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Filed 1/5/24 In re M.W. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.W., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

E081918

(Super.Ct.No. J291700)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County Counsel for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
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The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of J.B. (Mother) to her son, 

M.W. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)1 Mother contends the juvenile court 

erred by (1) not expressly stating, on the record, its analysis of the evidence pertaining

to the parent-child benefit exception to terminating parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. 

(c)(1)(B)(i); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632 (Caden C.)); and (2) not finding 

in favor of Mother on the parent-child benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). 

We affirm.

DISCUSSION

A. LACK OF AN EXPRESS ANALYSIS

The parent-child benefit exception to terminating parental rights applies when 

“[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child 

would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In 

Caden C., our Supreme Court wrote, “As to the second element, courts assess whether 

‘the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. 

(c)(1)(B)(i).) Again here, the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by 

a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in 

the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent 

and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) 

At the hearing to terminate parental rights, Mother’s attorney urged the juvenile 

court to apply the parent-child benefit exception to termination. When describing the 

1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
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second element—whether M.W. would benefit from continuing the relationship with 

Mother—Mother’s attorney explained some of the factors within that element: “the age 

of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent with the parent in her custody, and the 

child’s particular needs.” Mother’s attorney asserted that M.W. spent the majority of 

his life with Mother—four out of six years. 

In response, M.W.’s attorney argued in favor of terminating parental rights. 

M.W.’s attorney said, “The parents have both cited Caden C.” M.W.’s attorney 

contended Mother’s visits were detrimental to M.W. in that M.W. engaged in negative 

behaviors for several days after visits with Mother.

San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department) argued 

that Mother “met the first prong of Caden C.” by regularly visiting M.W. but “that’s the 

only prong that she meets.” The Department continued, “[I]n regards to the second 

prong of Caden C. it states that the children have [a] substantial, positive emotional 

attachment to [the] parents. The kind implying that he would benefit from continuing 

that relationship.” The Department argued that M.W.’s poor behavior at school for 

several days after visits with Mother “can negatively affect him in his future so . . . that 

prong is not met.” 

The Department explained that the third step in the parent-child benefit analysis 

is balancing the detriment to M.W. of terminating parental rights against the benefit to 

M.W. of adoption. The Department contended that M.W. is young, at six years old, and 

he would greatly benefit from 12 years in a stable adoptive home. 
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After the attorneys finished their arguments, the juvenile court said, “The Court 

finds termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to [M.W.] and there’s no 

exception to .2[6](c)(1) so the Court will grant the order of terminating parental rights.” 

The juvenile court did not state its reasons for finding that the parent-child benefit 

exception did not apply. However, given that the attorneys’ arguments were focused on 

Caden C., it is reasonable to infer that the juvenile court found Mother did not satisfy 

the Caden C. factors. 

Mother contends, “because the juvenile court failed to (1) address the elements 

and factors articulated in Caden C., (2) explain the factual basis for its findings, 

(3) engage in any subtle analysis of [M.W.’s] emotional attachment to his mother, it is 

impossible for this reviewing Court to affirm the findings and order terminating parental 

rights.” 

In her appellant’s reply brief, Mother concedes that there is no authority 

requiring the juvenile court to state its analysis on the record. However, Mother 

contends that without an expressly stated analysis, “it is difficult, if not impossible, to 

ascertain whether the [juvenile] court relied on impermissible factors.” Mother’s 

argument would be better presented to the Legislature. Mother is correct that one can 

better review the process when the trial court “shows its work,” i.e., expressly states its 

reasoning. However, as Mother concedes, the law does not require the juvenile court to 

state on the record its reasons for rejecting a parent’s argument for an exception to 

termination. Therefore, while a statement of reasons would be the best practice, it is not 

reversible error to omit a statement of reasons. 
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B. FINDING THAT THE EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY

Mother asserts that she should have prevailed under a Caden C. analysis, i.e., 

Mother asserts substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding. 

Mother urges this court to follow In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 77, in which the 

appellate court wrote, “The standard is whether the children benefit from Mother’s 

presence in their lives, not whether they could eventually be happy without her.” For 

the sake of addressing Mother’s argument, we will apply the foregoing benefit standard. 

“ ‘We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the 

existence of a beneficial parental relationship.” (Id. at p. 76.)

M.W. was removed from Mother’s custody in December 2021 due to Mother’s 

boyfriend physically abusing M.W.; Mother and M.W.’s father having engaged in 

domestic violence in the presence of M.W.; Mother’s drug abuse negatively impacting 

her child care; and M.W.’s half sibling “sustaining an orbital fracture, a skull fracture to 

the left of his forehead, and black and blue bruising to the face.” 

In February 2023, the Department reported that M.W. was “receiving mental 

health services . . . to address outburst[s], verbal aggression and nightmares. The [foster 

parent] shares that the child has decreased these behaviors and that therapy treatments 

have further decreased [them].” In June 2023, the Department wrote in its report, 

“[M.W.’s foster mother] reported that [M.W.] will have a different attitude, he will not 

listen, and he tends to get into trouble at school for two to three days after the visits

[with Mother].” Mother’s parental rights to M.W. were terminated in August 2023. 
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The foregoing is substantial evidence supporting the finding that Mother’s 

relationship with M.W. had a negative effect on M.W. because he suffered nightmares 

and had aggressive behaviors following his time with her, which improved during his 

time in foster care. M.W. regressed after visiting Mother. The evidence reflects that 

Mother was not a beneficial presence in M.W.’s life. Accordingly, substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s determination that the parent-child benefit exception does 

not apply in this case. 

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

FIELDS

J.