alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case No. 8,740.

#### McDANIEL v. WAILES.

[4 Cranch, C. C. 201.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

May Term, 1832.

Ejectment — Amendment op the Fictitious Lease.

In ejectment, the fictitious lease may be amended, after the jury is sworn, upon payment of the costs of the term.

The fictitious lease to the .plaintiff [McDaniel’s lessee] was, by mistake, dated before the expiration of the lease to the defendant [Wailes, tenant of Dyer].

After the jury was sworn, the plaintiff prayed leave to correct the declaration in that respect, which

THE COURT

(nem. con.) permitted to. be done on payment of the costs of the term. A juror • was withdrawn, the amendment was made, and the jury sworn again.
<PAGE>
                            LNB Bancorp, Inc.

                         Exhibit to Form 10 - K/A

              (For the twelve months ended December 31, 2002)

                        Exhibit Number (99.4)

                          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                           18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                          AS ENACTED PURSUANT TO
               SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of LNB Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-K/A for the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Gregory D. Friedman, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and
Corporate Secretary of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as enacted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

    (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

    (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




/s/ Gregory D. Friedman


Gregory D. Friedman, CPA
Executive Vice President,
Chief Financial Officer and
Corporate Secretary
June 30, 2003
From: bill7b@yahoo.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 1:22:09 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

William Brandon

Mesquite, TX 75150
From: jabreo01@cox.net

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 1:46:12 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs and

devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

John Abreo

Gramercy, LA 70052
EX-10.6



 Exhibit 10.6 

AMENDMENT TO 
 GOVERNANCE
AGREEMENT 
 This Amendment to Governance Agreement (this “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of April 21, 2016, effective as
of the date hereof, by and between Aradigm Corporation (the “Company”), and Grifols, S.A. (“Grifols”). 

RECITALS 
 WHEREAS, the
Company and Grifols are parties to that certain Governance Agreement, dated August 27, 2013 (the “Agreement”). All capitalized terms set forth herein shall (unless otherwise defined herein) have the meanings given to them in
this Agreement; 
 WHEREAS, in the Company intends to raise capital through a convertible notes and warrants securities offering (the
“Securities Offering”) in which Grifols intends to participate; 
 WHEREAS, in connection with the Securities
Offering, the Company and Grifols wish to amend the Target Percentage; 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Grifols agree to the amendment of
the Agreement set forth herein. This Amendment shall be effective as of the date hereof. Effective upon such amendment, the Agreement will remain in full force and effect, with the definition of Target Percentage being deleted and replaced by the
new definition from and after the date hereof. 
 AGREEMENT 

NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows: 
  

	 	1.	AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT. The definition of Target Percentage in Section 1 of the Agreement will be deleted and replaced as follows: 


“Target Percentage” means 43.3%. 

2. NO OTHER AMENDMENTS. Except as expressly set forth above, all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement remain in full force and
effect. 
 3. COUNTERPARTS. This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered
will be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. 
 4. FACSIMILE SIGNATURES. This
Amendment may be executed and delivered by facsimile and upon such delivery the facsimile signature will be deemed to have the same effect as if the original signature had been delivered to the other party. The original signature copy shall be
subsequently delivered to the other parties. The failure to deliver the original signature copy and/or the nonreceipt of the original signature copy shall have no effect upon the binding and enforceable nature of this Amendment. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment to the Governance
Agreement as of the date first written above. 
  

			
	ARADIGM CORPORATION
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Nancy Pecota

	Name:	 	Nancy Pecota
	Title:	 	Chief Financial Officer
	
	GRIFOLS, S.A.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Alfredo Arroyo

	Name:	 	Alfredo Arroyo
	Title:	 	CFO
No. 68881.

#### Sol Tool Co. *v.*United States,

protest 64/10475 (New York).

Opinion by

Laweence, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of steel bandsaws similar in all material respects to those the subject of *J. E. Bernard & Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(50 Cust. Ct. 41, C.D. 2386), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sherman Adams, Appellant.

[632 NYS2d 482]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rotker, J.), rendered September 8, 1993, convicting him of assault in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the People failed to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt is unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), it is legally sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility and the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented are primarily questions to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see, People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94). Its determination should be accorded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see, People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88). Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt is not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). Balletta, J. P., Rosenblatt, Ritter and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.
From: engineer.twr@gmail.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 2:22:00 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

Please rescind the unjust and coercive mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be

covered by private health insurance with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you

to expand conscience protections for any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and

have moral or religious objections. I strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on

Americans especially for drugs and devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion

(such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children. No Americans should be forced by

the federal government to essentially subsidize services they object to. I again urge you in the strongest

way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and sterilizations from the list of mandatory

preventive services.

Sincerely,

Joseph Miller

Phoenix, AZ 85020
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Alan Andrew SARVIS, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 04-4956.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: July 27, 2005.

Decided: Aug. 9, 2005.

Edward C. Sussman,'Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Allen F. Loucks, United States Attorney, Patrick M. Pericak, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alan Andrew Sarvis pled guilty to conspiracy to *141distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). Under the terms of his plea agreement, Sarvis waived the right to appeal his conviction and sentence. He was sentenced on June 28, 2002, to 262 months’ imprisonment. Based on Sarvis’ substantial assistance, the Government moved for a four-level downward departure in Sarvis’ sentence. After conducting a hearing pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 35(b), the court resentenced Sarvis in October 2004 to 168 months’ imprisonment. He now seeks to challenge his sentence under *United States v. Booker,*— U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).

Although the Government argues that Sarvis’ appeal is barred by the waiver of his right to appeal in his plea agreement, we find that, in any event, Sarvis cannot assert a *Booker*claim in the context of an appeal from resentencing pursuant to Rule 35(b). A final judgment is one where the judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari has expired. *Allen v. Hardy,*478 U.S. 255, 258 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986). A later modification to a sentence does not affect the date on which the judgment of conviction became final. *See United States v. Sanders,*247 F.3d 139, 143 (4th Cir.2001). To the extent Sarvis seeks to revisit his original sentence under *Booker,*his appeal is untimely. Sarvis’ judgment became final upon the expiration of the ten-day period to appeal his sentence, i.e., July 8, 2002. Sarvis cannot now resurrect his direct appeal simply because the district court re-sentenced him pursuant to a Rule 35(b) proceeding.

Furthermore, it is well established that this court does not review a defendant’s appeal of the extent of a downward departure unless the departure resulted in an illegal sentence or resulted from an incorrect application of the guidelines. *United States v. Hill,*70 F.3d 321, 324 (4th Cir.1995) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2000)). Finding neither circumstance present, we dismiss this appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
From: sweetspirit8@frontier.com

To: E-OHPSCA2713.EBSA

Subject: Comment: RIN 1210-AB44

Date: Wednesday, September 07, 2011 12:57:11 PM

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing today to ask in the strongest way possible that you rescind the unjust and coercive

mandate that all "contraceptives" and sterilization procedures be covered by private health insurance

with no co-pay to patients. If you do not reverse course I ask you to expand conscience protections for

any organizations that provide individual and group insurance and have moral or religious objections. I

very strongly oppose the government forcing free insurance coverage on Americans especially for drugs

and devices that I oppose because some of these can cause an abortion (such as ella and Plan B).

I also ask you to reconsider your definition of religious employer and offer an authentic conscience

protection for any organization and business that has moral or religious objection to providing such

insurance to their employees. This legal mandate clearly violates the spirit of conscience laws which

prohibit government discrimination against those who object to various health services on moral or

religious grounds. The definition of "religious employer" in the regulation is so narrow as to only include

churches, but will still mean that a host of businesses and organizations that have conscience objections

will be required to choose between either violating their conscience or not being able to offer employees

health insurance.

Please protect the conscience rights of insurers, providers and people like me who object to being

forced by the federal government to offer or subsidize contraceptives and sterilization services, especially

when some of these drugs can take the life of early unborn children.

I do not want to be forced by the federal government to essentially subsidize services which I object to.

I again urge you in the strongest way possible to reverse course and remove contraceptives and

sterilizations from the list of mandatory preventive services.

Thank you for your time in considering my request.

Pamela Faith Fahey, Ph.D

Sincerely,

Pamela Faith Fahey

Edmonds, WA 98026
#### Gerard Smith et al., Plaintiffs, v Angelo Flori et al., Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants. Joseph Facchin, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[633 NYS2d 67]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants third-party plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Posner, J.), dated February 17, 1994, as denied their motion for summary judgment against the third-party defendant.

*658Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs.

The plaintiff Gerard Smith was seriously injured when he fell through a skylight opening on the roof of a building under construction in Flushing, Queens. Shortly after the accident, Smith and his wife commenced this action against Angelo Flori, Daniel Flori, and Seasons Fuel Oil Corp. (hereinafter the defendants), the owners of the building, alleging causes of action sounding in negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241.

The defendants commenced a third-party action for indemnification against Smith’s employer, Joseph Facchin, Inc. (hereinafter Facchin). Facchin subsequently agreed to pay the plaintiffs $2,250,000 to settle their claims attributable to Facchin’s fault in the happening of the accident, and the plaintiffs’ action continued against the defendants. Thereafter, the defendants moved for summary judgment against Facchin, contending that as property owners, they are only vicariously liable for Smith’s injuries and that they are entitled to indemnification from Facchin, the negligent party. The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion, concluding that there is an issue of fact regarding whether the defendants exercised supervisory control over the construction project.

On appeal, the defendants contend that the Supreme Court erred by denying their motion because the record establishes that they did not supervise or control the roofing work at the construction site. We agree. In opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs submitted evidence that the defendants regularly visited the construction site to check the progress of the work and that employees of the corporate defendant delivered some materials to the site and performed some construction-related tasks under Facchin’s direction. However, the record is devoid of any evidence that the defendants controlled or supervised the construction procedures or the safety measures that Facchin employed in erecting the roof. Indeed, to the contrary, the parties’ admissions establish that Facchin hired Smith to perform the roofing work and that Facchin’s president directed and controlled Smith’s work. Under these circumstances, the defendants are entitled to indemnification from Facchin whose negligence was the sole cause of Smith’s injuries *(see, Mackey v Beacon City School Dist,*216 AD2d 534; *Dumoulin v Oval Wood Dish Corp.,*211 AD2d 883; *Richardson v Matarese,*206 AD2d 354; *McNair v Morris Ave. Assocs.,*203 AD2d 433; *Damon v Starkweather,*185 AD2d 633). Sullivan, J. P., O’Brien, Copertino and Krausman, JJ., concur.
Agreement


 


This Agreement are hereby entered to by the following parties:


 


		·	Hua Mei Investments Limited (Party A)



 


		·	Greater China International Investment Limited (Party B)



 


Whereas:


 


Party A previously made a loan to Party
B in the amount of $2,385,425.24 in HKD. Now through consultations on an equal footing, both parties have reached the following
agreements with regard to the loan:


 


		I.	Party A agrees that Party B does not need to repay the above-mentioned loan of $2,385,425.24 in HKD, and Party A completely
abandons its right of recourse to demand the loan repayment.



 


		II.	Both parties agree that the loan amount shall be converted into the capital reserve.



 


		III.	This Agreement will be effective upon signing by the directors of both parties.



 


		IV.	This Agreement is executed on September 25, 2012.



 


	Signed by a director of each party:
	 
	Hua Mei Investments Limited (Party A, Company Seal)
	By:	/s/ Xingping Hou	 
	 	Hou, Xingping	 
	 
	Greater China International Investment Limited (Party B, Company Seal)
	By:	/s/ Zhihao Zhang	 
	 	Zhang, Zhihao Sabio
Case No. 13,469.

#### STODDARD v. The PEDRO.

[See Case No. 4,489.]