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S. HRG. 114–197 

THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS: BUILDING 

THE COALITION AND ENSURING 

MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Bob Corker, U.S. Senator From Tennessee .................................................. 1 

Hon. Bob Menendez, U.S. Senator From New Jersey .......................................... 2 

Gen. John R. Allen, USMC (Retired), Special Presidential Envoy for the 

Global Coalition To Counter ISIL, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 

DC .......................................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by: 

Senator Bob Corker ...................................................................................... 34 

Senator Marco Rubio .................................................................................... 36 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

THE FIGHT AGAINST ISIS: BUILDING THE 

COALITION AND ENSURING MILITARY 

EFFECTIVENESS 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:31 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, Gardner, 

Perdue, Isakson, Paul, Barrasso, Menendez, Boxer, Cardin, 

Shaheen, Murphy, Kaine, and Markey. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. I call this meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee to order, and I want to thank General Allen for being here. 

I know he has a hard stop today at 3:30, and that he has meetings 

with CENTCOM later that he is traveling to. But I want to thank 

him for being here, and I will properly introduce him in just a moment. 

The President has sent forward a request for the authorization 

for the use of military force. Because of the nature and the way 

that this happened in that the conflict has been ongoing for about 

6 months now, I think one of the things that most people here are 

concerned about is that there is a level of confidence in what we 

are doing, and that it is going to achieve the stated goals that the 

President has laid out. And I do not know of anybody more 

equipped to come before us today than General Allen, who has 

served our country with great distinction. 

I think many people feel decently well about what is happening 

in Iraq. I think there are a lot of questions relative to Syria. My 

sense is today you will have a number of questions regarding that. 

And we hope that what you will do, General Allen, is give us an 

honest assessment as to the end state that we would like to see 

happen in Iraq and Syria when we complete the activities that we 

are involved in, and understand the political and military strategy 

that we have underway, and to give us a little sense of timeframe 

relative to the various activities that are necessary. 

I was just in Iraq last week in both Baghdad and Erbil with our 

Kurdish friends, and then over in Ankara with our Turkish friends, 

and I will say that the Shia militias are everywhere in Iraq, as peoFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

ple know. General Suleimani, who is head of the Quds Force for 

Iran, has now become a celebrity in Iraq. And I have to say it feels 

very strange to be there knowing that much of the activity that we 

have underway, while it is necessary, is really to Iran’s benefit. 

And I know there are a lot of concerns that after this activity is 

completed if we are successful with ISIS, which I know we will be, 

in essence, the next issue is going to be dealing with security of 

forces there with the Shia militias. 

I was happy to see that Turkey has gone ahead and signed an 

agreement, train and equip agreement. I am sure that is something 

that you have made happen, and thank you for that. At the same 

time, I know there are a lot of concerns right now about how we 

deal with Assad’s barrel bombs as we train and equip these individuals. How do we protect them from the barrel bombs, which 

cause them to diminish in a greater number than they can be 

trained? And I am sure that you are going to talk about that. 

There is a lot of discussion, as you know, on the ground there 

about an air exclusion zone—I know you will have some questions 

about that—and just no-fly discussions. It may be taking place to 

draw Turkey more into what is happening in Syria itself, which I 

think most of it—most of us believe is very important. 

So as we—as I close, I just want to say we owe it to our nation 

as we consider this to know that the full range of America’s elements of national power, diplomatic, economic, and military means 

are aligned in such a way to get to the administration’s stated 

goals. Because of the nature of this decision, one, again, this being 

made after the fact, all of us need to have confidence that the administration is truly committed to achieving the stated goals that 

they have laid out. And I think your testimony here is going to be 

very valuable to us. 

And with that, I would like to turn to our distinguished ranking 

member, Senator Menendez, who has been a great partner on all 

of these issues. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

for calling the hearing for our work forward on this. And, General 

Allen, welcome back to the committee, and thank you for your distinguished service to our country in so many different ways, including your present position as a special envoy. 

Although this hearing is not focused on the administration’s proposed authorization for the use of military force against ISIL, it is 

by nature an opportunity to probe the dynamics of our current 

anti-ISIL strategy that will inform our discussion of an AUMF, and 

specifically whether a strategy that relies on U.S. air power and logistics, intelligence, and training support, but not on U.S. troops on 

the ground, would be successful in achieving our ultimate goal to 

end the barbaric rampage of ISIL. 

There are those who believe that it is up to our local partners 

on the ground to ultimately take this war across the finish line. I 

have heard from others who believe that ISIL cannot be defeated 

without a significant U.S. ground commitment. So I would like to 

hear from you, General Allen, where you come down on what will 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

be required to eradicate ISIL, given that we hear reports from Secretary Carter’s meetings in Kuwait that while the anti-ISIL strategy does not require fundamental recalibration, our coalition partners can be doing more. 

My view personally is that the United States must help combat 

ISIL and restore stability to the region, and we must follow 

through on our commitments to our Arab partners. But large-scale 

U.S. ground forces at this time in this complex political and military atmosphere would at the end of the day decisively increase the 

prospect of losing a long war. 

Now, I appreciate and want to salute all the men and women 

who are waging a campaign against ISIL, particularly from the air, 

all of the airstrikes that have, according to your own testimony, inflicted significant damage. And those are promising, and we salute 

the men and women who do that. But our effectiveness in combating this threat I think cannot be measured only in the number 

of sorties flown or bombs dropped. 

So today’s hearing is a welcome opportunity to step back and assess the big picture, the state of the coalition, what will it ultimately take to defeat ISIL, and what we know, I think, will be a 

multiyear effort that will take billions of dollars, significant military assets, and the painstaking patience of diplomacy matched to 

all of those efforts. 

We look forward to your insights, and we welcome you back to 

the committee. 

The CHAIRMAN. Our distinguished witness today is Gen. John 

Allen, the Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to 

Counter ISIS. General Allen is a retired U.S. Marine four-star general, former commander of ISAF and U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 

Upon his retirement from the Marine Corps, he was appointed as 

the senior advisor to the Secretary of Defense on Middle East security. He is currently on a leave of absence from Brookings Institution, where he is codirector of the 21st Century Security and Intelligence Center. 

We thank you for your frankness. We thank you for your service 

to our country. We thank you for being here today. I know you are 

going to have an unusually long opening comment, which we appreciate, and then we will turn to questions. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. ALLEN, USMC (RETIRED), 

SPECIAL PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY FOR THE GLOBAL 

COALITION TO COUNTER ISIL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

General ALLEN. Chairman Corker, thank you, and Ranking 

Member Menendez, it is good to be back today. Esteemed members 

of the committee, I want to thank you for providing me the opportunity to update you on the progress of the Global Coalition to 

Counter ISIL. And let me just add as well my deep and sincere 

thanks for all that this committee has done for our Department of 

State, for our diplomats, and for the members of the Department 

who are serving with such great courage and capability at the farflung locations of American influence. This committee has done 

marvelous work to support them, and I want to thank you very 

much for that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

I just returned to Washington yesterday afternoon from Kuwait 

where, at the request of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, I 

joined a group of more than 30 senior U.S. diplomats and military 

commanders for a wide-ranging discussion on our counter-ISIL 

strategy. While my role as senior special presidential envoy is concerned with the consolidation and the integration of the coalition 

contributions, not the coordination of its military activities, I remain nonetheless closely synced with my colleagues in the military, 

and we meet regularly with other departments and agencies involved to review the progress of the counter-ISIL activities. 

In addition, we are also discussing the coalition’s next step now 

that we have largely achieved the objectives of the campaign’s first 

phase, which was to blunt ISIL’s strategic operational and tactical 

momentum in Iraq. Through over 2,500 coordinated coalition airstrikes in support of our partners on the ground, we have degraded 

ISIL’s leadership, its logistical and operational capabilities, and we 

are denying it essential sanctuary in Iraq from which it can plan 

and execute attacks. 

With New Zealand’s very welcome announcement yesterday that 

it will provide military trainers to build the capacity of the Iraqi 

Security Forces, a dozen coalition nations now participating in 

these efforts are operating from multiple sites across Iraq. Still the 

situation in Iraq remains complex, and the road ahead will be challenging and nonlinear. Considering where we were only 8 months 

ago, one can begin to see how the first phase of the strategy is delivering results. 

As I appear before this esteemed committee today, it is important to recall that in June of last year, ISIL burst into the international scene as a seemingly irresistible force. It conquered a city, 

Mosul, of 1.5 million, then poured south down the Tigris River Valley toward Baghdad, taking cities, and town, and villages along the 

way. Outside Tikrit, it rounded up and massacred over 1,000 Iraqi 

army recruits, and to the west it broke through the border town 

of Al-Qaim and poured east toward Baghdad. ISIL’s spokesman, 

Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, vowed, ‘‘The battle will soon rage in 

Baghdad and in the holy city of Karbala.’’ 

Shortly thereafter, ISIL launched a multiple-pronged attack further into northern Iraq, massacring minority populations, enslaving hundreds of women and girls, surrounding tens of thousands of 

Yazidis on Sinjar Mountain, and opening clear route to Erbil, the 

region’s capital. 

Then the United States acted. Since our first airstrikes in August, ISIL’s advance has been blunted, and they have been driven 

back from the approaches to Baghdad and Erbil. ISIL lost half of 

its Iraq-based leadership, thousands of hardened fighters, and is no 

longer able to amass and maneuver effectively, and to communicate 

as an effective force. Iraqis are also standing on their feet. The 

Kurdish peshmerga have recovered nearly all of the ground lost in 

August, and the peshmerga have also taken control of the Mosul 

Dam, the Rabiya Crossing with Syria, the Sinjar Mountain, Zumar, 

and the Kisik Road junction, which eliminated a supply route for 

ISIL from Syria to Mosul. These forces also broke the siege of the 

Bayji oil refinery and have begun to push north into the Tigris Valley. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

To the west, Sunni tribes are working with Iraq Security Forces 

to retake the land in the heart of Al-Anbar, a land I know well. 

And just last week under the cover of bad weather, ISIL launched 

an attack on the town of al-Baghdadi near the Al-Asad Airbase in 

Al-Anbar, where our forces are located with the Danes and the 

Australians to help to train Iraqi soldiers and tribal volunteers. 

ISIL, as it has done over and over again, rampaged through the 

town, killing civilians and driving hundreds of families into the 

safe haven of the airbase. But the Iraqis did not sit idle. They organized and fought back. Prime Minister Abadi went to the Joint Operations Center in Baghdad and ordered an immediate counter attack. The Minister of Defense flew to Al-Asad to organize available 

forces, and Iraq army commanders sent an armored column from 

Baghdad to road march to al-Baghdadi to join the attack. And 

Sunni tribal volunteers organized to support and, in some cases, 

led the attack. 

Today, much of al-Baghdadi is back in the hands of these local 

and tribal forces. And I was at Al-Asad just last month, and my 

deputy, Brett McGurk, was there just 3 days ago, I would tell you 

that all Americans would be proud to see what our troops are doing 

there, helping the Iraqis and the tribes to join the battle against 

ISIL. But this is only the start, and ISIL remains a substantial foe. 

But any aura of the invincibility of ISIL has been shattered. ISIL 

is not invincible. It is defeatable, and it is being defeated by Iraqi 

Forces defending and taking back their towns, and their cities, and 

ultimately their country with the support of the United States and 

the coalition. And importantly, very importantly, the aura of the 

so-called caliphate is destroyed, and the future of the so-called Caliph Abu Bakr Baghdadi is very much in doubt. 

Because we lack the same kind of partners on the ground in 

Syria, the situation there is more challenging and more complex. 

Still, we are working closely with regional partners to establish 

sites for training and equipping vetted and moderate Syrian opposition elements to train approximately 5,000 troops per year for the 

next 3 years. These and other military aspects of the campaign will 

inevitably receive the most attention, but as I have seen in the four 

previous coalition efforts in which I have been involved, it will ultimately be the aggregate pressure of the campaign activity over 

multiple, mutually supporting lines of effort that will determine 

the campaign’s success. 

This is why when I visit a coalition capital and when I meet with 

a Prime Minister, or a King, or a President, I describe the coalition’s counter-ISIL strategy as being organized around multiple 

lines of effort: the military line to deny safe haven and provide security assistance, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, disrupting 

ISIL’s financial resources, providing humanitarian relief and support to its victims, and counter messaging or defeating the idea of 

ISIL. 

Since mid-September I have traveled to 21 partner capitals, several of them multiple times, to meet with national leadership there. 

And in that short span we have assembled a global coalition of 62 

nations and international organizations. Of the many recent visits, 

leaders have expressed heightened concern for the immediate and 

generational challenge presented by foreign fighters, and rightly so. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

Through capacity building in the Balkans, criminal justice efforts 

in North Africa, and changes to laws in more than a dozen countries, partners are working together to make it more difficult for 

citizens to fight in Syria and Iraq. 

Even with these expanded measures, foreign fighters continue to 

make their way to the battlefield. We must continue to harmonize 

our border and customs processes and promote intelligence sharing 

among our partners. This kind of information-sharing has allowed 

the coalition to make significant gains on synchronizing practices 

to block ISIL’s access to banks within the region and globally. This 

includes stemming the flow of private donations and restricting 

ISIL’s ability to generate oil revenues. We are now expanding these 

efforts to counter ISIL’s access to local and informal financial networks. 

The coalition is also supporting the United Nations’ efforts to 

provide food and aid and supply critical assistance to protect the 

vulnerable children, and women, and men from harsh winter conditions in the region. The ravaged communities ISIL leaves in its 

wake bear witness to ISIL’s true identity, one we are actively working with coalition partners to expose with Arab partners taking a 

leading role. 

ISIL was attractive to many of its recruits because of its proclamation of the so-called caliphate and the sense of inevitability that 

it promoted. The last 6 months have amply demonstrated that ISIL 

is really operating as a criminal gang and a death cult, which is 

under increasing pressure as it sends naive and gullible recruits to 

die by the hundreds. 

Coalition partners are working together as never before to share 

messages, engage traditional and social media, and underscore the 

vision of religious leaders who reject ISIL’s millennialist vision. As 

the President announced recently, we are partnering with the 

United Arab Emirates to create a joint messaging center that will 

contest ISIL’s vigorous information offensive and extremist messages for the long term. And we are seeking to create a network 

of these centers, a global network where a regional consortia of nations can dispute and ultimately dominate the information space 

filled with ISIL’s messaging. 

The President has outlined a framework for the authorities he 

believes will be necessary to pursue this long-term campaign with 

his formal request to the Congress for the authorization for the use 

of military force against ISIL. The AUMF request foresees using 

our unique capabilities in support of partners on the ground instead of through large-scale deployments of U.S. ground forces. The 

President has asked for flexibility to fight an adaptable enemy, one 

that hopes to expand his reach beyond the borders of Iraq and 

Syria. 

Taking the fight to ISIL requires that we be flexible and patient 

in our efforts. It also requires close coordination with this committee and with the Congress so that we are constantly evaluating 

our tactics and our strategy, and that we are resourcing them appropriately. 

Chairman and Ranking Member Menendez, I thank you for the 

opportunity to be before this committee today and to continue that 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

process of coordination and consultation with you. And I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Allen follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. ALLEN

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, esteemed members of the committee, thank you for providing me the opportunity to update you on the progress 

of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. 

I just returned to Washington late yesterday from Kuwait, where at the request 

of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, I joined a group of more than 30 senior U.S. 

diplomats and military commanders for a wide ranging discussion of the counterISIL strategy and progress to date. 

While my role as Special Envoy is concerned with the consolidation and integration of coalition contributions, not the coordination of its military activities, I remain 

closely synced with my colleagues in the military, and we meet regularly with other 

departments and agencies involved to review progress of the coalition’s counter-ISIL 

activities. 

In addition, we are discussing the coalition’s next steps now that we have largely 

achieved the objective for the campaign’s first phase: to blunt ISIL’s strategic, operational, and tactical momentum in Iraq. 

Through over 2,500 coordinated coalition airstrikes in support of our partners on 

the ground, we have degraded ISIL’s leadership, logistical, and operational capability, and are denying it a sanctuary in Iraq from which it can plan and execute 

attacks. 

With New Zealand’s announcement yesterday that it will provide military trainers 

to build the capacity of Iraqi Security Forces, a dozen coalition nations are now participating in these efforts in multiple sites across Iraq. 

Still, the situation in Iraq remains extraordinarily complex, and the road ahead 

will be challenging and nonlinear. But considering where we were only 8 months 

ago, one begins to see how this first phase of our strategy is delivering results. 

In June of last year, ISIL burst into the international scene as a genocidal and 

seemingly unstoppable juggernaut. It conquered a city, Mosul, of 1.5 million, then 

poured south toward Baghdad, taking cities, towns, and villages along the way. Outside Tikrit, it rounded up and massacred over 1,000 Iraqi Air Force recruits. To the 

west, it broke through the border town of Al-Qaim, and poured east toward Baghdad. ISIL’s spokesman, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, vowed: ‘‘The battle would soon 

rage in Baghdad and [in the holy city of] Karbala.’’ Shortly thereafter, ISIL 

launched a multiple pronged attack further into northern Iraq, massacring minority 

populations, enslaving hundreds of women and girls, surrounding tens of thousands 

of Yazidis at Sinjar mountain, and opening a clear route to Erbil, the region’s 

capital. 

Then the United States acted. Since our first airstrikes in August, ISIL’s advance 

has been largely blunted, and has been driven back away from the regional capitals 

of Baghdad and Erbil. It has also lost half of its Iraq-based leadership and thousands of hardened fighters, and is no longer able to mass, maneuver, and communicate as an effective force. 

Iraqis are also standing on their feet. The Kurdish peshmerga have recovered 

nearly all of the ground lost in August. Peshmerga have taken control of Mosul 

Dam, Rabiya border crossing, Sinjar Mountain, Zumar, and the Kisik road junction, 

which eliminated a supply route for ISIL from Syria to Mosul. Iraqi Security Forces 

with popular volunteers have secured the routes to Baghdad, and the capital is now 

seeing the lowest levels of violence it’s seen in years. These forces also broke the 

siege of the Bayji oil refinery, and have begun to push north up the Tigris Valley. 

To the west, Sunni tribes are working with Iraqi Security Forces to retake land in 

the heart of Anbar province, land I know well. 

Just last week, under the cover of bad weather, ISIL launched an attack the town 

of Al-Baghdadi, near Al-Asad Airbase, where our forces are located with the Danes 

and Australians to help train Iraqi soldiers and tribal volunteers. ISIL, as it has 

done over and over again , rampaged through the town, killing civilians, and driving 

hundreds of families into exile on the airbase. But the Iraqis did not sit idle; they 

organized, and fought back. 

Prime Minister Abadi went to the Joint Operations Center in Baghdad and ordered a counterattack. The Minister of Defense flew to Al-Asad to organize available 

forces. Iraqi Army commanders sent an armored column from Baghdad to join the 

attack. Sunni tribal volunteers organized to support and in some cases lead the 

attack. Today, much of Al-Baghdadi is back in the hands of these local tribes and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

security forces. I was at Al-Asad Airbase last month, and my deputy, Brett McGurk, 

was there 3 days ago. All Americans would be proud to see what our troops are 

doing there, helping the Iraqis and the tribes join the battle against ISIL. This is 

only a start, and ISIL will remain a formidable foe: but any aura of invincibility 

has been shattered. ISIL is not invincible, it is defeatable, and is being defeated— 

by Iraqi forces, defending and taking back their towns, villages, and cities with the 

support of the United States and the coalition. 

Because we lack the same kind of partners on the ground in Syria, the situation 

is more challenging and complex there. Still, we are working closely with regional 

partners to establish sites for training and equipping vetted, moderate Syrian opposition elements, to train approximately 5,000 troops per year for the next 3 years. 

On February 19, we formalized a framework on Turkey’s support for the Department of Defense’s train and equip activities for the moderate Syrian opposition. 

These and other military aspects of the campaign will inevitably receive the 

most attention. But as I saw in Afghanistan during my command there, in Iraq in 

Al-Anbar in 2007–08, and in recovery efforts for the 2004 South Asian tsunami, the 

military effort is essential but not sufficient. 

It will ultimately be the aggregate pressure of the coalition’s activity over multiple, mutually supporting lines of effort that will determine a campaign’s success. 

That is why when I visit a coalition capital and meet with a prime minister, a 

king, or president, I describe the coalition component of the counter-ISIL strategy 

as being organized around multiple lines of effort including the military line to deny 

safe haven and provide security assistance, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters, 

disrupting ISIL’s financial resources, providing humanitarian relief and support to 

its victims, and countermessaging . . . or defeating ISIL as an idea. 

Since mid-September, I have traveled to 21 partner capitals, several of them multiple times, to meet with the national leadership. In that short span, we have 

assembled a global coalition of 62 nations and international organizations. 

Among Coalition members, disrupting the flow of foreign fighters is an urgent 

concern in all of these conversations . . . and rightly so. There is no question that 

the thousands of young men who have traveled to fight in Syria and Iraq present 

a truly unprecedented, generational challenge. 

Today, coalition members are coming together to take the coordinated actions 

required to meet this growing threat. 

More than a dozen nations have changed laws and penalties to make it more difficult to travel and fight in Syria and Iraq. Through capacity building in the Balkans, criminal justice efforts in North Africa, and a 20 million euro investment from 

the European Union to engage at-risk communities, governments are taking a series 

of concerted actions. 

Even with these expanded measures, foreign fighters continue to stream to the 

battlefields of Syria and Iraq . . . so we are enhancing our cooperation with key 

international partners to confront this threat. We must continue to improve how we 

harmonize border and customs processes, track potential and actual fighters en 

route to the battle, and share intelligence with partners. 

This kind of information-sharing and creative thinking between partners is also 

vital in meeting a related and similarly urgent challenge: constraining ISIL’s access 

to financial support. 

Here, the coalition has made significant gains in synchronizing practices to block 

ISIL’s access to banks, both in the region and globally. This includes stemming the 

flow of private donations and limiting ISIL’s financial options by restricting its ability to generate oil revenues. We are now expanding these efforts to counter ISIL’s 

access to local and informal financial networks. 

As we come together to curb ISIL’s financial support, we are also providing urgent 

assistance to ISIL’s victims. 

The coalition is supporting the United Nations’ efforts to provide food aid and supply critical assistance to protect vulnerable women, children and men from harsh 

winter conditions. Saudi Arabia alone has contributed $500M in aid in support of 

the U.N. appeal for Iraq, and has provided more than a dozen medical camps; 

numerous partners have made substantial investments in education for refugee children and in host communities. The United States alone has contributed close to $4 

billion in assistance for many of the 13 million displaced Iraqis and Syrians. But 

we and our partners must do more. 

The communities and refugees left in ISIL’s wake bear witness to ISIL’s true 

identity, one we are actively working with coalition partners to expose, with Arab 

partners taking a leading role. 

ISIL is attractive to many of its recruits because it proclaimed the Caliphate, and 

emerged onto the world stage with self-proclaimed inevitability and invincibility. 

But the last 6 months have amply demonstrated that ISIL is little more than a 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

criminal gang and death cult, which now finds itself under increasing pressure, 

sending naive and gullible recruits to die by the hundreds. 

Our coalition partners are working together as never before to share messages, 

engage traditional and social media and underscore the vision of religious leaders 

and the international community that rejects ISIL’s millennialist vision. As the 

President announced recently, we are partnering with the U.A.E. to create a joint 

messaging center that will contest ISIL’s vigorous offensive in the information 

battlespace. 

In confronting these enduring challenges, the coalition can take some confidence 

from what it has already helped to achieve. We as a country and as a coalition will 

inevitably have good days and hard days on the battlefield and we are still in the 

early stages of a long-term campaign. 

The President has outlined a framework for the authorities he believes will be 

necessary to pursue this long-term campaign with his formal request to Congress 

for the authorization of the use of military force against ISIL. The AUMF request 

foresees using our unique capabilities in support of partners on the ground . . . instead of through the use of large-scale deployment of U.S. ground forces. At the 

same time, the President has asked for the flexibility to fight an adaptable enemy, 

one that is expanding its reach and capabilities well beyond the borders of Iraq and 

Syria. Taking the fight to ISIL requires that we be flexible and patient in our 

efforts. It also requires close coordination with this committee and with Congress, 

so that we are constantly evaluating our tactics and strategy, and that we are 

resourcing them appropriately. 

This hearing presents an opportunity to continue that process of coordination and 

consultation. I want to thank you again for the invitation to speak with you and 

look forward to taking your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you for the testimony and for your 

great service to our country. 

Yesterday Senator Kerry testified that he felt like that today the 

administration already has, because of the 2001 AUMF and the 

2002 AUMF, the authority to conduct the operations that are being 

conducted in Iraq and Syria. Do you agree with that assessment? 

General ALLEN. I do, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So it is an interesting place that we find 

ourselves where 6 months after conflicts have begun, a new AUMF 

is being offered. And I know that in order to pursue one properly 

through Congress, it is standard process to submit one, which I appreciate. But it is an interesting place that those authorities already exist. 

The train and equip program that you have been able to negotiate, many concerns have been raised about the fact that most of 

the free Syrian opposition initially was targeting Assad. That was 

the reason for their being. Now we are organizing these against 

ISIS, and my understanding is we are going against an entirely different recruitment group to do that. Are we finding that to be an 

easy recruitment process? 

General ALLEN. As we began this, Chairman, we were not sure, 

frankly, how that recruitment process would unfold. Just 2 days 

ago I had the opportunity to have a conversation with the great soldier that the United States has put against this challenge, General 

Nagata. And I will not go into the details of the numbers, but the 

numbers are much higher than we thought actually. And it has 

been a very encouraging—we have had an encouraging sense that 

there is an interest in this—in this outcome. 

The CHAIRMAN. So my sense is there are, based on my experiences last week, there are larger groups of people that are willing 

to go against ISIS initially in this train and equip than some initially thought. Is that correct? 

General ALLEN. That is correct, Chairman. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

The CHAIRMAN. So let me ask you this question. One of the big 

moral dilemmas I think is that as we train and equip these folks, 

we know that Assad is, in fact, barrel bombing other members of 

the Free Syrian Army today. I know that is a loose description of 

who it is that is opposing him. But my understanding is there have 

been significant discussions with Turkey over an air exclusion zone 

in the northwestern Aleppo area and a no-fly zone along the border. And that has been the issue that has hindered them actually 

getting more involved in the conflict even though they are working 

with us more fully than they have in multiple areas, some of which 

I will not mention here. That has been the issue that has kept 

them from actually getting more involved. 

It is also my understanding that that decision, the decision to do 

that, is at the President’s desk. It is at the White House, and he 

has not made a decision yet as to whether to engage. Can you update us on that or tell us the effect of that decision not being made 

on Turkey getting more involved in the conflict, and helping us 

with those ground operations you were talking about earlier? 

General ALLEN. Well, I will start by, you know, reciting what I 

have said before with respect to Turkey, and it is we have an old 

friendship with Turkey, and they are an ally. And where we began 

this conversation just some months and where we are today, I 

think there has been significant progress in the conversation about 

Turkey’s role in the coalition and all that we want to accomplish 

together, and, in particular, what we would like to accomplish in 

Syria. 

That conversation is not over, but there has been much progress. 

I just met with a Turkish delegation yesterday, and I intend to 

head back to Ankara in the very near future to continue that conversation. And part of that conversation obviously is those measures or those measures that can be taken either collectively or by 

a larger coalition to provide protection for the moderate Syrian elements that we support and ultimately will produce over time. 

And I will not get into the specific details of the negotiation, but 

that is a very important part of the conversation, and we are going 

to continue that conversation in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. But it is fair to say that there are some significant decisions that our government needs to make relative to those 

protections. And if they are made, could break a little bit of a logjam relative to greater involvement by Turkey. That would be a 

fair assessment. Is that correct? 

General ALLEN. It is a fair assessment, Chairman. The details of 

what the conversation can be can lead us in several different directions. There was the initial conversation about a formal no-fly zone, 

which was heavily or very specifically and purposefully laid out on 

a map. The real issue is not necessarily a no-fly zone. It is how do 

we protect our allies. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. 

General ALLEN. And that is the nature of the conversation. And 

putting all measures necessary to be able to provide for that protection is the heart of the conversation that we are going to continue 

to have with the Turks. 

The CHAIRMAN. And one final question, and then I will stop and 

turn it over to Senator Menendez. In the event that we needed to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11 

protect those that we are training and equipping and other members of the Free Syrian Army, in the event we needed to protect 

them against Assad barrel bombing them, do you believe that is 

something that needs an additional authority other than what is 

now being requested? 

General ALLEN. I would have to study that, Chairman. My hope 

is that we would be able to provide the kind of protection that they 

need and they deserve within the authorization that we are currently proposing. 

The CHAIRMAN. You would want to make sure that we knew that 

that type of authorization was a part of anything we may do. 

General ALLEN. Oh, I think so, yes, sir. That is going to be clearly a part of the outcome. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Allen, 

you are a retired U.S. Marine, four-star general. You were the 

former commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance 

Force and the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan for about a year and a 

half. And then you became the senior advisor to the Secretary of 

Defense on Middle East security. 

You commanded during that period of time 150,000 U.S. and 

NATO Forces in Afghanistan during a critical period of the war. 

And I put that out there, one, in recognition of that service, and, 

two, in also the framework of my question. What does ‘‘no enduring 

combat forces’’ mean? 

General ALLEN. I think obviously the nature of the contingency, 

or the emergency, or the potential conflict will give us the indications of what kinds of measures would need to be taken in the aggregate to deal with that emergency, to give the President the 

kinds of options that he needs in order to protect the lives of American citizens and American interests in the homeland. 

Each one of these emergencies will be different. Each one will require a different aggregation of American hard and soft power ultimately to solve them. And so, I think it would be difficult to put 

necessarily a level of precision against the word ‘‘enduring.’’ I think 

what we will seek to do, and I believe this Administration and future administrations would be obviously very interested in consulting with the Congress about each particular emergency. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate a consultation. The problem is 

you referenced your answer in the context of emergencies, but ‘‘no 

enduring offensive combat troops’’ does not necessarily only apply 

to emergencies. If you send 20,000 troops there in there for 4 

months, is that enduring? 

General ALLEN. Again, Senator, I think that trying to put a specific amount of time on the word ‘‘enduring’’—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. So it is neither time nor size. 

General ALLEN. I think we take a full appreciation of what we 

are facing. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. 

General ALLEN. And I believe that we give the President the options necessary in order to deal with the emergency. And ‘‘enduring’’ might only be 2 weeks, but enduring might be 2 years. I think 

we need to ensure that we put the right resources against the conFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

tingency and give us the amount of time necessary, ‘‘us’’ being all 

the American people, the time necessary to solve the problem. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And I think you have honestly stated the 

challenge that we have. Two weeks is one thing, 2 years is another, 

and this is the problem with the language as it exists. There is no 

clear defining element of the authorization given to the President 

in which hundreds, but then maybe tens of thousands of troops 

could be sent. They could be sent for long periods of time. 

That is a challenge. And so, how do we get our arms around that, 

you know. I think I can fairly speak for Democrats. We want to 

fight ISIL. We want to give the President the wherewithal to degrade and deter them. But we cannot provide a blank check to this 

and a future President because everything that is envisioned goes 

beyond this President. So I wanted to use your expertise to try to 

put my arms around it, and I see the challenge that we have. 

Let me ask you this. Following up on the chairman’s questions, 

is it not basically true that unless we buy into something that is 

about getting rid of Assad, Turkey is really not going to engage 

here with us in the way we want them to? 

General ALLEN. The Turks have not indicated that to me in our 

conversations. I think we share the same goal with respect to 

Syria, and that is the solution to Syria is not going to be determined by military force, that they ultimately desire a political outcome in Syria that is the will of the Syrian people, and that that 

outcome is one that does not include Bashar al-Assad. 

I think we share that goal with Turkey, but I have not had in 

my conversations with the Turks the requirement that we take 

concerted action against Bashar al-Assad as the precondition necessarily for the Turks to have any greater role in the coalition to 

deal with ISIL. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Is it not true that Turkey at this point still 

is allowing foreign fighters to cross its borders into Syria? 

General ALLEN. If foreign fighters get across the border from 

Turkey, it is not because the Turks are allowing them. Again, I had 

a conversation with them yesterday. I have watched them grip this 

problem. It is a greater problem than many of us had imagined at 

the beginning. They have attempted to strengthen their border 

crossing protocols. We are seeking greater information-sharing and 

intelligence-sharing with them in that regard. We are restructuring 

some elements of the coalition specifically to focus the capabilities 

of nations on the issue of the movement and the dealing of foreign 

fighters through transit states, of which the Turks are going to 

play an important role in that process within the coalition. 

So do foreign fighters cross Turkey and get into Syria? Yes, they 

do. Are the Turks permitting them to do that? I do not believe so, 

and I think that the Turks are working hard ultimately to take the 

measures necessary to staunch that flow as much as they can. 

Senator MENENDEZ. One final question on Iran. Iran is in the 

midst of Iraq. It is in the midst of Syria. Do we share mutual goals 

with Iran? 

General ALLEN. Well, I would say that our goals with respect to 

Iraq is that we return Iraq to the sovereign control of the Iraqi people and to the central government in Baghdad. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you think the Iranians share that view? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

General ALLEN. Oh, I believe so. I believe the Iranians would believe that their interests—would consider that their interests are 

best served by an Iraq—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. Because they have very significant influence 

in Iraq. 

General ALLEN. Well, they have regional interests, and those interests are, in fact, in Iraq. That is not something that should surprise us or necessarily alarm us. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I am looking beyond, so if we think an accommodation to fight ISIL is good, the aftermath of that in Iraq, 

in Syria, in Yemen, and elsewhere, in my view, is not so good. And 

so, sometimes we look at the short game versus the long one, and 

I am concerned about what the long one is. 

General ALLEN. Well, Senator, I would not propose that we are 

accommodating Iran in Iraq at this particular moment. We are undertaking the measures that we taking in Iraq with the Iraqis. We 

are not cooperating with the Iranians. But as you have pointed out 

and as your question presupposes, the Iranians have an interest in 

a stable Iraq, just as we in the region have an interest in a stable 

Iraq. But that does not mean we are accommodating the Iranians 

by virtue of the actions that we are taking in Iraq. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Allen, 

thank you for your service. I did not envy your task. In your testimony you say that ISIS has lost half of its Iraq-based leadership. 

How do we know that? 

General ALLEN. I am sorry. Say again your question again, sir? 

Senator JOHNSON. You said that ISIS has lost half of its Iraqbased leadership. How do we know that? Do we have pretty good 

intelligence for that? 

General ALLEN. We actually do have pretty good intelligence on 

this matter, and in the process of tracking the elements within the 

senior echelons of ISIL’s leadership, we have been tracking and 

systematically, as we are able to find them, dealing with them. 

Senator JOHNSON. You also said that in the last 6 months we 

have amply demonstrated that ISIS is ‘‘little more than a criminal 

gang and death cult, which now finds itself under increasing pressure, sending naive and gullible recruits to die by the hundreds.’’ 

What is your evaluation of the accretion versus degradation ratio? 

How many people are coming into the battle, actually being drawn 

and recruited by what they see in ISIS versus the number of people 

who really are dying? 

General ALLEN. Well, I think that is a difficult number to—— 

Senator JOHNSON. Is it positive or negative? Are more people 

joining the fight versus what we are able to degrade? 

General ALLEN. Well, I would say two things. The numbers are 

up, and the numbers are up because we are now tracking the numbers in ways we have not before. I think the numbers are also up 

because of the so-called caliphate, and that has created in some respects a magnetism for those elements that want to be part of this, 

that want to support this emergence within their own sense of 

their faith. And so, that has created a recruiting opportunity for 

ISIL that they had not had before. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14 

So we are going to continue to track those numbers. It is not just 

a matter of dealing with those numbers in the battle space. We are 

dealing with those numbers by virtue of taking other measures. As 

my testimony indicated, we operate along five lines of effort. The 

military line is only one of them. Another line where I think we 

will be seeing more traction be realized as time goes on will be the 

consortium of nations that are taking the necessary steps to make 

it difficult to be recruited in a country, to transit out of that country, and ultimately get to the battle space. 

Plus as ISIL’s so-called caliphate, as it continues to receive blow 

after blow and ultimately be proven as not being inevitable or invincible, using that as an opportunity to truly message what this 

organization is to decrease its attractiveness to those who might 

otherwise be attracted and seek to move to the battle space ultimately to support them. It will take all those measures in concert, 

sir. 

Senator JOHNSON. So that kind of leads me to my next question. 

Defeat sounds good, but can you describe what defeat looks like? 

General ALLEN. Is that this organization has been rendered ineffective in its capability of being an existential threat to Iraq. We 

are not going to eradicate or annihilate ISIL. Most of these organizations that we have dealt with before, there will be some residue 

of that organization for a long period of time to come. But we do 

not want it to have operational capabilities that create the opportunity for it to threaten the existence of Iraq or other states in the 

region. 

We want to diminish its capacity to generate funding, which limits dramatically its operational decision making and capabilities to 

affect discretion with respect to its recruiting and its battlefield capabilities. We want to compete with it and ultimately overcome or 

defeat its message in the information sphere where it has achieved 

a significant capability and recruiting prowess. 

So across the many different measures of our lines of effort, we 

have a sense of what we want to do in the physical sphere, how 

we want to deal with them in the financial sphere, and ultimately 

how we want to deal with them in the information sphere. And all 

of those together will constitute the defeat of ISIL. 

Senator JOHNSON. You mentioned the establishment of the caliphate. The article in The Atlantic really kind of laid out that that 

is a draw. That is a pull. That establishes certain benchmarks, a 

certain motivation for people being recruited. It relies on territorial 

gains or a hold onto territory. Is that part of defeat, to deny them 

all territory? 

General ALLEN. Absolutely. 

Senator JOHNSON. To destroy them so that the caliphate no 

longer exists? So we are talking about pretty much decimation, correct? That is what Secretary Kerry—that was the word he used, 

‘‘decimate.’’ You know, a few people scattered maybe around the 

world—kind of like after Nazi Germany—but pretty well decimated. That is not exactly what I am hearing out of you. 

General ALLEN. Well, we can apply whatever term you would 

like to. ‘‘Decimation’’ is clearly one of the terms that we might 

apply to it. We want them to have no operational capability in the 

end, and that means breaking them into small organizations that 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15 

do not have the capacity as it begins to attempt to mass to be a 

threat. 

Senator JOHNSON. Define a ‘‘small organization.’’ Again, I am 

just trying to get some sense of what we mean by defeat. It sounds 

great, to deny them operational capabilities. Are we talking about 

taking 30,000 down to 500? Are we taking 30,000 down to 10,000 

broken up into 10 different groups? 

General ALLEN. It will take time. It will take time that will ultimately be realized in a number of ways. It will be by breaking up 

the organization through kinetic and military surface terrestrial 

means. It will take time to reduce the message and the 

attractiveness that gives it the capacity to regenerate its forces. It 

will take time ultimately to deny it access to the international financial system that gives it the capabilities of restoring itself or 

generating capabilities. 

All of those things together, if we deny them that access, if we 

can defeat their messaging in the information sphere, and we can 

break them up into small groups that cannot mass to be operationally significant, then that is defeat. 

Senator JOHNSON. And I am out of time. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, General Allen, 

thank you very much for your continued service to our country. We 

appreciate that very much. These are extremely challenging times, 

and we are very proud of your leadership. 

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. You are urging us to be patient, that this is 

going to take some time in order to achieve our mission of not only 

degrading, but destroying and defeating ISIL. You believe, as I understand, that the authorizations previously passed by Congress 

give the administration the authorization necessary for use of force. 

But I also understand you support the President’s request to Congress? 

General ALLEN. I do. I do, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. And, of course, the President’s request to Congress is pretty specific on ISIL and expires in 3 years. It is clear 

that there may well be a need for a continued military U.S. presence beyond that 3 years. 

General ALLEN. I would say probably a need for military activity, 

U.S. activity in some form or another, yes, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. And I think that is an honest assessment. 

General ALLEN. Sure. 

Senator CARDIN. And if I understand the reasoning behind their 

request is that the current administration recognizes it will be up 

to the next administration to come back to Congress to get the next 

Congress and the administration together on the continued commitment to fight terrorists and what use of force will be necessary. 

General ALLEN. I cannot answer that precisely, but it would 

seem that is a logical reason for that. 

Senator CARDIN. So my point is, why does that not also apply to 

2001 authorization of force? Here we are talking about a threat 

that was identified last year that we are currently combating, recognizing that the campaign or use of force may well go beyond 3 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16 

years. But it is the prerogative of the next Congress and administration to define the authorizations that are needed. 

The 2001 authorization, which was passed against a known 

threat against the United States in Afghanistan, now is still being 

used to a threat such as ISIL. Would the same logic not apply that 

Congress should define the 2001 authorization contemporary with 

the current needs to go after al-Qaeda? 

General ALLEN. I have traveled to many of the capitals of this 

coalition, and one of the things that has been clear to me as I have 

traveled to these capitals has been the really substantial gratitude 

of the coalition for American leadership and the willingness for 

America to act. And in so many ways, these nations of the coalition 

see ISIL in a very different way than they ever saw al-Qaeda. 

So they are grateful for our leadership. They are grateful for our 

willingness to act. And I believe that this AUMF, which is specifically tailored to ISIL, with the very strong support of the Congress, 

gives not just the President the options that are necessarily ultimately to deal with this new and unique threat, but it also reinforces the image of American leadership that is, I think, so deeply 

wanted by our partners, and so deeply needed by this country and 

ultimately by the coalition to deal with ISIL the way we want to. 

Senator CARDIN. And I understand that, and it is limited to 3 

years. 

General ALLEN. That is right. 

Senator CARDIN. Would you agree that our success in Iraq in 

dealing with ISIL very much depends upon the Sunni tribes taking 

a leadership role in stopping the advancement of ISIL, that it is 

difficult for the Shiites, it is difficult for Western forces to be able 

to get the type of confidence in the community to withstand the 

recruitments of ISIL? 

General ALLEN. I would put it slightly differently. I would absolutely agree with you, but I think it takes decisive Sunni leadership as well within Iraq, and that leadership is coming together. 

But the tribes will be essential to the outcome, and your question 

is correct, sir. 

Senator CARDIN. And what is your confidence in the Government 

of Iraq and Baghdad and its ability to work with the Sunni tribal 

leaders to give them that type confidence that their centralized 

government represents their interests and protects their interests? 

General ALLEN. Sure. It is a hard sell, Senator, because previously we asked the Sunni tribes to trust the central government 

in Baghdad under Malaki. It did not work out too well for them 

frankly. But I have met with many of the Sheikhs of the tribes of 

Al-Anbar and some other of the areas of Iraq. And I have been 

please, frankly, very pleased at their willingness to accept the leadership of Prime Minister Abadi, and their willingness to accept the 

leadership of the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior 

in helping them ultimately to be one of the principal mechanisms 

by which we will defeat Daesh in that country. 

And that has been a very encouraging sign for me, frankly, to see 

them not just as a group of tribes, but also as leaders of the tribes, 

be public and forthcoming in their willingness to support the central government in Iraq and, in particular, Prime Minister Abadi. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator CARDIN. Thank you, General. I really do appreciate all 

your service. 

General ALLEN. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Paul. 

Senator PAUL. General Allen, thanks for your testimony. What 

percentage would you say is an estimate of how many of the officials in Iraqi are Sunni versus Shia? 

General ALLEN. I will have to take the question, sir, and get back 

to you. Right now, the standing army, the preponderance is the 

majority is Shia, but I cannot give you the numbers. I will take the 

question—— 

Senator PAUL. The reason I ask is because it is sort of on the 

heels of what Senator Cardin is asking. Global Security reports basically somewhere between 80 to 90 percent of the official Iraqi 

Army being Shia. I think to have an enduring victory, there is 

some question from some of us whether or not you can have an enduring victory and occupy Mosul and be seen as a legitimate government if you have got an 80- to 90-percent Shia force. So I think 

that still is a significant political problem and a significant military 

problem as well. 

Of the chieftains that fought in the surge, just an estimate, what 

percentage are engaged on our side now fighting against ISIS, and 

what percentage are on the sidelines, and what percentage indifferent? 

General ALLEN. Again, those are numbers that are difficult to 

give you with any precision. The ones that I fought alongside in 

2007 and 2008, the ones that I have spoken to, without exception 

have indicated their desire to fight Daesh to recover their lands, to 

ultimately return, in this case, Al-Anbar, to the tribes and ultimately to Iraq. And so, they have been very forthcoming in their 

desire to do that, every one that I have spoken to. 

Senator PAUL. And the chieftains are no longer in the area? They 

have been driven out of the area, the ones that you have spoken—— 

General ALLEN. Well, many of them are. Some have, at great 

risk, traveled out of the area ultimately to speak with us. But they 

are, and many of them are in Amman and they are in other places. 

Senator PAUL. With regard to arming the Kurds, there were reports a month or two ago that Germany wanted to send arms directly to them, but there were objections by our government saying 

everything had to go through Baghdad. Are arms from our allies 

forced to go through Baghdad to get to the Kurds? 

General ALLEN. I will take the question, but let me offer this. 

Baghdad has not disapproved requests that the Kurds have made 

for weapons. We have attempted to work with Baghdad to streamline to the maximum extent possible to reduce any delays that may 

inhibit or impair the expeditious delivery of arms and equipment 

to the Kurds. 

Senator PAUL. Do you think this includes sufficient technology 

and long-range weaponry to meet their needs and their requests? 

General ALLEN. Well, all of that is coming. As you know, sir, and, 

again through the support of the Congress, we are training and 

equipping 12 Iraqi brigades, three of which are peshmerga briFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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gades, and those peshmerga brigades will be armed and equipped 

with exactly the same sophisticated weapons that the other nine 

Iraqi brigades will receive. 

Senator PAUL. We are destroying or abandoning equipment in Afghanistan. Is there any possibility that any of that could be transported to the Kurds? 

General ALLEN. That is a question we should pose to the Department of Defense, but I will take the question. 

Senator PAUL. Thank you. With regard to ultimate victory with 

regard to trying to get Turkey involved, do you think there is any 

possibility of an agreement between the Turks and the Kurds, particularly the Turkish Kurds, to accept an agreement where there 

would be a Kurdish homeland not in Turkish territory that would 

encourage Turkey then to participate more heavily? And is anybody 

in the State Department trying to come to an accommodation between the Turks and the Kurds? 

General ALLEN. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator PAUL. Take that message to them, too, please. Thank 

you. 

General ALLEN. Senator, if I may, on the one comment you made 

with respect to the Shia and the Shia composition of the Iraqi Security Forces. The actions that will be taken in these towns are 

going to be more than simply those of the clearing force. What is 

going to be very important to recognize as well is there will be follow-on echelons behind the clearing force, which will be important 

as well. And we are working closely with the Iraqis for the hold 

force, which will be hopefully the Sunni police, which will actually 

secure and provide support to the Iraqi population that will have 

just been liberated. 

The governance element, which will be familiar to those Sunni 

elements that will have been liberated, and, very importantly, to 

have the Sunnis involved in what may be the most important aspect of the clearance of Daesh out of those areas, which is the immediate humanitarian assistance necessary to provide for the relief 

and the recovery of the populations. 

So it is more complex than simply the clearing force. And while 

we may have to accept that there is a large presence of the Shia 

elements within the Iraqi military, I know that there is a very 

strong effort underway to ensure that the Sunnis are deeply engaged elsewhere in all the other aspects of the recovery of the population. 

Senator PAUL. And one just quick followup to that. I think you 

might get more indigenous support from the Sunni people if you 

are leafleting the place as you are invading saying it is an invading 

Sunni force led by Sunni generals, and that were announced. I 

think our problem really was Mosul was being occupied by a Shiite 

force, and they did not stay long. Once push came to shove, they 

were pretty much gone. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey. 

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. Thank 

you, General, so much for your service. 

In the authorization for the use of military force text that the administration provided to this committee, it said that it would prohibit enduring ground forces. And this was meant to convey that 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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large numbers of troops would not be on the ground for a long 

time, whatever that means. I voted for the 2001 resolution, and I 

am reminded that the U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan were 

dubbed ‘‘Operation Enduring Freedom.’’ 

We are now past 13 years in that enduring fight, and that resolution, of course, was also the basis for the justification of our actions in Somalia, in Yemen. And the administration is saying quite 

clearly that they oppose the repeal of that, and that the operations 

that are going on right now, in fact, are consistent with that 2001 

resolution. 

Now, that causes great problems to me and, I think, to many 

members of the committee because even in the absence of the passage of a new AUMF, the administration is maintaining that they 

have the authority to continue as they have for 13 years under Operation Enduring Freedom. And so, that obviously is a problem for 

us because that sits there as an underlying authority for the next 

President, Democrat or Republican, who is sworn in on January 20, 

2017. And most of us will be sitting here then as your successor 

is sitting here, and perhaps not with the same interpretation of the 

word ‘‘enduring.’’ 

So my questions then go to, is this going to open up a potential 

foreign open-ended war in the Middle East? Will it allow for unfettered deployment of ground troops? And ultimately, whether or not 

we are opening up Pandora’s Box, especially in Syria. So my first 

question to you goes to President Assad and what the goal will be 

underneath this authorization in terms of the removal of President 

Assad, which has been historically an objective that the United 

States has said is important. 

So could you tell us what President Assad and his removal represents as one of the goals that exists in training 5,000 troops in 

Syria for the next 3 years in a row as the long-term objective after 

the defeat of al-Nusra and ISIS? 

General ALLEN. Well, our political goal, our policy goal ultimately 

is that the process of change, of Assad’s departure should occur 

through a political process, and that ultimately he should depart 

and should not be part of the future political landscape in Syria. 

The role of the T&E program is to, first and foremost, to give those 

elements of the moderate Syrian opposition that we are supporting 

the capacity to defend themselves, to build battlefield credibility, 

and ultimately to use those elements, those forces, to deal with 

Daesh in the context of our strategy to deal with Daesh. 

At the same time that we are building that capacity in the moderate Syrian opposition, our hope would be building within the political echelon of the moderate Syrian opposition a level of coherence and sophistication that the two together—the moderate Syrian political echelon and the military echelon—are the credible 

force that will have a place at the table during that political process, which will ultimately see the replacement of Assad. 

Senator MARKEY. I appreciate that, but it just seems to me that 

that is a 10-year proposition, and if that is the case we should be 

talking about a 10-year period. We can finish Iraq perhaps over the 

next 3 years, but then in Syria it is a much longer process. And 

we should just understand what the long-term goal requires from 

us inside of Syria. And just saying Assad’s name over and over 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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again I think will just help us to focus on the ultimate objective 

that the Free Syrian Army is going to have in that country, and 

then what we are signing up for in terms of the long-term military 

effort inside of that country. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to ask this 

one final question, which is, the basic tension that King Abdullah 

was talking about, which is that of the Americans providing help 

to fight the war, but not claiming credit so it does not look like a 

crusade inside of that region. Can you talk about that so that the 

people in the region do not view this as a U.S.-led coalition against 

ISIL, because ultimately that then comes back to haunt us. And 

that was the message that we are receiving from all the Middle 

East. 

General ALLEN. Well, I think, Senator, as your question presupposes, King Abdullah of Jordan has been very clear throughout 

the period of this coalition that in the end the solution to the problems of the region must not only look like, but must be a function 

of those states within the region to take concerted action supported 

by the United States and supported by a broader global coalition 

for those concerted actions to be successful. 

It is very important obviously that the solution have an Arab 

face and a Muslim voice with respect to dealing with the so-called 

caliphate and all that it has brought to the region. And the king 

and other Muslim and Arab leaders in the region have been very 

clear on the desire that they not just appear, but really are exercising leadership frontally in this process. 

Senator MARKEY. I do not think people in that region view it that 

way right now. I think that has to be our goal, though. We just 

have to switch it so that it is not us, and I think Senator Paul is 

referring to that, that it has to be an indigenous Muslim-led effort, 

and I do not think that is the internal view. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Allen, 

thank you for your service to the country. I have followed you on 

TV closely the last couple of months, and I think you have done 

a great job. 

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. Am I correct, we are operating currently in the 

Middle East under the 2001 AUMF? Is that correct? 

General ALLEN. Yes, sir. That is correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. Would it be a fair statement to say the one the 

President has sent to us to consider is actually a limiting AUMF 

compared to the 2001 authorization? 

General ALLEN. It is specifically intended to deal with the threat 

of ISIL. That is correct. 

Senator ISAKSON. But it is limiting in the authority the President 

would have primarily by the interpretation of the ‘‘enduring’’ 

phrase. Is that correct? 

General ALLEN. ‘‘Enduring’’ and the expectation, as he has described it in the proposed legislation, on the size and the kinds of 

forces that might be applied, measures that be applied. That is correct. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

Senator ISAKSON. Like Senator Markey, I voted for the 2001 authorization when I was here. It came on the heels of 9/11/2001. It 

was passed at a time when Americans had American flags on their 

windshields and their front doors, and American businesses had 

flags raised. And the patriotism in our country, because of the terrible attack against our country, was at an all-time high, at least 

in my lifetime, in my memory. Are we going to have to wait for 

that type of event again to happen to us before we use whatever 

it takes to destroy this evil, meaning ISIL and those like them? 

General ALLEN. I think we are taking those measures now to get 

after the evil that is ISIL, and it is an evil we have not seen before 

in a very long time. Just today the FBI rolled up three individuals 

in this country that were intent of either joining or doing—joining 

ISIL in the battle space or doing ill to the American people. And 

as long as we are the front edge of this and taking those kinds of 

measures, I think we have the possibility of keeping it from becoming something that could like a 9/11. 

Senator ISAKSON. In your printed statement, and I assume it is 

part of your remarks that you said verbally, you said, ‘‘It will ultimately be the aggregate pressure of the coalition’s activity over 

multiple mutual supporting lines of effort that will determine the 

campaign’s success.’’ 

General ALLEN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. What are those mutually supporting lines that 

you are referring to? 

General ALLEN. First, working very closely within the coalition 

and more broadly in the community of nations to limit the flow of 

foreign fighters; to deal with the measures—to take the measures 

necessary to deal with the ability to limit ISIL’s capacity to generate revenue, ultimately to support its operations, and to give it 

discretion to take action against us or potentially our allies; to provide support to those elements of the population in the region that 

have been displaced by virtue of the activities of ISIL or have been 

directly suppressed by the boot of ISIL’s conquests and subjugation; 

and then, very importantly, to work together in the information 

space ultimately to defeat the idea of Daesh. 

And the coalition is working very hard in those areas. I have just 

come back from Southeast Asia where I met with the leadership of 

several countries there. They are watching with great interest and 

concern those things that are—that are occurring in the Middle 

East which could spread into their region. And they are interested 

in joining us in ways that can limit the ability of those organizations there to travel to the battle space or to limit their ability to 

directly challenge the authorities of those countries. So it is not 

just the countries of the Middle East. It is not just the countries 

of Europe. It is the countries of Southeast Asia. 

And very importantly within the context of the multiple lines of 

effort, working very closely to outreach to the indigenous populations of these countries in ways that can dispel the image of this 

so-called caliphate in ways that we can work with religious leaders 

and tribal leaders in those countries with populations that may be 

at risk. Work with teachers, and clerics, and families to reduce the 

attractiveness of Daesh and this kind of an extremist message. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

And the combination of all those activities together we think will 

pressure and ultimately put the kinds of pressure necessary on 

Daesh, first, to defend ourselves, and ultimately to defeat the organization. 

Senator ISAKSON. On that point and very briefly because my time 

will be up in about 45 seconds. 

General ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. Are we doing enough to counteract the use of 

social media and technology to communicate exactly what you are 

talking about that they are doing, because what you heard about 

in Southeast Asia and what I have heard from on some trips I have 

taken is the fear they will use social media and the modern communication mechanisms that we have today to spread their ideology and their fear around the world. Are we attacking that as 

much as we should? 

General ALLEN. They are doing it now, and it is, in fact, an explicit objective within our efforts within the counter messaging line 

of effort among the many nations involved to do just that. Obviously in nations where free speech is an issue, we have to accommodate that aspect of our relationship with industry that own 

these platforms to ensure that we are either able to interdict that 

message or with industry to remove that message within its own 

content. So we are working very closely actually with industry and 

with our partners to counter that message across all the social 

media. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you for your time and your service. 

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Menendez. General, thank you so much for your dedication to this nation. I want to thank the President for the wisdom 

he showed in appointing you as the special envoy. I find your presentation to be very direct, no frills, just straightforward, and I appreciate it. 

Under Article 1, Section 8, Congress has the power to declare 

war. I know you agree with that, yes? 

General ALLEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator BOXER. All right. So I hope you could then understand 

why we want to be very precise when we do that because we are 

sent here by a lot of people who have a lot of kids who serve in 

the military, and they are the fabric of our community, so we want 

to be careful. And I just want to say—I am not even going to ask 

you to expand on this ‘‘enduring’’ word because you have said it 

very clearly. Your definition of no enduring presence could mean a 

2-week presence of combat boots on the ground, American boots on 

the ground, or a 2-year presence of American combat boots on the 

ground. 

And that answers the question the Democrats on this committee 

have been searching for—this definition—and I think what you 

have proven with your honesty here is there is no definition because it is in the eye of the beholder. When you say to me that if 

I vote for this there will be no enduring combat presence, and I am 

sending kids in my State there for 2 years, I would argue you have 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

misinterpreted it. The Congressional Research Service says there is 

really no definition. And if I wanted to take an administration to 

court because as a Member of Congress, I said no enduring presence, CRS says I would not have a legal leg to stand on because 

there is no definition. 

So I just think it is very important the administration hear this 

once again. I mean, I know poor Secretary Kerry had to hear it 

over and over again from our side yesterday, but we are very uncomfortable with this language. And when Senator Menendez was 

chairman, he cobbled together a really good AUMF that united all 

of us on our side because he essentially said no combat troops with 

these exceptions, and he put in the kind of exceptions I think you 

would agree with: special forces operations, search and rescue, protecting personnel. And we would urge you to please go back and 

take a look at it. I just feel very strongly. 

Now, I want to ask you questions that have nothing to do with 

that because I think you and I would probably disagree on that 

subject. There is no point in going over it again. But I am very concerned about U.S. military support for the Kurds, and you answered the question in a very sure way, which is wonderful. You 

said, oh, no problem. However, the Kurds are not saying that. 

So I want to call to your attention a recent interview with 

Bloomberg View just 3 weeks ago. The head of the Kurdistan Regional Security Council expressed concerns about our commitment 

to the Kurds, and these are our boots on the ground. These are our 

boots on the ground. He said, ‘‘We are starting to have doubts that 

there might be a political decision on what sort of equipment 

should be given to the Kurds . . . We are fighting on behalf of the 

rest of the world against this terrorist organization. We are putting 

our lives on the line. All we ask for is the sufficient equipment to 

protect these lives.’’ 

So I need you to respond to that. Is that off base? What do you 

think about that? Do you take that comment seriously? Does it concern you? 

General ALLEN. Well, I listen very carefully to what the Kurds 

have to say, and they have, in so many ways, demonstrated battlefield excellence and courage that should elicit all of our respect. 

But we have worked very carefully and very closely with the 

Kurds, and your question presupposes, and is correct, that American support to the Kurds has given them the capacity, and more 

broadly and more recently, coalition support to the Kurds has given 

them the ability to do much of what they have been able to accomplish: the recovery of Mosul Dam, the seizure of Kisik Junction, the 

successful defense of Guerra. The many things that they have done 

is because the coalition has been in close support with them. 

At the same time, in several different rounds we have worked 

very hard with coalition members to respond to Kurdish requests 

for equipment, and that equipment has been flowing in. Also, in 

the context of the $1.6 billion that was appropriated for the train 

and equip program for the 12 Iraqi army brigades, three of which 

are peshmerga, they are getting exactly the same sophisticated 

equipment that the Kurds or the Iraqis are getting. 

Senator BOXER. My question was not about how good they are. 

We agree. They are saying they do not feel they have enough 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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equipment. And I am just saying that while you are saying everything is rosy, they are complaining about it. And I just want to 

say—as one Senator, I cannot speak for anyone else—they are our 

boots on the ground, and we need to get them what they need. I 

know there is pressure from certain factions, but if they are going 

to be our boots on the ground, we have got to give them what they 

need. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. First of all, General, thank you for 

your service to our country and for your willingness to come back 

in and help with this new endeavor of great difficulty. 

I want to start out by just—I know we are not debating the authorization for use of force, but I do want to ask you because of 

your experience in these affairs in the past, it is my understanding 

from our review of the process that only two times in our history 

has Congress authorized the use of force with limitations, and both 

were United Nations peacekeeping missions. And so, the question 

that I would have now is, if our objective here is the defeat of ISIS, 

would it not be more prudent to authorize the Commander in Chief 

to move forward in that regard and allow him as Commander in 

Chief and any future Commander in Chief, whoever they may be, 

to decide what the appropriate strategy is moving forward to ultimately defeat them if that is the ultimate goal? What would be 

wrong with simply authorizing the President to defeat them? 

General ALLEN. Well, the strategy that the President has approved, in fact, does envision the defeat of Daesh. 

Senator RUBIO. No, I understand the strategy does. Just for purposes of an authorization from Congress, and I understand you 

have endorsed here today what the President wants to do, and I 

understand that perhaps that is what the President thinks he can 

get passed. But from a military point of view, would it not be more 

appropriate to simply authorize the President to do whatever it 

takes to defeat them? 

General ALLEN. The President needs the options that he—that 

should be available to him ultimately to defeat Daesh. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. My second question is, is it possible to defeat ISIS without them ultimately being defeated by someone on 

the ground? Someone is going to have to confront them eventually 

on the ground and defeat them there. If you can update us on efforts, and I have seen in the past some conversation among some 

of the regional countries, about the potential for a coalition of 

armed forces brought together—the Egyptians, the Turks, the 

Saudis, perhaps some of the kingdoms, Jordan, et cetera—who 

could provide a coalition of local forces who could play that role 

with significant U.S. assistance from the air, logistics, intelligence, 

et cetera. Has there been any progress made in that? Is that something that is actively being discussed with those nations? 

General ALLEN. Senator Rubio, I would really prefer to have this 

particular part of the conversation in a closed session. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay, I understand. So let me move on then to 

a separate topic, and that is the nature of this conflict. ISIS has 

already proven that they are going to move into—for a group to 

take root, and take hold, and actually be able to grow, they need 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ungoverned vacuum spaces that they can operate from. That is 

what perhaps has attracted them, for example, to Libya, not just 

the access to a port town, but the ability to operate uncontested in 

terms of another government, et cetera. 

It is important to understand that as this conflict continues, the 

possibility continues to grow that ISIS, in addition to being based 

in Syria and Iraq, will also look to other places where they can set 

up nodes operation. Libya is an example, but potentially training 

camps in Afghanistan. Any place where a vacuum opens up is an 

attractive and appealing place for them to move operations. 

And, therefore, as we put forth our strategy and as the Congress 

deliberates the authority it gives the President, that reality needs 

to be taken into account, correct? 

General ALLEN. I agree, yes, sir. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. My last question is about the nature of 

this conflict. You know, it has been talked about in the past that 

ISIS is some sort of, and they certainly are, a group of monsters 

that take on these acts of extreme violence, but these are not just 

random acts of extreme violence. This is a group who has a—their 

barbarism has a purpose. At the end of the day it is to purify, in 

their mind, that region to their form of Islam at the exclusion not 

just of non-Sunni Islam, but especially of non-Islamic populations. 

And in that realm, it is clear that the Christians and Yazidis, but 

recently we have seen Christians in particular, are in increased 

danger in this region, and they specifically target Christian populations for barbarity, both as a way to shock the world, but also as 

an effort to carry out their ultimate goal of, in their mind, ‘‘purifying the region for Islam.’’ Is there a not deep religious component 

to ISIS’ strategy here? They are clearly as part of their effort trying 

to, again, using a term they would use, not one that I necessarily 

enjoy using, but ‘‘cleanse the region’’ of infidels and non-believers. 

And in that realm they have specifically targeted Christians for 

these sorts of atrocities that they are committing on now an ongoing basis as we saw yesterday again. 

General ALLEN. I would say yes to that. The interpretation that 

they apply to all of those segments of the population that live within the area that they control has permitted them to do the things 

that they have done to certain elements of the population. So I absolutely agree with you. Their interpretation of their responsibility 

under this so-called caliphate is to take action against certain elements of the population and treat them one way, and certain elements of the population and treat them another way. It is based 

on their historic interpretation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General Allen, for your service. I also want to thank you. You did very 

significant and important work with respect to trying to provide a 

security roadmap for the West Bank in the event of a peace deal 

between Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Whether the leaders will 

do what their citizens want them to do and find such a deal is up 

to them. But it should not go unnoticed that you worked very, very 

hard on that, and you have put in place a template for security on 

the West Bank that is a very good thing in your work then, and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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in this context, really in the best traditions of American diplomacy. 

And I want to thank you for that. 

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

Senator KAINE. I want to make a comment about ends in the 

next two questions about means. I will pick up—Senator Johnson 

was quizzing you about what is defeat of ISIL. They are not a 

state. They say they are a state. They are not. They are not Islamic. They say they are. They are not. They are a mutation of 

Islam. And you even talk about defeating the idea of ISIL. I agree 

with you. They are just sort of an ideologically driven death cult. 

And so, as we grapple with the authorization, we really have to 

kind of grapple with this question of what does defeat look like. I 

am very practical about this. I want to protect Americans from 

ISIL. That is what I want to do. I want to protect Americans from 

ISIL, and I want to protect our allies who ask for our help. The 

defeat of the ideology, the death cult, you know, fantasy that they 

had, we could be chasing after a phantom by trying to do that. But 

I want to protect Americans, and I want to defend our allies who 

ask us for that. 

On the means side, a question about the ground troops issues. 

In the last three weeks, we have had meetings with two leaders 

from the region, King Abdullah and today the emir of Qatar. King 

Abdullah said this is our fight, not yours, and basically suggested 

that U.S. ground troops would not be a good idea. The emir of 

Qatar was actually even more straightforward about that today. He 

said I do not want American ground troops in. He actually—we did 

not suggest this to him. He brought up the notion that American 

ground troops may be a recruiting bonanza for ISIL, may change 

the notion of what the fight is. It is against the West, now we can 

really recruit people. 

General ALLEN. I think that is accurate. 

Senator KAINE. And so, this is—you know, the ground troop 

thing is a wordsmithing issue, but the wordsmithing is subsidiary 

to the bigger issue, which is, you know, do we become an occupier? 

Do we become a recruiting tool for ISIL? King Abdullah’s notion, 

you know. This terrorism is born and bred in the region. The 

United States did not create it. The region has got to stand up 

against it. If the region is not willing to stand up against it, there 

is virtually nothing that the United States can do, no matter how 

many resources we put into it, that will ultimately lead to a success. We cannot police the region that will not police itself. 

So I am kind of interested—forget about the wordsmithing. But 

when the leaders from the region say American ground troops are 

a bad idea, that is pretty—that is a powerful thought to those of 

us who are going to be voting on the authorization. How would you 

respond to that notion that the presence of any significant American ground troops changes the character of this and makes it the 

West against ISIL rather than a region needing to police its own 

extremism? 

General ALLEN. Well, I do agree with both the emir and the king. 

The presence, the infusion of a large—and I think this where they 

would be a little more precise if given the opportunity. The presence of a large conventional maneuver force would change the nature of the conversation. But it is really important to understand 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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that during Iraq, and during Afghanistan, and in the way we have 

responded to other similar challenges around the world, the United 

States brings to bear a variety of really important capabilities. 

The first is the capacity of our strategic leadership. Just our 

leadership alone has brought to bear 62 nations against this challenge. Our leadership brought to bear the first night of our strike 

operations five Arab air forces flying along on the wing of the 

United States Air Force in strikes against ISIL targets in Syria. 

That is not anything that any of us could have imagined a year 

ago. So our strategic leadership counts as really an enabler to this 

process. 

Other ways and means, and your question is really important. 

Other ways and means that we can bring success to the Arab solution to this is providing technical support, intelligence support; focused special operations strike capabilities; the training and equipping that we are doing today, some of which can be done in country, some of which can be done offshore in partner nations; the aggregation of those activities undertaken with partners in the region 

ultimately to achieve the ends that we seek. 

The United States really has and our coalition partners really 

have many means at our disposal from leadership all the way 

through to potential for special operations strike to give our Arab 

partners exactly what they want, which is the capacity for them to 

be the defeat mechanism in the end of Daesh. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FLAKE [presiding]. Senator Gardner. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

General Allen, for your service, and your time, and your testimony 

today. And, again, we have to recognize that ISIS is a real threat 

to this country, and it requires a comprehensive strategy. And the 

commitment to their total destruction, I think, is the only thing 

that we can accept. 

I am glad the President has made the effort to forward the 

AUMF to Congress. Obviously I look forward to working with the 

President on the AUMF and this committee. In the letter that the 

President transmitted along with his language in the AUMF, he 

stated ‘‘I have directed a comprehensive and sustained strategy to 

degrade and defeat ISIL. As part of this strategy, U.S. military 

forces are conducting a systematic campaign of airstrikes against 

ISIL in Iraq and Syria.’’ 

It is my understanding from the testimony that you have provided to us today that the United States has conducted about 2,500 

airstrikes. Is that correct? 

General ALLEN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. And that is since Operation Inherent Resolve 

began on August 8. That is the timeframe of the 2,500? 

General ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. Okay. And that is an average of 10 airstrikes 

a day. And so, the question I have is, is the pace of the operation 

sufficient to eradicate ISIL at this point? 

General ALLEN. Well, eradication is not the end state that we are 

seeking at this particular moment. Our hope—‘‘hope’’ is not the 

term I want to use. What our expectation is given the strategy is 

that the combination of U.S. and coalition air power in conjunction 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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with the training and equipping of Iraqi Forces and ultimately Syrian forces will over time give us the strategic outcomes that we desire. That is not going to happen tomorrow. It is going to happen 

over a period of time. But the combination of all those things together is what we anticipate will permit us to achieve the objectives of the strategy. 

Senator GARDNER. And so, what besides the airstrikes then does 

the President’s comprehensive and sustained strategy envision? 

General ALLEN. Several things. The first is to provide support to 

the stability of the Iraqi Government, which is essential, and we 

are doing that. We are working closely with the Iraqi Government 

with respect to reforms in partnership with the Abadi government, 

which is inclined to see it that way. Working closely with the Iraqi 

Security Forces to prepare ultimately for a long-term counter offensive, which will remove Daesh from the population centers and ultimately eject it from the country. 

We are working as an international coalition on behalf of Iraq to 

pressure Daesh’s capacities to generate funds and resources necessary for its long-term survival. We are working as an international coalition to staunch the flow of foreign fighters to the battlefield so that Daesh has difficulty in replacing its combat losses. 

We are going to work very closely as partners to share intelligence 

so that we are working with the Iraqis to give them a clear picture 

of what we understand Daesh to be, but also between and among 

the members of the coalition that we can defend ourselves and our 

homelands from the potential for Daesh activities within the 

United States. 

And then, of course, we are working very closely with our partners to provide humanitarian assistance to those elements of the 

population that will need to be recovered and relieved as we liberate them from the presence of Daesh in their population centers. 

And then finally, to work together with Iraq and our partners to 

deal what I think is the decisive blow here beyond the physical defeat of Daesh, which is the defeat of its idea and the idea of its 

attractiveness over the long term. 

Senator GARDNER. And the pace of operations which we discussed, with the passage of the AUMF, does that change at all? 

General ALLEN. Well, I think the pace of the operation will be 

judged as time goes. You know, commanders take stock of the operational environment, and ultimately resource the operations that 

either—takes advantage of opportunities that are availed to them 

by the changes in the operational environment. We could well find 

that based on our current estimates that the activities that we will 

undertake in the counter offensive will follow along the pace and 

the timeline that we anticipate. But we could easily find that as 

the counter offensive unfolds, that Daesh is unwilling to receive defeat after defeat at the hands of the Iraqi Security Forces, which 

is exactly what we want to see. And they may decide that it is time 

to pull out. 

So we may see that the operational environment could change, 

and it is the responsibility of our very capable commanders, in this 

case, Lloyd Austin and James Terry, to constantly be monitoring 

the success of the unfolding operation to ensure we are getting the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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most out of the resources that we have, and if we need more resources, that we ask for them. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator FLAKE. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General 

Allen, thank you for your service. Thank you for your answers to 

the questions. I agree with Senator Boxer, they are straightforward 

and very helpful. 

I want to build on some questions from Senator Menendez and 

Senator Boxer on the authorizing language that we have before us. 

A lot of attention has been given to this phrase ‘‘enduring,’’ not as 

much attention given to the juxtaposition that has now been created between what are offensive forces and what are defensive 

forces. Just so I understand this, you have talked about what the 

potential limitation is on size of force or duration of force under the 

enduring limitation. But so long as the presence of troops is considered defensive, there is no limitation in this authorization of military as to the number of troops or the duration of their time in the 

conflict area so long as they are considered defensive forces. 

General ALLEN. Again, I am not sponsoring the legislation, but 

I think your point is correct in that regard. It is about offensive 

maneuver forces. 

Senator MURPHY. I thought your answer to Senator Kaine’s question was definitive in that you worry, as I know the President does, 

that a large-scale deployment of troops could become recruiting fodder for extremists as our presence in Iraq did over the 10 years. 

Do you think that that changes if our categorization of the forces 

are offensive or defensive, if we have 100,000 defensive troops? I 

do not think this President is going to authorize this, but this is 

a 3-year authorization, so the next President will get the chance to 

decide differently. 

Would it matter in terms of the ability for extremists to recruit 

as to whether our troops there were categorized as defensive versus 

offensive? 

General ALLEN. Again, these are all individual measures. It depends on how the crisis has unfolded. It depends on the region in 

which those forces may be involved. It would depend on the activities that may have occurred prior to the introduction of forces that 

we might call defensive. It is just not possible to give a specific answer to that question. You know, I would have a difficult time understanding how we would have 100,000 forces in a defensive environment if we had not had substantial offensive operations to begin 

with. And that would, of course, change the regional view and the 

perspective on our forces and the outcome. 

So I think that there will be occasions where we may find that 

locations or facilities or concentrations of friends and allies need to 

be defended. The rationale that we would use with our regional 

partners for the insertion of our allied troops to defend those locations or those populations would be very, very important. And so, 

I think each region or each of those circumstances would have to 

be judged independently. 

Senator MURPHY. And do you have a sense, and I know you are 

not the sponsor of this legislation, but you were there, as to what 

the limits of that word ‘‘defensive’’ are? If our forces were there 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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taking fire from an ISIL position and needed to advance on that 

position to eliminate it in order to defend our troops, I assume that 

that action in that time and space looking like an offensive action 

would still be considered defensive in the sense that it was necessary in order to defend our troops or coalition troops? 

General ALLEN. Well, yes. In that particular example, yes. Again, 

we would probably prior to the deployment of those forces have 

come forward with as clear an explanation as we could as to what 

defensive would look in the context of accomplishing that mission 

and accomplishing those tasks associated with defense. 

Senator MURPHY. You are going to get stuck with a lot of hypothetical questions on these two phrases ‘‘enduring’’ and ‘‘defensive 

and offensive’’ simply because we are stuck with them trying to figure them out. 

Just one last question if I could. Part of the success of the awakening was not just persuasion, but also the transfer of substantial 

resources to tribes. We, you know, effectively paid tribes in various 

ways in order to compensate them for their moving away from 

insurgencies and towards coalition forces. What did we learn from 

that experience, and how does it educate us as we try to move forward a strategy, once again, of trying to win over these forces? 

General ALLEN. That is a really important question. I was eye 

deep in that process. 

Senator MURPHY. Yes. 

General ALLEN. And we did, in fact, provide direct support. And 

we gave that direct support to the tribes in so many ways because 

a central government was incapable of doing it. And when we provided that support and ultimately the tribes made the strategic decision to side with us against al-Qaeda, as you well recall, fundamentally the operation al environment changed very quickly in 

2007 and 2008. 

I think what we learned from that was not the fundamental 

change in the battle space that favored us. It was the long-term 

outcome of the Sons of Iraq, which was the handover of the responsibility to resource the Sons of Iraq to the central government in 

Iraq. And that did not work out frankly because it was never clear 

to us, I think, whether Malaki intended to support them or not. 

So in this case, and the lesson is being applied today. In this 

case, we seek in every possible way both to encourage and to support the central government to build those bridges now with the 

tribal elements by providing support to them, by being present in 

the training process, and ultimately ensuring the linkage between 

the Sheikhs and the Iraqi civilian Sunni leaders, that linkage now 

is effective with the central government, not in a handoff later. And 

that one of the important messages or lessons that have come out 

of this. 

Senator MURPHY. And so, does that include financial resources 

being transferred from the Iraqi Government to these tribes? Is 

that one of our recommendations to them? 

General ALLEN. Yes, in the context, for example, of the 2015 

budget that was just passed by the Iraqis. There was a wedge in 

there for the recruitment of tribal elements and indigenous populations from each province into the national guard organizations. 

And those national guard organizations will belong to the governor. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

They will support the police locally in the event that there is a crisis, or will be nationalized, federalized to support the army in the 

event of a national emergency. 

That entity will belong to the ministry of defense. They will recruited into the Ministry of Defense. They will be part of the national guard brigade, but they will be paid by national funds. So 

the mechanisms underway right now where we are training tribal 

elements in Al-Anbar, for example, they are actually being paid 

now by the Iraqi Government and armed by the Iraqi Government. 

We are providing the training. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you. 

General ALLEN. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony. We 

have got a vote on, so I need to go quickly, so I will ask just a couple of questions quickly. 

How important do you think, and I apologize if you answered 

this before I came. How important do you think it is to have the 

AUMF? 

General ALLEN. It is very important. 

Senator FLAKE. How important—go ahead. 

General ALLEN. I think it is extraordinarily important actually. 

The United States has exerted great leadership in bringing together these countries ultimately to support the restoration of the 

situation in Iraq, its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and ultimately to help to deal with the—to be able to defeat that Daesh 

necessary in Syria. So it is very important. 

ISIL is a threat that is unique in our time. It is certainly unique 

in the time that I have been in the service. And while the elements 

of the AUMF will be properly debated between this body and the 

administration, and many of the members here today have brought 

up important points for clarity or for continued discussion, I think 

that it is extraordinarily important, the message that it sends that 

the administration is in a conversation and dialogue with this committee and the Congress on the issue. 

But most importantly, in support of the U.S. leadership globally 

on this issue, a strong bipartisan vote to support the AUMF complements the leadership that the United States has exerted in this 

crisis. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. That is certainly the case I have 

made that both our adversaries and our allies need to know that 

we speak with one voice here. 

General ALLEN. That is exactly right. 

Senator FLAKE. Is there one that is more important than the 

other in that regard, or is it equally important for both of them to 

hear this message? 

General ALLEN. Our friends who are in the coalition in the 21 

capitals I have traveled to have been extraordinarily grateful for 

the American leadership on this issue. What I want is for our adversaries to not be able to sleep at night because we have the unqualified support of the Congress in our actions necessary to defeat 

this enemy. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

32 

Senator FLAKE. At what point is the impact of this AUMF diminished if we have language that is just—I mean, if we try to include 

every point of view and every nuance as opposed to something 

straightforward that we are in this to win. At what point does it 

become less important? 

General ALLEN. It would be difficult for me to answer, Senator, 

but I would just hope that the consultation between the administration and this committee puts the language in there that the 

President needs to defend the American people, defend our country, 

but also to deal the defeat to Daesh that it desperately needs. 

Senator FLAKE. In other examples of AUMF, there has not been 

much change. We have basically done what the administration has 

asked for. And there have been some amendments in recent 

AUMFs, but by and large it has been rather straightforward language, rather short. I frankly think the language the administration put forward is a good start, and maybe amended some. But I 

would caution the committee and the Congress in general, the Senate and the House, from going too far to make it all things to everyone, and probably diminish the importance of it. 

But anyway, thank you for your service, and thank you for your 

testimony here. 

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kaine I know had 

a followup. 

Senator KAINE. General, I wanted to ask about one of the lines 

of effort that we are working on in a fairly significant way, and 

that is the humanitarian relief line. The United States is the most 

generous nation in the world in terms of humanitarian relief to refugees from Syria. But the problem is getting worse in some ways 

because of the closing of borders with Lebanon. There were too 

many refugees there. Jordan, probably the same thing. Turkey 

with border issues is probably less willing to just see waves and 

waves of Syrians coming over. And so, what are we doing in tandem with the London Eleven and other nations to try to deal with 

the humanitarian crisis of all of these displaced folks in Syria, 

whether they are being displaced because of Bashar al-Assad, ISIL, 

cholera outbreaks, weather, desperate poverty that they are being 

displaced? And I wonder about or humanitarian efforts in tandem 

with other nations. 

General ALLEN. I will give you a partial answer, sir, and I will 

take the question and give you the ability of the Department to 

come back. We obviously take that very seriously. We have the relief efforts that, as you properly point out, have been very generously supported by the United States and others directly to the 

populations of Syria and Iraq. We have the U.N. appeals, which 

need a lot more assistance to bring those appeals up to 100 percent. We are in the depth of a winter right now which has made 

this more urgent and more timely. 

We have the frontline states that are struggling with the influx 

of Syrian refugees—Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan—so we need to 

work closely with them to give them the kinds of support necessary 

to ensure that these demographic changes that they are experiencing in their countries are not in the end destabilizing to their 

stability and their security. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33 

And then, very importantly, is humanitarian assistance that will 

follow in trace of the counter offensive when that ultimately kicks 

off. It can be argued that the clearing operation will be important 

to remove Daesh out of the population centers and the police will 

secure the population. But we are going to find that these people 

have lived under indescribable conditions, and so our ability to 

marshal and quickly apply the humanitarian assistance necessary 

to the female populations, to, more broadly, the liberated populations, to the internally displaced persons that will come home as 

we begin to clear these population centers of Daesh, supporting 

their return to their homes, the necessary humanitarian assistance 

to the restoration of the central services, electricity, water, and 

then ultimately reconstruction. 

As your question presupposes, this is a huge bill, and it is a huge 

regional undertaking. And so, I think it should be to everyone’s satisfaction, or at least optimism, many of the members of the coalition have been very clear in their willingness to support the broader U.N. effort for the region and the frontline states. And a number 

of the other coalition members have put their hands in the air to 

be leaders of and supporters to that very important humanitarian 

effort that will follow right closely on the heels of the clearing operation that will move Daesh out of Iraq. 

So it is a multifaceted, multilayer, complex issue, but in the end 

the humanitarian piece, I think, is one of the death blows that 

Daesh will experience. 

Senator KAINE. I know in response to a question from the chairman, you indicated the complexities of no-fly zones. I just would 

commend the idea of a humanitarian zone inside Syria probably on 

the border with Turkey or the border with Jordan, or maybe both, 

that would be justified by a U.N. Security Council resolutions already in place promoting cross-border delivery of humanitarian aid. 

That would be humanitarian zones for people who, whether they 

are fleeing Bashar al-Assad, ISIL, cholera, hunger, winter, whatever is, once the borders have been closed and they cannot transit 

across the borders, I hope we would contemplate some form of safe 

haven for the citizens who are suffering so badly in what I think 

most have testified is the worst refugee crisis since World War II. 

General ALLEN. That is correct, sir. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be in the form of some type of 

no-fly zone—— 

Senator KAINE. Because no-fly has the military, you know, label 

right up front, I would call it a humanitarian safe haven zone. But 

definitely I would want such a zone to be protected from whoever 

might try to mess around with people who are refugees who are 

just seeking safety, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Well, General, I know you have got 

a hard stop in 20 minutes, and I think we have—you have certainly helped us in the way that we wanted you to help us. We appreciate your testimony. 

I would have one question, and that is you, in response to Senator Flake, talked about the need for Congress to be behind the effort that is taking place with ISIL. There have been differing discussions about the length of time from an AUMF standpoint. And 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

34 

is there anything about the timeframe—I know the President has 

asked for three—whether it is longer, shorter? Is there anything 

about that that you think matters at all relative to those that you 

are talking about appealing to our enemies and allies together? 

General ALLEN. Well, our intent with respect to Daesh is to end 

its abilities, to deal that defeat to them as quickly as we can. If 

it takes longer than three years, my suspicion would be that we 

would come back to this committee and request an extension. 

The CHAIRMAN. And if it was shorter than that, it would trouble 

you either. 

General ALLEN. If it was shorter than that, it would not trouble 

me at all if Daesh were defeated in less than 3 years. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no, it would not trouble us either. Thank 

you. Does the length of time really particularly matter to you from 

the standpoint of the allies and those that we are defeating, or is 

it just more Congress getting behind the effort in a bipartisan way? 

General ALLEN. Well, I think it is the latter. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, listen, I called you over the weekend 

when I knew you were on your way to Kuwait. I know you are your 

way to CENTCOM now. I think you can tell by the respect that everyone has shown you today we all view you as someone who is an 

outstanding public servant. We appreciate the way you have gone 

about your work. 

I know it is difficult. I know that decisions do not always get 

made in the manner or in the timeframe that someone like you 

that wants to seek this—get this done in the appropriate way. But 

I think your demeanor, the way you talk with all of us is certainly 

very, very well received. We wish you well in what you are doing, 

and hope you will be before us again soon to update us. 

General ALLEN. Honored to be with you today, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General ALLEN. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General ALLEN. Have a good day, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. And with that, the record will be open until Friday for any questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. We would ask that you and your staff respond 

to those in a fairly timely fashion. 

And the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:13 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

RESPONSES OF GEN. JOHN R. ALLEN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. Can you please explain the command structure for the fight against 

ISIS? Do you believe there is a coherent chain of command aligning all elements 

of American and coalition power against the threat? 

Answer. Because the answer to this question is outside the Department of State’s 

purview, we must respectfully defer to the Department of Defense for a response. 

Question. Do you believe an authorization for the use of force should include 

authority to strike the Syrian regime? 

Answer. The President has been clear that he wants to work with Congress on 

a bipartisan, ISIL-specific AUMF. That is the immediate focus. Consistent with that 

focus, the administration’s proposed AUMF would provide authority for the military 

mission we are currently undertaking in Iraq and Syria against ISIL. 

We believe that Assad has lost the legitimacy to govern, but we are not asking 

for authority to use force against the Assad regime. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

35 

The nature and extent of the support the United States is prepared to provide 

to the Syrian forces we train is critically important and under active consideration. 

We plan to provide a level of support that is sufficient to support the objectives of 

the T&E program. 

Question. Do you believe an authorization for the use of force should be limited 

by time? 

Answer. The President’s goal is to secure the passage of a bipartisan, limited, 

ISIL-specific AUMF that will provide a clear signal to the American people, to our 

allies, and to our enemies that the United States stands united behind the effort 

to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. The President has developed and transmitted 

to the Congress an AUMF that reflects bipartisan input and contains reasonable 

limitations and that provides the flexibility he needs to successfully pursue the 

armed conflict against ISIL. 

Although the confrontation with ISIL will not be over quickly, the President 

believes that 3 years is an appropriate period of time in order to allow the next 

President, the Congress, and the American people to assess the progress we have 

made against ISIL and review the authorities we have in place. 

Question. Do you believe Shia militias in Iraq are, or will be, a threat to Americans in Iraq? 

Answer. The protection of our people is paramount. That is why the Department 

of State and the Department of Defense have taken precautions to mitigate a wide 

range of risks in Iraq to the level where our personnel can operate safely and effectively. Our Embassy and consulates in Iraq maintain a strong and robust security 

posture in Iraq and we work closely with the Department of Defense on contingency 

planning. Security at the missions in Iraq include Diplomatic Security Special 

Agents, Security Protective Specialists, Marine Security Guards, Marine Security 

Augmentation Unit personnel, Worldwide Protective Service armed movement security and static personnel, local guards, and host nation security forces. We refer you 

to Department of Defense for details about their specific security previsions at coalition military sites in Iraq. 

Shia volunteers are an important element of the fighting force against ISIL inside 

Iraq. Although some of these groups predate the current crisis, many of these militia forces formed last summer as a result of Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s call for volunteers when Baghdad and other major cities were under imminent threat. They have 

since continued to play a key role in the Government of Iraq’s efforts to retake its 

sovereign territory from ISIL. 

However, given the history of some of these groups targeting U.S. personnel and 

facilities in Iraq prior to 2012, as well as recent allegations of abuses against Iraqi 

civilians, we do have concerns about some of these militias. We have a continuing 

dialogue with the Iraqi Government about these concerns and the necessity for all 

militias to be brought under the command and control of the Iraqi security forces. 

Prime Minister Abadi has stated that he has a zero tolerance policy of human 

rights abuses and all armed groups and militias should be incorporated under state 

security structures. The draft National Guard law approved by the Council of Ministers on February 3 is a step toward this objective, and, once implemented, an Iraqi 

National Guard structure will ensure greater oversight and regulation of these 

armed elements. 

Question. How does the administration define success in Iraq and Syria? Can you 

explain the terms defeat, destroy, disable and contain as they relate to an end state 

in Iraq and Syria? Which terms align best with the administration’s goals in Iraq 

and Syria? 

Answer. Our Counter-ISIL strategy aims to degrade ISIL in Iraq and Syria over 

the course of a multiyear timeframe, leading to its eventual defeat. 

Degrading ISIL involves suppressing its ability to conduct large-scale operations. 

In the immediate to medium term, conducting military operations to halt and reverse ISIL’s territorial expansion; reducing its capability to resource, plan and execute offensive and/or terrorist attacks; diminishing its capacity to generate funding; 

and restoring legitimate governance and security in Iraq will all have the effect of 

degrading ISIL’s capacity. 

In the longer term, the defeat of ISIL will come when it no longer has a safe 

haven from which to operate, when it no longer poses an existential threat to Iraq 

and other states in the region, and when the coalition effectively counters its global 

reach in spreading its message and ideology of hate, thus preventing it from regenerating over time. With regard to fully eradicating, annihilating or destroying all 

remnants of ISIL, like other terrorist groups before it, there will likely be some resFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

36 

idue of the organization for a long time to come. We do not refer to disabling or 

containing ISIL. 

RESPONSES OF GEN. JOHN R. ALLEN TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

Question. How many countries is ISIL currently present in? Would you agree that 

we need an AUMF that is not specific to just Iraq and Syria? 

Answer. ISIL’s strongholds are in Iraq and Syria; however, ISIL seeks to extend 

its reach, and that is something we are monitoring closely. 

The administration’s proposed AUMF does not include a geographic limitation, as 

we believe it would be a mistake to advertise to ISIL that there are safe havens 

for them outside of Iraq and Syria by limiting the proposed AUMF to specific countries. 

Question. Will ISIL be defeated by 2018? 

Answer. Our Counter-ISIL strategy aims to degrade ISIL in Iraq and Syria over 

the course of a multiyear timeframe, leading to its eventual defeat. This will be a 

long-term effort, and it would be premature at this point to assign a completion date 

to it. 

Degrading ISIL involves suppressing its ability to conduct large-scale operations. 

In the immediate to medium term, conducting military operations to halt and 

reverse ISIL territorial expansion; reducing its capability to resource, plan and execute offensive and/or terrorist attacks; diminishing its capacity to generate funding; 

and restoring legitimate governance and security in Iraq will all have the effect of 

degrading ISIL’s capacity. 

The defeat of ISIL will come in the longer term, when it no longer has a safe 

haven from which to operate, when it no longer poses an existential threat to Iraq 

and other states in the region, and when the coalition effectively counters its global 

reach in spreading its message and ideology of hate, thus preventing it from regenerating over time. Like the process of degrading ISIL, defeating ISIL must also take 

place over a multiyear timeframe. 

Question. What is your understanding of the definition of ‘‘enduring offensive 

ground combat operations’’ in the White House’s proposed AUMF? 

Answer. As the President noted in his letter transmitting the proposed AUMF to 

the Congress, the proposal would not authorize long-term, large-scale ground combat operations like those our Nation conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. As I testified before this committee in December, such operations will be the responsibility 

of local forces because that is what our local partners and allies want, that is what 

is best for preserving our international coalition, and most importantly, that is in 

the best interest of the United States. 

The President has been clear, however, that there always may be exigent or 

unforeseen circumstances in which small numbers of U.S. forces may need to engage 

in limited or short duration ground combat operations, for example, to protect and 

defend U.S. personnel or citizens. The proposed AUMF would therefore provide the 

flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or the use 

of special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership. The proposal would also authorize the use of U.S. forces in situations where ground combat 

operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and sharing, 

missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational planning and other 

forms of advice and assistance to partner forces. 

As the ground combat limitation is focused on major operations—long-term, largescale—the proposal would provide the authority and the flexibility required to perform the mission. 

Question. Why would we not authorize the President to simply achieve a mission 

rather than telling him to do so in a certain time period and only using certain 

means? 

Answer. The President’s goal is to secure the passage of a bipartisan, limited, 

ISIL-specific AUMF that will provide a clear signal to the American people, to our 

allies, and to our enemies that the United States stands united behind the effort 

to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL. The President has developed and transmitted 

to the Congress an AUMF that reflects bipartisan input and contains reasonable 

limitations and that provides the flexibility he needs to successfully pursue the 

armed conflict against ISIL. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

Although the proposed AUMF would not authorize long-term, large-scale ground 

combat operations like those our Nation conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, it 

would provide the flexibility to conduct ground combat operations in other, more 

limited circumstances, such as rescue operations involving U.S. or coalition personnel or special operations forces to take military action against ISIL leadership. 

The proposal would also authorize the use of U.S. forces in situations where ground 

combat operations are not expected or intended, such as intelligence collection and 

sharing, missions to enable kinetic strikes, or the provision of operational planning 

and other forms of advice and assistance to partner forces. 

In addition, although the confrontation with ISIL will not be over quickly, the 

President believes that 3 years is an appropriate period of time in order to allow 

the next President, the Congress, and the American people to assess the progress 

we have made against ISIL and review these authorities again. 

We therefore believe that the proposed AUMF provides the authority and the 

flexibility required to perform the mission. 

Question. You commanded U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Put yourself in 

your former positions as a commander. Do you believe that it makes sense for politicians to prematurely tell our military how they need to win a military conflict? 

Answer. Civilian control over the military is a bedrock principle of the Constitution. We are strongest as a nation when the administration and Congress work 

together on issues as serious as the use of military force. 

The President proposed AUMF contains reasonable limitations and that would 

provide him with the flexibility to direct our military in successfully pursuing the 

armed conflict against ISIL. 

Over the past several weeks, we have engaged in substantial consultations with 

Congress regarding the AUMF. We look forward to continuing to work with the 

Congress on this issue. 

Question. How many countries was ISIL present in last August when coalition 

operations began? 

Answer. From the evidence we have seen, ISIL had an operational presence in 

Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in August 2014. The international community and the 

Global Coalition continue to diminish ISIL’s capacity to generate revenues and fund 

its operations, cut off the flow of foreign terrorist fighters transiting to Iraq and 

Syria, and expose its empty and destructive ideology. 

In fact, since September 2014, coalition efforts have forced ISIL to change its tactics and it is suffering significant losses, reducing its morale and challenging its 

ongoing propaganda campaigns. 

Question. Why has ISIL continued to expand its reach despite our military operations? 

Answer. While military operations against ISIL have succeeded in significantly 

reducing the area of ISIL-held territory in Iraq, a number of terrorist groups in 

other part of Muslim-majority countries have chosen to affiliate themselves with 

ISIL. These new ISIL affiliates do not appear to be established by an influx of ISIL 

militants, but rather, by a rebranding of already existing violent extremist organizations as ISIL franchises. We are monitoring the situation carefully to ascertain the 

extent to which these new affiliates benefit materially and doctrinally from their 

association with ISIL. 

The strategy to combat these ISIL-related groups outside of Iraq and Syria 

leverages the broad capabilities of the United States, coalition members, and international partners across the globe. The strategy rests on the foundation of degrading and then destroying the self-proclaimed ‘‘Islamic State.’’ Coalition efforts in Iraq 

and Syria—such as helping Iraqi security forces reclaim territory held by ISIL, suppressing ISIL’s ability to conduct large-scale operations, degrading its command, 

control and logistics capabilities, and building the political foundations for long-term 

security—will inhibit the group’s capability to operate globally and expand. 

Beyond Iraq and Syria, the international community and the global coalition continue to diminish ISIL’s capacity to generate revenues and fund its operations, cut 

off the flow of foreign terrorist fighters transiting to, and from, Iraq and Syria, and 

expose its empty and destructive ideology. Starving any new ISIL-related groups of 

funds and manpower reduces any of the groups’ opportunity to expand or conduct 

attacks against our international partners. Following meetings with coalition members which Secretary Kerry chaired in December and January , coalition working 

groups are now coordinating combined efforts to address ISIL’s finances, foreign 

fighter draw, and messaging and thereby diminish ISIL’s global potential. 

As these ISIL-related groups have emerged, the United States has also been 

working closely with our partners to reduce the safe havens that many of these 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

38 

groups exploit, build effective governance and security, strengthen the capacity of 

our partners to deal with these threats internally, enhance economic opportunity, 

and disrupt any plots. 

Question. What is the strategy and timetable for an Iraqi security forces offensive 

to recapture Mosul and other areas still held by ISIL? 

Answer. Any offensive will not begin until the Iraqis have determined they are 

ready. We are focused on getting the Iraqi security forces (ISF) adequately trained 

and equipped and the plan synchronized. This training is a critical component to 

our ultimate success because it is what will help generate durable security that 

exists beyond our direct military engagements. 

Any action on Mosul or other areas needs to be methodical, coordinated, and 

planned properly. We are working with the Government of Iraq on isolating Mosul 

by cutting ISIL’s lines of communication, eroding its forces through the air campaign, building combat power through the Building Partner Capacity sites, and 

helping with planning and synchronizing all of these elements to set the conditions 

for an offensive. 

I would refer you to the Department of Defense and the Government of Iraq for 

any future operational planning, but as we have said, any operation on Mosul would 

be Iraqi-led and we are committed to working with the Iraqi security forces to 

degrade and defeat ISIL. 

The timing of a campaign to liberate Mosul in relation to other important population centers and infrastructure in Iraq will depend on the political and military 

conditions on the ground and require strategic flexibility. Regardless of timing, our 

shared goal is clear: the defeat of ISIL and ensuring that ISIL can no longer pose 

a threat to the people of Iraq and to other countries in the region. 

Question. What is the U.S. strategy to combat the rise of ISIS in other countries 

outside of Iraq and Syria? 

Answer. The strategy to combat ISIL and related groups outside of Iraq and Syria 

rests on the coalition efforts within Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the coalition is helping 

Iraqi security forces reclaim territory held by ISIL, suppressing ISIL’s ability to conduct large-scale operations, degrading its command, control, and logistics capabilities, and building the political foundations for long-term security. In Syria, more 

than 1,200 coalition airstrikes against ISIL targets have destroyed ISIL vehicles and 

buildings, have degraded its economic infrastructure, and have defended local forces 

contesting ISIL advances, such as in Kobani. Our efforts in Syria will deny ISIL 

safe haven while creating the conditions for a stable inclusive Syria that fulfills Syrian’s aspirations for freedom and dignity. Our counter-ISIL strategy in both countries will inhibit the group’s capability to operate globally and expand. In fact, since 

September 2014, coalition efforts have forced ISIL to change its tactics and it is suffering significant losses, reducing its morale, and challenging its ongoing propaganda campaigns. 

Beyond Iraq and Syria, the international community and the global coalition continue to diminish ISIL’s capacity to generate revenues and fund its operations, cut 

off the flow of foreign terrorist fighters transiting to, and from, Iraq and Syria, and 

expose its empty and destructive ideology. 

Starving any new ISIL-related groups of funds and manpower mitigates the risk 

of attacks against our international partners. Over the past 6 months, the international community has been increasing its efforts to expose the true nature of ISIL 

to reduce its draw to foreign fighters and other extremist groups. Similarly, international organizations and local communities across the globe are also increasingly 

working to minimize the influence of this hateful rhetoric and insulate potentially 

vulnerable sectors of populations. Following meetings with coalition members which 

Secretary Kerry chaired in December and January, coalition working groups are 

now coordinating combined efforts to address ISIL’s finances, foreign fighter draw, 

and messaging and thereby diminish ISIL’s global potential. 

As these ISIL-related groups have emerged, the United State has also been working closely with our partners to reduce the safe havens that many of these groups 

exploit, build effective governance and security, strengthen the capacity of our partners to deal with these threats internally, enhance economic opportunity, and disrupt any plots. The United States continues to emphasize the importance of a multifaceted, multinational approach to addressing ISIL and other extremist groups. 

Question. The administration has built its strategy against ISIL around the notion 

that local partners will be trained and equipped to do much of the fighting, yet 

many key partners continue to complain about the level of support and communication they receive from the U.S. Government. The Kurds continue to request additional weapons, Sunni tribes in Iraq and Syria complain that their communities 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39 

have endured massacres at the hands of ISIL, yet their requests for assistance have 

not been responded to. Meanwhile, the Syrian opposition has faced significant setbacks on the battlefield and they have raised fundamental concerns about U.S. 

strategy in Syria. 

♦ How do you address these criticisms? 

Answer. Our military support to our local partners in Iraq remains steadfast and 

suggestions to the contrary do not reflect what we have witnessed so far. As the 

President has stressed, the campaign to degrade and defeat ISIL will take time, 

however, we have been able to reverse ISIL’s momentum and the Iraqis continue 

to retake territory. 

Through more than 2,700 coordinated coalition airstrikes in support of our partners on the ground, we have degraded ISIL’s leadership, logistical, and operational 

capabilities, and are denying sanctuary in Iraq from which it can plan and execute 

attacks. Over 1,800 American and international troops, from a dozen countries, are 

training Iraqi and Kurdish security forces at Building Partner Capacity (BPC) sites 

around the country. Prime Minister Abadi has stated his appreciation for U.S. and 

coalition assistance on a number of occasions. 

Regarding U.S. assistance to the Kurds in Iraq, U.S. military personnel are providing support for ISF and peshmerga on planning ground operations, intelligencesharing, integrating air support into their operations, logistics planning, command 

and control, and communications. We established a Joint Operations Center in Erbil 

that has facilitated unprecedented cooperation between the KRG, Iraqi Government, 

and U.S. forces, and sent U.S. advise-and-assist teams to partner with peshmerga 

for operational planning. The Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) will provide an 

estimated $350 million to train and equip Kurdish brigades. To date, the coalition 

has provided the Kurds nearly 50 million rounds of light and heavy ammunition; 

24,000 hand grenades; 47,000 mortar rounds; 50,000 RPG cartridges; and 18,000 

rifles. This is in addition to the more than 300 tons of arms and ammunition that 

the Government of Iraq itself provided and delivered to the Kurds. We have also 

provided 25 MRAPs to our Kurdish partners. Hundreds of air strikes have supported the Kurds, striking ISIL elements in Mosul, near Sinjar Mountain, and other 

areas of northern Iraq providing relief to Kurdish forces and strategic opportunities 

to fight back against ISIL. 

ITEF also allocates funding for the equipping of GOI-approved Sunni tribal fighters. On Sunni communities specifically, through our airstrikes and advise-and-assist 

teams, we have helped to protect key terrain and regain ground at Mosul Dam and 

around Haditha Dam in Anbar province. We also helped break the siege of Dhuluyia 

with airstrikes in support of Iraqi security forces and Sunni tribes when ISIL had 

that town surrounded. While we recognize that a variety of logistical challenges 

remain, we are working with the Government of Iraq to overcome these. 

Question. Given the central focus of our strategy on empowering local allies to 

combat ISIL, why have we been so slow to provide the Jordanians, Kurds, and others with requested assistance? 

Answer. Jordan has been a critical partner to the United States for many years. 

In support of our renewed Memorandum of Understanding signed by Secretary 

Kerry and Foreign Minister Judeh on February 3, we recently released $300 million 

in FY15 Foreign Military Financing several months earlier than it is generally 

released for other FMF recipient countries. We expect to provide additional FY15 

FMF to Jordan once the post-appropriation allocations are finalized. And we are 

expediting delivery of a wide variety of military equipment. 

The U.S. military is also directly enabling Jordanian counter-ISIL air strikes by 

providing targets, intelligence, fuel and training on refueling operations, dropping 

precision guided munitions, and night operations. This supplements long-standing 

military-to-military support and cooperation, such as U.S. Special Operations Forces 

training of their Jordanian counterparts and U.S. Army and Marine individual, collective, and unit training focused on border security techniques, tactics, and procedures for five Jordanian brigade- and battalion-sized formations. 

Jordan’s contributions to the global coalition against ISIL underline the continued 

importance of our bilateral partnership; the Departments of State and Defense have 

mobilized to support these Jordanian operations. Jordan has increased its anti-ISIL 

military operations following the appalling murder of its pilot, Captain Moaz alKasasbeh, and we have increased our efforts to coordinate with the JAF to further 

specify and prioritize its requirements. We have taken the following steps to support 

Jordan: 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40 

• To ensure Jordan can continue its airstrikes, we have expedited delivery of 

more than 200 bombs for its F–16s months early, with hundreds more on the 

way. • To help Jordan prepare for ground combat contingencies, on February 7, the 

United States delivered to Jordan 20,000 rifles, 6,746 machine guns, and over 

1 million rounds of small arms ammunition. One-thousand night vision devices 

are being drawn from U.S. military stocks and will be delivered to Jordan soon. • We have notified Congress of our intent to provide eight Blackhawk helicopters 

to Jordan though a 2-year, no-cost lease as we pursue options to provide a 

larger, permanent capability in the long-term. 

KURDISH ASSISTANCE

We have enormous respect for the courage the Kurds have shown and the fight 

they have taken to ISIL in Iraq and Syria. In coordination with the Government 

of Iraq, the United States and the coalition have been very supportive of Iraqi Kurdish forces, and coalition airstrikes were key to defeating an ISIL attempt to take 

the predominantly Kurdish city of Kobane in Syria. 

• In Iraq, we have organized a coalition effort that to date has provided nearly 

50 million rounds of light and heavy ammunition; 24,000 hand grenades; 47,000 

mortar rounds; 50,000 RPG cartridges; and 18,000 rifles. Thousands more 

rounds of ammunition and weapons have been identified for donation and are 

being prepared for delivery. This is in addition to the more than 300 tons of 

arms and ammunition that the Government of Iraq itself provided and delivered 

to the Kurds. We have also provided 25 MRAPs to our Kurdish partners. • Additionally, we will provide an estimated $350 million of ITEF to train and 

equip Kurdish brigades. While no equipment has yet been delivered under 

ITEF, these units will receive the same weapons, vehicles, and equipment as 

the Iraq Army forces: small arms, mortars, HMMWVs, cargo trucks, trailers, 

radios. Training began in Erbil in December. • Hundreds of air strikes have supported peshmerga forces, striking ISIL elements in Mosul, near Sinjar Mountain, and other areas of northern Iraq providing relief to Kurdish forces and strategic opportunities to fight back against 

ISIL. 

• We established a Joint Operations Center in Erbil that has facilitated unprecedented cooperation between the KRG, Iraqi Government, and U.S. forces, and 

sent U.S. and coalition advise-and-assist special forces teams to partner with 

peshmerga forces for operational planning. 

• We will continue to evaluate the needs of all of Iraq’s security forces, including 

the Kurdish security forces, to ensure that they have the necessary weapons to 

defeat ISIL. 

• In Syria, we provided critical assistance to the Kurdish and Free Syrian Army 

forces defending the city of Kobane from ISIL advances. We launched more than 

700 airstrikes to target ISIL positions and equipment, enabling the Kurdish 

ground forces to enhance the town’s defenses, to prevent ISIL from attacking, 

and to extend security in the areas around Kobane. In addition, the United 

States bolstered Kobane’s defenders by air with supplies provided by Kurdistan 

Regional Government authorities in Iraq, in addition to facilitating the entry of 

Iraqi peshmerga forces into northern Syria to assist those defending Kobane. 

• Following ISIL’s defeat in Kobane, military airstrikes in the vicinity of Kobane 

continue to support the efforts of Kurdish and Free Syrian Army forces to push 

ISIL from the surrounding areas. 

Question. A key component of our strategy is the train-and-equip effort related to 

Syria. What pledges is the administration making to those Syrian rebel forces that 

agree to participate in coalition training programs regarding air support and ultimate plans to fight the Assad regime? 

Answer. Our effort to equip appropriately vetted Syrian opposition elements has 

specific objectives: to defend the Syrian people from attacks by ISIL and secure territory controlled by the Syrian opposition; to protect the United States, its friends 

and allies, and the Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria; and 

to promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria. 

We are committed to the success of the personnel we will train. The nature and 

extent of the support the United States is prepared to provide to those forces are 

critically important and under active consideration. 

Question. Does the AUMF, as currently drafted, allow U.S. forces to provide 

defensive assistance to trained Syrian opposition forces from all of the threats they 

face, including from the Assad regime? 

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Answer. The President has been clear that he wants to work with Congress on 

a bipartisan, ISIL-specific AUMF. That is the immediate focus. Consistent with that 

focus, the administration’s proposed AUMF would provide authority for the military 

mission we are currently undertaking in Iraq and Syria against ISIL. 

We believe that Assad has lost the legitimacy to govern, but we are not asking 

for authority to use force against the Assad regime. 

The nature and extent of the support the United States is prepared to provide 

to the Syrian forces we train is critically important and under active consideration. 

We plan to provide a level of support that is sufficient to support the objectives of 

the T&E program. 

Question. What is Iran’s level of control over the Shiite militias that have been 

mobilized to defend Baghdad and other areas in southern Iraq? 

Answer. The threat of ISIL in Iraq has provided Iran with the opportunity for unprecedented cooperation with the Government of Iraq. However, Iranian influence 

in Iraq is not new. Iran has been a major player there since 2003. 

Shia volunteers are an element of the fighting force against ISIL inside Iraq. 

Many are militia forces that formed last summer as a result of Grand Ayatollah 

Sistani’s call for volunteers when Baghdad and other major cities were under imminent threat. Iran wields varying degrees of influence over these many different Iraqi 

Shiite militias, from high to negligible. 

Where influence exists, it may not extend throughout the entire command structure of a militia making some members nonresponsive to Iranian direction. 

Question. How would you characterize the role that Iran is currently playing in 

the fight against ISIL in Iraq? What level of coordination is there between coalition 

forces and Iran? 

Answer. Iran is providing significant military support to the Iraqi security forces, 

Iraqi Shia volunteers and militias, and Kurdish forces in the form of weapons, combat advisors, training, intelligence, artillery support, and a handful of airstrikes. 

Iran is seeking to leverage and publicly highlight its military support in the 

counter-ISIL campaign for additional influence in Iraq. 

Iran has channeled most of its support to Iraqi Shia groups under the Popular 

Mobilization Committee (PMC), upon which the Iraqi Government has relied heavily 

in recent counter-ISIL operations. The PMC is comprised of many untrained Iraqi 

volunteers, to include some Sunni tribes, as well as more hard-line sectarian militias heavily influenced by Iran. The Government of Iraq is seeking to differentiate 

between Iranian proxy groups and Iraqi volunteers in an effort to limit Iran’s influence and gain better control over the security forces. 

We recognize that Iraq and Iran share a long physical border, and that Iraq and 

Iran will have a relationship. And it is also clear that ISIL is a threat to the entire 

region, including Iran, and we understand that Iran is pursuing its own actions 

against ISIL in Iraq. But to adequately address the threat posed by ISIL and ensure 

long-term stability in Iraq, ISIL can only be defeated by an integrated and capable 

Iraqi security force backed by a unified Iraq. 

Question. What is Iran’s current relationship toward the Assad regime in Syria 

and to ISIL forces in Syria? 

Answer. Iran has been a critical support line to the Assad regime, providing not 

only funds and weapons, but also strategic guidance, technical assistance, and training. This support has enabled the regime to continue its repression and slaughter 

of tens of thousands of Syrians, which has also fostered the emergence and expansion of extremist groups such as ISIL. Many analysts assess that Iran’s assistance 

has been crucial to helping the Assad regime survive to date. 

We know that Iran is supplying arms to the Syrian regime in violation of the U.N. 

Security Council prohibition against Iran selling or transferring arms and related 

materials, including through flights over Iraqi territory. 

This issue has been raised with Iraqi officials by Secretary Kerry and other senior 

U.S. officials, emphasizing the connection between the flow of weapons and the escalation of extremist violence in the region, particularly in Syria. We have urged that 

Iraq either deny overflight requests for Iranian aircraft going to Syria, or require 

such flight to land in Iraq for credible inspections, consistent with its international 

legal obligations. 

Question. ISIS is now a threat to all Syrians and Iraqis regardless of their religious faith, but the smallest religious communities, including Catholics, Syriac 

Christians, Protestants, Yazidis, and Sabean Mandaeans, face an existential threat. 

ISIS has committed countless acts of crimes against humanity, including murder 

through beheadings, enslavement of women and children, and torture. 

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♦ How can the United States and its coalition partners protect the smallest communities from complete eradication in Syria, Iraq, or anywhere else ISIS is a 

threat? How can the United States best work with our partners to help ensure 

the region’s religious diversity and the protection of freedom of religion or 

belief? 

Answer. The United States has long been concerned about the safety and rights 

of members of Iraq’s and Syria’s vulnerable populations, including members of religious and ethnic minorities. Protecting these communities and others in the face of 

the existential threat from ISIL is one of the priorities of our counter-ISIL strategy 

and of the 62-nation international counter-ISIL coalition, as well a part of our regular diplomatic engagement. 

The United States and certain coalition partners have conducted a campaign of 

coordinated airstrikes against ISIL, and the coalition also has undertaken military 

assistance, diplomatic engagement, and intelligence and messaging coordination to 

defeat, degrade, and delegitimize ISIL. Through these actions, we have dealt ISIL 

strategic blows, halting its advances and preventing atrocities, beginning with the 

airstrikes President Obama announced August 7, 2014, to help the Yezidis stranded 

on Mt. Sinjar, and followed by airstrikes and the delivery of relief supplies to the 

Shia Turkmen in Amerli. 

The United States has regular and ongoing contact with leaders of minority religious groups in the United States and throughout the Middle East region to discuss 

their well-being and needs. The Office of International Religious Freedom in the 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor has been especially helpful in this 

outreach. Our contacts include Christian leaders, Yezidi activists, civil society and 

clergy members, minority diaspora, and advocacy groups. In Iraq, the U.S. Embassy 

in Baghdad and consulate general in Erbil are in daily contact with the Iraqi Government, the Kurdistan Regional Government, the U.N., and other humanitarian 

aid organizations in Iraq to ensure they do their utmost to reach and assist displaced Iraqis—including minorities. 

It is very difficult to reach areas of Syria and Iraq that are under the control of 

ISIL. Despite these challenges, the United States continues to work closely with 

humanitarian organizations to find ways to try to provide life-saving aid to those 

who need it. The U.N., which is overseeing the massive international effort to aid 

those fleeing areas in, or at risk of, conflict, is also in regular contact with minority 

groups and their leaders. Representatives of these communities have expressed the 

importance of not only food, shelter, and clean water, but of educational opportunities for children, job opportunities for young people, and medical services for displaced communities to avoid the need to relocate to a third country while ISIL is 

being defeated. The United States remains the single largest donor to the humanitarian response for Syria, contributing more than $3 billion in life-saving humanitarian aid to Syrian IDPs and refugees in the region since the crisis began. The 

United States also continues to be a primary donor to displaced Iraqis, contributing 

over $219 million since fiscal year 2014. 

In Iraq, we are working with the Government of Iraq, the U.N., and our coalition 

partners to create the conditions for the displaced to return to their homes as soon 

as possible, and we will continue to press the Government of Iraq and support its 

efforts to ensure that minority communities are able to return to their homes in 

peace. This includes support for Prime Minister Abadi’s efforts to devolve power 

from the federal government to provincial and local authorities as an important 

mechanism for protecting the rights of all Iraqis and to preserve the unity and longterm stability of Iraq. We are also encouraging the establishment of an Iraqi 

National Guard, which would provide a stable mechanism for local communities, 

including minority communities, to take more responsibility for their own protection 

while receiving the resources and training needed to do so. In Syria, the United 

States will continue to work toward a negotiated political solution that produces a 

stable, inclusive Syria for people of all ethnic and religious identities, a Syria free 

from the tyranny of the Assad regime and the terror of ISIL. 

Question. ISIL’s extremist ideology disallows any religious diversity or religious 

freedom. Increasingly, minority communities, especially in Iraq, report they will not 

attempt to return after years of targeting because they simply do not trust the government or their neighbors. 

♦ How are issues of religious freedom, human rights, interfaith dialogue, or 

respect for diversity and pluralism being made part of the strategy to fight 

against ISIS? 

Answer. We will not degrade and defeat ISIL through military effort alone. An 

important component of our work requires promotion of an open and inclusive society, which can win out against its repressive and divisive ideology. This demands 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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a society that respects the rights to all citizens regardless of religious identity or 

other distinction, and that also respects diversity, including members of religious 

and ethnic minorities, women, and those voicing different political views. 

In Iraq, Prime Minister Abadi has made important strides to reduce sectarian 

tensions and promote inclusivity including, for example, the proposed National 

Guard law, his statements regarding a ‘‘zero tolerance’’ policy for human rights violations, and his efforts to incorporate militias into existing security structures, as 

well as his Executive order to adhere to Iraqi law regarding the time detainees may 

be held in custody—a key concern of the Sunnis. We will support him in these 

efforts and urge him to implement them. 

We are working to promote and establish an inclusive, rights-respecting governance system in Iraq, especially in regards to the security forces, to prevent 

marginalization and minimize sectarian hostilities. We seek the same thing in Syria 

through a negotiated political solution that fulfills Syrians’ aspirations for freedom 

and dignity. These efforts include focusing on respect for human rights in our 

engagements with military and civilian leaders and incorporating law of armed conflict training in our plans to train and equip both Iraqi security forces and vetted 

elements of the Syrian opposition. 

We are supporting the Iraqi Government and civil society to reconstitute those 

areas that have been liberated from ISIL control with those communities who were 

forced to flee, rebuilding toward tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Our projects 

engage and support members of religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq, aiming to 

increase community representation and participation by minorities, bolster advocacy 

on their behalf, and promote the peaceful rebuilding of Iraqi communities. In Syria 

we are supporting interim governance structures, as well as local and provincial 

councils, civil society organizations, and local security actors, setting a course 

toward a peaceful, democratic, inclusive future and helping establish the conditions 

for a political solution to this conflict. We also support programs to empower religious and ethnic minorities and promote tolerance and reconciliation to counter rising sectarian tensions, among others; for instance, we have hosted multiple Syrian 

interfaith conferences and activities both in the United States and in the region that 

featured prominent Syrian clergy of all backgrounds with large followings. Additionally, the Department of State played a key role in the White House-hosted summit 

on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015, which Syrian and Iraqi civil 

society and clergy representatives attended and which has resulted in renewed 

attention to role of governance and human rights in the fight against violent extremism. 

Æ 

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