Supreme Court

No. 2013-203-M.P. 

(P1/82-500A) 

 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before 

publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are 

requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of 

Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 

02903, at Telephone 222-3258 of any typographical or 

other formal errors in order that corrections may be made 

before the opinion is published. 

State :

v. :

Anthony Parrillo. :

May 3, 2017
- 1 -

Supreme Court

No. 2013-203-M.P.

(P1/82-500A)

(Dissent begins on page 18)

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. 

O P I N I O N

Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. This Court issued a writ of certiorari to 

review a Superior Court order denying the state’s request to adjudge Anthony Parrillo a 

probation violator. The hearing justice’s decision to deny the state’s request was based 

upon his finding that Parrillo was no longer on probation at the time that he allegedly 

committed the offense of felony assault. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we 

vacate the order of the Superior Court and remand the case for further proceedings. 

I

Facts and Procedural History

The pertinent facts in this case are not in dispute. In March 1982, Parrillo was 

charged with two separate counts of murder. Later that year, a Superior Court jury found 

him guilty of murder in the first degree on count 1 of the indictment and guilty of murder 

in the second degree on count 2 of the indictment. Parrillo appealed to this Court, and in 

1984 we vacated the judgment of conviction. State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1359 (R.I. 

State :

v. :

Anthony Parrillo. :
- 2 -

1984).1 The case was remanded to the Superior Court where, on January 21, 1986, 

Parrillo pled guilty to two counts of second-degree murder. Significantly, per the 

judgment of conviction and commitment, he was sentenced to thirty years, the first 

twenty years to serve with “the remaining 10 years * * * suspended, probation for 10 

years, said probation to commence upon [Parrillo’s] release from the [Adult Correctional 

Institutions (ACI)], each count concurrent.”

2

On December 22, 1993, after receiving what appear to be credits for time served 

pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 12-19-2

3

and for good behavior pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 42-56-

24,

4

Parrillo was released from the ACI on parole. According to an affidavit by Parrillo, 

 

1 Although the 1984 case caption was spelled State v. Parillo, Parrillo appears to be the 

correct spelling and is used herein.

2 A transcript of the sentencing hearing was not before the Superior Court at the 

probation violation hearing, nor is one before this Court. 

3 General Laws 1956 § 12-19-2(a) provides, in relevant part, that “if the punishment to be 

imposed is imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed shall be reduced by the 

number of days spent in confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting sentencing 

* * *.”

4 General Laws 1956 § 42-56-24, as amended by P.L. 1976, ch. 290, § 1, in effect in 1986 

provided:

“The assistant director of adult services shall keep a record 

of the conduct of each prisoner, and for each month that a 

prisoner who has been sentenced to imprisonment for six

(6) months or more and not under sentence to 

imprisonment for life appears by such record to have 

faithfully observed all the rules and requirements of the 

institutions and not to have been subjected to discipline, 

there shall, with the consent of the director of the 

department of corrections or his designee, upon 

recommendation to him [or her] by the assistant director of 

adult services be deducted from the term or terms of 

sentence of such prisoner the same number of days that 

there are years in the said term of his [or her] sentence; 

provided that when the sentence is for a longer term than 

ten (10) years, only ten (10) days shall be deducted for one

(1) month’s good behavior; and provided, further, that in 

the case of sentences of at least six (6) months and less than 
- 3 -

on or about October 25, 1999, he was advised by his parole officer that his parole was 

terminated and that his ten-year term of probation began as of that date. Ten years passed 

without incident, and the Department of Corrections (DOC) informed Parrillo, in writing,

that his “file ha[d] expired on [October 24, 2009,]” and that “[a]ccording to available 

records as of [that] date, [his] probation ha[d] been terminated * * *.” This information 

was conveyed in a letter, dated December 14, 2009, under the letterhead of the “Adult 

Probation and Parole” unit of the DOC and signed by Donna Broccoli, “[a]dministrative 

[o]fficer” (2009 letter). Parrillo thereafter had no contact with the probation department. 

On December 17, 2011, Parrillo was arrested as a result of a physical altercation 

that occurred at Club 295, a nightclub located on Atwells Avenue in Providence (2011 

 

one (1) year, one (1) day per month shall be so deducted; 

and provided, further, that for purposes of computing the 

number of days to be deducted for good behavior, 

consecutive sentences shall be counted as a whole sentence; 

and provided, further, that for every day a prisoner shall be 

shut up or otherwise disciplined for bad conduct, as 

determined by the assistant director of adult services 

subject to the authority of the director, there shall be 

deducted one (1) day from the time he [or she] shall have 

gained for good conduct; and provided, further, that the 

assistant director of adult services subject to the authority 

of the director, shall have the power to restore such lost 

good conduct time in whole or in part upon a showing by 

the prisoner of subsequent good behavior and disposition to 

reform; and provided, further, for each month that a 

prisoner who has been sentenced to imprisonment for six

(6) months or more and not under sentence to 

imprisonment for life who has faithfully engaged in 

institutional industries there shall, with the consent of the 

director, upon the recommendations to him [or her] of the 

assistant director of adult services be deducted from the

term or terms of sentence of such prisoner an additional 

two (2) days a month. Said two (2) days a month shall be 

deducted regardless of the length of the sentence of said

prisoner.”
- 4 -

incident). He was later charged with two counts of felony assault, conspiracy to commit 

felony assault, and simple assault as a result of the 2011 incident.

5

 In addition, on 

January 9, 2012, the state filed a probation violation report pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the

Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.

6

The state maintained that Parrillo had

failed to “keep the peace and be of good behavior” and that, as a consequence, he should 

be adjudged a violator. 

Parrillo objected to the state’s Rule 32(f) violation report and filed a request to be 

discharged from probation, to which the state objected. He sought a dismissal of the Rule 

32(f) violation report on the grounds that “he was no longer on probation at the time of 

either the alleged conduct or the filing of the violation notice, but instead that his 

probation expired some time before that.” Parrillo attested that he “believed that [his] 

probation should have ended at the earliest on December 20, 2003, but in any event [he] 

 

5 After a jury-waived trial before a Superior Court justice, Parrillo was convicted of 

aiding and abetting one felony assault and of misdemeanor assault. The other felony 

assault and the conspiracy counts were dismissed. A notice of appeal was filed on April 

19, 2016. 

6 At the time, Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provided 

that:

“The court shall not revoke probation or revoke a 

suspension of sentence or impose a sentence previously 

deferred except after a hearing at which the defendant shall 

be afforded the opportunity to be present and apprised of 

the grounds on which such action is proposed. The 

defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing. 

Prior to the hearing the State shall furnish the defendant 

and the court with a written statement specifying the 

grounds upon which action is sought under this 

subdivision.”

In 2016, Rule 32(f) was amended to include that “[n]o revocation shall occur unless the 

[s]tate establishes by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached a 

condition of his/her probation or deferred sentence or failed to keep the peace or remain 

on good behavior.”
- 5 -

was not on probation after October 24, 2009,” and that he “conducted [him]self at all 

times as though [he] was not on probation.” He claimed that he had relied on the 

language used by the sentencing justice, i.e., that his ten-year probationary term would 

“commence upon [his] release from the ACI,” in addition to the DOC letter that

informed him that his probation had terminated on October 24, 2009—ten years after his 

release from parole. He also argued, seemingly in the alternative, that the state should be 

barred from seeking to revoke his probation because to hold otherwise would constitute a 

violation of his due-process rights. 

A violation hearing was held on November 2, 2012, at which time Parrillo argued

that he was not “subject to being violated because his probation ha[d] already terminated” 

in 2009. He maintained that it was “inconceivable” that the state could inform Parrillo

that his probation had ended, and then, years later, attempt to adjudge him a probation 

violator. In response, the state maintained its position that Parrillo was in fact on 

probation at the time of the 2011 incident. Specifically, the state claimed that Parrillo’s 

thirty-year sentence in 1986 meant that he would “finish serving the full term of his 

sentence on January 22, 2016.” 

The hearing justice disagreed with the state and quashed the Rule 32(f) violation 

report. The hearing justice rejected Parrillo’s argument that the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel barred the state from seeking to adjudge him a violator, reasoning that “the 

probation officer had no authority to modify [the sentence],” and that it was “absurd to 

even attempt to apply the detrimental reliance [analysis] in the context of the facts of this 

case.” However, the hearing justice held that the language of § 12-19-8 was clear in that 

it granted the sentencing justice the authority to set the period of probation. Therefore, he 
- 6 -

concluded that the sentencing justice’s specification that probation would “commence 

upon [Parrillo’s] release from the ACI” should be given effect.7 An order entered 

denying the state’s request that Parrillo be adjudged a probation violator. 

The state subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and, on April 5, 2013, its 

motion was heard.8 The hearing justice explained that his decision to deny and dismiss 

the Rule 32(f) violation report was based on what he felt was “the only evidence of the 

intent of the sentencing judge”—the clear language of the judgment of conviction that 

articulated that the probationary term would “commence upon [Parrillo’s] release from 

the ACI.” The hearing justice further explained that “[t]he [sentencing] judge could have 

sentenced [Parrillo] to 30 years, 20 to serve, with the balance of the term suspended and 

[Parrillo] placed on probation for that period of time[,] [but] [h]e did not.” Therefore, the 

hearing justice denied the state’s motion to reconsider. The state thereafter filed a 

petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on May 27, 2014. 

II

Standard of Review

“This Court’s review ‘on writ of certiorari is limited to examining the record to 

determine if an error of law has been committed.’” Huntley v. State, 63 A.3d 526, 530

(R.I. 2013) (quoting State v. Shepard, 33 A.3d 158, 163 (R.I. 2011)). “Questions of law 

* * * are not binding upon the [C]ourt and may be reviewed to determine what the law is 

and its applicability to the facts.” Id. at 530-31 (quoting Shepard, 33 A.3d at 163). “We 

 

7

The hearing justice did not specify if, in his view, the probation began upon Parrillo’s 

release from the ACI or upon his completion of parole, but the hearing justice did find 

that regardless of the operative date, at the time of the 2011 incident, Parrillo was not on 

probation. 

8 We agree with the hearing justice that our Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure

provide no avenue for such a motion. Nevertheless, the hearing justice entertained the 

motion. 
- 7 -

reverse only when we find pursuant to the petition that the [hearing justice] committed an 

error of law.” Id. (quoting Shepard, 33 A.3d at 163). On certiorari, “[w]e do not weigh 

the evidence.” Kedy v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 946 A.2d 1171, 1177 (R.I. 2008). “If 

legally competent evidence exists to support th[e] determination, we will affirm it unless 

one or more errors of law have so infected the validity of the proceedings as to warrant 

reversal.” Id. (quoting Cullen v. Town Council of Lincoln, 893 A.2d 239, 244 (R.I. 

2006)).

III

Discussion

We first address the question of whether, as a matter of law, Parrillo was on 

probation at the time of the 2011 incident. To do so, we must delve into the governing 

statutory provisions and our jurisprudence interpreting such provisions, most recently 

pronounced in Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903 (R.I. 2014). If Parrillo was indeed on 

probation at that time, then we must determine if the hearing justice committed an error 

of law in rejecting Parrillo’s equitable estoppel defense against the state.

A

Parrillo’s Thirty-Year Sentence

The determination of whether Parrillo was on probation at the time of the 2011 

incident turns on the application and interplay of several statutory provisions, the first of 

which is § 12-19-8. Section 12-19-8(a) provides, in relevant part, that the sentencing 

court “may impose a sentence and suspend the execution of the sentence, in whole or in 

part, or place the defendant on probation without the imposition of a suspended 

sentence[,]” and that such “suspension shall place the defendant on probation for the time 
- 8 -

and on any terms and conditions that the court may fix.” We have interpreted § 12-19-8 

as granting a sentencing justice a wide range of discretion when imposing a sentence so 

long as that sentence does not conflict with any other statutory provision. See Rose, 92 

A.3d at 909. Next at play are §§ 42-56-24 and 12-19-2(a). Section 42-56-24 authorizes

the DOC to mitigate a defendant’s sentence by rewarding a prisoner’s good behavior and 

industriousness with credits towards his or her sentence (herein, good-time credits);

meanwhile, § 12-19-2(a) requires that “if the punishment to be imposed [at sentencing] is 

imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed shall be reduced by the number of days 

spent in confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting sentencing” (herein, timeserved credit). This Court’s recent decision in Rose, 92 A.3d at 907-13, dealt with the 

interplay of these statutory provisions in light of a mandatory-minimum sentence.

In Rose, 92 A.3d at 907, this Court was tasked with deciding “[w]hat effect, if 

any, [did the defendant’s] credits for (1) good time and (2) time served have on the total 

length of his sentence[.]” Alexander Rose (Rose) had pled nolo contendere to one count 

of first-degree child molestation and was sentenced to twenty years—the mandatory 

minimum at that time pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.2.

9 Rose, 92 A.3d at 905. At the 

sentencing hearing, the Superior Court justice stated that: “the defendant [was] sentenced 

to 20 years at the ACI, eight years to serve, credit retroactive to December 23, 1992, the 

balance, 12 years, suspended, and upon release the defendant is placed on 12 years 

probation.” Id. Rose was subsequently released from the ACI on parole on December 17, 

1997, as a result of receiving time-served and good-behavior credits. Id. at 905-06. In 

July 1999, Rose completed his parole without incident and, in 2010, he filed a petition for 

 

9 General Laws 1956 § 11-37-8.2 has since then been amended to a twenty-five-year 

mandatory minimum sentence. See P.L. 2006, ch. 206, § 3.
- 9 -

a writ of habeas corpus and an application for post-conviction relief—specifically

requesting to be discharged from probation. Id. at 906. Rose asserted that his 

probationary period ended in July 2011—twelve years after his successful completion of 

parole.10 Rose relied on the sentencing justice’s assertion at sentencing that his twelveyear probationary term would commence “upon release” from the ACI. Id. at 908. 

In our opinion affirming the dismissal of Rose’s petition, this Court analyzed the

language of § 42-56-24’s good-time credits. Rose, 92 A.3d at 907-11. We held that the 

plain language of the good-time-credit statute suggested that the “only form of mitigation 

contemplated in that provision [was] a reduction of the amount of time that a defendant 

must spend incarcerated.” Id. at 908. Thus, any mitigation of Rose’s sentence under § 

42-56-24 did not change or reduce his twenty-year sentence, but instead reduced the time 

that he would be confined at the ACI. See Rose, 92 A.3d at 908. In response to Rose’s 

argument that he relied on the statements made by the sentencing justice that he would be 

on probation for twelve years “upon release from the ACI,” we acknowledged that:

“Although we have previously interpreted § 12-19-8 as 

affording a trial justice the discretion to determine when a 

prisoner’s term of probation will commence, * * * we have 

also held that a sentencing justice’s pronouncement about 

the commencement of probation will not be given effect to 

the extent that it conflicts with another statutory provision.

 “* * * [W]e conclude[d] that there [was] no authority 

which would allow the sentencing justice’s words to 

effectively reduce the total length of Rose’s sentence below 

the mandatory minimum.” Rose, 92 A.3d at 908, 909.

In analyzing time-served credits pursuant to § 12-19-2(a), we held that although 

Rose “intellectualized [his] situation differently than the defendant” in State v. 

 

10 In his filings, Rose had also argued that his probation ended on December 17, 2009—

twelve years after the date of his release from the ACI on parole. Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 

903, 906 (R.I. 2014). At oral argument, he abandoned this position. Id. at 907.
- 10 -

Bergevine, 883 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 2005) (mem.), in essence Rose sought the same outcome 

that this Court rejected in Bergevine, i.e.,—that Rose’s probation start and end date be 

dated back due to the fifteen-month credit that he received for time served. Rose, 92 A.3d 

at 912. In Bergevine, we decisively rejected the defendant’s argument that he was not on 

probation at the time of an alleged probation violation because the approximate ninemonth time-served credit made his ten-year sentence, including his probation, retroactive.

Bergevine, 883 A.2d at 1158-59. Accordingly, we concluded in Rose, as had the hearing 

justice, that “neither Rose’s credits for good time nor his credits for time served entitled 

him to an acceleration of the end date of his probationary term.” Rose, 92 A.3d at 912. 

In the case under review, the state argues that this Court should apply Rose and, 

in view of its holding, reverse the hearing justice’s decision and his finding that Parrillo

was not on probation at the time of the 2011 incident. The state also argues that any 

attempt to distinguish Rose from this case lacks merit. In response, and in support of 

Parrillo’s assertion that he was not on probation at the time of the 2011 incident, Parrillo

raises three key arguments. First, he argues that Rose is inapplicable to his case, as Rose

relied heavily on State v. Jacques, 554 A.2d 193 (R.I. 1989),11 and State v. Dantzler, 690 

A.2d 338 (R.I. 1997),12 two cases that were decided after Parrillo’s 1986 sentencing. 

Second, Parrillo argues that even if Rose is applicable, it is distinguishable from his case,

as Rose dealt with a mandatory minimum sentence and whether the words of a sentencing 

justice, together with both the defendant’s good-time and time-served credits, could in 

 

11 In State v. Jacques, 554 A.2d 193, 196 (R.I. 1989), we first announced that a

probationary period began at imposition of a sentence, even if that meant at the 

commencement of incarceration. 

12 In State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 341-42 (R.I. 1997), we held that the trial court 

could revoke a probationary term on the basis of criminal acts committed after imposition 

of sentence but before the actual probationary portion of sentence commenced.
- 11 -

effect lower the defendant’s sentence to less than the statutory minimum. However, here, 

Parrillo argues that, unlike Rose, “there was no possibility that the combined length of 

[the] time [he] will spend incarcerated and on probation will fall below [the minimum 

mandatory term] if the sentencing justice’s words ‘upon release’ are allowed to control.” 

Lastly, Parrillo argues that principles of estoppel apply as a matter of due process, barring

the state from seeking to adjudge him a probation violator. 

Rose is central to our analysis of the state’s petition and to our application of 

good-time credits, time-served credits, and § 12-19-8 to this case. Here, Parrillo, like 

Rose, claims that the sentencing justice’s pronouncement that his probationary term was 

to begin “upon [his] release from the ACI” is binding pursuant to the authority granted to 

a sentencing justice, implying that the clock on his probationary term should have started 

ticking when he either was released on parole or had successfully completed parole. We 

reject, however, Parrillo’s contention that Rose does not apply because it was predicated

on two decisions decided after he was sentenced. It is well established that a judicial

interpretation of a statute “relates back” to the date the statute was enacted and, unlike 

legislative action, does not implicate ex post facto considerations. State v. Barber, 767 

A.2d 78, 79-80 (R.I. 2001) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that Dantzler and 

Jacques were inapplicable to his case because they were decided after he was sentenced). 

Moreover, this Court appreciates that here, unlike in Rose, if Parrillo’s probation 

were to “commence upon [his] release from the ACI,” it would not reduce his sentence 

below the mandatory minimum. See Rose, 92 A.3d at 909. The reduced sentence, which 

would range between seventeen and twenty-three years, depending on the operative 
- 12 -

date,

13 would be well above the ten-year mandatory-minimum for second-degree murder,

pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 11-23-2. It is our opinion, however, that this distinction does not 

require us to stray away from our clearly articulated interpretation of the good-time and 

time-served credit statutes enunciated in Rose, and the effect that these credits have on

the length of a defendant’s overall sentence, nor does this distinction warrant a different 

outcome. Rose, 92 A.3d at 912, was clear—neither Parrillo’s “credits for good time nor 

his credits for time served entitle[] him to an acceleration of the end date of his 

probationary term[,]” because the DOC does not have the “power to modify the overall 

length of a judicially imposed sentence * * *.” Id. at 911.

14 The power to reduce a 

sentence, either directly or indirectly, is reserved to the judiciary.15 Id. Here, the 

sentencing justice sentenced Parrillo to thirty years. Although § 12-19-8 permitted the 

sentencing justice to suspend a portion of the sentence, as he chose to do, any suspended 

or probationary period did not reduce the sentence from what he specifically articulated 

was thirty years.

 

13 If his probation were to begin upon his physical release from the ACI in 1993, his 

sentence would end in 2003, seventeen years after it was imposed in 1986. If his 

probation were to begin upon his release from parole in 1999, his sentence would end in 

2009, twenty-three years after it was imposed.

14 We are of the opinion that the dissent’s conclusion that the General Assembly has, by 

statute, modified Parrillo’s sentence is incorrect and not supported by our well-settled 

constitutional jurisprudence. The sentence imposed in this case is a final judgment of 

conviction by the Superior Court. A final judgment may be reopened or amended only 

according to law and in the exercise of judicial power. See Taylor v. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 

363 (1856) (“the exercise of judicial power [is] prohibited to the general assembly” 

pursuant to the Constitution of Rhode Island).

15 A recent amendment to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 

now provides a vehicle to amend a sentence. Rule 35(c) provides that: “At any time after 

a defendant has served at least three (3) years of a term of probation in the community, 

the probation unit of the department of corrections, either at a defendant’s request or 

administratively, may review the defendant’s case history and recommend amending the 

defendant’s sentence to terminate the defendant’s probation.”
- 13 -

Accordingly, because Parrillo was sentenced on January 21, 1986, to a thirty-year 

term, and because the effect of his good-time or time-served credits reduced his period of 

incarceration, but did not reduce the overall length of his sentence, his sentence officially 

ended on January 21, 2016—thirty years later. Consequently, the hearing justice 

committed an error of law in finding that Parrillo was not on probation at the time of the 

2011 incident. Because we hold that Parrillo was on probation and subject to being 

adjudged a violator at the time of the 2011 incident, we must now address whether the 

hearing justice committed an error of law when he held that the doctrine of equitable 

estoppel did not bar the state from seeking to adjudge Parrillo a probation violator. 

B

Equitable Estoppel

Parrillo argues that the state should be estopped from seeking to adjudge him a 

probation violator by invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel because he relied, to his 

detriment, on the representation made by the DOC in the form of the 2009 letter 

informing him that he had completed his probationary term. Parrillo attested that he 

“conducted [himself] at all times as though [he] was not on probation” in reliance to the 

representation made. In response, the state insists that Parrillo has failed to meet the 

necessary elements of the equitable estoppel doctrine. 

Necessary “to the successful invocation of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is the 

establishment of: ‘[F]irst, an affirmative representation or equivalent conduct on the part 

of the person against whom the estoppel is claimed which is directed to another for the 

purpose of inducing the other to act or fail to act in reliance thereon; and secondly, that 

such representation or conduct in fact did induce the other to act or fail to act to his 
- 14 -

injury.’” Faella v. Chiodo, 111 A.3d 351, 357 (R.I. 2015) (quoting Cigarrilha v. City of 

Providence, 64 A.3d 1208, 1213 (R.I. 2013)). Moreover, the applicability of equitable 

estoppel is dependent upon “[t]he facts and circumstances of each case.” Lerner v. Gill,

463 A.2d 1352, 1362 (R.I. 1983).

“It must be emphasized that ‘[e]quitable estoppel is extraordinary relief, which 

will not be applied unless the equities clearly [are] balanced in favor of the part[y] 

seeking relief.’” Faella, 111 A.3d at 357 (quoting Sturbridge Home Builders, Inc. v. 

Downing Seaport, Inc., 890 A.2d 58, 67 (R.I. 2005)). “Indeed, ‘equitable estoppel is not 

a favored doctrine * * * [and should be] applied carefully and sparingly and only from 

necessity. Each of the elements of estoppel must be proved with the requisite degree of 

certainty; no element may be left to surmise, inference, or speculation.’” Id. (quoting 28 

Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver § 166 at 633 (2011)). “[T]he party seeking relief under 

the doctrine of equitable estoppel bears the burden of proving the necessary elements.”

Id. at 358. “[W]hether a party ‘has [successfully] met [his or her] burden in a particular 

case is an issue of fact’ to be resolved by the factfinder.” Id.

This Court has acknowledged that, “[a]s a general rule, courts are reluctant to 

invoke estoppel against the government on the basis of an action of one of its officers.” 

Lerner, 463 A.2d at 1362. However, we have also

“held that in proper circumstances a public agency may be 

estopped from denying representations made by its agents 

causing an individual to act to his detriment in reliance 

upon those statements. The facts and circumstances of each 

case must be closely scrutinized to determine whether 

justice requires the imposition of estoppel.” Id.

16

 

16 See State v. Bonsante, 112 R.I. 547, 548, 313 A.2d 134, 135 (1973) (“we should hold 

that the state’s failure to award [the defendant] a speedy trial acts as a bar of estoppel to 

any further prosecution for the same or another closely related offense”).
- 15 -

It is our opinion that the facts of this case do not present the “proper 

circumstance” for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply against the state, and that 

therefore the hearing justice’s finding that Parrillo’s equitable estoppel argument was 

unpersuasive was not an error of law for several reasons. First, although a DOC

administrative officer sent the 2009 letter to inform Parrillo that his probation had 

terminated, this employee did not have the authority to decrease a judicially imposed 

sentence. As we have previously noted, this authority is limited to the judiciary. See

Rose 92 A.3d at 910-11. Accordingly, neither the administrative agent nor any member 

of the DOC had the power to determine when Parrillo had completed his probationary 

period.

Moreover, in Romano v. Retirement Board of the Employees Retirement System 

of Rhode Island, 767 A.2d 35, 37-38 (R.I. 2001), a retiree sought to invoke the equitable 

estoppel principle against the state which, through a retirement system counselor, had 

provided wrong information regarding the retiree’s retirement benefits. The retiree’s

claims failed because neither the counselor nor the board’s executive director possessed 

any authority to “vary or contradict” state law. Id. at 39 (contrary to information the 

retiree received from the state employee, G.L. 1956 § 36-10-36(b) specifically provided, 

in relevant part, that “[p]ension payments shall be suspended” when a state retiree is 

employed or reemployed by a municipality). Similarly, here, any statement that 

Parrillo’s probationary period had ended in 2009, was not only in direct contradiction to 

the judicially-imposed thirty-year sentence, it also contradicted §§ 42-56-24 and 12-19-

2(a), including the effect these credits had on the length of Parrillo’s sentence. 
- 16 -

Moreover, the only evidence before the Superior Court was the 2009 letter sent 

from the DOC administrative officer and Parrillo’s affidavit in which he attested that “he 

conducted [him]self at all times as though [he] was not on probation.” Parrillo, who bore 

the burden of proving the elements of equitable estoppel, presented no evidence that the 

DOC employee intended to induce any specific behavior on his part, nor that his conduct 

as it relates to the 2011 incident was somehow induced by the 2009 DOC letter. See

Faella, 111 A.3d at 357. Our law is clear that no element of the equitable estoppel claim 

can be left to speculation, and, in any event, we agree with the hearing justice that to even 

attempt to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to these facts is “absurd.” See id. It 

would be preposterous for Parrillo to claim that a letter informing him that his 

probationary period had ended in 2009 induced him to commit the alleged felony assault

in 2011, let alone for him to claim that the DOC employee actually intended to induce 

him to commit such act as the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires.17

Accordingly, it is our opinion that the hearing justice’s denial of Parrillo’s 

equitable estoppel claim was not an error of law.

C

Due Process

Parrillo’s equitable estoppel argument is firmly predicated upon principles of due 

process. He first raised a due-process argument in his memorandum of law in opposition 

 

17 Parrillo attempts to shoehorn his criminal conduct into the precepts of equitable 

estoppel by claiming that he “does not argue detrimental reliance on the [s]tate’s 

representation in committing a new crime; the detrimental reliance was that regardless of 

what he may have done, he would not suffer a resulting probation violation, and the 

consequent further punishment for an old crime–a matter wholly separate from the 

consequences of the underlying offense conduct.” Although we reject his efforts to 

invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel, this argument may be more appropriate on 

remand. See Part III, C, infra.
- 17 -

to the state’s notice of probation violation submitted to the Superior Court, in which he 

asserted that “he ha[d] not been given fair warning that certain conduct [would] subject 

him to the penalty associated with a probation violation. The due process transgression

[was] thus complete.” Although the hearing justice rejected Parrillo’s equitable estoppel 

contentions, the hearing justice did not address the due-process argument, ruling rather 

that Parrillo’s probationary term had terminated under the clear terms of the original 

sentence. 

Before this Court, Parrillo again emphasizes the underpinnings of his estoppel 

argument, stating that “[t]he application of principles of estoppel in the circumstances 

present here is a straightforward matter of due process” and that “the principles of 

fundamental fairness, which include due process and fair notice, could not be more in 

play.”18 Because the trial court decided the case on other grounds, however, we are of 

the opinion that this case should be remanded to the Superior Court so that a hearing

justice may address Parrillo’s contentions in the first instance, making such findings of 

fact and conclusions of law as he or she sees fit. We do not intend hereby to restrict the 

Superior Court should it deem it just to otherwise resolve this probation violation 

proceeding. 

 

18 Parrillo also indicates that “[t]his issue was thoroughly explicated not long ago by the 

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 453 Mass. 474, 903 

N.E.2d 201 (2009).”
- 18 -

IV

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the order of the Superior Court and 

remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. The record shall be returned to the 

Superior Court.

 Justice Flaherty with whom Justice Robinson joins, dissenting. I depart from 

the majority’s interpretation of G.L. 1956 § 42-56-24 and G.L. 1956 § 12-19-2, and 

would affirm the Superior Court’s decision that Parrillo’s probation had already ended 

when he was charged with assault. Accordingly, I respectfully, but vigorously, dissent 

from the majority’s opinion.

A little more than two years ago, in Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903 (R.I. 2014), this

Court was faced with an issue identical to the one presented in the case at bar, except for 

one critical fact. In Rose, the majority held that good-time and time-served credits could 

act only to reduce the time a defendant spent incarcerated, but could not reduce a 

sentence below a statutorily imposed mandatory minimum. Id. at 908, 912. The majority 

in Rose specifically left for another day the issue of what to do when a defendant’s 

sentence is not up against a mandatory minimum. Id. at 913. That day has arrived.

For the same reasons set forth in my dissent in Rose—which Justice Robinson

also joined—I do not agree with the majority’s opinion that extends Rose to all 

probationers. In Rose, I dissented because, in my opinion, the majority incorrectly 

interpreted two statutes: § 42-56-24 and § 12-19-2. Rose, 92 A.3d at 914, 918. 

Specifically, it was my opinion that, when the majority interpreted § 42-56-24, it 

“focuse[d] on the word ‘sentence’ and equate[d] ‘sentence’ with ‘imprisonment.’” Rose, 
- 19 -

92 A.3d at 914. It was my view then, and it is now, that “nothing cited to by the majority 

contravene[d] my conclusion that good-time credits reduce the entirety of [the] sentence 

and not simply the period of incarceration.” Id. I also found fault with the majority’s 

interpretation of § 12-19-2 on nearly identical grounds. Rose, 92 A.3d at 919. That 

statute mandates that a “sentence or sentences imposed shall be reduced by the number of 

days spent in confinement while awaiting trial and while awaiting sentencing * * *.” 

Section 12-19-2(a). Like § 42-54-24, § 12-19-2 speaks of reducing the “sentence,” as 

opposed to the period of incarceration.

Now, the majority extends the holding in Rose to all probationers, finding that 

good-time and time-served credits do not reduce the length of a defendant’s overall 

sentence, irrespective of whether such a reduction would bring that sentence below a 

mandatory minimum. I disagree because the statutes clearly say that good-time credits 

should “be deducted from the term or terms of sentence of that prisoner * * *” and timeserved credits should be “reduced” from the sentence. Both statutes are clear and 

unambiguous. Notably, neither statute limits deductions or reductions to only the time of 

incarceration.

The gravamen of my dissent lies in the distinction between “sentence” and 

“imprisonment.” In addition to incorporating my dissent in Rose, I also observe that 

“sentence” is defined as “[t]he judgment that a court formally pronounces after finding a 

criminal defendant guilty; the punishment imposed on a criminal wrongdoer.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary 1569 (10th ed. 2014). Meanwhile, “imprisonment” is “[t]he act of 

confining a person, [especially] in a prison.” Id. at 875. Accordingly, it is my opinion 

that the only conclusion that can be drawn is that, when the General Assembly enacted 
- 20 -

the legislation in question and used the term “sentence,” it was referring to the entirety of 

the judgment imposed against the defendant—i.e., both the period of incarceration and 

the probationary period. And, when the General Assembly referred to “imprisonment,” it 

spoke of only the period in which a defendant is incarcerated. Thus, when the General 

Assembly mandated that good-time credits be “deducted” from a defendant’s “sentence” 

and that a defendant’s “sentence * * * shall be reduced” by the amount of time served 

while awaiting trial and sentencing, I am led to what I consider to be the obvious 

conclusion that the General Assembly intended good-time and time-served credits to act 

to reduce the entirety of a defendant’s sentence, and not just that defendant’s period of 

incarceration.19

Despite my dissent in Rose, I accept, as I must, that the holding in that case is 

now the law in this state. Nevertheless, I do not believe that the holding in Rose is 

applicable here because the issue before us is simply not the same; the reductions that 

Parrillo received to his sentence did not bring that sentence below a mandatory minimum. 

The majority’s opinion in Rose was, in substantial part, driven by the conflict between 

G.L. 1956 § 11-37-8.2, which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence, and §§ 42-56-24 

and 12-19-2, the good-time and time-served statutes. Here, no such conflict exists. 

Accordingly, it is my opinion that the statutory interpretation that I endorsed in Rose

should control; under that interpretation, Parrillo’s probation would have ended by the 

time of his December 2011 arrest. As a result, it is my opinion that the order of the 

Superior Court should be affirmed.

 

19 The majority says that the Department of Corrections has no authority to reduce a 

sentence, but it is the General Assembly that set the sentence by statute. Through the 

enactment of G.L. 1956 § 42-56-24 and G.L. 1956 § 12-19-2, the General Assembly has 

modified the sentence, also by statute. 
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Anthony Parrillo.

Case Number No. 2013-203-M.P.

(P1/82-500A)

Date Opinion Filed May 3, 2017

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and 

Indeglia, JJ.

Written By Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell

Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer From Lower Court Associate Justice Bennett R. Gallo

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For State:

Lauren S. Zurier

Department of Attorney General

For Defendant:

Anthony M. Traini, Esq.

John B. Harwood, Esq. 

SU-CMS-02A (revised June 2016)