Filed 9/10/20 P. v. The North River Ins. Co. CA2/7

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THE NORTH RIVER 

INSURANCE CO., et al.

Defendants and Appellants.

B296412

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. SJ4504)

 

 

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Alison Estrada, Judge. Affirmed.

Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendants and Appellants.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Adrian G. Gragas, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Jonathan McCaverty, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION

Bad Boys Bail Bonds, acting as the agent for The North 

River Insurance Company (collectively, North River), posted a 

bail bond to secure the release of a defendant in a criminal 

proceeding. The trial court ordered the bond forfeited when the 

defendant failed to appear for the preliminary hearing. The court 

entered summary judgment against North River under section 

1306 of the Penal Code. North River appeals, and we affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 3, 2017 the People charged Eduardo Cardenas 

with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).1 North River

posted a $50,000 bail bond to secure Cardenas’s release. 

Cardenas appeared at the arraignment on January 24, 2017,

where the trial court set the preliminary hearing for February 6, 

2017 and ordered Cardenas to return on that date. Cardenas did 

not appear at the preliminary hearing, and the court ordered the 

bail forfeited.

On February 14, 2017 the trial court mailed notice of the 

forfeiture to North River, triggering a 185-day period for 

Cardenas to appear or North River to seek to set aside the 

forfeiture prior to the trial court entering summary judgment 

against North River. (See §§ 1305, subds. (b)-(c), 1306, subd. (a).) 

On August 15, 2017 Bad Boys Bail Bonds filed a motion to extend 

the appearance period, which the trial court granted on 

September 8, 2017, extending the period to March 7, 2018. 

North River did not move to set aside the forfeiture before the 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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extended appearance period expired, and on March 19, 2018 the 

trial court entered summary judgment in the amount of $50,370 

($50,000 for the bond, plus $370 in court costs) against North 

River. 

On October 18, 2018 North River filed a motion to set aside 

the summary judgment, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the 

bond. North River argued the judgment was void because the 

judge who initially declared the bond forfeited when Cardenas 

failed to appear at the preliminary hearing was not the same 

judge who subsequently signed the judgment against North 

River. North River also argued the bond was void because the 

trial court violated Cardenas’s constitutional rights by setting the 

amount of his bail without considering either Cardenas’s ability 

to pay or less restrictive bail conditions. The trial court denied 

the motion. North River timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

A “‘bail bond is a contract between the surety and the 

government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the 

defendant’s appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the 

bond.’” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 653, 657; accord, People v. International Fidelity Ins. 

Co. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 456, 460; see People v. Bankers Ins. Co. 

(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011 [“‘A bail bond is a contract 

between the government and the surety.’”].) Sections 1305 to 

1306 govern bail forfeiture. Section 1305, subdivision (a)(1),

provides a “court shall in open court declare forfeited the 

undertaking of bail . . . if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant 
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fails to appear” for one of the proceedings enumerated in the 

statute. “[T]he trial court is required to declare bail forfeited” if 

the defendant fails to appear. (International Fidelity Ins. Co., at 

p. 460.) Where (as here) “the amount of the bond . . . exceeds four 

hundred dollars ($400),” the clerk of the court must mail notice of 

the forfeiture to the surety. (§ 1305, subd. (b)(1).) The mailing 

triggers a 185-day “appearance period” (180 days plus five days 

for mailing) during which “the surety on the bond is entitled to 

move to have the forfeiture vacated and the bond exonerated on 

certain grounds, such as an appearance in court by the 

accused.” (American Contractors Indemnity Co., at p. 658; see 

§ 1305, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1)-(3).) 

Section 1306, subdivision (a), provides that, if the court has 

not set aside the forfeiture by the end of the appearance period,

the court “shall enter a summary judgment” against the surety in 

“the amount of the bond plus costs.” (See People v. International 

Fidelity Ins. Co., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 460-461 [“If the 

surety fails to obtain relief from the forfeiture . . . the court shall 

enter summary judgment against the surety on the bond, plus 

costs.”].) The Penal Code also requires that, for a surety to post 

the bond, the surety must execute a written undertaking 

acknowledging that, “[i]f the forfeiture of this bond be ordered by 

the court, judgment may be summarily made and entered 

forthwith against” the surety “as provided by Sections

1305 and 1306.” (§§ 1278, subd. (a), 1287, subd. (a).)

Because a court enters summary judgment under section 

1306 “pursuant to a contractual consent in the bond agreement” 

(People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 915, 919,

fn. 2), the judgment “is a consent judgment which is normally not 

appealable” (County of Los Angeles v. American Bankers Ins. Co. 
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(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 792, 795). (See Merritt v. J. A. Stafford Co. 

(1968) 68 Cal.2d 619, 623 [“a judgment on an appeal bond may 

not be appealed by the surety . . . because the judgment against 

the surety is a consent judgment”]; People v. American Surety Co. 

(2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 380, 389 [same]; People v. International 

Fidelity Ins. Co. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1059 [“Summary 

judgments entered on forfeitures of bail are consent judgments 

. . . not usually subject to challenge.”].) However, “[a]n order 

denying a motion to set aside summary judgment on a bail bond 

forfeiture is an appealable order.” (People v. Accredited Surety 

Casualty Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 548, 554; accord, American 

Surety Co., at p. 394; People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co.

(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 588, 592.)

We generally review an order denying a motion to vacate a 

summary judgment following forfeiture of a bail bond for abuse of 

discretion. (See People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2018) 

31 Cal.App.5th 797, 804 [“‘Ordinarily, appellate courts review an 

order denying a motion to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond 

under an abuse of discretion standard.’”]; People v. Financial 

Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 308, 314 [same]; 

County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2009) 173 

Cal.App.4th 538, 542 [“‘[t]he abuse of discretion standard applies 

to the trial court’s resolution of a motion to set aside a bail 

forfeiture’”].) “‘When the facts are undisputed and only legal 

issues are involved,’” however, we “‘conduct an independent

review.’” (The North River Ins. Co., at p. 804; accord, Financial 

Casualty & Surety, Inc., at p. 314; see People v. International 

Fidelity Ins. Co., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 461 [when “the issue 

is one of statutory construction or contract interpretation, and 

the evidence is undisputed, we review the order de novo”].)
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B. Section 1306 Does Not Require the Judge Who 

Declared the Forfeiture To Enter Summary Judgment 

North River argues that, because section 1306, 

subdivision (a), states “the court which has declared the forfeiture 

shall enter a summary judgment” against the surety after the 

end of the appearance period, the same judge who declares the 

forfeiture must also sign the judgment. Here, the judge who 

declared the forfeiture when Cardenas failed to appear for his 

preliminary hearing was not the same judge who signed the 

summary judgment against North River.

“Statutory interpretation requires us ‘to ascertain and 

effectuate the intended legislative purpose.’ [Citation.] We 

consider the provisions’ language in its ‘broader statutory context’

and, where possible, harmonize that language with related 

provisions by interpreting them in a consistent fashion.” (ZB, 

N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 189.) “‘If this 

contextual reading of the statute’s language reveals no 

ambiguity, we need not refer to extrinsic sources.’” (Dr. Leevil, 

LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 478; 

see United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co.

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1089-1090.) “If an ambiguity remains 

after this preliminary textual analysis, we may consider extrinsic 

sources such as legislative history and contemporaneous 

administrative construction.” (ZB, at p. 189.)

North River essentially asks us to interpret “the court 

which has declared the forfeiture” as “the judge which has 

declared the forfeiture.” As this Court held in People v. The 

North River Ins. Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 559 (North River II), 

however, section 1306 “does not state, and does not mean, the 

same judge of the court must enter both” the order declaring bail 
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forfeited and the subsequent order entering summary judgment 

against the surety because “it is the court that has jurisdiction of 

the matter, not a particular judge.” (North River II, at p. 565.)

Since 1966 the California Constitution has defined “a 

superior court” as all of the judges serving on that court. (See 

Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4 [“[i]n each county there is a superior court 

of one or more judges”];

2 People v. Konow (2004) 32 Cal.4th 995, 

1018 [“‘jurisdiction is vested by the Constitution in the court and 

not in any particular judge or department thereof; and . . .

whether sitting separately or together, the judges hold but one 

and the same court’”]; Hamblin v. Superior Court (1925) 195 

Cal. 364, 368 [“‘A court is an instrumentality of government. . . .

A time when, a place where, and the persons by whom, judicial 

functions are to be exercised are essential to complete the idea of 

a court.’”]; North River II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 564 [“A 

court is a single entity consisting of multiple judges or bench 

officers.”].) In 1977 the Legislature added the provision of section 

1306, subdivision (a), stating that the court which3 has declared 

the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment. (Stats. 1977, 

ch. 889, § 3.5, p. 2662.) We presume the Legislature was aware 

of the Constitution’s definition and would have used the term 

“the judge” (or some other unambiguous term) rather than “the 

2 Although article VI, section 4 of the California Constitution

has been amended, the provision defining a superior court has 

not changed. (See Cal. Const., former art. VI, § 4, as adopted 

Nov. 8, 1966.)

3 The that/which rule requires “that” here, but we use 

“which” to be consistent with the language of the statute. (See 

Garner, Garner’s Modern American Usage (3d ed. 2009)

pp. 806-807.)
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8

court” if the Legislature intended to refer to a specific judge

sitting on a superior court. (See Mosser Companies v. San 

Francisco Rent Stabilization & Arbitration Bd. (2015) 233 

Cal.App.4th 505, 514 [“‘[t]he Legislature is presumed to know

existing law when it enacts a new statute’”]; Ramos v. Superior 

Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 727 [“We presume the

Legislature knew what it was saying and meant what it said.”].) 

The Legislature has also used the term “judge” in other statutes 

when it intended to refer to a specific judge of the court. (See, 

e.g., § 1538.5, subd. (p) [“[r]elitigation of [a] motion” to return 

property or suppress evidence granted in favor of a defendant

“shall be heard by the same judge who granted the motion at the 

first hearing if the judge is available”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6, 

subd. (a)(1) [“A judge, court commissioner, or referee of a superior 

court of the State of California shall not try a civil or criminal 

action” if “the judge or court commissioner is prejudiced against a 

party or attorney”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 635 [“In all cases where the 

decision of the court has been entered in its minutes, and when 

the judge who heard or tried the case is unavailable, the formal 

judgment or order conforming to the minutes may be signed by 

the presiding judge of the court or by a judge designated by the 

presiding judge.”].) 

Moreover, to the extent there is any ambiguity in section 

1306, the legislative history demonstrates the Legislature did not 

intend that the judge who entered the summary judgment had to 

be the judge who declared the forfeiture. (See Goodman v. 

Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1335 [even where the meaning of 

statutory language “is plain, it is helpful to look at [the statute’s] 

legislative history”].) Prior to 1927, section 1306 did not provide 

for a summary judgment procedure following bail forfeiture; 
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instead, the district attorney could “proceed by action against the 

bail . . . .” (Former § 1306, added by Stats. 1905, ch. 539, § 2, 

p. 702 and amended by Stats. 1927, ch. 734, § 1, pp. 1385-1386.) 

In 1927 the Legislature amended section 1306 to add a summary

judgment procedure. As relevant here, the original summary

judgment procedure differentiated between courts that had “civil 

jurisdiction to render judgment in an action arising upon a 

contract of similar nature and amount” as the bond (for example, 

a superior court), and those that did not (for example, a 

municipal court or a justice court). (Stats. 1927, ch. 734, § 1, 

pp. 1385-1386.)4 “[I]f the court which ha[d] declared the [bond]

forfeited” had jurisdiction to render judgment in the amount of 

the bond, the court had to “enter a summary judgment against”

the surety. (Ibid.) But if the court which declared the bond 

forfeited did not have jurisdiction to render judgment in the 

amount of the bond, the court had to “deliver to the district 

attorney of the county in which said court is located said bond, 

together with a certified copy of its order declaring the same 

forfeited . . . .” (Ibid.) After the district attorney “file[d] the bond 

and said certified copy of forfeiture in a court” having jurisdiction 

to render judgment in the amount of the bond, the court in which 

the district attorney filed the bond had to “enter a summary 

judgment against” the surety. (Ibid.) By adopting a procedure 

that permitted the district attorney to transfer the bond 

4 California voters did not eliminate justice courts and 

incorporate them into municipal courts until 1994 (see Prop. 191, 

as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994)) and did not 

consolidate superior and municipal courts until 1998 (see 

Prop. 220, as approved by voters, Prim. Elec. (June 2, 1998)). 

(See Persky v. Bushey (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 810, 824, fn. 13.)
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forfeiture to a new court and that authorized the new court to 

enter summary judgment, the Legislature could not have 

intended that the judge who entered summary judgment had to 

be the judge who declared the bond forfeited.

In 1977 the Legislature amended section 1306 “specifically 

to eliminate the administrative difficulties related to transferring 

a matter to another court for entry of summary judgment when 

the first court lacked jurisdiction to enter the summary 

judgment.” (North River II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 566.) 

The amended section 1306 provided that, when the appearance 

period expired after a court declared a bond forfeited, “the court 

which has declared the forfeiture, regardless of the amount of the 

bail, shall enter a summary judgment against” the surety. 

(Stats. 1977, ch. 889, § 3.5, p. 2662.) But this amendment had 

nothing to do with requiring the judge who declared the forfeiture

to enter summary judgment; “the Legislature’s concern was with 

the jurisdiction of the forfeiture court to enter summary 

judgment, not with the identity of the particular bench officer 

making that decision.” (North River II, at p. 566; see Assem. 

Com. on Judiciary, Bill Digest on Sen. Bill No. 1107, as amended

June 2, 1977 [explaining that the purpose of this amendment was 

to grant “jurisdiction to enter summary judgment” to “a 

municipal or justice court [that] orders forfeiture on a bond 

in excess of $5,000,” so that it would not have to “transfer the 

action to the superior court for summary judgment”]; Cal. Law 

Revision Com., com. West’s Ann. Pen. Code (2013 ed.) foll. § 1306

[“Before unification, it was necessary to make clear that a 

municipal court was authorized to enter summary judgment on a 

bail forfeiture even though the amount of bail exceeded the 

jurisdictional limit of the municipal court.”]; see also HLC 
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Properties, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 54, 62 [“the 

Commission’s official comments reflect the intent of the 

Legislature . . . and are entitled to substantial weight”].) North 

River does not cite any legislative history or provide any evidence 

to support its contention that the Legislature also intended to 

protect the rights of the surety in some way by requiring the 

judge who declared the forfeiture to be the judge who entered 

summary judgment.

5

North River relies on a single line from People v. Frontier

Pacific Ins. Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1289 (Frontier), where the 

court stated: “It is clear from the plain language of sections 1305 

and 1306 that the court (i.e. the judge) and the clerk have distinct 

functions.” (Frontier, at p. 1295.) North River argues the 

decision in Frontier reflects the Legislature’s intention to use the 

term “court” synonymously with “judge.” But it doesn’t. In 

Frontier the clerk of the court, rather than the judge, signed the 

judgment against the surety. (Id. at p. 1294.) The court in 

Frontier held that, because “the rendition of judgment is not a 

ministerial act which may be delegated to the clerk,” a “judge 

[must] sign the judgment.” (Id. at pp. 1294-1295.) The court did 

not consider whether the same judge who declared forfeiture 

must sign the summary judgment.

5 In 2012 the Legislature further amended section 1306 by 

removing the language “regardless of the amount of the bail.” 

(Stats. 2012, ch. 470, § 50.) The purpose of this amendment was 

to remove language that was “obsolete due to trial court 

unification.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. 

Pen. Code (2013 ed.) foll. § 1306.)
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C. The Trial Court Did Not Violate North River’s Due 

Process Rights

North River also argues that, even if section 1306 does not 

require the judge who declared the forfeiture to enter summary 

judgment, the court nonetheless violated North River’s due 

process rights “because [the judgment] was entered by a judge 

who did not hear the evidence of the bail forfeiture.” North River 

relies on European Beverage, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 

Cal.App.4th 1211, 1214 (European Beverage), where the court 

stated: “It is considered a denial of due process for a new judge to 

render a final judgment without having heard all of the 

evidence.” As this court held in North River II, supra, 

53 Cal.App.5th 559, however, there is “no due process violation” 

where a new judge simply enters summary judgment based on a 

record reflecting the bond forfeiture, “the expiration of the 

appearance period,” and “the absence of a pending motion to 

vacate forfeiture.” (Id. at p. 567.)

“Both the federal and state Constitutions compel the 

government to afford persons due process before depriving them 

of any property interest.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los 

Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.) 

‘The essence of due process is the requirement that “a person in 

jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the case against him 

and opportunity to meet it.”’ [Citations.] The opportunity to be 

heard must be afforded ‘at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.’” (Ibid.; accord, California DUI Lawyers 

Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 

1247, 1259.) California courts “have adopted the Mathews [v. 

Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893] balancing test as the 

default framework for analyzing challenges to the sufficiency of 
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proceedings under” due process, which requires consideration of 

“the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, 

and the government’s interest.” (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc., at 

p. 213; see Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell

(2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 174 [“[i]n determining whether due 

process was afforded here, we adopt the balancing test set forth 

in Mathews v. Eldridge”].) 

North River is correct that in a court trial “[a] party litigant 

is entitled to a decision upon the facts of his case from the judge 

who hears the evidence . . . .” (In re Guardianship of Sullivan 

(1904) 143 Cal. 462, 467-468; see id. at pp. 463, 467 [party was 

entitled to have the judge who heard the evidence and saw the 

witnesses enter judgment]; European Beverage, supra, 

43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216 [party was entitled to have the judge 

who decided the first phase of a bifurcated trial in civil action 

hear the second phase of the trial]; In re Marriage of Colombo 

(1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 572, 581-582 [judge who did not hear the 

evidence could not sign a judgment for dissolution of marriage]; 

Armstrong v. Picquelle (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 122, 125, 127-128 

[in action to dissolve a partnership and for an accounting, a new 

judge could not enter judgment adopting the tentative decision of 

a prior judge who had heard the evidence].) But North River does 

not cite any authority extending this principle beyond a court

trial, and certainly not to the type of summary proceeding 

described by sections 1305 and 1306. And contrary to North 

River’s contention, due process does not require that in every

proceeding where the government deprives a person of a property 

interest, the decisionmaker who renders a final decision must be 

the same decisionmaker who hears the relevant evidence. (See 

Nat. Auto & Cas. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1949) 34 Cal.2d 20, 30 [“it 
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is not a denial of due process for [a] commission to base its award 

on a report of a referee although it does not review the record”], 

disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 989, 1010; Bollinger v. San Diego Civil Service Com. 

(1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 568, 576 [“The use of a single hearing 

officer, whose findings and proposed decision are adopted by [a]

public agency, complies with due process.”]; Strode v. Board of 

Medical Examiners (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 291, 293, 298 [State 

Board of Medical Examiners could issue a decision revoking 

doctor’s license based on a hearing officer’s proposed decision 

“‘without reading or otherwise familiarizing itself with the 

record’”].)

Here, the trial court’s summary judgment against North 

River followed neither a court trial nor a similar adversarial 

proceeding where the parties presented evidence. (See North 

River II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 567 [“Summary judgment 

following a declaration of forfeiture is a consent judgment entered 

without a hearing pursuant to the terms of the bail bond.”]; 

People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2015) 238 

Cal.App.4th 1041, 1047 [“A summary judgment in a bail 

forfeiture is a consent judgment entered without a hearing and 

the proceedings are not adversarial.”]; County of Los Angeles v. 

Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 961, 967 [an action 

“to enforce against a bail bond surety the obligation under a bail 

bond is not . . . an adversary civil action”].) Section 1305 requires 

the court to declare bail forfeited if the defendant fails to appear 

for certain proceedings, here, Cardenas’s preliminary hearing. 

Section 1306 directs the court to enter summary judgment 

against the surety if the forfeiture has not been set aside after 

the appearance period, which the court also did here (after 
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granting Bad Boys Bail Bonds’ request to extend the appearance 

period). The surety has no right to present evidence, and the 

court entering summary judgment does not need to review or 

weigh any evidence or make findings. It simply has to confirm 

from the record of proceedings that the bail had not been set

aside. North River does not cite, much less analyze, the factors in 

Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. 319 to argue why the rule 

in European Beverage should apply to this type of proceeding.

In addition, even in a court trial “different judges may hear 

different phases of a trial . . . upon the stipulation of the parties.” 

(European Beverage, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1215.) 

Similarly, where the parties consent to a general reference under 

Code of Civil Procedure section 635, the trial court appoints a 

referee to make findings and a ruling and subsequently enters

judgment “thereon in the same manner as though the matter had 

been tried by the court” without reviewing the evidence. (See 

Jovine v. FHP, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1522.) By 

agreeing to post bail to secure Cardenas’s release, North River

entered into a contract with the government in which it 

“consented . . . as prescribed by section[s 1278 and] 1287 that 

judgment may be summarily entered against it, so long as the 

provisions of sections 1305 and 1306 have been met.” (County of 

Los Angeles v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 967.) By doing so, North River acknowledged it was not 

entitled to a trial before a judge or jury before judgment. The 

trial court did not violate North River’s due process rights by 

entering judgment here. (See ibid. [“there is under the Penal 

Code both notice to the surety and the opportunity to be heard”

after the court declares bail forfeited, which is “sufficient to 

satisfy the California constitutional due process requirements”].)
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D. The Trial Court’s Alleged Violations of Cardenas’s 

Constitutional Rights Did Not Invalidate the Bond

Citing In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006 

(Humphrey), review granted May 23, 2018, S247278, North River 

in its opening brief argued the bond was void because the trial 

court violated Cardenas’s constitutional rights by setting a bail 

amount without inquiring into Cardenas’s ability to pay the

amount or considering less restrictive bail conditions. In its 

reply brief, however, North River concedes this issue in light of 

the court’s decision in People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2020) 

48 Cal.App.5th 226 (North River I).

We agree with the North River I court that, even if a trial 

court violates a defendant’s constitutional rights when setting the 

bail amount, and even if a surety has standing to assert the 

defendant’s constitutional rights, the bond and a subsequent 

summary judgment entered are not void. First, “[a] judgment is 

‘void’ only when the court entering that judgment ‘lack[ed] 

jurisdiction in a fundamental sense’ due to the ‘“entire absence of 

power to hear or determine the case”’ resulting from the ‘“absence 

of authority over the subject matter or the parties.”’” (North 

River I, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 233.) Where a court “merely 

act[s] in excess of its jurisdiction or defined power,” the judgment 

is voidable but not void. (Id. at pp. 233-234.) Here, the court did 

not lack fundamental jurisdiction over the proceedings; the court 

had subject matter jurisdiction to declare the forfeiture and enter 

judgment under sections 1305 and 1306 and had personal 

jurisdiction over North River. (See North River I, at p. 234.)

Second, as the court in North River I stated, “any 

noncompliance with Humphrey would, at best, render the bail 

order voidable as to the defendant, not as to the surety.” (North 
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17

River I, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 235.) The bail forfeiture 

proceedings arose from North River’s contract with the 

government to act as the guarantor of Cardenas’s appearance. 

(See People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co., supra,

33 Cal.4th at p. 657.) Therefore, the forfeiture proceedings were

“independent from and collateral to” the criminal prosecution,

and any “errors in [the] trial court’s setting of bail during the 

criminal prosecution” did not let North River “off the hook in the 

collateral bail proceedings.” (Ibid; see People v. Accredited Surety 

& Casualty Co. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 891, 897-899 [trial court’s 

“[f]ailure to comply with the procedural requirements of 

Humphrey . . . did not render the subsequently issued bond 

void”]; People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2019) 

39 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1217, 1225-1227 [assuming the trial court 

violated the defendant’s constitutional rights by conditioning bail 

on the defendant waiving his Fourth Amendment rights against 

warrantless searches, the violation did not “vitiate the surety’s 

obligation to comply with the terms of the undertaking”]; People 

v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 

1, 4, 6-8 [trial court’s failure to comply with section 1275 when 

setting bail did “not operate to exonerate a surety’s liability” on 

the bond].)
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DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The People are to recover their costs 

on appeal.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J.

DILLON, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.