N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT EVELYN DAVIDSON, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt,
v. C ARL E. KOR

M AN; PETE GER

EN; JOHN M c HUGH, De fe nda

nts - Appe lle e s. No. 11-17572 DC No. 2:10 c v -2502 FC D
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia Fra nk C . Dam

re ll, Se nior Distric t Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d

June 14, 2013 ** San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : TASHIM A and B YB EE, C irc uit Judge s, a nd W OOD, Se nior Distric t Judge
. *** 

# FIL ED JUL 02 2013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S
. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously finds this c a se suita

ble for de c ision without ora l argum e nt. S

e e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2)(C ). *** The Honora

ble Kim ba M . W ood, Se nior Unite d State s Distric t Judge for the Southe rn Distric t of Ne w York, sitting by de signa tion.Eve ly n Da vidson wa s e m

ploy e d by the Arm y C orps of Engine e rs (“ AC E” )
a s a n attorne y . She c la i m s tha t she wa s fire d in re ta lia

tion for c ha l le nging a
ra c i a lly and se xua l l y

hostilework e nvironm e nt, in viola t ion of TitleVII of the C ivil Rights Ac t of 1964, 42 U.S.C . § 2000e e t se q. She furthe r a lle g e s tha t he r im m e diate supe rvisor, C arl Korm an , m a de va rious m isre pre se ntations tha t c onstitute c om m o n-la w fra ud. He r Title VII c la im

wa s dism isse d, on a

m otion for judgm e nt on the ple a dings, for fa ilure to sta te a prim a fa c i e c a se tha

t she e nga ge d in a prote c te d

a c tivity
. H e r fraud c l a im wa s dism isse d a s pre e m

pte d by the Fe de ra l Tort C la im s Ac t, 28 U.S.C . §§ 2679(a), 2679(b)(1) (“ FTC A” ). W e hav e jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C
. § 1291, a nd we a ffirm
. 1 1. Davidson fa ile d

to a lle ge a prim a

fa c ie c a se that she wa s fire d in
re ta lia tion for opposing wha

t she re a sona

bly be l ie ve d c onstitute d a

ra c ia lly and
se xua l ly hostilework e nvironm e nt, in viola tion of Title

VII. Se e 4 2 U.S.C
. § 2000e -3(a ); Fre itag v . Ay e r s , 468 F.3d 528, 541 (9th C ir. 2006). There le va nt

1 Dism issa ls unde r Fe d. R . C iv. P. 12(b)(1) a nd 12(c ) are subje c t

to de nov o re vie w. Se eZure

ss v . Donle

y , 606 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th C ir. 2010), c e rt. de nie d , 131 S. C t. 3056 (2011); Mac Donald v . Grac e C

hurc h Se attle , 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th C ir. 2006). Our re vie w of a R ule 12(c ) dism issa l is limi te d to “ a l le g a tions c onta ine d in the ple a dings, e xhibits a tta c he d to the c om

p la int, a nd m a tte rs prope rly

subje c t to judic ia l notic e .” Ak h tar v . Me

sa , 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th C ir. 2012); se e Fe d . R . C iv. P. 12(d); Dw ork in v
. Hustle r Magazine

, Inc
. , 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th C ir. 1989). 2fa c t s c o nc e rn Davidson’ s inte ra c tions with two individua l s: Pa tric ia Ha wkins, a fe llow AC E attorne y -e m

ploy e e , a nd Korm an, Da

vidson’ s supe rvisor. Hawkins a lle ge dly

m a d e two ra c ist c o m

m e nts: (1) Ha

wkins opine d tha

t the y oung son of a

n Afric an-Am e ric an AC E e m ploy e e re c e ive d a

pa rtic ula r c om m e n dation pla que from a

judge only

be c a u se the judge wa s bla c k ; a nd (2) Hawkins told Da

vidson tha

t Ha wkins ha d trouble working with blac ks whe n she pra c tic e d la

w in Ha wa ii. 2 No re a sona

ble pe rson would c onside r suc h re m arks
m a de by a c o-worke r “ a

n unla wful e m ploy m e nt pra c tic e of a

n e m p loy e r” ra the r tha n “ an a c t of disc rim i nation by a priva t e individual.” Silv e r

v . K C A , Inc
. , 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th C ir. 1978). M ore ove r, no re a s ona b le pe rson would c onside r Hawkins’ isola

te d a nd offha nd c om m e nts a s working a

disc rim inat ory

“ c ha nge in the t e rm s a

nd c onditions of [Da

vidson’ s] e m

ploy m e n t.” Faraghe r v . C

ity of Boc a Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). Davidson a lso a l le ge s tha t, during wha

t a p pe ars to be a

single c onve rsa tion, Korm a n told he r a

bout his unc le ’ s phone se x busine ss, tha t he sta rte d to te ll he r a bout one of the unc le ’ s se xua l e xploits, a nd tha t he told he r that he pre ve nte d the AC E from

disc iplining a

n e m ploy e e who wa s c a

ught looking a

t nude photos a

t work be c a

use Korm an

did not think the

e m ploy e e ha d viola

te d the la w. Tha t

2 The se c om

m e nts we re not dire c te d at Da vidson, who is C a

u c a sia n. 3c onve rsa tion is “ a t worst a n ‘ i sola te d inc i de n[t] ’ tha

t c annot re m ote l y be
c onside re d ‘ e xtre m e ly

se rious,’ a s [the Supre m e C ourt’ s] c a se s re quire .” C lark C nty . Sc h. Dist. v . Bre e de n , 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (pe r c uriam ) (first a lte ra tion in origina l) (quoting F

araghe r , 524 U.S. a

t 788). And, like Haw kins’ ra c ist
c om m e n ts, Korm an’ s se xua l c om m e nts bore no ne xus to thete rm s or c o nditions of Davidson’ s c ontinue d e m ploy m e nt a t the AC E . In short, no re a sona ble pe rson would c onside r the c onve rsa tion with Korman a s rising to the le ve l of c re a ting a
se xua l ly hostilework e nvironm e nt. The distric t c ourt prope rly grante d De fe nda nts’ m o tion for judgm e nt on theple a dings a s to this c la i m . 2. The distric t c ourt prope rly dism isse d Da

vidson’ s fra

u d c la im be c a use it wa s pre e m

pte d by the FTC A. 3 As the c ourt obse rve d, the FTC A is the e xc lusive
re m e dy for torts c om

m itte d by fe de ra l e m

ploy e e s while a c ting within the sc ope of the i r dutie s. Se e 28 U.S.C . §§ 2679(a), 2679(b)(1). In suc h c a se s, “ the FTC A is the e xc lusive m ode of re c ove ry for the tort of a Gove rnm e nt e m ploy e e e ve n whe n

3 This c a se wa s origina lly file d in the Northe rn Distric t of C a lifornia and wa s tra

nsfe rre d from

tha t distric t to the Ea s te rn Distric t of C a lifornia
. Se e Dav idson v . K

o rman , No. 4:09 c v-1695 SB A (N.D. C a l. De c . 1, 2009) . B e fore the transfe r, howe ve r, the tra

nsfe ror c ourt dismisse d Da v i dson’ s fra

u d c la im s a g a inst Korm a n. The tra

nsfe re e c ourt the n

dism isse d the Title VII c la im a ga inst Korm an be c a use he wa s not thehe a d of a de pa rtm e nt, a ge nc y , or unit, a s re q uire d by Title VII. Davidson doe s not a ppe a l tha t portion of the de c ision be l ow. She doe s, howe v e r, a

ppe a l the tra

nsfe ror c ourt’ s dism issa l of he r fra ud c la im a ga inst Korm a n. 4the FTC A itse lf pre c lude s Gove rnm e nt lia bility .” M

e ridian Int’l Logistic

s, Inc . v . Unite d State s , 939 F.2d 740, 743 n.1 (9th C ir 1991) (inte rna l quota tion m arks
om i tte d). Although Da

vidson points to the

m anne r in whic h Korm an fire d he r a s e vide nc e of c onduc t outsidethe sc ope of duty , she ha s wa ive d the dispositive que stion: whe the r Korm an wa s a c ting outside the sc ope of duty whe n he
c om m itte d the a lle ge d fra

u d
. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 28(a )(9)(A) (re quiring tha t Appe l la n t’ s B rie f c onta in “ a

ppe lla nt’ s c onte ntions a

n d the re a sons for the m , with
c ita tions to the

a uthoritie s a

nd pa rts of the re c ord on whic h the a ppe l la nt re l ie s” ). The m a nne r in whic h Korm an fire d Da v idson sim

ply ha s no be aring on whe the r the a lle ge d fra

ud wa s c om

m itte d within the

sc ope of Korm an’ s dutie s. Se e 28 U.S.C . § 2679(b)(1). 4 AFFIRM E D.

4 Davidson a lso a

rgue s, in the a lte rna tive , tha t she ha s substa

n tia lly c om plie d with FTC A’ s a dm inistra tive e xha ustion re quire m e nts. W e ne e d not re a c h this issue

be c a use Dav idson ha s not a l le ge d a via ble FTC A c la im
. 5