alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Josh Coleman v. The State.

No. 2437.

Decided November 6, 1901.

Murder—Conviction and New Trial—New Indictment.

Where, on the first indictment, defendant was acquitted of murder in the first degree and convicted of murder in the second degree, and a new trial was-granted upon his motion, whereupon a second indictment was brought against him; Held, that upon the second indictment he could legally be tried and convicted of murder in the second degree; and his former acquittal of murder in the first degree was no bar to his second prosecution and conviction for murder in the second degree.

Appeal from the District Court of Freestone. Tried below before Hon. L. B. Cobb.

Appeal from a conviction of murder in the second degree; penalty, fifteen years imprisonment in the penitentiary.

The indictment charged defendant with the murder of John H. Burleson, on the 39th day of October, 1900, by shooting him with a pistol.

*Boyd, Compton & Anderson,*for appellant.

*RoVt A. John,*Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and his punishment assessed at fifteen years confinement in the penitentiary.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bill of exceptions. It may be inferred from the charge of the court that appellant, at a previous term of the court, had been convicted of murder in the second degree, and new trial awarded; that, subsequent to this, a new indictment had been preferred, and this conviction was predicated on the second indictment. Appellant’s contention is, under this character of case, that he could not be convicted of any grade of homicide; that the prior acquittal of murder in the first degree barred all further prosecution for any character of homicide growing out of the transaction. We can not "agree to this proposition. It is true he could not be convicted of murder in the first degree, because he had been once *281acquitted of that offense, but that did not bar the prosecution for murder in the second degree, when the new trial was granted at the request of appellant. It would make no difference whether it was under the old indictment or the new that the subsequent trial was had.

It is also contended that the indictment does not show it was presented by the grand jury into the district court. This contention is not borne out by the record; in fact, the record shows the contrary. As the record is before us, the conviction was proper. The judgment is affirmed.

*Affirmed.*

Brooks, Judge, absent.
From: GORDONYTH@aol.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:37:41 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Gordon Gathright

Hastings, MN 55033
From: dcurtis6@earthlink.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 1:46:58 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Don Curtis

Long Beach, CA 90807
* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 27, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-60448 Summary Calendar

KASSA WOLDEMARIAM LEMMA, Petitioner,

versus JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A77 893 067
Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM: * Kassa Woldemariam Lemma challenges the decision of the Board of Immigr ation Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA’s finding that Lemma failed to establish eligibility for asylum is supported by the requisite substa ntial evidence.
See Mikhael v. INS , 115 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1997); Faddoul v.2

INS , 37 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir. 1994). And, because Lemma is not eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of removal. S ee F addoul , 37 F.3d at 188. Moreover,
Lemma failed to exhaust his claim for relief under the CAT, therefore this court is without jurisdiction to consider it. See Wang v. Ashcroft , 260 F.3d 448, 452-53 (5th Cir. 2001).
Lemma’s claim that the IJ erred in excluding evidence under 8
C.F .R. §§ 3.33 and 287.6 (certification of foreign documents and
trans lations) fails because he has not demonstrated substantial prejudice as a result of the exclusion. S ee Molina v. Sewell , 983
F .2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1993). His claim that his due process rights were violated by such exclusion under 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(b) fails for the same reason. S ee Anwar v. INS , 116 F.3d 140, 14 4 (5th Cir. 1997).
DENIED
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-40225

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ARMANDO ARMENDARIZ-MORENO, also known as Armando Moreno-Ortiz

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:06-CR-1029-ALL

Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Armando Armendariz-Moreno (Armendariz) pleaded guilty to illegal

reentry after deportation and after having been convicted of an aggravated

felony.

On appeal, Armendariz challenges the district court’s characterization of

his prior Texas conviction of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle as an

aggravated felony for sentencing purposes. Armendariz concedes that this issue

is foreclosed, but he nevertheless seeks to preserve it for Supreme Court review

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 12, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-40225

2

in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).

As Armendariz concedes, this issue is foreclosed. See Brieva-Perez v. Gonzales,

482 F.3d 356, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169

F.3d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1999).

In light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), Armendariz also

challenges the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)’s treatment of prior felony

and aggravated felony convictions as sentencing factors rather than elements of

the offense that must be found by a jury. This court has held that this issue is

“fully foreclosed from further debate.” United States v. Pineda-Arrellano, 492

F.3d 624, 625 (5th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Aug. 28, 2007) (No. 07-6202).

AFFIRMED.
Order entered October 1, 2021

In The 

### Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05

- 21

- 00557

- CR
ARIEL DANIEL ERIVES , Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 380

- 85054

- 2019

O RDER On July 9 , 2021, appellant requested official court reporter Karla Kimbrell to

prepare the reporter ’ s record in th is appeal . That record was due on August 24 , 2021. When i t was not filed, we not ified M s. Kimbrell by po stcard dated August
26 , 2021 and directed her to file the reporter ’ s record by September 25 , 2021. To
date , the reporter ’ s record has not been filed and we have had no communication
from Ms. Kimbrell

.We ORDER court repor ter Karla Kimbrell to file the comple t e r epor ter ’ s
record in this appe al within T HIRTY DAYS of the date of t his order.
We DIRECT th e Clerk t o s end copies of this order to the Honorable Benjamin Smith , Pres iding Judg e, 380th Judicial D istr ict Court; Karl a Kimbrell , official court reporter , 380th Judicial District Cou rt; and couns el fo r all pa rties.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE
Befoke the Third DIVISION,

January 5, 1967

No. P67/5.

#### United China & Glass Co. *v.*United States,

protests 63/11984, etc. (Baltimore).

Dandis, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise covered by the foregoing protests consists of cups and saucers similar in all material respects to those the subject of *W. Kay Company, Inc.*v. *United States*(53 Cust. Ct. 130, C.D. 2484), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
Coös,

Dec. 2, 1914.

#### Arthur C. Harvey Co. *v.*Peter E. Lemieux.

Assumpsit. Trial by the court and verdict for the plaintiffs for five dollars. Transferred from the April term, 1913, of the superior court on a bill of exceptions allowed by *Pike,*J.

In September, 1911, the defendant ordered of the plaintiffs four iron beams of a specified length for use in the construction of a building. The plaintiffs sent beams which were two feet shorter than the order specified and were notified by the defendant that he would not accept them. The plaintiffs thereupon admitted that *592the beams were not of the length ordered and that the defendant was not bound to accept them, and also requested him to hold them for a while. A small plate which came with the beams was used by the defendant with the plaintiffs’ consent. The plaintiffs undertook to furnish beams of the required length. As they did not do so in a reasonable time, the defendant cancelled the order, brought an action against the plaintiffs for damages caused by their breach of contract, and attached the beams. That suit is still pending. The verdict was for the plate above mentioned.

The plaintiffs excepted to the verdict found for them on the ground that it was too small, and also to the refusal of the court to find a verdict for the value of the beams.

*Ovide J. Coulombe*(by brief and orally), for the plaintiffs.

*Matthew J. Ryan,*for the defendant.

Walker, J.

As the beams did not conform to the specifications in a material respect, the defendant was justified in refusing to accept them; and as the plaintiffs, upon notice from the defendant that the beams were too short, admitted the defendant was not bound to accept them and requested him to hold them, it is too clear for argument that they remained the property of the plaintiffs, and-as such they were subject to attachment. It follows that the verdict limiting the plaintiffs’ damages to five dollars, the value of the plate which the defendant used with the plaintiffs’ consent, is amply supported by the facts.

*Exception overruled.*

All concurred.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                               2
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                          0
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                         60,283
<ALLOWANCE>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  61,526
<DEPOSITS>                                           0
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                 16
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     30,250
<COMMON>                                        30,250
<OTHER-SE>                                       1,010
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  61,526
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  1,021
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                    0
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                    17
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                 1,038
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,038
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                     46
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    992
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         992
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       992
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     9.81
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     9.81
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.41
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     0
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00097-CV

AZZ Incorporated and AZZ Group, 

L.P.

v.

Michael Coleman Morgan; Boyce 

Galvanizing, LLC; and Big Spring 

Holdings, LLC

§

§

§

§

From the 67th District Court

of Tarrant County (067-257747-12)

April 9, 2015

Opinion by Justice Walker

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

It is further ordered that appellant AZZ Incorporated and AZZ Group, L.P. 

shall pay all of the costs of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By _/s/ Sue Walker____________________

 Justice Sue Walker
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Adopted Pursuant To
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, John L. Coker, Vice President, Finance and Administration and Chief
Financial Officer of BioReliance Corporation (the Corporation), certify,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
that:

(1)  the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Corporation for the period
September 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.

/s/ John L. Coker
John L. Coker
Senior Vice President, Finance and Administration,
Chief Financial Officer, Secretary and Treasurer
November 14, 2003

37
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-20464

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LAZARO MORENO,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-95-CR-142-22

--------------------

April 11, 2002

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lazaro Moreno appeals from his sentence for conspiring to

possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of

marijuana. Moreno contends that his sentence violated Apprendi

v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because his indictment did

not allege a specific amount of marijuana or a range of amounts

of marijuana. The Government contends that Moreno waived his

Apprendi contention by waiving his right to appeal his sentence

and that Moreno’s Apprendi contention is unavailing on its

merits.
No. 01-20464

-2-

Even without the waiver, Moreno’s appeal has no merit. 

There was no Apprendi violation in the case. Moreno’s indictment

alleged that he had conspired to possess with intent to

distribute 1,000 or more kilograms of marijuana; Moreno’s offense

carried a statutory penalty range of ten years’ to life

imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Moreno’s sentence

of life imprisonment was within that statutory range. See United

States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,

531 U.S. 1182 (2001).

AFFIRMED.
From: hoffman@huntel.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 1:14:18 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Bonnie Hoffman

Wakefield, NE 68784