T.C. Memo. 1998-168

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

TERRI L. BLAKE, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket Nos. 387-97, 3581-97. Filed May 7, 1998. 

 

Terri L. Blake, pro se.

Christine V. Olsen, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GERBER, Judge: Respondent determined deficiencies in

petitioner’s Federal income tax and additions to tax as follows:

 Additions to Tax 

 Sec. Sec. Sec. 

Year Deficiency 6651(a)(1) 6651(a)(2) 6654(a)

1993 $21,167 $4,482 1$2,590 $828

1994 22,057 5,354 --- ---
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1 Petitioner's failure to respond to respondent's requested

admissions resulted in the admissions’ being deemed admitted. 

See Rule 90(c).

1 In a motion for summary judgment, respondent

conceded that the sec. 6651(a)(2) addition to tax for

1993 was determined in error.

All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in

effect for the years in issue, and all Rule references are to

this Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

Respondent, subsequent to petitioner's failure to respond to

requests for admissions,1 filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Rule 121(b) provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be

granted if the pleadings and admissions show that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that a decision may be

rendered as a matter of law. Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C.

527, 529 (1985). The moving party bears the burden of proving

that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Marshall v.

Commissioner, 85 T.C. 267, 271 (1985). The facts are viewed in a

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Jacklin v.

Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 344 (1982).

Petitioner, throughout the administrative portion of this

proceeding, advanced several successive theories or reasons in

support of her position that she is not liable for Federal income

tax on her compensation or wages. At the hearing on respondent's 

motion for summary judgment, respondent, under section 6673,

orally moved for penalties against petitioner on the grounds that
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petitioner has maintained this proceeding for delay and/or that

petitioner's position is frivolous.

There is no question or dispute about the material facts in

these cases. Petitioner does not dispute that she received

$86,408 and $92,274 in compensation or wages from her employer

for the taxable years 1993 and 1994, respectively. Petitioner

resided in Mission Viejo, California, at the time her petitions

were filed. Petitioner filed her 1993 and 1994 Federal income

tax returns on June 5, 1996, and December 5, 1995, respectively. 

On those returns, petitioner reported the amount of wages she

received and then, as an adjustment, claimed it was "Nontaxable

compensation * * * [Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920)]”. 

As a result, petitioner reported zero taxable income and

requested a refund of any withholding tax withheld by her

employer. Attached to petitioner's returns are explanations

that, in essence, propose the following reasons why the

compensation she received was not taxable: (1) There is no

statutory requirement to file a return of income; (2) she is a

resident and citizen of California and a nonresident for Federal

purposes; and/or (3) her wages were not a gain or profit in

accord with her reading of Eisner v. Macomber, supra.

Petitioner, by selectively analyzing statutes, regulations,

and case precedent out of context, has reached the conclusion

that amounts she received do not constitute taxable income. 
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2 It has been conceded that the determination of the

(continued...)

Petitioner, following in the footsteps of numerous others who

have unsuccessfully attempted to rationalize a way to avoid

paying Federal income tax, must also fail. We find petitioner’s

arguments to be either wholly without merit and not worthy of

further analysis and/or previously addressed by this and other

courts. See, for example, opinions holding that "Compensation

for labor or services, paid in the form of wages or salary, has

been universally, held by the courts of this republic to be

income, subject to the income tax laws currently applicable." 

United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981); see

Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1982), affg. per

curiam T.C. Memo. 1981-506; Broughton v. United States, 632 F.2d

706, 707 (8th Cir. 1980); Hayward v. Day, 619 F.2d 716, 717 (8th

Cir. 1980); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1120 (1983). 

Further, we are not obligated to exhaustively review and/or rebut

petitioner’s misguided contentions. Crain v. Commissioner, 737

F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).

Accordingly, we sustain respondent’s determination that

petitioner's wages are income for petitioner’s 1993 and 1994

taxable years.

Respondent also determined additions to tax for 1993 and

1994 under section 6651(a)(1) (failure to file), and for 1993

under sections 6651(a)(2)2 (failure to pay tax) and 6654(a)
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2(...continued)

application of sec. 6651(a)(2) was in error.

(failure to pay estimated tax). It is clear from the information

available in these cases that petitioner failed to file timely

returns. In addition, petitioner has offered no evidence or

sound explanation as to why these additions to tax should not be

imposed. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the additions to

tax under sections 6651(a)(1) and 6654(a) for the taxable year

1993, and section 6651(a)(1) for the taxable year 1994 are

sustained. Rule 142(a); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292

U.S. 435 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

Finally, respondent orally moved for a penalty under section

6673. Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require a

taxpayer to pay the United States a penalty not exceeding $25,000

when a taxpayer institutes or maintains a proceeding primarily

for delay or where the taxpayer's position is frivolous or

groundless, or the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue

available administrative remedies. Respondent did not seek a

specific amount and instead moved generally for a penalty under

section 6673.

At trial, petitioner offered a trial memorandum, which the

Court received and filed as a response to respondent's motion for

summary judgment. In that document, petitioner attempted to

characterize her dispute with respondent as one where she

"believes the income tax to be an excise tax." The document
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references various opinions that concern the constitutionality of

taxes and address the question of direct and indirect taxes. 

Most of the citations offered by petitioner in support of her

position are lifted out of context and are not necessarily

interrelated. She has attempted, albeit inartfully, to create a

conglomerated argument to support her quest to avoid paying

income tax. Petitioner explained at the hearing that she

obtained much of her information from the internet and that her

beliefs are sincere.

Although, as a matter of law, petitioner's argument will not

suffice to satisfy her avoidance goal, we must decide whether, as

respondent contends, petitioner maintained her position primarily

for delay and/or whether petitioner’s position is groundless or

frivolous. It does not appear that petitioner maintained her

position primarily for delay. However, petitioner’s argument and

position have, on numerous occasions, been unsuccessfully

advanced by others. Her position is, and has been, found to be

frivolous and without support. Under those circumstances, a

$1,000 penalty under section 6673 will be awarded in each of

these cases.

To reflect the foregoing,

Orders and decisions will be

entered for respondent, except for

the concession of the section
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6651(a)(2) addition to tax, and

respondent's oral motion for

penalties under section 6673 will

be granted.