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99–470PDF 2016

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL

SELF–DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 15, 2016

Serial No. 114–152

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Paul R. Williams, Ph.D., president and co-founder, Public International Law 

and Policy Group .................................................................................................. 4

Jason Sorens, Ph.D., lecturer, Department of Government, Dartmouth College ........................................................................................................................ 21

Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, senior vice president for programs, German Marshall Fund 

of the United States ............................................................................................. 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Paul R. Williams, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 7

Jason Sorens, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 23

Mr. Ivan Vejvoda: Prepared statement .................................................................. 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

The Honorable Lois Frankel, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 48

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL

SELF–DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS 

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m., in room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good afternoon. This hearing of the European Subcommittee is called to order. Today we will discuss a topic 

that is dear to me, but quite often overlooked by too many policy 

experts, and that is, national self-determination, and its impact on 

what is going on in the world today. There have been many examples since the Second World War of self-determination movements, 

galvanizing local support, challenging their central authorities, 

and, of course, giving our State Department headaches in the process. 

As advocates of democratic government and human rights, we 

cannot help but have sympathy with the grievances of many of 

these self-determination movements. They are often based on legitimate complaints, and aspire to change a political structure that 

they quite often had no voice in creating. Yet, these groups can be 

cooperated by hostile outside forces, and used violently against otherwise friendly governments. 

The foreign policy of our government, perhaps for no better reason than for simplicity’s sake, has opted to treat questions of selfdetermination as internal matters and existing borders as unchangeable. The word ‘‘stability’’ has been invoked more times than 

I can count. 

During today’s hearing, we will discuss another point of view, 

that self-determination movements represent a dynamic force in 

the history of the world that can be channeled into peaceful and 

legitimate political change, but we should not see—because of the 

fear that that is not the way it is—we should not see as tramping 

them down and suppressing them as our solution to that type of 

dynamic that is being created in a self-determination movement. 

Border and other types of change, border change, and the creation of new states, these are things that will result in this type 

of dynamic, the self-determination that we see popping up in various parts of the world, but what is wrong with new governments? 

2

What is wrong with new states? What is wrong with changing borders that have been created by monarchs back two centuries ago? 

And after all, our country is a product of the self-determination 

movement. Some worry that self-determination movements will 

have a domino effect of changes and challenges to the existing 

world order that will lead to chaos, and I have no such fears. And 

acknowledging these movements and state the principles by which 

they should seek progress, by doing that, we affirm that there is 

value in the existing global standards, and we can demonstrate 

change within those global standards. 

Alternatively, by ignoring these groups who are looking for their 

own self-identity and united by a national identity, even though it 

is subjugated by the boundaries of a country that is dominated by 

other people, by ignoring them, we push these ethnic patriots toward violence and insurrection. 

In our recent history, we can see several examples where self-determination and finding peace were intermingled. We can see this 

in Kosovo’s experience breaking away from Serbia. Had that been 

an election all along and there had been sort of a relationship established between Kosovo and Serbia, a lot of violence and people 

on both sides would have been better off. We have seen that with 

the splitup of the Czechs and the Slovaks, something that needed 

to happen. It happened, and it has been good for both of those people. We can see how Pakistan’s refusal to recognize the rights of 

the Baloch people creates more conflict and more suffering. 

In 2014, the referendum in Scotland allowed the people there to 

act in a peaceful way to express their wishes as to what their future would be, or where their sovereignty would be placed. And 

that was a strong example of how democracy can work. 

I am watching now in the cases, for example, in Catalonia, to see 

if a peaceful and mutually agreeable process can be made to work 

there that satisfies, yes, the rights of self-determination and, yes, 

a Democratic and free government. A change there in Catalonia, 

through politics and ballots, is much preferable than violence or 

terrorism. In many cases, the continued stubbornness of a ruling 

ethnic majority fuels frustrations which leads not just to instability, but also to chaos, to hatred, and long-term hatred and violence. 

We need to look at this powerful concept, self-determination. 

What role is it playing in our world today? What role is it playing 

in the various regions of the world? Whether it is in the Balkans, 

or whether it is in Spain. 

We thank you, our witnesses, for appearing today, and without 

objection, all the members will have 5 legislative days to submit 

any additional written questions or extraneous materials for the 

record. And I now turn to our ranking member for his opening remarks, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your remarks and organizing today’s subcommittee hearing on U.S. policy 

toward self-determination, a theoretical topic with practical relevance for current affairs. 

You might recall, during our last hearing on the domestic situation in Turkey, we had an interesting discussion on the Kurdish 

question, and their future in the region. Whatever the resolution 

3

to this timely question, the effects will reverberate throughout the 

Middle East and Europe. I look forward to examining some of the 

examples of self-determination movements, while keeping in 

mind—I think we have to still as we look at these things—international law and our foreign policy objectives. 

Across the world, we see desperate groups clamoring for a voice, 

space, and basic human rights from their governments. In a world 

where global structures are based on the relationships between nation states and people, sometimes that can be overlooked. This 

poses the essential question: What are the nation states’ responsibilities and obligations to each of its citizens? 

In a best-case scenario, disparaged people work with the national 

government to negotiate special rights for even referenda on their 

relationship with the capitals. In this regard, I think of the upcoming U.K. and Scottish referenda. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the struggle for self-determination can also lead to conflict, 

confusion, and even intervention. And in this category, I think of 

Kosovo and Chechnya, two of Eurasia’s most tumultuous examples. 

However, questions of self-determination in my opinion are never 

just black and white. And as outsiders, we must exercise extreme 

caution when considering the best policy toward these movements. 

One would hope that the reconciliation processes are consistently 

peaceful and democratic. Unfortunately, we have seen, in many 

cases, that peaceful reconciliation is not always the ultimate outcome. Even here in the United States, we are ironing out questions 

of sovereignty when discussing issues such as Native American 

rights, or our relationship with Puerto Rico. 

What rights to self-governance should the people have here in 

the United States, the people of Puerto Rico? The Native Americans? The Virgin Islands? What responsibility does the United 

States Government have toward them? 

There is no simple answer to these questions, but, nevertheless, 

they lie at the heart of how one defines democracy and nation 

states. 

As these tensions come to a head in Europe, governments and 

legislatures across the globe must address the universal conundrum of self-determination. Recognizing the delicacy and the complexity of self-determination, what I think I am going to do at this 

juncture, and at this hearing, I am going to leave it to the expert 

panelists, so that to listen to you and to hear your thoughts and 

for you to address this sensitive issue. And I think that you can 

do it from both an academic and policy perspective and historic 

perspective. So for me, you know, this is really going to be listening 

and questions on the run, but I am looking forward to the dialogue 

and conversation and listening to the experts and your opinion. 

This is a complex issue, no question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. And, Mr. 

Weber, do you have anything to say for an opening statement? 

Mr. WEBER. Mine is real short about self-determination. I think 

the people ought to decide. Let’s go. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is very risky to ask a guy from Texas to 

talk about self-determination. 

Mr. MEEKS. I started to say that. 

4

Mr. WEBER. After all, my wife would not let me put on my pickup truck bumper that ‘‘secede’’ bumper sticker. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Got it. All right. We have our witnesses 

today. I want to thank them for being here. I would suggest if you 

could keep your testimony to 5 minutes, and your written testimony will be placed into the record, and then we can have some 

dialogue on this particular issue. 

First of all, we have Dr. Paul Williams, who is the co-founder 

and president of Public International Law and Policy Group, a pro 

bono firm providing legal assistance to governments involved in 

peace negotiations or post-conflict situations. Dr. Williams has been 

involved in over 20 self-determination negotiations, working with 

either the parent state, or the self-determination movement. Dr. 

Williams has previously served in the Office of Legal Adviser at the 

Department of State. He holds a Ph.D. From Cambridge University 

and a J.D. From Stanford Law School. 

Next, we have Dr. Jason Sorens. He is a lecturer of Government 

at Dartmouth College. He is an expert on secessionism and an author of a book on that topic, which was published in 2012. He has 

taught at Yale and the New York School, and has earned his doctorate from Yale University. We have with us also Ivan Vejvoda, 

a senior vice president for programs at the German Marshall Fund 

here in Washington, D.C. From 2010 to 2013, he was executive director of that organization’s Balkan Trust for Democracy Program, 

so this really gives him an expertise for this discussion today. Before that, he was an adviser to the Serbian Government, and a 

long-time advocate of democracy in the region. 

Thank you all for attending and to enlighten us with your knowledge and your experience. And, Dr. Williams, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL R. WILLIAMS, PH.D., PRESIDENT AND 

CO-FOUNDER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 

GROUP 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and Congressman Weber, for inviting me here this afternoon to testify. It is a real honor. The committee has noted that with the growth of Democratic governance in 

Europe, questions of national self-determination have become increasingly prevalent. In response, the U.S. policy has generally emphasized stability and the status quo of existing borders. As the 

chairman noted, the committee has asked for assistance in examining whether long-term peace and stability might better be served 

in supporting national self-determination. The answer is yes, under 

a framework of earned sovereignty. In my remarks, I will briefly 

highlight the risks posed by the inherent conflict between status 

quo sovereignty and national self-determination in Europe and in 

Eurasia. I will then discuss the conflict resolution approach of 

earned sovereignty as a means for reducing those risks and as a 

pathway to heightened autonomy or independence. I will be summarizing my written statement, which goes into the approach of 

earned sovereignty in more detail. 

National self-determination is a global phenomenon that tugs at 

the strings of a world order, as we know it, based on sovereignty 

and territorial integrity. National self-determination conflicts are 

5

numerous, and they are widespread. Conservatively estimating, 

there are over 60 national self-determination conflicts around the 

globe, with over a dozen in Europe, and they afflict some of our 

most intense and strategic allies: United Kingdom, France, Spain, 

Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine. 

Since 1990, half of the world’s conflicts, hot conflicts, involve 

questions of national self-determination. As a consequence of the 

myopic approach of sovereignty, sovereignty, sovereignty, borders, 

borders, borders, these conflicts are deadly, they are destabilizing, 

and they are durable. 

They are deadly. Since 1945, over 20 million individuals have 

died as a result of conflicts associated with national self-determination. They are deadly, in part, because they require the consent of 

the parent state as a legal fiction, so to speak. South Sudan received the consent of North Sudan for a peace agreement, after 2 

million people were killed in that conflict. 

They are durable. Only one-third of national sovereignty conflicts 

have been resolved in the past half century. The average length of 

a sovereignty-based conflict is 30 years, twice the length of the duration of a regular conflict. They are destabilizing, as the chairman 

mentioned in his remarks, creating large refugee populations, war 

economies, and sometimes giving rise to opportunistic terrorists. 

One-third of the designated foreign terrorist organizations listed 

by the Department of Treasury have found their way to associate 

in areas where there are self-determination conflicts. This is the 

case because there is no globally accepted approach to dealing with 

national self-determination. 

There is a gridlock between sovereignty first, promoted by states, 

and self-determination first, promoted by many these national selfdetermination movements. Neither one of those approaches promotes stability. Europe, despite its economic progress, is no exception. Europe, in fact, has avoided—Western Europe, in fact, has 

avoided creating a policy on national self-determination. The response to the Scottish referendum and the current response to 

Catalonia is simply incoherent and unhelpful. 

The European Union has refused to answer the question of 

whether new states created out of member states are entitled to 

membership automatically, or whether they may have a veto-free 

path to membership. They have failed to answer the question of 

citizenship, or of a common currency. Europe is stuck in a very difficult conundrum. States like Belgium, Italy, France, Romania, 

Spain, Cyprus, are all opposed to recognizing new states within the 

European Union, because they suffer from their own self-determination movements. Yet, members of the European Union have 

recognized over 3 dozen new states in the last 20 years. So how can 

you recognize states outside of the European Union and not recognize those that seek a democratic path to independence or heightened autonomy within the European Union? 

As the chairman noted, there have been a number of successes 

recently. These successes in Serbia, Montenegro, East Timor, 

Northern Ireland, Bougainville, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sudan, and 

proposed agreements in Western Sahara, provide a path for a basis 

for what I called earned sovereignty. There are three essential elements of an earned sovereignty approach, and three optional eleVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:39 Apr 19, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_EEET\031516\99470 SHIRL
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ments. The idea, however, is to handcraft a multistage solution to 

each national self-determination conflict based, as Congressman 

Weber pointed out, on the will of the people. 

The first three options would be: Shared sovereignty, either between the parent state and the sub-state entity, or, in cases like 

Kosovo, between the sub-state entity and the international community. Institution building. Oftentimes, new states fail or are afraid 

to have new states because they don’t have the requisite institutions. You are a sub-state entity on Monday, you are a republic. On 

Tuesday, you are an independent state. You don’t have the institutions. You are being set up for failure. And, a set date for determination of final status. In Serbia and Montenegro, it was 3 years. 

In Bougainville, it is window of 10 to 14 years. 

There are three additional elements which can be added at will: 

Phased sovereignty. There is no reason a new state must assume 

all of the rights and obligations on the very first day. These rights 

and obligations can be phased in as stability requires. They can be 

conditioned. Sovereignty can be conditioned on human rights protection, minority rights protection, and democratic development, 

and sovereignty can even be constrained. Restrictions on territorial 

association, or other destabilizing activities, can be constraints that 

can be put on a new state. 

To conclude, to promote long-term peace and stability, the United 

States should shift from a policy that solely emphasizes stability in 

the status quo of existing borders to one of earned sovereignty. 

This allows greater flexibility in managing the aspirations of national self-determination movements, and reduces the potential for 

violence and political and economic instability. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. We will discuss that. 

Mr. Sorens. 

STATEMENT OF JASON SORENS, PH.D., LECTURER, 

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 

Mr. SORENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

committee. It is a pleasure to testify for you today, and I will be 

summarizing my written remarks. 

National self-determination movements seek greater self-government for a national minority, typically, including the right to vote 

on forming a new independent state. Like other states, the U.S. 

Government faces decisions about whether to recognize declarations of independence, to enter into diplomatic relations with new 

states, and to engage in diplomacy with other states about self-determination movements with their borders. 

In my testimony, I will first describe the current state of self-determination movements around the world, then summarize what 

scholars have learned about the relationship between self-determination claims and violence. I will conclude by assessing the validity of claims advocating the creation of new states or changes to 

national borders. 

The current state of self-determination movements. Self-determination movements generally take one of two forms: Political parties and armed groups. In Western liberal democracies secessionist 

political parties are common. Armed self-determination movements 

are typically found in a developing world, and you can see this in 

figure 1 of the written testimony. 

Developing countries usually forbid self-determination movements from organizing as political parties. Western liberal democracies typically allow secessionist parties to organize, but not all of 

them allow secession. Britain, Canada, Belgium, and Denmark are 

examples of countries that have allowed some sort of legal path to 

independence under some circumstances for at least some part of 

their country. On the other side of the spectrum, you have got 

France, Spain, and Italy, which have constitutions defining their 

countries as indivisible, thus ruling out self-determination. 

Majority support for independence in a population is rare. In all 

the high-income democracies of Europe, North America, and the 

Pacific Rim, there is only one region in which a party or group of 

parties advocating independence in the short run has actually won 

an absolute majority of votes, and that is Scotland, and that happened even before the referendum of 2014, which, of course, was 

lost for the independence side. 

Using data from the Minorities At Risk Project, I looked at ethnic minorities around the world, and I found that only 38 percent 

of them have any secessionist organization of any kind, no matter 

how small. 

The causes of self-determination conflicts. Popular demand for 

independence comes from a combination of a distinctive cultural 

identity, territorial coherence, and either political or economic benefits from independence. Having just one of those elements is not 

enough. You need all of them. That is why the vast majority of minority nations around the world don’t have secessionist movements. 

22

One worry about allowing secessionist movements is the problem 

of contagion. But secessionism, according to the best research, does 

not appear to be contagious across national borders. It does have 

a tendency to spread within a country, which is why central governments often try to crack down on the first movement that 

emerges. Because there is usually no legal framework for regulating secession, secessionism is strongly statistically associated 

with violent conflict. 

In general, separatist civil wars last longer than other kinds of 

wars, implying that the warring parties cannot find negotiated settlements even when the conflicts are stalemated. I find in my own 

research that providing a legal path to independence is associated 

with less ethno nationalist rebellion. The United Kingdom, Canada, 

Denmark, and Belgium have had much less secessionist violence 

than France, Italy and Spain. Clauses permitting secession were 

also crucial to peace agreements ending the conflicts in Northern 

Ireland, South Sudan, and Bougainville, part of Papua New Guinea. The European Union’s Treaty of Lisbon also explicitly guarantees member states a right to withdraw from that union. 

A legal path to independence can promote peace by constraining 

secessionists in central governments to pursue their aims through 

electoral and legislative means. Central governments often cannot 

commit to respecting a negotiated regional autonomy compromise 

without also conceding a right to secede. The South Sudanese and 

Bougainville secessionists would probably not have agreed to any 

peace deal without a referendum guarantee. 

If every country recognized some sort of right to national self-determination, only a few would exercise such a right. Moreover, the 

overall level of global violence would likely decline by replacing 

intrastate conflicts with a smaller number of interstate conflicts. 

Intrastate conflicts are far more common that interstate conflicts, 

and you can see that in figure 2 of the written testimony. Civil conflicts have killed seven times more people than interstate conflicts 

since World War II. They last much longer than interstate wars, 

and civil wars are more common in bigger countries. 

So all these findings suggest that reducing the average size of 

states over the long run and increasing the number of independent 

states would actually reduce deaths from violent conflict. 

There are good reasons for the U.S. Government to avoid assertively internationalizing other countries’ self-determination conflicts which can look like meddling in other countries’ internal affairs. Nevertheless, once a declaration of independence is issued, 

the U.S. Government has no choice but to respond. In such an 

event, the U.S. Government might wish to consider not only the interests of the host state, but also the interests of the seceding state 

and the effect of secession on regional stability. On average, replacing a state-to-nation relationship with a state-to-state relationship 

reduces violence. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sorens follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. You may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. IVAN VEJVODA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR PROGRAMS, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Mr. VEJVODA. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking 

Member Meeks, and Congressman Weber. It is a real honor to be 

here today. I am not a specialist on self-determination. As I said 

to one of our co-panelists, I lived it, through the breakdown of the 

country I was born into, called Yugoslavia that no longer exists, 

and that today constitutes seven countries, one of the 36 that came 

out of what happened after the fall of the Berlin Wall. I think 

much has been said. As a former Professor of Political Science, I 

taught Transitions to Democracy, and, obviously, this was a key 

part of what happened in former Communist Europe as countries 

sought to seek their path toward democracy and a stable future. 

You, yourself, alluded to the Czechoslovak-Velvet divorce, which 

was led by the elites, and a very peaceful and successful example. 

I would like to stress, first of all, when we talk about Europe, 

the soothing role of the European Union. The existence of a community of nations that after World War II decided that it wasn’t 

really good to go to war every 20 years, and to seek institutions 

that would be shock absorbers to any friction or conflict that might 

appear, and it has not been said without reason that the European 

Union is probably the most successful peace project that the world 

has seen. And we see that effect with all the travails that Europe 

is confronting today. And Spain has been mentioned as one of 

them, the Scottish referendum, the pending Brexit on June 23, that 

is a sort of self-determination. 

Does the United Kingdom want to stay part of a family that it 

chose to join in 1973, and now maybe wants to leave? And what 

would be the ripple effects that it would have on a country like Ireland, for example, or the contagion effect that was spoken? But as 

we see, it is mostly a domestic issue. 

No one is immune to this issue, whether a Democratic policy or 

a non-Democratic policy. And I think Northern Ireland is an example. It took the mediation of Senator George Mitchell to achieve the 

Good Friday Agreement in 1998. But we saw then that Richard 

Haass, Dr. Richard Haass, and Dr. Meghan O’Sullivan had to be 

expedited to Northern Ireland in 2014 to try and put the final 

stitches on that. And after 3 or 4 months and a final round of 15 

hours of negotiation, they did not achieve that final stitch on the 

agreement. 

What I want to say by that is there are no ancient hatreds. 

There are no prejudices. And thus, we have to look, as several have 

said already, at each specific situation that is grounded in historical cultural identity issues. 

And so, the fact that we have the European Union has been in 

this case between Serbia and Kosovo a very important element. It 

gives a framework in which countries that want to join a bigger 

family, by choice, voluntarily, of their own account know that it is 

only by a peaceful and democratic way that they must resolve these 

issues. 

30

There is nothing easy in a compromise. That is what Bernard 

Crick has called the high price of peace. Maximos’ positions have 

to be abandoned and coming to a middle where no one will be completely happy with the result, but when they reach the compromise, knowing that it can create stability and lasting peace. 

And that is probably the most difficult thing. 

As you mentioned, Chairman, I was a Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic who sought to solve the 

Kosovo issue as expeditiously as he could by advocating a possible 

direct negotiation with Hashim Thaci then, in the beginning of 

2003, where the north of Kosovo would be able to, itself, have selfdetermination and possibly independence, and at the same moment, recognizing the full independence of Kosovoand, as you said, 

Serbia needed to put this issue behind itself as quickly as possible. 

The rest is history. He was assassinated, and then we went into 

a protracted period, and now the mediation of the European Union 

is having that soothing effect as we go forward, and I believe it will 

be achieved. But as colleagues have said, these processes take a 

very long time. 

I would just like to, finally, make a point about the frozen conflicts, that countries such as Russia use a frozen conflict to keep 

leverage on international politics, and to allow or disallow a solution. The frozen conflicts that have been alluded to in Transnistria, 

and Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, are ones 

that have gone maybe on too long, and maybe we would like to see 

more leadership from the European Union in seeking a resolution 

to these conflicts. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vejvoda follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you all very much for your testimony. 

I think today we are launching a dialogue on an issue that has just 

been ignored, although it has had dramatic impact on our world, 

but they don’t want us to talk about it because to set any new 

standard on this frightens people. It just frightens us all that chaos 

is going to break out if we have a new international concept of 

what is right and wrong in the way to proceed with these issues 

of sovereignty, and the issues of self-determination and freedom 

and democracy, et cetera. 

Let me note that we—first of all, the first thing that got me involved in this issue was the fact that when I was first elected to 

Congress, the issue was whether or not Serbia was going to permit 

Kosovo to be an independent entity, or, at that time, by the way, 

I might note that Serbia also was claiming that they had to be the 

government of Croatia and the other countries as well. 

Let’s just put this in perspective. The Serbians, however, felt 

that because they had recognized national heritage treasures within Kosovo, that that meant that they had a right to keep that part 

of their jurisdiction under their jurisdiction, even though the majority of people, clearly, the majority of people, did not want to be 

part of Serbia. And that brought that home to me, and that was 

a, I think had, and I think I mentioned this in the opening remarks, had we basically had a situation where the Serbs at that 

time would have said, okay, you are going to be independent, but 

we are going to have a free trade zone among all these and open 

borders, and you would have had basically the same situation as 

a sovereign country, but not having people feel that they were 

being subjugated to one particular area of that country. 

Let’s get back to what my friend from Texas said earlier. Are we 

really talking about the majority has a right to determine what the 

government is in that part, in that area of any country, or anyplace 

in the world where they hold a majority? 

And, by the way, let me preface it by saying we are not talking 

about little enclaves of people spread throughout a country. We are 

talking about someplace on the periphery of a country. Do those 

people have a right, whether it is in Catalonia, or whether it is in 

Kosovo or wherever it is, or how about Biafra? Do these people or 

a majority of people in that area say they want to be independent 

and have their own country from the country that now governs 

them with a majority of a different type of people in another part 

of the country, is that their right to have their government? Because the majority, does the majority decide? And just real quickly, 

we will go down the list. Dr. Williams. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. The international law is seldom helpful in 

these instances, but in your particular question it is helpful. There 

are two answers: One, the International Court of Justice has said 

that an entity where a majority of the people decide that they 

would like to be independent, has a right to declare independence. 

It left unaddressed the question of whether or not there was an obligation of the international community to recognize them, but at 

least it gets you halfway there. The other way in which international law is helpful is it answers your question about who these 

people are that you need a majority determination from. It is pretty 

38

clear that there has to be a political identity, cultural identity, a 

history of association. 

A lot of the groups that you have been speaking about, as well 

the Armenians, and Nagorno-Karabakhs, the Catalonians, the 

Kosovars, they have that identity as a people, and you meld that 

with modern democratic norms, modern human rights norms, and 

they do have a right to seek independence, and then it has to be 

managed in a way that it doesn’t destabilize. But the fear of destabilization is not a reason to deny them their democratic right to determine their own political future. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When you say ‘‘democratic right,’’ are we just 

talking about what international law as it seems to be played out 

today, or are we talking about a theory of natural rights that our 

Founding Fathers——

Mr. WILLIAMS. I think it is more the theory of international. As 

an international lawyer, I can sort of put international law aside 

a little and not feel too guilty, but it is the natural law. It is the 

democratic norms and principles that drive this country and, quite 

frankly, that drive the self-determination movements around the 

globe, that willingness to determine your own political future, 

which international laws reflects, but that is not where the right 

comes from. It comes from this national right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that started within the course of 

human events. But Dr. Sorens. 

Mr. SORENS. Yes. I mean, you could take it back to John Locke’s 

second treatise, right, that influenced our Declaration of Independence, the idea that government is legitimate only when it enjoys 

the consent of the governed. If you take that view, then if the majority of people in a territory prefer a different government to the 

one that is currently ruling them, then letting them have that government increases the number of people living under a government 

that is legitimate to them. 

So that seems like, on balance, a reason to allow them to secede. 

But there are some other considerations we should bear in mind. 

So if a majority wants to secede in order to oppress a minority 

within its borders, that would be a reason not to let them secede, 

even if they get majority support. In some situations, you could do 

even better by allowing some negotiation over the borders of a new 

state. I think Kosovo is a good example here. The vast majority of 

people living in Kosovo wanted to become independent, but there 

was a small minority of ethnic Serbs that were very much opposed 

to that. 

If you could have had a situation where you negotiated Kosovo 

independence recognized by Serbia and a small part of Kosovo returned to Serbia if its inhabitants so desired, then, I think, things 

would have turned out better for Kosovo. Right now they are struggling to get recognized by other countries that don’t want to set a 

precedent. Spain is one country that hasn’t recognized Kosovo, at 

least the last time I checked. 

That has made it hard for Kosovo to join international organizations. So sometimes we can do better than simply saying whatever 

the majority decides goes. It is a good starting point, but we might 

want to negotiate from that starting point to try to protect the 

rights of everybody involved. 

39

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Vejvoda. 

Mr. VEJVODA. Just dovetailing on that, I mean, one could use 

also Tocqueville’s expression of the tyranny of the majority which 

he used in a political sense, but it applies here. You know, if there 

is this recognition that you want to be independent, but as Dr. 

Sorens just said, but there are minorities within majorities, you 

know, there was this half-flippant remark as all this started to unravel which said, Why should I be a minority in your country when 

you can be a minority in mine? And I think we have exactly seen 

that in several of these cases. 

I think, you know, it is really about the democratic legitimacy, 

about the consent of the government, and whether people feel that 

those who govern them really are doing a rather good, or a rather 

bad job. I would take the example of Quebec in 1995, when the Canadians and the Quebecers went for the vote. The difference in 

that referendum was stunning. It was 1.16 percent. And people 

went quietly home and accepted the result that Quebec had voted 

to stay in Canada. 

That doesn’t mean that they won’t do it again or the Scots won’t 

do it again. I think it is the general atmosphere and the policy. We 

talked about many of the elements that determine this default position that it is about state sovereignty, and everybody wants to be 

on the side of let’s not rock the boat. But we see in cases like these, 

it does create heightened emotions. But if people understand the 

rules of the game, they will go home, even if there is a 1-percent 

difference. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. And I am going to yield to my 

ranking member in a moment, but let me just note that the Czechs 

and the Slovaks managed to pull this off very quickly, and we had 

with us President Klaus, who told us that the reason he was successful in doing that with so few bumps and so little suffering in 

both sides and the reorganizing the economies, et cetera, was that 

he did it very quickly, very, very quickly, and everybody recognized 

it very, very quickly. And unlike what happened where we determined that the people in Kosovo, by a vast majority, did not want 

to be a part of Serbia, yes, we helped them free themselves by violence, force and violence. We, in fact, bombed Serbia in order to 

prevent their armed suppression of the Kosovars’ self-determination. But then, once we declared Kosovo, and it was recognized now 

as independent, we basically strung it out. They still are not really 

a fully recognized government. And for self-determination to work, 

it can’t be just philosophically correct, but we have got to have the 

courage and that principle of consent of the governed, that we act 

as a people and a government immediately on it, rather than letting something string out, which will then just keep the issue—it 

is just like tearing the scab off the wound every other day. 

So with that said, also perhaps we need an OSCE mandate that 

they would now be responsible, not only for observing elections in 

developing countries, or countries where there is conflicts, but instead, also, to be the entity that goes in to ensure that a vote on 

self-determination is a legitimate and fair vote. That would be 

something—would be something we could discuss as time goes on. 

And finally, one last point for, in terms of the United States. I 

have quite often, I actually take my own tweets; I tweet it out and 

40

sometimes right before I go to bed I will have a lot of fun debating 

people all over the world. You would be surprised. All these people 

say what about—because I happen to believe that the Baloch in 

Pakistan have a right to their self-determination. And these Indians say what about Kashmir? What about Kashmir? Yeah, I think 

they do, too. Yeah, if you believe in a principle, it is right for both 

peoples. And it was especially true when they say what about 

Texas? I kid you not. I get this. And I always say—or San Diego. 

One of the reasons why I believe that we have to control our borders to make sure that the people coming into this country are regulated to the point that they are absorbed into our society, is that 

we don’t end up in areas of our country where a vast majority of 

the people, who come from someplace else, now have a different 

point of view as to what our country should be, and live on the periphery and maybe want to be part of Mexico. 

But I will say that if we permit people into our country and permit them here legally, they have rights just like we do. That is why 

we have to control our borders. And if the majority of people in San 

Diego end up being people who would prefer that they live in Mexico, I’m sorry, they have a right to vote on it, and it is adios, San 

Diego. 

And this is, of course, a surprise that people are tweeting me on 

this. But I do believe that our Founding Fathers actually had 

something special that they tapped into when they talked about 

rights that are granted. You call them natural law. They are granted by God. These are things that I believe they have universal application, and that we shouldn’t be at all hesitant or apologetic 

about trying to use that as our standard on how we move forward. 

Mr. Meeks, you may proceed. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as I said, there is 

a lot of theoretical questions I think also, and I don’t know if there 

is one box that fits all. I mean, sitting here and listening and going 

back and forth, if there was one principle, we probably wouldn’t be 

here today, because we would be two different countries, the North 

and the South, would not be one unit. And people died in the 

United States in a Civil War, because half the country wanted to 

be governed a different way than the other half of the country. 

And, so, if we just had one principle, then the confederacy should 

have been allowed to leave, and we would not be here today as the 

United States of America, wouldn’t be. And, so, there are ramifications all over the world to just say, We are going to let one little 

minority group do a little—I can just recall, from my own lifetime, 

we had it in the African American community, back during the 

civil rights struggle, where some would say, Hey, we didn’t want 

to be part of the United States anymore. We wanted our own little 

state. We all come together because we were mostly one area and 

said let us create our own little country. 

So how do you define a people, number one? Because people of 

the United States are citizens of the United States, no matter what 

your background, your ethnicity, et cetera. So what are the people? 

I just look at another. You can go to Rwanda where the Tutsis and 

the Hutus, they are still one country. But it would be easy to say 

separate and make two. And who, then, recognizes what? And that 

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tions, because what is important about being a country to one degree is being recognized by another. And then coming together 

where you do have the lack of democracy and/or ethnic cleansing 

where there is a majority that is just going—so that is when we 

are supposed to come together in a unified humanitarian caucus 

and say we are not going to allow this to happen in certain areas 

where that is happening. That is part of what you, and I think that 

is part of, and then protect one another, that is part of what NATO 

was all about. So it is not easy. It is not just as simple as saying 

the people will decide because it depends upon who the people are, 

right? And I can see some context going both ways. I don’t know. 

So, Mr. Vejvoda, you lived it in the former Yugoslavia and 

Kosovar self-determination movement, and the fight now for 

Kosovo to try to get—what do you see? What do you envision? And 

are there any lessons that we can learn from the Kosovo experience 

since you lived it? 

Mr. VEJVODA. Let me start by quoting Isaiah Berlin, whom I 

quote at the end of the written testimony, who tried to give a definition of what good government was, and he put it very simply. He 

said: ‘‘To avoid the extremes of suffering.’’ I think that is exactly 

the opposite of what happened in my country. Someone called 

Slobodan Milosevic created the extremes of suffering with other 

leaders. He wasn’t the only culprit. 

And I think, obviously, when I was asked, you know, why my 

country disappeared in front of me, big lesson for a social scientist 

like myself, that the evil of history can always return, and we have 

to be vigilant to these kinds of populists and other movements, 

leaders that offer so-called simple snake-oil solutions to very complex problems. The answer was simple. We were not a democracy. 

We were a Communist system, and we didn’t have institutions, and 

that is why I talk about the European Union as having, up until 

today, created at least institutions that are what democratic institutions are supposed to be: A framework where you resolve conflict. 

A conflict will remain with us, as Machiavelli said, forever. And it 

is a question of how we deal with it, and what are the mechanisms 

by which we resolve them? 

So the experience one draws from the case of the former Yugoslavia, it is exactly that. It is the need to move out of the authoritarian dictatorial regime, and to move toward the creation of stabilization of institutions. That is why Dr. Williams’ earned sovereignty, I think, is a very important one, because he gives all the 

elements of what is needed. 

Preparing for this, I looked at the recent self-determination 

referenda that we talked about, you look at Eritrea, you look at 

South Sudan, you look at East Timor, they all went through processes of a diverse kind. I asked the question, who is caring for 

them the day after? There was an NPR story last week on South 

Sudan, the reporter said short and sad 5 years. And I think we 

need to be cognizant. That is why the earned sovereignty is so important. People need to be there the day after, not just in the leadup to that moment where the people decide, and I think that is key 

and that is maybe the biggest lesson. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Were you through, Mr. Meeks? 

42

Mr. MEEKS. Yes, I know we got votes coming up. 

Mr. WEBER. There they are. Gosh, I don’t know where to start, 

guys. You all have brought up so many interesting concepts. One 

of you said that—I think it was you, Dr. Sorens—is that right—

that self-determination, there is two paths, and I basically understand that to be the ballot box or military, militarily. You said 

there is a contagion, but that contagion doesn’t usually cross borders. What about the Arab Spring? 

Mr. SORENS. So democratic contagion can definitely go across 

borders. So we saw that back, as far as Europe 1848. But secessionism is fundamentally different because it only happens when a 

particular group has particular grievances or fears about the situation it is in. So we don’t see this kind of thing, even if you look 

at——

Mr. WEBER. So you don’t equate secessionism with democratization necessarily——

Mr. SORENS. I think they are fundamentally different processes. 

And any time, even if we look at Eastern Europe, it doesn’t look 

as if people are looking at Yugoslavia and saying, oh, we need to 

do that. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me interrupt you for a minute because we have 

to go to votes. Secession doesn’t equate to democratization, but yet, 

if self-determination, somebody is tired of the old ruling order, the 

avant garde, call it whatever you want, and they want self-determination, isn’t that democracy? 

Mr. SORENS. You could say that it——

Mr. WEBER. So secession is a means to an end of democracy? 

Mr. SORENS. It can be. It could be that the motivating principle 

of democracy might be a reason to recognize secession happening. 

So someone isn’t trying to secede normally in order to get democracy. It is normally you are trying to secede in order to get out 

from under the thumb of a regime that you feel is alien or hostile 

to your interests. So democracy might be a reason for us to say, 

okay, the majority has decided we are going to recognize you, but 

that is not what is driving these secessionist movements to happen. 

Mr. WEBER. You also said that if every country recognized the 

people’s right to self-determination or secession, I guess, then few 

would exercise it, which I thought was interesting. Why do you say 

that? 

Mr. SORENS. It is. It is surprising. Most people say, one of the 

first objections they have to this is, oh, you are going to get 10,000 

new states, and it is just going to be unmanageable, but all the evidence suggests that even in the developing world, most people fear 

big changes to the status quo. So, you only get strong support for 

independence when there is a history of discrimination or violence 

or other things that make people fearful to stay in that arrangement. Even India, I looked at data in India, every Indian state, trying to figure out the proportion that wanted to secede, the highest 

was in Kashmir, and it is only about 20 percent. 

Mr. WEBER. Let me jump over to your comments about Italy. You 

said the Italy constitution defines the country as indivisible. We 

would argue that our Pledge of Allegiance has that same phrase 

basically in it, but then you said the constitution had the phrase—

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determination. But, in point of fact, hasn’t the majority of people 

who voted for that constitution self-determined that they wanted to 

make the statement that they are indivisible? 

Mr. SORENS. It is sort of a philosophical question, but you could 

wonder, do the majority of Italian people have the right to decide 

for, say, Sardinians? Well, if Sardinians don’t want that——

Mr. WEBER. I would argue that they do until the constitution is 

changed. 

Mr. SORENS. We could wonder what the best constitutional form 

should be, should the constitution have this? That is sort of the debate. 

Mr. WEBER. That is where self-determination comes in. 

Mr. SORENS. Yeah. So we can say maybe the constitution should 

recognize self-determination. As long as it doesn’t, yeah, you got to 

follow the constitution, but maybe the constitution should be 

amended. 

Mr. WEBER. The problem with people voting is that they are people voting. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. In a couple minutes 

here, we are going to have to adjourn. We have a vote on, but let 

me just note, one point my dear friend and colleague made about, 

well, if the South would have seceded, we would have had them as 

principle, if the South wouldn’t have been preventing such a large 

chunk of their population not to have any rights, had all the slaves 

been citizens and been able to vote, yes, all of those people would 

then, in my mind, that would have justified their vote. 

Mr. WEBER. But aren’t those contradictory terms, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So, anyway, I do believe that is their right. 

And the other thing is, let me just note, we have a lot of these—

there are countries all over the world right now, people, whether 

it is in Biafra—and there is bloodshed going on right now for people in Biafra—feel that they should be independent. We didn’t back 

them up. I remember years ago when I was a kid, they had that 

same concept, the Baloch, people of Baloch, the Kosovars, I think 

this has not turned out the way it should have, because we have 

not had the courage of our conviction, but we had a little bit, 

enough to get involved but not enough to solve the issue of Sudan 

and the rest of this. 

Let me just note one issue that we will discuss in another hearing, which is, the most complicating factor to me, is that they are 

movements of populations by tyrants into people’s area and the 

people there become overwhelmed because Stalin moves a bunch of 

people into Crimea or wherever, and it muddies up this issue. 

But thank you very much for sharing with us, starting this dialogue on an issue that has been ignored, and today, I declare that 

an open issue for discussion of self-determination, but the end of 

this hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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