Tamarac Holding Corp. v. Laframboise, No. 536-6-17 Cncv (Mello, J., May 25, 2018).

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VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT

CHITTENDEN UNIT

CIVIL DIVISION

│

TAMARAC HOLDING CORPORATION, │

│

 Plaintiff │

│

 v. │ Docket No. 536-6-17 Cncv

│

BERNARD LAFRAMBOISE and │

PAMELA J. LAFRAMBOISE, │

│

 Defendants │

│

DECISION ON BERNARD LAFRAMBOISE’S CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST PAMELA J. 

LAFRAMBOISE

This is a suit to repossess a 1998 Titan mobile home that was purchased in 2003 by 

Defendants Bernard and Pamela J. LaFramboise and which is now owned solely by Pamela. 

Plaintiff Tamarac Holding Corporation also seeks a judgment against both defendants for any 

deficiency that may still be owed after the mobile home is repossessed and sold. 

On March 5, 2018, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Tamarac on its claims 

against Bernard and Pamela. The court held that both defendants are liable on the retail installment 

contract that they signed when they purchased the mobile home, that the contract had been assigned 

to Tamarac, that both defendants had defaulted on the loan, that Tamarac had sent defendants a 

notice of default and notice of right to cure, that neither of the defendants had cured the default, 

and that Tamarac had accelerated the loan, which is now due and owing in full. 

That same day, however, the court denied Bernard’s motion for summary judgment on his 

cross-claim for indemnity against Pamela because there was a genuine dispute over which of them 
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had been responsible for the default. The cross-claims was, therefore, scheduled for an evidentiary 

hearing, which was held on May 17, 2018. At the hearing, Tamarac was represented by Heather 

Z. Cooper, Esq., Bernard was represented by Matthew M. Glitman, Esq., and Pamela represented 

herself. Based upon the credible evidence, the court finds, concludes and orders, as follows. 

At the time Bernard and Pamela purchased the mobile home in 2003, they were married and 

living together. Difficulties arose in their marriage, however, and in February of 2014, Bernard

moved out, leaving Pamela in sole possession of the mobile home. Bernard filed for divorce, and 

in December of 2014, a divorce decree was entered ordering that the mobile home be sold and the 

net proceeds divided 35% to Bernard and 65% to Pamela. The decree also ordered that, pending 

the sale of the home, Bernard “make all mortgage and tax payments” and Pamela “shall pay the 

full amount of lot rent, plus any utilities.” Bernard was also ordered to pay Pamela $400 a month 

in spousal maintenance. 

Pamela made no any serious effort to sell the mobile home, notwithstanding the divorce decree. On 

August 21, 2015, the family court held a hearing on a motion Pamela had filed to enforce spousal 

maintenance. By the time the of the hearing, Bernard had brought his maintenance payments current, 

so the court denied the motion. The mobile home, however, still had not been sold. Pamela told the 

court that she had “put the trailer on [the] market, and had interest, but no offers.” The court ordered, 

among other things, “If no sale by 10/1/15, either party may seek modification with respect to costs of 

ownership of trailer....” At the time the court made that entry, Bernard had made all the required monthly 

payments on the debt to Tamarac for the mobile home. His last payment had been made July 20, 2015. 

Bernard made no further payments towards the Tamarac loan after that date, although he did continue 

to pay spousal support to Pamela.

On November 24, 2015, the family court held a hearing on Bernard’s motion to modify the divorce 

decree. Both parties appeared. After hearing the parties, the court issued an entry saying: “Court 
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modifies Final Order and awards Mobile Home to [Pamela] subject to her obligation to make all payments 

relative to property.” The court added, “[Bernard] is relieved of his obligation to pay mortgage and all 

equity in mobile home is awarded to [Pamela].” By the time the family court entered that order, the 

Tamarac loan was four months in arrears, inasmuch as neither party had made any payment on the loan 

since Bernard’s payment in July. 

Since acquiring sole ownership of the mobile home in November of 2015, Pamela has continued to 

live in the mobile home, but she has made no payments towards the Tamarac loan. Bernard contends 

that Pamela should be required to indemnify him for any payments that may now have to make to 

Tamarac, because Pamela has had the sole ownership and use of the home since November of 2015, she 

was awarded “all equity in [the] mobile home,” she failed for three years to comply with the family court’s 

order requiring her to ”make all payments relative to [the] property,” and, under the court’s order, he 

was “relieved of his obligation to pay [the] mortgage.” Pamela opposes Bernard’s request for indemnity. 

She contends that his request should be denied because under the divorce decree he was solely 

responsible for paying the Tamarac loan until the decree was amended in November of 2015, and he 

caused the loan to go into default by failing to make the August, September, October and November 

payments. 

“[T]he right to indemnity may be implied where ‘circumstances require the law to imply such an 

undertaking.’” Hemond v. Frontier Commc’ns of Am., Inc., 2015 VT 66, ¶ 8, 199 Vt. 259 (quoting City of 

Burlington v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 173 Vt. 484, 486 (2001) (mem.)). As “an exception to our 

longstanding rule barring contribution among joint tortfeasors,” indemnity is “imputed only when 

equitable considerations concerning the nature of the parties’ obligations to one another or the significant 

difference in the kind or quality of their conduct demonstrate that it is fair to shift the entire loss 

occasioned by the injury from one party to another.” Hemond, 2015 VT 66, ¶ 9 (citing White v. Quechee 
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Lakes Landowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 170 Vt. 25, 28–29 (1999); W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 

Torts § 51, at 344 (5th ed.1984)). 

The relationship between Bernard and Pamela was that of husband and wife and equal coowners of the mobile home until December of 2014, when they became divorced and unequal 

owners of the home (35% Bernard and 65% Pamela). That relationship continued until November 

of 2015, when Pamela became the sole owner. Since then, their only relationship has been codebtors on the Tamarc loan. 

Under the original divorce decree, Bernard was obligated to pay the Tamarac loan each 

month until the decree was modified. It was not modified until November of 2015, by which time 

it was four months in arrears due to Bernard’s failure to make the required installment payments 

of $370.04 per month for the months of August, September, October and November of 2015. 

Because he was solely responsible for making those four payments, and because he failed to do 

so, Bernard is not entitled to indemnity from Pamela for the total of those amounts (i.e., $1,480.16). 

However, Bernard is entitled to be indemnified by Pamela for any payments he is required 

to make to Tamarac beyond that $1,480.16. This is because, under the divorce decree as modified 

in November of 2015, Pamela became obligated “to make all payments relative to the property” 

from that point forward. The modified decree also clearly provided that, from November 2015 

onward, Bernard was “relieved of his obligation to pay [the] mortgage.” Because Pamela has been 

solely responsible for making the Tamarac payments since November of 2015, and because she 

has failed to do so, it would be inequitable to require Bernard to shoulder any part of that debt. 

This is especially so in light of the fact that Pamela has had the sole ownership and use of the 

mobile home this entire time, and she was awarded his 35% ownership interest in the home in 

return for her becoming solely responsible for the Tamarac loan. Therefore, Bernard is entitled to 

judgment in his favor on his cross-claim against Pamela.
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Judgment

Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusion, Judgment is hereby entered in favor of 

Bernard LaFramboise on his cross-claim against Pamela J. LaFrmboise as follows: If Bernard is 

required to make any payments to Tamarac Holding Corporation, he is not entitled to indemnity 

for the first $1,480.16 of such payments. If, however, Bernard is required to make any payments 

to Tamarac Holding Corporation in excess of $1,480.16, then Pamela shall indemnify him in full 

for those excess payments.

SO ORDERED this 23rd day of May, 2018.

_____________________________

Robert A. Mello

Superior Court Judge