UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DAVID TALBOT , Plaintiff,

v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE et al. , Defendants. Case No. 17-cv-0588 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION Over a half-century after Presi dent Kennedy’s assassination, th eories still abound as to who was responsible. In vestigative journali st David Talbot poi nts the finger at the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”). In a quest for supporting evidenc e, Talbot filed Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) reques ts with the CIA and the State De partment for passport and travel records of two deceased CIA agents who Talbot suspects w ere aware of the agency’s involvement in the assassinati on, or worse. Talbot apparently seeks the records in order to link the agents’ comings and goings t o the known wher eabouts of othe r characters in the continuing whodunit. In this suit, Talbot challenges the adequacy of the agencies’ s earches in response to his requests and the appropriatene ss of their reliance on a number of FOIA exemptions to withhold otherwise responsive records . Both sides now seek summary judg ment. For the reasons explained further below, the C ourt will grant summary judgment to the agencies with two exceptions: it concludes that (1) the State Department’s search for passports issued to one of the agents under two pseudonyms was undul y restrictive and (2) cert ain potentially responsive records in operational files that the CIA claimed were exempt f rom disclosure fall under an2 exception to that exemption and, consequently, the CIA must eit her search the files for those records or explain why no respons ive records are likely to be f ound there.
I. Background David Talbot is a journalist , author, and co-founder of the onl ine newspaper Salon.com. Compl. ¶ 1. He has written multiple books covering the histori cal period of the presidency of John F. Kennedy, including the Kennedy assassination. Id. ¶¶ 1 –3. In May 2013, in connection with research for a now-publis hed book on former CIA Director A llen Dulles, Talbot submitted FOIA requests to the Department of State and the CIA. The requ est to the State Department sought “[a]ll passport and visa rec ords pertaining to” two form er CIA agents, William King Harvey and F. Mark Wyatt, from January 1, 1950 through July 1, 1976, as well as copies of all photographs of the two men. Id. E x. 1. The request to the CIA also sought records related to Wyatt and Harvey, specifically “[a ]ll records pertaining to temporary duty (TDY) travel,” “[a]ll passport and visa records,” “[a ]ll records reflecting assignmen t to a[] station, post, base, unit or other component of the CIA,” a nd “[a]ll photographs pertaining to” the two from January 1, 1950 to July 1, 1976 for Harvey and from January 1, 1948 to 197 5 for Wyatt. Id. Ex. 6. State and the CIA informed Tal bot they had received his request s and began processing them. Id. ¶¶ 11, 20. When the agenc ies failed to fully proces s Talbot’s requests, he brought suit against them in this Court. A fter production was completed, bo th parties filed motions for summary judgment, with Talbot cha llenging the agencies’ searche s and their withholdings. The Court held a hearing on the motions on May 15, 2018.

II. Standard of Review Summary judgment may be granted when the moving party establish es that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is e ntitled to judgm ent as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.3 P. 56(a). Summary judgment is the typical mechanism to determi ne whether an agency has met its FOIA obligations. See, e .g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. CFPB, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2014). Under FOIA, an agency is first required to make an adequate sea rch for any responsive records. Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 236 F. Supp. 3d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 2017). In reviewing an agency’s search, courts appl y a “reasonablenes s” test that l ooks to the methods and not the fruits of a search. Id. To prove i ts search was reasonable, t he agency “must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a sear ch for the requested records , using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.” Ogl esby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The age ncy may rely on affidavit s that detail “what records were searched, by whom, and through what process” to make this showi ng. Steinberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Agency affidavits are “accorded a presumption of good faith.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In addition to demonstrating that it conducted an adequate sear ch, the agency must also justify any withholdings it has ma de pursuant to a FOIA exempti on. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 862 (D.C. C ir. 2009). Justification can be provided by sufficiently detailed agency affidavits. See, e.g., id. Because the primar y purpose of FOIA is disclosure, exemptions are construed narrowly. See, e.g., DiBacco v. U.S. Army, 795 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The agencies here have invoked three separate FOIA exemptions. First, the CIA has withheld some documents under Exemption 1, which protects from disclosure documents “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Execu tive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy” and that “are i n fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S .C. § 552(b)(1). Second, the CIA has withheld documents under4 Exemption 3, which covers certain records “specifically exempte d from disclosure by statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). To demonstrate that records fall within Ex emption 3, the agency must show that “the statute claimed is one of exemption as contemplated b y Exemption 3 and that the withheld material falls with in the statute.” Larson, 565 F.3d at 865. Finally, both the State Departmen t and the CIA have redacted ce rtain names and personal information under Exemption 6, which covers “personnel and medi cal files and similar files the disclosure of which would const itute a clearly unwarranted inva sion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Courts follow a two-part test in applying Exemption 6. See, e.g., Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric ulture, 515 F.3d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Ci r. 2008). First, the Court determines whether the informa tion constitutes “personnel, medi cal, or ‘similar’ files covered by Exemption 6.” Id. Then, the Court determines whether disclosure would “‘constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’” by “balanc[ing] the privacy interest that would be compromised by disclosure against any public interest in the re quested information.” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)).

III. Analysis Talbot challenges nearly every a spect of the State Department’s and the CIA’s response to his FOIA requests. 1 He first contends that neither agency performed an adequate s earch for records. He next argues that bot h agencies’ withholdings were improper. Finally, he argues that the agencies have not met their obligations to segregate non-ex empt material from the withheld records. The Court will begin i n Foggy Bottom before traveling to Langley.

1 While Talbot’s complaint eve n challenges the $31.70 fee charge d by the CIA to process the Harvey records, Compl. ¶¶ 37–38, he does not mention that f ee in his briefing on summary judgment.5 A. The State Department’s Search and Withholdings Talbot challenges the State Department’s search and production on several grounds: that (1) the Department’s search for records responsive to his May 2 013 request was inadequate, (2) its withholdings were improper , and (3) it failed to respond to a separate April 2016 request he submitted. While the Court will gr ant the Department summary j udgment as to its withholdings, the April 2016 request, and its search for Agent Wyatt’s record s, it will deny both motions without prejudice as to the adequ acy of the Department’s searchfor passport records associated with Agent Harvey’s two pseudonyms.
1. Adequacy of the State Department’s search The State Department’s search for passport records for both Har vey and Wyatt is described in declarations submitted by Eric F. Stein, the Direc tor of the Department’s Office of Information Programs and Services . According to Mr. Stein, the Department determined that any responsive records were lik ely to be found in the Departmen t’s Office of Passport Services because that office handles the issuance of passports to U.S. c itizens. Decl. of Eric F. Stein ¶¶ 14–15. Department personnel co nducted a search of several e lectronic databases that typically contain records for more recent passports, but also i nclude some imaged records for older passports. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 20. T hese personnel searched f or records listing Harvey’s name and birthdate, Wyatt’s name a nd birthdate, or two pseudonyms us ed by Harvey that Talbot provided and Harvey’s actu al birthdate . Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 20. Add itionally, Department personnel searched the agency’s archive d hard copy passport files, again for passport records with Harvey’s name and birthdate, Wyatt’ s name and birthdate, or Harvey’s two pseudonyms and actual birthdate. Id. ¶¶ 1 8, 21. The Department found ten doc uments pertaining to Wyatt but none to Harvey. Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.6 Talbot advances several argumen ts as to why this search was ina dequate, all but one of which are unavailing. First, Talbot faults the Department for searching using only Harvey’s and Wyatt’s first and last names rath er than their full names inclu ding their middle names. Mem. P. & A. Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J . & Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“P l.’s Cross-MSJ”) at 12–13, 16. But Mr. Stein clarifies in asupplemental declaration that any results from the search using first and last names would necessarily include results associat ed with their full names. Suppl. Decl. of Eric F. Stein ¶¶ 5, 8. Next, Talbot contends that the Department should have searched for records related to two specific passports, which ot her records produced by the Dep artment indicated were used by Wyatt. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 18. In h is supplemental declaration , however, Mr. Stein attests that the Department ran an additional search for any responsive reco rds related to those two passports and found none. Suppl. Decl. of Eric F. Stein ¶¶ 10–12. Third, Talbot contends that the s earch excluded th eoretical loc ations where records could have been found. He speculates, for instance, that there must be some sort of “records system relating to passport services provided to CIA officers” that th e Department neglected to search. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 14. Similarl y, Talbot argues that the Department also needed to search “employment and personnel record s relating to employees who rec eive ‘special passports.’” Id. at 17. But as the Department notes , Talbot’s request was for passport and visa records pertaining to Wyatt and Harve y, not for any records or even for any employment or personnel records. See Compl. Ex. 1. The Dep artment does not typically create or maintain records on visas that Americans receive fr om foreign countries—those are h oused with the foreign country authorizing the visa. Decl. of Eric F. Stein ¶ 14 n.1. As to passport records, the Department has explained why the locations search ed—the electronic and paper r ecords of the office responsible7 for processing and issuing passports to U.S. citizens—were the logical places to find any responsive records. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. Talbot also contends that the s earch for Harvey’s passport reco rds was inadequate because the Department failed to find any responsive records—a result he argues “beggars belief” because Harvey “was a C IA officer serving in overseas p osts in the 1950s and 1960s” and it is “well documented that he travelled extensively during tha t time.” Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 14. But it is well-settled that the adequacy of a search “is genera lly determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropria teness of the methods used to c arry out the sear ch.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003). R ecords, especially ones that are several decades old, “may have been accidentally lost or destro yed, or a reasonable and thorough search may have missed them.” I d. The Department has attested that it searched the place most likely to contain passport record s using reasonable terms, name ly Harvey’s name and birthdate. Talbot’s final argument fares better. When the Department sear ched for passports issued under two pseudonyms that Harvey is known to have used, it limi ted its search to records containing those pse udonyms and Harvey’s actualbirthdate. Decl. of Eri c F. Stein ¶ 18. It strikes the Court as unlikely t hat a CIA officer using a pseudo nym would list his real birthdate with the false name rather tha n a false birthdate. The Departm ent’s declarations offer nothing to support a contrary conclusion. The Court therefore concludes that the Department’s search for only records reflecting Harvey’s actual birthdate was too narro w. As a result, the search was not reasonably calculated to find a ll responsive records. The Cour t will, accordingly, deny both motions without prejudice as to th is aspect of the Department’s search and will require a further search for records associate d with Harvey’s pseudonyms.8 That said, the Court appreciat es that there may be many passpor ts issued to other individuals who share a name w ith Harvey’s pseudonym, especiall y the pseudonym “William Walker,” which the State Department would not be at liberty to produce. At the hearing, Talbot’s counsel proposed sever al possible ways to limit the De partment’s search so as to exclude results that are not lik ely to be Harvey’s passport rec ords—namely, using a range of birthdates falling within five y ears of Harvey’s actual birthda te (that is, two-and-a-half years on either side of his actual birthd ate) and limiting the search to passport applications listing planned travel to Germany or Italy (where Talbot believes Harvey travel led during the re levant time period). Given these reasonable limitations, the Court will re quire the State Department to conduct another search with these parameters and to report back on whether the search yields any results. If it does, the Cour t will consider ways that it might determine whether the passport records are associated wit h Harvey and not someone else.
2. The State Department’s withholdings Next, Talbot challenges the Stat e Department’s decision to with hold certain information pursuant to Exemption 6. As e xplained by Johnathan Rolbin, the Director of Legal Affairs and Law Enforcement Liaison for the Department’s Passport Services Directorate, the Department redacted from the disclosed reco rds the names and signatures of Department employees and the names, birth dates, and places of birth of Wyatt’s then-minor c hildren. Decl. of Johnathan M. Rolbin ¶¶ 5, 9–12. As to the detail s regarding Wyatt’s childre n, the Department concluded that the release of that information “ would reveal private details o f these individuals ’ lives, including when and how these individuals wer e documented as U.S. citizens ” and “other biographical information in which these indivi duals have a privacy interest” but would “shed no light on the operations and activities of t he U.S. government.” Id. ¶ 9. F or the Department employees, it9 was felt that the release of t he redacted information could “su bject them (and their family members) to harassment, violence , or even improper civil judgme nts outside of the workplace.” Id. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶¶ 11–12. For instan ce, Mr. Rolbin expl ains that “Department employees involved in passport adjudicat ion process have been named perso nally in state court lawsuits seeking personal monetary civil judgments” and “have been subje ct to personal threats and harassing communications,” eve n if the employees no longer work for the Department. Id. ¶ 10; see also id. ¶¶ 11–12. As noted above, the Court applies a two-part test to determine the applicability of Exemption 6. See, e.g., Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1228. Fir st, the Court determines whether the information sought to be withheld meets the requirements of “personnel, medical, or ‘similar’ files covered by Exemption 6.” Id. Talbot argues that “[t]he redactions in issue in this case are neither medical nor personnel file s nor are they files similar to medical or personnel files.” Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 25. But he is incorrect in light of the Supreme C ourt’s decision in U.S. Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) , which held that Exemption 6 covers all “information which appl ies to a particular individua l” no matter the type of file it is contained in, id. at 602. The info rmation redacted here—specif ically, the names and signatures of employees and the names, birt h dates and places of birth of Wyatt’s children, Decl. of Johnathan M. Rolbin ¶ 5—clearl y applies to particular individua ls. Talbot next contends that the privacy harms identified by Mr. R olbin are “secondary effects” that are insufficien t to trigger Exemption 6. This ar gument also misses the mark. The D.C. Circuit has recognized tha t the “secondary effects” of a d ocument’s release do not qualify to trigger the applicability of Exemption 6. Arieff v. U.S. De p’t of Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But the types of harms addressed in Arieff a re different; since the records at10 issue there contained no inform ation directly attributable to an individual, id. at 1466, any harm that flowed from their release was distinct from the type of ha rm that could “only occur when the documents disclose information a ttributable to an individual,” id. at 1468. Here the redacted information is attributable to a n individual and the harms that Mr. Rolbin identifi es flow directly from the release of information a ttributable to that individual

. Additionally, Talbot sug gests that the Department’s redactions were inappropriate because it failed to verify that the individuals whose names we re redacted were still alive (and deceased individuals lack a sufficient privacy interest to just ify the application of Exemption 6 in this context). Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 22. But in a supplemental d eclaration, Mr. Rolbi n explains that the Department verified whether the individuals at issue were a live and released additional records for those it concl uded were not. Suppl. Decl. of Johna than M. Rolbin ¶ 4. It made these determinations using human resour ces files, the Social SecurityDeath Matrix File, and a precautionary presumption that individuals born within 100 year s are still alive. Id. The Department’s approach as outlined in this supplemental declarat ion was adequate. See Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 663–65 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that agency that relied on institutional know ledge of life status, searched the Social Security Death Index with individuals’ social security number, and applied a similar 100-year rule adequately attempted to verify whether ind ividuals were still living). Finally, Talbot argues that even if the threshold requirements for Exemption 6 are met, the balance of privacy interests and public interests favors di sclosure here. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 25–26; see Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1228 (the second step fo r determining the applicability of Exemption 6 is a balancing of t he privacy and public interes ts). The Court disagrees. With respect to Wyatt’s children, the disclosure of information regarding “private citizens” which11 “‘reveals little or no thing about an agency’s own conduct’ does not serve a relevant public interest under FOIA.” Consumer s’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 554 F.3d 1046, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2009). T he names, places of birth, and dates of birth of Wyatt’s then-mi nor children—which is what the Department redacted, Decl. of Johnathan M. Rolbin ¶¶ 9, 11—sheds little if any light on the D epartment’s own conduct. The privacy interests of Wyatt’s ch ildren in their personal biograp hical information thus outweigh whatever public interest might e xist in the disclosure of the i nformation. This leaves the redacted names a nd signatures of State Departme nt employees who were involved in processing Wyatt’ s passports. See id. ¶¶ 10–12. T he question is whether the “incremental value of the speci fic information being withheld”— the employees’ names and signatures—would outweigh the emp loyees’ privacy interests. Se e Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 661. It would not. Mr. Rolbin points to s everal legitimate concerns the employees might have about the disclosure of their names , including the possibility of har assment and threats. Decl. of Johnathan M. Rolbin ¶¶ 10–12. These concerns exist even if the particular passport application decisions here are favorable: th e release of the names and sign atures provides a possible target for other members of the public who have received unfavorable d ecisions. While these concerns strike the Court as somewhat att enuated, Talbot points to littl e value that would be gained by knowing the specific civil servan ts involved in the processing of the passports beyond what was already disclosed by the release d redacted records. The Court therefore concludes that the public interest here does notoutweigh the privacy i nterest of the emp loyees. The Department’s redactions under Exem ption 6 were proper.12 3. The April 2016 request Finally, Talbot argues that the Department failed to respond to a separate April 16, 2016 FOIA request that he submitte d. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 19. The De partment responds that it never received this request. Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs .’ Reply”) at 17. If an agency does not receive a FOIA request then it has no obligation to re spond to it. See, e.g., Kanaya v. Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 ( D.D.C. 2018). An agency’s affidavit attesting that it has no record of receiving the requ est will suffice to prevail on summary judgment unless the requester ca n present sufficient evidence t o create a genuine factual question regarding the agency’s recei pt of the request. See, e.g., id.; Pinson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 69 F. Supp. 3d 108, 114 (D.D.C. 2014). Here, Mr. Rolbin attests that the Department searched its case tracking system and found no evidence that the April 2016 r equest was received. Decl. of Johnathan M. Rolbin ¶¶ 13–15. The Department also checked the case file for Talbot’s May 2013 FOIA request and consulted the paralegal who handled tha t request, and similarly found no indication that the April 2016 request was received. Id. ¶ 16. I n turn, Talbot submits a res ponsive declaration from his attorney, Dan L. Hardw ay, attesting that he sent a FOIA request to the Department on April 16, 2016. Decl. of Dan L. Hardway ¶ 4. But as multiple judges in this District have recognized, the mere fact that a plaintiff alleges a request was sent does not indicate the request was received

. See, e.g., Kanaya, 284 F. Supp. 3d at 2–3; Banks v. Lappin, 539 F. Supp. 2d 228, 235 (D.D.C. 2008). Mr. Hardway attaches to his declaration U.S. Postal Service tracking information he claims is for the FOIA request t hat was sent, but this informat ion does not indicate the address or recipient of the request. S ee Decl. of Dan L. Hardway Ex. 5. Moreover, the State Department notes that the package was shown delivered in Washington, D.C., but FOIA requests to the13 Department are to be sent to Ste rling, Virginia. Defs.’ Reply at 18; see also 22 C.F.R. §171.4(a)(1) (directing that reques ts for passport records shou ld be sent to a post office box in Sterling, Virginia). The Court fi nds that Talbot has failed to contradict the State Department’s attestation that it never r eceived his April 2016 request. See , e.g., Ning Ye v. Holder, 624 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D.D.C. 2009) (plainti ff’s attestation that h e mailed FOIA request and submission of tracking informati on that did not show the recipi ent’s name or address failed to overcome agency declaration that it had no record of receiving plaintiff’s request). Summary judgment is therefore appropriate for the State Department as t o Talbot’s claims regarding the April 2016 request.
B. The CIA’s Search and Withholdings In challenging the CIA’s search a nd withholdings, Talbot conten ds that the agency: (1) performed an inadequate search; (2 ) erroneously concluded that its operational files were exempt from disclosure; (3) produced an inadequate Vaughn index; and (4) improperly withheld responsive documents under Exemptions 1, 3, and 6. The Court w ill grant the CIA summary judgment on each aspect of its search and production except for its failure to search its operational files. As to that i ssue, the Court concludes that a subset of potentially responsive records contained in operational files were not categorically e xempt and the CIA must either search its operational files fo r those records or explain why n o such responsive records would be found there.
1. Adequacy of the CIA’s search Beginning with the adequacy of the CIA’s search for records, An toinette B. Shiner, the Information Review Officer at th e CIA’s Litigation Information Review Office, submitted a declaration on behalf of the age ncy outlining its search for re cords. According to Ms. Shiner, the14 CIA determined that the Official Personnel File (“OPF”) for Har vey and Wyatt were likely to contain any responsive records , since such files “contain[], am ong other things, work-related travel records (TDY records) a nd records pertaining to the assi gnment and reassignment of officers throughout their career at the CIA.” Decl. of Antoine tte B. Shiner ¶¶ 21, 23. CIA personnel conducted a search for Wyatt’s and Harvey’s personnel files—a supplemental declaration from Ms. Shiner e xplains this was done by using eac h agent’s name and Agency Identification Number, a unique identifier provided to each CIA employee during their employment. Suppl. Decl. of Ant oinette B. Shiner ¶¶ 7–8. Whil e Harvey’s file was located and processed, the CIA was unable to locate Wyatt’s file. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶¶ 22, 23. The search indicated that Wyatt’ s archived file was requested b y staff from the Office of Human Resources, was never returned t o the records center, and could not be located by the Office of Human Resources in it s own files after tw o searches. Id. ¶ 22; see also Suppl. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 7 (descri bing additional search for Wyat t’s file). Aside from a challenge to the CIA’s failure to search operatio nal files, which the Court will address separately below, Talbot primarily contends that the CIA’s search was inadequate because it overlooked indications that responsive records could be found in other locations. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 33–34. He points to s pecific documents suggesting an assortment of other offices—such as the agency’s Office of Personnel Security—that might have other responsive records. But the CIA is obligat ed to search where records are most likely to be housed today

. As Ms. Shiner explains, in the f ifty plus years that have passe d since the operative dates of Talbot’s request, the CIA has “undergone numerous internal reor ganizations” involving “the creation of new divisions and compo nents and the closure or mer ging of other divisions and components, as well as a corresponding reshuffling of responsib ilities among the various15 divisions within CIA.” Suppl. D ecl. of Antoinett e B. Shiner ¶ 10. Some of the divisions that might have housed records in the 1950s and 1960s no longer do s o or may even no longer exist. Id. Moreover, Ms. Shiner has ex plained that given the age of t he records, any existing records would not be digitized. Id. These are adequate explanations f or why the agency concluded that the hard copies of Harvey’s a nd Wyatt’s personnel files were th e most likely current repository for any existing responsive record s. See Decl. of Antoinette B . Shiner ¶¶ 21, 23; Suppl. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 5. Talbot also argues the search w as inadequate because the CIA w as unable to find the missing Wyatt personnel file and f ailed to detail the steps it took to locate it. Pl.’s Reply Defs.’ Opp’n (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 8. How ever, the declarations provided by Ms. Shiner attest that the CIA division that houses the personnel files contacted the Office o f Human Resources, which conducted a search for Wyatt’s personnel file in December 2015 and again in June 2017. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 22; S uppl. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shi ner ¶ 7. Human Resources searched its own files and had the individual who requested Wya tt’s file search as well. Suppl. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 7. Neither Human Resources nor the requestor nor the division that houses the personnel files c ould locate Wyatt’s file—and g iven its age, no digitization of the file exists. Id.; Decl. of Antoi nette B. Shiner ¶ 22. Shiner’ s declarations sufficiently detail the steps taken to find Wyatt’s mi ssing file and are afforded a pre sumption of good faith. See, e.g., SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200. T albot offers no basis to d iscredit the declarations. The Court therefore concludes that the CIA conducted a reasonable s earch for Wyatt’s file notwithstanding its failure to locate it. In sum, setting asid e the CIA’s failure to search operational files, to which the Court will now turn, the Court concludes that the CIA conducted an adequate search for responsive records.16 2. Search of the CIA’ s operational files Talbot also argues the CIA’s sear ch was inadequate because the agency did not look for any responsive records within its operational f iles. Pl.’s Cro ss-MSJ at 29–31. The CIA responds that operational files—and thus a ny responsive records containe d therein—are categorically exempt from FOIA under the C IA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 314 1. Defs.’ Reply at 5. That statute defines “operational file s” as files that “document the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations or intelligence or security liai son arrangements or information exchanges with foreign government s or their intelligence or sec urity services,” 50 U.S.C. § 3141(b)(1), and generally exempts t hem from disclosure under FOIA, id. § 3141(a); see also Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007). There is an exception, however: the statute goes on to provide that op erational files may still be searched for responsive records that are “the specific subject ma tter of an investigation by the con gressional intelligence committees” or other specifically enumera ted investigative offices conducte d into “any impropriety, or violation of law, Executive order , or Presidentia l directive, i n the conduct of an intelligence activity.” 50 U.S .C. § 3141(c)(3). 2
The D.C. Circuit has laid out a t hree part test to determine if requested records fall under this congressional-investigati on exception to the CIA Informati on Act’s protection. See, e.g., Morley, 508 F.3d at 1116. First, the entity that performed the investigation must qualify as a “congressional intelligence committee” or be one of the other l isted entities in the statute. Id. Second, the request must concern “ the specific subject matter” of the investig ation. Id. at 1117

2 The specifically enumerated offices are: the Intelligence Over sight Board, the Department of Justice, the Offi ce of the General Counsel of the CIA, the Office of Inspector General of the CIA, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c)(3).17 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c)). This requirement is satisfied w hen the investigating entity “would have deemed the records at issue to be central to its in quiry.” Id. at 1118. Finally, the investigation must be one into an “impropriety or violation of law, Executive order, or Presidential directiv e, in the conduct of an intelligence activ ity.” Id. (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c)). Such an investiga tion need not involve misconduct that amounts to illegal behavior. Id. Talbot argues that the records he requests fall under this exem ption because they concern the subject of multiple investigations, namely the Senate Selec t Committee of Intelligence (the “Church Committee”) investigation into plots to overthrow or as sassinate Fidel Castro; a CIA Inspector General investigation i nto the Castro assassination p lot; the Warren Commission investigation into President Ke nnedy’s assassina tion; and the H ouse Select Committee on Assassinations (“HSCA” ) investigation into the Kennedy assassin ation. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 30–
32. Starting with the Church Committ ee, the D.C. Circuit has already held that it meets the first requirement—that it is a “congressional intelligence comm ittee”—and that its inquiry into the CIA’s efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro meets the third r equirement—that it is an investigation into impropriet y or violation of law in the condu ct of an intelligence activity. Morely, 508 F.3d at 1117, 1119. What rem ains, then, is whether the requested records meet the second requirement: whether the Church Committee “would have de emed the records at issue to be central to its inquiry.” Id. at 1118. As to a subset of the requested r ecords, the answer is yes. In1975, William Harvey testified as a witness before the Church Committ ee regarding hi s role from November 1961 to March 1963 in a covert operation di rected at overthrowing the C astro regime dubbed “Operation18 Mongoose” and a related pla n to assassinate Castro. Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Gov’t Operations with Re spect to Intelligence Activities , 94th Cong. 86:21, 105:3–13, 107:20–24, 140:23–24 (1976) (testimony of William K. Harvey). The Committee released an interim report specifically addr essing several CIA planned assa ssinations, including that of Castro, which discussed Harv ey, his testimony, and his role in those operations. See, e.g., Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders , S. Rep. No. 94-465, at 164–65 (1975). Given the Church Committee’s inte rest in Harvey, it seems clear that it would have considered records reflecting h is TDY travel and station or bas e assignments (both subjects of Talbot’s request, see Compl. E x. 6) with respect to the specifi c operations at issue central to its investigation. Indeed, the Committee asked Harvey about his tr avel at the hearing, Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Gov’t Op erations with Respect to Intelligence Activities , 94th Cong. 63:11–13, 66:11–13 (1976) (testimony of William K. Harvey), and discussed trips he took for meetings in the in terim report it released, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders , S. Rep. No. 94-465, at 83–84 (1975) . Thus, the second requir ement of the D.C. Circuit’s three-part test is also met. The Court therefore con cludes that a speci fic, narrow subset of the possible requested record s in operational files—those th at would relate to Operation Mongoose or the Castro assassin ation plots, during the time per iod of November 1961 to June 1963—fall within the exception in 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c) and are n ot categorically exempt from
FOIA. The other investigations that Ta lbot points to do not meet the requirements in 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c) and thus records associ ated with those operations rem ain exempt. For one, the D.C. Circuit has indicated that the House Select Committee on Assass inations does not meet the definition of a congressional inte lligence committee. Morley, 508 F.3d at 1117. As to the19 Warren Commission, while Harvey may have been mentioned in witn ess testimony before the Commission, he was not a witness himself and his name does not seem to appear once in the Commission’s 900-page f inal report. This relative dearth of di scussion about Harvey indicates that any records concerning him we re incidental rather than cen tral to the inve stigation. These additional investigations tha t Talbot points to thus do not suf fice to place any further requested records within the sc ope of 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c). 3 To conclude: because Harvey’s activities and involvement with Operation Mongoose and the Castro assassinati on plots in 1961 to 1963 were central to the Church Committee investigation, any respo nsive records relate d to those operatio ns contained in the agency’s operational files fall withi n 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c) and the CIA must search those files to the extent necessary to conduct an adequate search. However, other record s located withi n operational files remain exempt. The Shiner Declarations suggest t hat the CIA has not considered whether any responsive records would even be found in the operational files discussed above because it believed all records in operational files we re exempt wholesale. See, e.g., Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 24 (“The decision to task HR and foc us the search on Harvey and Wy att’s OPFs was informed by CIA’s knowledge of specific databa ses and/or files—other than o perational files of the CIA which are exempt from the search, review, publication, and disc losure requirements of the FOIA . . .”); Suppl. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 8 (“Again, base d on the CIA’s knowledge of specific databases and/or files , excluding exempt operational f iles, the CIA determined that the

3 Since the Inspector General of the CIA’s investigation into th e Castro assassination plot concerns the same topic as the Church Committee investigation, the Court need not address whether that investigation provide s a separate basis to conclud e that the requested records fall under 50 U.S.C. § 3141(c).20 OPF files were the most likely r epository of the information Pl aintiff sought.”). Consequently, the Court will require the CIA to either search the operational files for the specific universe of non-exempt records—those responsiv e records related to Operatio n Mongoose or the Castro assassination during the per iod of November 1961 to June 1963—o r provide an explanation for why it need not do so to perf orm an adequate search. 4
3. Sufficiency of the Vaughnindex Next, Talbot challenges the sufficiency of the CIA’s Vaughn index. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 34–35; see Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner Ex. L ( Vaughn index). In analyzing a Vaughn index’s sufficiency, the Court’s “focus is on the functions served by the Vaughn index: to organize the withheld documents in a way that facilitates litigant challenge s and court review of the agency’s withholdings.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Thus, the Vaughn index must “adequately describ e each withheld document or delet ion from a released document” and must “state the exemption claimed for each deleti on or withheld document, and explain why the exemption is rele vant.” People for the Am. Way Found. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 503 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294 (D.D.C. 2007) (citation omitted). An agen cy is allowed to use a Vaughn index in conjunction with agency de clarations that more fully d etail the basis for the claimed exemptions. Judicial Watch, 449 F.3d at 148. Here, the Vaughn index includes an entry for ever y withheld or redacted document , and each entry provides the nature of the document ( e.g. , “[m]emorandum regarding reimbursement

4 Counsel for Talbot at the hear ing argued that the CIA had not established that the alleged operational files met th e requirement to be operational files. But Talbot di d not raise this argument in his briefing—in fact, t he case he cited at the hear ing, Judicial Watch v. CIA, 2018 WL 1885665 (D.D.C. April 18, 2018), w as decided after the brief ing was complete and Talbot filed no notice of supplemental authority. As such, the argume nt was forfeited and the Court will not address it.21 of expenses” or “[p]ayroll change notice”); the exemption(s) cl aimed; and a description of the type of information redacted, eith er by listing the specific in formation withheld ( e.g. , “names” or “identifying information”) or r eferencing a category of informa tion described in the Shiner Declarations ( e.g. , “cover” or “coding information” ). The Shiner Declarations, i n turn, explain why these specific categories of information meet the claimed e xemption’s requirements for withholding. See Decl. of Anto inette B. Shiner ¶¶ 29–33. Fina lly, the Court is mindful that many of the redactions involved he re relate to intelligence sou rces and methods, and requiring more thorough explanations—such a s a description of which sourc es and methods are being protected, see Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 39 (faulting the CIA for “pro vid[ing] no information in regard to what sources and methods are s ought to be protected”)—could risk incurring the harm that the FOIA exemptions are designed to avoid. For all these reasons, the Court finds that the CIA’s Vaughn index is sufficient to fulfill its purposes.
4. The CIA’s withholdings Finally, Talbot challenges the CI A’s withholdings. The CIA ass erted withholdings, some in part and some in full, under th ree FOIA exemptions: Exemptio n 1 (for classified information), Exemption 3 (for records exempt from disclosure by statute), an d Exemption 6 (for personal information). The Court conclude s that the CIA ’s withholdings were proper.

a. Exemption 3 The CIA withheld several docum ents in part or in full under Exe mption 3, which applies to records exempted from releas e under FOIA by another statute, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The CIA bases its withholdings on tw o specific statutes: the Centra l Intelligence Agency Act (“CIA Act”) and the National Security A ct. The CIA Act prevents the disclosure of “the organization, functions, names, official titles , salaries, or numbers of pers onnel employed by the Agency.” 5022 U.S.C. § 3507. The National Secur ity Act broadly directs the D irector of National Intelligence to “protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1). Both statutes have been recognized as valid Exem ption 3 statutes. See DiBacco v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 234 F. Supp. 3d 255, 275 (D.D.C. 2017) (CIA Act); CIA v. Simms, 471 U.S. 159, 168 (1985) (National Security Act). The Court will start with the withholdings under the CIA Act. In her declaration, Ms. Shiner states that the agency withheld the “names, titles, iden tification numbers, and information pertaining to the organization (such as office titles) of CIA p ersonnel” under Exemption 3, since such information falls under the CIA Act and its release could subject former intelligence officers and their families to “intimidation or possible physic al harm.” Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 38. Talbot first challenges thes e withholdings on the ground that t he records are not “personnel documents,” Pl.’s Cr oss-MSJ at 39, or “personnel inf ormation,” Pl.’s Reply at 14. This argument is unavailing. The s tatute specifically protects the disclosure of “names, official titles, [and] salaries.” 5 0 U.S.C. § 3507. A perusal of the C IA’s Vaughn index shows this is precisely the type of informa tion it withheld. See, e.g., Decl . of Antoinette B. Shiner Ex. L ( Vaughn index) entry 6 (redacted names of CIA personnel); id. entry 52 (redacted names of personnel and employee ID numbers) ; id. entry 79 (redacted iden tifying information of CIA personnel). That such informati on may not be in a “personnel d ocument” is irrelevant: the statute nowhere says it applies only to names, titles, and sala ries in personnel documents. See, e.g., DiBacco, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 277. Talbot also contends that the CIA Act does not apply to former or deceased employees. Pl.’s Reply at 14. But he cite s no authority for this proposit ion, and the statutory text is to the23 contrary. It protects the names and titles of personnel “ employed by the Agency.” 50 U.S.C. § 3507 (emphasis added). A former or deceased employee was sti ll employed by the CIA. Thus, as other judges in this Distri ct have concluded, the plain text of the statute encompasses names and other information for former or deceased employees. See, e .g., DiBacco, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 277; Hall v. CIA, 881 F. S upp. 2d 38, 66 (D.D.C. 2012). And cl early, the kind of harm that can flow from the disclosure of su ch information—exposing CIA perso nnel and their families to “intimidation or physical harm,” Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 38—is just as capable of occurring to former or deceased employees and their families as to current employees and their families. The CIA has thus justified the withholdings it made under the CIA Act. Second, the CIA made a series of withholdings pursuant to Exemp tion 3 in reliance on the National Security Act. 5 Ms. Shiner’s declaration attests that the CIA withheld inform ation that “concerns intelligence s ources and methods.” Id. ¶¶ 36–37 . It further details the categories of withheld information contained i n the records—foreign liaiso n services, locations of and assignments to permanent oversea s field installations, the use of cover and cover methods, and coding information 6 —and the harms to national securi ty that would flow from disclo sure of such information, including damage to the U.S. government’s relation ship with foreign intelligence partners, and disclosure of the location of clandestine CIA bas es and the agency’s intelligence methods. Id. ¶¶ 28–34.

5 All of the CIA’s Exemption 1 with holdings were also made under Exemption 3 in reliance on the National Security Act. See Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner Ex. L ( Vaughn index). Since the Court concludes that those withholdings were proper u nder Exemption 3, it need not address Exemption 1’ s applicability.

6 Coding information is “informati on that, if connected to other information or placed in the proper context, could revea l the presence of an overseas fi eld installation or the fact that the CIA utilizes a particular cover mechanism.” Decl. of Antoinett e B. Shiner ¶ 33.24 Talbot’s main challenge to the Exemption 3 withholdings is that the text of the National Security Act only prohibits unauthorized disclosures and the CIA has not demonstrated that disclosure here would be unaut horized. Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 39. Talbot notes that much of the relevant information is likely no longer classified because of automatic-declassification provisions for records more than 25 or 50 years old. Id.; see also Pl.’s Reply at 13. “If information has been declassifie d,” he argues, “its disclosure is no longer unauthorized.” Pl.’s Reply at 13. This argument is unavailing. Tal bot cites no authority for the proposition that simply because information is not classified, any disclosure of that information pursuant to a FOIA request is authorized. This is not surprising. For one, the m ere fact that information is not classified does not mean that disc losure of that information is automatically authorized. For another, Talbot’s argument woul d vitiate the scope of the Natio nal Security Act’s protection under Exemption 3: if the disclo sure of unclassified informati on pursuant to a valid FOIA request is necessarily authori zed, then any protection accorded by the National Security Act under Exemption 3 would be co-exte nsive with Exemption 1’s prot ection for classified information. Finally—and most importantly—the statutory text does not compor t with Talbot’s interpretation that declassification autom atically makes any di sclosure authorized. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “Co ngress [did not] state that on ly confidential or nonpublic intelligence sources are protected. [The statute] contains no such limiting language.” Sims, 471 U.S. at 169; see also Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 762 (D.C . Cir. 1990) (“[T]he fact that the District Court at one point conc luded that certain contacts bet ween CIA and the foreign officials were ‘nonsensitive’ does not help Fitzgibbon because apparentlyinnocuous information can be25 protected and withheld.”). U ltimately, the question the Court confronts here is whether the information at issue would disclose intelligence methods and so urces. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 865 (D.C. C ir. 2009) (the inquiry under Exemption 3 for the National Security Act is “whether the withheld material relates to intel ligence sources and methods.”). Ms. Shiner’s declarations ade quately attest that it would. See Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶¶ 28–33, 37; Suppl. Decl. of Antoi nette B. Shiner ¶¶ 16–17. b. Exemption 6 In addition to the withholdings under Exemption 3, Talbot chall enges the withholdings the CIA made under Exemption 6. According to Ms. Shiner, the C IA withheld the “names and personally identifiable inform ation of CIA officers and other i ndividuals found in the responsive records” under Exemption 6. Decl. of Antoinette B. Shiner ¶ 39 . She explains that “the release of names and other identifying i nformation would be reasonably likely to subject individuals or those associated with them to i ncreased harassment or threats.” Id. Talbot makes the same arguments as to these withholding s as he does to the State Depa rtment’s Exemption 6 withholdings. See Pl.’s Cross- MSJ at 40. For the reasons disc ussed above as to the State Department’s Exemption 6 withholdings, the Court concludes thes e withholdings were proper.
C. Segregability Finally, Talbot challenges the ag encies’ compliance with the re quirement to release any “reasonably segregable portion of a record,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 9). Pl.’s Cross-MSJ at 40–42. “Agencies are entitled to a presumption that they complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable material .” Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv ., 494 F.3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Ms. Shiner attests th at the CIA conducted a segreg ability review and released all reasonably segregable records. D ecl. of Antoinett e B. Shiner ¶ 40. Mr. Rolbin similarly attests26 that the State Department rel eased all reasonably segregable in formation. Decl. of Johnathan M. Rolbin ¶¶ 9–12. The burden is on T albot to proffer contrary ev idence to rebut the applicable presumption. See Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1117 (discussing s tandards to rebut this p resumption). He has not done so, and, conseque ntly, his challenge to the CIA ’s response on this basis fails.

* * * For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant in part and den y in part the agencies’ motion for summary judgment a nd deny Talbot’s cross-motion. Itwill grant the agencies summary judgment except as to th e State Department’s search for passport records under Harvey’s pseudonyms and the CIA’s search of the operational fil es. On these two points, the Court will deny both motions withou t prejudice and require the State Department to conduct a supplemental search and the CIA to either do the same or justif y why no such search is needed. A separate Order shall accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge Date: June 7, 2018