laid down that

will apply to all situations. Due to the technical nature of the

equipment, it is usually more convenient to have all major repair

work accomplished by the communication personnel attached to the

headquarters of the Force thus obviating the duplication of test

equipment as well as the necessity for maintaining large stocks of

repair parts at widely separated stations.

h. Pigeo'm coinm'unieation.—Pigeons may be carried by patrols in

active areas. Although patrols are normally equipped with portable

radio sets, it may be desirab1 to maintain radio silence except in

cases of extreme emergency. In such cases, pigeons afford a dependable means of keeping higher authority informed of the prog55
SWM 2—46

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

ress and actions of the patrol. Crated pigeons may be dropped to

patrols in the field by aircraft, small parachutes being used to cushion

the fall. This method of replenishment is used when patrols are

in the field longer than 3 days.

i Air-ground liaion.—(1) Because of the nature of the terrain

usually encountered and the operation of numerous ground units

employed in small-wars operations, air-ground liaison is especially

important. There must be the closest cooperation between aviation

and ground troops. The period of each contact is limited. Panel

crews must be we].! trained and ground-unit commanders must confine their panel messages to items of importance only.

(2) Panels which indicate th cod,e designation of the organization

or patrol are displayed in open spots upon the approach of friendly

aircraft to identify the ground unit. They also indicate to the airplane observer where lie may drop messages, and where panel messages are displayed for, him. Panel strips are used in conjunction

with identification panels for the purpose of sending prearranged

signals. Letter and number groups of the air-ground liaison code are

formed from the individual panel strips, and are laid out to the right

of the designation panel as determined by the direction of march.

'When the signal has been understood by the airplane observer, it is

acknowledged by a pyrotechnic signal, wing dips, or other prearranged method.

(3) The message-dropping ground should be an open space removed

from high trees, bodies of water, and weeds. If possible, it should

be so located that the panels can be seen at wide angles from the

vertical.

(4) The method of message pick-up employed in air-ground liaison

is described in detail in "''Var Department Field Manual 24—5."

Experience has indicated that it is preferable to make a complete

loop of the pick-up cord, securing the message bag at the bottom of

the loop instead of the double loose-end cord described in the abovementioned Field Manual.

(5') In small wars situations, the use of pyrotechnics for communication between ground units, other than to acknowledge lamp signals

or flag signals, may be considered exceptional. Pyrotechnics are

normally employed for air-ground liaison only. Position lights and

signal projectors are particularly useful to ground units when heavy

vegetation makes the employment of panels impracticable. Aviation

employs the Very pistol 'for air-ground liaison when its use will speed
COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

SWM 2—46

\

\

57

C

e

a

w

C0

0.

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0. 0

-j

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0
SWN 2—47

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

up the transmission of short messages by a prearranged code. This

method of communication with ground units is also employed when

the establishment of a message-dropping ground is prevented by

heavy vegetation or other reason, or when the close approach of the

airplane to the ground during a message drop would expose it to

hostile rifle fire from enemy groups in the vicinity.

2-47. Chemical troops.—a. Properly employed, chemical agents

should be of considerable value in small wars operations. The most

effective weapons to quell civil disorders in the larger towns are the

chemical hand and rifle grenades and the irritant candles. Their

effectiveness has been proved so many times in civil disorders in the

United States that they are now accepted weapons for such situations.

Consideration should therefore be given to similar, employment of

these munitions in a small wars theater of operations. The burningtype hand grenade with a smoke filler ma be use by patrols to indicate their location to friendly airplanes. Another use of this type of

hand grenade is the development of smoke to conceal the flanking

action of a large group in an attack over open ground against a

strongly heM and definitely located hostile position. Advantage

should be taken of the prevailing wind direction and the grenades so

fired that the target will be covered by the smoke cloud.

b. Chemical agents have not been employed by the United States

in any small wars operations up to the present time, as their use in

a foreign country is definitely against the best interests of our foreign

policy. If they are employed, in some future small war, the armament, equipment, munitions, and tactics of the chemical troops will

not vary from the normal doctrine. The strength of the chemical

units to be included in the force will be decided by the force commander in accordance with their prospective employment as determined by the existing situation.

2—48. Medical troops.—a. The type of operation, the size of the

force, the nature of the country in which operations will take place,

the health conditions to be expected, and the estimated casualties

from combat will determine the class or classes of field hospitals and

the strength of the medical personnel that will be attached to the

force. In almost every small wars operation, the number of commissioned medical and dental officers and enlisted corpsmen will be

considerably in excess of that required for a corresponding force

in a major war, because of the numerous small detachments of combat

units scattered throughout the entire theater of operations. Special

care should be taken in selecting the hospital corpsmen to accompany

58
SWM 2—48

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

the force. In many cases, an enlisted corpsman will be required to

make the diagnosis and administer the medication normally prescribed by a medical officer.

b. Commanding officers of all grades are responsible for sanitation

and for the enforcement of sanitary regulations within their organizations and the boundaries of the areas occupied by them. They

must be thoroughly conversant with the principles of military hygiene, sanitation, and first aid. Particular attention should be paid

to the following:

(1) Instruction in personal hygiene of the command.

(2) The thorough washing of hands after visiting the head

(latrine) and before each meal.

(3) The proper sterilization of mess gear.

(4) Vaccination against small-pox and typhoid fever.

(5) The prevention of venereal disease.

(6) The proper ventilation of quarters, and provision of adequate

space therein.

(7) The carrying out of antimosquito measures.

(8) The destruction of flies, lice, and other insects.

(9) The purification of non-portable water supplies.

(10) The proper disposal of human excreta and manure.

(11) The proper disposal of garbage.

c. The medical officer, under the direction of the commanding officer, supervises the hygiene of the command and recommends such

measures as he may deem necessary to prevent or diminish disease.

He should investigate and make recommendations concerning the

following:

(1) Training in matters of personal hygiene and military

sanitation.

(2) The adequacy of the facilities for maintaining sanitary

conditions.

(3) Insofar as they have a bearing upon the physical condition

of the troops:

(a) The equipment of organizations and individuals.

(b) The character and condition of the buildings or other shelter

occupied by the troops.

(c) The tharacter and preparation of food.

(d) The suitability of clothing.

(e) The presence of rodents, vermin, and disease-bearing insects

and the eradication thereof.

59
SWN 2—49

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

d. The medical personnel with the force is one of the stronget

elements for gaining the confidence and friendship of the native

inhabitants in the theater of operations. So long as it can be clone

without depleting the stock of medical supplies required for the

intervening troops, they should not hesitate to care for sick and

wounded civilians who have no other source of medical attention.

e. If the campaign plan contemplates the organization of armed

native troops, additional medical personnel will have to be provided

with the force or requested from the United States, as required.

f. See Chapters 12 and 14, Landing Force Manual, United States

Navy, and Field Manuals 8-40 and 21—10, United States Army, for

detailed instructions regarding military hygiene, sanitation, and first

aid.

2—49. Artillery.—a. The amount of artillery to be included in the

strength of a force assigned a small wars mission will depend upon

the plan for the employment of the force, the nature of the terrain

in the theater of operations, the armament and equipment of the

prospective opponents, and the nature of the opposition expected.

As a general rule, some artillery should accompany every expedition for possible use against towns and fortified positions, and for

the defense of towns, bases, and other permanent establishments.

The morale efTect of artillery fire must always be considered when

planning the organization and composition of the force. If the

hostile forces employ modern tactics and artillery, and the terrain

in the country permits, the proportion of artillery to infantry should

be normal.

b. The role of artillery in small wars is fundamentally the same

as in regular warfare. Its primary mission is to support the infantry.

Light artillery is employed principally against personnel accompanying weapons, tanks, and those material targets which its fire

is able to destroy. Medium artillery reinforces the fire of light

artillery, assists in counterbattery, and undertakes missions beyond

the range of light artillery. Unless information is available that

the hostile forces have heavy fortifications, or are armed with a

type. of trtillery requiring other than light artillery for counterbattery work, the necessity for medium artillery will seldom be

apparent. Antiaircraft artillery, while primarily for defense against

air attack, may be used to supplement the fire of light artillery.

c. The artillery must be able to go where the infantry can go. It

must be of a type that can approach the speed and mobility of

foot troops. The 75-mm. gun and the 75-mm. patk howitzer fulfill

60
SWN 2—49

cdMPosmoN OF THE FORCE

these requirements. Because the pack howitzer can be employed

as pack artillery where a satisfactory road net is lacking in the

theater of operations, the pack howitzer usually will be preferable

to the gun in small wars situations, although the latter may be

effectively employed in open country.

d. Pack artillery utilizes mules as its primary means of transport

and has reasonably rapid, quiet, and dependable mobility over all

kinds of terrain; however, it is incapable of increased gaits. It is

especially suitable for operations in mountains and jungles. Mules

required for pack purposes normally will be secured locally. The

loads carried by these animals require a mule of not less than 950

pounds weight for satisfactory transportation of the equipment. If

mules of this size cannot be obtained, a spare mule may be used

for each load and the load shifted from one animal to the other

after each 3 hours of march. One hundred horses and mules are

required for pack and riding purposes with each battery. The

approximate road spaces for the battery, platoon, and section, in

single column, are as follows:

Yards

Battery 400

Platoon 150

Section 52

Since there is no fifth section in the pack battery, the supply of

ammunition available within the battery is limited to about 40

rounds per piece.

e. The separate artillery battalion is an administrative and tactical

unit. It is responsible for the supply of ammunition to batteries

so long as they remain under battalion control. When a battery is

detached from the battalion, a section of the combat train and

the necessary personnel from the service battery should be attached

to it. In the same way, a detached platoon or section carries with

it a proportional share of battery personnel and ammunition vehicles.

In determining what amount of artillery, if any, should be attached

to the smaller infantry units in the field, the nature of the terrain,

the size and mission of infantry units, and the kind of opposition

to be expected are the guiding factors. The infantry unit should

be large enough to insure protection for the artillery attached to

it, and the terrain and nature of the opposition should be such as

to permit the attached artillery to render effective support. Also,

the ammunition supply should be attached to infantry units.

61
SWM 2—49

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

No artillery should be attached to infantry units smaller than

a rifle company.

A section of artillery to a rifle company.

A battery to an infantry batallion.

A battalion to an infantry regiment.

f. The employment of artillery in small wars will vary with

developments and t.he opponent's tactics. When resistance is encountered upon landing and the advance inland is opposed, artillery

will be employed in the normal manner to take under fire those

targets impeding the movement. When the opponent's organization

is broken and his forces widely dispersed, the role of artillery as

a supporting arm for the infantry will normally pass to the 81-mm.

mortar platoons. (See paragraph 2—40, n.)

g. Artillery in the march. colurn'n.— (1) In marches in the presence

of hostile forces tactical considerations govern the location of the

artillery units in the column. Artillery should be sufficiently well

forward in the column to facilitate its early entry into action, but

not so far forward as to necessitate a rearward movement to take

up a position for firing. It. should be covered by sufficient infantry

for security measures.

(2) In advance and. rear guards the artillery usually marches at

or near the tail of the reserve. In flank guards the artillery marches

so as to best facilitate its early entry into action.

(3) The artillery with the main body, in advance, usually marches

near its head. In retirement, if the enemy is aggressive, the artillery

should march at or near the tail of the main, body. However, when

the enemy is not aggressive, it may even precede the main body, taking advantage of its mobility to relieve congestion.

(4) The difficulties to be anticipated in passing through defiles are

due to the narrowness of the front and to a restricted route where

the column may be subjected to concentrated infantry and artillery

fire. When resistance is anticipated during the passage of a defile,

the column should be organized into small groups, each composed of

infantry and artillery, capable of independent action. When meeting

resistance at the exit of a defile, artillery is employed to cover the

debouchment. 'When meeting resistance at the entrance of a defile,

the artillery is employed as in the attack against a defensive position.

(5) Due to the limitations in its employment at night, the entire

artillery is usually placed near the tail of the main body on night

marches.

62
SWM 2—49

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

h. Artillery with the outpost.—Normally the artillery which has

been assigned to the advance or rear guard is attached to the outpost.

The outpost commander designates the general position for the

artillery, prescribes whether it shall be in position or posted in readiness, and assigns the artillery mission. Normally, the outpost artillery is placed in position. Defensive fires are prepared in advance

insofar as practicable.

i. Employment of crtiileriJ on the defertve.— (1) The defense of

towns, camps, etc., does not present the complex problem of ammunition supply that confronts artillery on the offensive. The ammunition

available at each place usually will be ample and no question of

transportation will be involved. The supply of ammunition need not

affect the assignment of artillery for defensive purposes. The presence of a single piece in a defended town will often have a deterring

effect on hostile forces.

(2) After the initial stages of the operation, if it appears that

artillery will be required for special limited missions only, it can

be used to advantage in the defense of stabilized bases, and permanent

stations and garrisons. The troops not needed with the artillery can

be used to relieve rifle units on special guard duty, such as at headquarters, fixed bases, and on lines of communication. The conversion

of artillery into infantry units should be considered only as an

emergency measure. However, artillery units of the force carry with

them (boxed) the necessary rifles, other infantry weapons, and equipment required to convert them into infantry when the situation

develops a need for this action.

5. Antiaircraft and base defense artillery.—(1) It can be assumed

that, in the future, some hostile aviation will be encountered in small

wars operations, and the inclusion of antiaircraft artillery in the force

will have to be considered. To depend upon aviation alone for antiaircraft protection presupposes that friendly air forces can annihilate

all hostile aircraft and all facilities for replacements. Even one

hostile operating plane will be a potential threat to vital areas such as

the beachhead, supply bases, and routes of communication.

(2) The comparative mobility of the .50 caliber AA machine gun

makes it particularly suitable for employment in small wars operations. However, its limited range renders it impotent against any hostile aircraft other than low-flying planes. If it becomes apparent

that antiaircraft machine guns, as such, are not needed, this weapon

can be profitably employed for the defense of the more important

bases and outlying garrisons against ground targets.

63
SWN 2—50

COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE

(3) Whether the 3" Ak gun will be included in the force will

depend largely upon the opposition expected. This weapon may be

used with restricted mobility o defensive missions against land targets

in the same manner as the 'T5 mm. gun.

(4) It is difficult to conceive of any small wars situation in which

base defense weapons of 5" caliber would be required with the force.

If the opponent can muster sufficient armament to make the inclusion

of such artillery necessary in the force, the campaign will probably

take on all the aspects of a major war, at least during the initial

stages of the operation.

2—50. Aviation.—For the employment of aviation in small ware

operations, see Chapter IX, "Aviation."

0

64
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER III

LOGISTICS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Majinal, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published in 15 chapters

as follows:

CHAPTJR I. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

Iv. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

III

RESTRiCTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAITEB III

LOGISTICS

Par. Page

SECTION I. INTRODUCTON 3—1 1

II. SUPPLY 3—2to3--17 3—14

1111. TRANSPORTATION 3—18 to 3—36 1540

V

SWM 3—i

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

3—i. Logistics is that branch of the military art which embraces

the details of transportation and supplies.

"The Tables of Equipment, Supplies, and Tonnage, U. S. Marine

Corps," set forth the equipment and supplies that are prescribed for

Marine Corps expeditionary forces to take the field. These tables

are a guide to the fourth section of the commander's executive staff

in making a decision as to the type and amount of transportation

and supplies required. However, the supply on hand at the port

of embarkation, the time allowed for preparations, the ship's storage

space available, the supplies in the theater of operations, the distance

from home ports, when replacements can be expected on the foreign

shore, and the condition o the roads and the road net within the

anticipated field of operations will all be essential and controlling

factors in arriving at the final decision.

1

SWM 3—2

SECTION II

SUPPLY

Par. Page

Influence of supply on a column 3—2 3

Supply officers 33 4

Storage 3...4 4

Distribution 3-5 5

Supply steps 3—6 8

Localpurchases 3—7 8

Requisitions 3—8 8

Depots, dumps, and distributing points 3—9 8

Chain of responsibility 3—10 9

Accountability 3—li 9

Publiofunds 3—12 10

Objective 3—13 11

Supervision of requisitions 3—14 11

Accumulation of stores 3—15 12

General 3—16 12

Importance of supply 3—17 12

3—2. Influence of Supply on a column.—The "big three" of supply

are Ammunition, Food, and Water. Combat troops can operate in

the field for a very limited time in actual combat with only AMMIJNITION, but their continued existence requires the other two, FOOD

and WATER. Therefore, in order to conduct the advance inland,

one of the first considerations in such a movement must be the means

of supply.

Supplies may be obtained as follows:

(1) From the country en route, by requisition or other authorized

method.

(2) By continuous resupply via convoys despatched from the base.

(3) By taking sufficient supplies with the column for its maintenance from the base to its destination; resupply to begin after

arrival at destination.

(4) By the establishment of fortified advanc,ed bases along the

route. These advanced bases are established by detachments from

the column initially and supplies built up at them by convoys dispatched from the rear or main supply base; thereafter, the column

draws its supplies from these advanced bases direct.

(5) By airplane, either in plane drops or landing of transport

planes on favorable terrain at the camp site of the column. (See

Chapter IX, Aviation.)

3
SWM 3—3

SUPPLY

(6) In most small wars operations, a combination of all these methods will be used.

3—3. Supply officers.—Officers charged with supply have a dual

mission. They must first get the supplies, then supply them to the

troops. In order to carry out these duties it is essential that the

officer responsible for supply has the following essential information

at all times:

(1) The supplies and equipment required by the force.

(2) The supplies and equipment the force has on hand.

(3) Where the required items may be procured, from whom,

and when.

(4) When, where, and in what quantities replacements will be

needed.

3—4. Storage.—a. The matter of storage is very closely connected

with the problem of supply and starts at the port of debarkation.

Prior to or upon arrival of the expeditionary force at the port of

debarkation, a decision must be made as to the location of the mainsupply depot. The following factors are of importance in reaching

this decision:

(1) Mission of the intervening force.

(2) Docking or lighter facilities.

(3) Availability of suitable shelter for stores.

(4) Railroads, highways, water routes available for supply

purposes and types of carriers.

(5) Availability of civilian labor.

(6) Security.

(7) Location of troops; distance from supply base.

(8) Location of possible landing fields.

b. It is always desirable to have the supply base near the point of

debarkation in order to facilitate unloading and segregation of stores.

However, for various reasons, this is not always practicable. It will

then. be necessary to establish at the debarkation point a forwarding

depot, and place the. main depot or base at an intermediate point.,

between the forwarding depot and the area to be supplied. From

the main supply depot., the flow of supply would ordinarily be to and

through advanced supply bases, and forward to organizations in

combat zones. The usual route would be via railroad, where it exists,

or highway, using motor transportation to advanced supply bases in

organization areas. It will usually be found advantageous to build

up small stocks of essential supplies, at these advanced bases, or even

farther forward at the advanced distributing points, in order to

4
SWM 3—5

SUPPLY

insure a continuous supply. This is especially necessary when operating in a theater that has a rainy season.

e. The available transportation facilities will also be an important

consideration in determining the location of distributing points, and

the levels at which they are to be kept.

d. Quartermaster department personnel will be kept at the depots.

These units will ordinarily be organized to handle the main subdivisions with warrant officers or staff noncommissioned officers of the

department as assistants or section chiefs. At these points the

enlisted force should be augmented by civilian labor if available.

e. Routine replacements of depot stocks will ordinarily be maintained by timely requisitions submitted by officers in charge to the

proper supply depot in the United States or, in the case of articles

not normally carried by these depots, by requisitions submitted direct

to the Quartermaster, Headquarters Marine Corps.

f. The foregoing replenishment should be augmented by local purchases of items available locally at reasonable prices.

p. It will be necessary to inspect existing local facilities regarding

shelter for depot stocks and service units in order that proper recommendations may be made to Force Headquarters relative to preparation of formal agreement for rental. Failing this, it would be

proper, in the event a long stay is anticipated, to recommend construction of suitable buildings for this purpose. Ordinarily, in

tropical countries, service units may be quartered in tents.

1. The location of transportation units employed in the depot

supply plan will usually be controlled by the location of the depot

or bases. Such units should be reasonably close to the depots and

subject to depot control.

3—5. Distribution.—a. Ordinarily, depots with force transportation will supply as far forward as consistent with existing conditions. Organization transportation, whether motor or pack, will

carry forward from this point either directly to troops or to positions

from which troops may be supplied by carrying parties. Force Headquarters units and rear echelons of all organizations will normally

be supplied directly by supply depots or bases.

b. If fortified advanced bases are to be established, the decision

relative to their location will be influenced by the suitability of the

sites as camps. The type of shelter utilized will depend on the availability of buildings or construction material in the vicinity or the

feasibility of transporting shelter material to these sites from the

main or intermediate base. In the latter case, the decision will be

5
SWM 3—5

SUPPLY

SUPPLY PROCUREMENT AND DISTRIBUTION CHART FOR SMALL WARS MANUAL

/ UNDER SUPERVISION OF QUARTERMASTERS DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS /

MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, 0. C.

\ MARINE CORPS DEPOTS PURCHASE IN THE FROM STOCKS OF OTHER

• \ U. S. A. U. S. A. SERVICE BRANCHES.

VIA

2 NAVY TRANSPORTS

ARMY TRANSPORTS

COMMERCIAL SHIPS

TO PART OF FORCE DEPOT.

TO PU.ES MAIN SUPPLY DEPOT FORCE DEPOT.

VIA

5 RAILROADS AIR

HIGHWAYS

WATER ROUTES

TO

ADVANCED SUPPLY BASES CRE ECHELQNS

VIA

ANIMAL DRAWN TRANSPORTATION

MOTOR DRIVEN TRANSPORTATION

WATER TRANSPORTATION

PACK TRANSPORTATION

AIR

TO

B. ADVANCED DISTRIBUTING POINTS

VIA

CARRYING PARTIES

TO

IC TROOPS IN COMBAT ZONES

6
SWM 3—5

SUPPLY

influenced by the amount of transportation available at the time the

bases are being established. If local shelter or transportation for

such construction material is not available, the vicinity of the advanced bases should at least be cleared and developed as a camp

site. An adequate water and fuel supply should be available.

c. The accompanying chart shows how procurement and supply

will normally exist in small wars.

d. Description of chart.—Step (1)—Procurement here and (2)

transportation to depot or forwarding depot is of course continuous,

based on requisitions from the expeditionary force. Requisitions are

varied, consisting of periodical requirements submitted on usual

forms together with letter and, in emergencies, radio, telegraphic, or

cable dispatches. Decisions as to quantities for, and places of, storage depend upon the particular situation and mission. In some

instances the port of debarkation 'might be selected as the site of

the force depot. If the operation necessitates the presence of the

bulk of the force far inland, it is probable that only a forwarding

depot or segregation point would be maintained at the port of debarkation, and the main depot established further jul and along the

line of communications. There can be no set rule regarding this

arrangement. From the depot or main base, field distribution begins. Those nearest the main base would probably be supplied

through the medium of advanced supply bases at which small stocks

would be maintained. If possible, a daily distribution would be

made to points beyond. Failing this, a periodical system of distribution would be made, carrying forward to combatant units sufficient supplies and ammunition to meet their needs for stated periods.

This would entail the establishment of additional advanced dumps

from which troops could be supplied either by means of their own

transportation, or in some instances, by pack trains. Carrying

parties might be employed at this point.

e. It is doctrine that supplies are echeloned in depth to the rear,

and that' some system be decided upon that results in a proper distribution forward. In most small wars situations almost every accepted principle of warfare on a large scale is subject to modification

due to the irregularity of the operation. It is this characteristic

that sets the "small war" in a class by itself. It is obvious then, that

a successful supply plan in any small war theater must be ready to

meet these irregular conditions. Here, the means offered by the

specific local country and used extensively by it, should most certainly

be exploited, modified, improved, where necessary, and adopted to the

7
SWM 3—6

SUPPLY

use of our forces. This is particularly true of methods of transport. Supply officers of a small war operation should never overlook the fact that it is always possible to learn something from close

observance of local facilities and customs. They may need modification and improvement in order to meet our requirements, but basically

there will almost always be found something of value that can and

should be used.

3—6. Supply steps.—From a study of the chart above, it will be

apparent that some of these steps may, in certain situations, be

eliminated, such as the Forwarding Depot and carrying parties

where step No. 7 supplies directly to step No. 10.

3—I. Local purchases.—a. Local purchases may be made at any

of the five places shown along the chain of supply, and sent to troops

in combat areas.

b. Where local purchases are made by other than a regularly detailed purchasing officer, prior authorization for such practice must

be secured from Force Headquarters.

3—8. Requisitions.—a Requisitions for replacements of equipment, supplies, ammunition, etc., are submitted to the nearest accountable or supply officer by the officer responsible, usually company

commanders, to and through Bn—4's. Sufficient forethought must be

employed to permit procurement and distribution by the required

tune.

b. Close teamwork should exist between the Quartermaster Department and the field commanders. It is essential that the Quartermaster know what supplies can be procured by the field commander,

and likewise the field commander should know what supplies can

be furnished by the Quartermaster.

3—9. Depots, dumps, and distributing points.—a. The Advanced

Distributing Points may be at Area Headquarters or merely at a

selected site close to combatant troops. In countries where the condition of roads in forward areas will not permit a daily delivery

routine, and such occasions will be common, it will be necessary

to maintain small stocks of essential supplies at these Advanced

Distributing Points. In most systems of supply operating in the

field, there exists the necessity for establishing permanent and temporary points of storage and points where distribution takes place.

The terms commonly used to designate such points are "depot,"

"dump," and "distributing point." The word "depot" is used to

designate a place where supplies in bulk are stored permanently

and from which the first step in field distribution takes place. Such

8
SWM 3—10

SUPPLY

a point requires shelter, security, and close proximity to some good

means of transporting supplies. This point is usually established

by the organization carrying the bulk of replacement. supplies.

b. The word "distributing point" signifies a position or site selected for the transfer and distribution of supplies to consuming

units. It is most often used in connection with the daily distribution of automatic supplies used by troops at a fairly uniform rate,

such as rations, oil, fuel, forage, etc. It simply means a spot or

area to which supplies are brought by one means and turned over

to another for purpose of interorganizational distribution.

c. Advanced supply bases are in reality subsidiary depots established inland to facilitate the forwarding of supplies to the distributing points.

3—10. Chain of responsibility.—a. The usual chain of responsibility of individuals connected with procurement and distribution

of equipment and supplies in the field is:

Force Headquarters F—4.

Force QM.

Force Depot QM.

Brigades

Regiments R—4.

Battalions Bn-4.

Companies .Company commander.

Platoons or detachments Platoon or detachment commander.

b. In each company is a company supply sergeant, whose duties

include the preparation of company requisitions and through whom

requests for replacements of any kind emanating from squads, sections, and platoons should be sent to the company commander.

When these requisitions are filed, the company supply sergeant is

in charge of proper distribution of the new material to the lower

units and individuals. This man holds the rank of sergeant and is

entrusted with matters of company supply.

c. Company and detachment commanders should exercise close

supervision over requisitions and the issuing of supplies. This is

particularly true of rations.

3-41. Accountability.—a. Ordinarily, accountability, when it exists, extends down to the battalion in field organizations where the

battalions are administrative units. From there on down to the

individual, responsibility obtains.

b. There is no set rule by which decisions may be reached relative to recommending the discontinuance of all or part of accountability. In any event, such discontinuance will have to be authorized

9
SWi 3—12

SUPPLY

by the Quartermaster, Headquarters Marine Corps, and approved

by the Major General Commandant.

c. There will be occasions when some modifications of this system

will be desirable and necessaFy, but normally the administrative

units of the force will be. able to establish and conduct the routine

of their rear echelons so as to permit and justify the continuance

of accountability and proper records involving responsibility.

d. The absence of accountability promotes carelessness and waste

and presents a serious obstacle to intelligent and economical supply.

Loose handling in the responsibility for weapons and ammunition

makes it easier for these articles to get into unauthorized hands and

even into the hands of the opposing force.

e. The exigencies of field conditions are recognized by everyone

connected with our service of supply and consideration is always

given to such conditions. Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, is fully

cognizant of hazards engendered by field conditions. Under justifiable circumstances, certificates of adjustment to accountable officers'

accounts will be acceptable. The Quartermaster's Department recognizes this fact and acts accordingly but the point is, that in continuing accountability, there must be a certified record of all such

unusual occurrences.

f. It may be entirely impossible for an administrative unit to

obtain proper receipts for its issues, but a record for such issues can

and should be kept in order that requests for replacements within the

unit can be intelligently supervised by the unit supply officer. if

the entire administrative unit has taken the field actively, such record

should be kept by the accountable officer in the last step of the supply

chain before it reaches the unit.

3—1. Public funds.—a. Public funds for procurement of such

material and services as the force may find desirable and economical

are usually entrusted, through official channels, to an officer designated as a disbursing assistant quartermaster.

b. These officers, when authorized by competent authority, may

advance public funds to officers in outlying stations for certain local

purchases. When such purchases are made, standard forms of

vouchers are either prepared by the officer making the purchase, or

ordinary receipts are taken by him and furnished the disbursing

assistant quartermaster concerned. In order that such transaction

may have proper basic authentication it has been the usual practice

to write into the orders for such officers, when detailed for duty at

10
SWM 3—13

SUPPLY

outlying points, a specific designation as agent for the disbursing

assistant quartermaster concerned which becomes the authority for

advancement of public funds.

c. An officer receiving such designation as agent should, before

entering on his new duties, confer with the disbursing assistant

quartermaster in order that there will be complete understanding

of how the money in the possession of the agent is to be accounted

for when expended. If such a procedure is impracticable, the matter

should be made the subject of immediate correspondence between

these two officers. There exists such a multitude of regulations and

decisions governing the expenditure of Government funds that no

one shourd undertake disbursing even to the extent of a very small

sum, without first learning the proper method to pursue. Such procedure will avoid explanation and correspondence later, and may be

the mans of saving the one concerned the necessity of making good

froni personal funds an amount of public funds spent in error, solely because of lack of sufficient and proper advance information. It is

desired to stress this point most emphatically.

3—13. Objective.—The objective is the one common to all military

operations, i. e., success in battle. The well trained and supplied

fighter needs but proper leadership to win; therefore the task of the

supply officer becomes one of considerable importance from the commander's point of view.

3—14. Supervision of requisitions.—a. The most important function of a supply officer is the supervision of requisitions. To know

what, when, where, and how to get what the command needs, and

then get it and distribute it, is perhaps the whole story of supply

insofar as it affects the one to be• supplied. The remainder consists

of proper recording of what has been done; this is known as accountability.

b. The requisition is the starting point of the whole process. If

it be wrong, everything else can't help but be wrong also. Never

pad a requisition on the assumption that it will be cut down. Sooner

or later this will become known and your requisitions will be worthless to the one who reviews them. If your real needs are cut by

someone, find out why and, if you can, insist on what you ask for.

But be sure you know what you want, and why. On the other

hand, a requisition should never be cut without a thorough investigation.

c. Place explanations on the face of requisitions covering items

that are exceptional from previous requests.

11

210—705 0 — 88 — 6 OL 3
SW1 3—15

SUPPLY

3—15. Accumulation of stores—a. There is a delicate balance between overstocking and understocking. Overstocking means forced

issues, while understocking means privation and possibly failure.

b. Do not permit the accumulation of slow-moving stores, particularly clothing in extreme sizes. If it fails to move, report its presence

and ask for disposition. Someone, elsewhere, may want the very

sizes that are in excess of your needs. Arrange to turn over subsistence stores of a staple nature at least once every 90 days. Report

your excess quantities to your nearest senior supply officer through

official channels.

3—16. General.—i. The following general rules may be of assistance to persons responsible for the handling and storing of supplies:

(1) As a rule, provide an air space under all stored articles. It

prevents deterioration.

(2) In the absence of buildings for storage, request that necessary

security measures be taken to safeguard your stores.

(3) Visit the units that you supply.

(4) Find out how your system works and adjust it where necessary.

(5) Watch your. stock of subsistence stores.

(6) Become familiar with the data contained under "Mhimum

safekeeping period" for subsistence stores under article 14—54, Marine

Corps Manual. (Note particularly the remarks in this table.)

(7) Ask for an audience from time to time with your commander.

Keep him apprised of the supply situation. Give him your picture,

clearly and briefly, and the.n recommend desirable changes, if any.

Above all, make your supply system fit into his plans.

(8) Keep in close touch with your source of supply. Know what

is there and how long it will take you to get it.

(9) Get a receipt for everything that leaves your control. If field

conditions are such that this is, in part, impracticable, then keep a

record of all such transactions, and set down the reasons for not

being able to obtain proper receipts.

(10) Keep your own supply records up-to-date and render necessary

reports regarding them.

(11) When you need help, ask for it and state facts. Camouflage,

or any attempt at it in the supply game, is fatal. If your best judgment has failed, admit it. It is a human characteristic and can rarely

be cloaked by a garment of excuses.

3—17. Importance of supply.—The importance of the question of

supply upon small wars is well set forth in the following extract taken

from Small Wars by Caliwell:

12
SWM 3—17

SUPPLY

The fact that small wars are, generally speaking, campaigns rather against

nature than against hostile armies has been already referred to. It constitutes

one of the most distinctive characteristics of this class of warfare. It effects

the course of operations to an extent varying greatly according to circumstances,

but so vitally at times as to govern the whole course of the campaign from start

to finish. It arises almost entirely out of the difficulties as regards supply which

the theaters of small wars generally present. Climate effects the health of

troops, absence of communication retards the movement of soldiers, the Jungle

and the bush embarrass a commander; but If it were not for the difficulty as

regards food for man and beast which roadless and inhospitable tracts oppose

to the operations of a regular army, good troops well led would make light

of such obstacles in their path. It is not the question of pushing forward the

man or the horse or the gun, that has to be taken into accou-it so much as

that of the provision of the necessities of life for the troops when they hove

been pushed forward.

13

SWM 3—18

SECTION III

TRANSPORTATION

Par. Page

General 3—18 15

Railroad transportation 3—19 16

Motor transportation_ 3—20 16

Tractor-trailer transportation 3—21 16

Transportation pools 3—22 17

Aviation transport 3—23 17

Water transportation 3—24 17

Animal transportation 3—25 17

Important points In packing 5—26 18

Pack mules 3-27 19

Pack horses 3-28 19

Pack bulls 3—29 19

Phillips pack saddle 3—30 20

McClellan saddle 3—31 21

Pack equipment 3—32 22

Native packers 3-33 24

Marines as packers 3—34 25

Bull carts 3-35 26

Trains with comb:it columEs 3—36 30

3—18. General.—a. The types of transportation used in small wars

operations will vary widely, depending upon local conditions such

as roads, terrain, and distances to be covered. In sohie cases the

seasons of the year will be a controlling factor.

b. During small wars in the past every possible type of transportation known to mankind has been used, from railroad, aviation, and

motor transportation to dogs, elephant, camel, and porter service.

c. It is safe to say that the type of transportation most suitable

to any specific country is being utilized there. A study of these local

methods, together with the local conditions, will aid the commander

in determining the type of transportation to be used by the intervening forces.

d. In countries where small wars usually take place, the roads are

generally bad and exist in only a few localities. When there is a

season of heavy rain, it is most probable that practically all roads

and trails will become impassable for trucks and tractor-trailer transportation. For that reason other means of transportation must be

utilized. This may mean that railroads and air transport, where

15
SWM 3—19

TRANSPORThTION

they are available, will have to be used for very short hauls. Animal, cart, boat, or porter transportation will have to be used where

there are no passable roads, trails, or railroads.

3-19. Railroad transportation.—a. Normal principles of loading

and transporting troops and supplies will apply as they do in similar

movements elsewhere, making use of whatever rail facilities the

country has to offer.

b. For the use of railroads for movement inland sce chapter 5,

paragraph 3, Movement by Rail.

3—20. Motor transportation.—a. This type of transportation

should be under the direction of officers specially qualified in it3 uses.

It is not always known exactly what road conditions can be found

in the field, and the motor transportation officer, knowing th capabilities and limitations of this type of transportation, considering

the conditions of the roads, the road net, and the seasons of the year,

will have to use ingenuity in carrying out the task assigned to him.

b. 'rrucks should be of uniform type generally, but sturdy enough

to stand, heavy usage. The U. S. Marine Corps equipment tables

provide for 1/2 and 2-ton trucks; these seem to be best for our

purposes.

c. Motor transport assignment varies according to the situMion.

Motor transportation is attached to the. force by sections, platoons,

or companies, as the case may be. In the case of an independent

regiment, a section or more of motor transportation is usually

attached.

d. Motorcycles, with or without sidecars, are of very little value

in small wars. They require good roads and have, some value for

messenger service.

e. When needed, native.owned transportation can be used to great

advantage. Native chauffeurs, mechanics, and laborers are used when

practical. Sudden demands made on the native type of transportation will usually exceed the supply, resulting in very high costs for

transportation; but this cannot be avoided.

3—21. Tractor-trailer transportation.—a. in certain localities it

is likely that where the roadM stop, there will be trails and terrain

that are passable for tractors with trailers, where motortrucks will

be unable to go.

b. Tractors may be available in four sizes. The lightest will weigh

approximately 2 tons and run on wheels, using "Jumbo" tires, with

small wheels in front and large ones in rear. The other three sizes

16
SWIVI 3—22

TRANSPORTATION

will weigh approximately 3 tons, 5 tons, and either 7 or 8 tons. All

of these are to be the track-laying types.

3—22. Transportation pools.—a. Certain organizations habitually

requiring transportation have vehicles along with their operators

and supplies attached to them as a part of their organic organization.

Other organizations request transportation as it is needed.

b. In some instances it will be more economical to operate a transportation pool. This is done by placing all transportation in the

force under the Force Motor Transport Officr, who will assign the

different vehicles to the different tasks as they are required.

3—23. Aviation transport.—For transportation of supplies and

troops by aircraft, see chapter IX ("Aviation").

3—24. Water transportation.—a. In some instances river boats and

lighters can be used to transport troops, animals, and supplies from

the port of debarkation inland.

b. Where lakes or other inland waterways exist within the theater

of operations, a most valuable method of transportation may be open

to the force, and every effort should be made to utilize all watertransportation facilities available.

o. Boats for this purpose and outbonrd motors should be carried

if it is expected that they will be needed. (See di. X, "River

Operations.")

3—25. Animal transpórtation.—a. The use of animals for the pur- pose of transporting supplies has been one of the most generally

used methods of transportation in small-wars operations.

b. 'Without the pack animal, operations far into the interior of a

mountainous and unsettled area, devoid of roads, are impracticable if

not impossible. However, the use. o pack animals is not a simple or

always a satisfaàtory solution of a transportation problem. Crude

or improvised pack equipment, unconditioned animals, and the general lack of knowledge in the elementary principles of animal management and pack transportation will tend to make the use of pack

transportation difficult, costly, and possibly unsatisfactory.

c. The efficiency with which the pack train is handled has a direct

and material effect on the mobility of the column which it accommodates. With an inefficient pack train the hour of starting, the route

of march, and the amount of distance covered are noticeably affected.

On the other hand, with conditioned animals, good modern equipment, and personnel with a modicum of training in handling packs,

the pack train can accommodate itself to the march of the column

and not materially hamper its mobility.

17
SWM 3—26

TRANSPORTATION

d. If time permits it is highly important to have the animals that

are to be used for transporting supplies accustomed to the firing of

rifles and automatic weapons, so that they will not be frightened

and try to run away if a contact is made. This can be done by firing

these weapons while the animals are in a place with which they are

familiar and preferably while they are feeding. The firing should

be done at some distance first and gradually moved closer as the

animals get accustomed to the noise. In a short time the animals

will pay no attention to the reports when they find that it does not

hurt them. If this is impossible, and an animal carrying important

cargo, such as a machine gun or ammunition, is frightened and tries

to bolt, the animal should be shot to prevent the loss of these supplies

and to prevent them from falling into the hands of the opposing

forces.

e. Pack animals must be conditioned be.forc being taken on an extended march or heavy losses of animals will result.

f. The march should begin immediately after the last animal is

packed.

3—26. Important points hi packing.—a. Loads and distances traveled must be adjusted to the condition of the animals. Pack animals

must not be overloaded.

b. In packing up, the time interval between placing the loads on

the first and the last animal should be reduced to an absolute mInimum.

This time interval should never exceed 30 minutes. c. All equipment should be assembled neatly and arranged the night

before a march is to begin. Every single item should be checked,

otherwise needless delays will result in the morning.

d. All cargoes should be weighed, balanced, and kshed up the night.

before a march is to begin.

e. A standard system should be established for stowing all pack

gear and cargo loads at each halt for the night. This facilitates the

checking of equipment after the halt and greatly reduces the number

of lost pieces. A satisfactory system is to place the pack saddles on

the ground in a row just in rear of the picket line or, if the aniinals

are pastured at night, place them on a line in a space suitable for

packing up in the morning. The harness, lash ropes, and all other

gear that belong to that particula.r saddle and its load should be

placed on top of each saddle. The loads should be placed in a row

parallel to the saddles; each load in rear of the saddle on which it is

to be packed. Only by careful planning and by systematic arrangement can delays in packing up be averted.

18
SWM 3—27

TBANSPORThTION

3—27. Pack mules.—a. The mule is the ideal pack animal for

supply trains, pack trains with foot patrols, and pack trains with

detachments mounted on mules. The mule has certain advantages

over the horse which fit him for this work, namely:

(1) The mule withstands hot weather better, and is less susceptible to colic and founder than the horse.

(2) A mule takes better care of himself, in the hands of an

incompetent driver, than the horse.

(3) The foot of the mule is less subject to disorders.

(4) The mule is invariably a good walker.

(5) Age and infirmity count less against a mule than a horse.

b. Pack mules are habitually driven and not led. However, pack

mules carrying weapons and ammunition will, for purposes of safety,

be led in column by having the leader of each mule drive the mule

that precedes him. His mule will, in turn, be driven by the man

next in rear of it.

3—28. Pack horses.—a.. Any good riding horse of normal coiiformation, good disposition, and normal gaits can be used as a pack

horse. The pack animals of a detachment mounted on horses should

always be horses. This is necessary in order to maintain the mobility

of the mounted detachment. Each pack horse is led alongside a

ridden horse. On very narrow trails and at any time when it is

impossible for two horses to travel abreast, the pack horse is led behind the ridden horse.

b. Horses properly packed can march at the same gaits as the ridden

horse.

3—29. Pack bulls.—a. Under certain conditions, bulls can be used

to good advantage as pack animals. A pack bull with its wide spreading hoof can negotiate mud in which a mule with its small hoof will

bog down. While slower than mules, bulls can carry heavier cargoes

than the mules usually found in most small war theaters. Good pack

bulls can carry from two hundred (200) to two hundred and fifty

(250) pounds of cargo. They can make about fifteen (15) miles a

day loaded but, after 5 days march, they will require a rest of from

five (5) to seven (7) days if they are to be kept in condition. In

employing pack bulls it is advisable to hire native bull keepers to

handle them.

b. Mixed pack trains of bulls and horses do not operate smoothly

due to their different characteristics.

19
SWM 3—30

TRANSPORTATION

3—30. Phillips pack saddle.—a. The Phillips pack saddle was developed to supply the need for a military pack saddle of simple but

scientific design—a saddle that could be handled by newly organized

troops with only a short period of training. The characteristics of

this saddle make it ideally suited for small wars operations. It is

manufactured in one design in four sizes, and all sizes are suitable

for either horses or mules.

I (J ILJØ.I

L ,;

,. '

1

j H]

4j

r_l•'••

I.

• . I

Pnir.Liis .tcK SADDr.I, Po Siza.

Correctly positIoned and harness properly adjusted.

(1) Cargo-artillery type.—75-mm. pack howitzer units are equipped

with this size. It is designed for the large American pack mule.

(2) Cavalry type.—A size designated for the average American

cavalry horse.

(3) Pony type.—A size designed for th.e Philippine and Chinese

pony.

(4) Caribbean type.—A size designed for the Central American

mules.

b. This saddle is designed for either hanger or lash loads. Hang20
TRANSPORTATION

SMW 3—31

ers for all standard equipment such as the Browning machine gun,

the 37-mm. gun, ammunition in machine-gun boxes, some radio sets,

and the pack kitchen can be obtained with these saddles. These

hangers consist of attachments which can be quickly and easily

attached to the saddle. The loads for which they are designed are

simply placed in these hangers and held firmly and rigidly in place

..,

1. ,

,F

(

BRowNING MACHINE GUN LOAD ON PHILLIPS PACK SADDLE, PONY SIZE.

with gooseneck clamps which can be instantly sec.ured or released.

3—31. McClellan saddle.—In addition to the regular pack saddles,

McClellan saddles may be used in emergency for packing. The tree

of a McClellan saddle has most of the characteristics of a pack-saddle

tree, and fair results may be obtained by tying the two side loads

together across it and running the lashings under the quarter straps

or through the cinch strap rings, spider rings (at lower part of

21

.1
SWM 3—32

TRANSPORTATION

quarter straps), or the quarter strap D-rings to hold the load down.

3—32. Pack equipment.—a. The types of pack equipment in common use by the inhabitants of counties where pack transportation

forms a basic part of the transportation system vary in different

countries, and sometimes within a country in different areas. This

native equipment, though crude, can be converted to military pur44

BROWNING MACHINE GUN LoAD ON PHILLIPS PAcK SADDLE, PONY SIZE.

A complete fighting unit of gun, tripod, ammunition, and spare parts roll. Quick release

devices on each item of load.

poses and, when no other equipment is available, must be used. Such

native equipment invariably has one or more of the following defects:

(1) Highly skilled specialists are required to use it satisfactorily.

(2) Due to its crude construction it is very injurious to

animals.

(3) It cannot be adjusted easily on the trails.

(4) Many military loads are extremely difficult to pack on this

equipment.

22
TRANSPORTATION

SWM 3—32

(5) The pads, cinches, and other attachments wear out rapidly

under constant usage.

(6) Packing and unpacking require a comparatively great

length of time.

b. The advantages of Native Equipment are:

(1) Generally available in quantities in or near the zone of

operation.

(2) Relatively cheap.

(3) Light in weight.

Tripod side.

c. These advantages are the only reasons which might justify the

use of native pack equipment in preference to the Phillips pack equipment. However, the cheapness of native equipment is overbalanced

by the high. percentage of animals incapacitated by its use; its light

weight is not necessarily an advantage as an equal or greater pay

load can be carried on heavier modern equipment with considerably

less damage to the animal.

23

BR0wNtNU MACHINE GUN LOAD.
SWM 3—33

TRANSPORT;ATION

d. The aparejo, or primitive pack saddle, has many shapes, being

made of leather with sometimes a wooden tree or back pieces to stiffen

it and padding placed either in the leather skirts or between the

leather and the animal's back, or both. This type is rather hard to

pack, as it requires a complicated hitch around the load and saddle.

e. Another form in general use by civilians is the sawbuck type.

H

MACRIME GUN AMRUNITION LOAD ON PISILL1PS PACK SADDLE, PoNY SIZE.

Seven hundred and fifty rounds on each side with space on top of saddle for additional equipment.

It consists of a wooden tree formed of two bars fitting the saddle

place (bearing surfaces) and four straight wooden pieces which

form two crosses, one at the pommel and one at the cantle, fastened

to these bars. This type may be used with fiat straw pads or blankets

or both. It has the advantage of absolute rigidity in the framt or

tree, requires little skill to construct of materials easily available,

and less skill to pack than the aparejo described above.

3—33. Native packers.—Native packers have been used to good advantage. Two natives experienced in packing are generally hired

24

4
SWM 3—34

TBANSPORTATION

for every 10 animals, since two men are required to pack each animal

and hence work in pairs. A good system is to hire a competent chief

packer and allow him to hire the necessary number of packers. With

such an arrangement, all orders and instructions should be issued

through the chief packer and he should be held responsible for the

handling of the cargoes of the animals.

3—34. Marines as packers.—a. The average marine can be trained

in a fairly short time to pack mules more securely and more rapidly

than the average native mule driver, and in regions where pack transportation is used, every marine should be taught to pack. The use of

marines as packers has the effect of decreasing to some extent the

combat strength of the column, but it has many advantages.

. .

p...

MACHINE GuN AMiUNIrroN LOAD.

Showing space on top of saddle for additional equipment.

b. In some cases it may be undesirable or impracticable to include

native packers in a combat patrol. The hiring of native packers always gives the populace warning that the column is about to move

out.

c. The train is more efficiently handled by marines, thus obviating

the necessity of issuing orders to the train in a foreign language.

Ammunition and weapon loads should always be led by marines,

ra.ther than herded or turned over to natives. The adoption of the

Phillips pack saddle, coupled with the ease and rapidity with which

I. C

I
SWM 3—35

TRANSPORTATTON

marines can be taught to use it, will warrant a greater use of marines

as packers in future operations.

3—35. Bullcarts.—a. In some localities the bull-clrawn cart is the

principal means of transporting bulky articles, and when large quantities of supplies are required, the bulicart may be the best means of

transportation available. It is a suitable means of transport when

THE Naw CAVALRY PACK CUOKINO Ours'i'c ON ctia PHILLtPS SADDLE.

This outfit is made up of many standard utensils nested to form two side loads. Each

troop of cavalry is to have one pack cooking outfit.

motortrucks or tractors are impracticable and when the time element

does not equire supply by the faster methods. Supplies shipped in

builcarts will ordinarily arrive in good condition, if properly loaded

and protected. Weapons and munitions so transported should be

constantly under special guard.

b. If it can possibly be. avoided, bulls should not be purchased for

Government ownership. Private ownership is more feasible and less

2G
T1{ANS.I'Oll'I'A'I'1ON

SWM 3—35

expensive. Furthermore, it is unlikely that good animals can be

purchased at a reasonable price.; natives are willing to part with their

aged and disabled animals, but rarely sell their good ones.

c. Whenever possible, a chief builcart driver should be secured or

appointed. He should be a man in whom the other native drivers

have confidence, and through whom general instructions can be issued.

d. A definite contract should be drawn up with the native owners

before the movement begins. All details of pay, rationing of native

drivers and animals, breakage, and damage should be clearly set forth;

it is necessary to be assured that the native contractors thoroughly

understand the terms of the contract. Contracts should be made on

the basis of weight or bulk delivered at the destination, and the natives should not be paid until the service is completed. Deductions

can be made for losses or damage to supplies en route. In some cases

27

/,

DIAxoNn HITCH LOAD ON TH PH1LLIPS PACK SADDLE.

The usual lash cinch is not required on this saddle.
SWM 3—35

ThANSPORI'ATION

it may be necessary to advance small sums for the. feeding of the

animals en route.

e. Much that is associated with the handling of builcarts must be

learned from experience. The following information, if followed by

the inexpeiiencecl bulicart comnmall(ler, will greatly lessen his

difficulties:

(1) The buhicart is a simple outfit, but. it. requires an experienced

buhlwhacker to guide and man it.

(2) Two thousand 1)ouhlds is a maximum load for a cart drawn by

two yoke of bulls. If the going is bad, from one thousand (1,000) to

one thousand six hundred (1,600) pounds is a sufficient load. A load

of over two t,housand (2,000) pounds is dangerous, regardless of road

conditions or number of bulls per cart, as it is too great a strain on

the cart and will cause break-downs which are almost impossible to

repair on the trail.

(3) When such break-downs occur, new carts should be secured in

the immediate vicinity of the break-down, or the load of the broken

cart should be distributed among the remaining carts. If neither of

these makeshifts is possible, sufficient of the least vluable cargo should

be discarded and the loads of carts rearranged to carry all important

or valuable cargo. This rearrangement of loads should be made by

the chief bulicart driver under the supervision of the escort commander, if there is one.

(4) It is difficult to tell whether one pair of bulls is stronger or

weaker than another. Some carts will have to be loaded lighter than

others, and only an expert will be able to decide this.

(5) It is better to arrive safely with all carts, cargo, and bulls iii

good conditiomi than to gamble on overloads with their resultant delays, broken cargo, and injured bulls.

(6) The weight. of all umilitary aimnunition and supplies can be

estimated, and ration containers are usually accurately marked with

the gross weight. Thus proper loads can be assigned to all carts.

(7) When streams are to be crossed, carts should be loaded so that

t.he top layer contains perishable cargo, such as sacked flour and

sugar, thus preventing or lessening losses by wetting.

(8) In loading carts the native cart driver should be permitted to

distribute and lash his load as he sees fit, insofar as is practicable.

However, the driver should not be permitted to say when he has a

sufficiently large load or he will start off with as light a load as possible. He should be given his share of the cargo and such assistancb

as he needs in loading it. He will balance his load with a slight

28
SW1VI 3—35

TRANSPORTATiON

excess weight to the front to prevent the tongue from riding upwards

when under way. He will test the loading by lifting the tongue

before the bulls are hitched to it, to estimate the strain on the bulls

when they are attached to the cart.

(9) On the first day's march, the best cart driveis should be noted.

This can be done by l)ei'So)lal observatioii and careful spotting of

the carts that are s]ow, and those that cause most delays. On the

morning of the seciid day, or sooner if it can be done without undue

delay or confusion, Poor carts should be placed at the head of the

train, leaving the best carts in the rear. This will assist in keeping

the column closed Ill), thus making supervision, l)rotection, and control of the train much less difficult. When the train consists of so

many carts that a mental list of the drivers is difficult, the carts should

be numbered with painted numerals before departure, and a written

list made of each cart by nuniber, driver, and owner.

(10) By having a few officeis or noncommissioned officers mounted,

much tinie can be saved in checking up and clearing delays on the

trail. If all trouble has to be. cleared on foot, needless delays will

result.

(11) Train guards must keep a careful watch on cargo to p1e\'e1t

drivers from breaking containers and consuming unauthorized rations en route and in camp. In camp, carts should be arranged in a

park convenient for guarding and for the next day's departure.

(1.2) Extra bulls should be provided for a train, especially in hot

weather, to facilitate getting carts out of difficulties, advancing carts

up steep grades, and replacing casualties among the bulls.

(13) Any interference on the part of marines with the function

of the native drivers, other than that absolutely necessary, will probably work out disadvantageously.

(14) Cargoes, especially those of rations and ammunition, should

have a protective covering—such as ponchos or canvas.

(15) During hot weather, bulls cannot be worked in the heat of the

day. A good schedule to follow at such times is to start the day at

about 3 a. m., and travel until about 9 a. m., then give the bulls a

rest 'until 3 p. m., when travel can be continued again until 9 p. m.

In this way the carts can cover from 15 to 20 miles per day, depending upon the conditions of the roads.

(16) A marine officer in charge of a train should cooperate to the

fullest' extent with the native chief of the bull-cart train in allowing

him to set his own schedule. The trip can be materially speeded if

this i possible, and the schedule of the marines made to conform

to that of the bull-cart train.

29
SWM 3—36

TRANSPORTATION

(17) In traveling through barren country, it may be necessary to

carry food for the animals and, if this is the case, the pay load must

be lessened in proportion. As soon as responsible natives can be

found and when the route along which the supplies have to be transported is safe, it is wise to allow the train to proceed without escort.

The natives, if held strictly responsible for losses, will probably not

proceed if there is danger that the train will be captured, as they

will have been warned of this danger before the marines. Escorting

supplies by such a slow method is very tedious and costly in men.

However, ammunition and weapons must be escorted.

3—36. Trains with combat columns.—a. Pack trains which carry

the supplies, baggage, ammunition, and weapons of combat columns

should be made as mobile as possible. Both the number of animals

and the cargo loads should be as small as is consistent with the

absolute needs of the column. If there is a choice, it is better to increase the number of animals than to increase the individual cargo

loads.

b. In general, the pack loads accompanying a combat column

should not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the weight of the

pack animal which, for small mules and horses, would mean a

maximum pay load of about one hundred and thirty (130) pounds.

One hundred pounds is considered an average load. This is a general rule and the load must be varied to meet the condition of trails

and the condition of the individual animal. Some combat loads will

exceed this percentage, and it will be necessary to select the strongest

and best conditioned animals to carry these special loads.

0

30
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER IV

TRAINING

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940, is

published in 15 chapters as follows:

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

lV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VJII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

III

RESTRiCTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER 1V

TRAINING

SECTION I. CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF SMALL Par. Page

WARS TRAINING 4— 1 to4— 6 3—8

II. TRAINING DURING CONCENTRATION. 4— 7 to 4— 9 9

III. TRAINING EN ROUTE ON BOARD

SHIP... 4—lOto4—17 11—14

IV. TRAINING IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS 4—18to4—23 15—17

V. TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES 4—24 to 4—26 19—2E

I

4—1

SECTION I

CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF SMALL WARS TRAINING

Par. Page

Relation to other training 4—1 3

Tactical training 4—2 4 Rifle company 4—:; 4 Machilie gun COi1i1)Iiflt -— 4—4 6

Mortars and 7 mm. guns 4—5 6

Troop schools 4—( 7 4.4. Relation to other training.—a. riraifli11 for small wars missions is carried on simultaneously with training for naval operations

overseas and training for major warfare on land. Training for

naval overseas operations and major warfare. on land is often applicable, in many of its phases, to small wars operations. Training

that is associated particularly with small wars operations is of value

in the execution of guerilht operations on the fringes of the principal

front in major warfare.

b. In small wars, the iiorrnal separation of units, both in garrison

as well as in the field, requires that all military qualities be well

developed in both the individual and the unit. Particular attention

should be paid to the development of initiative, adaptability, leadership, teamwork, and tactical proficiency of individuals composing

the various units. These qualities, while important in no small degree in major warfare, are exceedingly important in small wars

operations.

c. Training for small wars operations places particular emphasis

upon the following subjects:

(1) Composition, armament, and equipment of infantry patiols.

(2) Formations and tactics of infantry patrols.

(3) Mounted detachments.

(4) Transportation of wounded.

(5) Planned schemes of maneuver when enemy is encountered by

patrols.

(6) Security on the march.

(7) Security during halts and in camp.

(8) Organization of the ground for all-around defense.

(9) Night operations, both offensive and defensive.

(10) Employmnemit of weapons.

3
4—2

CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF SMALL WARS TRAINING

(11) Messing. To include the feeding of troops on the trail and

in small groups in garrison.

(12) Laying ambushes.

(13) Attacking a house.

(14) Street fighting.

(15) Riot duty.

(16) Defense of garrisons.

(17) Surprise attacks on enemy encampments.

(18) Stratagems and ruses.

(19) Scouting and patrolling, including tracking.

(20) Combat practice firing.

(21) Sketching and aerial photograph map reading.

(22) Marching, with particular attention paid to marching over

rough, wooded trails, both dirt and rocky, under varied weather

conditions. Trail cutting through dense underbrush and conservation

of drinking water to be included.

(23) Bivouacs and camps.

(24) Sanitation, first. aid, and hygiene.

(25) Handling of small boats on inland waterways.

(26) Air-ground liaison.

(27) Training of officers as aviation observers.

(28) Rules of land warfare.

4—2. Tactical training.—The current training manuals describe the

combat principles for the various arms and are the basis of tactical

instruction for units preparing for or participating in a small war.

These combat principles may be supplemented or modified to conform

with the requirements of anticipated or existing conditions. The

usual enemy tactics encountered in small wars are those associated

with the ambush of patrols and convoys, river fighting, and surprise

attacks against garrisons and towns. These operations are described

in chapters V to X, inclusive.

4—3. Rifle company.—a. The rifle company and its subdivisions

are often called upon to perform independent mission. Such missions include the establishment of small garrisons in isolated communities and at strategic points along lines of communication and

supply, patrol operations coordinated with the operations of aviation

and other patrol units, and independent operations that may carry

the rifle company and its subdivisions beyond supporting distance

of their bases or friendly patrol units. Training for small wars

operations, therefore, must be conducted with a view to the probable

assignment of the rifle company and its subdivisions to independent

4
4—3

CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF SMALL WARS TRAINING

missions. In the larger patrols, the patrol leader will usually find it

impracticable, if not impossible, to direct the actions of each subdivision of his patrol during action against the enemy. In such

cases, the leaders of the several subdivisions of the patrol must control their units in such manner as will best promote the known plan

of the patrol leader. Upon contact with the enemy in the field, there

will often be no opportunity for the leaders of the several subdivisions of the patrol to consult with and receive orders from the patrol

leader prior to committing their units to action. They must know,

in advance, his plan of action in case contact is made with the enemy

and must be prepared to act independently without the slightest

hesitation. In the training of patrols, the independent control of

subdivisions should always be stressed.

.b. The principal weapon of the combat organizations is the rifle.

The man so armed must have complete confidence in his ability to

hit battlefield targets and must be thoroughly imbued with the "spirit

of the bayonet"—the desire to close with the enemy in personal combat.

and destroy him. The fact that small wars operations may be conducted in localities where the terrain and vegetation will often prevent engaging the enemy in hand-to-hand combat does not remove

the necessity for training in the use of the bayonet. It is oniy

through such training that each individual of the combat. team is

imbued with the "will to win." Every man attached to a combat

organization must be trained in the use of the rifle grenade and hand

grenade, both of which are important weapons in small wars operations. The rifleman should be given a course of training in the other

infantry weapons in order that he may know their employment and

functioning. Machine guns, mortars, and 37 mm. guns may, at

times, be issued the infantry company to augment the fire power of

its rifles. Since additional trained personnel will often not be available to man the added weapons it becomes the duty of the infantry

company to organize squads for the operation of such weapons.

c. The rifle is an extremely accurate shoulder weapon. In the

hands of an expert rifle shot (sniper) it is the most important weapon

of the combat units. Other infantry weapons cannot replace the

rifle. The rifle is exceedingly effective in the type of fire fight connected with small wars operations. A course in sniper firing is of

great value in the development of individuals as snipers. Such a

course may be readily improvised by placing vegetation before the

line of targets on any rifle range or by using growing vegetation,

provided its location makes the method practicable. Silhouette tar5
4-4

CHARACTER AND PURPOSE OF SMALL WARS TRAINING

gets are shown for several seconds at irregular intervals and at different locations within the vegetation by the manipulation of ropes or

wires from a pit or other shelter in the vicinity of the targets. This

type of training develops fast; accurate shooters.

d. While the development of expert individual rifle shots is highly

desirable, it is even more important that combat units receive a course

of training in the application of musketry principles to the conditions

of combat ordinarily encountered in small wars operations. Whenever facilities are available, the training program should devote considerable time to combat range firing. Every phase of actual combat

should be included in this training. To make the practice realistic

will require much ingenuity and skillful planning but there is no

other method of training that will develop effective combat teams.

Combat practice firing presents the nearest approach to actual battle

conditions that is encountered in the whole scheme of military training.

Exercises should be so designed that leaders are required to make an

estimate of the situation, arrive at a decision, issue orders to put the

decision into effect, and actually supervise the execution of orders

they may issue. The degree of skill and teamwork of the unit is

shown by the manner in which the orders of the leaders are executed.

The conservation of ammunition 'should be stressed in all combat

practices.

4—4. Machine gun company.—The machine gun company is organized as a unit for administrative purposes to effect uniformity in

instruction, and to promote efficiency in training. During active

operations in the field, however, it will often be found necessary to

assign platoons, sections, or even single guns to either permanent or

temporary duty with garrisons, patrols, or other units. In some cases

it may be necessary to arm the personnel as riflement to augment the

number of men available for patrol duty. Machine-gun personnel

are, therefore, given the course of training with the rifle as outlined

in paragraph 4—3, c and d.

4—5. Mortars and 37 mm. guns.—a. 'l'hese weapons are employed

to augment the fire power of other weapons. They are of particular

value in the organization of the defensive fires of small garrisons.

Because of their bulk and the difficulty of effective employment in

heavy vegetation, they are not normally carried by small, highly

mobile patrols in the field. In an attack on an organized position, the

need for both weapons is apparent.

b. The 37 mm. gun is employed against definitely located automatjc

weapons and for the destruction of light field works. It delivers

6
4—6

CHARACTER ANT) PURPOSE OF SMALL WARS T1IAININO

fire from a masked position by use. of the quadrant sight. When time

is an important element, direct laying is used or lire may be conducted

from a masked position having sight clefihide only. Since its tactical

employment in small wars does not vary from its normal ue in major

warfare, there is no need for special training applicable only to small

wars situations.

c. The ability of the mortar to fire. from well-concealed positions

against targets on reverse slopes and under cover makes it a valuable

weapon for small wars operations. Because of its mobility it will

often be used as a substitute for light artillery. It can be used against

targets that can not be reached by other infantry weapons. o special

training is required for small wars operations.

4—6. Troop schools.—a. The troop school is an important agency

of the unit commander for the training of his own l)e1soJ1nel to meet

I he requirements of the training program. Troop schools may take

any form that produces effective results, including informal conferences or lectures, demonstrations, sand table or squadroom instruction,

as well as the formal organized school with its staff of instruetoi,

a definite course, and fixed periods of instruction.

b. The object of the troop school is to train persoiiiiel for combat.

and to coordinate such training. It insures uniformity in the training of the entire command. Certain technical subjects, in whidi a

comparatively small number of men from each organization are to

be qualified, can frequently be taught more economically and

thoroughly in classes or schools conducted by a higher echelon. c. Instruction in centralized classes, whether they be company

classes or those of a higher unit., does not relieve the subordinate commander from further training of troops under his command. It is

his duty and responsibility to so organize his unit that each individual

is placed where he may contribute most to the efficient working of the

combat team. Thus, a scout. may receive, instruction in scouting and

patrolling in a centralized class, returning to his organization upon

the completion of the course. Upon his return, his training is continued under his squad leader and officers of his own unit in order that.

the unit may gain the advantage of the training lie has received while

attending the centralized class for scouts.

d. A course in a troop school is planied with tine of the two following objectives:

(1) .A course conducted for the purpose of (levelo)iIIg instructors in

a particular subject. As a rule, these classes are con(llicted by the

7
4—6

CHAJtAOTER AND PURPOSE OF SMALL WARS TRAINING

battalion or higher echelon. Graduates of such classes are particularly valuable as instructors in newly organized units.

(2) A course conducted for the purpose of teaching troops the

mechanics and technique of their work and equipment. It does not

concern itself with the development of qualified instructors. As a

rule, these classes will be conducted by companies, the course being

somewhat shorter than the course designed for developing instructors.

e. The group method of instruction may be used in the training of

any group, regardless of its size or organization. It provides careful systematic instruction under the direct supervision of an instructor,

and centralizes control within the group for the purpose of teaching

the mechanics of any subject. The group method of instruction is

preferable for introductory training and is especially adapted to instruction in basic military subjects. It consists of five distinct steps,

as follows:

(1) Explanation of the subject or action by the instructor.

(2) Demonstration of the subject or action by the instructor and

assistants.

(3) Imitation (application) by all undergoing instruction.

(4) Explanation and demonstration of common errors by the instructor and his assistants.

(5) Correction of errors by the instructor and his assistants.

Instruction should be clear and precise. Every error made by the

student during the applicatory step shcmld be corrected immediately

in order to prevent the formation of faulty habits and wrong impressions. It is often easier to instruct a new recruit than to change

the faulty habits of a man who has been longer in the service.

8
4—7

SEcTIoN II

TRAINING DURING CONCENTRATION

Par. Page Training objective

Scope of training 9

Disciplinary training_ 4.5j 9

4—7. Training objective.—a. rhe character of the training conS

ducted during concentration depends upon the time available, the

state of training of the individual units concentrated, the nature of

the country in which operations are to be conducted, the character

and armament of the forces likely to be encountered, and the type of

operations that may be necessary.

b. Training during concent1ation is prilnarily concerned with

preparation for the following operations:

(1) Ship-to-shore movement, against organized opposition and

without opposition.

(2) Reorganization preliminary to movement inland.

(3) Movement inland, including the seizure of defended cities and

towns, and operations against guerrilla forces whose tactics include

surprise attacks and ambushes.

4—8. Scope of training.—a. During concentration it is necessary

to verify the readiness of troops for the conduct of small wars operations. Deficiencies in training must be corrected, particularly if the

deficiency is such as to hazard the successful prosecution of contemplated operations.

b. For subjects to be stressed during training for small wars operations, see paragraph 4—1, o. 4—9. Disciplinary training.—Where time is short, all training in

ceremonies and close order drill should be reduced to a minimum.

The disciplinary value of close order drills may be achieved through

the efficient conduct and close supervision of field exercises, during

instruction in bayonet fighting, and in training in the use, functioning, and care of weapons and equipment. Smartness, prompt obedienc, and orderly execution can be exacted of troops during such

exercises, thus increasing the value of the instruction as well as developing a higher degree of battle efficiency in the individual.

9

210—705 0 — 88 — 7 : OL 3

4—10

SECTION III

TRAINING EN ROUTE ON BOARD SHIP

Par. Page

Ooneral — 4—10 11

Ship routine 4—il 11

Time available for truo training 4—12 12

Troop schools on hoard ship 4—13 12

Size of classes 4—14 12

Example of instruction nssigumeiits (rifle cii1npany 4—15 13

Subjects covered 41fi 14

Essential training 4—17 14

4—10. General.—a. The relative value of training conducted aboard

ship depends on the necessity for the training. The more an organization is in need of training, the more it will profit from every hour

devoted to such training. The more advanced an organization is

in its training, the more difficult it is to prepare a profitable schedule

that can be carried into effect on board. It must be remembered

that one of the main features of a system of instruction is the prevention of idleness and resultant discontent. A schedule that allows

practically no time for relaxation, however, is always to be avoided.

b. The total time available for instruction is a factor to be considered whei formulating the training schedule. Some organizations will be on board only during the period spent enroute to the

scene of operations and will disembark immediately upon arrival

thereat. Other organizations (sometimes called "floating" battalions) may be quartered on board for varying periods of time, possibly for several months.

c. The thoroughness of the instruction will be depen(lent upon the

skillful planning of schedules, the ability of the instructors, the

time allotted for each subject, and the facilities available.

4—11. Ship routine.—a. Aiiy training to be conducted on board

ship must be fitted into the ship's routine. rrhe troop commander

is in command of the troops on board, but the commanding officer

of the ship is responsible for all the activities on board. The troop

activities must not interfere with the normal routine of the ship,

without specific permission of the commanding officer of the ship.

Usually, the ship's routine will include breakfast at 0730, inspection

of quarters at 0830, quarters at 0900, dinner at 1200, and supper at

1700. Friday is normally given over to field day, with Saturday

morning reserved for inspection of living spaces and personnel by

the commanding officer. As a result, training is limited to 4 full

(lays per week.

11
4—12

TRAINING EN ROUTE ON BOARD SHIP

b. Mess facilities on board ship are usually limited. Troops will

probably eat cafeteria style, using their individual mess equipment.

Normally 1 hour will be ample time for the troops to be served and

to complete any meal. This includes sufficient time for them to

procure their mess gear, be served, wash their mess gear, and stow it.

c. Working parties will be required for serving the food, work in

the galley, and handling stores. In order that interference with

training may be reduced to a minimum, it is desirable that a complete

unit, such as a platoon or company, be detailed daily for such duty.

'rhe duty should be assigned to troop units in rotation.

d. Emergency drills will also interfere with the schedule of training. These drills are an important part of the ship's routine. They

include abandon ship, collision, fire, and fire and rescue drills.

Everyone on board will participate in these drills.

4—12. Time available for troop training.—The tune available for

which definite schedules for troop training may be made up is limited

to two daily periods, 0900 to 1130 and 1300 to 1600, a total of 51/2

hours. Since only 4 full days per week can be definitely scheduled,

the weekly schedule is limited to 22 hours of instruction. If Friday

may be used for training, another 51⁄2 hours will be available.

4—13. Troop schools on board ship.—a. Classes are organized to

cover instruction in such subjects as may best prepare each member

of a command to become a more proficient member of his combat

team. Due to lack of space and facilities, the establishment of troop

schools, employing the group method of instruction, is the accepted

method for shipboard training. Classes covering essential subjects

are organized for officers, noncommissioned officers (including selected

privates) and privates.

b. Formations are usually limited to assemblies for quarters and

inspections. At such formations, it is often possible to carry out

exercises such as the manual of arms, setting-up exercises, and physical drill under arms.

4—14. Size of classes.—Training on board ship is generally attended by a number of distracting and annoying features such as

seasickness, wet paint, scrubbing of decks, heat, etc. it is, therefore,

desirable that classes be organized in small groups. Groups of 20

are the largest that one able instructor can be expected to handle

efficiently. In the instruction of groups in the mechanics of the

several types of weapons, care should be taken to avoid assigning

too many individuals to a single weapon. Not more than two men

should be assigned to one automatic rifle and not more than three

to a machine gun. A man learns very little about the mechanics of

12
4—15

TRAINING EN ROUTE ON BOARD SHIP

a weapon by watching someone else assemble and disassemble the

weapon. He must have the weapon in his own hands and perform

the work himself as it is only through this method that he attains

proficiency.

4—15. Assignment to classes.—a. An example of the assignment

of the personnel of a rifle company to the several classes of a troop

school on board ship is as follows:

C1a88 Supervi8ion Attendance

Automatic rifle Company, 2 per squad (18), plus instructors.

Machine gun Do.

Grenades - Do.

Scout Do.

Signal Company, 3 from co. hdqtrs. and 3 per platoon hdqtrs.

(12), plus instructors.

Communication Battalion, 2 per company (cp. "Signal" and pvt.

"Agent") (8).

b. Classes organized as shown above are of a convenient size.

Qualified instructors are assigned to each group, the number of assistants depending upon the type of instruction and the availability

of qualified personnel. The name of the class indicates the subject

in which that class receives the major part of its instruction. However, each class receives instruction in such other subjects as may

be considered necessary.

c. An example of a day's schedule for the automatic rifle class is

as follows:

0930—1030 Functioning of automatic rifle. Lieutenant, first platoon, senior

instructor.

1045—1130 Stoppages of automatic rifle. Lieutenant, first platoon, senior instructor.

1300—1330 Bayonet training. Lieutenant, bayonet instructor, a rifle company

officer designated by the battalion commander, senior Instructor.

He coordinates all bayonet instruction within the battalion.

1345—1430 Tactics, street fighting. Company commander, instructor. Scout

class joins for this period.

1445—1530 FIrst aid, application of tourniquets. Battalion surgeon, senior instructor.

1545—1600 Talk, racial characteristics of country of destination. Company commander, senior Instructor. Entire company assembles for this

period.

d. Division of personnel of machine gun and howitzer units into

groups for class instruction is effected similarly to the outline shown

for the rifle company in paragraph 4—15, a. The daily schedules for

the different classes are made up in a manner similar to the example

shown for the automatic rifle class in paragraph 4—15, c.

13
4—16

TRAINING EN ROUTE ON BOARD SHIP

446. Subjects covered.—a. Paragraph 4—1, c, lists a number of

subjects that are suitable for shipboard instruction. Deficiencies in

train ing of the troops on board, as influenced by the tactical situa.

tion likely to be encountered, will govern the selection of subjects

that are to be stressed. Having determined the training needs of

the several units, the subjects to be stressed may be selected and

schedules prepared accordingly.

b. In addition to the subjects liste(l in paragraph 4—1, c, the following subjects are particularly importailt and should be emphasized

enroute to the theater of operations.

(1) Information of the country of destination; its people, language, topography, political and military situation.

(2) Enemy tactics likely to be encountered. Tactics to be adopted

by our own troops.

(3) Relations with inhabitants of the country of destination.

4—1. Essential training.—a. Newly organized units will often

include men who are only partially trained in handling their weapons.

After formation of the unit, there may be only a short period for

instruction prior to embarkation. In some cases, there will be no

time for any instruction whatsoever. While enroute to the country

of destination, troop schools should aim to acquaint every man with

the mechanics, technique, fiiin, and technical employment of the

weapon with which he is arme(l, thus increasing his value to his

organization as a member of the combat team. Permission may be

readily secured from the commanding officer of the ship to fire

the various infantry weapons from the deck while the ship is tinder

way. Targets may consist of articles floating at sea or articles

thrown overboard (tins and boxes from the galley). For safety,

shooting is conducted only from the stern of the ship. If there

are no articles available to be used as targets, "white-caps" may be

used as aiming points.

6. Instruction in tactics should be sufficiently adequate to give all

enlisted personnel a knowledge of scouting, patrolling, security measures, and troop leading problems, appropriate to their rank. Methods

of Instruction include sketches on blackboards (the best method).

chalk sketches on the deck, and matches laid out on deck. The

instructor explains the situation (diagram or sketch) and asks different men for their decisions and reasons for their decisions. rnitiative aid discussion should be encouraged. In small wars situations,

the noncommissioned officer and private are often faced with problems requiring decision and subsequent immediate execution.

14
4—18

S&rio IV

TRAINING IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Par. Page

Sysfrrn of training 4—iS 15

lraClIltks 4—19 15

Suhjects (overd 4—20 15

Troining centers 4—21 13

Troop schools 4—22 16

Organization of training centers and troop schools 4—2 17

4—18. System of training.—a. Upon arrival in the theater of operations, immediate steps are taken to continue the training along

methodical and progressive lines. The training is goverened by training programs and schedules prepared by the various organizations.

b. For each training subject functional units (squads, sections, and

platoois) are employed. This places the responsibility for training progress upon the unit leader. Unfortunately, all training subjects cannot be so handled. In many instances, subjects must be

taught by classes composed of individuals from several subdivisions

of a unit.

4—19. Facilities.—As early as possible after the force is established on shore, organization commanders of higher echelons should

provide their respective commands with the facilities necessary for

the conduct of training. 'Whenever practicable, these facilities

should include the establishment of training centers, troop schools,

ranges for practice and record firing of infantry weapons, ranges

for combat practice firing, and terrain suitable for the conduct of

field exercises.

4—20. Subjects covered.—a. Paragraphs 4—i, c, and 4—16, b, list

subjects suitable for training conducted in the theater of operations.

b. All training should include field exercises involving the tactical

employment of troops in military situations peculiar to the terrain

and enemy resistance likely to be ecountered in different sections

of the country.

4—21. Training centers.—a. Weapons are constantly improving

and minor powers are progressively arming themselves with a greater

number of improved weapons. This indicates the necessity for

trained troops if our operations are to succeed without excessive

casuakies to personnel. When i)artially trained troops compose

a large part of the units of the force, the establishment of a training

center is highly important.

15
4—22

TRAINING IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

b. The establishment of a training center offers the following

advantages:

(1) It provides for methodical, progressive,, and coordinated

training.

(2) It is the central agency for the receipt and dissemination of

information with respect to the unusual features of the campaign

as they develop during operations in the field.

(3) It may be made sufficiently extensive to include terrain for

field exercises and ranges for combat practice firing, thus providing

facilities that might otherwise be denied to detached companies and

battalions.

(4) It is an ideal agency for the training of replacements. All

replacements, both officers and men, should be put through an intensive course of training before they are assigned to active units in the

field.

(5) It. supplies a location for troop schools.

(6) It provides the ranges necessary for the record firing of all

infantry weapons.

c. A training center includes the following activities:

(1) Ranges for record practice: These include the ranges, courses,

and courts necessary to conduct record practice with all weapons.

(2) Ranges for combat practice firing: These ranges should be sufficiently extensive to permit the maneuvering of units and the firing

of all weapons under conditions similar to those encountered in the

type of combat peculiar to the country in which operating.

(3) Troop schools: The unit. in charge of the training center will

be better able t.o conduct classes in special subjects than will other

units of the force. Units of the force are thus enabled to send se-

]ected personnel to the training center for an intensive course of

training in a particular specialty.

4—22. Troop schools.—Each theater of operations will present different problems that will require a knowledge of special subjects. A

troop school is the ideal agency for such instruction. The following

are a few of the subjects that may have special application:

Scouting and patrolling. (To include tracking.)

Sniping.

Handling small boats. (Launches, nntive canoes, etc.)

Language of the country.

Transportation. (Ox carts, small boats, animals.)

Care of animals, riding and draft..

Packing. (Pack animals, pack saddles, and their cargoes.)

16
4—23

TRAINING IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

First aid, hygiene, field sanitation. (An advanced course.)

Horseshoeing.

Saddlery. (Leather working.)

Cooks and bakers. (To include butchering and cooking for small

units on the march and in garrison.)

Aviation observers. (For all officers.) 4—23. Organization of troop schools and training centers.—a.

Instructors for troop schools that are conducted by the various garrison units are supplied by the units themselves. The students for

such troop schools are the members of the unit and duties are so

arranged that the troop school does not interfere with the normal

routine of the garrison. At times, the unit will be called upon to perform some emergency type of duty that may necessitate the temporary

suspension of the troop school. Instructors for a training center

come from the unit in charge of the training center and from the unit

or units undergoing instruction. Ordinarily, units such as complete

companies are assigned to training centers for instruction. In addition, replacements are organized into casual units in the order in

which they arrive for duty from the continental United States. At

times, it will be advantageous to assign certain qualified individuals

among the replacements to receive special instruction in one of the

troop school classes conducted at training centers. Troop school instructors are members of the unit in charge of the training center.

b. The training unit is the. company. Instruction may be by

platoons, sectioils, or squads. Companies undergoing training at a

training center furnish many of their own instructors. Special instructors are furnished by the unit operating the training center.

The supervision and coordination of training is a function of the

staff of the training center.

c. A list of subjects suitable for the troop school method of instruction is found in paragraph 4—22. Classes are organized from

among selected personnel sent to the training center from the various

units in the field and from among qualified replacement personnel

who have just arrived. Upon completion of the assigned courses,

men are sent to active units in the field. Provided existing conditions do not require otherwise, men who have been sent to the training

center for specialized training are ordinarily returned to the organizations from which they were originally detailed. Replacement personnel who have completed a special course are sent to those

organizations where their specialized training will be most valuable.

17

4—24

EC1'1ON V

TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES

Par. Pate

Training Instructions 4—24 19

Training programs 4—2 19

Training schedules 4—2f 23

4—24. Training instructions.—Training programs and training

schedules are the means generally used to outline the training for

the various units, thus providing uniformity in training. Training

memoranda may supplement training programs and training

schedules.

4—25. Training programs.—a. Training programs are issued by

all commands down to and including the company. They express

the general plan of training of the command over a considerable

period of time, usually a training cycle of 1 year, but may be issued

to cover periods of 6 months, 3 months, or 1 month.

b. The essential elements of the training program include the

training objective or objectives, the time available in which to accomplish the mission or missions, and such special instructions relating to the conduct of the training as may be necessary. A feature

of the training program with which unit commanders are primarily

concerned is the total amount of time allotted for the training of

their own units. The authority issuing a training program should

indicate clearly the time available, whether the training period

covered by the program is 1 year, 6 months, 3 months, or 1 nmnth.

c. Prior to the preparation of a txaining program, a careful estimate is made of the entire training situation. The following factors

must be taken into consideration: (1) Analysis of order from higher

authority; (2) mission (training objective) ; (3) essential subjects;

(4) time available; (5) equipment and facilities available; (6) personnel; (7) local conditions (climate and terrain); (8) existing

state of training; (9) organization for training; and (10) obstacles

to be overcome.

d. The amount of information that should appear in the training

program (order) depends upon the size of the unit and the particular

situation. A small unit requires a training program in more detai]ed

form than does a larger unit. A situation pertaining to a mobilization will demand more centralized control than will a situation

19
4—25

TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES

normal to peacetime training. During peacetime training, brief

orders containing only essential information may be considered satisfactory, since the various units will usually contain a number of

experienced officers. e. It is assumed that the First Battalion, Fifth Marines, has received the regimental training program (order), with annex showing

regimental "losses" for the training period, October 1, 19____, to

March 31, 19..._... _. The battalion training program is then prepared

and is sent to the various companies of the battalion and such other

units as may be concerned. An annex showing battalion "losses" accompanies the battalion training program. The following is an

example of such a battalion training program (order)

GENERAL ORDER 1 HEADQUARTERS is? BN 5TH MARINES,

14o 10 f Marine Barrack8, Quantico, Va.,

August 20, 19___

1. The following training program governing the training of the 1st Ba 5th

Marines during the period, 1 October, 19_._, to 31 March, 19_.__, is published

for the information and guidance of all concern3d.

2. A conference, at which, all officers of the battalion will be present, will

be held at battalion headquarters at 0930, 25 August, 19___, to discuss this training program. All officers will make a careful study of the training program

prior to the conference.

A B. C

Lieutc'n.ant Colouel., U. S. Marine Corp8, C'onzmanding.

Official:

D E. F

Fir8t Lieu fenant, U. 2. Marine Corps, Bn—.3.

Distribution: A, B, X.

TRAINING PROORAI

HRADQUAR!rERS 1ST BN 5TH MARINES,

Mo rifle Barracks, Qua n.tko, Va.,

20 August, 19._

1. TRAININO MIssIoNs.—Tbe training missions of this battalion are:

a. To secure In this command a maximum of efficiency for the march, camp,

and battlefield, with a view to possible active service at any time.

b. To prepare organizations for expansion to war strength.

c. To develop instructors for traIning recruits In case an emergency should

arise.

d. To provide personnel (individuals as well as groups) for increasing unltø

to war strength and to provide personnel for newly organized units.

e. To develop the science and art of war.

2. TIME AVAILABLE.—a. Training period.—Six months, 1 October, 19___, to 31

March, 19____ (both dates inclusive).

b. Training week.—Six days, except when shortened by holidays, guard duty,

police details, and working details.

20
4—25

TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES

c. Training day.—Normally, 4 hours, 0730 to 1130. During periods devoted

to marksmanship, the training will be 7 hours, 0700 to 1200 and 1300 to 1500.

No limiting hours are prescribed for field exercises. Calculatioiis for field exercises should be based upon a 7-hour day. No Instructional periods will bq

scheduled for mornings that follow night operations. As a general rule, after.

noons will be available for administrative work, additional training for deft.

dent men, athletics, troop schools, and ceremonies. Rifle companies will devote

one afternoon each weck to instruction in rifle marksmanship. This may take

the form of gallery practice and competitions. No training will be scheduled

for Wednesday or Saturday afternoons, except that during marksmanship

and field exercise periods, training will be scheduled for Wednesday afternoons.

Saturday mornings will be set aside for inspection except (luring marksmanship

periods or when other instruction has been ordered by the battalion commander.

d. Training losses.—(1) One company will be detailed each day to perform

the necessary guard duty and furnish police and working parties for the regiment. The Regimental Headquarters Company and Regimental Service Company will not be so detailed. Guard schedules will be issued every 2 weeks.

The normal order of detail will be A. B, (, D, B, F, G, H, I, K, L, and M Company. During regimental and battalion field exercises the necessary guard duty

will be performed by the regimental band. Guard mounting will be held at

1145, daily, commencing on 30 September, when Company A will take over the

duty as guard company. Further details relative to guard mounting will be

issued later. Instruction in interior guard duty will be carried on during the

days each company is detailed to perform guard duty.

(2) The following holidays are announced: 23 November (Thanksgiving Day);

24 December to 1 January (both Inclusive); 22 February (Washington's

Birthday).

(3) Regimental losses are shown in annex A.

(4) Battalion losses are shown in annex B.

3. SCOPE OF INSTRUcTI0N.—a. Training subjects and ref erences.—The applicatory system of training will be employed. Training of units and Individuals

will be conducted as prescribed in the following orders and publications, as

applicable:

Marine Corps Order No. 146.

Landing Operations Manual, U. S. Navy.

Landing Force Manual, U. S. Navy.

Field Manuals, U. S. Army.

Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps.

b. U8e of schools.—Schools will be established and conducted, as follows:

(1) Officers' school.

(a) Advanced course.

(b) Orientation cdflrse (current training).

(2) Enlisted men's schools.

(a) Basic course.

(b) Specialist courses.

(c) Drills and tactical training.

(d) Field training.

21
TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES

A schedule of instruction for the officers' school will be issued by this

headquarters every 2 weeks. The names of officers who will act as lnstruc

tors En the several subjects will be included In the schedule. Specialist courses

for enlisted personnel will be conducted by the heads of their respective sections; that Is, communication officers will conduct the instruction of communication personnel, pioneer officers will conduct the Instruction of pioneer personnel, etc. With the exception of the specialist courses, all other courses of

instruction for enlisted personnel will be conducted under the direction and

supervision of company commanders.

e. Standard8 of proflciency.—All material to be Inspected shall be complete,

immaculately clean, and serviceable. In all training covered by published

reguLations, the standard for all ranks is accuracy as to knowledge and precision as to execution. In tactical training, the objective Is the development

of the tactical judgment of all leaders and their replacements by the application of accepted tactical principles and methods to a variety of tactical

situations.

d.. In8pection.—A proficiency test will be held at the conclusion of each

phase of training. It is to be expected that the reqtiired standard of proficiency

will have been developed on the last day of training in any given subject and it

is ou that day that the final test will be conducted. However, instruction In a

given subject may be discontinued at any time that It becomes apparent that

the desired standard has been reached. The time thus saved may be utilized

for other instruction. Unit progress charts will be kept by each company

commander. Inspections to test proficiency In a subject will be practical and

informal in nature and will not Interfere with the training.

4. MIScEUANE0uS.—a. Program8 and 8chedule8.—(1) Training program8.—

Company commanders will prepare company training programs for the period

Indicated and will submit them to this headquarters prior to 15 September.

The company training program is not to be regarded as a rigid schedule of

execution. It is merely the plan of the company commander, showing the

approximate allotment of time and the general scheme for using that time.

It is intended to be flexible and must be so considered.

(2 Tiainin.g scftedules.—Weekly training schedules will be submitted to

this headquarters before noon on the Wednesday preceding the training week

covered by the schedule. Alternate instruction for 1 day will be added to

weekiy schedules to provide for possible interruption due to inclement weather.

b. Attendance.—Men detailed to special duty will receive not less than 8

hours instruction weekly, except during weeks shortened by holidays or guard

duty. Company commanders will submit requests to this headquarters, 1

week in advance, when the attendance of special duty men is desired for Instructional periods. Administrative details will be so arranged that every

man performing special duty will receive at least 4 hours training each week.

0. Ceremonie8.—Weather permitting, there will be one regimental ceremony

and one ceremony for each battalion weekly, except during the marksmanship

i*riod. All units will normally participate in the regimental ceremony. Days

for ceremonies are assigned as follows: Monday, First Battalion; Tuesday,

Second Battalion; Thursday, Third Battalion; Friday, Fifth Marines.

d. At1leic8.—ParticipatIon In athletics is voluntary. Company commanders

sviii encourage Intercompany sports and company competition. The bat-


4—26

TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES

tallon athletic officer vill coordinate the use of the various athletic .fncillties.

o. Jun 4or offlcer8.—Except as otherwise prescribed in regulations, each lieutenant will be given a permanent assignment to a clearly defined duty pertaining to the daily command training and administrative activities of his

organization.

f. Exercie in leaving post.—Organizatlons will be prepared to leave the

post at any time upon order of the regimental commander. The order for

the exercise will include instructions relative to the amount of equipment to

be carried and whether preparations will be made for prolonged field service

or for only a short period of time.

p. Uniform.—Post regulations prescribe the uniform of the day for different

seasons of the year. During training, the uniform of the day may be modified

at the discretion of company commanders, depending upon the nature of the

training; I. e., dungarees may be worn by Company D during gun drills and by

all companies during instruction in scouting and patrolling; shooting coats

may be worn during marksmanship training, etc.

h. In8truetknzal method8ç—Instructions in oral orders, messages, range estimation, target designation, hasty sketches, care and display of equipment, and

similar subjects, will be carried on concurrently with other training.

A B. C

Lieu frnunt Colonel, U. S. Marine Carpx. Coflin&(Iisdiflg.

Oftictal:

D E. F

I"fr8f lieutenant, U. S. Atarlue CorpM,

Bn-8.

Annexes:

A—Regimental losses.

B—Battalion losses.

Distribution: A, B, N.

f. Company training programs are ordinarily made up in tabular

form and list the training subjects, the estimated number of hours to

be devoted to each subject, and the allocation of these hours by weeks.

These forms are convenient and useful, provided they are regarded

as flexible. At best, they only estimate the time factor and indicate

a proposed scheme for employing that time. They are understood

to be tentative programs and should be so considered. It is assumed

that Company B, Fifth Marines, has received a copy of the training

program of the First Battalion. Using the battalion training program as a guide, the following is an example of the company training

program prepared to cover the period October 1, 19__..._, to March

31, 19__... _:

4—26. Training schedules.—Training schedules are issued by a.

commander for that part of the training of his unit that is to be

accomplished under his direct command. They are based upon the

training programs and orders of higher commanders. The amount

of time devoted to the several subjects is dependent upon the state of

23
4—26

TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES

proficiency of the unit for which the training schedule is prepared,

more time being allotted to instruction in those subjects in which the

unit is deficient. Training schedules are generally made up in tabular form and include the name of the subject, hours, place, uniform

and equipment, references, and name of the instructor. When properly prepared, no additional information is required for training during the period covered by the schedule. Training schedules are issued

to cover relatively short periods of time. The usual period covered

is 1 week, since schedules covering a longer period are likely to be

interrupted. In addition to imparting the information necessary to

conduct the training, schedules are so arranged that the required

standards of proficiency are reached in a minimum of time. When

approved by higher authority, training schedules become instruments

of execution. This does not mean, however, that a training schedule

is to be followed blindly. Should it become apparent that the in.

struction is not accomplishing the desired result, the schedule should

be varied immediately. It is assumed that Company B, Fifth Marines, has received a copy of the battalion training program of the

First Battalion and that the company training program has been

prepared. Using these programs as a guide, the following is an

example of the weekly training schedule prepared to cover the week

ending October 6, 19_

24
TRAINING PROGRAMS AND SCHEDULES

0

25

4—26

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER V

INITIAL OPERATIONS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is Published in

15 chapters as follows:

CHTER I. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

III

RESTRICTED

S MALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER V

INITIAL OPERATIONS

Par. Page

SEcrlox I. NEUTRAL ZONES 5—i to 5—6 1—4

IL MOVEMENT INLAND 5—7 to 5—12 5—12

III. MILITARY TERRITORIAL ORANIZATION 5—13 to 5—16 13—16

IV. METHODS OF PACIFICATiON 5—17 to 5—25 17—20

V

SWM 5—1

SECTION I

NEUTRAL ZONES

l'ar. I 'age

General - 3—1 1

Purpose, occasion, and circumstances.._ -- - -.. - 5—2 2

Basic orders - 5—3 3

Instructions _. - 3

Zone force commander's order 5—5 3

Proclamation 5—6 4

5—i. General.—a. A neutral zone is an area in which no hostilities

are permitted. The establishment of neutral zones is not of recent

origin; the system has been employed not oniy by civilized nations

but also by early American Indians and by African tribes. The

procedure at the beginning of a small war operation often follows

a sequence that is more or less a matter of routine. First, one or more

of our cruisers arrive off a foreign port in consequence of actual or

potential danger to our nationals and their property. Then if the

situation requires it, a ship's landing force is sent ashore at this port

to suppress disorder, provide a guard for our nationals and their

property in the port, including our legation or consular buildings,

and, in addition, certain local government buildings, such as custom

houses. If there is a prospect of fighting between the local factions,

the cruiser's commander (or senior naval officer in command locally)

forbids combat in areas where the lives and property of our nationals

might be- endangered. This is done by the establishment of neutral

zones; and this procedure frequently results in the cessation of hostilities; the mutually destructive strife may become so severe that

absolute chaos is imminent, and neither faction is capable of guaranteeing the security of life and property. Then the neutral forces may

be forced to enlarge their sphere of action by a movement inland.

b. The foreign policy of the United States relative to domestic disorders in unstable countries is one of nonintervention. However, as

a measure to safeguard our nationals and, incidental thereto, other

foreign nationals, havens of refuge will no doubt be established at

certain seaports of an unstable country w-henever the domestic disorder threatens the lives of tjjese nationals. To provide protection

1
SWM 5—2

NEUTRAL ZONES

en route to the haven of refuge, certain routes of evacuation, such

as railroads, highways, and rivers leading to the seaports may also

be designated as a part of the neutral zones. In such cases, a definite

time limit may be set for refugees to clear the routes. Situations

undoubtedly will arise where our individual nationals will not seek

safety within the neutral zone established at the seaport, but will

elect to remain with their property and goods in the interior. In

such cases the responsibility of the commander of the United States

forces at the seaport neutral zone should be considered to be at an

end with regard to any protection to be afforded these nationals.

Should any harm come to these nationals who elect to remain with

their property and goods in the interior of the country, recourse must

be had later to diplomatic action for redress, and recompense for

loss of goods and property must be made in the case of those nationals

who seek safety in the neutral zone seaports and abandon their

property in the interior.

c. The establishment of a neutral zone may not necessarily be followed by further military operations; however the prolongation of the

unsettled condition in the country may necessitate such action, involving a movement inland from those zones. Accordingly, Neutral

Zones and Movement In land are presented in that order in this

chapter.

5—2. Purpose, occasion, and circumstances.—a. Purpose.—(1)

Protect treaty rights.

(2) Assist in maintaining the existence of, or the independence of,

a government in accordance with treaty provisions.

(3) Protect lives and property of our nationals located iii disturbed

areas and unfortified cities.

(4) Further the provisions of our national policy. () Protect and prevent depredations on neutral territory of adj acent countries.

b. Occasion.—(1) In time of revolution, during riots, or when the

local government has ceased to function.

(2) In time of war between two nations.

c. Circum.stanee$.—(1) At the request of a recognized government.

or at the insistence of regular local officials.

(2) At the request of the opposing factions.

(3) By forces of another power, or group of powers, without the

invitation of any faction.

(4) By agreement between contending states or forces.

2
SWM 5—3

NEUTRAL ZONES

5—3. Basic orders.—The orders directing the establishment of a.

neutral zone should be brief and concise, and should contain the following information:

(1) Designation of the military force to be employed in the establishment and maintenance of the zone, and the zone fore commander.

(2) The mission of the force.

(3) Information relative to the purpose, occasion and circumstances

necessitating the establishment of the neutral zone.

(4) The exact time after which an area shall be considered as a

neutral zone, relative to movements by land, water and air.

(5) The limits of the neutral zone.

(6) Logistic provisions, including those pertaining to the requirements of refugees.

(7) Reference to the communication plan and notification of the

location of the zone force commander.

5—4. Instructions.—Additional information required should accompany the Basic Order in the form of an annex, or if there are

existing general instructions relative to the establishment of neutral

zones, reference should be made to them in the order. These instructions should contain, when applicable, stipulations covering the following matters:

(1) Control to be exercised by the zone force commander and the

local civil authorities.

(2) Restrictions placed on opposing force(s) within limits of

neutral zones at. the time of establishment.

(3) Instructions relative to local authorities and civilians bearing

arms within the zone.

(4) Acts to be prohibited, such as the delivery from, or passage

through the zone, of supplies destined for the contending forces who

are prohibited the use of the zone.

(5) Type of vessels and also land and air transportation carriers

prohibited entrance to or passage through the zone.

(6) Restrictions upon the communication facilities.

5—5. Zone force commander's order.—The operation orders of

the zone force commander should contain so much of the information

furnished him in his orders from higher authority as will be of value

to his subordinates, and also any additional information that may

be pertinent. The order should contain detailed instructions for each

task group of his force. If general instructions for the establishment

of neutral zones have been issued by higher authority, those parts

that are applicable to the immediate situation should be promulgated

3
SWM 5—6

NEUTRAL ZONES

to the task groups of the local zone force either in the zone force commander's order or as an annex thereto. Logistic provisions, communication plan and location of the zone force commander should

complete the order.

5—6. Proclamation.—The civilian population of the neutral zone

and its vicinity, as well as the factions to be prohibited the use of the

zone, should be informed of its establishment as early as practicable.

This may be accomplished by the delivery of a written memorandum

to the local authorities and to the heads of the contending factions,

or by the publication of a proclamation in the local newspapers with

a delivery of same to the local authorities and to the heads of the

contending factions. Such memorandum or proclamation should be

published both in English and in the local language. The delivery

of the memorandum or proclamation may be made direct or through

the diplomatic agent of the country represented by the zone force

commander. Regardless of the method of transmission or its form,

the proclamation should contain stipulations regarding the following

matters:

(1) Precise date and hour at which the establishment of the neutral

zone becomes effective.

(2) Area included in the neutral zone, with the boundaries or

limits clearly defined by terrain features.

(3) Relationship of armed forces of contending factions with the

neutral zone.

(4) Relationship of the zone force 'with the civilian population and

local authorities within the zone.

(5) Acts to be prohibited in or over the zone.

(6) Transportation restrictions on routes of communication through

the zone.

(7) Communication restrictions within the zone.

(8) Conduct or status of armed vessels within the zone.

(9) Such other information as may be necessary for a clear understanding of the exact circumstances upon which the establishment of

the zone is based, the purpose to be accomplished, and the means to

be used.

4
SWM 5—7

SECTIoN II

MOVEMENT INLAND

Par. Page

Point of departure 5—7 5

Mobile columns and flying columns 5—8 5

Strength and composjtion of columns 5—9 7 Protective measures covering movement —i0 8

Establishment of advanced bases Inland 5—li U Movement by rail 5—12 10

5—7. Point of departure.—a. As in all forms of warfare, logistic

requirements must be given careful consideration in preparing strategic and tactical plans; in fact such requirements are frequently the

determining factor. Before a movement inland is undertaken an

analysis and estimate of the local transportation and supply facilities

must be made in order to insure a reasonable rate of advance with

replacement of supplies.

b. The movement inland will not always be a movement from a

seaport to the interior. Frequently the movement will be made from

t.he capital or principal city, located at the terminus of a railroad at

the head of navigation on the upper part of a large river, or on a

well-developed highway, with well-defined lines of communication

connecting it with the seacoast. In any case the point of departure

becomes a base of operations as well as a base of supply until other

bases more advanced are established. Should the small-war operations be initiated by the establishment of neutral zones, one or more

of them may later become a base for extended operations.

c. If the point of departure for the movement inland is to be other

than a seaport, the movement to the point is made by the most convenient means. The movement will be of the same general nature

as an advance in major warfare in the presence of the enemy. The

special features of a movement by inland waterways are presented

in chapter XII.

5—8. Mobile columns and flying columns.—a. When the successful prosecution of the campaign requires the execution of measures

beyond and/or supplementary to the establishment of neutral zones,

the control of seaports, or key cities along lines of communication in

the affected areas, mobile columns must be projected inland from the

5
SWM 5—8

MOV1\iEXT INLANI)

points of departure, for the purpose of pursuing, rounding-up, capturing, or dispersing any existing irregular forces; of covering productive areas; or of establishing chains of protected advanced bases in

the interior.

b. Mobile columns as such differ from the so-called flying columns

in one great essential—supply. A flying column is defined as a detachment, usually of all arms, operating at a distance from, and independent of, a. main body or supporting troops, lightly equipped to

insure mobility and sufficiently strong to exempt it from being tied

to a base of supplies through a fixed ithe of communications. A

mobile column is of the. same description as the flying column with

the exception that it is self-supporting to a lesser degree and is dependent for its existence on its base of supplies.

c. The movement may be made by a. large force operating along

a well-defined route, but will usually be made by several mobile

columns operating either along separate lines of advance or following each other independently along the same route of advance at an

interval of about 1 day. In some situations, columns may start from

different points of departure and converge on a city or productive

area.. The columns may vary in size from a reinforced company

to a reinforced regiment, but the size best adapted to such Qperat.ions

has been found to be a reinforced battalion.

d. When fortified posts with permanent garrisons are established,

flying columns should operate, therefrom. This is the most arduous

of all operations; the idea being to combat the native guerilla at his

own game on his own ground. At. the beginning of such operations,

the column may be of considerable strength—a company of infantry

accompanied by a machine umi and howitzer detachment preceded by

a mounted detachment. As the guerilla forces are dispersed, combat

patrols (mounted or dismounted) consisting of two or more squads

may suffice. The mission of the flying column will be to seek out. the

hostile groups, attack them energetically, and then pursue them to

the limit. Therefore, there should be nothing in its composition or

armament that would tend to reduce its mobility or independence of

action beyond that absolutely necessary for combat and subsistence.

Except for supplies which can be carried by the men, the column as

a rule, will depend upon the permanent garrisons. These posts must.

be established in sufficient numbers to permit of such supply—a post

always being within 1 or 2 days' march of another post.

e. A' flying column should never be dispatched to any area unless

it is amply supplied with CAsh. With available funds, not only may

6
- SWM 5—9

MOVEMENT INLAND

subsistence be purchased, but often information of the hostile forces

and the terrain (guides and interpreters). The money supplied the

flying column should be in SMAu denominations, principally silver; it is difficult, frequently impossible, to change bills in rural

communities.

5—9. Strength and composition of columns.—a. The strength and

composition of mobile columns will depend upon the probable resistance to be encountered, the terrain to be traversed, the type and

condition of existing transportation, and the means of communication. Normally, the addition of mounted detachments, armored cars,

and aircraft is dirabIe in such olumns. i a march through an

extensive area of undeveloped country is contemplated, an engineer

unit should be included. The use of light field pieces has been limited in the past, but with the increase of armament .by all classes of

powers and the improvement of defensive means, they cannot be

dispensed with unless there is every assurance that they will not be

needed. However, as a general rule, nothing should be added to the

mobile column that would tend to decrease its mobility and which

is not absolutely necessary.

b. The column should be of sufficient strength to enable it to cope

with the largest force likely to be encountered. While weakness in

the strength of a column is dangerous, yet excessive strength should

be avoided. The supply requirements of a large column necessitate considerable transportation, and results in a proportionately

larger train guard as the length of the column increases. A larger

train also decreases the mobility of the coiurnn.

c. If the movement is made over broken country with poor roads

and traiLs, the column often will be forced to move in single file. A

column of excessive strength for its mission will march irregularly

due to the elongation of the column. Such a column will arrive at

its destination in a more exhausted condition than a smaller force

which is able to maintain a regular rate of march. In case an operation necessitates a large column with the corresponding large train,

the train may be broken up into two columns in addition to eparation of the combat orce. This will prevent elongation of the column

and allow a regular rate of march.

d. The numerical strength of a column may be decreased by the

inclusion of an increase of automatic weapons and supporting infantry weapons above the normal allowance. The increase of ammunition necessitated thereby will not be proport.ionate to the decrease

7

210—705 0 — 88 — 8 : OL 3
SWM 5—10

MOVEMENT INLAND

in the amount of subsistence. Such a decrease will also decrease

the amount of transportation required.

e. By means of the modern portable light radio sets (one of which

at least should be assigned to the column) and contact planes, a

column can be readily reinforced when necessary. Columns moving

in the same general area are better able, due to these means of communication, to keep in close touch and to render mutual support

than in the past. This, with the offensive support available from

aviation, must be considered in determining the composition and

strength of the column.

f. Radio and contact planes may be the only reliable means of

communication at the beginning of a movement. However, all means

of communication must be considered, not only in deciding upon

the strength of the column but also the route to be followed. Telegraph and telephone lines may be destroyed, and in the early stages

of the operations it may not be worth while to repair and maintain

them. If not interfered with, or when control is established and

repairs effected, these land lines should be utilized. Dispatch riders

(runners, foot or mounted) may not be of much value until conditions become fairly settled, but at times they may be the only means

available, or they may be used to supplement other means. Where

the country lends itself to the employment of armored cars, they may

be used for courier service. Any courier service on a regular time

schedule and via restricted routes is dangerous.

5—10. Protective measures covering movement.—a. When a col..

umn starts its movement, it is immediately concerned with the general means of insuring its uninterrupted advance through hostile

territory. Usually all parts of a column are vulnerable to attack.

In major warfare an army usually has such an extent of front that

its rear and base are reasonably secure, and attacks are launched by

the enemy at the flanks and front. In small wars, however, the frontage of the regular force is relatively narrow and the column of regular

troops is liable to attack by encircling detachments of the irregular

forces. Therefore the column must insure itself from an attack from

every direction.

b. In major warfare, this security is effected by outposts, by advance, flank, and rear guards, by scouts, by combat patrols and connecting groups, by deployment in depth, and by means of' air reconnaissance. In sinai! wars, the principles of security are the same but

their application varies with the hostile tactics, armament, and the

terrain over which the forces operate. The guiding principle of

8
SWM 5—11

MOVEMENT INLAND

security is to prevent the hostile fire from being effective against the

main body of a march column. The enemy should be denied all terrain from which he may inflict losses upon the column, and the advantage of superior armament and accuracy of fire maintained to

prevent the opponent from closing in to effective range of his own

weapons even though he be superior numerically.

c. The nature of the terrain has a marked influence on security

measures. Often in the theaters of operations, thick low brush interspersed with cactus extends along the main trails and roads making

an almost impenetrable jungle, too thick for the movements therein

of even small combat groups. In such cases the use of flank guards

for a marching column is practically impossible. the lack of which at

times permits the hostile force to establish favorable ambushes along

such a route.

d. An active hostile force bent on small depredations and armed

with rifles and automatic weapons will have ample opportunity to

ambush the main body of a column after the advance guard has

passed unless patrols are kept continually moving through the underbrush on both sides of the road at a distance from which the ambush

position would be effective (normally about 20 to 40 yards). The

progress of such flank patrols, however, will be slower than that of

the main body with the result that these patrols will be continually

falling behind. This necessitates sending out frequent patrols from

the head of each organization. To prevent uncovering the head of

each organization by these detachments therefrom, the patrols

should be started out well ahead of the organization when opposite

the rear.

e. On mountain trails with heavy growth of brush and timber

which restricts or prohibits the use of flank patrols, a column may be

obliged to march in single file. Its only security in this case will

depend upon a prompt return of a heavy volume of fire from the part

of the column attacked. When the column is restricted in its march

formation, it should be divided into a number of small combat teams,

each being capable of independent action.

5—li. Establishment of advanced bases inland.—a. After the

mobile columns have successfully dispersed the larger groups of the

hostile forces in any area, the next step is the establishment of advanced bases and fortified posts inland for the prosecution of the next

phase—the operation of flying columns into the interior.

b. The particular functions of a fortified post are as follows

(1) To cover productive areas and their lines of communication

with their markets.

9
SWM 5—12

MOVEMENT INLAND

(2) To afford protection to the local population in that area.

(B) To form a base of supply, rest, replacement, and information

for flying columns.

c. As a general rule, these posts should be located at the heads of

Valleys on main roads or waterways leading from seaports, and at the

apexes of valley and intervalley roads and trails leading to the more

difficult wooded and mountain regions—the final theater of operations.

d. The site of the post should if possible have the following

characteristics:

(1) Be capable of defense by a relatively small detachment.

(2) Be of sufficient extent to permit the bivouac of a flying column

of not less than 100 men with a mounted detachment.

(3) Be so situated as to control any town in the vicinity and all

approaches thereto, especially roads and ravines.

(4) Be located on commanding ground overlooking the surrounding

country.

(5) Be accessible to water supply and main roads.

(6) Be located near terrain suitable for a landing field.

e. In many cases, old forts, redoubts, or isolated masonry buildings

with compounds can be organized for defense. Often however it will

be found that conditions will warrant the construction of an entirely

new fortified post from the material available in the vicinity.

f. The main requirements of a fortified post, garrisoned as it will

be by only a few men is that is must not be vulnerable to a sudden

attack or rush. This requirement can be met by the construction of

a double line of defense; an outer line of defense (occupied only when

the flying column is present) to inclose the bivouac area., and an inner

line of defense to inclose the depot' facilities and permanent garrison,

provision being made in both lines for free use of automatic weapons and grenades. (For further details concerning the defense of

towns, etc., see cli. VI.)

g. Communication with fortified posts should primarily depend

upon radio and aviation. All such posts should be equipped with a

radio set capable of communicating not only with its headquarters

and other nearby posts, but also with the air service. A landing

field at times may not be available in the vicinity of the post so recourse must be had to the use of the pick-up and drop message method

of communication.

5—12. Movement by rail.—a. If the movement to the point of departure is opposed, or the adjacent territory not under complete control, a movement by rail will involve many tactical features not

10
SWM 5—12

MOVEMENT INLAND

'encountered in a simple rail movement. Even after the railroad is

functioning and the hostile forces dispersed, raids and other operations by guerrillas may require the use of armored trains with train

guards. Guards may be neessary at stations, bridges, junction

points, and other critical points along the railroad.

b. In case a country, or an extensive part of it, containing railroads

is to be occupied as a part of the campaign plan, then the operation

order for the seizure of the seaport terminus of the railroad should

include instructions directing the seizure of the rolling stock and the

terminal and shop facilities. This action may prevent their destruction or their removal from the seaport area. Rolling stock

having been seized in accordance with the aforesaid instructions,

measures must be taken to continue the operation of the railroad

service, provided the strategical plan involves the establishment of

a point of departure at some place along the railroad line or at some

inland terminus thereof. Opposition to such use of the railroad may

be encountered in the form of organized military resistance, or by

sabotage. c. The first step taken to operate a railway train over the line

Where opposition may be expected, is to provide a pilot train. The

engine of this train should be protected by placing armor, usually

improvised, over the vital parts, supplemented by additional protection of sandbags or similar material. Several cars loaded to fullweight capacity, preferably flat cars or gondolas, that do not obstruct

the view from the engine and rear cars, should be placed ahead of

the engine to serve as a buffer. These flat cars will then serve as

a test-load element, over mines laid in the road bed, or over bridges

and via ducts that have been weakened through sabotage. The car

immediately in rear of the engine should be a box or cattle car

from the top of which rifle and machine gun fire may be directed

over the engine to the front.. '1he remaining cars in the pilot train

should be flat cars, gondolas or cattle cars, from which troops protected by sandbags or similar material may deliver all-around fire.

Some of the personnel accompanying the pilot train should consist

of engineer troops to be employed in counter-demolition work and

in inspecting the roadbed for mines and the bridges and viaducts

for structural weakness. Where such mines are found, these engineer

troops should accomplish their destruction, and in the case of

weakened bridges, etc., should make the necessary repairs. The

main body of the troops embarked on the pilot train should consist of sufficient personnel to protect the train and the working

11
SWM 5—12

MOVEMENT INLAND

parties of engineers and laborers. A number of volunteer local

civilian laborers may be added to the complement in order to obviate

the necessity of using the combat troops as working parties with

the engineers. The combat troops should be armed with a large

proportion of automatic weapons, light mortars and 87 mm. guns.

Some fire-fighting equipment should also be carried with this pilot

train. A few light chemical tanks, water barrels and tools for beating out a fire, should be placed in one of the cars. Irregular forces

not provided with demolition equipment will probably resort to

burning the wooden bridges and railroad trestles usually found in

the theater of operations in small wars. Material available for putting out a fire of this nature in its initial stage will gain many

hours of valuable time in the advance inland. A troop train should

follow the pilot train within close supporting distance; it should

contain sufficient troops, properly armed, as to be capable of dispersing any hostile forces until the arrival of additional troop trains.

If the use of artillery is contemplated later in the combat operations,

some of it should be carried on this troop train.

d. This troop train should have some fiat cars or gondolas ahead

of its engine and should also be equipped with improvised protective

material for the troops. The troops on the forward flat cars or

gondolas should be armed with machine guns and howitzer platoon

weapons. The remainder of the train should be composed of raIlroad cars readily adapted to all-around defense and of such type

as to permit the rapid debarkation therefrom of the troops. Depending on the capacity of the trains available, detachments of

troops from the first troop train or another closely following it

should be debarked at critical points along the railroad line for its

protection. These protective detachments should institute a system

of patrols along the line to prevent sabotage and interruption of

the railroad line at points intermediary between the critical points.

Aviation may render most valuable aid to these trains in the initial

movement inland as well as during the period of operation of the

line. On the approach to a city, defile, or other critical points, the

troop train should close up on the pilot train and a reconnaissance

should be made by ground troops to supplement the information

furnished by the aviation. Positive information from the aviation

can usually be acted upon; however, negative data from the aviation

may be misleading tmcl if acted upon, may lead to fatal results.

e. Where a good road paralleisciosely a railroad, a flank covering•

detachment in trucks may expedite the train movement.

12
SWM 5—13

SEcrIoN III

MILITARY TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION

Par. Page

Purpose 543 13

Influence of the mission on territorial organization 5—14 13

Assignments of troops to areas 5—15 14

Size and limits of areas 5—16 14

5—13. Purpose.—a. In all warfare, territorial organization is necessai'y to facilitate the performance of strategical, tactical, and

administrative functions by allocating appropriate tasks to various

units.

b. Nearly all independent states include internal territorial subdivisions that are utilized to facilitate the execution of numerous

governmental functions. In many cases the limits of these subdivisions were predetermined by the necessities of government.

tTsually one or more of the following factors have fixed the geographical limits of the internal territorial subdivisions of a country:

Density of population.

Routes of communication.

Economic conditions.

Geographic features.

Racial extraction.

Military requirements.

c. The larger subdivisions of a country, regardless of name (Department, Province, State, etc.,) are usually the political, electoral,

administrative, judicial, and military districts of the country.

5—14. Influence of the mission on territorial organization.—a.

The mission of the intervening force will usually come under one

of the following headings:

(1) Restoration of law and order, (either by furnishing aid to

the recognized government or by establishing a temporary military

government).

(2) Supervision of elections.

(3) Establishment of neutral zones.

b. If the mission is to aid the local government in restoring law

and order, or to establish military government until a new govern13
SWM 5—15

MILITARY TERRITORL\L ORGANIZATION

ment is organized and functioning. it is advisable to recognize the

political subdivisions of the country. When the military situation

requires that an arbitrary division of the country into areas be made,

easily recognized topographical features should be used as boundary

lines. in areas of military activity, boundaries should not. split a

]ocality such as dense forests and rugged terrain, that favors hostile

operations, but should include such features in a single command

area when practicable.

C. In supervising elections, 1)olitical subdivisions should be recognized and followed in the assignment of personnel.

d. Neutral zones are generally as limited as the accomplishment

of the. mission will permit. Thus the boundaries of such zones will

often be arbitrary and at other times will follow some distinctive

terrain feature.

5—15. Assignment of troops to areas.—a.. Major territorial divisions, such as areas, should have complete tactical and administrative control within their limits subject to such coordinating

instructions as are issued by higher authority. This necessitates the

assignment of sufficient executive and special staff personnel to enable the unit to perform all of its functions efficiently. Thus the

assigiment of a regiment, independent battalion, or other tactical

and administrative unit to an appropriate area. is advantageous.

Small tactical units must have the necessary administrative staff

assigned to them.

b. Large areas are usually subdivided for the reasons stated in

Paragraph 5-13. Such minor divisions are usually called departinents, districts, or subdistricts, depending on the size and importance

of the. area. Command and staff appropriate to the task are allocated

to these. subdivisions.

5—16. Size and limits of areas.—a. It is not necessary that. areas

be equal in military strength, population, or extent, but for reasons

of organization and command previously discussed, more or less simila.rity in these features is desirable. Some of the. considerations that

should be borne. in mmd when defining the size and limits of specific

areas are:

(1) Available troops in the theater.

(2) Location and strength of hostile force(s).

(3) Present boundaries of subdivisions of the country.

(4) Political affiliations of the inhabitants.

(5) Geographic-topographic features.

(0) Supply.

14
SWM 5—16

MILITARY TEPJ1TORIAL ORGANIZATION

(7) Communication.

(8) Transportation.

(9) Distribution of population.

(10) Economic conditions.

The more important of these are discussed in order in the subparagraphs below.

b. In considering the troops available, it. will usually be found

that a considerable number are required for garrisoning areas where

unrest exists, and for the protection of bases, lines of communication

and the like. Often this duty can be utilized as rest periods for

troops that have been engaged in active operations. A decision as

to the strength of forces required in various localities will determine

the location of the administrative and tactical units of the Force.

This in turn should be considered in determining the size of military

areas.

c. If active opposition is localized, it may be desirable to form an

area of the turbulent zone in order to centralize the command SO

far as combat activities are concerned. The nature of the opposition

has considerable influence on the composition of the force assigned

to an area. A large area with varied terrain and considerable resistance to overcome might have a force of all arms for the task.

This force, in turn, may have a section particularly adaptec! to the

operation of a particular arm (mounted units, mechanized unit, or

special river patrol), in which case the particular arm, if available,

might well compose a district garrison.

d. Other considerations being equal, retention of existing boundaries when defining the limits of command areas is desirable for

several reasons, among which are:

(1) Political, judicial, and administrative functions (insofar as

the civil population is concerned) are better coordinated.

(2) The routine of the people is less disturbed; thus better information and less antagonism may result.

(3) Often such boundaries coincide with those dictated by strategy

and tactics.

e. When political or other antagonisms among the inhabitants contribute materially to the difficulties of the situation, formerly establisheci subdivisions may be divided or combined in a manner best

calculated to accomplish the desired end. In cases where a step-bystep occupation of the country is necessary, territorial organization

may conform to the geographical features which control the successive

objectives.

15
SWN 5—16

MILITARY TERkITORLAL ORGANIZATION

f. Each area should have its own base(s) of supply. A landing

field should be. in each area. If the supply channels of one area

pass through another area, positive steps must be taken by the supreme commander to insure that the flow of supplies to the far area

is uninterrupted. It is highly desirable that areas have transversal

as well as longitudinal lines of communication. Ordinarily an undeveloped section with poor roads or trails that might serve as a hideout

or stronghold for irregulars should be incorporated in a command

area in such a way that the commander controls the routes thereto.

g. Consideration of the existing wire communication installations

is of importance when defining the limits of an area. Area commanders should not be forced to rely on radio and airplane communications alone, if there are other means of communication available.

1. In countries which are not well developed, mapé are not usually

up to the normal standard as to variety or accuracy. When defining

areas, the use of a particular map designated as "official" by all

units facilitates coordination and partly eliminates the confusion as

to names of localities, distances, boundaries, and other matters that

result from the use of erroneous maps of different origin.

16
SWM 5—17

Sc'rIoN IV

METHODS OF PACIFICATION

Par. Page

The nature of the problem 5—17 17

Methods of operation .. 5—18 17

Occupation of an area. a—19 17

Patrols ... 5—20 18

Roving patrols 5—21 19

Zones of refuge -. 5—22 19

The cordon system 5—23 19

The blockhouse system ... 5—24 19

Special methods 5—25 20

5.47. The nature of the problem.—The regular forces in this type

of warfare usually are of inadequate numerical strength from the

viewpoint of extent of terrain to be controlled. Thus the decision as

to the amount of dispersion of regular forces that may be resorted to

is an important problem. Detachments with offensive missions

should be maintained at sufficient strength to insure their ability to

overcome the largest armed bands likely to be encountered. Detachments with security missions, such as the garrison of a town or the

escort of a convoy, should be of the strength essential to the accoinplishment of the task.

5—is. Methods of operations.—Among the various methods that

have been used for the pacification of an area infested with irregulars

are:

(1) Occupation of an area.

(2) Patrols.

(8) Roving patrols.

(4) Zones of refuge.

(5) Cordon system.

(6) Blockhouse system.

(7) Special methods.

Each of these will be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

5—19. Occupation of an area.—a. This consists of dispersing the

force in as many small towns and important localities as the security

and patrolling required of each garrison will permit. It partakes

of the nature of an active defense. When communications are good,

17
SWM 5—20

METHODS OF PACIFICATION

a coordinated counter-offensive may be taken up rapidly, because

patrols from various garrisons will receive prompt operation orders.

b. Sometimes the requirements that certain localities be defended

necessitates the application of this method; at other times pressure

from the outside sources to secure protection for communities and

individuals makes this method mandatory. In establishing numerous

fixed posts, consideration should be given to the fact that withdrawal

theiefrom during active operations involves protests from those protected directly or indirectly, loss of prestige, and increased danger

to the installations or individuals that were protected. The greater

the number of localities that are garrisoned permanently, the less

is the mobility of the command; consequently, care should be taken

to retain sufficient reserves properly located to take up the counteroffensive at every opportunity.

c. The necessity for bases of operation indicates that this method

will be use.d to a greater or less extent in every operation, that is,

irrespective of the plan adopted, this method will be used at lea

in part. The discussion in this paragraph is particularly applicable

to those situations where this plan is the fundamental one for accomplishing the pacification.

d. Modification of this scheme wherein many detachments of regulars are encamped in infested localities and on or near hostile routes

of movement, has been used successfully in combination with other

courses of action.

5-20. Patrols.—a. These are detachments capable of operating for

only a comparatively limited time without returning to a base. They

vary anywhere from powerful combat patrols to small detachments

performing police functions according to the situation and mission.

They arc usually controlled by the commander responsible for the

area in which they operate, but in operations against well defined

objectives they are often coordinated by higher commanders.

b. Patrolling is essentially offensive action. Accordingly its use

in small-wars operations is universal even under conditions that

require the strategical defensive. c. When information of hostile forces is lacking or meager, recourse to patrolling for the purpose of denying the opposing forces

terrain and freedom of movement may he the only effective form of

offensive action open to the commander. In this case, patrols become

moving garrisons and deny the opposing forces such terrain as they

can cover by observation, movement, and fire. Extensive operations

of this nature exhaust the command, but on the other hand are often

18
SWM 5—21

METHODS OF PACIFiCATION

more effective in the restoration of order than first appearances

indicate.

5—21. Roving patrols.—a. A roving patrol is a self-sustaining detachment of a more or less independent nature. It usually operates

within an assigned zone and as a rule, has much freedom of action.

As distinguished from othcr patrols, it is capable of operating away

from its base for an indefinite period of time. Missions generally

assigned include a relentless pursuit of guerilla. groups continuing

until their disorganization is practically complete.

b. This' method is particularly applicable when large bands are

known to exist and the locality of their depredations is approximately

known. Such patrols are often employed in conjunction with other

methods of operation.

5—22. Zones of ref uge.—a. This system consists of establishing

protected zones in the vicinity of garrisons. Their areas are so

limited as to be susceptible of protection by the garrisons concerned.

Peaceful inhabitants are drawn into this protected area together with

their effects, livestock, and movable belongings. , Unauthorized perSons found outside of these areas are liable to arrest, and property

that could be used by insurgent forces is liable to confiscation.

b. This procedure is applicable at times when, through sympathy

with or intimidation by insurgents, the rural population is furnishing

such extensive support to the resistance as to seriously hamper attempts at pacification. This is a rather drastic procedure warranted

only by military necessity.

5-23. The cordon system.—a. This system involves placing a

cordon of troops around an infested area and closing in while

restoring order in the area.

b. The cordon may remain stationary while patrols operate within

the line.

c. This system may be used when the trouble is localized or the

regular force is of considerable size. Due to the limited forces

usually available, the application of this system by a marine force

will usually be confined to situations where the trouble is rather

localized, or to the variation of the method where only a general or

partially effective cordon is established.

5—24. The Blockhouse system.—The blockhouse system involves

the establishment of a line of defended localities. In one way it is

similar to the cordon system as both methods deny the opposing

forces. terrain beyond an established line. in principle it is defensive while the latter is offensive.

19
SWN 5—25

METHODS OF PACIFICATION

5—25. Special methods.—a. The peculiar nature of any situation

may require the application of some special method in conjunction

with and in accord with the general principles discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Two important phases of operation that may be

used in any campaign of this nature are:

(1) River operations.

(2) Flying columns.

b. The tactics and technique of river operations are discussed in

chapter X.

c. Flying columns are self-sustaining detachments with specific

objectives. Their most common use is in the early phases of campaign such as the movement inland where large columns with important strategic objectives in view may temporarily sever their connection with the base, seize the objective, and thereafter establish

lines of communication. (See par. 5—8.)

0

20
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER VI

INFANTRY PATROLS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OPFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published

in 15 chapters as follows

Cr I. INTRODUCTION.

IL ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XL DISABMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL

III

Restricted

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER \I

INFANTRY PATROLS

Par. Page

SECTION I. SMALL WAR TACTICS 6— 1 to 6— 5 1— 3

II. ORDERS AND GENERAL hSTRUCTIONS 6— 6 to 6— 8 5

III. ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY

PATROL 6— 9 to 6—30 7—18

IV. FEEDING THE PERSONNEL 6—31 to 6—37 19—22

V. THE MARCH 6—38 to 6—56 23—25

VI. RECONNAISSANCEANDSECURITY. 6—57 to 6—68 37—40

VII. LAYING AMBUSHES 6—69 to 6—74 41—44

VIII. ATTACKING AMBUSHES 6—75 to 6—79 45—49

IX. ATTAcKING HOUSES AND SMALL

Bivouxcs 6—80 to 6—82 5 1—52

X. STRATAGEMS AND RusE&. -.. 6—83 to 6—87 53—54

XI. RIVER CROSSINGS 6--88 to 6—97 55—66

XII. SPECIAL OPERATIONS 6 98 to 6 99 67—68

(v)

SWM 6—i

SECTION I

SMALL WAR TACTICS

Par. Page

Tactics during initial phases 6—1 1 Tactics during later phases 6--2 1 Influenceof terrain 6—3 2

The principle of theoffensive 6—4 2

The principles of mass, movement, surprise, and security 6—5 2

6—i. Tactics during initial phases.—During the initial phases of

intervention, when the landing and movement inland may be opposed

by comparatively large, well led, organized, and equipped hostile

forces, the tactics employed are generally those of a force of similar

strength and composition engaged in major warfare. If a crushing

defeat can be inflicted upon those forces, the immediate cessation of

armed opposition may result. This is seldom achieved. Usually the

hostile forces will withdraw as a body into the more remote parts of

the country, or will be dispersed into numerous small groups which

continue to oppose the occupation. Even though the recognized

leaders may capitulate, subordinate commanders often refuse to abide

by the terms of capitulation. Escaping to the hinterland, they assemble heterogeneous armed groups of patriotic soldiers, malcontents,

notorious outlaws, and impressed civilians, and, by means of guerrilla

warfare, continue to harass and oppose the intervening force in its

attempt to restore peace and good order throughout the country as a

whole.

6—2. Tactics during later phases.—To combat such action, the intervening force must. resort to typical small war operations, with

numerous infantry patrols and outposts dispersed over a wide area,

in order to afford the maximum protection to the peaceful inhabitants

of the country and to seek out and destroy the hostile groups. The

tactics of such infantry patrols are basically the military methods,

principles, and doctrines of minor tactics, as prescribed in the manuals

pertaining to the combat principles of the units concerned. The majority of contacts in small wars is in the nature of ambushes, or surprise-meeting engagements, in which the various subdivisions of a

small patrol may be brought almost simult.aueously under the opening

hostile fire. This prevents the normal development and deployment

1
SWM 6—3

SMALL WAR TACTICS

of the command for combat. In larger patrols, however, most of the

main body may escape the initial burst of fire and consequently may

be developed and deployed for combat. from the march column in an

orthodox manner.

6—3. Influence of terrain.—The tactics employed by patrols in

combat over open terrain are, in general, the same as those in open

warfare operations in a major war. Since open terrain is more advantageous to regular troops than to irregulars, the latter usually try

to avoid combat. under these conditions. As a result, infantry patrols

engaged in the later phases of small wars operations generally must.

cope with the military problems encountered in combat in mountainous, wooded terrain, with the attendant limited visibility and lack

of centralized control. These tactics are analogous to those prescribed in training manuals for combat in wooded areas in major

warfare.

6—4. The principle of the offensive.—So long as there is armed

opposition to the occupation, the intervening force must maintain

the principle of the offensive. If it adopts a defensive attitude by

garrisoning only the more important cities and towns without accompanying combat patrols throughout the theater of operations, minor

opposition to the force will soon increase to alarming proportions. A

guerrilla leader, if unmolested in his activities, creates the impression

among the native population that the intervening forces are inferior

to him; recruits flock to his standard, and the rapid pacification of

the country will be jeopardized. Such hostile groups will seldom

openly attack the regular garrisons, but will pillage defenseless towns,

molest the peaceful citizenry, and interfere with the systems of supply

and communication of the force of occupation. The latter must,

therefore, adopt an aggressive attitude in order to seek out, capture.

destroy, or disperse the hostile groups and drive them from the

country. (See also Section II, Chapter I, "Psychology.")

6—5. The principles of mass, movement, surprise, and security.—

a. Mass.—In nearly every engagement, the hostile groups will outnumber the infantry patrols opposed to them. This superiority in

numbers must be overcome by increased fire power through the proper

employment of better armament, superior training and morale, and

development of the spirit of the offensive.

b. Movenwnt.—4nfantry patrols of the intervening foroe must.

develop mobility equal to that of the opposing forces. The guerrilla

groups must be continually harassed by patrols working throughout the theater of operation.

2
SWM 6—5

SMALL WAR TACTICS

c. Surprf.e.—Surprise is achieved by varying the route, dates, and

hours of departure of combat patrols, by mobility, and by stratagems

and ruses. The intelligence system of the guerrillas decreases in proportion to the mobility and number of patrols erniloyed iii the theater of operations.

d. Security.—The tendency of the force to relax its service of

security during the later phases of small war operations must be

carefully guarded against. Security on the march and at rest. must be

constantly enforced throughout the entire period of occupation.

3

SWM 6-6

S&"rloN II

ORDERS AND GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Par. Page

Written orders 6—6 5

Verbal orders _ - 6-7 5

General instructions —8 5

6—6. Written orders.—Whenever possible, orders to a patrol leader

should be issued in writing. This is especially true when several

patrols are operating simultaneously in the same general area. The

patrol leader must assure himself that he understands the orders

issued to him. Subordinate leaders and the other members of the

patrol should be thoroughly informed of such parts of the order as

will enable them to carry out the mission of the particular patrol, and

of the force as a whole. For the purpose of secrecy it is sometimes

necessary to limit the information imparted to individual members

of the patrol. 'Written orders follow the general form of a regular

operation order.

6—7. Verbal orders.—Because of the nature of small war operations, verbal orders will be issued to patrol leaders more frequently

than written orders. Such verbal orders should be as complete as

the situation permits, and will follow the general form of an operations order. Patrol leaders should reduce to writing any verbal

orders or verbal modifications of written orders received.

6—8. General instructions.—The force commander should publish,

in the form of general instructions, the policies which will govern

the action of patrols in the theater of operations in regard to the

following:

a. Firing upon suspicions individuals or groups before being fired

upon.

b. Firing upon guerrillas accompanied by womiien and children.

c. The seizure of property and foodstuffs for the benefit of the

patrol or to prevent its use by hostile forces.

d. The destruction of houses. e. rFl.Ie destruction of crops which may be of value to the hostile

forces.

f. Other pertinent, instructions regarding general policy.

5

SW)! 6—9

SEcTIoN III

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

Par. Page

Definition 6— 9 7

Factors which gover'l its organization 6—10 8

Size of the patrol 6—il 8

Permanent roving patrols -. 6—12 9

Selections of units - 6—13 9

Elimination of the physically unfit 6—14 10

Patrol and subordinate leaders 6—15 10

The rifle squad 6—16 10

Theheadquarterssection 6—17 11

Attachedunits 6—18 11

Guidesandinterpreters 6—19 11

Native transport personnel 6—20 12

Native troops 6—21 12

Prominent native civilians 6—22 12

Transportation 6—23 13

Weapons 6—24 13

Ammunition -. 6—25 14

Signalequipmerit 6—26 15

Medical supplies 6—27 15

Miscellaneousequiprnent 6—28 15

Personal clothing and accessories 6—29 16

General preparations 6—30 17

6—9. Definition.—An infantry patrol is a detachment of infantry

troops dispatched from a garrison, camp, or column with the mission

of visiting designated areas for combat or for other purposes. It is

a military unit disposed in such a manner that its various subdivisions are in suitable formations to engage the enemy immediately

after contact is made. In general, the infantry patrol in a small

war differs from one in a major war in the following respects:

a. It is larger.

b. 'It is more capable of independent action.

c. It operates at greater distances, in miles and hours of marching.

from its base or supporting troops; a distance of 50 miles or more

is not uncommon.

d. It conducts its operations for a longer period of time; missions

of 10 days or more duration are not unusual.

7
SWM 6—li

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

e. It is often encumbered by a proportionately large combat train.

6—10. Factors which govern its organization.—Some of the factors that govern the size and composition of an infantry patiol in a

small war are:

a. Mission.

b. Information of the hostile forces.

c. The probability of combat.

d. Strength and armament. of the enemy.

e. Nature of the terrain, with particular reference to its effect on

the formation and length of the column, the number of men required

on service of security, and the work to be clone, such as cutting trails.

f. Proximity of friendly troops.

g. Aviation support. including recoilnaissance,: liaison, combat

support, transportation of supplies and personnel. evacuation of

wounded.

h. Personnel available for assignment to the patrol, their efficiency

and armament.

i. Native troops available, their efficiency and a rmnarnent..

j. Native nonmilitary personnel available, such as guides, interpreters, and transportation personnel.

k. Time and distance involved.

1. Problem of supply.

nm. Methods of communication.

The above factors are considered in the estimate of the situation

which precedes the organization of any patrol.

6—11. Size of the patrol.—a. Geimerai.—The patrol should be large

enough to defeat any enemy force that it can reasonably expect to

encounter in the field. It should be able to assume the defensive and

successfully withstand hostile attacks while awaiting reenforcement

if it encounters enemy forces of unexpected strength. It is desirable

to keep the patrol as small as is consistent with the accornplislnient

of its mission. The larger the patrol the more difficult its control

in combat, the more complicated its supply problems, and the more

it sacrifices in the way of concealment and secrecy of movement.

b. Effect of rni&ion.—The mission assigned an infantry patrol in

a small war, such as reconnaissance, security, liaison, convoy, and

combat, is analogous to the corresponding mission in major warfare.

and will affect the strength of the patrol. In some situations it will

be desirable to have the patrol sufficiently large to establish a temporary or permanent base iii the theater of operations from which it

can maintain one or more combat patrols in the field.

8
SWIVI 6—12

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

c. Effect of terrain.—The nature of the terrain in which the patrol

will operate has a marked influence on its size and composition. In

fairly open country, with roads available which permit the use of

normal distances within the column, a reenforced rifle company or

larger organizations can operate with reasonable control and battle

efficiency. In mountainous, wooded terrain, where the column must

march in single file over narrow, winding trails, the reenforced rifle

platoon with its combat train has been found to be the largest unit

that can be controlled effectively on the march and in combat. It

is the basic combat unit in the later phases of small war operations.

If, in such terrain, the situation requires a stronger patrol than a

reenforced rifle platoon, it is advisable to divide the column into

combat groups equivalent to a platoon, marching over the same

route and within supporting distance (5 to 15 minutes) of each other.

Liaison should be established between the rear leading patrols and

head of the following patrol during halts and at prearranged time

intervals during the day's march.

6—12. Permanent roving patrols.—It is sometimes desirable to

organize a few permanent combat patrols with roving commissions

throughout the theater of operations, irrespective of area boundaries

or other limitations. These patrols should be as lightly equipped as

possible commensurate with their tasks. Authority should. be granted

them to secure from the nearest outpost or garrison such replacements

of personnel, animals, equipment, and rations as may be required.

Aviation is normally their main source of supply while in the field.

6—13. Selection of units.—a. Permanent organization&—W henever possible, an infantry patrol should be composed of personnel

permanently assigned to organized units, such as a squad, platoon, or

company. This applies also to attached machine-gun units or other

supporting weapons.

b. Ha8tily organized patrols.—In the rapidly changing situations

encountered in wars, the operations may require the simultaneous

movement of more patrols than can be furnished by a single organization. In some instances, two or more units from different posts will

be combined into a single patrol for an emergency operation. Other

situations will require that supply train escorts and special duty men

be relieved and made available for patrol duty. The result of this

pressing need for men is the intermingling of personnel from several

different organizations, whose individual combat efficiency is un

known to the patrol leaders, or to one another. Although such

hastily organized 1)atlols should be avoided whenever possible, they

are often necessary.

9
SWM 6—14

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

6—14. Elimination of the physically unfit.—Men who are physically unfit for duty in the field or whose presence would hinder the

operations of a patrol should be eliminated from the organization.

They include the following:

a. Those who have been recently ill, and especially those who have

recently bad malaria, dysentery, jaundice, or a venereal disease.

b. Those suffering from deformities or diseases of the feet, particularly flatfoot, hammertoes, bunions, corns, or severe trichophytosis

(athlete's foot).

c. The old or fat, or those of obviously poor physique from any

cause.

d. The neurotic or mentally unstable; and the alcohol addicts.

6—15. Patrol and subordinate leader.—a. Officers and noncommissioned officers assigned to the theater of active operations in

small wars will generally command smaller elements than those assigned to them in major warfare, for the following reasons:

(1) A patrol on an independent mission is usually far removed

from the direction and control of more experienced superiors.

(2) The suddenness with which action may break, and the necessity

for rapid and practical employment of all the small elements in the

patrol. An officer or experienced noncommissioned officer should be

with each small group to facilitate its control during combat. This

is especially true in wooded terrain where the limited visibility

and short battle ranges usually restrict the patrol leader's control

over the situation to his immediate vicinity.

(3) The possible dispersion of the troops in column at the moment

of contact, and in the subsequent attack and assault.

(4) The possibility that the troops are not thoroughly trained.

b. Two commissioned officers should accompany every rifle platoon assigned to an independent combat mission. If this cannot be

done, the second in command must. be an experienced, capable, senior

noncommissioned officer who is in addition to the regular complement. This requirement is necessary to insure a continuity of effort

in the event the patrol leader becomes a casualty. The normal

complement of officers is usually sufficient if the combat patrol consists of two or more rifle platoons combined under one commander.

6—16. The rifle squad.—Wherever possible, the rifle squad is employed in small wars in the same manner as in major warfare. In

many situations in small war operations, however, it will be desirable

to divide the squad into two combat teams of four or five men each,

one of which is commanded by the corporal, the other by the second

10
SWM 6—17

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

in command. Such combat teams can be profitably employed as

the point for a combat patrol in close country, as flank patrols, and

fori reconnaissance or other security missions. In thickly wooded

terrain, it is often impossible for the corporal to maintain control

over the entire squad in combat. Under such conditions, the two

combat teams must fight as independent units until the situation or

better visibility permits the corporal to regain direction and control of the squad as a whole. Automatic and special weapons within

the squad should be equally divided between the combat teams.

6—17. The headquarters section.—a. The headquarters section of

a combat patrol, consisting of a rifle platoon or reenforced rifle platoon, must be augmented by certain personnel who are not organically

assigned to it. Such personnel includes one or more competent

cooks, a medical officer or one or more qualified hospital corpsmen,

and a radioman when the patrol is equipped with a portable radio.

b. If the hostile forces are not complying with the "Rules of Land

Warfare," the medical personnel should be armed for self-defense.

6—18. Attached units.—In the future, most combat patrols of the

strength of a rifle platoon or more, operating in hostile areas, probably will be reenforced by attached supporting weapons. With the

adoption of the semi-automatic rifle as the standard infantry arm or

as a replacement for the Browning automatic rifle, a light machine

gun squad or section and a 60-mm. mortar squad or section would

appear to be appropriate units to accompany a rifle platoon assigned

a combat mission. These organized units should be attached to the

platoon from the headquarters platoon of the rifle company. A

combat patrol consisting of a rifle company may require the support

of a heavy machine gun section or platoon and an 81-mm. mortar

squad or section. These should be attached to the company as intact

units from the appropriate organizations of the battalion or regiment.

(For further details, see Section III, Chapter II, "Organization.")

6—19. Guides and interpreters.—a. Native officials and foreign

residents are usually helpful in securing reliable guides and interpre

ters whenever their employment is necessary. Local inhabitants who

have suffered injury from the hostile forces and those having members of their families who have so suffered, often volunteer their

services for such duty. The integrity of these men must be tested

in the field before they can be considered entirely reliable and trustworthy. In many cases, their employment in any capacity makes

them subject to hostile reprisal measures and the intervening force

must assume responsibility for their protection.

11
SWM 6—20

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

b. Troops assigned to combat. operations sholcl learn the terrain

and trails within their sectors, and gain a working knowledge of the

local language as quickly as possible so that they may dispense with

the employment of native guides and interpreters insofar as the

situation permits.

6—20. Native transport personnel.—In most situations, the. employment of native porters (carriers), muleteers, or other transport

personnel will be required with each combat patiol. For further

details, see Chapter III, "Logistics."

6—21. Native troops.—a. When native troops are available, they

may be included in the patrol In addition to their combat duties,

they will, if properly indoctrinated, do much to establish friendly.

relations between the peaceful inhabitants and the intervening force.

b. Native troops are especially valuable for reconnaissance an(l

security missions. They will notice and correctly interpret those

signs whith indicate the presence of the enemy much more quickly

and surely than will the average member of a foreign force

unaccustomed to the country.

c. Work and guard duty must be divided and distributed proportionally between the regular forces and native troops, and friction

between the two organizations must be avoided.

6—22. Prominent native civilians.—a. It is sometimes a(lvisable to

include prominent native civilians or government officials in tlie

patrol. They can do much to explain the mission of the intervening

forces in the community, spread the. gospel of peace, friendly relat.ions, and cooperation, and counter the propaganda of the enemy.

The natives of the community are all potential enemies and many

will become actively hostile if they are not convinced of the true

objective of the occupation.

b. If political alignments and hatreds are virile in the area, the

patrol leader must be very circumspect in the choice of civilians and

government officials who accompany the patrol. If the patrol is susPected of political partisanship, the problems of pacification may be

intensified. e. Frequently prominent and well-informed civilians will furnish

valuable information, provided their identity is not disclosed and they

are not required to act as guides or otherwise openly associate themselves with the intervening force. Their wishes should be respected

in order to gain their confidence aiicl obtain the information which

they possess.

12

SWM 6—25

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

affected by the number of casualties sustained in combat. The majority of the personnel in an infantry patrol should be armed, therefore, with weapons that are capable of delivering deliberate, aimed,

acurate fire rather than with weapons whose chief characteristic is

the delivery of a great volume of fire. The automatic weapons

should be utilized to protect the expose'! flanks, or to silence hostile

automatic weapons.

c. Whether or not the bayonet is included in the armament of thc

patrol depends upon the terrain, the nature of the particular operation, the training of the men, and the opinion of the patrol leader.

In jungle terrain, the bayonet impedes the movement of the individuals both on the march and when deployed for combat by snagging on vines and the dense underbrush; it is doubtful if it can be

used effectively, even in the assault, in such terrain. In fairly open

country, the bayonet should be carried and employed as in regular

warfare. It is an essential weapon in night attacks. The bayonet

is practically useless in the hands of untrained troops who have no

confidence in it; it is a very effective weapon in small war operations when employed by troops who have been thoroughly trained

in its use.

d. For further details regarding infantry weapons, see Section

III, Chapter II, "Organization."

6—2. Ammunition.—a. In past small war operations, the average

expenditure of small arms ammunition for a single engagement has

seldom exceeded 50 rounds for each person in the patrol. There

have been a very few instances where the expenditure has slightly

exceeded 100 rounds per person. It is believed that the following

s a reasonable basis for the quantities of ammunition to be carried for each type of weapon with infantry patrols assigned a combat mission in small war operations:

(1) 0n the perRon—the full capacity of the belt or other carrier

issued to the individual.

(2) in the combat tran—l/ unit of fire.

These quantities should be modified as dictated by experience or as

indicated by the situation confronting a particular patrol.

b. Emergency replacements of some types of ammunition can be

dropped by plane.

c. If the regular ammunition containers aie too heavy for the

means. of transportation in the combat. train, the ammunition is repacked and the individual loads macic lighter.

14
SWM 6—26

ORGAXIZ[NG THE INFANTRY PATROL

d. Cartridge belt.s and other carriers with the patrol must be in

perfect condition to prevent the loss of ammunition.

6—26. Signal equipment.—a. The following signal equipment must

be taken with every patrol:

(1) Airplane panels, Codes, and pick-tip equlpment.

(2) Pyrotechnics.

b. The following signal equipment should be carried with the

patrol when it is available

(1) Portable radio.

(2) Other special equipment demanded by the situation or

the use of which can be foreseen. (See Section III, Chapter II, "Organization.")

6—27. Medical supplies.—a. The patrol leader, in conjunction with

the medical personnel, must assure himself of the sufficiency of his

medical equipment. and supplies. If charity medical work among the.

iative inhabitants is anticipated, additional supplies must be provided for that purpose..

b. Besides the regular medical kit carried by the hospital corpsman, reserve supplies should be made up into several assorted kits

distributed throughout the column.

e. Sufficient ampoules should be, carried for chlorination of water

for the duration of the patrol. The Lyster bag, if carried, should be

carefully inspected for leaks, particularly at the taps, and should

be cleaned and dried. Four to six yards of muslin for straining

trash from the water should be provided. The bag should be rolled

and stowed so that it will not chafe in carrying.

d. A. few "sanitubes" should be carried for prophylaxis and for the

treatment of certain skin diseases. e. Several additional first aid packets, tubes of iodine, and a small

roll of adhesive should be carried with patrols to which medical

personnel is not attached.

f. Preparations to carry the wounded must be made before the

patrol leaves the garrison. In addition to the methods described in

Chapter 14, "Landing Force Manual," USN, the canvas field cot

cover is easily earned an(i can be quickly converted into a stretcher

in the field.

6—28. Miscellaneous equipment.—Such of the following articles

as may be necessary should be carried with the patrol:

a. Native machetes, for cutting trails, forage. tirewood. fields of

fire, and material for bivouac shelters.

b. Matches in waterproof containers, flashlights, candles, and a. lantern for the mess force.

15
SWM 6—29

ORGATZING THE 1FATRY PATROL

c. A quantity of hemp rope to assist the patrol in crossing dangerOIlS streams. It can be stretched across the stream and used as a

hand hold while crossing, or it can be used in building an improvised raft.

d. Entrenching tools or larger engineering tools as demanded by

the situation.

e. A horse-shoer's kit., if the number of nnhmils with the patrol

makes it advisable.

6—29. Personal clothing and accessories.—a. Generai.—The personal clothing and accessories worn or carried by the patrol must be

reduced to the minimum consistent with the length of time the patrol

will be absent. from its base, and the climate and season of the year.

Clothing should be in good condition when the patrol leaves it. base.

It is better to rely on airplane suppiy for necessary replacements in

the field than to overburden the patrol with too much impedimenta.

Superfluous articles will increase the transportation problems, and

decrease the quantities of essential ammunition and rations which

can be carried. Personal comfort and appearance must always be

of secondary importance as compared with the efficient accomplishment. of the assigned mission. Officers should fare no better in these

respects than the enlisted men of the organization. The. inclusion of

officers' bedding rolls, field cots, and similar equipment is unwarranted in patrols operating from a base in the theater of operations.

b. Clothing worn, by troops.—Shoes should. fit properly, be broken

in, and in good condition. New shoes, though of the correct size, will

usually give trouble on the. march. Socks should be clean, free from

holes and darns. Flannel shirts, which absorb perspirttion, rain, and water freely, and still afford warmth and protection at night,

are preferable to cotton khaki shirts even in the tropics. The scarf

should not be worn. The value of canvas leggings in the field is

questionable. rrhe woolen sock l)ulled over the bottom of the trouser

leg is a satisfactory substitute.

e. Gb thing and aceessorie.s carried n the pac.—The following articles are considered reasonable quantities to be carried in the pack

or roll of each individual with a patrol operating in a warm climate

(1) A shelter-half, poncho, or light native hammock, depending

upon the nature of the terrain, the season of the ear, and the personal decision of the patrol leader. The shelter-half can he dispensed with if materials are available in the field for the construction of lean-to sheheis. In this case, the poncho is utilized as a cover

for the pack or roll. 'l'he oiim is primarily useful as protectioi

16
SWM 6—30

ORGANIZING THE INFAITRY PATROL

from the clamp ground while sleeping at night. It interferes with

movement, of an individual if worn on the march, and is a distinct

impednnent if worn in combat. The hammock has many acivantages, but it is bulky and adds considerable weight to the pack or

roll. During the rainy season, two of these articles,,may be desirable.

If the shelter-half is carried, the tent pole and pins are included

when necessary.

(2) One blanket.

(3) A mosquito net is desirable. in malarious countries. It is

bulky and quite heavy. Some combat patrols in past operations in

tropical countries did not carry the net in the field and did not incur

any apparent harmful consequences.

(4) One change of underwear.

(5) At least two pairs of woolen socks; four pairs are recommended, if the patrol is to operate for 2 weeks or longer.

(6) One change of outer clothing.

(7) Toilet articles: soap, small bath towel, tooth brush and povder or paste, comb, and mirror. A razor, shaving brush, and shaving soap may be carried, although they are not considered essential

items.

(8) Tobacco, as desired

(9) Toilet paper, a small quantity to be carried by each incliviclual,

the remainder with the mess equipment.

d. Peso'nal cleanline&s.—A bath should be taken and soiled clothing

should be washed as frequently as opportunity affords. Simply

soaking clothes in water, wringing them out, and permitting them

to dry in the sun, is better than not washing them at all.

6—30. General preparations.—Prior to clearing its base, the patrol

leader of an infantry patrol personally verifies or arranges for such

of the following as may be pertinent to the particular situation:

a. Aviatio; support.—

(1) Liaison, reconnaissance, and combat support. (2) Regular and emergency supply by plane.

b. Information.—

(I) A personal airplane reconnaissance over the area, if practicable.

(2) A map or sketch of the area, including the route or alternate

routes to be followed. A rude sketch, however, inaccurate, is better

than none.

(3) Airplane, photographs of villages and important terrain features, such as stream crossings, possible or former ambush positions,

etc., if practicable.

17
SWM 6—30

ORGANIZING THE INFANTRY PATROL

(4) The condition of the rouls and trails, the attitude of the local

inhabitants, and the possible food supply.

e. 1npection of.—

(1) Men; individual, combat, communications, and medical supplies and equipment; and animals, pack. and riding equipment.

(2) Cleaning materials for the weapons, especially oil for

automatic arms.

d. Liaison with.—

(1) Native officials, when desirable.

(2) Native troops, or other persons not of the comnmud, who are

to accompany the patrol.

(3) Other friendly patrols operating in the area.

e. Employment of.—Native transportation personnel, intelligence

agents, guides, and interpreters.

f. Money, in small denominations, for the puichase of supplies,

emergency transportation, an(l information. In some countries, articles such as soap, salt, tobacco, etc., which are expensive and difficult

to obtain locally, are more acceptable to the natives than money.

18
SWM 6—31

SECTION IV

FEEDING THE PERSONNEL

Par. Page

Responsibility of patrol leader 6-31 19

Mess equipment 6--32 19

Weightof rations ... -- 6—33 20

The field ration - . .. 6—34 21

Butchering on the march - - .. 6—35 22

Feeding native personnel 6—36 22

Emergency rations 6—37 22

6—31. Responsibility of patrol leader.—The patrol leader should

confer with the mess officer at the garrison or base from which the

patrol will operate, and, in conjunction with the patrol's mess sergeant or cooks, determine what suitable foodstuffs are available for

the patrol. Also, he must decide what kitchen equipment i required

and procure it.. Written menus for breakfast and supper for each

clay of the proposed operations are piepaied. It is not desirable

to make midday halts for the purpose of cooking a meal, although

it may be desirable in some situntions to prepare cold lunches which

may be issued to the men prior to breaking camp in the morning.

Based on these. menus, a check-off list of the necessary rations is

prepared, t.he rations drawn and carefully verified before loading.

Thereafter, the rations are issued as required and notations made on

the check-off list. The rations remaining in the train should be

inventoried periodically while the patrol is in the field. Canned

goods should be inspected for swelling of the top due to deterioration of the contents, for leak. and for bad dents. Such cans should

be rejected, or destroyed.

6—32. Mess equipment.—a. The amount of mess equipment (arned by the patrol should be reduced to a minimum.

b. The cavalry pack kitchen is satisfactory for a large patrol which

includes pack animals. The complete unit less hangers for the

Phillips pack saddle, weighs 118 pounds and constitutes one pack

load. It is adequate for feeding 200 men in the field. Patrols of

between fifty and one hundred men can eliminate unnecessary pieces.

It is questionable whether a patrol of less than 50 men should carry it..

c. If a regular pack kitchen unit is not used, issue or improvised

cooking equipment will have to be provided. The following points

are pertinent:

19
SWM 6-33

FEEDING THE PE1*ONNEL

(1) Although G. I. buckets are seldom used for cooking in garrison, they are useful for that pUipOse in. the field. They can be

set on a flue or suspended over it. 'rliey nest weU and (To not rattle

if leaves or similar materials are l)aCke€l between them.

(2) In comparison with tin boilers, buckets, and roasting ptns,

large iron kettles are not So fragile, do riot, burn food so (1mckly,

hold heat. better, can. be used for frying, and pack better. Packed.

one on each side of the aitimal. hev can carry the cooked or uncooked

foodstuffs riecessar for the evenu'ig meal, thus ex)editnlg its reparation. Suitable iron kettles can generally be pu1C11a5e(l beau in

the theater of operations.

(3) A small ii wta I grill about 2 feet square and flu ted v i Ui f u r

'collapsible legs facilitates cooking in the field.

d. During rainy weather or in areas where. many streams have to

be forded, some provision must be made to protect such foodstuffs as

sugar. salt, florir. coffee, etc. Bags made of canvas, leather, or of

canvas material coated with rubber, and tarpaulins or pieCes of

canvas, have been used suecesfu1ly in tlie past. e. When a patrol is to be made into unfamiliar country where the

existence. of an adequate water suppiy is doubtful, drinking water

may have to be transported Ill the train. 5-gallon cans may be used

for this purpose in the absence of specially designed equipment.

,F. A limited amount of soap should l)e carried as' an aid in cleansing the cooking equipment.

6—33. Weight of rations.—a. The aggregate weight of the rations

carried by a patrol is influenced by:

(1) Number of men in the patrol.

(2) Native foodstuffs avaihuble in the field.

(3) Issue foodstuffs available.

(4) Rations to 1)e supplied by p1a (1 lop.

() Replenishmeuits expected from outposts aiiti 0$ lie) ga l'FisOt)S

in the area.

(6) The ability of the cooks.

(7) The ability of the l)ersonhIel to adjust themselves to (liminislle(l

rations.

(8) The method of transport and tli predeternnne(i size of the

combat. train.

7). The normal field ration weighs approximately 3 pounds. The

normal garrison ration weights about 4 pounds. The average pack

animal found 11 iiiost small—wars (OUfltIies can carry 30 man—day

garrison rations, (OnIputefi oh the assumption that no foodstuffs can

20
SWM 6—34

FEEDING THE PERS0NNEL

be procured in the field, 40 man-day complete field rations, or 50

reduced field rations.

6—34. The field ratioiL—a. Every effort. should be made to build

up the supply of rations at the advanced patrol bases and outposts

until they approach or equal the normal garrison ration in quantity

and variety. A patrol operating from those bases, should never

carry more, and may often carry less, than the components of the

field ration, modified in accordance with the probable foodstuffs

which can be obtained in the area. Emphasis should be placed on

those articles which give the greatest return in food value for the

hulk and weight carried, and the ease with which they can be t.ransported. This may not result in a. "balanced" ration, but the deficiencieS encountered in the field can he. compensated for UPOfl the return

of the patrol to its base. The general tendency of troops is to carry

too great a variety and too large a quantity of foodstuffs with patrols

in the field. Man should become accustomed to the native fare as

quickly as possible. If properly led, they will soon learn that they

can subsist quite we]l and operate efficiently on much less than the

regular garrison ration. This is a matter of training and is influenced in a. large measure by the attitude of the patrol leiders

and other commissioned and noncommissioned officers.

h. The prescribed field ration is approximately as follows:

Conipouc.. t artiele.q Subotltutc o,fjcfr

pCOllld hard brea(L_ . .. - 1 fresh bread, or

1i pounds flour.

1 pound tinned 1 pounds salt meat, or

18/4 pounds smoked meat, or

1 pounds fresh meat, or

1% pounds fresh fish, or

1% pounds poultry.

pound tinned vegetables 18/4 pounds fresh vegetables, or

3 gills beans or peas, or

4 pound rice or other cereal.

2 ounces coffee 2 ounces cocoa, or

ounce tea.

1 ounce evaporated milk quart fresh milk.

Salt and pepper.

c. Suitable foodstuffs from the. regular issue include: rice, rolled

oats, hominy grits, dry beans, canned pork and beans, corned beef

hash, salmon, corned beef, chipped beef, bacon, Vienna sausage, hard

bread..dried fruits, cheese, sugar, coffee, tea, evaporated or dried milk,

salt, black pepper, and limited amounts of canned potatoes and vegetables. In general. canned and fresh fruits should not. be carried.

21
SWM 6—35

FEEDING THE PERSONNEL

Small sized cans are usually preferable to the larger sizes for issue

to patrols. Generally a combat patrol should carry such foodstuffs

that not more than one component, other than tea. or coffee, requires

cooking for each meal in order to reduce the number of cooking utensils to be carried and the time of preparation in the field.

d. Native foodstuffs sometimes found in inhabit.ed areas include:

beef on the hoof, fish, chickens, eggs, beans, rice, corn, coffee, and

fruits and vegetables in season. To these may be added such wild

game as may be killed by the patrol. If hostile groups are active in

the area, the available supply of native food will be limited.

6—35. Butchering on the march.—a. Each patrol operating in the

field should include a man familiar with the killing and dressing of

livestock and game. If the patrol is dependent upon the. country for

its meat supply, suitable stock should be procured during the day's

march unless it. is definitely known that the desired animals will be

available at or near the bivouac.

b. The animal should be butchered in such a manner that. it will

bleed profusely. It. should be dressed, cut-up, and cooked while it is

still warm. Meat cooked after rigor mortis has set in will be tough

unless it is cooked in a solution of vinegar or acetic acid, or allowed

to season for at least 24 hours. Excess beef may be. barbecued and

utilized the following day.

6—36. Feeding native personnel.—Native personnel attached to

patrols may provide their own food and cooking arrangements. In

certain situations they may be given a cash allowance which will permit them to eat with the local inhabitants. When circumstances

require them to subsist with the patrol, they should receive their proportionate share of the available food. If the patrol is living off the

country, equitable treatment given to the natives attached to the

patrol will usually be more than repaid by their foraging ability and

by assistance in preparing palatable dishes out of the foodstuffs which

are indigenous to the locality.

6—37. Emergency rations.—Either a specially prepared, commercial emergency ration, or one composed of available materials, should

be issued to each individual and carried on the person at. all times

while operating in the field. This ration should be eaten only on

the orders of a responsible commander, or as a. ]ast resort if an individual becomes separated from his patrol. Frequent inspections

should be made to insure troops are complying with these instruct.ions.

22
SWM 6—38

SECTION \

THE MARCH

Par. Page

General 6—38 23

Hourof starting 6—39 23

Rate of march 6—40 23

Factors influencing march formations .. 6—41 24

Influence of terrain on march formation 6—42 25

Road spaces 6—43 25

Location of patrol and subordinate leaders in march formation - 6—44 26

Location of the combat train -. - 6—45 26

Descriptive march formations 6—46 26

March formations for a reenforced rifle company 6-47 27

March formations for a reenforced rifle platoon 6—48 29

March formation for a rifle platoon 6—49 30

March formation for a rifle squad 6—50 31

March discipline 6—.51 31

March outposts 6—52 32

Camp sites 6—53 32

Makiiigcamp 6—54 33

Shelter 6—55 33

Bivouac beds -- 6—56 34

6—38. General.—The conduct of marches will vary considerably

with the condition of the men, their state of training, the condition

of the roads or trails, the climate, the weather, the tactical situation,

and various other factors. 'Whenever it can be avoided, the men

should not arrive at their destination in a state of exhaustion.

6—39. Hour of starting.—In small wars, breakfast usually should

be served at dawn, animals fed and watered, camp broken, packs assembled and loaded, and the march begun as soon after daylight as

possible. The march should begin slowly in order to warm up the

men and animals, and to permit packs and equipment to settle and

idjust themselves to both personnel and animals.

6-40. Rate of march.—a. The first halt should be made iiot later

than three-quarters of an hour after the start, and should be of about

15 minutes duration, so that the men can adjust their equipment,

check and tighten the pack loads in the train, and attend to the calls

of nature.

h. Under normal conditions, troops usually halt 10 minutes every

hour after the first halt. This cannot be accepted us doctrine in
SWM 6-41

THE MARCH

small wars operations, in which the rate of march is dependent upon

the state of training and efficiency within the combat train. The

column must be kept closed up at all times. Liaison should be constantly maintained throughout the column by wOrd of mouth. Whenever a pack needs readjustment, or an animal becomes bogged in some

mudhole, or any other delay occurs within the column, a halt should

be called until the defect is remedied and the. patrol ready to move

forward as a body. If the regulation 50 minute march, 10 minute

halt schedule is maintained, even a small patrol may become SO

elongated that several miles will separate t.he head and tail of the

column at the end of the day's march. As the men become trained

in such operations, forced halts will become more infrequent and of

shorter duration, and the normal march schedule may be achieved.

To avoid disaster, however, it is essential that liaison be maintained

throughout the entire length of the column at all times, regardless

of the freque.ncy of the halts.

c. Under normal conditions, intervals of marching should be modified to take advantage of good halting places, especially those which

afford proper security to the column.

6—41. Factors influencing march formations.—The march formatiori of a patrol in small wars is influenced by the following factors:

(1) The. nature of the terrain.

(2) The strength, composition, and armament of the patrol.

(3) The size. of the combat. train.

(4) The necessity for security, observing the principle. that. security elements should increase proportionately in strength from the

point to the main body.

(5) Ability to shift. rapidly and automatically from a column to

a ]ine formation that will face the enemy, cognizance being taken

of the possibility of the enemy being in several different directions.

(6) The necessity for dividing the patrol into small, mutually

supporting, maneuver units, each one capable. of developing its offensive power independently and immediately at. short, battle ranges.

(7) Sufficient distance between elements to enable one or more

units in the main body to escape the initial burst of hostile fire, thus

assuring some freedom of maneuver.

(8) The distribution of supporting weapons throughout the column to facilitate their entry into action in any direction.

(9) The rapid development of maximum fire power.

(10) The necessity of withholding an initial reserve.

(11) The degree of darknvs dnring night marches.
SWM 6—42

THE MARCH

6—42. Influence of terrain on march formation.—a. Open te,-

'i'ain.—In open country, the distribution of the troops in the column,

and the distances between the various elements, will be similar to that.

employed by a force of comparable strength in major warfare.

b. Close terrain..—(1) In the mountainous, heavily wooded terrain

in which the majority of small war operations occur, patrols aie

usually forced to march in a. column of files. 'Underbrush elm-,

croaches upon the trails, which are narrow and tortuous, and visibilit.y is often limited in every direction to only a few yards. As a

result, the column is greatly elongated, the distances between security

elements and the main body are reduced, and the patrol leader can

personally see and control only a small portion of his command.

(2) There should be sufficient distance between subdivisions in the

column to avoid the intermingling of units, to fix in tl minds of

each individual the maneuver unit to which he is attached, and to

subject as few men as possible to the initial bursts of hostile fire

delivered at. short ranges. The. distance between units should be

sufficient to enable one or more of them to get. free to maneuver, thus

creating an opening for the emoyment of fire and movement. On

the other hand, the various elements in the column must be mutually

support.ing as too much distance between them may enable an aggressive enemy to defeat. the patrol in detail.

6—43. Road spaces.—a.. Depending on the prevailmg conditions,

the distances between men within subdivisions of a patrol operating

in thickly wooded terrain generally will be about. as follows:

auM.ivi.ioi& D1.9tace Jctwecn ne;

Point . .... 10 to 40 yards.

Advance party .. 5 to 20 yards.

Support . .... .. 3 to 10 yards.

Main body . 2 to 5 yards.

Rear guard .. 2 to 20 yards.

b. The distances between the VaIIOUS subdivisions in the column

will vary from 10 to 50 yards or more, depending upon the strength

of time patrol and the nature of the terrain through which it. is

marching.

e. The distances given above, should never be considered as fixed

and immutable. They usually will be changed several times during

a day's march on the orders of the patrol and subordinate leaders

as required by the. nature of the country.

d. The road space for a riding or pack animal is considered to be

5 yards. This includes t.he man assigned to ride, lead, drive, or guard

the animal.

25
SWM 6—44

THE ?SIARCH

6—44. Location of patrol and subordinate leaders in march

formation.—a. Patrol leader.—The patrol leader will usually march

with or at the head of the main body. This is particularly desirable

in the case of large patrols. In small pattols, the leader may have to

alternate with a subordinate as commander of the advance guard.

The leader of the patrol should iiot. make a practice, of marching in

the point unless necessity requires ii. If he is at the head of the main

body, he can always move forward to the point to indicate the route to

be followed or to make some other important decision which cannot

be assumed by the advance guard commander.

b. $ubordinate leaders.—Subordinate leaders of all elements in the

patrol, except the point, normally march at or near the head of their

respective unit or subdivisions. The Point commander should march

near the center of that group so that he may effectively control all

of the men in the point. Leaders of supporting units, such as a

machine-gun section or platoon, normally march close to the patrol

cOmmander.

6—45. Location of the combat train.—The location' of the combat

train in the column depends upon several factors. rfllese include the

strength of the patrol, the probability of combat, the normal tactics

of the enemy, and the size of the train itself. Normally, the combat

trains should follow' the main body, preceding the rear guard of the

column. If, as is often the cus in small wars, attack may be expected

• from any direction, it may be. advisable to place the combat train near

the center of the column, or to split it into two or more. sections

interspersed with elements of the main body of troops. If the train

is exceptionally large, it may be detached from f lie combat elements

of the patrol an(l marched as a separate convoy (see cli. VIII, "Convoys and Convoy Escorts"). Whatever its location in the column, the

reserve supply of ammunition should be distributed throughout the

train so that some of it may reasonably be expected to escape the

initial burst of hostile fire in the event of ambush.

6—46. Descriptive march formations.—a. 6eii ei'ai.—The march

formations described in the next three succeeding paragraphs illustrate several of the principles previously described in this chapter.

They should not be considered as the only formations which organizations of comparable size and compositton may adopt. It is believed

that they will be effective under the conditions assumed. Every

experienced patrol leader will have his own opinion of how his patrol

should be organized. He should imot hesitate to modify the forma26
SWM 6—47

THE MARCH

tion or redistribute the personnel of his command to meet the particular situation which confronts him.

b. Assumptions as to terrain.—In each instance, the terrain in

which the following patrols are operating is assumed to be mountainous, heavily wooded country, with only narrow, winding trails

available.

6—47. March formations for a reenforced rifle company.—a.

Situation.—A reenforced rifle company consisting of: a headquarters platoon which includes a light machine-gun section (4

Browning automatic rifles, modified), a GO-mm. mortar section (2

60-mm. mortars), attached signal and medical enlisted personnel, a

native guide, and an interpreter; 3 rifle platoons of 3 squads each,

armed with semi-automatic rifles; an attached machine platoon ( less

1 section) with 4 machine guns (2 of which are for defense only);

an attached 81-mm. mortar section; an attached squad of native

troops; and a combat train of 75 pack animals and 20 native muleteers; has been ordered to proceed to an outlying village to establish

an advanced base and conduct further patrol activities therefrom.

The village is 3 days march from the point of departure. The total

strength of the patrol is 220 officers and men and 30 native soldiers

and civilians. The road space for the patrol in column of files is

estimated at 1,140 yards, of which the combat train (less 6 miles

carrying organic machine-gun and 81-mm. mortar equipment.), will

occupy 350 yards. A hostile guerrilla force estimated at 600 men

has been active in the area which must be traversed. That force is

well led, and armed with bolt action rifles, automatic shoulder

weapons, and some machine guns. in previous engagements, the

enemy has attempted to ambush the leading elements of the main

body, but there has been one instance in which he created a diversion

at the head o the column and directed his main attack at the rear

elements.

b. Formation "A."—

Element Cornpo4t ion

Point 1 rIfle sqd. plus % sqd. native troops

commanded by a Sgt.

Distance

Advanced party - I rifle pint. (less 1 sqd.)

Lt. MG sect. (less 1 sqd.)

60-mm. sect. (less 1 sqd.)

Commander by Lteut. "file Plat."

27
SWM 6—47

THE MARCH

Element Com.poitlrni

Distance - Main body - Patrol commander.

Native guide.

Native Interpreter.

Fwd. esch., Co. Hdqtrs.

1 rifle plat.

1 MG piat. (less 1 sect.)

1 81-mm. sect.

Distance

Combat train and tralim guard Rear esch., Co. Hdqtrs.

Supply personnel and ammunition sqd.

from attached units.

sqd. native troops.

Commanded by Lt. "2d in command."

D1samnce

Rear party 1 rifle pint. (less 1 sqd.)

Lt. MG sqd.

60-mm. sqd.

Commanded by Lient. "Rifle Nat."

Distance

Rear point 1 rifle sqd.

Commanded by a Sgt. c. Formation 'B."—

Element Corn pos4tion

Point % sqtl.

% sqd. native troops

Commanded by pint. Lt.

Distance

1st sectIon of main body Patrol commander

Native guide

Native interpreter

Fwd. esch., Co. Hdqtrs.

1 rifle plat. (less 1 sqd.)

Lt. MG Sect. (less 1 sqd.)

60-mm. sect. (less 1 sqd.)

Distance

Combat train and train guard Approximately % combat train

Rear esch., Co. Hdqtrs.

,4 sqd. native troops

Commanded by Sgt.

Distance

Rear point % rifle sqd.

Commanded by Sgt.

28
SWM 6—48

THE MARCH

S minn.te.s marching diRtonec

Elcrnrnt Corn podtiofl

Point — .-.-_.. — 1/, rifle s'id.

Commanded by Sgt.

Distance

2d section of main body - 1 rifle plat. (less 1 sqd.)

1 MG plat. (less 1 sect.)

1 Si-mm. sect. (less 1 sqd.)

Commnmi oded by Lieul. "Rifle Pint."

Distance

Combat train and train guard Ap. omnhat train.

MG ammunition supply personnel

Commanded by Sgt.

Distance --.- - Rear point 1/. rifle sqd.

Commanded by Sgt.

5 to inn tc.s marching distance

Point 1/2 rifle sqd.

('ommandeil 1)3' Sgt.

Distance

3d section of mdiii body 1 rifle plat. (less 1 sqd.)

Lt. MG sqd.

60-mm. sqd.

81-mm. sqd.

Commanded by Lient. "Rifle Pint."

Distance

Combat train and train guard App. % combat tiln

81-mm. ammunition sqd.

Commanded by Lt. "2(1 in command"

Distance

Hear point 1/2 rifle sqd.

Commanded by Sgt.

N0TE.—Contact between subdivisions of the pltrol Is cstablihcd once each hour as follows : 1st section halts. 2d section makes contact and halts. As ld section gaiiis contact

with 2d section, word is passed forward to let section, which resumes march, followed at

5-minute intervals by 2d and 3d sections.

6—48. March formation for a reenforced rifle platoon.—a. Situation.—It is assumed that a reenforced rifle platoon, consisting of:

One rifle platoon of three squads armed with semi-automatic rifles;

one light machine section (4 Browning automatic rifles, modified);

one 6t)-mm. mortar squad; an officer, a cook, and a hospital corpsman

from company headquarters; a native guide; a native interpreter;

and a combat train of 15 pack mules, 1 riding mule for wounded,

and 4 native muleteers; has been ordered to proceed from its base

for a 10-day combat patrol missions. The total strength of the patrol

29
SWM 6—49

THE MARCH

is 57 officers and enlisthd men, and 6 natives. Hostile guerrillas have

been active in the vicinity.

b. Patrol formation.—

Element

Point 1⁄2 rifle acid.

Commanded by a Sgt.

Distance

Main body — Patrol commander.

Native guide.

Native interpreter.

Fwd. each. Pint. }lilqtrs.

1 rifle plat. (less 1 sqd.).

Lt. MG. sect. (less I sqd.).

60-mm. sqd.

Distance

Combat train and train guard . Rear esch. Plot. Hdqtrs.

Lt. MG sad.

Commanded by Lt. "2d in command."

Distance

Rear point - 1⁄2 rifle sqd.

Commanded by a Sgt.

6-49. March formation for a rifle platoon.----a. S'ituation.—Tt is

assumed that a rifle platoon consisting of three squads, each armed

with bolt action rifles and two Browning automatic rifles or semiautomatic rifles; an officer, a cook, and a 11Ol)ital coi'psia from

company headquarters; a native interpreter; an(l a combat train of

10 pack mules and 1 ndmg mule (for wounded) and 3 native

muleteers; has been ordered to proceed from its base on a 10-clay

patrol into a section in which hostile guerrillas are known to be

operating. The total strength of the patrol is 3 officers and enlisted

men, and 4 natives.

b. Patrol formation.—

Emcna en t CompoRition

Point 1/2 rifle sqd.

Commanded by a Sgt.

Distance

Maui body — Patrol commander.

Na tire Interpreter.

Fwd. each. Plot. H(lqtr.

1 rifle pint. (less 1 sqd.).

Distance

Combat trout and train guard . Rear eseb. Plot. Hdqtrs.

Commanded by Sgt.

Distance

Rear point - 1⁄4 rifle sqd.

Conmmnunded by Lt. '21 in conumuid."

30
SWN 6—50

THE MARCH

6—50. March formation for a rifle squad.—A rifle squad should

rarely, if ever, be sent as a patrol on a combat mission. Its normal

employment in small wars, as in a major war, is that of reconnaissance, security, or liaison. The duration of the patrol will seldom

exceed 1 day's march. If it extends over 1 day, it will usually subsist

off the country and should not be encumbered with a train. It may

often be mounted, in which case the riding animals will carry the

hecessary impedimenta. 'rite formations of a squad acting as an independent patrol are basically those prescribed in FM 21—45. The

important. points are: it must provide for all-around security by

means of a point, rear point, and flank observation or flankers; the

patrol leader should be near the head of the main body, rather than

in the point, so that he can control the action of the entire patrol;

the automatic weapons within the patrol should be located near the

leader in order that he may control their initial action before they

become committed or pinned to the ground in the first burst of hostile

fire; a get-away man should be designated. The distances between

the individuals in the patrol will depend entirely upon the nature of

the terrain through which it is passing, bearing in mind that mutual,

sipport must be assured.

6—51. March discipline.—a. Silence es8enhial.—A combat patrol

operating in a hostile area must march in silence. The noises, including voices, made by the patrol at a halt should not be loud enough.

to be heard by the outguards.

b. Mqintaining distanees.—(1) The distances to be maintained between subdivisions of the patrol, and between individuals, are designated by the patrol leader. If these distances are temporarily

decreased or increased due to the terrain or for other unavoidable

reasons, they should be resumed as soon as warranted by the situation.

(2) Distances should be maintained with respect. to the elements

both in front and in rear. If an individual loses contact with the

man next in rear of him, word should be passed forward and the

rate of march decreased or the patrol temporarily halted until the.

gap is closed.

(3) It requires particular effort to prevent men from bunching

at stream crossings, fallen trees, large mudholes, and similar obstacles.

(4) The arm signals "halt" and "forward" should be used freely

to indicate to the men in rear what is happening to their front.

c. General ruie8.—All members of t.he patrol should comply with

such of the following rules as pertain to t.he situation:

(1) No noise or "skylarking" to be permitted.

31
SWM 6—52

THE MARCH

(2) Weapons and ammunition carried by individuals will be retained on their persons. They will not be secured to riding or pack

animals.

(3) A man leading an animal will not secure the lead line to his

person or equipment.

(4) rflle riding animal for the sick will march at the rear of the

train.

(5) Be alert at all times. Do not depend entirely on the leading

elements for reconnaissance.

(6) No smoking except when authorized.

(7) Do not leave articles foreign or strange to the locality on the

trail or in camp sites.

(8) Only the patrol leader will question natives encountered on

the trial foi: information about distances and directions. When he

does so, he should ask for data about several places so as to disguise

the route to be taken.

(9) No conversations will be entered into with natives except by

the patrol leader, designated subordinates, or interpreter.

(10) The native guide will not talk to other natives except in the

presence of the interpreter.

(11) When passing or halting in the vicinity of dwellings occupied

by peaceful natives, do not take fruit, eggs, or other things without

fair payment; do not gamble or drink with natives; do not enter

native houses without clearly understood invitation; do not assume

a hostile attitude.

(12) All distances will he maintained at temporary halts as when

marching.

6—52. March outposts.—1\'Iarch outposts should be established at

every temporary halt. The advance party, or, in small patrols, the

main body should halt on ground which can be easily defended. The

point should proceed at least a hundred yards along the trail and

take up a position in observation. Other routine security measures

are followed, such as reconnoitering and observing lateral trails, reconnaissance of commanding ground to the flanks, and security to

the rear. These requirements are fully as important in small war

operations as in major warfare.

6—53. Camp sites.—c. If the patrol is to bivouac on the trail, the

days march should cease at least. 2 hours before sundown.

b. When the location of the camp site is not definitely known, the

patrol leader should begin looking for a favorable site at least 3 hours

before sundown. In peaceful territory, inquiries may be made of

32
SWM 6—54

THE MARCH

friendly natives but this is inadvisable in a hostile region. Too

much reliance cannot be placed in the information received. Usually

the natives accompanying the patrol as guides, interpreters, or muleteers will be able to give fairly definite informatiOn regarding good

camp sites.

c. The camp area should be a level or slightly rolling, cleared, dry,

well-drained field with firm turf free from stones, stubble, arid brush, and ample in size to accommodate the command without crowding.

'Water is essential. Fuel and forage should be available. The vicinity of swamps, marshes, and native houses should be particularly

avoided because of the danger of insects and disease. Camp sites

recently used by other troops are undesirable unless they have been

left in good police.

d. Dry stream beds and ravines are undesirable because of warmth,

poor ventilation, and the danger of floods.

e. Part or all of the desirable features for a camp site may have

to be disregarded in hostile territory when proper defense of the

bivouac will be paramount.

6—54. Making caznp.—When the patrol is halted for the night,

march outpost security is immediately enforced until the regular outguards can be formed, instructed, and posted. Reconnaissance patrols should be sent over all trails radiating from the camp site for

a distance of at least. a half mile, including the route which has just

been traversed. Outguards will usually be detailed from the unit

which has furnished the advance guard for the day. In small patrols it is often necessary to detail some personnel from the main

body for this duty. Plans for the defense of the bivouac should be

formulated, and every element of the patrol instructed accordingly.

Squads and other units should be bivouacked as organizations and in

relation to their respective sectors in the defense. Working details

are assigned to procure water and fuel, to dig latrines, and to perform other necessary tasks.

6—55. Shelter.—a. The skelter tent.—In good weather it is often

better to sleep in the open rather than to construct temporary

shelter. If some shelter is desirable, the shelter tent is generally

the best type for troops in bivouac.

b. The lean-to.——When necessary materials are available leami-tos

can be constructed almost. as quickly as shelter tents can he erected.

'rhey are roomier than the shelter tent and afford better protection

during heavy rains. The lean-to consists of two forked uprights.

a cross pole, and a rough framework which is thatched with large
SWIlL 6—56

THE MARCH

leaves, such as manaca, banana, palm, etc., or with grass or reed

tied in bunches. The uprights may be two convenient forked trees

or saplings. After the cross-pole. is secured in place, the framework is leaned against it, and the covering secured in place. The

various parts of the lean-to are lashed together with vines which

are usually found in the vicinity. A well made lean-to will last for

3 or 4 weeks before it has to be recovered. (See Plate I.)

c. The canva.s lean-to.—This combines certain desirable features

of both the shelter tent and the thatched lean-to. It consists of a

frame of light poles with a tarpaulin, tent fly, or several shelter

halves or ponchos thrown over it and staked down on one edge. The

two ends are enclosed. The front is left open like a lean-to. This

shelter is strong, quickly built, and makes use of various sizes of

canvas.

d. Native buildinys.—Native buildings generally should not be

used by patrols for shelter. Most of them are unclean and infested

with insects. They are usually more difficult to defend than bivouac

which can be selected with its defense in view. Sometimes, vacant

buildings may contain mines or bombs laid by the hostile forces to

explode on contact.

6—56. Bivouac beds.—a. Men should not sleep on damp ground.

In temporary camps and in bivouac, they should raise their beds

with leaves, boughs, or makeshift bunks in addition to placing the

poncho between them and the ground. Satisfactory bunks can be

macic from small poles placed together on crosspieces raised about

6 inches from the ground. The poles should be covered with leaves

or similar material. Bamboo can be split lengthwise, the joints

cracked, and the piece flattened out to make an excellent, springlike bunk when laid on crosspieces at the head and foot.

b. Native hammocks made of light material are of practical use

in some operations. The sleeper can protect himself from the rain

by stretching a line between the hammock lashings and hanging a

helter-half or poncho over it.

34
4

THE irArcJi SWi 6—56

4

(VS

C' a

C, •5

E

SWM 6—57

SECTION VI

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

Par. Page

Methods of reconnaissance 6—57 37

Reconnoitering by scouts 6—5S 37

Careful visual reconnaissance 6—59

Hasty visual reconnaissance 6—60 38

Reconnaissance by fire - 6—61 38

Reconnaissance by aviation personnel 6—62 39

Airplane reconnaissance by patrol leaders 6—63 39

Intelligence agents 6—64 30

Questioning inhabitants for information 6—65 81)

Dogs on reconnaissance -. 6—66 30

Security on the march 6-67 :*

Security at rest 6-68 40

6—57. Methods of reconnaissance.—The various methods of reconnaissance and security employed by patrols in small wars do not

vary in principle from those used in major warfare. Because of the

nature of the terrain in which most small war operations occur, the

difficulties of reconnaissance and security are increased. Several

months of active operation in the field are required to train average

individuals as efficient scouts, and only a small proportion will acquire

the ability of a native to interpret correctly the things observed along

the trail.

6—58. Reconnoitering by scouts.—a. The most certain method to

uncover an enemy is to send scouts to visit suspected positions. 'l'he

disadvantages of this method include:

(1) It slows up the progress of the patrol.

(2) Dense underbrush, and mountains, broken terrain are difficult

to negotiate and will rapidly exhaust the personnel.

(3) Scouts are likely to be in the line of fire wlieii the battle

commences.

In spite of its disadvanta.ges, the results of this method of reconnaissance are so reliable that it should normally be employed.

b. Scouts sent to reconnoiter positions which may be occupied by

the enemy at any time during the passage of the patrol, such as commanding positions, and roads and trails intersecting the route being

37
SWM 6—59

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

traversed, should remain in position until the patrol completes its

passage. This is the principle of "crowning the heights."

6—59. Careful visual reconnaissance.—The careful visual reconnaissance of suspected positions while approaching and passing them

enables a patrol to march more rapidly, but it is not as certain

to disclose the presence of an enemy as the method of reconnaissance by scouts. Excellent field glasses are essential for efficient

observation.

6—CO. Hasty visual reconnaissance.—a. In some situations reconnaissance will consist only of a hasty visual inspection of dangerous

and suspicious places. Hasty visual reconnaissance may be employed

when:

(1) Patrols are operating in supposedly peaceful areas, or in areas

which have been recently vacated by the enemy.

(2) Airplane reconnaissance has indicated that the area is free of

the enemy.

(3) Military necessity requires the patrol to expedite its march.

b. It must be understood that to carefully reconnoiter every commanding position and suspected ambush site will, in some terrain,

almost immobilize the patrol.

6—61. Reconnaissance by fire.—a. Reconnaissance by fire attempts

to inveigle the enemy to disclose his position by returning fire directed

against a suspected hostile position. This method should never be

used by 1)atrols assigned to aggressive or offensive missions.

b. Some of the disadvantages of reconnaissance by fire are:

(1) It discloses the presence and location of the patrol to the

enemy within range of the sound of the gunfire.

(2) It prevents the capture of guerrillas who may be traveling

alone or in small groups.

(3) It expends valuable ammunition, the supply of which may be

limjted and all of which may be needed in a crisis.

(4) It has a tendency to make the men on service of security less

observant.

(5) There is always the chance that a well-controlled enemy force in

ambush will not, return the fire.

(6) The members of the patrol have difficulty in distinguishing

between the reconnaissance fire and the initial shots fired from an

ambush. c. Reconnaissance by fire may be reasonably employed by:

(1) Liaison patrols which are too weak to engage in combat with

hostile forces.

38
SWM 6—62

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

(2) Patrols whose mission requires them to reach their destination

as quickly as possible.

6—62. Reconnaissance by aviation personnel.—a. Recoimaissance

by plane is invaluable in small wars operations. It has the following

disadvantages, however:

(1) Difficulty of detecting the enemy in wooded country. () It may divulge the location of friendly ground patrols.

(3) The difficulties of maintaining continuous reconnaissance.

(4) It does not relieve the ground patrols of their responsibility

for continuous close reconnaissance, although it often gives them a

false sense of security.

b. For further details, see Chapter IX, "Aviation."

6—63. Airplane reconnaissance by patrol leaders.—Patrol leaders

should make an airplane reconnaissance of the area of operation at

every opportunity in order to study terrain features. This is especially important if accurate maps of the area are not available.

6—64. Intelligence agents.—Reliable intelligence agents can sometimes be employed to reconnoiter an area prior to the arrival of a

patrol, and to continue their reconnaissance in conjunction with the

patrol's activities.

6—65. Questioning inhabitants for information.—Patrol leaders

must evaluate cautiously information obtained by questioning inhabitants encountered on the trail. A person who resides in a community

overrun by guerrillas generally is sympathetic towards them or

fearful of their reprisals.

6—66. Dogs on reconnaissance.—Dogs may sometimes be profitably employed with outguards and security detachments on the march

to detect the presence of hostile forces. Unless they are carefully

and specially trained, their usefulness for this purpose is doubtful.

(—6T. Security on the march.—a. Generai.—Whenever practicable, the methods of security employed in normal warfare are used

by patrols in small wars.

b. Brakzng canip.—Security measures must not be relaxed when

breaking camp. The exit from the camp should be reconnoitered and

the patrol should be vigilant when getting into its march formation.

c. Dute.s of the poznt.—The primary function of the point is reconnaissance, to disclose the presence of hostile forces on or neai' the

route of march before the next succeeding unit in the column comes

under fire. It is a security detachment rather than a combat unit.

There is a tendency in small war operations to overlook this important principle. If a patrol leader assigns too large a proportion

39
SWN 6—68

RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

of his force to the point, he sacrifices his freedom to maneuver in

combat. The leading man of the point should never be armed with

an automatic rifle. He, more than any other man in the patrol,

is likely to become a casualty in the initial burst of hostile fire

from ambush. Point duty is dangerous and fatiguing. Men assigned to the point should be relieved every 2 or 3 hours during

the day's march, and more frequently in dangerous localities.

d. Flaink security.—The most difficult feature of security for a

patrol marching through wooded terrain is adequate protection

against ambush and attack from the flanks. It is usually impossible

or undesirable to,maintain flank patrols continuously in such country.

Au experienced patrol leader will often detect the presence of a

hostile force in the vicinity by signs along the trail. At that. timer

he should establish flank patrols abreast or slightly in rear of the

point., even though the rate of march will be. adversely affected. Except under these conditions, flank security is generally maintained

by observation, and reconnaissance of intersecting trails.

6—68. Security at rest.—a. See paragraphs 6—52 and 6—54.

b. Camp fires should be screened at night. to prevent the personnel

from being silhouetted against, them in the event of a hostile attack. c. Not more than 50 percent of the patrol, including the mess detail.

men washing or bathing, and working parties, should be separated

from their weapons during daylight, hours. During the night, all

men should keep their wtapons near their pe1's.

40
SWM 6—69

SECTION VII

LAYING AMBUSHES

Par. Page

Definition 6—69

Selection of position -. ---. 6—70 41 Usual characteristics of an ambnsh_ .- 6—71 41. Occupying the Position . - 6-72 43

The ambush engagement 6—73 43

Employment of infantry weapons 6—74 44

6—69. Definition.—An ambush is the legitimate disposition of

troops in concealment for the purpose of attacking an enemy by surprise. The laying of a successful ambush in hostile territory in a

small war is a difficult operation.

6—70. Selection of position.—a. Offen.sive ainbwh.—An offensive

ambush should be so located as to facilitate the assault after the initial burst of fire.

b. Defen.ive alnbu.9h.—A. defensive ambush p1esupposes an inabilit.y to assault and the. probable necessity of a rapid withdrawal. It

should be so located as to facilitate defense, with natural obstacles

between the position and the enemy, and routes of withdrawal should

l)e. carefully planned, reconnoitered, and prepiied, if necessary.

These requirements usually limit the location of a defensive ambush

to the military or geographical crest, where the withdrawal will be

protected by the reverse slope.

c. I)irection of wind.—The ambush site should be selected so that

the odor and noises of the men will be carried away from the enemy's

route of approach.

d. Obstacles.—Stream crossings, large mudholes, or fallen trees

across the trail, are all useful obst.acles. They generally cause the

ambushed troops to bunch up before the firing starts, and hinder

their movements afterwards. Intersecting stream beds and trails at

the position should be enfiladed by fire.

6—Il. Usual characteristics of an ambush.—Every ambush imist

provide suitable firing positions and concealment. in close, proximity

to the hostile route of march. The usual position is located on the.

forward slope and at a bend in the trail. Automatic weapons or

machine guns are placed in prolongation of the probable direction of

march at the bend in order to take the enemy in enfilade. The main

body of the ambuscade is placed parallel to the hostiie route of

march to facilitate the. assault after the initial burst of fire. Tile

security elements of the enemy should be permitted to pass by the

41
SWM 6—71

LAYING AMBUSHES

position in order to secure the maximum effect. against, the hostile

main force. A position that permits engaging the enemy column

from both flanks simultaneously is possible only if the trail lies in a

deep ravine.. Even then there is considerable danger that ricochets

ind wild shots from one flank will cause casualties to the other flank.

42

A—Machine Guns

B-M— Assault Uruts
SWM 6—72

LAYING AMBUSHES

6—72. Occupying the position.—a. To ambus1 a pursuing force.—

In t.he event a combat patrol wishes to ambush a hostile force

known to be following over the same trail, it must proceed well

beyond the ambush position selected. At a suitable point, such as a

stream, it is led off the trail and counter-marched, parallel to, but

clear of the trail, until it reaches the reverse slope immediately in

rear of the selected ambush. The. men then move individually, as

carefully as possible, into their firing positions and remain motionless.

b. To ambush a meeting force.—It is more difficult to lay a successful ambush against a meeting force than one which is pursuing.

unless the patrol leader is thoroughly familiar with the terrain and

has definite information of the approach of the hostile party. The

ambuscade must leave the trail some distance in advance of the.

selected position. It. then moves into firing position as before and

awaits the approach of the enemy. Any movement along the trail

in advance of the ambush will disclose its location by footprints, or

ot.her tell-tale signs.

c. NigiLt ambush.—In some. situations it. may be desirable to Occupy

an ambush position at night. This maneuver requires a definit'

knowledge of the terrain, and good. guides.

d. Ambush out posts.—An outpost must. be established at the point

the patrol leaves the. main trail to intercept and capture any person

traveling the trail who might inform the hostile force of the location

of the ambush.

e. Observation post.—An observation post should be established in

a. position that will enable the observer to give timely warning of the

enemy's appearance. The most desirable position is some distance.

from the ambush and in the direction of the enemy's approach.

f. Firing positios.—Ea.ch man should select a. good firing position

as close to the trail as is consistent. with complete concealment.

g. Tell-tale signs.—Every effort must be made. to avoid moving

foliage or earth for purposes of cover, shelter, or camouflage. The

keen eyes of the enemy may detect the turning of a leaf, the breaking of a twig, or the appearance of a handful of new dirt.

6—73. The ambush engagement.—a. The enemy approacltes.—As

the, enemy approaches the ambush, the men lie face downward and

remain motionless until the signal to "commence firing" is given. If

they raise their heads, the position will usually be. disclosed by the

outline of the heads or headgear. by movement, or by the reflection of

light from their eyes and faces. Too often, some man will become

so excited tha.t he cannot, resist. firing prematurely at the first enemy

he sees.

43
SWM 6—74

LAYING AMBUSHES

b. The eignal to eoimmence firing.—The patrol leader should give

the signal to commence firing. An excellent method of doing this

is by opening fire with an automatic weapon. He should be on the

flank toward the enemy, or in a commanding position that will enable him to observe the entire enemy force.

o. Actioi after opening fire.—Depeiiding upon the situation, the

heavy initial fire will be followed by an assault, a defense, or a

withdrawal.

6—74. Employment of infantry weapons.—Machine guns should

be sited to enfilade a portion of the trail. Trench mortars, hand

grenades, and rifle grenades are difficult to employ in an offensive

ambush because of the danger of such projectiles falling among

friendly assaulting troops. They are of value in defensive ambushes.

44
SWM 6—75

SECTION VIII

ATTACKING AMBUSHES

Par. Page

Mental preparation 6—75 45

Prearranged schemes if maneuver 6—76 45

Spirit of the offensive 6—77 47

Fire and movement 6—78 48

Authority of subordinates to act on own initiative 6—79 48

6—75. Mental preparation.—The principal objective of an offensive ambush is to take advantage of surprise. The closeness and

suddenness of the attack is supposed to disorganize and demoralize

the enemy. A necessary 1)1otection against, complete disorganization,

and possible demoralization, is to prepare the troops mentally for

the shock of ambush. They must be steeled to withstand a sudden

blast. of fire at close quarters and to react to it. in a manner that

will unnerve the enemy. To accomplish this, the troops must have

a thorough understanding of what is likely to happen if they are

ambushed.

6—76. Prearranged schemes of maneuver.—a. General.—Since

the, great majority of ambushes have certain similar characteristics,

the nature of an ambush attack can be anticipated. Usually there

will be a burst. of automatic fire from the front that. will enfilade

the column, combined with an attack from one flank. Both of these

attacks will be delivered at. short ranges and from positions located

in thick cover on commanding ground. With this situation hi

mind, the patrol can be indoctrinated with simple prearranged

schemes of maneuver to combat such attacks.

b. Action.s of the train ad train gua'rd.—(1) In the. event the

train is not under fire when the. engagement commences, it should

be closed up on the forward elements in the column. As soon as

closed up, or when endangered by hostile fire, the animals are driven

into positions affording cover or shelter. When possible, the animals are tied to trees to ptevent theni from running away. This

enables the train guard to use its weapons to protect the train, and

assists t.he native muleteers to control the train. In some' situations,

particularly where the area is heavily wooded, the animals tired,

and t.he enemy aggressive, the ration and baggage. animals are

abandoned until after the battle.

45

210—705 0 — 88 — 10 OL 3
SWM 6—76

ATTAOIcING AMI3 (TSHES

(2) Men leading animals carrying weapons an(l ammunition retain possession of them. In desperate situations, it may be necessary

to shoot these animals to prevent them from bolting into the enemy

positions.

(3) If heavy machine gulls or 81 mm. mortar units are attached,

to the patrol the crews take their loads from the pack animals and,

moving "by hand," prepare to go into action.

(4) The train guard keeps the muleteers and animals under control. It is assmb1ed under the train commander and is available to

augment the patrol reserve.

c. Patrol re&erve.—A patrol reserve should be withheld from the

initial action. An alert enemy may fire upon the leading elements

from one flank oniy and, once the patrol has been committed, launch

an unexpected attack from the rear or some other direction. As

soon as the hostile position has been fully developed, however, the

reserve may be employed to envelop his flank or as otherwi required

by the situation. In many situations the rear guard will constitute

the patrol reserve. Certain automatic. weapons should be definitely

assigned to the patrol reserve.

d. The rear guard.—If the patrol is ambushed from either flank,

the rear of the column becomes an exposed flank. The primary function of the rear guard is to protect this flank, and it. should not. be

committed to action until the situation makes it mandatory. The

rear guard commander may, if necessary, send, part of his unit, to

assist the train gua.rd in controlling the animals and native mulet.eers. If the rear guard constitutes the patrol reserve, it may be

employed after the train is secured and the train guard has been

assembled to assume the functions of the reserve.

e. Anticipated action against an attae1 fiom the front and a forward part of the rqht (left) flan.k.—In the majority of an ambush

the attack will be delivered against, the. front and foTward part. of

the. right (left) flank of the column. The point (advance guard)

and the leading elements of the main body usually are immobilized

by the initial burst of fire. They return the fire and act as a holding force, developing the hostile position. The rear elements of the

main body immediately maneuver to envelop and overrun t.he exposed hostile flank and capture the enemy's automatic weapons. As

the attack progresses, the hostile force will begin to withdraw, and

the point. (advance guard) and leading units of the main body will

be enabled to participate in the final assault of the position. The

46
SWM 6—77

ATTACKING AMBUSHES

patrol reserve may be employec[ to extend the envelopment in order

to intercept the enemy's line of retreat. rflle action of the rear

guard and train guard is as outliied above.

f. Anticipated action against an aztack from. the fro.t and entire

length of the rqht (left) flank.—(1) The point (advance guard)

builds up a firing line facing the enemy and makes a holding attack,

developing the enemy's position, until able to participate in the

assault.

(2) The main body advances the. attack as rapidly and aggressively as possible in order to penetrate the hostile position. When

the ambush is penetrated, a flank attack is delivered in. one or both

directions, overrunning and capturing the enemy's automatic

weapons. (3) The train guard builds up a firing line facing the enemy

and makes a holding attack, developing the hostile position, until

able to participate in the assault.

(4) Attached weapons, if present with the patrol, are unpacked

and put into action.

(5 Enlisted mule leaders secure. their animals under cover and

then assemble under command of the train commander as the patrol

reserve.

(6) The rear point builds UJ) a firing line facing the enemy and

makes a holding attack, developing the hostile position, until able

to participate in the assault.

g. Direction of flre.—WThen operating along winding, trails in

hilly country the selection of targets and direction of fire must be

well controlled to avoid killing or wounding friendly personnel.,

ii. The bole attack.—In certain theaters of small wars operations

there is the possibility that a patrol may be ambushed and rushed

from both sides of the trail by an enemy armed only with bladed

weapons. Such attacks are launched from positions located a few

feet from the sides of the trail. The use of rifle fire in the general

melee which results is fully as dangerous to friendly personnel as

to the enemy. The experience of regular forces which have encountered such tactics in the past has indicated that the bayonet

is the most satisfactory weapon to combat an attack of this nature.

6—77. Spirit of the offensive.—a. Troops engaged in small wai

operations must be thoroughly indoctrinated with a determination

to close with the enemy at the earliest possible moment. A rapid,

aggressive attack is necessary to overrun the hostile positions and

47
SWM 6—78

ATTACKING AMBUSHES

seize his automatic weapons. It often happens that some slight

movement, or the reflection of light from hostile wetpons, will disclose the location of an enemy. ambush before the first shot. has been

fired. If this occurs, immediate action of some sort is imperative.

To stand still, even momentarily, or simply to attract the attention

of the person next. in column, is usually fatal. If the individual or

unit who observes the ambush rushes forward immediately, not in

a straight line but in a. zigzag course depending. upon the nature

of the terrain, the enemy may break from his position. In any

event his opening burst of fire will be erratic and comparatively

ineffective instead of deliberate and well aimed. The rush should

be accompanied by a yell to warn the remainder of the patrol, which

will also disconcert. the enemy. This action is effective even though

the bayonet is not carried or fixed to the rifle, nor is it any more

dangerous than taking up a firing position near the trail which is

almost certain to be within the beaten zone of some hostile weapon.

It is analogous to the final assault which is the objective in every

combat.

6-78. Fire and movement.—a. If an immediate assault is not initiated against the hostile position, the ambushed patrol must seek

cover and engage in a fire fight. Even though the patrol is armed

with superior weapons and is better trained in combat. firing than

the enemy, it is at a disadvantage in a purely passive fire fight. The

hostile faces have the advantage of commanding ground and concealed positions. So long as they are not forced to disclose their individual positions by actual or threatened personal contact, they are

free to break off the engagement at any time. The eventual loss of

ground means nothing t.o the guerilla. If he can withdraw with

no casualties or only minor ones after delaying and harassing the

patrol, the engagement has been a success. The objective of the

patrol must be, therefore, to inflict as many casualties upon the enemy

as possible. This can be accomplished in a fire fight only if the spirit

of the offensive, with movement, is employed. During the fire fight,

members of the. patrol must move forward at every opportunity in

order to close with the enemy as quickly as possible, or make him

disclose his position so that he may become a definite target. The

culmination of the action is the assault, to overrun the enemy, capture. his weapons, and pursue him by fire to the limit of visibility.

6—79. Authority of subordinates to act on own initiative.—a.

Considerable authority must be granted all leaders to act independent.lv and on their own initiative. In the absence of orders, action on

48
SWM 6—78

ATTACKING AMBUSHES

the part. of the patrol's subdivision is Preferable to inaction. Subordinate leaders must remember that the action which they initiate.

should furnish mutual support in the action to the hostile. force.

b. Leaders must. make. every effort to gain direction and control of

the elements of their own units. They must not hesitate to influence

the action of subordinate leaders of nearby elements which have

become separated from the control of their iiornial superioi.

49

SWM 6—80

SEcTIoN IX

ATTACKING HOUSES. AND SMALL BIVOUACS

Par. Page

Attacking houses 6—80 51

Attacking sinai) bivouacs .. (i—Si 52

Destroyiiig captured bivouacs 6—82 52

6—80. Attacking houses.—a. In sniall war operations, it is frequeiitly necessary to seize individuals or attack hostile groups known

to be at a certain house. Although the task may appear to be simple.

it is often difficult to accomplish successfully.

b. The following instructions are generally applicable in planning

an attack against a house:

(1) Secrecy is essential. Relatives, sympathizers, or intimidated

natives lñay warn the enemy of the patrol's approach. In sonie

instances, they have been warned before the patrol cleared its home

station.

(2) The location of the house and the nature of the terrain surrounding it must be definitely known, either by personal reconnaissance, a sketch, or through the medium of a guide.

(3) The patrol should usually approach and occupy its position

under cover of darkness.

(4) Do not uso a larger patrol than necessary to carry out the mission. A large patrol is hard to control, difficult to conceal, and makes

too much noise.

() The approach must be made quietly and cautiously. Barking dogs often warn the inhabitants of the approach of the patrol.

(6) Utilize all available, cover.

(7) Cover all avenues of escape, either physically or by fire.

(8) Bayonets should be fixed. The patrol is sometimes unable

to open fire due to the presence of women, children, or unidentified

persons, or because of instructions received from higher authority.

(9) If the mission is the capture of the occupants and armed resistance is not expected, surround the house and approach it from all

sides.

(10) If the mission is to attack the house, and armed resistance

may be expected, the patrol must be located so that every side of the

building will be covered by fire. Particular care must be taken to

make certain that no member of the lMttrol will be in the line of fire

of any other individual in the patrol.

1St
SWM 6—81

ATTACKING HOUSES AND SMALL BIVOUACS

G—81. Attacking small bivouacs.—a. A successful attack on a hostile bivouac often has a more demoralizing effect thaii a defeat in

ordinary engagements.

b. Many of the instructions for attacking houses are applicable to

attacking bivouacs. In addition, the leader of a patrol making a

surprise attack oii a small enemy force in bivouac should be guided

by such of the following instructions as may be applicable in the particular operation:

(1) Secure a guide who knows the exact location of the bivouac.

If he is a reliable, friendly native, an effort should be made to have

him reconnoiter a good approach to the bivouac.

(2) RequirB the guide to make a sketch of the bivouac and its

approaches. This can be traced on the ground. The leader should

study it carefully, but should be prepared to find the actual situation

quife different from that expected.

(3) Attack with few men. A leader and two teams of four men

each is a suitable group for most situations.

(4) Arm the majority of the patrol with automatic or semiautomatic weapons.

(5) Leave the trail as soon as convenient and approach the bivouac

from unexpected direction. When in the vicinity of the bivouac,

approach slowly and cautiously.

(6) After sighting the bivouac, the leader should make a careful

reconnaissance of it. Determining the exact location of the principal groups of the. enemy force is generally difficult. When confident. of the location of the major portion of the enemy, the leader

builds up a final firing line.

(7) When the firing line is in position an(l prepared to open fire,

the leader orders the. enemy to surrender. In the event they refuse,

the leacle.r signals, "Commence Firing." All men direct their fire

into the. bivouac, firing rapidly, but semi-automatically.

(8) The possibility of an assault and a pursuit should be considered. but the lack of bayonets, the nature of the terrain over which

the enemy will flee, and the agility of the enemy, will often make

such efforts futile.

6—82. Destroying captured bivouacs.—The value of a bivouac as

a known enemy camp site should be considered before destroying it.

Guerrillas have a weakness for occupying camp sites they have previously found satifactory. particularly if shelters have been constructed. The burning of bivouac shelters rarely serves any useful

1)1rpose unless they contain military stores of some value.

52
SWM 6—83

SECTION X

STRATAGEMS AND RUSES

Par. Page

Rules of land warfare U—83 53

Clearing the station 6—84 53

Apprehending informers 6—85 53

Spies following a patrol _. 6—86 53

Guerrilla ruses and stratagenis. 6—87 54

6—83. Rules of land warfare.—Patrol operations always furnish

opportunities for the employment of stratagems and ruses; however,

such as are used must be in accordance with the accepted Rules of

Land Warfare.

6—84. Clearing the station.—A patrol should he able to clear its

stations without that fact being transmitted to the hostile forces by

their intelligence agents. The following methods may be used to

deceive the enemy as to the plans of the patrol:

(1) Having decided to attack a certain hostile bivouac, a rumor

is started among the. natives that the patrol is to march to some place

in the opposite direction. The patrol clears the town in that direction and eventually circles at some distance from the station and

marches towards the objective.

(2) Clearing the station late at night.

(3) The members of the patrol filtrate out of the camp during the

day or night and assemble at a rendezvous some clitance from the

station.

6—85. Apprehending informers.—Guerri 11 a ICS who live near

the garrison are a constant menace. While they are often suspected.

it is very difficult. to apprehend them in a guilty act. One way of

doing this is to establish sentinels on the trails leading from the station to the hostile areas. After the sentinels have reached their

posts, organize a patrol and allow word to be passed among the

natives that the patrol is clearing for the hostile area. This information may cause the informers to start for the enemy camp in order

to warn them, thus permitting the sentinels to intercept and detain

them for questioning.

6—86. Spies following a patrol.—Jlostile intelligence agents may

follow a patrol, but at. a safe distance. One. way to capture them

53
SWM 6—87

STRATAGEMS AND RIJSES

is to leave an outpost several hundred yards in rear of a selected camp

site. The men in the outpost take cover and capture any suspicious

persons following the patrol.

6—87. Guerrilla ruses and stratagems.—For purposes of protection, a careful study must be made of the ruses and stratagems practiced by the enemy, and the facts learned should be published for

the information of the regular forces concerned. Ruses and stratagems practiced in warfare between forces of irregulars, or by irregulars against regulars, include:

(1) Inveigling the enemy into an attack and pursuit and then,

when he is disorganized and scattered, make a violent counter-attack

A modification of this method includes abandoning animals and supplies and then, when the attacking force is more interested in booty

than pursuit, to counter-attack.

(2) A group of the enemy may retreat before the attacking force

and lure it into a carefully prepared ambush.

(3) Disguising themselves to resemble their foes, sometimes wearing a similar uniform.

(4) Having their men on service of security disguised like their

foes.

(5) On one pretext or another, to lure a small enemy force into

an exposed position and destroy it. Examples:

(a) Cutting a telegraph wire and then destroying the repair party.

(b) Raiding a community with a small group and then striking

the patrol sent to its relief with a stronger force.

(6) A guerrilla group surprised in an area may hide its firearms

and assume the appearance of a peaceful group of citizthis busy in

their fields or clearing trails.
SWM 6—88

SECTION XI

RIVER CROSSINGS

Par. Page

Introduction 6—88 55

Availability of means 6—89 55

Swimming 6—90 55

Bridges 6—91 56

Boats 6—92 57

Ferries 6—93 57

Fords 6—94 58

Rafts - 6—95 59

Crossing unfordable streams with usual infantry equipment - 6—96 59

Crossing horses and mules 6-97 63

6—88. Introduction.—a. The passage of a patrol across a stream in

small wars operations is similar to the passage of a defile. It should

be assumed that every crossing will be opposed by the enemy, and

necessary precautions should be taken to effect the passage with a

reasonable degree of safety. The security measures taken and the

tactics employed to force a crossing against opposition in small wars

do not differ from those of major warfare.

b. All streams act as obstacles to a greater or lesser extent. Some

means must be devised to get the troops and material across without disorganization and in condition effectively to resist an enemy

attack before, during, and after crossing. Crossing may be opposed

or unopposed. The probability of opposition is frequently the determining factor in the choice of a crossing site. Poorly adapted

sites may have to be used by the reconnoitering parties. Time is a

factor in every crossing and the means employed must be those that

will permit a crossing in the minimum of time to avoid continued

separation of the parts of the patrol by the river.

6—89. Availability of means.—Means of crossing may be divided

into fords, boats (including rubber boats of the collapsible variety),

rafts, ferries, permanent and temporary bridges, and swimming. It

may be necessary to make use of several or all of these expedients

for the classing of a body of troops with its supplies. It. may be said

that fording and swimming will be the normal means of crossing in

small wars operations.

6—90. Swimming.—Most unfordable streams, especially in small

wars operations, will have to be crossed, initially at least, by swim55
SWM 6—91

RIVER CROSSINGS

ming, until protection for the main crossing has been established on

the opposite bank. Most men will be incapable of swimming even a

short distance with their rifles, belts, and clothing and would be

helpless and naked when they landed on the opposite bank if they

discarded this equipment. Swimming is therefore usually combined

with some such method as the use of individual floats or rafts, or the

use of the few boats available, for the transport. of arms and supplies.

Such floats may assisL the swimmers in keeping afloat while crossing

relatively wide rivers. When the men land, they establish themselves in a position that. will protect the crossing, assist on the far

side in construction of bridges, ferries and similar means of getting

the remaining troops and supplies across, or proceed on their assigned

mission, which may be to drive an enemy detachment. from a more

suitable crossing place. Life lines may be stretched across the river,

one above and one below the crossing, as safety measures to prevent

men from being swept. away downstream by the current.

6—91. Bridges.—a. The construction of bridges for the passage of

tll arms requires considerable time and material, and a certain amount

of technical engineering training. Bridges are most useful at crossings on the line of communications and have the advantage of provicling a. permanent means of crossing a river. Only those forms of

bridges easily constructed with materials or tools available at the

bridge site will be considered here.

b. Felled tree.—Very narrow streams may be bridged by felling a

large tree across the stream, staking clown or otherwise securing the

ends, and then cutting off the branches above the water so that troops

can walk across. A line can be stretched as a handrail if necessary

from bank to bank over the fahlentree trunk.

c. Foot bridge of two or nwre trees.—W'here one tree will not reach

across the stream, two trees may be felled on opposite sides of the

stream, and their branches and tops secured together in midstream.

Lines should be made fast. near their tops before felling, and the line

snubbed to ot.her trees well upstream and eased downstream by the

ropes until the two trees intertwine. Then the tops should be securely

lashed together and the. branches cleared to provide a footpath over

the. tree. trunks. Stakes on either side of the felled tree trunks may

he used to strengthen this bridge. A third tree, felled so that its top

falls on the point where the other two meet in midstream, but at. an

angle to them, vill strengthen the bridge, as it provides a tension

member against the force of the current.

56
SWM 6—92

RIVER CROSSINGS

il. Floating bidges.—Floating bridges may be constructed of rafts

or boats, with planks laid across the gunwales. These boats should

be securely anchored or moored with their bows upstream. Sections of the bridge may be constructed and floated downstream into

place. It is desirable to have all the floats of about the same capacity, to avoid extra strain on the planks or other flooring. The

larger boats or rafts may be placed at greater intervals than the

smaller, to accomplish the same purpose. Rafts or floats may be

made of timber, casks, barrels or anything at hand that will float.

6—92. Boats.—a. In the countries in which small wars operations

usually occur, some native boats will be found in the vicinity of

river crossings which are too deep to be fordable. These will normally be of the dug-out type which are quite unstable, but unsinkable. Their capacity will range from small, two-man boats, to

bateaux of 30- or 40-man capacity. If the crossing is opposed, it is

desirable to have a sufficient number of boats available to execute

the crossing of the patrol promptly. If the passage is unopposed,

even one small boat will be found of inestimable value.

b. If no boats can be found in the locality, it is sometimes necessary to construct makeshift boats from available materials. In recent small wars operations, boards found in a local dwelling were

used to construct a 6- by 22-foot boat, caulked with gauze from the

hospital corpsman's kit. It was employed to ferry a patrol of 13

officers and men and 70 animals across a stream swollen with torrential rains which made the customary fording impossible. The

current was so swift that the use of a raft was impracticable.

c. Collapsible rubber boats, which can be carried by patrols iii

the field or dropped by aircraft in case of necessity, will probably

be used extensively in future small wars operations.

6—93. Ferries.—a. Ferries may be either "flying" ferries or "trail"

ferries, and in most streams the current can be used to propel them.

If the current is too sluggish, a "rope" ferry may be used; i. e., the

boat or raft is drawn across the stream by pulling on the rope or

by poling. "Trail" and "flying" ferries are propelled by the curient by holding the boat or float at an angle to the current, either

by means of ropes or by rudders, or even by paddles held in the

water. The angle and the speed of the current controls the speed

of the ferry, arid since the angle may be varied, the speed can also

be controlled.

b. Trail ferry.—A good trail ferry may be constructed in most

streams that are not too wide by stretching a rope or cable (several

57
SWM 6—94

RIVER CROSSINGS

telegraph wires twisted together will do for a small boat) across the

stream and rigging a pulley so that it will travel on this line ("sheer

line"). A line is then fastened to the pulley from the bow of the

boat. Some ferries, especially in slow streams, must be controlled

by a bow and a stern line ("maneuvering ropes") attached to the

pulley. By hauling in on the bow line and slackening the stern

line, or vice versa, the bow may be set at such an angle to the

current that the force of the current acting on the hull will cause

the boat to move across the stream. In a swifter current, where

the boat points more nearly upstream, a paddle may be held over

the downstream side at the stern, or a rudder may be used.

c. Flying ferry.—A flying ferry uses the same means of propu

sion, but in place of the "sheer line," there is an anchorage upstream

to which a long line is fastened from the bow of the boat., enabling

the boat to swing like a pendulum across the stream. The line is

supported by floats at intervals, so that it will not trail in the water

and slow up or even stop the ferry. In narrow streams it may be

possible to find a curve in the stream that will permit the anchorage

to be on land, but still above the center of the stream at the point

where the ferry crosses. An island is also a convenient location for

an anchorage. The cable must be long enough so that the ferry will

iiot have difficulty in reaching both banks.

d. Rafts a ferries.—Rafts may be used in all types of ferries, but

they should be so constructed that the current will act against them

efficiently, and so that they may be easily maneuvered but hard to

swamp.

6—94. Fords.—a. The requisites of a good ford are low banks, no

abrupt changes in depth of water, the bottom offering a firm footing

for men and animals and the current moderate. One of the first

duties of the reconnaissance parties of a patrol or larger detachment

on arriving at a stream is to reconnoiter for fords and bridges in the

vicinity, and when found, to test them and define their limits. Dangerous fords should be marked before use by the main body. Fords

that show signs of use are likely to be passable, but care must be taken

to allow for the height of the water above normal. This may be

ascertained by an examination of the banks, especially of the vegetation on. the banks and of small trails parallel to the water. When

fording swift shallow streams with native pack animals, each animal

should be led and not herded across. 'When the water is deep enough

to reach the pack, the cinch may be loosened and two men accompany

each animal, one on either side to raise the sugar, coffee, and similar

58
SWM 6—95

RIVER CROSSINGS

loads to their shoulders in the deep water. Rain in the uplands,

which are drained by rivers, may cause sudden floods. These floods

rapidly descend the rivers, and make it dangerous to use fords until

after the swollen streams subside.

b. Fords may be improved in very swift streams or during freshets.

by felling trees across the stream and lashing their ends together

(narrow streams only) or by fastening a line of floating obstacles

such as logs or barrels above the ford, to cut down the current, at

least on the surface. A life line should be stretched across the stream

for the crossing of large numbers of troops, and men should hold on

to this line. Crossings should be guarded by good swimmers and

by boats downstream if available, to take care of those who may be

swept off their feet or who may stray from the ford. Infantry may

ford a stream in a column of squads, by men in each rank holding

on to each other abreast. The distance between ranks is greatly

lengthened to avoid the increased resistance which might he caused

by partially damming the stream. Mounted men pass over the ford

in column of twos or files.

6—95. Rafts.—Rafts may be constructed of any materials that will

furnish sufficient buoyance, and which are available at or very near

the point of crossing. Many woods do not have enough buoyance

even when dry, and this is especially true of green hard woods.

cans with burlap or other cloth under the covers, to make them

wateitiglit, casks and barrels, gasoline drums and other containers

may be used to give buoyancy to a raft. In general the construction

of rafts to effect a crossing will be inadvisable except for the heavy

articles that cannot be conveniently crossed by other means. Rafts

drift more than boats, and must therefore be started across farther

upstream than boats. Rafts may be used for carrying equipment of

men who cross by swimming or for the assistance of those who do

not swim well enough. These individual rafts 'may be made of two

logs with a board or two across them, reeds bound together (Or bound

banana stacks), or inflated rubber bags. Large rubber bags have

been carried by patrols operating on or near the rivers. These bags

were made from coffee sacks by coating the sacks with crude rubber.

They were larger than seabags, and would hold one man's personal

belongings and equipment. When partially filled with air and the

mouth tied securely, they floated indefinitely, with sufficient buoyancy

to support a man in the water.

6—96. Crossing unfordable streams with usual infantry equipment.—-a. Recent experiments by the Philippine Scouts have resulted

59
SWM 6—96

RIVER CROSSINGS

in a method of stream crossing making use of little else besides the

equipment usually carried. This method is believed to be superior

to most methods of crossing by. swimming. It is suitable for crossing

in the face of opposition, its rapidity gives it great tactical value,

and should cut down casualties considerably.

b. The two-man rfie float.—This float can be prepared by two men

in 7 minutes. Tile two shelter halves (one on top of the other) are

placed on the ground, and the remainder of the two packs and the

clothing of the two soldiers are placed in the center of the canvas.

Now the rifles are placed (crossed to give rigidity) on top of the

packs and clothing. The float is completed by binding the 4 corners

of the outside shelter half to tile four extremities of the rifles by

means of the shelter tent ropes.

TWO-MAN FLOAT, USING PONCHO

60

FIGUR1 1.—First Stng.

Fiounj: .-—SFcond tIg&'.
RIVER CROSSINGS

SWN 6—96

"In a similar manner, using two 3-foot sticks or shelter tent poles

instead of rifles, a machine gun complete can be floated in a shelter

tent." ("Infantry Journal" for March and April, 1933.)

c. In the construction of the above float, bayonets are attached to

rifles, with the scabbards on, to give greater length. A very little

untying will make the rifle available to the man after landing on

the opposite side since slip knots are used. As no additional materials are required this method is suitable for almost any stream crossing, even for deep fords, and is available to detachments who must

go up or down the stream to make a land attack on forces opposing

the use of a ford or ferry. Canvas is more nearly waterproof if

wetted before making up the float.

d. UBe of poncho in two-man float with hoie8hoe rolls.—

(1) A method of constructing a. two-man float using ponchos anti

the equipment usually carried in small wars operations was developed

at the Marine Corps Schools along the lines stated in subparagraph

b above, and has met tests satisfactorily. The float is made up of

the rifles, ponchos, and shelter tent guy ropes. It contains: the

horseshoe rolls consisting of one blanket, spare suit of underwear,

toilet articles, food, the cartridge belts, canteens., haversacks, and

61

Fiuuiti L—Fin!shed float.

FIGUIU 4.'—Cioss section of float.
SWM 6—96

RIVER CROSSINGS

bayonets of two men, as well as their clothing and shoes which they

remove. The horseshoe roll has the poncho on the outside of the

blanket with the shelter tent guy rope used for lashing.

(2) To make the float.—(a) Remove the ponchos and shelter tent

guy ropes from the horseshoe roll. Fold the poncho the long way

with the head hole at the side, and lay it flat on the ground.

(b) Lay the two cartridge belts on top of the center of the

poncho, ammunition pockets down, so that one bayonet and one

canteen will be on each side.

(c) Lay the horseshoe rolls on top of one another on the cartridge

belts with their long dimensions parallel to the longest side of the

folded poncho. Buckle the two cartridge belts around both rolls and

slip the end of each bayonet under the other cartridge belt to hold

the sides of the bundle rigid. See Diagram No. 1.

(d) Take the haversacks and place them on edge in the space

in the center of the horseshoe rolls. Men remove their shoes and

place one pair on each side of the bundle so as to build out the sides.

(e) Lay the two rifles, crossed to form an X, on top of the bundle

with their ends pointed at the four corners of the folded poncho.

Lash the rifles where they cross, with a waist belt to hold them in

place. See Diagram No. 2.

(f) Theii the two men, starting at opposite ends of the same rifle,

fold the corner of the poncho up over the rifle, end, and wrap the

sides of the poncho corner up around it, lashing the ponch around

he rifle end with one end of the shelter tent guy rope.

(g) The two men, next pass to the other rifle and wrap its ends in

the two remaining corneis of the poncho, lashing them in place with

the bight of the shelter tent guy rope. The remaining end of the

rope is then lashed to the next rifle end so that the float will be held

in place by lashings between all four rifle ends. Care should be

taken to wrap the corners of the poncho around the rifle ends and

lash them so than water will not enter the float readily if one corner

clips under. Diagram No. 3.

(h) Place the other poncho, folded twice, over the top of the

equipment in t.he float and tuck the sides down around the edges of

the equipment.

(3) When making up this float, stow the equipment and lash

the rifles, in such a way that the float will be regular' in shape,

fiat on t.he bottom, and not too high, so that it will float on an

even keel and not tend to upset easily. The two men swimming

62
SWM 6—97

RIVER CROSSINGS

with the float should be on opposite sides of it. and use a side.

stroke to swim, leaving one hand free to guide the float. If desired, the men can take turns pushing the float, ahead of them with

both hands, the float keeping their heads out of water while they

paddle with their legs.

(4) Trained men need about 5 minutes to make these floats, exclusive of the time they spend removing their clothing. Care should

be taken in lashing the float to use slip hitches that can be removed

quickly when the line is wet, so that. the rifles can be used instantly

once the river is crossed.

(5) Similar larger floats may be improvised, by using wall, etc.,

tent flies with the upright poles or ridge poles.

e. Other canvas fioats.—All canvas floats should be wide enough

to prevent their capsizing easily, and the loads should have sufficient.

bulk in proportion to their weight so as to give buoyancy to the

whole float. A light frame of boards or sticks will help in the

case of heavy articles. Patrols and larger detachments may easily

carry extra line for use in establishing lifelines for crossing streams,

for starting animals into the water, etc., by wrapping about 30 feet

of line, one-fourth inch in diameter, about a man's body just below

the belt. (Many natives habitually carry such a line on their bodies

when contemplating crossing streams.) Stronger lines may be carried by patrols using pack animals carrying the lines as top loads.

These lines serve as picket lines during halts, and may be used in

the construction of ferries. Extra canvas may be carried in the

form of tent flies, which are used to construct floats, and as shelters

for galleys or other purposes in camp. The inclusion, of these few

pounds of extra equipment may actually increase the. mobility of a

patrol. If strong vines grow near the river, they may be used as

ropes in lashing trees together to obstruct the current, in lashing

rafts together, as lines for small flying ferries, or as life lines. It

is presumed that all patrols will include some machetes in their

equipment when operating in the small wars situations.

6—97. Crossing horses and mules.—a. A stream that is too deep

to be crossed by fording presents a very serious obstacle to a unit

which includes riding or pack animals, and particularly so if the

unit be operating in hostile country. Horses and mules can ford

with relative ease streams that are difficult if not impossible to ford

by men on foot. To cross animals, their cargo loads and equipment over a stream too deep or too swift to be forded is an opera63
SWM 6—97

RIVER CROSSINGS

tion to be undertaken only when the situation permits of no other

course of action. The difficulties of such a crossing increase with:

(1) Width of the stream.

(2) Swiftness of the current.

(3) Size of the command (No. of animals).

(4) Slope of the banks, particularly on the far side.

(5) Hostile opposition encountered.

The width and the current are difficulties which are correlated.

For any given width of stream, the animal will be carried farther

downstream as the current is increased and likewise for any given

current, the animal will be carried farther downstream as the width

is increased. Since some animals will naturally swim faster than

others, they will arrive on the far bank dispersed over a wide front.

This front will sometimes be several hundred yards wide. When

the animals arrive on the far bank, they must arrive at a point

where the bank is not too steep or the footing too poor for them

to get out of the water. Many horses will be drowned if a good

landing place of suitable slope, width, and footing is not available

on the far bank. Unfordable streams have been and can be crossed

by single riders and by very small patrols but even the most daring

and boldest leaders have hesitated to cross such streams. Many of

the smaller streams rise and fall very rapidly. The unit leader

should bear this in mind. Frequently it will be advisable to increase the rate of march so as to arrive at a crossing before an

expected rise, or to decrease the rate so as to take advantage of

an expected fall before crossing.

b. 'When the patrol includes riding or pack animals, these are

usually taken across the strea.m by swimming. Mounted patrols in

small wars usually cross by swimming with full equipment. Sometime the saddles and all equipment except the halter and smtffie

bridle are removed and ferried across by boat or raft, and the rider

removes most of his clothing. Pack animals are unpacked and unsaddled. The rider then mounts and rides the horse into the water

at a point well upstream from a good landing place on the other

side: The reins should be knotted on the neck, and only used

when necessary to turn the horse, and before the horse gets beyond

his depth in the water. Horses that are unwilling to take the water

may be. ridden behind other horses or tied behind boats or rafts.

WThen.the horse enters deep water, the rider slides out of the saddle,

64
SWM 6—97

RIVER CROSSINGS

or off the animal's back, and hangs onto the mane or halter on

the downstream side, keeping low in the water and stretching out.

Care must be taken to avoid being struck by the horse's front feet.

and not to throw the animal off balance by putting too much weight

on his head and neck. A swimming animal may be easily guided

across a stream and prevented from turning back by the rider resting slightly forward of the withers and pushing the horse's head to

the front with either hand if he attempts to turn. If the horse

gets too excited, it may be necessary to release the halter or mane,

and then catch the horse's tail and hold on. The horse should be

kept headed upstream, especially in a swift current. c. A much quicker and easier method of swimming animals is to

her(T them across, but animals not trained or practiced in swimming

are often difficult to herd into water, and often turn around and come

back when halfway across. (Herding should not be attempted in

a swift current.) Sometimes the appearance of a few horses or mules

on the opposite bank will help to start the herd across, and those

which are seen to turn back in midstream may be kept out of the

herd and crossed individually later. Some animals will have to be

forced into the water. This may be done by passing a strong line

across the rump of the animal and manning each end, a good rider

then mounting the animal, and having a long lead line pulled by a

man in a boat or on the other side of the stream. In dangerous

streams it may be necessary to run a strong line across, and have a

lead of at least 10 feet long tied to a pulley or sliding ring on the

line and tied to the horse's halter with two leads of smaller line

on the ring from each bank. The horse is then put into the water,

head upstream, and drawn over to the other side by men pulling

on the line and by the horse swimming. The ring is then drawn

back for further operations. If the ropes do not fail, no horse can

be washed downstream, and if done promptly, none should be in

danger of drowning, as the tendency of this pulley method is to

force the horse's head up. Sheer lines for trail ferries may be used

in this manner, but it is usually more economical to lead the horse

behind the ferry. A few difficult horses may be crossed by simply

carrying a line from the horse to the other side of a narrow swift

stream, holding it at a point upstream from the landing, and letting

the horse swing across the stream and land on the other side (as is

described in par. 27—7 e, for Flying Ferries). As this requires more

65
SWM 6—97

RIVER CROSSINGS

trouble than any of the other methods, it should be used only when

there are few such difficult animals, and when other methods fail.

d. Mounted Marines should be thoroughly trained in swimming

their mounts and in fording. Practice of this kind makes the anim1s

willing to enter the water, and saves much time in emergencies. 'With

light equipment, mounts may be crossed by swimming with the

saddles on. The ant1e roll aids buoyancy rather than detracts

from it.

66
SWM 6—98

SECTION i\I1

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Par. Page

Trail cutthig 6—9S 67

Night operations 6—90 8S

6—OS. Trail cutting.—a. Some situations will require the cutting

of trails through wooded terrain. One cutter at the head of a small

column will suffice. 'When it is desirable to open a trail for pack

animals, there should be three or four cutters.

b. The leading cutter is charged with direction. In general the

trail will follow a compass azimuth, with necessary variations to the

right and left as determined by the terrain features, the ease of

cutting, etc. As a prerequisite to trail cutting, the patrol leader

must have a general knowledge of the area, the direction of flow of

the more important stream lines and the intervening ridge lines, the

distance to his objective and its general direction from the point of

orIgin. A fairly accurate map, an airplane mosaic or a previous air

reconnaissance over the route would be of inestimable value, but

probably none of them will be available. Native cutters should be

employed, if possible, and they can usually be relied upon to select

the best and shortest route. This does not relieve the patrol leader

of his responsibility of checking the general direction of the trail

from compass bearings.

c. The second cutter widens to the right, the third to the left, and

so on depending upon the number of cutters and width desired. If

time trail is to be used. by mounted inch, a second group of cutters

should follow the first, increasing the height of cut. All cutters

should be equipped with suitable machetes. The cutters have a

fatiguing task and should be relieved after from 10 to 30 minutes,

depending upon the speed of movement desired, the thickness of the

underbrush, and whether native or enlisted cutters are employed.

The speed of cutting will vary from an eighth of a mile per. hour

for a large trail through the worst sort of jungle, to a mile or more

an hour for a hasty trail through lighter growth. The heaviest brush

will be found in the miver bottoms, while the ridge hues will usually

be comparatively open.

67
SW1VI 6—99

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

6—99. Night operations.—a. Generai.—Niglit operations present

in general, the same problems that are associated with such operations in major warfare.

b. Night marche.—Night marches are extremely exhausting for

both men and animals. The rate of march is approximately half that

of a day march. The distances between men and subdivisions in the

column will have to be less than during day operations. In heavily

wooded terrain, a night march is impossible on a dark night unless

artificial lights are used. When marching over bad trails on clear

or moonlight nights in such terrain, it will be necessary to march

slowly and with only comfortable walking distance between men

and subdivisions. Night marches are practicable, and desirable under some circumstances, when conducted over known trails. They

are of very doubtful value if made over routes which are being

traversed for the first time.

c. Night attack8.—A night attack, to be successful, implies an accurate knowledge of the location and dispositions of the enemy, of

the routes of approach, and of the terrain in the viciiity of the hostile position. Each man participkting in the operation should wear a

distinctive white arm band, or other identification marker. A night

attack should be an assault only, with the bayonet. Indiscriminate

firing by the attacking force is fully as dangerous to friendly personnel as it is to the enemy. The problems of control are greatly increased. The favorable outcome of an attack is so doubtful that this

operation should be attempted only after the most careful consideration. These remarks do not apply to attacks that are launched at

dawn, but only to those that are made during the hours of darkness.

0

68
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER VII

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published in

15 chapters as follows:

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

1.1. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGiSTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

Vi. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED 1)ETACBMENTS.

Viii. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVJATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATIONS.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

III

RESTRiCTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER Vii

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

Par. Page

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 7— 1 to 7— 4 1—2

II. CARE OF ANIMALS 7— 5 to 7—20 3—17

III. PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALL 7—21 to 7—30 19—24

IV. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS 7—31 t 7—49 25—36

V. HASTILY ORGANIZED MOUNTED

PATROLS 7—50 to 7—52 37—39

V

SWM 7—1

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

Par. Page

Purpose 7—1 1 Use of animals an expedient .. 7—2 1 Need for training in animal care and employment .. - -- 7—3 1 Some difficulties in employing animnals - - -. - - ..... .... 7—4 2

7—i. Purpose.—This chapter is designed to present in convenient

form the minimum information required by Marines to procure and

handle pack and riding animals in the theater of operations, to organize temporary and permanent mounted detachments, and to set

forth the uses, limitations, and characteristics of such detachments

in small wars. Exhaustive treatment of the subject of animal management, training and conditioning of animals and men, and mounted

tactics, is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, sufficient detail is included to provide the basic essentials necessary for the successful handling of animals in the field. If the principles enunciated

in this chapter are applied in small wars, many of the difficulties

associated with the employment of animals will be obviated.

7—2. Use of animals an expedient.—The use of animals in small.

wars by the Marine Corps is a move necessitated by expediency. The

tables of organization of the Marine Corps do not include animals

for any purpose whatever, but the probable theaters of small-wars

operations present transportation and tactical problems which usually

require the use of animals for their successful solution. In those

theaters where animal transport forms a basic part of the. native transportation system, it generally will be found necessary for Marine

Corps forces to employ animals, at least for transportation of supplies, and, generally, to some extent, for mounted work.

7—3. Need for training in animal care and employment.—The

value of animals for military purposes is directly proportional to the

skill.and training of the personnel charged with their handling. It

is therefore essential in our small-wars operations that considerable

attention be devoted to the manner in which animals are handled and

employed and to the proper training of personnel.

1
SWM 7—4

INTRODUCTION

7—4. Some difficulties in employing animals.—a. The employ..

ment of animals by Marine Corps units should be attended by careful

planning, intensive training, and close attention to detail. The difficulties and responsibilities of an officer commanding a unit employing

animals are multiplied and such commander must realize these responsibilities and make proper preparations to overcome these

difficulties.

b. Some of the handicaps which must be faced by units employing

animals are—

(1) Lack of personnel experienced in handling animals and animal

equipment.

(2) Lack of the necessary specialists, i. e., horseshoers, veterinarians, stable sergeants, pack masters, etc.

(3) Absence of any animal-procurement or remount service.

(4) Necessity for subsisting animals off the country due to practical difficulties of providing an adequate supply of grain and forage

to units.

(5) Lack of personnel experienced in the tactical handling of

mounted units.

(6) Possible necessity for transporting animals to theatre of

operations.

0
SWM 7—5

SECTION II

CARE OF ANIMALS

Par. Vage

Knowledge of animal management requireth 7— 5 3

Nomenclature . . - 7— 6 3

Identification 7— 7 3

Duties of officers charged with care of animals.. 7— 8 8

Rules for handling animals 7- 9 8

Stables and corrals 7—10 9

Grooming 7—il 9

Forage 7—12 9

Principles of feeding 7—13 10

Watering . 7—14 10

Conditioning 7—15 ii

Management of animals on the march 7—16 11

First-aid treatment 7—17 14

Communicablediseases 7—18 16

Care of the feet 7—19 17

Veterinary supplies 7—20 17

7—5. Knowledge of animal management required.—Successful

handling of animals in the field demands at least a limited knowledge of the basic principles of animal management. This subject

includes a general study of the framework and structure of the horse

and mule, the colors and markings, feeding and watering, grooming,

conditioning, first-aid treatment of diseases and injuries and care of

the animal's feet.

7—6. Nomenclature.—a. The regions of the horse and mule are

shown in plate No. 1 (p. 4).

b. The principal bones and joints of a horse and mule are shown

in plate No. 2 (p. 5).

c. All officers and noncommissioned officers charged with the handling of animals should be thoroughly familiar with the matter contained in these 2 plates as they constitute what might be called the

"nomenclature" of the military animal. All members of regularly

organized mounted detachments and men in charge of pack animals

should be instructed in this "nomenclature."

7—7. Identification.—a. There are certain prominent and permanent characteristics by which an animal may be identified. These

characteristics are, color, markings, and height. A proper cxecution

of the animal descriptive card (Form NMC 790) required by article

21—2, MCM., necessitates a familiarity with these characteristics.

3

210—705 0 — 88 — 11 OL 3
SWM 7—5

CARE OF ANIMALS

-J d_ .J

I4
CARE OF ANIMALS

b. The colors of horses and mules are shown below:

(1) Black is applied to the coat of uniform black hairs.

(2) Chestnut is a medium golden color.

SWM 7—7

z

.4-4 0

0

-I

0

0I

(8) Bay is a reddish color of medium shade. Black points.

(4) Brown is the color of the coat almost rusty black and distinguished therefrom by the reddish coloration around the nostrils,

elbows, flanks.

5
SWM 7—7

CARE OF ANIMALS

(5) Gray is applied to a coat of mixed white and dark colored hairs,

about equal in numbers.

(6) Mouse is an ash gray shade resembling the color of the mouse.

(7) White is an absence of pigment. Skin is white. N.M. C. 1000500 DESCRIPTIVE CARD OF PUBLIC ANIMALS Place or organization

Data of purchase

Date of rcceipt

Horsje: Riding. Drieing. or Draft

Mule: Dnjt, PacI, or Riding Hoof No Name Sex Age — years Weight — Color Height — h.ends Inches Rentarks. . SPECIAL DESCRIPTION

SERVICE

(I) Tranafeired from —

(Orgsuisstioss

(Pita) (Dote)

to

(OtisaissIlts)

(Pita) IDol.) Quartermaster (2) Transferred from

Ornz(sst)ou)

(Pb.a) (Dots)

to

(OtflttiasOa)

(riser) (Dote) Quartermaster (3) Transferredfrom (OrgsoI.stsoo) (Pius) (Oslo)

to

(Oresuisst)on( (Pfli (Dots) — Quartermaster (4) Transferred from — —

(0ruiatIsa)

(Pitt.) (Dots)

to

(Orcs,itatioo)

)Pisce) (D.to)

Quartermaster —- FINAL DISPOSITION

Died 19._.,at Cause — Surceyed. condemned, and sold .... 19

at Price. $ —

r.. Remarks:

- .—.. .5. nt

(8) Roan is applied to a coat composed of red, white, and black

hairs, usually red and white on body with black mane and tail.

(9) Buckskin is applied to a coat of uniform yellowish colored

hairs.

(10) Piebald is applied to the coat divided into patches of white

and black only.

6

4.-out
SMW 7—7

CARE OF ANIMALS

(11) Pied Black, Pied Bay, and Pied Roan are terms used to designate the patched coats of white and black, white and bay, or white

and roan. If the color other than white predominates, the term pied

should follow the predominating color, as black pied, bay pied, or

roan pied.

(12) Dapple is prefixed to the designation of any color when spots

lighter or darker about the size of a silver dollar overlay the basic

color.

c. The following are the principal white or other contrasting hair

markings found on horses and mules:

(1) White Hairs is a term used to designate a few white hairs on

the forehead, at the junction of the neck and withers, on the shoulders,

the coronet, over the eyes, etc.

(2) Star designates a small, clearly defined area of white hairs on

the forehead.

(3) Race designates a narrow stripe down the face, usually in the

center and further described as "short" when it does not reach the

nose.

(4) Snip designates a white mark between the nostrils.

(5) Blaze designates a broad splash of white down the face. It is

intermediate between a Race and White Face.

(6) White Face means that the face is white from forehead to

muzzle.

(7) Silver Mane and Tail designates the reflection of white in these

appendages.

(8) White Pastern means that the white extends from coronet to

and including the pastern.

(9) Quarterstocking means that the white hairs extend from coronet to and including the fetlock.

(10) Halfstockirig designates that. the leg is white from the coronet

to an inch or two above the fetlock.

(11) Three-Quarterstocking means that the white hairs extend to

midway between fetlock and knee or hock.

(12) Full Stocking designates the leg white to or including the knee

or hock.

(13) Cowlick is a term applied to a tuft of hair presenting an inverse circular growth. They are permanent distinguishing characteristics, which should be recorded.

(14) . Black Points means black mane, tail, and extremities.

(15) Ray designates the dark line found along the. back of some

horses, and many mules.

7
SWM 7—8

CARE OF ANIMALS

(16) Cross designates the dark line over the withers from side to

side.

(17) Zebra Marks designates the dark, horizontal stripes seen upon

the forearm, the knee, and the back of the cannons.

d. The height of horses and mules is expressed in "hands." A hand

is 4 inches. The animal is measured by first placing him on level

footing and causing him to stand squarely on all 4 feet. The perpendicular distance from the highest point of the withers to the

ground is then measured with a stick that is graduated in hands and

inches.

7—8. Duties of officers charged with care of animals.—a. Officers

having animals attached to their units should keep them in such training and health as will enable them to do their work to the best advantage. This requires careful instruction of the men in the treatment,

watering, feeding, grooming and handling of animals, and such continuous supervision and inspection by officers as will insure that. these

instructions are understood and carried out.

b. Officers in charge of animals should know the symptoms and

treatment of common diseases, first aid treatment of injuries and

should be familiar with the principles of horseshoeing. This information can be obtained from TM 2100—40, "The Horseshoer."

7—9. Rules for handling animals.—a. All men connected with the

care and handling of animals must be taught, and must thoroughly

understand, the following rules for the care of animals:

(1) Animals requirB gentle treatment. Cruel or abusive treatment reduces the military value of animals by making them difficult

to handle.

(2) When going up to an animal speak to bun gently, then pproach quietly.

(3) Never punish an animal except at the time he commits an

offense, and then only in a proper manner—never in anger.

(4) Never kick an animal, strike him about the head, or otherwise

abuse him.

(5) Never take a rapid gait until the animal has been warmed by

gentle exercise.

(6) Animals that have become heated by work should not be allowed to stand still but should be cooled down gradually by walking.

(7) Never feed grain or fresh grass to an animal when heated.

Hay will not hurt a heated animal.

(B) Never water an animal when heat'4 unle;s the maicit or ex—

(rcise is to be immediately 1PSliflm(t1.

8
SWM 7—10

CARE OF ANIMALS

(9) Animals must be thoroughly groomed after work.

7—10. StabIe and corrals.—Stables need not be provided in tropical climates, if some type of shed is available for protection from

rain. If stables are used, they should be well ventilated, but without

draughts. Stalls should be so constructed that the animals can lie

down in comfort. Stables must be well drained, and stable yards

and corrals must be so situated that even heavy rains will drain off.

Sand is a good standing for animals, either in stalls or corrals. A

corral should have a strong fence and gate, and have some shade,

either natural or artificial, at all hours of the day. A manger should

be provided if grain is to be fed. It is highly desirable to have water

available at all times in corrals.

7—11. Grooming.—a. Thorough and efficient daily grooming has a

very close relation to the good condition which is so essential in

animals being used in military operations. Proper grooming aids

greatly in maintaining the skin of the anima.l in a healthy condition,

prevents parasitic skin diseases and infections, and reduces to a great

extent the incidence of saddle sores.

b. The following points are important in the proper grooming of

animals:

(1) The currycomb should not be used on the legs from the knees

and hocks downward, nor above the head.

(2) First use the currycomb on one side of the animals beginning

at. the neck, then chest, shoulders, foreleg down to the knees, then

hack, flank, belly, loins and rump, the hind leg down to hock. Pro-

(,eed in similar manner on the other side.

(3) Next brush the animal in the same order as when currycomb

was used except that in brushing legs go down to the. hoof.

(4) In using the brush, stand well away from the animals, keep

the arm stiff, and throw the weight of the body against the brush.

(5) The value of grooming is dependent upon the force with which

the brush is used and the thoroughness of the work.

(6) Wet animals should be dried before grooming.

(7) The feet should be cleaned and the shoes examined.

(8) Sponge out the eyes, nose, and dock.

(9) Officers and noncommissioned officers should, by continual and

personal supervision, see that the grooming is properly done.

7—12. Forage.—Forage can be conveniently divided into two

classes.; roughage, including such types as hay, grass, sugarcane tops,

leaves of trees, etc., and grain, including such as oats, corn, and Kaffir

corn. Grain is not necessary to the animal's existence if he is doing

9
SWM 7—13

CARE OF ANIMALS

no work, but for military animals is a concentrated energy-producing

food, which enables the animal to do the sustained work required of

him. It requires much more time for a horse or mule to eat enough

grass or hay to support life and keep in condition than if the roughage is supplemented with a reasonable amount of grain. An economical method of feeding is to make the fullest possible use of

pasture. Bulk is an essential for the diet of horses and mules. Concentrated foods, no matter how nourishing, cannot alone maintain

an animal in condition. An unlimited supply of grain cannot take

the place of roughage.

7—13. Principles of feeding.—a. The following principles of feeding are the results of long experience and should be adhered to as

closely as the circumstances will permit:

(1) Water before feeding.

(2) Feed in small quantities and often. The stomach of the

horse and mule is small in comparison with the rest of the digestive

tract and therefore cannot digest large feedings. Three or more feedings a day are desirable.

(3) Do not work hard after a full feed.

(4) Do not feed a tired horse a full feed. Failure to observe this

principle frequently results in the most severe colic, in laminitis

(feed founder), or both.

(5) Feed hay before grain. This is not necessary for the first feeding in the morning because hay has been available all night and has

therefore taken the edge off the animal's hunger.

7—14. Watering.—a. The following rules for watering should be

adhered to:

(1) In corrals it is desirable that animals should have free access

to water at all times. If this is impossible animals should be watered

morning, noon, and evening.

(2) Water before feeding, or not until 2 hours after feeding.

(3) Animals may be watered while at work but, if hot, they should

be kept moving until cooled off.

(4) On the march the oftener the animals are watered the betters

especially as it is not. usually known when another watering place

will be reached.

(5) In camp, where water is obtained from a river or stream,

nuimals must be watered above the place designated for bathing

and fur washing clothes.

(6) Animals should be watered quietly and without confusion.

10
SWM 7—15

CARE OF ANIMALS

7—15. Conditioning.—a. Condition as applied to animals used fOr

military purposes means health, strength, and endurance sufficient to

perform without injury the work required of them.

b. Good hard condition is the best preventive against loss of animals from any causes except accidental injury. The importance

of proper conditioning cannot be overestimated. More animals are

incapacitated or die in military operations from lack of proper conditioning than from any other cause. This is especially true in those

countries where native animals are procured locally. As a general

rule, such horses or mules are of the grass-fed variety accustomed

to working 1 day and grazing the next 3 or 4 days.

c. There is only one way to condition animals, whether they are

required for riding, pack, or for draft. The only method is a

judicious combination of sufficient good feed, and healthful work,

continued over an extended period. The transformation of fat.,

flabby flesh into hard, tough muscle cannot be forced. A regular

program of graduated work is the only way to accomplish it. Some

animals require longer periods of conditioning than others depending upon their age and the amount of previous work they have performed. Individual attention to each animal is required in conditioning. All work should be light at first. and gradually increased.

7—16. Management of animals on the march.—a. Without condition, it is impossible for animals to undergo the fatigue and exertion

incident to any prolonged effort. When military necessity requires

the marching of uncondition animals, unless the situation is such as

to override all thought of loss, the space and time must be comparatively short, otherwise exhaustion, sore backs, and sore shoulders

will shortly incapacitate the majority of t.he animals and the mobility and efficiency of the unit will be very greatly reduced. From

the viewpoint of the animal's welfare, the length of the march is to

be estimated not only in miles but also with regard to the number

of hours that the load has to be carried. This latter consideration

is frequently the more important of the two. Particularly does this

latter consideration apply to pack animals. The advance of a column

in small wars is sometimes as slow as 1 mile an hour and even less.

Under such circumstances a short march may, in reality, demand

extreme endurance of the animals in the column.

b. Prior to starting, a special inspection of the saddles, packs,

harness, and shoeing should be made to insure that all is in order.

After the halt for the night all animals and equipment. should be in11
SWM 7—16

CARE OF ANIMALS

spected, necessary treatment and repairs made, and all gear placed

in order so as not to delay the hour of starting in the morning.

c. With any considerable number of animals in the column, it is

seldom advisable to start before daylight except for purely military

reasons. In the dark, feeding and watering cannot be satisfactorily

handled; saddles, packs, and harness may not be properly adjusted

and it is practically impossible to properly inspect the adjustment

of equipment. Many sore backs will result from saddle blankets

and pads being improperly folded in the darkness. Night marches,

with any considerable number of animals in the column, will prove

most difficult. and unsatisfactory unless the personnel is thoroughly

experienced in handling, saddling, bridling, and in packing animals.

d. A first halt should be made after being under way for ten (10)

or fifteen (15) minutes to allow men and animals to relieve themselves. At this time, equipment is adjusted, the girths tightened

and an inspection made to insure that the saddles, packs, and harness are all correct. This halt is most important, especially for the

purpose of rechecking the saddling and packing. Subsequently a

short halt of about 5 minutes should be made hourly. At each halt

each man should look over his animal, examining the feet and the

adjustment of animal equipment and loads. Noncommissioned

officers should be indoctrinated to enforce this inspection.

e. Animals should be watered within reason whenever an opportunity occurs, especially on hot days. The principle of watering

before feeding is of course adhered to on the march but, if a stream

is crossed an hour after feeding, they may again be allowed to

drink if circumstances permit the delay. Bits, especially the curb, should be removed when it is intended to give a full watering.

While watering, overcrowding must be preveited, and plenty of time

given every animal to drink his fill. Groups of animals should conic

up to the watering place together and leave together. If they are

moved away individually, others cease drinking and try to follow

them. At the end of the day's march it is best to relieve the anirnal.s of the weight of their equipment without delay and before

watering.

f. Feeding of animals on the march in small wars has always been

a difficult problem. On an extended march it is very difficult to

keep animals in condition. The problem of providing sufficient

forage requires constant attention and is one that will tax the ingenuity of the leader of any column containing a considerable number of animals. The first step in the solution of this problem is to

12
SMW 7—16

CARE OF ANIMALS

indoctrinate thoroughly the marine in the principle that the animal

under his care is going to suffer if he does not think of and for

his animal on all occasions. It must become a matter of simple

routine for him to care for his animal at every possible opportunity.

At every halt, if it is at all possible, he must permit his animal to

graze. Many standing crops provide excellent filler and may be

used for feeding the animals, or if circumstances permit, a sufficient

quantity may be cut and carried to provide for the next halt.

•g. Feed bags should be provided for animals for the purpose of

feeding grain on the march. The feeding of grain from the. ground

is not only highly wasteful but is the frequent cause of severe colic.

These. bags can be used for carrying grain on the march by filling

them and securing the open end. They are generally carried attached to the pommel of the saddle on riding animals and as a top

load on pack animals. A supply of corn or other grain along the

trail should never be passed without refilling the empty feed bags.

Wit.h the feed bag, the principle of feeding little and often can be

adhered to with greater facility. The best type for military use is

that at present issued by the Army. If no feed bags are available

they should be improvised from canvas or other durable material.

h. It. frequently will be possible to halt for the night at places

where small enclosed pastures are available. If such be the case the

animals should be permitted to graze throughout the night. It

will, of course, be necessary to provide an adequate pasture guard

to prevent the seizure or destruction of the animals in case of a night

attack. When possible a site within or adjacent to a suitable enclosed pasture should be selected. Otherwise ground flat enough to

provide level standing for a suitable length of picket line should be

selected. Marshy ground should be avoided if possible. A nearby

water supply suitable for men and animals is essential. It should be

as near the camp as possible but some sacrifice may have to be made

in this respect in order to occupy a position suitable for night. defense. In some areas it will not be possible to graze animals at night.

In such cases some form of restraint must be used.

4 The most satisfactory method of securing animals at night "is

to secure. them to a picket line raised 3 or 4 feet above the ground.

This line should be stretched taut between trees suitably spaced or

between other suitable supports. After the animals have been secured to the picket line it is essential that a man be kept on watch

to prevent the animals from becoming entangled and injuring themselves. Hay, tall grasses, sugarcane, etc., should be procured and

13
SWM 7—17

CARE OF ANIMALS

placed within reach of the animals along the line as it will make

them stand more quietly and provide them with nourishment.

7—17. First-aid treatment.—a. The evidence indicates that in

small wars casualties among animals have occurred in the following

order of frequency:

(1) Wounds and injuries. (Pack and saddle injuries account for

most of these.)

(2) Loss or want of condition and exhaustion.

(3) Intestinal diseases. (Colic.)

(4) Contagious diseases.

b. Loss or want of condition, and pack and saddle injuries, account

for the bulk of the losses in small wars. 1hese are to a large extent

preventable. While the athmal is fit and in condition, hardship and

exertion can be borne without injury, but the unconditioned animal

soon becomes unfit and a handicap because of injury or disease. The

prevention of injuries and disease is far more important than their

treatment. And particularly so as there are no veterinarians available. Injuries and emergency cases must be dealt with in a. commonsense manner. If veterinary service is obtainable it. should be

utilized.

c. The healthy animal stands with the forefeet square on the

ground; one hind foot is often rested naturally. The pointing, or

resting of one forefoot or the constant shifting of the weight on the

forefeet indicates a foot or leg ailment. The pulse of the healthy

animal is thirty-six (36) to forty (40) beats per minutes; the respiration at rest nine (9) to twelve (12) per minute; the temperature

ninety-nine (99) to one hundred (100) degrees Fahrenheit. The

temperature is taken by placing a clinical thermometer in the rectum

for about three (3) or five (5) minutes. The droppings of the

healthy animal should be well formed but soft enough to flatten

when dropped.

d. Loss of appetite, elevation of temperature, accelerated breathing, listlessness, dejected' countenance, stiffness, profuse sweating,

nasal discharge, cough, diarrhea, pawing, excessive rolling, lameness, reluctance to move, and loss of hair or intense itching are some

of the most common indications of disease. e. Pressure on the back will often cause swellings, which by further

rubbing and pressure become open sores. While unbroken, swellings

may be cured by removing the pressure and soaking with cold water

packs. If the animal is to work, fold or cut awa.y the saddle pad

14
SWM 7—17

CARE OP ANIMALS

so that the place is left free. If open, saddle sores, like other

wounds, must be kept clean and flies kept out of them.

f. Wounds will heal naturally if they are kept clean and well

drained. Almost any grease that is unappetizing to flies will help

to heal the wound. Screwworms and maggots, the larval form of

certain flies, are frequently found in wounds. Lard with a little

sulphur mixed in it is usually available. If the ingredients can

be obtained, the following mixture will keep the flies out of wounds:

1/ ounce creolin.

1 ounce linseed oil (or oil of tar).

10 ounces olive oil (or salad oil).

If close inspection shows the presence of worms or maggots, or

if there is a t.hin reddish discharge from the wound or sore, the

following treatment is indicated: swab out thoroughly with a soft

cotton swab dipped in creolin. The edges and especially the lower

edge where the wound drains should be greased, to prevent burning

by the creolin or the spreading of the sore by the discharges coming

in contact with the skin. This treatment will kill the worms or

maggots and they will slough off with the dead flesh. All wounds

should have some opening through which they may drain, at the

lowest point in the wound, and grease should be used to prevent

the drain causing running sores. Pus in the feet is drained off

through the sole, and treated like any other wound.

g. Colic is the term given to the symptoms shown by animals with

abdominal pains. This pain nay be caused by any of numerous

conditions. The predisposing causes are: small size of stomach compared to the size of the animal and capacity of digestive tract, and

inability of the animal to vomit. The chief exciting causes of colic

are:

(1) Over feeding.

(2) Feeding or watering exhausted animals.

(3) Feeding wilted grass.

(4) Sudden changes of food.

(5) Working hard after a full feed.

(6) Lack of sufficient water.

(7) Eating hay or grain on sandy soil.

(8) Eating mouldy hay or grain.

(9) Eating green grain.

(10) Intestinal tumors, abscesses, etc. h. The symptoms of colic are uneasiness, increased perspiration

depending upon the degree of pain, pulse and respiration accelerated,

15
SWM 7—18

CARE OF ANIMALS

pawing, turning head towards flanks, lying down, sometimes rolling

and rising frequently, and excessive distension of abdomen.

i. A compliance with the principles of feeding and watering as

set forth in this section will reduce the incidence of colic to a minimum. Prevention is far more important than treatment, and therefore it is most important that the principles of feeding and watering

be adhered to closely. Military necessity may sometimes prevent a

strict adherence to these principles.

j. Bed down a space with hay or dry grass and tie the animal with

just enough shank to allow him to lie down comfortably. In ordinary cases give one aloes ball or the following drench: raw linseed

oil one (1) pint, turpentine one (1) ounce; if not relieved repeat

the drench in 1 hour. Induce the animal to drink but withhold food

until the acute symptoms subside. ,. Any ordinary long-necked bottle properly wrapped to protect

it from breaking may be used in giving a drench. The animal's

head should be raised until the mouth is just slightly higher than

the throat to provide a gravity flow to the throat. The neck of the

bottle is inserted in the side of the mouth and a small amount of

the drench administered. This must be swallowed before more is administered. Repeated small amounts are administered in this way until the required amount has been given. If the animal coughs or

chokes his head should be immediately lowered to prevent strangling.

7—18. Communicable diseases.—a. Prevention is again the prime

aim. Proper conditioning and seasOning, plenty of wholesome food,

good grooming, and protection from undue exposure to the elements

and mud, keep the animals strong and in such a state of health that

they can resist considerable exposure to infection. When a disease

appears among a group of animals, there are certain rules of procedure. that have been found absolutely necessary in c.hecking the

spread to healthy animals and in stamping out the disease. These

measures are:

(1) Daily inspection of all animals in order to detect new cases.

This insures the prompt removal of the sick as a source of infection

and the initiation of the proper treatment or destruction.

(2) Quarantine of exposed animals.

(8) Isolation of sick animals.

(4) Disinfection of infected premises, equipment, and utensils.

b. The treatment of the various communicable diseases of the

horse and mule are beyond the scope of this chapter.

16
SWM 7—19

CARE OF ANIMALS

7—19. Care of the feet.—Animals that have to travel over hard

and stony roads should be shod, at least in front, to prevent excessive

wear of the horn of the hoof. On soft going and in pasture, shoeing

is neither necessary nor desirable. Shoes should be fiat, without

caiks, and should fit the outline of the hoof. When the hoof wears

too much, the animal goes lame, but a rest in pasture allows the hoof

to grow again. Shoes left on too long do not permit the natural

growth and wear of the hoof, and they should be removed from

animals which are expected to remain out of service for a considerable time. A properly fitted shoe allows the animal to stand fiat on

a level floor without strain. Neither commercial shoers nor members of the detachment should be allowed to cut. away any of the

sole or frog or to rasp or trim the outer surface of the hoof. The

thick callous of the frog and sole protects the animal's foot from

bruises, and the compression of the frog circulates the blood through

the foot. The natural varnish of the outside of the hoof retains the

moisture in the hoof, and keeps it from rotting. Hoofs should be

cleaned out at grooming time and before starting out., to make sure

that there are no stones or small sticks caught in the hoof between

the frog and the sole. Feet should be inspected by riders and drivers

at each halt.

7—20. Veterinary supplies.—Standard surgical and medical supplies for the treatment of common ailments are obtained by

requisition to the quartermaster or in emergencies from the medical

department. (See art. 21—5, MCM.) In small wars where any considerable number of animals is employed, it is highly desirable that

Stable Sergeant's Veterinary Chests, supplied by the Medical Department, U. S. Army, be requisitioned in sufficient number. These

chests are quite complete and contain sufficient medicines and

instruments for all ordinary veterinary cases.

11

SWM 7—21

SECTION III

PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALS

Par. Page

Necessity for local purchase 7—21 19

Procurementagents 7—22 19

Native dealers 7—23 20

Purchasingfromnativedealers 7—24 20

Minimum specifications for animals 7—25 20

Héightqualifications . -- 7—26 20

Age qualifications 7—27 21

Examinationfor soundness 7—28 22

Markingofpurchasedanimals ... .. 7—29 24

Use of United States bred animals in small wars 7—30 24

7—21. Necessity for local purchase.—a. Animals have seldom

been transported with expeditionary forces to the theater of operations. Mounted detachments and pack transportation have been employed only in those areas where horses and mules were used locally

and in which the supply of animals was reasonably adequate. A careful study of the theater of operations should indicate whether the

type and number of animals available will be adequate for the military

needs in that particular area. For special operations and for special

cargo loads the type of animal procurable in the theater of operations may not be suitable. In some operations it has been necessary

to bring into the occupied country United States bred mules for use

in transporting pack artillery. Present pack artillery weapons cannot be broken down into loads sufficiently light to be transported on

mules weighing much under 1,000 pounds.

b. The great majority of animals used iii small-wars operations will

probably be procured within or near the theater of operations. This

section will deal, therefore, primarily with the problem of procurement in the theater of operations.

7—22. Procurement agents.—a. While procurement is primarily a

supply or quartermaster function, the general practice has been to

authorize units in the field to procure their own animals. Under this

system the quartermaster has simply set a maximum price and advanced the necessary funds to the unit commander in the field and he,

or an officer appointed by him, has acted as the purchasing agent.

While this system is frequently necessary to provide animals quickly

19
SWM 7—23

PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALS

for immediate use in the early stages of the operation, it has the effect

of rapidly running up the price of animals due to the fact that there

will be a number of purchasing officers in the market competing for

the more serviceable animals.

b. As soon as practicable, it is advisable to establish a single procurement agency with the function of selecting, purchasing, distributing and accounting for all animals procured by the Force. This

should be done with a view to providing a better selection of animals,

to facilitate accountability, and to effect a saving in animals and in

money.

7—23. Native dealers.—It is well to utilize native dealers in procuring animals. The average cost per head thus will possibly be

higher than it would be otherwise but this is offset by a saving in

time and energy. Moreover, the native dealer will know where the

desired types are to be found. It is most essential however, to convince the dealer at. the outset. that he must deliver for inspection only

such animals as conform to the minimum standards.

7—24. Purchasing from native deaiers.—The purchaser of native

animals should determine by thorough inquiry what prices have been

usual among the natives for the best types of animals. Although

economy in expenditure of government funds may be temporarily

subordinate to military necessity, it is never wise to pay excessive

prices for animals.

7—25. Minimum specifications for animals.—a. All animals delivered for inspection as saddle animals or pack animals should have

all of the following qualifications:

(1) Be reasonably sound.

(2) Have been worked under pack or been ridden enough to require little or no further training.

(3) Be mature; immature animals are useless for military purposes,

no matter how sound they may be.

(4) Be of the size required for the purpose for which intended

this should be fixed only after careful consideration of the types and

capabilities of the mounts available, but it will be found unprofitable

to go below the minimum, once fixed.

(5) Be as nearly as possible in condition for use; it is not necessary

to require that an animal be in perfect condition, but he should be

able to carry his load the day of purchase.

7—26. Height quaiifications.—In most small war theaters the

native animals are undersized according to United States standards.

Moreover, the average size varies somewhat in the various countries.

20
SWM 7—27

PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALS

An average as low as 13.1 hands has been used in past expeditions.

The purchaser can soon determine, however, a fair average in height

from observation of the animals he finds in use. He should then set

a height standard and use this in his selection as the first step in

eliminating undesirable animals from the herd the dealer is showing.

7—27. Age qualifications.—a. The dealer should be given definite

age limits, as a guide toward satisfactory animals. Six to twelve

years is the most satisfactory period. The animal under 6 years of

age cannot endure the exertions and privations incident to taking the

field. Since few matured native animals can be found that will not

show the white hairs and scars of sores and injuries, the purchaser

will be strongly tempted to choose immature animals in order to

obtain animals free from blemishes.

b. It is better to choose older horses because they will generally

have become thoroughly broken. This factor is most important at

the outset because the majority of men detailed to handle them will

have had little recent practice with animals.

c. The twelve (12) front (incisor) teeth afford the. easiest and most

reliable means of determining the age of a horse or mule. These

teeth consist of six uppers and six lowers and, from side to center,

are known as the "corners," "laterals," and "centrals." The horse

(mule) has two sets of teeth:

(1) The temporary or colt teeth which are cast off when the permaiient teeth erupt. This shedding of the temporary teeth begins with

the "centrals" at about the age of three and is completed when the

"corners" are shed at about five years.

(2) The permanent or second set of teeth. The permanent teeth

have all erupted and are in wear at the age of 51/2 years. The temporary teeth can be distinguished from the permanents by their

milk-white color. The permanent teeth stain ve.ry quickly and generally have the dull appearance of old ivory.

d. The incisor tooth in cross section is shown below

IABLE SURFACE

PULP CAVITY

E.D33 tNCISOR TOOTH OF HORSE

21
SWM 7—28

PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALS

e. Wear of the incisor teeth. The principles of age determination

from 6 years upward are based primarily upon the wear of the.

incisor teeth. The tooth attains its greatest length the second year

after eruption. During the succeeding years, teeth do not grow but.

undergo a regular process of destruction from wear and from the

receding of the bony socket margin. As the tooth wears down, the

cup finally disappears. The table surface of the tooth changes from

oval to triangular and finally becomes rounded.

f. Some of the more important means used in age determination

are:

(1) Loss of temporary teeth and eruption of the permanent teeth.

This has been completed at the age of 5.

(2) Disappearance of the cups. All cups have disappeared at

8 years.

(3) Shape of table surface of teeth. At 10 to 12 years the centrals

and laterals are triangular. At 16 to 20 the table surfaces are round

or fiat. from side to side.

(4) Angle of incidence. The angle of incidence between the upper

and lower incisors becomes more and more acute as the age increases.

(5) Space between the teeth at the gums increases as the animal

grows older.

g. Procedure in determining the age. The angle of incidence and

the presence or absence of temporary teeth should be noted. The

mouth should then be opened and the teeth examined for cups and

the shape of the table surfaces noted. The lower incisors are more

reliable as a guide than the uppers.

h. The following classifications are listed:

(1) Animals under 1⁄2 years; temporary teeth present; permanent

teeth erupting.

(2) Animals between 5 and 8 years; cups present, table surfaces

oval; angle of incidence about 1800; all teeth are permanent.

(3) Animals over 8 years; absence of cups; table surfaces triangular or round; angle of incidence more acute; space between teeth

at. the gums begins to show as the animal gets older. Old horses

begin to show gray hairs around the eyes and nose, and the depressions over the eyes become more sunken.

7—28. Examination for soundness.—-a. The examination for

soundness should be as thorough as the circumstances, the availability of trained men, and the knowledge of the buyer permit. However, the average officer can buy horses and mules without, having

had any special training, if he uses gàod judgment and buys what he

00
SWM 7—28

PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALS

considers to be sound animals. The following points a.re suggested

as guides, and will assist the inexperienced horse buyer until he

acquires experience:

(1) Observe the horse at a halt, noting whether he. is very lean

or obviously crippled.

(2) Examine the head and neck. Check for blindness by looking

at the eyes and by passing the hand suddenly over each eye in turn.

If the horse does not blink, he is blind in that eye. Pass the hand

over the head and face, and see if there is evidence of any sores or

injury. See if the mouth and nostrils look healthy, and if the animal

breathes freely.

(3) Examine back, noting scars or sores caused by packs and

saddles. Many animals will be found with scars, but these need not

be rejected, if the scar tissue. appears to be healthy. In many cases,

animals without them will turn out to be young and untrained, and

actually less desirable. All animals with actual puffs and sores

should be rejected.

(4) Examine the legs. If any variation in symmetry between the

legs of a pair be found, it is safer to reject the animal unless you

know enough to differentiate between temporary and permanent

disabilities. Legs should be reasonably near to the same vertical

plane, fore and aft, and the animal should put. his weight on all of

them. Joints should not be swollen.

(5) Examine feet. The feet and pasterns should not be sore to the

touch. There should be plenty of horn on the hoofs, and they should

not show any split or crack. The frog should rest on the ground,

but since it is quite usual to pare the frog and sole, do not reject on

this account, but trust the frog to. grow later. Examine the coronet

and press it with the fingers. A prick in the sole. of the foot will

sometimes result in pus breaking through at this point. (just above

the horny part of the foot).

(6) Examine. the hindquarters, sheath, tail, anus, etc.

b. Animals which have passed these tests should be segregated from

those already rejected and those awaiting examination. If no serious and obvious defects have been noted, and the animal has a general

healthy appearance, an alert bearing and a reasonable amount of flesh,

then have him led on a loose rope directly away from you and then

directly toward you, at the walk and trot. If the animal is lame or

has badly formed legs, this will usually be apparent. A lame animal

"favors" the lame foot, adjusting his weight so as to put very little

weight on it. Since his head is his principal means of doing this,

23
SWM 7—29

PROCUREMENT OF ANIMALS

YOU will see his head drop as he puts the sore foot down. If all feet

are lame, the animal will trot very short and reluctantly. Most

lameness is in the feet.

c. Have each animal saddled and mounted, and ridden for a short

distance, to demonstrate that he can be handled. Do not require

that a horse have any particular gait, except the walk, as many of

the best will have been gaited in a way not suitable for military

purposes, but which may be changed by training. The bargaining

may well be begun now. Have the animal worked at a trot or

canter for a few minutes, to see if he appears to have good wind. In

this connection, the animal with a broad muscular breast is to be

preferred to one with a very narrow breast, as its wind is usually

better.

7—29. Marking of purchased animals.—As soon as an animal has

been purchased, the animal descriptive card (Form NMC 790) required by article 21—2 MCM should be completely and accurately

filled in showing all markings and pertinent data and he should be

immediately branded. The customary method is to brand the animal

on the left shoulder with the letters "U. S." (See par. 7—7

IDENTIFICATION.)

7—30. Use of United States animals in small wars.—When it is

necessary to transport United States animals to the theater of operations, a period of recuperation and acclimatization after the sea travel

will be necessary. The unnatural environment and the lack of adequate exercise incident to sea travel debilitate animals to an extent

dependent upon the length and character of the voyage. After a

period of recuperation and acclimatization, and after the animals

have become gradually adjusted to any changes of food necessitated

by the local forage supply, they should thrive practically as well as

the native animals. The larger United States bred animal, being

required to carry a greater load, requires a greater quantity of

grain and roughage to keep him in condition. Such losses in United

States animals as have been suffered in the past operations have

been due principally to lack of feed and to unskilled handling.

24
SWM 7—31

SECTION IV

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

Par. Page

Value of mounted detachments 7—31 25

Basisfororganization 7—32 26

Amounted rifle company 7—33 27

Machine-gun and howitzer units 7—34 27

Animals formounted detachments 7—35 28

Sparemounts 7—36 28

Assignment of mounts 7—37 28

Horseequipment 7—38 29

Individualequipment 7—39 29

Arms and ammunition 7—40 30

Packequipment 7—41 31

Training, general 7—42 31

Training for specialists 7—43 31

Time required for training 7—44 32

Combattraining 7—45 32

Tactical uses of mounted detachments 7—46 32

Conduct of mounted patrols 7—47 33

Combat patrols 7—48 34

Ambushes 749 35

7—31. Value of mounted detachments.—a. It is reasonable to expect that small-war operations of the future, like those of the past,

will require the use of mounted detachments. The value of

mounted detachments will depend upon the nature of the terrain, the

character of the resistance, the extent of the operations, and, finally,

the missions assigned to them.

b. The nature of the terrain has a direct bearing upon t.he value

and use that is to be made of mounted detachments. The. more open

flat and rolling terrain is more favorable for the successful employment of mounted detachments. As the country becomes more

mountainous, more given to jungle growth or marsh lands the general use of mounted detachments becomes less practicable. Furthermore, the more unpopulated and uncultivated areas are less favorable

for the general use of mounted detachments. As the country is

more given over to waste lands it becomes increasingly difficult to

maintain mounted detachments in the field.

c. (1) The character of resistance encountered will have considerable effect both on the general effectiveness of mounted detachments

25
SWM 7—31

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

and on the manner in which they should be employed. If the enemy

tends to retain a well organized unity, the mounted detachment can

be employed by attaching it to the force or column sent in the field to

destroy this resistance. If, on the other hand, the enemy retains

no definite organization but uses guerrilla tactics the mounted detachment can be best employed as an area or district reserve to be

available for independent action on special missions. Again, in a

situation where the enemy operates to any extent mounted, it may be

necessary to use mounted detachments in place of foot patrols for

regular combat patrolling.

(2) The effectiveness of mounted detachments also varies with the

type of armament in use by the enemy. Prior to the advent of

automatic weapons, mounts were of some value after contact was

gained. They could be used for shock action or for maneuver even

in the immediate presence of the enemy. The modern high powered

automatic weapon in the hands of small war opponents has made the

horse ot only of little use, but an actual handicap once contact

is gained. The mounted detachment is extremely vulnerable to ambush by guerillas armed with automatic weapons.

d. The more extensive the operations, the greater will be the value

of mounted detachments. If the operations include the occupation

of the seaports and a few of the important inland towns only, the

need for mounted detachments will be limited. As the operations

extend farther and farther inland and over wider areas, the need

for these detachments will become greater. e. Regardless of the individual efficiency of mounted detachments,

their value will depend upon their employment by the higher cornmandei's who assign them their missions; A thorough understanding

of the capabilities and limitations of mounted units and due consideration of the factors which affect their combat value, is required

for the proper assignment of missions to these units. The mounted

and foot patrols should be assigned missions that enable them to work

together and not in competition.

7—32. Basis for organization.—A definite basis for transition from

the normal dismounted organization to a mounted organization status

should be adopted. To this end the dismounted organization given

in Tables of Organization should be adopted as a basis for transition

with such obvious modifications as may be necessary. The conversion of an infantry unit to a mounted status requires more than the

simple addition of horses and equipment. The converted organization, even with the minimum of necessary modifications, presents diffi26
SWN 7—33

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

culties of training, administration, and tactical use. The officer

assigned to organize a mounted unit will find himself so beset with

unfamiliar details that the adoption of some system is practically

mandatory. The deficiencies which become apparent may be remedied as the organization progresses, without disturbing the general

scheme of organization.

7—33. A mounted rifle company.—Assume that a rifle company is

to be organized as a mounted detachment. The Tables of Organization provide for a company headquarters and three platoons of three

squads each. This organization is suitable for a mounted company.

The platoons are small enough, even though mounted, to be handled

in most situations by one officer. The addition of the necessary horses

and equipment, together with the additional training and upkeep

incidental to the transformation from dismounted t.o mounted status,

will require some essential changes in the enlisted personnel provided

in the organization tables. A stable sergeant, a horseshoer, and a

saddler, all being necessary for a mounted organization, must be

added to the company headquarters. It is also necessary to provide

about five drivers in company headquarters for the necessary kitchen,

cargo, and ration pack animals. The company should be able to

operate independently; it must therefore be organized to carry such

supplies as will enable it to remain away from its base for at least

3 days, which period can be taken as a minimum patrol period. For

longer periods away from the base provision will have to be made for

additional drivers, arrangements made for ration drops, visits to

friendly outposts planned; or for the unit to subsist itself off the

country, or some combination of these methods.

7—34. Machine-gun and howitzer units.—a. It is not contemplated that machine-gun companies or howitzer platoons will be

mounted as units in small war operations. Unquestionably, however, subdivision of such units will have to be mounted and attached to the mounted rifle detachments. The attachment of two

or more machine-gun squads to each mounted company will almost

invariably have to be made, and in some situations, it may be

necessary to attach 37 mm. and mortar sections. For this purpose,

it is simply necessary to mount the attached units with their weapons

placed in pack, the weapon crews acting as drivers for their own

weapon and ammunition pack animals.

b. It is absolutely essential that the attachment of these units to

the mounted companies be made as early as possible so that the

personnel and animals can be properly trained and conditioned for

27
SWM 7—35

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

their mounted duties. 'I'Iie attachment of these units will not require

additional specialists except )QsSibly one additional horseshoer per

mounted rifle company.

7—35. Animals for mounted detachments.—The better animals of

the occupied country will not be avaIlable upon landing. Great

effort and ingenuity will be necessary to obtain suitable animals in

sufficient numbers. The best animals obtainable will be necessary

for mounted organizations. The purchase of animals should be

undertaken as early as possible in order to condition the animals.

7—36. Spare mounts.—Mounted service in small war expeditions

is especially trying upon the mounts. Experience indicates that the

number of mounts should exceed the number of men authorized for

the organization by from 20 to 30 percent. The excess should furnish replacements for the lame, sick, sore-backed, wounded, or debilitated mounts, certain to develop in hard field duty. This figure

may decrease as men and animals become accustomed to each other.

and as the condition of the animals improves.

7—37. Assignment of mounts.—a. Every officer and man in the

mounted organization should be assigned a horse. Two horses for

each officer will usually be required. The assignments of horses

should be kept permanent. Changes should be made only upon the

decision of the organization commander in each case. Sickness and

injuries to animals will require changes froni time to time. Such

changes should be understood to be distinctly temporary. Men

whose animals are sick or injured should he temporarily mounted

from the spare animals of the organization.

b. The maintenance of animals in constant fitness for duty is one

of the most difficult tasks of the commander of the mounted organization. He cannot do this effectively unless he holds every individual under his command r&ponsible in turn for the animal he

rides. This individual responsibility most certainly will be evaded

by enlisted men if two oi more riders are permitted to use the

same mount.

c. In changing horses a definite loss in efficiency results because

the man who knows a certain horse will, as a rule, secure the best

performance from that. particular horse. Also a man will normally

become fond of his horse after he becomes acquainted with him.

This in turn prompts greater interest. in the welfare and training

of the animal.

d. It sometimes happens that. a certain man and a certain horse

will not get along well with each other. The commander of a

2S
SWM 7—38

M0EJNTEI) DETACHMENTS

mounted organization slIoul(1 be constantly on the lookout for such

a situation an(l, after assiiringluimself that. a bonn tide case of mutual

unsuitability exists, correct it by renssignment of mount and man.

e. The officers and the senior noncommissioned officers must have

the best horses available to the organization. Their duties require

them to exert their horses to a greater degree than is required of

men in the ranks.

7—38. Horse equipment.—a. The following is the minimum necessary equipment, one set of which, modified to suit the conditions of

the operations and its availability, is issued to each man:

1 saddle, McClellan.

1 blanket, saddle.

1 brIdle, with snaffle hit.

1 headstall, halter.

1 halter tie rope.

1 surclngle.

1 pafr saddlebags.

1 feed bag.

1 gruia bag.

1 currycomb (preferably one equipped with a hoof lIok).

1 brush, horse.

1 paIr spurs.

I pair suspenders, cartridge belt, 1)iStOl.

1 machete.

6. Grain and feed bags are. carried strapped to the pommel. rflte

reed bag shoul(l cover the filled grain t)ag. to piotect the grain frei:L

rain and from other animals chewing through the bag.

c. 'rhe snaffie bit is listed, bt the. curb bit may prove nwre. satisfactory for some horses.

d. The machete should be carried in a sheath attached to tlie saddle

on the off (right.) side, in a horizontal 1)OSitiOmI, hilt to the front. If

issue saddlebags are carried, it may 1)e necessary to attach the machet.e to the off (right) pommel and let it hang. The machetes are

not intended for use as weapons, but are provided for cutting trails,

clearing camp sites, building shelters, and even more important, for

cutting forage, such as grass and cane tops.

7—39. Individual equipment.—a. 'l'here are three general ways of

carrying emergency rations, mess gear, gl,oorning kit, toilet articles,

etc., each having certain advantages, all being practical, as follows:

(1) Saddlebags (standard equipment) are two large leather pockets, fastened together,in a size approximately to a full-sized cavalry

mount. rather thaii to a small horse. (mule) which fits on the cantle

of the McClellan saddle. As they are large, they imist not. be ove:-

29
SWM 7—40

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

loaded, thus preventing pressure on the anks and consequent chafing

of the stifles and hips.

(2) Use of infantry equipment as issued, but attach the blanket

roll to the saddle. The canteen should always be carried on the belt.

(3) Use of one or two NCO haversacks per man, fastened to the

cantle by their hooks through cantle rings. These may be placed one

on each side. This method carries much less than the saddle bags,

but is much easier on the horse, especially if he be short coupled.

b. A "cantle roll" will ordinarily be carried on patrol or on the

march. It should include those articles not needed until camp is

made for the night, which are not easily carried in the saddlebags.

Care must be taken that rolls remain small and light, and that the

weight is divided equally between the sides of the mount. The roll

should be smaller in the center, so that it may bend easily. It is

carried strapped up tight on the cantle of the saddle, the ends extending down about as far as the cantle quarterstrap D-rings, no part

of it touching the horse, but all its weight held up by the saddle.

The following list is not exhaustive, nor need all these things be

carried on every patrol:

1 blanket, wool.

1 pair socks.

1 suit underwear.

1 poncho.

1 mosquito net.

Canned rations may be placed in the ends of the roll, and will be

more easily carried there than in the saddlebags, especially if in

round cans. If the roll is carefully made up, and the opening formed

by the edge of the poncho turned so that it will not catch water, the

roll is rainproof and nearly waterproof.

7-40. Arms and ammunition.---a. The arms and ammunition carried by each man are regulated in the same manner and by the same

considerations as for dismounted troops. It will be noted that pistols and rifle scabbards have not been included in the minimum requirements for issue to mounted detachments. If the rifle scabbard

is issued, care must be taken that troops are so trained that there will

be no danger of their being separated from their rifles when they

dismount. The rifle scabbard has the disadvantage of interfering to

some extent with the seat of the rider and the normal action of very

small horses on rough going and at increased gaits, and hastening

rust under field conditions by retaining moisture. The rifle scabbard

should not be used in territory where contact is at all probable.

30
SWM 7—41

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

Mounted men should be armed with the bayonet and indoctrinated in

its use. The rifle, automatic rifle, and submachine gun may be carried by the mounted men slung in the same manner as they are

carried dismounted, or the butt may be rested oti the thigh, or the

rifle may be held by the right hand at the small of the stock, the

balance resting 011 the pommel of the saddle.

b. All grenades and other ammunition should be carried on the

persons, not only to save the horse ("live loads" are easier to carry

than "dead loads"), but also to have them always available in an

emergency. All such loads should be supported on the shoulders

of the man, carried high enough so as not to interfere with his seat

in the saddle; that is, nothing should extend lower than the bottom of his belt in front or rear. If the 54)-round drums for the

Thompson submachine guns are carried, some form of sling should be

provided for them, or they should be attached to tile left side of

the belt, to keep them off the saddle. Carriers for grenades should

be as high on the body as possible.

7—41. Pack equipment.—-The Phillips packsaddle, which is coming more and more into general use, should always be used by

mounted detachments if it is obtainable. This saddle can be used

at the walk, trot and, when necessary, at the gallop without injury

to the animal or derangement of the load. The mobility of the

detachment, therefore, is not reduced when accompanied by pack

horses using the Phillips saddle. If this saddle is not obtainable, a

special study of native equipment available will have to be made to

determine the type most suitable for military use. If the Phillips

saddle is used, the necessary hangars for weapons, ammunition, pack

kitchens, and other special loads should be obtained. (See art. 3—30.) 7—42. Training, general.—For the general training of mounted

detachments see LIT. S. Army Training Regulations 50—45. "The

Soldier; Instruction Mounted without Arms."

7-43. Training for specialists.—a. For the training of specialists

such as the stable sergeant, packmaster, horseshoer, packers, and

saddlers, the following publications should be referred to:

(1) Animal Management, the Cavalry School.

(2) FM 25—5, "Animal Transport."

(3) TM 2100—25, "The Saddler."

(4) TM 2100—30, "The Packer."

(5) TM 2100—40, "The Horseshoer."

(6) BFM, Vol. I, Chapter 3, "Equipment & Clothing, Mounted

and Dismounted Organizations."

31
SWM 7—44

I*.IOIJNTED DETACHMENTS

(7) Department of Agriculture Pamphlets. These give the names

and kinds of feed found in foreign countries, with their nutritive

ratio to oats, the form in which they are usually fed, and other

useful information.

b. All of the above except ANIMAL MANAGEMENT may be secured

by the Quartermaster from the Government Printing Office at from

5 to 15 cents per copy. The Department of Agriculture pamphlets

may be secured from that Department direct. In this connection,

application should be made for the pamphlet or pamphlets applicable

to the country in question.

7—44. Time required for training.—Sufficient time for thorough

training in all details will seldom if ever be available. The mounted

unit commander is usually ordered to be ready to take the field within

a short time after organization. 'Whate'er the situation, the

mounted unit commander must adapt his training schedule to the

time available. He makes every effort to secure a reasonable time

for training. Six weeks may be considered a minimum requirement

after the order for mounting is received. Failing this, he conducts

his initial operations in the field with due regard to the limited

training of his men and the conditioning of his animals.

7—45. Combat training.—The combat training of the mounted detachment cannot be neglected. This training is all important and

must be carried on concurrently with the mounted training. Since

the mounted detachment will habitually fight on foot its small wars

combat training will be practically identical to that of a foot patrol.

When contact is made the mounted unit will habitually dismount,

turn over its mounts to horseholders, and thereafter fight on foot.

The combat training of mounted. detachments should include numerous and varied combat exercises, which require the men to dismount

rapidly and without confusion and to go instantly into dismounted

action against a simulated or outlined enemy. Only by repeated

exercises of this type will the mounted unit become indoctrinated

in the schemes of action for combat.

7—46. Tactical uses of mounted detachments.—a. Some of the

tactical uses of mounted detachments are:

(1) For normal patrolling in pacified areas. Smaller numbers

of troops can patrol larger areas with greater facility when organized into mounted detachments. A show of force in these pacified

areas can be made almost continuously over wide areas and with a

small force by the judicious use of mounted detachments.

32
SWM 7—47

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

(2) As a mobile unit attached to a large combat column. The

commander of a large column in some small wars situations may

require a mounted detachment for the execution of special missions

such as distant reconnaissance to the front and flanks, escort for

evacuation of wounded, foraging, investigation of towns or district

along the route of march, etc.

(3) As an area or district reserve. Such a reserve can be used

for the accomplishment of special urgent missions such as the relief

of towns which have been attacked, the rescue of the personnel of

planes making forced landings in hostile territory, as an escort for

area and district commanders on inspection trips, and for other

special missions of a similar nature.

(4) To augment aerial reconnaissance.

b. From a study of the above tactical uses of the mounted detachment, it can be seen that it is not contemplated that the mounted

detachment will perform the normal patrol work in small wars. In

bush and jungle warfare where the situation is always vague and

the enemy never definitely located, the foot patrol is more effective

for combat patrols and particularly so when the enemy habitually

fights on foot. The foot patrol, whose primary combat training is

that of infantrymen, will give a better account of itself in this

type of warfare when contact is macic and such a patrol is far

less vulnerable to ambush. The superior mobility of the mounted

detachment means very little if there is no definite objective on

which to move. But there are special missions in most small wars

operations in which strong and boldly led mounted detachments,

well organized, trained and equipped, will be of great value. When

such detachments are available to a commander in a hostile area

they may be moved rapidly on a definite objective when aeroplane,

radio, or other communication or intelligence agency indicated its

use at a particular point..

7—47. Conduct of mounted patrols.—a. In country that is open

enough to permit marching at the trot, patrols may move at better

speed mounted than dismounted, and arrive at the destination or

point of contact with the hostile force, in better condition to fight.

A greater load can be carried without undue fatigue by the mounted

man than by the dismounted, but loads should not be such as to

cut down mobility. Over average dirt roads, with few steep grades

and with small horses in fair condition, a platoon should march

about 80 miles in 1 day, or 80 to 85 in 3 days. Longer daily marches

may often be made, but losses in condition must be made up by rest

33
SWM 7-48

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

after the march. These figrires will not be found accurate under all

circumstances, but falling much below them makes the mounting

of the men unprofitable, as seasoned infantry can move in small

bodies for limited periods at rates nearly approaching these.

b. Patrols required to remain out for long periods should take advantage of all facilities of friendly garrisons, SO S to preserve their

mobility. Sick should be. left at the first post passed through, supplies replenished if they can be spared by the garrison, and information exchanged at every opportunity.

c. Timely preparations should be made for any march, to insure

that men and animals are in the best condition possible, that the

required equipment and supplies are lwesent and loaded as required

and that provision is made for the care and evacuation of the disabled.

d. The strict observance, of march discipline is most essential in

mounted units. it is maintained only by frequent and rigid inspections by officers arid noncommissioned officers both on the march

and at all halts. rflie object of these inspections are:

(1) To keep equipment, especially saddles and packsaddles

correctly adjusted at all times.

(2) To require all riders to maintain the correct seat in the saddle.

Slouching in the saddle has a tendency to injure the animal's back.

(3) To maintain the prescribed gaits within subdivisions of the

column.

(4) To require all riders to dismount., when there is no need for

remaining mounted. This is especially important. A horse standing still, and with his rider sitting on him is not able to relax and

rest.

(5) To permit individuals to leave the column oniy in case of

urgent necessity.

(6) To police halting places and camp or bivouac areas.

7—48. Combat patrols.—a. Most patrols sent out in small wars

must be ready to accept combat, even if not sent out primarily with

the mission of seeking it. Usually psycl'iological considerations will

require that no patrol give ground, and patrols are habitually made

strong enough to repel expected attacks. Reconnaissance and other

special patrols, therefore, are considered with combat patrols, and not as requiring special formations. The essentials required of

mounted formations are the same as those of dismounted formations.

There must be adequate control by the leaders of parts of the patrol,

mutual support, power of maneuver must be preserved as long as

34
SWM 7—49

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

possible by holding out supports, and the patrol must be protected

from surprise from any direction. The principles of the dismounted

patrol formations may therefore be followed, modifying distances

and intervals to conform to the different capabilities of the mounted

man. For short distances, a horse can easily travel twice as fast

as a man, and thus support can be furnished from a greater distance.

b. When the point comes under fire, the men of the leading squad

should dismount at once and take firing positions. There will seldom be time for these men to secure their horses. Other squads, not

actually engaged, may have time and opportunity to secure their

mounts by having one man hold four of them, and it will sometimes

be possible, especially in patrols larger than two squads, for units

not engaged to make a mounted dash to a position from which they

tan make a dismounted attack on the enemy's flank or rear. Units

riot actually engaged should maneuver, either mounted or dismounted, to take the opposition in flank or rear, but always attacking dismounted. Actions of this type may be prearranged and

practiced, but must be kept so simple as to be flexible in application,

and must not permit any part of the patrol to go beyond effective

control of the leader without definite orders from him.

c. Distances are shortened in woods and lengthened in more open

country. Details for flank reconnaissance are usually arranged before the march is begun, so that a signal by the leader will be sufficient to start the reconnaissance.

d. Mounted patrol formations are identical with those of foot

patrols with the exception that allowance must be made for the

greater road space required by mounted units. For patrol formations, distribution of weapons, tactics, and other details see Infantry

Patrols, chapter VI.

7—49. Ambushes.—a. Many areas afford innumerable good ambush

positions. If all such positions are carefully reconnoitered by

mounted patrols operating in such areas the rate of march will be

reduced to that of foot troops. The mounted detachment when employed on an urgent mission requiring rapid movement on a definite

objective avoids being ambushed not so much by cautious movement

and careful reconnaissance as by rapid and secret movement and by

radical changes of direction to deceive the enemy. The mounted

unit leader, for this reason, must have as thorough knowledge of the

terrain as possible and must have the best guides obtainable.

b. The above paragraph is not to be construed as relieving the

mounted detachment con ImnhI(ler of ti ie responsibi I ity of pi.oviding

210—7050—88—12: 0L3
SWM 7—49

MOUNTED DETACHMENTS

reasonable security for his column when on the march and of carefully investigating any position which he has reason to believe is

occupied. If the attack be from a flank on the center of the column,

the leading and following elements do the maneuvering, and the

attack is still normally driven home on the flank or rear. The horses

of the elements caught in the initial burst. of fire will generally have

to be temporarily abandoned. Tired horses will not stray far and

those not wounded or killed can be recovered as soon as the enemy

position is taken. The horses of elements not caught under fire

should be turned over to the appointed horse holders of the squad

who will get them under such eover as is available.

(V. .-) 0
SWM 7—50

SEcrIoN V

HASTILY ORGANIZED MOUNTED PATROLS

Par. Page

Definition afl(1 flses 7—50 37

Discussion . . - 7—Si 39

Type of aiiiinal to emploY 7—52 39

Other Detnils ... .... 7—53 39

7—50. Definition and uses.—a. Hastily organized mounted patrols

are units mounted for immediate. patrolling without prior training

in riding or animal care. This expedient has been resorted to fre—

quently in the past. Ii; usually suggests itself in areas where suit.-

able riding animals are available in considerable numbers. Whether

for increasing the mobility of the patrol, or conserving the strength

of the men, due consideration should be given to the advantages

and disadvantages of such procedure as indicated in this section,

prior to the adoption of this expedient.

b. The leaders of infantry units often err when they decide to

execute combat patrolling on mounts instead of on foot. Past operations have definitely indicated that there are certain advantages and

disadvantages of hastily organized mounted patrols. Some of the

considerations which bear upon the advisability of organizing hastily

mounted patrols are set forth below:

(1) The mounted patrol is more formidable in appearance and it

affords an easy way to make a display of force in fairly peaceful

territory.

(2) For a march of not over 1 or 2 days' duration and with suitable terrain, the hastily mounted patrol can travel more rapidly and

cover a greater distance than on foot.

(3) Mounted men cail, for short marches, carry heavier individual

loads than men on foot.

(4) A mounted man can give all his attention to observing the

terrain and looking for signs of the enemy. The mount will select

its own footing on the trail. A man on foot on bad trails must

spend much time looking at the trail to pick his route.

(5) A man Oil horseback presents a smaller target than a man

standing. His body appears shorter and is partly protected by the

horse.

37
SWM 7—50

HASTILY ORGANIZED MOUNTED PATROLS

(6) A mounted man is higher than a man on foot and he can see

farther, On some terrain his eyes will clear brush over which the

man on foot cannot see. This sometimes enables a mounted man to

dete3t a waiting enemy at a distance denied to a man on foot; particularly if the enemy is not well schooled in lying in ambush.

(7) The mounted patrol is easier on the men. They will arrive at

their destination in a less exhausted condition.

(8) The rapidity of movement and the distance covered will decrease materially as the size of the patrol is increased.

(9) For extended marches the foot patrol, untrained in riding, and

in the care and handling of animals, will make better progress on

foot day in and day out than if mounted on animals.

(10) For large patrols, even marches of only 1 or2 days' duration

can be made with greater facility on foot than if hastily mounted.

(11) If the march is to be extended, it is essential that the load on

the ridden animals be kept as light as possible. The average load

carried by the ridden animal in the field is about 250 pounds. It can

readily be seen. that this load places considerable burden on small

native animals and every effort should be made to reduce this load

by the use of accompanying pack animals.

(12) The animal casualties in hastily organized mounted patrols

will be excessive because of poor handling and lack of condition in

the animals.

(13) Lack of training in dismounting and securing animals, places

the hastily organized mounted patrol at a distinct disadvantage once

contact with the enemy is made.

(14) The mounted man is generally more conspicuous, and more

clearly outlined, and he cannot hit the ground, take cover, and return

the hostile fire as rapidly as a man on foot. At any given range,

therefore, he is more exposed to the hostile initial bursts of fire.

(15) A foot patrol has the advantage over a mounted patrol when

it runs into an enemy ambush. In a mounted patrol the animals will

suffer severely and the men will be more exposed. If any men or

horseholders have to concern themselves with the animals they are

not much help against the enemy.

(16) A mounted patrol is more visible from a distance than a foot

patrol, particularly if the colors of the animals do not. blend with the

background. Natives on one mountain can see mounted men marching onanother mountain then, under the same conditions, they could

not see foot troops.

38
SWM 7—51

HASTILY ORGANIZED MOUNTED PATROLS

(17) A foot patrol can make and break camp more rapidly than a

mounted patrol and is not as much concerned about a site that will

furnish forage and water. Hastily organized mounted patrols of any

size are notoriously slow in breaking camp.

(18) A mounted patrol is more expensive than a foot patrol. The

expenditure for animals and animal equipment, in past operations,

has been extremely high for hastily organized mounted patrols.

(19) At the end of the day's march the work of the mounted man

has just. begun. The animals, pack and ridden, have to be groomed,

watered, fed, the sick and injured treated, and, in hostile territory,

guarded during the night.

(20) The general consideration t.hat riding is less fatiguing than

walking is apt to outweigh other more important. considerations in

tropical comtres where there is ever present a strong tendency to

avoid bodily exertion.

7—51. Discussion.—--.The above considerations indicate that the use

of the hastily organized mounted patrol in hostile territory is rarely

justified. Only for small patrols when equipment and conditioned

animals are immediately available, when the march is not. in excess

of about. 2 days, when the patrol is to be made in fairly peaceful

territory, and. when rapid movement is desirable and practicable

are the conditions suitable to justify the organization of a hastily

mounted patrol.

7—52. Type of animal to employ.—In some localities there may be

a choice between horses and mules. The characteristics of the mule,

as set forth in article 3—27, make him more suitable for riding and

handling by untrained men who for the most part make up hastily

organized mounted patrols. However, for small patrols on short

urgent missions the horse can well be used to advantage.

7—53. Other details.—The organization, assignment of duties and

animals; marches, equipment and other details of a hastily organized

mounted patrol should be based upon a study of the preceding section, section IV, and should approximate the standards set for regular mounted detachments.

0

39

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

CHAPTER VIII

CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Mrine Corps, 1940, is published

in 15 chapters as follows;

CAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. iNFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

III

RESTRICTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER VIII

CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS

Par. Page

DIsrrIoNs 8—1 1

MISSION 8—2 1

ORGANIZATION 8—3 1

CoNvoY TYPEs 8-4 2

MARCH OF CoNvoYs 8—5 3

DIsPosmoN OF THE ESCORT ON THE MARCH 8-6 4

DEFENSE OF A CoNvoY 8-7 5

ArFACK OF A CONVOY 8—8 6

SECURITY MEASURES AT THE HALT 8—9 6

V

SWM 8-1

8—1. Definitions.—a. When a number of pick animals, carts,

wagons, or trucks are to be sent from one place to another, they are

formed into a train. The train is called a CoNvoy.

b. When carts, wagons, or trucks are used at least one man armed

with rifle or automatic weapon generally goes with each vehicle, or

men so armed are otherwise disposed throughout the length of the

train. These men constitute what is known as the TRAIN GUARD.

They stay with the convoy and fight only for the close protection of

the convoy. They are under the direct command of the convoy

commander.

c. When operating in dangerous territory troops are furnished for

the protection of the convoy. These troops are called the CoNvoY

ESCORT. The officer in charge of the escort is in command of, and is

responsible for, the convoy. He defers to the recommendations of

the convoy commander insofar as is consistent with the necessary

safety precautions.

8—2. Mission.—The mission of the convoy escort is to insure the

uninterrupted march and safe arrival of the convoy it is detailed to

protect. All formations adopted and all plans of action must be in

accordance with this mission. This does not and should not preclude

offensive action, but merely requires that the attack must have as its

purpose the safety of the convoy, rather than the destruction of the

enemy. Pursuit that carries the escort, or any part of it, to such

distance that it can no longer act in defense of the convoy violates

the mission of the escort and such action may be just the opportunity

for which the enemy seeks. The rate of march is limited by the rate

of the slowest element of the convoy or the convoy escort.

8—3. Organization.—a. Escorts vary in strength and composition

with the size and importance of the convoy, the length of the march,

the nature of the terrain, and the type of resistance expected. Detachments from the rifle companies with the necessary machine guns

1
SWM 8—4

CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS

attached will usually constitute the escort. When the rate of march

of the convoy exceeds that of infantry, the escort should be provided

with a means of transportation which is no slower than the convoy.

For other than convoys mounted detachments may be employed very

effectively for this duty.

b. For large trains the vehicles or pack animals should be formed

into sections, each under a responsible officer or noncommissioned

officer, before the march begins. The train guards placed on the

individual vehicles or within the pack-animal sections, should come

under the control of the section commanders.

8-4. Convoy types.—a. Convoys of pack animals are difficult to

protect because of the vulnerability of the animals themselves and

because of the extended road space required on narrow trails. When

possible, the pack animals should be herded in groups of about five

animals but generally it will be necessary to have them travel in

single file. Pack trains of untrained or poorly trained animals will

take more road space and will require more men. In extreme cases,

a man to lead each animal may be necessary, but usually the animals

may be led in strings of two or three, fastened together, "head to

tail." If train guards are placed in the pack-animal sections, they

may be employed by the section leader to lead animals, particularly

ordnance animals. Comparatively speaking, pack convoys are not

economical and should be used only in very difficult terrain.

b. Trains of native packmen (porters or carriers) are sometimes

necessary. The average useful load of packman is about fifty

pounds. These trains, like all other trains should be organized into

sections, each section under its native leader, when any considerable

number of packmen is employed. Trains of i)acknIeI have the disadvantage of extending to great ength on the line of march and. of

requiring strong escorts. The packman, unlike the pack animal, fully

appreciates danger, and, at its first appearance, is likely to abandon

his load and seek safety in flight.

a. A. train of 100 bull carts or wagons when well closed up occupies

a road space of about 1 mile. The difficulties of control and protection of such trains will naturally increase with their length. In

dangerous territory it will seldom be advisable to operate very large

trains because of the difficulties of protecting them. Close protection should be provided by having train guards armed with rifle or

automatic weapon ride on the individual carts or wagons. If marine

drivers are employed they should be armed with the rifle or an automatic weapon (no pistol or revolver). Communication should be

2
SWM 8—5

CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS

maintained between sections of the train by mounted messengers.

The prompt discovery of breaks in the column is dependent upon

continuous communication between sections of the, train by mounted

messenger. Each element of the convoy must guide on the element

next in rear. If contact with a rear element is broken the leading

element must immediately halt on ground that will afford the animals rest and wait for the rear element to close up. If this is habitually done, serious breaks in the column can be averted. Proper

consideration for defense must be given in the choice of such halting

places.

d. Motor convoys are made up of military motor transport units or

of hired or unrequisitioned motor vehicles. In any case, the convoy

should be properly organized before starting the march. The escort

may be carried on the train or in separate vehicles capable of at

least the same speed as the convoy. The slower elements of the

convoy should be placed in the lead. With suitable roads, motor

transportation is peculiarly advantageous for convoys because it is

less vulnerable to small arms fire, and because of its speed and

ability to travel long distances with few halts. Fast tanks, armored

cars, or trucks converted to serve as armored cars, may be employed

to great advantage in escorting motor convoys. If the enemy has

made a practice of using land mines, it may be advisable to have a

pilot cargo truck precede the point.

e. For river convoys and escorts see chapter X.

8-5. March of convoys.—a. Convoys should be assembled in sufficient time prior to the march to organize them into sections and to

appoint and properly instruct the section leaders in their duties.

Carts, wagons, and motor vehicles should be loaded the day prior

to starting the march, and should be so located the night before

that there will be the minimum of confusion in forming the column

in the morning for the march. Newly organized pack and bull cart

trains should be marched only a very short distance the first day,

preferably only a few miles beyond the limits of the town from

which the march originates. This first day of march can then be

used, to perfect the organization of the convoy, to correct any deficiencies in equipment, and to indoctrinate the escort in their duties.

Spare vehicles or carriers should be provided to carry the burden

of those that may be disabled enroute. When this is not practicable,

the loads of disabled vehicles or pack animals must be distributed

amongst the convoy, or destroyed.

3 .
SWM 8—6

CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS

b. It may happen, as it has in past operations, through misinformation, inability to foresee road conditions or other circumstances, that

large convoys will begin a march greatly overloaded. When such

a condition develops, the escort commander is faced with a serious

problem which requires immediate action to save the convoy from

serious difficulties, or, in extreme cases, from complete break-down.

If the convoy has not proceeded far from its base, it may be advisable to return and reorganize the convoy with lighter loads or

to procure additional animals or vehicles from the base or in the

vicinity of the halt. If this is not practicable, it will be necessary

to lighten the loads by the establishment of a dump or by destruction

of the excess cargo. It is far better to make a radical reduction of

the loads as soon as it becomes apparent that the loads are excessive

than to make small reductions from day to day as the animals become worn and exhausted from carrying excessive loads.

c. The available route should be considered carefully. Long distances, poor roads, steep grades, many stream crossings, sharp turns,

defiles, close country, and exposure to view from considerable distances along an open ridge are objectionable features. The loss of

a few animals shot down by a handful of men in ambush, or the

disabling of a few trucks or tractors might seriously delay the convoy.

Generally, the best road, even though it may not be the most direct,

is to be preferred. The route should be selected with a view to avoiding probable hostile forces, and a detour is justifiable if it be reasonably certain that an ambush may thus be avoided. Provision should

be made for temporary repair of roads and bridges and for the

crossing of fords.

8—6. Disposition of the escort on the march.—a. The escort commander, after assigning the necessary train guards to the sections of

the convoy, should divide his force into an advance guard, a main

body, a rear guard, and flank guards as necessary. The functions,

armament, and tactical disposition of these elements are the same

as those corresponding elements in combat patrol formations.

b. The advance guard precedes the train in the convoy in the usual

patrol formation. Critical places on the route of march, such as

fords, defiles and trail crossings should be reconnoitered and commanding positions occupied before the convoy is committed to them.

Over some terrain, the convoy can be protected best by having the

advance guard proceed by bounds from one position to another. The

head of the convoy is never l)ermitted to enter a defile until the advance guard is in possession of the farther end.

4
SWM 8—7

CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS

c. The main body is charged primarily with the defense of the

convoy. It is therefore likely to fight on the defensive, this being

forced on it by its mission. The main body may be marched ahead

of the convoy; but, if this iS done, adequate train guards must be

provided within the sections of the train and the rear guard must

be sufficiently strong to fight independently until support can reach

it from the main body. For very long convoys, it may be necessary

to split the main body and have these divisions of the main body

march between sections of the convoy.

d. The rear guard marches a short distance in rear of the convoy

with the usual rear-guard formation. Rear guards should not maneuver in support of advance elements of the escort if by doing so the rear

of the convoy is left totally unprotected. Conditions may sometimes

warrant the detachment of a part of the rear guard to maneuver in

support of advance elements of the escort, but sufficient force should

always be retained by the rear guard commander to protect the

train from attack in that direction.

e. The flanks of a convoy are most vulnerable and are particularly

difficult to protect in heavy brush, jungle, or mountainous country

where parallel roads or trails do not exist. In such terrain it is often

not practical to employ flank guards as they will slow the rate of

march to too great an extent. Whenever practical, adequate flank

guards should be provided. In terrain not practical for the employment of flank guards, the flanks will generally have, to be protected

by a careful reconnaissance by the advance guard and by the. occupation of commanding positions and intersecting roads or trails by

elements from the advance guard. These elements join the rear guard

when the convoy has passed.

8—7. Defeflse of a convoy.—The escort fights oniy when necessary.

The mission of the escort is to protect the train and to insure its

uninterrupted progress. If the enemy is discovered holding a commanding position or a defile on the line of march, he should be dislodged and driven off before the convoy is permitted to proceed. In

most small war situations, hostile forces attempt. to ambush the convoy. Prearranged schemes of maneuver, as described in chapter VI

should be prepared to meet such ambushes. The sections of the

convoy under the immediate protection of the train guards should

seek any available cover that will prevent the hostile troops from firing into the train. If it becomes evident that the capture of the

train by the enem.y cannot be prevented, the transport and its contents

should be destroyed.

5
SWM 8—8

CONVOY AND CONVOY ESCORTS

8—S. Attack of a convoy.—The most favorable time for an attack

against a convoy is when it is passing through heavy woods, jungle

growth, defiles, or stream crossings; when it is ascending or descending steep slopes, or passing over bad sections of the road; when the

convoy is making or breaking camp; and when animals are being

watered. The objective of the. attack is always the transport and not

the escort. The attacking force should first bring the convoy to a

halt and then throw it into confusion by attacking from an unexpected direction. The fire of automatic weapons and the attacks of

airplanes flying at low altitude are very effective. When a convoy is

captured, the parts that cannot be carried off should be destroyed.

8—9. Security measures at the halt.—a. During short halts, elements from the escort should be so disposed as to afford protection to

the convoy for the period of the halt. Commanding positions and

intersecting trails particularly should be guarded and the train

guards should be kept on the alert.

b. For long halts and halts for the night, the train must be so parked

that it will afford the maximum protection to the convoy escort. At

the same time the train should be ready to move out without delay

when march is resumed. In dangerous territory, when no suitable defensive positions are available, the cargoes and the pack saddles of

pack convoys may be so placed at night as to serve as breastworks.

In very close country, this use of the cargoes is particularly valuable

as it provides a definite line on which the escort can form in case

the convoy is rushed in a night attack. Carts and wagons can be

arranged in a circle or hollow square with the escort located within

the enclosed area. This disposition should not relieve the escort commander from the responsibility of establishing outposts. The anitna.ls should be afforded such protection as is possible. Motor vehicles should be so parked for night halts as o provide maximum

protection for the radiators, motors, and other vital parts of the

vehicles from small-arms fire in case of night attack.

0

6
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER IX

AVIATION

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published in

15 chapters, as follows:

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

Ill. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VIZ. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATiON.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

m

RESTRICTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER IX

AVIATION

Pai. Page

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 9—1 to 9—2 1

II. COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION.. 9—3 to 9—8 3—4

III. SELECTION AND PREPARATION OF

BASES 9—9 to9—14 5—7

IV. GENERAL CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS 9—15 to 9—17 9—11

V. EMPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION 9—18 to 9—22 13—16

VI. COMBAT SUPPORT 9—23 to 9—31 17—20

VII. AIR TRANSPORT 9—32 to 9—36 2 1—24

V

SWM 9-i

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

Par. Page

General 9—1 i

Special air tactics involved 9—2 1 9—i. General.—a. The opposition usually encountered in small war

operations consists of scattered bands of irregular troops, well armed

and extremely mobile, but deficient in disciplined morale. Logistical

arrangements for such forces are apt to be very primitive and sketchy,

offering no substantial target for bombing aviation. Air opposition is

usually nonexistent or negligible. The Marine air force is thus able

to concentrate almost entirely on the close support of ground units.

b. In order to secure the full measure of cooperation between the

air and ground forces, it is necessary that each understands the

problems of the other. The aviator must know something of the tactics of the ground patrol, and lie must be ready and willing to assume

any justified risk to assist the ground commander. On the other hand,

the ground commander should understand the hazards and limitations imposed on aviation operating over difficult terrain, and should

not expect the impossible.

9—2. Special air tactics involved.—a. The employment of aviation in small wars is characterized by the operation of many small

units, two or three plane patrols, over a wide area. Normal scouting

missions will in most cases be modified to search attacks, performed

by airplanes of the scouting or observation class armed with light

bombs and machine guns.

b. If attack or light bombing units are included in the force, the

tactics of their employment will not differ greatly from normal procedure. They should constitute an aerial reserve, to be dispatched

only against definitely located targets, and in such force as may be

necessary. Occasions will arise where one six-plane division may be

ample force for the task at hand; in fact, the employment of small

striking units will be frequent, and independent missions for the division the rule rather than the exception. The usual absence of air

opposition in small wars gives to an air force a freedom of action,

and the ability to employ small units independently, not enjoyed in

major conflicts. If air opposition should exist, it must of course be

countered by fighters in the normal way.

1
SWM 9-1

INTRODUCTION

c. In the past, Marine air forces have been equipped generally

with dual-purpose airplanes of the two-seater type, suitable for observation or scouting, and equipped with the armament necessary

for limited ground attack. The observation and light bomber types

were so similar that they were used indiscriminately on whatever

mission came first to hand. While it is true that such diversion and

substitution is still possible for emergency situations, modern design

of airplanes and engines is along specialized lines and does not permit the wide latitude of tactical employment practiced with the more

simple machines of former years.

2
SWM 9-3

SECTION II

COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION

Par. Page Types 3

Reconnaissance aircrnft 9—4 3

Combat aircraft 9—•i 3

Transport aircraft 9—6 3

Organization 9—7 4

Movement to theater 9—8 4

9—3. Types.—The composition of an air force organized for small

wars operations cannot be definitely prescribed, nor can its comparative strength in relation to the ground force be determined prior to

a careful estimate of the situation in each case. Much depends upon

the character of the campaign, and upon the nature of the theater of

operations. The final choice will be influenced by the type of air

units immediately available. The discussion contained in t.his chapter assumes a typical situation wherein an independent brigade or

force is supported by a composite group of aircraft.

9—4. Reconnaissance aircraft.—Primary consideration should always be given to reconnaissance types in the organization of a small

wars air force. Due to the advisability of operating in small formations and to the frequent. calls for air reconnaissance to be expected

from the commanders of independent columns and patrols, at. least

twice the number of observation or scouting airplanes will be required

for the support of a force engaged in a campaign of this nature as

would suffice for normal operations.

9—5. Combat aircraft.—The inclusion of combat types of aircraft

in addition to the dual-purpose scouts may be advisable or necessary

in many small wars situations. In making a decision as to what

types to include in the air force, consideration should be given to

the existence of objectives which are beyond the capabilities of the

dual-purpose scouting airplane.

9—6. Transport aircraft.—This type of aircraft has proven indispensable for small wars operations. The lack of railroads, improved

motor roads, and navigable waterways in some of our probable theaters of operation makes the supply and transportation of troops by

air more or less mandatory. Two types of transports are standard:

the multiengined cabin land plane; and the multiengined cabin

3
SWM 9-7

OOMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION

amphibian. Both should be included in the air force; both are included in the organization of the present. utility squadron. The ratio

of land planes to amphibians will depend upon operating conditions

to be encountered.

9—7. Organization.—The present squadron organization of the

Marine Corps is satisfactory for small wars operations. The only

problem of organization is the selection of the units which are to

compose the group. One headquarters and service squadron, one

utility squadron, and two scouting squadrons may be considered as

the minimum basic force for the support of a brigade or similar unit.

To these should be added such additional transports and combat

units as the situation demands. The composite group is flexible and

can take care of several operating squadrons without additional

overhead.

9—8. Movement to the theater of operations.—Aircraft should

always be flown to the theater of operations whenever distance and

the situation will permit. Air units so transported arrive in the

minimum of time with less hazard of damage en route and are ready

for immediate action upon arrival. This method presupposes available landing fields within the theater of operations protected by

Marine detachments from naval vessels, or by friendly native troops.

In most cases intermediate refueling stops must. also be available,

either on foreign airdromes or on board own aircraft carriers.

4
SWM 9-9

SETrION 111

SELECTION AND PREPARATION OF BASES

Par. Page

Mainairdroine 9.9 5

Auxiliaryairdromes 6

Advancelandingfields 9—11 6

Emergencylandingfields 9—12 6

Specificationsoflandingfields 9—13 6

Minimum size of landing fields 9—14 7

9—9. Main ajrdrome.—a. The main airdrome within the theater

of operations should be located within a reasonable distance of Force

Headquarters and must be accessible by motor transport. or on a

navigable waterway. The air commander must be able to maintain close personal contact with the Force staff, and, conversely, the

various departments of Force Headquarters should have easy access

to the airdrome facilities. The main airdrome should be of such

size as to permit heavily loaded transports to operate during adverse

weather and field conditions. Existent landing fields which meet

all of the requirements will seldom be encountered, and provision

must be made for labor and construction materials to clear and

prepare landing surfaces.

b. .The ground activities of a main airdrome can be conducted

under canvas, but the use of permanent or temporary buildings will

greatly facilitate shop work and improve the general efficiency of

the organization. Provision must be made for the underground

storage of bombs and fuzes. Protected areas for the storage of

gasoline and oil must be selected, and preferably fenced off from other

airdrome activities. Should there appear to be danger of sabotage, it

may be advisable to fence off the more vulnerable areas of the

airdromes with barbed wire entanglements. Airdrome guards, in

addition to those furnished by the air units themselves, may be

necessary. Should the opposing forces possess aircraft, antiaircraft

protection must be provided for the airdrome. For defense against

sporadic air raids which might be expected from a weak and poorly

trained opposing air force, the air units would be able to organize

their own antiaircraft machine gun crews for emergency protection,

provided equipment were made available. In other cases, it. would

5
SWM 9-10

SELECTION AND PREPARATION OF BASES

be necessary to arrange for a stronger defense by regular antiaicraft units.

9—10. Auxiliary airdromes.—In small wars situations the use of

Auxiliary airdromes is contemplated, not for the dispersion of air

units for protection, but to facilitate the provision of air support

for semi-independent commands. Territorial departments are organized and garrisoned by subordinate units of appropriate size.

The headquarters of these departments may be situated in isolated

regions with indifferent transport facilities, and so remote from the

main airdrome as to seriously curtail air support during periods of

unfavorable weather. Auxiliary airdromes established in the vicinity of department headquarters, lightly stocked with supplies of

fuel, bombs, ammunition, and spare parts, and staffed with skeleton

ground crews, enable the air commander to detach small units for

the close support of departmental operations. Furthermore, the

uninterrupted transportation of troops and supplies by air is dependent upon the existence and maintenance of such auxiliary

airdromes.

9—11. Advanced landing fields.—Each detached post and outlying

detachment camp should have a field of sufficient size to permit the

operation therefrom of scout and combat planes. Many of these

fields need have no special facilities, other than the landing area,

but certain ones in key locations should be provided with storage

facilities for limited amounts of fuel, bombs, and ammunition. It

may be desirable to have one or more mechanics stationed at such

fields. Necessary protection and assistance in handling airplanes

on the ground should be provided by the garrison of the station.

9—12. Emergency landing fields.—These are merely possible landing places, located, cleared, and properly marked. Their Primary

function is to provide disabled or weather-bound aircraft with

emergency landing places. They may also be useful in making

evacuations of sick and wounded men from isolated patrols, or for

facilitating air Support in unusual situations. As many as possible

of these fields should be. provided throughout the area of operations.

9—13. Specifications of landing fields.—a. Under normal conditions current types of military airplanes in taking off and landing

usually roll on the ground for a distance of from 500 to 700 yards.

This distance will be increased by the load carried, by a rough or

muddy surface, by hot dry weather, or where the airdrome is situated at high altitudes. Therefore, in order to allow a reasonable

factor of safety in operating airplanes under the varying conditions,

6
SWM 9-14

SELECTION AND PREPARATION OF BASES

landing fields should have minimum dimensions of from 700 yards

for all combat. airplanes up to 1,000 yards for transpqrts. The landing fields should be smooth, of firm surface, and without obstructions

within or near its boundaries.

b. If obstacles such as hills, trees, or large structures are near the

boundary of a landing field, its dimensions must be increased in

order that the airplane may clear the obstacles in taking off or

landing. Obstacles near the ends of runways must not have a height

greater than one-tenth of their distance from. the field, i. e., a tree

50 feet high cannot be closer than 500 feet to the end of the runway.

c. Under varying conditions of terrain it will frequently be impossible to locate or construct landing fields which will permit airplanes to land and take off in all directions. Under such conditions

the runways or longer dimensions of the landing field should, if

possible lie in the direction of the prevailing wind for that locality.

9—14. Minimum size of landing fields.—

Load Conditions, land and take-off Tras- A,opether

LightDo

Military load Do

Yards Yards

No wind 800 700

10 miles per hour 700 600

No wind 1,000 800

10 miles per hour 900 700 Runways should have a minimum width of 200 yards.

7

SWM 9-15

SECTION IV

GENERAL CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS

Par. Page

Control and Command D—1 9

Details of Operations 9—Th 9

Reports 9—17 10

9—15. Control and command.—a. The senior aviator on duty with

a command exercises a dual function similar to that of the force

artillery commander. He commands the air force and acts as advisor

on air matters to the Force Commander. The air commander will

generally have an extensive detailed knowledge of the area in which

operations are being conducted—first-hand knowledge which may

not be available otherwise—and he should maintain close contact

with the Force Commander and staff through the medium of frequent conferences. An aviation liaison officer may be detailed to

represent the air commander at headquarters during the absence

of the latter on flying mission.

b. Normally, all aviation attached to a small wars expeditionary

force will operate from the main airdrome under centralized control. However, when distances are great and weather conditions

uncertain, it may become advisable to detach aviation units to subordinate commands, to be operated from auxiliary airdromes.

9—16. Details of operations.—a. At the close of each day's operations the air commander estimates the situation for the following

day, and imparts his decision to his staff and unit commanders.

Formal operation orders are seldom written in advance, their substance being posted on the operations board and explained to the

pilots concerned. The hour for publishing the daily orders will

normally be late enough in the day to permit the commander to

analyze the day's reports and receive last-minute instructions from

the higher command, but should not be so late as to interfere with

the crew's rest. Where possible, the board should be made ready for

inspection at a given hour each evening—at 7 or 8 o'clock for

example.

b. During daylight hours time airplanes' and crews not scheduled

for flight should be kept in a condition of readiness to take off

within 20 or 30 minutes. Small wars situations often require prompt

9

210—7050—88— 13: QL3
SWM 9—17

GENERAL CONDUCT OF AIR OPERATIONS

action on the part of the supporting air force. Night operations

will seldom be required, due to the nature of the support rendered,

but should occasion demand, the air units must be equipped to perform night reconnaissance or combat missions. Operations under

unfavorable weather conditions will be the rule, rather than the

exception, in the average small wars theater. This factor, and the

necessity for operating small independent units rather than large

formations, requires a large percentage of seasoned and highly

trained pilots. At least half of the flight personnel should be in

this category.

c. Constant two-way radio communication is desirable between

the air patrols and the airdrome operations office. Present equipment will permit such communication within reasonable distances

by radio telephone; radio telegraph is available in the same sets

for longer range transmission.

9—17. Reports.—a. Upon the completion of each tactical flight the

pilot and observer should compare notes and submit their report on

a standard form which will contain a brief chronological record of

the flight, including a statement of the mission; time, and place of

observation; action taken; comments on the situation; copies of all

messages sent or received; weather conditions encountered; ammunition expended; and casualties inflicted or suffered. Reports should

be limited to observed facts, and opinions given sparingly. Deductions, except where immediate action is indicated, should be left

to the Force staff or appropriate commander. It must be understood, however, that the air observer in small wars operations must

be given a greater latitude in estimating a situation on the ground

than he would be given in a comparable position in major operations.

Often the rapidly moving situation will not permit of delay in the

transmission of information to headquarters, but requires immediate

positive action on the part of the air patrol commander. In such

cases, of course, the written report will eventually be made, with

notation of the action taken. In any event, flight reports are submitted immediately upon completion of each mission.

b. In addition to the formal reports submitted upon landing, flight

crews may gather information to be dropped to troops in the field,

or they may submit fragmentary reports prior to the completion of

the flight. Expediency will govern the method of disseminating

information, but it is doctrinal for observers to transmit important

information without delay to the units most immediately concerned.

The airdrome radio station guarding the flight will habitually copy

all intercepted messages.

10
SWM 9—17

GENERAL CONDUCT OF. AIR OPERATIONS

o. The air operations office consolidates the information contained

in the individual flight reports into the operations report, which is

submitted daily to Force Headquarters. The air, force commander

is responsible for the accuracy of these reports and for their immediate transmission when urgent action is required. Normally, a brief

summary of important or unusual information is telephoned to Force

Headquarters immediately, or the air commander calls in in person

to discuss the results of important flights. Radio reports received

from airplanes in flight should be handled in the same manner,

unless Force Headquarters also maintains a radio watch on the aviation frequency. Standard procedure will govern as to the priority

of transmission. Formal reports are intended as a summary of the

day's operations; vital information should never be withheld pending

their preparatioh.

11

SWM 9-18

SECTION V

EMPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION

Par. Page

General considerations 9—18 13

Strategic (distant) reconnaissance 9—19 14

Tactical (close) reconnaissance 9—20 14

The infantry mission 9—21 15

Special combat mission 9—22 16

9—18. General considerations.—a. The employment of reconnaisance aviation in small wars situations follows generally the tactics

prescribed for major operations. The principal difference lies in

the common usage in small wars of the reconnaissance airplane in

the dual missions of scouting and attack operations against ground

targets. The habitual employment of scouts in pairs or small formation, primarily for mutual protection, favors the dual mission for

this type.

b. Reconnaissance may be classified as strategical or tactical as

to mission; visual or photographic as to method. Visual reconnaissance will be the principal method of obtaining information in the

typical small wars operation. The type of country, unusually densely

wooded, and the fleeting nature of the contacts to be expected with

hostile forces, will probably limit the use of photographic observation to mapping operations.

e. The effectiveness of air reconnaissance is dependent upon: the

nature of the terrain, whether open or densely wooded jungle; the

habits of the opposing forces with respect to concealment from aircraft; and, to a greater extent than any other factor, upon the skill

and training of the observer. Generally speaking, a trained observer

will detect the movement in open country of small groups, while in

densely wooded country he will have great difficulty in locating a

force the size of a company or larger. However, it will be very

difficult for a hostile force of any considerable size to move in daylight without disclosing some indication of its presence, while the

mere presence of airplanes in the area will be a deterrent to guerrilla

operations. Intensive low altitude reconnaissance over restricted

areas will seldom fail to discover the presence of hostile forces, although aviation cannot be expected to always furnish reliable nega13
SWM 9-19

EMPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSAXCE AVIATION

tive information with respect to the hostile occupancy of dense woods,

towns, and villages. In small wars, as in major ones, air reconnaissance supplements but does not replace, the normal measures of

security.

9—19. Strategical reconnaissance.—a. Prior to the initiation of

the land campaign, the commander should dispatch such reconnaissance aircraft as may be available to make a general air survey of the

proposed theater of operations. This mission may include aerial

mapping, verification of existing maps, the location and disposition

of hostile forces, their methods of operation and supply, location of

airdromes and bivouac sites, and the scouting of possible routes of

advance into the interior. During this period the flying personnel

will familiarize themselves with the terrain and climatic conditions

of the country.

b. Strategical reconnaissance may precede the initial landing of

troops, if patrol seaplanes, shipbased seaplanes, or carrier-based

aircraft are available. Where time is an important factor, much

strategical information can be secured in a single flight, although a

period of several days may be needed for a comprehensive air survey.

Landplanes or amphibians should be used for inland reconnaissance

when available, although the urgency of the situation may require

the dispatching of seaplanes on such missions. In any event, the

importance of a thorough air reconnaissance prior to the advance

inland will justify the employment of whatever type of aircraft might

be available.

9—20. Tactical reconnaissance.—a. After a general picture of the

situation has been obtained and the ground forces have started their

movement inland, reconnaissance becomes more tactical in nature.

When contact becomes imminent, reconnaissance aviation maintains

a close surveillance over local hostile activities, keeps the ground

commanders constantly informed, and furnishes such combat support

as may be urgent. The principal task of aviation operating in close

support of an advancing column is to supplement. the normal security

measures taken by the ground forces against the possibility of surprise. Ambush by guerrilla bands is a constant menace. Airplanes

should reconnoiter ahead of the ground columns, paying particular

attention to those localities recognized by the. skilled observer as being

dangerous ambush sites. This precaution will protect the ground

units from surprise by a large force. It must be remembered, however, that detection of 8mall forces of irregulars, not in uniform and

with no distinctive formation, in heavily wooded country, or in a

14
SWM 9—21

EMPLOYMENT OP RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION

jumble of mountain boulders, is extremely difficult and largely a matter of luck for even the most skilled air observer. The habitual

presence. of airplanes in the vicinity of our column will discourage

operations of guerrilla forces, even though they escape detection,

hence it is advisable to conduct more or less continuous reconnaissance

throughout the hours of daylight over the area occupied by our advancing forces. Flights at irregular intervals may accomplish the

same purpose with more economy of force.

b. Tactical reconnaissance immediately prior to combat becomes

more intensive and is centralized to a definite locality. Detailed information of the hostile positions, strength, movement, and dispositions will be sought out by aircraft and communicated to the friendly

ground units without delay. Ground observation, will usually be

very limited because of the nature of the terrain, and observation of

the enemy position from the air may be absolutely essential for the

formulation of plans and for the conduct of the action. Airplanes

engaged in close reconnaissance missions may participate in combat

by employing bombs and machine-gun fire against objectives particularly dangerous to ground troops, especially when requested by the

ground commander. It should be borne in mind, however, that combat is secondary to reconnaissance, and attacks which are not coordinated with the ground force action should generally be avoided.

9—21. Infantry mission.—a. In small wars there does not exist the

same line of demarcation between the tactical reconnaissance mission

and the infantry mission as is prescribed in air tactical doctrine for

major operations. The functions of each merge into the other.

Perhaps the best definition of the term "Infantry mission," as understood for small wars, refers to a daily or periodic air patrol which

flies over a given area and contacts all the ground patrols and station

garrisons located within this area. Tactical reconnaissance is conducted by these air patrols incident to their passage from one ground

unit to another, and they are prepared to attack hostile ground forces

upon discovery. Their primary mission, however, is to maintain

command liaison with detached units of friendly ground forces, and

to keep these forces informed of the situation confronting them. The

infantry airplanes may be used for the emergency transport of men

and supplies, or they may be called upon to assist some ground patrol

in a difficult situation by attacking the hostile ground force. In

short, the airplanes assigned to the infantry mission, operating habitually in pairs, support the ground forces in whatever manner is

expedient, regardless of their normal function in major warfare.

15
SWM 9-22

EMPLOYMENT OF RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION

b. Occasions may arise where it is desirable to dispense with air

support for some special operation. Considerations of secrecy of

movement for some ground unit may justify the responsible commander in making such a decision. Should it be decided that air support will not be furnished a ground patrol, the patrol commander

should be so informed, and pilots instructed not to communicate with

this unit, nor to disclose its presence in any way. However, to av9id

being fired on, the ground patrol should display an identification

panel whenever possible. While the infantry airplanes may disclose

the position of a ground patrol to the enemy through efforts to establish a contact., it is likewise possible to deceive the enemy as to the

true location of our forces by having the airplanes simulate contact

with fictitious units in various other places.

c. Contacts between the infantry airplane and ground units are

established by means of panels and drop messages, and where open

ground is available, by message pick-ups. The use of radio will be

more prevalent in the future than has been the case in the past.

9—22. Special combat missions.—Airplanes engaged in reconnaissance missions will be prepared to attack hostile ground forces, in

order that emergency combat support may be rendered friendly

ground units without delay. In small wars operations targets are apt

to be fleeting and time may not permit the dispatch of regular attack

units. If the enemy is to be struck while he is most vulnerable, he

must be attacked immediately by the air patrol which discovers him.

When time permits, a contact report should be made, but the patrol

leader must make the decision in each case. This doctrine is applicable mainly to jungle warfare, against small groups of irregulars,

where the offensive power of a pair of scouting airplanes would be

of some avail. In more open country, against larger and better organized forces, search-attack missions by small air units are not

generally recOmmended. In any event, it must be remembered that

the primary mission of reconnaissance airplanes is not combat, but

the procurement of information, and the mere existence of offensive

armament should not encourage their needless diversion to combat

tasks.

16
SWM 9-23

SECTION VI

COMBAT SUPPORT

Par. Page General discussion 9—23 17

Fighting aviation 9—24 17

Attack aviation 9—25 18

Bombing aviation 9—26 18

Attacks on troop columns and trains 9—27 18

Support of marching column 9—28 19

Attacks on hostile positions 9—29 20

Attacks on towns 9—30 20

Aviation as a mobile reserve 9—31 20

9—23. General discussion.—The primary mission of combat aviation in a small war is the direct suppo:rt of the ground forces. This

implies generally that all combat aviation will be used for ground

attack. Air opposition will usually be nonexistent or weak, and

friendly aviation should be able to operate against hostile ground

troops at will. Fighting squadrons, if included in the force, may be

employed as light bombers; while the bombing squadrons will find

more use for their lighter bombs and offensive machine guns than

they will for their major weapon—the heavy demolition bomb.

Attack aviation, or its substitute, the dual-purpose scout, is the best

type to cope with the targets likely to be encountered in small wars.

'rroop columns, pack trains, groups of river boats, occupied villages

of flimsy construction, mountain strongholds, and hostile bivouac

areas are all vulnerable to the weapo:s of the attack airplane—the

light bomb and machine gun. Occasionally, targets of a more substantial nature may require the use of medium demolition bombs. As

the type of campaign approaches th proportions of a major conflict, so will the employment of the dif'erent types of combat aviation

approach that prescribed for major w.rfare. For the typical jungle

country small war, the division of missions between the different types

is not so clearly marked.

9—24. Fighting aviation.—This class of combat aviation will be

included in the small wars air force when there exists a possibility

that opposition will be provided with rrailitary aircraft. The fighting

squadrons should be used to neutralize the hostile. air force early in

the campaign. Thereafter, the fighting units could be made avail17
SWM 9-25

COMBAT SUPPORT

able as a part of the general air reserve to be employed for ground

attack against particularly favorable targets.

9—25. Attack aviation.—The employment of attack aviation (or

dual-purpose scouts acting as such) differs little in tactics or technique from the doctrine prescribed for major operations. Such units

a are available should be held in central reserve to be dispatched

only against definitely located targets. The six-plane division, instead of the squadron, will usually be ample force to employ against

the average small wars objective.

9—26. Bombing aviation.—'I'he medium dive bomber is a versatile

weapon, and although there will probably be little call for the employment of the 1,000-pound bomb against small wars objectives,

this type of aircraft can also carry the lighter demolition and fragmentation bombs, and is armed with offensive machine, guns. Bombing units may thus be employed against personnel and the lighter

material targets usually assigned to attack aviation. Legitimate

targets for bombing units include forts, village strongholds, railroad

rolling stock, motor trains, and the larger supply boats; secondary

targets are troop columns and pack trains. 'When attack units are

available for strafing missions, the bombing squadrons should, like

the fighters, be considered as part of the general air reserve, and

their use against unsuitable targets avoided.

9—27. Attacks on troop columns and trains.—a. Troops and animal trains marching in close formations on roads or trails are extremely vulnerable to surprise air attack. Such attacks should be

carefully timed to hit columns as they pass through narrow defiles

formed by the hills or jungle growth. If the terrain permits, a low

altitude strafing attack is preferable, as it favors surprise, and permits a more effective employment of air weapons. An attempt

should be made. to enfilade the column with machine-gun fire and with

fragmentation bombs dropped in trail, repeating the attack as required. Shoold the hostile column be encountered in very mountainous country it may be necessary to employ the diving attack, each

airplane in the column selecting a part of the target, in order to

cover the whole effectively on the first assault. Surprise will be

more difficult to obtain when the diving approach must be used,

although a skilled leader should be able to launch an effective assault

without giving the enemy more than a few seconds' warning. Repeated diving assaults are made as required, although the objective

may be much less vulnerable after the first surprise attack. In the

attack of a long column which cannot be covered in one assault by

18
SWM 9-28

COMBAT SUPPORT

the air force available, the head of the column should always be

chosen as the initial objective, regardiess of the method of attack

employed. This will ensure the maximum of delay and confusion,

and facilitate repeated assaults.

b. The successful attack of a column by an organized air unit is

dependent upon the prompt transmissio:ri of information by the reconnaissance agency which makes the discovery. Small columns of

mobile troops will usually be attacked on the spot when discovered

by reconnaissance patrols. If the importance of the target and the

nature of the terrain appears to wai:rant the delay necessary to

launch a concentrated attack, the hostile column should be kept under

surveillance, if it can be done without .saeri flee of surprise, and a full

report be made by radio to the air commander. Upon the receipt

of such a message the air commander should communicate with the

Force Commander while airplanes are being prepared, advising him

of the contemplated action. Speed of movement and surprise of

execution will be the essence of success in the air attack of a column.

9—28. Support of a marching column.—a. When the size of a

column, or the hazardous nature of its advance makes the assignment

of combat aviation advisable, two methods of general support are

possible. A division of airplanes car. be kept continuously in the

air over the column; or the column can be contacted at short intervals

by a combat patrol of appropriate s2e. In most cases the latter

form of support will suffice, bearing ilL mind that the column would

normally have a pair of infantry planes with it at all times. The

reconnaissance airplanes seek out ambushes and enemy positions

along the route of march; the air cmbat units assist the ground

forces in routing hostile opposition. Air attacks may be coordinated

with the ground attacks if communication facilities and the tactical

situation permit, or they may be launThed independently to prevent

hostile interference with the march of the supported column.

b. Ground ommanders supported by aviation should be careful

when in action to mark the position Df their advanced elements by

panels, and where the force is held up by fire from a given locality

they should also indicate by the proper panel signal the direction

and estimated distance to the enemy position. The ground commander should also indicate, by whatever means is expedient, just

when and where he wishes tle fire of aviation to be concentrated. In

short, he requests fire support in the Eame manner as he would from

artillery. In addition to complying with these requests, the air cornmander will be constantly on the lookout for the location and move19
SWM 9-29

COMBAT SUPPORT

ment of any enemy forces in the vicinity,, and will be prepared to

exploit any success of the ground forces by the immediate pursuit of

retreating hostile troops.

9—29. Attack on hostile positions.—Combat aviation may be used

as a substitute for artillery in the organized attacks of hostile strongholds. As such it provides for the preliminary reduction of the

hostile defenses by bombing, for the interdiction of lines of communication and supply, and for the direct close-in support of the

attacking infantry by lying down a barrage of machine-gun bullets

and fragmentation bombs on the enemy front lines. All these missions cannot of course be performed by one air unit; schedules of fire

must be worked out, timed with the infantry advance, and executed

by successive waves of aircraft. Details of this form of air support

are worked out by the air commander, using such numbers and types

of air units as are available and necessary. The ground commander

must submit a definite plan if air attack is to be coordinated; otherwise, the air commander on the spot must use his force as opportunity

offers. In minor attacks the latter procedure will probably be the

rule.

9—30. Attacks on towns.—When hostile forces seek the shelter of

occupied towns and villages, air combat support cannot be given the

attacking troops without endangering the lives of noncombatants.

However, it may be feasible to drop warning messages to the inhabitants, and allow them sufficient time to evacuate before initiating

an attack. Once the attack is decided upon, aviation again performs

the role of artillery. One bomb, penetrating the roof of a small

house before exploding will effectively neutralize all occupants; those

not being killed or wounded will immediately escape to the streets

to become targets for machine guns. Continuous bombing forces the

defenders from their shelters and facilitates their capture or defeat

by the ground forces. The tactics and technique involved in the air

attack of a town do not differ materially from those used against any

defended position, except that medium dive bombers may be used

here to better advantage than they could be in most small wars situations. Care must be taken not to endanger advancing friendly

troops.

9—31. Aviation as a mobile reserve.—The employment of aviation

as a reserve for infantry in battle is merely an application of the

princi1e of quick concentration of superior force at the decisive

point. The mobility and striking power of combat aviation favors

such employment in minor operations.

20
SWM 9—32

SecTIoN VII

AIR TRANSPORT

Par. Page

General considerations 9-82 21

Troop transportation 9.83 22

Transportation of supplies 9—84 22

Dropping of supplies 9-85 23

Evacuation of sick and wounded 9—86 24

9—32. General considerations—a. The transportation of troops

and supplies becomes of increasing importance as the ground forces

in a small wars campaign work inland, away from the navigable

waters and railroads usually found in the coastal regions of tropical

countries. Roads for wheeled transport ere apt to be poor or nonexistent, and dependence for supply of certain units may have to be

placed on slow animal transport. A distances from the base of

operations increase, this form of supply tends to break down, especially during rainy seasons, and the most advanced of the ground forces

may be partially or altogether dependent upon air transport for

months at a time. The air force, then, should include a much greater

percentage of transport aircraft than is required for the normal needs

of the air units themselves.

b. Air transportation is justified only when more economical forms

of transport will not serve; it should I e considered only as an emergency supplement for land transportation, and its use rigidly controlled by Force Headquarters. Factors which may influence the

decision to use air transport are: unfavorable condition of roads and

trails; long distances through hostile t?rritory necessitating the provision of strong escorts for land transport; and emergency situations

requiring immediate action. When air transport is planned, the air

force will usually establish regular schedules for transport airplanes.

Force Headquarters will arrange for routine and priority listing of

supplies and replacements to be fon warded to outlying stations.

Routine evacuation of the sick and wounded is accomplished on the

return trips, and only occasionally should the necessity for emergency flights arise. The air force should generally have priority iii

the use of air transport for its own requirements. Where small air

units are maintained and operated on outlying auxiliary fields, the

21
SWM 9-33

AIR TRANSPORT

problem of supplying fuel, ammunition, bombs, and other supplies

becomes a considerable task.

9—33. Troop transportation.—a. Possibilities for the transportation of troops in airplanes are limited oniy by the number of transport

aircraft available and the existence of suitable landing fields. In

sma11 wars operations, the ability to concentrate forces quickly in any

part of the theater, through the medium of air transport, may materially influence the planning of the campaign, and offers a solution

to the grave difficulties of moving forces through a country devoid of

communication facilities. Small forces, not, to exceed a battalion,

can be transported and supplied by air everywhere within the operating radius of the aircraft, provided landing facilities are available.

The utility squadron of eight transports will carry approximately one

rifle company per trip, including combat equipment. While these

figures indicate the maximum troop movement possible with the

amount of air transport normally provided, they by no means imply

that movements on a larger scale are impractical. In the typical

campaign of this nature, the movement of a force larger than a

company will be exceptional.

b. Troop commanders of units ordered to move by air should be

advised in advance of the weight limitations per man, in order that

excess equipment may be stored before embarkation. Movement

orders should be specific as to time of arrival on the airdrome; details

of loading will be supervised by a representative of the air operations

officer, who will be guided, insofar as possible, by the principle of

tactical unity in the assignment of troop spaces. On outlying airdromes, the senior aviator present is charged with these details and

is responsible that safety limitations are observed. While in flight,

the regularly assigned pilot of the aircraft exercises command analogous to that of the commander of a surface vessel on which troops

are embarked. o. A general policy classifying persons and articles considered eligible for air transport, with priority ratings, should be adopted and

published by Force Headquarters. Permits for air travel should be

issued by Force and Area Commanders, and passages coordinated

with scheduled or emergency movements of transport airplanes.

Requests for special airplanes should be rigidly controlled by Force

and Area Commanders.

9—34. Transportation of supplies.—a. Generally speaking, the

transportation of bulky supplies by air is economical only for long

hauls in regions of poor communication. Questions of tactical expe22
SWM 9-35

AIR TRANSPORT

diency will often outweigh those of economy, however, and where air

transport is available it will normally be used to capacity.

1. In order to handle properly the many calls for air transportation of supplies, regulate priority, and expedite the more urgent

shipments, a special shipping office, under the control of the air commander, should be maintained at the base airdrome. This agency

acts as a regulating depot between the rear echelon and the units in

the field. It receives and prepaFes shipments, loads and unloads the

airplanes, and arranges for the storage and delivery of incoming

shipments. Adequate storage and transportation facilities should be

made available. Shipping agencies should also be provided at the

more important auxiliary airdromes if tbe volume of supplies appears

to warrant such installations. Personnel for these regulating stations is supplied by the Force Quartermaster, as requested by the

aviation supply officer who is responsible for the preparation and

loading of all air shipments. The air operations officer is kept informed at all times regarding amounts and priorities of shipments,

and will issue the necessary instructions for the actual loading of the

airplanes.

9—35. Dropping of supplies.—-a. Supplies transported by air may

be delivered by landing, or by dropping from the airplane while in

flight at low altitude. To avoid undue loss by breakage, articles to

be dropped must have special packing. Skilled personnel can wrap

almost any article so that it will not be injured by contact with the

ground after being dropped. Explosives, detonators, liquid medicines, etc., may be swathed in cotton au d excelsior and dropped safely;

water in half-filled canteens may be d:opped from low altitudes with

no protection other than the canvas ccver; dry beans, rice, sugar, and

similar supplies may be dropped by enclosing a half-filled sack in a

larger one. The governing principle in packing is to arrange for

cushioning the impact and for ex])ansion within the container.

Machine guns and similar eqLlipmeni; should be disassembled prior

to packing for air drops, although in emergency such loads could be

dropped intact by using parachutes. In short, it is possible to drop

safely any article of supply provided it is properly packed.

b. The dropping ground should havu a clear space at. least 100 yards

in diameter, with no obstructions which would prevent the airplane

from approaching at. low altitude and minimum speed. An identification panel should mark the center of the area. Men and animals

must be kept clear, or casualties wil.i occur from men being struck

by heavy falling articles.

23
SWM 9-36

AIR TRANSPORT

c. Emergency supplies of medicines, food, small arms ammunition,

clothing, money, and mail are usually transported to detached units

in the field by the daily air patrols. The observers stow the articles in their cockpits and drop them when contact is established. The

standard scouting airplane will safely handle an overload equivalent

to the weight of an. extra man, provided room can be found for stowage near the center of gravity of the plane. Unless a landing can

be made, however, the load is limited to what the observer can stow

in his cockpit.

9—36. Evacuation of sick and wounded.—The evacuation by air

of the sick and wounded personnel reduces the percentage of permanent casualties, relieves the units in the field of responsibility for

their care, and enhances the morale of troops engaged in patrolling

or garrisoning remote areas. Air ambulance service should have

priority over all utility missions, and should be second only to urgent tactical requirements. The normal flow of sick and slightly

wounded personnel are handled on the return trips of regularly

scheduled transports, or by smaller airplanes from the more remote

districts where no transport fields exist. When it is known in advance that casualties are to be evacuated, a medical attendant should

accompany the transport or ambulance plane on its outbound trip in

order that medical escort will not have to be provided by the unit in

the field. Emergency cases will be handled by the senior aviator

present without waiting for formal authority for the flight. Stretcher

cases can be moved only by transport or ambulance planes; the

patient must be able to sit up if evacuation is to be effected from a

small field by a two-seater scout.

0

24
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER X

RIVER OPERATIONS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

RESTRICTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER X.

RIVER OPERATIONS

Par. Page

SECTION I. RIVER OPERATIONS IN GENERAL. 10—i to 10—2 1—3

II. TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF

BOATS. 10—3 to 10—11 5—10

III. PREPARATIONS FOR RIVER O:'ERATIONS 10—l2tolO—17 11—15

IV. OCCUPATION OF A RIVER 10—18 to 10—31 17-24

V

SWM 10—1

SECTION I

RIVER OPERATIONS IN GENERAL

Par. Page

Necessity for river operations 10—i 1

General characteristics of rivers 10—2 2

10—i. Necessity for river operations.—a. During the estimate of

the situation, or after the initiation of the intervention, it may become apparent that navigable inland waterways exist within the

theater of operations to such an extent that their use by the intervening force is necessary or advisable.

b. In many countries, water routes ar a primary means of transportation and communication, especially if there are few and inadequate railroads, roads, or trails. In scme sections of the country,

they may be the only avenues of approach to areas occupied by

hostile forces. So long as water routes are more economical in time

and money than other available means, they will be employed by

the local inhabitants and their use must be seriously considered in

the plan of campaign of any force entring the country for small

war operations. Such river operations as appear practicable should

be coordinated with the land operations which are to be conducted

simultaneously.

c. In some cases, it may be necessary o: advisable to occupy a river

valley in order to protect the foreign civilians, of other than United

States citizenship, and property located therein against hostile

depredations.

d. When offensive operations against the hostile forces interrupt

the normal land routes, such forces will turn to navigable rivers as a

means of supply and communication, or as an avenue of escape. Adequate and timely preparations should be undertaken by the intervening force to deny these water routes to t'ie enemy.

e. Navigable rivers often form part or all of the boundary between

the affected country and an adjacent State. If the hostile forces are

receiving assistance and supplies from th8 neighboring country, river

patrols may seriously interfere with, but never entirely suppress, such

activities. Amicable agreements should 1 e completed as soon as possible, through the Department of State, for the use of territorial

waters by such patrols, and for the pursuit of hostile groups who

1
SWM 10—2

RIVER OPERATIONS TN GENERAL

may use the remote districts of the friendly country as a base of

operations or place of refuge.

10—2. General characteristics of rivers.—a. All navigable rivers

have certain similar characteristics. Their general profile is best

represented as a series of terraces, the levels of which are relatively

placid' stretches of water of more or less uniform depth and current,

and the walls of which are impassible falls or rapids. As one proceeds upstream from the mouth of the river, the depth of water in

each successive level is usually less thaii in the one preceding. This

characteristic feature determines the distance that a. boat of any

given draft can travel and eventually makes the use of any type

of boat impossible. The extent of each group of falls and rapids,

their relative distance from the mouth of the river, and the length

of the intervening stretches of smooth water will vary with every

river. For example, the first obstacle in the Congo River in Africa

is only a hundred miles from its mouth, although the. second level

of the river presents no impassable falls for over a t.housand miles.

The Yangtze River in China is navigable by ocean-going vessels for

nearly a. thousand miles from its mouth before the Yangtze Gorge

is reached. The Coco River in Nicaragua can be traveled for over

200 miles before the first real falls and rapids, extending over 30

miles, are found; the second level is navigable for some 60 miles; and

the third level for another 70 miles to the head of navigation.

b. These various levels are customarily the "lower," "middle," and

"upper" rivers as one proceeds upstream from the mouth to the head

of navigation, and as the depth of water in the succeeding levels necessitates a change in the type and draft of boat which can be used. c. The condition of the river, the. depth and length of the navigable

stretches, and the obstacles presented to navigation vary with the

seasons of the year. At certain times, the water in the middle and

upper rivers may be so low that. numerous portages are necessary.

When the river is in flood, such obstacles may disappear entirely and

the boats normally restricted to the middle river may proceed all

the way to the head of navigation, or the lower and middle rivers

merge into one. This characteristic will influence the time of year

and the ease and practicability of conducting river operations. The

probability that. supply boats could not reach Poteca, on the Coco

River, during the months of April and May, influenced the decision

to abandon that outpost in April 1929. In commenting on the Nile

Expedition of 1884—85, Caliwell says, "And it must be added that the

supply difficulties were enormously increased by the lateness of the

2
SWM 10—2

RIVER OPERATIONS IN GENERAL

start, by the unfortunate postponement in deciding on the dispatch of

the expedition. A few weeks sufficed to convert the Nile between the

second and third cataracts from a great waterway up which the

steamers from below Wadi Haifa could have steamed with ease, into

a succession of tortuous rapids passable only with difficulty by small

boats." ("Small Wars, Their Principles and Practice," by Col. C. E.

Caliwell, 3d ed., p. 70.)

d. As the river empties into the ocean, the sediment which it carries

is depositd to form a bar or shoal. Ir the case of large rivers, the

shoal is usually so deeply submerged hat it does not prevent the

entrance of ocean going vessels. In tho:e rivers usually found in the

theater of small war operations, the bar may be so near the surface

of the water that it is a real obstacle and may make the passage of

even the ordinary ship's boat a dangerous undertaking, especially if

the services of a local pilot are not available.

3

SWM 10—3

SECTION II

TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BOATS

Par. Page

General 10—3

Coa8twise communications 10—4 5

Nature of the river 10—5 5

Lower river boats 10—6 6

Middle river boats 10—7 6

Upper river boats 10—8 6

Types of boats available . 10—9 6

Method of propulsion 10—10 8

Influence of tactical principles 10—11 9

10—3. General.—The types and characteristics of boats which are

to be used in a particular river operation depend upon several

factors, of which the more important are:

(1) Coastwise communications required.

(2) Nature of the river.

(3) Desirable boat characteristics for lower, middle, and upper

river use.

(4) Types of boats available.

(5) Method of propulsion.

(6) Influence of tactical principles.

10—4. Coastwise communications.—Navy vessels, motor launches,

and local coastal schooners, normally will be used for maintaining

coastwise communications. Unless a main supply base is located

at the mouth of the river on which the operations are being conducted, coastal shipping will be used for the transportation of

personnel and replacements, and primarily for the. shipment of

supplies.

10—5. Nature of the river.—The naturs of the river, more than any

other factor, determines the types of b:ats which will be used in

river operation. The depth of the lower, middle, and upper rivers;

the swiftness of the current; the distances between obstacles in the

river; the number and length of the portages required; the season

of the year; and the probability of securing native boatmen; each

of these will have some effect on the decision. Ordinarily, at least

three types of boats will be required bEcause of the limitations as

to draft in the various river levels. If the lower river is more

5
SWM 10—6

TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BOATS

than 300 miles long, or has a limiting depth of over 8 feet, boats

of the coastwise type will be used in addition to the usual river

types. On the other hand, if the length of the middle river is

quite short, it may be more economical to use only two types of

boats, those for the lower and upper rivers only.

10—6. Lower river boats.—Boats to be used on the lower river

normally should be motor propelled, of 4 feet draft or less, and with

a maximum speed of 15 miles or more per hour. Their propellers

should be protected to prevent damage from submerged rocks or logs.

If they are procured outside of the theater of operations, they should

be of such size and weight as to permit them to be transported by

Navy transports. They should be provided with .30 or .50 caliber

machine guns mounted on swivel mounts at the bow, and light armor

provided to protect the gunner, helmsman, and fuel tank.

10—7. Middle river boats.—Boats for use on the middle river should

be of sufficient size to carry at least one squad and its equipment in

addition to the boat crew. Normally these boats should have a draft

of 21⁄2 feet or less. The power plant may be an outboard motor or an

inboard motor with the propeller protected against damage from rocks

and other obstacles. A maximum speed of 20 miles per hour is desirable. These boats should be strongly but lightly built, to facilitate

their passage through rapids and rough stretches of water, or their

portage around such areas. The .30 caliber machine gun may be

mounted forward, either on its regular tripod mount, or on a swivel

mount if one has been provided.

10—8. Upper river boats.—For the upper rivers, the most suitable

boats are those obtained locally from the natives. If these cannot be

procured in sufficient quantity, substitutes should be of the light, shallow-draft, canoe-type boat, with fairly wide, flat bottoms and built as

strongly as l)osSible commensurate with their light weight. Provision should be made for the attachment of outboard motors, although

the normal method of propulsion will be by hand in most. situations.

They will vary in size from small canoes capable of carrying one half

of a squad plus the. crew, to cargo canoes capable of carrying 8 to 10

thousand pounds of supplies in addition to the necessary crew. The

average upper river boat should be of sufficient size to carry a complete squad with its equipment, in addition to the crew.

10—9. Types of boats available.—a. Local boat8.—Locai boats obtamed in the theater of operations have been used in the past with a

fair degree of success. Unless the operation is planned a considerable length of time before its initiation, local boats will probably be

6
SWM 10—9

TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BOATS

the only ones available. These boats shuld be purchased outright if

they are to be used for combat purposes. If the owners will not

agree to sell them, as is sometimes the case, it may be necessary to

requisition them. Receipts must be given for such boats. A record

should be made of the owner's name, if it can be ascertained, the

date and place at which the boat was acquired, its condition, and the

estimated value. This information should be forwarded to the area

commander or other appropriate commander so that proper adjustinent can be made of the owner's claim when it is submitted. If

combat boats are rented on a per diem basis, the eventual cost for

rent, plus the expense of repairs or replacements if the boats are

damaged or lost, will be exorbitant. On the other hand, it is usually

more economical to rent local boats which are to be used solely for

the transportation of supplies after the river has been pacified.

Local boats will be nondescript in character. This complicates the

repair and upkeep of motor-propelled craft. They have one decided

advantage, however, all of them will have been built for use on the

river on which the operations are to take place and, in that respect,

they probably will be superior to boats imported for the operation.

b. Regular Navy boats will seldom be available in sufficient numbers to meet the needs of the expedition. They may be used for

coastwise communications and on the lower river, depending on the

depth of the water and the presence of rapids or falls in that section

of the river. They are too heavy, draw too much water, and are too

slow to answer the helm for use in the middle river.

c. Marine Corps landing boats, especially the smaller types, probably can be used effectively in the lower and middle rivers. Their

armament, uniformity of power plant and equipment, protected bottom and propeller, and the fact that trained crews may be available to

handle them, are important advantages. Their weight may be a disadvantage for middle river operation if many portages are required.

d. There are numerous boats avaiiabh in the United States which

are suitable for small wars river operations and which can be purchased if the situation makes it necessary. They range in type from

the larger shallow draft boats which ca be used on the lower rivers,

to canoes suitable for employment in he upper river. So far as

possible they should have approximately the same characteristics as

those found in the local theater of opeiations. Radical changes in

type should be introduced with caution.

e. Rubber boats probably will be used. extensively in future small

wars river operations.

7
SWM 10—10

TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BOATS

/. Improvements and new developments are constantly taking

place in boat design and boat materials. One can never expect to

obtain a uniform flotilla of boats for river operations. The difficulty

will always be to get enough boats of any description to meet the

demands of the. situation which are suitable for use in the particular

river involved. It. is probable that much better boats will be available in the future than have been utilized for such operations in the

past.

10—10. Method of propulsion.—a. General.—Boats used in river

operations will be motor propelled, rowed, paddled, poled, or towed,

depending upon the type of boat being used, the nature of the river,

and the tactical situation.

b. Inboard nwtor boat8.—Inboard motor boats have the following

advantages:

(1) Speed.

(2) Usually greater carrying capacity than other types of boats.

(3) Requires small crew.

They have the following disadvantages:

(1) Noise of exhaust, even though muffled, discloses the location

of the patrol and gives warning of its approach.

(2) Gasoline and oil must be carried for the period between the

initiation of the patrol until the arrival of the first supply boats.

This decreases the carrying capacity for troops and rations, which

may be offset by the increased speed of the movement.

(3) They draw too much water for use in the upper river, or in

some stretches of certain middle rivers.

(4) Their power plant often fails, or propellers are fouled or

broken in rapids where power is most essential.

(5) Weight of the boat increases the difficulties of portaging

around obstacles in the river.

Inboard motors are especially useful for transporting the main

body and supplies of a large patrol, and in the system of supply

in the lower and middle rivers.

c. Outboard rn.otors.—(1) Outboard motorboats have the same advantages and disadvantages as inboard motorboats. They are more

subject to failure during heavy rains than the inboard type.

(2) Outboard motors can be used with a fair degree . of success

in the, upper river, although the presence of sandbars, rocks, sunken

trees, and other debris, and the innumerable rapids normally encountered in this section of the river increase the difficulties of

operation.

8
SWM 10—11

TYPES AND CHARACTERISflCS OF BOATS

(3) Outboard motorboats are especially useful for security units

with a patrol operating entirely with motorboats; and for liaison

and command missions.

(4) Outboard motors purchased for river operations should be

of the multiple cylinder type and capable of developing at least 25

horsepower. Motors whose water intak is through the forward end

of the propeller housing should not be purchased. They are prone

to pick up too much sand, dirt, and other debris in the shallow

waters in which they often have to operate.

d. Rowboat8.—Rowboats will seldom be used in small war river

operations. Disabled navy or large sized motorboats may have to

be rowed for comparatively short distances.

e. Paddles.—Paddles are normally used as the means of propulsion

with upper river boats which are not equipped with outboard

motors. They may be used when moving against the current in

quiet stretches of the river, depending upon the strength of the

current, and will always be used when going downstream or from

one side of the river to the other. They are used as rudders in

boats of the canoe type. Because of their reliability under all conditions, they are part of the normal eqripment of every middle and

upper river boat, whether they are equipped with motors or not.

f. Poles.—In swift water, poles must be used to make headway

against the current if the water is too shallow for the operation of

motors or if the boat is not equipped with a motor. In many cases,

poles can be used to assist a motorboat when passing through rapids

and bucking an unusually strong current. They are part of the

normal equipment of every middle and upper river boat.

g. Towing.—Towing will have to be resorted to when passing upstream through very bad rapids. Occasionally the overhanging

branches close to shore may be grasped to haul the boat along. Before towing ,a boat through bad stretches of water, it should be

unloaded at the foot of the rapid, and ihe load portaged around it.

In some cases, such as falls or extreme'y bad rapids, the boat will

have to be portaged also. In going downstream through dangerous

rapids, towlines must be used to ease the boat and keep it under

control.

10—11. Influence of tactical principles.—Tactical principles will

have considerable influence on the type c f boats selected for any particular river patrol. Security units should be transported in small,

light, easily maneuverable boats, carrying one-half .to a complete

squad of men in addition to the crews. The command group requires

9
SW1VI 10—li

TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF BOATS

a small, fast boat. Elements of tha main body must be transported

as units in order to facilitate their entry into action. Supply boats

may be of an entirely different type than the combat boats. The

necessity for speed will influence the composition of the flotilla. Even

in the lower river, these tactical requirements may necessitate the employrnent of some middle and upper river craft; in the upper river

sections, they will influence the size of the boats employed.

10
SWM 10—12

SECTION III

PREPARATIONS FOR RIVER OPERATIONS

Par. Page

Introduction 10—12 11

Organizing the river patrol 10—13 12

Crews 10-14 12

Boatprocurement 10—15 13

Armamentandequipment 10—16 13

Loading boats -. 10—17 14

10—12. Introduction.—a. When the decision to seize and occupy a

river route has been reached, certain preparatory measures, such as

the organization of the force to be employed and. the assembling of

boats and their crews, must be taken. In many respects these preliminary steps closely resemble the organization of infantry patrols

discussed in Chapter VI, "The Infantry Patrol."

b. In the majority of cases, the occupaion of a river will proceed

from the coastline inland. If the situation requires that the occupation begin near the head of navigation and work downstream, the

difficulties of preparation are magnified, especially in the collection

of the necessary boats, boat equipment, and native crews. The measures to be taken, however, are similar in either event.

c. If the river to be occupied is not already held by hostile

forces, or no opposition is offered, the problem will be relatively

simple, provided suitable and sufficient beats to handle the personnel

and initial supplies are available. If the mouth of the river is held

by the enemy, it must be seized as the first step. This operation

does not differ from any landing against opposition, which is completely covered in the "Manual for Landing Operations."

d. River operations are relatively unfamiliar to our forces.

They utilize types of transportation whose capabilities and care are

comparatively unknown to our personnel. The operations are

conducted on routes of travel which are seldom accurately indicated

on the available map, and they are executed over waterways of constantly changing characteristics. The condition of the water highways varies with the low or flood stage in the river and with the

part of the river in which the boat is operating, whether lower,

middle, or upper river. Every opportunity should be given the men

11
SWM 10—13

PREPARATIONS FOR RIVER OPERATIONS

to become water-wise and boat-wise, in order to build up their boathandling ability and their self-confidence. Preparations for river

operations should commence, therefore, as far as possible in advance

of the date when such operations are expected to begin.

10—13. Organizing the river patrol.—Many of the same principles

apply to organization of a river patrol as apply to that of an infantry patrol. The size of the patrol is determined by the same

factors, except that the number and type of boats available must

be taken into consideration. Individual armament, the proportion

of supporting weapons to be attached, the necessity for additional

officers, cooks, medical personnel and signal personilel, native guides,

and interpreters are all considered in the estimate of the situation

on the same basis as for a land patrol. The principles to be borne

in. mind are the same; the difference is that a river is used as the

avenue of approach to the hostile area instead of a road or trail,

and instead of riding animals or marching, boats are used.

10—14. Crews.—a, Whether enlisted or native boat crews, or a proportion of each, are included in the organization of the patrol depends upon the types of boats to be used, the nature of the river, the

availability of reliable natives, and the general situation in the theater

of operations. Very few natives who are good engineers and mechanics will be found in the usual small wars theater. If the nature

of the river is such that only motorboats will be used in the patrol,

the crews should consist of enlisted men, with a sufficient number of

natives to act as guides in the bow of each boat. Even these can be

dispensed with if the patrol is well trained in river work. On the

other hand, if the operations are to take place in the middle and upper

rivers, where innumerable rapids will be encountered, and boats have

to be propelled by hand, natives should comprise the boat crews if

they can possibly be obtained. The handling of shallow-draft boats,

such as the canoe and sampan, in the upper river is an art not easily

or quickly acquired. This is second nature to the native who has been

brought up in the upper river country; whereas, only a very few

enlisted men will be found who can learn to handle all types of river

craft in all kinds of water. Every enlisted man who is detailed as a

member of a boat crew depletes the number of effectives in the combat

personnel. The procedure relative to hiring native boat crews does

not differ from. the hiring of native muleteers, and the same principles

apply• as with land patrols. Every situation must be estimated and

decided upon its merits.

12
SWM 10—15

PREPARATIONS FOR RIVER OPERATIONS

b. The crew of a boat powered with an inboard motor should consist of a. coxswain, an engineer, and a pilot. An outboard motorboat

requires an engineer and a pilot only. Boats which are propelled

by hand; that is, by poling when. going upstream and paddling when

going downstream, require a much larger crew in relation to the size

of the boat. The smaller, upper river boats, capable of carrying from

a half squad to a squad, should have a poling crew of three or four

men at t.he bow, and a boat captain who handles the steering paddle

or rudder at the stern. The larger supply and combat boats may

require as many as twelve bowmen and two men at the stern. Smaller

crews than these can operate, but the speed of the patrol will be

adversely affected, and the. dangers of capsizing or losing control of

the boat in rough water will be increased.

10—15. Boat procurement.—a. After a decision has been made to

engage in a river operation, the earlier the necessary boats are procured, the. better are the chances for succ3ss. If such operations can

be foreseen when the expedition is organizing in the United States,

lower- and middle-river boats, and a few .ight-draft. boats which may

be suitable for use in the upper river, should be carried with the initial

equipment, as well as a supply of outboard motors.

b. If suitable boats have not been provided, it will be necessary to

purchase or charter local boats. If the supply of available craft

exceeds the needs of the patrol, only the best of the various types

required as determined by the composition of the patrol should be

selected for the initial movement. It is advisable, however, to take

possession of at least double that number .o that they will be immediately available for supply and replacem?nt purposes in the future.

Boats should be inspected and inquiries made as to their riverworthiness before they are purchased. I:i man cases the supply of

boats will be less than the required num'er or type, and the size of

the patrol my have to be curtailed, or some compromise effected in

the distribution of personnel, equipment, and supplies among the

boats.

10-46. Armament and equipment.—-a. Organic.—The organic

armament and equipment, and the propo:tion of attached units, will

not differ from that of an infantry patiol of comparable strength.

For details, see Chapter II, "Composition Df Forces," and Chapter VI,

"The Infantry Patrol."

b. Zndividual.—The same principles apply to the amount of individual equipment carried in a river patrol as on an infantry land

patrol. (See ch. VI, "The Infantry Pat:ol.") Each man, however,

13

210—705 0 — 88 — 14 : QL 3
SWM 10—17

PREPARATIONS FOR RIVER OPERATIONS

should be provided with a rubber, waterproof bag for carrying his

personal equipment. The bag should be securely tied at the throat

and distended to create the maximum airspace. If the boat capsizes,

as is often the case, the bag will float, and support the man in his efforts

to reach the shore. Mosquito nets must always be included, especially

in operations along the lower and middle rivers.

c. Boat.—For the armament of lower- and middle-river boats, see

paragraphs 10—6 and 10—7. Each boat should be equipped with the

following

100-foot, stern arid bow lines of 1 inch manila rope, in place ready

for instant use at all times.

1 paddle for each man required to use it.

1 pole, metal shod, for each man required to use it.

2 long range focusing flashlights.

1 gasoline or makeshift stove for preparing food.

d. Sigal.-_—Patrols operating in the. lower river should be equipped

with a reliable, two-way radio set. Patrols in the middle and upper

rivers should carry the light, portable set and establish communication with the base each day. (See ch. II, "Organization.") Panels, message pick-up set, and pyrotechnics should be carried as with

infantry patrols. (See ch. VI, "The infantry Patrol.")

e. Medicai.—Medical supplies should be packed and distributed

among several boats in the patrol to reduce the possibilities of loss

if one or more of the boats should capsize.

f. Anrnvunition..—The same principles apply as with an infantry

patrol, especially as to the amount of ammunition which should be

carried on the person. Because of the comparative ease with which

it can be transported with a river patrol, it might be advisable to

carry at least one complete unit of fire in the train. Like the

medical supplies, the ammunition in reserve should be distributed

throughout the entire boat flotilla, except the security units.

g. Rations and galley equ.ipment.—See Chapter VI, "The Infantry

Patrol."

10—17. Loading boats.—After all other preparations have been

made, the boats, in order to facilitate an early start, should be

loaded with as much of the patrol equipment and supplies as possible the day before the patrol is to clear its base. Each man should

be required to carry his ammunition belt. and similar equipment

on his person, properly fastened at all times to avoid its loss if

the boat is capsized. Arms should be carried within reach at all

times. Individual packs are loaded in the boat the man will occupy;

14
SWM 10—17

PREPARATIONS FOR aIvE:a OPERATIONS

they can be used as seats in boats of i;he upper-river type. Boats

assigned to the service of security should be lightly loaded and

should carry only the personal gear of the men on that duty. Other

boats in the flotilla should carry their proportionate share of the

equipment and supplies. Even though a supply train is included

in the flotilla, it is necessary to distribute some of the supplies

among the other boats as a precauticnary measure against their

loss if the supply boats are capsized or broken in negotiating rough

water. In navigating fast water, boats should be loaded down by

the head for work against the current; or down by the stern for

work with the current, so that the deeper end will always be up.

current. As the boat tends to pivot on its deeper end, the current

will hold the boat parallel to the flow of the current.

1s

SWM iO-i&

SEcnoN IV

OCCUPATION OF A RIVER

Par. Page

The mission 10—18 17

Similarity to land operation 10—19 17

The day's march 10—20 18

Rate of movement 10—21 18

Boat formation 10—22 19

Reconnaissance and security 10—23 20

Initial contact with the enemy 10—24 21

Atypical ambush 10—25 21

The attack 10—26 22

Garrisoning the river 10—27 22

Defensivemeasures 10—28 23

Passage of obstacles - 10—29 23

Night operations 10—30 23

Supporting forces 10—31 24

10—18. The mission.—The missions which determine the necessity

for the occupation of a river line have, been stated previously: to

provide an easier and more economical route of supply to the land

forces; to deny the use of the river to the hostile forces; to interfere

with enemy lines of communication which are perpendicular to the

river line; or to secure an avenue of approach to the hostile area for

the establishment of a base from which active land operations can

be conducted. Each of these will affect the size and composition of

the force employed, and the location of the garrisons established

along the river.

10—19. Similarity to land operatioiis.—The occupation of a river

parallels in every respect the advance of a land patrol from its base,

except in the' means of transportation. After the initial base at the

mouth of the river has been seized, a first objective is selected and

patrols are pushed forward until it is captured. Reorganization

takes place, supplies and reenforcements are brought forward, and

the advance is resumed to the second objective. A third objective

is selected and taken in the same way, and so on until the river is

brought under control. If opposition is not expected and the mission

is to garrison the river more or less equitably throughout its length,

as in the case of using it as a route of supply or to deny it to the

enemy, the advance may be continuous. The entire river force may

17
SWM 10—20

OCCUPATION OF A RIVER

leave the original base as a body, provided enough boats are available, and detachments are made as each outpost is established along

the route. If opposition is anticipated, or if the supply of boats is

not sufficient for the entire patrol, the advance will certainly be made

by bounds from objective to objective, and eventually the major portion of the river force will be concentrated at the final objective where

it is employed for coordinated land and river operations against the

enemy in hostile territory.

10—20. The day's march.—As with land patrols, the day's march

should begin as soon after dawn as possible. This is facilitated by

the fact that most of the supplies and equipment may be loaded into

the boats each evening as soon as the rations for the next 24 hours

have been removed. Noonday halts should not be made for the purpose of preparing a hot meal. Midday lunches may be prepared and

distributed in the morning although usually the ration situation will

not. permit such action. Unless tactical considerations prevent, the

(lay's movement should be halted at least 2 hours before sundown in

order to carry out the necessary security measures, make the camp,

and feed the troops and boat crews before dark. The camp should

be on fairly level ground, sufficiently above the water level to avoid

flooding in the event of a rapid rise in the river during the night.

Boats should be secured with a sufficiently long line to prevent their

being stranded on dry land because of a sudden drop in the water

level, or being pulled under and swamped because of a sudden rise

in the river. Boat guards should always be posted over the flotilla.

10—21. Rate of movement.--—The rate of movement will depend

upon the type of boat being used, whether propelled by motor or by

hand; the nature. and condition of the river, whether in deep comparatively calm water, or in the strong currents and innumerable

rapids of the middle and upper river; and the need for careful reconnaissance. A motor flotilla may average between 60 and 100 miles

a day under the best. conditions; a flotilla moving by hand power

will average from 12 to 15 miles per day. The rate of advance will

be that of the slowest boat in the column. Regardless of the rate of

movement, some word of the approach of the patrol will usually

precede it up river, especially if the area is well populated. If the

state of the river permits, it may be possible, and in certain situations

desirable, to overrun the hostile shore positions by utilizing the speed

available to a motorboat flotilla. If the mission of the patrol is to

drive the hostile groups out of the river valley, it may be better to

18
SWM 10—22

OCCUPATION OF A RIVER

advance slowly, sometimes by poling, in order to seek out the enemy

by reconnaissance and engage him in combat.

10—22. Boat formations.—a. Genercl.—Formations for a boat

column advancing along a river, either up or down stream, parallels

in every respect a march formation for an infantry patrol over land,

and the same principles apply. (See "The Infantry Patrol," ch. VI).

There should be an advance guard, a command group, a main body,

a combat or supply train, and a rear guard. Tactical units, such

as half squads (combat teams), squads, and platoons, should be assigned to separate boats so as to maintain freedom of maneuver and

yet retain as much control over the various elements of the patrol as

possible. The number and type of boats within the formation will

depend upon the size and composition of the patrol and the nature

of the river in which it is operating. Even in the lower river where

no opposition is expected, some security elements should proceed and

follow the main body. It would be a mistake to place an entire

patrol consisting of a rifle platoon in a single lower river boat, or

even to divide it into a point of a half squad in an upper river boat

and the remainder of the patrol in a single lower river boat, if opposition is anticipated. To do so might immobilize the entire patrol if

the main body should suddenly he fired upon from a concealed hostile

position. On the other hand, it would be tactically unsound to empioy only upper river boats containing one squad each or less for a

patrol consisting of a reenforced rifle company. This would result

man elongated column and a correspording lack of control. If the

nature of the river and the type of boats available make such a disposition necessary, it would be. better to employ the split column

formation, described in Chapter VI, for large infantry patrols.

b. Type of boats employed.—The elements of the advance guard,

the rear guard, and flank security units, as well as the command

group should be assigned to small, light, fast boats of the upper-river

type. This is especially true of the point, rear points and command

group. This facilitates the movement of the security elements and

permits them to adjust the distances it the formation according to

the terrain through which they are passing without slowing up unduly the steady progress of the main body. It enables the patrol

commander to proceed rapidly to any part of the column where his

presence is most urgently required. The remainder of the patrol

may be assigned to types of boats which are best suited to the tactical

requirements and the nature of the rive:.

19
SWM 10—23

OCCUPATION OF A RIVER

c. Distances in formation.—The. distances between the elements of

the column will vary with the terrain, the size of the flotilla, and the

speed of movement. The principles involved are analogous to land

operations in which the troops are proceeding along a fairly wide,

open road. The leading elements should never be out of sight of

the next element in rear for more than a minute or so at a time.

Where the river is straight and wide, distances between the various

parts of the column should be great enough to prevent the main

body coming under machine-gun fire before the hostile position has

been disclosed by the security detachments. Wherc the river is winding and tortuous the distance between groups should be shortened.

If the distance between elements is too great each unit may be

defeated in detail before the next succeeding unit can be brought

up, disembarked, and engaged with the enemy.

d. Location of patrol commander in colunin.—The patrol commander's boat will usually move at or near the head of the main

body.

e. Location of supply boats.—Normally the supply boat or boats

should be located at the tail of the main body. The rear echelon

of the command group acts as train guard. In the event of combat,

the train guard assembles the boats of the flotilla and the crews, and

moves the train forward to maintain liaison with the main body as

the attack progresses. If the rear guard is committed to action,

the train guard assumes its functions to protect the column from

an attack from the rear. If the train is unusually long, as may be

the case when a patrol is to establish an advance base at the end of

its river movement, it may be advisable to detach the majority of

the supply boats from the main column and form it into a convoy,

following the combat part of the patrol at a designated distance.

10—23. Reconnaissance and security.—a. Methods of reconnaissance.—A river patrol employs the same methods of reconnaissance

as an infantry patrol ashore. (See "The Infantry Patrol," ch. VI.)

Since the route of advance is limited to the river, it is often necessary to halt the movement temporarily while small land patrols

reconnoiter suspicious localities some distance from the river banks.

b. The advance guard.—The advance guard may consist of a point

boat only, or it may be broken into a point, advance party, support,

and reserve, depending upon the strength of tlie patrol. As in operations on land, the function of the point is primarily reconnaissance,

to uncover and disclose hostile positions in front of the advancing

column before the main body comes within effective range of the

20
SWM 10—24

OCCUPATION OF A RIVER

enemy's weapons. The upper-river type boat is best suited for this

purpose; it can be handled easily and does not expose too many

men to the surprise fire of an ambush laid along the shore lines.

The elements of the advance guard shculd increase in strength from

front to rear so that increasing pressure is applied as succeeding

units engage the hostile position. If the river is wide, the advance

guard should employ a broad front, with at least one boat near

each bank. The main body should pi:oceecl near the center of the

river to reduce the effects of hostile fire from either bank.

e. Flank security.—(1) It is almost impossible for men in boats

to discover a well-laid ambush. When operating in hostile territory, or when there are indications that combat is imminent, shore

patrols should precede or move abreast of the advance guard boats

on each bank of the river. Although this will slow the rate of

travel, it is an essential precaution unless speed is the most important

factor in the mission of the patrol.

(2) Navigable tributaries entering the route of advance should

be reconnoitered and secured by some small boat element of the patrol

while the column is passing them.

d. March outpost.s...—March outposts should be established at every

temporary halt. This is accomplished by reconnaissance to the front

and rear by the point and rear point., resepectively, and by the establishment of flank boat or shore patrols as necessary.

e. Security at rest.—Immediately upon arriving at a temporary

or permanent camp site, boat reconnaissance patrols are sent up and

down river for a distance of one or more miles depending upon the

nature of the river. Trails and roads leading into the camp site and

suspicious localities in the vicinity of the site are reconnoitered by

land patrols. Other precautionary measures are taken as prescribed

for infantry patrols. (See "The Infantry Patrol," ch. VI.)

10—24. Initial contact with the enemy.—The initial contact with

the enemy ii river operations may be in the nature of a meeting

engagement, with all the elements of surprise for both forces found

in such contacts, or, as is more often the case, it consists of uncovering .his outpost positions. In either event, once contact has been

made, the choice of position and the time of future engagements will

pass to the hostile force attempting to prevent the further advance

of the patrol. In most small war operations, these engagements will

be in the nature of an ambuscade.

10—25. A typical arnbush.—Tlie typical hostile ambush will resemble those found in land operations. It will be located at a bend

21
SWM 10—26

OCCUPATION OF A RIVER

in the river in order to provide suitable locations for automatic

weapons to enfilade the advancing column of boats. The nature of

the river will be such that the boats will be forced close to one bank

to negotiate the current. Along this bank will be located the main

hostile position so sited that rifle and automatic weapon fire can be

directed at the column from the flank. The terrain will be heavily

wooded to afford cover and concealment. Under these conditions,

the possibilities that the ambush can be detected by men in boats will

be very slight. Portages, rapids, and canyons may also be selected as

ambush positions in order to engage the patrol when it is widely dispersed and out of control of its commander.

10—26. The attack.—Men in boats present a concentrated, vulnerable target to a hostile force ashore. The hostile fire should be re

turned by the weapons carried on the boats as normal armament.

A few riflemen may be in such a position that they can open fire

without endangering the crew or other members of the boat. However, any fire delivered from a moving boat will be erratic and

comparatively ineffectuaL The full power of the attacking force

cannot be developed until the troops are on shore and deployed for

the fight. If the attack occurs in a wide, deep stretch of river in

which the boats can be maneuvered, it may be possible to run past

the hostile fire and land the troops above the ambush to take the

attack in the rear and cut off the enemy's prearranged line of retreat.

Usually the ambush will be so located that this is impossible. In

that event, the leading boats should be beached toward the hostile

position. Disembarking, the men in these boats take up the fire

and hold the hostile force in its position. Those boats not under

the initial burst of fire should be. brought upstream as close to the

hostile position as possible, the troops disembarked, and the attack

launched from the flank to envelop the ambush, overrun the Position, and intercept the hostile line of withdrawal. Ordinarily the

patrol should land on one side of the river only. In some situations

it may be desirable or necessary to land on both banks, especially if

the hostile force is deployed on both sides of the river. This action

increases the difficulties of control, and may result in inflicting casualties among friendly personnel. Once the troops are ashore, the

tactics are similar to those employed by regular infantry patrols.

10—27. Garrisoning the river.—a. The location of the various posts

to be established along the river is determined by: foreign settlements and investments which require protection; junctions of important river-ways; location of intersecting roads and trails; supply

22
SWM 10—28

OCCUPATION OF A. RIVER

dumps and reshipping points between the lower and middle rivers

or the middle and upper rivers; and the strength, aggressiveness,

and disposition of the hostile forces.

b The strength of eaeh post will depend upon its mission and the

hostile forces in the area. The largest. forces should be located at

those points on the river which are most vulnerable to attack, or from

which combat patrols can operate to best advantage against, hostile

forces.

o. The distance between posts on th. river is determined by the

existing situation. If the hostile forcE is active and aggressive in

the area, the posts should be within supporting distance, not over 1

day's travel upstream, from each other. If the hosti]e force is weak,

unaggressive, or nonexistant, a distance of 150 miles between posts

may not be too great a dispersion of force.

d. In some situations, it may be necessary to establish outposts on

navigable tributaries to the main river in order to protect th.e line of

communications. This is especially important if the tributary leads

from hostile areas or if trails used by the hostile force cross its course.

10—28. Defensive measures.—a. Each garrison along the river

must be prepared for all-around de.fer.se. Wire entanglements or

other obstacles should be erected, mack,ne gulls and other defensive

weapons should be supplied, and normal defensive measures taken.

Active patrolling by land and water should be maintained. Communications by radio or other means should be established with the

area headquarters and with other outposts along tile river. Boats

should be supplied to each outpost for reconnaissance, liaison, and

local supply purposes, and as a means :or evacuation down river in

case of necessity.

10—29. Passage of obstacles.—Obstacles in the river, such as narrows, gorges, bad rapids, and falls, whether they can be navigated

or require a portage, are similar to defiles in ordinary warfare and

similar protective measure must be tak3n. A combat patrol should

proceed to the head of the obstacle, and flank security patrols should

reconnoiter both banks of the river and dangerous commanding localities, in order to secure the safe passaga of the main body through

the obstacle.

10—30. Night operations.—Night OpErations may be conducted:

(1) To make a reconnaissance.

(2) To make a search.

(8) 'To secrete small detachments and picket boats.

23
SWM 10—31

OCCUPATION OF A RIVER

(4) To send out a patrol.

(5) To change the location of a post.

(6) To avoid aimed fire from shore and to avoid combat. Night

operations must be conducted by poling or paddling, never by motor,

if secrecy is to be attained. Movements upstream against the current

at night are extremely slow, difficult, and fatiguing to crew and combat force alike. They should be avoided except in the most urgent

situations. They have all the attendant difficulties of a night. march

by an infantry patrol. See "The Infantry Patrol," Cli. VI.) On

the other hand, night movements by boat downstream with the current can be silently and easily executed if the night Is clear and if the

river is free of dangerous obstacles. Such night movements are often

profitably employed in river operations.

1041. Supporting forces.—a. Infantry patrol8.—River operations

often can be coordinated with the operations of infantry patrols if

the trail net is satisfactory and such supporting troops are available

in the area. Such coordinated efforts should be employed whenever

possible to effect the seizure of important towns or localities along the

river, or to increase the probability of inflicting a decisive defeat upon

the hostile forces.

b. Aviation.—Aviation support is fully as important for the successful conclusion of river operations as for the corresponding land

operations. For details, see Chapter IX, "Aviation."

0

24
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER XI

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940. is published

in 15 chapters as follows:

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERAPIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF' ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

III

ZWM 11.-i

RESTRICTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER XI

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

Par. Page

GENERAL 11—I 1 ESTIMATE AND PLANS 11—2 3

LAWS, DECREES, ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS 11—3 5

MANNER OF COLLECTING ARMS 11—4 6

COLLECTINGAGENCIES 11—5 7

CUSTODY OF ARMS 11—6 9

DIsPosITIoN 11—7 11

PERMITS 11—8 12

CONTROL OF SOURCES OF SUPPLY 11—9 13

MEASURES FOLLOWING DISARMAMENT 11—10 14

11—1. General.—a. Due to the unsettled conditions ordinarily prevailing in a country requiring a neutral intervention, and the existence of many arms in the hands of the inhabitants, the disarming

of the general population of that country is not only extremely

important as a part of the operation of the intervening forces but

also to the interests of the inhabitants themselves. It is customary

in many undeveloped or unsettled communities for all of the male

population upon reaching maturity, to be habitually armed, notwithstanding that such possession is generally illegal. There is a

logical reason for the large number cf weapons in the hands of the

inhabitants. The arbitrary political methods which frequently result in revolution, and the lawlessness practiced by a large proportion of the population, is responsible for this state of affairs. The

professional politicians and the revolutionary or bandit leaders, as

well as their numerous cohorts, are habitually armed. Legal institutions cannot prevail against this distressing condition; persons and

property are left at the mercy of unsrupulous despots, until in self1
SWM 11—i

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

preservation the peaceful and law abiding inhabitants are forced

to arm themselves.

b. If it has not been done previously by the intervening forces,

the disarming of the people should be initiated upon the formal

declaration of military government, and must be regarded as the

most vital step in the restoration of tranquility. The disarming of

the native population of a country in which military occupation has

taken place is an imperative necessity.

c. One of the initial steps of an intervention is the disarming of

the native factions opposing each other. If this action is successful,

serious subsequent results may be averted. To be effective, this

action must be timely, and the full cooperation of native leaders

must be secured through the proper psychological approach. The

disarmament can be effected only through the greatest tact and

diplomacy. It is only one of several successive steps in the settlement of the local controversy, and any agreement effected must

insure not only ultimate justice but immediate satisfaction to all

contending parties. To secure this concession, the arbiter must have

the confidence of the natives and must be ready willing, and able

to insure the provisions of the agreement. This involves the responsibility to provide security not only for the natives who have been

disarmed but for the individuals depending upon them for protection. This implies the presence of the arbiter's forces in sufficient

numbers to guarantee safety.

d. Peaceful inhabitants, voluntarily surrendering their arms,

should be guaranteed protection by those forces charged with the

restoration and maintenance of peace and order. Were it possible to

disarm completely the whole population, the military features of

small wars would resolve themselves into simple police duties of a

routine nature. Obviously, considering the size of the population,

the extent of' territory, and the limited number of available troops,

any measures adopted will not be 100 percent effective. However,

if properly executed, the native military organizations and a large

proporticm of the populace may be disarmed voluntarily; many

others will be disarmed by military or police measures designed to

locate and confiscate arms held clandestinely. These measures will

limit the outstanding arms to those held by a few individuals who

will seek to hide them. In many instances, these hidden arms will

be exposed to the elements or to deterioration which in time will accomplish the same end as surrender or confiscation. Although complete disarmament may not be attained, yet the enforcement of any

2
SWM 11-2

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

ordinance restricting the possession of arms will result in the illegal

possession of such arms only by opposing native forces, outlaws or

bandits, and a few inhabitants who will evade thisordinance as they

would attempt to do with any unpopular legislation. Comparatively few of this latter class will use their weapons except in self-

• defense. Thus the inhabitants are partially segregated at the outset

of the negotiations. The disarming order will probably not. influence the Professional guerrilla fighters to give up their weapons but

such source of supply and replenishment of weapons and ammunition within the country vill be practically eliminated.

11—2. Estimate and Plans.—a. Prior to the issuance of any order

Or decree disarming the inhabitants, it s necessary to make an estimate of the situation and analyze all :eatures of the undertaking,

the powers and limitations, the advantages and disadvantages, and

then make plans accordingly. The plans should include the following provisions:

(1) The measures necessary to strengthen the local laws.

(2) The civil or military authority issuing the disarming order,

or decree.

(3) The forces necessary to enforce the order or decree.

(4) The form of the order or decree.

(5) The method of promulgating the order or decree.

(6) The measures and supplementary instructions to place the

order in effect.

(7) The designation and preparation of depots, buildings, and

magazines in convenient places for the storage of the arms, ammunition, and explosives.

(8) The disposition of the munitions collected.

(9) The method of accountability for such munitions, including

the preparation of the necessary forms, receipts, tags. and permits,

to be used in this system.

(10) The arrangements for the funds necessary to execute the

disarmament.

(11) The designation of the types and classes of munitions to be

turned in.

(12) The exceptions to the order or decree, definitely and plainly

stated for the information of subordinales. (Special perimt to individuals.) (13) The agencies (civil officials or military commander), who

will collect, guard, and transport the riiaterial.

3
SWM 11-2

DISARMAMFNT OF POPULATION

(14) The supplementary instructions for the guidance of the

agencies charged with the execution of the order or decree.

(15) The instructions governing the manufacture and importation

of munitions.

(16) The instructions governing the sale and distribution of munitions manufactured or imported.

(17) The time limit for compliance and penalties assigned thereafter.

b. Small wars take place generally in countries containing primitive areas where many of the inhabitants depend on game for their

fresh meat. The peasants in the outlying districts accordingly are

armed with shotguns for hunting, as well as for self-protection.

Many demands for the retention of such arms will 'be made on this

score and they should be satisfied in accordance with the seriousness

of the situation, the justice of the request, and the character of the

individual making it.

c. A feature of the disarming of the inhabitants which is a source

of difficulty and misunderstanding is the question of retaining their

machetes, cutachas, knives, and stilettos. Machetes in these ountries are of two general types; one is for work and the other for

fighting. The working machete is practically the only implement

found on the farms or in the forest; it is used for clearing and cultivating land as well as harvesting the crops. It would be obviously

unfair to deprive the natives of this general utility tool. It is distinguished by its heavy weight, the blade being broader and slightly

curved at the end away from the handle, and without. a guard or hilt.

The fighting machete or cutacha has a hilt and is narrow, light, and

sharp. Sometimes working machetes are ground down into fighting

weapons but these are readily distinguished. Directions issued for

the collection of arms should contain instructions so that subordinates may be informed of the difference in order to insure the collection of these dangerous weapons, and to avoid depriving the peasants of their implements which mean their very livelihood. Similarly, one finds that the natives are almost always armed with some

kind of knife. They are used when packing animals and for all

kinds of light work; they are often the only implements used in

eating; they are used in butchering, in trimming the hoofs of their

animals, and for many other chores. Certain weapons are obviously

for fighting only and these are banned without question; these are

the stiletto or narrow blade, dagger type of weapon. They have

little or no cutting qualities but they are deadly.

4
SWM 11-3

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

d. The disarming order, or supplementary instructions thereto,

should describe these weapons sufficiently to properly guide the

subordinates who will execute the order. They should provide that

cutacha,s will not, be permitted to be carried at any time; agricultural machetes will not be permitted on the pub] ic roads or in public

gatherings; stilettos will not be permitted at any time or place.'

e. Care should be taken to allow sufficient time for all inhabitants

to tuin in their arms, and opportunity to turn in arms must be assured.

If sufficient time is allowed, or if instructions to turn in arms are

not widely published, a number of inhabitants may have arms in

their possession though willing to turn them in. They will be fearful of the consequences, and through their ignorance will constitute

.a ready field for recruiting for bandit ranks. rrhis is particularly

true in remote areas. It is therefore most important that time, notice,

and opportunity be given all concerned.

lb—3. Laws, Decrees, Orders, and Instructions.—a. In most countries, there are statutes restricting the possession of arms and explosives. As a rule these laws are not enforced rigidly and even at

best are not sufficiently comprehensive to meet the immediate requirements. The laws and their enforcement agencies must be strengthened by appropriate measures to insure the effective execution of the

measures intended.

b. The first step in disarming the po:pulation is to issue a disarming order forbidding all inhabitants to have in their possession firearms, ammunition, or explosives, excep under special circumstances

to be determined by a specific authority. This order is directed to

the authority who will be responsible for its execution. It specifies

that the prohibited articles will be turned in to the proper officers

'of the forces of occupation, who will receipt and care for such as

are voluntarily surrendered, but. that such articles as are not voluntarily surrendered will be confiscated. It will further stipulate that.

after a certain date the illegal possession of arms, ammunition, or

explosives will render the person apprehended liable to punishment.

The details of carrying out this order are properly left to the discretion of appropriate military authori':y.

c. The official who has the authority to issue the disarming order

will be indicated by the nature of the intervention. In a simple

intervention where the civil authoritie4 are still in charge, a decree

might be issued by the Chief Executive, or a law might be enacted

in proper form and sufficiently forcef 11 to fit the situation. Such

'decrees have been issued iii emergencies in the past and have proven

effective, In case a military government is established, the miii5
SWIVI 11-4

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

tary governor would issue the decree or order. Under some circumstances the commander of the military or naval forces might issue

the disarming order.

d. To give the order the force and character of a public document

it should be published in appropriate official publications of the

government for the information and guidance of the citizens of the

country. This method not only gives the order an official character

but insures its prompt and legal distribution throughout the country.

The order should be published in the native language and, as necessary, in the language of the intervening forces. Circumstances will

determine the time limit in which the prohibited munitions must be

surrendered; after which date their possession will be. illegal. This

will depend upon the ability of the natives to comply before a given

date, or the availability of the forces to make it effective. The

necessity for explosives required for the routine peaceful vocation

of some inhabitants should not be overlooked. Prohibitory restrictions against their possession or use would materially interfere with

industrial and commercial enterprise and development. So, in keeping with the policy of fair and liberal treatment of the natives,

provision must be made for these special cases. Before incorporating in the disarming order any exception thereto, the military authorities should consider first, the conditions which might result

under legalized use of firearms and explosives by certain favored

individuals (civil officials, land owners, etc.,), and second, the extent

and character of supervision that will be required to control their

use and their sources of supply. Once these points have been determined, the order should be prepared to incorporate the necessary

provisions. The disarmament of that portion of the native population living in remote and lawless districts should only be undertaken with a full appreciation of the responsibilities involved.

Ranch overseers, mine superintendents, paymasters and local civil

authorities, should be given special consideration in the matter of

arms permits. There is such a thing as being over-zealous in the

matter of disarmament, and It is often advisable to make certain

concessions to responsible parties in order to secure their full cooperation in the enforcement of the laws.

11—4. Manner of Collecting Arms.—a. When opposing native

forces are operating in the field, the intervening forces, if acting as

an arbiter, should institute measures to secure the arms of all the

opposing forces by organizations prior to their disbanding. Every

endeavor should be made to have the full cooperation of the leaders

6
SWM 11-5

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

and to prevent the escape or departure of any subordinate leader and

his followers with arms in their possession. Disarming such organizations involves disbanding. them and providing for their return

home. With the twofold purpose of insuring the turning in of their

arms and the return of the natives to their homes, a price is often

paid to individuals for their weapons in accordance with a schedule

fixing the rates for the various types of firearms and ammunition.

This is a reasonable charge against thE native government and the

money from this source must be assured before proceeding. This

procedure may be a source of chicanery and fraud to deceive the

authorities and get money dishonestly. Every precaution should be

taken to see that money is paid only for the arms of men regularly

serving with the units at the time of the agreement. Precautions

must be taken that the armories and magazines are not raided after

the agreement is in effect and that the same individuals do not repeatedly return with such rifles for payment. On the other hand,

ready money in sufficient quantity from the local government must

be available at the time and place of payment agreed upon, or where

the forces are found.

b. If part of the native forces remain armed, the full benefits of

disarmament are not obtained, and serious consequences may later

develop. 'When this occurs, some of these small armed groups may

take the field and continue their operaticns not only against the local

government but also against the intervening forces. This would

place the intervening forces in an embarrassing position. After

having disarmed the forces which might have been capable of controlling the movement, the intervening forces may be required either

to halt the disarming negotiations and again rearm those forces or

send out its own troops to take the field against these armed groups.

In other words, to be fully effective, disa ftma1nent must be practically

complete.

11—5. Collecting Agencies.—a. The following agencies may be employed to collect firearms, ammunition, xpiosives, etc.

Provincial governors and local police authorities, particularly the

communal chiefs, the chiefs of police, and the rural policemen.

The military forces of occupation.

Special agents or operators of the Force Intelligence office, or the

Provost Department.

The. native constabulary forces.

If military government has been instituted, the Provost Department may very appropriately be assign€d the task of collecting the

7
SW1VI 11-5

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

munitions, the responsibility for the storage and custody of same.,

keeping records and submitting necessary reports. In other situa.tions where a native constabulary has been organized, there may

be advantages in assigning this duty to that. organization.

b. (1) When employed as a collection agency, the civil authorities

are issued supplementary instructions at the time the disarming

order is promulgated, stating explicitly the manner in which firearms, ammunition, and explosives will be collected and stored or

turned over to the. military forces. These instructions may be amplified where necessary by field commanders who will visit the various communities and issue instructions to the local officials, imposing

such restrictions as to the time and place the. prohibited articles will

be surrendered. The civil officials may be required to make personal

delivery of the collected articles to the military forces or to make

report of same. and the material collected periodically by designated

agencies.

(2) The success attained through employment of civil officials

depends upon the spirit and conscientious effort which they display.

Some who have been thoroughly indoctrinated with the advantages

of the. idea will have. remarkable success; others who consider the

disarming order an unjust imposition will perform their duties in

a. perfunctory manner, and still others will use the order to promote

dishonest practices, disarming some of the people and permitting

others to retain their arms, for personal, political, or monetary

reasons.

(3) The disarming of the inhabitants through the intervening

instrumentality of the civil officials possesses many redeeming features over the utilization of the armed forces for the same purpose.

It is the most peaceful means of accomplishing the desired object,

less provocative, and the least likely to engender antagonism or

create friction It gives the peaceful, law-abiding citizens, who are

worn out by the constant political abuse of the past, the opportunity

to hand over gracefully their weapons without. being subjected to

what they might consider the indignity of making a personal surrender to the military authorities. Misunderstanding will thus be

avoided that might otherwise occur if the armed forces are employed,

because of a difference of language and custom. Moreover, it relieves the armed forces of the unpleasant responsibility and eliminates the factor of personal contact at. a time when the population

views the intentions of the. forces of occupation with doubt and

suspicion.

8
SWiVI 11-6

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

c. It is not to be. assumed that an order as exacting and fa.r reaching in its effect as this disarming order will meet with willing and

universal compliance. As a consequence, it may be necessary to

resort to more stringent enforcement in order to compel the recalcitrants to surrender their weapons. The civil officials may be directed

to secure the prohibited articles, or the armed forces may conduct a

house-to-house search for concealed weapons. Both means may be

employed simultaneously. Stringent measures may be unavoidable

and wholly justifiable, in au effort to promote an early return to

peace and order.

d. (1) Special agents or operators of the Force Intelligence office

or the Provost Department may trace, or make collections of weapons. Their action is taken on what is considered reliable information and generally applies to comparatively large quantities of firearms and ammunition held by certain prominent individuals. The

success of these operations depends upon the skill and courage of the

agents who have to rely in a great measure upon their own initiative

and resources.

(2) The Intelligence Service through, special operatives may be

employed to trace imports of arms arid ammunition during a period

of several years preceding the occupation. Government permits and

correspondence, custom house files, and. other records will aid in

identifying receipts of these munitions, and a search for their subsequent disposition may be undertaken. Deliveries of rifles, special

weapons, automatics, machine guns, howitzers, artillery pieces, ammunition, and explosives are noted and compared with issues, sales,

and expenditures.

e. (1) Upon the establishment of a native constabulary, this organization may assist the military forces in the collection and confiscation of firearms. These troops may perform valuable service in

this connection through their knowledge of the country and their

familiarity with the habits of the people.

(2) After a reasonable time has elapsed, or when it appears that

the civil officials have exhausted their usefulness in the collection of

arms, the military authorities may issue an order to the effect. that

after a given (late the military forces will be responsible for the

collection of arms and the gathering of evidence for the conviction

of persons involved.

11—6. Custody of Arms.—a. Included in the plans for disarming

the population must be. the designation of personnel necessary to receive and care for the material turned in. Buildings and storerooms

9
SWN 11-6

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

suitable for the safekeeping of the weapons, munitions, and explosives must be provided prior to the actual receipt of the material;

the volume of this material may assume unwieldy proportions by the

large increments arriving during the early days of the disarmament.

An accurate system must be devised to keep a complete record of

everything received, and the material tagged and stored in such

manner as to identify it easily; the place should be of such construction as to preserve the material and also to make it secure. When

material is received in condition which makes its keeping dangerous,

authority should be requested to destroy it or to dispose of it otherwise. A frequent inventory and inspection of all such material in

custody should be made not only by the custodian official but by

inspecting officers.

b. Receipts should not be given for weapons delivered upon payment of money, nor for arms and material confiscated. There will

be, however, a number of reputable citizens including merchants

authorized previously to deal in these stocks, who wish to comply

with the latest order and turn their stocks in to the custody of the

military forces. The latter are obliged to accept this material and

must be prepared to deliver it when a legitimate demand is made for

its return.

c. Instructions should be issued designating and limiting the agencies which will accept the material and give receipts for same.

There have been instances in the past, where sufficient time has not

been allowed for proper organization and preparation for the methodical receipts of arms; in the avalanche of arms turned in simultaneously at many places, junior officers, in good faith, have accepted

the material and have given personal receipts for it without having

a proper place for its safe keeping. In the rush of official business,

they did not demand a receipt from other officers to whom they delivered the material collected. No records were made of the ultimate

disposition of the material. ',Vhen proper authorities subsequently

requested information concerning the final disposition of special

material, the information was furnished only after a most difficult

search In many cases, the material could not be located or its disposition determined due to the lack of records.

d. If only certain officers are designated to issue receipts on the

prescribed forms, and if the material is assembled by areas or districts, confusion may be avoided. Such confusion may arise from

junior officers giving personal receipts iii several different districts

in which they may serve during the disarming period with no record

10
SWM 11-7

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

being made of the receipts. The receipts should be in standard form,

and should indicate the name and residence of the owner of the

weapon, and the date and t.he place of issue of the receipt. The

material or weapon should be properly identified and other appropriate. remarks should be added. This receipt should be signed by the

officer authorized to receive the material.

e. District Commanders should be required to submit monthly

reports of all arms and ammunition collected within their respective

districts. The larger part of the weapons collected will be obsolete

and in such poor condition as to render them of little or no practical

value; those which have been paid for or confiscated may be destroyed by burning or dumping at sea. Those of better type and

condition may be retained or issued to the native constabulary

troops. The collection of arms cannot be said to be terminated at

any given time; it is a process vhic continues throughout the

occupation.

11—7. Disposition.—a. When arms have been received from various

sources, they are classified as follows:

(1) Material for which a receipt has been issued.

(2) Material confiscated, collected upon payment of money, or

otherwise received.

b. The custody of material under "class one" implies responsibility

to guard and preserve it for return to the rightful owner when law

or decree permits.

c. The material under "class two" is further divided into serviceable, unserviceable, and dangerous material. The srviceab1e material may be of a type, caliber, and condition suitable for reissue

to native troops, local police, special agents or others whom it is

desired to arm. The question of uniformity, adaptability, and ammunition supply is involved. The unserviceable, material, or that whose

keeping is hazardous, is disposed of as directed; firearms are burned,

the metal parts being used in reinforcing concrete, or disposed of in

other effective ways to preclude any possible future use as a weapon.

Sometimes material is dumped in deep water beyond recovery.

Dangerous material, such as explosives, should be stored in special

places apart from other material.

d. Whenever any material is disposed of in any manner, permanent records should be made of the transaction. Receipts should be

demanded for that which is reissued or transferred no matter in

what manner. When material is destroyed or otherwise disposed of,

a certificate should be made, attested to by witnesses, which voucher

11
SWM 11-8

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

should set forth in sufficient detail by name, mark, and quantity,

the identity of the material disposed of. This will prove a valuable

aid if and when information is ever demanded at a later date. e. In general, records are made and subscribed to by witnesses

whenever material is destroyed or disposed of otherwise. Appropriate receipts should be demanded whenever material is issued in

accordance with orders from higher authority. Care must be taken

that no weapon or material is issued or otherwise disposed of except

in an authorized manner.

f. Great care should be exercised in keeping material which has

been confiscated, or whose ownership is transferred to the governmént, segregated from that material which the government simply

holds in custody. The latter is not subject to destruction nor available for issue. Beware of the ever present souvenir hunters of all

ranks who wish to get possession of articles of unusual design, of

historical interest, or of special value. All such unusual weapons or

articles create a peculiar interest whenever they come into our custody. They arouse the attention and interest of enlisted men or

civilian workers who assist around the magazines or storerooms in the

receipt or storage of such material. These unusual articles which

are in greatest demand as souvenirs, and the disposition of which is

most closely watched and remembered by subordinates, are the very

articles that the original owners wish to have returned sooner or

later. Minor indiscretions in the disposition of material received

assume serious proportions in the minds of the natives which are not

at all in keeping with their actual importance.

11—8. Permits.—a. The military authorities determine who shall

be empowered to issue arms permits, to whom they may issue them,

and any other pertinent restrictions. Under certain circumstances

District Commanders and District Provost Marshals may be the designated agencies. In any event the process must be coordinated to

prevent conflict or overlapping authority. Certain civil officials,

such as provincial governors, judges, and others exercising police

functions, may be authorized to carry arms. Certain permits are

issued which are honored throughout the country; some are issued

which are good for more than one district or jurisdiction but not

for the whole country; in either case the higher authority approving

same notifies the responsible officers in the several subordinate jurisdictions concerned. When permits are requested, information is

furnished concerning the nationality, character, commercial and political affiliations, occupation, and address of the applicant and the

12
SWM 11-9

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

necessity for the granting of the permit. Officers issuing permits

must exercise great care to the end that permits be issued only where

real necessity exists; any application which has the appearance of

being made simply to enhance the prestige of the individual making

it, as often happens, should be promptly refused.

b. Permits should be issued on a standard form with a description

of the person to whom issued, together with the character and serial

number of the firearm, the purpose for which it is to be used, and

the locality in which it is to be carried. These permits should be

nontransferable and should be renewed each year or the firearms

must be turned iii to the authorized agency. Holders of permits

should be warned that the unauthorized use of their firearms will

result in certain disciplinary measures in keeping with the gravity

of the offense and the punitive authority of the official; this may

include revocation of the permit and confiscation of the firearm, and

even fine or imprisonment or both.

c. Permits should be issued only for the possession of pistols,

revolvers, and shotguns. The privilege of possessing rifles should

be refused consistently. It should be exceedingly difficult to secure

any kind of permit.

d. In order to maintain a strict account of all arms permits in

effect., all issuing officers should be directed to keep a record of all

permits issued by them, copies of which should be forwarded to the

district commander. The district commanders in turn should submit to Force Headquarters, annually or semiannually, a list in duplicate of all permits issued within their respective districts. In addition to this annual or semiannual report, they should also render a

monthly change sheet in duplicate, contFining a list of permits issued

and cancelled during the month.

11—9. Control of Sources of Supply,—a. As the military force is

charged with the preparation and execution of regulations concerning the possession and use of firearms, ammunition, and explosives,

it is only proper that it should exercise similar supervision over the

sources of supply.

b. The military forces should control the entire legal supply of

arms and ammunition. This control may be exercised either (1) by

requiring purchases to be made from official sources by the Provost

Marshal General and turning this ammunition over upon requisition

to the .District Commanders, who may distribute it to their provost

marshals for sale in limited and necessary quantities to persons having permits, or (2) certain merchants may be authorized to sell

13
SWM 11-9

DISARMAMRNT OF POPULATION

munitions. If there are munitions manufacturing plants in the country, they must be controlled; in addition, the introduction of munitions into the country must be restricted vigorously. c. Any person, or representative of a business or firm desiring

to import these articles should make written application for permission for each separate shipment of arms, ammunition, or explosives, in which application should appear in detail, the quantity and

character of the stores to be imported, the use for which supplies

are contemplated, the name of the firm from which the stores are

to be purchased, and the port from which they will be exported.

All applications should be forwarded through local Provost Marshals or other designated authorities who should endorse the request

with such informatioii or recommendation as will establish the character and identity of the applicant. In case there is a legal restriction on the importation of arms, the approved application should be

forwarded to the office of the Minister of Foreign Relations for

request on proper authorities through diplomatic channels.

d. There have been two methods used by marines in the past to

control the sale of munitions in the occupied territory. Either of

these two methods shown below apears to be effective.

(1) Immediately upon the arrival of the arms, ammunition, or

explosives at the port of entry, the customs officials should notify

the local Provost Marshal, who receives the shipment and deposits

it in the provost storeroom or other suitable place. The articles

may then be drawn by the consiguee in such quantities or under such

conditions as the Provost Marsha) may indicate. Except for an

exceptional shipment of explosives for some engineering project,

the' shipments will ordinarily be small.

(2) Immediately upon the arrival of the approved munitions shipment at. the port of entry, the customs officials should notify the local

Provost Marshal. This officer should notify the consignee, and with

him check the shipment for its contents and amount. An enumerated record of the contents and the amounts should be prepared by

the Provost Marshal, one copy given to the consignee and the other

retained by the Provost Marshal. The shipment is then turned over

to the consignee, after payment of all duties and with the written

approval of the Provost Marshal. A monthly check should then

be made by the Provost Marshal of all munitions stores in' the hands

of thc approved sales agency; the sales agency making a monthly

report of all sales (on individual approved permits) to the Provost

Marshal.

14
SWM 11—10

DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION

11—10. Measures Following Disarrnament.—a. Even after the

population has been effectually disarmed, energetic measures must be

taken to discourage or prevent rearming. Some plan must be

evolved without delay to make it impracticable or dangerous to procure firearms illegally, either from within or without the country.

If the existing laws of the country prohibiting possession of arms

are sufficient in themselves, measures should be taken to make them

effective. To the extent that authority is delegated or assumed, additional or new laws should be put into effect restricting the possession of firearms. This latter method can be applied only if military government is established. In issuing these laws one must

bear in mind the responsibility assumed by the military forces in

enforcing the laws and guaranteeing th security of life and property. If there be remote sections where law enforcement is difficult

due to the limited number of the military forces, certain concessions

may have to be made in order to permit the local inhabitants to protect themselves against the lawless element. On the other hand if

the lawless elements remain in the field in numbers greatly in excess

of the military forces, special considerations may make it advisable

to provide means for arming a certain proportion of the reliable and

responsible natives, to compensate in a degree for that inferiority

in numbers; this should not be prejudicial to the other law-abiding

elements. Sometimes this action will grat1y discourage the lawless

factions.

b. The military forces, or native constabiilary, in conjunction with

the customs officials, should be particularly alert along the coast and

frontiers of the occupied country to prevent illegal entry of munitions. Where a native constabulary exists or is later established, a

portion of such organization should be constituted a coast guard,

equipped with fast boats, to prevent such irms being smuggled along

the coast and rivers. Until such a constabulary is constituted, a unit

of our own military forces, adequate in size and equipment, should

be established as soon as active intervention takes place.

0

15

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

CHAPTER XIII

ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING FFICE

WASBINGTON: 1940

210—705 0 — 88 — 15 : OL 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published in

15 chapters as follows:

CHAPTER I. INTROI)UCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

11!. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VIZ. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

III

RESTRiCTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER XII

ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

Par. Page

SECTION I. GENERAL 12—1 to 12—4 2—3

II. ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY 12—5 to 12—18 5—15

III. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING 12—19 to 12—23 17—19

IV. AUXILIARY FORCES 12—24 to 12—26 2 1—22

V. CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 12—27 to 12—28 23—25

V

SWN 12—i

SECTION 1

GENERAL

Par. Page

Local armed forces 12—i 1

United States intervention 12—2 1

Restoration of authority to local governmenL 12—3 2

Formation of a constabulary 12-4 2

12—1. Local armed forces.—In most sovereign states, the executive authority is enforced by the national military forces, national

forces, and organized reserves under the control of the state. In

addition, there may be an organized militia and police forces under

the control of political subdivisions of the state. Police forces are

normally maintained by municipalities. These armed forces represent the national-defense forces of the state and the armed forces

employed to preserve peace and order within its borders.

12—2. United States intervention.—. When the domestic situation of a foreign country is such that it is necessary for the United

States Government to intervene, the national and local armed forces

of the country concerned are usually powerless to suppress the

domestic disorder or enforce the laws. At the time of intervention,

the armed forces of the country will probably have disintegrated

due to defeat by insurgent forces or bec use of desertions. In some

cases, the armed forces may be engaged in action against an insurgent force, whose operations have crEated havoc and destruction

throughout the country. Die to the magnitude of the domestic

disturbance, the local police authorities are usually ineffective in the

suppression of lawlessness, and may even have ceased to function

entirely. Upon arrival within the foreign country, the armed forces

of the United States Government imm€diately become responsible

for the protection of the life and property of all the inhabitants of

the foreign country. In order to discharge this responsibility, it may

become necessary for the United States forces to assume the functions

of the national armed forces of the foreign country in addition to

the duties of the local and municipal police.

b.. In assisting any country to restore peace and order, it is not

the policy of the United States Govern:nent to accept permanent

responsibility for the preservation of governmental stability by sta1
swN 12—3

GENERAL

tionilig its armed forces indefinitely in the foreign country for that

urpose. The United States forces seek to restore domestic tranuility as soon as possible and to return the normal functions of

gov,rnment to the country concerned. To accomplish this, the

Uñitsd States Government will usually insist upon the establishment

of an fficient and well-trained armed native force, free from political

ihflueñce and distatorial control.

12—3. Restoration of authority to local government.—Having

assumed the obligation for the restoration of domestic tranquility

*ithiñ the foreign country concerned, the obligation is fulfilled by

the use of United States forces. There is also present the obligation

to restore to the foreign country its organic native defensive and

la*-enforcement powers as soon as tranquility has been secured.

The organization of an adequate armed native organization is an

effective method to prevent further domestic disturbances after the

intervention has ended, and is one of the most important functions

f the intervention since the United States armed forces may have

ipersded or usurped the functions of armed forces of the country

concerned at the beginning of the intervention. It is obvious that

such armed forces must be restored prior to withdrawal.

12—4. FOrmation of a constabulary.—a. In the case of smaller

countries whose national and international affairs are of limited magnitude and whose finances support only a small budget, the defense

furittions of the country and the police functions within the country

can usually be combined and assigned to one armed force. Such a.

force is termed a "constabulary." The constabulary is a nonpartisan

armed forc patterned along the line of the military forces of the

United States, with modifications to suit local conditions. The legal

authority or appfoval for the formation of such an armed native

organization r1ust emanate from some person or body empowered

with such soverigii right.

b. The authority for formation of a constabulary may be a decree

of the de jure ot de facto Chief Executive of the country in cases

where a legislative agency does not exist. In such cases, the authority

for any law enactment rests with the Chief Executive alone, who

legally has the authority to issue a. decree for the establishment of

armed forces for his government. Provision is made for the appropriation of the necessary funds from the national budget for

maintenance of the constabulary.

c. Authority for the formation of a constabulary may be granted

by legislation initiated by the legislative body. In such cases, the

2
GENERAL

existent armed forces of the country concerned are ig11 dibhded

and the new constabulary force lawfully created by dI hih of

the organic law of the country. Provision is made t.* th apopriation of the necessary funds from the national buclg it thaintenance.

d. Authority for the formation of a constabu1at ffiy b the

result of a treaty between the United States GovMhlht tfi the

country concerned, providing for creation of such sabUlary.

The treaty normally outlines the powers and liinittith of th Organization and provides funds for its maintenance; tThn t t1eàty

between the two governments will already exist, grahtihg authority

to the United States Government to intervene in th tttih tic affairs

of the country concerned whenever the latter is Uhab to eontrol

domestic disorder within its boundaries. In such this t1eaty

is usually the basis or the authority fDr the creatiOh o ilew ttmed

forces within the country concerned, either through th exUtive

or legislative agencies of the State, or through the pWi of miiitary government set up within the country cohcefid hy lihited

States forces.

e. Authority for the formation of the constabulam mny b the

result of a decree of the military commander of Uhiteti Ste ftrces

in cases where a military government has been estab1!shd t supplant the local government. In such ases, the nainte11tiiCe it the

constabulary is provided by means of appropriation of ottl revhues

under control of the military governm€nt.

3

SWM 12--5

SECTIoN II

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

Par. Page

Planning agency 12—5 5

Approval of plans 12—6 5

Local creative law 12—7 6

United States creative laws 12—8 6

Composition 12—9 7

Duties and powers 12—10 8

Size of force 12—11 8

Administrative organization 12—12 9

Supply and equipment 12—13 9

Records and reports 12—14 12

Finances 12—15 13

Recruiting 12—16 14

Housing and she'ter 12—17 14

Military courts 12—18 15

12-5. Planning agency.—a. The establishing of a constabulary

is preceded by the appointment of a planning group to draft the

necessary plans for its formation. The initiative in the creation of

the constabulary devolves upon the United States forces, since it

has assumed the obligation to restore law enforcement and defense

forces to the country concerned prior to withdrawal of United States

forces.

b. The planning group, or the majority of the members of such

a group, are usually drawn from the military and naval forces of

the United States Government within the country concerned. The

selection of the planning group from among officers of the United

States forces then in the country is advisable since such officers will

normally be more familiar with existing political, economic, geographical, and psychological conditions, In addition to such members, it may be advisable to select officers who have had prior

experience in constabulary duty in other countries.

12—6. Approval of plans.—After the planning group has completed its plans for the organization of the constabulary, the plans

must first be approved by the proper officials before the constabulary

may be considered existent. Among the officials who approve the

plans are the Chief Executive of the local state, the diplomatic rep5
SWM 12—7

ORGA1cIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

resentative of the United States accredited to the foreign country

concerned, the senior naval officer in command of the United States

forces operating within the foreign country concerned, the Secretary

of the Navy, the Secretary of State, the Congress of the United States,

and the President of the United States. When a legislative body

exists, the approval of the legislature of the foreign country concerned is also secured. When a military government has been established, only the approval of the United States executive, legislative,

and departmental agencies is required.

12—7. Local creative law.—In order that the constabulary may be

the constituted military instrument of the local government, it must

be legally established and provided with the legal power to execute

its functions. In the law or decree establishing the constabulary,

there should be definite provisions setting forth the authority and

responsibility of the commander of the constabulary in order that

the constabulary may be entirely free from autocratic or political control within the country concerned. The law or decree should state

definitely the specific duties that the constabulary is legally empowered

to perform.

12—8. United States creative Iaws.----a. The plans for the establishment of a constabulary will invariably contain certain provisions

relative to the employment of members of the United States armed

forces as officers or directing heads of the proposed constabulary

upon its initial formation. rllhe Constitution of the United States,

Article I, Section 9 (8), states: "No title of nobility shall be granted

by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or

trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept

of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from

any king, prince, or foreign state." In order that members of the

United States forces may accept office, including emolument for such

office, from the foreign country concerned, it is necessary that the Congress of the United States grant specific authority by law. The

necessary law for service with. the constabulary is drawn up by the

planning group, and, after approval, is presented to the Congress for

enactment and subsequent apProval by the President of the United

States. Such authority may be included in a treaty between the

United States and the country concerned.

b. Since all treaties of the United States are ratified only by the

United States Senate, without action by the House of Representatives,

it becomes necessary to enact a separate law approved by both Houses

of Congress, even though authority for members of the United States

6
SWM 12—9

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

forces to serve in the constabulary may be included in the treaty. When

a general law has been already enacted by the Congress of the United

States permitting members of the United States forces to serve in the

armed forces of the foreign country concerned, no specific law is

required.

12—9. Composition.—a. Initially, th officers of the constabulary

are selected officers and enlisted men (usually qualified noncommissioned officers) of the United States military and naval forces. In

time, as the domestic situation becomes tranquil and the native members of the constabulary become proficient in their duties, the United

States officers of the constabulary are replaced by native officers.

Officers and enlisted men of the United States forces appointed as

officers of the constabulary should be aceptable to the local government and have the qualities considered essential for a position of

similar importance in the United Slates forces. They must be

physically fit to withstand arduous c1u&y in the field and should be

proficient in the language of the country concerned. A general

knowledge of local conditions is an important requirement. They

should be known for their tactful relationships, and should be in

sympathy with the aspirations of the in habitants of the country concerned in their desire to become a stable sovereign people. They

should be educationally and profession ally equipped to execute the

varied functions that they will be calkd upon to perform.

b. Native troops make up the enlisted personnel of the constabulary. Service is not compulsory. Recruiting is carried on throughout the country, and the desired personnel is acquired by enlisting

only those volunteers who possess the :equisite qualifications.

c. Plans are made for the operation of recruit depots. Schools in

academic and governmental subjects ara conducted for enlisted personnel. Consideration must be given to the format-ion of a medical

department. In some cases, a coast guard may be required. The

medical department and the coast guard are included in the constabulary organization. Early establishment of a school for training

candidates for commission should receive much thought and consideration. The establishment of such a school will provide orderly

replacement of the personnel of the United States forces utilized

initially to officer the constabulary. It also indicates to the local government the altruistic motives of the United States Government and

indicates its intention to turn over the control of the constabulary to

the local government at the earliest possible moment.

7
SWM 12—10

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

12—10. Duties and powers.—a. The police duties formerly performed' by the organic military and naval forces of the country concerned are assumed by the organized constabulary. The constabulary

is the national-defense force of the country concerned and also performs police duties and civil functions.

b. The military duties of the constabulary consist of the defense

of the country against outside aggression and the suppression of domestic disorder when local police in the territorial subdivisions of

the country are ineffective in the maintenance of law and order.

c. Among the police duties of the constabulary are the prevention

of smuggling and the control of the importation, sale, and custody of

arms, ammunition, and explosives. It is also empowered to arrest

offenders for infractions of local laws, not only of the state, but also

of the territorial subdivisions and municipalities. It is charged with

the protection of persons and property, the control of prisons, and.

the issuance of travel permits and vehicular licenses. The constabulary provides guards for voting places and electoral records, and exerts plenary control during natural disasters, such as floods and

earthquakes.

d. The civil duties of the constabulary include the distribution of

funds for the payment of civil employees in outlying areas and the

distribution of executive, legislative, and judicial notices. When required, the constabulary operates the lighthouse and lifesaving service by means of a coast guard. Members of the constabulary may

act as communal advisors to municipalities. The constabulary may

be assigned the task of supervision of the construction of roads and

bridges. Census compilation, supervision of local sanitation, and

operation and control of telephone and telegraphic systems, including

air and radio communication may also be included among the civil

duties of the constabulary. Other civil duties are the supervision

of weights and measures, the enforcement of harbor and docking

regulations, compilation of reports on the use of public lands, supervision of the occupancy of public lands, and periodic reports of

agricultural conditions.

12—11. Size of force.—In determining the strength of the constabulary force, it is necessary to consider carefully th,e domestic situation

in each territorial division of the country concerned, particularly the

situation in the principal cities and seaports. The strength of the

constabulary detachment required for one locality may be entirely

inadequate or excessive in another locality. Factors that enter into

the determination of the strength of th constabulary are the organic

8
SWM 12—12

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

strength of the military forces employed prior to the interveition,

the organic strength of the civil police forces in territorial divisions

and municipalities, the normal domestic situation relative to law observance and law enforcement in the territorial subdivisions, and the

relative importance of the larger cities within the state. The political,

economic, and geographical impGrtance of the various territorial subdivisions should also be considered. The constabulary should be

large enough to suppress active rebell:ion, as well as to repel outside

aggression. The original estimate of the strength required is based

upon the normal domestic situation in. all territorial subdivisions of

the country concerned. Local conditions in a particular section may

call for a material increase in the strngth that would be normally

required for that section. Such conditions should be taken into consideration in order that the initial strength may be adequate to meet,

all situations that may require the employment of the constabulary.

Although the foregoing considerations my dictate the necessity for

a larger force, restrictions on tIie strength of the constabulary may

be imposed by the limited fmances of the local government, as well

as the financial requirements of other governmental activities.

12—12. Administrative organization.—The constabulary is organized administratively in the following manner: the headquarters, consisting of the commander and his staff; the administrative, technical,

and supply departments or groups; the operating forces, organized as

administrative or tactical units and stationed in tactical localities or

at posts and stations in conjunction with other governmental activities. The geographical divisions of thI3 state are normally the determining factor in the formation of "groupments" or territorial

commands.

12—13. Supply and equipment.----a. Any estimate that is made to

determine the required strength of a constabulary must naturally

include provisions for the supply and equipment for such troops.

Among the items of equipment are weapons and military uniforms

or distinctive dress for the troops and, in some cases, vehicular

transportation. The confidence and loyalty of the native troops

is promoted by careful supervision of their material needs. More

often than not, they will have been accustomed to meager salaries

irregularly paid, scant food carelessly provided, as well as indifferent

shelter, clothing, and equipment. When they are regularly paid in

full on the date due, when fed adequately as provided by the allowance, and when good shelter, clothing, and equipment are provided,

native troops will usually respond in the quality of service rendered.

9
SWM 12—13

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

ORGANIZATION OF NST/4BULARY

10

1Area _Area
SWM 12—13

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

In establishing and maintaining an organization of native troops,

attempts should be made to provide better clothing and shelter and

particularly better food than nativE civilians of the same social

class enjoy. This is decidedly an important morale factor. The

equipment of the constabulary is governed by the type of service

required. Often different types of equipment are employed in various localities.

b. In many countries, the distinctive uniform or dress of native

troops prior to intervention by United States forces is likely to

be of a type more adapted to purely peaceful military display or

ceremony than to combat. In some cases, the uniform is of a type

that cannot be termed a "distinctive dress" within the meaning of

the Rules of Land Warfare. There is a natural inclination on the

part of United States forces when organizing a constabulary to outfist the troops with a uniform similar to that of the United States

forces, with slight modifications in the distinctive ornaments, texture

of clothing, and design. Any uniform adopted for the constabulary

should be suitable for the combat and climatic conditions likely to

be encountered.

c. The organic armed forces of the country may have been only

indifferently armed. Such weapons us they have are likely to be

in a poor condition, due to carelessness in upkeep. However, modern

weapons are becoming more accessible to all countries, due to the

lowered costs as a result of modern mass production. Such arms

as are in good condition are retained and reissued to the constabulary after the disarmament of government arid insurgent forces.

Plans for arming the constabulary should take into consideration all

probable tasks that may be assigned, as well as the capabilities of

the troops in the employment of the various types of weapons. It

may be advisable to arm the constabulary with weapons of different

types, make, and in different proportio:is from the organic armament

of the United States forces.

ci. There are three methods for subsisting the constabulary. The

first method is by the organization of general messes at those points

where sufficient troops are quartered together to make the method

feasible. The second method is to permit individuals to subsist

themselves upon the payment of an adequate subsistence allowance in addition to their normal pay. The third method is the

subsistence of personnel by contract with civilian contractors. The

ration allowance should be announced in orders. The psychology

of making the ration allowance the same for general mess, subsistence

11
SWM 12—14

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

allowance, and contract mess is self-evident, since the troops will

feel that under each system they are receiving the same treatment

in, regard to their food. The organized mess is practicable only at

those posts and stations having a sufficient number to make this

method economical. Recruit depots, officers' schools, and commands

of over 20 men are normally fed in general messes. However, even

in commands of over 20 men, activities in the field may dictate that

a subsistence allowance is more practicable. In small detached posts

of only a few men, it is usually more practicable to furnish food

by contract messing, or to pay the 'troops a subsistence allowance.

In outlying posts and stations, troops normally ration themselves

on the cash allowance. As a general rule, a cash allowance should

not be granted if a general mess can be organized or if contract

messing is practicable. When a cash allowance is paid, there is a

tendency to squander the cash allowance and to contract indebtedness for food, with no assurance that troops are subsisted on a

well-balanced ration. When food is procured under contract, the

contractor may be so interested in making a profit, that troops will

not receive the proper amount or quality of food. The commanding

officers of detached posts should continually check on the quantity

and quality of food served when troops are subsisted in a contract

mess. In the conduct of a general mess, no attempt should be made

to supply foreign food products. The ration component should

be confined to local staples and garden products, since it is this type

of food to which the troops are accustomed.

e. Estimates should be made covering the type and quantity of

miscellaneous supplies required by the constabulary. Many materials may be purchased locally. To facilitate the acquisition of

supplies not obtainable locally, they are normally procured from

the continental United States.

12-14. Records and reports.—a. The records and reports in general use by military organizations are used by the constabulary.

In addition, periodic reports may be required covering local economic and political conditions, reports of arrests and disposition

of such cases, reports of military activities of the various units,

and such special reports as may be required by higher authority.

b. Reports and records should always be in the language of the

country concerned. It is unreasonable to require natives to learn

the English language simply because that is the language of the

United States forces. In the preparation of texts to be used in

the training of troops and in the preparation of instructions for

12
SWIVI 12—15

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

handling of legal cases, the language of the country concerned should

always be employed.

12—15. Financs.—a. When. planning the creation of a constabulary, the financial status of the country concerned is naturally a

feature that. will influence the strength of the constabulary as well

as the acquisition of supplies for such a force. When the necessary

funds have bee.n estimated, it is imperative that such funds be

allotted from the national treasury by presidential decree or by the

legal sanction of the legislature of the country concerned. Funds

are allotted from the revenues by the military government in those

cases where the constabulary is organized during the tenure of a

military government. Appropriations for the establishment and

maintenance of the constabulary may be difficult to obtain, not only

because administrative authority is required for such allotment, but

also due to the fact that, in most instances, the country will have

few funds available for such a purpose. The scarcity of funds is

likely to be the consequence of unstab1 economic conditio.ns due to

widespread disorder, the despoilation of the treasury by individuals

or groups, and the lack of an efficient system for the collection

and control of taxes and custom duties.

b. Initially, a large part of the revenue of the country concerned

will necessarily be devoted to the financing of the constabulary.

After the initial allotment of funds has been authorized for the

establishment of the constabulary, it is necessary to assure that the

annual or other periodic allotments are continued, and that these

allotments are given the highest priority in the national budget.

This is insisted upon at all times, arid efforts to decrease or subordinate this allotment for the constabulary should be resisted

energetically.

c. The pay of officers and enlisted personnel forms a large part

of the expenditures of the constabulary. Consideration should be

given to the standards of living within the country in computing

the rates of pay. The rates of pay should be such as to attract

the best type of natives to join the constabulary. By making the

rates of pay attractive, natives of the highest type will be encouraged

to make the constabulary a career. This feature is particularly

desirable since it will tend to promote tranquility throughout the

country after the withdrawal of the United States forces, if the

majority of the officers and men have served in the constabulary

for a number of years. Initially, all th officers of the constabulary

are members of the United States forces. .The rates of pay granted

13
SWM 12—16

ORGANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

them as officers of the constabulary are in addition to pay and

allowances received from the United States Government.

12—16. Recruiting.—a. Age and height limits are established for

recruits. Physical requirements are decided upon for regular enlistments, but these may be relaxed somewhat in case of emergency.

If recruit depots are maintained, a definite period for recruit

training is assigned. In some cases, it may be advisable to refuse

enlistment of men from disturbed sections of the country. In many

cases, the political affiliations of applicants musts be considered. This

matter may be adjusted satisfactorily by the enlistment of recruits of

different political beliefs in proportion to the voting strength of the

principal political parties. In some cases, it may be deemed advisable to refuse enlistment to members of former military forces of the

country. In some countries, the best method of obtaining recruits

may be to enlist troops from one locality to serve in that locality under their own noncommissioned officers after a period of training at

a recruit depot. In accordance with the plan of organization of the

constabulary into a chain of command through departmental control,

it may be advisable to distribute the officers of the constabulary to

their respective posts and stations in order that the recruiting of enlisted personnel may be accomplished under their direction and control. The officers of the constabulary act as recruiting officers in

addition to their other duties. To assist in recruiting, notices are

published in the official gazette of the local government, advertisements are inserted in local newspapers, and notices are furnished local

civil officials for publication to the populace. Itinerant recruiting

parties may be employed in thickly settled areas. Medical units are

attached to garrisons in the more important towns and villages in

order that applicants may receive prompt medical examination. In

some cases, it may be necessary to utilize the services of contract physicians for the initial examination of recruits, further examination to

be conducted later by medical personnel of the constabulary.

b. Before accepting applicants for service, the recruiting officer

should assure himself of the proper qualifications of applicants. In

addition to an oral examination, recommendations from reputable

citizens of the home locality of the applicants are usually required.

In many instances, the recommendations of local civil officials are

invaluable in the selection of applicants.

12—17. Rousing and shelter.—When the organic armed forces of

the country have been disbanded upon the formation of the constabulary, it will be found that many public buildings are available to

14
SWM 12—18

0R4ANIZATION OF A CONSTABULARY

house the constabulary. These public buildings will consist of barracks, offices, forts, prisons, camps, polce stations and, in some cases,

naval craft. Public buildings are within the eminent domain of the

local government and as such can be lawfully employed by proper

authority to house and shelter the constabulary. When such housing

does not exist, it may be necessary to rent suitable buildings or to

erect permanent buildings. Prison lalbor may be used in such construction and every effort should be made to use construction materials obtainable locally. Warehouses may have to be leased for the

storage of supplies when such space is not available in old arsenals,

forts, or former military warehouses.

12—18. Military courts.—The system of military courts-martial set

up by the constabulary must have the legal sanction of the local government. Usually, the constitution of any sovereign state will provide for military tribunals. In such cases, it is necessary only to

secure legislative approval for the system of courts martial applicable

to the constabulary. A modification of the courts-martial system

employed by the United States forces, adapted to local conditions and

the basic laws of the country concerncd, will usually be acceptable.

The system of courts-martial set up within the constabulary does not

usurp any of the judicial functions of the civil courts. Members of

the constabulary, who commit civil offenses, should be brought before

civil courts for trial and punishment. (See par. 12—27.) Trial by

courts-martial is reserved for military and for criminal offenses, when

civil jurisdiction is lacking in the latter case.

15

SWM 12—19

SEcYrIoN III

OPERATIONS AN!) TRAINING

Par. Page Recruits 12—19 17

Unit training 12—20 18

Officers 12—21 18

Field operations 12—22 18

Troop leading 12—23 19

12—19. Recruits.—The methods adopted for the training of recruits

are dependent upon the military situation at the time of enlistment.

Normally, recruits are sent to a central recruit depot for a stated

period of training. Several recruit depots may be conducted in different sections of the country. In some cases, recruits may be retained at the local station or military post, trained at that station,

and later assigned to duty in that locality or sent to another military

post that may have been unsuccessful in obtaining the required number of recruits. The adoption of a single method may be practicable

in some areas while in others a combination of training methods may

be necessary in order to meet local conditions. Some troops are more

effective when serving in their own community, while others will be

found to operate more effectively in other localities due to changes

in climate, environment, and food. In some situations, it is better

to employ troops away from their home localities to prevent the use

of their authority improperly againsi; personal enemies or for the

benefit of friends. Recruiting officers should be supplied with uniforms and equipment sufficient to outfit the number of recruits desired from the various sections of the country. The training of the

recruit has two distinct objects in view, namely, training as a member of a military combat organization and training for police duties.

The military instruction of a recruit covers the basic individual

training of a soldier including target practice and drill. A recruit

training textbook in the language of the country concerned will be

found extremely useful. Instruction of the Fecruit in police duties

includes instruction in the constitution of the country, civil and criminal laws, powers and limitations in riaking investigations and arrests, and the assistance the constabLlary is to render local civil

officials. A handbook in the language of the country concerned, coy17
SWM 12—20

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

ering these police duties will materially aid in presenting this instruction and will also provide a useful guide to all members of the

constabulary. For the larger cities, it may be advisable to train

units for the primary duties of municipal police with only secondary

instruction in military duties. The early training of competent

police forces for the larger cities is one of the most effective methods

to strengthen the local government and secure the good will of the

better class of inhabitants. Medical enlisted personnel is obtained

by enlistment of qualified individuals for duty with the medical

service.

12—20. Unit training.—Unit. training is carried out by individual

units of the constabulary as a part' of their routine training in order

to maintain their military and police efficiency. This training embraces unit combat training, target practice, field firing, specialist

training, instruction in law enforcement and, in some cases, instruction in elementary academic subjects. Instruction schedules are so

arranged that training does not interfere with the normal military

and police duties of the unit. In preparation for special operations,

units may be more effectively trained at a central point prior to

engaging in such operations.

12—21. Officers.—As soon as practicable after the formation of the

constabulary, a school for the training of native candidates for commission should be organized. The staff of this school is composed

of officers of the United States forces, who are specially qualified

for this work. Rigid physical qualifications are adopted to cover

the admittance of candidates. All candidates should have sufficient

scholastic qualifications to insure their ability to absorb the military

instruction. The period of instruction for such a school is 1 year.

At the end of this period, the candidate is given a probationary

commission that is confirmed after 1 year of service with the troops.

This method of instruction provides a steady supply of native officers

to replace the members of the United States forces. The gradual

replacement o commissioned medical personnel of the United States

forces is effected by commissioning native physicians as vacancies

occur. This is usually commenced just prior to withdrawal of all

United States forces.

12—22. Field operations.—a. Each race of people has its peculiar

characteristics and customs. These may be modified somewhat under influence, but cannot be entirely destroyed or supplanted. These

characteristics and customs should always be recognized and considered when dealing with persons of different races.

18
SWM 12—23

OPERATIONS AN!) TRAINING

b. In the organization of the constabulary, consideration should

be given the form of warfare to which the troops are accustomed.

No attempt should be made to impose entirely new forms of tactics

unless a long period of training and indoctrination is available. In

emergencies, or when only a limited time is available for training,

it may be better to organize the troops according to native methods.

Different types of organizations, equipment, and tactics will often

be required in various localities.

12—23. Troop Ieading.—a. Strict justice exerts a marked influence on the discipline of native troops. A few lessons suffice, as a rule,

to impress upon them that orders are to be obeyed. When this idea

has been implanted in their minds, they generally become amenable

to discipline.

b. During the earlier field operations of the constabulary, it is

usually advisable to employ mixed unite composed of members of the

United States forces and the constabulary. Later, the United States

forces are used only as a reserve available to support the constabulary

in emergencies. The constabulary gradually assumes full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order. In active operations,

the officers of the constabulary should be models of leadership, inspiration, and an example to their troops. Members of the United

States forces serving with the constabulary must possess good judgment and extreme patience, coupled with tact, firmness, justice, and

control. Firmness without adequate means of support may degencrate into bluff. Tact alone may he interpreted as weakness.

19

SWN 12—24

SEcTION TV

AUXILIARY FORCES

Par. Page

Urban and rural agents 12—24 21

Special agents 12—25 21

Auxiliary units 12—2l 22

12—24. Urban and rural agents.—Small detachments of varying

size are stationed throughout the country in towns, cities, and viilages. Each detachment is assigned th task of restoring and maintaining law and order within a given area. To assist the detachments

in the performance of their duties, urban and rural agents are employed as part of the constabulary. These agents are selected from

among the inhabitants of communities and outlying sections. Only

men of high standing in the community are selected for this duty.

These agents are, in reality, the rurad police of the constabulary.

They are appointed or commissioned by the constabulary and are

paid as a separate budgetary unit of the constabulary. They are

granted powers similar to those granted a sheriff in the continental

United States. They are not given any distinctive uniform, but are

provided with a badge of office, together with a special police permit

to bear arms in the execution of their duties. These agents are under

the direct comm and of the local cor stabulary commander. Employment of such agents is invaluable, since they are thoroughly

familiar with their section or community and know all the individuals residing in the vicinity, thus making the apprehension of any

resident malefactor a comparatively easy task. They keep the local

constabulary commander informed of the domestic situation within

their respective sections, thereby forestall lug any organized attempt

at insurrection or rebellion against the local government.

12—25. Special agents.—In addition to urban and rural agents,

individuals nay be armed and endowed with police powers. These

special agents are employed by owners of large estates, plantations,

mines, ranches, banks, and other large financial and commercial

houses. They act as guards for the protection of life and property

from marauders, bandits, and robbers. They are paid by the estate

or firm employing them and are legally empowered by the constabulary to make arrests of trespassers as agents of that force. They

21
SWM 12—26

AUXILIARY FORCES

are given a distinctive badge of office and are. issued a. special police

permit to bear arms in the performance of their duties. The appointment of special agents should be made only after a careful investigation by the local constabulary commander. Under no circumstances,

should the practice of appointing special agents be permitted to grow

to such an extent that any large land owner has a considerable number of armed men in his employ and under his control. The hiring

of additional special agents should be strenuously opposed when sufficient personnel of the constabulary is present in the vicinity to

provide protection.

12—26. Auxiliary units.—When an organized rebellion or insurrection develops, or when banditry assumes such proportions that the

local units of the constabulary are unable to combat such domestic

disorders successfully, volunteer units under the direction of the constabulary may be organized from the inhabitants to assist in quelling

such disorders. These auxiliary units are composed of inhabitants

who are armed and rationed by the constabulary. Auxiliary units

are temporarily armed forces, and are employed only for the duration of the emergency. During their period of service, they ar governed and controlled in the same manner as regular members of the

constabulary.

22
SWM 12—27

SECTION V

CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Par. Page

Relation to civil power 12—27 23

Relation to United States forces 12—28 24

12—27. Relation to civil power.—o. 'rue constabulary represents

the power of the executive branch of the government and its territorial subdivisions. Unlawful acts committed by members of the

constabulary are usually found to be. in contravention of the regulations of the constabulary or the civil or criminal laws of the country. In the former class are military misdemeanors and crimes that

are within the jurisdiction of the military power; that is, the constabulary courts-martial system. In the latter class are those crimes

and felonies that are set forth in the penal code of the country.

Generally, any infraction of constabulary regulations by a member

of the constabulary should be tried by the constabulary itself, either

by the member's immediate commanding officer or by court martial.

Likewise, members of the constabulary charged with conspiracy

against the local government should be tried by court martial and

the punishment executed by the constabulary after confirmation of

the sentence by the Chief Executive. Alleged civil offenses are first

investigated by the constabulary. If an offense is found to be sufficiently proved by evidence as to its commission, the member should

be discharged from the constabulary and delivered into the custody

of the civil authorities for trial and punishment as a civilian. If,

however, after investigation of the offense by the constabulary, the

evidence indicates that the member is guiltless, he should under no

circumstances be delivered to the civil authorities for trial and

punishment until such authorization has been secured from the commanding officer of the constabulary.

b. It is to be expected that some animosity and jealousy will be

prevalent during the establishment oi the constabulary by officers

of the United States forces. Attempts may be made to interfere

with or embarrass the constabulary in its operations indirectly by

civil-court actions and by noncooperation on the part of minor

officials. Complaints against members of the constabulary should

23
SWM 12—28

CIVIL AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

be thoroughly investigated. When warranted, a just trial should be

immediately conducted, with prompt punishment of guilty individuals, thus indicating to the populace that the constabulary enforces

the law among its own members and that they receive no preferential

treatment not granted civil violators of the law. The chief of the

constabulary is responsible directly to the Chief Executive of the

country, who is the commander in chief of all the armed forces of

the country.

c. In their contacts with civil officials, members of the constabulary

must be courteous, flim in the execution of their duties, and just

in dealing with any and all classes of inhabitants, regardless of rank,

title, creed, or social position. Tact is one of the most necessary

attributes which may be possessed by members of the constabulary.

Fair and just operation of the constabulary must always be tempered

with tact. Bruality in making investigations and arrests should

be firmly and promptly suppressed. The inhabitants should be encouraged to regard the constabulary as an honest, impartial, and just

law enforcement agency, friendly toward the law-abiding population.

In times of emergency during fires, floods, and earthquakes, the constabulary should be quick to render aid to the distressed.

12—28. Relation to United States forces.—a. The line of demarcation between the execution of the military power of the United

States forces and the constabulary should be definite. When it has

attained full strength, the constabulary should have soi responsibility for the preservation of law and order. Since the United

States forces have set up this military instrumentality for the local

state and endowed it with a certain strength, the constabulary should

have unhampered opportunity in its conduct of operations as the

armed force of the country. Interference by United States forces

not only seriously decreases the prestige of the constabulary, but also

denies to the local state the ability to utilize freely the force that has

been created to increase its power and prestige. The constabulary

assumes its functions gradually, as it recruits to full strength, and

takes over the police functions of the country under the guidance

and observation of the United States forces. When the constabulary

has demonstrated its competence to perform its duties, the United

States forces relinquish control and command, and are withdrawn

and concentrated at central points where they are available to be

employed as reinforcements in case of unexpected emergencies.

During the organization of the constabulary, the assignment of detachments of the constabulary to operate with elements of United

24
SW 12—28

CIVIL AND MILITARY B.ELATIONHIP

States forces in joint action against hostile forces may be advisable. In this manner, the constabulary, as well as the native population,

will feel that the local situation is being handled by their own governmental agency and not by a foreign power. Unlawful acts cornnutted by members of the constabulary or by civilians against the

United States forces are legally under the jurisdiction of the United

States forces and may be punishable by an exceptional military

court martial. Whenever possible, every effort is made to have the

offenders tried by the constabulary couLrts-rnartial system or by the

local civil judicial agency in order that such unlawful acts may be

punished by agencies of the country and not by agencies of the

United States forces.

b. When joint operations are conducted by United States forces

and the constabulary, the principle of seniority according to rank of

members of United States forces present should be retained. Thus,

if the senior constabulary officer present, who is also an officer of

the United States forces, is senior to the officer in command of the

United States forces present, the senior constabulary officer assumes

command of the joint forces. When the officer in command of the

United States forces present is senior, :he assumes command of both

organi?lations.

0

25

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER XIII

MiLITARY GOVERNMENT

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTPG OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1940

210—705 0 - 88 — 16 : OL 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published

in 15 chapters as follows:

CHArrR I. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AViATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIV] ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

m

RESTRiCTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER XIII

MILITARY GOV ERNMENT

Par. Page

SECTION I. GENERAL 13—i to 13—6 1—3

lIE ESTABLISHMENT AND ADMiNISTRATION OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT 13—7 to 13—23 5—19

III. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES

TO SITUA'lIONB SHORT OF

WAR 13—24to13—25 21—22 V

SWM 13—1

SEOTION 1.

GENERAL

Par. Page

General 13—1 1

Definitions 13—2 1

Authority for exercise of military government 13-3 2

Functlofls of military government in generaL 13—1 2

By whom exercised 13—5 3

How proclaimed 13—6 3

13—1. Scope of chapter.—a. The feat;ures of the subject of military

government herein discussed relate to the powers, duties, and needs of

an officer detailed to command a force on a mission involving intervention into the affairs of a foreign country under conditions which are

deemed to warrant the establishment of complete military control over

the area occupied by the intervening force. While the form of military control known as military government is designed principally to

meet the conditions arising during a stae of war, it has been resorted

to, by the United States in numerous instances, where the inhabitants

of the country were not characterized as enemies and where war was

neither declared nor contemplated.

b. Military government being founded on the laws of war, many

questions arise with regard to the method to be used in the application

of these laws in situations requiring the establishment of such a government where no state of war exists. Ii; is the purpose of this chapter

to outline the general principles involved in the exercise of authority

and functions of military government and to indicate how those principles are applied in the various situations with which the marine or

naval officer may be confronted.

13—2. Definitions.—a. Military govenment.—Military government

is the exercise of military jurisdiction by a military commander,

under the direction of the President, with the. express or implied

sanction of Congress, superseding as far as may be deemed expedient,

the local law. This form of jurisdiction ordinarily exists only in

time of war, and not only applies to the occupied territory of a

foreign enemy but likewise to the territory of the United States in

cases of insurrection or rebellion of such magnitude that the rebels

are treated as belligerents.

1
.SWM 13-3

GENERAL

1. Martial iaw.—Martial Jaw is that form of military rule called

into action by Congress, or temporarily by the President when the

action of Congress cannot be invited, in the case of justifying or

excusing peril, in time of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or

foreign war, within districts or localities whose ordinary law no

longer adequately secures public safety and private rights.

C. Di8tinctions.—Tiie most important distinction between military

government and martial law is, that the former is a real government

exercised for a more or less extended period by a military commander

over the belligerents or other inhabitants of an enemy's country in

war, foreign or civil; martial law, on the other hand, is military

authority called into action, when and to the extent that public danger

requires it, in localiti or districts of the home country which still

maintain adhesion to the general government. The subjects of miiitaiy government are the belligerents or other inhabitants of occupied

territory, those of martial law are the inhabitants of our own territory who, though perhaps disaffected or in sympathy with a public

enemy, are not themselves belligerents or enemies. The occasion

for military government is usually war; t.hat for martial law is simply

public exigency which, though more commonly growing out of pending war, may nevertheless be invoked in time of peace in great

calamities such as earthquakes and mob uprisings at home.

13—3. Authority for exercise of military government—Military

government usually applies to territory over which the Constitution

and laws of the United States have no operation. Its exercise is

sanctioned because the powers of sovereignty have passed into the

hands of the commander of the occupying forces and the local authority is unable to maintain order and protect life and property

in the immediate theater of military operations. The duty of such

protection passes to the occupying forces, they having deprived the

people of the protection which the former government afforded. It

is decidedly to the military advantage of the occupying forces to

establish a strong and just government, such as will preserve order

and, as far as possible, pacify the inhabitants.

13—4. Functions of military government in general.—As to its

function, military government founded on actual occupation is an

exercise of sovereignty, and as such dominates the country which is

its theater in all branches of administration whether administered

by officers of the occupying forces or by civilians left in office. It

is 'the government of and for all the inhabitants, native or foreign,

wholly superseding the local law and civil authority except insofar

2
SWM 13—5

GEN ERAL

as the same may be permitted to exist. Civil functionaries who are

retained will be protected in the performance of their duties. The

local laws and ordinances may be left in force, and in general should

be subject, however, to their being in whole or in part suspended and

others substituted in their stead, in the discretion of the governing

authority.

13—5. By whom exercised.—Military government may be said to

be exercised by the military commarijer, under the direction of the

President, with the express or implied sanction of Congress. The

President. cannot, of course, personally administer all the details, so

he is regarded as having delegated to the commander of the occupying forces the requisite authority. Such commander may legally

do whatever the President might do if he were personally present.

It follows that the commander of the occupying force is the representative of his country and should be guided in his actions by its

foreign policy, the sense of justice inherent in its people, and the

principles of justice as recognized by civilized nations. A single

misuse of power, even in a matter that seems of little importance,

may injure his country and its citizens. Foreign, official, commercial,

and social relations depend in a great measure upon the friendliness

of other countries and their people. Acts of injustice by a force

commander jeopardize this friendliness, especially in neighboring

countries, or in those whose people hive racial or other ties in common with the people of the occupied country.

13—6. How proclaimed.—In a strict legal sense no proclamation of

military occupation is necessary. Military government proclaims

itself; a formal proclamation, although not required; is invariably

issued and is essential in a practical way as announcing to the peeple that military government has been established and advising them

in general as to the conduct that is expected of them. It should

be remembered that the inhabitants do not owe the military government allegiance; but they do owe it obedience. A sample form for

a proclamation may be found in the current issue of Naval Courts

and Boards.

3

SWM 13—7

SECTION 11111

ESTABLISHMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF MILITARY

GOVERNMENT

Par. Page

Importance of organization 13—7 5

Plans 13—8 5

Theproclamation 13-9 8

Supplemental regulations 13—10 9

Digest of information 13—11 11

Attitude toward local officials and inhabitant, - 13—12 13

Law enforcement agencies and public services 13—13 14

Exceptional military courts 13—14 15

Control of civil and military administration 13—15 15

Public utilities -. 13—16 16

Trade relationship 13—17 17

Mines and quarries 13—18 17

Publiorevenues 13—19 17

Requisitionsand contributions 13—20 17

Public and private property 13—21 18

Employment of inhabitants 13—22 18

Police and elections 13—23 19

13—7. Importance of organization.—The efficient administration

of a military government requires thk the officers chosen for the

administration of various departments should be particularly qualified

for such office.

13—8. Plans.—a. Whenever it becomes known or can be foreseen

that territory is to be occupied, the commander of the military forces

that are to occupy it will no doubt be called upon to formulate before.

hand his plans for administering the military government. These

detailed plans are prepared by him under the policies prescribed by

higher authority pursuant to such general plans or policies as may

previously have been prepared, announced, or approved by the Navy

Department. They will always depend upon the military situation,

and will be influenced by the political, economic, and psychological

factors which may prevail in the area to be governed.

b. The actual preparation of the main plan or plans is primarily

a function of that section of the commander's staff which will later

take part in the administration of the military government. The cornmander of the occupying forces should ordinarily organize a separate

5
SWM 13—8

MILI'rARY GOVERN MENT

and additional staff for the administration of civil affairs. However,

the plan as determined upon by the commander of the occupying force

requires coordinated study and assistance of the several staff officers.

F—i provides the data as to personnel; F—2 the data as to the situation

in the territory to be occupied; and F—3 the data for coordination

between the tactical plan and the military government plan.

c. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the necessity for having

the military government under a separate staff section, thus avoiding the interference with the military functions of the usual staff

sections, and yet coordinating the whole under the supervision of the

force commander. The chief of this separate staff is designated as

Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs. An outline of the organization of

this staff showing the various subdivisions, along with the duties

assigned to each is set forth in the following outline which is in.

tended as a guide only, there being no hard and fast rule prescribed

for organizing this staff:

The snilitary governor and civil affairs staff

Rank Title Outline of duties

Acts under the authority and by the direction of the President of the United States. Exercises military

law applicable to the occupation. Issues proclamations and supplemental regulations. Assumes the

duties of the President and Congress of the occupied

territory. Continues in effect the laws not conflicting with the objects of, or regulations Issued by, the occupation. Supervises and controls officials. Supervises the collection of revenue and controls Its expenditure. Establishes military tribunals. Respects personal and property rights. Acts as officer In charge of civil affairs. Promulgates

the orders of the Military Governor and supervises

- their execution. Assumes the duties of the Secretary of State (Foreign Relations). Assumes the dutiespertaining to the Department of Public Works. Conducts the public business of

this department In accordance with the laws and Constitution of the occupied territory. Supervises public works of all kinds, public utilities public building, mining, agriculture, forestry, and ñsheries. Assumes the duties pertaining to the Department of

the Treasury and Public Credit. Conducts the

public business of this department in accordance with the laws and Constitution of the occupied

territory. Has general supervision of public finances, taxes, excises, banking, postal service, state insur- ance, foreign commerce, and customs service. As Indicated by name. Includes quarantine service.

Assumes the duties pertaining to the Department of Education, as indicated by name. Includes religious societies and activities. Assumes the duties pertaining to the Department of Justice, supervises courts, prisons, provost courts, and military commissions. Gives legal advice and

opinions. Assumes the duties pertaining to law enforcement

through a native force organized as a constabulary.

Major general Military govnor

Colonel Officer in charge of civil affairs.

Commander ((EC), Officer in charge of public U. S. Navy or lieu- works and utilities.

tenant colonel, U.S. Marine Corps.

Lieutenant Colonel Officer in ehayge of fiscal

(PM or QM). affairs.

Commander (M. C.), Officer in charge of sanita- United States Navy. Zion and public health. Major Officer in charge of schools and charitable Institutions.

Major Officer in charge of the

legal department.

Colonel or Lieutenant Officer in charge of the Colonel, constabulary.
SWM 13-8

MiLITARY GOVE14NME1T

The Department of War and Navy will be abolished during the

occupation.

d. The plan of the commander for the administration of the miii

tary government should give expression to his decisions and instruc.

tions on the following points:

(1) The distribution and territorial assignment of his military

forces in the occupied territory.

(2) The immediate changes, if any, to be made in the local governmental system.

(3) The extent to which the more important local civil officials

are to be displaced and officers appointed to fill their places.

(4) The relationship which is to exist between the civil and military administrationìs, especially the extent to which tactical subdivisions are to be used as units of control of the civil administration.

e. The following form illustrates a guide which might be utilized

by the commander of the forces in drawing up the general instructions set forth above. Annexes to this plan will be prepared showing

the proclamation to be issued, the supplemental regulations to be published at the beginning, and proposed staff organization for admin

istering the military government.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT PLAN

Distribution and territorial assignmEnt of the occupying forces:

General distribution.

(1) Number of areas into which the occupied territory is to be

divided for administrative purposes.

(2) General policy of the commander in respect to the distribution

and administration of the military 'govermnent..

Territorial assignment of units.

Unit eadquartrs Area

List task groups - - Designate city Oiv politiciLl area to be occupied by the task group lioting

any extraordinary mission.

N0TE.—Within their respective areas, commanders will assign districts and subdistricts conforming to

political subdivisions when practicable.

Immediate changes to be made in the governmental system:

(1)Powers to be exercised by the Military Governor in his administration of the occupied territory.

(2) Immediate changes to be made in the exititing governmental

system as a whole.

7
SWM 13—8

iE Ii A'rA WY (( )VERN MENT

Extent to which more important civil otticia1 are to be displaced:

(1) Status of Chief Executive nd his cabinet under the military

government.

(2) Status of the Coijgress under the military government.

(3) Status of the Governors and other civil officers of the several

provinces.

(4) Status of the customs and tax collectors.

Relationship between the civil aiid military administrations:

(1) Military commanders assigned to various areas—will they perform civil administrative duties or act purely in an advisory

capacity?

(2) Local laws and ordinances—will they be adopted, amended,

or abrogated?

(8) Internal judicial system—to what extent will it function?

(4) Will a strict or liberal policy in relations with officials and

inhabitants be pursued?

13—9. The proclamation.—a. The proclamation of the commander

to the inhabitants of the occupied territory should be prepared beforehand, should above all be brief, and should cover the following

points:

(1) Announcement as to the exact territory occupied.

(2) The extent to which the local laws and governmental system

are to be continued in force, including a statement that the local

criminal courts have no jurisdiction in cases of offenses committed

by or against members of the occupying forces.

(3) Warning that strict obedience of the orders of the commander

of the occupying forces is to be expected of all, and that those who

disobey such orders or regulations,or commit acts of hostility against

the occupying forces, will be severely punished; but those who cheerfully accept the new sovereignty and abide by its orders will be

protected.

(4) A statement that the occupying forces come not to make war

upon the inhabitants but to help them reestablish themselves in

the ways of peace and to enable them to resume their ordinary

occupations.

(5) In conclusion, the proclamation should make reference to

supplemental regulations to be issued containing more detailed

instructions.

b. The proclamation should be published in English and in the

national language of the occupied territory. The conditions which

might call for such proclamations are varied, and in each case the

8
SWM 13-10

MILITARY G0V1RNMENT

particular circumstances must control. (For form for L proclamation

see currentS edition of Naval Courts and Boards.)

13—10. Supplemental regulations.-—'t. The ml Iituy government,

being supreme, can lawfully demand the absolute obedience of the

inhabitants of the area over which it is exercised. There should,

therefore, always be prepared and ready for issue contemporaneously

with the proclamation, or as soon thereafter as practicable, a supplementary order giving definite expression to regulations and detailed

instructions on a variety of subjects in order that the inhabitants

may be fully informed from the first as to the conduct that is expected

of them.

b. The drafting of these regulations, usually at a headquarters far

removed from the theater of operatioiis, is by no means an easy task.

If they are more harsh than is necessary for the preservation of order

and the proper decorum and respect, the force commander and his

government are bound to stand in disrepute before the civilized world.

c. One of the principal aims should be to SQ administer the military

government that upon conclusion of the occupation, the transition

to the new state of affairs may be accomplished without radical change

in the mode of life of the inhabitants or undue strain in the return

to, or setting in motion of, the machinery of their own laws and institutions. Yet, restrictions must be placed upon assemblages, notwithstanding that the people, looking to the future, will want to gather

together and discuss platforms of poltical parties or campaigns for

supremacy in their national affairs. Parades and gatherings in celebration of national holidays, and even religious processions on church

holidays, may have to be restricted. The problem of reconciling

these conflicting features is one of the most difficult and delicate with

which the military government will have to deal.

d. The principal restrictions included in the supplemental order relate to unlawful assembly, circulation, identification, possession of

arms and ammunition, policy as to manufacture and sale of alcoholic

beverages, and offenses in general against the personnel, establishments, installations, and material of the forces of occupation.

e. Consideration should be given to the following matters:

(1) The force and effect of the instructions, rules, and regulations

contained in the order.

(2) The fact that existing civil laws shall remain in effect, and be

enforced by the local officials except those laws of political nature,

and except that the civil laws shall not apply to members of the oc

cupying force.

9
SWM 13-10

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

(3) A list of additional rules and regulations imposed by the military authority, and to be enforced by military tribunals, declaring it

to be unlawful:

To act as a spy or to supply information to the opposing forces.

To cause damage to railway property; war materials, and other public

utility.

To impair sources of water supply.

To destroy, damage, or secrete any kinds of supplies or materials useful

to the occupying forces.

To aid prisoners to escape, or to willing assist the opposing forces.

To harm or injure members of the occupying forces.

To attempt to Influence members of the occupying forces to fail or be

derelict in the performance of their duties.

To damage or alter military signs or notices.

To circulate propaganda against the interests of the occupying forces.

To recruit troops, or to cause desertion by members of the occupying

forces.

To commit any act of war, treason, or to violate the laws of war.

To utter seditious language.

To spread alarmist reports.

To overcharge for merchandise sold to members of the occupying forces.

To Interfere with troops in formation.

To commit arson or to unlawfully convert property to the Injury of the

occupying forces.

To circulate newspapers or publications of a seditious nature.

To signal or communicate with the opposing forces by any means.

To sketch or photograph places or materials used by the occupying forces.

To escape or attempt escape from Imprisonment.

To swear falsely.

To forge, alter, or tamper with passes or other documents issued by the

occupying forces.

To interfere with or refuse to comply with requisitions.

To perforiii any act In substantial obstriwIon to the military government.

To show disrespect to the flag or colors of the United States.

To print, post, circulate, or publish anything antagonistic or detrimental

to the Military Government or the Forces of Occupation. (Publications

may be' suspended or censored for cause.)

To violate aimy proclamation or regulation Issued by the occupying forces.

To conspire, attempt to do so, or aid and abet anyone violating the foregoing regulations.

f. It is important to have beforehand a thorough knowledge of the

customs of the country to be occupied, for the enforcement of regulations which run counter to long-established customs is always extremely difficult. It is not likely that much difficulty will be encountered in the enforcement of purely military regulations, but

where the customary daily life of the civilian populatiQu is circum10
SWM 13—11

MILITARY GOVERN 1\'lENT

scribed by many restrictions and i:riconveniences, the tendency is

towards frequent or continual violations. Desirable as such restrictions may seem from an idealistic standpoint, they will, not be

conducive to success unless they are so framed as to harmonize to

the fullest possible extent with the psychology of the population

which they are expected to govern.

13—il. Digest of information.—li,i addition to the study of the

theater of operations, the commander should be furnished with a

digest, prepared by the Law Officer, utilizing all information at. the

disposition of the Second Section, and such other pertinent information which would be of value to the commander in administering

the military government. A sample form for such a digest follows:

DIGEST OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND PSYCHOLOGIC

INFORMATION

1. MILITARY SITUAtION (omitted).

2. PoLrncAL SInJATI0N.

a. National govcrouent.

(1) Executive power.

(a) In whom vested.

(b) Method of accession.

(c) Term of office.

(d) Cabinet and advisers.

(2) Legislative power.

(a) Composition of legislative body.

(b) How chosen.

(c) Term of office.

(d.) Legislative procedure.

(!) Judicial department.

ii) Existing system.

(h) Efficiency of existiiig courts.

b. Local govcrnnent.

(1) DescriptIon of political divisions of country.

(2) Administration of p01 itical subdivisions.

(3) Administration of rnnnlcipilities. e. Political parl1c8.

(1) Principal parties.

(2) Leaders.

(3) Sphere of influence.

(4) Political tenets.

(5) Political background prior to establishmnent of military government. . Treatie.s and con.ventions.

(1) Existing and pending. C. Franchise.

(1) To whom granted.

(2) How exercised.

11
SWM 13—11

MILITAIIY t3OVlItN ME1T

3. Eooxouo SITUATION.

u. Geography.

(1) Area.

(2) (limate and rainfall.

b. Population.

(1) Entire country.

(2) Important cities and ports,

(3) DIstribution of population.

(4) Percentage and distribution of forelgiwrs.

e. Production and ifldu8lry.

(1) ChIef industrIes and resources.

(2) Location.

(3) Exports and Imports.

(4) ShIps and shipping.

(5) MInes and quarries.

d. Finance.

(1) Monetary system.

(2) FInancial condition of country.

(3) Sources of revenue.

(4) Customs administration.

C. Communica tiOfl8.

(1) Railroads.

(a) Extent and condition.

(b) Ownership.

(2) Roads and trails—extent and condition.

(3) Waterways and harbors—extent and navigability.

(4) Telephone, telegraph, radio and cables.

(a) Extent, equipment, and possibilities.

(b) Ownership.

(5) Air transportation.

(a) Extent, equipment.

(b) Ownership.

(6) Postal service. . Public utilities.

(1) Extent.

(2) Control and supervision.

g. Labor condition8.

(1) Unemployment situation.

(2) Wages, and hours.

(3) Presence and effect of labor organizations.

(4) Social conditions of 'aboring class.

A. Sanitation.

4. PsyeoLooio SITUATION. a. General racial chara-cterlslies.

(1) Type: superstitious—vnclllating—susceptible to propnga mlii—

excitable.

(2) Degree of corruption in politics.

(3) FightIng ability.

(4) Language and dialects.

12
SWM 13—12

I1iLt1AItY (.ovE:rN I1E.N 1'

4. PsyoitoLowc S11'UATION—( oiitiiiued.

b. Educat ion.

(1) Peic'iitagc of ill itraey.

(2) Coiiiim1ory 01 VOIUHtO ry.

(3) Outline of school system.

(4) Location of Important universities.

c. Religion.

(1) PrevailIng form.

(2) Effect of religion on life of people.

(3) LocatIon of religious centers.

d. Attitude toward other people8.

(1) Foreigners In general.

(2) Members of the occupation.

13—12. Attitude toward local officials and inhabitants.—a. Considering the data obtained with regard to the political situation,

decision must be made as to immediate changes to be effected in the

local government. Civil control must be subordinated to military

control. All the functions of the government—executive, legislative,

or administrative—whether of a general, provincial, or local char.

acter, cease under military occupation, or continue only with the

sanction, or if deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier.

b. The functions of the collectors of customs at all important ports

should be assumed, and officers of the naval service appointed to fill

their places. No other civil officials should be displaced except as

may be necessary by way of removal cn account of incompetency or

misconduct in office. The policy should be to retain the latter in

their official positions and hold them responsible to the military

officers in charge of the various areas within which their jurisdiction

lies; the idea of this responsibility should be emphasized from the

beginning of the occupation.

c. The following general rules should guide the commander of the

occupying force in his dealings with the local government machinery

to the extent that the latter is functioning:

(1) Acts of the legislature should not become effective until approved by the military governor.

(2) The acts of city and minor councils should likewise not become effective until approved by the military commanders having

immediate jurisdiction of the political subdivisions concerned.

(3) In general, a liberal policy should be preserved in all relations

with the inhabitants and the greatest latitude permitted in public

and private affairs, consistent with the rights and security of the

military forces and the termination of the occupation.
SWM 13—12

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

(4) More specifically, all local laws should be permitted to remain

in full force and effect, except as specifically provided by the military

governor.

(5) All local civil officials, except those duly removed or suspended

from office by the military governor, or by the military commander

having immediate jurisdiction over said officals, should be encouraged

to remain at their posts and be. protected in the performance of their

official duties. They slloul(i be required to take an oath to faithfully

perform their duties. This oath is not an oath of allegiance.

(6) Vacancies among local civil officials by death, flight, or removal from office should be filled as follows:

(a) Where the local law provides for their selection by the President or by the head of a department, or for their popular election—

by the military governor.

(b) Where the local law provides for their selection by a subordinate civil official or minor legislative body—by the military commander having immediate jurisdiction over the said official or

legislative body.

(7) An official of the hostile government who has accepted service

under the occupant should be permitted to resign and should not be

punished for exercising such privilege. Such official should not be

forced to exercise his functions against his will.

(8) Any civil official found guilty of acts subversive of the occupying power should be subject to trial and punishment by military

commission.

13—13. Law enforcement agencies and public services.—The

proclamation of the commander of the force announces the extent

to which the local law and governmental system ale to be continued.

It should request the inhabitants to resume their usual occupations.

Public services and utilities should continue or resume operations

tinder the direction and control of military authorities. The administration of justice should be given special attention. All courts,

unless specifically excepted by the commander of the force, should

be permitted to function and their decisions enforced except that:

(1) No person in the service of the naval forces and subject to

naval law will be subject to any process of the local courts. However, writs of subpoena may be served with permission from the local

commanding officer.

(2) •Persons charged with violations of military orders, or with

offenses against persons or propeFty of members of the occupying

forces, or against the laws of war are to be tried by military tribunal.

14
SWM 13—14

MILITARY GOVEIINMENT

(3) Persons employed by or in the service of the occupying forces

should be subject exclusively to the military law and jurisdiction of

such forces.

13—14. Exceptional military courts.—Since a naval court martial

is a court of limited jurisdiction restricted by law to the trial of

officers and men of the naval service, it is apparent that, in order to

exercise the power conferred upon the force commander when his

duty is such as to place under him a wider jurisdiction in accordance

with the principles of this chapter, it i necessary to employ tribunals

other than those used in connection with the administration of naval

law. Such tribunals have been referred to by the Navy Department

as exceptional military courts, and include the military commission,

the superior provost court, and the provost court. At such time as

the proclamation and supplemental regulations are issued, an order

establishing military tribunals and defining their jurisdiction and

procedure should be published. For a discussion of these courts and

their procedure, see Naval Courts and Boards.

13—15. Control of civil and military administration.—a. The

greatest efficiency of government will be acquired by centralization

of policy and decentralization of execution. In order to accomplish

this, it is necessary that the actual administration of the military

government be decentralized by means of a special organization of

military persoimel. This special organization should be designed to

facilitate the military supervision necessary within the territorial

subdistricts into which the occupied area has been divided for the

purpose of governmental control.

b. In subdividing the area for the purpose of administering t.he

military government, the preexisting I)olitical subdivisions, such as

counties, townships, municipalities, etc., should be considered, and

overlapping and mixture of these subdivisions should be avoided as

far as possible. The subdivision should also be made so as to lend

itself to geographic unity; that is, no district or area. should be separated from one of its parts by a range of mountains; each should

have adequate means of communication and a fair share thereof;

each should have a reasonable proportion of ports of entry and egress;

and, each should have a reasonable proportion of the population,

industries, etc. The principal feature of the organization should be

that each territorial district or subdistrict will be placed under the

control of a tactical commander, and I hat each tactical commander

charged with duties pertaining to the supervision of civil affairs will

15
SWM 13—16

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

have his staff increased by personnel to be organized as a staff section

similar to that previously referred to. c. The principle of making the military commands coextensive with

the political subdivisions of the occupied territory tends to subordinate

tactical considerations to the necessities of civil administration. However, the relationship between the civil and military administrations

should be such that should it become necessary for the military forces

to move on to a continuation or renewal of hostilities, the civil affairs

section of the staff may, with a minimum of interference with the

military administration, remain in the area and be capable of extending its sphere of activity to include additional territory that may

be occupied. So long as a tactical unit remains in a. particular subdistrict, its commander will exercise the usual functions of command

through the agencies normally at his disposal. He will exercise his

special functions relative to civil affairs through the staff which has

been organized especially for that purpose. The Officer in Charge

of Civil Affairs in each area or district, together with his staff, should

be subject to supervision and coordination in technical and routine

matters by the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs next higher 'in

the hierarchy of military government, but all orders involving

announcements or changes in policy, or affecting personnel should

come through the military commander in the usual way.

13—16. Public utilities.—a. Municipal water works, light and

power plants should be permitted to remain open and function as in

normal times, but should be supervised by the officer on the civil

affairs staff having jurisdiction over public works. Payments for

public services should be made in the usual manner, while appeals in

the matter of rates, wages, etc., should be referred to the military

governor. Wilful damage to, or interference with, any public utility

should be considered as an offense against the occupying force. Railways, bus lines, and other public carriers needed for military purposes

may be seized and operated by the public works officer of the military

governor's staff. This officer is also responsible for the upkeep of the

highways.

b. All telegraph and telephone lines, cable terminals, and radio

stations, together with their equipment, may be taken over and conducted under the supervision of the force communication officer. He

should prescribe which will• be operated by the occupying forces,

which closed, and which will continue to be operated by civilian companies; and, in case of the latter, may requisition the services of the

personnel, whether individually or as an organization, as may be

16
SWM 13—17

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

deemed advisable. The use by civilians of telegraph, telephone, and

cable lines and of radio systems should be permitted only under regulations issued by the force commandei.

13—17. Trade relationship.—a. Ships and shipping should be

treated according to the rules of war. The normal port service should

be interfered with as little as possible. The port regulations in effect

should so remain as long as they are consistent with the orders issued

by the military governor. The occupying force may take over any

ferry or water transportation regarded as necessary to supplement

other transportation lines.

b. The general policy of the military government should be to

encourage, foster, and protect all citizens of the occupied territory

in the energetic pursuit of legitimate interior and exterior trade relationship. It should be unlawful for inhabitants of the occupied territory to engage in any form of traffic with the enemies of the occupying

forces, or to engage in commerce with foreign states in contraband

articles of war, or to export money, gold, silver, jewelry, or other

similar valuables for the time being.

13—18. Mines and quarries.—Mines and quarries should be permitted to operate as in peace except that all explosives on hand should

be reported to the local military representative. The manager of a

mine or quarry should be held responsible and the explosives are used

only for proper purposes. Where the stock is large, a guard therefor should be furnished by the local military commander Requisitions of local military commanders should be given priority over all

orders at mines and quarries. Quarris of road material in areas or

districts may be -exploited by the local military commander.

13-19. Public revenues.—Generally, the policy of the military

government should be to divert no public revenues from their normal

uses except to defray the legitimate expenses of the military government. Taxes, excises, and custom dutii3s collected at the current legal

rate by agencies already operating, or otherwise provided for in

orders issued by the military governor, should be turned over to the

military government for accounting and disbursement according to

law. Supplies for the forces of occupation, and the carriers of same

while employed as such, should be exempt from taxes or other public

revenue charges of any nature.

13—20. Requisitions and contributions.—a. Requisitions for supplies required by the occupying forces should be issued under the

supervision of the military commander. They should be made upon

the officials of the locality rather than upon individuals; they must

17
SWM 13—18

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

be reasonable in proportion to the resources of the country so as to

avoid unnecessary distress among the inhabitants. They should be

paid for in cash, if possible. Otherwise, receipts should be given.

b. Contributions may lawfully be levied against the inhabitants by

authority of the military governor or the commander of the occupying

force (but not by a subordinate), for the following purposes:

(1) To pay the cost of the military government during the occupation.

(2) Compensation for the protection of life and property, and the

preservation of order under difficult circumstances.

(3) As a fine imposed upon the community as a whole for acts

injurious to the occupying force.

c. Contributions should be apportioned like taxes, and receipted for.

One method of exacting contributions is to take over the customs

houses, thus controlling the revenues from import receipts.

1&—21. Public and private property.—Public buildings and public

property of the occupied country, except charitable institutions and

those devoted to religious, literary, educational, and sanitary purposes,

may be seized and used by the forces in the manner of leaseholder.

Title does not pass to the occupying sovereignty. Other buildings are

not to be used except in case of emergency. Private property must

he respected.

13—22. Employment of inhabitants.—a. Services of the inhabitants of occupied territory may be requisitioned for the needs of the

occupying force. These will include the services of professional men

and tradesmen, such as surgeons, carpenters, butchers, barbers, etc.,

employees of gas, electric light, and water works and other public

utilities. The officials and employees of railways, canals, river or

coastal steamship companies, telegraph, telephone, postal and similar

services may be requisitioned to perform their duties so long as the

duties do not directly concern operations of war against their own

country, and thereby violate the Rules of Land Warfare as recognized

by the United States.

b. The prohibition against forcing the inhabitants to take part in

operations of war against their own country precludes requisitioning

their services upon works directly promoting the ends of the war,

such as the construction of forts, fortifications, and entrenchments;

but there is no objection to their being employed on such work voluntarily for pay, except the military reason of preventing information

concerning such work from falling into the hands of the enemy.

18
BWM 13—23

MILITARY GOVE:ItNMENT

18—23. Police and electlons.—The civil police force may be con.

tinued in operation in conjunction with the military forces and the

members thereof may be required to shoulder the burden of enforcing

certain additional police regulations imposed by the various military

commanders. Elections may be suspended or held at the discretion

of the military governor; and he may regulate such elections to avoid

fraud, disorder, and intimidation.

19

SWM 13—24

SECTION ill

APPLICAI'IONS OF- PRINCIPLES TO SITUATIONS SHORT

OF WAll

Par. Page

General considerations 13—24 21

What laws apply 13-25 21

13—24. General considerations.—The history of our Government

indicates that we have occupied territory and established complete

military control over such territory in time of peace as well as in time

of war. If war has been declared, the establishment of a military

government over the territory of the enemy occupied by our forces

gives rise to very few questions. However, when military government is established over a foreign sovereign state or a portion thereof,

without Congress declaring war, that is, when the native inhabitants

of the country occupied are not considered enemies, it brings up the

question of whether or not the laws of war can be legally applied.

Such situations have presented themselves in the past and will probably present themselves in the future. They arise from the policies

of our Government which dictate what our attitude should be toward

assisting our neighbors in maintaining peace and order and in protecting the personal and property rights of our own and other foreign

nationals. When we intervene in such cases, our action will always

appear to many, especially those of the country concerned, as a quasihostile act and they will, be ready to protest and criticize the conduct

of the military government in all its functions. If, as we are taught,

a military governor, even in time of war, should be careful to make

his government humane, liberal, and :lust, because of the undesirability of making a return to peace difficult, how much more this

principle must apply when there is no war.

13—25. What laws apply.—If the commander of the force of occupation establishes a military government ind there is no war, what laws

can he apply? He cannot apply the laws of our own country in the

occupied territory and he cannot accept and enforce on the laws of

the occupied territory. Our own constitution cannot be made to

apply to a foreign territory, and the existing laws in the occupied

territory manifestly will contain no provisions which will guarantee

21
SWM 13—25

SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR

the security of the forces of occupation, their installations and material. The fact remains that the commander must govern and he must

utilize a military form of control. Therefore, he will be justified in

adopting any reasonable measures necessary to carry out the task

or mission that has been assigned him. Whether his government

has declared war is no concern of his—that is a diplomatic and.

international move over which he has no control. The very nature

of his mission demands that he must have absolute power—War

Power. However, as a matter of policy, the more rigorous war powers

should not be enforced. Contributions, requisitions, treatment of war

traitors, spies, etc., should not be more rigorous than absolute necessity demands for self-protection. The commander's policy should be

to enforce the laws of war but only to such extent as is absolutely

necessary to accomplish his task.

0

22
SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER XIV

SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1910

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Mrine Corps, 1940, is published

in 15 chapters as follows:

CHAtrp:R 1. 1 NTROI)UCTION.

LI. ORGANIZATION.

111. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

VII. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS.

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

In

RESTRICTED

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CHAPTER XIV

SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

Par. Page

SECTION I. GENERAL 14— 1 to 14— 7 1— 9

II. PERSONNEL 14— 8to 14—15 11—15

III. ELECTORAL MISSION 14—16 to 14—28 17—27

IV. NArIONAL BOARD OF ELCTIONS 14—29 to 14—33 29—32

V. REGISTRATION AND VOTINCL. 14—34 to 14—36 33—35

V

210—7050—88—17: QL3

SWM 14—]

SECTION I

GENERAL

Par. Page

introduction 14—1 1

Request for supervision 14—2 2

Definitions 14—3 2

Responsibilities of electoral mission_.. 14—4 3

Intimidation of voters 14—5 4

Military and police measures 14—6 4

Unethical practices 14—7 6

14—1. Introduction.—a. The Government of the United States has

supervised the presidential or congressional elections of neighboring

republics on 12 different occasions. iy accepting the responsibility

for such supervision, the Government cf the United States has settled

serious political disturbances and assisted in the reestablishment of

law and order. Sanguinary revolutio1rls were stopped and countries

rescued from a state of civil war. Assistance rendered by the Government of the United States was, in most cases, the direct result of

requests of the conflicting political elements. In some instances, the

aid was given in order to preserve peace and to settle controversies

in accordance with existing treaties.

b. The supervision of an election i.s perhaps the most effective

peaceful means of exerting an impartial influence upon the turbulent affairs of sovereign states. Such supervision frequently plays

a prominent role in the diplomatic endeavors that are so closely

associated with small war activities. Due to the peaceful features

of electoral supervision, there will probably be more of this form

of aid rendered neighboring republics in the future. Such action

is in keeping 'with the popular revulsion against armed intervention

in the internal affairs of other countries, and supports the principles of self-determination and majority rule.

c. Whenever the Government of the United States assumes the

responsibility of supervising the elections of another sovereign

state, it compromises its foreign political prestige as effectively as

by any other act of intervention or interposition. There is, perhaps,

no other service which may be rendered a friendly state, the motive

of which is more actively challenged or criticized, as an endeavor

to control the internal affairs or the political destiny of that state.

1
SWM 14—2

GENERAL

The duty of electoral supervision is normally performed by military

and naval personnel. In addition, the electoral supervision will

often be conducted under the. protection afforded. by United States

military or naval forces assigned for that specific duty. A knowledge

of the subject of electoral supervision will be found useful to all

personnel engaged in small wars operations.

14—2. Request for supervision.—The supervision of elections

within a sovereign State is normally undertaken only after a formal

request for such supervision has been made to the President of the

United States by the government of the foreign state, or by responsible factions within the foreign state, provided no de facto government exists. The formal request is usually accompanied by

statements from the principal officials of recognized . political parties

to the effect that they desire the electoral supervision, that they

pledge their active aid and support in cooperation with the proposed

electoral mission, and that they agree to exercise their influence over

all their followers to the end that a peaceful election may be held.

14—3. Definitions.—a. The group of individuals representing the

Government of the United States that proceeds to the foreign country

concerned to supervise a particular election in accordance with agreements between the Government of the United States and the foreign

government is known as the ELECTORAL MISSION To

(E. M.). It is normally composed of officers and enlisted personnel

of the military and naval services of the United States, augmented

by certain qualified civilian assistants.

b. The committee that directs and controls the national electoral

machinery and electoral procedure of the country concerned is known

as the NATIONAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS (N. B. E.). It is governed by

the existing electoral laws of the country concerned, and is normally

composed of citizens of the country. During the supervision of a

particular election by the Government of the United States, a member

of the Electoral Mission serves as a member of the National Board of

Elections in lieu of one of the members who is a citizen of the foreign

country. In the past, it has been customary for the Chairman of the

Electoral Mission to serve also as President of the National Board of

Elections. c. The committee that directs and controls the electoral machinery

and electoral procedure within a Department is known as a DEPARTMENTAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS. A member of the Electoral Mission

serves on this board in lieu of a citizen member. The Department

is a political subdivision of the country analogous to a State in the

2
SWM 14—4

GENERAL

United States. These political subdivisions are sometimes known as

Provinces.

ci. Depending upon the further political subdivision of the country

concerned, minor boards of election are set up. Such boards may be

known as CANTONAL BOARDS OF ELEOTtONS, Dismic'r BOARDS OF ELECTIONS, or COMMUNAL BOARDS OF ELECTIONS. In each case, the political

subdivisions of the country concerned will be the governing factor

in the organization of such minor boards. Normally, a District (Arrondissement) is a political subdivision of a Department (Province)

analagous to a County in the United States. A further political subdivision of the District (Arrondissement) is known as a Canton

(Commune) and is analogous to a Ward or Township in the United

States.

14—.4. Responsibilities of an electoral mission.—a. A. "free and

fair" election implies the unrestrained popular choice of the whole

people expressed at the polls by all who are lawfully entitled to

suffrage. There must be no restraint or reservation, either physical

or mental, exerted upon any aspirant to office or upon any of his

supporters, except those normal restrictions required for the preservation of law and order. The fear of restraint may be real and with

sufficient reason, or it may be imaginary and without cause. In

either case, every effort must be made to remove the fear of restraint.

It is only by a studied impartiality on the part of the Electoral

Mission that charges of favoritism can be avoided.

b. It is well to consider the internal conditions that make the

electoral supervision necessary. The electoral laws, the economic

conditions, and the educational problems of the country concerned

will often be found to be factors. The Electoral Mission can actually institute few permanent electoral reforms during the limited

time that it is present in the country. It can, however, demonstrate

a method of conducting elections thai may serve as a model to the

citizens for future elections. A free, fair, and impartial election

cannot be held in a country torn by civil strife. Before such an

election can be held, the individual must be made to feel safe in

his everyday life. The presence of United States military and

naval forces is often necessary to furnish that guarantee.

c. The Electoral Mission can assume the responsibility for the conduct of a "free and fair" election only within the definite limitations

of the authority granted it and the facilities made available for

carrying out its mission. There may be political and legal restrictions over which the Electoral Mission has no control. To guaran3
SWiVI 14—5

GENERAL

tee a "free and fair" election, the Electoral Mission should have the

necessary authority over the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the government to make effective its legal decisions. It

must also have the active cooperation, if not the actual control, of

military and police forces sufficient to enforce its rulings.

14—5. Intimidation of voters.—The employment of military and

police forces for the protection of voters will often be a vital factor

in the conduct of a "free and fair" eletion. The selfish personal

and' political partisanship of individuals, groups, or political parties

may induce them to use various and sundry methods, including force,

in an attempt to influence the outcome of the election. Guerrilla

elements may be encountered', whose announced purpose is the prevention of an impartial election. These guerrilla elements may be

banded together on their own initiative for this announced purpose,

or they may be in the hire of some political group or party. Military and police forces are employed to prevent violence to personnel

conducting the elections at voting booths, to prevent the destruction

or seizure of ballots and electoral records, and for general protection

of the populace from guerrilla activities. Protection is furnished

the inhabitants in towns, in cities, and along lines of communication

in order that registrants and voters may not be prevented from

registering or voting due to threats of bodily violence while proceeding to and from registration and polling places. In some cases

the homes of voters may be threatened, and the safety of their lives,

families, and property may be endangered as a result of their announced desire to exercise their right of suffrage. This is particularly true in the case of members of campaigning (propaganda)

parties normally employed in countries that do not enjoy good

communication facilities. The foregoing measures of violence may

be attempted by individuals, small groups, or large bands of guerrillas. A. large organized group may make raids into quiet sections

of the country in order to frighten the peaceful inhabitants and

disturb the peace to influence the elections in the locality, attack

isolated posts, ambush patrols, and conduct other operations of such

nature a to demand the employment of a comparatively large

military force for protection of the inhabitants.

14—6. Military and police measures.—a. It is essential that the

Chairman of the Electoral Mission have military and police forces

available in sufficient number to insure peace and order during the

election campaign, the registration period, and the voting period.

4
SWM 14—6

GENERAt

Without such forces, it may be highly iml)raclicable to assure the

electorate of a free, fair, and impartial election.

b. During the electoral period, United States naval and military

forces already stationed in the country may be augmented temporarily by troop detachments from the continental United States, by

detachments from ships of the United States Fleet, or others armed

forces of the United States. In order that. such units may be readily

availab. for recall or return to their nonnal stations for duty and

to save time and transportation, it. will usually be advisable to employ

such temporarily attached troops in or near the larger bases or along

lines of communication (railroads, automobile roads, lake, and river

boats). Veteran troops that are accustmned to the country and inhabitants are employed in the more exposed districts. Such assignment of troops will promote more efficient. performance of duty.

c. In some countries, there may be a native constabulary or similar

organization under the command of United States or native officers.

Whenever practicable, the larger portion of the military and police

duties required to guarantee an impartial election should be provided

by the native military organization. Tlis force should be employed

to its maximum capacity before employing United States forces. The

display of United States armed forces at or near the polling places is

kept to a minimum in order to avoid the charge that the Government

of the United States has influenced the election, or placed favored

candidates in office by the. employment of military forces. However,

the safety of Electoral Mission personnel must be considered at all

times. The use of the native military organization places the responsibility for law and order where ii; properly belongs. It also

tends to give the electorate the impression that the election is bing

conducted under the control of their own country. Care must be

exercised to prevent the native military organization and individuals

composing that organization from exhibiting any partiality. There

cannot be a "free and fair" election if the use of the native constabu-

]ary degenerates into a partisan display of force. If the organization

is not under the immediate command of United States officers, it

becomes even more necessary to supervise its conduct during this

period.

d. Local police are generally politicaJ appointees and, as a rule,

cannot be depended UOfl to support i "free and fair" election.

Their local, political, and personal interests will often result in

prejudices and injustices, which will compromise efforts for impartial control. If they are not federalized, nonpartisan, and under

5
SWM 14—7

GENERAL

neutral superior authority, it is better to confine the duties of the

local police agencies to their normal functions of preserving the

peace in their localities, thus furnishing indirect support toward

the conduct of a "free and fair" election. Their actions should be

observed for any sign of partiality or improper activities that may

tend to influence the outcome of the election. In some instances,

it may be deemed advisable to suspend the civil police and similar

organizations during the period of registration and election. This

may be done by decree or other legal means. Their duties are then

temporarily assigned to the native military organization. Armed

guards from the constabulary force may be stationed at polling places

to assist the regular civil police force in the maintenance of order.

'When so employed, the members of the constabulary. force are given

civil police power and may make arrests for ordinary civil offenses.

e. It is sometimes desirable to station an armed member of the

United States forces inside each polling place to protect the electoral personnel, to guard the electoral records and ballots, and to

preserve order within the building, thus relieving the Chairman of

the local Board of Elections (usually a member of the Electoral

Mission) of those responsibilities. The latter can then devote his

entire attention to his electoral duties. At times, it may be necessary to asign detachments of United States troopss to protect

electoral personnel and records at polling places and while traveling

between polling places and departmental capitals.

f. During the electoral period, and particularly on registration

days and the day of election, aviation is employed to patrol polling

places in outlying sections. This action is particularly valuable in

that it gives tangible evidence to the voters that. they are receiving

protection in the exercise of their civil rights. Airplane patrols

also furnish an excellent means of communication with pol1ng

places. They are a constant threat to any organized attempt to

foment disorder.

14—7. Unethical practices.—n. In addition to the military or police features which may materially influence the ability of the Electoral Mission to guarantee a "free and fair" election, there are other

elements that may operate to prevent that desirable result. These elements may properly be grouped under the heading of "political pressure" practices. Political pressure exerts a powerful influence in the

conduct of elections since it reaches and touches every voter, whether

he resides in the capital or a remote district of the interior. This

political pressure consists of practices of long standing in some coun6
SWM 14—7

GENERAL

tries, is extremely difficult to uncover, and requires tactful and painstaking effort to circumvent.

b. The incumbent Chief Executive may find it politically expedient

to declare martial law in scetions of the country at the beginning of the

election period, giving as a reason, the preservation of law and order.

The action may have no relation to the military situation at the time,

and may possibly be taken in spite of recommendation against it by

the military authorities concerned. As a consequence of such executive decree, the duly elected civil officials are automatically ousted from

office and replaced by presidential appointees. By carrying out the

process to its logical conclusion down to and including game wardens

scattered throughout the province or provinces, political henchmen,

willing and anxious to use every kind of pressure on any voter who

might be opposed to the national administration, are in a position to

interfere radically with an impartial election. This is a most unhealthful condition under which to attempt to conduct a free and

fair election. By appealing to the sense of fair play of the executive,

and through other diplomatic endeavors, it may be possible to have the

decree rescinded. Unless the civil off cials that have been appointed

by executive action are removed from office, however, the effect of having such individuals continue in authority is likely to be deleterious

to the conduct of an impartial election in the sections affected. c. Public lands may be distributed to citizens with a tacit understanding that they will vote for the candidates of the party controlling

the distribution of the land, an act whkh is clearly contrary to the laws

of the country. By this process, a political victory for the party dispensing the land is practically assured in a district whose inhabitants

are known to be about equally divided between two political parties.

Investigation and exposure of this prtctice, coupled with diplomatic

efforts on the part of the Electoral Mission, will serve to put a stop to

this activity, but it is likely to be too late to prevent full political profit

from being drived.

d. In some countries, it is an established custom during electoral

periods to arrest numerous citizens of the party, not in power, for old

offenses, for charges of minor infringement of law, for honest political

activities, and even upon charges that have absolutely no foundation

whatsoever. In accordance with the law of the country, such citizens

are automatically disfranchised, due to their having been arrested

within a given period prior to the date elections are to be held. This

action gives the party in power a powerful weapon in influencing the

result of election. It is also not uncommon for the Chief Executive to
SWM 14—7

GENERAL

banish prominent political opponents from the country, thereby ridding

the party in power of some of its intelligent opposition. Another

pernicious custom is the enIJ)lOyu1ent of the "warrantS for arrest" as a

means of depriving citizens of their constitutional right of suffrnge.

By this means, citizens may be prevented from voting or holding office

during the time the charges are pending against theimi, even though no

arrest may be made. Charges may cover real or imaginary offenses or

crimes alleged to have been committed on a date many years before.

Through dilatory procedure on the part of the civil courts, trial of

such cases may be delayed beyond the registration period, thus effectively disfranchising the alleged offender. This method is employed

principally against members of the party not in power, since it is a

difficult matter to swear out a "warrant for arrest" against members of

the party in power due to the partisanship of the civil officials charged

with this duty. By exerting diplomatic pressure, it may be found

practicable to have the national laws amended by the insertion of a

statute of limitations providing that "warrants for arrest" for civil

offenses expire automatically after 2 years and those for criminal

offenses after a period of 5 years, provided the civil authorities have

taken no steps to bring the case to trial before the expiration of such

periods.

e. Public utilities and other agencies owned or controlled by the

government may be used in a discriminatory manner for the benefit

of the party in power. Campaign (propaganda) parties, voters,

workers, and others who may be of assistance to the party in power

may be found to have free passage granted them on railroads, river

and lake steamships, airplane lines and suburban street car lines owned

or controlled by the government. The party in power may employ

government trucks to carry voters to registration and voting places,

denying such transportation to members of the party not in power.

Provided the government owns or operates the telephone, telegraph,

radio, or postai service, the party in power may be found to have full

and free use of these public utilities, while the opponents of the party

in power do not. Telegrams sent and paid for by the party not in

power may be garbled en route, and delayed in delivery. When delivered, the message may be so changed from the original that it contains an entirely different meaning from that intended. Members of

the party not in power may be subjected to delays in telephone connections, in the transmission of telegraphic and radio messages, as

well as delay in the delivery of personal mail. A tactful appeal to

8
SWM 14—7

GEIctflAL

the sense of fair play of the government officials concerned is generally

prod uctive in term uating such practices.

f. •Just prIor to elections, public, works projects may be i.indertaken

in districts of doubtful political complexion or in those districts where

the pai'ty not in power is known to have only a slight majority.

Workers of the party in power may be imported into such districts to

work on the projects in order that they may vote in that district, such

workers normally being transported f]'om districts where a majority

for the party in power is definitely assured. Since the worker resides

in the doubtful district at the time of registration and election, he is

entitled to vote there, and thus may gain a clear majority for the

party in power. This situation may be met by imposing a residential

qualification for voters. For example, 6 months residence in a given

district just prior to registration may be required as a qualification

to vote in that district. This qualification may be a part of the electoral law of the country, or may be imposed as an interpretation of the

law by decision of the National Board of Elections.

g. In some countries, the government, has a monopoly on the manufacture and distribution of distilled liquors. This places a strong

weapon in the hands of the party in power during the electoral period.

The government party may dispense free liquor at political rallies in

order to influence the opinion of the voters. This practice may be

continued through the registration and voting period. Adherents

to the party in power may give liquor to voters of the opposite party

on election day, and then attempt to have them disqualified due to their

intoxicated condition when they appear at the polls to vote. By restricting the distribution and sale of distilled liquor to normal

amounts, this situation may be alleviat€d. Distilleries are padlocked,

and an amount of liquor withdrawn for legitimate sale to authorized

dealers. The amount withdrawn is equal to the average withdrawn

over a reasonable period as shown by official records. To prevent the

further use of intoxicants during this crucial period, stores and cafes

dispensing them at retail are closed or prohibited from selling intoxicants on registration and election days.

9

SWM 14—8

SECTION II

PERSONNEL

Par. Page

Chairman 14—8 11

Electoral mission staff 14—9 11

Commissioned officers 14—10 12

Enlisted personnel 14—11 12

Civilian personnel 14—12 13

Instruction of personnel 14—13 13

Replacements 14—14 13

Pay and allowances 14—15 14

14—8. Chairman.—The Chairman oiF the Electoral 'Mission is designated by the President of the United. States. Usually, he is a flag

officer or general officer, and holds the title of Envoy Extraordinary

and Minister Plenipotentiary during the period covered by his assignment to the Electoral Mission. In order to carry out his duties

in connection with the elections, he holds the appointive position of

President of the National Board of Elections of the foreign country

concerned.

14—9. Electoral mission staff.—The Electoral Mission staff consists of such officers as are required to carry out the mission in a

particular case. Although the size and requirements may vary to

some extent, the following tabulation covers the usual staff

requirements:

Chairman.

Vice Chairman.

Executive Officer.

Secretary of Electoral Mission.

Secretary of National Board of Elections.

Assistant Secretary of National Board of Elections.

Inspector.

Intelligence and Press Relations Officer.

Assistant Intelligence and Pres; Relations Officer.

Legal Advisor.

Assistant Legal Advisor.

Communications Officer.

Disbursing and Supply Officer.

Assistant Disbursing and Suppily Officer.

Medical Officer.

Aides.

11
SWM 14—10

PERSONNEL

14—10. Commissioned officers.—a. The officer personnel of the

Electoral Mission should have rank commensurate with the importance of their duties. Whenever practicable, officers who have had

prior duty with electoral missions should be selected for the more

important positions. A knowledge of the language of the country

concerned is one of the most important qualifications.

b. When United States forces are present in the country concerned

for the purpose of restoring law and order, the officers assigned to

duty with the Electoral Mission should not be taken from the United

States forces unless suitable replacements are immediately available.

In normal small wars situations, a proportionately large number of

officers are required, and the United States forces present cannot be

expected to have extra officers available. In general, the qualifications for officers assigned the Electoral Mission are identical with the

qualifications required in the case of officers serving with the United

States forces. The selection of a few of the latter officers for duty

with the Electoral Mission may be practicable. The replacement of

a large number of the officers serving with the United States forces

by officers who are unacquainted with the local situation appears to

be inadvisable during this critical period.

14-11. Enlisted personnel.—a. The most important qualification

of enlisted personnel selected for duty with an Electoral Mission is

fitness for independent duty requiring a large measure of responsibility. They should be able to speak, read, and write the language

of the country concerned. Men selected should have a scholastic

background of at least 2 years of high school, and preferably should

be high school graduates. A clear record is an important qualification together with a reputation for tact, good judgment, and patience.

For duty in remote areas, in districts known for their unhealthful

living conditions, and in sections of the country where it is known

guerilla bands operate, it is a decided advantage to assign men who

have previously served in those areas to electoral duty with the

boards of minor political subdivisions. Their prior experience with

the military and police situation, in combating unhealthful conditions, and in the procurement of food and shelter, will enable them

to assume their electoral duties with less difficulty than men who are

unaccustomed to their surroundings.

b. In the event that United States forces have been in the country

concerned for some length of time to preserve law and order, the majority of the enlisted personnel for electoral duty should be taken

from among those forces. Since the employment of a number of men

12
SW 14—12

PERSONNEL

on electoral duty will tend to reduce the activities of the forces engaged in purely military pursuits, it is obvious that they must be

replaced by an equal number of troop from the continental United

States or other source. Inasmuch as the electoral period is one which

requires a maximum effort in maintaining law and order, it may be

neccessary to increase the military forces during the electoral period.

14-12. Civilian personnel.—A number of United States civilians

shu1d be included in the personnel of the Electoral Mission. This is

done to reduce the likelihood of the charge that the elections are being

controlled by the military, a charge to which an enterprise of this

nature is peculiarly susceptible. Since employment of any considerable number of qualified civilians will generally be impracticable due

to the expense involved, it will be possible to employ only a small

number of expert legal advisors and technical men, particularly individuals who have made the study of elections and government their

life work.

14-13. Instruction of personnel.—As stated in paragraph 14—il a,

one of the most important qualifications of enlisted personnel selected

for electoral duty is a knowledge of the language of the country concerned. In order to improve that knowledge, a language course is

included in the instruction received prior to taking over their electoral

duties. The language course is confined to the essentials of the

language, with particular emphasis placed upon vocabulary adapted

to the particular requirements of electoral duty. In addition, they

receive instruction in the electoral law and procedure. The electoral

law is studied by sections. Each section is discussed in connection

with its historical background, its applications, and weaknesses that

may have been disclosed in prior, elections. The course covered by

such a school depends primarily upon the time available and the need

for the instruction. One month's instruction may be considered the

minimum time required. A longer course of instruction will probably

be found to be advantageous.

14—14. Replacements.—The personnel of the Electoral Mission

will have the same losses, due to sickne and other casualties, as

other United States forces serving in the same country. For the

proper ee.cution of electoral procedure, certain positions of the

various electoral boards are filled by members of the Electoral Mission. in order that their work may continue, trained replacements

must be available in sufficient number to take care of the estimated

number of losses due to sickness and other casualties. Losses among

13
SWM 14—15

PERSONNEL

United States forces who are already in the country may be used

as a basis for computing the radio of replacements required.

14-15. Pay and allowances.—a. The government of the country

in which the elections are being conducted normally should provide

a monthly money allowance for officers of the United States forces

performing duty with the Electoral Mission. This allowance is to

cover extra expenses incurred in the performance of electoral duties.

b. When performing electoral duty in cities and towns garrisoned

by United States forces, enlisted personnel of the Electoral Mission

may be subsisted with those forces. If this is impracticable, they

should be furnished a per diem cash allowance for subsistence and

lodging. This allowance should be ample to provide them with

suitable subsistence and lodging, and should be uniform for all enlisted

personnel serving on electoral duty throughout the country.

14
LEGEND:

PERSONNEL

Authority and Communication

Coninunication but no authority

SWM 14—15

FUNCTIONS OF ELECTORAL ICSSION AP

NATIONAL BO4RD OF ELCTIQ$

15

——

I )iiasion I J.ectorai

I ec,Qfficer — —

•,- md Staff

SWM 14—16

SEcTIoN III

ELECTORAL MISSION

Par. Page

Chairman 14—16 17

Vice chairman 14—17 20

Executive officer 14—18 20

Secretary 14—19 21

Inspector 14—20 21

Intelligence and press relations officer 14—21 21

Law officer - 14—22 22

Communications officer 14—23 23

Disbursing and supply officer 14—24 24

Medical officer 14—25 25

Aides 14—26 25

Departmental board personnel 14—27 25

Cantonal board personnel 14—28 26

14—16. Chairnian.—a. After his designation by the President of

the United States, the Chairman of the Electoral Mission visits the

State Department in Washington, D. C., and acquaints himself with

the history and the existing status of the situation in the foreign

country concerned. He is also informed of the policy of the Government of the United States relative to the responsibility of the

Electoral Mission, and the doctrine and procedure to be followed.

He receives definite assurances from the State Department defining

his authority, particularly in relation to other diplomatic representatives of the Government of the United States who may be

present in the foreign country.

b. The Chairman then visits the foreign country, accompanied by

such expert advisors as may be deemed appropriate, in order to

make a personal survey of the situation including the legal, personnel,

financial, and material requirements of the Electoral Mission. He

assures himself that all necessary preparations are made, by person.al

contact with the appropriate authorii;ies. The preparation and

adoption of an electoral law to meet the requirements may be involved. It will probably be necessary to secure agreements establishing the legal status of the United States electoral personnel and the

obligations of the foreign government concened in relation thereto,

particularly those obligations having to do with salaries, allowances,

expenses, shelter, supplies, and the right of "free entry."

17
SWM 14-16

ELECTORAL MISSION

c. The Chairman issues instructions to United States naval, military, and civil authorities in the country concerned, directing their

full cooperation in the successful accomplishment of his mission.

Such instructions may involve questions having to do with reassignme.nt of personnel, shelter, rationing, transportation, protection, disciplinary procedure, and replacements. Plans are prepared for

instituting necessary military and police protection to maintain

order during the registration and electoral period. If available, the

native constabulary or similar organization is generally charged with

the principal effort with relation to military and police problems

arising during the electoral period. This force may fail to cooperate

fully with the Electoral Mission and may even attempt to defeat the

purpose of the Electoral Mission, of left under the command or control of an officer of the country concerned. For its proper control, it

is obvious that such military force should be placed under the authority, if not the actual control, of the Chairman of the Electoral

Mission during the electoral period. The Chairman of the Electoral

Mission need have no administrative authority over the United States

forces in the country. He does, however, expect full support from

such forces. The military protection required for the Electoral Mission will include guards at polling places and in the towns where

polling places are situated. It may be necessary to increase the

number of combat patrols during the period, particularly in sensitive

areas. Escorts may be required to convoy groups of citizens to and

from places of registration and voting. A general redistribution of

military forces may be required to support the Electoral Mission

during the critical period.

d. Upon his arrival in the country concerned, the Chairman of the

Electoral Mission should have absolute local United States authority

on all questions pertaining to the election. He communicates with

the State Department, direct, concerning all electoral matters. The

State Department representative regularly assigned to represent the

Government of the United States in the foreign country concerned

forwards reports or other correspondence concerning or affecting the

election through the Chairman of the Electoral Mission. The absence of a definite delineation of authority may lead to confusion and

disagreement.

e. Direct contact with the chief Executive of the country. places the

Chairman of the Electoral Mission in a position to exert a favorable

influence, most important in its effect, toward the successful accomplishment of his mission. The political party in power may attempt

18
SWM 14—15

ELECTORAL MISSION

to adopt unethical measures that are tolerated by local civil law and

accepted by customary usage. Such unethical measures may affect

the conduct of a free, fair, and impartial election. Control over such

matters generally rests with the Chief Executive of the country.

Insofar as practicable, such unethical practices should be controlled

by restrictive measures in the election laws themselves. An understanding concerning these practices should be reached by the Government of the United States and the Chief Executive of the country

concerned prior to the assumption of responsibility by the Government of the United States for the proper conduct of the elections.

In the.event problems arise that are beyond his control, the Chairman

of the Electoral Mission communicates the circumstances to the. State

Department.. When the counsel or instructions of' the latter have

been received, he visits the Chief Executive of the foreign country

and, with his cooperation, makes definite arrangements to remedy a

situation which may become intolerable if permitted to continue.

The Chairman makes an estimate of the funds that. will be required

to cover the expenses of the Electoral Mission, submits such estimate

to the proper authority of the country concerned, and arranges for

its appropriation. He arranges for the United States funds necessary for salaries, allowances, and travel expenses to and from the

country concerned.

f. The Chairman selects his staff and organizes the Electoral Mission. Through his Vice Chairman, he arranges to have the staff

undertake studies and the preparation of detailed plans.

g. Prior to the departure of the other members of the Electoral

Mission from the United States, the Chairman assists in drawing up

a definite agreement between the two governments on the. following

matters:

(1) The portion of the expenses of the Electoral Mission to be

borne by the foreign government conce:rned, including the appropriation and the deposit of such funds to the. credit of the Electoral

Mission.

(2) The strength of the constabulary or other military organization' of the country concerned, and the police force estimated to be

necessary to insure peace and order in the country during the electoral period, and during the 30 days immediately preceding that

period. He receives definite assurances that the military 'and police

forces' will be maintained at the estimated required strength.

(3) The laws and decrees of the government concerned that. are

considered necessary in order that the Electoral Mission may accom19
SWM 14—17

ELECTORAL MISSION

push its task. Such laws and decrees should be passed and promulgated prior to the assumption of its functions by the Electoral Mission in order that the appearance of pressure on the part of the

Electoral Mission may be avoided.

h. The Chairman of the Electoral Mission should be installed in a

properly furnished residence by the foreign government concerned.

He arranges for the government concerned to provide the Electoral

Mission with sufficient office space where complete privacy is assured.

i. After his appointment as President of the National Board of

Elections, the Chairman of the Electoral Mission organizes that

Board and trains the personnel necessary for its proper functioning.

He calls meetings of the National Board of Elections to discuss the

electoral law and its procedure, and to make such 'decisions as are

required for the proper interpretation and execution of that law. In

some instances, the candidates for office, their followers, and even the

political parties themselves may require emphatic instruction to guide

them in their conduct. Political parties and their leaders are required to assume certain definite responsibilities, and are charged with

maintaining discipline within their respective organizations.

14—17. Vice chairman.—The Vice Chairman of the Electoral Mission is the assistant to the Chairman of the Electoral Mission. He

is also Vice President of the National Board of Elections. In general, his duties are comparable to those performed by a chief of staff.

As Vice President of the National Board of Elections, he attends

all meetings of that Board and is prepared to assume the office of

the President in the event of the latter's inability to serve.

14—is. Executive officer.—a. The duties of the Executive Officer

include the administration, training, and supervision of United

States electoral personnel in their activities of a nonpolitical nature.

He controls the expenditure of United States funds, and arranges

for the procuienient of necessary United States supplies. He is the

liaison officer between the Electoral Mission and United States forces.

The activities of the Executive Officer are confined to Electoral Mission duty only, as differentiated from duties pertaining to the

National Board of Elections. This tends to keep the administration

of the Electoral Mission and the training of its personnel separated

from the electoral functions of the Electoral Mission.

b. The Executive Officer may be assisted in the administration of

the personnel of the Electoral Mission by the assignment of one or

more officers as commanding officers of units of the electoral detachment. When the administration of their detachments does not

20
Swivr 14—19

ELECTORAL MISSION

require their full time, and when there is a need for their services,

the latter may be assigned duty as assistants to the staff officers of

the Electoral Mission.

14—19. Secretary.—a. The duties of the Secretary include the operation, direction, and supervision of the office personnel of the

Electoral Mission. He records the assignments of personnel, including transfers and other items of importance. He is charged

with the. safeguarding and filing of all correspondence of the Electoral Mission. He keeps the daily history of th Mission. The

Secretary arranges for the reception of officials and other visitors.

The information and reception desks operate under his supervision.

He supervises the work of the noncierical civilian employees of the

Electoral Mission. He is not assigned the dual function as Secretary

of the National Board of Elections. An additional officer is required for that duty.

b. The Chief Clerk operates under the supervision of the Secretary. His duties include the management of the clerical force

attached to the Executive Officer's office, and the proper handling of

incoming and outgoing correspondence, files, and orders issued by

the Executive Officer. He is charged with the duty of posting

guards to safeguard the office and correspondence therein. The

Electoral Mission bulletin board is under his direct supervision.

14—20. Inspector.—The Inspector of the Electoral Mission should

be thoroughly familiar with the electoral law and all interpretations,

decisions, and instructions of the National Board of Elections. He

should be qualified to conduct investigations and interviews in the

language of the country. His duties include the investigation of

complaints of a serious nature. }le keeps the President of the

National Board of Elections informed of the operations of the

electoral law and procedure by observation of their operation

throughout the country. He visits the various outlying departments

and studies conditions which may have a direct and important

bearing on the elections.

14—21. Intelligence and press relations officer.—a. The Intelligence and Press Relations Officer collects, evaluates, and distributes

all intelligence information of interest to the Electoral Mission. He

is in constant touch with the military, economic, social, and political

situations and developments insofar as they may affect the elections.

A periodic intelligence report, covering the political, economic, and

military situation, is made regularly. The period covered may be

biweekly or monthly. He prepares and submits to the Chairman

21
SWM 14—22

ELECTORAL MISSION

of the Electoral Mission, periodically or upon call, general estimates

covering the military or political situation, and may be directed to

prepare special studies of particular localities or activities. A personnel file of all important characters in the country is kept up to

date. This file has a complete history of each individual, including

his military and political affiliations. The Intelligence and Press

Relations Officer is the liaison officer of the Electoral Mission with

intelligence sections of 'United States military forces, native military

and police forces, and with the local and foreign press. He prepares

and releases information to the press. A clipping bureau is maintained and brief résumés are prepared of all articles appearing in

the press concerning the Electoral Mission or the National Board

of Elections. The latter are prepared daily and submitted to the

Chairman of the Electoral Mission. If deemed advisable, a résumé

of such information may be mimeographed and distributed to personnel of the Electoral Mission. Prior to leaving the United States

and after arrival in the country concerned, the Intelligence and

Press Relations Officer collects books, texts, and articles of a nonfictional nature pertaining to the country or region concerned, and

maintains such material for the use of the personnel of the Electoral

Mission. Photographs are taken of various subjects having to do

with the activities of the Electoral Mission and are later included

in the final report made to the United States State Department.

b. Assistants to the Intelligence and Press Relations Officer are

assigned to relieve him of the det.ail of compiling briefs of articles

appearing in the press, and to assist in the preparation of press releases. These assistants also make special investigations and reports,

and assist in the instruction of Electoral Mission personnel during

the period immediately preceding the registration of voters.

e. The office force will generally require a minimum of three proficient stenographers and typists, at least one of whom should be

thoroughly conversant with the language of the country concerned.

It will often be convenient to employ one or more native interpreters

to assist the Intelligence Officer. They should be men of education,

good bearing, and neutrality in politics. If it is impossible to find

nonpartisan interpreters, they should be selected equally from among

partisans of both political parties.

14—22. Law officer.—a. The Law Officer furnishes information to

the President of the National Board of Elections on legal matters

relating to that Board. In the discharge of such duties, he takes

into consideration the current electoral law, the constitution of the

22
SWM 14—23

ELECTORAL MISSION

Country concerned, various local laws and decrees, and, as a matter

of precedent, the rulings and decisions of former Electoral Missions

and National Boards of Elections. 'When required, he renders

opinions on complaints submitted to the National Board of Elections

for a ruling. He prepares the initial draft of the electoral law,

during the period of survey by the Ciairman of the Electoral Mission, provided such a document has not already been furnished

through the United States State Department. Upon the completion

of its duties by the Electoral Mission, the Law Officer prepares a

report showing any weaknesses in the legal features of the electoral

law or procedure that have been disclosed in the election just completed. This report is prepared in the form of proposals for laws,

decrees, and instructions, and is delivered to officials of the country

concerned as a suggestion for the improvement of the electoral law

and procedure.

b. The Law Officer may be assigned one or more assistants, including United States civilian experts in electoral law. Such clerical assistance as may be necessary is provided. Two stenographers

and typists may be considered the minimum requirement for this

office. If practicable, they should have had prior experience in legal

research and reports.

14—23. Communications officer.—a. The Communications Officer

prepares plans and recommendations for the maintenance of efficient

communications for the Electoral Mission and National Board of

Elections, by the utilization of existing means of communication, and

through the supply of such additional channels as are necessary and

practicable. Methods of communication will generally include telegraph, radio, telephone, airplane pane] and pick-up, and messenger.

The Communications Officer is responsible for the coding, decoding,

routing, and filing of dispatches. He maintains a record of communication facilities throughout the country.

b. All the usual agencies of communication in the country should

be available to the Electoral Mission and the National Board of Elections. In addition, the communicatioa facilities of United States

military and naval forces may be placed at the disposal of the Electoral Mission, provided this can be done without interference with

t.he normal communications of the lai:ter. Such forces will often

have only extremely limited facilities for communications, and these

will be heavily burdened with necessary traffic. In order that these

facilities may not be further burdened, the Electoral Mission should

limit its requests for transmission of messages to cases of urgent

23

210_7050-88—18: 0L3
SWM 14—24

ELFCTORAL MISSION

necessity, or after the failure or proved inadequacy of other means

of communication. Communication with detachments at polling

places may sometimes be difficult and slow. It may be necessary to

depend chiefly upon the airplane for communication with remote

places lacking other communication facilities, and for communication

with places with which other means of communication is unreliable.

For short messages, advantage can be taken of planes that patrol

remote registration and voting places.

14—24. Disbursing and supply officer.—The Disbursing and Supply Officer is responsible for the custody and expenditure of all funds

of the country concerned, placed to the credit of the Electoral Mission. He prepares estimates for funds required by the Electoral

Mission, and presents them to the Chairman of the Electoral Mission

for requisition on the foreign government concerned. He drafts all

correspondence pertaining to funds of the Electoral Mission placed

to its credit by the foreign government. When required, he submits

vouchers and requisitions requiring expenditures to the Executive

Officer for approval. He submits monthly itemized reports of receipts and expenditures, together with the necessary vouchers, to the

Minister of Finance of the government concerned, via the Chairman

of the Electoral Mission. The Disbursing and Supply Officer visits

the Minister of Finance and secures his approval of the wording and

arrangement of vouchers in order that the latter may conform to the

current governmental practice. Electoral Mission funds are kept on

deposit in an approved bank in the name of the Electoral Mission.

The Disbursing and Supply Officer keeps the books, records, vouchers,

and reports pertaining to such funds, according to approved methods.

'rhe transportation of personnel and freight by rail, airplane, motor, etc., and the coordination of the employment of such agencies is a

function of the Disbursing and Supply Officer. Prior to the departure of the Electoral Mission from the United States, the Disbursing

and Supply Officer prepares a budget estimate of the elections in considerable detail. To this estimate should be added the item, "Unestimated, Underestimated, and Unforeseen Items." Insofar as can be

foreseen, the budget estimate should contain all contingent items,

such as per diem allowances and rentals. Some items which are

included in the budget estimate, may be found to be unnecessary later, but are included as a precautionary measure to insure an adequacy of

funds. It is far easier to reach an agreement upon a definite sum

initially, even though this sum is somewhat large, than it is to pro- cure supplementary funds from time to time in order to make up for

24
SWM 14—25

ELECTORAL M:IssION

a budget estimate that was originally inadequate. A favorable impression is created when unexpended credits are turned ba(k t.o the

credit of the country concerned by the Electoral Mission. The funds

appropriated by the country concerned should be placed to the credit

of the Electoral Mission for its use immediately upon arrival at the.

beginning of the electoral period, in order to provide funds for expenses, supplies, and rents, that. will b€ needed immediately. Before

his departure from the United States, the. Disbursing and Supply

Officer should be furnished a statement by the State Department

indicating the exact United States funds and funds of the country

concerned that will be available for the conduct of the elections.

14—25. Medical officer.—The Medical Officer is charged with c.aring

for the health of the personnel of the Electoral Mission. He instructs

such personnel in hygiene, sanitation, and related subjects that are

peculiar to the country concerned. w:hen the bulk of the personnel

of the Electoral Mission is distributed in outlying regions, the Medical

Officer makes inspection trips to the various departments to investigate

living conditions, health, hygiene, and sanitation.

14—26. Aides.—Aides are assigned to the Chairman of the Electoral Mission to perform such duties of an official, or personal nature

as the Chairman may direct. It may be found practicable to assign

one aide additional duty as morale officer. As such, he is responsible

for the recreational activities and equipment of the Electoral Mission

personnel.

14—27. Departmental board personneL—a. The Chairmen of Departmental Boards are commissioned officers of the United States

forces. They are directly responsible to the President of the National

Board of Elections for the proper conduct and operation of the

electoral procedure within their respective departments. The necessary facilities to carry out these duties are placed at their disposal.

They are inducted into office by the National Board of Elections, and

proceed to their respective departments about 6 or 8 weeks prior to the

first day designated for registration Additional commissioned officers are designated as Vice Chairmen of Departmental Boards and

serve as assistants to the Departmental Chairmen. Upon arrival at

the capital of his department, the Chairman makes contact with the

local civilian officials, and organizes the Departmental Board of Elections. He surveys the departmental political organization and studies

any changes recommended by the political members of his board.

Armed with this information, he makes a personal reconnaissance of

his department to establish contacts in the various cantons (districts)

25
SWM 14—28

ELECTORAL MISSION

and to determine if any rearrangement of proposed polling places is

advisable. He surveys the political nd military situation throughout

his department, ascertains the housing and rationing facilities available to the Electoral Mission personnel, and determines the number

of guards necessary for their protection and for the maintenance of

order at the polling places. The Chairman then returns to the

capital of the country concerned, where he makes a detailed report

to the President of the National Board of Elections. Included in

this report are recommendations made as a result of a survey of the

department.

b. The Departmental Board of Elections is organized in a manner

similar to the National Board of Elections. The Board consists of

the Chairman, who is a commissioned officer of the United States

forces, and two political members, one representing each of the two

political parties. The political members are appointed by the National Board of Elections after nomination by the representatives of

their respective political parties, who are members of the National

Board of Elections. Provision is made for the appointment of substitutes to act in case of incapacity of regular political members.

c. The Chairman in each department is authorized to appoint a

secretary for the Departmental Board of Elections. It may be advisable to restrict such appointments to commissioned officers of the

United States forces. The Secretary may be a United States civilian

or a civilian of the country concerned. He takes no part in the deliberations or decisions of the Board.

d. The Departmental Board of Elctions has general supervision of

the election in its own department, and deals directly with Cantonal

(District) Boards of Election. The Departmental Chairman is

frequently called upon to reconcile the opposing views of the political

members of the Board. Every attempt is made to dispose of complaints, appeals, and petitions by action of the Departmental Board,

permitting only the more important complaints, appeals, and petitions

to go to the National Board of Elections for decision.

14—28. Cantonal board personneL—a. The Cantonal (District)

Boards of Election are similar in composition to the Departmental

Boards of Election. Each Cantonal (District) Board of Elections

has a Chairman, who is usually an enlisted man of the United States

naval or military forces, and two political members, one from each

of the two political parties. The political members of a Cantonal

(District) Board of Elections are appointed by the Departmental

Board of Elections in a manner similar to the appointment of the

26
SWM 14—28

ELECTORAL 1IISSI0N

political members of the latter by the National Board of Elections.

Provision is made for the appointment of substitutes to act in case

of incapacity of regular political members. In some cases, the

Chairman, as well as the other two members of the Board, is a citizen

of the country concerned. Care should be exercised that the number

of Chairmen assigned from among cliizens of the country concerned

are drawn equally from both political parties, in order to avoid

charges of partisanship.

b. The Cantonal (District) Board of Elections exercises direct

supervision over the registration and voting of the individual voter.

The Cantonal (District) Board is responsible for the enforcement

of provisions of the electoral regulations to insure a "free and fair"

election. This responsibility rests primarily upon the Chairman, as

the representative of the United States Government, who is in direct

contact with the voters themselves. He is placed in a position of

responsibility and authority, and his relations with the political

members of the Board and the military guards will require a maximum of tact and good judgment. The Cantonal (District) Chairman and his guards should arrive at the location of their polling

places at least one week prior to the first day designated for registration, in order that they may be estab]ished and ready for the transaction of official business on the opening day. In each case, circumstances will determine whether or not the Cantonal (District)

Chairman and his guards will be withdrawn to the nearest garrison

during the period between the close of the registration and the time

it will be necssary to return to the polling places for the election.

This decision will be influenced by the challenges, complaints, and

other official business to be transacted, and by the travel time required to make the trip. The final decision is made by the Departmental Chairman or higher authority after consultation with the

military commander concerned.

c. Many of the cantons (districts) may be situated in remote and

outlying places where United States members may be forced to

undergo some hardships. It may be necessary for them to live in

uncomfortable and unhealthful surroundings without immediate

medical aid. Airplane drop and pick-up may be the only method

of communication in some cases.

d. When the Electoral Mission personnel available is limited in

number, it may not be feasible to assign a Chairman to each Cantonal

(District) Board. In such cases, it may be necessary to use superviSorS. A supervisor is an enlisted member of the Electoral MisSion

who acts as Chairmaii of two or rnre (2antonal (District) Boards of

Election. 27

SWM 14-29

SECTION 1V

NATIONAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS

Par. Page

Members and staff 14—29 29

Duties 14-30 30

Secretary .. 14—31 30

Complaints, appeals, and petitions 14—32 30

Assembly. 14—33 82

14—29. Members and staff.—a. The membership of the National

Board of Elections includes the following:

1. President.—The Chairman of the Electoral Mission. He is

designated as President of the National Board of Elections by the

executive of the foreign country concerned. He is 1ega1l inducted

into office in accordance with the laws of that country, as are also

the two political members.

2. Member.—This member is designated by one of the major political parties and represents that political party on the National

Board of Elections.

3. Member.—This member is designated by the other major political party and represents that party on the National Board of

Elections.

b. The Staff of the National Board of Elections consists of a secretary, assistant secretary, translators, and clerks. The number of

translators and clerks is governed by the need for their services, and

will vary with the size of the country, the number of voter5, and the

electoral laws of the country.

c. In order that the work of the National Board of Elections may

continue without interruption, substitutes for all members are provided to take the place of any members who are temporarily unable

to serve during meetings. The substitutes are designated by the

major political parties of the country concerned, and are legally inducted into office in accordance with t'ie laws of the country in the

same manner as provided for regular members. The Vice Chairman

of the Electoral Mission is designated as Vice President of the

National Board of Elections. Although only one secretary and one

assistant secretary are normally requir€d to carry on the work of the

29
SWM 14—30

NATIONAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS

National Board of Elections, it is convenient to have substitutes

available who have been legally designated and inducted into office.

14—30. Duties.—The National Board of Elections exercises general

supervision of the election and is the final authority on all matters

pertaining to the election. It issues interpretations and instructions

for the proper execution of the electoral laws. The National Board

of Elections hears all complaints that require its decision. When

such action is indicated, complaints should be investigated initially

by the political party concerned and then presented to the National

Board of Elections by the responsible head of that political party.

Petitions and appeals presented for action by responsible citizens must

be made in accordance with the law of the country, and in a manner

that will uphold the dignity of the National Board of Elections.

14—31. Secretary of the National Board of Elections.—This office

is generally filled by a commissioned officer of the United States naval

or military forces. He is charged with keeping the record of the

minutes of all meetings of the National Board of Elections. He prepares all correspondence emanating from the National Board of

Elections, and maintains a record of all incoming and outgoing correspondence of that Board. Since the National Board of Elections

does not have a communication system of its own, the communication

system available to the Electoral Mission is employed to handle the

communications of the Board. The Secretariat of the National Board

of Elections should be entirely apart from the offices of the Electoral

Mission, but should be conveniently located with relation to the latter

in order that the necessary contact among the various staff members

may be readily maintained. The Secretary has an assistant secretary,

and one or more stenographers for clerical assistance. When the

offices of the Electoral Mission and the National Board of Elections

are separated by several city blocks, it is desirable that the Secretary

of the National Board of Elections have his office at the headquarters

of the Electoral Mission. The Assistant Secretary of the National

Board of Elections is in charge of the office of the National Board of

Elections. Matters requiring the signature of the Secretary of the

National Board of Elections are sent to the latter's office at the headquarters of the Electoral Mission. It should be clearly understood

that the Secretary of the Electoral Mission does not perform a dual

function as Secretary of the National Board of Elections. These are

completely separate functions.

14—32. Complaints, appeals, and petitions.—a. All complaints,

appeals, arid petitions should be. presented through the regular official

30
SWM 14—32

NATIONAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS

channels. Subordinate agencies should make every effort to settle

such matters without the necessity of forwarding them to the next

higher agency for action. To further their own interests, complainants will often attempt to take their complaints to the highest

authority that will listen to them. Thus, if a complainant succeeds

in presenting a complaint before the President of the National Board

of Elections, and the latter refers the complaint to a Chairman of a

Departmental Board of Elections for an investigation, the complainant will have a tendency, thereafter, to ignore the Chairmen of the

Departmental Boards of Elections. Much correspondence and time

will be saved if the higher authority refuses to accept complaints,

appeals, and petitions when it is obvious that a subordinate agency

can handle the matter.

b. When complaints, appeals, and pstitions are received through

the mail, direct, by the President of the National Board of Elections,

they should be returned to the originator with instructions that they

be taken up with the proper subordinate authority in order that they

may be received through regular official channels. This will generally mean that the originator will be instructed to submit his complaint, appeal, or petition to a Departmental Board of Elections.

In order that a record may be made of all such matters, oral complaints, appeals, and decisions should not be accepted. The originator should be instructed that all such matters must be submitted

in the form of a written document before action can be taken.

c. Members of the staff of the headquarters of the Electoral Mission, who are personally acquainted with the leading politicians,

must be particularly careful to prevent such acquaintanceship from

being imposed upon by the politicians. It is to be expected that the

latter will attempt to register complaints with the members of the

staff of the headquarters of the Electoral Mission with the expressed

desire that such. staff member make a personal investigation. If such

complaints are received, they normally will have to b referred to a

Chairman of a Departmental Board of Elections to investigate, and

such request should go through the President of the National Board

of Elections. This will tend to overburden the Secretariat of that

Board, and violates the principles laid down in paragraph 14—32,

above. When staff members of the Electoral Mission receive such

requests, they should tactfully, but firmly, refuse to accept the complaint and should suggest that the complaint be taken directly to the

Chairman of the Departmental Board of Elections concerned. The

same principle applies to the acceptance of complaints, appeals, and

31
SWM 14—33

!ATIONAL BOARD OF ELECTIONS

petitions by the Chairman of a Departmental Board of Elections,

when it is obvious that the matter is not to be handled originally by

a Chairman of a Cantonal (District) Board of Elections.. A strict

compliance with the instructions contained in this paragraph will

simplify many of the problems arising in connection with the

electoral laws and electoral procedure.

14—33. Assembly.—The National Board of Elections should be furnished a place for holding its sessions. The location should be such

as to furnish complete privacy. The space furnished should be in

keeping with the dignity of the high office of the National Board of

Elections, and should be free from the curiosity of the general

public. The main room for the holding of sessions should be sufficiently large to accommodate a limited number of spectators. Provision should be included for the maintenance of complete privacy

during secret sessions. In order that the Secretariat of the Board

may occupy offices convenient to the Board while in session, it will

often be most convenient to use a private residence of the better

class as headquarters of the National Board of Elections. In some

cases, the National Board of Elections may be more conveniently

located in a commercial building such as an office building. In the

latter case, the maintenance of privacy will be more difficult. The

headquarters of the National Board of Elections should be within

one or two blocks of the headquarters of the Electoral Mission, when

such is practicable. The two offices should never be in the same

block or under the same roof, in order to prevent interference with

the proper performance of duty by both groups due to the close

intermingling likely to ensue.

32
SWM 14—34

Sw'rIoN V

REGISTRATION AND VOTING

Par. Page

Registration 14—34 33

Voting 14—35 33

Final reports 14—36 35

14—34. Registration.—a. The National Board of Elections designates the day or days on which voters may register. The rules

covering the process of registration aie issued by the proper authority. Three successive Sundays and two intervening Wednesdays

will generally be found sufficient for registration days. The designation of five registration days will encourage the greatest possible

iiumber of voters to register and will permit them to do so with the

hast inconvenience t.o themselves.

b. Cantonal (District) Boards of Election are organized some

time prior to the first date set for registration. The registration

of voters is conducted by these Cantonal (District) Boards. In

order that the Cantonal (District) Boards of Elections may hear

or dispose of any challenges made during registration of voters,

a day is set aside for this purpose. rt will generally be found convenient to designate a date about a week after the last registration

(late for the hearing and disposition of challenges.

c. The average voter will judge the efficiency and fairness of the

election supervision by the procedure and methods employed during

the registration period. The impressions received by the average

citizen at this time will determine, in a large measure, the amount

and kind of criticism that the Electoral Mission will receive. The

creation of a favorable impression of fairness and impartiality will

assist the Electoral Mission in carryng out its mission of holding

a "free and fair" election, by encouraging a larger proportion of the

electorate to vote.

14—35. Voting.—a. A study of the registration reports by Departmental Boards of Elections will indcate whether any changes are

necessary in the designation of Cantons (Districts). It may be

found desirable to combine some voting booths, and others may be

moved or closed entirely. In some instances, additional voting

booths may be needed in sections having poor roads or trails, and in

33
SWM 14—35

REGISTRATION AND VOTING

sections where there has been a large increase in population since the

last elections.

b. The ballots are prepared and supplied in a form in keeping with

the nature of the election and the intellectual attainments of the inhabit.ants. In some countries, the political parties have a distinguishing color. For example, the color of one political party may be

green, and the other red. By the employment of a green or red circle

on the ballot, a voter who cannot read, and is also not color blind, is

enabled to place an (X) in the colored circle representing the party

of his political belief. In some countries, the political parties are

identified by certain symbols. For example, in one country, one political party may have for its symbol a rooster and the other may use

a bull. The exact form of ballot to be employed should be determined by a study of the customs and methods followed in the country

concerned, after consultation with the best local counsel available.

c. In order to prevent multiple voting, it is generally convenient to

require each voter to dip one finger in a fluid stain of a secret formula

immediately after depositing his ballot. The fluid should be of a

type that cannot be removed by ordinary processes available to the

inhabitants, and should wear off after the elapse of several days.

The color should be such that it will show clearly in contrast with

the color of the individual. The formula of the fluid is kept secret

to prevent the distribution of neutralizing formulas by persons bent

on illegal practices. Since some opposition to the use of marking

fluid may be encountered, it is well to have the Chief Executive of

the country, leading candidates, and other prominent citizens photographed while dipping their fingers into the fluid. Wide publicity

is given the demmst.rations, together with the favorable comments

from such prominent citizens concerning the requirement.

d. If the registration has been carefully conducted, and disposition

has been made of all challenges prior to the day of election, the voting

will be expedited, and the work of the Cantonal (District) Boards,

subsequent to the day of election, will also be lessened. When all the

business pertaining to electoral procedure has been completed by the

Cantonal (District) Boards of Election, the members of the Cantonal

(District) Boards of Election proceed to the departmental capital with

the ballots and records. Each Departmental Board of Elections hears

all challenges and complaints of each Cantonal (District) Board in its

departwent. When the Departmental Board has heard and settled

all challenges and complaints, the members of the Cantonal (District)

Boards of Elections are released from further electoral duty. The,

34
SWN 14—36

REGISTRATION ANI) VOTING

Chairmen of the Departmental Boards of Election then report in

person with their complete electoral reports to the National Board of

Elections. Serious reports and challenges from any department are

heard by the National Board of Elections in the presence of the

Chairman of the Departmental Board of Elections concerned. The

ruling of the National Board of Elections is final in each case.

14—36. Final reports.—a. The National Board of Elections submits a complete report of the elections to the Chief Executive of the

foreign country after receiving the reports of all the Departmental

Boards of Election. After the Chief Executive has received this report, the Electoral Mission is released of its electoral duty by proper

United States authority.

b. Upon completion of their duties, the personnel of the Electoral

Mission may be required to submit reports of their particular activities. Cantonal (District.) Chairmen may be required to describe their

cantons (dist.ricts), th living conditions encountered, and other

matters of interest. Departmental Chairmen may be required to

describe the operation of the electoral law as they observed its operation in their departments, together with any recommendations they

may wish to make for the conduct of future elections.

c. The Chairman of the Electoral Mission submits a detailed and

comprehensive report to the State Department covering the histoiy

of the Electoral Mission. The report includes criticisms and recommendations of a constructive nature, and all information likely to be of

assistance to future electoral missions.

0

35

SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

1940

+

CHAPTER XV

WITHDRAWAL

RESTRICTED

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHiNGTON: 1940

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published in 15 chapters

as follows:

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.

II. ORGANIZATION.

III. LOGISTICS.

IV. TRAINING.

V. INITIAL OPERATIONS.

VI. INFANTRY PATROLS.

Vu. MOUNTED DETACHMENTS.

VIII. CONVOYS AND CONVOY ESCORTS.

IX. AVIATION.

X. RIVER OPERATIONS.

XI. DISARMAMENT OF POPULATION.

XII. ARMED NATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

XIII. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

XIV. SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

XV. WITHDRAWAL.

TIl

RESTRiCTED

SMALL WARS MMIJAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

CEIAPTER XV

WITHDRAWAL

Par. Page

SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 15—1 to 15—3 1—2

II. WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTIVE

OPERATIONS 15—4 to 15—6 3—4

III. FINAL WITHDRAWAL 15—7 to 15—19 5—11

V

SWM 15-1

SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

Par. Page

General 15—i 1

F'actors to be considered 15—2 i

Phases of withdrawal 15—S 1

15—i. General.—In accordance with national policy, it is to be expected that small wars operations will not be conducted with a view to

the permanent acquisition of any foreign territory. A force engaged

in small wars operations may expect to be withdrawn from foreign

territory as soon as it.s mission is accomplished. In some instances.

changes in national foreign policy may lead to the abrupt termination

of small wars operations within a given theater. Since eventual

withdrawal is certain, it. is a governing factor in troop assignment and

field operations.

15—2. Factors to be considered.—Voluntary and involuntary withcirawal from contact with a hostile force is a tactical operation, the

basic principles of which are applicable to any type of warfare. When

a withdrawal from a foreign territory is ordered, the mission will

usually be to withdraw, leaving the local government, secure in its

ability to execute all of its functions sai:isfactorily. Policies, decisions.

plans, and alternate plans should be decided upon well in advance of

the time of execution. Local governmental functions should be returned to the control of the local authorities as early in the campaign

as conditions w-arrant, in order that i.t may not be necessary to turn

over all such functions at one time. As soon as an approximate date

for withdrawal has been decided, the commander of the United States

forces makes recommendations to higher authority, relative to the

methods to accomplish the withdrawal and requests decisions on all

matters pertaimng to the operation that he is not empowered to decide

himself. Decisions are requested on all matters requiring coordination

by a higher authority.

15—3. Phases of withdrawal.—For convenience of analysis, withdrawal is divided into two phases; the withdrawal from active military operations and the final withdrawal. The withdrawal from

active military operations commences when elements of the United

States forces initiate the restoration to the local authorities of any

governmental authority or responsibility that has been assumed during

1
SWM 15—3

INTRODUCTtON

the course of the campaign. This phase of the operation terminates

when the local government is in complete control of the theater of

operations. This phase may merge into the final withdrawal phase

since the final withdrawal may be proceeding concurrently with the

last stages of withdrawal from active, military operations. When the

United States forces have transferred all governmental authority and

responsibility to the local government and no further military operations are contemplated except in case of grave emergency, the final

withdrawal phase may be properly considered to have started. This

phase ends when all United States forces have been evacuated from the

foreign country.

2
SWM 15-4

SEcrIoN II

WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS

Par. Page

Concentration -.. 15—4 3

Rights retained 15—5 3

Procedure 15—6 4

15—4. Concentration.—During the initial military operations of a

small war campaign, the commander of the United States forces is

usually free to dispose his forces in acordance with the tactical situation, subject to general directives received from higher authority.

When the tactical situation permits, troops may be withdrawn from

outlying areas and concentrated at points that will enable them to

support native forces if such support is required. When order is

restored and the proficiency of the native troops or police is such that

there is no further need for United States forces in close support, the

latter may be concentrated in a locality or localities where they will be

available in case of emergency. This concentration may be gradual

and extend over a considerable period of time. It may be hastened

or retarded by international or local l)olitical considerations. Concentration areas are selected only after a careful estimate of the situation. In a withdrawal that is unhampered by combat operations,

logistic considerations will usually be a controlling factor in the selection of such areas. The main or flital concentration area or areas

will normally be at a seaport. When the final concentration area or

areas lie inland, a line of communication thereto must be secured.

15-5. Rights retained.—As the U. S. forces will be relinquishing

all, or at. least a part, of their military, territorial, and administration

functions, consideration must. be given to the matter of rights and

povers that are to be retained by the United States forces for reasons

of policy or security. The right to use all communication facilities

is retained in order that the supply and evacuation of United States

forces may be readily carried out until the final withdrawal is completed. Means of communication include the unrestricted use of

roads, railroads, waterways, as well as telephone and radio facilities.

A definite written agreement with the proper authorities is usually

made to cover the retention of rights and privileges pertaining to

communication facilities. Military control is retained over areas

actually used for military purposes, such as camp sites, airfields, and

supply bases. Control is also retained over sufficient adjacent terrain to provide for their defense. The right to operate military

planes throughout the theater of operations is also retained. Corn3
SWM 15-6

WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS

plete jurisdiction over all members of the United States forces, even

if serving in some capacity with the local government, should be

retained. Under no circumstances should members of the United

States forces be subject to trial by the courts of the foreign country.

The detention of members of the United States forces by native police

or military authority should be permitted only in the gravest emergency, and then only for the protection of life and property until

the. offender can be turned over to United States military or naval

authority. In all small-war operations, a definite policy relative to

the joint functioning, the extent of duties, and the mutual relations

among local police forces, local military forces, and United States

forces should be enunciated as early as practicable. Modification of

the details of the policies agreed upon are transmitted to all concerned from time to time as the withdrawal progresses.

15—6. Procedure.—Normally, the first step in the withdrawal from

active military operations will be the concentration of troops at some

suitable location or locations in each military territorial subdivision.

The final step will probably be the withdrawal of troops from these

territorial subdivisions to a final concentration point or points. No

area is evacuated until adequate local agencies have assumed the

responsibi]ity for the maintenance of law and order. Usually, the

initia.1 withdrawal of troops is from the more tranquil or remote

areas. If conditions permit, troops are assembled at the most advantageous locations in the territorial subdivisions and are then withdrawn by battalions or regiments. In anticipation of withdrawal,

and for other cogent reasons, it is desirable to release the United

States forces from all routine constabulary and police duties as

early in the campaign as the situation permits. Such procedure does

not preclude participation in joint combat operations, since the

United States forces continue to act as support for the native military forces. Unforeseen development.s in the military situation may

necessitate active combat operations by United States forces in order

to maintain the morale and prestige of the native military forces

that find themselves hard-pressed. Tactical units of the United

States forces may be evacuated from the theater of operations prior

to the date of final withdrawal. in such cases, due regard should

be given to the necessity of retaining certain special units that will

be required to function until the last troops are withdrawn. Such

special units include air, supply, and communication troops. Administrative plans and the logistics pertaining to the evacuation

should be formulated well in advance of the actual troop movement.

4
SWM 15-7

SECTION III

FINAL WITHDRAWAL

Par. Page

General 15—7 5

Plansandorders 15—8 6

Executive staff duties 15—9 6

First section 15—10 7

Second section 15—li 8

Third section 15—12 8

Fourth section 15—13 8

Special staff duties 15—14 9

Air officer 15—15 9

Engineer officer 15—16 9

Communications officer 15—17 10

Surgeon 15—18 10

Quartermaster 15—19 10

15—7. General.—After the withdrawal from active military operations is completed, the United States forces have the status of reserves. Although their active employment is not anticipated, they

are held in readiness for active military operations. Their presence

is an influential factor in the support of a legally constituted local

government. At times, a military commission, legation guard, or

other component of the United States forces may remain in the

country after the final withdrawal of the major portion of the

troops. In such cases, they remain as a result of diplomatic exchanges between the Government of the United States and the country concerned. The final withdrawal is not thereby affected. The

plan for the final withdrawal is submitted to higher authority for

approval well in advance of the contemplated operation. The final

authority empowered to approve, modify, or disapprove all or part

of the plan for final withdrawal may be the senior officer present or

the Secretary of the State, 'War, or Navy Department. In some

cases, the approval of the Chief Executive of the United States may

be required. The necessity for the approval of any or all of these

authorities will depend upon the location of the theater of operations, the provisions of the agreement for the withdrawal, or other

factor, dependent upon the type of operation. Many important

questions requiring action by a higher authority will usually present

5
SWM 15-8

FINAL WITHDRAWAL

themselves. Those that can be foreseen are ordinarily submitted

for decision well in advance of the date of final withdrawal,

15-8. Plans and orders.—Initial plans for withdrawal are usually

tentative. Due to unforeseen developments in the military situation,

they are subject to changes that may be imposed by directives and

instructions from higher authority as they become necessary. As a

consequence, initial orders for the withdrawal are issued in fragmentary form in order to allow the maximum preparation period. A

formal written operation order with appropriate annexes, confirming

fragmentary orders and embodying all pertinent instructions for the

withdrawal, is issued well in advance of the final troop movement.

All agencies and units of the United States forces should be given

ample time to provide for every detail pertaining to the withdrawal.

The formulation of a comprehensive plan for the final withdrawal is

dependent upon securing definite information relative to the date of

withdrawal, the ships available for transportation, the schedules of

such ships, the naval support available, naval operations affecting the

withdrawal, the destination and final organization of the United

States forces involved in the withdrawal, and the policies and decisions of higher aut.hority relative to the political and military features of the situation. The necessary orders for the execution of

the withdrawal are issued when the military requirements of the

situation have been determined and all plans for the final stages of

the withdrawal have been perfected in cooperation with the naval

forces involved in the evacuation. The administrative details will

ordinarily require the issue of voluminous instructions. Only the

essential general instructions pertaining to administrative matters

are incorporated in the body of the operation order. Other administrative instructions are issued in the form of annexes to the operation

order.

15—9. Executive staff duties.—Although the duties and responsibilities of the Executive Staff are essentially the same during the

withdrawal period as at any other time during a small wars operation, the members of the staff will usually find that their attention is

focused on certain definite phases of their duties that assume rela.-

tively greater importance during this period. The Chief of Staff

may be designated as liaison officer for the purpose of assuring close

cooperation with the local agencies of the State Department and other

United States naval and military forces involved in the withdrawal.

The Executive Staff concerns itself primarily with those decisions

and policies announced by the commander of the United States forces

6
SWM 15-10

FINAL WITHDRAWAL

from time to time during the preparation period. These include the

foilowing: the date troops are to be withdrawn from each concentration area; the dates on which major troop units are to be transferred

to the continental United States; protective measures to be employed;

assembly positions, when designated; outes of movement to be used

by each unit; composition and strength of the last unit to clear the

country; property and supplies to be returned to the continental

United States; the disposition of property and supplies not to be

returned to the United States; procedure to be followed during negotiations for final settlement of all claims against the United States as

a result of military operations; reserve supplies and ammunition to

be held available until the date of departure; date of evacuation of

ineffectives, noncombatants, dependents, household effects, and excess

baggage; and the ceremonies to be conducted upon the return of forts,

barracks, or other property to the custody of the country concerned.

15—10. First section.—The first section is charged with the preparation of details relative to the evacuation of the members of the United

States forces and their families. Advance information as to tentative assignments to new stations of all personnel is required in order

that dependents and personal effects may be properly routed. Since

the evacuation of dependents will also require the transportation of

the personal effects and household goods, this movement should be

executed well in advance of the final troop movement. Arrangement

• is made for the discontinuance of United States postal service ashore

and the transfer of such activities to naval vessels within the theater

of operations. Steps are taken to obviate the continued arrival of

United States mail for members of the command after the withdrawal has been effected by a notification to all postmasters at forwarding ports in the continental United States of the date on which

to discontinue forwarding mail. Plans are agreed upon relative to

the relationship of military police with members of the United States

forces, and with local military and police forces. Preparations are

made for the discontinuance of wellar3 and post xchange activities.

The quantity of welfare and post exchange supplies brought into the

country during the preparation for withdrawal is limited to the

minimum necessary for current needs. Measures are inaugurated to

assure that all financial obligations, individual and organizational, of

any kind whatsoever, except those peitaining to the Quartermaster

and Paymaster Departments, are liquidated prior to departure. This

procedure should be comprehensive, thorough, and timely in order to

eliminate the submission of claims by individuals against members

7
SWM 15—il

FINAL WITHDRAWAL

of the United States forces or against the United States Government

after the final withdrawal has been effected. The procurement and

retention of releases and signed receipts from firms and individuals

having financial dealings with the United States forces or with individual members of the United States forces will eliminate the filing

of delayed claims for reimbursement. The first section prepares the

administrative annexes with which that section is concerned.

15—11. Second section.—The second section continues its normal

activities, paying particular attention to the reaction of the populace

to the. contemplated withdrawal. Steps are taken to uncover the

activities of agitators or others who may attempt to interfere with

the withdrawal. Appropriate a.ction is taken to see that maps and

monographs of the country are up-to-date and as accñrate as circumstances will permit.. Information thus collected may be of inestimable future value.

15—12. Third section.—The third section continues its normal functions. A continuous study of the situation is conducted in order

that the section may be prepared to make recommendations for

changes in the plan when the circumstances demand. The military

situation may change suddenly. and tentative plans must be prepared

for the renewal of military operations, should such action become

necessary. A thorough study of the ammunition requirements

should be made with due regard to the military situation, as well as

to the fact that it is desirable to keep such supplies at the minimum

necessary for estimated requirements.

15—13. Fourth section.—The fourth section is ordinarily confronted with a huge mass of detail prior to and during the withdrawal. The fourth section prepares and distributes administrative

instructions and administrative orders to cover the details of the

period of withdrawal. Provision is made for the disposition of all

supplies, including ammunition, motor transportation, and animals.

Steps are, taken (o dispose of real estate, shelter, and other facilities.

In all cases, signed releases are obtained from lessors. Arrangement,is made to dispose of all the utilities maintained by the United

States forces. In order that the movement of excess supplies may

be expedited, a schedule is prepared covering the tonnage to be

shipped daily. A continuous study of the situation must be conducted order that prospective or emergency changes may be me.t

with adequate supply arrangements. and in order to insure the

proper disposition of supplies and property. In general, all excess supplies that are to be returned to the continental United States

8
SWM 15-14

FINAL WITHI)RAWAL

are moved to the United States as early as possible. Care must

be taken, however, not to reduce the amount of supplies below

the estimated requirements. The equipment for all organizations

should be reduced to that authorized for expeditionary units in existing tables of organization, in advance of the date of withdrawal.

The normal reserve of supplies carried by the force may be used

before drawrng on the supplies in the base depot or depots. The

depots at embarkation points change from receiving and distributing

centers to collecting and shipping centers. They should be kept

supplied with outbound freight to insure that all available ship space

is utilized. Arrangements are made for the transportation of dependents and troops by land and water, including the operation of

ports of embarkation. Available government transportation is employed to the fullest possible extent in effecting the withdrawal of

both personnel and matriel. Orders are issued relative to highway

circulation and the control of traffic. Decision is made as to the

priority of the expenditure of funds. The evacuation of hospital

patients to the continental United States should be carried out with

a view to reducing the number remaining in field hospitals to a

minimum as the final day approaches.

15—14. Special staff duties.—The disposition of extra equipment

and supplies is an important duty of all special staff officers. Definite arrangements are necessary to prevent the loss of supplies as a

result of carrying excess stocks. However, a proper amount of supplies must be maintained until the date of withdrawal.

15—15. Air officer.—All active planes are maintained in commission

as long as practicable, and are flown or shipped to the continental

United States. Since adverse flying weather may delay the departure of the planes by air, the date of departure for planes being flown

to the continental United States will normally be placed somewhat

in advance of the date of departure of the last troop units. Consideration should be given to the fact that supply and maintenance

facilities during the period immediately preceding the date of withdrawal will be somewhat limited. Air operations should be reduced

to the minimum required by the military situation in order that all

planes may be in proper mechanical condition prior to their departure from the country.

15—16. Engineer officer.—The engineer officer is in charge of the

dismantling of portable construction that is to be returned to the

continental United States. The construction of cranes and other

weight-lifting machinery may be required to move and load heavy

9
SWM 15-17

FINAL WITHDRAWAL

material. If existing dock facilities are deficient, preparations are

made to reinforce and enlarge such facilities or to construct floating

docks if required. The cooperation of naval forces at the port or

ports of embarkation will be of considerable assistance.

15—17. Communications officer.—The communications officer is

responsible for the maintenance of communications until the last

headquarters is closed. Plans are made for the disposition of communication equipment. Field radio sets are employed from the time

permanent stations are closed until the arrival of naval vessels. Arrangements are made with naval vessels to take over radio communication on a date just prior to the final date of withdrawal. Provision

is made for the operation of a message center and messenger service

until the headquarters of the United States forces is closed. Telephone service is continued at important stations by means of field

sets or permanent installations until the final date of withdrawal.

15—18. Surgeon.—Field hospitals are maintained to meet maximum

requirement.s until the naval forces present are able to furnish hospitalization. Patients are evacuated from field hospitals as soon as

ships are available. Plans are made for the evacuation of casualties

to the embarkation point or points in case of casualties during movement to the latter. Special sanitary measures are adopted, provided

it is found necessary to concentrate civilian dependents and additional troops in concentration areas prior to embarkation. Provision

is made for the assignment of additional medical personnel to units

evacuated on ships that are not equipped as transports.

15—19. Quartermaster.—a. The quartermaster is charged with the

preparation for shipment of equipment and supplies that are to be

transported to the continental United States. In all cases, excesg

supplies are shipped at the earliest practicable date. Household effects and baggage should be shipped prior to the date of final withdrawal. The supplies and equipment are, however, maintained in

proper quantity until the date of departure in order to care for current needs. Arrangements are made for the operation of quartermaster utilities, storage, and repair facilities to the capacity required

until the naval forces afloat can take over such functions. The

transportation of supplies and troops by land and water is a function

of the quartermaster. Loading plans are completed in detail in order

that the movement of troops and supplies may be carried' out without confusion or delay.

b. All unserviceable property of every kind should be surveyed

and sold in order to avoid congestion and rush in the final days of the

10
SWM 15-19

FINAL WITHDRAWAL

withdrawal. Unserviceable property should be disposed of, except

such items as cooking ranges, mess equipment, and other similar articles that are required for use up to the date of withdrawal. Property

that is serviceable, but so worn that it is not worth transportation to

the United States, should be surveyed and sold. Careful consideration should be given to all installations of refrigerating equipment and

like items with a view to local disposition of heavy items of such

nature whose condition does not fully warrant return to the continental United States for future military use. Steel cots, worn mosquito nets, mattresses, sheets, old office furniture, and other articles

of this nature should be surveyed and sold.

c. Stocks of clothing and subsistence stores, as well as other items

of normal supply, should be reduced to a minimum prior to evacuation

by making requisition. for replacements only when absolutely necessary. Supplies of this nature remaining on hand at the time of

withdrawal should be returned to the United States. All weapons,

ordnance stores, ammunition, and other classes of stores that are serviceable should be returned to the continental United States.

d. Motor transportation and motor transport equipment should be

carefully inspected and all that is ito considered serviceable for

future use should be disposed of by sale. .l1 radio equipment that is

serviceable should be returned to the corttinental United States.

Particular care should be taken t.o see that such equipment is carefully packed under the direct supervision of the: communications

officer, in order to avoid damage in shipment. Such equipment should

be returned complete with all spares and accessories available.

e. The withdrawal period will require the appropriation of more

funds than would ordinarily be required. Requirements must be foreseen, and arrangements made for the procurement and allotment of

the extra funds well in advance of the date of withdrawal.

f. All contracts for supplies are canceled, final payment is made,

and receipts obtained. Proper releases are obtained from lessors of

all property in order to avoid subsequent claims for damage. Buildings belonging to the United States forces located on land belonging to the foreign government ard those constructed on leased

land should be sold.

C

11

* U.S. GOVBRNMEIr PRINTING OFPICE:j9g7424.$54,lOlgj