DRUG CONTROL

Customs Can Do More

To Prevent Drug-Related

Employee Corruption

Statement for the Record by

Richard M. Stana

Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues

General Government Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Finance Committee

U.S. Senate

Not to be Released

Before

10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday

May 25, 1999

GAO/T-GGD-99-106

Statement

Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To

Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption

Page 1 GAO/T-GGD-99-106

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to submit this statement to assist in your oversight of the U.S.

Customs Service. You asked us to discuss work we have done on the U.S.

Customs Service’s efforts to combat drug-related corruption. Corruption

of Customs employees along the Southwest Border by persons involved in

the illegal drug trade is a serious and continuing threat. The enormous

sums of money being generated by drug trafficking have increased the

threat of bribery. It is a challenge that Customs and other law enforcement

agencies must overcome at the border.

My statement today is based on a report1

 we issued on March 30, 1999, and

follow-up testimony2

 we delivered on April 21, 1999, before the Senate

Caucus on International Narcotics Control. It focuses on (1) the extent to

which Customs has complied with policies and procedures for ensuring

employee integrity; (2) an identification of the types of illegal drug-related

activities of which Customs employees on the Southwest Border have

been convicted;3

 (3) an identification of the Department of the Treasury’s

organizational structures, policies, and procedures for handling allegations

of drug-related employee misconduct and whether the policies and

procedures were followed; and (4) the extent to which lessons learned

from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to

changes in policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related

corruption of Customs employees.

We make the following points in this statement:

• Customs’ compliance with its integrity procedures varied.

• Customs’ compliance with its investigative procedures was uncertain.

• Customs missed opportunities to learn lessons from closed corruption

cases.

In our report, we made recommendations to address these points.4

 

1

 Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption

(GAO/GGD-99-31).

2

 Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption

(GAO/T-GGD-99-86).

3

 If employees entered guilty pleas, we considered them to have been convicted of the crime.

4

 GAO/GGD-99-31.
Statement

Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption

Page 2 GAO/T-GGD-99-106

Stretching 1,962 miles from Brownsville, TX, to Imperial Beach, CA, the

Southwest Border has been a long-standing transit area for illegal drugs

entering the United States. According to the Department of State, the

Southwest Border is the principal transit route for cocaine, marijuana, and

methamphetamine entering the United States. Customs is one of the

principal agencies responsible for stopping and seizing illegal drug

shipments across the Southwest Border. At the ports of entry, about 2,000

Customs inspectors are to check incoming traffic to identify both persons

and contraband, including illegal drugs, that are not allowed to enter the

country.

The threat of corruption of Customs employees is not a new phenomenon,

and the 1990s have seen congressional emphasis on ensuring employee

integrity and preventing corruption. A corrupt Customs employee at a port

of entry can facilitate the safe passage of illegal drug shipments. The

integrity policies and procedures adopted by Customs are designed to help

ensure that its employees, especially those in positions that could affect

the smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States, are of acceptable

integrity and, failing that, to detect any corruption as quickly as possible.

Customs has policies and procedures designed to help ensure the integrity

of its employees. However, Customs’ compliance with these policies and

procedures has varied. The policies and procedures consist mainly of

mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5-year

reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic integrity training. While

Customs generally completed required background investigations for new

hires by the end of their first year on the job, reinvestigations were

typically overdue, in some instances by as many as 3 years. Customs

provided integrity training to new employees during basic training, but

advanced integrity training was not required.

Customs had not formally evaluated its integrity procedures to determine

their effectiveness. One way to evaluate the effectiveness of integrity

procedures would be to use drug-related investigative case information.

For example, among employees assigned to the Southwest Border, nine

were convicted of drug-related crimes during fiscal years 1992 through

1997. These nine employees engaged in one or more illegal drug-related

activities, including

• waving drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry,

• coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border,

• selling drugs, and

• disclosing drug intelligence information.

Background

Summary of Findings
Statement

Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption

Page 3 GAO/T-GGD-99-106

The nine convicted employees received background investigations or

reinvestigations that determined they were suitable for employment and

had the required integrity. However, based on our review of the case files,

the financial information that these employees provided during their

background investigations and reinvestigations was not fully used by

Customs. According to a Customs official, reported liabilities are to be

compared with debts listed on a credit report to determine if all debts were

reported. This use of the financial information would not have helped to

identify employees who were living well beyond their means or whose

debts were excessive.

The Treasury has established procedures for handling allegations of

employee misconduct. Within the Treasury, Customs’ Office of Internal

Affairs is generally responsible for investigating both criminal and

noncriminal allegations against Customs employees. We could not readily

determine if the Office of Internal Affairs complied with the investigative

procedures because Customs’ automated case management system and its

investigative case files did not provide the necessary information to assess

compliance with these procedures.

Customs has missed opportunities to (1) learn lessons from drug-related

corruption cases and (2) change its policies and procedures for preventing

drug-related employee corruption. Our review of the closed cases of the

nine convicted employees revealed internal control weaknesses that were

not formally reported by the Office of Internal Affairs, even though

Customs procedures require them to formally report internal control

weaknesses identified during investigations. These weaknesses included

instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of

entry, (2) Customs employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting

individuals with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law

enforcement personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest Border

without inspection. At the time of our review, we found that Customs had

not corrected these internal control weaknesses, and we therefore made

recommendations in our report to address them.5

Because of the enormous sums of money being generated by drug

trafficking and the corruption of some Customs employees, Customs is

vulnerable to the threat of corruption. Therefore, we recommended that

the Secretary of the Treasury

 

5

 GAO/GGD-99-31.

Recommendations
Statement

Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption

Page 4 GAO/T-GGD-99-106

• direct the Commissioner of Customs to evaluate the effectiveness of

integrity assurance efforts, including training, background investigations,

and reinvestigations;

• require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with policies that require

employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are due;

• require that Customs fully review financial disclosure statements, which

employees are required to provide as part of the background investigation

or reinvestigation process, to identify possible financial irregularities, such

as employees who appear to be living beyond their means;

• require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies and

procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in cases

where a Customs employee was determined to have engaged in drugrelated criminal activities; and

• direct the Commissioner of Customs to strengthen internal controls at

Southwest Border ports of entry by establishing (1) one or more methods

to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes; (2) a recusal policy

concerning the performance of inspections by Customs inspectors where

their objectivity may be in question; and (3) a policy for inspection of law

enforcement officers and their vehicles.

The Department of the Treasury provided comments from Customs that

generally concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it is

taking steps to implement them.
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