ARMY PLANNING

Comprehensive Risk 

Assessment Needed 

for Planned Changes 

to the Army’s Force 

Structure

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2016

GAO-16-327

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-327, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2016

ARMY PLANNING

Comprehensive Risk Assessment Needed for 

Planned Changes to the Army’s Force 

Structure

What GAO Found

The Army prioritized retaining combat units, such as brigade combat teams 

(BCT) and combat aviation brigades, when planning to reduce its end strength to 

980,000 soldiers, and as a result plans to eliminate proportionately more 

positions from its support (or “enabler”) units, such as military police and 

transportation units. The Army’s force planning process seeks to link strategy to

force structure given available resources through quantitative and qualitative 

analyses. The Army completed analyses showing that it could reduce its BCTs 

from 73 in fiscal year 2011 to a minimum of 52 in fiscal year 2017; however, the 

Army plans to retain 56 BCTs. Moreover, by redesigning its combat units, the 

Army plans to retain 170 combat battalions (units that fight the enemy)—3 fewer 

battalions than in fiscal year 2011. Given the focus on retaining combat units,

and senior Army leaders’ assessment that shortfalls in combat units are more 

challenging to resolve than shortfalls in enabler units, the Army plans to reduce 

proportionately more positions from its enabler units than from its combat units. 

GAO found that the Army performed considerable analysis of its force structure 

requirements, but did not assess mission risk for its enabler units.

• Combat Forces: The Army’s analysis of BCT requirements entailed an 

assessment of mission risk—risk resulting from units being unable to meet 

the missions specified in Department of Defense (DOD) planning guidance. 

The mission risk assessment used current Army deployment practices and 

assumed that sufficient enabler forces would be available to sustain combat 

units over a multi-year scenario. The result of this analysis, and a similar 

analysis of the Army’s aviation brigades, showed that the Army’s proposed 

combat force structure would be sufficient to meet most mission demands. 

• Enabler Forces: The Army's analysis of its enabler units entailed an 

assessment of risk to the force—how frequently and for how long units need 

to deploy to meet as many demands as possible. Army officials said this 

analysis is useful because it enables the Army to identify the units it would 

use the most. However, the analysis overstated the availability of the Army's 

enabler units because it assumed they could deploy more frequently and for 

longer duration than DOD's policies allow. The Army did not identify enabler 

unit shortfalls, or the risk those shortfalls pose to meeting mission 

requirements. 

According to Army guidance, the Army’s planning process should assess 

mission risk for both combat and enabler units. The Army did not complete this 

type of assessment for its enabler units during its most recent force planning 

process because the Army assessed the risk operational demands pose to the 

health of the Army’s force, not mission risk. Without a mission risk assessment 

for both the Army’s planned combat and enabler force structure, the Army has an 

incomplete understanding of mission risk and is not well-positioned to develop 

mitigation strategies. Furthermore, as currently implemented, its process does 

not include analyses needed for the Army to routinely prepare a mission risk 

assessment for both its combat and enabler force structure. Without expanding 

its force planning process to routinely require a mission risk assessment for the 

Army’s combat and enabler force structure as part of future planning processes, 

the Army will not be well-positioned to comprehensively assess risk and develop 

mitigation strategies.

View GAO-16-327. For more information, 

contact John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 

or pendletonj@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

The Army plans to reduce its end 

strength to 980,000 active and reserve 

soldiers by fiscal year 2018, a 

reduction of nearly 12 percent since 

fiscal year 2011. According to the 

Army, this reduction will require 

reductions of both combat and 

supporting units. Army leaders 

reported that reducing the Army to 

such levels creates significant but 

manageable risk to executing the U.S. 

military strategy and that further 

reductions would result in 

unacceptable risk.

The Senate report accompanying a bill 

for the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a 

provision that GAO examine the 

factors that the Army considers and 

uses when it determines the size and 

structure of its forces. This report (1) 

describes the Army’s priorities and 

planned force structure reductions and 

(2) evaluates the extent to which the 

Army comprehensively assessed 

mission risk associated with its 

planned combat and enabler force 

structure. GAO examined the Army’s 

force development regulations and 

process, DOD and Army guidance, and 

Army analysis and conclusions; and 

interviewed DOD and Army officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army 

complete a mission risk assessment of 

its planned enabler force structure, and 

revise its process to routinely require a 

mission risk assessment for its combat 

and enabler force structure. The Army 

agreed with GAO’s recommendations.
Page i GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Letter 1

Background 5

The Army Prioritized Retaining Combat Units and Plans to 

Reduce a Greater Proportion of Enabler Units to Make End 

Strength Reductions 9

The Army Did Not Comprehensively Assess Mission Risk 

Associated with Its Planned Force Structure 14

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 23

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 25

Table

Table 1: Net Reduction in Combat Battalions by Army Component 

and Type of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) (Fiscal Year 

2011 to Fiscal Year 2017) 11

Figures

Figure 1: Projected Reductions to the Army’s Planned End 

Strength 7

Figure 2: Force Development Phases and the Total Army Analysis 

Process 8

Contents
Page ii GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Abbreviations

BCT Brigade Combat Team

DOD Department of Defense

TAA Total Army Analysis 

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

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Page 1 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 13, 2016

Congressional Committees

In 2011, the Secretary of Defense announced a series of initiatives 

intended to reduce costs across the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the military services, including cuts of $29.5 billion from planned Army 

spending from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2016. Additionally, in 

2011, Congress passed the Budget Control Act of 2011, which, among 

other things, sets limits for national defense spending through fiscal year 

2021.1 In response to these spending limits the Army announced it would 

reduce its planned end strength from a high of about 1.11 million soldiers 

in fiscal year 2011 to 1.045 million soldiers by fiscal year 2016.2 In June 

2014, DOD stated that the Army would further reduce its end strength to 

980,000 soldiers by fiscal year 2018, a level at which the Army stated that 

it could execute the National Defense Strategy, but at significant risk.3

The Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff reiterated this 

point in March 2015 in congressional testimony, and stated that further 

reductions would make that strategy unexecutable.

Additionally, in September 2013, the Army announced in its Army 

Structure Memorandum for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, that it would 

 1 Pub. L. No. 112-25 (2011) (as amended). 

2 End strength numbers are those used by the Army when planning how to allocate 

positions across its force structure and may not reflect what is ultimately authorized in law. 

In addition to the approximately 1.11 million end strength planned for fiscal year 2011, the 

Army temporarily increased its end strength that year by about 22,000 soldiers by using 

statutory authority provided to the Secretary of Defense by the Congress in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This increase was authorized for fiscal 

years 2011 and 2012. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 403 (2009). 

3 Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Requirements Report, Fiscal Year 2015

(June 2014). The National Defense Strategy is reflected in DOD’s 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance; the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (which builds upon the 2012 Defense 

Strategic Guidance); and, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s 2015 National Military 

Strategy. See Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 

21st Century Defense (January 2012); Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 

Review (Mar. 4, 2014); Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America 2015 (Washington, D.C.: June 2015). 

Letter
Page 2 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

decrease the number of its brigade combat teams (BCT) from 73 to 60.4

The Army also announced it would eliminate 12,000 positions from units 

that Army officials said provide long-term sustainment for the Army’s 

combat units.5 In October 2015, the Army stated that it would further 

reduce its end strength by reducing the number of its BCTs to 56 and by 

redesigning other units in its force structure so that they required fewer 

soldiers. The Army also announced plans to inactivate two BCTs in the 

Army National Guard and convert two active component BCTs to smaller 

battalion-sized task forces.

In light of the significant changes to the Army’s force structure, Congress 

established the National Commission on the Future of the Army in the 

Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2015.6 The commission was directed to evaluate the 

size and force mix of the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army 

Reserve and make recommendations where appropriate. The 

Commission was also directed to study the Army’s planned transfer of 

Apache helicopters from the Army National Guard to the Regular Army as 

part of the Army’s aviation restructuring initiative. The Commission’s final 

report, published in January 2016, determined that an Army with 980,000 

soldiers (450,000 in the active component, 335,000 in the Army National 

Guard, and 195,000 in the Army Reserve), is the minimum sufficient force 

needed to meet the U.S.’s national security objectives and the challenges 

of the future strategic environment.7

 4 The Army Structure Memorandum documents the force structure approved by the 

Secretary of the Army and is the output of the Army’s Total Army Analysis process. A 

brigade combat team is a unit consisting of a headquarters, multiple maneuver battalions, 

and enabler capabilities, and comes in three variants: Armored, Infantry, and Stryker. 

5 According to Army officials, the Army generally deploys combat units with enablers to 

meet operational demands. During a contingency, enabler units often provide critical 

support in early deployment (such as port opening), and for long-term sustainment (such 

as those that transport supplies or establish bases from which combat units can operate). 

Positions are requirements for personnel that are documented on the Army’s manpower 

requirements document. These requirements may not be filled by the Army when making 

resourcing decisions and, as a result, do not represent actual manpower assigned to Army 

units.

6 See Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1702 (2014).

7 National Commission on the Future of the Army, Report to the President and the 

Congress of the United States (Jan. 28, 2016).
Page 3 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Congress has included multiple provisions for GAO to review Army force 

structure decisions. The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a 

provision for us to assess the Army’s Aviation Restructuring Initiative as 

well as any proposals submitted by the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau that could serve as an alternative to the Army’s initiative.8 In April 

2015 we reviewed the Army’s analysis of its combat aviation force 

structure proposal and the National Guard Bureau’s alternative proposal. 

We found that the Army and the National Guard Bureau agreed on some 

assumptions and not others, that both proposals met most projected 

mission demands, and that the Army’s cost estimates were reliable for the 

purposes for which they were used. However, we also found that 

additional sensitivity analysis could have been useful for decisionmakers 

and that the Army’s cost estimates were of limited value for projecting the 

actual implementation or annual costs of the Army’s proposal.9

Additionally, Senate Report 113-176, accompanying a bill for the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision for 

GAO to examine how the Army determines the size and structure for its 

forces and the factors it considers when doing so.10 In this report, we (1) 

describe the Army’s priorities and planned changes to its force structure

when making end strength reductions and (2) evaluate the extent to 

which the Army comprehensively assessed mission risk associated with 

its planned combat and enabler force structure.

To describe the Army’s priorities and planned changes to its force 

structure when making end strength reductions, we reviewed the Army 

Structure Memorandum for fiscal years 2018 through 2022, which 

documents the service’s most recent force structure decisions. We also 

analyzed statutes pertaining to the Army’s end strength for fiscal years 

2011 through 2015, and documentation associated with the Army’s Total 

Army Analysis (TAA) process during fiscal year 2013 through fiscal year 

 8 See Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1057 (2014).

9 Force Structure: Army’s Analyses of Aviation Alternatives, GAO-15-430R (Washington,

D.C.: Apr. 27, 2015). We did not make any recommendations in this report because the 

Army’s analyses used a reasonable methodology when evaluating the force structure 

proposals’ abilities to meet mission demands and its cost estimates were suitable for the 

Army’s purposes. 

10 S. Rep. No. 113-176, at 83 (2014).
Page 4 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

2015 such as briefing slides, guidance, and relevant studies.11 We 

reviewed regulations and studies completed by Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, concerning the generating force units and 

positions allocated to its transients, trainees, holdees, and students 

accounts.12 We reviewed relevant documentation about the 

methodologies used for the studies and interviewed officials responsible 

for conducting them. We did not seek to independently replicate the 

results of the Army’s study as that was beyond the scope of this 

engagement. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Office of Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation within DOD as well as Army officials 

from Headquarters, Department of the Army; U.S. Army Reserve 

Command and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve; U.S. Army 

National Guard Directorate; U.S. Army Forces Command; U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (the Army Capabilities 

Integration Center at Fort Eustis, Virginia, and the TRADOC Analysis 

Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas); and the Center for Army Analysis 

to obtain their perspectives on the Army’s processes and planned force 

structure.

To evaluate the extent to which the Army comprehensively assessed 

mission risk associated with its planned force structure, we compared the 

Army’s risk management guidance to GAO’s risk management framework 

to determine if the Army’s guidance aligned with leading practices.13 After 

our evaluation of the Army’s risk management guidance, we focused our 

review on the Army’s risk assessments because the remaining steps in 

 11 Our review only reviewed documentation associated with decisions made after the Army 

published its last Army Structure Memorandum in September 2013.

12 Active component soldiers not assigned to units are counted as part of the Army’s end 

strength, separately from its operating force and generating force. Soldiers in these 

accounts include soldiers in training, cadets attending military academies, injured soldiers, 

or soldiers en route to a new permanent duty station.

13 GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize 

Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, 

D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). Within this report we developed our risk management framework by 

reviewing risk literature, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 

Government Auditing Standards, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, the work of the 

President’s Commission on Risk Management, consulting papers, and the enterprise risk 

management approach of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 

Commission. In addition, we consulted with subject matter experts and reviewed 

numerous frameworks from industry, government, and academic sources. 
Page 5 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

the Army’s risk management framework are predicated on the Army 

completing a risk assessment.14 We compared documentation of the 

Army’s risk assessments, including briefing slides and published reports, 

to its risk management guidance and force development regulations to 

determine the extent to which these assessments followed the Army’s risk 

assessment standards and met force development objectives.15 We also 

interviewed officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy; the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the Joint 

Staff; Headquarters, Department of the Army; the Center for Army 

Analysis, and the TRADOC Analysis Center to understand how the Army 

applies its risk guidance to force development and how it assessed risk in 

making its most recent force structure decisions.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to April 2016 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The National Defense Strategy is the foundation for DOD’s direction to 

the military services on planning their respective force structures. This 

strategy calls for the U.S. armed forces to be able to simultaneously 

defend the homeland; conduct sustained, distributed counterterrorist 

operations; and deter aggression and assure allies in multiple regions 

through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails, U.S. 

forces should be able to defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale 

 14 This Army guidance specifies that operational and non-operational activities are subject 

to the Army’s risk management framework and calls for the identification of events that 

can cause mission failure, the assessment of risk, the analysis and prioritization of 

mitigation options, and the documentation of decisions. Army Techniques Publication 5-

19, Risk Management, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 2014). 

15The Army regulations covering its force development processes are Army Regulation 

71-32, Force Development and Documentation (July 1, 2013) and Army Regulation 71-11 

Total Army Analysis (TAA), (Dec. 29, 1995).

Background

National Defense Strategy 

and Defense Planning 

Guidance
Page 6 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or impose 

unacceptable costs on—a second aggressor in another region. According 

to the Army’s force development regulation, the Army seeks to develop a 

balanced and affordable force structure that can meet the requirements of 

the National Military Strategy and defense planning guidance tasks.16

The Defense Planning Guidance operationalizes the National Defense 

Strategy and provides guidance to the services on their use of approved 

scenarios, among other things, which serve as their starting point for 

making force structure decisions and assessing risk. These classified 

scenarios are used to illustrate the missions articulated in the National 

Defense Strategy, including the need to defeat one regional adversary 

while deterring a second adversary in another region, homeland defense, 

and forward presence. Drawing from the scenarios approved in the 

Defense Planning Guidance for 2017 through 2021, the Army derived a 

set of planning scenarios, arrayed across a timeline, that reflect these 

missions.

Congress authorizes the number of personnel the Army is able to have in 

its active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve components 

respectively. The Secretary of the Army—in consultation with the Director 

of the Army National Guard and the Chief of the Army Reserve—

approves how the Army will allocate that end strength within each of the 

Army’s components.17 Between fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2018, the 

Army’s planned end strength is projected to decline by 132,000 positions 

(12 percent), from about 1.11 million soldiers in fiscal year 2011 to 

980,000 soldiers in fiscal year 2018, as shown in figure 1.18 By fiscal year 

 16 Army Regulation 71-32 at paragraph 3-5.

17 Congress authorizes the end strength each service is able to have in each of its 

components on the last day of the fiscal year in the National Defense Authorization Act. 

The services are authorized by statute to increase their active duty end strength by up to 2 

percent of the end strength authorized by Congress upon a determination by the Service 

Secretary that it would enhance manning and readiness in essential units or in critical 

specialties or ratings. See 10 U.S.C § 115(g).

18 In addition to the approximately 1.11 million end strength planned for fiscal year 2011, 

the Army temporarily increased its end strength that year by about 22,000 soldiers by 

using statutory authority provided to the Secretary of Defense by the Congress in the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This increase was authorized 

only for fiscal years 2011 and 2012. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 403 (2009).

Army End Strength
Page 7 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

2018, the individual components expect to be at the following projected 

end strengths: active (450,000), Army National Guard (335,000), and 

Army Reserve (195,000). As a result, the reserve component—which 

includes both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve—will 

make up 54 percent of the Army’s planned end strength starting in fiscal 

year 2018; a proportion that is comparable to the size and allocation of 

Army forces across its components prior to the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks.

Figure 1: Projected Reductions to the Army’s Planned End Strength

a

End strength numbers are those used by the Army when planning how to allocate positions across 

its force structure and may not reflect what is ultimately authorized in law. In addition to the 

approximately 1.11 million end strength planned for fiscal year 2011, the Army temporarily increased 

its end strength that year by about 22,000 soldiers by using statutory authority provided to the 

Secretary of Defense by the Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 

This increase was authorized only for fiscal years 2011 and 2012. See Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 403 

(2009).

The Army implements its force development processes to make decisions 

about how to allocate end strength that has been authorized for each of 

its components, among other things. Taking into account resource 

constraints, the five-phase process entails determining organizational and 

materiel requirements and translating those requirements into a planned 

force structure of units and associated personnel, as illustrated in figure 2. 

During the fourth phase—the determination of organizational 

authorizations—the Army undertakes its annual Total Army Analysis 

Army Force Development 

and Total Army Analysis 

Processes
Page 8 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

(TAA) process, during which it determines how it will allocate its end

strength among its units and manage risk.

Figure 2: Force Development Phases and the Total Army Analysis Process

Note: The Army Structure Memorandum documents the force structure approved by the Secretary of 

the Army and is the output of the Army’s Total Army Analysis process.

The TAA process is envisioned to help the Army allocate its end strength 

among its enabler units—those units that deploy to support combat 

forces—after initial decisions about the size of combat forces, other types 

of Army formations, and key enablers are made. The Army’s TAA 

regulation states that the Army will use force guidance, such as the 

defense planning guidance, to identify the combat unit structure that will 

be used as an input to TAA’s analysis of the Army’s enabler unit 

requirements.19 The Army also uses the results from its most recently 

concluded TAA as the starting point for the next TAA. For example, Army 

officials stated that the planned force structure documented in its October 

2015 Army Structure Memorandum was an input for the Army’s ongoing 

TAA, examining force structure for fiscal years 2019 through 2023. The 

Army Structure Memorandum documents the force structure approved by 

the Secretary of the Army for resourcing and is an output of the Army’s 

TAA process. Army officials said that the Army concluded the quantitative 

 19 Army Regulation 71-11.
Page 9 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

analysis phase for this TAA in December 2015 and they expect that the 

Army will complete the qualitative analysis phase by June 2016.

Army officials said that they have modified the TAA process substantially 

since the Army last issued its regulation and that an updated regulation 

that will cover TAA is pending final approval. Last updated in 1995, the 

Army’s TAA regulation describes the objectives and procedures of the 

TAA process, which includes documenting the Army’s total planned force 

structure and any unresourced unit requirements.20 Army officials said 

that the Army no longer documents unresourced unit requirements 

because senior leadership at the time the Army stopped tracking these 

requirements determined that it was not useful for force planning 

purposes. Additionally, the Army has expanded the inputs to its TAA 

process beyond those specified in its regulation to include other 

segments of its force structure and some enabler units that were not 

eligible for reduction or reallocation. For example, the Army has identified 

a minimum number of positions for its generating force—which includes 

units that enable the Army to train and safeguard the health of its 

soldiers—and during recent TAAs did not evaluate some types of enabler 

units for reduction or reallocation that were considered to be in high 

demand (such as its Patriot Battalions) and units that are considered to 

be critical to early phases of a major contingency (such as those that 

provide port opening capabilities).

The Army prioritized retaining combat units, as well as other segments of 

its force structure, when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000 

soldiers and as a result will take proportionately more position reductions 

from its enabler units.

 20 Army Regulation 71-11.

The Army Prioritized 

Retaining Combat 

Units and Plans to 

Reduce a Greater 

Proportion of Enabler 

Units to Make End 

Strength Reductions
Page 10 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

The Army prioritized retaining combat units and incorporated other 

considerations when planning to reduce its end strength to 980,000 

soldiers. Army officials said that the Army used its force planning process 

to evaluate how it can best implement planned end strength reductions.

This process—which is intended to link strategy to force structure 

requirements given available resources—included robust modeling and 

incorporated senior leaders’ professional military judgement.21 The Army 

incorporated its priorities at the beginning of this process, which

influenced the planned force structure that the Secretary of the Army 

ultimately approved. Foremost, the Army sought to retain as many 

combat units as possible so that it could better meet the missions 

specified in DOD’s defense planning guidance and the Army’s classified 

scenarios as well as to account for near-term uncertainty. Additionally, the 

Army determined it needed to maintain a minimum number of positions in 

its generating force and its transients, trainees, holdees, and students 

accounts, based on separate analyses. Lastly, the Army sought to 

minimize the disruption to Army National Guard capabilities and reserve 

component unit readiness that resulted from reductions.

Retaining combat units. According to Army officials responsible for TAA, 

Army leaders determined that it was important that the Army retain as 

many combat units as possible when assessing how to implement end 

strength reductions. In 2013, the Secretary of Defense announced the 

conclusion of the department-wide Strategic Choices and Management 

Review. As part of this review, DOD examined ways to obtain cost 

savings by altering the Army’s future force structure.22 According to Army 

officials, the Secretary of Defense’s review had, at one point, considered 

whether the Army could reduce its end strength to 855,000, which would 

correspond with a force structure of 36 BCTs, including 18 in the regular 

Army and 18 in the reserve component. Army leaders, reacting to what 

 21The Army’s force planning process is envisioned to help the Army allocate its end 

strength among its combat and enabler units and its active component and reserve 

components given available resources. This process includes quantitative analysis and 

incorporates senior officer perspectives and judgements through the use of councils and 

resourcing committees.

22The Secretary of Defense’s 2013 Strategic Choices and Management Review was to 

examine the potential effect of additional, anticipated budget reductions on DOD and to 

develop options for performing the missions in the Defense Strategic Guidance. 

Specifically, the review was to inform how the department would allocate resources when 

executing its fiscal year 2014 budget and preparing its fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 

2019 budget plans.

Army Prioritized Retaining 

Combat Units

Army Force Structure Units by Type

Operating Forces: Those force whose primary 

mission is to participate in combat. Operating 

force units comprise combat forces and enabler 

forces.

• Combat Forces: The Army’s combat units 

are responsible for fighting enemy forces in a 

contested environment and include the 

Army’s Brigade Combat Teams (Armored, 

Infantry, and Stryker) and combat aviation 

brigades.

• Enabler Forces: Units that provide support 

to the Army’s combat units when they are 

deployed. They often provide critical support 

in early deployment (such as port opening), 

as well as for long-term sustainment (such as 

those that transport supplies or establish 

bases from which combat units can operate). 

Combat units are dependent on enabler units 

for long-term sustainment in theater and the 

Army generally deploys both types of units to 

meet operational demands.

Generating Force: Army organizations whose 

primary mission is to generate and sustain the 

operating force, including the Army’s Training 

and Doctrine Command—which oversees the 

Army’s recruiting, training, and capability 

development efforts—and Army Medical 

Command—which provides health and medical 

care for Army personnel.

Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students: 

Active component soldiers not assigned to units 

are counted as part of the Army’s end strength, 

separately from its operating force and 

generating force. Soldiers in these accounts 

include soldiers in training, cadets attending 

military academies, injured soldiers, or soldiers 

en route to a new permanent duty station.

Source: GAO analysis of Army documentation | GAO-16-327
Page 11 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

they considered to be unacceptable reductions, commissioned analyses 

to determine the end strength and number of BCTs the Army needed to 

execute the missions specified in defense planning guidance. The 

analysis determined that the Army should retain a minimum of 52 BCTs, 

including 30 in the active component, in order to best meet the missions 

specified in defense planning guidance. Ultimately, Army senior leaders 

decided to retain 56 BCTs based in part on these analyses as well as 

their assessment of global events and the potential for increased demand 

for BCTs.

In retaining 56 BCTs in its force structure, the Army took additional steps 

to redesign its force, reflecting its priority to retain combat capacity. 

Specifically, the Army plans to eliminate 17 BCTs from its force structure 

relative to its fiscal year 2011 force (a 23 percent reduction in the number 

of BCTs). However, because the Army decided to redesign its BCTs by 

increasing its composition from a two maneuver battalion to three 

battalion formation, the Army estimates that it will be able to retain 170 

maneuver battalions in its force structure—a net reduction of 3 battalions 

compared to fiscal year 2011 (less than 2 percent), as shown in table 1.

Table 1: Net Reduction in Combat Battalions by Army Component and Type of Brigade Combat Team (BCT) (Fiscal Year 2011 

to Fiscal Year 2017)

Component Unit

Fiscal Year 

2011

Fiscal 

Year 2017

Fiscal Year 

2017 Change

Fiscal Year 2017 

Change (Percentage)

Active Component Armored BCT: Combined Arms Battalions 41 27 -14 -34%

Infantry BCT: Infantry Battalions 40 41a 1 3%

Stryker BCT: Stryker Battalions 18 21 3 17%

Active Component Total 99 89 -10 -10%

Reserve Component Armored BCT: Combined Arms Battalions 17 15 -2 -12%

Infantry BCT: Infantry Battalionsb 54 60 6 11%

Stryker BCT: Stryker Battalions 3 6 3 100%

Reserve Component Total 74 81 7 10%

Total Number of 

Battalions

173 170 -3 -2%

Source: Department of the Army. | GAO-16-327

a

Army officials said that this includes two Infantry Battalion Task Forces, which are converted Infantry 

BCTs.

b

All of the Army’s reserve component infantry battalions reside in the Army National Guard except for 

one which resides in the U.S. Army Reserve.

Note: The percentages shown are approximate due to rounding.
Page 12 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Maintain minimum number of positions in generating force units and the 

trainees, transients, holdees, and students accounts.23 According to Army 

officials responsible for TAA, the Army needs to maintain a minimum 

number of positions in the Army’s generating force (in order to provide 

medical support and training to Army personnel) and its trainees, 

transients, holdees, and students accounts (in order to account for 

personnel that are not assigned to units). Specifically, the Army tasked 

the two largest organizations in its generating force (U.S. Army Medical 

Command and TRADOC) with evaluating their position requirements and 

concluded that the Army needs a minimum of 87,400 active component 

soldiers in the generating force for an end strength of 980,000 soldiers. 

Additionally, Army officials said that based on a review of historical levels, 

the Army assumed that 58,500 regular Army positions (13 percent of a 

450,000 active component force) would be filled by trainees, transients, 

holdees, and students.24

Minimize the disruption to Army National Guard capabilities and reserve 

component unit readiness resulting from reductions. According to Army 

officials, the Army sought to minimize disruption to Army National Guard 

capabilities needed for state missions and reserve component unit 

readiness when implementing end strength reductions by relying on the 

components to develop recommendations for making those reductions. 

Army officials also told us that the reserve components have better 

visibility into their ability to recruit personnel into specific positions, or the 

potential impact that reductions would have on the Army National Guard’s 

domestic missions. The Army plans to eliminate approximately 34,000 

positions from its reserve component—of which nearly 27,000 will be from 

its non-combat formations. Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

officials agreed with the Army’s assessment and said that they have 

developed their own processes for assessing where they can best reduce 

or reallocate positions within their respective components and still meet 

Army mission requirements.

 23 Active component soldiers not assigned to units are counted as part of the Army’s end 

strength, separately from its operating force and generating force. Soldiers in these 

accounts include soldiers in training, cadets attending military academies, injured soldiers, 

or soldiers en route to a new permanent duty station.

24 The Army National Guard does not have Transients, Trainees, Holdees, and Students 

personnel accounts.
Page 13 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Given the focus on retaining combat units and the constraints senior 

leaders placed on changing the Army’s generating force; its trainees, 

transients, holdees, and students accounts; and its reserve components, 

the Army will take proportionately more positions from its enabler units 

than from its combat units as it reduces end strength to 980,000 soldiers. 

Specifically, in fiscal year 2011 enabler unit positions constituted 42 

percent of the Army’s planned end strength (470,000 positions), but the 

Army intends for 44 percent of its reductions (58,000 positions) to come 

from its enablers. In contrast, the Army’s combat units constitute 29 

percent of the Army’s end strength (319,000 positions), but will account 

for 22 percent of the planned reductions (29,000 positions). When 

evaluating enabler unit requirements, the Army focused its attention on 

those capabilities that were less utilized across a 13-year timeline 

covered by the Army’s planning scenarios. The Army did not consider 

reductions for capabilities it determined were critical, such as its Patriot 

and field artillery units, and reduced the size of or eliminated enabler units 

that were judged less critical, such as military police, transportation, 

chemical, and explosive ordnance disposal units.

Determining the appropriate amount of enabler capacity has been a 

persistent problem for the Army. We issued several reports during the 

2000s reviewing Army plans and efforts to redesign its combat force, an 

effort known as “modularity.”25 In those reports, we found that the Army 

persistently experienced shortfalls for both key enabler equipment and 

personnel as it restructured its combat units into brigade combat teams. 

Between 2005 and 2008 we made 20 recommendations addressing the 

Army’s challenges in creating a results-oriented plan as it transformed its 

force, developing realistic cost estimates, and completing a 

comprehensive assessment of the force as it was being implemented.26

For example, in 2006, we made 2 recommendations that the Army 

develop a plan to identify authorized and projected personnel and 

equipment levels and that it assess the risks associated with any 

 25 The Army decided to organize the modular force under a generally smaller two-battalion 

brigade combat team formation, which was expected to be equally or more effective by 

incorporating key enablers into the combat units. 

26 The Army generally agreed with 18 of these recommendations but implemented only 3 

of them.

The Army Plans to Reduce 

a Greater Proportion of 

Enabler Units
Page 14 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

shortfalls.27 The Army generally agreed with both recommendations but 

ultimately did not implement them. In our 2014 report, we found that the 

Army’s report to Congress assessing its implementation of modularity did 

not fully identify the risks of enabler shortfalls or report its mitigation 

strategies for those risks.28

Army officials told us that, based on senior leaders’ professional military 

judgment, concentrating reductions in enabler units is more acceptable 

than further reducing the Army’s combat units because combat unit 

shortfalls are more challenging to resolve than enabler unit shortfalls. 

Prior Army analysis showed that it would take a minimum of 32 months to 

build an Armored BCT and Army officials said that the Army cannot 

contract for combat capabilities in the event of a shortfall in BCTs. In 

contrast, officials said that some types of enabler units could be built in as 

few as 9 months. Additionally, a senior Army leader stated that the Army 

has successfully contracted for enabler capabilities during recent 

conflicts.

The Army did not comprehensively assess mission risk (risk to the 

missions in DOD’s defense planning guidance) associated with its 

planned force structure because it did not assess mission risk for its 

enabler units. As a result, the Army was not well positioned to develop 

and evaluate mitigation strategies for unit shortfalls.

In assessing its requirements for aviation brigades and BCTs, the Army 

determined where combat units in its planned force structure would be 

unable to meet mission requirements given current Army practices in 

deploying forces to meet mission demands. Notably, the analysis 

 27 Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More Visibility Regarding 

Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation Plans, GAO-06-745 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 6, 2006).

28 Army Modular Force Structure: Annual Report Generally Met Requirements, but 

Challenges in Estimating Costs and Assessing Capability Remain, GAO-14-294 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2014).

The Army Did Not 

Comprehensively 

Assess Mission Risk 

Associated with Its 

Planned Force 

Structure

Army Assessed Mission 

Risk for Its Combat Forces
Page 15 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

assumed that sufficient enabler capability would be available. Using the 

Army’s scenarios derived from defense planning guidance, the Army 

estimated how well different numbers of each type of unit would meet 

projected demands over time, which allowed it to compare how different 

aviation and BCT force structures would perform. As we reported in 2015, 

the Army analyzed the risk of its aviation brigades to meeting 

requirements based on the timing, scope and scale of missed demands, 

and made key decisions to reshape its aviation force structure based in 

part on this mission risk analysis.29

The Army used the same type of analysis to compare different quantities 

of BCTs. The Army analyzed how many, and what types, of BCTs would 

be needed to meet the mission demands of certain scenarios within the 

defense planning guidance. The Army’s analysis focused on four different 

BCT levels, including a high of 60 BCTs at 1.045 million soldiers and the 

low Army officials said was considered by the Strategic Choices and 

Management Review of 36 BCTs at 855,000 soldiers. As it did when 

analyzing aviation requirements the Army assessed the timing, scope and 

scale of missed demands, given current DOD policies and practices 

governing the length and frequency of military deployments. The Army 

also assessed how it could mitigate risk to a major combat operation 

through strategies such as by changing the deployment schedule, or by 

temporarily reassigning units away from other non-contingency missions 

in near-east Asia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. According to Army 

officials, the Army’s analysis enabled senior leaders to assess risks and 

tradeoffs for this portion of the force in meeting these demands.30 The 

Army did not complete a risk to force assessment for its combat units 

because officials prioritized retention of these combat units and as a 

result the Army’s analysis was intended to determine the number and 

types of these units needed to meet mission requirements.

 29 The Army determined that a force with 22 aviation brigades would be sufficient to meet 

most mission demands. GAO-15-430R.

30 The Army’s analysis concluded that a force structure with a minimum of 52 BCTs would 

be sufficient to meet most mission demands. TRADOC Analysis Center, Army End 

Strength Analysis – Analysis Supporting Army End Strength Reduction Decisions, TRACF-TR-14-012 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: May 14, 2014).

Risk Within the Context of Force 

Development 

Mission risk: mission risk is the ability of the 

Army to meet the demands of the National 

Defense Strategy as operationalized in DOD’s 

defense planning guidance. Generally, 

mission risk can be measured by sufficiency 

(the ability of supply to meet demand) and 

effectiveness (the availability of the best unit 

to accomplish a mission).

Risk to the force: risk to the health of the 

force caused by issues such as increased 

frequency of deployment with less time at 

home, or early and extended deployments. It 

is related but not equivalent to mission risk 

because it can impact morale and unit 

effectiveness.

Source: GAO analysis of Army documentation | GAO-16-327
Page 16 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

In contrast to the mission risk assessment the Army conducted for its 

combat units (risk to the Army’s ability to meet the missions in DOD’s 

defense planning guidance), the Army assessed risk to the force for its 

enabler units in its most recent TAA (risk to the health of the Army’s 

enabler units). Assessing risk to the force entails determining how 

frequently and for how long individual types of enabler units would need 

to deploy to meet the maximum amount of demands possible, given the 

previously identified combat force structure, and does not entail 

identifying missed mission demands or documenting unresourced unit 

requirements. The Army then determined the length of time at home for 

each type of enabler assessed, and compared the result with that for the 

Army as a whole, in order to determine the level of stress (“risk”) on that 

type of unit. The Army’s analysis necessitates making key assumptions 

about how enablers would be used, some of which contrasted from 

current DOD deployment practices. For example, the Army assumed 

active component enabler units could be deployed indefinitely, which may 

overstate their availability unless the Secretary of Defense authorizes 

indefinite operational deployment. Similarly, the Army assumed that it 

could deploy its reserve component enabler units more frequently than 

DOD’s current policy allows.31

Army officials told us that assessing risk to the force for its enablers is 

useful because the Army can identify the units it would use the most and 

those that it would use least. Based on its analyses of the frequency and 

length of deployments for each type of enabler unit assessed, the Army 

developed and prioritized options to mitigate risk to the enabler force. 

These options included adding structure to more utilized units and taking 

reductions from or divesting less-utilized enabler units. For example, the 

Army’s analyses showed that one type of engineer unit spent far less time 

at home than the Army’s other units during a contingency, and so the 

Army added an additional engineer unit to its structure to mitigate this 

stress. In contrast, the Army determined that it had excess support 

maintenance companies in its force structure and decided to eliminate 6 

of these units.

 31 See, for example, DOD Instruction 1235.12, Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)

(Feb. 4, 2010, incorporating Change 1, Apr. 4, 2012) which limits involuntary mobilization 

of reserve component forces for a maximum of 12 months at any one time and with no 

less than 4 years before the unit can be mobilized again.

Army Assessed Risk to the 

Force for Enabler Units,

but Did Not Assess 

Mission Risk
Page 17 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Additionally, the Army analyzed its enabler units to identify which units 

would be needed during the first 75 days of a conflict. Army officials used 

war plans to identify the minimum number of each type of enabler unit 

that would be needed to execute the war plan and then compared that 

requirement to the number of those units that would be available to meet 

those requirements. Army officials told us that assessing early 

deployment requirements is useful because the Army can assess whether 

it needs to move units from its reserve component to its active component 

in order to ensure that early deployment requirements can be met. 

Assessing risk to the force and early deployment requirements does not 

identify potential mission shortfalls in the enabler inventory, however, and 

these shortfalls could lead to missed mission demands. When the Army 

has conducted mission risk assessments for its enabler units outside of 

TAA it has been able to identify and mitigate risk. In May 2014, the 

TRADOC Analysis Center completed mission risk assessments for 

certain types of artillery units, air and missile defense, and truck units, 

among other units. These analyses showed that some types of units were 

unable to meet projected mission demands and provided information 

needed for the Army to develop mitigation strategies. For example, the 

Army’s assessment of artillery units identified unmitigated mission risk 

and determined that these units could meet only about 88 percent of 

demands during a major contingency. To address this risk, Army officials 

said that they recommended a change to the Army’s deployment 

practices for these units to allow one type of unit to be substituted for 

another. This change would enable these units to meet approximately 94 

percent of mission demands during a major contingency. Similarly, in 

another example, the Army’s assessment of its truck units found that 

planned reductions could limit the Army’s ability to transport troops 

around the battlefield, among other risks. The Army intends to add 4 

medium truck companies to its force structure by the end of fiscal year 

2019 in part to address this risk.

In its January 2016 report, the National Commission on the Future of the 

Army identified enabler capabilities that in its view needed further risk 

assessment and risk mitigation. As previously discussed, Army leaders 

decided to reduce enabler units they judged less critical, such as military 

police, transportation, chemical, and explosive ordnance disposal units, in 

part to preserve the Army’s combat force structure. However, the National 

Commission on the Future of the Army identified some of these same 

units as having shortfalls—including units that provide transportation, 

military police, and chemical capabilities. The Commission recommended 
Page 18 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

that the Army complete a risk assessment and assess plans and 

associated costs of reducing or eliminating these shortfalls.32

Army guidance indicates that the Army’s TAA process should assess 

mission risk for its combat and enabler force structure, but the Army did 

not complete a mission risk assessment during its most recent TAA. In 

addition, its TAA process is not being implemented in a manner that 

would routinely prepare such an assessment. According to the Army’s 

force development regulation, the Army’s TAA process is intended to 

determine the requirements for both the Army’s combat and enabler force 

structure to meet the missions specified in defense planning guidance, 

document unresourced requirements, and analyze risk given resource 

constraints.33 When assessing risk, the Army’s risk management 

guidance states that the Army should identify conditions that create the 

potential for harmful events and analyze how such conditions could cause 

mission failure. Within this context, Army officials told us that the TAA 

process should assess mission risk by assessing how the Army’s combat 

and enabler force structure could lead to a failure to meet the missions 

specified in defense planning guidance. According to the Army’s risk 

management guidance, once the Army identifies mission risk, it then 

should analyze and prioritize strategies to mitigate identified risk.

In the near term, although the Army’s guidance and risk management 

framework indicate the Army should complete a mission risk assessment 

for its combat and enabler force structure, the Army did not do so during 

its most recent TAA for its enabler units, instead assessing the risk to the 

force and early deployment requirements for these units. Army officials 

stated that they did not complete this assessment because the Army 

assessed how ongoing demands affected the health of the Army’s force 

and not the mission risk associated with shortfalls. However, our review 

 32 In light of the significant changes to the Army’s force structure, Congress established 

the National Commission on the Future of the Army in the Carl Levin and Howard P. 

“Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. The commission 

was directed to evaluate the size and force mix of the Regular Army, Army National 

Guard, and Army Reserve and make recommendations where appropriate. The 

Commission was also directed to study the Army’s planned transfer of Apache helicopters 

from the Army National Guard to the Regular Army as part of the Army’s aviation 

restructuring initiative. National Commission on the Future of the Army, Report to the 

President and the Congress of the United States (Jan. 28, 2016).

33 See Army Regulation 71-32 and Army Regulation 71-11.

TAA Does Not Routinely 

Assess Mission Risk for 

Both Combat and Enabler 

Force Structure
Page 19 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

found that the Army’s guidance does not require that the Army complete 

an assessment of the risk to force.

Army officials are currently revising the Army regulation that documents 

its force development processes, but the draft does not currently include 

a requirement that the TAA process assess mission risk for the Army’s 

combat and enabler force structure. Without an assessment of the 

mission risk associated with the planned enabler force structure 

documented in the Army’s October 2015 Army Structure Memorandum, 

the Army has an incomplete understanding of the risks that may arise 

from the potential shortfalls in its enabler inventory. Accordingly, the Army 

is not well positioned to develop strategies to mitigate these risks. Army 

officials told us the next opportunity to complete this mission risk 

assessment and develop mitigation strategies would be as part of its 

ongoing TAA for fiscal years 2019 through 2023.

Furthermore, the Army is required to complete TAA every year and as 

currently implemented its TAA process does not include the modeling and 

analyses needed to routinely prepare a mission risk assessment for its 

combat and enabler force structure. Army officials told us that they 

recognize a need to expand TAA to include mission risk assessments for 

a set of the Army’s enabler units, consider potential strategies to mitigate 

this risk, and implement such strategies; but have not revised TAA to 

include these elements. Without expanding the TAA process to routinely 

require a mission risk assessment for the Army’s combat and enabler 

force structure as part of future iterations of TAA, the Army will continue 

to not be well positioned to identify mission risk and develop mitigation 

strategies when making future force structure decisions.

Facing end strength reductions, the Army made a decision to retain 

combat capabilities to provide maximum warfighting capability and 

flexibility. However, the Army’s planned force structure is based on an 

incomplete assessment of mission risk across its combat and enabler 

force structure because it did not assess this type of risk for its enabler 

units. As a result the Army did not comprehensively assess whether its 

force structure will be able to meet the missions specified in defense 

planning guidance and, in the absence of that risk assessment, was not 

well positioned to assess mitigation options when making recent force 

structure decisions. The Army has an opportunity to more fully assess its 

recommended force structure’s ability to meet mission demands, identify 

capability shortfalls, and develop mitigation strategies to address 

identified shortfalls before it implements its planned force structure. 

Conclusions
Page 20 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Unless the Army completes this type of assessment, it will lack 

reasonable assurance that it has identified and mitigated risk that will 

prevent it from executing the missions specified in defense planning 

guidance. Additionally, by completing a mission risk assessment for its 

planned force before completing its ongoing TAA for fiscal years 2019 

through 2023, the Army will be better positioned to identify improvements 

to its TAA process so that it can complete such assessments on a 

recurring basis moving forward. Unless the Army changes its approach to 

routinely complete this type of risk assessment as part of its TAA process, 

it may not be able to identify and mitigate risk associated with changes to 

its force structure in the future.

To identify and mitigate risk associated with the Army’s planned force 

structure and improve future decision making, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the 

following two actions:

1. Conduct a mission risk assessment of the Army’s planned enabler 

force structure and assess mitigation strategies for identified mission 

risk before Total Army Analysis for Fiscal Years 2019 through 2023 is 

concluded and implement those mitigation strategies as needed.

2. Expand the Army’s Total Army Analysis process to routinely require a 

mission risk assessment for the Army’s combat and enabler force 

structure and an assessment of mitigation strategies for identified risk 

prior to finalizing future force structure decisions.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both of 

our recommendations and identified the steps it plans to take to address 

them. DOD’s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix I. DOD 

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report 

as appropriate.

In response to our first recommendation that the Army conduct a mission 

risk assessment and assess mitigation strategies for its planned enabler 

force structure before Total Army Analysis for Fiscal Years 2019 through 

2023 is concluded, the Army stated that it recognizes the need to conduct 

these types of assessments and that it has modified its Total Army 

Analysis process to include them. As we stated in our report, at the time 

of our review the Army had not yet incorporated these assessments into 

its TAA process. Should the Army complete these assessments prior to 

finalizing its ongoing TAA, it would be better positioned to identify and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 21 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

mitigate the risk associated with its planned enabler force structure and it 

will have taken the steps needed to satisfy our recommendation.

With respect to our second recommendation that the Army expand its 

TAA process to routinely require a mission risk assessment and an 

assessment of mitigation strategies for its combat and enabler force 

structure, the Army stated that it recognizes the need to routinely conduct 

these types of assessments. The Army stated that it intends to formalize 

inclusion of these types of assessments in its process by publishing a 

Department of the Army pamphlet that is currently under development. 

Should the Army modify its guidance to require these assessments, and 

implement its TAA process in accordance with its revised guidance, the 

Army would be better positioned to identify mission risk and develop 

mitigation strategies when making force structure decisions. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional

committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. In 

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix II.

John H. Pendleton

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 22 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 23 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

GAO received DOD’s 

letter on March 28, 2016
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of 

Defense

Page 24 GAO-16-327 Army Planning
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 25 GAO-16-327 Army Planning

John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or Pendletonj@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above, Kevin O’Neill, Assistant Director; 

Tracy Barnes; Katherine Blair; Erin Butkowski; Martin De Alteriis; Amie 

Lesser; Ricardo A. Marquez; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Alex Winograd 

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(352032)
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