AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A P u b l i c at i o n o f t h e A f r i c a C e n t e r f o r S t r at e g i c S t u d i e s

n o . 2 5 / J u ly 2 0 1 3

1

Peace Operations in Africa:

Lessons Learned Since 2000

By Paul D. Williams

u Over 50 peace operations have been deployed to 18 African countries since 2000.

u “Partnership peacekeeping,” which involves collaboration between various multilateral and bilateral 

actors and institutions, has become increasingly common. 

u Force generation efforts should focus on deploying the capabilities needed to realize mission objectives 

and not solely on numbers of peacekeepers.

u Peace operations must be seen as part of an effective political strategy aimed at conflict resolution not a 

substitute for it.

u Maintaining legitimacy among international and local stakeholders is a crucial part of achieving success.

u International disagreements persist over the fundamental purpose of peace 

operations, particularly with regard to the use of military force. H I G H L I G H T S

Violent conflict and the power of armed nonstate 

actors remain defining priorities in 21st century Africa. 

Organized violence has killed millions and displaced 

many more, leaving them to run the gauntlet of violence, disease, and malnutrition. Such violence has also 

traumatized a generation of children and young adults, 

broken bonds of trust and authority structures among 

and across local communities, shattered education and 

healthcare systems, disrupted transportation routes and 

infrastructure, and done untold damage to the continent’s ecology from its land and waterways to its flora 

and fauna. In financial terms, the direct and indirect cost 

of conflicts in Africa since 2000 has been estimated to 

be nearly $900 billion.1

 The twin policy challenges are 

to promote conflict resolution processes and to identify 

who can stand up to armed nonstate actors when the 

host government’s security forces prove inadequate.

Whether the focus is on al Shabaab in Somalia, 

the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 

or M23 rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of the 

Congo (DRC), the Janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan, or al 

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al Dine in 

northern Mali, peace operations have been designated 

a leading role in dealing with these “spoiler” groups.2

Following a U.S.-led international withdrawal from 

peacekeeping in Africa after the “Black Hawk down” 

episode in Mogadishu in October 1993, a new wave 

of peace operations were deployed to the continent in 

the late 1990s with the missions to the DRC, Sierra 

Leone, and the Central African Republic. During the 

21st century, 52 peace operations have been deployed to 

18 African countries (see Table). Since 2011 alone, 10 

new peace operations have been deployed in 8 African 

countries. They were conducted by a range of international organizations, principally the United Nations 

(UN), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), 

and the Economic Community of West African States 

(ECOWAS). A small number were also undertaken by 
Paul D. Williams is Associate Professor in the Elliott

School of International Affairs at The George Washington

University. Among his publications is Understanding

Peacekeeping, 2d ed. (Polity Press, 2010).

2

protect civilians; changed the incentives for war and 

peace among the belligerents, sometimes by actively 

coercing spoilers; assisted in the reduction of uncertainty between various conflict parties; helped prevent 

accidents and control skirmishes that otherwise might 

have escalated to war; and facilitated political dialogue 

between belligerent groups.

But these operations have also generated controversy. On the ground, peacekeepers have not always 

extinguished the flames of war, effectively confronted 

illegal armed groups, or managed to protect the civilian 

victims of violence. Moreover, too many peacekeepers 

have been accused of incompetence, corruption, or 

sexually exploiting the people they were supposed to 

protect. At the UN, the Secretary-General told the 

Security Council in August 2011 that tensions and 

arguments will arise because “those who mandate missions, those who contribute uniformed personnel, and 

those who are major funders are separate groups” of 

countries.7

 This has produced a significant mismatch 

between the states making the key strategic decisions 

about UN peace operations and the states risking their 

personnel on the ground. While Western states have 

pushed to establish more and more ambitious operations 

in Africa, they have been reluctant to deploy their own 

soldiers, instead preferring to offer financial, logistical, 

and training assistance. In financial terms, the cost of 

these operations has risen at a time when the recent 

global economic downturn has constricted resources 

(since mid-2008, UN peace operations in Africa have 

cost over $5 billion per fiscal year).

This brief reviews the major strategic and operational lessons learned from the more than 50 peace 

operations deployed to Africa since 2000 with the aim 

of making these and future operations more effective 

instruments of conflict resolution.

Africa’s other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 

and individual states, principally France, South Africa, 

and the United Kingdom.

The United Nations has been the predominant 

peacekeeper on the continent during this period. 

Since mid-2006, it has spent over $36 billion and 

now maintains approximately 70,000 peacekeepers in 

its 11 operations in Africa (plus its Support Office to 

the AU Mission in Somalia, UNSOA).3

 Nevertheless, 

since 2003 the AU has hugely increased the tempo 

of its missions in an attempt to operationalize its new 

principle of “non-indifference.” To that end, the AU 

has authorized more than 40,000 peacekeepers to deploy 

into Burundi, the Comoros, Darfur, Somalia, Central 

Africa, and Mali.4 One important trend has been the 

increasing number of operations that involve collaboration among two or more international institutions, 

most notably involving the UN, AU, EU, and various 

bilateral partners. Such “partnership peacekeeping” 

has become the new norm in Africa whereby African 

states provide the majority of the personnel but other 

actors provide significant forms of assistance in terms 

of funding, training, logistics, and planning.5

Despite deploying into difficult environments 

and being given a long list of difficult tasks, many 

of these operations have proved to be effective tools 

of conflict management.6 Among other things, they 

have assisted states during the risky transition from 

war to peace; helped mitigate humanitarian crises and 

WHAT ARE PEACE OPERATIONS ? 

Peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military), with a 

mandate to: 

 Assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process

 Serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements

 Enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace

This encompasses UN, UN-authorized, and non-UN operations, which may range in size from small observation and security sector reform missions involving less than 50 personnel to multidimensional operations 

involving tens of thousands of soldiers, police, and civilians.
3

Key Lessons

There are many mission-specific lessons to draw 

but seven general lessons bear highlighting:

An effective political strategy is a prerequisite for 

success. Peace operations are instruments, not a strategy. 

To be successful, peace operations must be part of an 

effective political strategy and peace process not a substitute for them. Without a viable political strategy, peace 

operations should not be an automatic response to all 

wars. As former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 

Susan Rice put it, “peacekeepers cannot do everything 

and go everywhere.”8 First and foremost, it is unwise 

to deploy peace operations in active war zones unless 

they are part of a viable political process for managing 

or resolving the conflict. Nor should peacekeepers be 

deployed unless they have active cooperation from the 

host government(s) in question. They should generally 

avoid crossing what has been dubbed the “Darfur line”—

“deploying where there is no (real) consent by the state.”9

If civilians are being systematically massacred by their 

own governments and international society wants to 

stop it, then a military intervention is needed rather 

than a peacekeeping operation.

Strategic coordination is crucial. Contemporary 

peace operations in Africa involve a variety of actors 

(states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations) working in the same environment. 

Strategic coordination between these actors is therefore 

crucial. It will be more likely to occur if policymakers recognize at least three things. First, since different 

organizations will always maintain their own distinct 

agendas, coordination will always be a political not just a 

technical exercise. Second, policymakers need to ensure 

that the relevant actors—especially states contributing personnel and members of the authorizing institution—share a similar vision of the operation’s purpose, 

mandate, and rules of engagement (ROE). Third, in 

Africa, the practical focus of many strategic coordination issues will be developing sensible divisions of labor 

in the complicated UN-AU-EU-U.S. nexus. While 

the United Nations remains the single most important 

organization for conducting peace operations in Africa, 

the African Union, European Union, and United States 

are all playing more significant roles. These partnerships must figure out how to respect the AU’s political 

authority but avoid the trap of overestimating its current capabilities with regard to deploying and sustaining 

peace operations in the field. A key priority is to clarify 

the relationship between Africa’s RECs, the regional 

standby forces, the new “African Capacity for Immediate 

Response to Crises” (AICRC),10 and the AU’s Peace 

and Security Council.

Ends and means must be in synch. Peace operations are unlikely to succeed if they are not given the 

resources necessary to achieve their goals. There are 

at least two dimensions to this issue. First, the goals of 

an operation should be set out in clear, credible, and 

flexible mandates with appropriate ROE. For example, 

policymakers should avoid replicating the strategic headache handed to MONUC/MONUSCO in the DRC, 

which was told to assist successive Congolese governments and their security forces and protect civilians, 

when the former were often a major threat to the latter. 

And AMISOM was handed the herculean challenge 

of protecting a transitional government in Mogadishu 

that was internationally recognized but deeply unpopular within many parts of Somalia. Both arrangements 

provided very weak foundations on which to build a 

sustainable political solution.

Second, once mandated, policymakers must prevent large vacancy rates (i.e., discrepancies between 

the authorized force levels and the actual numbers of 

personnel on the ground). Such personnel gaps not 

only hamper a mission’s ability to take advantage of the 

so-called “golden hour” immediately after the cessation 

of fighting but also signal to the conflict parties a lack 

of political will within the authorizing organizations. 

Large vacancy rates have damaged the performance of 

several peace operations, perhaps most notably during 

UNAMID’s first year in Sudan and AMISOM’s first 3 

years in Mogadishu. Reducing vacancy rates would be 

easier if the UN and AU developed a broader pool of 

reliable troop- and police-contributing countries, and 

found more effective ways of finding strategic lift capabilities to ferry personnel into the theater of operations.11

Define and deliver “robust” operations. In 2000, 

the “Brahimi Report” concluded that once deployed, 

peace operations must be based on robust doctrine, force 

posture, and ROE that do not “cede the initiative to 

their attackers.” This would enable missions to achieve 

their mandated tasks as well as deter antagonistic parties from using force against peacekeepers and civilians. 

In practice, however, numerous peace operations have 

“it is unwise to deploy peace 

operations in active war zones unless 

they are part of a viable political 

process for managing or resolving the 

conflict”
4

Tab l e . P eac e Ope rat i o ns i n A f r i ca S i n c e 2 0 0 0

Co l o r K e y

Mission Location Dates Uniformed Personnel 

(Maximum Deployed)

MINURSO Western Sahara 1991-present 237

ECOMOG Sierra Leone 1997-2000 7,000

MINURCA CAR 1998-2000 1,350

MONUC DRC 1999-2010 c.21,000

UNAMSIL Sierra Leone 1999-2005 17,670

OAU JMC DRC 1999-2000 43

UNMEE Ethiopia, Eritrea 2000-08 4,200

OLMEE/AULMEE Ethiopia, Eritrea 2000-08 43

Operation Palliser Sierra Leone 2000 1,300

SAPSD Burundi 2001-09 754

OMIC 2 Comoros 2001-02 14

CEN-SAD Force CAR 2001-02 300

JCM and IMU Sudan 2002-05 24

ECOMICI Côte d’Ivoire 2002-04 1,500

Operation Licorne Côte d’Ivoire 2002-present 4,000

FOMUC CAR 2002-08 380

Operation Boali CAR 2002-present 450

OMIC 3 Comoros 2002 39

MINUCI Côte d’Ivoire 2003-04 76

ECOMIL Liberia 2003 3,600

UNMIL Liberia 2003-present 16,115

Operation Artemis/IEMF DRC 2003 2,205

AMIB Burundi 2003-04 3,250

ONUB Burundi 2004-06 5,770

UNOCI Côte d’Ivoire 2004-present 10,954

AMIS Sudan 2004-07 7,700

MIOC Comoros 2004 41

UNMIS Sudan 2005-11 10,519

EUSEC-CONGO DRC 2005-present 50

EU Support to AMIS 2 Sudan 2005-07 50

EUFOR-RDCongo DRC 2006 2,275

AMISEC Comoros 2006 1,260

AMISOM Somalia 2007-present 17,781

MAES Comoros 2007-08 356

MINURCAT Chad & CAR 2007-10 5,525

Operation Democracy in the Comoros Comoros 2008 1,800

EUFOR-Chad Chad 2008-09 3,700

UNAMID Sudan 2008-present 21,600

MICOPAX CAR 2008-present 2,000

EU SSR Guinea-Bissau 2008-10 33

MONUSCO DRC 2010-present 22,016

EUTM Somalia Somalia-Uganda 2010-present 125

Operation Odyssey Dawn Libya 2011 c.8,000

UNMISS South Sudan 2011-present 7,900

UNISFA Sudan 2011-present 4,250

RCI-LRA CAR-DRC-South Sudan-Uganda 2011-present c.4,500

MISSANG-GB Guinea-Bissau 2011-12 200

ECOMIB Guinea-Bissau 2012-present 629

AFISMA Mali 2012-present 9,620

Operation Serval Mali 2013-present 4,000

EUTM Mali Mali 2013-present 450

MINUSMA Mali 2013-present 12,600 (authorized)

UN Missions UN-Authorized Missions UN-Recognized Missions Non-UN Missions
5

been unable to deter spoilers, protect civilians, and stop 

their own personnel from being killed or taken hostage. 

Considerable progress has been made at both the UN 

and the AU with regard to understanding the political 

and military tasks required to protect civilians and both 

organizations have now developed mission-wide civilian 

protection strategies for several of their operations. But 

greater clarity is required over the obligations of peacekeepers to proactively protect civilians in conflict zones 

and when and how to use military force against armed 

nonstate actors. Operations which envisage threatening or using force to protect the mandate, civilians, 

and their own personnel clearly need to be authorized 

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (This includes 

AU or regional standby force arrangements.) But this 

alone does not clarify what types of military capabilities 

or ROE are most suitable for a particular operation.

Generate specific mission capabilities not just 

numbers of personnel. Force generation has always 

been a crucial component of peace operations. But in 

order to be successful, peace operations must do more 

than deploy certain numbers of personnel into the theater of operations. Rather, they must achieve particular 

political effects on the ground such as to coerce spoilers, 

protect displacement camps and supply routes, demobilize 

armed factions, or promote the rule of law. Policymakers 

must therefore move beyond a narrow preoccupation 

with numbers of personnel for each mission and focus 

instead on what capabilities are necessary to generate 

the desired political effects. The more complex the tasks 

given to peacekeepers the more specialist capabilities 

they will require. Among the most important for multidimensional operations are engineer and medical units, 

sophisticated communications and logistics capabilities, 

field intelligence, and formed police units12 as well as 

special forces. To this list should be added the general 

need for more female peacekeepers (see below) and 

appropriate vehicles, particularly armored personnel 

carriers, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Legitimacy matters. In peace operations, maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the relevant audiences—including the conflict parties, local civilians, international 

NGOs, and foreign governments—is a crucial part of 

achieving success. Importantly, peacekeepers are never 

in total control of their legitimacy because it depends on 

the perceptions of other actors. The situation is made 

more complex because the relevant constituencies may 

well come to different conclusions about the legitimacy 

of the same actor or action. Operations perceived as 

legitimate by these key audiences will be more likely 

to achieve their objectives, not least because force 

generation will be easier and locals will support the 

force, including by providing peacekeepers with good 

intelligence. Operations perceived as illegitimate will 

struggle on both counts, as AMISOM, MINURCAT, 

and MONUSCO have all discovered at various points 

in their operations. Irrespective of the specific details 

of the mandate, a peace operation’s legitimacy can be 

eroded by various forms of behavior, most notably when 

peacekeepers are accused of committing war crimes (e.g., 

AMISOM), failing to protect civilians from violence 

(e.g., AMIS, MONUC/MONUSCO), corruption 

(e.g., MONUC, AMISOM), and sexual exploitation 

and abuse (e.g., MONUC, UNMIL). The potential for 

illegitimate behavior will be reduced if peacekeepers 

are well trained to cope with the challenges they are 

A c r o n y m K e y

•	AFISMA = African-Led International Support

Mission in Mali

•	AMIB = African Mission in Burundi

•	AMIS = African Union (AU) Mission in Sudan

•	AMISEC = AU Mission for Support to the

Elections in The Comoros

•	AMISOM = AU Mission in Somalia

•	AULMEE = AU Liaison Mission to Ethiopia and

Eritrea

•	CEN–SAD = Community of Sahel–Saharan

States

•	ECOMIB = Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) Mission in GuineaBissau

•	ECOMICI = ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire

•	ECOMIL = ECOWAS Mission in Liberia

•	ECOMOG = ECOWAS Monitoring Group

•	EU SSR = European Union (EU) Security

Sector Reform

•	EUFOR = EU Force

•	EUFOR-RD Congo = EU Force Democratic

Republic of the Congo

•	EUSEC-Congo = EU Advisory and Assistance

Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo

•	EUTM Somalia = EU Training Mission in

Somalia

•	EUTM Mali = EU Training Mission in Mali

•	FOMUC = Multinational Force in the Central

African Republic (CAR)

•	IEMF = Interim Emergency Multinational Force

•	IMU = International Monitoring Unit

•	JMC = Joint Military Commission

•	MAES = AU Electoral and Security Assistance

Mission to The Comoros

•	MICOPAX = Mission for the Consolidation of

Peace in CAR

•	MINUCI = United Nations (UN) Mission in Côte

d’Ivoire

•	MINURCA = UN Mission in CAR

•	MINURCAT = UN Mission in CAR and Chad

•	MINURSO = UN Mission for the Referendum in

Western Sahara

•	MINUSMA = UN Stabilization Mission in Mali

•	MIOC = AU Observer Mission in The Comoros

•	MISSANG-GB = Angolan Technical and Military

Assistance Mission in Guinea-Bissau

•	MONUC = UN Mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo

•	MONUSCO = UN Stabilization Mission in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo

•	OAU = Organization of African Unity

•	OLMEE = OAU Liaison Mission in EthiopiaEritrea

•	OMIC = OAU/AU Mission in The Comoros

•	ONUB = UN Operation in Burundi

•	RCI-LRA = Regional Cooperation Initiative for

the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army

•	SAPSD = South African Protection Support

Detachment

•	UNAMID = AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur

•	UNAMSIL = UN Mission in Sierra Leone

•	UNISFA = UN Interim Security Force for Abyei

•	UNMEE = UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

•	UNMIL = UN Mission in Liberia

•	UNMIS = UN Mission in Sudan

•	UNMISS = UN Mission in South Sudan

•	UNOCI = UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
6

likely to face in the field, follow similar codes of professional ethics, are adequately paid during their tours of 

duty, and are punished appropriately if found guilty of 

illegal acts. Toward this end, AMISOM, MONUC/

MONUSCO, and UNAMID expanded efforts to incorporate protection of civilians into their missions 

over time enhancing their local legitimacy, respect for 

international humanitarian law, and effectiveness on 

the ground as a result.

Female peacekeepers enhance operational effectiveness. Although female peacekeepers remain a rare 

sight, their presence is increasing. Among the most 

visible have been the two all-female formed police units 

deployed in Africa: by India in Liberia and Bangladesh in 

the DRC. Whether at the UN, AU, or EU, the presence 

of female peacekeepers has enhanced the operational 

effectiveness of missions in several ways.13 Not only does 

the presence of female peacekeepers enhance the gender 

equality goals of these institutions, it also significantly 

enhances situational awareness and acceptance of a 

force by local communities. Local women are also more 

likely to report incidents of sexual violence to female 

peacekeepers, and women’s presence in missions can 

reduce instances of sexual exploitation and abuse carried 

out by peacekeepers. Female peacekeepers can perform 

certain security tasks better than their male counterparts, including sensitive body searches, working with 

women’s prisons, and screening female combatants at 

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration sites.

Policy Implications

In light of these general lessons, a number of practical steps can be taken to address the challenges raised 

by contemporary peace operations in Africa:

Clarify the purpose of peace operations. Greater 

clarity and a wider consensus are required about the 

tasks that peace operations should be able to deliver 

(and those that are beyond them). Currently, the UN 

and AU have divergent philosophies on the purposes 

of peace operations. Based on over 60 years of experience and approximately 70 missions, the UN believes 

“peacekeeping operations” are unlikely to succeed where 

one or more of the following conditions are not in place: 

(1) a peace to keep, where the signing of a ceasefire or 

peace agreement is one (but not the only) important 

indicator of when parties are genuinely seeking peace; 

(2) positive regional engagement; (3) the full backing of a united Security Council; and (4) a clear and 

achievable mandate with resources to match. The UN 

has therefore developed three core principles to govern 

its operations: (1) consent of the parties, particularly of 

the host country government; (2) impartiality; and (3) 

non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of 

the mandate.14 The AU, on the other hand, argues that 

its “peace support operations” must be able to address 

the entire spectrum of conflict management challenges 

and has criticized the UN’s peacekeeping doctrine for 

rendering it unable to enforce peace in ongoing war 

zones, such as Somalia, the DRC, and Mali. Unlike 

the UN, the AU has therefore developed “a different 

peacekeeping doctrine; instead of waiting for a peace 

to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity 

to establish peace before keeping it.”15 Clearly, a workable compromise must be found on the fundamental 

purposes of peace operations. While the AU must find 

the means to generate, deploy, and sustain its operations 

in theaters which the UN believes are not suitable for 

its peacekeeping operations, the UN must find a way to 

effectively respond to crises where the preferred conditions for its peacekeeping operations are not met.

Prioritize peace operations to support effective 

peace processes. Policymakers should put more resources into designing effective peace processes that 

address the causes as well as the symptoms of armed 

conflicts. The merits of deploying a particular peace 

operation should be assessed with direct reference to 

the prospects for constructing a successful peace process. 

The difficulty of conducting effective peace operations 

amid stalled and unsustainable peace processes in Sudan, Somalia, the DRC, and Côte d’Ivoire emphasize 

the importance of this point. Constructing effective 

peace processes is never solely about providing more 

money, although funds spent wisely will usually help. 

Rather, it requires the provision of better and sustained 

mediation from senior political figures as well as greater 

organizational support for them. Yet the UN has only a 

small standby team of mediation experts while the AU 

has none at all. Moreover, mediators and their teams 

who are permanently based in the region concerned will 

be more likely to have a positive impact than special 

envoys who make only fleeting visits to the conflict 

zone in question.

 “greater clarity is required over 

the obligations of peacekeepers to 

proactively protect civilians in conflict 

zones and when and how to use 

military force against armed nonstate 

actors”
7

Design better entry and exit strategies. Knowing 

when and where to deploy peace operations and when 

they should leave are fundamental but underdebated 

questions. With regard to getting in, more thought needs 

to be given to the issue of consent: whose consent is 

essential, whose consent is desirable but not essential, 

and what should be done if these actors withdraw their 

consent or place additional conditions upon it after 

peacekeepers deploy? In particular, policymakers need to 

decide what roles peace operations can play in preventing 

a sitting government from perpetrating atrocities against 

elements of its own population. It was therefore most 

unfortunate that the UN Security Council’s decision 

to authorize military force to protect civilians in Libya 

in 2011 caused such heated disagreements with the AU 

(and arguments within the AU itself). The greater the 

level of international consensus on these fundamental 

issues, the better. A lack of consensus complicates the 

design of exit strategies for peace operations, an issue 

that needs more systematic analysis, particularly on the 

best benchmarks to assess mission performance. This is 

particularly important for operations with state-building 

components to their mandates and those helping to 

strengthen state authority in the face of armed challengers (e.g., AMISOM, MONUSCO, UNMISS, AFISMA/

MINUSMA). Combined with the issue of consent, such 

benchmarks would help clarify how to proceed when 

controversy emerges over how and when to end operations (as has occurred with regard to UNMIL, ONUB, 

MINURCAT, UNMIS, and MONUC).

Invest more and better resources. Failed peace 

operations seriously damage the credibility of the 

organization(s) involved, do a great disservice to local 

civilians, and sometimes even endanger the notion of 

peacekeeping itself. As a consequence, once the decision has been taken to deploy an operation, maximum 

international effort should be expended to ensure that it 

succeeds. In time, a critical mass of successful missions 

will invigorate the peacekeeping brand and strengthen 

the credibility of the UN Security Council and other 

peacekeeping actors such as the AU and EU. Peacekeepers therefore deserve to be given more and better resources to fulfill the numerous tasks they are set. 

Specifically, resources are needed to ensure missions 

avoid overstretching their personnel, assets/capabilities, finances, and headquarters/command and control. 

Shortfalls in personnel and capabilities of the kinds 

discussed above should be relatively easy to overcome 

if the world’s most advanced military powers made a 

more serious commitment of their specialist capabilities 

to UN peace operations. The AU is also figuring out 

its own force generation strategies and how to persuade 

more of its member states to train and then deploy 

their troops and police for AU operations. In relation 

to command and control structures, more experienced 

management personnel are needed within the relevant 

secretariats of the crucial organizations, particularly military planners within the AU. In financial terms, the costs 

have increased as peace operations have been asked to 

carry out more and more tasks, often in remote areas 

with inhospitable environments. The good news is that 

compared to operations conducted by the world’s most 

advanced military states in NATO, peacekeeping by the 

UN and AU is cost effective. In the 21st century, the 

UN has consistently fielded around 100,000 uniformed 

peacekeepers at a cost of around $7 billion a year and is 

now making further savings as part of its Global Field 

Support Strategy. By way of comparison, this is less 

than 0.5% of global military spending and the annual 

estimated costs of fielding just 5,000 troops in the early 

years of the International Security Assistance Force in 

Afghanistan ranged from $600 million to $2 billion. 

Recruit more civilians. Building a self-sustaining 

peace requires more than carrying out specific military 

tasks. It also requires a wide range of civilian skills.16 Contemporary peace operations therefore must strengthen 

their civilian components, especially police and civilians 

with expertise in rule of law, engineering, civil-military 

affairs, and development issues. Both the UN and AU 

are working on enhancing their civilian and policing 

standby rosters and rapid deployment capabilities. But 

much more needs to be done and it is often difficult 

to find significant numbers of well-qualified civilians 

who are willing and able to work in peace operations. 

Three conclusions stand out from these ongoing efforts. 

First, it would make sense to hire more locals to address 

some of the cultural, linguistic, and knowledge-based 

deficiencies that often bedevil peace operations. Second, 

more of them should be women: local women to help 

female empowerment in these conflict zones, as well as 

internationals, in part for the reasons cited above. And 

third, it is important to develop a bigger pool of highly 

qualified senior mission staff, which would go a long 

way to addressing these capacity challenges.

Conclusion

Despite a range of valid criticisms and serious imperfections, peace operations remain a principal tool 

of international conflict management and have helped 

reduce the burden of armed conflict and tackle spoiler 

groups across the African continent. Reform efforts 
8

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports United States 

foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity 

of African states to identifiy and resolve security challenges in ways 

that promote civil-military cooperation, respect for democratic 

values, and safeguard human rights. Toward these aims, the ACSS 

is committed to building networks of African, American, European, 

and international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ACSS, 

the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government.

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

http://www.africacenter.org

Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies

Acting Director: 

Michael E. Garrison

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 20

Fort McNair

Washington, D.C. 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Website: www.africacenter.org

Africa Center Regional 

Office in Dakar

Regional Manager:

Gerald Lefler

Phone: 221 33 869 6158

Email: Gerald.Lefler@ndu.edu

Africa Center Regional 

Office in Addis Ababa

Regional Manager:

Brad Anderson

Phone: 251 11 130 6683

Email: AndersonBG@state.gov

Africa Security Briefs

Director of Research:

Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: +1 202-685-6808

Email: SiegleJ@ndu.edu

ISSN 2164-4047

should build on those elements that are working well 

and change those that have failed. Accordingly, policymakers and analysts alike should work to ensure that 

peace operations are given sensible operational directives, clear mandates, the right capabilities to achieve 

those objectives, and are but one component of a broader 

conflict resolution strategy. The resulting success stories 

would help reduce violent conflict in Africa and address 

the problem of armed nonstate groups. This would, in 

turn, open the door to more dynamic and sustained 

development across the continent.

Notes

1 Based on Paul Collier’s estimate that the cost of each “typical” 

civil war in a low-income country is approximately $64 billion. See 

his, “The benefits of reducing the incidence of civil war,” available 

at < http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/conflict.htm>. A conservative estimate could identify 14 such wars in Africa since 2000 

(in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, 

Somalia, Sudan [twice], and Uganda).

2 “Spoilers” are “leaders and parties who believe that peace 

emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” Stephen 

John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International 

Security 22, no. 2 (1997), 5.

3 The U.S. Government contributed roughly one-quarter of 

this bill.

4 Paul D. Williams, The African Union’s Conflict Management 

Capabilities, Working Paper (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign 

Relations, October 2011).

5 Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams, Peace Operations, the 

African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships

(New York: International Peace Institute, April 2013).

6 Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping 

Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University 

Press, 2008). Scott Straus, “Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa,” African Affairs 111, no. 443 

(2011), 179-201.

7 “Secretary-General’s Remarks at Security Council Debate on 

Peacekeeping,” United Nations, August 26, 2011, available at <https://

www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5473>. 

8 Susan E. Rice, prepared remarks before a UN Security Council 

debate on peacekeeping, New York, New York, June 29, 2009, available at <http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/125798.htm>. 

9 Bruce Jones et al, Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of 

Strategic Uncertainty (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 

April 2009), 12.

10 In light of the AU’s inability to operationalize the rapid deployment concept of the African Standby Force, in early 2013, the AU 

unveiled the AICRC as an interim solution. Drawing from a reservoir 

of 5,000 troops, the AICRC would comprise tactical battle groups of 

1,500 military personnel deployed by a Lead Nation or a group of AU 

member states. Its purpose is to conduct stabilization and enforcement 

missions, neutralize terrorist groups, and provide emergency assistance 

to AU member states. See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission 

on the Operationalisation of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African 

Standby Force and the Establishment of an “African Capacity for Immediate 

Response to Crises” (AU doc. RPT/Exp/VI/STCDSS/(i-a)2013, 29-30 

April 2013).

11 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Broadening the Base of 

United Nations Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries, Providing for 

Peacekeeping No. 1 (New York: International Peace Institute, August 

2012). Birame Diop, David M. Peyton, and Gene McConville, Building 

Africa’s Airlift Capacity: A Strategy for Enhancing Military Effectiveness, 

Africa Security Brief No. 22 (Washington, DC: Africa Center for 

Strategic Studies, August 2012).

12 These are specialized, armored police units trained in public 

order management and consisting of approximately 125 officers from 

a single country.

13 Sahana Dharmapuri, Just A Numbers Game? Increasing 

Women’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Providing for 

Peacekeeping No. 4 (New York: International Peace Institute, July 

2013).

14 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 

Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008).

15 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership 

between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: 

Towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence (AU doc. PSC/PR/2.

(CCCVII), January 9, 2012), 19.

16 UN Civilian Capacities initiative, available at <http://www.

civcapreview.org/>. Cedric de Coning and Yvonne Kasumba, eds., The 

Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force (Durban: ACCORD, 

2010).