Opinion issued July 9, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-23-00172-CR

———————————

CORNELIUS WATSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1716994

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted appellant Cornelius Watson of the first-degree felony 

offense of murder.1 After Watson pleaded true to the allegations in two enhancement 

paragraphs, the jury assessed his punishment at eighty years’ confinement.

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2).
2

In his sole issue on appeal, Watson argues that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence to prove that he was guilty of murder, specifically pointing out 

that the State offered no DNA, fingerprint, or gunshot residue evidence. We affirm.

Background

On September 11, 2020, Daniel Partida purchased some clothing and shoes at 

two stores in north Houston. He also purchased drugs. After eating and drinking at 

a local restaurant, he walked to a bus stop near the intersection of Interstate 45 and 

Crosstimbers. Partida had missed the bus, so he decided to buy more alcohol at a 

nearby convenience store. He continued drinking, and he also used the drugs he had 

purchased earlier in the day until he lost consciousness.

Around midnight on September 12, 2020, a GMC Terrain parked at the Corner 

Food Mart, a gas station and convenience store located at the intersection of I-45 and 

Crosstimbers. Several individuals got out of the Terrain, including Vincent Harris, 

who was involved in the underlying offense. Inside the convenience store, the Corner 

Food Mart had a room that housed several gambling machines. The Corner Food 

Mart also had multiple surveillance cameras set up inside and outside the store, 

although none of the cameras could record audio. Surveillance footage showed that 

Harris and his friends hung out at the Corner Food Mart that night, occasionally 

playing games on the gambling machines, for around two hours.
3

Partida regained consciousness around 1:00 a.m. When he woke up, he 

discovered that all his belongings—his newly purchased clothing and shoes, his cell 

phone, and his wallet—were missing. Partida walked to the Corner Food Mart and 

tried to enter, but Ricky Nacosta, who was holding the bags of Partida’s belongings,

held the door shut and would not let him inside. Outside the store, Partida confronted 

a group of men, including Nacosta, about the theft of his property. After some 

discussion, Nacosta and another man repeatedly punched and kicked Partida. Harris 

was not involved in this fight, although he did witness it. Defeated, Partida 

eventually left the convenience store without his belongings.

Several minutes after the fight, Harris opened the door to the cashier area of 

the convenience store and placed a handgun on a shelf beneath the cash register. He 

then stayed inside the store, spending time on his phone and talking with others who 

were playing the gambling machines.

Around twenty minutes after the fight, Cornelius Watson walked up to the 

Corner Food Mart and went inside. Watson immediately walked to the game room, 

where he started interacting with Harris and the others playing the gambling 

machines. Over the next half-hour, Watson, Harris, and their companions spent time 

in the game room, wandered through the convenience store, and walked around 

outside the store. Surveillance footage from inside the game room showed that, at 

one point, Watson took a handgun out of his pocket and briefly walked around 
4

holding it. Several minutes after this, Nacosta looked through Partida’s bags and 

showed Watson the contents. Watson did not take any of Partida’s belongings, but 

he did turn to the cashier’s booth, remove the handgun from his pocket, and place it 

under the counter.

Approximately ten minutes later, around 2:00 a.m., Nacosta was sitting 

outside the convenience store with Partida’s property. Partida returned to the store 

and again confronted Nacosta, hoping to have his belongings returned to him this 

time. Instead, a second fight ensued. This time Watson witnessed the fight, and

Harris joined in the attack on Partida, quickly taking over for Nacosta, who left the 

fight and sat near the outside wall of the store with Partida’s bags. The fight 

ultimately moved from the parking lot of the Corner Food Mart to the median of 

Crosstimbers, and then to the parking lot of a Shell station across the street from the 

Corner Food Mart.

While Harris and Partida were fighting in the Corner Food Mart parking lot, 

complainant Jarmel Jarmon-Joiner,2 who used a wheelchair, rolled down the 

sidewalk of Crosstimbers, away from I-45. Joiner was a regular patron of the Corner 

Food Mart, but he did not stop at the store on this evening, nor did he get involved 

2 Throughout the trial testimony, Jarmel Jarmon-Joiner was referred to as “Mr. 

Joiner.” In this opinion, we likewise refer to him as “Joiner.”
5

in the fight. After the fight moved across the street to the Shell parking lot, Joiner 

headed back towards the I-45 underpass.

The fight lasted several minutes. Eventually, Watson and Harris ran into the 

Corner Food Mart and retrieved the handguns that they had placed underneath the 

counter in the cashier’s booth. Meanwhile, Partida had crossed Crosstimbers again 

and was walking towards the I-45 underpass, several feet in front of Joiner in his 

wheelchair. Surveillance footage showed Watson and Harris, guns in hand, walking 

towards the intersection of I-45 and Crosstimbers. Witnesses heard multiple 

gunshots,3and police officers later recovered fired cartridge casings from two 

different caliber handguns in the intersection. One of the bullets struck Joiner in the 

back, killing him.

After the shooting, Watson and Harris returned to the Corner Food Mart, guns 

visible in their hands. Watson walked back inside the store, still holding a gun. Harris 

climbed into the backseat of the Terrain and handed his gun to the driver, who then 

passed the gun to a man standing outside the vehicle. Less than a minute later, 

Watson left the convenience store and walked down Crosstimbers, away from I-45. 

Police did not recover either weapon. Several hours after the shooting, Watson 

3 Witness Ingrid Ramirez was in her vehicle at the intersection of I-45 and 

Crosstimbers at the time of the shooting. She witnessed two men leave the fight, run 

to the Corner Food Mart, return to the intersection with handguns, and shoot in the 

direction of Partida and Joiner, but she was not able to identify either shooter.
6

returned to the Corner Food Mart and asked the owner of the convenience store to 

delete the surveillance footage from the previous evening.

A grand jury indicted both Watson and Harris for murder, but the underlying 

case involved only the charge against Watson. The jury charge authorized the jury 

to convict Watson as a principal actor or under the law of parties. The jury found 

Watson guilty of the offense of murder and assessed his punishment at eighty years’ 

confinement. This appeal followed.

Sufficiency of Evidence

In his sole issue on appeal, Watson argues that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence that he was guilty of murder. Specifically, he argues that the State 

did not present any DNA, fingerprint, or gunshot residue evidence.

A. Standard of Review

When determining whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we 

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine 

whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence, a 

rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Edwards v. State, 

666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). The factfinder bears the responsibility 

to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Edwards, 666 S.W.3d at 574 (quoting 
7

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2023) (stating that factfinder is “the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be 

attached to the testimony of witnesses”) (quotations omitted).

We may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating 

the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edwards, 666 S.W.3d at 574. When the 

record supports conflicting inferences from the evidence, we presume that the jury 

resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. 

Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482 (quotations omitted).

In our review, we consider “the cumulative force of the evidence.” Edwards, 

666 S.W.3d at 574; see Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2015) (stating that we may not use “divide and conquer” strategy when evaluating 

sufficiency of evidence) (quotations omitted). “Each fact need not point directly and 

independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the 

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Dobbs v. State, 

434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence, 

and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt. Dobbs, 434 

S.W.3d at 170; see Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482 (“Direct evidence and circumstantial 

evidence are treated equally . . . .”) (quotations omitted).
8

B. Governing Law

To secure a conviction for murder in this case, the State was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Watson either (1) intentionally or knowingly caused 

the death of Joiner by shooting him with a deadly weapon, a firearm; or (2) intended 

to cause serious bodily injury and committed an act clearly dangerous to human 

life—shooting Joiner with a deadly weapon—that caused Joiner’s death. See TEX.

PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(1)–(2). A person acts intentionally with respect to the result 

of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. Id.

§ 6.03(a); see Schroeder v. State, 123 S.W.3d 398, 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) 

(stating that murder is “a ‘result of conduct’ offense”). A person acts knowingly with 

respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 

certain to cause the result. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b).

The jury charge authorized the jury to convict Watson as a principal actor or 

under the law of parties based on the actions of Harris. See id. § 7.01(a) (“A person 

is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his 

own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by 

both.”); see also Beltran v. State, 472 S.W.3d 283, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“[I]f 

a defendant is found guilty as a party, that defendant is found to have ‘caused the 

death’ of the victim.”). Under the law of parties, a person is criminally responsible 

for an offense committed by another if, “acting with intent to promote or assist the 
9

commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid 

the other person to commit the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2); see also 

Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (stating, in case 

involving another subsection of section 7.02(a), that “[t]o prove the intent-topromote-or-assist element, the State must show that it was the defendant’s conscious 

objective or desire for the primary actor to commit the crime”).

To determine whether a defendant is a party to an offense, we may look to 

“events before, during, and after the commission of the offense.” Gross v. State, 380 

S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quotations omitted). We may rely on 

circumstantial evidence to prove party status. Beltran, 472 S.W.3d at 290. “There 

must be sufficient evidence of an understanding and common design to commit the 

offense.” Gross, 380 S.W.3d at 186. The mere presence of a person at the scene of 

a crime, or even flight from the scene, without more, is insufficient to support a 

conviction as a party. Id. Evidence is sufficient to convict under this theory “when 

the defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages 

its commission by acts, words, or other agreement.” Barrientos v. State, 539 S.W.3d 

482, 490 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (quotations omitted).

“To establish guilt under the law of parties, the evidence must show that, at 

the time of the offense, the parties were acting together, each contributing some part 

towards the execution of their common purpose.” Nelson v. State, 405 S.W.3d 113, 
10

123 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d); see Gross v. State, 352 

S.W.3d 238, 243 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (stating that “‘acting 

together’ need not rise to the level of agreement,” but parties “must be acting 

together to accomplish their common purpose”), aff’d, 380 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2012).

The jury charge also instructed the jury concerning the law of transferred 

intent. Under that doctrine, a person is criminally responsible for causing a result “if 

the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, 

contemplated, or risked” is that “a different person or property was injured, harmed, 

or otherwise affected.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.04(b)(2); Trevino v. State, 228 S.W.3d 

729, 737 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g)

(“Transferred intent is raised when there is evidence that a defendant, with the 

required culpable mental state, intends to injure or harm a specific person but injures 

or harms a different person or both.”); Chimney v. State, 6 S.W.3d 681, 700 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d) (stating that under transferred intent doctrine, 

defendant can be held criminally responsible “for the death of another even if he did 

not intend to harm the victim so long as he caused the actual victim’s death while 

acting with the intent to kill a different person”).
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C. Analysis

On appeal, Watson does not argue that he was not present at the Corner Food 

Mart at the time of the shooting. Instead, he argues that because the State did not 

present any DNA, fingerprint, or gunshot residue evidence to substantiate its theory 

of his guilt, the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The State argues 

that notwithstanding the absence of these types of evidence, the circumstantial 

evidence was sufficient to establish Watson’s guilt either as the principal actor or as 

a party. We agree with the State that sufficient evidence supports a conclusion that 

Watson and Harris were acting together when they fired gunshots in the direction of

Partida and Joiner, killing Joiner.

Surveillance footage from the Corner Food Mart showed Harris arriving at the 

convenience store around midnight. Around 1:00 a.m., Harris witnessed the first 

fight between Partida and Nacosta, but he did not participate in this fight. Shortly 

after this fight, surveillance footage showed Harris placing a gun underneath the 

counter in the cashier’s area of the store. He then spent time in the convenience 

store’s game room, hanging out with others who were playing the gambling 

machines.

Approximately twenty minutes later, Watson arrived. Upon entering the store, 

he walked straight to the game room, where he started interacting with Harris and 

the others. Over the next half hour, Watson and Harris were frequently in each 
12

other’s company, walking around inside and outside the convenience store together 

and “cutting up” and “playing around” in the game room. At one point while he was 

in the game room, Watson took a gun out of his pocket.

While wandering around the convenience store, Watson spoke with Nacosta, 

who was inspecting the belongings stolen from Partida. Immediately after this, 

Watson removed a gun from his pocket and placed it underneath the counter in the 

cashier’s area, near where Harris had placed his gun. Watson, Harris, and other store 

patrons continued walking in and around the store and the game room.

Around 2:00 a.m., both Watson and Harris left the store and stood outside. 

Nacosta was also outside, and he had Partida’s belongings with him. Shortly 

thereafter, Partida returned to the convenience store. After having words with 

Nacosta, the two men fought a second time. This time, Harris also became involved 

in the fight. Watson was present during this fight, and surveillance footage shows 

him following the other men as they moved around the Corner Food Mart parking 

lot, but he did not attack Partida. Joiner arrived at the scene during this fight, 

although he did not appear to speak to anyone or get involved. Instead, he merely 

rolled his wheelchair down Crosstimbers before deciding to turn around and head 

back to the I-45 underpass.

This fight escalated beyond the mere throwing of punches, and the men did 

not stay in one place. Surveillance footage from both the Corner Food Mart and the 
13

Shell station on the other side of Crosstimbers showed that Harris and Partida moved 

from the parking lot of the Corner Food Mart to the median of Crosstimbers to the 

parking lot of the Shell station, fighting the entire time. Ingrid Ramirez witnessed 

this fight and its progress across Crosstimbers from her vehicle, and she did not see 

any weapons drawn at this time. At one point during the fight, a car pulled up at the 

Shell station and briefly paused while the driver apparently spoke to Harris. Ramirez 

witnessed this and testified that it did not appear that the driver and Harris knew each 

other, noting that the driver was only present for “less than a couple seconds” before 

leaving the Shell station and eventually driving under I-45.

After the interaction with the car in the Shell parking lot, Harris and Watson 

both ran back to the Corner Food Mart. Partida also crossed Crosstimbers, but 

instead of walking to the convenience store, he walked several feet in front of Joiner 

towards the I-45 underpass. Surveillance footage showed that Watson ran inside the 

store first, followed by Harris. Both men retrieved the guns that they had placed 

underneath the counter in the cashier’s area and then ran back outside. They both 

walked across the parking lot of the Corner Food Mart, heading toward the 

intersection of I-45 and Crosstimbers, before leaving the frame of the store’s 

surveillance cameras.

The shooting itself was not clearly visible on the surveillance footage from 

the Corner Food Mart or from the Shell station. However, Ramirez witnessed two 
14

men leave the fight, run to the Corner Food Mart, and return to the intersection 

carrying handguns. Ramirez was not able to identify either man, but she saw both 

men start shooting in the direction of Partida and Joiner, and she heard multiple 

gunshots. She did not see anyone else in the area with a weapon. Ramirez testified 

that she was “[a] hundred precent” sure that both men had guns and both men shot 

in the direction of Partida and Joiner. Joiner was shot in the back and died from the 

wound.

Watson and Harris were visible on surveillance footage as they returned to the 

Corner Food Mart following the shooting. Both men were holding guns when they 

re-appeared on the footage. Harris got into the backseat of the GMC Terrain and 

handed his gun to the driver, who passed the gun to a man standing outside the 

vehicle before driving away from the store. Watson walked into the store, still 

holding a gun. He left the store less than a minute later and walked down 

Crosstimbers, away from I-45. Watson returned to the store later that same day and 

asked the store’s owner to delete the surveillance footage.4

4 As the State points out, both flight from the scene and attempts to conceal 

incriminating evidence are circumstances of guilt that may be considered in a 

sufficiency analysis. See Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2014) (noting that defendant’s attempt to conceal complainant’s body was “strong 

evidence” of his “consciousness of guilt”); Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 905 n.11 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“Evidence of flight evinces a consciousness of guilt.”).
15

During the ensuing investigation, police officers did not recover any firearms.

They did, however, recover fourteen fired cartridge casings from the intersection of 

I-45 and Crosstimbers.5 Specifically, they recovered nine 9-millimeter caliber 

casings and five .380 caliber casings. This indicated to the crime scene investigator 

that “there were possibly two different firearms” used. Investigators were not able 

to determine which weapon fired the fatal shot that killed Joiner because Joiner’s 

gunshot wound was “perforating,” meaning that the bullet passed through his body 

and was not recovered during the autopsy. The medical examiner could not 

determine the caliber of the bullet that struck Joiner based on the entrance wound 

alone.

We agree with the State that despite the lack of DNA, fingerprint, or gunshot 

residue evidence, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient such that a rational 

factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense of murder beyond 

a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Edwards, 666 S.W.3d at 574; see 

also Dunham, 666 S.W.3d at 482 (“Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are 

treated equally . . . .”). Even though investigators were unable to determine whether 

Watson fired the shot that killed Joiner, there is sufficient evidence that, at the least, 

5 The homicide investigator testified that he did not request DNA or fingerprint 

testing of any of the fired cartridge casings because, in his experience, the heat 

created from the firing of the weapon alters the casing, and he has “never had a print 

come back.”
16

he aided or attempted to aid Harris in committing the offense and was therefore 

criminally responsible for Harris’s conduct under the law of parties. See TEX. PENAL 

CODE § 7.02(a)(2); Barrientos, 539 S.W.3d at 490 (stating that evidence is sufficient 

under law of parties “when the defendant is physically present at the commission of 

the offense and encourages its commission by acts, words, or other agreement”); 

Cain v. State, 976 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (“Even 

where there is no evidence that the defendant fired the actual shots which killed, the 

law of parties may sustain a conviction for murder.”).

Because a rational jury could have found that Watson and Harris were acting 

in concert when they left the fight, retrieved their guns from the Corner Food Mart, 

walked to the intersection of I-45 and Crosstimbers, and started shooting in the 

direction of Partida and Joiner, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s 

guilty verdict. See Cain, 976 S.W.2d at 234; see also Rodriguez v. State, 629 S.W.3d 

229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“[P]ointing a loaded gun at someone and shooting 

it toward that person at close range demonstrates an intent to kill.”) (quotations 

omitted); Rojas v. State, 171 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2005, pet. ref’d) (concluding that evidence supported inference that defendant knew 

that “shooting the gun in the general direction of a group of people” was reasonably 

certain to result in death).

We overrule Watson’s sole issue on appeal.
17

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

April L. Farris

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).