SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5470-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHARLES E. ALFORD,

a/k/a CHARLES ALFORD, 

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted May 11, 2021 – Decided June 28, 2021

Before Judges Gilson and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Indictment Nos. 16-10-2849

and 16-12-3621.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Rachel M. Lamb, Special 

Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, 

of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-5470-18

PER CURIAM

Following the denial of motions to suppress two handguns seized during 

separate searches, defendant Charles Alford pled guilty to two counts of 

attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), involving 

separate victims. In accordance with his plea agreement, defendant was 

sentenced to concurrent terms of ten years in prison with periods of parole 

ineligibility and parole supervision as prescribed by the No Early Release Act 

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying both 

motions to suppress the seizures of the handguns. We discern no basis to reject 

the factual findings made by the motion judge and therefore affirm both orders 

and convictions.

I.

On June 9, 2013, S.G. (Sam) was shot and seriously injured in Camden.1

 

The following month, on July 30, 2013, C.G. (Chuck) was shot and seriously 

injured in Camden. Both shootings were eventually linked to defendant. 

1 We use initials and fictitious names for the victims and witnesses to protect 

their privacy interests.
3 A-5470-18

On June 26, 2013, Camden County Police Officer Romelia Villegas-Diaz 

received a tip that the next day a tan or gold Cadillac would be dropping off 

drugs on Berkeley Street in Camden. Accordingly, on June 27, 2013, Officer 

Villegas-Diaz patrolled that area in a marked police vehicle. At approximately 

1:47 p.m., she observed a gold Cadillac with tinted windows, and she stopped 

that vehicle. The Cadillac had one occupant, the driver, who was later identified 

as defendant. Defendant did not have a driver's license and, following a check,

Villegas-Diaz learned that there were outstanding warrants for defendant's 

arrest. Consequently, the officer arrested defendant and placed him in the rear 

of her patrol car. 

Officer Villegas-Diaz then returned to the Cadillac and looked in its 

windows. While standing outside the front passenger door, Villegas-Diaz saw 

the black handle of what she believed was a gun. She thereafter opened the car 

door and observed an M88 .38 special revolver. The weapon was photographed,

seized, and later determined to be loaded. Defendant was charged with unlawful 

possession of a gun and given summonses for driving without a license and 

driving a vehicle with tinted windows. Apparently, the gun was not immediately 

linked to Sam's shooting, and defendant was released from custody.
4 A-5470-18

On July 31, 2013, the day after Chuck was shot, law enforcement 

personnel received a tip that the shooter was a young man named Mac who drove 

a gold Cadillac. That same day, Investigator Joseph Goonan of the Camden 

County Sheriff's Office stopped a Cadillac driven by defendant. During the 

vehicle stop, L.G. (Lucy) arrived and told investigators that she was defendant's 

girlfriend, and defendant went by the name Mac. She also gave the investigators

her address. Defendant was not arrested on that day. Several days later, on 

August 2, 2013, defendant was charged with first-degree attempted murder and 

other offenses for Chuck's shooting, and a warrant for his arrest was issued.

On October 30, 2013, law enforcement personnel received a tip that 

defendant might be at Lucy's home in Camden. Accordingly, several members 

of the U.S. Marshals Fugitive Task Force placed Lucy's home under 

surveillance. That same day, a black man matching defendant's description was 

seen going into Lucy's residence. As members of the task force approached the 

residence, Lucy drove up. According to the task force members, Lucy gave 

them verbal and written consent to search for defendant in her home. 

While searching for defendant, law enforcement personnel located a 

.9 mm loaded handgun in a couch cushion on the first floor of Lucy's home. 

Thereafter, Lucy gave a statement, during which she told detectives that the gun 
5 A-5470-18

belonged to defendant. Defendant was not found at Lucy's home, but later that 

day he was located and arrested. 

Law enforcement personnel subsequently connected the .9 mm handgun 

to Chuck's shooting. The .38 caliber handgun seized from the vehicle was 

connected to the shooting of Sam.

In December 2013, a grand jury indicted defendant for first-degree 

attempted murder and numerous weapons offenses related to the shooting of 

Sam. Several months later, in April 2014, a second indictment was issued 

charging defendant with first-degree attempted murder and weapons offenses 

related to the shooting of Chuck. In 2016, superseding indictments were issued 

in both matters.

Defendant filed two separate motions seeking to suppress the handgun 

seized from the Cadillac and the handgun seized from Lucy's home. The same 

judge conducted separate evidentiary hearings on those motions.

In the hearing related to the search of the vehicle, the judge heard 

testimony from four witnesses: Officer Villegas-Diaz, defendant, M.H., a friend 

of defendant, and M.F., defendant's fiancée.

Officer Villegas-Diaz testified that she stopped the Cadillac in Camden 

on June 27, 2013 based on an anonymous tip she had received the previous day,
6 A-5470-18

and her observation that the vehicle had tinted windows. She also explained 

how she arrested defendant when she learned that he had outstanding warrants.

Further, she testified that after defendant had been secured in her vehicle, she 

looked through the front passenger window of the Cadillac and saw the black 

handle of what she believed was a gun on the car's floor, partially obscured by 

the front passenger seat. She therefore opened the door to confirm her suspicion. 

The gun was subsequently photographed and seized. 

Defendant and his two witnesses told a different version of events. The 

two witnesses testified that it would be difficult to see through the Cadillac's 

tinted windows. Moreover, defendant, his friend, and his fiancée testified that 

they saw Officer Villegas-Diaz open the Cadillac's doors and look inside the 

vehicle. 

The motion judge found Officer Villegas-Diaz's testimony credible. The 

judge then found that the Cadillac had been stopped after the officer observed 

tinted windows and that the gun had been lawfully seized under the plain view 

doctrine. Accordingly, the judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the 

seizure of the .38 caliber handgun found in the vehicle. 
7 A-5470-18

In a separate hearing concerning the search of Lucy's residence, the 

motion judge heard testimony from several law enforcement officers, Lucy, and 

members of Lucy's family.

Investigator Goonan explained that he had learned of Lucy and 

defendant's dating relationship when he stopped the Cadillac driven by 

defendant on July 31, 2013. Other members of the task force testified 

concerning the search of Lucy's home. They explained that they had received 

an anonymous tip that defendant was going to be at Lucy's home. 

When they set up surveillance of the home on October 30, 2013, they saw 

someone matching defendant's description enter the home. At approximately 

the same time, Lucy arrived at the home. A detective explained to Lucy that 

they had a warrant for defendant's arrest, and he showed Lucy a picture of 

defendant. Initially, Lucy denied knowing defendant, but then admitted that he 

was her boyfriend and sometimes stayed at her home. The detective testified 

that Lucy then gave verbal consent to search the home. While members of the 

task force searched the home, another officer asked Lucy to execute a written 

consent form for the search, which she did.

Members of the task force also explained that when they searched Lucy's 

home, they looked for places where defendant might be hiding, including inside 
8 A-5470-18

furniture. During that search, a .9 mm handgun was discovered in a couch 

cushion on the first floor of Lucy's home. The team continued to search the rest 

of the home, but defendant was not located.

Members of the task force thereafter received a tip that defendant was at 

another location. After officers went to that location, defendant was found and 

arrested.

Lucy told a different version of events. She testified that on October 30, 

2013, she went to leave her home, but was confronted by at least six officers 

armed with guns. She was directed to put her hands up and was then placed in 

handcuffs. She denied giving consent to search her home. Instead, she 

explained, the officers went into the home without her consent and found the 

gun. The officers thereafter suggested that they might call child protective 

services if she did not sign a consent form. She testified she signed the form 

under duress.

After hearing the testimony and considering the evidence submitted, the 

motion judge denied defendant's motion and made findings of facts and 

conclusions of law on the record. The judge found the officers' testimony 

credible, and he rejected Lucy's testimony. The judge went on to find that law 

enforcement personnel had lawfully entered Lucy's home based on two 
9 A-5470-18

exceptions to the warrant requirement. First, the judge reasoned that the task 

force had an arrest warrant for defendant and had reasonable bases to believe 

that defendant was in and resided at Lucy's home. Second, the court found that 

Lucy had given knowing and voluntary consent to search her home. The court 

then went on to find that the handgun was lawfully seized under the plain view 

exception to the warrant requirement.

II.

Defendant appeals, challenging both his convictions and arguing that the 

searches of the vehicle and Lucy's home were illegal. Specifically, defendant 

articulates those arguments as follows:

POINT I – BECAUSE OFFICERS ENTERED A 

PRIVATE RESIDENCE WITHOUT A WARRANT 

OR VALID CONSENT, THE POLICE ENTRY WAS 

ILLEGAL, AND THE HANDGUN DISCOVERED 

MUST BE SUPPRESSED AS FRUIT OF THE 

UNLA[W]FUL ENTRY.

A. The Officers[] Did Not Have A 

Reasonable Basis To Believe That 

[Defendant] Lived With [Lucy]

B. [Lucy] Did Not Give Valid Consent 

To Search Her Home

POINT II – THE PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE 

WARRANT REQUIREMENT DOES NOT APPLY 

BECAUSE THE DI[S]COVERY OF THE HANDGUN 

WAS NOT INADVERTENT.
10 A-5470-18

Our review of a denial of a motion to suppress physical evidence 

following an evidentiary hearing is limited. See State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 

(2011). Appellate courts disturb factual findings made by trial courts only when 

they are not supported "by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. 

Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 37 (2018) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 

(2014)). That deference is afforded "because those findings 'are substantially 

influenced by [an] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 

"feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Gamble, 218 N.J. at 

424-25 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 

(1964)). Accordingly, we "reverse only when the trial court's determination is 

'so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and 

correction.'" Hagans, 233 N.J. at 37-38 (quoting Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425). We 

review the trial court's legal determinations de novo. Id. at 38 (citing Gamble, 

218 N.J. at 425).

The United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution protect 

individuals from "'unreasonable searches and seizures' by government officials." 

Ibid. (quoting State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 513 (2015)). A warrantless search 

is presumptively unreasonable. Ibid. To overcome that presumption, the State 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was based on 
11 A-5470-18

probable cause and "f[ell] within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to 

the warrant requirement." Id. at 38-39 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. 

Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69-70 (2016)). Several exceptions to the warrant 

requirement are applicable to the search of the Cadillac and the search of Lucy's

home. 

A. The Search of the Cadillac

Defendant argues that the handgun found in the Cadillac was unlawfully 

seized because the officer did not "inadvertently" discover the firearm as 

required by the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. We disagree.

To lawfully stop a motor vehicle, a police officer must have a "reasonable 

and articulable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle, or its occupants, is 

committing a motor-vehicle violation or a criminal or disorderly persons 

offense." State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016) (citing State v. Locurto, 

157 N.J. 463, 470 (1990)). Accordingly, an investigatory stop is permissible "if 

it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity." State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019) (quoting State v. 

Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004)).
12 A-5470-18

"[I]n determining the lawfulness of an investigatory stop, a reviewing 

court must 'evaluate the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen 

encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the 

individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police 

intrusions.'" State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010) (quoting State v. Davis, 

104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986)). "An investigative detention that is premised on less 

than reasonable and articulable suspicion is an 'unlawful seizure,' and evidence 

discovered during the course of an unconstitutional detention is subject to the 

exclusionary rule." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 247 (2007) (citing State v. 

Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 132-33 (2002)).

After hearing the testimony of Officer Villegas-Diaz, the motion judge 

found that she had acted with reasonable and particularized suspicion in 

stopping the Cadillac. Specifically, the motion judge found the officer testified 

credibly that she had stopped the vehicle because it had tinted windows.

The plain view exception allows police to seize contraband in plain view 

without a warrant if three requirements are met: "(1) the officer must be lawfully 

in the viewing area when making the observation; (2) 'the discovery of the 

evidence . . . must be inadvertent,'" State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 91 (2016)

(alteration in original) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468-
13 A-5470-18

69 (1971)); and (3) the "police officer must have 'probable cause to associate the 

property with criminal activity,'" State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 237 (1983) 

(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983)).

In Gonzales, the New Jersey Supreme Court eliminated the inadvertence 

prong of the plain-view test. 227 N.J. at 101. The Court, however, applied that 

new rule of law prospectively as of the date of the opinion – November 15, 2016. 

Ibid. The search at issue in this case took place on June 27, 2013, and therefore 

we analyze the officer's actions under the pre-Gonzales standard.

An "observation into the interior of an automobile by a police officer 

located outside the automobile is not a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment." State v. Reininger, 430 N.J. Super. 517, 534 (App. Div. 2013) 

(quoting State v. Foley, 218 N.J. Super. 210, 215 (App. Div. 1987)). When an 

officer seizes contraband in plain view from an automobile, it is "not necessary 

for the State to establish exigent circumstances." Id. at 537.

In this case, the motion judge credited Officer Villegas-Diaz's testimony

that, while standing outside the Cadillac, she looked through the passenger side 

front window and saw the black handle of what she perceived to be a gun on the 

floor. The motion judge also found that the gun was discovered inadvertently. 

In that regard, the motion judge reasoned that once defendant was arrested, there 
14 A-5470-18

was nothing unlawful in the officer looking into the unoccupied Cadillac. Those 

factual findings are supported by substantial credible evidence. We therefore 

discern no basis to reverse the motion judge's determination that the .38 caliber 

handgun was lawfully seized.

B. The Search of the Home

Defendant also argues that law enforcement officers unlawfully entered 

Lucy's home and therefore the seizure of the .9 mm handgun was illegal. We 

reject this argument. 

The motion judge found two bases for the entry into Lucy's home. First, 

that the task force members had a valid arrest warrant and had reasonable bases 

to believe that defendant was present and resided in Lucy's home. Second, that 

Lucy provided knowing and voluntary consent to search her home. We hold 

that the consent was valid and, therefore, we need not address whether the arrest 

warrant was lawfully executed at the home of a third-party.

To justify a warrantless search based on consent, "the State must prove 

that the consent was voluntary and that the consenting party understood his or 

her right to refuse consent." State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 305 (1993) (citing 

State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975)). "[T]he State is required to prove 

voluntariness by 'clear and positive testimony.'" State v. Chapman, 332 N.J. 
15 A-5470-18

Super. 452, 466 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 352 

(1965)). Moreover, the State must "show that the individual giving consent 

knew that he or she 'had a choice in the matter.'" State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 

639 (2002) (quoting Johnson, 68 N.J. at 354).

Factors "tending to show that the consent was coerced" include: (1) 

consent was obtained from a person who had already been arrested; (2) it was 

obtained notwithstanding a denial of guilt; (3) the police obtained consent only 

after the consenting person had refused initial requests for consent; (4) consent 

was given where the subsequent search led to the seizure of contraband "which 

the accused must have known would be discovered;" and (5) consent was given 

by a person in handcuffs. King, 44 N.J. at 352-53 (citations omitted).

Factors "tending to show the voluntariness of the consent" include: "(1) 

that consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that the police 

would find no contraband; (2) that the defendant admitted his guilt before 

consent; [and] (3) that the defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers." 

Id. at 353 (citations omitted). 

"[T]he existence or absence of one or more of the above factors is not 

determinative of the issue." Ibid. Instead, the factors "are only guideposts to 

aid a trial judge in arriving at his [or her] conclusion." Ibid.
16 A-5470-18

At the evidentiary hearing concerning the motion to suppress the gun 

seized from Lucy's home, the motion judge heard testimony from several law 

enforcement officers. The judge found their testimony regarding the oral and 

written consent provided by Lucy credible. The judge also considered, but 

rejected, Lucy's contradictory testimony that she had not given valid consent.

We discern no basis for rejecting the motion judge's factual findings that 

Lucy gave consent voluntarily, and that she understood her right to refuse 

consent. Those factual findings are supported by the officers' testimony, which 

the motion judge found credible. Moreover, the factual findings are

corroborated by the written consent form Lucy executed. Finally, there are more 

factors tending to show that the consent was voluntary than factors tending to 

show that the consent was coerced.

The motion judge credited the officers' testimony that after obtaining 

consent from Lucy, they searched the home looking for defendant. The motion 

judge also found credible that the officers had prior experiences during which

suspects hid inside hollowed out furniture. Therefore, the motion judge credited 

their testimony that they picked up the couch's cushions to see if there was a 

compartment in which defendant was hiding, and, in doing so, inadvertently 

discovered the gun in a couch cushion. The plain view exception allows police 
17 A-5470-18

to seize contraband without a warrant when they are lawfully in an area and they 

inadvertently discover evidence associated with criminal activity. See, e.g.,

State v. Farmer, 366 N.J. Super. 307, 313-15 (App. Div. 2004); see also State v. 

Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 291, 310-11 (2006) (finding law enforcement seizure of 

marijuana plants observed in plain view during residential consent search 

lawful). 

All those findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the 

record, and we discern no error in the trial court's application of the law to the 

factual findings. Accordingly, we also affirm the denial of defendant's motion 

to suppress the handgun seized from Lucy's home and defendant's subsequent 

conviction based on his guilty plea.

Affirmed.