Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Donald R. Shuler

Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP

Goshen, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Caryn N. Szyper

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tony W. Heroy,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 21, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A05-1607-CR-1572

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

20D03-1407-FA-21

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 2 of 13

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial, Tony Heroy was convicted of child molesting as a Class 

A felony and the trial court sentenced him to forty-five years executed in the 

Indiana Department of Correction. Heroy appeals his conviction and sentence, 

raising four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: 1) 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence, 2) whether 

the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction, and 3) whether his sentence 

is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. 

Concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence, the 

evidence is sufficient, and Heroy’s sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2011, B.G. lived with her father, M.J., and step-mother, S.J., in Elkhart, 

Indiana. Heroy, B.G.’s step-uncle, also lived nearby. Over the next several 

years, B.G. often spent time at Heroy’s residence to visit with family and also 

when Heroy babysat B.G. 

[3] In July 2014, then ten-year-old B.G. spent the night at C.R’s home; C.R. is a 

member of B.G.’s extended family. B.G. explained to C.R. that Heroy had 

previously touched her several times in a sexual manner. C.R. informed S.J. of 

B.G.’s statements and S.J. contacted law enforcement. 

[4] On July 17, 2014, a child forensic interviewer from the Child and Family 

Advocacy Center interviewed B.G., which was video recorded. During the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 3 of 13

interview, B.G. stated Heroy began touching her when she was approximately 

seven or eight years old and the touching occurred at two of Heroy’s residences

over the years. B.G. explained that, on at least one occasion, Heroy called her 

into his bedroom, positioned her on the bed, and pulled her pants and 

underwear down to her ankles. Using his hands, Heroy touched B.G.’s vagina, 

butt, and breasts, and also rubbed his penis on her butt and vagina. B.G. also 

explained that when she was nine years old, Heroy performed oral sex on her

and she observed “white stuff” coming out of Heroy’s penis. State’s Exhibit 8

at 17:20-17:30. B.G. estimated the touching occurred several times over the 

years, and at times, Heroy gave B.G. money and asked her to keep it a secret. 

[5] On July 22, 2014, the State charged Heroy with child molesting as a Class A 

felony. In January 2016, Heroy wrote a letter to his wife from jail describing 

B.G. as a “little c*nt” and requesting his wife find a witness who could falsely 

claim B.G. admitted to lying about Heroy’s acts. State’s Ex. 7. The letter was 

accidentally sent to Heroy’s brother and later given to law enforcement. On 

March 24, 2016, Heroy filed a motion in limine seeking to bar the State from 

admitting evidence of the letter at trial, which the trial court denied. 

[6] At trial, B.G. testified generally to the sexual encounters, but at times was 

unable to provide specific answers, citing an inability to remember. During a 

brief recess, the State attempted to refresh B.G.’s memory by having her view 

the recording of the interview. B.G. claimed the interview did not sufficiently 

refresh her recollection. The State then moved to admit the video recording of 

the interview into evidence, which the trial court granted over Heroy’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 4 of 13

objection. The trial court also admitted the letter over Heroy’s objection. A 

jury found Heroy guilty as charged and the trial court sentenced him to fortyfive years executed in the Department of Correction. This appeal ensued. 

Additional facts will be added as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

A. Standard of Review

[7] The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial 

court. Cherry v. State, 971 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A 

trial court may abuse its discretion in admitting evidence if its decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if 

the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.

B. The Letter

[8] Heroy contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the letter. 

Specifically, he claims the probative value of the letter is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and the letter’s admission likely 

inflamed the passions of the jurors. We disagree.

[9] Indiana Rule of Evidence 401 states evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency 

to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence . . . 

and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” However, a trial 

court maintains the discretion to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 5 of 13

value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or 

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403. In 

criminal prosecutions, all relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial to a 

defendant. Sanders v. State, 840 N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind. 2006). Therefore, to 

determine whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial, “courts should look for the 

dangers that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or 

that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.” 

Bell v. State, 29 N.E.3d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[10] In the letter, Heroy describes B.G. in a vulgar manner and requests his wife find 

a witness who could claim B.G. lied about Heroy’s acts of molestation. Such 

evidence is relevant and highly probative as it indicates Heroy’s consciousness 

of guilt and intent to discredit a child victim’s testimony. Although we 

acknowledge the letter does have some prejudicial impact and the potential to 

arouse or inflame the passions of the jury, we cannot say the admission of the 

letter was unfairly prejudicial. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting the letter.

C. The Interview

[11] Heroy contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a video 

recording of the interview. Specifically, he claims the interview constitutes 

inadmissible hearsay and further argues its admission violated his right to 

confront B.G. The State counters the admission of the interview falls within the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 6 of 13

recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule and Heroy’s confrontation 

rights were not infringed upon because he had an opportunity to face B.G. and 

cross-examine her at trial. We agree with the State as to both issues and find no 

error in the admission of the interview.

1. Recorded Recollection

[12] Heroy first contends the interview is inadmissible hearsay. “Hearsay is an outof-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted.” Coleman v. State, 946 N.E.2d 1160, 1168 (Ind. 2011) (citing Ind. 

Evidence Rule 801(c)). Hearsay can be admissible, however, if it falls within

one of the exceptions delineated in Indiana Evidence Rule 803. Evid. R. 802. 

Here, the parties acknowledge the interview constitutes hearsay but dispute 

whether the interview was properly admitted under the recorded recollection 

exception, which provides that a record may be admitted into evidence if the 

record: “(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall 

well enough to testify fully and accurately; (B) was made or adopted by the 

witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s memory, and (C) accurately 

reflects the witness’s knowledge.” Evid. R. 803(5). Specifically, it appears 

Heroy only challenges the first prong, arguing B.G.’s “memory as displayed 

during her testimony should not have been considered so insufficient to warrant 

application of the recorded recollection hearsay exception.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 13. 

[13] At trial, B.G. testified generally as to how Heroy touched her vagina with his 

penis and mouth. However, B.G. was unable to answer some questions due to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 7 of 13

her inability to remember certain details of the sexual encounters and

acknowledged having a better memory during the interview. B.G. was then 

excused from the stand, and during a brief recess, B.G. viewed the interview. 

Following the recess, the State recalled B.G. to the stand. B.G. then

acknowledged she struggled to answer the State’s questions in her previous 

testimony due to her memory, and although reviewing the interview helped her 

remember some details, she felt the interview adequately described details of the 

events she still could not remember. She further explained her statements 

during the interview were truthful. The State then moved to admit a redacted 

portion of the interview, which the trial court allowed over Heroy’s objection. 

[14] We conclude the interview was properly admitted under the recorded 

recollection exception to the hearsay rule. B.G. clearly could not recall some 

specific details of Heroy’s acts. During the interview and at trial, B.G. noted 

the statements she made in the interview were truthful. In addition, she

acknowledged the interview provided a level of detail she could not fully 

provide at the time of trial. We further note her testimony pertaining to the 

events she could recall at the time of trial were consistent with the statements 

she made during the interview. We conclude the interview pertained to a 

matter B.G. once knew about but could not remember well enough to 

accurately and fully recall at trial. See Horton v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1277, 1283 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding the admission of a videotaped interview under the 

recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule was proper in light of the 

fact the child victim could not recall “some specific details” during live 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 8 of 13

testimony, the victim’s statements at trial were consistent with the statements 

made during the interview, and the victim timely adopted the statements made 

during the interview as accurate), summarily aff’d on this ground, 949 N.E.2d 346 

(Ind. 2011). 

2. Confrontation Clause

[15] Heroy also contends the admission of the interview into evidence violated the 

Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions. 

Specifically, he claims the vast majority of evidence showing his culpability 

stemmed from the admission of the interview, and because the interview 

occurred nearly a year and one-half prior to trial, he was deprived of a genuine 

opportunity to cross-examine B.G. We disagree.

[16] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that, “In 

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him . . . .” Similarly, Article 1, Section 13 of the 

Indiana Constitution guarantees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face . . . .” However, in 

the event a declarant is unable to recall certain events during live testimony, the 

Confrontation Clause is satisfied as long as the declarant is available for crossexamination. Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied, 547 

U.S. 1193 (2006). Stated differently, “if the declarant ‘appears for crossexamination at trial,’—sometimes treated as equivalent to ‘available’—the 

opportunity for cross-examination on the witness stand is sufficient for purposes 

of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. Here, B.G. testified at trial, Heroy had an 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 9 of 13

opportunity to face B.G., and B.G. was subject to cross-examination before and 

after the interview was admitted into evidence. Heroy’s argument fails.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

[17] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal 

conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness 

credibility. Smart v. State, 40 N.E.3d 963, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Rather, we 

consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable 

inferences arising from such evidence. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless 

“no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind.2007) (citation 

omitted).

B. Child Molesting

[18] Heroy contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for child 

molesting. To prove Heroy committed child molesting as a Class A felony as 

charged, the State was required to prove Heroy, being a person of at least 

twenty-one years of age, performed or submitted to sexual intercourse or 

deviate sexual conduct with B.G., a child under the age of fourteen. Ind. Code 

§ 35-42-4-3(a) (2007). “‘Deviate sexual conduct’ means an act involving: (1) a

sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (2) the 

penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object.” Ind. Code § 35-

31.5-2-94 (2012). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 10 of 13

[19] At the outset, we note B.G.’s testimony establishes Heroy performed deviate

sexual conduct when he performed oral sex on her and the uncorroborated 

testimony of a victim or eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See 

Hubbard v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1219, 1220 (Ind. 1999). Heroy acknowledges this 

point, see Appellant’s Br. at 26, but contends the doctrine of incredible dubiosity 

dictates his conviction cannot stand. The incredible dubiosity rule allows a 

reviewing court to “impinge on the jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility 

of the witnesses only when it has confronted inherently improbable testimony

or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony . . . .” Moore v. 

State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 755 (Ind. 2015) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). In other words, “Application of this rule is rare and the standard to 

be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently 

improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Love v. State, 761 

N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). In Moore, our supreme court described the 

appropriate scope of the rule, which requires: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) 

testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; 

and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” 27 N.E.3d at 756. If all 

three factors are not present, application of the incredible dubiosity rule is 

precluded. Id. at 758. 

[20] Here, we note Heroy does not point to any portion of the record showing 

B.G.’s testimony was inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of 

coercion. Instead, Heroy claims B.G., during the interview and at trial, was 

unable to confidently say when the acts of molestation occurred. What Heroy 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 11 of 13

fails to acknowledge, however, is the fact he molested B.G., a young child, on 

several occasions over an extended period of time. In light of these 

circumstances, B.G.’s inability to consistently and specifically identify when the 

acts occurred does not make her testimony incredibly dubious. We decline 

Heroy’s request to apply the doctrine of incredible dubiosity and conclude the 

State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Heroy’s conviction for child 

molesting as a Class A felony.

III. Inappropriateness of Sentence

[21] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden of 

persuading this court his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 

N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate 

turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage 

done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given 

case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role 

of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not achieve the perceived 

“correct” result in each case. Id. at 1225.

[22] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature selected as an 

appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Here, Heroy 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 12 of 13

was convicted of child molesting as a Class A felony. A person convicted of a 

Class A felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty and fifty 

years, with the advisory sentence being thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). 

The trial court sentenced Heroy to forty-five years executed in the Department 

of Correction.

[23] As to the nature of the offense, we note Heroy took advantage of B.G. several 

times over an extended period of time, all while he was in a position of trust, 

care, and authority over her. In addition, Heroy gave B.G. money after several 

sexual encounters and requested she keep the encounters a secret. As to 

Heroy’s character, we note he attempted to avoid responsibility for his conduct 

by requesting his wife find a witness who would falsely claim B.G. fabricated 

the acts of molestation. Also in the letter, Heroy described B.G., his niece, as a 

“little c*nt.” State’s Ex. 7. Although these prior two points speak greatly to 

Heroy’s character, we further note Heroy has been convicted of at least three 

prior crimes, including child abuse, and has violated probation on two 

occasions. We conclude Heroy’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and his character.

Conclusion

[24] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence, 

the evidence is sufficient to sustain Heroy’s conviction, and Heroy’s sentence is 

not inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A05-1607-CR-1572 | March 21, 2017 Page 13 of 13

[25] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.