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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

GARY SULLIVAN and JOYCE SULLIVAN, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

UNPUBLISHED 

June 18, 2015 

v No. 320612 

Lapeer Circuit Court 

GREGORY HOLMES and PATRICIA HOLMES, LC No. 12-045232-CH 

 Defendants-Appellants. 

Before: STEPHENS, P.J., and BORRELLO and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendants appeal as of right from an order finding that plaintiffs’ claims were not 

frivolous under MCL 600.2591(3) and denying defendants’ motion for attorney fees. For the 

reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm. 

 This appeal arises from a dispute involving the use of a driveway between neighbors in 

Lapeer County. The driveway in dispute was located in part of a parcel of land commonly 

referred to in the trial court as “Parcel D.” Plaintiffs reside on Parcel E, which lies to the north 

and east of Parcel D. Plaintiffs used the driveway on Parcel D since the early 1980s to access 

their home. On May 4, 2012, defendants erected a gate on the boundary between Parcel D and 

Parcel E, which plaintiffs alleged prevented them from accessing their property. Plaintiffs filed 

their initial complaint, alleging a right to continue to use the driveway by way of an easement by 

necessity, and they also claimed an easement over the driveway by way of adverse possession 

and easement by prescription. 

 Defendants argued that plaintiffs were able to access their property by other means, 

pointing to a driveway which had been under construction some period of time. Additionally, 

defendants argued that plaintiffs could not prevail under any of the theories advanced in their 

complaints. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with defendants and awarded them summary 

judgment. In addition to seeking summary judgement however, defendants also alleged that they 

were entitled to attorney fees for having to defend against what they labeled as frivolous claims. 

The trial court disagreed, holding: 

It is this Court’s opinion that in the case at bar, although the causes of action 

asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint were certainly not strong enough to withstand a 

dismissal on summary disposition, this Court determines that the claims did not 

meet any of the definitional requirements of being frivolous under the court rules 
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or statute. Therefore, the Court determines that defendants are not entitled to an 

award of attorney fees or costs under MCR 2.114, MCR 2.625 or MCL 600.2591. 

However, this Court will sign defendants’ order granting motion for summary 

disposition . . . . The motion for attorney fees and costs is considered and denied. 

On appeal, defendants first argue that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs’ 

claims for adverse possession and easement by prescription were not frivolous. Specifically, 

defendants contend that plaintiffs did not have a reasonable factual basis to assert these claims 

where the record evidence demonstrated that plaintiffs’ use of the driveway on Parcel D was 

permissive. “A trial court’s findings with regard to whether a claim or defense was frivolous, 

and whether sanctions may be imposed, will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.” 

1300 LaFayette East Cooperative, Inc v Savoy, 284 Mich App 522, 533-534; 773 NW2d 57 

(2009), citing Kitchen v Kitchen, 465 Mich 654, 661; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). “A decision is 

clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with 

a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 1300 LaFayette, 284 Mich App at 

534, citing Kitchen, 465 Mich at 661-662. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial 

court’s decision with regard to the granting or denial of attorney fees. Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 

519, 526; 751 NW2d 472 (2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision 

is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id., citing Maldonado v Ford 

Motor Co, 476 Mich 373, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). 

 The guiding law in Michigan on frivolous claims is MCL 600.2591, which provides in 

pertinent part as follows: 

 (1) Upon motion of any party, if a court finds that a civil action or defense 

to a civil action was frivolous, the court that conducts the civil action shall award 

to the prevailing party the costs and fees incurred by that party in connection with 

the civil action by assessing the costs and fees against the nonprevailing party and 

their attorney. 

 (2) The amount of costs and fees awarded under this section shall include 

all reasonable costs actually incurred by the prevailing party and any costs 

allowed by law or by court rule, including court costs and reasonable attorney 

fees. 

 (3) As used in this section: 

 (a) “Frivolous” means that at least 1 of the following conditions is met: 

 (i) The party’s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the 

defense was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party. 

 (ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying 

that party’s legal position were in fact true. 

 (iii) The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit. 
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 Challenging plaintiffs’ claims for adverse possession and easement by prescription as 

frivolous, defendants contend that plaintiffs misled the trial court by not informing it of the 

existence of authorizing documents between the parties that rendered plaintiffs’ use of the 

driveway on Parcel D permissive. Defendants further assert that once such actions became 

apparent, the trial court erred in not finding that such actions fell within the confines of MCL 

600.2591(3)(a)(ii) since plaintiffs had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying 

their legal position were true. 

 Review of the trial court record does confirm defendants’ assertion that they were the 

first parties to produce a copy of a 2009 Driveway Authorization Statement signed by both the 

plaintiffs and the defendants. This Driveway Authorization Statement provided as follows: 

 For the sole purpose of engress [sic] and egress to the Sulivan [sic] home, 

Greg and Patti Holmes gives [sic] permission to the Sullivans to travel thru Greg 

and Patti Holmes [sic] property (approx. 80 yards from East side of Holmes 

property where easement road is located) to access Sulivan [sic] Home. Greg and 

Patti Holmes grant this passage way with no consideration or charge to the 

Sulivans [sic]. . . . This agreement is valid for two years and will expire 

4/15/2011. 

 In their brief in support of their motion for summary disposition defendants again alleged 

that there were three different authorization statements that the parties had signed—the 2009 

Driveway Authorization Statement already referenced, as well as two others, purportedly entered 

into in 2005 and 2007—and a January 1, 2004 letter that defendants had given to plaintiffs. 

Defendants provided the affidavit of defendant Gregory Holmes in support of this assertion. 

Defendants also attached the affidavit of Rick A. Smith to the brief in support of their motion for 

summary disposition, and in it he averred that he was present in the spring of 2007 when 

defendants gave plaintiffs permission to use the driveway and the parties signed a Driveway 

Authorization Statement. Additionally, the January 1, 2004 letter was included as an exhibit to 

defendant Gregory Holmes’s affidavit, and provided as follows: 

Mr. and Mrs. Sullivan, 

 I am writing this letter to you for your information. As you know I 

purchased the 10 acres North [and] West of you at [sic] 5/16/97 (formerly the 

Faulk property). The property is stake surveyed, registered and recorded at 

Lapeer Co. Records Office. Since buying I have spoke [sic] with you and O.K.ed 

the passage of you traveling on my property to and from your home to the 

easement drive. 

 At some point in time I may sell, fence, plant trees, etc making your 

passing thru impossible, therefore you may consider finishing your access drive. 

 The determination whether a claim is frivolous is factual, Kitchen, 465 Mich at 662, and 

most importantly, must be made on the basis of the circumstances at the time the claim was 

asserted. Robert A Hansen Family Trust v FGH Inds, LLC, 279 Mich App 468, 486; 760 NW2d 

526 (2008). In order to prevail, defendants must demonstrate to this Court that based on this 
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evidence presented, the trial court clearly erred in concluding that plaintiffs’ claims for adverse 

possession and easement by prescription were not frivolous. Such a finding requires this Court 

to be left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. 1300 LaFayette,

284 Mich App at 534. 

 At the time plaintiffs’ complaint was filed, there were legitimate factual issues about 

whether plaintiffs’ use of the subject property was permissive. In fact, the trial court entered a 

temporary restraining order against defendants forbidding them from blocking plaintiffs’ use of 

the driveway to access their home and pole barn. Discovery and the filing of pleadings 

subsequent to the complaint and amended complaint reflect that the parties agreed to continue to 

allow plaintiffs to use the Parcel D driveway. Additionally, though defendants assert there were 

subsequent agreements regarding the permissive use of the driveway, copies of the purported 

2005 and 2007 agreements that defendants referenced did not surface. Further, plaintiffs 

asserted in the trial court that they signed the 2009 authorization under duress and because they 

felt coerced. Any issue of duress would have needed to be resolved in the lower court. See, e.g., 

Norton v Michigan State Highway Dep’t, 315 Mich 313, 319; 24 NW2d 132 (1946) (“The 

question as to what constitutes duress is a matter of law, but whether duress exists in a particular 

case is a question of fact.”) Moreover, although the 2004 letter from defendants to plaintiffs was 

produced in the lower court and plaintiffs’ counsel conceded its existence at the hearing on 

defendants’ motion for summary disposition, there were potential factual issues at the time 

plaintiffs’ claims were made about whether plaintiffs had even received the 2004 letter. 

Determination of whether a claim is frivolous is very factual, Kitchen, 465 Mich at 662, and 

most importantly, must be made on the basis of the circumstances at the time the claim was 

asserted. With these precedents in mind, the trial court did not clearly err in ruling that plaintiffs 

had “no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying [their] legal position were in fact 

true.” MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii). See also, Robert A Hansen Family Trust v FGH Inds, LLC, 279 

Mich App 468, 486; 760 NW2d 526 (2008). 

 Defendants next argue that plaintiffs’ claims for adverse possession and easement by 

prescription were legally and factually deficient where the record makes clear that plaintiffs 

failed to satisfy the 15-year limitation period for adverse possession and easement by 

prescription. Hence, defendants argue, the trial court clearly erred by not finding plaintiffs’ 

claims frivolous under MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii) (no reasonable basis to believe facts underlying 

parties’ legal position were in fact true) and (iii) (parties’ legal position devoid of arguable legal 

merit). 

 Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous pursuant to MCL 

600.2591(3)(a)(ii) because (1) plaintiffs’ counsel did not investigate the chain of title to 

substantiate plaintiffs’ claims that they had satisfied the 15-year limitation period, and (2) 

plaintiffs knew about the existence of the 2004 letter authorizing their use of the driveway on 

Parcel D. Additionally, defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous and without 

legal merit pursuant to MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(iii) because plaintiffs’ counsel relied on an 

unwritten conveyance of property to support plaintiffs’ claims in contravention of MCL 566.108, 

which provides in pertinent part: 

 Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than 1 year, or for the 

sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or 
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some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and signed by the party by 

whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by some person thereunto by him 

lawfully authorized in writing. 

 Our review of the trial court file reflects that the chain of title to Parcel D was anything 

but clear. For example, at the time plaintiffs’ claims were initiated, it was not clear when 

plaintiffs conveyed away their interest in Parcel D. Plaintiffs asserted in the trial court that they 

conveyed title to Parcel D in 1991, however a writing to evidence that transfer was not produced. 

Defendants accurately assert that the record chain of title reflects that plaintiffs did not transfer 

title to Parcel D until 1997 when a warranty deed to Herbert and Nellie Kershaw was recorded. 

Accordingly, the issue of when plaintiffs’ claims of adverse possession and prescription by 

easement accrued and when the record owners of title, whether defendants or their predecessors, 

were disseised of the property was contested in the trial court and somewhat unclear until the 

time when the trial court granted summary disposition. 

Again, our review of the record does not leave this Court with a definite and firm 

conviction that the trial court clearly erred in finding that plaintiffs’ claims were not frivolous. 

As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs’ counsel is now deceased, so the facts of what he did or did 

not do or what he knew or did not know in investigating the chain of title are open to question. 

Further, while defendants are correct that conveyances of real property must be in writing to be 

valid, MCL 566.108, at the time these claims were asserted, factual issues existed with regard to 

when title to Parcel D was conveyed, and legal issues and questions may have existed with 

regard to whether a writing existed and the sufficiency of any writings conveying the parcel. 

Again, because plaintiffs’ counsel is now deceased, it is unclear what he may or may not have 

known with regard to any documentation of the purported 1991 conveyance of Parcel D. 

 Defendants further assert that plaintiffs’ claim of easement by necessity was frivolous 

because they alleged that the driveway on Parcel D was necessary for them to access their 

property but did not inform the trial court of several key facts. For example, plaintiffs did not 

inform the trial court that (1) they had already begun construction of a driveway on their property 

in 1983 but had abandoned construction of that driveway, and (2) they had a functional driveway 

on their own property leading from their home to their pole barn. According to defendants, 

plaintiffs further misled the trial court by alleging in their initial and amended complaint that a 

portion of their property was comprised of swamp making construction of a driveway on their 

property difficult. Defendants maintain that the court erred in not finding that plaintiffs’ claim of 

easement by necessity were frivolous under MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii) and (iii). 

 As this Court observed in Charles A Murray Trust v Futrell, 303 Mich App 28, 41-42; 

840 NW2d 775 (2013), “[a]n easement by necessity may arise either by grant, where the grantor 

created a landlocked parcel in his grantee, or it may arise by reservation, where the grantor splits 

his property and leaves himself landlocked.” Further, “[t]he scope of an easement by necessity is 

that which is reasonably necessary for proper enjoyment of the property, with minimum burden 

on the servient estate.” Schumacher v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 256 Mich App 103, 106; 663 

NW2d 921 (2003) (emphasis added). 

 In their response to defendants’ motion for summary disposition, plaintiffs asserted that 

they had made attempts to acquire estimates for the construction of a driveway on Parcel E that 
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would lead to their home and the pole barn. Because of the property’s terrain at the northern 

boundary of Parcel E, this work would have required significant fill at a high expense in excess 

of $50,000. Plaintiffs were ultimately able to construct a driveway at the southern end of their 

property that did not have the same issues with terrain. After the construction of a driveway in 

that location, plaintiffs abandoned their claim for an easement by necessity. 

 After reviewing the record evidence, particularly plaintiffs’ counsel’s submissions at the 

hearing on defendants’ motion for summary disposition, it appears that at the time plaintiffs 

initiated their claims there were genuine factual issues in dispute concerning whether an 

easement on Parcel D was “reasonably necessary” for plaintiffs to access their property. Further, 

there were factual issues about where and how a driveway could be constructed on plaintiffs’ 

property. Additionally, to the extent that defendants asserted that plaintiffs had an existing 

driveway that they could use to travel from their home to their pole barn, contrary to the 

assertions of defendants on appeal, the record is not clear that this driveway remedied any access 

issues to plaintiffs’ property. 

 Affirmed. No costs are awarded to either party. MCR 7.219(A). 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola