United States

Naval War College

International Law Department

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

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Friday, April 22, 2005 11:53:50 AM
MARITIME OPERATIONAL ZONES

United	States	Naval	War	College

Center	for	Naval	Warfare	Studies

International	Law	Department

Chairman:	Professor	Michael	Schmitt

Website:	 www.usnwc.edu/ild

Telephone	

(401)	841-4949	FAX	

(401)	841-3989	DSN	Prefix	948	

Postal	address

Naval	War	College	(36)

686	Cushing	Road	

Newport,	Rhode	Island	02841	

Electronic	mail	General	Information:	

ild@usnwc.edu

Opinions,	conclusions,	and	recommendations	expressed	or	implied	within	are	solely	those	of	the	

authors,	and	do	not	necessarily	represent	the	views	of	the	Naval	War	College,	the	Department	of	

Defense,	or	any	particular	Service	thereof,	or	any	other	government	agency	or	private	organization.	

On-line	version:	Dec	2013

Library	of	Congress	Cataloging-in-Publication	Data	(2006)

Maritime	operational	zones	/

Richard	Jaques, editor	(original);	

contributors	(original):	Thomas	McK.	Sparks,	Errol	Henriques,	Dale	Stephens.	

ISBN-13:	978-1-884733-37-6	

1. War,	Maritime	(International	law)	2.	Sea	control.	3.	United	States.	Navy.

I.	Jaques,	Richard.	II.	Sparks,	Thomas	McK.	III.	Henriques,	Errol.	IV.	Stephens,	Dale.	

KZ6563.M37	2006
Preface

This Maritime Operational Zones Manual is the result of a continuing International Law 

Department research project commissioned by the President of the Naval War College. The 

purpose is to study developments regarding the use of zones in the planning and conduct of 

maritime operations and to publish the results of the study in a format that would be useful to 

both operators and legal advisors in the planning of future operations. 

This Manual was originally published in 2006 in loose leaf format, with a copy of that original 

edition subsequently appearing on the International Law Department website. This 2013 edition 

is published exclusively on-line and in a format which will more readily facilitate the 

incorporation of future changes and updates. The original authors are indicated for each chapter, 

although their chapter texts have been updated where necessary. In addition, a number of 

individuals provided comments on earlier chapter drafts as well as on subsequent updates. Each 

chapter is the work of the original author and successive editors and does not necessarily 

represent the views or policies of the Department, the Naval War College, the Navy, or any other 

U.S. or other governmental agency. 

With the exception of the Manual Excerpts in Appendix D, this manual may be freely 

reproduced for academic or other noncommercial use. Excerpts from U.S. Government manuals 

also may be reproduced. Permission to reproduce excerpts from other manuals should be sought 

from the originating agency. 

Michael Schmitt

Professor of Law & Chairman

International Law Department

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Naval War College 

1 December 2013
Acknowledgments

The development of a departmental publication is always a team effort and in this instance, the 

International Law Department has been extremely lucky to have had so many outstanding 

individuals contribute to the production of this manual. First, we would like to acknowledge the 

role played by members of the department who did not author chapters, but played a significant 

role in bringing the project together. These individuals include Professor Charles Garraway 

(former Naval War College Stockton Professor of International Law); Professor Jane Dalton 

(current Stockton Professor); Colonel John Phelps, JA, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Scott Reid, JA, 

USA; Major Richard Jaques, USMC; Commander Sean Henseler, JAGC, USN; Lieutenant 

Colonel Randy Bagwell, JA, USA; and Ms. Kathleen Russell for their research, editing, 

proofreading, publication design, and logistic support. 

Additionally, the authors would like to acknowledge the exceptional research work undertaken 

by members of the Naval War College’s law reserve unit, including Captain Tim Flynn, JAGC, 

USN; Captain Kathleen McTighe, JAGC, USN; Captain David Sanders, JAGC, USN; Captain 

Brian Fresher, JAGC, USN; Commander Todd Cabelka, JAGC, USN; and LNC William Yonce. 

The development project has also benefited enormously from the input of Professor Dr. Wolff 

Heintschel von Heinegg, who provided valuable commentary on a number of draft chapters, and 

the International and Operational Law Division of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 

which reviewed and commented on the original 2006 text. Finally, the editors of the original 

2006 edition owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the staff at the Naval War College Desktop 

Publishing division, namely Jo-Ann Parks, Matthew Cotnoir, and Susan Meyer, who provided a 

timely and professional service putting the publication into final publishable form. 

In 2013 this Manual was revised and updated in significant areas by Captain Kevin M. Kelly, 

JAGC, USN and Captain Danial Rock, USMC, with extremely helpful input from Commander 

James Kraska, JAGC, USN; Commander David O’Connell, USCG; and Lieutenant Commander 

James Farrant, Royal Navy.

International Law Department Faculty 

Cover Photo: U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate Airman Stephen W. Rowe 

(www.news.navy.mil) 

Cover Design: Ms. Jo-Ann Parks
Table of Contents

Preface

Acknowledgements

Table of Contents

Foreword

Abbreviations and Recurring Citations

Introduction

Chapter 1 Coastal State Authority—

United States Maritime Zones

& Other Control Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Chapter 2 Warning Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

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Chapter 3 Zones in Crisis Conditions—

Control of Sea And Airspace

During Times of National Emergency

and Enforcing Collective Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Chapter 4 Law of Naval Warfare and Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Chapter 5 UN Security Council and Maritime Zones . . . . . . . . 5-1

Appendices

A. International Notice System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. Notification Procedure Directives for

United States Military Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

C. Zone Announcements, Warnings, Resolutions, and

International Notices (Chronological Order) . . . . . C-1

D. Manual Excerpts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1
Foreword to the 2006 Edition 

Professor Dennis Mandsager

What are “Maritime Operational Zones?” 

For the purposes of this manual, “maritime operational zones” are defined as designated ocean 

areas and superjacent air space in which a nation purports to restrict the freedom of navigation 

and/or overflight of other users or otherwise impact the exercise of those freedoms. We 

recognize that the definition is somewhat ambiguous; but that is the nature of zones in maritime 

operations. 

The U.S. and other nations have long used various forms of “zones” in maritime operations. 

Labels for these zones have included warning area, cordon sanitaire, maritime defense zone, 

warning zone, security zone, exclusion zone, blockade, and others. The purpose of these zones 

usually has been to warn other users of the sea of dangers, to limit the area of combat operations, 

to deny adversaries use of water and air space, and/or to avoid targeting platforms that do not 

present an actual threat. 

Current manuals include provisions on zones, but the manuals take different approaches and are 

not consistent. The highly respected San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to 

Armed Conflicts at Sea (written by independent experts) provides parameters for zones since the 

majority of the participants viewed zones as a “reality.” 

NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations is now under 

revision. The Handbook is the primary unclassified source of U.S. DoD doctrine regarding the 

law of maritime operations. Zone provisions are limited; but they are clear and have served as 

useful planning guidance. 

Organization 

The manual is divided into five chapters and four appendices. While some overlap between 

chapters was unavoidable, the plan of coverage is as follows: 

The Introduction provides a summary of chapters 1 through 5 and operational planning guidance. 

Chapter 1 addresses utilization of zones by coastal states in peacetime. The primary focus is on 

coastal state authority in internal waters, the territorial sea, and the Exclusive Economic Zone. 

This chapter briefly addresses Air Maritime Operational Zones Defense Identification Zones 

(ADIZ) and Flight Identification Regions (FIR) concepts due to the comparative lack of 

controversy involving those topics. 

Chapter 2 addresses “warning areas” used primarily in international waters for the purpose of 

advising other users of the sea of hazardous activity. 

Chapter 3 addresses the use of operational zones in international waters in crisis or brink of war 

situations, with detailed specific references to the cordon sanitaire and Cuban Quarantine. 
Chapter 4 addresses the authority of belligerents to exercise control over neutrals in the 

immediate area of operations and the use of zones, commonly called “exclusion zones,” and 

blockades as tools of naval warfare in international armed conflict. 

Chapter 5 addresses zones as maritime measures authorized by United Nations Security Council 

Resolutions. 

Appendix A is a summary of what we call the “International Notification System” or the 

common methods for announcing zones to users of the oceans and airspace, including NOTAMs, 

NOTMARs, HYDROPACs, HYDROLANTs, and Special Warnings. 

Appendix B contains U.S. directives implementing the “International Notification System.” 

Appendix C contains sample zone announcements in chronological order. Please note that not all 

of the included announcements are cited in a chapter. We have attempted to provide a 

representative selection of announcements, some of which are no longer generally available, to 

serve as examples and, in some cases, as potential models for use by planners. 

Appendix D is a compilation of the provisions regarding “zones” from various military 

international law manuals and doctrine publications and from the San Remo Manual. Only 

sections of the Manuals that specifically refer to “warning or exclusion zones” or to “control of 

the immediate area of operations” are included. The appendix is provided because many of the 

cited manuals are not readily available. For actual operational planning, the zones provisions 

should be read in conjunction with other sections of the manuals. 
 

Abbreviations and Recurring Citations 

Australian Reference Manual 

Australian Book of Reference 5179—Manual of International Law 

AWACS

Airborne Warning and Control System (U.S. Air Force E-3 surveillance and command and 

control platform) 

Canadian LOAC Manual 

The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level (2001) (B-GG-005-027/AF021). 

Chicago Convention 

Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, 7 December 1944, 59 Stat. 1693, 84 

U.N.T.S. 389 

Common Article 

Article common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War 

Victims

Continental Shelf Convention 

Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 29 April 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 

CPA

Closest point of approach 

Declaration of London 

Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, London, 26 February 1909, 104 B.F.S.P. 242, 

reprinted in Schindler & Toman 755 

Declaration of Paris 

Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Paris, 16 April 1856, 115 Parry 1, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 

(Supp.) 89, reprinted in Schindler & Toman 699 

DoD 

Department of Defense (United States) 

DoDDIR 

Department of Defense Directive 

FM

U.S. Army Field Manual 

GAOR

United Nations General Assembly, Official Records 
Abbreviations and Recurring Citations

German Commander’s Handbook 

German Commander’s Handbook: Legal Bases for the Operations of Naval Forces, 2004 

(English Translation) 

GC

Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 

1949. 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N. T.S. 287 

GP I 

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 

Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 16 I.L.M. 1391, reprinted in Schindler & 

Toman 551 [also Additional Protocol I, Protocol I, AP I] 

GP II 

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 

Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 16 I.L.M. 1442 [also Additional 

Protocol II, Protocol II, AP II] 

GPW

Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 

3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 

GPW 1929 

1929 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 

2021, 118 LNTS 343, reprinted in Schindler & Toman 271 

GWS 1929 

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the 

Field, Geneva, 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 118 L.N.T.S. 303 reprinted in Schindler & Toman 

257 

GWS

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 

the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 

GWS-Sea

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 

of Armed Forces at Sea, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 

Hague III 

Hague Convention No. III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 

36 Stat. 2259, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 85 

Hague IV 

Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 

October 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 90 
Abbreviations and Recurring Citations

HR

Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annex to Hague IV (see Hague 

IV) 

Hague V 

Hague Convention No. V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in 

Case of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 117 

Hague VIII

Hague Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, The 

Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 138 

Hague IX 

Hague Convention No. IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, The 

Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 146 

Hague X 

Hague Convention No. X for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva 

Convention, [of 1906], The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 153 

Hague XI 

Hague Convention No. XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the 

Right of Capture in Naval War, The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2396, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. 

(Supp.) 167 

Hague XIII 

Hague Convention No. XIII Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 

The Hague, 18 October 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 2 Am. J. Int’l L. (Supp.) 202 

High Seas 

Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958, 13 Convention U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 

92 

HYDROLANT 

U.S. radio navigational warning for Atlantic Ocean region 

HYDROPAC

U.S. radio navigational warning for Pacific and Indian Ocean region 

ICJ

International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders 

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross 

ICRC, Commentary 
Abbreviations and Recurring Citations

Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (’49 Conventions) (Pictet et al. eds., 

1952) 

ICRC, Commentary (GP I & II) 

Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 

August 1949 (Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) 

ICTY 

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 

ICTR 

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 

IHL

International Humanitarian Law 

ILM 

International Legal Materials 

IMO

International Maritime Organization (formerly International Maritime Consultative Organization 

(IMC)) 

IMT

International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 

JP 

JCS Joint Publication 

Lieber Code 

U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in 

the Field, General Orders No. 100, 24 April 1863 

LNTS 

League of Nations Treaty Series 

LOAC 

Law of Armed Conflict 

London Charter 

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment 

of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(a), 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 

82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 

LOS 

Law of the Sea 

LOS Bulletin 
Abbreviations and Recurring Citations

United Nations Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Law of the Sea Bulletin 

LOS Convention 

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 Dec. 

1982, in force 16 Nov. 1994, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). 

MCRM

Maritime Claims Reference Manual, DoD 2005.1-M (2001) 

NAC

NATO’s North Atlantic Council 

NCA

U.S. National Command Authorities 

NOTAM 

Notice to Airmen 

NOTMAR 

Notice to Mariners 

Nuremberg Principles 

Principles of International Law Recognized in the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the 

Judgment of the Tribunal 

NWP

Naval Warfare Publication 

NWP 1-14M 

The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 1-14M, 2007) 

Official Records 

Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 

International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974–1977 (1978) 

Oxford Manual 

Institute of International Law, The Laws of War on Land, 9 September 1880 

Restatement (Third) 

Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) 

ROE

Rules of Engagement 

Rome Statute 

Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [ICC Statute, 

Treaty of Rome] 
Abbreviations and Recurring Citations

San Remo Manual 

San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1995), Prepared 

by International Lawyers and Naval Experts convened by the International Institute of 

Humanitarian Law, Editor Louise Doswald-Beck 

SOLAS Convention 

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) 

SROE

Joint Chiefs of Staff Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces, CJCSI 3121.02 (2000) 

Territorial Sea Convention 

Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Geneva, 29 April 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 

516 U.N.T.S. 205 

TIAS 

U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements Series 

Title V Report 

Final Report to the Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Pursuant to Title V of the 

Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 

102-25 (April 1992) 

TS 

Treaty Series 

TWC 

Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law 

No.10: Nuremberg, October 1946–April 1949 (1949–53) 

UCMJ

Uniform Code of Military Justice 

UK LOAC Manual 

The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defence, 2004 

UNCLOS III 

Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1974–1982 

UN

United Nations 

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly [General Assembly] 

UNSC

United Nations Security Council [Security Council] 
Abbreviations and Recurring Citations

UNTS 

United Nations Treaty Series 

USC

United States Code 
i

Introduction to the 2006 Edition 

Professor Emeritus Richard J. Grunawalt

Properly established and appropriately implemented maritime zones and warning areas provide 

operational commanders with the means to enhance the self-defense and force protection posture 

of their assets. They are not, however, “silver bullets” that solve the commander’s defense and 

protection problems. Drawing imaginary lines in the water cannot and does not absolve 

commanders of their responsibility for the safety of the forces they command. Accordingly, it is 

imperative that commanders, and the judge advocates that advise them, have a working 

familiarity with the various regimes that are collectively referred to as “maritime zones” and 

“warning areas.” This compilation of essays and supporting documents is designed to facilitate 

that process. 

The analysis necessarily begins with determining the purpose to be achieved by the 

establishment of a particular maritime zone or warning area. During time of peace, 

considerations of navigational safety, operational efficiency, force protection and self-defense 

will likely pertain. During armed conflict, each of these will remain in play and be joined by 

considerations of how to enhance the commander’s capability to effectively both defend and 

fight the force. The purpose to be achieved, therefore, will depend on the what, when, where, and 

who of the equation. 

PEACETIME ZONES IN NATIONAL WATERS 

Chapter 1 examines the several types of maritime zones that may be established by a coastal or 

island nation in waters subject to its jurisdictional control. While retaining their efficacy in time 

of armed conflict, these regimes are principally designed for peacetime application to enhance 

navigational safety, to control ingress to national airspace and to ports, harbors and inland 

waters, to protect the environment, or to augment the security of ports, harbors, off-shore 

structures, and vessels (both military and civilian). Included in this assessment are safety zones, 

security zones, regulated navigational areas, naval vessel protection zones, restricted waterfront 

areas, restricted areas, danger zones, naval defensive areas, and air defense identification zones. 

Also addressed are other control mechanisms (e.g., suspension of innocent passage when 

“essential for security, including weapons exercises,” and mandatory notification of arrival 

procedures). While most of these zones fall domestically under the establishment and 

enforcement jurisdiction of the United States Coast Guard or the United States Army Corps of 

Engineers, all may have practical application to the naval commander. The key is knowing what 

mechanisms are potentially available, what their implementation brings to the table, and where to 

turn to effect their establishment. Appendixes A, B, and C describe, inter alia, the domestic and 

international notification systems utilized to promulgate maritime zones and warning areas, and 

provide the text of relevant examples. 

Although Chapter 1 focuses on zones and mechanisms established by the United States for use in 

U.S. waters and airspace, the underlying legal basis for each is applicable to other nations as 

well. Consequently, familiarity with the regimes set forth in Chapter 1 will be invaluable in the 

commander’s appreciation of similar zones that may be encountered off foreign shores. In this 

regard, it is useful to recall that the United States will respect the validity of such zones 

established in national waters only to the extent that they are consistent with international law, in 
Introduction to the 2006 Edition

ii

general, and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (including the rules pertaining to innocent 

passage, transit passage of international straits, and the sovereign immunity of warships), in 

particular. The reality of precedent and reciprocity are also apparent. 

It is incumbent upon operational commanders, and upon the judge advocates that advise them, to 

understand the legal and jurisdictional environment in which they must operate, whether in 

foreign waters or off our own shores. A working familiarity with the maritime zones and control 

mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1 are part of that process. 

MARITIME WARNING AREAS IN PEACETIME

Chapter 2 of this study addresses the various warning areas that may be established by nations to 

warn of potential hazards that may result from lawful peacetime operations at sea. Whether those 

operations involve military exercises, weapons testing or current operations, the warning areas 

are designed to ensure that such uses of the world’s oceans are undertaken with due regard for 

the safety of navigation and overflight of the ships and aircraft of other nations. Operational 

commanders need to be aware that not only do nations have the right to establish such warning 

areas, they may have an international obligation to do so. 

Beyond the territorial sea, ships and aircraft of all nations enjoy high seas freedoms of navigation 

on, over, and under the oceans. For warships, these freedoms include not only military exercises 

and weapons testing, but also surveillance and intelligence collection. Accordingly, and as 

discussed in Chapter 2, promulgation of a warning area beyond the territorial sea in conjunction 

with a weapons test, for example, does not extinguish the right of other nations to operate in 

those waters. Indeed, when such tests are announced it is often a signal for intelligence platforms 

of other nations to proceed to the area for surveillance purposes. And properly so. In short, 

warning areas are just that: notifications of potential hazard. They are not exclusion zones. 

Warning areas may, however, enhance the force protection and self-defense status of forces 

operating in high threat locations by reducing maritime traffic (“de-cluttering the radar”) and, 

when coupled with a request that approaching vessels and aircraft communicate their identity 

and/or intentions, may assist in the assessment of possible hostile intent. Chapter 2 recounts the 

establishment of operational warning areas in the Persian Gulf and in the Eastern Mediterranean 

Sea during the Iran/Iraq Tanker War. Appendix C contains the text of NOTMARs (Notices to 

Mariners) and NOTAMs (Notices to Airmen) promulgated by U.S. forces for that purpose. 

Appendix A discusses the international notification system and explains the process of issuance 

of such warnings. 

MARITIME ZONES IN CRISIS CONDITIONS

As noted in Chapter 3, maritime zones established during time of peace for purely peaceful 

purposes (e.g., navigational safety, etc.), and zones established by belligerents during time of war 

(e.g., immediate area of operations, blockade, etc.), are generally well understood and addressed 

in law of the sea and law of naval warfare literature. However, it is in the twilight between peace 

and war that maritime zones and similar control mechanisms may be both extremely useful and 

problematic. Chapter 3 focuses on two such concepts; cordon sanitaire and quarantine. These 

mechanisms, as originally conceived, were intended, respectively, to protect against acquisition 

by a potential adversary of a first strike advantage and to forestall a significant alteration in the 

balance of weapons deployment. While both were premised (ultimately) upon the inherent right 

of individual and collective self-defense as articulated in Article 51 of the United Nations 

Charter, neither are clearly sanctioned by customary or conventional law as peacetime measures. 
Introduction to the 2006 Edition

iii

Moreover, both present escalatory potential. That said, each may possibly be tailored for 

application in current operational settings, including, perhaps, the global war on terror. Given 

that cordon sanitaire and quarantine are terms often misunderstood and/or taken out of context, a 

close reading of Chapter 3 should prove useful to operational commanders and judge advocates 

alike. 

Cordon sanitaire, as a maritime concept, was designed (but never formally implemented) as a 

Cold War measure to protect high value targets from a crippling first strike by excluding 

intelligence collection assets of a potential adversary (tattletales) from a proscribed, and 

announced, mobile zone encircling the battle group. As the analysis in Chapter 3 notes, the 

concept held practical problems of implementation, not the least of which was the necessity of 

international notification of the location of the mobile zone (and hence the battle group). More 

importantly, it was a potential trip-wire for escalation. Nonetheless, the notion of announced 

zones surrounding naval assets operating in high threat environments may have application in 

time of crisis as a means to help clarify the possibility of the hostile intent of platforms 

encroaching the zone. That said, it is important to remember that cordon sanitaire, or any other 

maritime control measure for that matter, cannot be a substitute for the sound judgment of the 

on-scene commander in determining the presence of hostile intent. Although the declaration by 

higher authority that certain platforms engaged in specified activity (e.g. submerged submarines 

or “swarming” small boats) encountered in an appropriately announced cordon zone are 

presumed to be hostile, and therefore subject to engagement, provides obvious tactical advantage 

to the threatened force, such measures are understandably reserved to the most dire of 

circumstance. The discussion in Chapter 3 will enable the operational commander and the judge 

advocate to better understand both the potential and the limitations of cordon sanitaire as a selfdefense mechanism. 

Appendix A provides examples of warning areas employed by U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf 

and Eastern Mediterranean Sea that were premised, at least in part, on the concept of cordon 

sanitaire. 

Quarantine, as described in Chapter 3, refers to the forcible exclusion of specified weapons or 

weapons systems from a proscribed maritime area during time of crisis. The sole historical 

example of the implementation of quarantine is the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 in 

which the United States, in coordination with the Organization of American States, announced 

that the introduction of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons into Cuba would not be permitted. U.S. 

naval forces responsible for enforcing the quarantine were authorized to stop, board, inspect, and 

divert vessels enroute to Cuba carrying proscribed weapons and system components. While this 

mechanism proved highly effective, and ultimately helped to defuse an extremely tense situation, 

it was sharply criticized in some quarters as an unlawful attempt to establish a blockade in time 

of peace. Indeed, the term “quarantine” was coined in an effort to distinguish this peacetime 

crisis form of interdiction from that of belligerent blockade. Whether or not quarantine will ever 

again be invoked by the United States, or any other nation for that matter, remains to be seen. 

However, similar mechanisms have been utilized by U.S. and other maritime forces pursuant to 

United Nations Security Council mandate, as discussed in Chapter 5. 

MARITIME ZONES IN TIME OF WAR

The law of naval warfare has long recognized the utility of maritime zones to both facilitate 

belligerent control of areas of the seas and as mechanisms to keep neutral commerce out of 

harms way. Chapter 4 examines the effective use, as well as the abuse, of maritime zones in time 
Introduction to the 2006 Edition 

iv

of war. The three principal concepts applicable in this setting are addressed, namely the 

immediate area of operations, maritime operational zones, and blockade. Each involves, to 

varying degrees, denial of high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight to enemy as well as 

neutral vessels and aircraft in the proscribed zone. Those freedoms, articulated in the 1982 Law 

of the Sea Convention, are eclipsed during armed conflict by the law of naval warfare, which 

specifically countenances interdiction of enemy platforms as well as measures that are designed 

to control neutral commerce with the enemy and prevent neutral interference with belligerent 

operations. As noted in Chapter 4, the high seas freedoms delineated in Part VII (High Seas) of 

the Law of the Sea Convention are “exercised under conditions laid down in this Convention and 

by other rules of international law.” Those “other rules” include the law of naval warfare. 

Chapter 4 examines the concept of the immediate area of operations as a methodology that 

permits belligerent naval forces to control the movement and/or activities of neutral vessels and 

aircraft in areas in which hostilities are taking place or where those forces are then operating. 

Establishment of such areas has long been recognized as a legitimate tactic to avoid neutral 

interference in war at sea as well to keep neutral platforms from harms way. As Chapter 4 notes, 

while the concept is broadly accepted, its content is subject to some debate, particularly with 

respect to the permissible expanse of the zone and the degree of force that may be employed to 

compel compliance with its strictures. Accordingly, various sources are reviewed, including the 

San Remo Manual and U.S. and German military publications. Of particular utility to the 

operational commander is the discussion in Chapter 4 of contemporary application of the concept 

by U.S. naval forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom to help counter the threat of terrorist small 

boat attacks in waters plied by neutral platforms. The text of announcements establishing recent 

immediate areas of operations is contained in Appendix C. 

Maritime operational zones established by belligerents in time of war also have a long history. 

Variously referred to as “war zones,” “exclusion zones,” “total exclusion zones,” or “barred 

areas,” maritime operational zones are designed to designate waters and superjacent airspace in 

which the declaring belligerent intends to exercise control over access of ships and aircraft, both 

enemy and neutral. The lawfulness of such zones depends upon the extent and nature of their 

application. A maritime operational zone, however labeled, does not permit the targeting of a 

platform that is not a legitimate military objective. Simply put, a belligerent cannot absolve itself 

from compliance with the law of targeting by drawing imaginary lines in the water. However, 

such zones have proven to be extremely useful in management of the contemporary battle space 

at sea. They serve the dual purpose of warning neutral platforms to avoid areas of potential 

hostile action and of advising both neutral and enemy merchant vessels and civil aircraft entering 

the zone that they may be subject to boarding, inspection, diversion, capture or destruction, 

depending upon their status and activity. For the declaring belligerent, such zones may facilitate 

a more accurate assessment of the character and intentions of platforms encountered in or over 

such waters. 

Chapter 4 sets forth a clear articulation of contemporary U.S. policy with respect to maritime 

operational zones. Also provided are case studies of post-World War II application of the 

concept. Zones established by the United Kingdom and Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas 

Conflict, by Iran and Iraq during the Tanker War, and by U.S. and Coalition Forces during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom are described and assessed as to both their lawfulness and their 

operational utility. This effort is supported by texts of the declaration of these zones contained in 

Appendix C. 
Introduction to the 2006 Edition 

v

Lastly, Chapter 4 provides an overview of the law of blockade. Establishment of a blockade is a 

belligerent act, governed by the law of naval warfare, that is designed to seal off specified enemy 

ports, harbors, airfields or coastal areas from the ingress or egress of vessels and aircraft of all 

nations, enemy as well as neutral. The rationale underlying the rules of blockade, e.g., 

establishment by competent authority, international notification, impartiality of application, 

effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, and limitation of interference with commerce among 

neutrals, are examined. Each of these traditional rules is evaluated in the context of 

contemporary practice, with emphasis on operational considerations most likely to be 

encountered in the global war on terror. The concept of breach and attempted breach of blockade 

are also assessed. 

The various zones addressed in Chapter 4 have evolved over time as the means and methods of 

war at sea, driven by the constant development of technology, have become increasingly 

sophisticated. The applicability of traditional concepts, such as the immediate area of operations, 

maritime operational zones and blockade, to the challenges confronting today’s war fighters is 

necessarily influenced by that phenomenon. Yet as Chapter 4 demonstrates, these mechanisms 

for belligerent control of areas of the world’s oceans that developed during by-gone eras 

continue to have efficacy in war at sea in the 21st Century. The operational commander and the 

judge advocate need to have an awareness not only of the traditional rules of naval warfare 

governing these maritime zones, but of the inherent adaptability of their application to 

contemporary conflict realities, such as the global war on terror, as well. 

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND MARITIME ZONES 

U.S., NATO, and other coalition naval forces have increasingly relied upon UN Security Council 

Resolutions as the legal basis for maritime interception operations. Chapter 5 describes the 

overriding authority of the Security Council to maintain and restore international peace and 

security, and the legal primacy of its binding decisions. This Chapter contrasts the inherent 

flexibility of that authority with the restrictions and limitations that necessarily encumber the 

right of individual States to unilaterally control areas of the oceans during time of peace, in the 

transition to war, and during war itself. This analysis also includes an assessment of the impact 

of this broad mandate on the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense as articulated 

in Article 51 of the UN Charter and on the traditional rules of the law of naval warfare. It is 

clearly incumbent upon operational commanders and the judge advocates that advise them to 

have a working knowledge of these relationships. The planning and effective execution of 

maritime interception/interdiction operations in the post–Cold War era requires no less. 

Chapter 5 focuses principally upon the various maritime zones that were established by Coalition 

forces during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm pursuant to United Nations 

Security Council Resolutions following Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait. Those Resolutions, 

inter alia, prohibited the import and export of “all commodities and products” into and from Iraq. 

As a consequence, Coalition forces established maritime interception zones in the Persian Gulf 

and in the Red Sea. Those zones remained in place throughout the 1990s and were not rescinded 

by the Security Council until 2003 when the bulk of the sanctions were lifted. As Chapter 5 

notes, the embargo, and the maritime interception operations conducted by Coalition forces in its 

implementation, took on many of the attributes of belligerent blockade and involved modalities 

of visit and search applicable in time of war. Yet they were maintained even after the cessation 

of hostilities in 1991. Absent the continuing efficacy of the Resolutions, Coalition interception 

operations could not have been maintained (at least in the same form) without widespread 
Introduction to the 2006 Edition 

vi

condemnation. In short, the Resolutions enabled the Coalition to impose constraints on shipping 

in peacetime ordinarily considered lawful only during time of war. 

Operational commanders and judge advocates alike will do well to appreciate the enormous 

potential inherent in the authority of the United Nations Security Council, as expressed in its 

binding resolutions, to control the world’s oceans once it has determined that a threat to, or 

breach of, international peace and security has occurred. Given that the global war on terror will 

most likely be manifest in neither true peace nor traditional war, but in the twilight between the 

two, reliance upon maritime zones and control mechanisms available only in peace or war, but 

not in both, may not suffice. The overriding authority of Security Council Resolutions may well 

prove to be the enabler that will permit the effective use of maritime zones and control areas in 

this difficult struggle. 
1-1	

1 

Coastal State Authority: 

Zones in and near United States National Waters & Other 

Control Mechanisms 

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a compilation of short, general and practical discussions regarding various 

maritime zones and other control mechanisms established and used by the United States pursuant 

to both domestic and international law. For the most part, these maritime zones and other control 

mechanisms are grounded in a coastal state’s right to exercise jurisdiction (to varying degrees 

depending on purpose and exact location) over waters within and adjacent to their territorial land 

masses. They range in purpose and location from a safety zone around a distressed vessel in 

internal waters, to a security zone to respond to terrorism in the exclusive economic zone, to an 

air defense identification zone for national security in international airspace above waters 

adjacent to the territorial sea. 

In all cases, the statutory basis and implementing regulations and policies governing the use of 

the following United States zones and control mechanisms are consistent with international law, 

and in particular, the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention1

. However, when overseas, commanders 

should beware of similar sounding maritime zones and control mechanisms declared by other 

nations that purport to be legitimate but are in fact inconsistent with international law and the 

LOS Convention and unlawfully impede the freedom of navigation. The United States has a 

robust freedom of navigation program (supported by international law and the Law of the Sea) 

and routinely challenges excessive maritime claims, as well as other claims which unlawfully 

impede the freedom of navigation. The United States Maritime Claims Reference Manual2

 is a 

compilation of maritime claims by coastal nations, which includes annotations of instances in 

which the United States has protested excessive or otherwise unlawful claims and conducted 

operations designed to challenge them. 

The proper use of legitimate safety and security zones can enhance the security and safety of 

both maritime and land-based units. These are especially important considerations for 

commanders in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the increased emphasis 

now placed on antiterrorism and force protection. 

While the uses and nature of many of these maritime zones are often uncomplicated and 

straightforward, in some instances their purposes may seem to overlap. Moreover, on occasion, 

* This chapter is an update to that originally authored by Commander Thomas McK. Sparks, U.S. Coast Guard.

1 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982. 2

 DoD 2005.1-M, June, 23, 2005.
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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there may be a fair amount of legal complexity, ambiguity and imprecise limitations associated 

with these zones, with potential issues crossing a legal spectrum ranging from the United States 

Constitution to customary international law. Accordingly, as the application of these zones may 

involve significant political sensitivities—particularly concerning foreign vessels—commanders 

should always consult closely with their servicing judge advocates and chain of command 

regarding the establishment or enforcement of these zones. Similarly, Department of Defense 

judge advocates should coordinate closely with judge advocates from the Coast Guard (best 

contacted via the nearest Coast Guard District Legal Office) or attorneys from the Army Corps 

of Engineers (best contacted via the nearest Army Corps of Engineers District Office of Counsel) 

as appropriate, as these are the agencies most often vested with the statutory authority to 

establish and, in the case of the Coast Guard, enforce these zones. 

Prior to discussion of these maritime zones and other control mechanisms, there is a brief 

description of the various legal divisions of the maritime environment.

A. Legal Classifications of Oceans

The waters of the world are essentially divided into five legal regimes: internal waters, the 

territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the high seas.3 Internal 

waters are landward of the baseline4 from which the territorial sea is measured, and under 

international law, “have the same legal character as land itself.”5 Foreign vessels may not enter 

internal waters without coastal state consent, absent force majeure or distress.6

 The territorial sea 

is a swath of ocean extending no further than twelve nautical miles from the baseline.7

 With 

certain exceptions—innocent passage8

 and transit passage9 most prominent among them—

coastal nations enjoy almost complete sovereignty and jurisdiction in their territorial seas.10 The 

contiguous zone is an area of water seaward of the territorial sea that can extend no further than 

twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline.11 Within the contiguous zone, coastal nations may 

exercise the control necessary to enforce their laws regarding customs, fiscal, immigration and 

sanitation matters within their territory or territorial sea.12 The exclusive economic zone is an 

area of water adjacent to the territorial sea which may not measure more than two-hundred 

nautical miles beyond the baseline.13 Within the exclusive economic zone, coastal states may 

regulate activities such as the exploration, exploitation, management, and conservation of natural 

resources in the water, seabed, and subsoil, but they may not limit the traditional high seas 

freedom of navigation enjoyed by all states.14 Finally, seaward of the exclusive economic zone 

3 NWP 1-14M, 1.3 “General Maritime Regimes Under Customary International Law as Reflected in the 1982 LOS 

Convention.” 

4 Id., 1.4 “Maritime Baselines.” Typically the low-water line, a baseline is that geographic reference from which the 

territorial sea and all other maritime regimes are measured. 5 Id., 1.5.1 “Internal Waters.” 6 Id., 2.5.1 “Internal Waters.” 7 Id., 1.3.2 “Territorial Seas.” 8 Id., 2.5.2.1 “Innocent Passage.” 9 Id., 2.5.3 “Internal Straits.” 10 Id., 1.5.2 “Territorial Seas.” 11 Id., 1.3.3 “Continguous Zone.” 12 Id. 13 Id., 1.6.2 “Exclusive Economic Zones.” 14 Id., 1.6.2 “Exclusive Economic Zones”, 2.6.2 “Exclusive Economic Zones.”
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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are the high seas, upon which all states enjoy the freedom of navigation subject only to due 

regard for the interests of other states in their exercise of freedom of the high seas.15

B. Safety Zones

In U.S. domestic law safety zones are areas comprised of water or shoreline, or a combination of 

both, to which access is limited for safety or environmental purposes.16 No person, vessel or 

vehicle may enter or remain within a safety zone unless authorized by the Coast Guard.17 Safety 

zones are established for the protection of vessels, structures, waterways and shore areas, as well 

as for general safety and the protection of the environment.18 They may be described by fixed 

geographical limits or they may be a prescribed area around a vessel—whether at anchor, 

moored or underway.

In general, safety zones may be established within the navigable waters19 of the United States 

seaward to 12 nautical miles from the baseline as determined in accordance with international 

law.20

However, as explicitly permitted by Article 60(5) of the LOS Convention, safety zones may also 

be established to promote the safety of life and property on an outer continental shelf facility, an 

attending vessel, or adjacent waters.21 Such safety zones may extend up to 500 meters from the 

outer continental shelf facility.22

Safety zones may be established in such instances as:

(1) around a damaged or burning vessel, to facilitate access for fire or rescue units and to 

protect uninvolved persons and vessels;

(2) to limit vessel access to an area in which oil or hazardous material removal or mitigation 

operations are on-going;

(3) for an extended period of time, to safeguard a vessel grounded or sunk in or near a 

navigable channel, or to keep vessels off an uncharted shoal before marking or dredging;

																																																												 15 Id., 1.6.3 “High Seas”, 2.6.3 “High Seas Freedoms and Warning Areas.” See UNCLOS, Art. 87(2) supra note 1. 16 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 165.20 (2012). 17 33 C.F.R. § 165.23 (2012).

18 Id., at § 165.20. 19 Navigable waters are all internal waters subject to tidal influence; internal waters not subject to tidal influence for 

which the Coast Guard has made a finding of navigability; and waters of the territorial sea extending up to twelve 

nautical miles from the baselines of the United States, as determined in accordance with international law. 33 

C.F.R. § 2.36 Although Presidential Proclamation No. 5928 of 27 December 1988 extended the territorial sea to 12 

nautical miles for international law purposes, it explicitly stated it did not alter “existing federal or state law or 

jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom.” Accordingly, some statutes referring to 

“navigable waters of the United States” are applicable only in waters extending to three nautical miles from the 

baseline.

20 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 165.9 (2012). 21 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 147.1 (2012). 22 33 C.F.R. § 147.15 (2012).
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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(4) to limit access to shore-side areas experiencing explosions or fires;

(5) around an underway naval aircraft carrier, liquefied natural/petroleum gas tank ship, or 

large cruise ship in confined waters where they may be restricted in their ability to 

maneuver; and

(6) to promote the safety of life and property on outer continental shelf facilities being 

constructed, maintained, or operated, as well as their appurtenances, attending vessels, 

and those waters adjacent to them.

While the primary purpose of a safety zone is to limit access, the Coast Guard may also control 

activities within the safety zone.23 For example, those vessels or persons to whom permission is 

given to enter the safety zone may be required to meet certain conditions as specified by the 

Coast Guard prior to entry into the safety zone. Moreover, each person in a safety zone is 

required to obey any lawful order of the Coast Guard under penalty of criminal law.24 Where the 

primary intent is to control vessel operations in a zone rather than limiting access to the zone, the 

more appropriate tool for this purpose is the establishment of a regulated navigation area (taken 

up later in this chapter).

Enforcement of safety zones is primarily the responsibility of the Coast Guard.25 Those 

convicted of violations of safety zone regulations are subject to civil and criminal penalties.26

See REQUEST SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS P 302137Z NOV 00 in 

Appendix C for an example of an announcement for a safety zone. 

C. Security Zones

Under U.S. domestic law, security zones are areas comprised of water or land, or a combination 

of both, to which access is limited for purposes of:

(1) preventing the destruction, loss, or injury to vessels, harbors, ports, or waterfront 

facilities resulting from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or similar causes;27

(2) securing the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States;28

(3) preventing or responding to an act of terrorism against an individual, vessel, or structure 

that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or vessel of the United States;29 or

																																																												 23 33 C.F.R. § 165.23 (2012).

24 Id. 25 33 C.F.R. § 160.5(2012); 33 C.F.R. § 147.5 (2012). Additionally, state law enforcement agents may make arrests 

for violations of certain safety zones see 46 U.S.C. § 70118.

26 33 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012). 27 50 U.S.C. § 191 (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 6.01-5 (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 165.30 28 Id. 29 33 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012).
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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(4) responding to a national emergency as declared by the President by reason of actual or 

threatened war, insurrection, or invasion, or disturbance or threatened disturbance of the 

international relations of the United States.30

In general, security zones may be established within the navigable waters of the United States 

seaward to 12 nautical miles from the baseline as determined in accordance with international 

law. 31

However, security zones established to prevent or respond to an act of terrorism against an 

individual, vessel, or structure may be either: 

(1) in the navigable waters of the United States seaward to twelve nautical 

miles of the baseline as determined in accordance with international law or

(2) in the exclusive economic zone or on the outer continental shelf, provided the individual, 

vessel, or structure is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.32

Security zones are primarily used for national security purposes instead of solely for safety 

reasons. Once a security zone is established, no person or vessel may enter or remain in it 

without the permission of the Coast Guard.33 Additionally, all persons and vessels within the 

security zone must obey any lawful direction or order issued by the Coast Guard.34 Similarly, 

the Coast Guard may control the access to and movement by all vessels, persons, and vehicles 

within the security zone, as well as take control and possession of any vessel within the security 

zone.35

Enforcement of security zones is primarily the responsibility of the Coast Guard.36 Those 

convicted of security zone violations are subject to civil and criminal penalties.37 In certain 

instances, an offending vessel may be subject to seizure.38

																																																												 30 50 U.S.C. § 191 (2012).

31 33 C.F.R. § 165.9(c)(2012)

32 33 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012). As part of the Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99-399) and 

following the hijacking of the M/V ACHILLE LAURO, Congress amended this section of the Ports and Waterways 

Safety Act (PWSA) to allow the Coast Guard to take actions, including the establishment of security zones, to 

prevent or respond to acts of terrorism in waters within or adjacent to the marine environment. The term “marine 

environment” is defined by the PWSA as “[n]avigable waters of the United States[,]...waters...over which the 

United States asserts exclusive fishery management authority [the EEZ]...[and waters over] the outer continental 

shelf....” No national regulations have been written to date implementing this statutory authority to establish 

security zones beyond the territorial sea and this statutory authority has never been exercised via an ad hoc field 

regulation. However, if used in a reasonable, limited, and judicious manner, and consistent with the terms of the 

statute, a security zone beyond the territorial sea could be reconciled with traditional high seas freedom of 

navigation under a self-defense or defense-of-nationals justification. 33 33 C.F.R. §§ 6.04-6 - 6.04-7 (2012). 34 33 C.F.R. § 6.04-8 (2012). 35 Id. 36 Id. at § 6.04-1 (2012). Additionally, state law enforcement agents may make arrests for violations security zones 

see 46 U.S.C. 70118.

37 50 U.S.C. § 192 (2012), 33 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012).

38 Id.
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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See REQUEST SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS P 051436Z AUG 03 and 

REQUEST SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS P 092020Z FEB 04 in Appendix 

C for examples of announcements for a security zone.

It is worthwhile to note that the United States does not recognize several other countries’ 

unlawful claims (i.e., claims inconsistent with customary international law and the LOS 

Convention) regarding jurisdiction over security interests in their contiguous zones and beyond. 

These claims are not temporary in nature or otherwise incident driven, but permanent assertions 

of jurisdiction prohibited by international law and the LOS Convention. For example, Vietnam 

illegally claims jurisdiction over security matters in its contiguous zone, but the United States 

does not recognize this claim and protested it in 1982.39 Similarly, China also makes an 

unlawful claim of jurisdiction over activities “infringing [upon its]...laws or regulations 

concerning security” in its contiguous zone.40 The United States does not recognize this claim 

either and protested it in 1992.41 Finally, North Korea claims a “military zone” 50 nautical miles 

beyond its territorial sea.42 The United States has steadfastly refused to recognize this claim, 

protesting it by public statement in 1977 and challenging it via actual operations (overflights) in 

1988.43 A complete listing of such excessive “security” claims can be found in the Maritime 

Claims Reference Manual.

D. Regulated Navigation Areas

Regulated navigation areas are comprised of waters within a defined boundary for which 

regulations for vessels have been established by the Coast Guard to preserve the safety of 

adjacent waterfront structures, to ensure the safe transit of vessels, or to protect the marine 

environment.44 Essentially, regulated navigation areas provide for the safety of navigation when 

the condition of the waters they comprise warrants a higher standard of safety than that provided 

by the Navigation Rules (Rules of the Road). 

Regulated navigation areas may be established within the navigable waters of the United States 

seaward to 12 nautical miles from the baseline as determined in accordance with international 

law.45

Generally, regulations applicable in regulated navigation areas:

(1) specify the times of vessel entry, movement, or departure to, from, within, or through 

ports, harbors, or other waters;

(2) establish vessel size, speed, draft limitations, and operating conditions; and

																																																												 39 DoD 2005.1-M, at 689. 40 Id., at 126. 41 Id. 42 Id., at 346. 43 Id. 44 33 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012); 33 C.F.R. § 165.10 (2012). 45 33 C.F.R. § 165.9 (2012).
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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(3) restrict vessel operation in hazardous areas or under hazardous conditions to vessels 

which have particular operating characteristics or capabilities considered necessary for 

safe operation under the circumstances.46

Regulated navigation areas are designed to permit permanent passive vessel traffic management 

via their applicable regulations. Examples of such regulations include draft restrictions in areas 

having excessive but undocumented silting, speed limits in highly congested waterways, and nopassing or overtaking regulations in narrow channels.

Enforcement of regulated navigation areas is primarily the responsibility of the Coast Guard.47 

Those convicted of violations of regulated navigation area regulations are subject to civil and 

criminal penalties.48

E. Naval Vessel Protection Zones

Naval vessel protection zones are 500-yard areas of water surrounding large United States naval 

vessels which are necessary to provide for the safety or security of the naval vessels.49 Naval 

vessel protection zones exist around large (greater than 100 feet) United States naval vessels at 

all times in the navigable waters of the United States seaward to three nautical miles from the 

baseline, whether the naval vessel is underway, moored, anchored, or within a floating 

drydock—except when the naval vessel is moored, anchored, or otherwise within a restricted 

area or within a naval defensive sea area (both of which are taken up later in this chapter).50

Naval vessels are: 

(1) all vessels, including floating drydocks, which are owned, operated, chartered, or leased 

by the United States Navy; 

(2) all pre-commissioned vessels under construction for the United States Navy; or

(3) all vessels under the operational control of the United States Navy or a Combatant 

Command.51 

A “large U.S. naval vessel” is any U.S. naval vessel greater than 100 feet in length overall.52

All vessels within a naval vessel protection zone shall operate at the minimum speed necessary 

to maintain a safe course, unless required to maintain speed by the Navigation Rules (Rules of 

the Road), and shall proceed as directed by the Coast Guard, the senior naval officer present in 

command, or an official patrol.53 No vessel within the naval vessel protection zone is allowed 

																																																												 46 33 C.F.R. § 165.11 (2012).

47 33 C.F.R. § 160.5 (2012).

48 33 U.S.C. §§ 1232 (2012).

49 14 U.S.C. § 91 (2012); 33 C.F.R. 165.2015 (2012).

50 33 C.F.R. §§ 165.2025, 165.2030 (2012).

51 33 C.F.R. § 165.2015 (2012). 52 Id. 53 33 C.F.R. §§ 165.2025, 165.2030 (2012).
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within 100 yards of a large United States naval vessel unless authorized by the Coast Guard, the 

senior navy officer present in command, or the official patrol.54

The Coast Guard and Navy may enforce55 naval vessel protection zones.56 When immediate 

action is required and representatives of the Coast Guard are absent or not present in sufficient 

force to exercise effective control in the vicinity of large naval vessels, the senior naval officer 

present in command is responsible for enforcement and to ensure the safety and security of all 

large naval vessels present.57 In meeting this responsibility, the senior naval officer present in 

command may also directly assist any Coast Guard enforcement personnel who are present. 

Those convicted of violations of naval vessel protection zones are subject to criminal penalties.58

Although offending vessels have constructive notice of the naval vessel protection zones via 

their publication in federal regulations, the Coast Guard and Navy have nevertheless gone to 

great lengths to give the general public actual notice of their existence. Accordingly, while the 

violation of a naval vessel protection zone by itself is certainly not tantamount to hostile intent, it 

is definitely one factor that the naval commander or his personnel should consider when making 

an assessment of hostile intent. Among other things, commanders should also consider the 

applicable Rules of Engagement, the failure to respond to orders and warnings to leave the naval 

vessel protection zone, relevant intelligence, the threat assessment, the potential weapons 

capability of the violating vessel and specific guidance from higher authority. 

F. Restricted Waterfront Areas

Restricted waterfront areas are include waterfront facilities and port and harbor areas, including 

the vessels and harbor craft within them in certain circumstances.59 The Coast Guard may 

prevent access to waterfront facilities, and port and harbor areas, including vessels and harbor 

craft therein including persons who do not possess the proper credentials when certain shipping 

activities are conducted.60The Coast Guard may establish restricted waterfront areas and limit 

access to them during certain shipping activities such as:

(1) those vital to the Military Defense Assistance Program;

(2) those pertaining to the support of United States military operations; 

(3) those pertaining to the loading and unloading of explosives and other dangerous cargo; 

and

																																																												 54 Id. 55 33 C.F.R § 165.2020 (2012). Navy personnel do not have independent authority to arrest those who illegally enter 

a naval vessel protective zone. They may however, permit or deny entry to vessels wishing to enter a naval vessel 

protective zone and if practicable, detain suspect violators for turnover to responding Coast Guard units. 

56 Id. 57 Id. 58 14 U.S.C. § 91 (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012).

59 50 U.S.C. § 191 (2012); 33 C.F.R. Parts 6, 125 (2012).

60 33 C.F.R. § 165.40
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(4) those essential to the interests of national security and defense, to prevent loss, damage, 

or injury, or to insure the observance of rights and obligations of the United States.61

Restricted waterfront areas may be established in the navigable waters of the United States areas 

where any of the above activities ((1) – (4)) are conducted.62

No person without proper identification credentials acceptable to the Coast Guard may enter or 

remain within restricted waterfront areas or the port and harbor areas, vessels or harbor craft 

inside them.63 Restricted waterfront areas are so designated primarily to protect piers, wharves, 

docks and moored vessels from shore-side trespassers.

Enforcement of restricted waterfront area regulations is primarily the responsibility of the Coast 

Guard.64 Those convicted of violating restricted waterfront area regulations are subject to civil 

and criminal penalties.65 In addition, an offending vessel may be subject to seizure.66

G. Restricted Areas

Restricted areas are defined water areas established by the Army Corps of Engineers around 

United States installations.67 Access is prohibited or limited to restricted areas to provide security 

for government property or protection to the public from the risks of damage or injury arising 

from the government’s use of that area.68

Restricted areas may be established in the navigable waters of the United States seaward to three 

nautical miles from the baseline.69

Restricted areas may be closed to the public on a full-time or intermittent basis.70

Enforcement of restricted area regulations is primarily the responsibility of the installation 

commander; however, the Coast Guard also has enforcement authority.71 Those convicted of 

violations of restricted area regulations are subject to criminal penalties.72 

																																																												 61 33 C.F.R. §125.15 (2012).

62 Id. 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 33 C.F.R. §6.18-1 (2012). 66 Id. 67 33 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); 33 C.F.R. Part 334.2 (2012).

68 33 C.F.R. § 334.2 (2012).

69 Id. 70 33 C.F.R. Part 334 (2012) 71 Id. 72 33 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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H. Danger Zones

Danger zones are defined areas of water normally used by the armed forces for target practice, 

bombing, rocket firing, or other especially hazardous operations.73 Typically around weapons 

ranges operated by the armed forces, they are established by the Army Corps of Engineers.74

Danger zones may be established in the navigable waters of the United States seaward to three 

nautical miles from the baseline.75

Danger zones may be closed to the public on a full-time or intermittent basis, but in most cases 

they are open for public access to the maximum extent practicable.76

The enforcement of danger zone regulations is primarily the responsibility of the installation 

commander.77 Those convicted of violations of danger zone regulations are subject to civil and 

criminal penalties.78

I. Naval Defensive Sea Areas

Naval defensive sea areas are areas of water in the territorial seas around United States naval 

installations so designated for the purpose of national defense.79 They are established by the 

President via various executive orders and they restrict access to certain waters near naval 

installations due to their strategic nature.80 They may also serve to protect the naval installation 

and its facilities, personnel, property and equipment from destruction, loss or injury by accident, 

enemy action, sabotage or other subversive action.81 In no case do naval defensive sea areas 

extend seaward in excess of three nautical miles from the extreme high water mark.82 

Vessels and persons are prohibited from entering naval defensive sea areas unless specifically 

allowed access by the entry control commander or a designated representative.83 However, 

control of entry into naval defensive sea areas is exercised consistent with international law and 

the LOS Convention.84

During the First World War, the United States, through Presidential Order, established 33 naval 

defensive sea areas offshore from United States coastal installations. Since the First World War, 

																																																												 73 33 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); 33 C.F.R. Part 334 (2012).

74 Id. 75 See, e.g., 33. C.F.R § 334.1130 (Pacific Ocean, Western Space and Missile Center (WSMC), Vandenberg AFB, 

Calif. Danger Zone: “The waters of the Pacific Ocean in an area extending seaward from the shoreline a distance of 

about three nautical miles...”).

76 33 C.F.R. § 334.2 (2012).

77 33 U.S.C. § 3 (2012); 33 C.F.R. Part 334 (2012).

78 33 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).

79 Various Executive Orders; 32 C.F.R. Part 761 (2012). 80 Id. 81 Id. 82 OPNAVINST 5500.11F

83 Id. 84 Id.
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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the United States has continued to promulgate orders establishing additional naval defensive sea 

areas in both wartime and peacetime. There currently are naval defensive sea areas near naval 

installations at Guantanamo Bay,85 Honolulu, Kaneohe Bay, Pearl Harbor, Johnston Island, 

Kingman Reef, Wake Island, Kiska Island, Kodiak, and Unalaska.86 However, entry control for 

some of these naval defensive sea areas has been suspended and public access to them is no 

longer restricted.

87

Enforcement of naval defensive sea area regulations is primarily the responsibility of the naval 

installation commander.88 Those convicted of violations of naval defensive sea area regulations 

are subject to criminal penalties.89

See HYDROLANT 604/2003 GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA in 

Appendix C for an example of announcement of a naval defensive sea area.

J. Practical Considerations Regarding US Coastal State Zones

Military commanders desiring to establish or having technical questions regarding safety zones, 

security zones, regulated navigation areas, naval vessel protection zones or restricted waterfront 

areas should contact the nearest Coast Guard Captain of the Port or District Commander. 

Military commanders desiring to establish or having technical questions regarding restricted 

areas or danger zones should contact the nearest Army Corps of Engineers District Engineer.

To be most effective, these zones require adequate numbers of on-scene personnel for 

enforcement. Without sufficient enforcement personnel, the establishment of these zones will 

likely have minimal effect. Similarly, while in most cases there is “constructive notice” for these 

zones, as they are established by federal rulemaking and published in the Federal Register, 

commanders should realize that as a practical matter, they may want to give widespread actual 

notice to enhance the effectiveness of these zones and minimize the number of enforcement 

personnel necessary. 

The use of these zones to enhance unit security is likely to deter primarily those vessels and 

persons who would have entered them “innocently,” that is, inadvertently and without any intent 

to do harm. (Of course, force protection and on-scene zone enforcement personnel could also 

have a deterrent effect on a would-be terrorist.) Nevertheless, this reduction in vessels and 

persons who otherwise may stray “too close for comfort” to a potential terrorist objective is 

certainly useful as it pares down the field of possible intruders through which force protection 

and zone enforcement personnel would have to sift.

																																																												 85 Executive Order 8749 established the Guantanamo Bay Naval Defensive Sea Area pursuant to a written 

agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the United States.

86 32 C.F.R. Part 761 (2012). Although Midway Island is also listed here as having a naval defensive sea area, 

Executive Order 13022 turned over responsibility to the Department of the Interior.

87 32 C.F.R. § 761.4 (2012).

88 32 C.F.R. § 761.9 (2012).

89 32 C.F.R. § 761.3 (2012).
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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Finally, there is a “trade-off” interest in using some of these zones for the enhancement of 

antiterrorism and force protection—particularly in the case of obscure land-based military 

installations or vessel movements. In giving the requisite legal notice and publicizing the nature 

and location of the units which these zones surround or buffer, the would-be terrorist may find 

“target” information that he or she may not otherwise have obtained.

K. Other Control Mechanisms

1.) Suspension of Innocent Passage

Provided for in the LOS Convention, innocent passage is the right of a foreign vessel to pass 

through the territorial sea of another nation whether inbound, outbound or not proceeding to or 

from the internal waters of the other nation.90 Aircraft do not have the right of innocent 

passage.91 All warships, including submarines, have the right of innocent passage on an 

unimpeded and unannounced basis; submarines must however navigate on the surface and show 

their flag.92

Although an extreme measure, coastal nations may suspend innocent passage temporarily in 

specified areas of their territorial seas when “essential for [their] security, including weapons 

exercises.”93 Coastal states must publish notice of such suspension to the international 

community prior to it taking effect.94 Further, such suspension may not discriminate “[i]n form

or in fact among foreign ships.”95

Coastal states may not otherwise restrict navigation in their territorial seas and the United States 

does not recognize any such purported restrictions which it deems not in strict compliance with 

LOS Convention requirements to suspend innocent passage.

A correlative right to formally suspending passage within the territorial sea is the right of the 

coastal state under LOS Convention Article 25 to “take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to 

prevent passage which is not innocent.” Such necessary steps include, where appropriate, the 

use of force.96 However, should a foreign ship enter the territorial sea and engage in noninnocent activities,97 customary international law prescribes that the coastal nation should first 

notify the offending vessel and give it an opportunity to correct its conduct or otherwise clarify 

its intentions—albeit in a relatively short period of time.98

2.) Conditions of Entry

a. Notification of Arrival

																																																												 90 LOS Convention, Articles 17, 18.

91 NWP, 2.5.2.1.

92 Id., 2.5.4.2 “Innocent Passage.” 93 LOS Convention, Article 25.

94 LOS Convention, Article 25; NWP, 2.5.2.3 “Temporary Suspension of Innocent Passage.”

95 LOS Convention, Article 25. 96 NWP, 2.5.2.1.

97 LOS Convention, Article 19.

98 NWP, 2.5.2.1.
Maritime Operational Zones: Coastal State Authority

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Consistent with international law, nations have the right to place certain conditions upon vessels 

wishing to enter their internal waters.99 

For example, vessels bound for the United States must first give the Coast Guard an advance 

notice of arrival—at least 96 hours (with some exceptions)—prior to their expected arrival in 

port.100 In addition to this notice of arrival, vessels must also provide certain information, 

including, but not limited to: vessel particulars (name, owner, country of registry, etc.); voyage 

information (last five ports visited and other amplifying information about these port calls); 

cargo information (particularly as regards hazardous cargo); and information about crewmen and 

others on board the vessel.101 For the most part, these requirements apply to United States and 

foreign vessels of 300 gross tons or more or vessels carrying certain dangerous cargoes.

b. Air Defense Identification Zones in International Airspace

Although not maritime in nature, another entry control mechanism available to a coastal nation 

(and, in actuality, all nations) is the air defense identification zone.102 This zone, permitted by 

international law, is in international airspace adjacent to territorial airspace.103 Nations are 

permitted to establish reasonable conditions of entry into their territory and that is the primary 

purpose of the air defense identification zone.104 United States air defense identification zone 

regulations prescribe that aircraft approaching its national airspace identify themselves while in 

international airspace as a condition of entry approval.105 These regulations also require aircraft 

bound for United States airspace to file flight plans and make periodic position reports.106 

However, these regulations do not apply to aircraft not intending to enter national airspace and 

the United States does not apply them to such aircraft.107 Similarly, United States military 

aircraft which do not plan to enter the national airspace of another nation do not identify 

themselves or comply with other such procedures absent a specific agreement to the contrary.108

																																																												 99 LOS Convention, Article 25; NWP, 1.5.1.

100 33 C.F.R. § 160.212 (2012). Amended after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the time frame for this 

notice of arrival was previously only twenty-four hours. 101 33 C.F.R. § 160.206 (2012). 102 NWP, 2.7.2.3 “Air Defense Identification Zones in International Airspace.” 103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. United States air defense identification zones were established by Federal Aviation Administration 

regulations. 14 C.F.R. Part 99 (2013). 106 NWP, 2.7.2.3. 107 Id. 108 Id.
2-1

2

Warning Areas & 

Operational Warning Zones 

Introduction

“Warning areas” are used to warn others of potential hazards created by the operation of 

maritime forces in a given area of sea and airspace. A warning area is an identified area of the 

ocean in which a state is conducting or intends to conduct lawful activity which might pose a 

hazard to or interfere with others’ lawful use of the oceans. Any state may declare a temporary 

warning area in international waters and airspace to notify other states of the conduct of lawful 

activities which may be hazardous to navigation and/or overflight of the affected area.1

In contrast to warning areas, which pertain to notice of hazards created by maritime forces, the 

term “warning zone” is frequently associated with a commander’s effort to ascertain the level of 

outside threat posed to naval forces in a particular area of operations.2

 Such maritime operational 

“warning zones,” are discussed in section B of this chapter. It should be borne in mind, 

however, that the use of, and distinction between, the terms “warning area” and “warning zone,” 

while helpful in explaining the respective functions, is not universal. This chapter will describe 

two distinct and commonly occurring warning functions; the terms associated with these 

warnings may vary from state to state. 

Finally, while ostensibly peacetime measures and not associated with belligerent rights, the 

United States uses warning areas and warning zones when conducting exercises and operations 

in peace, crisis conditions, war, and transition, establishing them in a manner which provides 

notice of the danger associated with entering the area or zone. 

A. WARNING AREAS

Warning areas may be designated with respect to a variety of functions, including military 

exercises, weapons testing, gunnery exercises, space vehicle recovery, and other activities. . 

Such warning areas might adversely affect other states’ use of the oceans to some degree, 

potentially interfering with freedom of navigation and overflight. With limited exception --

discussed in detail throughout this Manual -- all ships and aircraft, regardless of type, have the 

right of freedom of transit and operation on and above international waters (that area beyond a 

coastal state’s territorial seas and superjacent airspace),3

 and rights of innocent passage in the 

* This chapter is an update to that originally authored by Commander Errol Henriques, JAGC, US Navy.

1

 NWP 1-14M, 2.6.3: “High Seas Freedoms and Warning Areas.” 2

 NWP 1-14M, 4.4.7: “Maritime Warning Zones.” 3

 LOS Convention, Article 87.
Maritime Operational Zones: Warning Areas & Warning Zones

2-2

territorial seas of another state.4 For warships, these freedoms in international waters include 

maneuver, flight operations, military exercises, weapons testing, surveillance, and intelligence 

gathering. All such activities are required to be conducted with due regard for the safety of 

navigation and overflight of other ships and aircraft operating in the proximate area.5 

States establishing warning areas have a duty to provide notice of the potential hazard or 

interference.6 Typically, notice to the international community of the establishment of such 

areas is promulgated in advance in the form of a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR), Notice to 

Airmen (NOTAM), HYDROLANT, HYDROPAC or Special Warning to Mariners (Special 

Warning).7 Such warning areas are not “exclusion zones”; ships and aircraft of other states are 

not obliged to remain clear of the area but must avoid interfering with a state’s lawful operations 

within the area. Notices for warning areas should avoid using language which would indicate 

that the area is “prohibited” or that U.S. forces are exercising control within.8 Ships and aircraft 

of one state may therefore transit through or operate within a warning area established by another 

state, conduct surveillance and collect intelligence, subject to the requirement of due regard for 

the other state’s lawful activities therein. 

EXERCISES AND WEAPONS/SYSTEMS TESTING

For exercises, system tests and evaluations, and weapons testing, warning areas provide notice of 

activities which might pose a hazard to the freedom of navigation and overflight of other vessels 

and aircraft.9 U.S. maritime forces routinely and frequently establish such areas,10 and in cases 

where exercises and testing are repeated events over time in the same designated area, the United 

States publishes a standing notice of these recurrent activities, activating the area as required. 

Exercise warning areas are primarily designed to de-conflict operations inside the area with 

routine commercial seagoing and air traffic, although they may also warn vessels and aircraft of 

risks associated with their failure to provide identification and state their intentions when 

 4 Id, Articles 17-22. 5 Supra, notes 1 and 3. 6

 The U.S. maintains that such areas may only be established on a temporary basis, restricted in time commensurate 

with the duration of the activity. A state establishing a warning area has an obligation to minimize the duration and 

degree of interference with other states’ rights to the extent possible consistent with its lawful activities in the area.

7 See, Appendix A for a discussion of the various types of notifications used to warn the international community of 

hazards to navigation.

8

 Captain John R. Brock, USN, Legality of Warning Areas as Used by the United States, JAG JOURNAL, December 

1966-January 1967 at 69-70. Brock stated that the use of the high seas for such purposes (exercises, weapons 

testing, etc.) is a preparatory measure by a state with regard to its rights of self-defense and is customarily accepted 

as a legitimate practice.

9

 Warning areas for exercises and weapons testing have been referred to as “closure areas”. The term “closure 

areas” is a misnomer, as it implies control over the indicated area which is contrary to the concept of warning areas.

10 See, Appendix C: NAVAREA XII 967/85 CALIFORNIA (establishes an underwater operations area for seven 

days during specified times in a designated OPAREA); NAVAREA IV 2911/85(11) FLORIDA-EAST COAST 

(establishes OPAREA for mining and gunnery exercises and ordinance drops in specified areas on particular dates); 

HYDROLANT 1893/85(53) ADRIATIC SEA (notifies of current meter operations in designated area for 21 days); 

and HYDROPAC 1332/85(91, 97) OKINAWA (bombing and rocket fire exercises over two days in designated 

area).
Maritime Operational Zones: Warning Areas & Warning Zones

2-3

entering the area.

11 Specific exercise warning areas, like more general warning areas, can be 

established inside the territorial seas, in international waters, or both. Warning areas may be 

static (confined to a designated sea area) or mobile (moving with the naval asset that is 

performing activities that might adversely interfere with others’ lawful use of the oceans). 

B. Operational Warning Zones 

Even during time of peace, naval forces may be subject to significant land, air, surface, or 

subsurface threats. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations states:

Commanders are then faced with ascertaining the intent of entities (e.g., small boats, low 

slow flyers (LSFs), jet skis, swimmers) proceeding toward their units. Oftentimes 

ascertaining intent is a very difficult problem, especially when operating in the littorals 

where air and surface traffic is heavy. Given an uncertain operating environment, 

commanders may be inclined to establish some type of assessment, threat, or warning 

zone around their units in an effort to help sort out the common operational picture and 

ascertain the intent on inbound entities. This objective may be accomplished during 

peacetime while adhering to international law as long as the navigational rights of other 

ships, submarines, and aircraft are respected.12

Current U.S. practice in the use of such defensive warning zones for worldwide operations had 

its genesis in the attack on U.S. Marine Battalion Landing Team 1/8 Headquarters at Beirut 

International Airport in October 1983. Terrorists in Lebanon had developed the tactic of using 

high-yield, gas-enhanced explosive devices light enough to be delivered by small conveyances, 

such as cars, fast boats, and light aircraft. In the case of the Marine headquarters, a truck 

carrying such a device was forcefully driven into the building, killing nearly 250 servicemen.13 

Primary among the lessons of the Beirut tragedy was the necessity in tactical deployment to 

ensure commanders at all levels have sufficient time and separation from potential threats in 

order to assess hostile intent. Consequently, U.S. forces established warning zones for current 

operations as a measure of self-defense, advising the world of our increased defensive mindset 

while providing commanders time and distance in their determination of prospective threats. 

The post-Beirut warnings, focused on close-in threats to U.S. forces, notified the world that, in 

response to the terrorist threat to U.S. forces operating in the Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, 

Gulf of Oman, Strait of Hormuz and selected areas of the Arabian Sea, U.S. vessels were 

operating at a heightened defensive posture. Vessels and aircraft were requested to identify 

themselves and their intentions prior to approaching within a certain distance of U.S. forces 

operating in these areas and were notified that failure to do so placed them at risk of being 

misidentified as a threat and subject to defensive measures.14 The warning zones did not attempt 

to suspend the right of transit or use of international waters within the designated area, but stated 

 11 In response to the tactical problem of identifying the general location of naval forces engaged in pre-deployment 

certification exercises, the U.S. Navy added these warnings to their exercise area notices after the attacks of 11 

September 2001.

12 NWP 4.4.7

13 REPORT OF THE DOD COMMISSION ON BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TERRORIST ACT, OCTOBER 23, 1983, 20

December 1983.

14 See, Appendix C: HYDROLANT 2420/83; NOTAM FOR PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, GULF OF 

OMAN, AND NORTH ARABIAN SEA, CNO RMG 231539Z JAN 84; HYDROPAC 78/84.
Maritime Operational Zones: Warning Areas & Warning Zones

2-4

that the notices were published “solely to advise that measures in self-defense will be exercised 

by US forces. The measures will be implemented in a manner that does not impede the freedom 

of navigation of any vessel or state.”15 

On 17 May 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), USS STARK (FFG 31), a PERRY class 

frigate, was operating in the Persian Gulf in support of Kuwaiti tanker escort operations.16 U.S. 

AWACS reported an Iraqi F-1 Mirage airborne and turning east with an 11 nautical mile CPA to 

STARK and informed the ship; the STARK achieved radar contact with the Mirage at 70 

nautical miles. Closing to within 23 nautical miles of the STARK, the Iraqi aircraft launched 

two Exocet missiles, striking the hull and superstructure, killing 37 sailors and injuring 11 

others.17 In response to the attack, the United States issued revised warnings to vessels and 

aircraft approaching U.S. forces, requesting identification and intentions as soon as they were

detected, stating that failure to do so or respond to warnings could result in defensive measures, 

and specifically noting that illuminating a U.S. vessel with fire control radar could result in an 

immediate defensive reaction.18 Expanding on the post-Beirut warning-zone concept, the postSTARK warning zone eliminated fixed distances and concentrated on establishing warning 

zones commensurate with potential threat capabilities.19 Both the NOTAM and the NOTMAR 

indicated that, despite the heightened U.S. defensive posture, these measures “will be 

implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere with freedom of navigation and 

overflight.”20 Warning zones of this type were repeatedly established over the years wherever 

U.S. maritime forces were operating in a heightened defensive posture or within certain areas of 

international waters. 

 15 See, Appendix C: HYDROPAC 78/84 16 Both Iranian and Iraqi forces were targeting neutral merchant vessels transiting the Persian Gulf. Late in the war, 

U.S. warships escorted Kuwaiti oil tankers, re-flagged as U.S. vessels, to enforce respect for their neutral status and 

ensure their safe transit. See, REPORT ON THE STAFF INVESTIGATION INTO THE IRAQI ATTACK ON THE USS STARK,

JUNE 14, 1987; and George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and Policy, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, Vol. 74 (2000), p. 60-61. 17 Supra, note 13. The first missile hit the ship but did not detonate; the second missile hit the STARK 20-30 

seconds later and detonated. The STARK had sent radio warnings to the aircraft after the launch of the first missile 

as the second missile was launched, initially unaware of the incoming threat.

18 See, Appendix C: HYDROPAC 870/87; and INTERNATIONAL NOTAMS, COMUSNAVCENT RMG 060210Z 

AUG 87.

19 The revised NOTMAR and NOTAM dispensed with the fixed distances used in previous warnings, extending the 

warning area to the limits of detection by U.S. forces, engaging the potential threat with warnings well beyond the 

threat’s weapons release range. This had the effect of removing any concept of a “fixed bubble” around U.S. forces 

and increased the area of potential hazard to other vessels and aircraft (maximizing the effectiveness of 

time/distance for threat determination and response). For examples of fixed-distance warning zones, sometimes also 

called “defensive bubbles,” see Appendix C: HYDROPAC 78/84 (“avoid closing U.S. Naval forces closer than 5 

NM”) and NOTAM (Jan. 21, 1984) (“Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL...are requested to avoid 

approaching closer than five NM to U.S. Naval forces.”). 

20 Id. The following year, on 3 July 1988, USS VINCENNES fired at and destroyed Iran Air flight 655, a civilian 

airliner, after the airbus’ repeated failure to respond to warnings (the airbus was mistakenly determined by the 

Tactical Information Coordinator to be descending, an attack profile indicator). At the time, the Commanding 

Officer of the VINCENNES believed himself and the USS ELMER MONTGOMERY (FF 1082) to be under a 

coordinated air and sea attack from Iranian forces. Prior to the attack, VINCENNES’ helicopter had been fired upon 

by Iranian small boats. See, FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DOWNING OF 

IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ON 3 JULY 1988, 28 July 1988; and Walker, supra note 12 at 71. This is precisely the type of 

hazardous situation the Persian Gulf warning areas were designed to mitigate.
Maritime Operational Zones: Warning Areas & Warning Zones

2-5

Most recently, after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., 

the United States issued a special broadcast warning, notifying the world that U.S. forces 

worldwide were operating at a heightened state of readiness in response to attacks on the United 

States and pursuant to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in the Middle East.21 Similarly, 

warning zones were used by U.S. and coalition forces in the Mediterranean Sea prior to the 

initiation of hostilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.22 After hostilities in Iraq commenced, 

areas of sea control and zones were implemented for combat operations.23

Warning zones have been used to notify other states’ vessels and aircraft of ongoing U.S. 

operations and that vessels and aircraft whose intentions are unclear risk being subjected to 

defensive action within the operational area. As with warning areas, notice of warning zones 

may be promulgated in advance by Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR), Notice to Airmen 

(NOTAM), HYDROLANT, HYDROPAC or Special Warning to Mariners (Special Warning). 

The existence of a warning zone might also be communicated via voice radio. As noted above, 

the geographic scope of these warning zones can be as expansive as the oceans of the entire 

world, limited to specific regions (e.g., the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Gulf), or 

restricted to a finite area established within a set of specific coordinates. A warning zone, of 

course, may also be mobile, moving with the naval vessels for whose protection it has been 

established. The language of the notices and conditions set forth are contingent upon the type of 

operations being conducted in the warning zone and the perceived potential threat to U.S. forces 

conducting those operations. As with warning areas, such warning zones can be used during 

peacetime, crisis conditions, transition, and international armed conflict. 

 21 See, Appendix C: U.S. Special Broadcast Warning to Mariners 162045Z NOV 2001. 22 See, Appendix C: HYDROLANTs 271/03 (U.S. forces warn of heightened state of readiness defensive measures 

against terrorist threats) and 509/03 (U.S. forces warn of combat training exercises in international waters off the 

northern and eastern coasts of Cyprus). 

23 Coalition forces established areas of sea control upon commencement of hostilities in Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM and notified the international community of the coalition’s exercise of its belligerent rights to stop, 

board and search vessels during operations against Iraq. See, Appendix C: Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) 

Bahrain Advisory Bulletin 06-03. See also, Chapter 4 for a discussion of the Mediterranean zones used during 

combat operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
3-1

3

Special Zones in Crisis Conditions – Control of Sea and 

Airspace during Times of National Emergency and Enforcing 

Collective Security

Introduction

The establishment and enforcement of zones in accordance with national domestic law, during 

times of international armed conflict, or pursuant to the authority of a United Nations Security 

Council Resolution are well-established concepts with legal and historical precedent. More 

problematic and singular is the concept of creating a special zone in the twilight between war and 

peace, during a national security crisis or an emerging threat to the collective security of several 

nations acting in concert. Under particular circumstances, such zones could further an effort by 

one or more states to alleviate or reverse imminently dangerous conditions which have led to a 

destabilization of the security status quo. This chapter deals with those conditions under which 

the United States, acting unilaterally or in the furtherance of a collective security arrangement 

(i.e., via NATO, the OAS, or with those other nations with which the United States maintains 

mutual defense agreements), might lawfully assert and effect control of international sea and

airspace by the establishment of a zone --in the absence of action by the United Nations and 

when international armed conflict is not occurring.. In order to provide a framework for the 

establishment and purpose of such zones, this chapter will examine the concept of naval cordon 

sanitaire and the historical application of a “maritime quarantine.”1

A. CORDON SANITAIRE

The original concept of a cordon sanitaire (‘sanitary cordon’ or ‘sanitary zone’) is closely related 

to the practice of contagion quarantine; such a cordon was used as “a guarded line between 

infected and uninfected districts, to prevent inter-communication and spread of disease or 

pestilence...”2 The concept of a naval cordon sanitaire (roughly translated, for purposes of this 

chapter, as “sanitary zone”) was adopted by the United States in the late-1960s as a possible 

answer to the threat of Soviet “tattletale” intelligence collection vessels. Recognizing the 

significant threat posed to Soviet forces and security by U.S. carrier battle groups, Soviet 

military leadership believed that they would gain an enormous tactical advantage in the early 

stages of a war with the West by decisively removing the threat of carrier air power to its 

* This chapter is an update to that originally authored by Commander Errol Henriques, JAGC, US Navy.

1 See NWP 1-14M, 4.4.8 “Maritime Quarantine” 2 See Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) at 927. Indeed, cordon sanitaire is sometimes translated as 

‘quarantine line.’ Note, moreover, that ‘cordon sanitaire’ might also popularly, if erroneously, be used 

interchangeably with ‘blockade,’ viz.: “North Korea may face blockade by US Navy” Belfast Telegraph, 27 May 

2009: “President Barack Obama is weighing a possible naval cordon sanitaire around North Korea as one means of 

ratcheting up sanctions amid the fierce global criticism of this week’s nuclear and missile tests by the reclusive 

communist country.”
Maritime Operational Zones: Special Zones in Crisis Conditions

3-2

seagoing and shore-based targets. In order to effect the removal or degradation of carrier air 

power in the tactical mix, the Soviets would require the ability to pre-emptively strike these 

forces in a coordinated fashion using up-to-date targeting data provided by “tattletale” ships 

traveling in company with the battle group. During the Cold War, it was routine Soviet naval 

practice to have one or more Soviet vessels in company with a U.S. carrier battle group. U.S. 

commanders recognized that in times of extreme crisis precipitating general war, the presence of 

Soviet shadow vessels posed an unacceptable risk to such high-value units as American aircraft 

carriers.3 The solution to the threat of Soviet “tattletale” ships was the concept of cordon 

sanitaire.

4

 Tactically and strategically, there were problems with the concept, primary among 

them that notice of the ‘sanitary zone’s’ existence and its breadth would provide the Soviets with 

precisely the information cordon sanitaire was designed to deny, the general location of the U.S. 

carriers. The Soviets would obviously have to be informed where not to sail their ships in order 

to respect the restrictions of the zone. Second, the establishment and notice of the zone might 

even invite a pre-emptive strike by the adversary.5 Despite the limitations inherent in the tactical 

situation for which cordon sanitaire was originally designed, the concept may be more 

practically applied to a variety of current tactical scenarios. It is therefore useful to re-examine 

what cordon sanitaire was and how it would work in today’s maritime environment.

Cordon sanitaire, as used by U.S. naval forces, has been defined as, 

[A]n area relative to U.S. Naval Forces, defined by [...] a circle centered on the [high value 

unit’s] formation in which the presence of units of a potential enemy would be considered a 

hostile act, making such units subject to military action.6

 

3 See Lieutenant Commander William H. Gregory, USN, Their Tattletales (Our Problems), PROCEEDINGS, February 

1984, at 97.

4 Cordon sanitaire was studied and subjected to war-game analysis by the U.S. Navy but never put into formal 

practice. However, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, in January 1984, during the Iran-Iraq Tanker War, the 

U.S. announced the use of “defensive bubbles” for its ships and aircraft operating in the Middle East (see NOTAM 

FOR PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, GULF OF OMAN, AND NORTH ARABIAN SEA, CNO RMG 

231539Z JAN 84.) The NOTAM recommended specific standoff distances from U.S. forces for air and surface 

(2000ft AGL and 5nm, respectively), threatening potential defensive action against unidentified contacts or contacts 

whose intentions were unclear. The action was justified by the neutral United States under the right of self-defense 

as a precaution against terrorist threats in the region (the precursor for this action was the 1983 attack on the Marine 

Barracks at Beirut International Airport). Although the defensive bubbles were categorized as the establishment of a 

cordon sanitaire (see George K. Walker, The Tanker War, 1980-88: Law and Policy, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, Vol. 74 (2000)), they were not nearly as severe in their tactical application. The 

January 1984 NOTAM specifically stated, “This notice is published solely to advise that hazardous operations are 

being conducted on an unscheduled basis: it does not affect the freedom of navigation of any individual or state.” 

Additionally, non-U.S. units transiting near or within the defensive bubble area were requested to maintain radio 

contact with the concerned U.S. units and warned that they “may be held at risk by U.S. defensive measures.” The 

cordon sanitaire, as originally conceived, is a far more severe response to a much greater state of crisis between 

potential belligerents: it is a true exclusion zone applied to potential enemy assets. See, Appendix B. 5

 Lieutenant Commander Stanley F. Gilchrist, USN, The Cordon Sanitaire – Is It Useful? Is It Practical?, NAVAL 

WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, May-June 1982, 61, 65. 6

 Gilchrist, p. 61. This chapter intentionally removes the language “either geographic boundaries or” from the 

definition; because the cordon sanitaire is designed to protect seagoing, high value units from targeting “tattletales” 

and conceptually would have little or no value for stationary, land-based, or pierside targets.
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Cordon sanitaire is foremost a defensive mechanism. Its characteristics are:

1. It is established pursuant to an order of the President or Secretary of Defense,7 or by 

delegation, of a combatant commander or theater component commander. The establishment of 

a cordon sanitaire is an act of sovereign authority which must be ordered by the head of state or 

by subordinates at the responsible level of command who have been delegated decision-making 

authority.

2. It is established as a response to deteriorating conditions between potential political/military 

adversaries which affect the security of the states involved or have enormous impact on regional 

stability in an area which affects the interests of the state(s) involved; this is most accurately 

defined as an international crisis which precipitates but falls just short of international armed 

conflict.

3. It is selective: cordon sanitaire requires the complete removal of all designated potentially (or 

imminently) hostile forces within the zone but permits the presence of neutrals and friendly 

forces. 

The first two characteristics are particularly important to establish the validity of a cordon 

sanitaire. Absent an international armed conflict, all warships of all states have the right of 

unimpeded freedom of navigation and overflight on and above the high seas and the exclusive 

economic zone (those areas beyond a coastal state’s territorial waters and superjacent airspace).8 

The rights of high seas freedoms are constrained only by the requirement that the high seas are 

reserved for only “peaceful purposes.”9 No state’s warships may intentionally threaten the safety 

and security of other vessels operating in the same area, nor are they permitted to threaten any 

other state(s)’ security by their actions and operations in international waters; where such a threat 

exists, states may take appropriate action to deter or decisively counter the threat. This concept, 

the sovereign state’s inherent right to act in defense of itself, individually or collectively,10 is the 

heart of the legal efficacy of establishing a cordon sanitaire. During international armed 

conflict, belligerent forces are permitted to exercise greater control over areas of sea and airspace 

than military forces in times of peace. Unrestricted freedom of navigation and overflight is the 

norm during peacetime, only to be departed from under the most extreme circumstances. Such 

conditions are present in peacetime only where a state or its forces must act to assure their 

security in response to a state of crisis. 

 7 See Gregory, p. 99; Gilchrist, p. 61. 8 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, Art. 86. While the United States has not 

ratified this convention, President Reagan’s Statement on United States Ocean Policy of March 10, 1983, recognized 

that the treaty’s provisions relating to navigation and overflight rights reflected the traditional uses of the oceans, 

existing maritime law, and current state practice.

9 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, article 88. International law also recognizes that coastal 

states may establish Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ) in the international airspace adjacent to their national 

airspace, and require identification of all aircraft in the zone as a condition of entry into the national airspace. U.S. 

ADIZ are set forth in 14 CFR 99.42, 99.43, 99.45, and 99.47 for the continental United States, Alaska, Guam, and 

Hawaii respectively. For a more complete discussion of ADIZ and their effect on rights of international overflight, 

see Chapter 1. 10 See Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Art. 51. Of course, whether a cordon sanitaire might 

prudentially be established by a state implicitly involves balancing that state’s right of self-defense with the right of 

other states to exercise high-seas freedoms. 
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While cordon sanitaire was born of Cold War planning doctrine, it nonetheless may have tactical 

application in present day operations. The establishment of a cordon sanitaire would be lawful 

where those conditions which permit the exercise of a state’s inherent right of individual or 

collective self-defense exist. The existence of such conditions must be determined by the 

President, or identified in general terms by him and later determined by an appropriate 

subordinate commander pursuant to a delegation of this strategic decision-making. The 

establishment of a cordon sanitaire would be a tactical measure required to protect high value 

units in order to preserve them for further defensive or combat actions occasioned by crisis 

conditions.11 In this, it performs much like a modified version of belligerent control of the 

immediate area of naval operations during warfare.12

Tactically, cordon sanitaire could be used in a variety of current operational scenarios as 

preparation for conflict or as a deterrent. In the Cold War, cordon sanitaire was to be used in the 

event that military confrontation with the Soviets approached inevitability. In that case, the 

establishment of the sanitary zone to eliminate tattletales became a measure of anticipatory selfdefense, a step below the use of force, though possibly presaging the first salvo of the war; 

however, the continued viability of carrier air power might also have given the Soviets pause and 

ultimately prevented a further escalation of the conflict. Applying the concept to today’s tactical 

and strategic environment, cordon sanitaire could be applied as a response to intelligence and 

tactical indicators which presage a coordinated assault by terrorist small boats intended to be the 

first in a series of attacks. In this situation, it is more than merely unit self-defense, but an 

exercise of national self-defense which would require direction from higher authority and 

enabling rules of engagement.13 

An examination of the state’s right to act in self-defense is pertinent to the discussion of how 

cordon sanitaire is applied. Customarily, it has been long recognized that a state, as an element 

of its sovereignty, has the fundamental right to take actions in national self-defense to ensure its 

continued survival.14 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter is a reflection of the continued 

recognition of that right:

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an 

armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 

measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The members of the UN Charter recognized that, while states had generally agreed to refrain 

from acts of aggression and grant the Security Council the power to deal with breaches and 

 11 Although the concept was originally designed to protect and preserve carrier air power, cordon sanitaire is 

universally applicable to the protection of any high value unit, such as carriers, flagships, T-AGOS (ocean 

surveillance) vessels, submarines, ammunition ships, and sea based command and control platforms.

12 See Chapter 4 for a discussion on the immediate area of operations in naval warfare. 13 It might be maintained, however, that cordon sanitaire is not a concept useful in defense against such threats as 

non-state actor/terrorist small boats and that, instead, defensive Warning Zones, discussed in the previous chapter, 

are the more appropriate measure. 

14 It must be noted that states may take any and all appropriate measures to ensure their survival and viability; 

however, the range of measures includes a long list of potential actions from diplomatic protest up to and including 

engaging in war.
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threats to international peace and security, they would retain their right to act to preserve their 

continued survival or political integrity. Although the right to act in response to an armed attack 

is manifest in the UN Charter, what is not apparent in the language is the state’s right to act in 

anticipation of an armed attack. It is generally accepted that states may also act pre-emptively in 

anticipation of an armed attack.

15

The application of force to counter aggression under self-defense doctrine, either with regard to 

an armed attack or in anticipation of one, is dictated by three criteria (derived from customary 

international law): necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.16

Necessity is the requirement to act, with counter force, to the threat presented. Proportionality 

refers to the appropriateness of the level of counter force to the attack or anticipated attack; 

succinctly put, it is that amount of force required to decisively counter the present or anticipated 

threat. While it does not require equal force and specifically contemplates sufficient force to 

overwhelm the adversary, it must be in response to and measured by the threat presented. 

Admittedly, it can be a gray area within the judgment of the head of state or the operational 

commander exercising this prerogative on his behalf. Immediacy is the requirement to use force 

instantly in response to the threat presented.17

It is these concepts which must be applied to the planning and execution of cordon sanitaire in 

response to an imminent threat: the necessity to establish the zone in response to the anticipated 

or present threat; the fact that the zone enforcement is a measured and proportional response to 

the threat; and knowing when to establish the zone so that it is neither too late to respond to the 

threat or premature.

In the case of a potential international conflict between the United States and another state, the 

establishment of a cordon sanitaire would be useful to eliminate the threat of submarines to 

command and control platforms or carriers and their escorts: creating an underwater sanitary 

zone in areas of restricted maneuvering as a measure of anticipatory self-defense, the threat to 

naval command and control or carrier air power could be eliminated, permitting continued use of 

those assets and perhaps deterring an enemy from further aggression. The area of the cordon 

sanitaire would be dictated by tactical concerns such as enemy capabilities, maximum effective 

weapons ranges, speed of advance, potential of maneuverability, and own forces ability to 

effectively patrol and enforce the zone.18

 15 For a discussion of the right of anticipatory self-defense under customary international law, see Yoram Dinstein, 

WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE, 3d Ed., Cambridge University Press (2001), p. 165. Note that Professor 

Dinstein indicates that “preventive use of force in response to sheer threats” would “not be in compliance with 

Article 51 of the Charter” [emphasis added]. Id. at 183. 16 Id., pp. 183-4, 194. 17 Immediacy contemplates a nexus between the time of the attack or anticipated attack and the response in selfdefense. The degree of nexus is another matter open to the judgment of the appropriate decision-maker. 18 An arguable example of cordon sanitaire preceded US entry into the Second World War. President Franklin 

Roosevelt, in response to the German submarine attack on the destroyer USS Greer southeast of Greenland on 

September 4, 1941, announced what was regarded as his ‘shoot-on-site’ policy against Axis warships, particularly 

submarines. President Roosevelt, in a September 11th radio address, said: “... It is no act of war on our part when 

we decide to protect the seas which are vital to American defense. The aggression is not ours. Ours is solely defense. 

But let this warning be clear. From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters, the protection of 

which is necessary for American defense, they do so at their own peril. The orders which I have given as 
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B. “QUARANTINE”

Used in a maritime interdiction context, the term “quarantine” was coined by the Kennedy 

Administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962.19 Although critics to this day 

deride the term ‘quarantine’ as merely a euphemism for an illegal blockade, the word was 

intended to denote a peacetime military action that would bear little resemblance to a true 

blockade.20 

In July and August of 1962, the Soviet Union increased its military assistance to Cuba in the 

form of air defense missiles. Strategically, post-revolutionary Cuba had been a thorn in the side 

of the United States: beginning in the Eisenhower Administration, and solidified by American

involvement with the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961, Cuba had shifted solidly into the Soviet orbit. 

A communist satellite within 100nm of the United States was considered strategically significant 

during the Cold War.21 Increasing Soviet military assistance to Cuba throughout 1962 concerned 

the Kennedy Administration and was seen as a direct threat to United States security and its 

strategic dominance in the Americas. On 4 September 1962, President Kennedy stated,

The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats 

to the peace. It must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special 

relationships which have long characterized the inter-American System.

22

Moreover, he informed the world that were the Soviet Union to place offensive weapons and 

capabilities in Cuba, “the gravest issues would arise” and the United States would prevent, “by 

whatever means may be necessary,” the Castro regime from becoming an aggressive power 

inside the United States’ sphere of influence in the Americas.23

In this statement, President Kennedy established what was understood to be the security status 

quo for the Americas, and delineated the conditions of change in that status quo which would 

require a response by the United States. From 16 through 18 October, U-2 photographs shown to 

 

Commander in Chief to the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy-at once. The sole 

responsibility rests upon Germany. There will be no shooting unless Germany continues to seek it...” 19 Max Frankel, HIGH NOON IN THE COLD WAR, KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS,

Ballantine Books (2004), p. 94. The term was proposed by the Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser, Leonard 

Meeker, to more properly define what might otherwise be known as a limited blockade. Initially, the term 

“quarantine” was more semantic, designed to transmit the intentions of President Kennedy that the action was not an 

act of war, which is the legal effect of a blockade.

20 See Chapter 4 for discussion of blockade 21 The placement of Soviet armament in Cuba was the subject of a variety of National Intelligence Estimates and 

memoranda from the Secretary of Defense throughout 1962. U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Bowles also met with 

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on 13 October 1962; their discussion centered on the increasing Soviet military buildup in Cuba, potential U.S. responses, and consequential Soviet counter actions against Berlin and Turkey. See U.S. 

Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, Vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and 

Aftermath. It was clear that both superpowers were concerned that Cuba could become the flash point for a larger

East-West military confrontation. 22 See U.S. Department of State, BULLETIN, Vol. XLVII, No. 1213 (September 24, 1962), p. 450 (read to news 

correspondents on September 4th by White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger). 23 Id.
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the President confirmed the presence of Soviet medium-range bombers and the construction of 

Soviet missile installations in Cuba.24 The installations housed Soviet medium and intermediaterange ballistic nuclear missiles capable of striking nearly every major city and every strategic 

base in the United States (a range of up to 2200 nm), as well as several other nations in North 

and Central America.25 

This defined the change in the security status quo in the Americas which the United States had 

indicated was intolerable.26 In his 22 October speech to the American people, President 

Kennedy informed the American public of the presence of a Soviet offensive nuclear capability 

in Cuba and stated,

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base [...] constitutes an explicit threat to 

the peace and security of all the Americas [...] and contradicts the repeated assurances of [the Soviet 

Union that the arms build-up would remain defensive in nature]. 

For many years, the Soviet Union and the United States [...] have deployed strategic nuclear weapons 

with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured the these weapons would not be 

used in the absence of some vital challenge. [The introduction of Soviet offensive nuclear weapons] is a 

deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this 

country.

In response to the Soviet disruption of the nuclear status quo, the President issued a Proclamation 

initiating an “Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba,” prohibiting the further 

transfer of strategic Soviet weapons and supporting materiel to Cuba, and directing the Secretary 

of Defense to take appropriate measures.27 The President invoked Articles 6 and 8 of the 1947 

Rio Treaty as the legal justification for his actions.28 The Proclamation permitted the Secretary 

of Defense to designate, “within a reasonable distance” from Cuba, “prohibited or restricted 

zones” and prescribe routes of transit for cleared vessels. The “quarantine” became effective on 

24 October, and was enforced by a naval picket line ordered to intercept inbound military 

shipments to Cuba from the Soviet Union; the “quarantine interdiction line” included the area 

 24 The Soviets’ placement of these weapons in Cuba was most likely designed to address the enormous strategic 

advantage the U.S. had over the Soviet Union in its nuclear arsenal as well as a negotiating tool for concessions on 

Berlin and a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

25 Frankel, p. 87-88. 26 A joint resolution of the 87th Congress on 3 October 1962 stated that the United States was determined to “prevent 

in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the United States,” identifying 

the specific threat of a communist Cuba with military ties to the Soviet Union, and citing the self-defense provisions 

of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). 27 Proclamation 3504, INTERDICTION OF THE DELIVERY OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS TO CUBA, October 23, 1962. See

Appendix C. 28 The OAS met on October 23, 1962 and voted unanimously to prohibit the shipment of strategic arms and materiel 

to Cuba from “the Sino-Soviet powers” under these articles, which, respectively, require a meeting of the OAS to 

address threats to regional peace and security in the Americas and permit the use of armed force in response to such 

threats. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty refers to situations in which “the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or 

the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an 

armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation might endanger 

the peace of America...” Article 8 lists, among actions to be taken, the following: “partial or complete interruption 

of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radiotelegraphic 

communications; and use of armed force.”
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“within a circle with its center at Havana and a radius of 500 nautical miles and [...] the area 

included within a circle with its center at Cape Maysi (Maisi), located at the eastern tip of the 

Island of Cuba, and a radius of 500 nautical miles.”29 (See figure 1 below). Within the 

interception area, U.S. forces were authorized to stop, board, inspect, and divert all vessels 

suspected or discovered to be shipping prohibited weapons and materiel to Cuba. 

The immediate Soviet response to the quarantine announcement was a rapid build-up of Cuba’s 

offensive capability; however, the quarantine served its objective, permitting the United States to 

halt further shipments to Cuba and ultimately led to a de-escalation in the crisis with the Soviet 

Union agreeing to remove its offensive weapons from Cuba.30 While the actions of the Kennedy 

Administration have been criticized as the illegal imposition of a blockade and an improper 

assertion of the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the U.S. maintains the 

interdictions were lawfully undertaken as a collective security measure authorized by a regional 

organization in the absence of Security Council action. , Under the right conditions, maritime 

quarantine is available as a peacetime military action involving limited coercive measures and 

employing the minimum force required. 31

 29 Department of State Press Release No. 645, October 27, 1962. The United States did not publish an official chart 

of the interception area.

30 The quarantine formally ended on 20 November 1962 with the Soviet agreement in late October to remove not 

only the missiles but its IL-28 bombers as well. For its part, the US pledged not to invade Cuba; the US also secretly 

agreed to remove its Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles deployed in Italy and Turkey and targeting the 

Soviet Union. The naval force tasked with maintaining the quarantine zone, Task Force 136, eventually included 

Argentine, Dominican, Venezuelan, and United States units and checked 55 merchant ships bound for Cuba.

31 Although some observers have questioned whether the United States and the OAS complied with the Charter of 

the United Nations, the United States placed the question before the UN Security Council. The Council met on 23 

October 1962 but failed to take any action. The U.S. position is that regional organizations are permitted to engage 

in such security actions where the Security Council is ineffective in addressing the situation. It is noteworthy that 

the Security Council specifically declined to act on a Soviet-proposed resolution condemning the quarantine. See, 

Carter and Trimble, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3d Ed., Aspen Law and Business, Gaithersburg/New York (1999), p. 

1239-1240.
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Figure 1: Quarantine Interdiction Line. 

The establishment of the naval quarantine was in response to a definitive change in the strategic 

(nuclear) status quo between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States, 

pursuant to its pre-conceived conditions of national security and hemisphere defense, acted in 

accordance with its stated policies and with the consent of those other nations in the region 

whose security was also at stake.32 The quarantine was an action by the United States in defense 

of the United States and U.S. interests and security while, to the greatest degree possible, 

maintaining the rights of freedom of navigation in a peacetime environment.33 The quarantine 

was in response to a change in the strategic status quo between two political and military 

adversaries involved in political brinksmanship; the sudden development of the Soviet Union’s 

true nuclear first strike capability -- contrary to the assurances of the Soviet head of state --

combined with its clandestine nature, placed the situation in the realm of unacceptable risk to the 

United States and the Americas. As such, the United States felt justified in taking action in 

circumstances which fell below the traditional threshold for actions in self-defense (and in fact 

took such action in an effort to avoid the need to act in self-defense at some later date ). 

 32 The Cuban-Soviet threat had serious implications beyond the Americas; a war between the United States and the 

Soviet Union would have necessarily involved the NATO nations and engaged the European continent in a 

devastating conflict. While not directly involved, the governments of France, Canada, West Germany, and the 

United Kingdom were briefed on the situation and all gave their approval to the actions of the United States. 33 As stated in the section on cordon sanitaire, all nations’ warships have the right of unimpeded freedom of 

navigation and overflight on and above the high seas and the exclusive economic zone, absent international armed 

conflict. The right, though, is not unlimited and in cases where national self-defense is at issue, nations faced with 

such threats may find it necessary to impose measures which affect or impede other states’ rights of navigation and 

overflight. Where the conditions for maritime quarantine are applicable to international waters surrounding other 

coastal states, the need to act in self-defense may also require the coastal state to set more restrictive conditions on 

navigation and overflight in the international waters and airspace adjacent to its own territory. In such cases, the 

quarantine concept would work in reverse, selectively prohibiting the use of international waters and airspace

adjacent to its territorial seas by units presenting the threat.
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As the body of international law has developed, an additional justification for the United States 

to depart from expected norms of international law in peacetime (i.e., by the restriction of 

freedom of navigation and trade) -- absent the need to act in national self-defense – might also be 

found in the doctrine of necessity, which states:

1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 

wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an international obligation of the 

State unless:

a. the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a 

grave and imminent peril; and

b. the act did not impair an essential interest of the State toward which the obligation 

existed.34

In the Cuban Missile Crisis, the President was faced with a destabilizing shift in the status quo

between the United States and the Soviet Union by the latter’s introduction of a nuclear first 

strike capability in the Americas. Short of engaging his adversary in what could become a global 

nuclear war, the President determined that the quarantine was the only practical measure 

available to reverse the events which led to the crisis.35 In contrast, there was no similar 

essential interest of the Soviet Union in jeopardy, since the conditions of nuclear parity that 

existed prior to the Missile Crisis were more stable and less threatening to Soviet interests than 

the situation created by Khrushchev in Cuba.

Under the doctrine of necessity, the lawfulness of the quarantine is supported by:

1. The determinations of the head of state regarding:

a. threats to national security and conditions under which the nation would invoke its 

right of self-defense, or 

b. destabilizing strategic conditions to the security status quo which require anticipatory 

action.

2. The existence of crisis conditions justifying extreme measures in response to a significant 

threat.

3. Reliance on international legal concepts of the right of self-defense and supporting 

regional/collective security arrangements.

 34 I.L.C. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 33.

35 Khrushchev was relying on finishing the missile sites quickly and secretly, then presenting a fait accompli to the 

United States before it could react to their presence in Cuba; the Soviets were dangerously close to completing 

construction of the missile facilities in Cuba and had stepped up their timetable once they knew that the missiles had 

been discovered by the United States. In light of these facts, the President determined that the Soviets would be 

unresponsive to protracted negotiation through normal diplomatic channels.
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4. Determining and engaging in appropriate actions short of warfare.

5. Notice to the international community of those actions the state will take in defense of its 

interests.

With respect to the contention that quarantine is merely a euphemism for an act of war, 

quarantine can be distinguished from blockade36 in that:

1. Quarantine is a measured response to a threat to national security or an international crisis; 

blockade is an unrestrained act of war against an identified belligerent.

2. The goal of quarantine is de-escalation and return to the status quo or other stabilizing 

arrangement; the goal of a blockade is denial and degradation of an enemy capability with the 

ultimate end state being capitulation in armed conflict.

3. Quarantine, like cordon sanitaire, is selective in proportional response to the perceived threat, 

in this case offensive arms and materiel shipments; blockade requires impartial application to all 

nations – discrimination by a blockading belligerent renders the blockade legally invalid.37

The Cuban Missile Crisis gave birth to a unique type of maritime zone designed to deal with the 

complexities of strategic brinksmanship in the modern world. The maritime quarantine concept 

has not been employed since the Cuban Missile Crisis, most likely due to its controversial 

justification under international law. Its application outside its original Cold War context is also 

questioned. However, developments in international law and the current rise of security threats 

of a similar nature give military planners reason to revisit the concept. Quarantine can be 

applied to a variety of contemporary situations that could deteriorate to the level of crisis. 

Consider the threat of North Korean nuclear arms production to United States, South Korean, 

and Japanese security; as the North Koreans come closer to developing a serious nuclear military 

capability, the affected states may very well consider the establishment of a quarantine area 

around North Korea to prevent their acquisition of the materials required to finalize and maintain 

their nuclear capability. Similarly, a quarantine prohibiting shipments of arms and military 

materiel could be used against states which are experiencing internal upheaval affecting regional 

security interests (e.g., Kosovo or Haiti). The quarantine interception and control area would be 

dictated by a number of factors, including potential sea space, number and location of ports and 

airfields affected, and the target state’s naval capability and shore-based tactical air and surface 

to surface weapons capability and range.

 36 Quarantine is also distinguishable from the concept of “pacific blockade,” used in the nineteenth and twentieth 

centuries. The pacific blockade was, in essence, the establishment of true blockade conditions during peacetime 

against target states with the goal of coercing them into a particular behavior. The occasions during which pacific 

blockade was applied were sporadic, few and controversial. Most pacific blockades were ultimately explained away 

as acts of reprisal or undeclared war; as such, significant doubt persists as to the existence of the doctrine.

37 See NWP 1-14M, 4.4.8 “Maritime Quarantine.” The quarantine was intentionally selective and designed to allow 

the United States to apply incremental measures in escalation if the situation deteriorated, to include the ultimate 

application of total blockade. See Frankel, p. 95. Although the members of ExComm (select members of the 

National Security Council, including the Vice President, the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Attorney General, 

and the U.S. Ambassador to the UN) used the terms “blockade” and “quarantine” interchangeably, hindsight 

demonstrates the creation of a concept separate and distinct from traditional blockade. 
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C. APPLICATION OF CORDON SANITAIRE AND QUARANTINE

Cordon sanitaire and quarantine are different applications of the same overarching requirement 

for a state to act in defense of its essential security interests. Cordon sanitaire is the application 

of self-defense doctrine to an extreme tactical condition; quarantine is the application of the selfdefense concept to a strategic crisis or a strategic anticipatory measure designed to avoid the 

necessity of having to invoke self-defense at some later time. And, despite their development 

during the unique circumstances of the Cold War, they may have continued application to 

contemporary operations. Cordon sanitaire can find use in conducting operations in theaters 

presenting heightened defensive concerns where preventive actions are required: for example, 

sea- and airborne terrorist threats or threats presented by states. Quarantine may find even more 

use in response to international crises where the UN has failed or is unable to respond in a timely 

manner to acts of aggression or threats to international peace: for example, North Korean and 

Iranian production and exportation of nuclear weapons and materiel, or peacekeeping and 

humanitarian operations such as Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, or destabilizing terrorist insurgencies in 

Iraq. The broad considerations for such operations would be:

1. The existence of an international crisis (a destabilizing departure from the security status quo) 

or extreme threat to U.S. forces, allies, or regional security.

2. The assertion of the state’s right to:

a. act in individual or collective self-defense in response to the threat; or

b. act pursuant to a collective security agreement in the absence of UN action or as an 

alternative to ineffective action; 38 or 

c. act anticipatorily in response to an unacceptable risk to its security interests (necessity).

3. An order by the President, Secretary of Defense, or responsible combatant commander or 

theater component commander delegated decision-making authority (quarantine would likely be 

directed by the President; cordon sanitaire could be delegated to subordinate commanders, 

possibly to the JTF level, depending on the defined national objectives).

4. Notice to the international community of the actions to be taken and areas where 

U.S./coalition forces would establish the zone of control, typically done through NOTMAR, 

Special Warning, or similar avenues.39

5. Creation of specific mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) which:

a. Identify hostile forces or objects of attack.

 38 Chapter 5 deals with zones effected pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution, either by UN forces, single 

nation-led coalitions, or regional organizations. 39 For the mechanics related to drafting and promulgating NOTMAR, NOTAM, Special Warnings, and 

HYDROLANT/HYDROPACs, see Appendices A and B.
Maritime Operational Zones: Special Zones in Crisis Conditions

3-13

b. Identify actions considered hostile.

c. Establish effective warning procedures.

d. Establish levels of command authority and conditions required for the application of 

force (use of warning shots, disabling or destructive fire; in the case of quarantine, requirements 

for detention and diversion of vessels, boarding party ROE, inspection regimes and procedures 

for clearance, transit lanes, etc.).

e. Coordinate operations of coalition forces in cases of collective action, either through 

the use of collective self-defense and ROE-sharing or the creation of coalition ROE.

6. Identification of the desired end-state of operations.

Meeting the above criteria would ensure validity under international law and provide the basis 

for successful mission planning for cordon sanitaire and quarantine operations.

Removed from their Cold War context and applied to modern tactical and strategic dilemmas, 

cordon sanitaire and quarantine are special zones designed to address particular crisis-level 

conflicts during peacetime, primarily those confrontations presenting extreme threats to U.S. 

forces or security interests. While they are designed to counter specific tactical and strategic 

threats, the ultimate goal of both cordon sanitaire and quarantine is to stabilize the conditions 

which led to the threat and return to the security status quo. Although these zones may not be 

successful in this regard and armed conflict may nonetheless result, cordon sanitaire and 

quarantine can also perform the function of providing a transitional framework to better control 

the conversion from peacetime to wartime operations.
4-1

4

 Wartime Zones

Introduction

The modern law of naval warfare allows belligerents engaged in armed conflict at sea authority 

to control sea areas, to interfere with neutral maritime trade and to engage a broad array of

targets that directly support the enemy’s war fighting capacities. These belligerent rights

override more general rights of navigation that are contained in multilateral treaties such as the

1982 Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention. The concept of “zones” is relatively new in the realm of

the law of naval warfare, but draws heavily upon more established concepts such as the right to 

exclude traffic from the immediate area of naval operations and the right to establish a 

blockade. The relatively recent recognition of “Belligerent Operational Zones” or 

“Exclusion Zones” draws heavily upon this heritage.

The purpose of this Chapter is to demonstrate the practical utility of maritime zones within an 

armed conflict at sea. The law has come to recognize that belligerents are permitted broad

powers within lawfully declared or enforced zones, which powers can more efficiently shape

battle space management. This Chapter deals with the three types of wartime zones

mentioned above, namely, the tactically important “immediate area” of belligerent naval

operations, strategically important belligerent maritime operational zones (sometimes

referred to as “exclusion zones,” or “war zones.”) and, lastly, blockade. The aim is to 

demonstrate to operational planners the advantages (and disadvantages) of reliance upon these

legal mechanisms to achieve desired military outcomes.

A. IMMEDIATE AREA OF BELLIGERENT OPERATIONS

Since at least the time of the Russo-Japanese war,

1 there has been an acknowledged capacity

under customary international law for belligerents to exercise rights within an immediate area of 

operations to control the manner of access of neutral ships and aircraft into such zones. Most

contemporary military manuals2 and international restatements of the law3 establish a

consensus as to the existence of such zones, but differ as to the rights exercisable by a belligerent 

within them.

The U.S. position states that “[w]ithin the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, a

belligerent may establish special restrictions upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and

* This chapter is an update to that originally authored by Commander Dale Stephens, CSM, Royal Australian Navy.

1 CONSTANTINE COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, 486–7 (David McKay, ed., 5th ed.

1962). 2 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.8; UK LOAC Manual, para. 13.80; German Commander’s Handbook,

para. 303. 3 San Remo Manual, para. 108.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-2

may prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area.”4 The U.S. position

further establishes that the geographic extent of an “immediate area or vicinity” is “that area

within which hostilities are taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating.”5

While the draft 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare permitted a belligerent to fire upon belligerent

non-military aircraft within, inter alia, the immediate vicinity of the military operations of the

enemy,

6 such authority to automatically engage noncombatants is plainly inconsistent with

international law that has developed since that time. While it is well established that freedom of

navigation rights expressed under the 1982 LOS Convention (and supporting international

customary law) may be overridden by the law of naval warfare as the lex specialis,

7 targeting rules

must nonetheless conform with international treaty or customary law standards. Thus, the German

Commander’s Handbook acknowledges a belligerent’s capacity to establish special restrictions

for the movement of neutral vessels and aircraft within the immediate area of operations “or in its

adjoining environment.”8 Such restrictions relate to conforming to special procedures for approach

and even, if “absolutely necessary,”9 the complete barring of access to a localized area where this

is necessary for the safety of the belligerent units or the success of the respective mission. The

German Manual does not, however, anticipate the direct targeting of vessels or aircraft that fail to

comply with announced stipulations.

The U.S. policy approach fuses the customary right of localized control within an immediate

area of operations with more traditional rights existing under the law of naval warfare for

targeting permissions. For example, with respect to communications, the U.S. position provides

that the commanding officer of a belligerent warship may exercise control over the

communications of a neutral merchant vessel or civil aircraft whose presence might “otherwise

endanger or jeopardize those operations.”10 Failure to comply with a belligerent’s directions

concerning communications within such a zone may prompt an assumption of enemy character

which might then render the vessel or aircraft liable to be fired upon.

11 The acquisition of enemy

character (and loss of civilian protection) is established under the law of naval warfare in a number 

of circumstances, including where a neutral may reasonably be believed to be engaging in

belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy,

12

or is incorporated into or assisting the enemy’s

intelligence system,13 or is otherwise making an effective contribution to the enemy’s military

action.14 The repeated failure of a neutral to comply with express directions of a belligerent vessel

 4 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.8. 5 Id. 6 Article 34 of the draft 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare states: “Belligerent non-military aircraft, whether public or private, are liable to be fired upon, if they fly (1) within the jurisdiction of the enemy, or (2)

in the immediate vicinity thereof and outside the jurisdiction of their own State, or (3) in the immediate vicinity of

the military operations of the enemy by land or sea.” 7 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 ICJ 226, para. 25 8 German Commander’s Handbook, para. 303.

9 Id.

10 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.8.1. 11 Id. 12 San Remo Manual, para. 67(b). 13 Id. at para. 67(d). 14 Id. at para. 67(f).
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-3

within an immediate area of operations would plainly bolster the reasonableness of the 

commander’s decision to ultimately attack such neutral vessels or aircraft under the law

relating to targeting. It is, however, always a matter of grave judgment as to whether an

otherwise neutral vessel has lost its protected status. To this end, U.S. policy caveats, for

example, that “[l]egitimate distress communications should be permitted to the extent that the

success of the operation is not prejudiced thereby.”15

The designation “immediate area” is a critical factor in permitting the exercise of control rights.

While it has been mentioned that the U.S. policy position is that the area of relevance is that

area within which hostilities are taking place or where U.S. forces are actually operating16

there is an obvious lack of specificity in this formulation. Academic assessments of the relevant

“immediate area” include the area where operations are actually in progress “on the spot,”17 or, in

the case of the German Manual, where “combat activities are taking place or units of the naval or

air forces are actually operating.”18 What the extent of an immediate are of operations is will be

determined by the tactical picture at the relevant time. Thus, it is a fluid, three-dimensional

concept that takes into account modern “over-the-horizon” targeting capabilities. Whatever its

geographic scope may be in a given circumstance, there is a consensus that a “belligerent may

not.. . purport to deny access to neutral nations, or to close an international strait to neutral

shipping, pursuant to this authority unless another route of similar convenience remains open

to neutral traffic.”

19 Accordingly, while belligerent powers may be exercised over neutral

shipping, such zones cannot impinge upon access to a neutral coastline. Similarly, there is a

view taken following U.S. warship presence in the Persian Gulf during the Iraq/Iran war, that

belligerents may not invoke this customary right to restrict the navigation of neutral warships,

naval auxiliaries, ships on governmental or noncommercial service, or neutral State or military 

aircraft.

20 It has also been noted, however, that even in the case of neutral warship operations,

the receipt by a neutral warship of a request from a belligerent warship to leave the

immediate area of operations “should not be lightly denied, absent other considerations, e.g.

conducting one’s own naval operations.”21

Immediate Area of Belligerent Operations: Contemporary Policy

As a customary right, the authority to control activities within an “immediate area of operations” is

consistently endorsed as a belligerent right under the law of naval warfare. Under this right, a

belligerent may regulate or prohibit entry of neutral vessels or aircraft into this zone. As the right

derives from the law of naval warfare, it overrides peacetime freedom of navigation rights. The

geographical extent of the “immediate area of operations” is not prescriptively defined. During the

 15 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.8.1. 16 Id. at para 7.8. 17 J. M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS, 401 (3rd ed., 1947). 18 German Commander’s Handbook, para. 303.

19 Id. at para. 303; NWP 1-14M, para. 7.8, GEORGE K. WALKER, THE TANKER WAR, 1980–88: LAW AND

POLICY, 395, 2000, Vol. 74, U.S. Naval War College, International Law Studies. 20 GEORGE K. WALKER, supra note 19, at 396.

21 Id.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-4

Russo-Japanese war the zones extended some ten miles from land. Given the ranges and capacities

of modern weapons systems including, in particular, anti-ship missiles, the “immediate” area of

naval operations may now be given a broader understanding based upon reasonable assessments of

the existing threats.

Neutrals who fail to comply with stipulations validly provided within such a zone are liable to be

forcibly removed or even fired upon. Attacking such vessels is not as an automatic right derived 

from their entering the zone or failing to respond to a direction to leave, but rather as a

function of the existing law relating to targeting under the law of naval warfare. Additionally, as

in peacetime, the basic right of unit self-defense

22 continues to apply to enable commanders to

defend their own units and all other units in the vicinity. Accordingly, the continued presence of

a vessel within an immediate area of operations –in peacetime or in wartime- that has been 

warned to clear may, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, may give rise to a reasonable

belief that an attack is imminent, allowing a response by the maritime unit in self-defense.

In the context of the Global War on Terrorism, a preferred tactic of terrorists against warships is the

use of the water-borne suicide bomb.

23 Thus, the proximity of a dhow, fishing boat, speedboat or

other small vessel within an immediate area of operations may be cause for significant

concern. The law of naval warfare and the facility of control exercisable under customary rights

applicable in the immediate area of operations provide legal justification for the control,

boarding, removal and even engagement of such vessels and can be an effective legal tool for

ensuring the safety of the asset and crew.

A contemporary example of an “immediate area of operations” is the declaration of localized

maritime zones by the United States with respect to off shore oil platforms in Iraq. On April

24, 2004, during the period of U.S. occupation of Iraq, terrorists conducted a small boat suicide

attack against Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) and against a coalition warship in the vicinity of

Khawr Al’ Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT). On May 2, 2004, a NOTMAR announcement was

made simply declaring (without more) the existence of a 3000 meter warning zone and a 2000

meter exclusion zone around the terminals.24 On May 3, 2004, this NOTMAR was cancelled and

a further NOTMAR was issued which more comprehensively declared and defined warning and

exclusion zones for ABOT and KAAOT.25 The NOTMAR temporarily suspended the right

of innocent passage “in accordance with international law” for all vessels in the Iraqi

territorial sea and established a series of concentric warning and exclusion zones surrounding

KAAOT and ABOT that extended out to 3000 meters.

26 Additionally, the latter NOTMAR

warned civilian mariners away from the zones and advised ships to “remain clear of Coalition

 22 NWP 1-14M, para 4.4.3. 23 The October 12, 2000 attack on the USS COLE graphically demonstrates the tactics and potency of a small boat 

threat in the context of the war on terror. 24 HYDROPAC 790/04 (021012Z MAY 2004). See Appendix C 25 HYDROPAC 795/04 (030850Z MAY 2004) See Appendix C; See also MARLO Advisory 06-04, 1 May 2004). 

See Appendix C. 26 Id.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-5

maritime security forces” unless properly identified.27 Such vessels were directed to follow

Coalition directions and were further advised that “Coalition warships are prepared to take

defensive measures, including if necessary the use of deadly force, against any contact whose 

identity or intentions are unknown and which poses a threat.”

28 These measures were

implemented specifically to counter the threat of terrorist small boat attacks in the region and

plainly had a self-defense element underpinning them. These measures also successfully

invoke, in a contemporary context, the classic customary rights to control access to the

immediate area of operations and thusform a useful precedent for operational planning.29

B. BELLIGERENT OPERATIONAL ZONES/ 

“EXCLUSION ZONES”/ “WAR ZONES”

Beyond the tactically important immediate area of operations, there has been an evolving recognition

of a broader right to declare zones under the law of naval warfare. Such zones purport to do more

than govern activities within a localized area and are implemented to more decisively shape battle

space management in the strategic sense. One view is that belligerent maritime operational zones

derive their authority strictly pursuant to the law of naval warfare; a contending 

view is that they might also be said to derive from the right of self-defense

which is reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

30 Referred to, variously, as “Exclusion

Zones,” “Total Exclusion Zones,” “Barred Areas,” “Operational Zones” and “War Zones,”31 the

purpose of establishing such a zone is to designate an area of water and superjacent air space where

a State may exercise control over access of ships and aircraft. A number of national military

manuals

32 and international restatements on the law of naval warfare33 acknowledge the

lawfulness of belligerent operational zones, provided that a number of legal criteria are observed.

Thus, the lawfulness of a declared belligerent operational zone is dependent upon compliance

with the law of naval warfare as to target selection, as well as more general obligations as to

proportionality and reasonableness in the establishment and enforcement of such zones. A

belligerent maritime operational zone is distinct from the belligerent right to declare a blockade34 as

well as the customary right to exercise necessary control over neutral vessels and aircraft in the

immediate area of naval operations.35

As a mechanism to “contain the geographic area of the conflict or to keep neutral shipping at a

 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 MARLO ADVISORY BULLETIN 08-03 issued March 31, 2003 is a further example where it was announced

upon commencement of the armed conflict in Iraq that “Vessels should remain clear for the duration of Coalition

military operations, so as to ensure their safety, the safety of their vessel, and passengers.” See Appendix C. 30 See for example Australian Reference Manual, para. 815. 31 Canadian LOAC Manual, para. 70.

32 NWP 1-14M, para.7.9; UK LOAC Manual, paras. 13.77–13.80; German Commander’s Handbook, paras.

304–5; Canadian LOAC Manual, paras. 70–74; Australian Reference Manual, paras 8.15–8.18.

33 San Remo Manual, paras. 106–8.

34 Michael N. Schmitt, Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective, 2

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 21(1991) at

22.

35 San Remo Manual, para. 108; See also NWP 1-14M, para. 7.9.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-6

safe distance from areas of actual or potential hostilities”36 a declared maritime operational

zone is both laudable and plainly lawful.37 Critically, all legal texts universally state that such 

a belligerent operational zone is not a free fire zone.38 This remains an undoubted and

immutable legal proposition. The law of naval warfare, especially the rules and obligations

relating to attacking vessels and aircraft continue to apply within, for instance, a declared

maritime “exclusion zone” (or “war zone,” etc.) just as it would outside of such a zone.

Individual commanders remain liable under the law of naval warfare for violations committed

within such a declared exclusion zone, such as for attacking vessels that derive protection

under the general law, just as they would for similar actions undertaken outside such a zone.

What a lawfully declared “exclusion zone” does provide is a limited authority to manage

access and movement within a zone. It grants an opportunity for neutral vessels to avoid the

area, thus ensuring better protection for such vessels. It also allows a belligerent more

accurately to assess the intention and ultimate status of a neutral vessel or aircraft that enters

a lawfully established e xclusion zone. This may entitle the State declaring the zone to more

confidently invoke other belligerent rights permitting the capture or destruction of vessels that

have acquired enemy character. The San Remo Manual reiterates this threshold position by

expressly acknowledging that “it might be more likely to presume that ships or aircraft in the

area without permission were there for hostile purposes.”39

The experience of establishing large maritime war zones during the course of the RussoJapanese War, World War I and World War II has contributed to the false belief by some that

unilateral declaration of an exclusion zone permits a “sink on sight” policy of all vessels, be

they enemy or neutral, warships or merchant ships, which are within such zones.

40 The legal

principles supporting these earlier wartime zones were of highly questionable authority and

dealt with propositions of “long distance blockade” and “reprisal.” These grounds do not

provide a reliable or accepted conceptual basis for determining the lawfulness of contemporary

belligerent maritime operational zones. U.S. policy is firm that commanders do not acquire any 

special targeting permissions outside of the law of naval warfare merely as a result of the 

declaration of an operational zone.41

Contemporary Policy Regarding Belligerent Operational Zones

U.S. policy as reflected in NWP 1-14M acknowledges the lawfulness of belligerent 

 36 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.9. 37 Id. 38 Id. at para. 7.9; UK LOAC Manual para. 13.77; German Commander’s Handbook, para. 304; Canadian LOAC 

Manual, para. 71; Australian Reference Manual, para. 8.18; San Remo Manual, para. 105 39 San Remo Manual, para. 105; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, 106–7 (2004). 40 DINSTEIN, supra note 39 at 106. 41 NWP 1-14M, para 7.9, states “.. . the establishment of such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming belligerent of

the obligation under the law of armed conflict to refrain from attacking vessels and aircraft which do not

constitute lawful targets. In short, an otherwise protected platform does not lose that protection by crossing an

imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent.”
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-7

maritime operational zones such as “exclusion zones” and “war zones” provided that

they are “reasonable” in containing the “geographic area of the conflict”

42 and/or keeping

neutral shipping “at a safe distance from areas of actual or potential hostilities.”43 Thus, to the

extent to which such zones “serve to warn neutral vessels and aircraft away from belligerent

activities,”

44 by reducing the likelihood of risk of collateral damage and incidental injury, they

serve a useful purpose. Enforcement of such zones may be equally facilitated by decisions of

maritime insurers who may compel avoidance of these areas for vessels covered by their

respective policies as a prudent business risk calculation. In any event, the establishment of

such zones often has the effect of “de-cluttering of the radar.”

The San Remo Manual provides a thorough analysis of the legal texture of belligerent maritime

zones and prescribes a number of conditions necessary to ensure their lawfulness. Importantly,

as a foundational proposition, the San Remo Manual repeats the emphasis of NWP 1-14M

concerning the maintenance of the law of naval warfare by dictating that a belligerent is not

absolved of its duties under the law of armed conflict/naval warfare when establishing such a

zone.45 In the event that a belligerent decides to establish a zone, the San Remo Manual

stipulates the following cumulative criteria apply:

1. The same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone;

2. The extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures imposed shall not exceed

what is strictly required by military necessity and the principle of proportionality;

3. Due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral States to legitimate uses of the sea;

4. Necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be provided:

(i). where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access 

to ports and coasts of a neutral State;

(ii). in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military 

requirements do not permit; and

5. The commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions

imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately notified.46

In addition to listing the criteria necessary to establish the legitimacy of a belligerent maritime

zone, the San Remo Manual further stipulates that compliance by a neutral with the measures 

imposed by a belligerent in respect of a maritime zone shall not, in itself, be construed as an act

harmful to the opposing belligerent, thus rendering the neutral liable to capture or attack by the 

 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 San Remo Manual, para. 105: 

“A belligerent cannot be absolved of its duties under international humanitarian law by establishing zones which 

might adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea.”

46 Id. at para. 106.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-8

other side.47

Belligerent Maritime Operational Zones: Case Studies

Falkland/ Malvinas Islands Conflict

The Falkland/Malvinas Islands conflict of 1982 witnessed the extensive use of belligerent 

maritime operational zones by both the United Kingdom and Argentina, and thus, provides a

useful case study for assessing the legality of declared maritime “exclusion zones.”

On April 2, 1982, Argentine military forces invaded the Falkland/Malvinas Islands and ousted

resident British military forces while asserting Argentine sovereignty over the Islands. A British

naval task force was dispatched from the United Kingdom shortly after the invasion to restore

British administration to the islands and on April 3, 1982, the United Nations Security Council 

adopted Resolution 502 which, inter alia, demanded an immediate withdrawal of Argentine forces

as well as an “immediate cessation of hostilities.”48

During the course of events leading up to the recovery of the Islands, the British Government

declared four maritime zones. The first, a “Maritime Exclusion Zone” (MEZ) was declared on

April 7, 1982 (to be made effective April 12, 1982), establishing a 200 nautical mile circle

around the islands. The British declared that “Argentine warships and Argentine naval

auxiliaries found within this zone will be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British

forces.”49 The declaration of the MEZ was expressed to be “without prejudice to the right of the

United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of

self-defense, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”50 The declaration was plainly

addressed to Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries only. Thus, neutral vessels and

Argentine merchant ships were not impacted by the declaration.

The second zone declared by the United Kingdom was the so-called “defensive bubble” or 

“defensive area” of April 23, 1982, with respect to which the British Government advised that,

. . . any approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which

could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the

appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft, including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British Forces,

will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly.51

 47 Id. at para. 107. 48 UNSC Resolution 502 (1982) adopted at the 2350th meeting by 10 votes to 1 (Panama) with 4 abstentions (China, 

Poland, Spain, USSR).

49 Speech by the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr John Nott, in the House of Commons on 7 April 1982 as found in 

Britain and the Falklands Crisis, A Documentary Record, Central Office of Information Reference Pamphlet 176, 38 

(1982). See Appendix C. 50 Id. 51 The Right of Self-Defence: Message of April 23, 1982 from the British Government to the Argentine Government, 

as found in supra note 49 at 42. 
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-9

This zone plainly covered an area (undefined in geographic scope) surrounding the British

task force and, unlike the declaration of April 12, incorporated an express reference to

Argentine aircraft. It seemed to be predicated upon a normal unit self-defense

52 paradigm in

conjunction with an immediate area of operations element, although it seemed from its literal 

terms to give a lesser threshold trigger for the manifestation of “hostile intent” as being merely 

one of “approaching” the task force.

On April 30, 1982, a third British zone took effect, namely a “Total Exclusion Zone” (TEZ).

Covering the same 200 nautical mile circle as the MEZ, this zone was declared to apply

not only to Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or

merchant vessel, which is operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine

Forces. The exclusion zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support 

of the illegal occupation.53

Moreover the declaration establishing the Total Exclusion Zone emphasized that:

Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found within this zone without due authority from the

Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore

be regarded as hostile and will be liable to be attacked by British Forces.54

On May 7, 1982, the British Government declared a fourth zone, namely an extension to the

TEZ. Argentina was informed that any of its warships or aircraft more than 12 nautical miles

from the Argentine coast would be treated as hostile and dealt with accordingly.55

On its part, the Argentine Government declared three different belligerent zones: first, 

on April 8, 1982, a 200 nautical mile “maritime zone” around the Islands and the 

Argentine coast56 and second, on April 28, 1982, a 200 nautical mile zone around the

Argentine coast.57 Within these areas it was declared that all British naval and air forces

would be considered hostile. The declaration also threatened to attack all British vessels and

aircraft entering Argentine airspace or waters. Finally, the Argentine Government declared on

May 11, 1982, the entire South Atlantic to be a “war zone” thus rendering any British vessel

therein liable to attack presumably covering all vessels whether having military character or

not. Referencing British attempts to impose restrictions on “Argentine marine traffic in the 

South Atlantic,” the Argentine declaration stated: “[A]ny vessel flying the United Kingdom 

 52 NWP 1-14M, para 4.432.2. outlines the U.S. approach to this concept:

The [Standing Rules of Engagement] provide implementation guidance on the inherent right and obligation

of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. A principal tenet of these ROE is the

commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate

action in self-defense of the commander’s unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity.

53 Total Exclusion Zone: Statement by Mr. John Nott in the House of Commons on April 28, 1982 as found in 

supra note 49 at 43. 54 Id. 55 As taken from W. J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Warfare, 1986 CANADIAN

YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. XXIV, 91 at 111. 56 See Appendix C. 57 See Appendix C.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

4-10

flag which is navigating in the aforementioned zone towards the area of operations and/or 

which may be presumed to constitute a threat to national security shall be considered hostile, 

and action will be taken accordingly.”) 58

Falkland/ Malvinas Islands Zones Analysis

The prominence of the declaration and implementation of “exclusion zones” and “war zones” within

this conflict has shaped subsequent recognition of the legal usefulness and limits of the zone

concept.59 Notwithstanding, it is equally evident that both the UK and Argentina are not free

from criticism as to aspects of their respective declarations.

For the most part, the respective British and Argentine declarations were potentially useful in

delimiting the geographical nature of the conflict and thus served to protect neutral shipping by

providing notice of the area of operations. Moreover, as the conflict revolved around the

restoration of British administration to the islands, rather than operations in either the United

Kingdom or Argentina themselves, such belligerent-declared zones could (with the exception of the

Argentine declaration of the South Atlantic as a “war zone”) be said to be reasonable and

proportionate measures in defining the naval battle space. Of course, this relied greatly on the fact

of limited neutral merchant traffic in the South Atlantic, for a 200 nm “TEZ" declared over the

Strait of Malacca would manifestly be disproportionate in scale and thus beyond the recognized

legal limits of such a zone.60

What appears to be problematic from a legal perspective was the reservation in the British TEZ

statement of 30 April that, prima facie, deemed any neutral ship within the 200 nm radius without

permission from London as being hostile and thus liable to attack.61 Engaging neutral vessels

merely because they are within a declared maritime exclusion zone, without any other indicia of

hostility or acquisition of enemy character, is not consistent with the law of naval warfare. It may

be, however, that the TEZ statement is being read too broadly and it was presumed that a British

decision to engage a neutral vessel in this region would be predicated upon establishing that such

 58 See Appendix C. See also United Nations Security Council Document s/15069 (“Letter dated 11 May 1982 from 

the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security 

Council”) quoting statement of the Joint General Staff of the Argentine Armed Forces. 59 R. P. Barston and P. W. Birnie, The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas Conflict, A Question of Zones, MARINE

POLICY, 14 (January 1983).

60 San Remo Manual at para 106.2, notes:

There must be a proportional and demonstrable nexus between the zone and the measures imposed,

including both restrictive and enforcement measures, and the self-defense requirements of the State

establishing the zone. For example, in the Falklands conflict, Argentina’s 200-mile zone around the

Falklands was probably adequate but its declaration that the entire South Atlantic was a war zone was

dis- proportionate to its defence requirements and would affect shipping unconnected with the conflict.

Zones located in isolated areas far from normal shipping routes, such as those used in the Falklands,

are less likely to raise objections than zones on major shipping routes such as those in the Persian

Arabian Gulf. Zones occupying relatively small areas or established for relatively brief periods are more

likely than the converse to be considered acceptable. 61 Fenrick, supra note 55, at 111.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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a vessel had come within one of the established grounds for divesting itself of protected status.

Such grounds include the carrying of contraband,62 engaging in belligerent acts on behalf of the

enemy,63 incorporated into or assisting the enemy’s intelligence system64 or under American

formulations, when otherwise integrated into the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining effort.65

It is relevant that the statement merely refers to such vessels being “liable” to attack, which

suggests a level of discretion for the military decision maker, based presumably upon the

establishment of additional criteria that would permit the lawful targeting of such a vessel. Such an

interpretation of the application of the rights unilaterally reserved within the TEZ may be what the

British Government had in mind as the British did not, in fact, engage any neutral vessel within

the TEZ during the course of the conflict.66

Alternatively, the Argentine declaration that the South Atlantic was a “war zone” thus

permitting the indiscriminate attack on any British vessel (including merchantmen) 

within the region can plainly be regarded as unlawful, on both geographic proportionality

grounds as well as violating the law of naval warfare asto targeting.67

What has proven controversial in the enduring public perception of the Falkland/Malvinas

conflict was the British attack upon the Argentine cruiser, the General Belgrano, on May 2,

1982. The ship was attacked and sunk by a British submarine when it was outside the

British declared TEZ of April 30, 1982. While the attack may at first appear to be inconsistent 

with the British declaration concerning the rights exercisable within the TEZ, it was not

unlawful as a matter of the law of naval warfare. As the Security Council had recognized in

UNSCR 502, a state of hostilities existed between the UK and Argentina at the time of the

attack and thus engagement of an Argentinean warship outside of neutral waters was perfectly

consistent with the law of naval warfare.

68 Moreover, the British declarations were always

careful to reserve the right to undertake actions in national self-defense, irrespective of the

geographical extent of the various exclusion zones. The incident nonetheless serves to 

demonstrate both the care needed when declaring rights under a maritime exclusion zone so

as to preserve both political and legal expectations and it also highlights the need to

recognize and emphasize maritime exclusion zones as being principally a tool for the

management of merchant shipping.

69

 62 San Remo Manual, para. 67(a). 63 Id. at para. 67(b). 64 Id. at para. 67(d). 65 NWP 1-14M, para. 8.2.; note that under para. 67(f) of San Remo, the limitation is restricted to “otherwise make 

an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action.”

66 Fenrick, supra note 55, at 114. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg observes that possibly “the proclamation of the 

TEZ was nothing but a most effective ruse of war because it obviously induced the Argentine forces to avoid the 

area.” If so, “the British measure was not illegal under the law of naval warfare.” Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 

“Current Issues in Maritime Operations,” International Law Studies, vol. 80, p. 207, 217; US Naval War College. 67 Id. at 113; San Remo Manual, para 106.2. 68 DINSTEIN, supra note 39, at 107. 69 Australian Reference Manual, 8.18.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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Iran/Iraq War

The Iran/Iraq war of the 1980s also witnessed the establishment of belligerent zones which

purportedly allowed for the reservation of rights relating to initiation of force against any

vessel entering such zones and which have been subject to significant criticism. At the

commencement of the war, the Iraqi Government declared the northern part of the Persian Gulf

as a war zone.

70 The Iranian Government made a similar announcement declaring an offshore

war zone that ran the length of the Iranian shoreline; warnings were issued that Iranian

authorities would not permit any merchant ship to carry cargo to Iraqi ports.71

In August 1982, the Iraqi Government established a “Naval Total Exclusion Zone” around

the Iranian oil facility on Kharg Island72 which was enforced by both military aircraft and

naval mines. The declaration did not designate safe passage routes for merchant ships and,

like the Iranian declared zone, seemed to unlawfully operate as a “free fire zone” for all

vessels entering such zone. In the period extending between 1980 and 1984, Iraq undertook

approximately 60 attacks on neutral shipping within the region.

73 Curiously, Iran arguably

relied upon the doctrine of reprisal to target neutral shipping in the region, which approach

has been correctly criticized for its misreading of the rights available under this

controversial doctrine.

74

The actions of both Iraq and Iran have been comprehensively criticized for violating the law 

of naval warfare with their respective policies of indiscriminant attacks upon neutral

shipping within the Gulf during the course of their conflict. It is plainly evident that the

disruption of oil exports by either side did have military utility as such exports did contribute

greatly to the war-fighting/war-sustaining capacity of both sides. The legal mechanisms

for undertaking this type of economic warfare derive from the law relating to blockade or

visit and search. Under each body of law are a number of onerous obligations regarding

third party notice and enforcement capacities. Similarly, general principles of the law of 

naval warfare permit the targeting of vessels which by “their nature, location, purpose or use,

effectively contribute to the enemy’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose

total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization would constitute a definite military 

advantage to the attacker.”

75 One might imagine arguments supporting the selective targeting

of neutral tankers that, through the purchase and carriage of oil, they directly facilitated the

war fighting capacities of the belligerents. However, military engagement of neutral

vessels is a last resort, and is plainly not something that may be overcome with unilateral

statements seeking to establish preeminent rights within a m aritime e xclusion zone to

 70 Fenrick, supra note 55, at 118. 71 Id. at 117–8; SPECIAL WARNING No. 53 of 27 May 81; SPECIAL WARNING 72 of 7 August 1987; See 

Appendix C.

72 ANDREA DE GUTTRY AND NATALINO RONZITTI, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988) AND THE

LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, (1993) 61; See Appendix C. 73 Fenrick, supra note 55, at 119. 74 Maxwell Jenkins, Air Attacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Gulf: The Legality of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone

and Iranian Reprisals, 8(2) BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 517

(1985).

75 NWP 1-14M, para. 8.2.
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attack any vessels that should so enter such a zone.

Operation Iraqi Freedom—U.S. Declared Maritime Zones76

Significant U.S. naval forces were involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) combat

operations.77 Moreover, from the Special Warnings, NOTAMs and NOTMARs that were issued

immediately before and during OIF, it is evident that U.S. naval forces initially took measures to

control shipping in the immediate area of naval operations, but refined this localized legal tool in a

more strategic manner as the conduct of hostilities were underway with the declaration of more

strategically focused operational zones.

Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean

In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Service Committee on March 4, 2004, the

Commander of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) noted that EUCOM’s naval component

commander exercised operational control of the USS HARRY S. TRUMAN and USS THEODORE

ROOSEVELT Carrier Strike Groups, with 22 ships and 157 carrier-based aircraft.78 He went on to

state that strike-group aircraft flew over 3,000 combat sorties from the Eastern Mediterranean Sea

and delivered precision-guided ordnance in Northern Iraq.

79 Additionally, cruisers and destroyers

launched 36 Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise missile strikes into Iraq from the Mediterranean.80

As these forces gathered in the Eastern Mediterranean before OIF, a series of NOTAMs and

NOTMARs were issued. On February 5, 2003 a NOTAM/ NOTMAR was issued advising all

aircraft and surface vessels that “U.S. forces in the Mediterranean sea are operating at a

heightened state of readiness and taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist

and other potential threats.”81 The notice went on to request that all aircraft and surface vessels

maintain radio contact with U.S. forces to ensure that their intentions were known. The notice

also specifically stated that “nothing in this warning is intended to impede or otherwise interfere

with the freedom of navigation or overflight of any vessel or aircraft, or to limit or expand the 

inherent self-defense rights of U.S. forces.”82

 76 The section outlining U.S. Zones utilized in Operation Iraqi Freedom was prepared by Captain Stauffer “Corky” 

Malcolm, USN.

77 See Remarks of Admiral Vernon Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Sea Air Space Exposition, Washington, 

D.C. April 17, 2003, accessible at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/speeches/clark030417.txt

A month before conflicts started in Iraq, we had five carrier battle groups and three quarters of my amphibious

structure carrying the United States Marine Corps committed... . The first agility comes from the freedom of

operating out of our domain, that maneuver space that I talked about. The free access, not much has been said

about this. Think of this, half of our force is sitting over in the Eastern Mediterranean. A thousand miles 

away is another piece of our force, and these groups are operating in a totally cohesive way. 78 Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, United States European Command, before the Senate 

Armed Services Committee on March 4, 2004, at 9.

79 Id. 80 Id. 81 HYDROLANT 271/03 (051340Z FEB 2003). See Appendix C. 82 Id.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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On March 6, 2003 a second NOTMAR was issued advising ships of a potential hazard to

navigation since U.S. forces were conducting “combat training exercises in international

waters off the northern and eastern coast of Cyprus.”

83 The warning provided coordinates

for two operating areas in international waters and advised all vessels to navigate these areas

with extreme caution.84 Once again, the warning advised that U.S. forces were “operating 

at a heightened state of readiness and taking additional defensive precautions against

terrorist and other potential threats.”85 The notice requested vessels to make radio contact

and again specifically stated that “nothing in this warning is intended to impede or otherwise

interfere with the freedom of navigation or overflight of any vessel or aircraft, or to limit or

expand the inherent self-defense rights of U.S. forces.”86

On March 20, 2003, as the war against Iraq commenced, a NOTMAR was issued declaring

that “U.S. forces in the eastern Mediterranean have established a maritime safety zone and are

conducting combat operations in international waters that pose a hazard to navigation.”

87 The

warning defined the perimeter of the zone with exact coordinates and requested that all vessels 

remain clear. Like the previous NOTMARs, vessels in the area of this designated zone were

requested to make their intentions known via radio contact.88 However, in contrast to the 

previous NOTMARs, this one advised that vessels entering the maritime safety zone were

subject to boarding and visit by U.S. forces.

89 Moreover, this NOTMAR made no reference to

the unrestricted right of freedom of navigation or overflight that was contained in the previous

NOTMARs.

On March 21, 2003, a second maritime safety zone was declared off the eastern coast of Cyprus.

90

The exact coordinates of the zone were listed to establish its perimeter and it contained

substantially the same language as the NOTMAR issued on March 20, 2003.91

Zones Declared in General Area of Operations—OIF

In addition to the specific measures being taken in the Eastern Mediterranean that are described

above, when hostilities commenced against Iraq, a Special Warning was issued March 20,

2003 advising all shipping and aircraft of military operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, 

Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Gulf.92 The warning advised

all vessels and aircraft that Coalition vessels would seek to determine “timely and accurate

identification,” and that Coalition naval forces would be prepared to “exercise appropriate

 83 HYDROLANT 509/03 (061620Z MAR 2003). See Appendix C. 84 Id. 85 Id. 86 Id. 87 HYDROLANT 597/03 (202135Z MAR 2003). See Appendix C. 88 Id. 89 Id. 90 HYDROLANT 602/03(211240Z MAR 2003). See Appendix C. 91 Id. 92 SPECIAL WARNING 121 PERSIAN GULF (200120Z MAR 2003), Repeated in MARLO Advisory Bulletin 06-

03 of 20 March 2003. See Appendix C.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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measures in self-defense to ensure their safety in the event they are approached.”93 The

warning notified all vessels that they were “subject to query, being stopped, boarded and 

searched by U.S./Coalition warships operating in support of operations against Iraq [and that]

[v]essels found to be carrying contraband bound for Iraq or carrying and/or laying naval mines

are subject to detention, seizure and destruction.”94

OIF—Zones Legal Analysis

The notices issued on February 5 and March 6, 2003 were not based upon any assertion of

belligerent right to control the immediate area of operations nor were they establishing a

belligerent maritime operational zone. Rather, they were based upon a unit self-defense paradigm

and were prudent measures taken to inform shipping in the area of the posture adopted by U.S.

forcesin the build up to the conflict.

The announcements of March 20 and 21, 2003 in the eastern Mediterranean were examples of

U.S.-declared belligerent maritime operational zones. These zones were established in the

context of armed conflict, they specified a geographic area in which traditional rights under

the law of naval warfare were being exercised, and where control over neutral shipping was

asserted. The purpose of the zones was to ensure appropriate battle space management given

that the warships in the zone were the source of sustained offensive operations against an

enemy. In general, the zones were enunciated with sufficient specificity as to scope and

measures relied upon and they appeared to satisfy the criteria of reasonableness and respect for

access to neutral ports. If criticism could be leveled at the announcements of March 20 and 21,

it would be their paucity of detail concerning restrictions on freedom of navigation. These were

asserted only implicitly, although the reservation as to reliance on boarding operations under the

regime of “visit and search” gave a significant indication as to U.S. preparedness to control 

movement within the announced zones.

The announcement of the Special Warning of March 20 applicable to all general areas of

maritime operations did not constitute a belligerent “zone” of the type discussed within this

Chapter. The announcement was designed not to assert specific belligerent rights within a

specified area, but rather was an indicator of the assertion of general belligerent rights that

would be exercised in the course of the maritime phase of the conflict in conjunction with a 

heightened application of unit self-defense rights within these regions.

The declaration of the maritime zones by U.S. forces within the eastern Mediterranean during the

course of Operation Iraqi Freedom represents a useful precedent for operational planners. The

design and implementation of the zones generally complied with the conditions precedent for

lawfulness mandated by U.S. and international assessments of this legal and operational 

planning tool and serve as a viable model for the future. As a matter of historical record, there were

no third party protests registered following the implementation of the zones and neutral shipping

stayed clear of the declared zones for the duration of offensive operations, which necessarily

 93 Id. 94 Id.
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allowed for more efficient battle space management and, concomitantly, served to better protect

neutral and civilian rights and protections.

Summary: Legal Analysis of Belligerent Operational Zones/ 

“Exclusion Zones”/ “War Zones”

As a mechanism for controlling movement within a defined general area, the Maritime

Operational Zone may, in circumstances justified by military necessity, act to restrict all neutral

or enemy vessels from entry or may impose qualified entry and routing conditions.

As a recognized belligerent right, the establishment of a Maritime Operational Zone necessarily

impinges upon peacetime navigational rights as reflected within the 1982 LOS Convention. Article

87(1) of the 1982 LOS Convention expressly acknowledges that freedom of the high seas is

exercisable under the Convention “subject to other rules of international law.” In this context, George 

Walker notes pertinently that “the overwhelming majority of commentators including the International

Law Commission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts, have said the

“other rules” clauses in the 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions refer to the [Law of Armed 

Conflict].”95 Accordingly, as a recognized belligerent right, a maritime operational zone that (1) is

justified by military necessity, (2) is reasonable in its extent, location and duration and (3) exhibits a

proportional and demonstrable nexus between the establishment of the zone and measuresimposed,

may validly impose restrictions upon neutral navigational freedoms. The key to determining

“reasonableness” is necessarily case specific and what is reasonable in the South Atlantic may not be

reasonable elsewhere having regard to maritime traffic patterns and available navigational channels.96

While general navigational freedoms reflected within the 1982 LOS Convention may be

subordinated to the lex specialis of the law of naval warfare, the law relating to maritime

neutrality remains a principal bulwark against excessively declared belligerent maritime zones.

Accordingly, a maritime operational zone may not be declared by a belligerent that purports to

apply within the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a neutral State. Assertion of

belligerent rights within neutral territory threatens retaliation by the neutral State. Similarly,

declaration by a belligerent of a maritime operational z one within a neutral State’s

contiguous zone or exclusive economic zone while possible, must as far as practicable, be

undertaken with due regard for the legitimate interests possessed by the Coastal State in those

zones.97

The San Remo Manual stipulates that a State declaring a zone is required to publicize the

“general range” of enforcement measures that will apply within such a zone.98 This may be

done through diplomatic channels and appropriate international organizations, in particular

the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation

Organization.99 It may also be publicized through the expedient of NOTMARs and

NOTAMs.

 95 WALKER supra note 19, at 487–9. 96 San Remo Manual, para. 106.2. 97 With respect to Areas of Naval Operations see San Remo Manual, Part II, at pp. 11–14. 98 San Remo Manual, para. 106.3. 99 Id. at para. 106.6.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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The enforcement measures that may apply to neutral or enemy vessels transiting a

belligerent’s declared maritime operational zone derive generally from the law of naval warfare.

Customary international law as enunciated by the San Remo Manual acknowledges that a

neutral vessel entering a validly declared belligerent operational zone without permission might

raise a reasonable suspicion as to its purpose being hostile.

100 With respect to enemy 

warships and military aircraft, the law of naval warfare entitles a belligerent to capture or attack

such vessels/aircraft whether inside or outside of the belligerent’s operational zone. As a policy

determination, a belligerent may refrain from exercising its rights to attack enemy warships and

enemy merchant vessels that have become military objectives outside the zone, while reserving

its rights to attack within a zone. Such voluntary self-restraint is plainly acceptable, but not

lawfully mandated. Similarly, enemy merchant ships may be captured or, should they lose their

protection under the law of naval warfare, may be attacked whether inside or outside of a zone. It

thus remains essentially a policy matter as to whether belligerent rights should only be 

exercised within a zone.

C. BLOCKADE

A blockade is defined as “a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/ or aircraft of all

nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal

areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation.”101 The declaration

of a blockade is a belligerent act under international law

102 and is traditionally justified as an

action taken under the law of naval warfare applicable in a time of armed conflict.

103 The

purpose of a blockade is to stop the commerce to and/or from an enemy104 and is

unambiguously concerned with restricting the enemy’s trade.105 As a belligerent right106 and

a method of warfare,107 it allows the blockading State to override peacetime rights regarding

freedom of navigation and also allows, consistent with the principle of distinction, for the 

capture and targeting of all vessels or aircraft who breach or attempt to breach the blockade.

 100 Id. at para. 105.1. 101 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7

102 Article 3 of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, UN GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX) UN GAOR 29th Sess, Supp

No. 31 (1974) states that: “Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in 

accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression... . (c) The blockade of the ports or

coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State.” 103 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Naval Blockade, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ACROSS THE SPECTRUM 

OF CONFLICT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR L. C. GREEN, 204, (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2000) 

Vol. 75, U.S. Naval War College, International Law Studies.

104 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 22. 105 Id. at 39. 106 Traditional rules regarding the imposition of a blockade under the law of naval warfare must be distinguished

from claims as to the continued doctrine of Pacific Blockade which purports to apply in a time of peace. The doctrine

of Pacific Blockade has been subject to much equivocation given its apparent inconsistency with the dictates of the

UN Charter, see WALKER, supra note 19 at 389. 107 German Commander’s Handbook, para. 291.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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A blockade is “generally limited geographically”

108 and is set up as a “cordon”109 in a “defined

area adjacent to the target country’s territory.”

110 Unlike the separate belligerent right of visit

and search111 there is no obligation to declare specific items of cargo as contraband. Similarly, 

unlike the right of visit and search which applies only to the capture of vessels and goods en 

route to the enemy port, the right of blockade permits, subject to specific exceptions, the

interception and capture of all imports and/or exports from the enemy territory.

To be valid, a blockade must be declared and notified,112 it must be “effective,”113 it must be

applied impartially114 and it must allow for certain limited exceptions.115 A blockade can be

enforced by surface, subsurface or aerial units116 or other mechanisms117 of the blockading

belligerent.

Declaration and Notification

The imposition of a lawful blockade requires a declaration by the government of the belligerent

nation or by naval authorities acting on behalf the government. The declaration must include

the date the blockade is to begin, its geographic limits and any grace period granted for

neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the area to be blockaded.118 As a strategic measure, the

notification of these elements underpinning the declaration is to be formally transmitted to the

enemy State as well as all neutral States through normal diplomatic channels. It is the practice

of the U.S. to also inform local authorities.

119 Such notification may be undertaken through the

normal means available for advising international shipping and air traffic such as NOTMARs

and NOTAMs, and direct communications to the International Maritime Organization as well

as the International Civil Aviation Organization.

The obligations of declaration and notification are critical if belligerent rights are to be

legitimately exercised. Knowledge of the existence of the blockade is essential to the offenses

of breach of blockade and attempted breach of blockade.120 Knowledge may be presumed

once a blockade has been declared and appropriate notification provided to affected

governments.121 Given the speed of modern communications, it may be the case that a validly

 108 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 22. 109 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.1 110 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 22. 111 NWP 1-14M para. 7.6. 112 Id. at para. 7.7.2. 113

Id. 114

Id. 115 Id. at para. 7.7.2.5. 116 Id. at para. 7.7.2.3. 117 Heintschel von Heinegg, supra 103 at 214–5. 118 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.2.1. 119 Id. at para. 7.7.2.2. 120 Id. at para. 7.7.4. 121

Id.
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established blockade can be properly notified within a matter of hours.122 For operational

planning purposes, it is desirable that the notifications carry with them a high level of specificity.

It is appropriate that notices declaring the blockade outline communication protocols that will

be observed and specify the requisite channels and frequencies that will permit exchange

between the blockading force and vessels in the area. Such specificity concerning communication

measures is plainly advantageous in ensuring that intentions are clarified.

Requirement for Effectiveness

In order to be valid, a blockade must be “effective.”

123 This is test of fact124 that ensures that

“paper” blockades may not simply be declared and enforced in a non-discriminatory manner

at vast distances from the specific area subject to the blockade.125 Such “paper” blockades are

unlawful.126 To be effective, a blockade must be maintained by a surface, air, or subsurface 

force or mechanisms that are sufficient to render ingress and/or egress of the blockaded area

dangerous.127 The requirement of effectiveness does not preclude temporary absence if this is

due to stress of weather or pursuit of a blockade runner.128 Nor does effectiveness require that

every possible avenue of approach to the blockaded area be covered.129

The area which may be blockaded can comprise a specific port, a discrete geographical area or

the entire enemy coastline.130 Whatever the geographical area being blockaded, the blockading

force must ensure that it has the requisite forces or at least the military capabilities to prevent

access. It is not necessary “for the blockading force to be deployed in close vicinity to the 

coast. The force may also be stationed at some distance seaward as long as ingress and egress

continues to be dangerous.”131 The distance element is subject to military requirements of the

specific situation.132 Should the coastal State being blockaded have effective coastal 

armaments, aircraft or submarines, the blockading State is not required to position itself within

effective range of such threats.133 However, the blockade must still be conducted at “such a 

distance that there is a reasonable risk that access to the blockaded coastline and egress from

those waters will be effectively prevented.”134 The ability to properly discriminate between

vessels and aircraft that attempt to breach the blockade and those that have permission for entry (i.e.

 122 See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 103, at 214, where the author notes that the Iranian declaration of

October 1, 1980 regarding the imposition of a blockade on Iraq was made known to international shipping 

within a few hours.

123 See 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, Article 4, “Blockades, in order to be binding, must be

effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent ac- cess to the coast of the enemy,” see also 

NWP 1-14M para 7.7.2.3. 124 San Remo Manual, para. 95; Article 3, 1909 London Declaration. 125 Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 103, at 216 126 WALKER, supra note 19, at 390. 127 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.2.3. 128 Id. 129 Id. 130 Australian Reference Manual, para. 9.12. 131 Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 103, at 214 132 San Remo Manual, para 96 133 Australian Reference Manual, para. 9.16. 134 San Remo Manual, para. 96.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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distressed neutral vessels) may well be undertaken at a considerable distance and may be effectively

enforced with requisite modern weaponry by the blockading State.135 However, there may be

circumstances where this is not possible and the legitimacy of the blockade under the

“effectiveness” criteria will be questioned.

The question of effectiveness turns on military capability. A blockade may be maintained by a

number of surface ships or submarines or combat aircraft; or even one surface ship, submarine,

or combat aircraft if the area being blockaded is sufficiently circumscribed to allow single

units to effectively render ingress or egress dangerous or hazardous. The test of 

dangerousness essentially turns on the probability of interception.136 It must be established

that the blockading State has sufficient military means to ensure an adequate probability that

leaving or heading for the blockaded area can be detected and prevented.137 As a matter of

probability, a blockading force may decide to concentrate its forces within a particular quadrant

of the blockaded area where it is likely, due to navigational, political or historical reasons, that a 

third-party State or a particular waterway will be used by blockade runners.

138 Such a

concentration of forces still enables the blockade to be legally “effective,” notwithstanding that

vessels may sometimes evade the blockade in another part of the cordon where the blockading 

force has not so concentrated its forces.

A blockade may also be rendered “effective” by the placement of naval mines139 or an

offshore missile battery, if such weapons can be utilized in a discriminatory fashion. In the

absence of the necessary means to conduct an effective blockade, a belligerent party may well

lose the opportunity to employ this particular legal mechanism of naval warfare. During the

Iraq/Iran tanker war for example, neither State formally declared a blockade, but it has

been noted that Iraq may have lacked the military means to render a blockade effective in any

event.

140 Iran declared that the transport of all goods and cargoes to Iraq were prohibited141

but the generality of the assertion and lack of specific invocation and application of the

juridical elements of blockade ensured that Iran could not lawfully rely upon the mechanism of 

blockade.142 It has been observed in at least one military manual that the subsequent targeting

of oil tankers during that conflict was illegal, given the absence of a formally declared

blockade.

143 Of course, as already canvassed, there might be have been an argument that such

tankers themselves independently constituted military targets given their specific function, 

though even this argument was not specifically pressed in that conflict.

In allocating resources, it may be advantageous for a blockading State to elect only to prevent

the ingress or, alternatively, the egress of vessels. Under the law of blockade there is no

 135 Australian Reference Manual, para. 9.16. 136 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 45. 137 German Commander's Handbook, para. 293. 138 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 39. 139 Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 103, at 215. 140 WALKER, supra note 19, at 392, although there is evidence that Iraq possibly had the means to effect a blockade 

via its air force assets.

141 NOTAM 17/59 see Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 103, at 212. See Appendix C. 142 WALKER, supra note 19, at 393. 143 German Commander’s Handbook, para. 291
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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requirement that both inward and outward passages be intercepted and a blockading State may

choose to prevent only one or other passage, providing that enforcement is undertaken

impartially against all flags. As an operational tactic, there may be merit in electing such a 

course of action. It has been cogently noted that,

if the target country is primarily dependent on the export of oil for funds, it may be just as effective to prohibit

egress as it is to close off all transit. Likewise, a nation heavily reliant on oil imports may need only to be

blockaded as to ingress to achieve the desired results. Both approaches would contribute to the availability of 

assets for employment elsewhere.144

Discussions at international fora as to the “effectiveness” requirement indicate that a blockade

will still be effective even if the circumstances permit a single or even small number of aircraft

to land within the blockaded territory. Such action in itself does not necessarily mean that the 

blockade is to be assessed as ineffective and thus invalid.145

Areas Subject to Blockade

A blockaded area must be within established areas of naval warfare,146 namely, enemy 

territorial waters and the high seas. Similarly, a declared blockade may not bar access to ports

and coasts of neutral States.147 Neutral States retain the right to engage in neutral commerce that

does not involve trade or communications originating in, or destined for, the blockaded area.148

UnlawfulBlockade: EffectUponCivilianPopulation

Reflecting existing canons of customary international law, the declaration or establishment of a

blockade is prohibited if it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or

denying it other objects for its survival.149 As a corollary to this fundamental principle, it

would appear to follow that under existing precepts of the law of armed conflict, a blockade is 

similarly prohibited if the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be,

excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the 

blockade.150

Special Entry and Exit Authorization

A belligerent may authorize neutral warships and military aircraft to enter a blockaded area

subject to such conditions as the blockading State considers expedient and necessary. As the law

of blockade is concerned with limiting international trade with a blockaded enemy, there is no

pressing need to prohibit entry of neutral warships and military aircraft in every case, 

providing that there is no possibility of such warships and/or military aircraft violating their 

neutral obligations within the enemy territory.

 144 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 38. 145 San Remo Manual, para 95.2. 146 San Remo Part II, “Regions of Operations.” 147 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.2.5. 148 Id. 149 San Remo Manual, para. 102. 150 Id. at para. 102; see also WALKER, supra note 19, at 392.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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Special authorization may also be granted to neutral vessels and aircraft to enter and

subsequently depart blockaded areas in circumstances where such neutral vessels and aircraft

are in evident distress.151 Such permission may be under “conditions prescribed by the officer

in command of the blockading force or responsible for maintenance of the blockading

instrumentality (e.g. mines).”152

The law of naval warfare traditionally recognizes that if the civilian population of the blockaded 

territory is inadequately provided with food or other objects essential to its survival, the

blockading party must provide for free passage of such foodstuffs and other essential supplies.

This may be subject to the right to prescribe technical arrangements, including search, under 

which passage is permitted. It is also subject to the condition that the distribution of such supplies

shall be made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian organization

which offers guarantees of impartiality, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Similar stipulations also apply for the passage of medical supplies for the civilian population or 

for wounded and sick members of armed forces.153

Breach and AttemptedBreach ofBlockade

Breach of a blockade is the passage of a vessel or aircraft through a blockade without special

entry or exit authorization from the blockading belligerent.154 Consistent with the general law 

of naval warfare, vessels believed to be breaching a blockade may be captured. Vessels 

which, after prior warning, offer forcible resistance to capture (as opposed to attempting to 

flee) may be attacked and sunk.155 Capture of a vessel attempting to breach a blockade

renders the vessel subject to immediate confiscation and subsequent adjudication under 

national prize court processes.

U.S. policy stipulations provide that attempted breach of a blockade occurs “from the time a

vessel or aircraft leaves a port or airfield with the intention of evading the blockade, and for

vessels exiting the blockaded area, continues until the voyage is completed.”156 For incoming

vessels, this perspective arguably relies upon the doctrine of continuous voyage

157 and would 

allow the capture and engagement of vessels at considerable distances from the blockaded

zone. For example, where a blockade is mounted off the port of a country in Asia, the doctrine of

continuous voyage would enable the capture and targeting of a vessel leaving a port in Europe 

where its perceived intention was to ultimately evade the blockade being conducted half way 

around the world. If applied haphazardly and without significant intelligence support, the

doctrine of continuous voyage can prove to be problematic. Indeed, in the specific context of

the law of blockade, one military manual has gone so far as to say that the doctrine is

 151 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.3. 152 Id. 153 San Remo Manual, paras 103 & 104. 154 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.4. 155 San Remo Manual, para. 98. 156 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.4. 157 German Commander’s Handbook, para. 301.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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contrary to international law.158

The doctrine of continuous voyage arose out of the experience of the American Civil War

where European powers would use third party (Caribbean) ports to transship materials to

fast blockade runners seeking to evade the Union-imposed blockade on the Confederate states

coastline.159 Equally, exports were returned to third party ports for trans-shipment through 

similar means. The doctrine of continuous voyage was prohibited under the 1909 London

Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare (which was not ultimately ratified).

Article 17 of the London Declaration states that “[n]eutral vessels may not be captured for

breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the 

blockade effective” and Article 19 states “[w]hatever may be the ulterior destination of a

vessel or of her cargo, she cannot be captured for breach of blockade, if, at the moment, she is

on her way to a non-blockaded port.”

Consistent with the principles of proportionality and necessity applicable in the law of naval

warfare, it may be concluded that with respect to ingressing vessels, the attempted breach of a

blockade must, in the general course of events, occur generally within the zone of the

declared blockade. Such proximity bolsters the reasonableness of the decision that a vessel or

aircraft has a demonstrated intent to evade the blockade and more solidly groundsthe legality

of the decision to capture or subsequently attack such a vessel. With respect to vessels that are 

egressing from the enemy coastline and have evaded the blockade zone, the U.S. policy states

that pursuit may be undertaken against such vessels indefinitely and capture undertaken 

anywhere outside neutral waters or airspace.160

International practice, (for instance, as undertaken by the United States mining of Haiphong

Harbor during the Vietnam conflict)

161 allows for a grace period between the declaration and

enforcement of a blockade. In that instance a period of three days was allowed for neutral ships to

leave the port prior to the activation of naval mines. Vessels whose registry has been 

changed from enemy to a neutral flag may be restricted from leaving.162

Unlike the law applicable to land conflicts, the law of naval warfare has a slightly broader

interpretation of the principle of distinction. The requirements of “active”163 and “direct”164

participation for loss of civilian status in land conflict are broadened, in the naval context, to

conduct which more generally relates to the war fighting capacity. In this sense a blockade’s

purpose is more generally to “deny the enemy the use of enemy and neutral vessels or aircraft to

 158 Id. at para. 301. 159 Schmitt, supra note 34 at 27. 160 Id. at 46. 161 San Remo Manual, para 85.1, footnote 138. 162 WALKER, supra note 19, at 390. 163 Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1949 Geneva Convention I, 75 UNTS

31; 1949 Geneva Convention II, 75 UNTS 85; 1949 Geneva Convention III, 75 UNTS 135; 1949 Geneva

Convention IV, 75 UNTS 287) states that a civilian is entitled to protection provided he/she is taking no active 

part in hostilities. 164 Article 51(3) of 1977 AP 1,1391–441; states: “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless 

and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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transport personnel and goods to or from enemy territory.”

165 Attempting to breach a validly

declared and notified blockade that maintains its “effectiveness” ensures that the ultimate

targeting of such aircraft and vessels is within the contours of the principle of discrimination.

Where a blockade is not, inter alia, properly declared or notified or is not effective then targeting

vessels in the area under the guise of breach of blockade may violate the principle of distinction

and constitutes offenses under both international and, in most cases, domestic law.

Impartial Application

A blockade must be applied impartially to all vessels and aircraft, including those of the

blockading nation. Discrimination by the blockading belligerent in favor of, or against, the

vessels and aircraft of particular nations renders the blockade legally invalid.166 The rule

relating to impartiality requires that the “blockading force not pick and choose among

vessels flying the flags of different nations when enforcing a blockade”

167 enabling,

therefore, the possibility of restricting either ingress or egress of all flagged vessels if this is

considered necessary to achieve strategic outcomes.

TheCessation of aBlockade

The cessation, temporary lifting, reestablishment or extension of a blockade must be properly

declared and notified through similar channels to those used to impose a blockade. Significantly, if

a blockade is interrupted, a blockading belligerent must declare a blockade again.168 If the coastal

enemy through military action ends the blockade, then the blockading State must re-institute the 

blockade through formal declaration and notification mechanisms.169 Similarly, if the blockading

nation captures the specific port or geographical area being blockaded, then the blockade

obviously ends.170

Contemporary Practice

The doctrine of blockade draws heavily upon its nineteenth century treaty and customary base. The

reaffirmation of the doctrine in contemporary Military Manuals171 and its evident military utility

as an effective measure to intercept all vessels and aircraft seeking to cross a declared cordon172

attests to its continuing efficacy. Since the Second World War, blockades have been imposed in 

the Korean War,173 the Vietnam War,174 the 1971 India/Pakistan war,175 the 1967/1973

 165 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.1. 166 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.2.4. 167 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 38. 168 WALKER, supra note 19, at 390. 169 Id. 170 Id. 171 E.g. NWP 1-14M, para 7.7; UK LOAC Manual, pages 362–3; German Commander’s Handbook, para 291. 172 NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.1. 173 See generally, Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 103, at 211. 174 Id. at 211–12, see also NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.5. 175 Schmitt, supra note 34, at 31.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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Israeli/Arab wars,176 and the Israeli conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon (2006) and Hamas in 

Gaza (2009-present). 177 Blockades offer maximum legal scope for the capture of all vessels and

permit a broad application of the principle of distinction in the law of naval warfare context with

respect to targeting vessels that resist capture. Concomitantly with the rights bestowed upon the

blockading State are obligations regarding declaration, notification and effectiveness. Such

obligations are onerous and must be strenuously complied with in order to realize the opportunities

this mechanism of zone warfare allows.

During the 2003 war with Iraq, the United States did not impose a blockade upon Iraq,

notwithstanding the abundant American military capacity. Rather, reliance was placed upon the

right of visit and search for contraband, as complemented by the exercise of powers under the extent

of Security Council Resolutions. Such a decision was undoubtedly influenced by factors relating

to port access and the overlay of the Security Council sanctions regime as well as the well founded

anticipation that the maritime phase of that conflict was likely to be short-lived and control of the

ports an early operational outcome.

PlanningConsiderationsinRespect ofBlockades

Where a blockading State has relatively few assets to enforce a blockade, it may wish to

concentrate its forces in likely areas where a blockade may be breached. Such a decision may

be based upon navigational features or might be based upon political assessments of the source

of potential blockade runners. Additionally, thought may also be accorded to having a layered

approach to blockade enforcement with a series of identification and interception zones of

various distances where the blockading force may efficiently corral its forces for effective 

interception.

Finally, a strategic decision might be made as to whether a blockade is to be “total” or should

apply only to the ingress or egress of shipping and aircraft. Where an enemy State’s capacity

for war fighting is based heavily upon either the import or alternatively export of goods and

commodities, then a decision to more precisely frame the terms of the blockade has obvious 

 176 See generally, Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 103, at 212. 177 For the text of the January 6, 2009, Israeli Navy declaration regarding the blockade of Gaza, see Appendix C; see

also HYDROLANT 881/11(56) 25 May 2011 (Gaza) and HYDROLANT 58/10(56) 12 January 2010 (UN Interim 

Force in Lebanon monitoring of merchant shipping approaching Lebanese waters). For discussion of the legality, 

under the law of naval warfare, of the Lebanon and Gaza blockades, see James Farrant, “The Gaza Flotilla Incident 

and the Modern Law of Blockade,” Naval War College Review, vol. 66 (Summer 2013), p 81-98; James Kraska, 

“Rule Selection in the Case of Israel’s Blockade of Gaza: Law of Naval Warfare or Law of the Sea?” Yearbook of 

International Humanitarian Law, vol. 13 (2010), p 367-395. Kraska writes: “[T]he 2006 Lebanon War involved an 

Israeli blockade of the coast of Lebanon, but arguably the contest was a transnational NIAC [non-international 

armed conflict] rather than an IAC [international armed conflict] since the IDF was fighting Hezbollah, a non-state 

irregular armed force...” A similar situation obtains with Israel’s blockade of Hamas-controlled Gaza. Drawing a 

parallel between the blockade of southern ports in the American Civil War and the blockade of Gaza , Kraska 

observes: “While blockade originated as a legal concept in IAC, usage, state practice and opinio juris have caused it 

to migrate into NIAC. It is no longer the case that application of the law of blockade ...[is] restricted only to 

conflicts in which both parties are states.” Kraska, id, at 392. Farrant writes: “Despite a lack of consensus on every 

aspect of the law of blockade, the three investigations into the [2010 Gaza flotilla] incident all relied on the classic 

law of blockade. It seems, therefore, that the concept of blockade is alive and well today. It is equally clear that in 

certain circumstances blockade can be an effective method of warfare.” Farrant, id., at 94.
Maritime Operational Zones: Wartime Zones

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efficiency advantages.

Conclusion

The law of naval warfare offers much to the planner who seeks to rely upon designing and

implementing zones for battle space management in a concept of operations. At the tactical,

operational and strategic levels, the law of naval warfare anticipates the assertion of belligerent

rights within such zones that may override peacetime freedom of navigation rights of neutrals

and which allow a belligerent to directly and efficiently control shipping movements within a

defined zone. In each of the zones outlined in this Chapter, namely the Immediate Area of

Operations, the Maritime Operational Zone and the Blockade, there is ample capacity for

ensuring force protection and the maintenance of broader operational and strategic goals. The 

obligations imposed by the law upon the belligerent in creating such zones are high, although

the rewards from a legal perspective are correspondingly great. It is surprising that such legal

tools have not been invoked more thoroughly than they have been in recent years. This

reticence possibly owes much to their perceived antiquity but, as the use of such maritime

zones in Operation Iraqi Freedom has demonstrated, the concepts still possess significant utility

and can greatly assist the achievement of military/naval objectives in a time of armed conflict.
5-1

5

 UN Security Council and Maritime Zones

Introduction

Under the terms of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council possesses broad and 

overriding legal authority to decide how to deal with the maintenance or restoration of 

international peace and security.1 This authority has been invoked to an unprecedented level in 

recent years with numerous Peace Operations having been initiated or otherwise authorized by 

the Security Council through the 1990s and into this century. While these operations have largely 

focused upon land-based operations, the Security Council has also specifically authorized 

maritime measures from time to time to assist in the realization of Security Council goals. Such a 

maritime focus is not unusual given that the Security Council has express authority under the UN 

Charter to impose a maritime blockade as well as “other operations by [the] sea forces of 

members of the United Nations,”2 although it is also evident that the Security Council has been 

sparing in its resort to such maritime measures. 

There have only been five principal occasions where the Security Council has established 

maritime embargoes, namely: Rhodesia in the 1960s;

3 Iraq/Kuwait in the early 1990s;4 Haiti and 

the Former Yugoslavia in the early and mid-1990s; and Libya in 2011.

5

Of these, the maritime

embargo applicable to Iraq from 1990 to 2003 represents the “classic” template concerning the 

Security Council’s approach to this mechanism, and is the principal focus of analysis in this 

chapter. 

This chapter examines the legal quality of maritime zones declared by the Security Council as 

reflected principally in the maritime embargo structure applicable to Iraq. The analysis will 

review the authority underpinning such zones and will assess the limits to enforcement of such 

* This chapter is an update to that originally authored by Commander Dale Stephens, CSM, Royal Australian Navy.

1

 Article 39, UN Charter. 

2

 Article 42, UN Charter. 

3 See Appendix C: UNSC Resolution 217, November 20, 1965, on The Question of Southern Rhodesia; see also 

Appendix C: UNSC Resolution 221, April 9, 1966; UNSC Resolution 232, December 16, 1966.

4 See Appendix C: UNSC Resolution 661, August 6, 1990, on The Situation between Iraq and Kuwait; see also 

Appendix C: UNSC Resolution 660, August 2, 1990; UNSC Resolution 665, August 25, 1990. UNSC Resolution 

666, September 13, 1990.

5 Haiti: UNSC Resolution 917, May 6, 1994, on sanctions for restoration of democracy and return of the

legitimately elected President to Haiti, at para. 9; see excerpt in Appendix C. Former Yugoslavia: UNSC Resolution 

787, November 16, 1992, on the Situation in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, at para. 12; see excerpt in 

Appendix C. Libya: UNSC Resolution 1970, February 26, 2011, and UNSC Resolution 1973, March 17, 2011, see

Appendix C. For NATO-issued Navigational Warning for Libya (March 25, 2011; October 31, 2011), see Appendix 

C.
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5-2

zones. Additionally, it will be demonstrated that in the context of an armed conflict, it is possible 

for an operational planner to take advantage of the sui generis or “stand alone” rights of such a 

Security Council authorized zone in conjunction with more traditional rights exercisable under 

the law of naval warfare. The chapter concludes with a summary of some general planning 

considerations which follow from the analysis undertaken on the authority and character of UN 

Security Council maritime zones. 

A. MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS AND ZONES

The design and implementation of the maritime embargo against Iraq during Operation Desert 

Shield represents the key moment where the Security Council was able to muster its considerable 

latent legal authority to ensure an effective operational mechanism in the maritime environment. 

The maritime interdiction operations that were authorized by the Security Council during the 

latter half of 1990 with respect to Iraq remained in place throughout the 1990s and into the 

twenty-first century, until they were (largely) rescinded by the Security Council in May 2003.6

The maritime operations undertaken pursuant to the Security Council authority were directed 

towards achieving different goals, ranging from compelling Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait 

through ensuring effective Iraqi disarmament. The embargo transcended both the build-up and 

conduct of armed conflict with Iraq. 

While the legal framework underpinning the Security Council’s authorization of these operations 

against Iraq has become the working model for successfully implementing effective maritime 

measures against an aberrant State, the evolution of the framework was far from straightforward. 

Fundamental questions concerning use of force, the existence of an armed conflict and the limits 

of Security Council authority were all posed during the fall of 1990. The answers provided to 

these questions established the enduring foundation for understanding the capacities of the 

Security Council to mandate the creation and enforcement of maritime zones directed at 

restricting trade with an identified State. 

The implementation of the Security Council maritime embargo against Iraq in the latter half of 

1990 was a bold and unique step. Implemented at a time when the international community was 

not then ready to undertake armed conflict with Iraq, there was palpable concern that the 

embargo on trade constituted a blockade or was akin to the right of visit and search, two 

belligerent rights that were exercisable only in a time of armed conflict. 7Alternatively, some 

argued that while the embargo was not an exercise of maritime belligerent rights it shared some 

(though not all) of the same characteristics as a Pacific Blockade,8a controversial peacetime 

measure applicable under customary international law. 

It became evident at the time, and has since been established in the minds of many, that the 

Security Council authorized embargo was, in fact, a unique creation. The rights and obligations 

 6 UNSC Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, para. 10. See also MARLO 

Advisory Bulletin 01-04 of 12 January 04, which continued to apply the sanctions regime to the import of arms and 

related material within a defined and localized maritime zone off the coast of Iraq. See Appendix C. 

7 Lois E. Fielding, Maritime Interception: Centerpiece of Economic Sanctions in the New World Or-der, 53 

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1191 at 1216 (1993) where the author notes “France and Canada did not wish to 

become “co-belligerents” with those nations conducting the interception.”

8 Id. at 1218.
Maritime Operational Zones: UN Security Council & Maritime Zones

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possessed and owed while enforcing the embargo were themselves defined by the Security 

Council under its plenary authority to authorize action to restore international peace and security. 

As will be discussed subsequently in this chapter, the broadness of the Resolutions and the 

evolving jurisprudence deriving from their implementation meant there were numerous gaps in 

determining the applicable law at the tactical level and recourse was naturally made to general 

international law concepts, particularly the law of naval warfare, to fill those gaps and to shape 

operational decisions. 

It may appear disingenuous to refer to the maritime interception operations authorized by the 

Security Council as “zones.” The Security Council Resolutions establishing the maritime 

embargo against Iraq in Operation Desert Shield and thereafter did not, in themselves, define an 

area of operations. Rather, the parties that enforced the embargo defined the operable area where 

these measures would be enforced. The area defined, principally by the United States,9included 

the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea, representing a proximate and reasonable 

“zone” for ensuring that the prohibition of illicit trade with Iraq was given effect. 

While not formally predicated upon the declaration of a specific area, the subject is nonetheless 

properly included in any analysis concerning maritime zones because, in practice, the Iraq 

experience demonstrates that it is within operationally defined areas of operations that these 

measures were actually enforced. Indeed, as one commentator noted, the particularity of the zone 

was evident enough so that “ship masters had time and opportunity to consider options and make 

a reasoned choice whether to enter the zone and be challenged.”10

Additionally, on a qualitative level, the Security Council has the formal legal capacity to 

transcend existing treaty and customary law in its creation of new legal rights and obligations 

where this is necessary for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. 

The geographically targeted maritime interception operations that were developed in relation to 

Iraq are a new and profoundly important measure in the armory of legal “weapons” possessed by 

the Security Council. The legal framework adopted for the use of force in this maritime context 

represents a significant step in the evolution of unique supra-national rights exercisable in the 

maritime environment. The reconciliation of the undoubted authority of the Security Council to 

mandate unique measures to achieve its goals in the maritime arena is a vitally relevant subject to 

the discussion of maritime operational zones. 

B. MARITIME EMBARGO—IRAQ 1990

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. The Security Council quickly condemned 

the invasion and adopted Resolution 660 that demanded Iraq “immediately and unconditionally” 

withdraw from Kuwait.

11

On 6 August 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 661 which 

imposed sanctions on Iraq in an effort to “secure compliance of Iraq with . . . resolution 660.”

12

 9 U.S. Department of the Navy, SPECIAL WARNING No. 80, August 17, 1990, see Appendix C.

10 Fielding, supra note 7, at 1238.

11 UNSC Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, at para. 2 “Demands that 

Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 

1990.” 

12 UNSC Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, at para. 2.
Maritime Operational Zones: UN Security Council & Maritime Zones

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The Resolution required all member States to prevent the import of “all commodities and 

products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported therefrom after the date of the present 

resolution.”13Significantly, the only exception to this general embargo was for medical supplies 

and foodstuffs.

14

Acting pursuant to a request by the legitimate government of Kuwait, the United States and other 

responding States, acting under the collective self-defense provisions of Article 51 of the UN 

Charter, deployed naval forces to the Persian Gulf in a effort to ensure conformity with 

Resolution 661.15In an environment marked by much initial legal uncertainty, U.S. and allied 

naval forces resolved to monitor and intercept vessels in the region to maintain the sanctions 

regime imposed by Resolution 661.16The actions were expressly not regarded as a blockade of 

the Iraqi/Kuwaiti coastline, but rather were designed to ensure that the embargo was made 

effective.17There remained, however, considerable disquiet as to what measures of force could 

be employed under the aegis of the adopted Resolutions. 

Great Britain and Australia had agreed to join the United States in this naval action, but other 

countries, especially France, Malaysia, the Soviet Union and Canada were not supportive, 

considering that any use of force was required to be justified expressly under Article 42 of the 

UN Charter.18Article 42 deals with the enforcement capacities of the Security Council and the 

absence of an express invocation of this Article meant, according to France and Canada at least, 

that they would be in danger of becoming “co-belligerents” with those nations undertaking the 

interception operations.19The subsequent adoption of Security Council Resolution 665 on 25 

August 1990, “called upon [States] cooperating with the Gulf government of Kuwait which are 

employing maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific 

circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward 

and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations.”20

 13 Id. at para. 3(a).

14 Id. at para. 3 (c) “. . . but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian 

circumstances, foodstuffs.”

15Request of 12 August 1990 by His Excellency Sheik Jabar al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Emir of the State of Kuwait who 

requested that “the United States Government take such military or other steps as are necessary to ensure that 

economic measures designed to fully restore our rights are effectively implemented.” Letter from His Excellency 

Sheik Jabar al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Emir of the State of Kuwait, to George Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 

12, 1990) as taken from Jane Gilliland Dalton, The Influence of Law on Seapower in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 41 

NAVAL LAW REVIEW 27 at 34 (1993).

16 See Fielding, supra note 7, at 1215 where the author references a U.S. Department of Defense press release 

concerning naval interdiction, Aug. 16, 1990; U.S., Department of Defense, Desert Shield No. 10, memorandum for 

correspondence, Aug. 16, 1990.

17 The U.K. Ambassador to the United Nations characterized the action as “the close monitoring of maritime traffic 

as a key element in making the embargo effective,” as taken from Dalton, supra note 15, at 31. 

18 Id. at 34–5.

19 Fielding, supra note 7, at 1216.

20 UNSC Resolution 665 of August 25, 1990, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, at para. 1. 
Maritime Operational Zones: UN Security Council & Maritime Zones

5-5

This Resolution resolved the issue of whether forceful measures were permitted, by 

acknowledging outright that such measures, if necessary, were indeed authorized. Interestingly, 

given the original concern by some countries as to the specific authority under the Charter for 

these maritime interception measures, the wording was made purposely unclear in Resolution 

665. Rather than invoking any specific Article, the Resolution simply referred to Chapter VII 

simpliciter and maritime interception operations were thus conducted without the need for finite 

arguments as to the internal machinations as to the legal architecture of the Chapter VII 

framework. 

The maritime sanctions framework endured through both Operation Desert Shield/Storm as well 

as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The latent ambiguity as to the specific provisions being invoked 

under Chapter VII

21

in the resolutions sustaining the sanctions regime permitted an opportunity 

for constructive and operationally effective reading of the terms throughout this period. Indeed, 

the Resolution structure imposed for the liberation of Kuwait and the subsequent maritime 

sanctions regime directed towards Iraq, became a model for numerous subsequent Peace 

Enforcement missions authorized by the Security Council through the 1990s and into this 

century. Far from undermining Security Council effectiveness, the ambiguous formula of 

referring to broad “Chapter VII” and “all necessary means” authority within the Resolutions 

actually permitted the conduct of bold UN action through this period. 

C. THE UN CHARTER FRAMEWORK 

The concern originally expressed by a number of States as to the specific authority for the 

maritime interception operations conducted against Iraq was well founded given the escalatory 

framework of Chapter VII of the Charter. In hindsight, however, it seems that interpretations 

originally given to the extant Resolutions imposing the sanctions by some countries were too 

narrowly focused and overly “legalistic.” This being the first time the legal capacities of the 

Security Council to mandate the imposition of maritime zones on a global scale had been 

undertaken,

22

the experience now stands as a significant precedent for the conclusion that 

reasonable and necessary force at the tactical level to compel compliance with Security Council 

mandated ends is permitted, even in circumstances falling short of those enumerated within 

Article 42. 

With the ending of the Cold War, the literal terms of the Charter do provide enormous capacity 

to the Security Council to deal with threats to international peace and security and to establish 

appropriate mechanisms for dealing with such threats. The imposition of maritime embargoes 

through the promulgation of maritime interdiction zones is one such expression of this capacity. 

 21 UNSC Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait did specifically note in its 

preamble that the Security Council was “Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter” but this level of specificity 

was not maintained in subsequent Resolutions adopted by the Security Council. 

22Rob McLaughlin, United Nations Mandated Naval Interdiction Operations in the Territorial Sea, 51 

INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 249 At 258-59 (2002) who pertinently observes 

in relation to the embargo imposed upon Southern Rhodesia that “The Beira Patrol was clearly an Article 41 

authorised blockade. . . . It is not, however, the predominant precedent or authority for this practice-a title clearly 

held by Resolution 665 (1990) on the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.” The author arrives at this conclusion because, inter alia, 

the authorization from the Security Council was directed towards only one State to enforce the sanctions, namely the 

UK and the phraseology used in the Resolution was not susceptible to universal application.
Maritime Operational Zones: UN Security Council & Maritime Zones

5-6

Thus, in an examination of the Charter, Article 39 accords to the Security Council wide 

discretion to determine “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 

aggression.”23It is evident that the Security Council may rely upon its own politico-legal 

appreciations as to what may constitute a requisite “threat,” “breach” or “act” for the purposes 

of Article 39.

24

Indeed, following the precedent established in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, 

the Security Council has demonstrated a readiness to identify a broad range of threats to 

international peace and security for establishing an Article 39 base for further action. These have 

included domestic disputes,25violations of human rights26and even mass refugee migration.27

Article 41 of the Charter permits the Security Council to decide that measures not involving the 

use of force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. While Article 41 specifically 

mentions disruption of economic, communications and diplomatic relations, the Security Council 

is not bound by such subject matter in its determination of what measures may be appropriate. 

While it seems conclusive that “measures” may be given a broad and somewhat subjective 

meaning by the Security Council, its discretion cannot be unlimited. Thus, it has already been 

mentioned that when adopting Resolution 661 the Security Council exempted from the sanction 

regime “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and. . . foodstuffs.”28Whether or not the 

Security Council was bound to make these exemptions, it made good sense from a policy 

perspective. 

Article 42 provides that “[s]hould the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 

Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, 

sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” It 

is Article 42 that provides the ultimate formal sanction for application of force under a UN peace 

 23 Article 39, UN Charter.

24 Matthias J. Herdegen, The “Constitutionalization” of the UN Security System, (1994) 27 VANDERBILT 

JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 135 at 155.

25 UNSC Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Preamble “Gravely concerned 

by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq... which threaten[s] international peace and 

security in the region.”

26 UNSC Resolution 925 of June 8, 1994, on the Extension of the Mandate and deployment of the 2 additional 

battalions of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda and settlement of the conflict in Rwanda, “Noting with the 

gravest concern the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda and recalling in this context 

that genocide constitutes a crime punishable under international law”; UNSC Resolution 929 of June 22, 1994, on 

the Establishment of a temporary multinational operation for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until the 

deployment of the expanded UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, “Determining that the magnitude of the 

humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.” 

27 UNSC Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, on the Authorization to form a multinational force under unified 

command and control to restore the legitimately elected President and authorities of the Government of Haiti and 

extension of the mandate of the UN Mission in Haiti, “Gravely concerned by . . . the desperate plight of Haitian 

refugees” determines that “. . . the situation in Haiti constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.”

28 UNSC Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, para. 3 (c) “. . . but not 

including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs” and 

UNSC Resolution 666 of September 13, 1990, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, Preamble “Recognizing 

that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be supplied to the civilian population in 

Iraq or Kuwait in order to relive human suffering.”
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enforcement operation.29The invocation of this Article does not require that Article 41 measures 

have actually been implemented, rather it merely provides that the Security Council must only 

“consider” that such measures would be inadequate. 

There is considerable debate as to where the authority for the maritime sanctions regime against 

Iraq properly lies within the Charter structure. Some academics view the placement as falling 

somewhere between Article 41 and 42, probably closer to Article 41.30Others seem more 

inclined to view the action as falling more logically under Article 42.31Suffice it to say, the 

ambivalence of the Security Council itself to identify the specific Article of the Charter it is 

relying upon, coupled with the 13 years of successful multi-national action in enforcing the 

zone,

32

does indicate that there is a wide latitude for the authorization of forceful measures 

within Chapter VII irrespective of the particular Article relied upon. Such a reading is consistent 

with the International Court of Justice’s approach to discerning lawful authority for Security 

Council or General Assembly action in a more general sense where it has eschewed strict 

literalism and has been prepared to find both inherent and implied authority for Security Council 

and General Assembly action deriving from a holistic reading of the Charter.33

D. LEGAL PRIMACY OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS

The legal significance of a duly adopted Security Council Resolution lies in the primacy it enjoys 

as a matter of international law. Article 2(5) of the UN Charter requires that “All members shall 

give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present

Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is 

taking preventive or enforcement action.” Similarly, Article 25 mandates that “The Members of 

the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 

accordance with the present Charter.” Article 49 stipulates that “The Members of the United 

Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by 

the Security Council.” In respect of pre-existing obligations owed by States under treaties that 

may be inconsistent with a decision of the Security Council, Article 103 of the Charter states that 

“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under 

the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 

obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 

 29 Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel White, BLUE HELMETS: LEGAL REGULATION OF UNITED NATIONS 

MILITARY OPERATIONS 71, (1996).

30 Fielding, supra note 7, at 1241–2; see also McLaughlin, supra note 22, at 254–5 where the author canvasses the 

various assessments of the appropriate placement of UNSC Resolution 665 under either Article 41 or 42.

31 Dalton, supra note 15, at 45.

32 See SPECIAL WARNING 115 of February 16, 2001 which provides an illustration of the procedural requirements 

of enforcement within the sanctions zone. See Appendix C.

33 Nigel White, The UN Charter and Peacekeeping Forces: Constitutional Issues, 3(4) INTERNATIONAL 

PEACEKEEPING 43 (1996) at 50.
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The maritime interdiction measures established by the Security Council have a unique legal 

quality. Being neither a blockade nor based upon established criteria for a lawful visit and search 

regime,34the interdiction operations possess their own special legal character, justified as they 

were as a Chapter VII measure. Importantly, as a manifestation of Security Council 

determination, the condemnation of Iraqi actions35and the invocation of Chapter VII authority in 

framing the resulting maritime embargo meant that there was no possibility of neutral rights of 

third States being proclaimed. When armed conflict was eventually initiated between Iraq and 

the United States-led coalition forces, it was the constant and formal U.S. view that 

proclamations of neutrality were of no effect36and that belligerent actions could therefore be 

conducted in what were otherwise “neutral” areas. Such a determination is hardly revolutionary 

given the express obligations owed under the Charter. Accordingly, all States were required to 

observe the prohibition on trade and were to comply and render “mutual assistance” to effectuate 

the measures. 

E. LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE AND SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

Article 51 of the UN Charter suggests that States have the right to act in individual or collective 

self-defense until the Security Council takes the necessary action to maintain international peace 

and security.37The debate concerning use of force measures relating to the maritime interdiction 

framework against Iraq in 1990 highlighted the issue whether the decisions of the Security 

Council effectively exhausted the residual rights of individual and collective self-defense of the 

participating States. That is, did the decisions of the Security Council become the single frame of 

reference for determining the legality of forceful measures applied by those States supplying 

forces confronting Iraq. This argument was strongly rejected by the United States and the actual 

experience of Operation Desert Shield/Storm establishes that there is a symbiotic and 

accommodative relationship between general international law and decisions of the Security 

Council, especially in the context of rights of individual and collective self-defense. The 

differentiation between these respective bodies of law was clearly summarized by the 

commentator Eugene Rostow who stated at the time that “the customary law of self-defense is 

 34 Michael Schmitt, Aerial Blockades in Historical, Legal, and Practical Perspective, 2 UNITED STATES AIR 

FORCE ACADEMY JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 21 (1991) at 21–2.

35 UNSC Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait, “Condemns the Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait” and UNSC Resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, Preamble “Determined to bring the 

invasion and occupation of Kuwait to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 

Kuwait.”

36 “It was the U.S. position during the Persian Gulf crisis that, regardless of assertions of neutrality, all nations were 

obligated to avoid hindrance of Coalition operations undertaken pursuant to, or in conjunction with, UNSC 

decisions, and to provide whatever assistance possible.” Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, 

April 1992 at 626.

37 Article 51 of the UN Charter states “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 

collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 

has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the 

exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 

affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 

action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
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not impaired in any way by the Charter but remains intact until the Council has successfully dealt 

with the controversy before it.”38The sentiment expressed by Rostow acknowledges the legal 

supremacy of Security Council Resolutions, though he prefaces this recognition on a requirement 

of effectiveness. It is an established view held by other academics39and has been similarly 

invoked in the course of other world events. Indeed, with respect to the Falkland Islands crisis, 

the UK Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict reflects this dichotomy and similarly observes that 

“The UK’s actions in recovering the Falkland Islands in 1982 were based throughout on selfdefence. This conflict also showed that the right of self-defence is not placed in abeyance merely 

because the Security Council has been able to pass a resolution calling for one of the parties to a 

conflict to withdraw.”40

This differentiation between rights to national and collective self-defense and the content of a 

particular Security Council Resolution also applies at the operational or tactical level. While the 

specificity of a particular Resolution adopted under Chapter VII will naturally shape operational 

planning considerations directly, it is not common for a Resolution to get into that level of detail 

and to speak directly to the operational or tactical level.

41

Accordingly, as will be more fully 

discussed below, in circumstances of armed conflict, the prevailing law of naval warfare will 

operate in conjunction with the Security Council framework to shape operational planning 

outcomes in a mutually re-enforcing manner. This reinforcing corpus of law has significant 

impact upon the enforcement of Security Council established maritime interdiction zones in a 

time of armed conflict. 

F. SECURITY COUNCIL MARITIME ZONES 

AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

The conduct of armed hostilities by coalition forces against Iraq in 2003 comprised integrated 

land, air and maritime operations. With respect to the maritime component, the legal framework 

for the conduct of operations against Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom was based upon the 

concurrent application of both relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (that had 

remained essentially unchanged since first developed in 1990) and the traditional law of naval 

warfare. The contours of the interaction between these two authorities is not altogether settled. 

The commentary to the San Remo Manual has noted that traditional rights of neutrality that 

would otherwise be asserted in a time of armed conflict by third parties are obviated in 

circumstances where the Security Council has acted in accordance with its powers under Chapter 

VII and has “identified one or more of the parties to an armed conflict as responsible for 

 38 Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense? In Agora: The Gulf Crisis in 

International and Foreign Relations Law, 85 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 506 (1991) at 

511.

39 Todd Wynkoop, The Use of Force Against Third Party Neutrals to Enforce Economic Sanctions Against a 

Belligerent, 42 NAVAL LAW REVIEW 91 (1995) at 98 where the author notes “. . . the Article 51 right of selfdefense is only terminated when the Security Council’s actions actually restore peace and security.”

40 UK LOAC Manual, para. 3.2.2, footnote 4.

41 UNSC Resolution 1319 of September 8, 2000, on The Situation in East Timor is an exception in its statement 

within paragraph 6 that “. . . UNTAET should respond robustly to the militia threat in East Timor, consistent with its 

resolution 1272 (1999) of 22 October 1999.”
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resorting to force in violation of international law.”

42

Similar sentiments are contained within a 

number of operative Military Manuals.43

Interestingly, the commentary further provides that while this rule concerning the denial of 

neutrality is a plain application of the import of Article 25

44

of the UN Charter, as to the broader 

impact of Article 25 on elements underpinning the law of naval warfare, the Manual states that 

the “precise implications of this duty . . . .are not entirely clear.”45Thus, the Manual itself does 

not pursue the implications of the Security Council’s capacity to specifically modify the 

traditional law applicable in an armed conflict at sea. Instead it merely notes that “where the 

Security Council has taken a decision to use force, or to authorize the use of force by a particular 

State or States, the rules set out in this document and any other rules of international 

humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts at sea shall apply to all parties to any such 

conflict which may ensue.”46The issue is, however, the manner of that application. 

Notwithstanding the hesitancy reflected in the San Remo Manual, it is evident that there is a 

need to integrate the mandates and prerogatives of Security Council directives and the law of 

naval warfare when undertaking maritime operations within an embargo zone. When dealing 

with United Nations Security Council involvement in an international armed conflict at sea, the 

law of naval warfare is the principal body of international law that is used to complement the 

application of a relevant Security Council Resolution. The corpus of law comprising the law of 

naval warfare is thus employed to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in the language employed in 

the applicable Resolution in situations where the language of the Resolution is applied in a 

tactical context. 

G. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS INVOKING “ALL NECESSARY MEANS”

One of the principal issues to be answered in an operational sense is whether, in a time of armed 

conflict, a comprehensive Chapter VII peace enforcement Resolution containing an authority for 

States to employ “all necessary means” to engage in maritime interdiction/sanctions activity 

would enable the exercise of belligerent rights which exceed those contained within the law of 

naval warfare. Such an interpretation could conceivably permit the exercise of rights of naval 

warfare extending beyond the traditional means of conducting naval warfare, namely the visit 

and search regime or imposition of a blockade, or at least ameliorate the conditions precedent 

necessary for the exercise of such traditional naval warfare rights. Support for such an outcome 

may be indirectly drawn from the reasoning employed by the International Court of Justice in 

 42 San Remo Manual para. 7; see also Section III, para. 8 where the Manual states as follows: 

Where, in the course of an international armed conflict, the Security Council has taken preventive or enforcement 

action involving the application of economic measures under Chapter VII of the Charter, Member States of the 

United Nations may not rely upon the law of neutrality to justify conduct which would be incompatible with their 

obligations under the Charter or under decisions of the Security Council. 

43 NWP 1-14M, paras 7.2.1 & 7.2.2, at 7-1 & 7-2; German Commander’s Handbook, para. 230, and phrased more 

generally, Australian Reference Manual para. 7.25.

44 San Remo Manual, para. 7.1.

45 Id.

46 Id. at para 9.
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matters such as the Certain Expenses

47

and Namibia48Advisory Opinions. In these matters, the 

Court consistently provided robust support for the mandatory authority of the Security Council, 

venturing even (in the case of the former Opinion) to find a presumption against ultra vires for 

Security Council action.49

The Security Council itself is now well practiced in wording Chapter VII Resolutions so as to 

ensure that there is no legal deficit in respect of the application of force. The phraseology “all 

necessary means” has, since the Iraqi precedent was set in 1990, become a term of art, which is 

intended to ensure that forces acting under Chapter VII authority are permitted a broad basis to 

realistically address the Security Council’s perception of a threat to the peace, breach of the 

peace or act of aggression. The specific reference to use of force measures in Security Council 

Resolution 665 is a testament to this capacity to modify existing international law with the 

consensus view as to the placement of the Resolution into a mythical Article “411⁄2” category. 

With such an interpretation, it plainly helps that the ICJ has supported a presumption against 

ultra vires for Security Council capacities. 

Academic commentary on this issue appears to be mixed, especially in the context of armed 

conflict. The notion that the fundamental rules of the Geneva Conventions could be modified, for 

example, through adherence to a strongly worded Security Council Resolution is an anathema to 

some. A number of commentators are quite emphatic in stating that “although Article 103 of the 

Charter asserts that the obligations of UN members under the Charter—thus including the duty 

under Article 25 to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council—prevail over their 

obligations under any other international agreement, this provision cannot apply to “Geneva law” 

obligations binding States as well as the UN itself, as these obligations stem from 

“intransgressible” norms that may never be justifiably contravened, either by the former or by 

the latter.”50However, following the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the Security Council adopted 

Resolution 1483,51which detailed the powers of the Governing Authority in Iraq and appeared to 

modify the traditional obligations and rights of an occupying power under both the Hague law 

and Fourth Geneva Convention. The Resolution provided a specific foundation for modifying 

existing Iraqi law and an express license “to change the laws, institutions, and personnel of the 

occupied state.”52Such an authority plainly conflicts with conventional obligations regarding 

modification of structures and institutions within an occupied territory, though one commentator 

has correctly pointed out that “[i]t does not seem too remarkable a proposition, that a resolution 

 47Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), 1962 ICJ Reports 151. (Hereinafter Certain Expenses 

case)

48 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 

Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)(Advisory Opinion) 1971 I.C.J. Reports 16.

49Certain Expenses case, supra note 47, at 168.

50 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: 

Protecting Collective Interests, 837 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 67 (2000) at 76.

51 UNSC Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, on The Situation Between Iraq and Kuwait.

52 Thomas D. Grant, Iraq: How to reconcile conflicting obligations of occupation and reform, ASIL Insights, The 

American Society of international Law, June 2003.
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of the Security Council could carve out such provisions. The Security Council has sweeping 

dispositive authority, as evidenced by its resolutions establishing a legal basis for such ambitious 

programs as the independence of East Timor or administration of Kosovo, not to mention power 

to create upon the member States obligations, which, owing to Article 103 of the Charter, enjoy 

primacy over treaty obligations.”53

As a matter of simple construction of the terms of the Charter, unless an obligation has acquired 

peremptory status,

54

or is founded upon fundamental humanitarian protections, then it may be 

overridden or subsequently modified by the Security Council in a specifically worded 

Resolution. Whether the use of lethal force to stop or even sink a vessel which failed to submit to 

inspection under the authority of the Security Council Resolution (assuming such action not 

being in conformity with the law of naval warfare) would result in a violation of the law of 

armed conflict/law of naval warfare or, for those countries that have ratified it, the Rome Statute 

of the International Criminal Court, remains a poignantly unanswered question.55It does suggest 

though, that in the design of maritime interception zones, the Security Council might modify the 

existing law under the law of naval warfare and can set the terms for the manner in which such 

zones may be enforced, quite impervious to the traditional requirements for enforcing similar 

zones, such as blockade under the law of naval warfare. Indeed, such a proposition enjoys a level 

of mature consensus in much of the literature. It has been tacitly accepted, for example, that even 

when declaring a blockade against a State under its express authority contained within Article 42 

 

53 Id. Regarding the situation in Libya, Paragraph 9 of UNSC Resolution 1970, February 26, 2011, stated: 

“Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, 

sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or 

using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types...” Paragraph 11 of UNSCR 

1970 called upon all states “to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent 

with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo 

to and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has 

information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export 

of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of 

those provisions.” The language of Paragraph 11 was superseded by Paragraph 13, UNSC Resolution 1973, March 

17, 2011, which called “upon all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and 

authorize[d] Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such 

inspections...” See Appendix C.

54 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties entitled “Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm 

of general international law (jus cogens)” provides: 

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. 

For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted 

and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 

permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 

character. 

55 Article 8(2) of the ICC Rome Statute states “For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means: (a) Grave 

breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or 

property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: (i) Wilful killing” Rome Statute of the 

International Criminal Court, July 18, 1998, 37 ILM 999 (1998).
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of the Charter, the Security Council is at liberty to set whatever terms it deems fit while still 

preserving the lawfulness of its actions.56

It is a truism that the application of any and all force must comply with the cardinal principles of 

necessity and proportionality.57With respect to actions predicated upon rights reflected in Article 

51 of the UN Charter, the necessity/proportionality formula would generally allow a State to 

restore the status quo ante that existed prior to an armed attack. Such a constraint is not 

necessarily applicable to a Chapter VII maritime embargo and interdiction zone established by 

the Security Council and dedicated to restoring international peace and security. In that context, 

what is necessary and proportionate becomes more nebulous, especially when an authority 

contained within an applicable Resolution includes the “all necessary means” formulation to 

achieve a strategic outcome. Conversely, the level of specificity contained within an applicable 

Security Council Resolution could have the effect of minimizing the authority permitted under a 

classic recitation of the law of naval warfare. While Security Council Resolutions are generally 

targeted at the strategic level, there appears to be no limitation on focusing upon more 

operational levels of detail if deemed necessary to maintain or preserve international peace and 

security. In respect to Iraq, the Security Council had established through the 1990s an elaborate 

system of sanctions administration, overseen by a specifically created central Sanctions 

Committee.58This Committee exercised considerable power to approve items exported to Iraq. 

Allied to this procedural regime was a changing strategic approach to the importation and 

exportation of goods under the “oil for food” program and other concessions to an expedited 

approval process for agricultural and educational items destined for Iraq.59

The reconciliation of the sanctions approval process and the exercise of belligerent rights 

applicable in a time of armed conflict were of critical concern during the coalition maritime 

operations conducted in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Traditional rules of naval warfare 

employed during the course of the conflict were based upon the belligerent right of visit and 

search against all incoming vessels suspected of carrying contraband. Consistent with its own 

tenor, the law did not permit the exercise of boarding rights for outbound vessels or the boarding 

of vessels dormant in Iraqi waterways. Alternatively, the ongoing sanctions regime authorized 

under existing Security Council Resolutions and applicable Sanctions Committee procedures did 

permit a general boarding authority with respect to all vessels, wherever located within the 

embargo zone in order to verify sanctions compliance. Whether goods unilaterally declared as 

contraband by the belligerents could be seized remained a contentious point. For example, in 

 56 Lauterpacht notes that “a naval operation established under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is not required to 

conform to the strictures of blockade or other traditional forms of maritime zones” as taken from Fielding, supra 

note 7, at 1217; see also Annotated NWP 1-14M, para. 7.7.2.1, footnote 131 where it is stated “[i]t is not possible to 

say whether, or to what extent, a UN blockade would be governed by the traditional rules.”

57 As reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion Concerning the Legality of the Threat 

or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 20 at 41 (July 8).

58 See generally, Paul Conlon, Lessons From Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a Source of 

Sanctions Implementation Authority and Practice, 35 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 633 

(1995).

59Refer to HYDROPACs 205/206 of 2002 of 1 Feb 02 which detail the procedural application of sanctions 

committee authorities within the sanctions zone. See Appendix C.
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such circumstances, did a letter of approval for the importation of goods issued some months 

earlier by the Sanctions Committee override a belligerent right to seize contraband applicable in 

a time of armed conflict? Employing an integrative approach to interpretation, one may conclude 

that the Resolutions, applicable following the first Gulf War through the 1990s should recognize 

the existence of a state of armed conflict in 2003 and thus be “read down” so as to accommodate 

more traditional and more specific legal rights, such as the seizing and condemnation of prize 

under the traditional law. This would enable the Resolutions to provide a starting point upon 

which the law of armed conflict/naval warfare could then be applied in a manner consistent with 

the purpose of the Resolutions, which was to ensure Iraqi compliance with Security Council 

goals of restoring/ preserving international peace and security. The harmonious invocation of 

traditional law of naval warfare rights within the embargo zone would undoubtedly have 

furthered that particular aim. This is certainly the reading the United States gave to the 

Resolutions as it transitioned from Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm in 1991 

without any protest or objection from the international community60and was similarly 

undertaken in the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

H. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The experience of Security Council authorization of maritime embargoes over the past 15 years 

has distilled some key operational planning points, namely: 

1. A Security Council authorized maritime embargo is, in practice, based upon a zone concept of 

enforcement. Unlike the imposition of a blockade or Maritime Exclusion Zone, there is no 

requirement to specify with the same rigor the area or zone of enforcement. The zone to be 

enforced will in fact be proximate and reasonable to the goals being sought. 

2. A Resolution adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter ensures that third party States are 

obliged to provide “mutual assistance” and cannot formally declare themselves neutral should 

the enforcement transition from a peacetime environment to a time of armed conflict. 

3. Use of reasonable force at the tactical level to enforce a Security Council authorized embargo 

is permitted (and ROE can be drafted accordingly) when authorized under Chapter VII of the UN 

Charter, irrespective if the specific authority for the Resolution derives from Article 39, 40, 41 or 

42 of the UN Charter. 

4. Depending on the effectiveness of an extant Security Council Resolution, the customary law 

underpinning the right to individual or collective self-defense is not automatically extinguished 

and planners may configure CONOPS accordingly. 

5. There is the potential that a Security Council Resolution, especially when adopted under 

Chapter VII, may override elements of the existing law of naval warfare. The specificity of the 

particular Resolution will be key to reconciling the confluence of legal standards and a 

complementary approach to each body of law should be adopted. Similarly, it is open for a 

 

60 Dalton, supra note 15, at 68 where the author describes a straightforward transition and reconciliation between 

the sanctions regime and the overlay of the law of naval warfare, noting “When Desert Storm began, on January 17, 

1991, all parties involved could correctly be termed belligerents. Although the Maritime Interception Operations 

continued as before, important changes took place in the status of the Iraqi merchant vessels.”
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Resolution to specifically liberalize constraints under the existing law of naval warfare, 

providing that fundamental humanitarian protections are not dispensed with. 
APPENDIX A

Maritime Notification Systems

Each nation state bears primary responsibility for providing warning notices 

for their territorial waters, national airspace and adjacent areas of 

international waters and airspace under their effective control.1

 As a matter 

of practice, those states discovering or creating hazardous conditions in 

international waters and airspace are typically responsible for issuing the 

appropriate warning notices.2

 Thus, United States maritime forces are 

required to notify the international community of operations that may pose 

hazards to navigation and overflight, identifying those areas in which they 

establish maritime operational zones and warning areas.3

 

This appendix provides a summary of the notification systems used by the 

United States for announcing maritime operational zones to users of the 

oceans and airspace. It gives an overview of the different types of messages, 

such as NOTMAR, HYDROLANT, and Special Warnings, as well as where 

each type of message can be found.

In fulfilling its mission to improve navigation of maritime vessels, the U.S. 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) maintains a Maritime Safety 

Information portal (MSI).4

 This portal allows NGA to consolidate and 

disseminate important navigational safety information to Mariners. 

The MSI Portal provides worldwide coverage of vital information for safe 

navigation. In order to do this, five types of Navigational Warnings, 

categorized by their location, are issued. The first two types of messages, 

NAVAREA IV and NAVAREA XII, fulfill the United States responsibilities 

1 See, e.g., Chicago Convention , Annex 15. Such examples include hazards found or 

created in the territorial seas from oil spills, security around oil platforms in the exclusive 

economic zone, and restrictions in the ADIZ and FIR.

2 The exception to this rule is where states create zones within or overlapping areas of 

another state’s control or responsibility, typically during crisis conditions and armed 

conflict, which are discussed in Chapters 3 through 5.

3 Although this requirement is not specifically stated, it is an implied duty commensurate 

with the obligation to operate with due regard for (a) the safety of navigation and 

overflight of other states’ vessels and aircraft operating on or above the oceans, and (b) the 

interests of those states in the affected ocean regimes. See generally, United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Articles 39(2)(a), 39(3)(a), 56(2), 

58(3), 87(2), 142(1).

4 The MSI portal can be found at http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal.
Appendix A

in the Worldwide Navigational Warning Service (WWNWS), a global radio 

and satellite broadcast system.5 The primary objective of WWNWS is the 

timely promulgation of information of concern to ocean-going navigators, 

including the location of hazardous military operations. In order to facilitate 

the dissemination of information, WWNWS divides the world’s oceans into 

21 Navigation Warning Areas (NAVAREAS). Each NAVAREA has one 

nation designated as the NAVAREA Coordinator, responsible for 

consolidating and disseminating all relevant warnings for that NAVAREA. 

The United States is the NAVAREA Coordinator for NAVAREA IV 

(Western North Atlantic) and NAVAREA XII (Eastern North Pacific). NGA 

acts as the area coordinator, and as such, disseminates all relevant warnings 

for those NAVAREAS. In addition to NAVAREA messages, the U.S. 

maintains worldwide coverage of vital navigational information through the 

HYDROPAC, HYDROLANT, and HYDROARC Long Range Navigation 

Systems. HYDROPAC messages cover those areas of the Pacific Ocean not 

covered by NAVAREA XII, as well as the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, 

Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and continguous areas. HYDROLANT messages 

cover those areas of the Atlantic not covered by NAVAREA IV, as well as 

the North Sea, Baltic Sea, English Channel, Mediterranean Sea, and 

continguous areas. HYDROARC messages cover those arctic areas not 

covered by HYDROLANT or HYDROPAC messages. See the figure below 

for message coverage areas, as well as the other NAVAREA locations and 

their coordinators.6

5 The WWNWS was jointly created in 1977 by the International Hydrographic 

Organization (IHO), an intergovernmental consultative and technical organization 

established to support the safety of navigation and the protection of the marine 

environment (http://www.iho.int) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a 

specialized agency of the UN responsible for the safety and security of shipping and the 

prevention of marine pollution by ships (http://www.imo.org). 

6 For a list of the other NAVAREA coordinators and their corresponding websites, see 

http://www.gmdss.org/navareas.html. 
Appendix A

In addition to Navigation Warnings, which are issued regularly and 

contain information about persons in distress, or objects and events that 

pose an immediate hazard to navigation, Special Warnings to Mariners 

(Special Warnings) and Maritime Administration (MARAD) Advisories 

are occasionally issued and contain information about potential hazards 

caused by global political events. Special Warnings are urgent warnings 

approved by the Department of State to promulgate official U.S. 

Government proclamations affecting navigation and political/military 

incidents that could develop into direct threats to the safety of U.S. 

mariners.7 U.S. forces typically notify the world of dangerous operations 

at sea through Special Warnings.8 The U.S. Maritime Administration also 

periodically issues MARAD Advisories in order to rapidly disseminate 

information on government policy, danger, and safety issues pertaining to 

vessel operations and other timely maritime matters.

The primary dissemination method of NAVAREAS, HYDROS, Special 

Warnings and MARAD Advisories is via radio.9 In addition, NGA 

publishes two Daily Memorandums containing summaries of all Broadcast 

Warnings, including Navigation Warnings and Special Warnings, 

promulgated during the past 24 – 72 hours. The Atlantic Edition Daily 

7 See Appendix B: DoD Directive 5030.57, December 5, 2011

8 Although specific guidance exists which defines the purpose of each type of notification 

discussed above, in practice the U.S. approach to the use of the international notification 

system has been inconsistent with that guidance.

9 See NGA Publication 117, Radio and Navigational Aids.
Appendix A

Memorandum contains HYDROLANT and NAVAREA IV Warnings, 

while the Pacific Edition contains HYDROPAC and NAVAREA XII 

Warnings. Both editions contain Special Warning and HYDROARC 

messages issued during the same time period.

NGA also publishes via the MSI Portal weekly U.S. Notice to Mariners 

(NOTMARs). The NOTMAR provides timely marine safety information 

for the correction of all U.S. government charts and publications from a 

wide variety of sources, both foreign and domestic. The weekly 

NOTMAR also includes a list of all Broadcast Warnings that remain in 

force, as well as texts of those warnings promulgated during the previous 

week. 

Guidance for mariners on how to receive and report warnings via radio is 

contained in NGA Publication 117, Radio and Navigational Aids. Reports 

should be brief, but must contain the information called for in the 

publication. Additionally, mariners are requested to notify NGA of 

discrepancies in charts and publications, using the Marine Information 

Report and Suggestions Sheet found at the end of each published 

NOTMAR. For those items that should be made known immediately, 

mariners can make a report to the U.S. Coast Guard and to foreign 

authorities via radio, TELEX, telephone and fax.

Unique to the Middle East, the Maritime Liason Office, U.S. Naval 

Support Activity, Bahrain (MARLO) facilitates the exchange of 

information between the U.S. Navy and the commercial shipping 

community in the U.S. Central Commands area of responsibility.10

MARLO operates as a conduit for information focused on safety of 

shipping and is committed to assisting the commercial shipping 

community. MARLO publishes Advisory Bulletins on an ad hoc basis to 

notify the community of late-breaking or time-critical developments in 

port entry requirements or U.S. Navy Operations that have a potential 

impact on commercial affairs.

Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) are governed by Federal Aviation Order 

7930.2M,11 and proscribe the procedures used to obtain, format, and 

disseminate information on unanticipated or temporary changes to 

10 More information on MARLO, as well as their published Advisory Bulletins can be 

found at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/marlo/.

11 See Appendix B. Individual states are typically responsible for publishing warnings 

concerning national airspace and adjacent areas of international airspace within the state’s 

Flight Information Regions (FIR) and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ).
Appendix A

components of or hazards in the National Airspace System (NAS) until 

associated aeronautical charts and related publications have been 

amended. NOTAM are published every 28 days by Systems Operations 

Services of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Current NOTAM 

are available by calling 1-800-WX-BRIEF or on the internet at 

https://pilotweb.nas.faa.gov/PilotWeb/. 

NOTAM pertaining to U.S. Air Force, Army, and Navy navigational aids 

that are part of NAS are disseminated in both the civil and Department of 

Defense NOTAM systems. Military NOTAM are governed by Air Force 

Instruction Interservice Publication 11-208.
Appendix B

Notification Procedure Directives

for United States Military Forces

This appendix contains the basic directives, or links to the directives, 

for United States military forces concerning the procedures and 

controlling authorities for publishing notices to the international 

community via Notices to Mariners (NOTMAR), Notices to Airmen 

(NOTAM), HYDROPAC and HYDROLANT messages, and Special 

Warnings to Mariners (Special Warnings).

B- 1
Department of Defense 

INSTRUCTION 

NUMBER 5030.57

December 5, 2011 

USD(I) 

SUBJECT: SUBJECT: Special Warnings to Mariners Special Warnings to Mariners 

References: (a) DoD Directive 5030.57, “Special Warnings to Mariners,” May 3, 1977 

(hereby cancelled) 

References: (a) DoD Directive 5030.57, “Speci

(b) DoD Directive 5143.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

(USD(I)), November 23, 2005 

(c) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of State, Defense, 

Commerce, and the Central Intelligence Agency with Respect to Special 

Warnings to Mariners, July 20, 19761

(c) Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of State, Defense, 

Commerce, and the Central Intelligence Agency with Respect to Special 

Warnings to Mariners, July 20, 19761

1. PURPOSE. This Instruction reissues Reference (a) as a DoD Instruction in accordance with

the authority in Reference (b) to update established policy and assigned responsibilities 

concerning the warning to U.S. mariners of potential political or military hazards affecting U.S. 

shipping in accordance with Reference (c). 

2. APPLICABILITY. This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the 

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD 

Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to 

collectively as the “DoD Components”). 

3. DEFINITIONS. See Glossary.

4. POLICY. It is DoD policy that the implementation of DoD responsibilities for special

warnings to U.S. mariners shall be in accordance with the guidelines and criteria set forth in 

Reference (c). 

5. RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure.

1

https://usdi.dtic.mil/usdi_docs/keyref/dcs/keydocs/2011/MOU%20-

%20DoS%20DoD%20DoC%20CIA%20Special%20Warnings%20to%20Mariners.pdf 

B- 2
DoDI 5030.57, December 5, 2011 

2

6. RELEASABILITY. UNLIMITED. This Instruction is approved for public release and is

available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 

7. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Instruction is effective upon its publication to the DoD Issuances

Website. 

Michael G. Vickers

Under Secretary of Defense 

for Intelligence

Enclosure 

 Responsibilities 

Glossary

B- 3
ENCLOSURE

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)). The USD(I) shall:

a. Have overall responsibility for dissemination of special warnings to U.S. mariners.

b. Represent the DoD in maintaining and updating Reference (c).

2. DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NGA). The

Director, NGA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), shall: 

a. Expeditiously disseminate special warnings.

b. Distribute copies of special warnings to interested agencies.

c. Provide receipt of acknowledgement messages generated by special warnings to the

Maritime Administration on a continual basis. 

3. HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:

a. Ensure information germane to the safety of U.S. mariners is made available to the

Department of State, NGA, and the National Maritime Intelligence Center by the most 

expeditious means. 

b. Ensure that communications related to the safety of U.S. mariners is prefaced with

“Mariner Special Warning Information” to aid in alerting interested parties. 

B- 4
GLOSSARY

PART I. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

USD(I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

PART II. DEFINITIONS

These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction. 

special warnings. A limited series of urgent warnings approved by the Department of State and 

disseminated by the Director, NGA, which disseminate official U.S. Government proclamations 

affecting navigation and political or military incidents that could develop into direct threats to the 

safety of U.S. mariners. 

U.S. mariners. Crewmembers of U.S. flagged merchant ships, U.S. effectively controlled 

merchant ships, research vessels, offshore oil rigs, fishing boats and yachts, and personnel on all 

U.S. naval ships, Army vessels, and other Government-owned ships having been issued a U.S. 

merchant mariner document and the Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping 

certificate issued by the U.S. Coast Guard. 

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BY ORDER OF THE 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, 

ARMY, AND NAVY

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION INTERSERVICE 

PUBLICATION 11-208 ARMY REGULATION 

95-10 OPNAVINST 3721.20D

3 JUNE 2011

Flight Operations

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NOTICE TO 

AIRMEN (NOTAM) SYSTEM

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY 

ACCESSIBILITY: This publication is available digitally on the AFDPO WWW site at: 

http://www.e-publishing.af.mil.

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

OPR: HQ AF/A3O-BN

Supersedes: AFI11-208(I)/AR 95-

10/OPNAVINST 3721.20C, 

1 August 2004 

Certified by: HQ AF/A3/5 

(Mr. Harry C. Disbrow, SES) 

Pages: 27 

This instruction is governed by FAAO JO 7930.2, Notices to Airmen, and implements AFPD 11-

2, Aircraft Flight Rules and Procedures. This is an inter-service publication that applies to 

individuals at all levels including Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard (ANG) with the Air 

Force as the lead service. The Air Force is the single manager of the DoD NOTAM System. The 

DoD NOTAM System disseminates information to aircrews and flight operations personnel 

regarding the establishment, condition, or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure 

or hazard of which the timely knowledge may be critical to safe DoD flight operations. It also 

provides DoD agencies the capability to create NOTAMs via the Internet. The Defense Internet 

NOTAM Service (DINS) is the only authorized site for DoD NOTAM creation and retrieval. 

Records Disposition for Air Force units: Maintain and dispose of records created by prescribed 

processes in accordance with AFRIMS and AFMAN 33-363 and disposed of in accordance with 

services’ records disposition process – in the case of the Air Force in accordance with the Air 

Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/gcsssaf61a/afrims/. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of 

Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of 

Publications; route AF Form 847 from the field through the appropriate chain of command. 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

This document is substantially revised and shall be reviewed in its entirety. Major changes 

include: Chapter 1: Chief and Deputy Chief requirements. Chapter 2: ―X‖ Series NOTAMS, 

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 2 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

Graphical NOTAMS, Domestic and International NOTAMS. Chapter 3: Connectivity and 

Processing Capability. Backup facility requirements. Chapter 4: Information Specifications, 

Authorized Delays, Operations and Firings over the High Seas, Controlled Airspace Outside of 

the US and Bare-Bases Operations, Contingency Operations, Digital Aeronautical Flight 

Information File (DAFIF) Verification. Chapter 5: Online Resources. Minor changes were made 

throughout and include reference updates and editing errors. 

Chapter 1—ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 4

1.1. General Information. .............................................................................................. 4

1.2. Roles and Responsibilities. .................................................................................... 4

Chapter 2—NOTAM CLASSIFICATIONS 11

2.1. What are NOTAMs? .............................................................................................. 11

2.2. NOTAM Classifications. ....................................................................................... 11

Chapter 3—COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS 13

3.1. USNS. .................................................................................................................... 13

3.2. Connectivity. .......................................................................................................... 13

3.3. Processing Capability. ........................................................................................... 13

Chapter 4—STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 15

4.1. System Integrity. .................................................................................................... 15

4.2. DoD NOTAM Qualifications. ............................................................................... 15

4.3. Information Specifications. .................................................................................... 15

4.4. Use of Numbers. .................................................................................................... 15

4.5. Time. ...................................................................................................................... 15

4.6. Q-Codes. ................................................................................................................ 16

Figure 4.1. Q-Codes Example: ................................................................................................. 16

4.7. Duplication Avoidance. ......................................................................................... 16

4.8. Timeliness. ............................................................................................................. 17

4.9. Preventative Maintenance Schedules. .................................................................... 17

4.10. Specific NOTAM Conditions and Criteria. ........................................................... 17

4.11. Overseas Operations. ............................................................................................. 18

4.12. Instrument Procedures and Changes. ..................................................................... 19

4.13. NOTAM Disposition. ............................................................................................ 20

4.14. DAFIF Verification. ............................................................................................... 20

Chapter 5—ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 21

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 3

5.1. Notices to Airmen Publication. .............................................................................. 21

5.2. NOTAM Briefings. ................................................................................................ 21

5.3. International NOTAM Exchange. .......................................................................... 21

5.4. GPS. ....................................................................................................................... 21

5.5. Coordination. ......................................................................................................... 21

5.6. Online Resources. .................................................................................................. 21

Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 22

Attachment 2—SAMPLE NOTAM AUTHORITY BACKUP LETTER OF AGREEMENT 25

Attachment 3—SAMPLE JOINT-USE NOTAM AUTHORITY LETTER OF AGREEMENT 26

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 4 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

Chapter 1 

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

1.1. General Information. The USAF is the executive agent for the DoD NOTAM System. 

The DoD NOTAM Cell (HQ AF/A3O-BN) is located at the FAA Air Traffic Control System 

Command Center (ATCSCC) in Warrenton, VA. It is responsible for overall management of the 

DoD NOTAM System. The DoD NOTAM Cell represents the services in all NOTAM related 

issues. 

1.2. Roles and Responsibilities.

1.2.1. Chief, DoD NOTAM Cell. The Cell Chief shall be a rated AF officer in the grade of 

at least Colonel (O-6) or civilian (GS15) as agreed on by sister services and appointed by HQ 

AF/A3O-B. Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.1.1. Manages the DoD portion of the United States NOTAM System (USNS). 

1.2.1.2. Coordinates directly with domestic, international, and military NOTAM offices, 

as well as aeronautical information services (AIS) offices in order to meet DoD NOTAM 

requirements. 

1.2.1.3. Corresponds with the FAA NOTAM Manager and USNS contractor to protect 

and represent the DoD position. 

1.2.1.4. Ensures the NOTAM system complies with pertinent DoD regulations and 

requirements. 

1.2.1.5. Co-chairs the FAA/DoD Configuration Control Board (CCB), serving as a final 

voting member. 

1.2.1.6. Approves DoD NOTAM system modification requests. 

1.2.1.7. Establishes policy and guidance to maintain NOTAM system integrity. 

1.2.1.8. Ensures standardization of NOTAM products through training, field 

conferences, and briefings. 

1.2.1.9. Exercises operational control of the DoD NOTAM system through management 

of the military coordinators at FAA’s ATCSCC and the DoD European NOTAM Liaison 

Office at Ramstein AB, Germany. 

1.2.1.10. Provides interface for resolution of DoD NOTAM issues. 

1.2.1.11. Implements "flag to deny" procedures when directed by competent authority, 

thereby restricting DoD NOTAM data distribution only to DoD facilities. 

1.2.1.12. Relays critical information to the FAA NOTAM specialists through the FAA 

NOTAM Manager. 

1.2.1.13. Coordinates and monitors furnished communications circuits as required. 

1.2.2. DoD NOTAM Cell HQ AF/A3O-BN. Each service provides senior enlisted 

personnel to serve as military coordinators in the DoD NOTAM Cell. The Deputy Chief of 

the Cell shall be a rated AF officer in the grade of at least Lieutenant Colonel (O-5) or 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 5

civilian (GS13/14). The Deputy Chief shall fill all roles and responsibilities of Chief, DoD 

NOTAM Cell in his/her absence. 

1.2.2.1. DoD NOTAM Cell. Collocated with the FAA’s US NOTAM Office (USNOF), 

DoD NOTAM Cell’s specific responsibilities include:

1.2.2.1.1. Ensures 24-hour NOTAM support to all DoD customers. 

1.2.2.1.2. Responsible to and receives direction from the Chief, DoD NOTAM Cell. 

1.2.2.1.3. Serves as the operational liaison between FAA specialists and DoD users. 

1.2.2.1.4. Creates and maintains DoD tables in the USNS database. 

1.2.2.1.5. Develops DoD unique Q-codes. 

1.2.2.1.6. Establishes new DINS user accounts. 

1.2.2.1.7. Issues and manages DINS system security certificates. 

1.2.2.1.8. Troubleshoots DINS operations and certificate installations. 

1.2.2.1.9. Publishes DoD NOTAMs as directed or required by competent DoD 

authority. 

1.2.2.1.10. Monitors military NOTAMs, performs monthly quality assurance checks, 

and provides guidance to NOTAM Authorities and users. 

1.2.2.1.11. Conducts Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) and comprehensive training, 

briefings, and workshops as required or directed by the Chief, DoD NOTAM Cell. 

1.2.2.1.12. Maintains statistical data on DoD related NOTAM activity. Prepares and 

submits activity reports to appropriate agencies as required. 

1.2.2.1.13. Provides DoD representation on CCBs. 

1.2.2.1.14. Monitors contractor performance, conducts USNS test and acceptance 

procedures, identifies inaccuracies and malfunctions, and suggests performance 

enhancements when warranted. 

1.2.2.1.15. Initiates, reviews, and validates NOTAM system test data. 

1.2.2.1.16. Maintains and updates office FLIP publications as required. 

1.2.2.2. DoD European NOTAM Liaison Office (HQ AF/A3O-BNE). Stationed at 

Ramstein AB, Germany and collocated with National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

(NGA) Europe representatives (providers of Host Nation aeronautical data), the DoD 

European NOTAM office is the in-theater point of contact for all European DoD 

NOTAM-related issues. Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.2.2.1. Ensures 24-hour coverage for European DoD NOTAM customers. 

1.2.2.2.2. Responsible to and receives direction from the Chief, DoD NOTAM Cell. 

1.2.2.2.3. Serves as the DoD’s centralized European, Southwest Asia (SWA), and 

African NOTAM Authority, entering NOTAMs into the USNS as required. 

1.2.2.2.4. Acts as the operational liaison between theater NOTAM Authorities, FAA 

specialists, and international civil and military NOTAM offices. 

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1.2.2.2.5. Recommends DoD tables pertaining to OCONUS stations. 

1.2.2.2.6. Trains in-theater NOTAM Authorities on operations, procedures, and 

NOTAM formats. 

1.2.2.2.7. Performs quality control checks of all NOTAM and products pertaining to 

European area of responsibility (AOR). 

1.2.2.2.8. Monitors the distribution of international military NOTAM information 

over authorized communication circuits. Identifies problems, proposes solutions, and 

coordinates implementation with the Chief, DoD NOTAM Cell. 

1.2.2.2.9. Conducts Staff Assistance Visits (SAVs) and comprehensive training, 

briefings, and workshops as required or directed by the Chief, DoD NOTAM Cell. 

1.2.2.2.10. Produces and distributes exercise and contingency NOTAM products 

when required under the direction of the Chief, DoD NOTAM Cell. 

1.2.2.2.11. Maintains statistical data on DoD related NOTAM activity. Prepares and 

submits activity reports as required to appropriate agencies. 

1.2.2.2.12. Maintains and updates office FLIP publications as required. 

1.2.3. US Army (USA) Operations.

1.2.3.1. US Army Aeronautical Services Agency (HQ USAASA). Located at Fort 

Belvoir, VA, HQ USAASA serves as the Army’s responsible officer for the NOTAM 

system and central coordinating authority, providing specific policy and guidance to 

Army units on NOTAM matters worldwide. HQ USAASA determines Army specific 

NOTAM requirements and coordinates with other services and government agencies in 

the operation of the NOTAM system. HQ USAASA provides the Army representative to 

the DoD NOTAM office. 

1.2.3.2. US Army Aeronautical Services Detachment – Europe (USAASD-E). Located at 

Heidelberg, Germany, USAASD-E is a regional extension for operations in Europe, 

Africa, and the Middle East. Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.3.2.1. Provides technical assistance on airspace, ATC, aeronautical information, 

and NAVAIDs. 

1.2.3.2.2. Responsible for all US Army instrument procedures and NOTAM 

authority for Procedural NOTAMs (―V‖ Series) within AOR.

1.2.3.2.3. Official Army liaison and representative to the FAA in Europe. 

1.2.3.3. Army Flight Operations Detachment (AFOD). Located at Heidelberg, Germany, 

AFOD NOTAM Section serves as the Army’s centralized European NOTAM Authority. 

Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.3.3.1. The AFOD NOTAM section submits flight safety NOTAMs for U.S. 

AAF/AHP into the USNS through the German Military NOTAM Office. AFOD local 

NOTAMs are entered directly into the USNS. 

1.2.3.3.2. NOTAM request for Army Special Use Airspace in Germany will be handled 

by AFOD NOTAM section. 

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1.2.3.3.3. Produces US Army-Europe unique NOTAMs and non-NOTAM 

aeronautical information products that can be viewed on the European Theater section 

of DINS Query website. 

1.2.3.3.4. Under National Agreement 127 (NAT-127), the FAA provides Instrument 

Procedure development services to the Army. Contact USAASA/IP or USAASD-E 

with Instrument Procedure requests or questions. 

1.2.4. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). Located at Mail Stop L-27 3838 

Vogel Road, Arnold, MO 63010-6238, NGA uses a combination of military directives, host 

country Aeronautical Information Publications (AIP) and imagery to produce Flight 

Information Publications (FLIP) for the DoD. Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.4.1. Processes DoD requirements for new or modified FLIP products. 

1.2.4.2. Evaluates navigational and related operational data submissions to determine if 

NOTAM action is required. 

1.2.4.3. Publishes ―W‖ Series NOTAMs to maintain the accuracy of DAFIF and/or FLIP 

products when out of cycle changes are made by an official Aeronautical Information 

Service or NOTAM Office. 

1.2.4.4. Provides one copy of DAFIF to DINS through early distribution. 

1.2.4.5. Notifies the NOTAMs Division of any errors or omissions in NOTAM data. 

1.2.5. Pacific Theater (USAF). Within the Pacific theater, each USAF Numbered Air 

Force (NAF) with an Airfield Operations (AO) Subject Matter Expert (SME) will handle 

NOTAM-related issues within their respective AOR. If a NAF does not have an AO SME, 

contact HQ PACAF/A3OA. 

1.2.6. Service Lead Organizations. USAF (HQ AF/A3O-AA), USA (HQ USAASA), USN 

(CNO, N887). Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.6.1. Coordinates service specific NOTAM requirements with other services and 

government agencies. 

1.2.6.2. Acts as central coordinating authority and provides service specific guidance to 

its respective units on NOTAM matters. 

1.2.6.3. Responsible for NOTAM system personnel requirements. 

1.2.6.4. Establishes, develops, and manages NOTAM system procedures and operations 

at its locations. 

1.2.7. Component Commanders. Component Commanders shall coordinate with the 

proper agencies to ensure the INO issues NOTAMs concerning increased or unusual air or 

surface-to-air activities associated with military exercises or operations over the high seas, 

international airspace, or host nation airspace. 

1.2.8. Major Commands. MAJCOMs (USAF), ACOMs (USA), MARFORs (USMC), and 

TYCOMs (USN). Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.8.1. Ensures aircrews have NOTAM access. 

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 8 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

1.2.8.2. Coordinates NOTAM requirements with each service through HQ AFFSA, HQ 

USAASA, or CNO (N887) as needed. Ensures NOTAM processing is always accessible. 

1.2.8.3. Issues NOTAM requests to INOs of affected area(s) when military operations, 

exercises, or maneuvers are not under the jurisdiction of a component commander. 

1.2.8.4. Ensures each aviation commander complies with this instruction by ensuring 

aircrews have access to current NOTAM material and DINS website. 

1.2.8.5. USAF processes FAA Chart Change Procedure (CCP) NOTAMs for FAA 

Instrument Procedures developed for the USAF IAW FAAO 8260.32. 

1.2.8.6. The respective Service Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) branch will 

submit and maintain NOTAMs for Foreign Terminal Instrument Procedures (FTIP) 

published in DoD FLIP (Terminal). 

1.2.9. Airfield Facility Manager. Airfield Manager (USAF); post, installation, garrison, 

airfield (AAF), or heliport commander (AHP) (USA); Airfield Operations Officer (USMC); 

and Air Operations Officer (USN). Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.9.1. Ensures NOTAM Authorities receive the funding necessary to perform their 

duties and that aircrews can access NOTAM data. 

1.2.9.2. Ensures knowledgeable personnel are available to assist aircrews with 

NOTAMs. 

1.2.9.3. Ensures NOTAMs are drafted, transmitted, and coordinated according to 

applicable instructions. 

1.2.9.3.1. Joint-use aerodromes: 

1.2.9.3.1.1. Collaborates with civilian counterparts to establish a letter of 

agreement (LOA) that specifies NOTAM authoring, handling, and coordination 

responsibilities (see 4.7.4). Attachment 3 shows a sample LOA. 

1.2.9.3.1.2. Ensures all NOTAMs are submitted and coordinated in accordance 

with procedures established in the LOA. 

1.2.9.3.2. OCONUS stations: 

1.2.9.3.2.1. Tenant on host nation military aerodromes. Ensures a LOA with host 

nation is on file that specifically grants DoD the authority to create DINS 

NOTAMs and delineates coordination responsibilities. Note: AIPs, status of 

forces agreements, host nation agreements, and/or LOAs establish host nation 

NOTAM procedures. In most cases, host nation retains safety NOTAM authority 

for aerodromes. 

1.2.9.3.2.2. Ensures host nation military or civil NOTAM offices are informed of 

station’s current DINS NOTAMs.

1.2.9.3.2.3. Shall crosscheck and validate host nation and DINS NOTAMs to 

identify and correct discrepancies. Note: Host nation NOTAMs may not display 

in DINS (see 5.3). For distribution problems and other issues that require hostnation coordination, contact the DoD European NOTAM Office or DoD NOTAM 

Cell. 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 9

1.2.9.4. Coordinates with the air traffic control (ATC) facility chief/officer on procedures 

for issuing NOTAMs on NAVAIDs or facilities that ATC controls or monitors. 

1.2.9.5. Ensures NOTAMs are classified IAW Chapter 4, e.g., ―M‖ Series: Flight Safety, 

―L‖ Series: Local, and ―V‖ Series: Procedural NOTAMs.

1.2.9.6. Establishes and maintains connectivity to the USNS. 

1.2.9.6.1. Takes necessary actions to accurately process and publish NOTAMs. 

1.2.9.6.2. Establishes and maintains a LOA with another DoD installation to provide 

backup NOTAM support. 

1.2.9.7. Monitors all NOTAMs, military and civil, that correspond to airfields and 

airspace under their jurisdiction for accuracy and validity. 

1.2.9.8. Reviews and determines accuracy of base specific publications, charts, and other 

products for their area of responsibility, correcting discrepancies via NOTAM. 

1.2.9.9. Retains base specific and other associated NOTAM data in accordance with 

applicable service regulations following aircraft accidents or incidents. 

1.2.9.10. Contacts the DoD NOTAM Cell to resolve problems with NOTAM procedures. 

Contact information can be located on the DINS website (https://www.notams.jcs.mil).

1.2.9.11. Periodically checks DINS website for system and procedural changes 

(https://www.notams.jcs.mil).

1.2.10. NOTAM Authority. NOTAM Authorities are units or offices that are authorized to 

originate NOTAMs. Specific responsibilities include: 

1.2.10.1. Drafts, transmits, and coordinates NOTAMs according to applicable 

instructions. 

1.2.10.1.1. Joint-use aerodromes: Submits and coordinates NOTAMs in accordance 

with procedures established in the LOA. 

1.2.10.1.2. OCONUS station: 

1.2.10.1.2.1. Tenant on host nation military aerodromes. Host nation authorities 

are the NOTAM Authority for safety NOTAMs unless a LOA is on file that 

allows DoD to issue safety NOTAMs. 

1.2.10.1.2.2. Informs host nation military or civil NOTAM offices of station’s 

current DoD NOTAMs. 

1.2.10.1.2.3. Crosschecks and validates host nation and DINS NOTAMs to 

identify and correct discrepancies. 

1.2.10.2. Contacts DoD NOTAM Cell to resolve problems with NOTAM procedures. 

Note: For NOTAM assistance, forward deployed Army units in Europe, Africa, and 

Middle East should contact USAASD-E at DSN: (314) 373-5600 or the DoD European 

NOTAM Office at DSN: (314) 480-8092/7257 or email: 

europ.notam@ramstein.af.mil; all other OCONUS based Army units should contact 

DoD NOTAM Cell: DSN: (510) 422-4757/58/59. 

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 10 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

1.2.10.3. Cancels active NOTAMs when the condition no longer exists or NGA 

publishes the information in the FLIP. 

1.2.10.4. Ensures disposition and accuracy of authored NOTAMs. 

1.2.10.5. Monitors all NOTAMs—military and civil—that correspond to airfields, 

NAVAIDs and radars, and airspace under their jurisdiction for accuracy and currency. 

1.2.10.6. Ensures NOTAMs are classified correctly, e.g., ―M‖ Series: Flight Safety, ―L‖ 

Series: Local, and ―V‖ Series: Procedural NOTAMs.

1.2.10.7. Establishes and maintains connectivity to the USNS. 

1.2.10.8. Verifies the accuracy of Graphical NOTAMs when DAFIF information 

changes. 

1.2.10.9. Checks DINS website for system and procedural changes prior to assuming 

NOTAM Authority duties; notifies the Airfield Facility Manager of applicable changes. 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 11

Chapter 2 

NOTAM CLASSIFICATIONS 

2.1. What are NOTAMs? NOTAMs are unclassified notices or advisories distributed by 

means of telecommunication that contain information concerning the establishment, conditions 

or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the timely knowledge of 

which is essential to personnel and systems concerned with flight operations. 

2.2. NOTAM Classifications. NOTAMs are classified as Military, Domestic, International, 

and FDC: 

2.2.1. Military NOTAMs.

2.2.1.1. DESC NOTAM (―F‖ Series). Defense Energy Support Center issues ―F‖ Series 

NOTAMs for OCONUS locations concerning fuel availability for DoD users. 

2.2.1.2. Local NOTAM (―L‖ Series). Local NOTAMs usually promulgate non-critical 

related information. Airfield Facility Manager shall establish the parameters for 

classifying local NOTAMs. 

2.2.1.3. Flight Safety NOTAM (―M‖ Series). Flight Safety NOTAMs promulgate safety 

related information that is critical for safety of flight, such as aerodrome closures, runway 

closures, or changes in NAVAID availability. 

2.2.1.4. Procedural NOTAM (―V‖ Series). Procedural NOTAMs promulgate information 

concerning published instrument procedures, such as Standard Instrument Approach 

Procedure (SIAPs), Standard Instrument Departure (SID), Standard Terminal Arrival 

Route (STAR), and Departure Procedure (DP). 

2.2.1.5. DAFIF and/or FLIP Change NOTAMs (―W‖ Series). DAFIF and/or FLIP 

Change NOTAMs promulgate changes in DoD FLIP products that provide data/digital 

data for worldwide flight operations. 

2.2.1.6. ―X‖ Series. Reserved for DoD NOTAM Cell use only.

2.2.1.7. Graphical NOTAMs. Graphical NOTAMs allow NOTAM Authorities to create 

―M‖ and ―L‖ Series NOTAMs that disseminate like existing NOTAMs and also depict 

NOTAM information graphically on the airport diagram. Note: At OCONUS locations, 

the Graphical NOTAM tool is only available at locations that have host nation approval 

to process NOTAMs through DINS. 

2.2.1.8. Attention Notices. DoD NOTAM Cell and select other agencies, under the 

direction of competent military authority, promulgate regulatory and advisory Attention 

Notices by theater or under the general "ALL" category, i.e., ATTA (All), ATTC 

(Caribbean), ATTE (European), ATTN (North America), and ATTP (Pacific). 

2.2.2. Domestic NOTAMs (Civil).

2.2.2.1. NOTAM D. FAA issued NOTAMs that promulgate flight safety information 

concerning the NAS, NAS NAVAIDs, as well as all public use airports, seaplane bases, 

and heliports listed in the Airport/Facility Directory. 

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 12 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

2.2.2.2. Pointer NOTAM. FSS issued NOTAMs that highlight or ―point out‖ other, 

potentially obscure NOTAMs, e.g., FDC or PJE NOTAMs. Pointer NOTAMs assist users 

in cross-referencing important information that may not be found under an airport or 

NAVAID identifier. 

2.2.3. International NOTAMs (Civil).

2.2.3.1. International NOTAM (―A‖ Series). USNOF issues international NOTAMs to 

partner INOs concerning NOTAM D information at major international airports; 

OMEGA, LORAN, and GPS systems; and certain airspace NOTAMs; e.g., ARTCC and 

CARF altitude reservations (ALTRVs) and warning area information. In addition, 

USNOF issues international NOTAMs for select overseas locations and NAVAIDs when 

directed by competent authority. 

2.2.3.2. International NOTAM from Foreign Sources. INOs issue NOTAMs to the 

USNOF using guidance published in the general section of each country’s AIP. 

OCONUS stations may be required to provide and review specific country NOTAM 

Series. 

2.2.4. FDC NOTAM (Civil). USNOF issues FDC NOTAMs, which promulgate regulatory 

information. Examples of FDC NOTAMs include: interim IFR flight procedures, Instrument 

Approach Procedure (IAP) changes, temporary flight restrictions, flight restrictions in the 

proximity of the President and other parties, 14 CFR Part 139 certificated airport condition 

changes, snow conditions affecting glideslope operation, air defense emergencies, emergency 

flight rules, substitute airway routes, special data, US Government charting corrections, and 

laser activity. 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 13

Chapter 3 

COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS 

3.1. USNS. In 1988, FAA and DoD combined the NOTAM systems into a single infrastructure 

that receive, store, and display military, international, and domestic NOTAMs. Today, this 

system is called the USNS. 

3.1.1. FAA. The FSSs and ARTCCs access NOTAMs through FAA Domestic NOTAM 

Systems. 

3.1.2. DoD accesses the USNS through DINS, which allows authorized users the ability to 

Create, Cancel, or Replace (CCR) NOTAMs via NIPRNet and lets all users query NOTAM 

data via the NIPRNet/Internet. The DoD NOTAM Cell is only responsible for DINS 

NOTAM data. 

3.2. Connectivity. DINS is the only authorized DoD avenue for military NOTAM creation and 

the primary means of NOTAM retrieval. In addition to DINS Query, all DoD base and flight 

operations facilities shall have the ability to CCR NOTAMs. 

3.2.1. NOTAM Accounts and Passwords. In order to create NOTAMs, units shall establish 

an authority account and request a certificate from the DoD NOTAM Cell. NOTAM 

Authorities shall ensure the security of the assigned username and password required to CCR 

NOTAMs. 

3.2.2. Encryption Certificates. DoD NOTAM Cell issues encryption certificates in order to 

prevent unauthorized access to USNS databases. Certificates are valid for one year. Airfield 

Facility Managers should limit certificates to those who regularly author NOTAMs. DINS 

CCR Training Guide details the certificate requisition and installation process. 

3.3. Processing Capability. After system connectivity is established, units may connect to 

either DINS primary or secondary site via their primary or secondary computer, or by using a 

non-LAN dependent computer. 

3.3.1. Primary and Secondary DINS Query sites (https://www.notams.jcs.mil and 

https://www.notams.faa.gov) allow users and NOTAM Authorities to query NOTAMs, link 

to CCR sites, request and install NOTAM certificates, download DINS CCR Training Guide 

and instruction, view DINS updates, as well as link to various FAA and DoD-related 

websites. 

3.3.2. Primary and Secondary DINS CCR sites (https://www.dinsccr.notams.jcs.mil/ccr/ 

and https://www.dinsccr.notams.faa.gov/ccr/) allow NOTAM Authorities to CCR 

NOTAMs. 

3.3.3. Alternate Computer. Units should have a second computer with the appropriate 

encryption certificate available for NOTAM processing. 

3.3.4. Backup Facility Procedures: Units shall have a LOA on file with a backup facility to 

act as NOTAM Authority surrogate in case of extended outages or facility closures, thereby 

allowing for uninterrupted NOTAM coverage. Any DoD service may act as a backup facility; 

Airfield Facility Managers should choose a backup facility that is in different geographic 

B- 24
 14 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

location and accessible around the clock. USNOF should only be used as an emergency back 

up. Attachment 2 shows a sample LOA. 

3.3.5. Processing Difficulty. Units experiencing NOTAM processing difficulty should 

attempt the following troubleshooting steps: 

3.3.5.1. Ensure user’s browser has a valid certificate.

3.3.5.2. Attempt accessing both primary and secondary sites, using a secondary 

computer if necessary. 

3.3.5.3. Contact the base communication help desk to ensure base network is functioning 

correctly, e.g., LAN is available, firewall settings have not been modified, etc. 

3.3.5.4. If DINS connectivity is lost for an untenable amount of time, units shall 

coordinate with their designated backup facility to process NOTAMs as required (see

3.3.4).

3.3.5.5. If DINS is the only website that is down and if the preceding steps do not 

provide resolution, contact the DoD NOTAM Cell. 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 15

Chapter 4 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 

4.1. System Integrity. The following requirements are essential for information integrity and 

optimal performance of the DoD/FAA’s NOTAM system; compliance is mandatory.

4.2. DoD NOTAM Qualifications. NOTAMs shall be: 

4.2.1. A hazard to flight safety or may limit military flight operations. 

4.2.2. Published or qualify for publication in FLIP. 

4.2.3. More restrictive than the information published in FLIP. 

4.2.4. Under the jurisdiction of the NOTAM Authority. 

4.2.5. Temporary in nature, not exceeding 90 days. When conditions warrant a longer 

period, initiate required changes to the appropriate FLIP product as soon as practical and 

request reissue of NOTAM. Ensure the NOTAM is cancelled when the changes are published 

correctly in the FLIP. 

4.3. Information Specifications.

4.3.1. Q-Codes are used to standardize format of NOTAMs and, with the exception of ―L‖ 

Series, shall be used when drafting NOTAMs. 

4.3.2. NOTAMs shall not exceed 20 lines or 1500 characters in one part. 

4.3.3. Instrument and Microwave Landing Systems. Always use runway designation when 

transmitting ILS and MLS system NOTAMs. Do not NOTAM changes of 0.2 degrees or less 

from the published glideslope. 

4.3.4. Airfield Lighting Facilities. Follow appropriate service guidelines for issuing airfield 

lighting NOTAMs. 

4.3.5. Service Facilities. NOTAM servicing delays only if Airfield Facility Manager 

determines that such delays would impact operations significantly. If sent, NOTAMs should 

specify service and extent of delay. 

4.3.6. Explanations. Reasons as to why a NOTAM condition exists are optional and at the 

discretion of the Airfield Facility Manager. 

4.4. Use of Numbers.

4.4.1. Altitude shall be expressed in feet or established flight level (FL) relative to mean sea 

level (MSL), e.g., 1700 MSL, FL70, and FL550. Specify AGL only when MSL altitudes are 

not known or available, e.g., 500 AGL. 

4.4.2. Latitude and longitude coordinates shall be expressed in degrees and, if necessary, 

minutes, e.g., 39N077E or 3910N07751E. 

4.5. Time. NOTAM times shall be expressed in coordinated universal time (UTC) and 

indicated to the nearest minute. The day begins at 0000 hours and ends at 2359 hours. ―With 

Immediate Effect (WEF or WIE)‖ and ―Until Further Notice (UFN)‖ shall not be used as 

B- 26
 16 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

condition effective/expiration times in DINS. Similarly, 0000 is not a valid condition expiration 

time. 

4.6. Q-Codes. The Q-Code is a five-letter NOTAM code that standardizes subject and 

condition text by converting the respective codes into plain language. If a Q-Code exists for a 

specific subject and condition being addressed in a Flight Safety NOTAM, use it (see example 

below). When the subject/condition text does not exist/apply, complete the Q-code text with 

"QXXXX." DINS and CCR web sites both have comprehensive Q-Code listings. 

Figure 4.1. Q-Codes Example: 

4.6.1. Additional Condition Text. In order to increase clarity, NOTAM Authorities should 

use amplifying information to augment Q-Codes, such as geographical coordinates, 

frequencies, and runways. Note: When using free text, NOTAM Authorities should use 

both plain language and ICAO approved contractions outlined in FAAO JO 7340.2 to clearly 

express NOTAM conditions. NOTAM Authorities shall not use contractions in a way that 

undermines readability or causes confusion. 

4.6.2. Derived Q-Codes. The Derived Q-Code function allows units to select predefined QCode combinations to populate the NOTAM Q-line. Q-Code static listing may be used as a 

guideline to determine NOTAM classification. 

4.6.3. Smart Agents. Computer ―smart agents‖ query the NOTAM system for specific 

conditions, Q-Codes, or NOTAM Series. Accordingly, units shall use correct Q-Codes and 

NOTAM Series to classify their condition. 

4.7. Duplication Avoidance.

4.7.1. Do not issue NOTAMs to advertise data already published or charted correctly in such 

media as FLIPS or the FAA Notice to Airmen Publication (NTAP). 

4.7.2. Use the NOTAM system to obtain, format, and disseminate unanticipated or 

temporary changes to airfield or airspace hazards. 

4.7.3. Publish a NOTAM when changes occur rapidly and time does not permit issuing 

notice via FLIP chart or appropriate publication. NOTAMs should display temporary 

conditions which should be corrected before the next FLIP publishing date. 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 17

4.7.4. At joint-use aerodromes, Airfield Facility Managers shall collaborate with civilian 

counterparts to establish a LOA that specifies NOTAM authoring, handling, and coordination 

responsibilities. The LOA should direct that NOTAM conditions that affect both civil and 

military users (e.g., RWY and TWY closures, NAVAID outages, changes to Aerodrome 

status, etc.) be issued as civil NOTAMs. Conversely, NOTAM conditions that affect only 

military users (e.g., OLS outages, drag chute operations, LOX availability, etc.) should be 

issued via DINS and coordinated with the civilian Airport Manager. All told, duplication of 

NOTAMs shall be avoided as much as possible. (A sample LOA is contained at Attachment 

3.) 

4.7.5. When necessary, TERPS Authorities shall collaborate with appropriate sister service 

and civilian counterparts to ensure that NOTAM authoring, handling, and coordination 

responsibilities are clearly delineated for joint use and overseas locations. 

4.8. Timeliness. Timeliness of NOTAM information is critical to flight safety. New NOTAM 

information with an immediate effectiveness shall be coordinated and submitted within 15 

minutes of receipt or discovery. Exception: TERPS personnel may require additional time to 

safely coordinate procedural NOTAMS. 

4.8.1. NOTAM Transmission. NOTAMs shall be submitted no earlier than 3 days prior to 

the expected condition. 

4.8.2. Authorized Delays. NOTAM Authorities may delay transmitting NOTAMs 

concerning NAVAIDs for up to 1 hour and radars for up to 30 minutes, provided the 

aerodrome meets the following conditions: 

4.8.2.1. During daylight hours. 

4.8.2.2. At least 3000 foot ceiling. 

4.8.2.3. At least 5 statute miles visibility. 

4.9. Preventative Maintenance Schedules. Preventative maintenance schedules normally 

should be promulgated via FLIP. Airfield Facility Managers shall coordinate preventative 

maintenance schedules affecting NAVAIDs and radars that are a part of the National Airspace 

System (NAS) with the appropriate FSS and affected facilities with at least 5 hours prior notice. 

4.10. Specific NOTAM Conditions and Criteria. Conditions affecting the NAS shall be 

promulgated to civilian and DoD users via the appropriate NOTAM system. FAAO JO 7930.2 

details NOTAM origination and coordination responsibilities for NOTAMs that fall outside of 

DINS’ purview. The following procedures shall be adhered to:

4.10.1. Special Operations. Special operations, such as Aerial Refueling, Parachute 

Jumping/Sky Diving (PJE), Lights Out/Night Vision Device (NVD) Operations in a MOA, 

Unmanned Aircraft Operations, and flight demonstrations, shall be issued by the appropriate 

FAA facility IAW FAAO JO 7930.2. 

4.10.2. Special Use Airspace (SUA). FAAO JO 7400.2, Procedures for Handling Airspace 

Matters, describes the various types of SUA in the NAS and FAAO JO 7400.8, Special Use 

Airspace, details the legal definition of all SUA. NOTAMs for SUA shall be processed IAW 

FAAO JO 7930.2. 

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4.10.3. NAS NAVAIDs. Changes in the status of NAVAIDs that make up the NAS shall be 

promulgated through the FAA via civil NOTAMs. Airfield Facility Managers, at locations 

with NAVAIDs and radars that are part of the NAS, shall coordinate civil NOTAM issuance 

with the tie-in FSS IAW FAAO JO 7930.2. If necessary, a replicating ―M‖ Series NOTAM 

may also be issued via DINS. 

4.10.4. Surface Area Hours of Operation. For facilities whose surface area is listed as part 

time in the Airport/Facility Directory (AFD) (e.g., Class D part of the time; Class G another), 

changes in the hours of operation of surface areas require a civil NOTAM. Airfield Facility 

Managers shall coordinate civil NOTAM issuance with tie-in FSS IAW FAAO JO 7930.2. 

Example: The normal operating hours for NAS Key West, FL (KNQX) are 1200-0300 UTC. 

In order to accommodate aircraft operations, the aerodrome and Class D surface area will 

remain open an additional two hours. This scenario requires sending two NOTAMs. First, a 

DINS ―M‖ Series NOTAM shall be sent stating ―AERODROME HOURS OF SERVICE 

ARE...‖ (Q-Code: QFAAH). Second, a civil NOTAM changing the hours of the Class D 

surface area from 0300 to 0500 UTC shall be sent via the FSS. Note: Continuously active 

surface areas (e.g., Class D is always active) cannot be changed by NOTAM action, only 

rulemaking. 

4.11. Overseas Operations.

4.11.1. Host Nation Territory. In order to request NOTAM issuance for activities within 

non-DoD controlled international airspace, using agencies shall submit NOTAM requests to 

the ATS/controlling agency (e.g., ACC/FIR) for the affected airspace at least two weeks prior 

to the scheduled activity. This lead time permits timely promulgation of information in 

accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 15. INOs normally issue NOTAMs 48 to 72 

hours prior to the activity. 

4.11.2. Operations and Firings over the High Seas. Activities that present a hazard to air 

navigation and safety of nonparticipants require coordination with the appropriate ATS 

and/or controlling agency for potential deconfliction and, if necessary, NOTAM issuance. 

Component Commanders shall ensure proper coordination is accomplished (see 1.2.7). DoD 

FLIP General Planning and DODINST 4540.01 detail policy and procedures for ―Operations 

and Firings over the High Seas.‖ Specific NOTAM requirements are as follows:

4.11.2.1. Activities occurring within correctly scheduled SUA parameters (time and 

boundaries) do not require NOTAM issuance. 

4.11.2.2. Activities occurring outside scheduled SUA parameters (time and boundaries) 

require NOTAM issuance. Using agencies shall coordinate NOTAM issuance with the 

affected ATS/controlling agency. Note: Using agencies should coordinate with 

appropriate Component Commander if the ATS/controlling agency coordination 

procedures in either 4.11.1 or 4.11.2 are not clear. 

4.11.3. Controlled Airspace Outside of the US and Bare-Base Operations. Coordinate 

with HQ AF/A3O-BNE for European Theater operations, as appropriate, to establish the 

temporary authorization to process NOTAMs for locations listed in the enroute supplement 

but are not covered by the USNS, or for unpublished locations (aerodromes, highways used 

for landing, perforated steel planking strips, etc.). 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 19

4.11.3.1. The European NOTAM office hours are Monday – Friday, 0500Z –

1500Z+1(+2DT). Standby personnel process NOTAMs on weekends and holidays. 

4.11.3.2. Locations requiring international dissemination of NOTAMs as directed by HQ 

AF/A3O-BNE shall coordinate NOTAMs as follows: 

4.11.3.2.1. During European NOTAM Office Duty Hours (for Urgent and NonUrgent NOTAMs): Units shall provide the following NOTAM information to the 

European NOTAM Office via DSN (314) 480-8092/7257 or email at 

europ.notam@ramstein.af.mil: 

4.11.3.2.1.1. Four-Letter ICAO Identifier. 

4.11.3.2.1.2. Start Date and Time (UTC). 

4.11.3.2.1.3. Expiration Date and Time (UTC). 

4.11.3.2.1.4. Schedule (if applicable, e.g., 0400 – 1800 DAILY; 8, 10, 12 FEB; 

Every FRI, etc.). 

4.11.3.2.1.5. NOTAM Text, e.g., ―TWY F CLOSED DUE TO 

CONSTRUCTION,‖ or ―RWY 7/25 CLOSED DUE TO NUMEROUS HOLES

ON THE RWY.‖

4.11.3.2.1.6. Additional information as appropriate. 

4.11.3.2.1.7. Requestor’s name and telephone number.

4.11.3.2.2. During European NOTAM Office Non-Duty Hours (for Urgent 

NOTAMs): Units shall e-mail the USNOF with the NOTAM information indicated in 

paragraph 4.11.3.2.1.1 – 4.11.3.2.1.7 at 9-awa-notams@faa.gov; verify e-mail 

receipt at commercial: (540) 422-4260/61/62/63 or DSN: (510) 422-4757/58/59. 

4.11.3.2.3. During European NOTAM Office Non-Duty Hours (for Non-Urgent 

NOTAMs): Units shall transmit NOTAM via DINS and email the NOTAM 

information indicated in paragraph 4.11.3.2.1.1 – 4.11.3.2.1.7 to the European 

NOTAM Office. 

4.11.3.2.4. The European NOTAM Office and/or the USNOF will issue an ―A‖ 

Series NOTAM. Note: Once the ―A‖ Series NOTAM appears under the location’s 

ICAO within DINS, units shall cancel corresponding ―M‖ Series NOTAM.

4.11.4. Contingency Operations. During contingency operations, the Task Force 

Commander (US Army) takes overall control over operations and subsequent NOTAM 

issuance. Task Force Commanders may delegate control over air assets and pertinent 

NOTAM issuance to the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC [USAF]). 

Working together, these authorities shall designate NOTAM authorities necessary to issue 

NOTAMs on foreign airfields, airspace, and territory. 

4.12. Instrument Procedures and Changes. Establishing new instrument/radar approaches or 

making changes to existing instrument/radar approaches may require publishing procedural data 

temporarily via NOTAM. Airfield Facility Managers or authorized TERPS personnel shall 

adhere to the following: 

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4.12.1. Promulgate procedural changes only through ―V‖ Series NOTAMs and under the 

direction of TERPS personnel. 

4.12.2. When TERPS office is detached from the Airfield Facility Manager, TERPS 

personnel shall coordinate ―V‖ Series NOTAMs with the Airfield Facility Manager so that 

appropriate local coordination can be accomplished. 

4.12.3. Publish instrument procedures for aerodromes covered by the DoD NOTAM system 

only when waiting for the normal FLIP publication cycle would negatively impact flight 

operations. Instrument procedures shall meet the requirements of AFI 11-230, AR 95-2, or 

OPNAVINST 3722.16. 

4.12.4. Procedural changes made to published approaches shall be more restrictive than 

existing procedures, necessary for safety, and meet criteria set forth in FAAO 8260.3 or 

appropriate service TERPS directive. 

4.12.5. ―V‖ Series NOTAMs shall identify the exact procedure by name. If two or more 

minima values change in any aircraft category, the NOTAM shall state the entire minima 

4.13. NOTAM Disposition. Airfield Facility Managers shall retain NOTAM transmission 

forms for 15 days after NOTAM expiration. If an accident or incident occurs, retain forms with 

the same disposition as historical documents. 

4.14. DAFIF Verification. When DAFIF data is changed, which occurs on a 28-day cycle, 

NOTAM Authorities shall verify the accuracy of graphical NOTAMs to ensure their validity. 

CCR Guide details proper verification procedures. 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 21

Chapter 5 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

5.1. Notices to Airmen Publication. Published every 28 days, this FAA publication 

promulgates current NOTAMs that are considered essential to the safety of flight and known 

sufficiently in advance to be published in this format. 

5.2. NOTAM Briefings. USNS Specialists, which include both DoD Coordinators and FAA 

personnel, do not provide aircrew NOTAM briefings. Likewise, aircrews do not receive FAA 

Notice to Airmen Publication information or military NOTAMs from FSS briefers unless 

specifically requested during weather and NOTAM briefings. 

5.3. International NOTAM Exchange. USNOF exchanges NOTAM data with partner INOs 

throughout the world. While DINS pulls and promulgates all NOTAMs received by the USNS, 

DINS users need to be aware that USNS may not have received all NOTAMs for a specific 

location, which—in turn—could affect DINS coverage. Accordingly, users should check host 

nation for supplementary NOTAM information to better ensure complete NOTAM coverage. 

5.4. GPS. GPS availability NOTAMs, e.g., ―GPS ONLY NPA NOT AVBL FROM 29 MAY 

1500 TIL 29 MAY 1520,‖ appear under location identifiers where GPS approaches are currently 

available. GPS NOTAMs are computer generated, self-canceling, and require no action from 

Airfield Facility Managers. 

5.5. Coordination. Submit aeronautical data affecting FAA publications or airspace to the FAA 

through the responsible military authority. 

5.6. Online Resources. DINS Query site (https://www.notams.jcs.mil) provides detailed, upto-date resources, such as instructions, training manuals and tutorials, which are invaluable in 

maximizing DINS’ robust features. To better ensure a NOTAM Authority’s familiarity with 

these features, Airfield Facility Mangers should integrate these materials into their respective 

training syllabi and check for subject matter mastery prior to qualification. 

HERBERT J. CARLISLE, Lt Gen, USAF 

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and 

Requirements 

DEBORAH A. RICHARDSON, Col, USA 

USAASA Commander 

BRETT K. EASLER, CAPT, USN 

Chief Naval Airspace and Air Traffic Control 

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Attachment 1 

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

ACC—Area Control Center 

AFFSA—Air Force Flight Service Agency 

AFOD—Army Flight Operations Detachment 

AFRIMS—Air Force Records Information Management System 

ALTRV—Altitude Reservation 

ARTCC—Air Route Traffic Control Center 

ATC—Air Traffic Control 

ATS—Air Traffic Services 

ATTA—Attention All 

ATTC—Attention Caribbean 

ATTE—Attention Europe 

ATTN—Attention North America 

ATTP—Attention Pacific 

ATZ—Aerodrome Traffic Zone 

AUTODIN—Automatic Digital Network 

CARF—Central Altitude Reservation Function 

DAFIF—Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File 

DESC—Defense Energy Support Center 

DINS—Defense Internet NOTAM Service 

DoD—Department of Defense 

DP—Departure Procedures 

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration 

FDC—Flight Data Center 

FIR—Flight Information Region 

FLIP—Flight Information Publication 

FSS—Flight Service Station 

GP—General Planning 

GPS—Global Positioning System 

IAP—Instrument Approach Procedure 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 23

IAW—In Accordance With 

ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization 

IFR—Instrument Flight Rules 

INO—International NOTAM Office 

LOA—Letter of Agreement 

LORAN—Long Range Aid to Navigation 

ACOM—US Army Major Command 

MAJCOM—Major Command 

MARFOR—US Marine Corps Forces 

MOA—Military Operating Area 

NAS—National Airspace System 

NAVAID—Navigational Aid 

NAVFIG—Naval Flight Information Group 

NGA—National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NOTAM—Notice to Airmen 

NTAP—FAA Notice to Airmen Publication 

OCONUS—Outside Continental United States 

OPNAVINST—Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 

SIAP—Standard Instrument Approach Procedure 

SID—Standard Instrument Departure 

TERPS—Terminal Instrument Procedures 

TYCOM—Type Commander 

UFN—Until Further Notice 

US—United States 

USA—US Army 

USAADE—E United States Army Aeronautical Services Detachment - Europe 

USAASA—United States Army Aeronautical Services Agency 

USAF—US Air Force 

USAREUR—US Army Europe 

USMC—US Marine Corps 

USN—US Navy 

USNOF—US NOTAM Office 

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 24 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

USNS—US NOTAM System 

UTC—Coordinated Universal Time 

VASI—Visual Approach Slope Indicator 

Terms 

Aerodrome—Area (including buildings, installations, and equipment) prepared to accommodate 

the landing and takeoff of aircraft. 

Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN)—AFTN is a worldwide system of 

fixed circuits that operate mainly between the Air Traffic Service providers. It provides a 

telecommunications service (e.g., NOTAMs, flight planning, and movement messages) between 

specified fixed points. 

Air Traffic Services (ATS)—A generic term meaning variously, flight information service, 

alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control service (e.g., Flight Information 

Region / Area Control Center, approach control service, or aerodrome control service). 

Base—Any installation owned, leased, operated, occupied, or jointly occupied by a DoD unit or 

organization where DoD aircraft operate. 

International NOTAM Office (INO)—A governmental agency (military or civilian) that 

normally prepares and transmits NOTAMs according to ICAO Aeronautical Information 

Services, Annex 15.

National Airspace System (NAS)—Common network of US airspace; air navigation facilities, 

equipment and services, airports or landing areas; aeronautical charts, information and services; 

rules, regulations, and procedures, technical information, and manpower and material. Included 

are system components shared jointly with DoD. 

United States NOTAM Office (USNOF)—The FAA office that operates the US NOTAM 

system. It is a Cell within the National Flight Data Center (NFDC). HQ AF/A3O-BN is 

collocated with the USNOF. 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 25

Attachment 2 

SAMPLE NOTAM AUTHORITY BACKUP LETTER OF AGREEMENT 

4 May 10

LETTER OF AGREEMENT (LOA) FOR LANGLEY AFB AND NAS LEMOORE NOTAM 

AUTHORITIES

 

SUBJ: LETTER OF AGREEMENT 

1. Purpose: This LOA establishes backup procedures between Langley AFB Airfield 

Management Operations and NAS Lemoore Base Operations so that each base may transmit 

NOTAMs for each other if either location is unable to access DINS for extended periods. 

2. Instruction: AFI 11-208/OPNAVINST 3721.20D, Paragraph 3.3.4

3. Policy: This agreement allows Langley AFB Airfield Management Operations and NAS 

Lemoore Base Operations to coordinate with each other via DSN or e-mail in order to transmit 

NOTAMs when DINS CCR access is interrupted for either base. The backup base will need the 

originating base’s username and password in order to provide DINS CCR interface. All required 

coordination shall be accomplished by the originating base. Upon receipt, the backup base shall 

fax or e-mail the comeback copy to the originating base (Langley AFB FAX: xxx-xxxx, E-Mail: 

KLFI_AMO@LANGLEY.AF.MIL, NAS Lemoore FAX: xxx-xxxx, E-mail: 

KNLC_BASEOPS@NAVY.MIL).

4. This agreement is effective until further notice or until both parties mutually agree to 

terminate the agreement. 

5. This letter supersedes previous letters, same subject. 

John Doe, Rank, USAF 

Langley AFB, VA 

Jane Smith, Rank, USN

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 26 AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 

Attachment 3 

SAMPLE JOINT-USE NOTAM AUTHORITY LETTER OF AGREEMENT 

LETTER OF AGREEMENT (LOA) FOR CHARLESTON AFB AND CHARLESTON 

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT NOTAM AUTHORITIES

 

SUBJ: LETTER OF AGREEMENT

1. Purpose: This LOA establishes responsibilities and procedures for reporting outages or 

closures, and processing NOTAMs for Charleston AFB and Charleston International Airport, 

Charleston, South Carolina. 

2. Cancellation: Letter of Agreement between Charleston Air Traffic Control Tower and 

Charleston AFB dated May 21, 2001; same subject. 

3. Scope: This LOA applies to all system and movement areas at Charleston AFB and 

Charleston International Airport that are subject to NOTAM action in according with (IAW) 

FAA JO 7930.2, Notices to Airmen (NOTAM). 

4. Responsibilities: 

Charleston AFB Base Operations. 

Shall report outages/closures as per paragraph 5 and issue civil NOTAMs via Washington FSS 

for the following movement areas: 

All runways (including runway conditions). 

All taxiways except A and B. 

All ramps except Ramp 1 and 2. 

Emergency equipment capability. 

Primary and secondary air traffic control radar systems.

All radar approach control and emergency frequencies. 

Shall report outages/closures as per paragraph 5 and issue DINS NOTAMs for the following 

movement areas: 

Taxiway A and B. 

Ramp 1 and 2. 

Optical Landing System (OLS). 

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AFI11-208_IP 3 JUNE 2011 27

Charleston Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) shall report outages as per paragraph 5 and issue 

civil NOTAMs via Washington FSS for the following: 

Instrument Landing System (ILS) 

Airport and approach lighting systems or aids (except OLS). 

All tower frequencies. 

5. Coordination: All outages/closures shall be coordinated with the following: 

Charleston AFB Airfield Manager 

Charleston International Airport Manager 

Charleston Control Tower 

Washington Hub (FSS) 

Washington ARTCC 

6. This agreement is effective until further notice or until both parties mutually agree to 

terminate the agreement. 

John Doe, Rank, USAF 

Charleston AFB, SC 

Jane Smith 

Air Traffic Manager 

Charleston Air Traffic Control Tower 

B- 38
Federal Aviation Administration Order

7930.2M

FAA Order 7930.2M is the U.S. Government directive that covers 

Notice to Airmen. For purposes of this manual, only Chapter 8 –

Military NOTAMs has been included. The entire directive can be 

found at:

http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/NTM/index.htm

B- 39
U.S. Department

of Transportation

Federal Aviation

Administration

 Distribution: ZAT−793; ZAT−464; ZAT−423 (External) Initiated By: AJR−0

Vice President, System Operations Services

Order JO 7930.2M

Notices to Airmen

(NOTAM)

September 25, 2008

An electronic version of this publication is on the internet at

 http://www.faa.gov/atpubs

Includes Change 1 dated 2/11/2010 

and Change 2 dated 10/20/11

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9/25/08 JO 7930.2M

General 8−1−1

Chapter 8. Military NOTAMs

Section 1. General

8−1−1. MILITARY FACILITIES

NOTAMs pertaining to U.S. Air Force, Army, and

Navy navigational aids that are part of the NAS shall

receive dissemination in the civil system in addition

to dissemination in the military system.

8−1−2. SUBMISSION OF MILITARY DATA

FOR PUBLICATION

Military aeronautical data affecting FAA

publications shall be submitted to the FAA through

the responsible military authority.

8−1−3. MILITARY NOTAMs NOT MEETING

CRITERIA

All military NOTAMs that do not meet the criteria

outlined in this chapter will be distributed in

accordance with local agreements or within the

military NOTAM system only.

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9/25/08 JO 7930.2M

Military NOTAM Dissemination 8−2−1

Section 2. Military NOTAM Dissemination

8−2−1. MILITARY ARMY NOTAMs

Department of Defense (DOD) NOTAMs on

facilities that are part of the NAS are disseminated in

the FAA NOTAM system. Most of these facilities are

assigned to a tie−in FSS for NOTAM purposes.

(See Note 1.)

NOTE−

1. Some Army airfields are not assigned to a tie−in FSS.

Army aeronautical data and NOTAMs are not necessarily

published in FAA publications.

2. Publication of NOTAM data in the DOD Flight

Information Publication (FLIP) is justification for

NOTAM cancellation.

8−2−2. ALASKAN MILITARY NOTAMs

Alaskan military facility NOTAMs are classified

and disseminated in the FAA NOTAM system.

Military data submitted for NOTAM issuance shall

be classified and disseminated as a NOTAM in

accordance with the procedures in this order. The

base operations shall transmit NOTAM data into the

NOTAM system. If they are unable to transmit the

data, the base operations shall contact their tie−in

FSS for assistance. The USNOF shall contact the

military base for resolution of NOTAM issues.

However, if the USNOF is unable to contact the base,

they shall contact the tie−in FSS for resolution.

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9/25/08 JO 7930.2M

Military NOTAM Retrieval 8−3−1

Section 3. Military NOTAM Retrieval

8−3−1. MILITARY NOTAM AVAILABILITY

a. All military NOTAMs are stored in the USNS

data base. While current, they may be retrieved by

both AFTN subscribers and FAA facilities via

request/reply.

b. Refer to the DOD Flight Information Publication (Enroute), IFR, or VFR Supplements to

determine whether NOTAM service is provided for a

facility. A diamond symbol is used in the supplements

to show that NOTAM service is provided.

c. Military NOTAMs are entered in the military

system using the following NOTAM format:

EXAMPLE−

GG KCNFYNYX

121345 KADW

(MYYYY/YY NOTAMN

Q) /QMRLC

A) KADW

B) 1106021300

C) 1106021500

E) RWY 1L/19R CLSD

NOTE−

Refer to AFM 11−208/AR 95−10/OPNAVINST 3721.20

(series) for acceptable NOTAM (Q) codes. Although

similar, military NOTAM (Q) codes and international

NOTAM (Q) codes are not the same.

8−3−2. MILITARY NOTAM RETRIEVAL

Formats for retrieving military NOTAMs via NADIN

are as follows:

a. A request for a single NOTAM for a given

location:

EXAMPLE−

AIS:

GG KDZZNAXX

DTG KDCAYFYX

)SVC RQ MIL ACC=KADW NT=M0134/00

b. A request for all military NOTAMs for a given

location:

EXAMPLE−

AIS:

GG KDZZNAXX

DTG KSJTYFYX

)SVC RQ MIL LOC=KNGP

c. A request for all military NOTAMs for multiple

locations (maximum of eight):

EXAMPLE−

AIS:

GG KDZZNAXX

DTG KEKNYFYX

)SVC RQ MIL

LOC=KADW,KDAA,KNGP,KNGU,KNUW,

KHST,KHIF

NOTE−

All facilities must use their particular equipment’s

keyboard equivalent of the closed parenthesis or the equal

symbol as appropriate.

d. To review all NOTAMs for a joint−use airport;

e.g., CHS, both civil (CHS) and military (KCHS)

NOTAMs must be retrieved.

e. A request for all NOTAMs for a given location

from all files (domestic, FDC, international, and

military) that meets the military NOTAM criteria:

EXAMPLE−

AIS:

GG KDZZNAXX

DTG KEKNYFYX

)SVC RQ DOD LOC=KADW

RESPONSE:

GG KEKNYFYX

DTG KDZZNAXX

)SVC RQ DOD LOC=KADW

KADW ANDREWS AFB

1L/19R RWY CLSD 2 JUN 1300 TO 2 JUN 1500

10/20/11 JO 7930.2M CHG 2

Maritime Operational Zones - Appendix B

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JO 7930.2M 9/25/08

8−3−2 Military NOTAM Retrieval

8−3−3. SERVICE MESSAGES

Receipt of the USNS generated service message

“NOTAMS FOUND 0” indicates that there are no

military NOTAMs on file for the number or location

requested.

8−3−4. MILITARY NOTAM CRITERIA FOR

MILITARY NOTAM SYSTEM

Military units issue NOTAMs pertaining to their

bases and airspace based on the guidelines set forth in

DOD joint departmental publication (JPD) AFM

11−208/AR 95−10/OPNAVINST 3721.20 (series),

U.S. DOD Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) System.

Maritime Operational Zones - Appendix B

B- 44
C-1

APPENDIX C

Zone Announcements, Warnings,

Resolutions, and International Notices

This appendix contains: (a) an historical compilation of various notices published to the 

international community by the United States—published primarily as NOTMAR, NOTAM, 

HYDROPAC, HYDROLANT, and Special Warnings to Mariners—regarding zones and 

warnings areas associated with U.S. safety, security, and maritime operations; (b) various United

Nations Security Council Resolutions related to maritime operations; and (c) other international 

notices published by states regarding navigational safety, security, and military operations. 

All contents of this Appendix are arranged chronologically from earliest to latest.
Appendix C

C-2

Presidential Proclamation Regarding Interdiction of Offensive Weapons Delivery to Cuba 

October 23, 1962

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS the peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American States 

are endangered by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military 

capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of 

North and South America; 

WHEREAS by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress of the United States and approved on 

October 3, 1962, it was declared that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever 

means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from 

extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this 

hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military 

capability endangering the security of the United States; and 

WHEREAS the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics meeting in Washington on 

October 23, 1962, recommended that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of 

the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and 

collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the 

Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material 

and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent 

the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace 

and security of the Continent: 

Now, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting 

under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the 

United States, in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions of the United States Congress 

and of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the security of the 

United States, do hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered, beginning at 

2:00 p.m. Greenwich time October 24, 1962, to interdict, subject to the instructions herein 

contained, the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel to Cuba. 

For the purposes of this Proclamation, the following are declared to be prohibited materiel: 

Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; 

warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or 

operate the above items; and any other classes of materiel hereafter designated by the Secretary 

of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation. 

To enforce this order, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to prevent the 

delivery of prohibited materiel to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United 

States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American States. 

The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue such directives as he deems 

necessary to ensure the effectiveness of this order, including the designation, within a reasonable 

distance of Cuba, of prohibited or restricted zones and of prescribed routes. 
Appendix C

C-3

Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be 

directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to 

submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to 

respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or 

craft which it is believed is en route to Cuba and may be carrying prohibited materiel or may 

itself constitute such materiel shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another 

destination of its own choice and shall be taken into custody if it fails or refuses to obey such 

directions. All vessels or craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the United States for 

appropriate disposition. 

In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply 

with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, 

after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of 

self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the extent necessary. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and cause the seal of the United States 

of America to be affixed. 

DONE in the City of Washington this twenty-third day of October in the year of our Lord, 

nineteen hundred and sixty-two, and of the Independence of the United States of America the 

one hundred and eighty-seventh. 

[SEAL] 

JOHN F. KENNEDY 

By the President: 

DEAN RUSK, 

Secretary of State 
Appendix C

C-4

United Nations Security Council Resolution 217 

November 20, 1965

Resolution 217 (1965) 

of 20 November 1965

The Security Council, 

Deeply concerned about the situation in Southern Rhodesia, 

Considering that the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia have proclaimed independence and 

that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the 

administering Power, looks upon this as an act of rebellion, 

Nothing that the Government of the United Kingdom has taken certain measures to meet the 

situation and that to be effective these measures should correspond to the gravity of the situation, 

1. Determines that the situation resulting from the proclamation of independence by the illegal 

authorities in Southern Rhodesia is extremely grave, that the Government of the United Kingdom 

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland should put an end to it and that its continuance in time 

constitutes a threat to international peace and security; 

2. Reaffirms its resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and General Assembly resolution 

1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960; 

3. Condemns the usurpation of power by a racist settler minority in Southern Rhodesia and 

regards the declaration of independence by it as having no legal validity; 

4. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to quell this rebellion of the racist 

minority; 

5. Further calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to take all other appropriate 

measures which would prove effective in eliminating the authority of the usurpers and in 

bringing the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia to an immediate end; 

6. Calls upon all States not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic 

or other relations with it; 

7. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom, as the working of the Constitution of 

1961 has broken down, to take immediate measures in order to allow the people of Southern 

Rhodesia to determine their own future consistent with the objectives of General Assembly 

resolution 1514 (XV); 

8. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which would assist and encourage the illegal 

regime and, in particular, to desist from providing it with arms, equipment and military material, 

and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, including 

an embargo on oil and petroleum products; 

9. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom to enforce urgently and with vigour all the 

measures it has announced, as well as those mentioned in paragraph 8 above; 

10. Calls upon the Organization of African Unity to do all in its power to assist in the 

implementation of the present resolution, in conformity with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the 

United Nations; 
Appendix C

C-5

11. Decides to keep the question under review in order to examine what other measures it may 

deem it necessary to take. 

Adopted at the l265th meeting by 10 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France). 
Appendix C

C-6

United Nations Security Council Resolution 221

April 9, 1966

Resolution 221 (1966) 

of 9 April 1966

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 and 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 

and in particular its call to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with 

Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

Gravely concerned at reports that substantial supplies of oil may reach Southern Rhodesia as the 

result of an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the approach of a further tanker which may 

lead to the resumption of pumping through the Companhia do Pipeline Moçambique Rodésias 

pipeline with the acquiescence of the Portuguese authorities,

Considering that such supplies will afford great assistance and encouragement to the illegal 

régime in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to remain longer in being,

1. Determines that the resulting situation constitutes a threat to the peace;

2. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to permit oil to be pumped through the 

pipeline from Beira to Southern Rhodesia;

3. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to receive at Beira oil destined for Southern 

Rhodesia;

4. Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of any of their vessels reasonably believed to 

be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira;

5. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 

to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to 

be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia, and empowers the United Kingdom to arrest and 

detain the tanker known as the Joanna V upon her departure from Beira in the event her oil cargo 

is discharged there.

Adopted at the 1277th meeting by 10 votes to none, with 5 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay).
Appendix C

C-7

United Nations Security Council Resolution 232

December 16, 1966

Resolution 232 (1966) 

of 16 December 1966

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965

and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its appeal to all States to do their utmost to 

break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia,

Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far and the measures taken by the administering 

Power have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,

Reaffirming that, to the extent not superseded in the present resolution, the measures provided for 

in resolution 217 (1965), as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of that 

resolution, shall continue in effect,

Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,

1. Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to 

international peace and security;

2. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, 

copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia 

and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to 

promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their 

nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and 

exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of 

funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purpose of such activities or dealings;

(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of these commodities 

originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

(d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to 

promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military 

aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of 

arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia;

(e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to 

promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and of 
Appendix C

C-8

equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft and motor 

vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any 

such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and any activities by their nationals or in their 

territories which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or 

motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;

(f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air 

transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil 

products to Southern Rhodesia;

notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licences granted before the date of the present 

resolution;

3. Reminds Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the 

present resolution shall constitute a violation Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and 

independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 

Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 

1960, and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set 

forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Calls upon all States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist 

régime in Southern Rhodesia;

6. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out this decision of the 

Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

7. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, 

States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 

2 of the present resolution;

8. Calls upon States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies 

to report to the Secretary-General the measures which each has taken in accordance with 

provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the 

implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 

1967;

10. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of 

developments.

Adopted at the 1340th meeting by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
Appendix C

C-9
Appendix C

C-10

Notice to Mariners No. 17/59 22 

September 1980 

From: Commander-in-Chief of Naval Army of Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Regarding to the Iraqi aggression we declare Iranian maritime border nearby coast war area. 

The Iranian Government does not give any authorization to the vessels intending to proceed to 

Iraqi ports. For the safety of shipping in Persian Gulf the following route shall be strictly 

observed. 

Vessels after having passed Hormuz Strait will change the route to pass 12 miles south of Abu 

Musa Island, 12 miles south of Sirri Island, south of Cable Bank Light and 12 miles south west 

of Farsi Island. 

Iranian Government will not take responsibility for those vessels which do not pay consideration 

to this notice. Thanks. 
Appendix C

C-11

Special Warning No. 53 27 

May 1981 

1. The Iranian government has recently revised the guidelines which it issued last fall for the 

navigational safety of merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf. 

2. Relevant portions of the revised Iranian guidelines are as follows: 

– After transiting the Strait of Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian ports should pass 

12 miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south of Sirri Island; south of Cable Bank Island; 

12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west of a line connecting the points 27-55N 49-53E and 

29-10N 49-12E; thereafter south of the line 29-10N as far as 48-40E. 

– All Iranian coastal waters are war zones. 

– All transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited. 

– The Iranian government will bear no responsibility for merchant ships which fail to comply 

with the above instructions. 

3. Iraqi government has stated that the area north of 29-30N is a prohibited war zone. 

4. Deep-draft shipping should be aware of shoal waters near Farsi Island. 
Appendix C

C-12

United Kingdom Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) 

April 7, 1982 

7 April 1982 

United Kingdom established a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) effective 

0400Z 12 April 1982 

From 0400 Greenwich Mean Time on Monday April 12, 1982, a maritime exclusion zone will be 

established around the Falkland Islands. The outer limits of this zone is a circle of 200 nautical 

mile radius from Latitude 51 degrees 40 minutes South, 59 degrees 30 minutes West, which is 

approximately the centre of the Falkland Islands. 

From the time indicated, any Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries found within 

this zone will be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by British forces. 

This measure is without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever additional 

measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self defence under Article 51 of the United 

Nations Charter. 

The Times (London), 8 April 1982, at 6. Passed by Embassy of Switzerland in Buenos Aires to 

the Argentine Government.
Appendix C

C-13

Argentina 200 Mile Maritime Zone 

April 8, 1982 

8 April 1982 

Argentina declared 200 mile maritime zone around the disputed islands and Argentine coast as a 

theater of operations in which military action could be taken, declaring it will act in self-defense 

at any time in the zone if national security was in danger. Argentine also created an Argentine 

Atlantic Command. 

Washington Post, April 8, 1982, at A-1, col. 6; The Times (London), 10 April 1982, at 1. 
Appendix C

C-14

United Kingdom “Defensive Area” 

April 23, 1982 

23 April 1982: 

United Kingdom established a “Defensive Area” or “bubble” around the 

task force by warning to the Argentine Government on 23 April and 

reported to the United Nations on 24 April. 

In announcing the establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands, Her 

Majesty’s Government made it clear that this matter was without prejudice to the right of the 

United Kingdom to take whatever additional measures might be needed in exercise of the right to 

self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 

In this connection Her Majesty’s Government now wishes to make clear that any approach on 

the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval auxiliaries or military aircraft which 

could amount to a threat to interfere with the mission of British Forces in South Atlantic will 

encounter the appropriate response. 

All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging in surveillance of these British Forces will 

be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with accordingly. 

The Times (London), 26 April 1982, at 5. 
Appendix C

C-15

United Kingdom Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) 

April 28, 1982 

28 April 1982: 

United Kingdom established a Total Exclusion Zone as of 1100Z 30 Apr 82

From 11 am GMT on April 30, 1982, a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) will be established around 

the Falkland Islands. The outer limits of this zone will be the same as for the MEZ established on 

April 12, namely a circle of 200 nautical miles from latititude 51 degrees, 40 minutes South and 

longitude 59 degrees, 39 minutes West. 

From the time indicated the Exclusion Zone will apply not only to Argentine warships and 

Argentine naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, which is 

operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands by Argentine forces. 

The zone will also apply to any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is operating in support 

of the illegal occupation. Any ship and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found 

within this zone without due authority from the Ministry of Defence in London will be regarded 

as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile and will 

be liable to be attacked by British Forces. 

Also from the time indicated, Port Stanley airport will be closed; and any aircraft on the ground 

in the Falkland Islands will be regarded as present in support of the illegal occupation and 

accordingly is liable to attack. 

These measures are without prejudice to the right of the United Kingdom to take whatever 

additional measures may be needed in exercise of its rights of self-defence, under Article 51 of 

the United Nations Charter. 

“A Defence Minister spokesman emphasized that the new zone applied to all ships and all 

aircraft of any country. It therefore applied to any Soviet spy ships which might be trailing 

British forces inside the zone.” 

The Times (London), 29 April 1982, at 1. 
Appendix C

C-16

Special Warning No. 60 

May 7, 1982 

7 May 1982

Special Warning No. 60 

1. Because of the present situation involving Argentina and the United Kingdom in the western 

portion of the South Atlantic, mariners are advised to exercise particular caution when visiting or 

transiting the region. In particular, mariners are cautioned not to sail within 200 nautical miles of 

the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), South Georgia Island (Isla San Pedro), and the South 

Sandwich Islands (Islas Sandwich Del Sur). The British Government has announced that any 

ship found within 200 nautical miles of the Falkland Islands without due authority of the 

Ministry of Defense in London will be liable to attack by British forces and that any Argentine 

warship which is found more than 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast will be regarded as 

hostile and liable to be dealt with accordingly. 

2. This notice is solely for the purpose of advising US mariners of information relevant to 

navigational safety and in no way constitutes a US Government position regarding foreign 

claims or proclamations. 

3. Special Warning No.59 is hereby cancelled. 
Appendix C

C-17

Argentina Declaration of War Zone 

May 11, 1982 

11 May 1982 

Argentina declares South Atlantic as war zone 

Argentina declared entire the South Atlantic as war zone and threatened to attack any British 

vessel. Extension of exclusion zone in response to Britain’s persistent aggressive attitude, which 

had placed restrictions on Argentine maritime traffic in the South Atlantic. 

The Times (London), 12 May 1982, at 1. 
Appendix C

C-18

Special Warning No. 62 

August 16, 1982 

16 August 1982 

Defense Mapping Agency and Hydrographic Center Special Warning No. 62 

1. Special Warning No. 53 regarding the Persian Gulf remains in effect except that the Iraqi 

government has expanded the restricted military zone described below. 

2. The Iraqi government has warned that it will attack all vessels appearing within a zone 

believed to be north and east of a line connecting the following points: (1) 29-30N 48-30E; (2) 

29-25N 49-09E; (3) 29-00N 49-30E; (4) 2830N 49-30E; (5) 28-30N 51-00E. The Iraqi 

government has further warned that all tankers docking at Kharg Island, regardless of nationality, 

are targets for the Iraqi Air Force. 
Appendix C

C-19

HYDROLANT 2420/83 (54, 56) 

December 27, 1983 

P 271845Z DEC 83 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC//NVS// 

TO AIG FOUR FIVE ZERO ONE 

AIG FIVE SEVEN SEVEN FOUR 

SIG FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN 

RUHJWUA/COMSCSEA SUBIC BAY RP 

ZEN/COORDINATOR NAVAREA III INSTITUTO HYDROGRAFICA 

DE LA MARINA CADIZ SPAIN TELEX 76147 MEDCO 

INFO RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK 

RUDHAAD/DMA WASHINGTON DC 

BT 

UNCLAS 

HYDROLANT 2420/83 (54, 56). MEDITERRANEAN SEA, HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS. 

1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED BY U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN 

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 30 DEC 83 TO 31 JAN 84 IN AREA BOUND BY 34-

32N 035-56E, 34-30N 034-30E, 33-20N 033-00E, 33-20N 035-15E. 

2. ALL SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE CRAFT SHOULD ATTEMPT TO AVOID 

APPROACHING CLOSER THAN 5 NAUTICAL MILES TO U.S. NAVAL FORCES WITHIN 

THE BOUNDED AREA DUE TO POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS BEING 

CONDUCTED AND HEIGHTENED SECURITY AWARENESS RESULTING FROM 

TERRORIST THREATS. ON THEIR PART, U.S. NAVAL FORCES WILL ALSO ATTEMPT 

TO AVOID APPROACHING OTHER SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE CRAFT. IT IS 

REQUESTED THAT RADIO CONTACT WITH U.S. NAVAL FORCES BE MAINTAINED 

ON VHF CHANNEL 16, INTERNATIONAL SAFETY AND CALLING CHANNEL, WHEN 

WITHIN 5 NAUTICAL MILES OF U.S. NAVAL VESSELS. 

3. THIS NOTICE IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO ADVISE THAT HAZARDOUS 

OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED ON AN UNSCHEDULED BASIS; IT DOES NOT 

AFFECT THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OF ANY INDIVIDUAL OR STATE. BT 
Appendix C

C-20

NOTAM for Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and North Arabian 

Sea January 20, 1984 

P 202222Z JAN 84 

FM USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ3/

TO AFCNF CARSWELL AFB TX//

INFO JCS WASH DC// CNO WASH DC// 

CSAF WASH DC// CMC WASH DC// 

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI// USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA// 

USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE// USCINCSO 

QUARRY HEIGHTS PN// 

CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI// COMUSNAVCENT 

PEARL HARBOR HI// 

COMIDEASTFOR// COMSEVENTH FLT// 

CTF SEVEN ZERO// CMDT COGARD WASH DC// 

UNCLAS 

SUBJ: NOTAM FOR PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, GULF OF OMAN, AND 

NORTH ARABIAN SEA. 

1. IN RESPONSE TO JCS TASKING, REQUEST THE FOLLOWING NOTAM BE 

PUBLISHED WORLDWIDE IN THE ICAO ALERTING SYSTEM: 

QUOTE 

A. US NAVAND GULF OF OMAN ARE TAKING ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE 

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST TERRORIST THREATS. AIRCRAFT AT ALTITUDES LESS 

THAN 2000 FT AGL WHICH ARE NOT CLEARED FOR APPROACH/DEPARTURE TO OR 

FROM A REGIONAL AIRPORT ARE REQUESTED TO AVOID APPROACHING CLOSER 

THAN FIVE NM TO US NAVAL FORCES. IT IS ALSO REQUESTED THAT AIRCRAFT 

APPROACHING WITHIN FIVE NM ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT 

WITH US NAVAL FORCES ON 121.5 MZ VHF OR 243.0 MZ UHF. AIRCRAFT WHICH 

APPROACH WITHIN FIVE NM AT ALTITUDES LESS THAN 2000 FT AGL WHOSE 

INTENTIONS ARE UNCLEAR TO US NAVAL FORCES MAY BE HELD AT RISK BY US 

DEFENSIVE MEASURES. 

B. THIS NOTICE IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO ADVISE THAT HAZARDOUS 

OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED ON AN UNSCHEDULED BASIS; IT DOES NOT 

AFFECT THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OF ANY INDIVIDUAL OR STATE. 

UNQUOTE 

2. THIS IS A JOINT USCINCPAC AND USCINCCENT NOTAM AFFECTING 

OPERATIONS WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. 
Appendix C

C-21

HYDROPAC 78/84 (62) 

January 21, 1984

P 210100Z JAN 84 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC//NVS// 

TO AIG FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN 

INFO CNO WASHINGTON DC SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC 

SECDEF WASHINGTON DC JCS WASHINGTON DC 

CSA WASHINGTON DC CSAF WASHINGTON DC 

CMC WASHINGTON DC USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

USCINCCENT CINCPACFLT 

MACDILL AFB FL PEARL HARBOR HI

COMUSNAVCENT COMIDEASTFOR

PEARL HARBOR HI 

UNCLAS 

HYDROPAC 78/84 (62) PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ AND GULF OF OMAN. 

A. US NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WITHIN THE 

PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ AND THE GULF OF OMAN AND THE ARABIAN 

SEA NORTH OF TWENTY DEGREES NORTH ARE TAKING ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE 

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST TERRORIST THREATS. ALL SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE 

SHIPS AND CRAFT ARE REQUESTED TO AVOID CLOSING US FORCES CLOSER 

THAN FIVE NAUTICAL MILES WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFYING THEMSELVES. 

US FORCES ESPECIALLY WHEN OPERATING IN CONFINED WATERS, SHALL 

REMAIN MINDFUL OF NAVIGATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF SHIPS AND CRAFT IN 

THEIR IMMEDIATE VICINITY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT RADIO CONTACT WITH US 

NAVAL FORCES BE MAINTAINED ON CHANNEL 16, 121.5MZ VHF, OR 243.0 MZ UHF 

WHEN APPROACHING WITHIN FIVE NAUTICAL MILES OF US NAVAL FORCES. 

SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE SHIPS AND CRAFT THAT CLOSE US NAVAL FORCES 

WITHIN FIVE NAUTICAL MILES WITHOUT MAKING PRIOR CONTACT AND/OR 

WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE UNCLEAR TO SUCH FORCES MAY BE HELD AT RISK BY 

US DEFENSE MEASURES. 

B. THESE MEASURES WILL ALSO APPLY WHEN US FORCES ARE ENGAGED IN 

TRANSIT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ OR WHEN IN INNOCENT 

PASSAGE THROUGH FOREIGN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND WHEN OPERATING IN 

SUCH WATERS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE COASTAL STATE. 

C. THIS NOTICE IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO ADVISE THAT MEASURES IN SELF 

DEFENSE WILL BE EXERCISED BY US NAVAL FORCES. THE MEASURES WILL BE 

IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT IMPEDE THE FREEDOM OF 

NAVIGATION OF ANY VESSEL OR STATE. BT 
Appendix C

C-22

HYDROPAC 1332/85 (91, 97)

October 17, 1985

PRIORITY P 171630Z OCT 85 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC//HNNM/ 

TO AIG FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN 

UNCLAS 

SUBJECT: HYDROPAC 1332/85 (91,97). OKINAWA. ORDNANCE. 

1. BOMBING AND ROCKET FIRING EXERCIES 0400Z TO 0800Z DAILY 22 TO 24 OCT 

WITHIN 10 MILES OF 25-30N 129-30E. 

2. CANCEL THIS MSG 240900Z OCT. BT 
Appendix C

C-23

HYDROLANT 1893/85 (53) 

October 17, 1985 

PRIORITY P 171931Z OCT 85 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC//HNNM/

TO AIG FOUR FIVE ZERO ONE AIG FIVE SEVEN SEVEN FOUR 

UNCLAS 

SUBJECT: HYDROLANT 1893/85 (53). ADRIATIC SEA. 

1. CURRENT METER OPERATIONS BY M/V BANNOCK 18 OCT TO 08 NOV IN 40-06-

18N 18-37-00E AND 40-06-18N 18-57-30E. 

2. CANCEL THIS MSG 09 NOV. BT 
Appendix C

C-24

NAVAREA IV 2911/85 (11) 

October 17, 1985

PRIORITY 

P 172202Z OCT 85 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC//HNNM/ 

TO AIG FOUR FIVE ZERO ONE AIG FOUR NINE ZERO NINE 

UNCLAS 

SUBJECT: NAVAREA IV 2911/85 (11). FLORIDA-EAST COAST. ORDNANCE. 

1. MINING EXERCISES 221500Z TO 231700Z OCT IN AREA W133, 11-12/ I-K BETWEEN 

32-20N 32-39N AND 79-30W 80-00W. 

2. TORPEDO EXERCISES 231100Z TO 231700Z OCT IN AREA 13-14/P BETWEEN 32-00N 

32-20N AND 78-40W 78-50W. 

3. LIVE ORDNANCE DROPS 241500Z TO 261600Z OCT IN AREA W158A, 28/I-J 

BETWEEN 29-40N 29-50N AND 79-40W 80-00W. 

4. GUNNERY EXERCISES 221900Z TO 222200Z AND 232000Z TO 232300Z OCT IN 

AREA W132A, 13-14M BETWEEN 32-00N 32-20N AND 79-10W 79-20W. 

5. FLARE SMOKE DROPS 210900Z TO 260300Z OCT IN AREA W158E/F BETWEEN 30-

00N 30-36N AND 80-58W 81-25W. BT 
Appendix C

C-25

NAVAREA XII 967/85 

October 18, 1985 

PRIORITY P 180200Z OCT 85 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC//HNNM/ 

TO AIG FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN 

UNCLAS 

SUBJECT: NAVAREA XII 967/85. CALIFORNIA. 

1. UNDERWATER OPERATIONS 181930Z TO 190559Z AND DAILY 1300Z TO 0100Z 19, 

21-25 OCT IN AREA BETWEEN 32-45N 32-55N AND 117-30W 117-35W. 

2. CANCEL NAVAREA XII 731/85, 883/85 AND THIS PARA UPON RECEIPT. 

3. CANCEL THIS MSG 250200Z OCT. BT 
Appendix C

C-26

International NOTAMS 

July 29, 1987

P 291950Z JUL 87 

FM USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ5// 

TO AFCNF CARSWELL AFB TX//CC// 

INFO JCS WASH DC//J3// 

USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

FAA WASHINGTON HQ WASHINGTON DC 

COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC 

COMUSNAVCENT PERARL HARBOR HI 

COMIDEASTFOR 

UNCLAS 

SUBJ: INTERNATIONAL NOTAMS 

A. JCS/DJS 2123357 JUL 87. SUBJ: REVISED NOTAM/NOTMAR FOR PERSIAN GULF 

AREA (NOTAL) 

1. USCINCCENT REQUESTS PUBLICATION OF THE FOLLOWING JCS APPROVED 

(REF A) NOTAM OVER THE INTERNATIONAL NOTAM SYSTEM. THIS NOTAM 

REPLACES THE NOTICE CURRENTLY IN EFFECT AS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN 

JAN 84. 

2. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT NOTAM BE TRANSMITTED TO INTERNATIONAL NOTAM 

OFFICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION WITHING THE FOLLOWING 

COUNTRIES/FIRS. 

A. COUNTRIES: 

OMAN UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 

QATAR BAHRAIN 

SAUDI ARABIA KUWAIT

IRAQ IRAN 

PAKISTAN 

B. FIRS: 

KABUL---OAKX TEHRAN---OIIX 

BAHRAIN---OBBB BAGHDAD---ORBB

AMMAN---OJAC DAMASCUS---OSTT

JEDDAH---OFJN MUSCAT---OOMM 

KARACHI---OPKR 

3. NOTAM FOR THE PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, GULF OF OMAN, AND 

NORTH ARABIAN SEA TO BE PUBLISHED WORLD WIDE IN THE ICAO ALERT 

SYSTEM: QUOTE 
Appendix C

C-27

A. IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE USS STARK, AND THE 

CONTINUING TERRORIST THREAT IN THE REGION, U.S. NAVAL VESSELS 

OPERATING WITHIN THE PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, GULF OF OMAN 

AND THE ARABIAN SEA, NORTH OF 20 DEGREES NORTH, ARE TAKING 

ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS. IT IS REQUESTED THAT AIRCRAFT 

(FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS) APPROACHING U.S. NAVAL FORCES ESTABLISH 

AND MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH U.S. NAVAL FORCES ON 121.5 MHZ VHF 

OR 243.0 MHZ UHF. UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT, WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE UNCLEAR 

OR WHO ARE APPROACHING U.S. NAVAL VESSELS MAY BE REQUESTED TO 

IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AND STATE THEIR INTENTIONS AS SOON AS THEY ARE 

DETECTED. IN ORDER TO AVOID INADVERTENT CONFRONTATION, AIRCRAFT 

(FIXED WING AND HELICOPTERS) INCLUDING MILITARY AIRCRAFT MAY BE 

REQUESTED TO REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF U.S. VESSELS. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO 

REQUESTS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND INTERNTIONS, OR TO WARNINGS, AND 

OPERATING IN A THREATENING MANNER, COULD PLACE THE AIRCRAFT (FIXED 

WING AND HELICOPTERS) AT RISK BY U.S. DEFENSIVE MEASURES. 

ILLUMINATION OF A U.S. NAVAL VESSEL WITH A WEAPONS FIRE CONTROL 

RADAR WILL BE VIEWED WITH SUSPICION AND COULD RESULT IN IMMEDIATE 

DEFENSIVE REACTION. 

B. THIS NOTICE IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO ADVISE THAT MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE ARE BEING EXERCISED BY U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN THIS REGION. THE 

MEASURES WILL BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT UNDULY 

INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT. UNQUOTE. 

4. THIS IS AN UPDATED NOTAM AFFETING OPERATIONS WITHIN THE USCINCPAC 

AND USCINCCENT AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY. AFCNF PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE 

RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE TO USCINCCENT CCJ5. POC IS CDR (OMITTED). AV 968-

5854. BT 
Appendix C

C-28

HYDROPAC 870/87 (62) 

August 3, 1987

P 032215Z AUG 87 PSN 455045G18 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC/MONM// 

TO AIG FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN 

INFO DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC//EB/TRA/MA// 

UNCLASS 

HYDROPAC 870/87 (62). PERSIAN GULF-STRAIT OF HORMUZ-GULF OF OMANNORTH ARABIAN SEA. 

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE RECENT ATTACK ON THE USS STARK, AND THE 

CONTINUING TERRORIST THREAT IN THE REGION, U.S. NAVY VESSELS 

OPERATING WITHIN THE PERSIAN GULF, STRAIT OF HORMUZ, GULF OF OMAN 

AND THE ARABIAN SEA, NORTH OF 20 DEGREES NORTH, ARE TAKING 

ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS. IT IS REQUESTED THAT RADIO 

CONTACT BE ESTABLISHED ON VHF CHANNEL 16 (156.8 MHZ, 121:5 MHZ, OR UHF 

243.0 MHZ WHEN APPROACHING U.S. NAVAL FORCES. UNIDENTIFIED SURFACE 

OR SUBSURFACE SHIPS OR CRAFT WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE UNCLEAR OR WHO 

ARE APPROACHING U.S. NAVAL VESSELS MAY BE REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY 

THEMSELVES AND STATE THEIR INTENTIONS AS SOON AS THEY ARE DETECTED. 

IN ORDER TO AVOID INADVERTENT CONFRONTATION, SHIPS OR CRAFT, 

INCLUDING MILITARY VESSELS, MAY RE REQUESTED TO CHANGE: COURSE TO

REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF U.S. NAVY VESSELS. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO 

REQUESTS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND INTENTIONS, OR TO WARNINGS, OR A 

REQUEST TO REMAIN CLEAR, AND OPERATING IN A THREATENING MANNER 

COULD PLACE THE SHIP OR CRAFT AT RISK BY U.S. DEFENSIVE MEASURES.

ILLUMINATION OF A U.S. NAVAL VESSEL WITH A WEAPONS FIRE CONTROL 

RADAR WILL BE VIEWED WITH SUSPICION AND COULD RESULT IN IMMEDIATE 

U.S. OFFENSIVE REACTION. U.S. FORCES, ESPECIALLY WHEN OPERATING IN 

CONFINED WATERS, WILL REMAIN MINDFUL OF NAVIGATION CONSIDERATIONS 

OF SHIPS AND CRAFT IN THEIR IMMEDIATE VICINITY. 

2. THIS NOTICE IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO ADVISE THAT MEASURES IN SELF 

DEFENSE ARE BEING EXERCISED BY U.S. NAVAL FORCES IN THIS REGION. THE 

MEASURES WILL RE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT DOES NOT UNDULY 

INTERFERE WITH FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT. 

3. CANCEL HYDROPAC 1/87. BT 
Appendix C

C-29

Special Warning No. 72 

August 7, 1987 

7 August 1987 

SPECIAL WARNING NO.72. 

PERSIAN GULF-STRAIT OF HORMUZ-GULF OF OMAN. 

1. U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the waters of the 

Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, due to hostilities between Iran and 

Iraq. Mariners are further advised to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters and to remain 

outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 2 and 3 below until further notice. 

2. Iran has stated: 

A. Iranian coastal waters are war zones. 

B. Transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited. 

C. Guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf are as follows: 

after transiting the Strait of Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian ports should pass 12 

miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south of Sirri Island; south of Cable Bank Light; 12 

miles south of Farsi Island; thence west of a line connecting the points 27-55N. 49-53E. and 29 

10N. 49-12E.; thereafter south of the line 29-10N. as far as 48-40E. 

D. The government of Iran disclaims any responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply 

with the above instructions. 

E. Iranian naval forces patrol the Gulf of Oman up to 400 kilometers from the Strait of Hormuz. 

3. Iraq has stated: 

A.The area north of 29-30N. is a prohibited war zone. 

B. It will attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north and east of a line 

connecting the following points: 29-30N. 48-30E., 29-25N. 4909E., 28-23N. 49-47E., 28-23N. 

51-OOE. 

C. All tankers docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets for the Iraqi Air 

Force. 

4. Several vessels have suffered damage from moored or floating mines in the Persian Gulf. U .S. 

mariners should exercise caution in navigable waters thoughout the Gulf region and particularly 

in the following areas where moored mines have been encountered: 

A. The Mina AI Ahmadi/Mina Ash Shu’aybah Channel (28-56N. 48-53E.) and its approaches. 

B. The shipping channels south and west of Farsi Island. 

5. Mariners should be aware that Iranian naval forces visit, search and in some cases seize or 

divert to Iranian ports vessels of non-belligerents in the Persian Gulf/Gulf of Oman region. 

6. The publication of this notice is solely for the purpose of advising U.S. mariners of 

information relevant to navigational safety and in no way constitutes a legal recognition by the 

United States of the validity of any foreign rule, regulation, or proclamation so published. 

1. Cancel SPECIAL WARNING NO. 67. 
Appendix C

C-30

2. Cancel SPECIAL WARNING NO. 70. 
Appendix C

C-31

United Nations Security Resolution 660 

August 2, 1990 

Resolution 660 (1990) 

of 2 August 1990 

The Security Council, 

Alarmed by the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 by the military forces of Iraq, 

Determining that there exists a breach of international peace and security as regards the Iraqi 

invasion of Kuwait, 

Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, 

1. Condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; 

2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in 

which they were located on 1 August 1990; 

3. Calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of 

their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of 

Arab States; 

4. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the 

present resolution. 

Adopted at the 2932th meeting by 14 votes to none. One member (Yemen) did not participate in 

the vote. 
Appendix C

C-32

United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 

August 6, 1990 

Resolution 661 (1990) 

of 6 August 1990 

The Security Council, 

Reaffirming its resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 

Deeply concerned that that resolution has not been implemented and that the invasion by Iraq of 

Kuwait continues, with further loss of human life and material destruction, 

Determined to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq to an end and to restore the 

sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, 

Noting that the legitimate Government of Kuwait has expressed its readiness to comply with 

resolution 660 (1990), 

Mindful of its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of 

international peace and security, 

Affirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence, in response to the armed 

attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, 

1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 of resolution 660 ( 1990) 

and has usurped the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; 

2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to secure compliance of Iraq with 

paragraph 2 of resolution 660 (1990) and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of 

Kuwait; 

3. Decides that all States shall prevent: 

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait 

exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; 

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated 

to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products from Iraq or Kuwait; 

and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or in their territories in any commodities 

or products originating in Iraq or Kuwait and exported therefrom after the date of the present 

resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq or Kuwait for the purposes of such 

activities or dealings; 

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any 

commodities or products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or not 

originating in their territories but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, 

and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any 

person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or Kuwait, 

and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to 

promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products; 
Appendix C

C-33

4. Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of Iraq, or to any 

commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq or Kuwait, any funds or any other 

financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their 

territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to that Government 

or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to 

persons or bodies within Iraq or Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or 

humanitarian purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs; 

5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in 

accordance with the provisions of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered 

into or licence granted before the date of the present resolution; 

6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional rules of procedure, a 

Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the 

following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and 

recommendations: 

(a) To examine the reports on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution which 

will be submitted by the Secretary-General; 

(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by them concerning the 

effective implementation of the provisions laid down in the present resolution; 

7. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully with the Committee in the fulfilment of its tasks, 

including supplying such information as may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the 

present resolution; 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the Committee and to 

make the necessary arrangements in the Secretariat for that purpose; 

9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 to 8 above, nothing in the present resolution shall 

prohibit assistance to the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States: 

(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and 

its agencies; 

(b) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power; 

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress made in the 

implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted within thirty days; 

11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda and to continue its efforts to put an early end to the 

invasion by Iraq. 

Adopted at the 2933rd meeting by 13 votes to none with 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen). 
Appendix C

C-34

Special Warning No. 80 

August 17, 1990 

17 August 1990 

United States Department of the Navy 

Special Warning No. 80 

1. In response to requests from the legitimate Government of Kuwait and in exercising the 

inherent right of collective self-defense recognized under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, United 

States forces will, in cooperation with regional and allied forces, conduct a maritime operation to 

intercept the import and export of commodities and products to and from Iraq and Kuwait that 

are prohibited by UN Security Council Resolution 661. 

2. Affected areas include the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Tiran, and other choke points, key ports, 

and oil pipeline terminals. Specifically, Persian Gulf interception efforts will be concentrated in 

international waters south of 27 degrees north latitude; Red Sea interception efforts will be 

conducted in international waters north of 22 degrees north latitude. 

3. All merchant ships perceived to be proceeding to or from Iraqi or Kuwaiti ports, or 

transshipment points, and carrying embargoed material to or from Iraq or Kuwait, will be 

intercepted and may be searched. 

4. Ships which, after being intercepted, are determined to be proceeding to or from Iraq or 

Kuwait ports, or transshipment points, and carrying embargoed material to or from Iraq or 

Kuwait, will not be allowed to proceed with their planned transit. 

5. The intercepting ship may use all available communications, primarily VHF channel 16, but 

including international code signals, flag hoists, other radio equipment, signal lamps, 

loudspeakers, and other appropriate means to communicate his directions to a ship. (Safe 

navigation may require vessels to be diverted to a port or anchorage prior to conducting a 

search.) 

6. Failure of a ship to proceed as directed will result in the use of the minimum level of force 

necessary to endure compliance. 

7. Any ships, including waterborne craft and armed merchant ships, or aircraft, which threaten or 

interfere with U.S. forces engaged in enforcing this maritime interception will be considered 

hostile. 
Appendix C

C-35

United Nations Security Council Resolution 665 

August 25, 1990 

Resolution 665 (1990) 

of 25 August 1990 

The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) 

of 9 August 1990 and 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990 and demanding their full and immediate 

implementation, 

Having decided in resolution 661 (1990) to impose economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the 

Charter of the United Nations, 

Determined to bring to an end the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which imperils the existence of a 

Member State, and to restore the legitimate authority and the sovereignty, independence and 

territorial integrity of Kuwait, which requires the speedy implementation of the above-mentioned 

resolutions, 

Deploring the loss of innocent lives stemming from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and determined 

to prevent further such losses, 

Gravely alarmed that Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 

662 (1990) and 664 (1990) and in particular at the conduct of the Government of Iraq in using 

Iraqi flag vessels to export oil, 

1. Calls upon those Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait which are 

deploying maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate to the specific 

circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council to halt all inward 

and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and 

to ensure strict implementation of the provisions related to such shipping laid down in resolution 

661 (1990); 

2. Invites Member States accordingly to co-operate as may be necessary to ensure compliance 

with the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) with maximum use of political and diplomatic 

measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 above; 

3. Requests all States to provide, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, such 

assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1 above; 

4. Also requests the States concerned to co-ordinate their actions in pursuit of the above 

paragraphs of the present resolution using, as appropriate, mechanisms of the Military Staff 

Committee and, after consultation with the Secretary-General, to submit reports to the Security 

Council and the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning 

the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in order to facilitate the monitoring of the implementation 

of the present resolution;

5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 

Adopted at the 2938th meeting by 13 votes to none with 2 abstentions (Cuba and Yemen). 
Appendix C

C-36

United Nations Security Council Resolution 666 

September 13, 1990 

Resolution 666 (1990) 

of 13 September 1990 

The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of which apply, 

except in humanitarian circumstances, to foodstuffs, 

Recognizing that circumstances may arise in which it will be necessary for foodstuffs to be 

supplied to the civilian population in Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, 

Noting that in this respect the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) 

concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait has received communications from several 

Member States, 

Emphasizing that it is for the Security Council, alone or acting through the Committee, to 

determine whether humanitarian circumstances have arisen, 

Deeply concerned that Iraq has failed to comply with its obligations under Security Council 

resolution 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990 in respect of the safety and well-being of third-State 

nationals, and reaffirming that Iraq retains full responsibility in this regard under international 

humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection 

of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that in order to make the necessary determination whether or not, for the purposes of 

paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of resolution 661 (1990), humanitarian circumstances have arisen, the 

Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation 

between Iraq and Kuwait shall keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under 

constant review; 

2. Expects Iraq to comply with its obligations under resolution 664 (1990) in respect of thirdState nationals and reaffirms that Iraq remains fully responsible for their safety and well-being in 

accordance with international humanitarian law including, where applicable, the Geneva 

Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949; 

3. Requests, for the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, that the Secretary-General seek 

urgently, and on a continuing basis, information from relevant United Nations and other 

appropriate humanitarian agencies and all other sources on the availability of food in Iraq and 

Kuwait, such information to be communicated by the Secretary-General to the Committee 

regularly; 

4. Also requests that in seeking and supplying such information particular attention be paid to 

such categories of persons who might suffer specially, such as children under 15 years of age, 

expectant mothers, maternity cases, the sick and the elderly; 

5. Decides that if the Committee, after receiving the reports from the Secretary-General, 

determines that circumstances have arisen in which there is an urgent humanitarian need to 
Appendix C

C-37

supply foodstuffs to Iraq or Kuwait in order to relieve human suffering, it will report promptly to 

the Council its decision as to how such need should be met; 

6. Directs the Committee that in formulating its decisions it should bear in mind that foodstuffs 

should be provided through the United Nations in cooperation with the International Committee 

of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and distributed by them or under 

their supervision, in order to ensure that they reach the intended beneficiaries; 

7. Requests the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate the delivery and 

distribution of foodstuff to Kuwait and Iraq in accordance with the provisions of the present 

resolution and other relevant resolutions; 

8. Recalls that resolution 661 (1990) does not apply to supplies intended strictly for medical 

purposes, but in this connection recommends that medical supplies should be exported under the 

strict supervision of the Government the exporting State or by appropriate humanitarian 

agencies. 

Adopted at the 2939th meeting by 13 votes to 2 (Cuba and Yemen). 
Appendix C

C-38

Special Warning No. 53 

May 27, 1991 

O 272112Z MAY 91 

FM DMAHTC WASHINGTON DC //NVS// 

TO AIG FOUR FIVE ZERO ONE AIG FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN 

INFO DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC //EB/TT/MA// 

OSO WASHINGON DC //ASK(PA)// JCS WASHINGTON DC 

.....(OMITTED) 

BT 

UNCLAS 

SPECIAL WARNING NR 53. 

1. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY REVISED THE GUIDELINES WHICH 

IT ISSUED LAST FALL FOR THE NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY OF MERCHANT SHIPPING 

IN THE PERSIAN GULF. 

2. RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE REVISED IRANIAN GUIDELINES ARE AS 

FOLLOWS: 

---AFTER TRANSITING THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ, MERCHANT SHIPS SAILING TO 

NON-IRANIAN PORTS SHOULD PASS 12 MILES SOUTH OF ABU MUSA ISLAND; 12 

MILES SOUTH OF SIBBA ISLAND; SOUTH OF CABLE BANK LIGHT; 12 MILES SOUTH 

OF FARSI ISLAND; THENCE WEST OF A LINE CONNECTING THE PONTS 27-53N 49-

53E AND 29-10N 49-12E; THEREAFTER SOUTH OF THE LINE 29-10N AS FAR AS 40-

40E. 

--- ALL IRANIAN COASTAL WATERS ARE WAR ZONES. 

---ALL TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO TO IRAQI PORTS IS PROHIBITED. 

---THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BEAR NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR MERCHANT 

SHIPS WHICH FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS. 

3. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS STATED THAT THE AREA NORTH OF 29-30N IS A 

PROHIBITED WAR ZONE. 

4. DEEP DRAFT SHIPPING SHOULD BE AWARE OF SHOAL WATERS NEAR FARSI 

ISLAND. 

5. IN VIEW OF CONTINUED HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND RECENT 

ACTS OF INTERFERENCE OR HOSTILITY AGAINST VESSELS OF THIRD COUNTRIES, 

U.S. MARINERS ARE ADVISED, UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, TO AVOID IRANIAN OR 

IRAQI PORTS AND COASTAL WATERS, TO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE AREAS 

DELIMITED IN PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 ABOVE, AND TO BE ALERT TO POSSIBLE 

HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS, INCLUDING HOSTILE ACTIONS, WHEN TRANSITING 

THE WATERS WITHIN THE PERSIAN GULF. 
Appendix C

C-39

6. THE PUBLICATION OF THIS NOTICE IS SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADVISING 

U.S. MARINERS OF INFORMATION RELEVANT TO NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY, AND IN 

NO WAY CONSTITUTES A LEGAL RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE 

VALIDITY OF ANY FOREIGN RULE, REGULATION, OR PROCLAMATION SO 

PUBLISHED. 

7. CANCEL SPECIAL WARNING NR 51. 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TRAILER: ALL U.S. FLAG MERCHANT SHIPS IN THE 

PERSIAN GULF AREA ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE THROUGH THE 

SAME COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS USED FOR USMER REPORTS. 

BT 
Appendix C

C-40

United Nations Security Council Resolution 787 

November 16, 1992 

Excerpt from 

RESOLUTION 787 (1992) 

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3137th meeting, on 16 November 1992

The Security Council, 

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant 

resolutions, 

Reaffirming its determination that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 

constitutes a threat to the peace, and reaffirming that the provision of humanitarian assistance in 

the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important element in the Security Council’s effort 

to restore peace and security in the region, 

Deeply concerned at the threats to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, which, as a State Member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in 

the Charter of the United Nations, 

Reaffirming also its full support for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia as 

the framework within which an overall political settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia 

may be achieved, and for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the 

Conference, 

Recalling the decision by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to examine the 

possibility of promoting safe areas for humanitarian purposes, 

Recalling the commitments entered into by the parties and others concerned within the 

framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 

Reiterating its call on all parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen 

of the Steering Committee, 

Noting the progress made so far within the framework of the International Conference, including 

the Joint Declarations signed at Geneva on 30 September 1992 and 20 October 1992 by the 

Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro); the Joint Statement made at Geneva on 19 October 1992 by the Presidents of the 

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 

Montenegro); the Joint Communiqué issued on 1 November 1992 at Zagreb by the Presidents of 

the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the establishment of the 

Mixed Military Working Group in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the production 

of a draft outline constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 

Noting with grave concern the report of the Special Rapporteur appointed following a special 

session of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate the human rights situation in the 

former Yugoslavia, which makes clear that massive and systematic violations of human rights 

and grave violations of international humanitarian law continue in the Republic of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, 
Appendix C

C-41

Welcoming the deployment of additional elements of the United Nations Protection Force for the 

protection of humanitarian activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance 

with its resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992, 

Deeply concerned about reports of continuing violations of the embargo imposed by its 

resolutions 713 (1991) and 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, 

Deeply concerned also about reports of violations of the measures imposed by its resolution 757 

(1992) of 30 May 1992, 

......... 

12. Acting under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, calls upon States, 

acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to use such measures 

commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the 

Security Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify 

their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 

713 (1991) and 757 (1992); 

......... 
Appendix C

C-42

United Nations Security Council Resolution 917 May 6, 1994 

Excerpt from RESOLUTION 917 (1994) 

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3376th meeting, 

on 6 May 1994 

The Security Council, 

Reaffirming its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993) of 27 August 1993, 862 

(1993) of 31 August 1993, 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, 

875 (1993) of 16 October 1993 and 905 (1994) of 23 March 1994, 

Recalling its Presidential statements of 11 October 1993 (S/26567), 25 October 1993 (S/26633), 

30 October 1993 (S/26668), 15 November 1993 (S/ 26747) and 10 January 1994 

(S/PRST/1994/2), 

Noting resolutions MRE/RES.1/91, MRE/RES.2/91, MRE/RES.3/92, MRE/RES.4/92, and 

MRE/RES.5/ 93, adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, and 

resolutions CP/RES.575 (885/92) and CP/RES.594 (923/92) and declarations CP/Dec.8 (927/93), 

CP/Dec.9 (931/93), CP/Dec.10 (934/93) and CP/Dec.15 (967/93), adopted by the Permanent 

Council of the Organization of American States, 

Noting in particular resolution CP/RES.610 (968/93) of 18 October 1993 of the Organization of 

American States, 

Bearing in mind the statement of conclusions adopted at the Meeting of the Four Friends of the 

Secretary-General on Haiti, held in Paris on 13 and 14 December 1993 (S/26881), 

Having examined the reports of the Secretary-General of 19 January 1994 (S/1994/54) and 18 

March 1994 (S/1994/311) regarding the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 

Commending the continuing efforts undertaken by the Special Envoy for Haiti of the SecretariesGeneral of the United Nations and the Organization of American States to bring about 

compliance with the Governors Island Agreement and the full restoration of democracy in Haiti, 

Reaffirming that the goal of the international community remains the restoration of democracy in 

Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, under 

the framework of the Governors Island Agreement, 

Stressing in this context the importance of a proper and secure environment for all legislative 

action agreed to in the Governors Island Agreement and the New York Pact, as well as 

preparations for free and fair legislative elections in Haiti, as called for in the constitution, in the 

framework of the full restoration of democracy in Haiti, Concerned at the continued failure of the 

military authorities in Haiti, including the police, to comply with their obligations under the 

Governors Island Agreement, and at the violations of the related New York Pact committed by 

political organizations party thereto in relation to the disputed elections of 18 January 1993, 

Strongly condemning the numerous instances of extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, illegal 

detentions, abductions, rape and enforced disappearances, the continued denial of freedom of 

expression, and the impunity with which armed civilians have been able to operate and continue 

operating, 
Appendix C

C-43

Recalling that in resolution 873 (1993) the Council confirmed its readiness to consider the 

imposition of additional measures if the military authorities in Haiti continued to impede the 

activities of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) or failed to comply in full with its 

relevant resolutions and the provisions of the Governors Island Agreement, 

Reaffirming its determination that, in these unique and exceptional circumstances, the situation 

created by the failure of the military authorities in Haiti to fulfil their obligations under the 

Governors Island Agreement and to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions 

constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region, 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

....... 

9. Decides to prohibit any and all traffic from entering or leaving the territory or territorial sea of 

Haiti carrying commodities or products the export of which from Haiti or the sale or supply of 

which to Haiti would be prohibited under paragraphs 6 and 7 above, excepting regularly 

scheduled maritime shipping lines calling in Haiti with goods permitted under paragraph 7 and 

which are also carrying other commodities or products in transit to other destinations, subject to 

formal monitoring arrangements established with States cooperating with the legitimate 

Government of Haiti as provided in paragraph 1 of resolution 875 (1993) and paragraph 10 

below; 

....... 
Appendix C

C-44

Request Safety Broadcast Notice to Mariners 

November 30, 2000 

P 302137Z NOV 00 

FM COGARD MSO NEW ORLEANS LA//OPS// 

TO COMCOGARDGRU NEW ORLEANS LA I

NFO CCGDEIGHT NEW ORLEANS LA//M/CC/OB// 

COGARD ANT NEW ORLEANS LA 

COGARD STA NEW ORLEANS LA

COGARD MSD BATON ROUGE LA 

NAVSUPPACT NEW ORLEANS LA 

CDRUSAED NEW ORLEANS LA/ /CEMVN-OD-T// 

COGARD ANT VENI CE LA 

COGARD STA VENICE LA 

BT 

UNCLAS VOL CC //N16502// 

SUBJ: REQUEST SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS 

1. BROADCAST UPON RECEIPT AND EVERY SCHEDULED BROADCAST UNTIL 

CANCELLED. 

2. QUOTE: THE COAST GUARD CAPTAIN OF THE PORT NEW ORLEANS, UNDER THE 

AUTHORITY OF THE PORTS & WATERWAYS SAFETY ACT HAS ESTABLISHED A 

SAFETY ZONE FROM MILE MARKER 17, LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER, ABOVE HEAD 

OF PASSES TO MILE MARKER 30, LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER, ABOVE HEAD OF 

PASSES, DUE TO OIL SPILL CLEAN UP OPERATIONS. COMMENCING AT 1600 

LOCAL, ALL VESSELS REQUIRING TRANSIT THROUGH THE SAFETY ZONE MUST 

CONTACT THE NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE ON CHANNEL 12 VHF 

ONE HOUR PRIOR TO EXPECTED ARRIVAL AT THE SAFETY ZONE. 

3. THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS ARE IN EFFECT: 

A. ALL NORTH BOUND AND SOUTH BOUND VESSELS PLANNING TO ENTER THE 

SAFETY ZONE MUST GUARD CHANNEL 12 VHF. 

B. ALL VESSELS SHALL TRANSIT THE SAFETY ZONE AT THEIR SLOWEST SAFE 

SPEED AND MINIMIZE THEIR WAKE. 

C. ALL NORTH AND SOUTH BOUND TRAFFIC MUST STAY AS CLOSE TO THE LEFT 

DESCENDING BANK AS SAFE NAVIGATION PERMITS. 

D. THERE SHALL BE NO OVERTAKING OR MEETING WITHIN THE SAFETY ZONE. 

E. NO VESSEL WILL BE ALLOWED TO ENTER THE SAFETY ZONE WITHOUT 

PERMISSION OF THE NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE. 

4. ANY SOUTH OR NORTH BOUND TOW VESSEL WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF 

THE SAFETY ZONE MAY CONTACT NEW ORLEANS VESSEL TRAFFIC SERVICE ON 

CHANNEL 12 VHF AND REQUEST TRANSIT THROUGH THE SAFETY ZONE. 

UNQUOTE. 
Appendix C

C-45

5. IN EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 

BT 

NNNN 
Appendix C

C-46

Special Warning No. 115 

February 16, 2001 

16 February 2001 

Special Warning No. 115 

Persian Gulf 

1. IN THE PERSIAN GULF, MULTI-NATIONAL NAVAL UNITS CONTINUE TO 

CONDUCT A MARITIME OPERATION TO INTERCEPT THE IMPORT AND EXPORT OF 

COMMODITIES AND PRODUCTS TO/ FROM IRAQ THAT ARE PROHIBITED BY UN 

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 661 AND 687. 

2. VESSELS TRANSITING THE PERSIAN GULF AND GULF OF OMAN CAN EXPECT 

TO BE QUERIED AND, IF BOUND FOR OR DEPARTING FROM IRAQ OR THE SHATTAL-ARAB WATERWAY, ALSO INTERCEPTED AND BOARDED. SAFE NAVIGATION 

MAY REQUIRE VESSELS TO BE DIVERTED TO A PORT OR ANCHORAGE PRIOR TO 

CONDUCTING AN INSPECTION. 

3. MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS IN THE RED SEA, STRAIT OF TIRAN 

AND STRAIT OF HORMUZ HAVE CEASED. CARGO BOUND FOR AQABA OR 

TRANSSHIPMENT FROM AQABA MAY BE INSPECTED ON SHORE ACCORDING TO 

AN AGREEMENT WORKED OUT BY THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE AND 

JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES. 

4. DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NAVAL REGIME IN THE PERSIAN 

GULF AND THE SHORE-BASED REGIME IN AQABA ARE IDENTICAL AND CAN BE 

FOUND IN THE MOST RECENT HYDROPACS COVERING THE ENFORCEMENT OF UN 

SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. 

5. STOWAGE AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR VESSELS TRANSITING THE 

PERSIAN GULF CAN ALSO BE FOUND IN THE MOST RECENT HYDROPACS 

COVERING THE ENFORCEMENT OF UN SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ. 

6. SHIPS WHICH, AFTER BEING INTERCEPTED, ARE DETERMINED TO BE IN 

VIOLATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 661 WILL NOT BE ALLOWED 

TO PROCEED WITH THEIR PLANNED TRANSIT. 

7. THE INTERCEPTING SHIP MAY USE ALL AVAILABLE COMMUNICATIONS, 

PRIMARILY VHF CHANNEL 16, BUT INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL CODE OF 

SIGNALS, FLAG HOISTS, OTHER RADIO EQUIPMENT, SIGNAL LAMPS, 

LOUDSPEAKERS, BOW SHOTS, AND OTHER APPROPRIATE MEANS TO 

COMMUNICATE DIRECTIONS TO A SHIP. 

8. FAILURE OF A SHIP TO PROCEED AS DIRECTED WILL RESULT IN THE USE OF 

THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF FORCE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE. 

9. ANY SHIPS, INCLUDING WATERBORNE CRAFT AND ARMED MERCHANT SHIPS, 

OR AIRCRAFT, WHICH THREATEN OR INTERFERE WITH MULTINATIONAL FORCES 

ENGAGED IN ENFORCING A MARITIME INTERCEPTION MAY BE CONSIDERED 

HOSTILE. 

10. CANCEL SPECIAL WARNING 100. 
Appendix C

C-47

United States Special Broadcast Warning to Mariners 

November 16, 2001 

16 November 2001 

Special Warning No. 120 

Worldwide 

1. DUE TO RECENT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE AMERICAN 

HOMELAND, U.S. FORCES WORLDWIDE ARE OPERATING AT A HEIGHTENED 

STATE OF READINESS AND TAKING ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS 

AGAINST TERRORIST AND OTHER POTENTIAL THREATS. CONSEQUENTLY, ALL 

AIRCRAFT, SURFACE VESSELS, AND SUBSURFACE VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. 

FORCES ARE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH U.S. FORCES ON 

BRIDGE-TO-BRIDGE CHANNEL 16, INTERNATIONAL AIR DISTRESS (121.5 MHZ 

VHF) OR MILAIR DISTRESS (243.0 MHZ UHF). 

2. U.S. FORCES WILL EXERCISE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE IF 

WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AIRCRAFT, SURFACE VESSELS, AND 

SUBSURFACE VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. FORCES WILL, BY MAKING PRIOR 

CONTACT AS DESCRIBED ABOVE, HELP MAKE THEIR INTENTIONS CLEAR AND 

AVOID UNNECESSARY INITIATION OF SUCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES. 

3. U.S. FORCES, ESPECIALLY WHEN OPERATING IN CONFINED WATERS, SHALL 

REMAIN MINDFUL OF NAVIGATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF AIRCRAFT, SURFACE 

VESSELS, AND SUBSURFACE VESSELS IN THEIR IMMEDIATE VICINITY. 

4. NOTHING IN THE SPECIAL WARNING IS INTENDED TO IMPEDE OR OTHERWISE 

INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OR OVERFLIGHT OF ANY 

VESSEL OR AIRCRAFT, OR TO LIMIT OR EXPAND THE INHERENT SELF-DEFENSE 

RIGHTS OF U.S. FORCES. THIS SPECIAL WARNING IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO 

ADVISE OF THE HEIGHTENED STATE OF READINESS OF U.S. FORCES AND TO 

REQUEST THAT RADIO CONTACT BE MAINTAINED AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. 

(Issued 162045Z NOV 2001) 
Appendix C

C-48

HYDROPAC 205/2002 (Part I) 

HYDROPAC 2006/2002 (Part II) 

February 1, 2002 

IRAQ EMBARGO. 

HYDROLANT 245/2002 (GEN). 

HYDROLANT 245/2002 (GEN). 

(011310Z FEB 2002)

1. SUMMARY: THE NAVAL INTERCEPTION EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED 

NATIONS SANCTIONS PERTAINING TO IRAQ CONTINUES IN THE ARABIAN GULF 

AND OTHER AREAS WHERE VESSELS ARE INBOUND TO OR OUTBOUND FROM 

IRAQ. CARGO BOUND FOR AQABA OR TRANSSHIPMENT FROM AQABA WILL 

NORMALLY BE INSPECTED ASHORE BY A TEAM CONSISTING OF LLOYD’S 

REGISTER AND THE AQABA PORT AUTHORITY. VESSELS TRAVERSING THE 

NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF, THE SHATT ALARAB WATERWAY OR KHAWR ABDALLAH WATERWAY SHOULD EXPECT TO BE QUERIED AND IF BOUND FOR OR 

DEPARTING IRAQI PORTS, BOARDED BY MULTINATIONAL NAVAL UNITS 

ENFORCING UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS. DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 

FOR THE OFFICIALS IN AQABA AND THE NAVAL UNITS IN THE ARABIAN GULF 

ARE IDENTICAL. IRAQ-BOUND CARGOES OTHER THAN APPROVED FOOD, 

MEDICAL SUPPLIES OR HUMANITARIAN ITEMS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO PASS. 

VESSELS NOT IN POSSESSION OF APPROPRIATE AUTHORIZATION LETTERS FROM 

THE UNITED NATIONS MAY BE SUBJECT TO DELAY UNTIL PROPER 

DOCUMENTATION IS OBTAINED. ALL GOODS SENT INTO IRAQ UNDER THE OILFOR-FOOD PROGRAM REQUIRE A UNITED NATIONS AUTHORIZATION LETTER. 

ALL GOODS SENT LEGALLY INTO IRAQ OUTSIDE THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM, 

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FOOD AND MEDICINE, REQUIRE A UNITED NATIONS 

AUTHORIZATION LETTER. FOOD AND MEDICINE ARE NOT SUBJECT TO UNITED 

NATIONS SANCTIONS AND ARE NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE A UNITED NATIONS 

AUTHORIZATION LETTER UNLESS THEY ARE BEING SENT IN UNDER THE OILFOR-FOOD PROGRAM. 

2. UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 986 AND SUBSEQUENT 

RESOLUTIONS, THE OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OILFOR-FOOD DOES NOT AFFECT THE MISSION OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCES 

OPERATING UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF UNSCR 661 (1990), UNSCR 665 (1990), AND 

OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS. THE OPERATING PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN 

THIS NOTICE ACCOUNT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF UNSCR 986 AND 

SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS. SHIPS TRAVERSING THE ENFORCEMENT AREA IN 

THE ARABIAN GULF SHOULD EXPECT DELAYS STEMMING FROM MARITIME 

INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS. STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE PROCEDURES IN THIS 

NOTICE WILL MINIMIZE ANY DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH SEABORNE 

INSPECTIONS. 

3. THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE IN EFFECT FOR ALL IRAQBOUND 

SHIPPING TRAVERSING THE MARITIME INTERCEPTION OPERATIONS AREA IN THE 

ARABIAN GULF: 
Appendix C

C-49

A. NOTIFICATION: A MINIMUM OF 72 HOURS ADVANCE NOTIFICATION IS 

REQUIRED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AT THE ENFORCEMENT AREA. CONTACT THE 

MARITIME INTERCEPTION FORCES (MIF) COORDINATOR, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, 

CENTRAL COMMAND (BAHRAIN) BY FAX: 973 724 344 OR 973 724 334 OR LETTER 

(SEE PARAGRAPH 8). THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION MUST BE INCLUDED: 

(1) VESSEL NAME. 

(2) VESSEL FLAG. 

(3) INTERNATIONAL RADIO CALL SIGN. 

(4) ITINERARY, INCLUDING PORT OF CARGO ORIGIN. 

(5) DESCRIPTION OF CARGO. 

(6) VOLUME OF CARGO. 

(7) NUMBER OF HOLDS. 

(8) DIMENSIONS OF HOLDS. 

(9) IDENTIFICATION OF THE VESSEL’S SHIPPING AGENT. 

(10) IDENTIFICATION OF THE VESSEL’S OWNERS. 

(11) IF REQUIRED (REFER TO PARAGRAPH 1), UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 

COUNCIL LETTER SHOWING SERIAL NUMBER, ISSUE DATE AND EXPIRATION 

DATE. 

(12) ESTIMATED ARRIVAL DATE AND TIME AT THE CHECKPOINT (SEE 

PARAGRAPH 3.C). 

B. CARGO CONFIGURATION: ALL CARGO MUST BE ACCESSIBLE FOR INSPECTION 

AT SEA. CARGO CARRIERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR LOADING CARGOES TO 

ENSURE ACCESSIBILITY. THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC GUIDANCE APPLIES: 

(1) CONTAINERIZED CARGO: CARGO CONTAINERS MUST NOT BE STACKED MORE 

THAN THREE HIGH FROM THE DECK. AS A SAFETY PRECAUTION TO PROTECT 

INSPECTION TEAMS, CONTAINERS STACKED MORE THAN THREE HIGH WILL BE 

CONSIDERED INACCESSIBLE. THIS PROVISION APPLIES TO BOTH INTERNAL AND 

DECK-LOADED CONTAINERS. 

(2) BREAK BULK: PACKAGED OR BAGGED CARGO MUST BE LOADED IN A 

MANNER WHICH PERMITS THOROUGH INSPECTION. PALLETIZED ROWS OF 

CARGO REQUIRE ADEQUATE SEPARATION TO ALLOW FOR SAFE ACCESS. 

(3) LOOSE BULK: LOOSE BULK CARGO MUST BE ACCESSIBLE FOR PHYSICAL AND 

VISUAL INSPECTION, VERIFICATION OF MEASUREMENT SOUNDINGS AND 

SAMPLING. HATCH COVERS MUST BE OPENED TO ALLOW FOR THOROUGH 

INSPECTION. 

(4) IF A VESSEL’S CARGO IS DEEMED INACCESSIBLE FOR INSPECTION, THE 

VESSEL MAY BE DIRECTED TO RETURN TO A PORT WHERE ACCEPTABLE CARGO 

LOADING CAN BE ARRANGED. 
Appendix C

C-50

C. CHECKPOINT: VESSELS BOUND FOR OR DEPARTING FROM IRAQI PORTS OR 

THE MINA AL-BAKR OIL TERMINAL MUST PASS WITHIN A FIVE NAUTICAL MILE 

RADIUS OF LATITUDE TWENTYNINE DEGREES TWELVE MINUTES NORTH AND 

LONGITUDE FORTYNINE DEGREES TWENTY MINUTES EAST (29-12N 049-20E). 

APPROACHING VESSELS SHOULD CONTACT THE MIF COMMANDER ON 

BRIDGETO-BRIDGE RADIO, CHANNEL 16, WHEN WITHIN FIVE NAUTICAL MILES 

OF THIS POINT. VESSELS WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED FROM THIS 

POINT UNTIL CLEARED BY THE MIF COMMANDER. VESSELS CONTAINING 

CARGOES FOR DESTINATIONS OTHER THAN IRAQ WILL NOT BE ALLOWED 

PASSAGE INTO IRAQ. 

D. VESSEL TONNAGE LIMIT: VESSELS UNDER 30,000 DWT WILL NOT BE 

AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED TO MINA AL-BAKR FOR THE PURPOSE OF LOADING 

PETROLEUM CARGOES. 

E. DOCUMENTATION: VESSEL DOCUMENTATION MUST CONFORM TO THE 

FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS: 

(1) AN ORIGINAL MANIFEST LIST, DESCRIBING THE CARGO AS WELL AS IT’S 

LOCATION IN THE SHIP, MUST BE ON BOARD. THE ORIGINAL MANIFEST MUST 

INCLUDE THE PORT OF ORIGIN, PORTS OF CALL, COMPLETE BUSINESS NAMES 

AND ADDRESSES OF ALL SHIPPERS AND CONSIGNEES AND A FINAL 

DESTINATION OF ALL CARGO. A COMPLETE BUSINESS ADDRESS MUST INCLUDE 

EITHER THE STREET ADDRESS, A PROMINENT IDENTIFIABLE GEOGRAPHIC 

LOCATION OR A POST OFFICE BOX PLUS A TELEPHONE NUMBER OR FAX 

NUMBER. 

(2) CARGO ADDRESSED TO A FREE-TRADE ZONE MUST HAVE THE NAME, 

ADDRESS, TELEPHONE OR FAX NUMBER OF THE CONSIGNEE TAKING CUSTODY 

OF THE CONTAINER OR CARGO. 

(3) CONSIGNEE NAMES AND ADDRESSES ON ALL CARGO MUST MATCH THE 

MANIFEST. 

(4) THE MANIFEST MUST BE SIGNED IN THE ORIGINAL BY THE VESSEL’S MASTER 

OR CHIEF MATE. THE MANIFEST MAY BE ON SHIPPER’S LETTERHEAD, FAX, 

PHOTOCOPY OR COMPUTER PRINTOUT, BUT IT MUST BEAR AN ORIGINAL 

SIGNATURE, CONTAIN ALL THE INFORMATION LISTED ABOVE AND OTHERWISE 

COMPLY WITH NORMAL MARITIME TRANSPORT PRACTICE. 

(5) THE ORIGINAL MANIFEST MAY CONSIST OF MORE THAN ONE DOCUMENT IF 

THERE ARE AMENDMENTS THAT LIST CARGO DROPPED OFF AT A GIVEN PORT 

OR CORRECT THE ORIGINAL MANIFEST. THESE AMENDMENTS MAY ORIGINATE 

FROM THE SHIPPER OR CARRIER. SINCE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS MAY BE 

TRANSMITTED TO A VESSEL BY SUCH MEANS AS TELEGRAM OR FAX, THEY 

NEED NOT BEAR AN ORIGINAL SIGNATURE. HOWEVER, THE MASTER IS 

REQUIRED TO CERTIFY IN WRITING THAT THE AMENDED MANIFEST 

ACCURATELY REFLECTS WHAT IS ON BOARD THE VESSEL. THE UNDERLYING 

REQUIREMENTS ARE FOR ACCURATE DOCUMENTATION OF CARGO AND 
Appendix C

C-51

DESTINATION AND FOR A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE DOCUMENTS 

ARE AUTHENTIC. 

(6) IF APPLICABLE, THE CARGO DOCUMENTATION MUST INCLUDE A COPY OF 

THE AUTHORIZATION ISSUED BY THE U.N. PURSUANT TO UNSCR 661 OR UNSCR 

986 AND SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS. REFER TO PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE FOR 

SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS. 

4. VESSEL PRE-CLEARANCE: 

A. OIL TANKERS INBOUND TO THE MINA AL-BAKR TERMINAL PURSUANT TO U.N. 

AUTHORIZATION UNDER UNSCR 986 AND SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS WILL 

NORMALLY BE AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED UNINTERRUPTED THROUGH THE 

CHECKPOINT DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 3.C. ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AND 

CHECK-IN ON CHANNEL 16 ARE STILL REQUIRED. 

B. VESSELS TRANSPORTING BULK HUMANITARIAN CARGOES ARE INVITED TO 

CONTACT THE MIF COORDINATOR PRIOR TO SAILING TO EXPLORE PRECLEARANCE OPTIONS WHICH USE VOYAGE MONITORING METHODS AND CARGO 

LOADING CERTIFICATION FROM APPROVED AGENTS. THE MIF COORDINATOR 

MAY CONSIDER ALTERNATE PRE-CLEARANCE PROCEDURES ON A CASE-BY-CASE 

BASIS. 

C. NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRE-CLEARANCE OPTIONS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE 

MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCES RETAIN THE RIGHT UNDER UNSCR 665 AND 

OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS TO CONDUCT DOCUMENT CHECKS AND AT-SEA 

INSPECTIONS OF ANY VESSEL WHEN DEEMED NECESSARY. 

5. INCOMPLETE DOCUMENTATION: IRAQ-BOUND VESSELS WHICH ARE 

DETERMINED TO HAVE INCOMPLETE CARGO MANIFESTS OR TO BE OTHERWISE 

IN VIOLATION OF REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN THIS ADVISORY, MAY BE DETAINED 

BY THE NAVAL FORCES OR DIVERTED TO A NON-IRAQ PORT UNTIL 

APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS ARE MET. 

6. PETROLEUM EXPORTS AND BUNKER FUEL NOT APPROVED BY THE U.N: 

OUTBOUND VESSELS ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH BY THE MIF. IF AN INTERCEPTED 

VESSEL IS SUSPECTED TO BE CARRYING A CARGO OF IRAQI PETROLEUM, 

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS OR HAS TAKEN ON IRAQI BUNKER FUEL WITHOUT U.N. 

AUTHORIZATION, THE MIF WILL TAKE CARGO AND BUNKER FUEL SAMPLES FOR 

LABORATORY ANALYSIS, EXAMINATION, AND COMPARISON WITH IRAQI 

CONTROL SAMPLES. VESSELS SUSPECTED OF VIOLATING U.N. SANCTIONS MAY 

BE DETAINED, AND IF IT IS DETERMINED THAT A PETROLEUM CARGO IS OF 

IRAQI ORIGIN, THE CARGO WILL BE SEIZED AND DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE 

WITH UNSCR 778. IN SUCH CASES THE VESSEL ITSELF AND CREW MAY BE 

SUBJECT TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY AN ACCEPTING U.N. MEMBER STATE. 

7. CRUISE AND PASSENGER SHIPS: CRUISE OR PASSENGER SHIPS TRAVERSING 

THE MIF ENFORCEMENT AREA WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING 

REQUIREMENTS: 
Appendix C

C-52

A. VESSELS WITH NO COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRYING CAPACITY MAY 

ARRANGE FOR AN EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT THROUGH THE ENFORCEMENT AREA 

BY FORWARDING CERTIFICATION FROM A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES (IACS) THAT THE SHIP HAS NO 

SUCH CAPACITY. THE CERTIFICATION MUST BE SENT BY LETTER OR FAX AT 

LEAST SIXTY DAYS PRIOR TO TRANSIT. 

B. A PASSENGER VESSEL ARRIVING IN THE ENFORCEMENT AREA WHICH HAS 

NOT COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF PARAGRAPH 7.A WILL BE 

BOARDED AND INSPECTED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. IF IT IS DETERMINED 

THAT THE VESSEL HAS NO COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRYING CAPACITY, IT’S 

IDENTIFICATION WILL BE RECORDED SO THAT IT MAY BE VISUALLY IDENTIFIED 

AND NOT BOARDED DURING SUBSEQUENT TRANSITS. 

8. FOR MERCHANT ADVISORY UPDATES, VESSELS SHOULD CONTACT THE 

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND, MARITIME 

INTERCEPTION COORDINATOR (N31CG), FPO AE 09501 6008, PHONE: 973 724839 OR 

973 724841. FAX: 973 724344 OR 973 724334. 

9. CANCEL HYDROPAC 170/01 AND 171/01. 
Appendix C

C-53

HYDROLANT 271/03 

February 5, 2003 

HYDROLANT 271/03(GEN). MEDITERRANEAN SEA. 

(051340Z FEB 2003)

1. U.S. FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA ARE OPERATING AT A HEIGHTENED 

STATE OF READINESS AND TAKING ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS 

AGAINST TERRORIST AND OTHER POTENTIAL THREATS. ALL AIRCRAFT OR 

SURFACE VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. FORCES ARE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN 

RADIO CONTACT WITH U.S. FORCES ON BRIDGE-TO-BRIDGE CHANNEL 16, 

INTERNATIONAL AIR DISTRESS (121.5 MHZ VHF) OR MILAIR DISTRESS (243.0 MHZ 

UHF). 

2. U.S. FORCES WILL EXERCISE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE IF 

WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES. AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE VESSELS 

APPROACHING U.S. FORCES WILL HELP MAKE THEIR INTENTIONS CLEAR AND 

AVOID UNNECESSARY INITIATION OF SUCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY MAKING 

PRIOR CONTACT AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. 

3. NOTHING IN THIS WARNING IS INTENDED TO IMPEDE OR OTHERWISE 

INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OR OVERFLIGHT OF ANY 

VESSEL OR AIRCRAFT, OR TO LIMIT OR EXPAND THE INHERENT SELF-DEFENSE 

RIGHTS OF U.S. FORCES. THIS WARNING IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO ADVISE OF 

THE HEIGHTENED STATE OF READINESS OF U.S. FORCES AND TO REQUEST THAT 

RADIO CONTACT BE MAINTAINED AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. 

4. SPECIAL WARNING NUMBER 120 REFERS. 
Appendix C

C-54

HYDROLANT 433/2003 

February 25, 2003 

HYDROLANT 433/2003(GEN). FRANCE. 

(251140Z FEB 2003)

THE AUTHORITIES OF FRANCE ADVISE THAT SINGLE-HULL OIL TANKERS, MORE 

THAN 15 YEARS OLD, CARRYING HEAVY FUEL, TAR, ASPHALTIC BITUMEN OR 

HEAVY CRUDE OIL ENTERING INTO THE ECONOMIC EXCLUSIVE ZONE, ARE 

SUBJECT TO 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION TO RELEVANT FRENCH MRCC (CORSEN, 

JOBOURG OR GRIS NEZ) AND ARE STRICTLY CONTROLLED. 
Appendix C

C-55

HYDROLANT 509/03 

March 6, 2003 

UNCLAS 

061620Z MAR 03 

FM NIMA NAVSAFETY BETHESDA MD// 

MSGID/GENADMIN/NIMA NAVSAFETY BETHESDA MD// RMKS/ 

HYDROLANT 509/03(54,56) .EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA. 

1. U.S. FORCES ARE CONDUCTING COMBAT TRAINING EXERCISES IN 

INTERNATIONAL WATERS OFF THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN COAST OF CYPRUS 

UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. COMBAT EXERCISE ACTIVITIES MAY POSE A HAZARD 

TO NAVIGATION. ALL VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO NAVIGATE WITH EXTREME 

CAUTION. 

2. REQUEST SURFACE VESSELS WITH DESTINATIONS AT PORTS IN 

SOUTHWESTERN TURKEY, NORTH AND EASTERN CYPRUS OR SYRIA REMAIN 

CLEAR OF THE FOLLOWING DESIGNATED OPERATING AREAS: 

A. OPAREA ONE: 36-30N 034-40E, 36-12N 035-30E, 35-50N 035-30E, 35-50N 034-54E, 36-

00N 034-36E, 35-45N 034-00E, 35-55N 034-00E. 

B. OPAREA TWO: 35-25N 034-40E, 35-25N 035-30E, 34-40N 035-35E, 34-10N 035-10E, 34-

10N 033-55E, 34-25N 033-55E, 34-55N 034-25E, 35-15N 034-25E. 

3. DURING THESE COMBAT TRAINING EXERCISES U.S. FORCES WILL BE 

OPERATING AT A HEIGHTENED STATE OF READINESS AND TAKING ADDITIONAL 

DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST TERRORIST AND OTHER POTENTIAL 

THREATS. SURFACE VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. FORCES ARE REQUESTED TO 

MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH U.S. FORCES ON BRIDGE-TO-BRIDGE CHANNEL 

16. 

4. U.S. FORCES WILL EXERCISE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE IF 

WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES. SURFACE VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. 

FORCES SHOULD MAKE THEIR INTENTIONS CLEAR AND AVOID UNNECESSARY 

INITIATION OF SUCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY INITIATING RADIO CONTACT AS 

DESCRIBED ABOVE. 

5. NOTHING IN THIS WARNING IS INTENDED TO IMPEDE OR OTHERWISE 

INTERFERE WITH THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. OF ANY VESSEL, OR TO LIMIT 

OR EXPAND THE INHERENT SELFDEFENSE RIGHTS OF U.S. FORCES. THIS 

WARNING IS PUBLISHED SOLELY TO ADVISE OF THE HEIGHTENED STATE OF 

READINESS OF U.S. FORCES AND TO REQUEST THAT RADIO CONTACT BE 

MAINTAINED AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. 

6. CANCEL HYDROLANT 499/03.// 
Appendix C

C-56

Special Warning 121 Persian Gulf 

March 20, 2003 

Special Warning 121 Persian Gulf 

(200120Z MAR 2003) 

1. COALITION NAVAL FORCES MAY CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE 

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA, RED SEA, GULF OF ADEN, ARABIAN SEA, GULF 

OF OMAN, AND ARABIAN GULF. THE TIMELY AND ACCURATE IDENTIFICATION 

OF ALL VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT IN THESE AREAS ARE CRITICAL TO AVOID THE 

INADVERTENT USE OF FORCE. 

2. ALL VESSELS ARE ADVISED THAT COALITION NAVAL FORCES ARE PREPARED 

TO EXERCISE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE TO ENSURE THEIR 

SAFETY IN THE EVENT THEY ARE APPROACHED BY VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT. 

COALITION FORCES ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND DECISIVELY TO ANY HOSTILE 

ACTS OR INDICATIONS OF HOSTILE INTENT. ALL MARITIME VESSELS OR 

ACTIVITIES THAT ARE DETERMINED TO BE THREATS TO COALITION NAVAL 

FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO DEFENSIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING BOARDING, 

SEIZURE, DISABLING OR DESTRUCTION, WITHOUT REGARD TO REGISTRY OR 

LOCATION. CONSEQUENTLY, SURFACE VESSELS, SUBSURFACE VESSELS, AND 

ALL AIRCRAFT APPROACHING COALITION NAVAL FORCES ARE ADVISED TO 

MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT ON BRIDGE-TO-BRIDGE CHANNEL 16, 

INTERNATIONAL AIR DISTRESS (121.5 MHZ VHF) OR MILITARY AIR DISTRESS 

(243.0 MHZ UHF). 

3. VESSELS OPERATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA, 

RED SEA, GULF OF OMAN, ARABIAN SEA, AND ARABIAN GULF ARE SUBJECT TO 

QUERY, BEING STOPPED, BOARDED AND SEARCHED BY US/COALITION 

WARSHIPS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ. VESSELS 

FOUND TO BE CARRYING CONTRABAND BOUND FOR IRAQ OR CARRYING 

AND/OR LAYING NAVAL MINES ARE SUBJECT TO DETENTION, SEIZURE AND 

DESTRUCTION. THIS NOTICE IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND WILL REMAIN IN 

EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 
Appendix C

C-57

HYDROLANT 597/03 (54, 56) 

March 20, 2003 

HYDROLANT 597/03(54,56). EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA. 

(202135Z MAR 2003)

1. U.S. FORCES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN HAVE ESTABLISHED A 

MARITIME SAFETY ZONE AND ARE CONDUCTING COMBAT OPERATIONS IN 

INTERNATIONAL WATERS THAT POSE A HAZARD TO NAVIGATION. ALL VESSELS 

ARE ADVISED TO EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION AND TO REMAIN CLEAR OF THE 

FOLLOWING DESIGNATED OPERATION AREA BOUND BY 32-28.0N 033-22.0E, 31-

40.0N 033-22.0E, 31-55.0N 032-20.0E, 32-46.8N 032-20.0E. 

2. ALL VESSELS SHOULD MAINTAIN A SAFE DISTANCE FROM U.S.FORCES SO 

THAT INTENTIONS ARE CLEAR AND UNDERSTOOD BY U.S. FORCES. VESSELS 

THAT ENTER THE MARITIME SAFETY ZONE WHICH ARE APPROACHING U.S. 

FORCES, OR VESSELS WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE UNCLEAR ARE SUBJECT TO 

BOARDING AND VISIT BY U.S. FORCES. ALL VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. FORCES 

ARE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH U.S. FORCES ON BRIDGETO-BRIDGE CHANNEL 16. 

3. U.S. FORCES WILL EXERCISE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE IF 

WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES. VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. FORCES 

WILL HELP MAKE THEIR INTENTIONS CLEAR AND AVOID UNNECESSARY 

INITIATION OF SUCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY MAKING PRIOR CONTACT AS 

DESCRIBED ABOVE. 

4. NOTHING IN THIS WARNING IS INTENDED TO LIMIT OR EXPAND THE INHERENT 

SELF-DEFENSE RIGHTS OF U.S. FORCES. THIS WARNING IS PUBLISHED SOLELY 

FOR SAFETY OF NAVIGATION AND TO WARN VESSELS AWAY FROM COMBAT 

ACTIVITIES. 
Appendix C

C-58

MARLO Advisory Bulletin 06-03 

March 20, 2003 

Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) Bahrain 

MARLO Advisory Bulletin 06-03 

20 March 2003

With the intention of providing widest distribution, MARLO is forwarding the following 

NOTICE TO MARINERS in an attempt to ensure the maritime safety of crews and vessels 

operating in the Arabian Gulf. We request you pass this information throughout your own 

commercial circles. 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

COALITION NAVAL FORCES MAY CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE 

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA, RED SEA, GULF OF ADEN, ARABIAN SEA, GULF 

OF OMAN, AND ARABIAN GULF. THE TIMELY AND ACCURATE IDENTIFICATION 

OF ALL VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT IN THESE AREAS IS CRITICAL TO AVOID THE 

INADVERTENT USE OF FORCE. 

ALL VESSELS ARE ADVISED THAT COALITION NAVAL FORCES ARE PREPARED TO 

EXERCISE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY 

IN THE EVENT THEY ARE APPROACHED BY VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT. COALITION 

FORCES ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND DECISIVELY TO ANY HOSTILE ACTS OR 

INDICATIONS OF HOSTILE INTENT. ALL MARITIME VESSELS OR ACTIVITIES THAT 

ARE DETERMINED TO BE THREATS TO COALITION NAVAL FORCES WILL BE 

SUBJECT TO DEFENSIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING BOARDING, SEIZURE, 

DISABLING OR DESTRUCTION, WITHOUT REGARD TO REGISTRY OR LOCATION. 

CONSEQUENTLY, SURFACE VESSELS, SUBSURFACE VESSELS, AND ALL AIRCRAFT 

APPROACHING COALITION NAVAL FORCES ARE ADVISED TO MAINTAIN RADIO 

CONTACT ON BRIDGE-TO-BRIDGE CHANNEL 16, INTERNATIONAL AIR DISTRESS 

(121.5 MHZ VHF) OR MILITARY AIR DISTRESS (243.0 MHZ UHF). 

VESSELS OPERATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA, 

RED SEA, GULF OF OMAN, ARABIAN SEA, AND ARABIAN GULF ARE SUBJECT TO 

QUERY, BEING STOPPED, BOARDED AND SEARCHED BY US/COALITION 

WARSHIPS OPERATING IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS AGAINST IRAQ. VESSELS 

FOUND TO BE CARRYING CONTRABAND BOUND FOR IRAQ OR CARRYING 

AND/OR LAYING NAVAL MINES ARE SUBJECT TO DETENTION, SEIZURE AND 

DESTRUCTION. THIS NOTICE IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND WILL REMAIN IN 

EFFECT UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. 
Appendix C

C-59

HYDROLANT 602/03 (54, 56) 

March 21, 2003 

HYDROLANT 602/03(54,56). EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA. 

(211240Z MAR 2003) 

1. U.S. FORCES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN HAVE ESTABLISHED A 

MARITIME SAFETY ZONE AND ARE CONDUCTING COMBAT OPERATIONS IN 

INTERNATIONAL WATERS EAST OF CYPRUS THAT POSE A HAZARD TO 

NAVIGATION. ALL VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION AND 

TO REMAIN CLEAR OF AREA BOUND BY 

35-25N 034-40E, 35-25N 035-30E, 34-40N 035-35E, 

34-10N 035-10E, 34-10N 033-55E, 34-25N 033-55E, 

34-55N 034-25E, 35-15N 034-25E. 

2. ALL VESSELS SHOULD MAINTAIN A SAFE DISTANCE FROM U.S.FORCES SO 

THAT INTENTIONS ARE CLEAR AND UNDERSTOOD BY U.S. FORCES. VESSELS 

THAT ENTER THE MARITIME SAFETY ZONE WHICH ARE APPROACHING U.S. 

FORCES, OR VESSELS WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE UNCLEAR ARE SUBJECT TO 

BOARDING AND VISIT BY U.S. FORCES. ALL VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. FORCES 

ARE REQUESTED TO MAINTAIN RADIO CONTACT WITH U.S. FORCES ON BRIDGE 

TO BRIDGE CHANNEL 16. 

3. U.S. FORCES WILL EXERCISE APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN SELFDEFENSE IF 

WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES. VESSELS APPROACHING U.S. FORCES 

WILL HELP MAKE THEIR INTENTIONS CLEAR AND AVOID UNNECESSARY

INITIATION OF SUCH DEFENSIVE MEASURES BY MAKING PRIOR CONTACT AS 

DESCRIBED ABOVE. 

4. NOTHING IN THIS WARNING IS INTENDED TO LIMIT OR EXPAND THE INHERENT 

SELF-DEFENSE RIGHTS OF U.S. FORCES. THIS SPECIAL WARNING IS PUBLISHED 

SOLELY FOR SAFETY OF NAVIGATION AND TO WARN VESSELS AWAY FROM 

COMBAT ACTIVITIES. 
Appendix C

C-60

MARLO Advisory Bulletin 08-03 

March 21, 2003

Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) Bahrain 

MARLO Advisory Bulletin 08-03

 21 March 2003

The following information was provided to MARLO by Coalition forces. We are passing it in 

order to keep you informed of ongoing activity that may affect your shipping operations and 

planning. We request you pass this information widely throughout your own commercial circles. 

If any of you have any information related to this issue, please contact either your nearest U.S. 

Embassy/Consulate or MARLO through this channel. In the event of a critical or emergency 

situation, please contact us via the MARLO 24-hour duty telephone (973-940-1395). 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Coalition maritime forces are conducting clearing operations in Iraqi waterways. Coastal 

merchants and the maritime shipping agencies that have vessels underway in the Khor Abd Allah 

waterway are requested to immediately contact their vessels and direct them to proceed south in 

order to depart Iraqi waterways. Inform your vessels to contact Coalition units on bridge-tobridge radio for specific instructions. For units located north of Umm Qasr, you will be required 

to remain in place until counter-mining operations are completed in Umm Qasr and the Khor 

Abd Allah waterway. Once these clearing operations are complete, you will be allowed to exit 

into the Arabian Gulf. 

Coalition military forces will conduct a routine boarding to ensure the safety of both the crew 

and vessel. Upon completion of the boarding, vessels will be given navigation instructions that 

will keep them out of harms way. If vessels of the maritime shipping community or coastal 

merchants are used for military purposes, these vessels will be confiscated or destroyed by the 

Coalition. 

Vessels should remain clear for the durations of Coalition military operations, so as to ensure 

their safety, the safety of their vessel, and passengers. You will be given instructions from 

Coalition forces as soon as possible on when to resume maritime operations in and around Iraqi 

waters. Their goal is to open the waterways to legitimate maritime shipping as quickly as 

possible. 
Appendix C

C-61

HYDROLANT 604/2003 (26, 27) 

March 21, 2003 

HYDROLANT 604/2003 (26,27). 

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL DEFENSE SEA AREA. 

(212253Z MAR 2003)

AT NO TIME SHALL ANY SHIP OR OTHER CRAFT, OTHER THAN PUBLIC SHIPS OF 

THE UNITED STATES, BE NAVIGATED INTO GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL 

DEFENSIVE SEA AREA, UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. 

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL BASE, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, HAS BEEN 

AUTHORIZED TO ACT ON REQUESTS FROM VESSELS WHOSE NORMAL 

LEGITIMATE BUSINESS REQUIRES ENTRY INTO GUANTANAMO BAY. U.S. NAVAL 

BASE GUANTANAMO MAINTAINS A COMMUNICATIONS GUARD “GUANTANAMO 

BAY PORT CONTROL” ON MARINE BAND VHF CHANNEL 12 (156.6MZ) AND 16 

(156.8MZ). 

THE GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA IS DESCRIBED AS 

FOLLOWS: THE TERRITORIAL WATERS WITHIN GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 

BETWEEN HIGHAND LOW WATER MARK AND THE SEA AND IN AND ABOUT THE 

ENTRANCE CHANNEL WITHIN A LINE BEARING TRUE SOUTH EXTENDING THREE 

NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE SHORE LINE OF THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF 

GUANTANAMO NAVAL RESERVATION (LONGITUDE 75 DEGREES 05 MINUTES 15 

SECONDS) AND A LINE BEARING TRUE SOUTH EXTENDING THREE NAUTICAL 

MILES FROM THE SHORELINE OF THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF THE SAID NAVAL 

RESERVATION (LONGITUDE 75 DEGREES 14 MINUTES 00 SECONDS) AND A LINE 

JOINING THE EXTREMITIES OF THE ABOVE TWO BEARING LINES, AND HEREBY 

SET APART AND RESERVED AS A NAVAL DEFENSIVE SEA AREA. ALL VESSELS 

ARE DIRECTED TO STAND CLEAR OF THE GUANTANAMO BAY NAVAL DEFENSIVE 

SEA AREA. 
Appendix C

C-62

Request Safety Broadcast Notice to Mariners 

August 5, 2003 

P 051436Z AUG 03 

FM COGARD MSO NEW ORLEANS LA 

INFO CCGDEIGHT NEW ORLEANS LA//M/OAN/CC// 

COGARD ANT NEW ORLEANS LA 

COGARD MSU BATON ROUGE LA 

COGARD MSO MORGAN CITY LA COGARD MSD 

HOUMA LA 

CDRUSAED NEW ORLEANS LA//CEMVN-OD-T// 

NAVSUPPACT NEW ORLEANS LA 

BT 

UNCLAS 

UNCLAS //N16502// 

SUBJ: REQUEST SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS 

1. COMMENCE BROADCASTING UPON RECEIPT AND EVERY SCHEDULED 

BROADCAST THEREAFTER UNTIL CANCELLED: 

2. QUOTE: THE U.S. COAST GUARD CAPTAIN OF THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS, 

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE MAGUNSON ACT, HAS ESTABLISHED A 

SECURITY ZONE FROM MILE MARKER 92.5 TO MILE MARKER 93.5, ON THE LOWER 

MISSISSIPPI RIVER, AHOP, IN THE VICINITY OF THE NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY 

EXTENDING THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE RIVER. THE SECURITY ZONE HAS BEEN 

ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT THE NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY AND ITS PROPERTY 

FROM DESTRUCTION, LOSS, OR INJURY FROM SABOTAGE OR OTHER SUBVERSIVE 

ACTS, ACCIDENTS, OR OTHER CAUSES OF A SIMILAR NATURE. THE FOLLOWING 

RESTRICTIONS ARE PLACED ON VESSELS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE: 

(A) VESSELS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO TRANSIT FROM MM 92.5 TO 93.5 FROM 

6:00 A.M. LOCAL TO 6:00 P.M. LOCAL UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY THE COAST GUARD 

TRAFFIC LIGHT OPERATOR AT THE GOVERNOR NICHOLLS TRAFFIC LIGHT ON 

VHF-FM CHANNEL 16 OR 67. 

(B) ALL VESSELS ARE PROHIBITED FROM TRANSITING WITHIN 200 FEET OF THE 

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES ON THE EAST AND WEST BANKS. ENTRY INTO THIS 

AREA IS PROHIBITED TO ALL MARINE TRAFFIC AT ALL TIMES. 

3. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SECURITY ZONE WILL SUBJECT PERSONS TO 

CRIMINAL PENALTIES OF IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN TEN YEARS AND 

MAY, IN THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT, BE FINED NOT MORE THAN $10,000. 

SIGNED: (OMITTED), COMMANDER, U.S. COAST GUARD, ALTERNATED CAPTAIN 

OF THE PORT NEW ORLEANS, LA. UNQUOTE. 

BT 

NNNN 
Appendix C

C-63

MARLO Advisory Bulletin 01-04 

January 12, 2004 

Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) Bahrain 

MARLO Advisory Bulletin 01-04 12 

January 2004 

The following information on Iraq maritime security checkpoint procedures is provided by the 

coalition leadership for the benefit of the regional shipping community. Please disseminate 

widely to ensure safe and efficient coordination.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Following the removal of the former Iraqi regime, UNSCR 1483 terminated all trade sanctions 

against Iraq except the import of arms and related material. Coalition maritime forces continue to 

enforce this remaining sanction while conducting broader maritime law enforcement and security 

operations in Iraqi waters. The former UN checkpoint at 29-12N/049-20E has been 

disestablished and anew checkpoint established to the north to be more convenient to Iraq-bound 

shipping. 

Vessels bound for or departing from Iraqi ports and offshore oil terminals must pass within a five 

nautical mile radius of latitude twenty-nine degrees thirty-five minutes north and longitude fortyeight degrees fifty-three minutes east (29-35N/048-53E). Approaching vessels must contact the 

on station coalition warship on marine VHF (bridge-to-bridge) radio-telephone, channel 16 

within five nautical miles of this point and be prepared to be queried, boarded, and inspected for 

prohibited cargo by coalition Maritime Security Forces (MSF). Vessels will not be permitted to 

proceed from this point until cleared by the MSF. Clearance through the Iraqi maritime security 

checkpoint does not grant clearance to enter any specific Iraqi port or the internal waters of Iraq; 

such clearances must be obtained from appropriate authorities in Iraq. 

This information will be incorporated in a forthcoming HYDROPAC notice detailing revised 

procedures for maritime trade with Iraq. 
Appendix C

C-64

Request Safety Broadcast Notice to Mariners February 9, 2004 

P 092020Z FEB 04 

FM COGARD MSO NEW ORLEANS LA 

TO COMCOGARDGRU NEW ORLEANS LA 

INFO COGARD MSO MORGAN CITY LA 

COGARD MSU HOUMA LA 

USCGC PELICAN 

USCGC RAZORBILL 

USCGC STURGEON 

USCGC PAMLICO 

COGARD ANT GULFPORT MS 

COGARD ANT DULAC LA 

COGARD ANT VENICE LA 

BT 

UNCLAS //N16502// 

SUBJ: REQUEST SAFETY BROADCAST NOTICE TO MARINERS 

1. BROADCAST UPON RECEIPT AND EVERY SCHEDULED BROADCAST UNTIL 

CANCELLED. 

2. QUOTE: THE U.S. COAST GUARD CAPTAIN OF THE PORT NEW ORLEANS, UNDER 

THE AUTHORITY OF THE PORTS AND WATERWAYS SAFETY ACT, HAS 

ESTABLISHED A MOVING SECURITY ZONE ON THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER 

FROM THE SOUTHWEST PASS ENTRANCE LIGHTED BUOY TO MM 96.0. THIS 

MOVING SECURITY ZONE WILL PROVIDE A 500 YARD BUFFER ZONE AROUND 

CRUISE SHIPS AND IS NEEDED TO PROTECT CRUISE SHIPS FROM DESTRUCTION, 

LOSS, OR INJURY FROM SABOTAGE OR OTHER SUBVERSIVE ACTS, ACCIDENTS, 

OR OTHER CAUSES OF SIMILAR NATURE. THE FOLLOWING RESTRICTIONS ARE 

PLACED ON VESSELS OR PERSONS WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE: 

(A) NO VESSEL MAY OPERATE WITHIN 500 YARDS OF A CRUISE SHIP UNLESS 

OPERATING AT THE MINIMUM SAFE SPEED REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN A SAFE 

COURSE. VESSELS REQUIRING ENTRY WITHIN 500 YARDS OF A CRUISE SHIP THAT 

CANNOT SLOW TO THE MINIMUM SPEED NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN A SAFE 

COURSE MUST REQUEST PERMISSION TO PROCEED FROM THE VESSEL TRAFFIC 

CENTER (VTC) AT 589-2780 OR ON VHF-FM CHANNEL 67. 

(B) NO PERSON OR VESSEL IS PERMITTED TO ENTER WITHIN 100 YARDS OF A 

CRUISE SHIP UNLESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT. 

VESSELS REQUESTING PERMISSION TO ENTER THIS SECURITY ZONE MUST 

CONTACT THE VESSEL TRAFFIC CENTER (VTC) AT 589-2780 OR ON VHF-FM 

CHANNEL 67. 

3. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS SECURITY ZONE WILL SUBJECT PERSONS TO 

A CIVIL PENALTY OF UP TO THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS. 

WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER MAY BE PUNISHABLE BY A FINE OF NOT 
Appendix C

C-65

MORE THAN FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS OR IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE 

THAN FIVE YEARS, OR BOTH. 

SIGNED: (OMITTED), CAPTAIN, U. S. COAST GUARD, CAPTAIN OF THE PORT, NEW 

ORLEANS, LA. UNQUOTE. 

4. CANCEL AT TIME //141100Z OCT 02//. 

BT 

NNNN 
Appendix C

C-66

MARLO ADVISORY 06-04 1 

May 2004

WARNING AND EXCLUSION ZONES AT KHAWR AL’AMAYA OIL TERMINAL 

(KAAOT) AND AL BASRA OIL TERMINAL (ABOT). 

1. On 24 April 2004, terrorists conducted suicide attacks in small boats against ABOT and a 

Coalition warship in the vicinity of KAAOT. The terrorists used ordinary dhows, fishing boats, 

and speedboats to conduct the attack in contravention of the law of armed conflict. Their 

unlawful actions are intentionally designed to put innocent persons at risk. 

2. All mariners are advised to remain clear of Coalition maritime security forces, and to identify 

themselves and make their intentions known when operating in the vicinity of Coalition 

warships. If queried, mariners should clearly identify themselves and state their intentions, and if 

given directions from Coalition warships, they should promptly execute such directions so as to 

make their intentions known. Mariners are reminded that Coalition warships are prepared to take 

defensive measures, including if necessary the use of deadly force, against any contact whose 

identity or intentions are unknown and which poses a threat. 

3. Effective immediately, warning zones are established around the Khawr Al’Amaya Oil 

Terminal (GEOREF 29-46.8n, 048-48.5e) and the Al Basra Oil Terminal, formerly known as the 

Mina Al Bakr Oil Terminal (GEOREF 2940.8n, 048-48.5e) as follows: 

4. Khawr Al’Amaya Oil Terminal (GEOREF 29-46.8n, 048-48.5e). The warning zone extends 

3,000 meters from the outer edge of the terminal structure, in all directions, creating a racetrack 

shape 6,990 meters long by 6,107 meters wide, oriented northwest to southeast, centered on the 

terminal. This warning zone is distinct from, and in addition to, the exclusion zone established 

later in this advisory. 

5. Al Basra Oil Terminal, formerly known as the Mina Al Bakr Oil Terminal (GEOREF 29-

40.8n, 048-48.5e). The warning zone extends 3,000 meters from the outer edge of the terminal 

structure, in all directions, creating a racetrack shape 7,030 meters long by 6,107 meters wide, 

oriented northwest to southeast, centered on the terminal. This warning zone is distinct from, and 

in addition to, the exclusion zone established later in this advisory. 

6. VLCC traffic to the terminals has increased dramatically in the past 6 months and is expected 

to remain at high levels indefinitely. In addition to berthing and departing VLCCs and assisting 

tugs, Coalition warships conducting maritime security patrols maneuver unpredictably within the 

zone. 

7. Vessels are advised to remain clear of the warning zones for all but essential transits. If transit 

requires entry into the zone, vessels are advised to contact Coalition maritime security forces via 

marine VHF channel 16, identify themselves, and make transit intentions known. If Coalition 

maritime security forces advise a vessel to depart the warning area, the vessel should 

immediately depart. Such direction will be given only when necessary to keep the vessel from 

standing into danger. 

8. Additionally, effective immediately, exclusion zones are established and the right of innocent 

passage is temporarily suspended in accordance with international law around the KAAOT and 
Appendix C

C-67

ABOT oil terminals within Iraqi territorial waters. The exclusion zones extend 2,000 meters 

from the outer edges of the terminal structures in all directions. 

9. Only tankers and support vessels authorized by terminal operators or Coalition maritime 

security forces are allowed to enter the exclusion zones. Vessels attempting to enter the zones 

without authorization may be subject to defensive measures, including when necessary, the use 

of deadly force. All reasonable efforts will be taken to warn vessels away before employing 

deadly force; however, deadly force will be employed when necessary to protect Coalition 

maritime security forces, legitimate shipping present in the exclusion zones, and the oil 

terminals. 

10. Questions regarding this advisory may be directed to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central 

Command, IZMS Coordinator (N31CGA), FPO AE 09501 6008, tel: 973-17-85-4627 or 973-17-

85-4839, fax: 973-17-85-9117 or 973-17-85-4344, or the U.S. Maritime Liaison Office 

(MARLO) Bahrain, tel: 973-17-85-3925, fax: 973-17-85-3930. 
Appendix C

C-68

HYDROPAC 790/04 

May 2, 2004 

UNCLASSIFIED 

021010Z MAY 04 

FM NGA NAVSAFETY BETHESDA MD// 

MSGID/GENADMIN/NGA NAVSAFETY BETHESDA MD// 

RMKS/ HYDROPAC 790/04(62). PERSIAN GULF. 

CHART 62590 (2ND ED). 

3000 METER WARNING ZONES AND 2000 METER EXCLUSION ZONE ESTABLISHED 

IN: 

A. 29-46.8N 048-48.5E 

B. 29-40.8N 048-485.E.// 

BT 
Appendix C

C-69

HYDROPAC 795/2004 

May 3, 2004 

HYDROPAC 795/2004 (62). PERSIAN GULF. 

(030850Z MAY 2004)

1. ON 24 APR, TERRORISTS CONDUCTED SUICIDE ATTACKS IN SMALL BOATS 

AGAINST ABOT AND A COALITION WARSHIP IN THE VICINITY OF KAAOT. THE 

TERRORISTS USED ORDINARY DHOWS, FISHING BOATS AND SPEEDBOATS TO 

CONDUCT THE ATTACK IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT. 

THEIR UNLAWFUL ACTIONS ARE INTENTIONALLY DESIGNED TO PUT INNOCENT 

PERSONS AT RISK. 

2. ALL MARINERS ARE ADVISED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF COALITION MARITIME 

SECURITY FORCES AND TO IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AND MAKE THEIR 

INTENTIONS KNOWN WHEN OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF COALITION 

WARSHIPS. IF QUERIED, MARINERS SHOULD CLEARLY IDENTIFY THEMSELVES 

AND STATE THEIR INTENTIONS AND IF GIVEN DIRECTIONS FROM COALITION 

WARSHIPS, THEY SHOULD PROMPTLY EXECUTE SUCH DIRECTIONS SO AS TO 

MAKE THEIR INTENTIONS KNOWN. MARINERS ARE REMINDED THAT COALITION 

WARSHIPS ARE PREPARED TO TAKE DEFENSIVE MEASURES, INCLUDING IF 

NECESSARY THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE, AGAINST ANY CONTACT WHOSE 

IDENTITY OR INTENTIONS ARE 3. UNKNOWN AND WHICH POSES A THREAT. 

3. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, WARNING ZONES ARE ESTABLISHED AROUND THE 

KHAWR AL’AMAYA OIL TERMINAL (29-46.8N 04848.5E) AND THE AL BASRA OIL 

TERMINAL, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE MINA AL BAKR OIL TERMINAL (29-40.8N 

048-48.5E) AS FOLLOWS: 

4. KHAWR AL’AMAYA OIL TERMINAL (29-46.8N 048-48.5E). THE WARNING ZONE 

EXTENDS 3000 METERS FROM THE OUTER EDGE OF THE TERMINAL STRUCTURE, 

IN ALL DIRECTIONS, CREATING A RACETRACK SHAPE 6990 METERS LONG BY 

6107 METERS WIDE, ORIENTED NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST, CENTERED ON THE 

TERMINAL. THIS WARNING ZONE IS DISTINCT FROM AND IN ADDITION TO, THE 

EXCLUSION ZONE ESTABLISHED LATER IN THIS ADVISORY. 

5. AL BASRA OIL TERMINAL, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE MINA AL BAKR OIL 

TERMINAL (29-40.8N 048-48.5E). THE WARNING ZONE EXTENDS 3000 METERS 

FROM THE OUTER EDGE OF THE TERMINAL STRUCTURE, IN ALL DIRECTIONS, 

CREATING A RACETRACK SHAPE 7030 METERS LONG BY 6107 METERS WIDE, 

ORIENTED NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST, CENTERED ON THE TERMINAL. THIS 

WARNING ZONE IS DISTINCT FROM, AND IN ADDITION TO, THE EXCLUSION ZONE 

ESTABLISHED LATER IN THIS ADVISORY. 

6. VLCC TRAFFIC TO THE TERMINALS HAS INCREASED DRAMATICALLY IN THE 

PAST SIX MONTHS AND IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN AT HIGH LEVELS 

INDEFINITELY. IN ADDITION TO BERTHING AND DEPARTING VLCCS AND 

ASSISTING TUGS, COALITION WARSHIPS CONDUCTING MARITIME SECURITY 

PATROLS MANEUVER UNPREDICTABLY WITHIN THE ZONE. 
Appendix C

C-70

7. VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF THE WARNING ZONES FOR ALL 

BUT ESSENTIAL TRANSITS. IF TRANSIT REQUIRES ENTRY INTO THE ZONE, 

VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO CONTACT COALITION MARITIME SECURITY FORCES 

VIA MARINE VHF CHANNEL 16, IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AND MAKE TRANSIT 

INTENTIONS KNOWN. IF COALITION MARITIME SECURITY FORCES ADVISE A 

VESSEL TO DEPART THE WARNING AREA, THE VESSEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY 

DEPART. SUCH DIRECTION WILL BE GIVEN ONLY WHEN NECESSARY TO KEEP 

THE VESSEL FROM STANDING INTO DANGER. 

8. ADDITIONALLY, EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, EXCLUSION ZONES ARE 

ESTABLISHED AND THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE IS TEMPORARILY 

SUSPENDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AROUND THE KAAOT 

AND ABOT OIL TERMINALS WITHIN IRAQI TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE 

EXCLUSION ZONES EXTEND 2000 METERS FROM THE OUTER EDGES OF THE 

TERMINAL STRUCTURES IN ALL DIRECTIONS. 

9. ONLY TANKERS AND SUPPORT VESSELS AUTHORIZED BY TERMINAL 

OPERATORS OR COALITION MARITIME SECURITY FORCES ARE ALLOWED TO 

ENTER THE EXCLUSION ZONES. VESSELS ATTEMPTING TO ENTER THE ZONES 

WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO DEFENSIVE MEASURES, 

INCLUDING WHEN NECESSARY, THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE. ALL REASONABLE 

EFFORTS WILL BE TAKEN TO WARN VESSELS AWAY BEFORE EMPLOYING 

DEADLY FORCE. HOWEVER, DEADLY FORCE WILL BE EMPLOYED WHEN 

NECESSARY TO PROTECT COALITION MARITIME SECURITY FORCES, LEGITIMATE 

SHIPPING PRESENT IN THE EXCLUSION ZONES AND THE OIL TERMINALS. 

10. QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS ADVISORY MAY BE DIRECTED TO 

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND, IZMS COORDINATOR 

(N31CGA), FPO AE 09501 6008, PHONE: 973 1785 4627 OR 973 1785 4839, FAX: 973 1785 

9117 OR 973 1785 4344 OR THE U.S. MARITIME LIAISON OFFICE (MARLO) BAHRAIN, 

PHONE: 973 1785 3925, FAX: 973 1785 3930. 

11. CANCEL HYDROPAC 790/04. 
Appendix C

C-71

HYDROLANT 1750/05 (GEN).

26 SEP 2005

NORTH ATLANTIC. MEDITERRANEAN SEA

MILITARY EXERCISE WITH PARTICIPATION OF MERCHANT SHIPPING.

1. FAMEX-05. NCAGS EXERCISE WILL TAKE PLACE 26 THRU 28 SEP

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA (INCLUDING THE STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR)

AND THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. THE PARTICIPATING UNITS INCLUDE

MILITARY FORCES AND NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND NATIONAL

ADMINISTRATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS WITH RELATION TO THE

ACTION OF THE STATE AT SEA. DURING THIS EXERCISE, SPANISH

NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING (NCAGS)

STRUCTURE WILL BE ACTIVATED.

2. THE NCAGS AREA IS DEFINED AS THE AREA CONTAINED BY PARALLELS

25-00N 45-00N AND MERIDIANS 005-00E 020-00W. NCAGS PROCEDURES

WILL BE USED TO INTERACT WITH MERCHANT SHIPPING THROUGHOUT THE

EXERCISE PERIOD.

3. 26 THRU 28 SEP COOPERATION OF MERCHANT SHIPS WILL BE OF

SIGNIFICANT VALUE FOR THE EXERCISE. EVERY MERCHANT SHIP

GREATER THAN 300GRT APPROACHING THE EXERCISE AREA OR PORTS

WITHIN THE NCAGS AREA, IS INVITED TO PARTICIPATE TO IMPROVE

THE REPORTING AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. SUCH REPORTING IS

VOLUNTARY, HOWEVER ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENCOURAGED TO SUPPORT THIS

SERVICE WHICH IS AIMED AT BENEFITING SHIPPING OPERATING IN THE

VICINITY OF MILITARY ACTIVITY.

4. SHIPPING AUTHORITIES AND MERCHANT SHIPS ARE KINDLY REQUESTED

TO COLLABORATE WITH THE NATIONAL SPANISH SHIPPING CENTER (NATIONAL

SP SC), LOCATED IN CARTAGENA (SPAIN). INDIVIDUAL MERCHANT VESSELS

WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE NATIONAL SP SC WHEN

APPROACHING OR SAILING WITHIN THE NCAGS AREA BY SENDING 

ABBREVIATED

VERSION OF FORMAT ALFA. THESE REPORTS SHOULD BE SENT AT LEAST

24 HOURS IN ADVANCE OF ENTERING THE AREA OF EXERCISE.

5. VESSELS ARE INVITED TO CONTACT THE NATIONAL SPANISH SHIPPING

CENTER AS FOLLOWS, EMAIL: SPFAMNCAGS(AT)FN.MDE.ES,

FAX: 34 968 12 7033.

6. PROVISION OF THIS INFORMATION WILL ASSIST IN THE PRACTICE

OF COMPILING AN ACCURATE SHIPPING PLOT FOR THE SECURITY OF
Appendix C

C-72

SHIPPING BY NAVAL FORCES. IT WILL ALSO HELP THE PROCESS TO REDUCE

UNNECESSARY VHF TRAFFIC BETWEEN MERCHANT SHIPS AND NATO WARSHIPS.

7. WHEN IN OR APPROACHING THE EXERCISE AREA, SHIPPING MAY BE

CONTACTED BY PARTICIPATING NAVAL VESSELS OR ONE OF THE SHIPPING

COOPERATION POINTS (SCP'S) ESTABLISHED IN CARTAGENA, LAS PALMAS,

FERROL, CADIZ OR PALMA DE MALLORCA.

8. FORMAT ALFA (ABBREVIATED). THE FOLLOWING FORMAT ALFA WILL BE

USED DURING FAMEX-05. NCAGS EXERCISE:

(1) SHIP'S NAME.

(2) INTERNATIONAL CALL SIGN.

(3) TYPE OF VESSEL.

(4) FLAG OF REGISTRY.

(5) IMO NUMBER.

(11A) SERVICE SPEED.

(15) INMARSAT TELEPHONE NUMBERS.

(16) INMARSAT FAX NUMBERS.

(17) INMARSAT TELEX NUMBERS.

(18) INMARSAT DATA NUMBERS.

(19) OTHER COMMUNICATION MEANS INCLUDING E-MAIL ADDRESSES.

(20) INTENDED MOVEMENT - DESCRIPTION OF ROUTE.

(21) LAST PORT AND COUNTRY OF CALL INCLUDING ACTUAL DATE AND TIME

OF DEPARTURE FROM LAST PORT (ETD).

(22) NEXT PORT AND COUNTRY OF CALL INCLUDING ETA.

(23) CURRENT POSITION (0600Z, 1200Z).

FOR TIMINGS, PLEASE INDICATE THE USE OF LOCAL OR UTC/ZULU.

(261503Z SEP 2005)
Appendix C

C-73

SPECIAL WARNING NO. 123.

SOMALIA.

11 November 2005

1. Due to continuing conditions of armed conflict and lawlessness in Somalia and waters off its 

coast, mariners are advised to avoid the Port of Muqdisho (Mogadishu) and to remain at least 

200 nautical miles distant from the Somali coast. The U.S. Government does not have an 

Embassy in Somalia and cannot provide services to US citizens.

2. Recent vessel hijackings off the east coast of Somalia demonstrate that pirates are able to 

conduct at sea hijackings from as far south as Kismaayo (Chisimayu) (00-22S) - though vessels 

are advised to transit no closer than 02-00S - to as far north as Eyl (08-00N), and out to a 

distance of 170 miles. The first known attempt to hijack a cruise vessel occurred in November 

2005. All merchant vessels transiting the coast of Somalia, no matter how far offshore, should 

increase antipiracy precautions and maintain a heightened state of vigilance. Pirates are reported 

to have used previously hijacked ships as bases for further attacks.

3. Another reported pirate tactic has been to issue a false distress call to lure a ship close inshore. 

Therefore, caution should be taken when responding to distress calls keeping in mind it may be a 

tactic to lure a vessel into a trap.

4. Victimized vessels have reported two to three (2-3) speedboats measuring six to nine meters 

(6-9M) in length. Each vessel has a crew of three to six (3-6) armed men with AK-47s and 

shoulder launched rockets, which are opening fire on vessels in broad daylight in order to 

intimidate them into stopping.

5. To date, vessels that increase speed and take evasive maneuvers avoid boarding while those 

that slow down are boarded, taken to the Somali coastline, and released after successful ransom 

payment, often after protracted negotiations of as much as 11 weeks.

6. Cancel Special Warning number 111. (Dept. of State) (11 November 2005)
Appendix C

C-74

HYDROLANT 851/07(61).

21 MAY 2007

SOMALI PIRACY

1. THE NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER (NMIC) ADVISES THAT 

PIRACY HAS RESUMED IN INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LANES OFF THE CENTRAL 

EAST COAST OF SOMALIA AS OF 14 MAY 2007. VESSELS REPORT BEING FIRED 

UPON APPROXIMATELY 190 NM OFF THE SOMALI COAST IN THE VICINITY OF 01-

20N 049-00E BY GUNMEN IN SMALL WHITE SPEEDBOATS ARMED WITH MACHINE 

GUNS AND ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADES. GIVEN THE DISTANCE FROM SHORE 

THESE RECENT ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED AND POOR WEATHER CONDITIONS 

TYPICAL FOR THIS TIME OF YEAR, ONI ASSESSES PIRATES ARE LIKELY UTILIZING 

A LARGER MERCHANT VESSEL AS A MOTHER-SHIP TO LAUNCH THEIR

SMALL-BOAT ATTACKS. THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU (IMB) HAS 

INCREASED THEIR RECOMMENDED TRANSIT DISTANCE FROM 75 NM TO 200 NM 

FOR VESSELS NOT CALLING ON SOMALI PORTS.

2. ONI FURTHER ADVISES VESSELS TO STAY AT LEAST 50 NM AWAY FROM 

POSITION 01-02N 048-10E UNTIL THE MOTHER-SHIP THREAT CAN BE EVALUATED.

3. ALL VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO REMAIN AT LEAST 200 NM FROM THE EAST 

COAST OF SOMALIA. ALL MERCHANT VESSELS TRANSITING THE COAST OF 

SOMALIA, NO MATTER HOW FAR OFFSHORE, SHOULD INCREASE ANTI-PIRACY 

PRECAUTIONS AND MAINTAIN A HEIGHTENED STATE OF VIGILANCE.

PIRATES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE USED PREVIOUSLY HIJACKED SHIPS AS BASES 

FOR FURTHER ATTACKS.

4. ANOTHER REPORTED PIRATE TACTIC HAS BEEN TO ISSUE A FALSE DISTRESS 

CALL TO LURE A SHIP CLOSE INSHORE. THEREFORE, CAUTION SHOULD BE 

TAKEN WHEN RESPONDING TO DISTRESS CALLS KEEPING IN MIND IT MAY BE A 

TACTIC TO LURE A VESSEL INTO A TRAP.

5. VICTIMIZED VESSELS REPORT TWO TO THREE 6 TO 9 METER SPEEDBOATS 

WITH 3 TO 6 ARMED MEN PER VESSEL ARMED WITH AK-47S AND SHOULDER 

LAUNCHED ROCKETS, OPENING FIRE ON THEIR VESSELS IN BROAD DAYLIGHT IN 

ORDER TO INTIMIDATE THEM INTO STOPPING.

6. TO DATE, VESSELS THAT INCREASE SPEED AND TAKE EVASIVE MANEUVERS 

AVOID BOARDING WHILE THOSE THAT SLOW DOWN ARE BOARDED, TAKEN TO 

THE SOMALI COASTLINE, AND RELEASED AFTER SUCCESSFUL RANSOM 

PAYMENT, OFTEN AFTER PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS OF AS MUCH AS 11 

WEEKS.

7. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ADVISORY, CONTACT THE 

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY, CODE MAR-420, 2W23-312, 

1200 NEW JERSEY AVE, SE, WASHINGTON, DC

20590; TELEPHONE 202-366-1883, OR BY E-MAIL TO OWEN.DOHERTY@DOT.GOV.

8. SUSPECTED ACTIVITY OR ACTUAL PIRACY/TERRORIST INCIDENT REPORTING 

GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED IN MARAD ADVISORY 05-01.

9. DEPARTMENT OF STATE SPECIAL WARNING NUMBER 123 PERTAINS.
Appendix C

C-75

10. CANCEL MARAD ADVISORY 05-03 (28 OCT 2005). (211348Z MAY 2007)
Appendix C

C-76

HYDROPAC 44/08(GEN).

09 JAN 2008

NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF

1. BACKGROUND: AT THE REQUEST OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND IN

ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

(UNSCR) 1483 AND 1546, A MULTINATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY FORCE (MSF)

CONTINUES TO OPERATE IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN GULF (NAG). THIS FORCE

IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT MARITIME SECURITY OPERATIONS TO PREVENT

THE UNAUTHORIZED TRADE OF ARMS AND RELATED MATERIAL, TO PERFORM

CUSTOMARY DEFENSE MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND

TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MAINTENANCE

OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN IRAQ.

2. ACTION: ALL VESSELS EN ROUTE TO AND FROM IRAQI PORTS ARE SUBJECT TO

QUERY, AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO BOARDING AND INSPECTION BY THE MSF

UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. THIS NOTICE AFFECTS VESSELS TRAVERSING OR

PREPARING TO TRAVERSE IRAQI TERRITORIAL WATERS, THEKHAWR ABD

ALLAH, SHATT AL ARAB AND IRAQ'S OFFSHORE AL BASRAH AND KHAWR

AL'AMAYA OIL TERMINALS. INSPECTIONS ARE CONDUCTED TO VERIFY

COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT UNSCRS AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE

MINTENANCE OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN IRAQ. THE INTENT IS TO

CONDUCT THOROUGH INSPECTIONS WITH MINIMUM DISRUPTION TO MARITIME

COMMERCE. ALL CLEARED VESSELS WILL BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED TO

THEIR NEXT PORT OF CALL UPON INSPECTION COMPLETION. ANY VESSEL

CARRYING UNAUTHORIZED ARMS AND RELATED MATERIAL OR OTHER CARGO

THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN

IRAQ WILL BE DETAINED AND TURNED OVER TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR

APPROPRIATE ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH IRAQI LAW. SPECIFICALLY,

VIOLATIONS MAY RESULT IN THE SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION OF CARGO BY

THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE MASTER AND CREW MEMBERS

OF VESSELS CARRYING SUCH CARGO ARE SUBJECT TO ARREST, DETENTION,

AND PROSECUTION UNDER IRAQI LAW. STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE

PROCEDURES IN THIS NOTICE WILL MINIMIZE DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH

INSPECTIONS. IRAQI PORT STATUS, CATEGORIES OF VESSEL TRAFFIC THAT CAN

BE ACCEPTED, AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS WILL BE PUBLISHED VIA SEPARATE

NOTICE BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. HYDROGRAPHIC CONDITIONS OF IRAQI

PORTS AND CONNECTING WATERWAYS WILL ALSO BE PUBLISHED VIA

SEPARATE NOTICE BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. PARTIES WISHING TO

DISPATCH SHIPS TO IRAQI PORTS ARE ADVISED TO REVIEW THESE NOTICES

AND CONTACT THE IRAQI PORT AUTHORITY FOR CURRENT ENTRY PROTOCOL

AND RESTRICTIONS.

3. CHECKPOINT: VESSELS BOUND FOR OR DEPARTING FROM IRAQI PORTS AND

OFFSHORE OIL TERMINALS MUST PASS WITHIN A FIVE NAUTICAL MILE RADIUS

OF LATITUDE TWENTY-NINE DEGREES THIRTY-FIVE MINUTES NORTH AND

LONGITUDE FORTY-EIGHT DEGREES FIFTY-THREE MINUTES EAST (29-35N

048-53E). APPROACHING VESSELS MUST CONTACT THE MARITIME SECURITY

FORCE COMMANDER ON MARINE VHF (BRIDGE-TO-BRIDGE) RADIO TELEPHONE,

CHANNEL 16 WITHIN FIVE NAUTICAL MILES OF THIS POINT AND BE PREPARED
Appendix C

C-77

TO RESPOND TOMSF QUERIES.

4. NOTIFICATION: ALL SHIPPING MUST BE COORDINATED WITH THE IRAQI PORT

AUTHORITY OR STATE OIL MARKETING ORGANIZATION (SOMO).

5. CARGO DOCUMENTATION: DOCUMENTATION FOR IRAQ BOUND CARGO MUST

INCLUDE THE ITEMS LISTED BELOW.

A. AN ORIGINAL MANIFEST DESCRIBING THE CARGO, AS WELL AS ITS LOCATION

IN THE SHIP, MUST BE ONBOARD. THE ORIGINAL MANIFEST MUST INCLUDE

THE PORT OF ORIGIN, PORTS OF CALL, COMPLETE BUSINESS NAMES AND

ADDRESSES OF ALL SHIPPERS AND CONSIGNEES AND FINAL DESTINATION

OF ALL CARGO. A COMPLETE BUSINESS ADDRESS MUST INCLUDE, THE

STREET ADDRESS, A PROMINENT IDENTIFIABLE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION, OR

A POST OFFICE BOX, CONTACT PERSON, NAME OR RECIPIENT MINISTRY OR

ENTITY, AN E-MAIL ADDRESS PLUS A TELEPHONE NUMBER OR FAX NUMBER.

B. CONSIGNEE NAMES AND ADDRESSES ON ALL CARGO MUST MATCH THE

MANIFEST.

C. THE MANIFEST MUST BEAR AN ORIGINAL SIGNATURE OF THE VESSEL'S

MASTER OR CHIEF MATE. THE MANIFEST MAY BE ON SHIPPERS

LETTERHEAD, FAX, PHOTOCOPY OR COMPUTER PRINTOUT, BUT IT MUST

BEAR AN ORIGINAL SIGNATURE.

D. THE ORIGINAL MANIFEST MAY CONSIST OF MORE THAN ONE DOCUMENT IF

THERE ARE AMENDMENTS THAT LIST CARGO DROPPED OFF AT A GIVEN

PORT OR CORRECT THE ORIGINAL MANIFEST. THESE AMENDMENTS MAY

ORIGINATE FROM THE SHIPPER OR CARRIER. SINCE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS

MAY BE TRANSMITTED TO A VESSEL BY TELEGRAM OR FAX, THEY NEED NOT

BEAR AN ORIGINAL SIGNATURE. HOWEVER, THE MASTER IS REQUIRED TO

CERTIFY IN WRITING THAT THE AMENDED MANIFEST ACCURATELY REFLECTS

WHAT IS ON BOARD THE VESSEL.

6. INCOMPLETE DOCUMENTATION: IRAQ BOUND VESSELS WHICH ARE

DETERMINED TO HAVE INCOMPLETE CARGO MANIFESTS, TO BE OTHERWISE IN 

VIOLATION OF REQUIREMENTS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF THIS ADVISORY OR

IRAQI LAWS, MAY BE DETAINED BY THE MSF FOR TURN OVER TO THE IRAQI

GOVERNMENT OR DIVERTED TO LAST PORT OF CALL UNTIL APPROPRIATE

CONDITIONS ARE MET.

7. PETROLEUM IMPORTS AND EXPORTS: TRADE IN PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IS

CONTROLLED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. IRAQI LAW AUTHORIZES THE

SEIZURE AND CONFISCATION OF VESSELS FOUND IN VIOLATION OF ANY

PETROLEUM IMPORT OR EXPORT AUTHORIZATION. ALL PETROLEUM IMPORTS

AND EXPORTS ARE HANDLED THROUGH SOMO OR ITS AGENT THE IRAQI SOUTH

OIL COMPANY (SOC). ONLY THOSE OIL SHIPMENTS VERIFIED TO BE UNDER

VALID SOMO CONTRACT, OR OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE

IRAQI GOVERNMENT WILL BE ALLOWED TO PASS. SOMO CAN BE CONTACTED

BY FAX AT 00 8737 6370 5020.

8. VESSEL DOCUMENTATION: VESSELS MUST MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF

FLAG STATE REGISTRY, SUCH AS THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY, ON

BOARD AT ALL TIMES THE VESSEL IS IN OPERATION. STATELESS VESSELS OR
Appendix C

C-78

VESSELS WITHOUT VALID SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

CERTIFICATES ARE NOT WELCOME IN IRAQ.

A. QUESTIONABLE REGISTRY: VESSELS WITH QUESTIONABLE REGISTRY MAY

BE DELAYED IN OBTAINING CLEARANCE TO PROCEED OR FACE DETENTION

AND OTHER PENALTIES UPON ARRIVAL IN IRAQI PORTS.

B. INVALID REGISTRY: VESSELS PRESENTING CERTIFICATES OF REGISTRY

CONFIRMED TO BE INVALID WILL BE DENIED ENTRY INTO IRAQ, AND COULD

BE SUBJECT TO ARREST BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

9. PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION: ALL CREWMEMBERS ON IRAQ BOUND VESSELS

MUST POSSESS VALID SEAMAN'S DOCUMENTS OR PASSPORTS. ALL

PASSENGERS EN ROUTE IRAQ MUST POSSESS VALID PASSPORTS OR OTHER

IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS ACCEPTABLE UNDER IRAQI LAW OR 

REGULATION.

10. FERRIES AND PASSENGER SHIPS: FERRIES OR PASSENGER SHIPS

TRAVERSING THE IRAQI MARITIME SECURITY FORCE CHECKPOINT WILL BE

SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS.

A. VESSELS CARRYING PASSENGERS ONLY (WITH NO COMMERCIAL CARGO

CAPACITY) MAY ARRANGE FOR AN EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT THROUGH THE

CHECKPOINT BY FORWARDING A CERTIFIED PASSENGER LIST AT LEAST 36

HOURS PRIOR TO TRANSIT BY FAX OR LETTER TO THE IRAQI PORT

AUTHORITY. ADDITIONALLY, TEN DAYS PRIOR TO FIRST TRANSIT FORWARD A

CERTIFIED ATTESTATION BY FAX OR LETTER FROM A RECOGNIZED MEMBER

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLASSIFICATION SOCIETIES (IACS)

THAT THE SHIP IN FACT HAS NO CARGO CARRYING CAPACITY.

B. A PASSENGER VESSEL ARRIVING AT THE IRAQI MARITIME SECURITY FORCE

CHECKPOINT THAT HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF

PARAGRAPH 10.A. WILL BE HELD UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY THE IRAQI PORT

AUTHORITY TO ENTER PORT. THE PASSENGER VESSEL MAY BE BOARDED

AND INSPECTED WHILE AWAITING AUTHORIZATION.

11. QUERY/BOARDING PROCEDURES: MSF UNITS QUERYING PASSING VESSELS

WILL IDENTIFY THEMSELVES AS MARITIME SECURITY FORCE WARSHIP (OR

AIRCRAFT) AND MAY GIVE AN IDENTIFYING NUMBER. MERCHANT VESSELS

WILL BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPONSE

TO QUERY.

1. NAME.

2. FLAG.

3. INTERNATIONAL RADIO CALL SIGN OR DISTINCTIVE LETTERS ASSIGNED BY

FLAG STATE.

4. CARGO QUANTITY AND DESCRIPTION (WITH EXCEPTION OF MILITARY 

CARGO).

5. AGENT.

6. LAST PORT OF CALL AND DATE DEPARTED.

7. NEXT PORT OF CALL AND ESTIMATED ARRIVAL.

8. DATE OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE.

FOLLOWING QUERY, VESSELS MAY BE CLEARED TO PROCEED OR
Appendix C

C-79

DIRECTED TO STANDBY FOR BOARDING. SHIPS DIRECTED TO STANDBY FOR

BOARDING WILL BE BOARDED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, WITH DUE

REGARD FOR WEATHER CONDITIONS AND VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS.

COALITION VESSELS CONDUCTING BOARDING'S WILL ENDEAVOR TO

PROVIDE ADVANCE NOTICE OF BOARDING TEAM ARRIVAL WHENEVER

POSSIBLE.

A. BOARDING/SECURITY SWEEP: BOARDING TEAMS WILL ADVISE VESSELS OF

REQUIREMENTS TO MUSTER CREW AND ACCOUNT FOR ANY

WATCHSTANDERS PRIOR TO BOARDING. ALL DIRECTIONS FROM THE

COALITION VESSEL SHOULD BE FOLLOWED EXPLICITLY TO AVOID

MISUNDERSTANDING. IF ANY DIRECTION IS NOT UNDERSTOOD,

THE VESSEL MASTER SHOULD ASK FOR CLARIFICATION. MERCHANT CREWS

SHOULD NOT TAKE OFFENSE AT SECURITY SWEEPS, AND SHOULD NOT

INTERFERE WITH THEM. REMAIN IN LOCATIONS DESIGNATED UNTIL CLEARED

TO MOVE ABOUT THE SHIP BY THE BOARDING TEAM.

B. SHIP INSPECTION. VESSEL MASTERS CAN FACILITATE THE INSPECTION

PROCESS BY OPENING HATCH COVERS AND MAKING OTHER REASONABLE

PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE BOARDING TEAM. THE SHIP'S

CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRY, CARGO DOCUMENTATION, AND CREW

PASSPORTS OR SEAMAN'S BOOKS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION

BY THE BOARDING OFFICER. BOARDING TEAMS MAY REQUIRE COPIES OF

SOME DOCUMENTS.

(091140Z JAN 2008)
Appendix C

C-80

SPECIAL WARNING NO. 124.

NICARAGUA.

10 June 2008

1. Mariners operating small vessels such as yachts and fishing vessels should note that Nicaragua 

has boundary disputes with its neighbors in both its Caribbean and Pacific waters, and should 

exercise caution.

2. The Caribbean waters lying generally south of the 15th parallel and east of the 82nd up to the 

79th meridians are subject to a current dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia.

3. The international court of justice has delimited a new maritime boundary line awarding 

maritime areas to the government of Nicaragua previously claimed by Honduras above the 15th 

parallel and apparently east of the 82nd meridian.

4. The Nicaraguan navy is patrolling portions of this maritime space, enforcing the requirement 

that fishing vessels hold a valid Nicaraguan fishing license, and has seized vessels not in 

compliance.

5. There have been cases where Nicaraguan authorities have seized foreign-flagged fishing and 

other vessels off the Nicaraguan coast. The government of Nicaragua imposes heavy fines on 

parties caught fishing illegally within waters of Nicaragua’s jurisdiction.

6. While in all cases passengers and crew have been released within a period of several weeks, in 

some cases the ships have been searched, personal gear and navigational equipment has 

disappeared, and Nicaraguan authorities have held seized vessels for excessive periods.

7. Prompt U.S. embassy consular access to detained U.S. citizens on Nicaragua’s Caribbean 

coast may not be possible because of delays in notification due to the relative isolation of the 

region.

8. There have been reported incidents of piracy in Caribbean and Pacific waters off the coast of 

Nicaragua, but the Nicaraguan Navy has increased its patrols and no recent incidents have been 

reported.

9. Cancel Special Warning number 95. (Dept. of State) (10 June 2008)
Appendix C

C-81

NO. 1/2009 Blockade of Gaza Strip

Tuesday, 06 January 2009 01:00

1. Subject: Blockade of Gaza Strip

2. Source : Israeli Navy

All mariners are advised that as of 03 January 2009, 1700 UTC, Gaza maritime area is closed to 

all maritime traffic and is under blockade imposed by Israeli Navy until further notice.

Maritime Gaza area is enclosed by the following coordinates:

31 35.71 N 34 29.46 E

31 46.80 N 34 10.01 E

31 19.39 N 34 13.11 E

31 33.73 N 33 56.68 E
Appendix C

C-82

HYDROLANT 58/10(56).

12 JAN 2010

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA.

LEBANON.

1. UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFL) MARITIME TASK

FORCE (MTF) IS MONITORING THE MERCHANT TRAFFIC SAILING TOWARDS 

LEBANESE PORTS OR TRANSITING INSIDE THE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS. 

THE UNIFL-MTF IS ACTING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS 

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1701.

2. SHIPS APPROACHING THE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS ARE TO BE READY 

TO ANSWER UNITED NATION WARSHIPS HAILING AND TO BE CONTROLLED IN 

APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED UNSCR 1701. 3. SHIPS PLANNING TO 

ENTER LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS ARE TO MAKE SURE THAT THEIR 

AGENTS IN LEBANON INFORM THE APPROPRIATE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES 

ABOUT THEIR INTENDED ARRIVAL.

4. SINCE 12 SEPTEMBER 2006 FOUR ENTRY AND TRANSITING CORRIDORS HAVE 

BEEN ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE LEBANESE TERRITORIAL WATERS:

A. CORRIDOR TO TRIPOLI PORT: ENTRY POINT 34-30N 035-31E,

COURSE 090 TOWARDS TRIPOLI BREAKWATER.

B. CORRIDOR TO BEIRUT PORT: ENTRY POINT 33-54N 035-13E,

COURSE 090 TOWARDS BEIRUT BREAKWATER.

C. CORRIDOR TO SAIDA PORT: ENTRY POINT 33-34N 035-08E,

COURSE 090 TOWARDS SAIDA BREAKWATER.

D. COASTAL CORRIDOR: ALONG THE COASTLINE, THREE MILES FROM THE 

SHORELINE, TO BE USED BY MERCHANT TRAFFIC BETWEEN LEBANESE PORTS.

5. MERCHANT VESSELS USING THESE CORRIDORS ARE TO ADHERE TO THE

FOLLOWING RULES:

A. ANY MERCHANT VESSEL DESTINED TO ONE OF THE THREE ABOVE

MENTIONED PORTS SHALL SAIL TO THEIR DESTINATION USING THE INDICATED 

CORRIDOR UNTIL A DISTANCE OF 3 MILES FROM THE SHORE. FROM THIS POINT, 

THEY SHALL HEAD TO THE PORT ENTRANCE.

B. ANY MERCHANT VESSEL DEPARTING A LEBANESE PORT AND DESTINED TO 

ANY OTHER LEBANESE PORT SHALL SAIL ALONG THE LEBANESE COAST USING 

THE COASTAL CORRIDOR UNTIL THE PORT OF DESTINATION ENTRANCE.

C. WHEN DEPARTING FROM ANY LEBANESE PORT AND LEAVING THE LEBANESE 

TERRITORIAL WATERS, ALL SHIPS SHALL ASSUME COURSE 270, AS SAFE 

NAVIGATION PERMITS.

6. CANCEL HYDROLANT 1670/08.

(121240Z JAN 2010)
Appendix C

C-83

SPECIAL WARNING NO. 125.

WORLDWIDE.

16 November 2010

1. The Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the high security threat level in Yemen due to 

terrorist and recommends postponing non-essential to Yemen. The level of risk for foreigners in 

Yemen remains high. A recent body of information suggests that Yemen based extremists are 

planning an attack against port facilities, commercial or transiting warships. Although it is 

unclear exactly how the Yemen based extremists intend to conduct an attack, it may be similar in 

nature to the attack against the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000 or the M/V Limburg in October 

2002, where a small to mid-size boat laden with explosives was detonated in the vicinity of the 

targeted ships. However, it cannot be ruled out that the extremists may be capable of other more 

sophisticated methods of targeting, such as the use of mortars or projectiles to target ships such 

as the missiles used to unsuccessfully strike a navy ship in Jordan in 2005. Although the time and 

location of such an attack is unknown, it is likely that ships in the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, 

Southern Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden along the coast of Yemen, as well as in associated ports 

or at offshore facilities are at the greatest risk of becoming targets of such an attack.

2. Travel by boat through the Red Sea or near the Socotra Islands in the Gulf of Aden also 

presents a continuing high risk of pirate attacks. In 2009, over 70 vessels were reportedly 

attacked. Since the beginning of 2010, four vessels reportedly have been seized in the area, one 

released in February. As of 15 March 2010, nine vessels and crew were being held for ransom, in 

addition to a British couple that was abducted from their yacht.

3. The Department of State strongly encourages U.S citizens to register at the consular section of 

the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a and enroll in the Warden System (Emergency Alert Network) to 

obtain updated information on travel and security in Yemen prior to travel at State Department’s 

travel registration website: https://travelregistration.state.gov/ibrs/ui/. American citizens should 

also consult the U.S. eEmbassy website: http://yemen.usembassy.gov/yemen/citizen

services.html get the most recent warden messages with up to date information on security 

conditions.

4. The U.S. Embassy, Sana'a is located at Dhahr Himyar Zone, Sheraton Hotel District, P.O. Box 

22347. The number of the consular section is 967 1755 2000, extension 2153 or 2266. For after 

hours emergencies, please call 967 1755 2000 (press zero for extension) or 967 3321 3509. From 

time to time the embassy may temporarily close or suspend public services for security reasons. 

Emergency assistance to U.S. citizens during non-business hours (or when public access is 

restricted) is available through embassy duty personnel.

5. Additional information from the U.S. Maritime Administration may be available at: 

http://www marad.dot.gov/

news_room_landing_page/ maritime_advisories/advisory_summary.htm.

6. Cancel Special Warning 113. (Dept. of State) (16 November 2010)
Appendix C

C-84

HYDROPAC 471/10(19)

11 DEC 2010

NORTH PACIFIC. HAWAII.

MISSILES.

1. INTERMITTENT MISSILE FIRING OPERATIONS 0001Z TO 2400Z DAILY MONDAY 

THRU SUNDAY IN THE PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY, HAWAIIAN AREA, 

BARKING SANDS, KAUAI. THE MAJORITY OF MISSILE FIRINGS TAKE PLACE 1600Z 

TO 0400Z DAILY MONDAY THRU FRIDAY. PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY 

HAWAIIAN AREA (W188) IS BOUND BY

22-02.4N 159-47.3W, 22-00.0N 159-51.0W, 22-00.0N 160-00.0W,

22-02.7N 160-09.1W, 22-03.0N 160-21.0W, 22-05.0N 161-35.0W,

22-56.0N 161-49.0W, 22-45.0N 161-25.0W, 23-57.0N 160-41.0W,

25-41.0N 161-36.0W, 25-47.0N 158-15.0W, 23-54.0N 158-15.0W,

22-20.0N 159-09.0W, 21-58.1N 159-20.5W, 22-13.0N 159-42.0W,

22-00.0N 159-51.0W.

2. VESSELS MAY BE REQUESTED TO ALTER COURSE WITHIN THE ABOVE AREA 

DUE TO FIRING OPERATIONS AND ARE REQUESTED TO CONTACT "MISSILE 

RANGE BARKING SANDS" ON 2182 KHZ, 4491 USB OR 156.8 MHZ (CHANNEL 16) 

BEFORE ENTERING THE ABOVE BOUNDARIES. IF UNABLE TO CONTACT THE 

PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY PRIOR TO ENTERING OR WHILE IN THE 

WARNING AREA, RELAY MESSAGES THROUGH U.S. COAST GUARD HONOLULU.

3. VESSELS INBOUND AND OUTBOUND FOR HAWAIIAN PORTS WILL CREATE THE 

LEAST INTERFERENCE TO FIRING OPERATIONS AS WELL AS ENHANCE THE 

VESSEL'S SAFETY BY PASSING SOUTH OF THE ISLANDS OF KAUAI AND NIIHAU 

DURING SPECIFIED TIMES.

4. CANCEL NAVAREA XII 445/10.

(011241Z DEC 2010)
Appendix C

C-85
Appendix C

C-86

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970

February 26, 2011

Resolution 1970 (2011) 

of 26 February 2011

The Security Council,

Expressing grave concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and condemning the 

violence and use of force against civilians,

Deploring the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including the repression of 

peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting 

unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from 

the highest level of the Libyan government,

Welcoming the condemnation by the Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General 

of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and 

international humanitarian law that are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note of the letter to the President of the Security Council from the Permanent 

Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya dated 26 February 2011,

Welcoming the Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/S-15/2 of 25 February 2011, including 

the decision to urgently dispatch an independent international commission of inquiry to 

investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya, to establish the facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes 

perpetrated, and where possible identify those responsible,

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Expressing concern at the plight of refugees forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya,

Expressing concern also at the reports of shortages of medical supplies to treat the wounded,

Recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population,

Underlining the need to respect the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of expression, including 

freedom of the media,

Stressing the need to hold to account those responsible for attacks, including by forces under 

their control, on civilians,
Appendix C

C-87

Recalling article 16 of the Rome Statute under which no investigation or prosecution may be 

commenced or proceeded with by the International Criminal Court for a period of 12 months 

after a Security Council request to that effect,

Expressing concern for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 

national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

Mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 

under the Charter of the United Nations,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its 

Article 41,

1. Demands an immediate end to the violence and calls for steps to fulfil the legitimate demands 

of the population;

2. Urges the Libyan authorities to:

(a) Act with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and 

allow immediate access for international human rights monitors;

(b) Ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and their assets and facilitate the departure of those 

wishing to leave the country;

(c) Ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and 

workers, into the country; and

(d) Immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media;

3. Requests all Member States, to the extent possible, to cooperate in the evacuation of those 

foreign nationals wishing to leave the country;

ICC referral

“4. Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the 

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court;

5. Decides that the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary 

assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that 

States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and 

concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and 

the Prosecutor;
Appendix C

C-88

6. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan 

Arab Jamahiriya which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 

shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising 

out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya established or authorized by the 

Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the State;

7. Invites the Prosecutor to address the Security Council within two months of the adoption of 

this resolution and every six months thereafter on actions taken pursuant to this resolution;

8. Recognizes that none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral, including 

expenses related to investigations or prosecutions in connection with that referral, shall be borne 

by the United Nations and that such costs shall be borne by the parties to the Rome Statute and 

those States that wish to contribute voluntarily;

Arms embargo

9. Decides that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the 

direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from or through their 

territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel 

of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary 

equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or 

other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms 

and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not 

originating in their territories, and decides further that this measure shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, 

and related technical assistance or training, as approved in advance by the Committee established 

pursuant to paragraph 24 below;

(b) Protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to the 

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and 

humanitarian and development works and associated personnel, for their personal use only; or

(c) Other sales or supply of arms and related materiel, or provision of assistance or personnel, as 

approved in advance by the Committee;

10. Decides that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya shall cease the export of all arms and related 

materiel and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the Libyan 

Arab Jamahiriya by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not 

originating in the territory of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

11. Calls upon all States, in particular States neighbouring the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to 

inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with 

international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation 

agreements, all cargo to and from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in their territory, including 

seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to 
Appendix C

C-89

believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by 

paragraphs 9 or 10 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those 

provisions;

12. Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery 

of items prohibited by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, seize and dispose (such as through 

destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or 

destination States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by 

paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in 

such efforts;

13. Requires any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11 

above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, 

explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not 

cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such 

Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report 

containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the 

transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this 

information is not in the initial report;

14. Encourages Member States to take steps to strongly discourage their nationals from 

travelling to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to participate in activities on behalf of the Libyan 

authorities that could reasonably contribute to the violation of human rights;

Travel ban

15. Decides that all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or 

transit through their territories of individuals listed in Annex I of this resolution or designated by 

the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, provided that nothing in this 

paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

16. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 15 above shall not apply:

(a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the 

grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;

(b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;

(c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the 

objectives of peace and national reconciliation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and stability in the 

region; or

(d) Where a State determines on a case-by-case basis that such entry or transit is required to 

advance peace and stability in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the States subsequently notifies 

the Committee within forty-eight hours after making such a determination;
Appendix C

C-90

Asset freeze

17. Decides that all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and 

economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or 

indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or designated by the 

Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 below, or by individuals or entities acting on 

their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further 

that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are 

prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within 

their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this 

resolution or individuals designated by the Committee;

18. Expresses its intention to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 shall at a later

stage be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

19. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above do not apply to funds, other 

financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, 

medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or 

exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses 

associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or 

service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen 

funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to 

the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other 

financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the 

Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been 

notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the 

Committee; or

(c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the 

funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment 

provided that the lien or judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is 

not for the benefit of a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, and has been 

notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;

20. Decides that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the 

provisions of paragraph 17 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or 

payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which 

those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such 

interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

21. Decides that the measures in paragraph 17 above shall not prevent a designated person or 

entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a 
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person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not 

directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 17 above, 

and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive 

such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets

or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

22. Decides that the measures contained in paragraphs 15 and 17 shall apply to the individuals 

and entities designated by the Committee, pursuant to paragraph 24 (b) and (c), respectively;

(a) Involved in or complicit in ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of 

serious human rights abuses against persons in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including by being 

involved in or complicit in planning, commanding, ordering or conducting attacks, in violation of 

international law, including aerial bombardments, on civilian populations and facilities; or

(b) Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of individuals or entities identified in 

subparagraph (a).

23. Strongly encourages Member States to submit to the Committee names of individuals who 

meet the criteria set out in paragraph 22 above;

New Sanctions Committee

24. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a 

Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein “the 

Committee”), to undertake to following tasks:

(a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 9, 10, 15, and 17;

(b) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 15 and to 

consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 16 above;

(c) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 17 above and to 

consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraphs 19 and 20 above;

(d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the 

measures imposed above;

(e) To report within thirty days to the Security Council on its work for the first report and 

thereafter to report as deemed necessary by the Committee;

(f) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular 

those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States to meet with the 

Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;
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(g) To seek from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions 

taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed above;

(h) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or noncompliance with the measures contained in this resolution;

25. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Committee within 120 days of the adoption of 

this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 

9, 10, 15 and 17 above;

Humanitarian assistance

26. Calls upon all Member States, working together and acting in cooperation with the Secretary 

General, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available 

humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and requests the States 

concerned to keep the Security Council regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken 

pursuant to this paragraph, and expresses its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate 

measures, as necessary, to achieve this;

Commitment to review

27. Affirms that it shall keep the Libyan authorities’ actions under continuous review and that it 

shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, 

including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be 

needed at any time in light of the Libyan authorities’ compliance with relevant provisions of this 

resolution;

28. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

March 17, 2011

Resolution 1973 (2011) 

of 17 March 2011

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011),

Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy 

civilian casualties,

Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and 

reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible 

steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, 

enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities 

against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and urging these authorities to 

comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 

(2006),

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to 

consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return 

of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan 

Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and 

the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian 

personnel,

Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the Secretary 

General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights 

and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya,

Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 

2011, and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 

2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya, 
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Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to 

call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in 

places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan 

people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note further of the Secretary-General's call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate ceasefire,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 

2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and stressing that those responsible 

for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, 

must be held to account,

Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in 

the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, welcoming the response of neighbouring States, in particular 

Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and calling on the 

international community to support those efforts,

Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

Considering that the establishment of a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of 

the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in 

Libya,

Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr AbdelElah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution 

to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 

national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to 

international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 

1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all 

attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the 

legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to 

send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to 
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send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to 

the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, 

including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law and take all measures to 

protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of 

humanitarian assistance;

Protection of civilians

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or 

through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the SecretaryGeneral, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), 

to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any 

part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the SecretaryGeneral immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this 

paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. Recognizes the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the 

maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and bearing in mind Chapter VIII 

of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to 

cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

No fly zone

6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order 

to help protect civilians;

7. Decides further that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole 

purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including 

medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign 

nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 

4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorisation 

conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be 

coordinated with any mechanism established under paragraph 8;

8. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General 

of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 

arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights 

imposed by paragraph 6 above, as necessary, and requests the States concerned in cooperation 

with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures 

they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for 

implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,
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9. Calls upon all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 

arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over-flight approvals, for the 

purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

10. Requests the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the 

Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, 

including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or 

evacuation flights;

11. Decides that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary-General and the 

Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the 

authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by 

the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to 

report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this 

resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 

above;

Enforcement of the arms embargo

13. Decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following 

paragraph : "Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or 

through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the 

arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their 

territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or 

from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides 

reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of 

which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this 

resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, calls upon all flag States of 

such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use 

all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections";

14. Requests Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas 

to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General and further requests the States 

concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 

24 of resolution 1970 (2011) ("the Committee") immediately of measures taken in the exercise of 

the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

15. Requires any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or 

arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit 

promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the 

grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was 

provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to 

submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details 

on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a 
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description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the 

initial report;

16. Deplores the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and calls 

upon all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations under paragraph 9 of resolution 

1970 (2011) to prevent the provision of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya;

Ban on flights

17. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab 

Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or 

overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the 

Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

18. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or 

overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that 

the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by 

paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the 

provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

Asset freeze 

19. Decides that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 

(2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their 

territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as 

designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their 

direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and 

decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources 

are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities 

within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the 

Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned 

or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate 

such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this 

resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

20. Affirms its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 

1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of 

the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

21. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and 

firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when 

doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its 

jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities 

owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to 

believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;
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Designations

22. Decides that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions 

imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and decides further that the 

individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in 

paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);

23. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 

1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the 

Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), particularly paragraphs 9 

and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

Panel of experts

24. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with 

the Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("Panel of Experts"), under the direction of the 

Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 

1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, 

regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures 

decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to 

improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) Provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than 90 days after the Panel's 

appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to the termination of its 

mandate with its findings and recommendations;

25. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate 

fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at 

their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this 

resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

26. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 

(2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

27. Decides that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary 

measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any 

person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the 

benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its 

performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 

1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;
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C-99

28. Reaffirms its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review 

and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and 

resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as 

appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 

1970 (2011).

29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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NATO Navigational Warning

Libya

March 25, 2011

Info for Shipping 

NAVWARN in force

NAVAREA III 147/11

Eastern Mediterranean Sea North of Libya Territorial Waters NATO arms embargo operation in 

the vicinity of Libya territorial Waters 

1. In accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970 (26/02/2011) and 

1973 (17/03/2011), NATO maritime forces are conducting arms embargo operations in the 

vicinity of Libya Territorial Waters. 

2. Those operations are conducted in the Mediterranean Sea and systematically enforced in the 

following Maritime Surveillance Area: 

• Northern border: the 35N parallel 

• Western border: Tunisian Territorial Waters (not included) 

• Eastern border: Egyptian Territorial Waters (not included) 

• Southern Border: Libyan Territorial Waters (not included) 

3. All Merchant vessels transiting in this area or inbound to Libya Territorial waters may be 

subject to hailing, queries or boarding from NATO naval and air units. 

* All Merchant vessels transiting through this Maritime Surveillance Area are requested, 24hrs 

prior their entering in this area, to contact the NATO SHIPPING CENTRE (United Kingdom, 

contact details below): either via phone or fax / email to provide a Format ALFA report. The 

report must include the following information: 

• IMO number 

• DTG - Position / Speed / Course

• Last Port Of Call

• Next Port Of Call

• Port of Registry 

Alternatively, a Format ALFA form (Ref ATP 2(B) is available at: 

(http://www.shipping.nato.int) \

* Also, all Merchant vessels inbound to Libya Territorial Waters are requested, when crossing 

the boundaries of the Maritime Surveillance Area, to contact the Head Quarters Maritime 
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Command, Naples, Maritime Operations Centre (Italy, contact details below): either via phone or 

fax/email to provide the following information: 

• IMO number

• LPOC NPOC 

• Port of registry 

4. This request for reports fully supports the embargo operations under the United Nations 

Security Council Resolution and is, therefore, mandatory. This measure is complementary of the 

action of NATO naval forces in the vicinity of Libya Territorial Waters. NATO priority is to 

reduce interferences and delays caused to merchant shipping traffic to its minimum. It is 

therefore highly recommended for merchant vessels transiting through this area to cooperate 

promptly with NATO forces. Consequently, failure to comply with that guidance will result in 

further investigations conducted by NATO naval units. This investigation will include detailed 

queries, boardings or even diversion to nearby ports for inspection and will cause major transit 

delays to merchant shipping. 

5. Points of Contact: This operation is conducted by the NATO Head Quarters Maritime 

Command located in Naples (Italy). Its Maritime Operations Centre is the main point of contact 

for any issue or information regarding the arms embargo: HQ MC Naples MOC free toll phone 

number: 00 800 1101 2010 HQ MC Naples MOC unclassified internet address: 

mocn3dogcell@manp.nato.int

6. Reminder: HQ MC Naples is already conducting Operation Active Endeavour, NATO 

operation against terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The MOC can also be contacted regarding 

this issue: HQ MC Naples MOC Operation Active Endeavour collect line: 0039 081 1970 65337. 

For other issues, the NATO SHIPPING CENTRE (Northwood, United Kingdom), remains the 

main POC; e-mail: info@shipping.nato.int freephone: +44 1923 956574 free fax: +44 1923 

956575
Appendix C

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HYDROLANT 881/11(56).

25 MAY 2011

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN SEA. ISRAEL.

NGA CHART 56060 (9TH ED).

1. ALL U.S. VESSELS AND MARINERS ARE ADVISED THAT ISRAEL IS CURRENTLY 

ENFORCING A BLOCKADE IN THE GAZA MARITIME AREA. THE AREA IS CLOSED 

TO ALL MARITIME TRAFFIC AND THE BLOCKADE IS BEING ENFORCED BY THE 

ISRAELI NAVY IN AREA BOUND BY

31-46.80N 034-10.01E, 31-35.71N 034-29.46E,

31-19.39N 034-13.11E, 31-33.73N 033-56.68E.

2. U.S. VESSELS AND MARINERS INTENDING TO ENTER THE AREA ARE LIKELY TO 

FACE ENFORCEMENT ACTION BY THE ISRAELI NAVY. THE DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE HAS ALSO ADVISED AGAINST TRAVEL BY U.S. CITIZENS TO GAZA BY ANY 

MEANS, INCLUDING BY SEA. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO ENTER GAZA BY SEA 

HAVE RESULTED IN VIOLENT INCIDENTS AND THE DETENTION AND 

DEPORTATION OF THOSE INVOLVED.

3. U.S. MARINERS ARE ALSO REMINDED THAT PROCEDURES EXIST FOR THE 

DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN CARGO TO GAZA VIA THE ISRAELI PORT OF 

ASHDOD OR THE EGYPTIAN PORT OF EL-ARISH, WHERE CARGO CAN BE 

SCREENED. (251527Z MAY 2011)
Appendix C

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USDOT Maritime Administration Advisory

Advisory #: 2011-03

June 7, 2011

To: MARINERS

Subject: UPDATE TO VESSELS TRANSITING TO OR FROM JAPAN OR IN WATERS IN 

THE VICNITY OF HONSHU

1. THIS MARAD ADVISORY UPDATES GUIDANCE TO VESSELS TRANSITING TO OR 

FROM PORTS IN JAPAN OR IN WATERS IN THE VICINITY OF THE NORTHEAST 

COAST OF THE ISLAND OF HONSHU AND CANCELS ADVISORY 2011-02.

2. U.S.-FLAG OPERATORS WITH SHIPS IN THE AFFECTED AREAS ARE REQUESTED 

TO FORWARD THIS ADVISORY TO THEIR SHIPS BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS 

MEANS.

3. MARINERS ARE ADVISED TO CONTINUE TO MONITOR AND COMPLY WITH 

NAVTEX AND NAVAREA XI WARNINGS ISSUED FOR JAPANESE WATERS.

4. OPERATORS AND MARINERS ARE ALSO ADVISED TO REVIEW AND FOLLOW 

THE RADIOLOGICAL INFORMATION ON PORTS AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

PROVIDED ON THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN’S (GOJ) MINISTRY OF LAND, 

INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT, AND TOURISM (MLIT) WEBSITE: 

HTTP://WWW.MLIT.GO.JP/EN/MARITIME/MARITIME_FR1_000007.HTML. MARINERS 

SHOULD KEEP ABREAST OF INFORMATION BEING PROVIDED BY THE 

GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN RELATING TO ANY FURTHER POTENTIAL IMPACTS.

5. VESSELS THAT ENTER INTO THE JAPANESE DEFINED "RESTRICED AREA" MAY 

BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL SCREENING BY THE USCG IF THE U.S. IS THEIR 

FIRST PORT CALL AFTER DEPARTING THE RESTRICTED AREA. THE U.S. COAST 

GUARD REQUIRES THE VESSEL'S MASTER TO SUBMIT TRANSIT INFORMATION, 

INCLUDING THE DATE AND TOTAL TIME WITHIN THE PRECAUTIONARY AREA, TO 

THE COGNIZANT U.S. COAST GUARD CAPTAIN OF THE PORT USING THE 

COMMENT BLOCK ON THE 96-HOUR ADVANCED NOTICE OF ARRIVAL.

6. THIS ADVISORY WILL BE PUBLISHED ON THE MARAD WEB SITE AT 

WWW.MARAD.DOT.GOV UNDER THE NEWSROOM TAB.

7. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ADVISORY, CONTACT CAPTAIN 

ROBERT FORD, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY, CODE: MAR420, ROOM W25-308, 1200 NEW JERSEY AVE, S.E., WASHINGTON, DC 20590, 

TELEPHONE 202-366-0223, FACSIMILE 202-366-3954, TLX II 710.822.9426 (MARAD 

DOT WSH), OR EMAIL: MARADSECURITY@DOT.GOV.
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8. CANCEL ADVISORY 2011-02.

NAVAREA III Warning 445/2011

October 31, 2011

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

1. Operation Unified Protector 

Operation unified protector has been terminated as of 31st October at 2159 UTC.

2. Consequences

The following are cancelled:

- The maritime surveillance area (MSA) in vicinity of Libya

- All processes implemented specifically for OUP: humanitarian aid shipments deconfliction, 

reporting when arriving in the MSA and cargo pre clearance information.

3. Merchant navies cooperation with NATO during OUP

NATO expresses its gratitude to the international merchant community for its outstanding 

cooperation and understanding during this operation.

4. Operation Active Endeavour

Operation active endeavour remains NATO'S ongoing operation in the Mediterranean Sea with a 

mission to find, deter and, if required, protect countries from acts of terrorism.

If contacted by NATO units your cooperation and assistance in answering questions would be 

greatly appreciated.

You can ask questions or report any suspicious activity to NATO warships, or directly to any of 

the following.

NATO MARITIME COMMAND IN NAPLES:

TOLL FREE PHONE: +800 1101 2010

EMAIL: MOCN3DOGCELL@MANP.NATO.INT

NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING:

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER CYRIL STYLIANIDIS

C.STYLIANIDIS@MANP.NATO.INT

+39 334 609 9757

NATO SHIPPING CENTRE (UK):

+44 1923 956574

INFO@SHIPPING.NATO.INT

WWW.SHIPPING.NATO.INT

5. NAVAREA III (395/11) has been cancelled.
Appendix C

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USDOT Maritime Administration Advisory:

Advisory #: 2011-07

Dec 23, 2011

To: ALL OPERATORS OF U.S. FLAG, EFFECTIVE U.S. CONTROLLED VESSELS, AND 

OTHER MARITIME INTERESTS

Subject: IRANIAN NAVAL EXERCISE

1. REPORTS FROM MARITIME FORCES AND COMMERICAL MARITIME INTERESTS 

INDICATE CONCERN WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR LOCALIZED DISRUPTION TO 

SHIPPING IN CONJUNCTION WITH FUTURE IRANIAN NAVAL EXERICISES. DURING 

PREVIOUS EXERCISES IRANIAN MARITIME FORCES CONDUCTED BOARDINGS 

AND INSPECTIONS OF MERCHANT SHIPS, INCLUDING THOSE FLAGGED TO 

EUROPEAN NATIONS. THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT IRAN WILL ATTEMPT TO 

CONDUCT BOARDINGS AND INSPECTIONS DURING EXERCISES BETWEEN 

DECEMBER 2011 AND MARCH 2012. THE MOST LIKELY LOCATION FOR THIS 

ACTIVITY WOULD BE IN THE VICINITY OF THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, 

PARTICULARLY IN AREAS CLOSER TO IRANIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS.

2. IF A US-FLAG VESSELS IS HAILED FOR BOARDING BY THE IRANIAN NAVY IN 

INTERNATIONAL WATERS, THE SHIP'S MASTER SHOULD “PROTEST BUT 

COMPLY”, IF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT.

3. US-FLAG VESSELS ARE ADVISED TO REPORT INCIDENTS TO THE 

COMUSNAVCENT BATTLEWATCH CAPTAIN (MARITIME OPERATIONS CENTER) AT 

011-973-1785-3879, AND MARLO BAHRAIN AT 011-973-3940-1395.

4. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ADVISORY, CONTACT CAPTAIN 

ROBERT FORD, MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY, CODE: MAR420, ROOM W25-308, 1200 NEW JERSEY AVE, S.E., WASHINGTON, DC 20590, 

TELEPHONE 202-366-0223, FACSIMILE 202-366-3954, TLX II 710.822.9426 (MARAD 

DOT WSH), OR EMAIL: MARADSECURITY@DOT.GOV.
Appendix C

C-106

USDOT Maritime Administration Advisory:

Advisory #: 2012-02

July 12, 2012

To: MARINERS

Subj: VESSELS OPERATING IN THE GULF OF OMAN, NORTH ARABIAN SEA, GULF 

OF ADEN, AND BAB EL MANDEB REGIONS

1. THIS MARAD ADVISORY PROVIDES GUIDANCE TO VESSELS OPERATING IN 

SUBJECT WATERS.

2. ELEVATED REGIONAL TENSIONS HAVE INCREASED THE RISK OF POTENTIAL 

MARITIME ATTACKS CONDUCTED BY EXTREMISTS.

3. RECOMMEND VESSELS AT ANCHOR, OPERATING IN RESTRICTED 

MANUEVERING ENVIRONMENTS, OR AT SLOW SPEEDS BE ESPECIALLY 

VIGILANT, AND REPORT SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY.

4. U.S. FLAG VESSELS THAT OBSERVE SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY IN THE AREA ARE 

ADVISED TO REPORT SUCH SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY OR ANY HOSTILE OR 

POTENTIALLY HOSTILE ACTION TO COMUSNAVCENT BATTLEWATCH CAPTAIN 

AT PHONE NUMBER 011-973-1785-3879, CUSNC.BWC@ME.NAVY.MIL. ALL 

SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES AND EVENTS ARE ALSO TO BE REPORTED TO THE U.S. 

COAST GUARD NATIONAL RESPONSE CENTER IN ACCORDANCE WITH 33 CFR 

PART 101.305. IN ADDITION, A SHIP HOSTILE ACTION REPORT (SHAR) SHOULD BE 

SENT TO THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY (NGA) AS SOON AS 

POSSIBLE FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT/SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY, INCLUDING 

APPARENT SURVEILLANCE BEING CONDUCTED BY SMALL VESSELS/BOATS. EMAIL: NAVSAFETY@NGA.MIL OR REF: NGA PUB 117 FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE.

5. VESSELS TRANSITING HIGH RISK WATERS DESIGNATED BY U.S. COAST GUARD 

MARSEC DIRECTIVE 104-6 (CURRENT VERSION) MUST COMPLY WITH ITS 

SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, VESSELS SHOULD CONDUCT A PREVOYAGE RISK ASSESSMENT AND INCORPORATE APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE 

MEASURES INTO THEIR VESSEL SECURITY PLANS. ADDITIONALLY, U.S.-FLAG 

OPERATORS SHOULD HAVE THEIR PROTECTIVE MEASURES IMPLEMENTED PRIOR 

TO ENTERING HIGH RISK WATERS.

6. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT CAPTAIN ROBERT FORD, MARITIME 

ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY, CODE: MAR-420, ROOM W25-207, 1200 

NEW JERSEY AVE, S.E., WASHINGTON, DC 20590, TELEPHONE 202-366-0223, 
Appendix C

C-107

FACSIMILE 202-366-3954, TLX II 710.822.9426 (MARAD DOT WSH), OR EMAIL: 

MARADSECURITY@DOT.GOV.

7. U.S.-FLAG OPERATORS WITH SHIPS IN THE AFFECTED AREAS ARE REQUESTED 

TO FORWARD THIS ADVISORY TO THEIR SHIPS BY THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS 

MEANS.

8. THIS ADVISORY WILL BE PUBLISHED ON THE MARAD WEB SITE AT 

WWW.MARAD.DOT.GOV.

9. CANCEL ADVISORY 2010-10.

10. TO DETERMINE MARITIME ADVISORIES THAT REMAIN IN FORCE, CONSULT 

THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATION WEB SITE AT HTTP://WWW.MARAD.DOT.GOV 

OR THE MOST RECENT U.S. NOTICE TO MARINERS AT HTTP://MSI.NGA.MIL.
D-1

Appendix D

Manual Excerpts

This appendix is a compilation of the provisions regarding “zones” from various 

military manuals and doctrine publications. Only sections that specifically refer to 

“zones” or to “control of the immediate area of operations” or related concepts are 

included. This appendix is included because many of the cited manuals are not readily 

available. The zones provisions, of course, must be read in conjunction with other 

sections of the manuals, which are not included due to length. When possible, links to 

on-line copies of the manuals are provided.

Excerpts Page

Australia 

Executive Series ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict (2006) D-3

DI (AF) AAP 1003, Operations Law for RAAF Commanders (1994) D-6

Australian Maritime Doctrine (2010) D-7

Australian Book of Reference, 

ABR 5179 Manual of International Law (1998) D-8

Canada 

The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level—

Annotated (2001) D-10

Germany 

Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (1992) D-12

Commander’s Handbook—Legal Bases for the 

Operations of Naval Forces (2002) D-14

United Kingdom 

The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806) (1995) D-18

The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806) 

Second Edition (1999) D-19

British Maritime Doctrine (BR 1806) Third Edition (2004) D-20
Appendix D

D-2

The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, UK Ministry of Defense (2004)

 (Note: This Manual is an Oxford University Press publication

 that republishes the original version of JSP 383.) D-21

Handbook of the Law of Maritime Operations (BR 3012) Third Edition (2005) D-23

United States 

NWIP 10-2, Law of Naval Warfare (basic through change 6 incorporated) (1955) D-25

NWP 1-14M, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (2007) D-28

Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (2010/2013) D-36

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (2011) D-37

Air Force Operations & the Law: A Guide for Air, Space & Cyber Forces (2009) D-38

International

San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994) D-40

International Law Association: 

Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality (1998) D-42
Appendix D

D-3

Australian Defence Doctrine Publication (ADDP 06.4)

**************************** 

Executive Series ADDP 06.4 Law of Armed Conflict (11 May 2006):

http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/905/470419/Australian_LOAC_Manual_06.4_PART_I.pdf

Immediate area of naval operations

6.16 Within the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, a belligerent may establish 

special restrictions upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may prohibit altogether 

such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. Neutral vessels and aircraft which fail to comply 

with a belligerent’s orders expose themselves to the risk of being fired upon or captured. This 

traditional belligerent right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate area or 

vicinity of naval operations should be distinguished from the concept of exclusion zones (EZ).

6.17 Within the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, a commanding officer of a 

belligerent warship may exercise control over the communications of any neutral merchant 

vessel or aircraft whose presence might otherwise endanger the success of the belligerent 

operation. Legitimate distress communications by neutral vessels and aircraft should be 

permitted if they do not prejudice the success of operations.

Methods of armed conflict at sea

6.32 Exclusion zones. Maritime exclusion zones (MEZ), variously referred to as defensive sea 

areas, total EZ, maritime control areas or operational zones, are areas of ocean space from which 

a belligerent declares some or all types of ships or aircraft to be excluded. MEZ must be 

distinguished from EEZ which bear no relationship to armed conflict at sea. An MEZ may be 

moving or stationary and is sometimes declared to include the airspace above it. MEZ differ 

from the immediate area of naval operations because they normally encompass quite large water 

areas and are not confined to areas in the close vicinity of naval operations.

6.33 There is no specific international law treaty provision referring to MEZ, however, their use 

has acquired a degree of validity under customary international law. The International Military 

Tribunal at Nuremberg held that establishment of EZ in which neutral merchant ships were 

subjected to a ‘sink on sight’ policy was illegal. However, the Tribunal implicitly accepted the 

legitimacy of an EZ in which belligerent merchant ships were subjected to a sink on sight policy 

where such ships were incorporated into the belligerent war effort.

6.34 The establishment of an MEZ does not relieve the belligerent of its duties under IHL to 

avoid adversely affecting the legitimate uses of defined areas of ocean space. Where a belligerent 

establishes an MEZ the following conditions should apply:
Appendix D

D-4

• The extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures imposed should not 

exceed what is strictly required by military necessity and the principle of proportionality.

• Due regard must be given to the rights of neutral states in their exercise of the legitimate 

uses of the seas.

• The commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions 

imposed, must be publicly declared and appropriately notified to other states.

• Necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft should be 

provided:

–where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to 

the ports and coasts of a neutral state; or

–in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military 

requirements do not permit.

Air defence identification zones

8.23 An air defence identification zone (ADIZ) is a defined area within which civil aircraft are 

required to identify themselves. The asserted legal basis for such zones is the right of nations, 

under the Chicago Convention, to establish conditions and procedures for entry into their 

national airspace. These zones are established above the high seas adjacent to the coast, and over 

the territorial sea, land and territory. Declaration of an ADIZ does not constitute a claim of any 

sovereign rights. Australia, from time to time, has declared an ADIZ for military exercise 

purposes. Nations who have standing ADIZs include Indonesia (over Java), United States, Japan, 

Canada and France.

8.24 Air defence identification zone procedures. An aircraft approaching an ADIZ can be 

required to identify itself as a condition of entry to national airspace. ADIZ regulations generally 

require aircraft, bound for national airspace, to file flight plans and periodic position reports. 

nFailing voluntary identification, aircraft can expect to be identified by intercept aircraft. The 

declaration of an ADIZ does not confer on an intercepting pilot the right to engage an aircraft. 

Rules of engagement (ROE) will provide guidance on the circumstances in which an aircraft may 

be engaged. There is no right to require an aircraft to identify itself if it does not intend to enter 

national airspace. These procedures reflect the peacetime position. In the case of imminent or 

actual hostilities, a nation may take self-defence measures, which will affect overflight in 

international airspace.

8.25 Promulgation of an air defence identification zone. The activation of an ADIZ is 

effected by promulgation through military and civil agencies. In Australia, Air Services 

Australia, in concert with Headquarters Joint Operations Command, promulgates ADIZs by the 

issue of Notices to Airmen.

Security zones 

8.27 In the interests of safety, any nation may declare a temporary closure, or warning area, on 

and over the high seas to advise other nations of the conduct of hazardous activities. These 
Appendix D

D-5

warnings are cautionary, not mandatory. International law does not recognise the right of any 

nation to restrict the right of navigation of military aircraft in international airspace. Some 

nations have declared exclusion zones (EZ) in times of conflict, pursuant to the inherent right of 

self defence. The United Nations (UN) also sanctioned an air EZ over Bosnia following Security 

Council resolutions, in an effort to protect areas from attack.

8.28 Claims of security zones. Some nations have asserted claims that purport to restrict the 

activities of military aircraft and warships in so-called ‘security zones’ that extend beyond 

national airspace. These zones have no basis in international law except in times of conflict. 

Customary international law does not determine the extent of security zones, beyond having a 

requirement that they be reasonable in relation to the needs of national security.

Exclusion zones

8.29 In situations of international conflict and times of tension, a nation is entitled, under the UN 

Charter, to exercise measures of individual or collective self-defence against an imminent threat 

of armed attack or an actual armed attack. On many occasions this century, nations have declared 

an EZ in areas adjacent to national territory, invoking the principle of individual or collective 

self-defence.

8.30 An EZ is an area declared by a nation, or military force, into which entry by designated 

forces is prohibited. An EZ may be stationary or moving. Neutral aircraft and ships should avoid 

such zones; those that enter navigate at their own risk. The use of EZ is expected to increase, as 

not only nations but also the UN, seek ways to localise conflicts. Because acceptability of the EZ 

will depend on factors unique to each situation, providing clear guidance on the legal 

acceptability of an EZ is difficult. In times of conflict a belligerent is not barred from using force 

outside the zone to eliminate enemy threats. Further guidance on the use of EZ can be obtained 

from Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.1—Rules of Engagement and ADF legal 

advisers.
Appendix D

D-6

OPERATIONS LAW FOR RAAF COMMANDERS 

DI (AF) AAP 1003 

(1994) 

**************************** 

CHAPTER TWO 

INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT 

AND NAVIGATION RIGHTS 

(pp. 2-6 – 2-7) 

Security zones 

2.21 General In the interests of safety, any nation may declare a temporary closure, or warning 

area, on and over the high seas to advise other nations of the conduct of hazardous activities. 

These warnings are cautionary, not mandatory. International law does not recognise the right of 

any nation to restrict the right of navigation of military aircraft in international airspace. Pursuant 

to the inherent right of national or collective self defence, some nations have legitimately 

declared exclusion zones in times of conflict. The United Nations (UN) has also sanctioned air 

exclusion zones, following security council resolutions, in an effort to protect areas from attack. 

2.22 Claims of Security Zones Some nations have asserted claims that purport to restrict the 

activities of military aircraft and warships in so-called ‘security zones’ that extend beyond 

national airspace. These zones have no basis in international law, in times of peace. Historically,

these types of security zones have been restricted to times of conflict. In these circumstances, 

customary international law does not determine the extent of security zones, beyond having a 

requirement that they be reasonable in relation to the needs of national security. 

Exclusion zones 

2.23 In situations of international conflict and times of tension, a nation is entitled, under the UN 

Charter, to exercise measures of individual or collective self defence against an imminent threat 

of armed attack or an actual armed attack. On many occasions this century, nations have declared 

an exclusion zone (EZ) in areas adjacent to national territory, invoking the principle of individual 

or collective self defence. An exclusion zone can be a total exclusion zone (TEZ) , maritime 

exclusion zone (MEZ) or air exclusion zone (AEZ). 

2.24 An EZ is an area declared by a nation, or military force, into which entry by designated 

forces is prohibited. An EZ may be stationary or moving. Neutral aircraft and ships should avoid

such zones; those that enter navigate at their own risk. The use of EZs is expected to increase, as 

not only nations but also the UN, seek ways to localise conflicts. Because assessment of the 

acceptability of EZs will depend on a number of factors, clear guidance on the legal acceptability 

of an EZ is difficult, as each situation is unique. In times of conflict a belligerent is not barred 

from using force outside the zone to eliminate enemy threats. Further guidance on the use of EZs 

can be obtained from ADFP 3 – Rules of Engagement and legal advisers. 
Appendix D

D-7

AUSTRALIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 

(2010) 

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Amd2010.pdf

**************************** 

GLOSSARY 

(p. 193) 

Exclusion Zone

A zone declared by a military force or nation, the entering of which zone by forces of a potential 

enemy would be regarded as hostile intent or a hostile act. The zone may be moving or stationary 

and may include airspace above it.
Appendix D

D-8

AUSTRALIAN BOOK OF REFERENCE 

MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 

ABR 5179 

(1998) 

**************************** 

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE LAWS OF NAVAL WARFARE

http://www.navy.gov.au/reserves/e-docs/DATA/NAVYPUBS/NAVYMAN/ABR5179/08.pdf

(p. 8-4) 

Exclusion Zones 

8.15 In an attempt to restrict the area of a conflict, belligerent States have often declared an 

Exclusion Zone (EZ). Examples of this practice can be seen in the Falklands conflict where both 

belligerents proclaimed a variety of Exclusion Zones, and in the Iran/Iraq conflict. An EZ should 

not be confused with a ‘security zone’ and other such concepts which apply in peacetime.

14 

The 

declaration of an EZ is a belligerent right emanating from the right of national self-defence 

pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter and can only be exercised in time of armed conflict. 

14

The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, in Article 25(3), provides that a coastal State may suspend the right of innocent 

passage temporarily. Such a suspension should not, however, be considered as an Exclusion Zone. 

8.16 ADFP 3-Rules of Engagement defines an Exclusion Zone as ‘An area declared by a nation 

or military force into which entry by designated forces is prohibited’. States may phrase their 

declaration of an EZ such that they will consider any vessel present within the specified zone to 

be hostile and hence subject to attack.15 However, international humanitarian law continues to 

apply within a declared EZ and any attack on a neutral, merchant or protected vessel which has 

not lost its immunity under international humanitarian law within the zone will therefore be 

illegal. 

15

For example, the British Government in declaring an Exclusion Zone around the Falkland Islands stated that ‘Any ship 

and any aircraft, whether military or civil, which is found within the zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence in 

London will be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and will therefore be regarded as hostile and 

will be liable to be attacked by British forces’. 

8.17 The commencement, duration, location and extent of an EZ should be publicly declared and 

notified. The area and duration of an EZ should not exceed what is strictly required by military 

necessity and the principle of proportionality. 

8.18 The declaration of an EZ does not affect a belligerent’s obligations under international 

humanitarian law. Vessels entering a declared EZ must still be clearly identified as hostile 

before being made the subject of attack. There are however certain operational advantages in 

declaring an EZ, such as: 

a. neutral vessels and merchant ships are warned to avoid the area. This may reduce the 

number of vessels entering the area and hence facilitate quicker identification of vessels which 

do enter the area; 

b. the issuing and interpretation of Rules of Engagement may be simplified; 
Appendix D

D-9

c. the geographical spread of the conflict may be limited. 
Appendix D

D-10

THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL

- ANNOTATED -

(2001)

http://www.fichl.org/uploads/media/Canadian_LOAC_Manual_2001_English.pdf

****************************

CHAPTER 8

LAW RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES AT SEA

(p. 8-13)

 SECTION 11

 ZONES

852. GENERAL

1. Parties to naval conflicts have on a number of occasions established different kinds of zones in 

and over water areas that deny or restrict access to vessels and aircraft of states that are not 

parties to the conflict. Vessels or aircraft entering such zones risk being attacked. These zones 

have been given a variety of names including exclusion zones, military areas, barred areas, war 

zones and operational zones.

2. A belligerent is not absolved of its duties under International Law by establishing zones that 

might adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea. In particular, such zones 

are not "free fire zones".

SRM para 105

853. OBLIGATIONS OF A BELLIGERENT ESTABLISHING A ZONE

1. If a belligerent establishes a zone:

1. The law continues to apply in the same manner both inside and outside the zone. The 

practical effect of a zone is to warn shipping that hostilities are taking place and that there 

is a greater risk if entry into the zone occurs.

2. The extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures imposed shall not exceed 

what is strictly required by military necessity and the principle of proportionality.

3. Due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral states to legitimate uses of the seas.

4. Necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be 

provided: 

1. where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe 

access to the ports and coasts of a neutral state;

2. in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military 

requirements do not permit.
Appendix D

D-11

5. The commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions 

imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately notified.

SRM para 106

854. NEUTRALS

2. Compliance with the measures taken by one belligerent in the zone shall not be construed as 

an act harmful to the opposing belligerent. Therefore, if a neutral vessel does not enter or leaves 

the zone then the neutral has not done anything inappropriate in respect of another belligerent to 

the conflict.

SRM para 107

855. OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF THE ZONE

1. The existence of a zone does not preclude operations being carried on outside of the zone.

CHAPTER 7

LAW RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AIR

(p. 7-1)

 

703. AREAS OF OPERATION IN AN ARMED CONFLICT

2. Operational Zones: Parties to a conflict may, by appropriate notice, establish areas of 

immediate air operations where they pursue combat activities. Such zones may exist over the 

territories and territorial waters of all states involved in the hostilities. All aircraft entering such 

zones, including the aircraft of neutral states, risk damage from the hostilities.

GLOSSARY

(p. GL-19)

Zone 

A zone is an area on and over water established by a party to a naval conflict that denies or 

restricts access to vessels and aircraft of states that are not parties to the conflict. 
Appendix D

D-12

HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS

- MANUAL -

THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 

OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 

(August 1992) 

http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/905/454609/GermanManualZDv15.2.pdf

**************************** 

10. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 

III. Special Provisions Concerning Methods of Naval Warfare 

(pp. 108 - 109) 

5. Maritime Exclusion Zones 

1048. A maritime exclusion zone is a distinct area of the sea and the air space above that area in 

which a party to the conflict exercises extensive rights of control and prohibits access to ships 

and aircraft. Its purpose is to facilitate identification of military objectives and defence against 

hostile acts, but not to attack the war economy of the adversary. A difference is made between 

static and movable exclusion zones. A static exclusion zone comprises a space in three 

dimensions designed by coordinates, i.e. a distinct area of the sea and the air space above that 

area. A movable exclusion zone comprises the space in three dimensions around units of the 

naval forces, thus it changes its position when the unit moves. 

Example: During World War II both England – in the Skagerrak – and Germany – around the 

British Isles – established maritime exclusion zones. 

1049. The establishment of static maritime exclusion zones being an exception under 

international law is permissible only under the following preconditions: 

– The establishment of the maritime exclusion zone must be effective. Hence so many units of 

the air forces and naval forces must be charged with the insurance of the exclusion zone that 

there is sufficient chance to meet all vessels entering that zone. 

– The size and duration of as well as the rights claimed in .exclusion zones shall, by no means, 

exceed legitimate national security and defence requirements. Vessels in the exclusion zone 

must be allowed an appropriate time to leave it. 

– The boundaries of exclusion zones, the restrictions to be placed on sea and air traffic within 

and above these areas and the control measures to be taken shall be determined according to 

the principles of military necessity and proportionality as far as military considerations permit, 

particular passages in which only the right to stop and search is exercised shall be held free for 

neutral vessels. 

– The size, the exact boundary lines and the duration of the existence of an exclusion zone shall 

be announced in public. If an exclusion zone is divided into subzones, it is necessary to define 

the extent of restrictions and the boundaries of each individual subzone. 

1050. The establishment of movable maritime exclusion zones is permissible only if they are 

announced in public in general form. In the announcement the requested rights shall be 

determined. The size of movable maritime exclusion zones, the limitations of sea and air traffic 
Appendix D

D-13

in and above them, and the control measures to be enforced are to be determined according to the 

principles of military necessity and proportionality. The use of weapons in such zones shall be 

limited to military objectives.
Appendix D

D-14

COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 

LEGAL BASES FOR THE OPERATIONS OF NAVAL FORCES 

(2002) 

http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/905/454602/German_Naval_Handbook.pdf

**************************** 

PART I: PEACETIME MISSIONS AND TASKS 

Section 1 Operating Area 

VI. High Seas and the “Area” 

2. Freedom of the high seas 

(pp. 37 – 39, paragraphs 70 - 72) 

b) Military use 

It is under dispute, which activities shall rank among the “other ones permissible under 

international law”. Some states refer to the provisions of the Convention on the Law of the Sea 

(articles 88 and 301) according to which the use of the high seas is confined to peaceful purposes 

and any threat or use of force directed against a state’s territorial integrity or political sovereignty 

or otherwise incompatible with the principles of international law set down in the Charter of the 

United Nations is prohibited. They hold the opinion that any military use of the oceans is by 

definition unpeaceful and therefore prohibited. In particular, it would thus not be permissible to 

conduct any military exercises or other military activities (e.g. minelaying) in a coastal state’s 

exclusive economic zone or on its continental shelf without its consent. In this context, it must be 

noted, however, that not all military activities will violate the prohibition of the threat or use of 

force. In addition, states have always used not only the high seas but also the exclusive economic 

zones and continental shelves of foreign states for military exercises. The recognition of these 

sea areas which as a matter of fact are not covered by the coastal state’s sovereignty only 

involves the obligation to pay due regard to economic or resource-related rights but does not 

result in a prohibition of the military use of the high seas or the exclusive economic zones or 

continental shelves of other states. If the rights of the coastal state are considered in a manner 

appropriate under the circumstances, even acts of naval warfare (in the context of an 

international armed conflict) will be permitted. 

c) Warning areas, security and defence zones 

If, for example, weapons exercises (including missiles) in waters subject to the freedom of the 

high seas are not prohibited, the state conducting these or comparable activities (e.g., recovery of 

aircraft or spacecraft) must be permitted to inform other states that aviation and navigation in the 

sea area concerned are exposed to certain dangers. This is equalled by the practice of declaring 

warning areas which is employed in such cases by the states concerned. (Even though in 

everyday usage these areas will frequently be referred to as “prohibited or no-fly areas”, in order 

to avoid any possibility of confusion with measures contrary to international law taken during the 

two world wars, this term should not be used.) The establishment of such warning areas must be 

announced beforehand. Normally, this is done through a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) and/or 

a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). The vessels and aircraft of other states are under no obligation to 

steer clear of the warning area. In particular, they are not forbidden to monitor activities and 
Appendix D

D-15

gather information. However, they must refrain from any action which would adversely affect 

the respective activity in the warning area. Besides, they will enter the warning area at their own 

risk, so that possible damage arising from the activity in question cannot be attributed to the state 

declaring the warning area. 

There is no standard of international law which would permit a state to restrict or even prevent 

navigation and aviation of other states outside its territorial sea. Accordingly, the establishment 

of so-called security zones or prohibited/no-fly-areas beyond the 12-nautical mile limit (as to 

the respective international practice see the survey in paragraph V. 1 above) is contrary to 

international law. 

Things are different only with regard to artificial islands, installations and structures 

established or erected by the coastal state in its territorial sea, on its continental shelf or in its 

exclusive economic zone. Where this is necessary, the coastal state may surround these facilities 

by security zones which will provide the possibility of taking appropriate measures for ensuring 

the safety of navigation and the facilities. These zones must not extend beyond a distance of 500 

metres, measured from any point on the outer edge of the respective facility. If this has been 

explicitly permitted in internationally binding form such zones may, in exceptional cases, be 

larger. 

Not contrary to international law, on the other hand, are defence zones or maritime surveillance 

areas if they have been established in the exercise of the right of individual or collective selfdefence and consequently in response to or anticipation of an (imminent) armed attack. Defence 

zones are intended, above all, to provide for a more intensive surveillance of maritime and air 

traffic in a specific sea area. Insofar as they have been established during an international armed 

conflict, they are also referred to as exclusion or maritime operation zones. Their geographic 

dimensions and the scope of control rights are determined by the requirements of the individual 

case and always presuppose an appropriate political decision. 
Appendix D

D-16

Section 2 Legal status of warships and military aircraft including their crews, vessels and 

aircraft operating in and/or over foreign sea areas 

IV. Navigation in foreign special sea areas 

3. Warning areas, defence and security zones 

(pp. 79 – 80, paragraphs 155 - 156) 

As already mentioned, any state may establish temporary warning areas, in the maritime areas 

seaward of the foreign territorial sea and the airspace over these areas thus also including the 

exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf of another state, to advise other states of the 

conduct of activities that are hazardous to navigation and/or overflight. Such areas may be used 

for missile testing, weapons exercises or ship and aircraft recovery operations. Notice of the 

establishment of such areas must be promulgated in advance, preferably in the form of a Notice 

to Mariners (NOTMAR). Ships and aircraft of other states are not required to remain outside a 

declared warning area, but are obliged to refrain from interfering with activities therein. 

Consequently, ships and aircraft of another state may, for example, operate in a warning area, 

collect intelligence and observe the activities involved. 

The international law of peace does not recognize the right of any state to obstruct or impede 

navigation and overflight outside the territorial sea. For this reason, the establishment of security 

and defense zones extending beyond the territorial sea is contrary to international law and thus 

has no basis in time of peace. 

The establishment of a defensive zone or maritime control area is permissible, by way of 

exception, if it is required for individual and collective self-defense against a current armed 

attack or imminent threat of armed attack. In this case, the threatened state is entitled to enforce 

some degree of control over navigation and overflight in those maritime areas. The establishment 

of such areas is difficult to abstractly restrict to periods and geographical limits; it thus depends 

upon the circumstances of the specific case, especially the current threat. Therefore, a maritime 

operational zone is principally considered to be permissible, especially during an international 

armed conflict (see marginal 302 ff.) The decision about the establishment of such areas is 

subject to a resolution of the German Bundestag. 

PART II: OPERATIONS IN ARMED CONFLICT (LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE AND 

MARITIME NEUTRALITY) 

Section 3 Maritime neutrality 

IX. Special zones 

(pp. 157 - 159, paragraphs 302 - 305) 

Under the conditions of modern naval warfare it is indispensable to monitor the objects located 

in the area of operations and to identify them as reliable as possible. The international law 

applicable in international armed conflict recognizes this need of naval forces, i.e. it accepts an 

interference with neutral maritime and air transport. As long as the principle of proportionality is 

observed, this control may even be extended beyond the actual area of operations. 

1. Control of the area of operations 

In the area of operations or in its adjoining environment the parties to the conflict are permitted 

to establish special restrictions for neutral maritime and air transport. They may, for instance, 

require vessels and aircraft to clearly identify themselves or refrain from certain procedures 

when approaching a force (so-called defence bubbles which are also admissible in peacetime). If 
Appendix D

D-17

this is absolutely necessary for the safety of the units or the success of the respective mission, the 

access of neutral vehicles to the area of operations may be barred completely. Such measures, 

however, are only admissible in the area within which combat activities are taking place or units 

of the naval or air forces are actually operating, or in the adjoining environment. Access to 

neutral ports or coasts or passage through international straits in which the right of transit 

passage applies must not be impeded under any circumstances, unless another route of similar 

convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics is available. 

2. Exclusion zone 

An exclusion zone may neither be confused with the area of operations nor with the exclusion 

areas of the world wars. The term denotes the three-dimensional space in which a party to the 

conflict claims comprehensive control rights or denies access to vessels and aircraft in order to 

protect them from the effects of armed conflicts. Due to their extensive effects on neutral 

maritime and air transport, such exclusion zones are admissible only in exceptional cases and 

are subject to stringent requirements. They must not be devoted to the purpose of evading the 

requirements of the law of blockade or releasing the armed forces from the obligation to 

positively identify admissible military targets. A vehicle that must not be attacked, i.e. especially 

neutral merchant vessels and civil aircraft, will never lose this protection for the sole reason that 

they have entered an exclusion zone without authorization. 

If a party to the conflict thus feels compelled in specific exceptional cases to establish an 

exclusion zone, the following restrictions will apply: 

– Inside the exclusion zone the same rules and principles of international law applicable in 

international armed conflict will apply as outside. 

– Location and size of the zone and the duration of its existence as well as the measures to be 

taken in it must not be disproportionate to the absolutely necessary and legitimate needs of 

security and defence. 

– Due regard must be paid to the rights of the neutral states regarding the use of the seas. 

– The required safe passages for sea and air traffic must be kept open if 

• due to its spatial dimensions, the zone considerably restricts free and safe access to 

neutral ports and coasts; 

• routes normally used by international sea and air traffic are affected, unless this 

conflicts with military considerations. 

– Beginning and duration of the zone’s existence and its location and size as well as the 

restrictions imposed on neutral vehicles in this area must be publicized, including the notification 

of all other states. 

If a neutral vessel or aircraft observes the restrictions imposed on it in an exclusion zone by one 

of the parties to the conflict, the opposing party to the conflict must not exploit this situation to 

the detriment of the vehicle. 
Appendix D

D-18

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF BRITISH MARITIME DOCTRINE 

(BR 1806) 

(1995) 

**************************** 

CHAPTER 5 

THE APPLICATION OF MARITIME POWER 

(pp. 96 - 97) 

Establishment and Maintenance of Exclusion Zones. Although exclusion zones have no 

accepted status under international law, Military and Total Exclusion Zones serve both a military 

and diplomatic function. In conflict they offer a means of simplifying a sea control problem 

through the promulgation of an intention to maintain sea denial over a specific area. Their 

enforcement requires rules of engagement that allow selective use of combat. Diplomatically 

they are a way of enhancing coercive action by declaring resolve to use combat if necessary.
Appendix D

D-19

BRITISH MARITIME DOCTRINE 

(Second Edition) 

(BR 1806) 

(1999) 

**************************** 

CHAPTER 4 

THE APPLICATION OF MARITIME POWER 

(p. 54) 

The establishment of Exclusion Zones, the legitimacy of which is only guaranteed and 

unambiguous under international law when authorised by the United Nations through a Security 

Council Resolution, have served both military and diplomatic functions. In conflict, they offer a 

means of simplifying sea control through the promulgation of an intention to maintain sea denial 

over a specific area. In diplomatic terms they are a way of enhancing coercive action by 

declaring resolve to use combat if necessary. Clearly, to be credible, they must be enforceable 

and the rights and security of third parties need to be safe-guarded. 

GLOSSARY 

(p. 218) 

Maritime Exclusion Zone 

Declaration by a state of sea areas, including parts of the high seas in which conditions are 

imposed on the passage of ship and aircraft. (BR3012) 
Appendix D

D-20

BRITISH MARITIME DOCTRINE (Third Edition) 

(BR 1806) 

(2004) 

**************************** 

GLOSSARY 

Maritime Exclusion Zone (p. 270) 

Declaration by a state of sea areas, including parts of the high seas in which conditions are 

imposed on the passage of ship and aircraft. (BR3012) 

Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) (p. 275) 

Geographical (usually maritime) area including parts of the high seas within which a government 

states its intention to enforce the exclusion of all military units of a designated nation or nations 

or other grouping, using force if necessary. See maritime exclusion zone and total exclusion zone 

(TEZ) 

Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) (p. 295) 

Maritime geographical area including parts of the high seas within which a government states its 

intention to enforce the exclusion of all ships and aircraft, both military and civilian, of a 

designated nation or nations or other grouping, using force if necessary. See maritime exclusion 

zone and military exclusion zone (MEZ) 
Appendix D

D-21

THE MANUAL OF THE 

LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE 

(2004) 

http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/905/470409/UK_Joint_Service_LOAC_Manual_JSP_383_2004_edition.pdf

**************************** 

CHAPTER 12 

AIR OPERATIONS 

(pp. 323 - 324) 

MARITIME ZONES 

12.57 For maritime zones, see paragraph 13.77 onwards. WAR ZONES 

RESTRICTIONS

75 

75

See JM Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (3rd edn 1947) (Spaight, Air Power) 400 onwards. 

12.58 Parties to a conflict may establish zones of immediate operations or exclusion zones76 

within which they intend to pursue or are actively pursuing hostilities. Notice of the existence of 

these war zones must give the extent, location, duration, and associated risks, see paragraph 

13.78. The right to fire upon any aircraft disregarding a general prohibition of entry into such a 

zone must be based on military necessity. That requires an assessment as to whether in all the 

circumstances the aircraft is a military objective and whether an attack upon it can be carried out 

without disproportionate loss of civilian life or civilian property. 

76

During the Falklands conflict 1982, a total exclusion zone of 200 nautical miles radius was established around the 

Islands. It applied, inter alia, to any aircraft, military or civil, operating in support of the illegal occupation by the 

Argentine forces, and any aircraft (military or civil) found within the zone without authority from the Ministry of Defence 

would be regarded as operating in support of the illegal occupation and thus hostile and liable to be attacked by the 

British forces. The zone was imposed in exercise of the right to self-defence as recognized by Art 51 of the UN Charter. 

12.58.1 These zones may exist over the territories and territorial waters of any state involved in 

the armed conflict and, where military necessity justifies it, may include airspace over the high 

seas. Both civil and military aircraft, including those of neutral states, which operate in support 

of the enemy are liable to attack in a war zone. But due allowance should be made for the 

continuance of neutral traffic by allowing freedom of transit, at least between neutral countries, 

along alternative routes where the normal route lies through a zone which is temporarily closed. 

12.58.2 The presumption, in Additional Protocol 1,

77 

of civilian status in cases of doubt does 

not, strictly speaking, apply in air-to-air combat. 

78 

Nevertheless, attacks on ostensibly civil 

aircraft should only be carried out as a last resort when there is reason to believe that it is itself 

deployed on an attack. An example might be when, during an armed conflict, an exclusion zone 

has been established around the United Kingdom and an apparently civilian airliner enters the 

zone on a course set for a major city, all required notification and other procedures to establish 

the zone have been meticulously completed, and all attempts to communicate with the aircraft, 

including buzzing, have failed or been ignored. 

77

Arts 50(1) and 52(3). 

78

AP I, Art 49(4). 
Appendix D

D-22

CHAPTER 13 

MARITIME WARFARE

(p. 364)

SECURITY ZONES 

13.77 Security zones may be established by belligerents as a defensive measure or to impose 

some limitation on the geographical extent of the area of conflict. However, a belligerent cannot 

be absolved of its duties under the law of armed conflict by establishing zones in such a manner 

that they adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea.91 

91

Adapted from SRM 105. 

13.77.1 Maritime exclusion zones and total exclusion zones are legitimate means of exercising 

the right of self-defence and other rights enjoyed under international law. However, in declaring 

the zones, the exact extent, location, duration, and risks associated should be made clear in 

accordance with paragraph 13.78. 

13.78 Should a belligerent, as an exceptional measure, establish such a zone: 

a. the same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone; 

b. the extent, location, and duration of the zone and the measures imposed shall not 

exceed what is strictly required by military necessity and the principle of proportionality; 

c. due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral states to legitimate uses of the seas; 

necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be provided: 

(1) where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to the 

ports and coasts of a neutral state; 

(2) in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military 

requirements do not permit; and 

d. the commencement, duration, location, and extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions 

imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately notified.92

92

SRM 106 

13.79 Compliance with the measures taken by one belligerent in the zone shall not be construed 

as an act harmful to the opposing belligerent.93 

93

SRM 107. 

13.80 Nothing in paragraphs 13.65 to 13.79 should be deemed to derogate from the customary 

belligerent right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate vicinity of naval 

operations.94 

94

SRM 108. 
Appendix D

D-23

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 

OF MARITIME OPERATIONS 

(BR 3012) THIRD EDITION

(2005) 

**************************** 

CHAPTER 8 

THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY 

(paragraphs 0811 – 0812) 

0811. SECURITY ZONES AND EXCLUSION ZONES DURING CONFLICT 

a. Security Zones. Security zones may be established by belligerents as a defensive measure or 

to impose some limitation on the geographical extent of the area of conflict. However, a 

belligerent cannot be absolved of its duties under the law of armed conflict by establishing zones 

in such a manner that they adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea. 

b. Exclusion Zones. Maritime Exclusion Zones (MEZ) and Total Exclusion Zones (TEZ) are 

legitimate means of exercising the right of self -defence and other rights enjoyed under 

international law. However, in declaring the zones, the exact extent, location, duration and risks 

associated should be made clear in accordance with Para 0811 Sub Para c. 

c. Should a belligerent, as an exceptional measure, establish such a zone: 

(1) The same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone. 

(2) The extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures imposed shall not exceed 

what is strictly required by military necessity and the principle of proportionality. 

(3) Due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral states to legitimate uses of the seas; 

necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be provided: 

(a) Where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to the 

ports and coasts of a neutral state. 

(b) In other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military 

requirements do not permit. 

(4) the commencement, duration, location and the extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions 

imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately notified. 

d. Compliance with the measures taken by one belligerent in the zone shall not be construed as 

an act harmful to the opposing belligerent. 

0812. BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Within the immediate area of naval operations, a belligerent may establish special restrictions 

upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may prohibit altogether such vessels and 

aircraft from entering the area. The immediate area of naval operations is that area within which 

hostilities are taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating. This belligerent right is 

limited and transient, based on the need to defend itself without suffering neutral interference 

and its right to ensure the security of its forces. A belligerent may not, however, purport to deny 
Appendix D

D-24

access to neutral nations, or to close an international strait to neutral shipping, unless another 

route of similar convenience remains open to neutral traffic. 
Appendix D

D-25

LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE

NWIP 10-2 

(basic through change 6 incorporated)

(1955) 

http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/law_naval_warfare.htm

****************************

 CHAPTER 4 

AREAS OF OPERATIONS 

430 THE AREAS OF NAVAL WARFARE 

(p. 4-6) 

a. THE GENERAL AREA OF NAVAL WARFARE. The general area within which the naval 

forces of belligerents are permitted to conduct operations includes: the high seas, the territorial 

sea and internal waters of belligerents, the territory of belligerents accessible to naval forces, and 

the air space over such waters and territory. 

b. THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF NAVAL OPERATIONS23 

Within the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, a belligerent may establish special 

restrictions (see, for example, paragraph 520a) upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft 

and may prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. Neutral vessels and 

aircraft which fail to comply with a belligerent’s orders expose themselves to the risk of being 

fired upon. Such vessels and aircraft are also liable to capture (see subparagraph 503d7). 

23

The belligerent establishment of an “immediate area of naval operations” should be clearly distinguished from the belligerent 

practice during World Wars I and II of establishing “ßoperational (or war) zones.” The immediate area of naval operations refers to 

an area within which naval hostilities are taking place or within which belligerent naval forces are operating at the time. Belligerent 

control over neutral vessels and aircraft within an immediate area of naval operations is based on a belligerent’s right to attack, his 

right to defend himself without suffering from neutral interference, and his right to ensure the security of his forces. Operational (or 

war) zones refer to areas of the high seas, of widely varying extent which, for substantial periods of time, are barred altogether to 

neutral shipping or within which belligerents claim the right to exercise a degree of control over neutral vessels not otherwise 

permitted by the rules of naval warfare. In practice, belligerents have based the establishment of operational zones on the right of 

reprisal against alleged illegal behavior of an enemy. 

CHAPTER 5 

VESSELS, AIRCRAFT, AND PERSONNEL AT SEA 

520 COMMUNICATIONS 

(p. 5-8) 

a. COMMUNICATIONS BY NEUTRAL MERCHANT VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT. A neutral 

merchant vessel or aircraft which, when on or over the high seas, transmits information destined 

for a belligerent concerning military operations or military forces is liable to capture. 

Within the immediate vicinity of his forces, a belligerent commanding officer may exercise 

control over the communications of any neutral merchant vessel or aircraft whose presence 

might otherwise endanger the success of his operations. (See Appendix H, Form No. 4.) 

Legitimate distress communications by: neutral vessels and aircraft should be permitted if they 

do not prejudice the success of such operations. A neutral vessel or aircraft which does not 
Appendix D

D-26

conform to a belligerent’s control exposes itself to the risk of being fired upon and renders itself 

liable to capture. 

b. SUBMARINE TELEGRAPH CABLES. Submarine telegraph cables between points in an 

enemy’s territory, between points in the territories of enemies, between points in the territory of 

an enemy and neutral territory, or between points in occupied territory and neutral territory are 

subject to such treatment as the necessities of war may require. Submarine telegraph cables 

between two neutral territories should be held inviolable and free from interference. 
Appendix D

D-27

APPENDIX H TO NWIP 10-2 

Form No. 4 

DECLARATION OF PROHIBITION (RESTRICTION) OF RADIO SERVICE 

I, the undersigned, do hereby declare that from ______ o’clock ____ m. on the ______ 

day of ________, 19__, all vessels of whatever nationality provided with radio apparatus 

are prohibited from using the same apparatus within the immediate area of naval 

operations from ________ to ________ (or within the area of the sea inside the circle 

drawn with _______ radius _______ as its center) for the following purposes: 

(1) __________ 

(Mention what is to be prohibited or restricted, 

according to the provisions of the article.) 

(2) __________ 

I do further declare that the vessels which knowingly violate this prohibition (restriction) shall be 

liable to capture.

Given on board U.S.S. ________ this ______ day of ______, 19__. 

______________

Commander in Chief of _________ Squadron, 

(Commanding U.S.S. ______________.) 
Appendix D

D-28

THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK 

ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

U.S. NAVY NWP 1-14M 

U.S. MARINE CORPS MCWP 5-2.1 

U.S. COAST GUARD COMDTPUB P5800.7 

(July 2007 edition)

http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/905/454610/NWP_1-14M-1.pdf

**************************** 

1.6.4 Coastal Security Zones

Some coastal nations have claimed the right to establish military security zones, beyond the 

territorial sea, of varying breadth in which they purport to regulate the activities of warships and 

military aircraft of other nations by such restrictions as prior notification or authorization for 

entry, limits on the number of foreign ships or aircraft present at any given time, prohibitions on 

various operational activities, or complete exclusion. International law does not recognize the 

right of coastal nations to establish zones during peacetime that would restrict the exercise

of nonresource-related high seas freedoms beyond the territorial sea. Accordingly, the United 

States does not recognize the validity of any claimed security or military zone seaward of the 

territorial sea that purports to restrict or regulate the high seas freedoms of navigation and 

overflight. (See paragraph 2.5.2.3 for a discussion of temporary suspension of innocent passage 

in territorial seas. See also paragraph 4.4 for a further discussion of declared security and defense 

zones in time of peace and paragraph 7.9 for a discussion of exclusion zones and

war zones during armed conflict.)

4.4.7 Maritime Warning Zones

As nations endeavor to protect their interests in the maritime environment during peacetime they 

might employ naval forces in geographic areas where various land, air, surface, and subsurface 

threats exist. Commanders are then faced with ascertaining the intent of entities (e.g., small 

boats, low slow flyers (LSFs), jet skis, swimmers) proceeding toward their units. Oftentimes 

ascertaining intent is a very difficult problem, especially when operating in the littorals where air 

and surface traffic is heavy. Given an uncertain operating environment, commanders may be 

inclined to establish some type of assessment, threat, or warning zone around their units in

an effort to help sort the common operational picture and ascertain the intent of inbound entities. 

This objective may be accomplished during peacetime while adhering to international law as 

long as the navigational rights of other ships, submarines, and aircraft are respected. Specifically, 

when operating in international waters, commanders may assert notice (via NOTAMs and 

NOTMARs) that within a certain geographic area, for a certain period of time, dangerous 

military activities will be taking place. Commanders may request that entities traversing

the area communicate with them and state their intentions. Moreover, such notice may include 

reference to the fact that if ships and aircraft traversing the area are deemed to represent an 

imminent threat to U.S. naval forces they may be subject to proportionate measures in selfdefense. Ships and aircraft are not required to remain outside such zones and force may not be 

used against such entities merely because they entered the zone. Commanders may use force 
Appendix D

D-29

against such entities only to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, including 

interference with declared military activities.

4.4.8 Maritime Quarantine

Maritime quarantine was invoked for the first and only time by the United States as a means of 

interdicting the flow of Soviet strategic offensive weapons (primarily missiles) into Cuba in 1962 

involving a limited coercive measure on the high seas applicable only to ships carrying offensive 

weaponry to Cuba and utilizing minimum force required to achieve its purpose. The quarantine 

was an action by the United States, which dealt with the need to act in defense of western 

hemisphere interests and security while, to the greatest degree possible, maintaining the rights of 

freedom of navigation in what was otherwise a peacetime environment.

Although it has been compared to and used synonymously with blockade, quarantine is a 

peacetime military action that bears little resemblance to a true blockade. (For an in-depth 

discussion of blockade, see paragraph 7.7). Quarantine is distinguished from blockade, in that:

1. Quarantine is a measured response to a threat to national security or an international crisis; 

blockade is an act of war against an identified belligerent.

2. The goal of quarantine is de-escalation and return to the status quo ante or other stabilizing 

arrangement; the goal of a blockade is denial and degradation of an enemy’s capability with the 

ultimate end-state being capitulation in armed conflict.

3. Quarantine is selective in proportional response to the perceived threat; blockade requires 

impartial application to all nations—discrimination by a blockading belligerent renders the 

blockade legally invalid. 

Maritime quarantine is an action designed to address crisis-level confrontations during peacetime 

that present extreme threats to U.S. forces or security interests, with the ultimate goal of 

returning conditions to a stable status quo.

4.5 U.S. MARITIME ZONES AND OTHER CONTROL MECHANISMS

The United States employs maritime zones and other control mechanisms pursuant to both 

domestic and international law. These are grounded in a coastal state’s right to exercise 

jurisdiction (to varying degrees depending on purpose and exact location) over waters within and 

adjacent to their territorial land masses. In all cases the statutory basis and implementing 

regulations and policies are consistent with international law, and in particular the LOS 

convention. However, when deployed, commanders should be aware of similar sounding

maritime zones and control mechanisms declared by other nations that purport to be legitimate 

but are in fact inconsistent with international law and the LOS convention and unlawfully 

impede freedom of navigation.
Appendix D

D-30

As many of these zones and other control mechanisms have as their primary purpose the 

restriction of access (for assorted reasons), they can be used as tools by the military to enhance 

the security and safety of both maritime and land-based units.

4.5.1 Safety Zones

Safety zones are areas comprised of water or shoreline, or a combination of both, to which access 

is limited for safety and environmental purposes. No person, vessel, or vehicle may enter or 

remain within a safety zone unless authorized by the Coast Guard. Such zones may be described 

by fixed geographical limits or they may be a prescribed area around a vessel, whether at anchor, 

moored, or underway. In general, safety zones may be established within the navigable waters of 

the United States seaward to 12 nautical miles from the baseline. However, as explicitly 

permitted by Article 60 of the LOS Convention, safety zones may also be established to

promote the safety of life and property on an outer continental shelf facility, an attending vessel, 

or adjacent waters. Such safety zones may extend up to 500 meters from the outer continental 

shelf facility.

4.5.2 Security Zones

Security zones are areas comprised of water or land, or a combination of both, to which access is 

limited for the purposes of:

1. Preventing the destruction, loss, or injury to vessels, harbors, ports or waterfront facilities 

resulting from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or similar causes;

2. Securing the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States;

3. Preventing or responding to an act of terrorism against an individual, vessel, or structure that 

is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; or

4. Responding to a national emergency as declared by the president by reason of actual or 

threatened war, insurrection or invasion, or disturbance or threatened disturbance of the 

international relations of the United States.

In general, security zones can be established within the navigable waters of the United States 

seaward to 12 nautical miles from the baseline. However, security zones established to prevent or 

respond to an act of terrorism against an individual, vessel, or structure may also be in the 

exclusive economic zone or on the outer continental shelf, provided the individual, vessel, or 

structure is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Enforcement of security zones is 

primarily the responsibility of the Coast Guard. Those convicted of security zone violations

are subject to civil and criminal penalties.

4.5.3 Naval Vessel Protection Zones (NVPZs)

Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. in 2001, to provide for the 

safety and security of United States naval vessels in the navigable waters of the United States, 

the U.S. Coast Guard established naval vessel protection zones (NVPZs) under authority 
Appendix D

D-31

contained in 14 USC 91. NVPZs provide for the regulation of traffic in the vicinity of U.S. naval 

vessels in the navigable waters of the United States. A U.S. naval vessel is any vessel owned, 

operated, chartered, or leased by the U.S. Navy; any vessel under the operational control of the

U.S. Navy or a unified commander. As a result, the establishment and enforcement of NVPZs 

are a function directly involved in and necessary to military operations and the safety and 

security of naval commanders and personnel.

The official patrol may be a Coast Guard commissioned officer, a Coast Guard warrant or petty 

officer, the Commanding Officer of a US naval vessel or his or her designee.

All vessels within 500 yards of a US naval vessel must operate at the minimum speed necessary 

to maintain a safe course and proceed as directed by the official patrol.

Vessels are not allowed within 100 yards of a US naval vessel, unless authorized by the official 

patrol. Vessels requesting to pass within 100 yards of a US naval vessel must contact the official 

patrol on VHF-FM channel 16. Under some circumstances, the official patrol may permit vessels 

that can only operate safely in a navigable channel to pass within 100 yards of a US naval vessel 

in order to ensure a safe passage in accordance with the navigation rules.

Under similar conditions, commercial vessels anchored in a designated anchorage area may be 

permitted to remain at anchor within 100 yards of passing naval vessels.

Though restrictive in nature, the effects of NVPZs have not been significant because the 

protection zones are limited in size and the official patrol may allow access to the zone. 

Additionally, the naval vessel protection zones will affect a given location for a limited time 

while the vessel is in transit, along with notifications made by the Coast Guard so mariners can 

make adjustments.

7.7 BLOCKADE 

7.7.1 General 

Blockade is a belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well 

as neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, 

occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation. While the belligerent right of visit and 

search is designed to interdict the flow of contraband goods, the belligerent right of blockade is 

intended to prevent vessels and aircraft, regardless of their cargo, from crossing an established 

and publicized cordon separating the enemy from international waters and/or airspace. 

7.7.2 Criteria for Blockades 

To be valid, a blockade must conform to the criteria in the following paragraphs. 

7.7.2.1 Establishment 
Appendix D

D-32

A blockade must be established by the government of the belligerent nation. This is usually 

accomplished by a declaration of the belligerent government or by the commander of the 

blockading force acting on behalf of the belligerent government. The declaration should include, 

as a minimum, the date the blockade is to begin, its geographic limits, and the grace period 

granted neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the area to be blockaded. 

7.7.2.2 Notification 

It is customary for the belligerent nation establishing the blockade to notify all affected nations 

of its imposition. Because knowledge of the existence of a blockade is an essential element of the 

offenses of breach and attempted breach of blockade (see paragraph 7.7.4), neutral vessels and 

aircraft are always entitled to notification. The commander of the blockading forces will usually 

also notify local authorities in the blockaded area. The form of the notification is not material so 

long as it is effective. 

7.7.2.3 Effectiveness 

To be valid, a blockade must be effective—that is, it must be maintained by a surface, air, or 

subsurface force or other legitimate methods and means of warfare that is sufficient to render 

ingress or egress of the blockaded area dangerous. The requirement of effectiveness does not 

preclude temporary absence of the blockading force, if such absence is due to stress of weather 

or to some other reason connected with the blockade (e.g., pursuit of a blockade runner). 

Effectiveness does not require that every possible avenue of approach to the blockaded area be 

covered. 

7.7.2.4 Impartiality 

A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels and aircraft of all nations. Discrimination 

by the blockading belligerent in favor of or against the vessels and aircraft of particular nations, 

including those of its own or those of an allied nation, renders the blockade legally invalid. 

7.7.2.5 Limitations 

A blockade must not bar access to or departure from neutral ports and coasts. Neutral nations

retain the right to engage in neutral commerce that does not involve trade or communications 

originating in or destined for the blockaded area. A blockade is prohibited if the sole purpos

e is to starve the civilian population or to deny it other objects essential for its survival. 

7.7.3 Special Entry and Exit Authorization 

Although neutral warships and military aircraft enjoy no positive right of access to blockaded 

areas, the belligerent imposing the blockade may authorize their entry and exit. Such special 

authorization may be made subject to such conditions as the blockading force considers to be 

necessary and expedient. Neutral vessels and aircraft in evident distress should be authorized 

entry into a blockaded area, and subsequently authorized to depart, under conditions prescribed 
Appendix D

D-33

by the officer in command of the blockading force or responsible for maintenance of the 

blockading instrumentality (e.g., mines). Similarly, neutral vessels and aircraft engaged in the 

carriage of qualifying relief supplies for the civilian population and the sick and wounded should 

be authorized to pass through the blockade cordon, subject to the right of the blockading force to 

prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which passage is permitted. 

7.7.4 Breach and Attempted Breach of Blockade 

Breach of blockade is the passage of a vessel or aircraft through a blockade without special entry 

or exit authorization from the blockading belligerent. Attempted breach of blockade occurs from 

the time a vessel or aircraft leaves a port or airfield with the intention of evading the blockade, 

and for vessels exiting the blockaded area, continues until the voyage is completed. Knowledge 

of the existence of the blockade is essential to the offenses of breach of blockade and attempted 

breach of blockade. Knowledge may be presumed once a blockade has been declared and 

appropriate notification provided to affected governments. It is immaterial that the vessel or 

aircraft is at the time of interception bound for neutral territory, if its ultimate destination is the 

blockaded area. There is a presumption of attempted breach of blockade where vessels or aircraft 

are bound for a neutral port or airfield serving as a point of transit to the blockaded area. 

(Capture of such vessels is discussed in paragraph 7.10.) 

7.7.5 Contemporary Practice 

The criteria for valid blockades, as set out above in paragraph 7.7.2, are for the most part 

customary in nature, having derived their definitive form through the practice of maritime 

powers during the nineteenth century. The rules reflect a balance between the right of a 

belligerent possessing effective command of the sea to close enemy ports and coastlines to 

international commerce, and the right of neutral nations to carry out neutral commerce with 

the least possible interference from belligerent forces. The law of blockade is, therefore, 

premised on a system of controls designed to effect only a limited interference with neutral trade. 

This was traditionally accomplished by a relatively “close-in” cordon of surface warships 

stationed in the immediate vicinity of the blockaded area. The increasing emphasis in modern 

warfare on seeking to isolate completely the enemy from outside assistance and resources by 

targeting enemy merchant vessels as well as warships, and on interdicting all neutral commerce 

with the enemy, is not furthered substantially by blockades established in strict conformity with 

the traditional rules. In World Wars I and II, belligerents of both sides resorted to methods 

which, although frequently referred to as measures of blockade, cannot be reconciled with the 

traditional concept of the close-in blockade. The so-called long-distance blockade of both world 

wars departed materially from those traditional rules and were premised in large measure upon 

the belligerent right of reprisal against illegal acts of warfare on the part of the enemy. Moreover, 

developments in weapons systems and platforms, particularly submarines, supersonic aircraft, 

and cruise missiles, have rendered the in-shore blockade exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, 

to maintain during anything other than a local or limited armed conflict. Accordingly, the 

characteristics of modern weapon systems will be a factor in analyzing the effectiveness of 

contemporary blockades. Notwithstanding this trend in belligerent practices (during general war) 

away from the establishment of blockades that conform to the traditional rules, blockade 

continues to be a useful means to regulate the competing interests of belligerents and neutrals in 
Appendix D

D-34

more limited armed conflict. The experience of the United States during the Vietnam conflict 

provides a case in point. The closing of Haiphong and other North Vietnamese ports, 

accomplished by the emplacement of mines, was undertaken in conformity with traditional 

criteria of establishment, notification, effectiveness, limitation, and impartiality, although at the 

time the mining took place the term “blockade” was not used. 

7.8 BELLIGERENT CONTROL OF THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS AND NEUTRAL COMMUNICATION AT SEA

Within the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, to ensure proper battle space 

management and self–defense objectives, a belligerent may establish special restrictions upon the 

activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft 

from entering the area. The immediate area or vicinity of naval operations is that area within 

which hostilities are taking place or belligerent forces are actually operating. A belligerent may 

not, however, purport to deny access to neutral nations, or to close an international strait to 

neutral shipping, pursuant to this authority unless another route of similar convenience remains 

open to neutral traffic. (An example that fits this pattern—though the notice did not specifically 

refer to belligerent control of the immediate area of naval operations as the legal rationale—is 

provided by HYDROLANT 597/03, March 20, 2003, at Appendix A.)

The commanding officer of a belligerent warship may exercise control over the communication 

of any neutral merchant vessel or civil aircraft whose presence in the immediate area of naval 

operations might otherwise endanger or jeopardize those operations. A neutral merchant ship or 

civil aircraft within that area that fails to conform to a belligerent’s directions concerning 

communications may thereby assume enemy character and risk being fired upon or captured. 

Legitimate distress communications should be permitted to the extent that the success of the 

operation is not prejudiced thereby. Any transmission to an opposing belligerent of information

concerning military operations or military forces is inconsistent with the neutral duties of 

abstention and impartiality and renders the neutral vessel or aircraft liable to capture or 

destruction.

7.9 EXCLUSION ZONES AND WAR ZONES

Belligerent control of an immediate area of naval operations is to be clearly distinguished from 

the belligerent practice during World Wars I and II, the Falkland/Malvinas Conflict, and the IranIraq War of establishing broad ocean areas as “exclusion zones” or “war zones” in which neutral 

shipping was either barred or put at special risk. The most extensive use of such zones occurred 

during World Wars I and II. These zones were initially established by belligerents based on the 

right of belligerent reprisals against alleged illegal behavior of the enemy and were used to 

justify the exercise of control over, or capture and destruction of, neutral vessels not otherwise 

permitted by the rules of naval warfare.

Exclusion or war zones established by belligerents in the context of limited warfare that has 

characterized post–World War II belligerency at sea, have been justified, at least in part, as 

reasonable, albeit coercive, measures to contain the geographic area of the conflict or to keep 

neutral shipping at a safe distance from areas of actual or potential hostilities. To the extent that 
Appendix D

D-35

such zones serve to warn neutral vessels and aircraft away from belligerent activities and thereby 

reduce their exposure to collateral damage and incidental injury (see paragraph 8.3.1), and

to the extent that they do not unreasonably interfere with legitimate neutral commerce, they are 

undoubtedly lawful; however, the establishment of such a zone does not relieve the proclaiming 

belligerent of the obligation under the law of armed conflict to refrain from attacking vessels and 

aircraft that do not constitute lawful targets. In short, an otherwise protected platform does not 

lose that protection by crossing an imaginary line drawn in the ocean by a belligerent.

On 20 March 2003, the United States announced a special warning, asserting general belligerent 

rights in the course of the maritime phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Though not announced as 

an exclusion zone asserting belligerent rights in a specific area, the special warning served to 

advise neutral shipping of the heightened application of unit self-defense within the specified 

general regions. A copy of this special warning is provided at Appendix B. On 3 May 2004, after 

terrorists conducted suicide attacks in small boats against Iraqi oil terminals, the United States 

announced warning zones around a number of oil terminals in the Persian Gulf. It also

announced exclusion zones around two oil terminals and the suspension of the right of innocent 

passage around those oil terminals within Iraq’s territorial sea. A copy of this announcement is 

provided at Appendix C. Because exclusion and war zones are not simply free fire zones for the 

warships of the belligerents, the establishment of such a zone carries with it certain obligations 

for belligerents with respect to neutral vessels entering the zone. Belligerents creating such zones 

must provide safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft where the 

geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to the ports and

coasts of a neutral state and, unless military requirements do not permit, in other cases where 

normal navigation routes are affected. For this reason, the Total Exclusion Zone announced by 

the United Kingdom and the Argentine declaration of the South Atlantic as a war zone during the 

Falklands/Malvinas conflict both were problematic in that they deemed any neutral vessel within 

the zone without permission as hostile and thus liable to attack. Likewise, the zones declared by 

both Iran and Iraq during the 1980s Gulf War appeared to unlawfully operate as “free fire zones” 

for all vessels entering therein.
Appendix D

D-36

Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

08 November 2010

(as amended through 15 November 2013)

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

**************************** 

defensive sea area

(DOD) A sea area, usually including the approaches to and the waters of important ports, 

harbors, bays, or sounds, for the control and protection of shipping; for the safeguarding of 

defense installations bordering on waters of the areas; and for provision of other security 

measures required within the specified areas. It does not extend seaward beyond the territorial 

waters. See also maritime control area.

exclusion zone

(DOD) A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a specific 

geographic area in order to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the 

desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or the use or threat of 

force. Source: JP 3-0

maritime control area

(DOD) An area generally similar to a defensive sea area in purpose except that it may be 

established any place on the high seas. Maritime control areas are normally established only in 

time of war. See also defensive sea area.
Appendix D

D-37

Joint Publication 3-0 JOINT OPERATIONS

(11 August 2011)

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf

**************************** 

CHAPTER V: JOINT OPERATIONS ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY

OPERATIONS

SECTION C. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND

DETERRENCE

5. Typical Operations

g. Enforcing Exclusion Zones. A sanctioning body establishes an exclusion zone

to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic area. Exclusion zones usually

are imposed due to breaches of international standards of human rights or flagrant

violations of international law regarding the conduct of states. Situations that may

warrant such action include the persecution of the civil population by a government and

efforts to deter an attempt by a hostile nation to acquire territory by force. Exclusion

zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land (no-drive

zones). An exclusion zone’s purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify

their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of

sanctions or threat or use of force. Such measures usually are imposed by the UN or

another international body of which the United States is a member, although they may

be imposed unilaterally by the United States (e.g., Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, 

initiated in August 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, from March

1993 to December 1995).
Appendix D

D-38

AIR FORCE OPERATIONS & THE LAW

A GUIDE FOR AIR, SPACE, AND CYBER FORCES

(2009)

http://www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100510-059.pdf

**************************** 

(pp 77-79)

Security Zones

Some coastal nations, including North Korea and Vietnam, have claimed the right to

establish military security zones, beyond the territorial sea, of varying breadth, in which

they purport to regulate or prohibit the activities of warships and military aircraft of other

nations. This includes such restrictions as prior notification or authorization for entry,

limits on the number of foreign ships or aircraft present at any given time, prohibitions on

various operational activities, or complete exclusion. International law does not recognize

the right of coastal nations to establish zones in peacetime that would restrict the exercise of

non-resource-related high seas freedoms beyond the territorial sea. Accordingly, the U.S.

does not recognize the peacetime validity of any claimed security or military zone seaward

of the territorial sea which purports to restrict or regulate the high seas freedoms of

navigation and overflight. P.77

Air Defense Identification Zones

International law does not prohibit nations from establishing air defense identification

zones (ADIZ) in the international airspace adjacent to their territorial airspace. Security

zones are distinguishable from ADIZs, as the latter are merely a reporting and identification

regime for civil aircraft used by coastal and island states. ADIZs are legally justified on the

basis that a nation has the right to establish reasonable conditions of entry into its national

airspace. Accordingly, an aircraft approaching national airspace may be required to

identify itself while in international airspace as a condition of entry approval. ADIZ

regulations published by the United States apply to aircraft bound for U.S. territorial

airspace and require the filing of flight plans and periodic position reports. Some nations,

however, purport to require all aircraft penetrating an ADIZ to comply with ADIZ

procedures, whether or not they intend to enter national airspace. The United States does

not recognize the right of a coastal or island nation to apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign

aircraft in such circumstances. Accordingly, U.S. military aircraft not intending to enter

national airspace need not identify themselves or otherwise comply with ADIZ procedures

established by other nations, unless the United States has specifically agreed to do so.

Warning Areas

Any nation may declare a temporary closure or warning area on the high seas to advise

other nations of the conduct of activities that, although lawful, are hazardous to navigation

and/or overflight. The United States and other nations routinely declare such areas for

missile testing, gunnery exercises, space vehicle recovery operations, and other purposes
Appendix D

D-39

entailing some danger to other lawful uses of the high seas by others. Notice of the

establishment of such areas must be promulgated in advance, usually in the form of a

“notice to mariners” (NOTMAR) and/or a “notice to airmen” (NOTAM). Ships and aircraft

of other nations are not required to remain outside a declared closure or warning area, but

are obliged to refrain from interfering with activities in it. Consequently, U.S. ships and

aircraft may operate in a closure area declared by a foreign nation, collect intelligence and

observe the activities involved, subject to the requirement of due regard for the rights of the

declaring nation to use the high seas for such lawful purposes. The ships and aircraft of

other nations in a U.S. declared closure area may do the same.

United Nations and Other Collective Action

Freedom of navigation in international airspace and the sovereignty of states with respect to

their own national airspace may be impacted by action taken by the United Nations (UN)

through the UN Security Council. For instance, UN Security Council Resolution 816 tasked

member states to enforce a “no-fly” zone in the airspace of the Republic of BosniaHerzegovina, clearly interfering with sovereign rights to national airspace. Furthermore,

the use of the words “all necessary means” in UN Security Council Resolution 678 of 29

November 1990, dealing with the UN Security Council’s previous demand that Iraq

withdraw from Kuwait (under UN Security Council Resolution 660 of 2 August 1990), gave

the coalition forces the right to interfere with the use of international and national airspace

insofar as it related to forcing the Iraqi forces to leave Kuwait. Regional security

organizations may also, in certain circumstances, have the right to affect the use of

international or national airspace.
Appendix D

D-40

SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE

 TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA

12 June 1994

http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/905/461505/San_Remo_Manual.pdf

**************************** 

PART IV: METHODS AND MEANS OF WARFARE AT SEA

SECTION II: METHODS OF WARFARE

Blockade

93. A blockade shall be declared and notified to all belligerents and neutral States.

94. The declaration shall specify the commencement, duration, location, and extent of the 

blockade and the period within which vessels of neutral States may leave the blockaded 

coastline.

95. A blockade must be effective. The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of 

fact.

96. The force maintaining the blockade may be stationed at a distance determined by military 

requirements.

97. A blockade may be enforced and maintained by a combination of legitimate methods and 

means of warfare provided this combination does not result in acts inconsistent with the rules set 

out in this document.

98. Merchant vessels believed on reasonable grounds to be breaching a blockade may be 

captured. Merchant vessels which, after prior warning, clearly resist capture may be attacked.

99. A blockade must not bar access to the ports and coasts of neutral States.

100. A blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels of all States.

101. The cessation, temporary lifting, re-establishment, extension or other alteration of a 

blockade must be declared and notified as in paragraphs 93 and 94.

102. The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if:

(a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential 

for its survival; or

(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the 

concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade.
Appendix D

D-41

103. If the civilian population of the blockaded territory is inadequately provided with food and 

other objects essential for its survival, the blockading party must provide for free passage of such 

foodstuffs and other essential supplies, subject to:

(a) the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage 

is permitted; and

(b) the condition that the distribution of such supplies shall be made under the local supervision 

of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian organization which offers guarantees of impartiality, 

such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.

104. The blockading belligerent shall allow the passage of medical supplies for the civilian 

population or for the wounded and sick members of armed forces, subject to the right to 

prescribe technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted.

Zones

105. A belligerent cannot be absolved of its duties under international humanitarian law by 

establishing zones which might adversely affect the legitimate uses of defined areas of the sea.

106. Should a belligerent, as an exceptional measure, establish such a zone:

(a) the same body of law applies both inside and outside the zone;

(b) the extent, location and duration of the zone and the measures imposed shall not exceed what 

is strictly required by military necessity and the principles of proportionality;

(c) due regard shall be given to the rights of neutral States to legitimate uses of the seas;

(d) necessary safe passage through the zone for neutral vessels and aircraft shall be provided:

(i) where the geographical extent of the zone significantly impedes free and safe access to the 

ports and coasts of a neutral State;

(ii) in other cases where normal navigation routes are affected, except where military 

requirements do not permit; and

(e) the commencement, duration, location and extent of the zone, as well as the restrictions 

imposed, shall be publicly declared and appropriately notified.

107. Compliance with the measures taken by one belligerent in the zone shall not be construed as 

an act harmful to the opposing belligerent.

108. Nothing in this Section should be deemed to derogate from the customary belligerent right 

to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate vicinity of naval operations.
Appendix D

D-42

International Law Association: 

Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality

(1998)

**************************** 

3.3 Special Zones

Subject to Principle 5.2.9 and without prejudice to the rights of commanders in the zone of 

immediate naval operations, the establishment by a belligerent of special zones does not confer 

upon that belligerent rights in relation to neutral shipping which it would not otherwise possess. 

In particular, the establishment of a special zone cannot confer upon a belligerent the right to 

attack neutral shipping merely on account of its presence in the zone.

5.2.9 Transit

Neutral ships, whether commercial or warships, enjoy the right of transit passage through 

international straits, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage through archipelagic waters and 

the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of belligerents, 

regardless of the existence of an armed conflict. A coastal State may, however, subject such 

rights to reasonabledefence requirements. The belligerent may not close international straits and 

archipelagic sea lanes.

5.2.10 Blockade

Blockade, i.e. the interdiction of all or certain maritime traffic coming from or going to a port 

or coast of a belligerent, is a legitimate method of naval warfare. In order to be valid, the 

blockade must be declared, notified to belligerent and neutral States, effective and applied 

impartially to ships of all States. A blockade may not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. 

Neutral vessels believed on reasonable and probable grounds to be breaching a blockade may 

be stopped and captured. If they, after prior warning, clearly resist capture, they may be 

attacked.