[Cite as State v. Crossty, 2017-Ohio-8382.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 vs. 

LEVENSKI CROSSTY, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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APPEAL NO. C-170085 

TRIAL NO. B-1604044 

 

 O P I N I O N.

 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 1, 2017 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Brian T. Goldberg, for Defendant-Appellant. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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MYERS, Judge.

{¶1} Following a jury trial, Levenski Crossty was convicted of aggravated 

burglary, felonious assault, and abduction. The trial court sentenced him to 

consecutive prison terms for an aggregate of 20 years. He now appeals. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Jessica Wilson, the mother of Crossty’s two-year-old daughter, was 

house-sitting for a friend who was out of town. Wilson and her four young children 

were at the home when Crossty entered, uninvited, through a window. Wilson did 

not know Crossty had entered the home until she heard him screaming at her while 

she was giving one of the children a bath. Wilson shut and locked the bathroom 

door, but Crossty forced the door open. 

{¶3} Before Wilson could call 911, Crossty grabbed her and struck her in the 

head. She was apparently knocked unconscious because the next thing she recalled 

was that she was sitting in the passenger seat of her brother’s car with her two-yearold daughter on her lap and three of her older children in the back seat. Crossty was 

driving the car. 

{¶4} As he was driving, Crossty continually screamed at Wilson and struck 

her face, arm, and head. This continued over the course of several hours. 

{¶5} Wilson said that Crossty drove them to a park, where they all got out of 

the car for a short time. Wilson was scared and wanted to get away from Crossty, but 

she did not leave because she feared for the safety of her children. 

{¶6} Then they all got back into the car and Crossty drove Wilson and the 

children to his sister’s home. His sister was not there. In an attempt to escape from 

Crossty, Wilson ran to a neighbor’s home, pounded on the door, and yelled for help. 
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No one responded. Crossty grabbed Wilson, but she held onto a pole. At some point, 

Crossty bit Wilson’s hand. 

{¶7} Crossty got the kids back into the car and threatened to leave with 

them, so Wilson also got back into the car. Wilson was scared for her children and 

for herself, but had no phone to call for help, so she repeatedly asked Crossty to drop 

the children off somewhere. Crossty refused and continued to scream and to strike 

Wilson. They had been together for several hours at that point. 

{¶8} Then Wilson told Crossty that the children needed to eat. When 

Crossty pulled into a fast-food restaurant’s drive-through lane, Wilson scooped up 

her two-year-old daughter and escaped from the car. Wilson ran around the car and 

tried to hand the child to a restaurant employee through the drive-through window, 

but Crossty grabbed the child, put her in the car, and drove off, leaving a hysterical 

Wilson behind. 

{¶9} Restaurant employees called the police. An employee testified that 

Wilson’s eye was huge, swollen, black, and bloody. 

{¶10} Wilson was taken to the hospital, where she remained several hours 

for treatment. Police detectives went to the hospital to interview Wilson and to 

photograph her injuries. Wilson showed no signs of intoxication. 

{¶11} In his interview with the police, Crossty said that he and a friend had 

gone to the home where Wilson was house-sitting to have dinner. After his friend 

left, Crossty took Wilson and four of her children to a park. Crossty said that Wilson 

was drunk, and that he confronted her about cheating on him. He said that when 

they got to his sister’s home, Wilson ran to a neighbor’s home, banged on the door, 

and yelled for help. So Crossty grabbed her, and had to “get rough” with her to get 

her back in the car. He admitted that he had hit her a few times in the face, but said 

that he had just used “little flicks” or “little slaps.” 
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{¶12} After Crossty was arrested, he called Wilson from jail several times to 

convince her not to appear for the trial, so that the case against him would be 

dismissed. 

{¶13} Crossty was indicted for aggravated burglary, felonious assault, theft 

(of the car), five counts of abduction (for Wilson and the four children), and four 

counts of kidnapping (for the children). 

{¶14} Following the trial, Crossty was convicted of aggravated burglary, 

felonious assault, and a single count of abduction involving Wilson. The trial court 

granted Crossty’s Crim.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal on the theft charge, 

and the jury found him not guilty of the remaining charges. 

Weight and Sufficiency 

{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Crossty challenges the weight and 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. In a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, the question is whether after reviewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

all the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. In reviewing a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence, we sit as a “thirteenth juror.” State v. 

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We must review the 

entire record, weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and 

determine whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a manifest 

miscarriage of justice. Id.

{¶16} Aggravated Burglary. To find Crossty guilty of aggravated burglary 

in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1), the jury had to find that, by force, stealth, or 

deception, he trespassed in an occupied structure, when a person other than an 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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accomplice was present, with purpose to commit in the structure any criminal 

offense and that he inflicted, attempted, or threatened to inflict physical harm on 

another. Crossty argues that the state failed to prove the element of trespass because 

there was no evidence that the owner did not consent to his presence in the home, or 

that Wilson, whom he claims invited him in, had revoked her prior consent. 

{¶17} Trespass occurs when a person, without privilege to do so, knowingly 

enters or remains on the land or premises of another. See R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). Wilson 

testified that she had been house-sitting for a few days while her friend, the 

homeowner, was away. Although Crossty had visited Wilson at the friend’s home on 

two prior occasions in the previous three to five days, Wilson testified that on the day 

of the offense, she had not invited Crossty over or given him permission to enter the 

home. He entered the home through its front window without Wilson’s knowledge 

or consent. Under these circumstances, the jury could reasonably infer that he had 

entered the home without privilege or consent. 

{¶18} And even if Crossty had entered the home lawfully, once he began to 

assault Wilson, a “powerful inference” arises that the privilege to remain was revoked 

and that he had become a trespasser. See State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 115, 509 

N.E.2d 383 (1987); State v. Clark, 74 Ohio App.3d 151, 161, 598 N.E.2d 740 (1st 

Dist.1991); State v. Trigg, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26757, 2016-Ohio-2752, ¶ 9-10. 

Thus, the conviction for aggravated burglary was supported by sufficient evidence. 

{¶19} Felonious Assault. To find that Crossty committed felonious assault 

in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), the jury had to find that he knowingly caused 

serious physical harm to Wilson. He argues that the state failed to prove the seriousphysical-harm element. 

{¶20} R.C. 2901.01(A)(5) provides that “serious physical harm” means any of 

the following: 
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(a) Any mental illness or condition of such gravity as would normally 

require hospitalization or prolonged psychiatric treatment; 

(b) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death; 

(c) Any physical harm that involves some permanent incapacity, 

whether partial or total, or that involves some temporary, substantial 

incapacity; 

(d) Any physical harm that involves some permanent disfigurement or 

that involves some temporary, serious disfigurement; 

(e) Any physical harm that involves acute pain of such duration as to 

result in substantial suffering or that involves any degree of prolonged 

or intractable pain. 

{¶21} The degree of harm required to establish “serious” physical harm “is 

not an exact science, particularly when the definition includes terms such as 

‘substantial,’ ‘temporary,’ ‘acute,’ and ‘prolonged.’ ” State v. Irwin, 7th Dist. 

Mahoning No. 06 MA 20, 2007-Ohio-4996, ¶ 37. The extent or degree of a victim’s 

injuries is “normally a matter of the weight, rather than the sufficiency of the 

evidence.” Id., citing State v. Salemi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81091, 2002-Ohio7064, ¶ 34. 

{¶22} Where wounds require stitches or staples or other manner of medical 

treatment to close them, courts have found sufficient evidence of serious physical 

harm as defined by R.C. 2901.05(A)(5)(d) and (e). See State v. Reckers, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton Nos. C-060451 and C-060640, 2007-Ohio-3679, ¶ 15-16; State v. 

Studgions, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94153, 2010-Ohio-5480, ¶ 10; State v. McGuire, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 11443, 1989 WL 159206 (Dec. 27, 1989). Serious physical 

harm has been found where a victim sustained a bloody cut and significant swelling 

to the face, even when there was no evidence that stitches were required. See State v. 
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Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104076, 2016-Ohio-5143, ¶ 22, citing State v. Payne, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76539, 2000 WL 1010969 (July 20, 2000).

{¶23} Under certain circumstances, bruising can constitute serious physical 

harm because a bruise may satisfy the statutory requirement for temporary serious 

disfigurement. State v. Jarrell, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3250, 2009-Ohio-3753, ¶ 

14, citing State v. Worrell, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-410, 2005-Ohio-1521, ¶ 47-

51, rev’d on other grounds, In re Ohio Criminal Sentencing Statutes Cases, 109 Ohio 

St.3d 313, 2006-Ohio-2109, 847 N.E.2d 1174 (extensive bruising on the victim’s 

lower back and hip for which she sought medical treatment); State v. Krull, 154 Ohio 

App.3d 219, 2003-Ohio-4611, 796 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.) (extensive bruising 

on the victim’s buttocks and legs, and a bloody cut); but see State v. Massey, 128 

Ohio App.3d 438, 442, 715 N.E.2d 235 (1st Dist.) (a slight bruise on the victim’s head 

was “inarguably minor”). 

{¶24} Here, Wilson testified that Crossty hit her repeatedly about the face 

and body, causing her pain with each blow. In addition, Crossty bit her hand. As a 

result of Crossty’s beating, Wilson had to be treated at a hospital. Photographs 

depicted extensive bruising and swelling on Wilson’s head, arms, hands, and back, 

deep abrasions on her hand, a gash on her scalp, and large swelling and a gash under 

her deeply blackened eye. The gash under Wilson’s eye required medical tape to 

close the wound. Under these circumstances, a rational trier of fact could have found 

that Wilson suffered physical harm involving some temporary, serious 

disfigurement, permanent disfigurement, or acute pain that resulted in substantial 

suffering, as set forth in R.C. 2901.05(A)(5)(d) and (e). Therefore, we hold that the 

state presented sufficient evidence of serious physical harm for felonious assault. 

{¶25} Abduction. To find Crossty guilty of abduction under R.C. 

2905.02(A)(1), the jury was required to find that he had, without privilege to do so, 

by force or threat, removed Wilson from the place where she was found. Crossty 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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contends that the state failed to prove abduction because Wilson could not 

remember how she had gotten from the house into the car. 

{¶26} This argument fails for several reasons. First, the jury was free to 

make the reasonable inference that Crossty’s blow to Wilson’s head was so severe 

that it knocked her out (or at least dazed her), whereupon he forcibly removed her 

from the house. Second, Crossty admitted that Wilson tried to escape from him at 

his sister’s home, that she ran for help and was clinging to a pole to prevent him from 

moving her, and that he had “to get rough” to get her back into the car. This was 

sufficient evidence that Crossty had moved Wilson from the place where she was 

found, and had forcibly moved her into the car. Consequently, the conviction for 

abduction was supported by sufficient evidence. 

{¶27} In addition to finding sufficient evidence to support the convictions, 

we conclude that the jury neither lost its way nor created a miscarriage of justice in 

convicting him of the offenses. This is not an “exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 NE.2d 

541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st 

Dist.1983). We overrule the first assignment of error. 

Jail Telephone Call 

{¶28} In his second assignment of error, Crossty argues that the trial court 

erred by allowing the state to play a recording of a telephone call that he made to his 

mother from jail. He contends that the state failed to properly authenticate and 

establish a chain of custody for the recording. We review the court’s admission of 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brand, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C150590, 2016-Ohio-7456, ¶ 27, citing State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio7044, 781 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 43. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶29} The authentication requirement is satisfied when the proponent 

presents foundational evidence or testimony from which a rational jury may 

determine that the evidence is what its proponent claims it to be. State v. Mitchell, 

171 Ohio App.3d 225, 2007-Ohio-1696, 870 N.E.2d 228, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). This 

burden is not great, and only requires a prima facie showing through direct or 

circumstantial evidence. State v. Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120327, 2013-

Ohio-2720, ¶ 16. 

{¶30} The chain of custody is part of the authentication and identification 

requirement in Evid.R. 901. See State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98107, 

2012-Ohio-5421, ¶ 36. The state need not prove an unbroken chain of custody for 

physical evidence to be admissible. See State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-

Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 57. Any breaks in the chain of custody go to the 

weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence. State v. Franklin, 97 Ohio 

St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 43. Establishing the chain of custody for 

physical evidence is more critical than establishing the chain of custody for voice 

recordings, where a witness may identify a voice on the recording “based upon 

hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged 

speaker.” See Evid.R. 901(B)(5); State v. Guyton, 2016-Ohio-8110, 74 N.E.3d 939, ¶ 

32 (11th Dist.); see also Brown at ¶ 17. 

{¶31} Here, a police detective familiar with the local jail’s recording system 

for inmate telephone calls testified that Crossty used another inmate’s personal 

identification number (“PIN”) to make the call from the jail. He stated that inmates 

are informed that every call is recorded. Because jail telephone records identify an 

inmate caller by PIN, inmates commonly use each other’s PINs to attempt to conceal 

the calls that they make. 

{¶32} The detective testified that after the first day of trial, Crossty used 

another inmate’s PIN to call his mother. Call logs were searched for calls made to 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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Crossty’s mother’s telephone number, and a recording of a call made to that number 

that day was provided to the detective’s unit. The detective listened to the recording 

and recognized Crossty’s voice and Crossty’s mother’s voice because he had 

conducted a nearly 40-minute interview with Crossty and had heard both Crossty’s 

and his mother’s voices in numerous recordings of jail calls. Consequently, we hold 

that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable likelihood that 

the recording was authentic, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the recording into evidence. We overrule the second assignment of error. 

Consecutive Sentences 

{¶33} In his third assignment of error, Crossty argues that the trial court 

erred by imposing consecutive sentences. He contends that the record did not 

support the findings made by the court to impose consecutive sentences. This court 

will only modify or vacate a sentence pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) if it clearly and 

convincingly finds either that the record does not support the mandatory sentencing 

findings or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. White, 2013-Ohio4225, 997 N.E.2d 629, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). 

{¶34} First, Crossty claims that nothing in the record supported the court’s 

finding that he had a prior criminal record because sentencing occurred immediately 

after the verdict, and before a presentence investigation could occur. However, at 

sentencing, defense counsel acknowledged that Crossty had a prior criminal record 

that included a 2008 felony conviction for receiving stolen property. 

{¶35} Here, the trial court made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C) to 

impose consecutive sentences on the record and incorporated those findings into the 

sentencing entry. See State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 

N.E.3d 659, syllabus. The court further explained that it found Crossty “extremely 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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disturbing,” “extremely violent,” and “extremely dangerous.” The court said that 

Crossty had “terrorized” Wilson, and described the beating of Wilson as 

“horrendous.” In addition, the court found that Crossty had demonstrated no 

remorse. 

{¶36} The record supports the court’s mandatory findings and the sentences 

are not otherwise contrary to law. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not 

err in imposing consecutive sentences. We overrule the third assignment of error 

and affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

ZAYAS, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.