IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-IA-00059-SCT RAM-KABIR OF AMERICA, LLC d/b/a HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS & SUITES

v. S.C. ANDERSON GROUP INTERNATIONAL d/b/a ANDERSON GROUP INTERNATIONAL DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/23/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. EDW IN Y. HANNAN TRIAL COURT ATTORNEY: ADAM REESE deNOBRIGA COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: MADISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: PAUL MANION ANDERSON SAMUEL STEVEN McHARD ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW W ILLIAM VANDERLOO CLYDE X. COPELAND, III ADAM REESE deNOBRIGA HIRAM RICHARD DAVIS, JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CONTRACT DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 09/08/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE RANDOLPH, P.J., LAMAR AND KITCHENS, JJ. RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. S.C. Anderson Group International, Inc. (“AGI”) f iled two m otions–one f

o r leave to

am end its com

plaint and one to transf

e r to the Circuit Court of Madison County

. The County Court of Madison County granted AGI’s m otion to transf er based on AGI’s averm ents and
argum ent that it w as seeking m ore in d a ma g e s t h an it originally pleaded, specif ically an i ncrease in attorney ’s f

ees. If the am endm ent were allowed, the ad damnum clause wou l d exceed the $200,000 jurisdictional lim it of the county court. Based on the f acts and recordpresented in to d a y ’ s c a s e , w e hold that the jurisdiction of the county court attached at the

tim e the original com

plaint was f

iled. W e reverse the transf er order. W e rem and the case to the circuit court with instructions to transf er AGI’s claim s against Ram -Kabir of Am erica, LLC, back to the county

court. 1
S TATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW ¶2. Although this proceeding h as num erous c o n t e s t e d f acts, what is uncontested is that

at the tim e AGI f

i led its com

plaint, AGI pleaded that the am ount in c o ntroversy was $171,073.63, plus attorney ’s f ees in Counts I and III, and up to $171,073.63, with no claim s f or attorney ’s f

ees, in alternative Counts II and IV. 2 ¶3. In A GI’s m otions f or leave to am end i ts com plaint and transf

e r and at the hearing set f or sam e, AGI pray ed to increase the ad damnum clause and seek a n u ndeterm ined increase in attorney ’s f

ees, while se e k i n g n o increase f or the underly i ng claim

. AGI a rgued that jurisdiction in the county court would be def eated by granting leave to am end the c om plaint.
Ram -Kabir contested both m otions, arguing that the county court could n ot be stripped of its jurisdiction based upon subsequent events and that the m otion to am end was untim ely and in violation of an agreed scheduling order. Af ter receiving a r gum ent a n d w i thout granting the m otion to am end the ad damnum clause, the county court transf e r r e d t h e c ase to the

1 T h e claim

p resen t ly is p en d in g in th e M ad iso n C o u n ty C ircu it C o u rt.

2 T h e co u n ts alleg ed in th e co m p lain t are b reach o f co n tract (C o u n t I), q u an tu m m eru i t (C o u n t II), en f

o r c em en t o f co n stru ctio n lien (C o u n t III), an d d e clarato ry j u d g m en t (C o u n t IV ). 2Madison County Circuit C ourt. R am -Kabir f iled an i nterlocutory appeal of that order, which this Court granted. 3
ANALYSIS ¶4. It is well-established that jurisdiction is a question o f law, which we r eview de novo. Derr Plantation, Inc. v. Swarek , 14 So. 3d 711, 715 (Miss. 2009). “Jurisdiction is decided based on the existing f

a cts at the tim e the action is com m enced.” Bronk v. Hobson , 152 So. 3d 1130, 1 132 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Joshua Properties, LLC v. D1 Sports Holdings, LLC , 130 So. 3 d 1089, 1092 (Miss. 2 0 14)). “To deter mi n e w h e t her a court h as subject m atter jurisdiction, we look to the f ace o f the c om

plaint, e xam ining the nature o f t h e controversy and the relief sought.” RAS Fam ily P artners v . Onnam Biloxi, LLC

, 968 So. 2d 926, 928 Miss. (2007). W e ref

e r to Section 9-9-21 of th e M i s s issippi Code f o r all cases brought in county court. County c ourts “

. . . shall h ave jurisdiction c oncurre n t w ith the circuit and chancery courts in all m atters o f law and equity wherein the am ount of v alue of the thing in controversy shall not e xceed, exclusive o f c o s t s a nd interest, the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00).

. . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 9-9-21 ( Rev. 2014). In this action, jurisdictio n a t t a c h e d w hen AGI elected to f ile its com

plaint in county court f

o r an am ount within the jurisdictional li mit of $200,000. It sought dam ages f or tim e and m aterial in the

am ount of

$171,073.63. 4

3 S ee M .R .A .P . 5

. 4 In ad d itio n to th e t im e an d m aterial claim , A G I p ray ed f o r “p re- an d p o s t-j u d g m en t in terest, s tatu t o ry late p ay m en t p en alty , atto rn ey ’s f ees, co sts, an d e x p en ses.” A ltern ativ ely , in C o u n t I I , i t r eq u e sted “u n j u st en rich m en t/q u an tu m m eru it f o r th e f a i r an d reaso n ab le v alu e o f th e w o rk p ro v id ed b y C o n tracto r, p lu s p re- a n d p o st-j u d g m e n t in terest, statu to ry late 3¶5. AGI argued to the trial court, and the trial court agreed that Walm a rt Super Center

v . L o n g , 852 S o. 2d 568 Miss. (2003) controlled. Walm art , an outlier, is readily distinguishable. The f

irst issue addressed by the Walm art Court was whether W al-Mart “suf f ered ‘actual prejudice’ af ter Long was allowed to am end h er com p laint, requiring the
Court to c o nsider what b e aring the f ederal right to r em oval has o n the state’s policy to f reely allow am endm ents.” I

d. at 570. A signif

icant distinction f

r om today ’s case i s that the county
court g ranted Long’s m otion to am end the ad dam n um clause. I d . at 570. This did not occur in the case sub j udice. Additionally , the Walm art Court devoted alm ost its e n tire analy sis to this issue and the standard o f review bef ore opining that a n a b u s e -of -discretion standard should apply

. Id. Our standard of review in the case s ub judice is de novo. W al-Mart argued that L ong’s a ttem

pt to am end the c om

p laint af t er the e xpiration of the one-y ear tim e lim it on

remo v al was a “‘classic exam p le of f orum m anipulation’” which w ould result in actual prejudice in preventing W alm a rt f rom exercising its right to rem o val. I d . No claim of f

orum

m an i p u l a t i o n h a s been identif ied in the case sub judice. Long argued that there was “no d ilatory m otive o r b ad f a ith f or the delay and assured the c ourt that the d e l a y w a s unintentional.” Id. Collectively , none of these c l aim s, argum ents, or issues is present in the

m atter bef

ore the Court today

. ¶6. The pronouncem ent in Walm art answering w hether county c ourts have “ the authority

to transf er a case t o c ircuit courts by granting an am endm ent that ef f ectively divests itself of jur i s d i c t i on,” was m a de without overruling or citing any of our caselaw Id. at 574. That

p ay m en t p en alty , co sts an d ex p en ses.” N eith er C o u n t I I o r C o u n t IV req u ested atto r n e y ’ s f ees. 4record a nd the f acts which precipitated that decision a re not p resent in the case sub judice (a point c onceded b y AIG at the hearing bef ore the trial court). W e reject AGI’s argum ent that it is com pellin g a uthority in today ’s case, given that our caselaw, spanning m ore than 140
y ears, is contrary

. ¶7. In 1 930, this Court held that “the j urisdiction of the court i s determ ined and f ixed by the a m ount dem anded i n the original suit.

. . . [ T]he criterion of jurisdiction is the am ount of dam ages c laim ed.” Cont’l C as. C o. v. Crook , 157 Miss. 518, 128 So. 574, 577 (1930). In Catchot v. Russell , 160 Miss. 330, 134 So. 140 (1931), that Court, r ely ing on cases decided as f a r back as 1876, held: the principal am ount in controversy in determ ining whether jurisdiction is in the circuit court or the court of a justice of the peace is ascertained as of the dat e o f t h e filing of t

he suit , and that the attorney ’s f ee, provided f

or in the contract, or note, is a p a rt o f the said principal a m ount, and m ay be calculated on the dem and, augm ented by the interest to the d ate the suit was f iled; a nd if the attorney ’s f

ee, thu s ascertained , a d ded t o the f ace of the note, excluding interest, is in excess of

$200, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the cause.
Catchot , 134 So. at 142 ( em phasis added). In Barnes v. R ogers , 206 M i s s . 8 8 7 , 41 So. 2d 58 (1949), 5 the Court held:
In 21, C.J.S., Courts, § 54(b), page 64, we f ind the rule stated to the ef f ect that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount in controversy at the time when the court is first called on to exercise jurisdiction , which in the trial court is the am ount claim ed at the tim e when the suit is f iled, and in the sam e volum e at page 143, § 93, w e f i n d i t s t a ted that it is well established as a general rule th a t j u r i sdiction once acquired is not defeated b y subsequent events, even though t hey are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance

.

5 We n o te th at R a m -K ab ir d id b r in g th i s c ase an d its p ro g en y to th e atten tio n o f th e trial co u rt d u rin g th e h earin g . 5Barnes , 206 Miss. at 8 93-94, 41 So. 2d a t 60 ( em phasis added). That rule rem ains the general rule today

. See J

e fferson v. State , 556 So. 2d 1 016, 1021 (Miss. 1989); William s v. State , 459 So. 2d 777, 779 (Miss. 1984); Bynum v . State , 222 Miss. 632, 6 37, 76 So. 2 d 821, 823 (1955)). See also 2 0 Am

. Jur. 2d Courts § § 9 6, 102, 104 (2015); 2 1 C.J.S. C ourts §§ 32, 98 (2015). Moreover, the C ourt h as held that “‘interest is a thing that is alway s growing,’ and

costs are steadily increasing in the progress of a cause , i f this jurisd i c t i o n does not exist to-day , it m ay t o-m orrow. . . . ‘[ I]t is not p roper’ that a jurisdiction, ‘now becom e im portant, should be f

luctuating.’” Jackson v. Whitfield , 51 Miss. 202, 206 ( 1875) (em phasis added). ¶8. Ram

- Kabir’s f

ocus on Horton v. White , 254 So. 2d 188 ( 1971), s u perseded by statute

a s r e c ognized by H

obbs Autom o tive, Inc. v. Dorsey , 914 So. 2d 148 (Miss. 2005), i s unavailing. W hile the H

orton Court d i d rely on the rule that jurisdiction, once acquired,

cannot b e def

eated by s u b sequent events, H orton is distinguishable. The issue in Horton

was: the county courts of Mississi p pi are without jurisdiction to entertain counterclaim s in excess o f the jurisdictional l im it of $10,000 and, theref ore, the judgm ent of the county court could not b e res adjudicata of the m erits of the controversy a nd the plea in bar was wrongf ully s ustaine d b y t h e court below.
Id. at 189. The c ase sub judice does not involve counterclaim s. Theref ore, Horton is not controlling. ¶9. In today ’s case, j urisdiction attached when AGI elected to f i le its com plaint in county
court. Jurisdiction c annot be divested by upwardly f

l uctuating a ttorney ’ s f

ees. The County

6Court o f Madison County w as not divested of j urisdiction and erred in transf erring the case to circuit court. This claim m ust be transf

erred back to that court. The court which f

irst exercises its jurisdiction acquires exclusive jurisdiction to proceed in the case, e ven though other c o u r ts in the sam e state have concurrent jurisdiction in the m atter. Its authority continues until the m atter is com pletely d isposed of and no other court of concur r ent j urisdiction can interf ere with proceedings.
20 Am . Jur. 2d C

ourts § 83 (2015).
CONCLUSION ¶10. The j urisdiction of the C ounty Court of M adison County attached when AGI f iled its

com plaint. That court’s jurisdiction was not d ivested b y AGI’s claim that its d am ages were increasing since the f

iling o f the com

plaint. Theref

ore, we reverse the county court’s order

t r a nsf erring this case t o c ircuit court, and we rem and this case to the Circu i t C o u r t o f Madison C ounty with i nstructions to t r a n s f e r A G I ’s c l aim s as to Ram -Kabir back to the County Court of Madison County

f or f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶11. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., LAMAR, KING, COLEMAN, MAX WELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, J., SPECIALLY C ONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C .J., LAMAR, KING, MAX WELL AND BEAM, JJ. DICKINSON, P.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

KITCHENS, JUSTICE, SPECIALLY CONCURRING: ¶12. I agree with the m ajority ’s holding that the a ccrual of additional attorney f ees since the f iling o f the com

plaint did not divest the County Court of Madison C ounty of j urisdiction.
As t h e ma

j ority explains, this Court has held that, g enerally , the jurisdiction of the county

7court, “once acquired is not def eated by subsequent events, even though they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction f rom attaching i n the f

irst instance.” Barnes

v. Rogers , 206 Miss. 8 87, 894, 41 So. 2d 58, 60 (1949). I write separately t o em phasize that, because the county court does have jurisdiction over this m atter, that court is em powered to decide whether to award the attorney f ees now c l a i me d by S.C. A nderson Group International (AGI), and if so, in what am ount. ¶13. In Barnes , the county court ordered a sale of property f o r division of p roceeds, and the property was s old f

or $1,200. Id. at 891, 41 S o. 2d 59. B u t a t t h e t i me of the sale, the jurisdictional lim it of the county court was $1,000. Id. In i t s f i n a l d ecree, the county court f ound that the value of the property f ixed in the original bill of com p laint had been $1,000, but that the discovery o f o il near the land since t h e b i ll was f iled had increased the land’s value to $1,200. Id. The f inal d ecree conf

irm ed the land s ale and directed the delivery of the deed to t h e buy er. I

d. This Court rejected a jurisdictional challenge to the county court’s entry o f the f

inal decree o n the ground that “the jurisdiction o f a c o urt is determ ined by the

am ount in controversy

at the tim e when the court is f irst called on to exercise jurisdiction” and, generally , “jurisdiction, once acq uired, is not def e ated by subsequent events, even though they

are of such a character as would h ave prevented jurisdiction f r om attaching in the f irst instance.” Id. at 893-94; 41 So. 2d at 60. T h e Court held that, because the original bill of com plaint had alleged the land’s value would not exceed $1,000 and the increase in its value had occurred af

ter the b ill of com

plaint was f

iled, the f inal decree was valid, and the deed had vested valid title in the buy er. Id.

8¶14. A s i n B a rnes , i n this case, the original com plaint m ade a good f

aith alle g a t i o n o f dam ages within the jurisdictional lim it of the county court, but events that occurred during the litigation c aused the dam ages to i ncrease b ey ond th e j u risdictional lim it. Here, the

a mo u n t o f a t torney f

ees increased during the approxim ately one y e ar o f litigation. 6 It has been held that “if the original petition is within the jurisdictional lim its, but an am endm ent increases the am ount in controversy above the court’s jurisdictional lim its, the court continues to have jurisdiction if the additional am o unt accrued because of the p a s s a g e of tim e.” R odney R . Elkins & Co. v. Im m anivong , 406 S.W .3d 777, 7 7 9 (Tex. A p p. 2013). This is particularly apt in the c ase of attorney f ees that cannot be calculated on the date the

com plaint is f i led. Cf. Surf Cottages Hom eowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Janel Associates, Inc ., 826 A.2d 818, 819 (N.J. S uper. C t. App. D i v . 2 0 03) (holding that a ttorney f ees that c annot be calculated at the tim e the c om plaint is f iled are not included i n the am ount in c ontroversy that determ ines the court’s jurisdictional lim it). Indeed, an estim a t e of the attorney f e e s required to bring the case to resolution depends on m any f actors ordinarily

incapable of

calculation

at the tim e the com

p laint is f iled. Im m anivong , 406 S.W .3d at 779-80. T he Suprem e Court of New Jersey

has observed:
W h at am o unt o f counsel f e es will be incurred as a result of the twists and turns of litigation is not ascertainable at [ the beginning of the litigation]. Those f ees will a ccrue as the case pr o ceeds and will i ndeed not even be calculable until the judgm ent is entered. Thus, f or exam ple, a plaintif

f expecting a quick and inexpe nsive adjudication of his or her consum er com p laint m ay incur h ef

ty f ees as a result of

a hard f ought def ense by a well-heeled def

endant . . . .

6 AGI argues that its attorney f ees increased bey ond its i nitial expectations af ter Ram

Kabir raised a new def

ense that its agents had exceeded the scope of their authority

.

9Lettenm aier v. Lube Connection, Inc. , 741 A.2d 591, 596 (N.J. 1999).

¶15. The accrual d

uring the litigation of attorney f ees not capable of calculation when the

com plaint was f

i led distinguishes this case f rom Wal-Mart Super C

e nter v. Long , 852 So. 2d 568 ( Miss. 2003). In Wal-Mart , Long f iled a personal injury claim in county court seeking $75,000 in dam ages. Id. at 569. More than a y e ar later, she m oved to am end the com plaint

to increase the dam ages claim to $750,000. Id. Long asserted that she h ad h ired new counsel, whose evaluation of the c ase revealed that L o n g’s d am ages were ten tim es what had been alleged in the orig inal com plaint. Id. at 571. The county court g ranted the am endm ent and transf er r e d the case to circuit court on the ground that the d am ages claim ed exceeded the county court’s jurisdictional lim it. Id. at 570. This Court af f irm e d the county court’s actions, holding that “county courts have the authority to grant an am endm ent even though by doing

so [ the court] will divest i tself of jurisdiction and require the m a t ter to be transf erred to either the chancery or circuit c ourts.” Id. at 574. Unlike this case, in W al-Mart the increased dam ages were not attorney f ees that had accrued due t o the passage of tim e since the original

com plaint was f

iled. Rather, in Wal-Mart , the additional cl a i me d d a mages w ere actual dam ages the p laintif

f had incurred bef

ore f iling the o riginal com

plaint. Thus, in Wal-Mart , the a m ount in controversy alleged in the origi n a l c o mp l a i nt was incorrect, and the case properly was transf

erred to circuit court. ¶16. Because the good f a i t h a l l e g a t i o n s o f A G I ’ s o r i ginal com plaint placed this controversy squarely within the jurisdictional lim it of the county c o urt, that court retains jurisdiction over

1 0this case, an d it is e m powered t o award the attorney f ees that have accrued during the litigation. WALLER, C.J., LAMAR, KING, MAX WELL AND BEAM, JJ . , J O I N THIS OPINION.

1 1