AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

NO. 24 / JANUARY 2013

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The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa

By Prosper Nzekani Zena

u Notwithstanding laudable successes, incomplete or poorly conceived disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration (DDR) initiatives have been key factors to high rates of conflict relapse in Africa.

u Reintegration is the most complex and critical yet least prioritized facet of DDR.

u The decision to integrate former militias into the national army is typically a political expediency that impedes 

military professionalism and increases the likelihood of human rights abuses and instability.

HIGHLIGHTS

There are approximately 500,000 individuals in a 

variety of nonstate militias, national armies, and paramilitary groups slated to undergo DDR programs across 

Africa. This is consistent with the estimated average 

annual DDR caseload for most of the last decade. As 

previous large-scale efforts in Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have wound down, new challenges in South 

Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Great Lakes region have 

emerged. Organized DDR initiatives were underway in 

10 African states in 2012, and the need for disarmament 

was apparent in many others. 

In Libya, scores of militias emerged during and after 

the 2011 anti-Qadhafi revolution, and subsequent clashes between them have resulted in hundreds of deaths. 

Such incidents have focused attention on DDR, but 

the prevailing volatility has compounded the reluctance 

among militias to disarm. Libyan authorities estimate that 

150,000 combatants need to be disarmed and many judge 

this issue to be among the most difficult challenges of the 

post-Qadhafi transition.

Following a decade-long low-intensity conflict that 

culminated in a 5-month postelectoral crisis in 2011 in 

which 3,000 people died, Côte d’Ivoire faces immense 

DDR challenges as well. The United Nations (UN) 

peacekeeping mission there estimates that up to 100,000 

combatants will need to be demobilized from among 

the former regime’s military, rebel forces, and various 

partisan paramilitary units. A spate of armed attacks in 

2012 killed dozens of civilians and government troops as 

well as seven UN peacekeepers, indicating that militants 

remain a threat to stability. Insecurity has also spread to 

neighboring Liberia and Ghana, as fighters from Côte 

d’Ivoire have stored arms and launched attacks across 

their shared borders. 

The fledgling government of South Sudan launched 

a disarmament program to downsize its security forces by 

150,000 personnel and is mounting a separate effort to 

disarm individuals and local militias to stem worsening 

intercommunal violence. Roughly 20,000 former fighters 

from the Lord’s Resistance Army and other militias are 

waiting to complete a DDR process in Uganda. Approximately the same number has been waiting since 2009 

for a DDR program to be implemented in the Central 

African Republic. Frustrated by the delays, some of these 
Colonel Prosper Nzekani Zena (ret.) is an independent 

consultant and former military professor and trainer with 

the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

He has served in a variety of roles supporting DDR efforts 

in the DRC for more than a decade, including as a lead 

advisor to the national disarmament and demobilization 

program from 2008 to 2010. 

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configuration of a DDR program is a secondary concern.

A second subset of combatants harbors deeper ties 

and vested interests in militancy. They are typically senior in rank, and demobilization represents a substantial 

sacrifice of influence and authority. Often they profit 

from their role in a militia or the armed forces, whether 

through illicit taxation or trafficking of minerals and 

commodities. Some of these combatants may face prosecution or investigation for war crimes, and therefore have 

strong incentives to remain armed and active. Promises 

of skills training or reintegration assistance are unlikely 

to appeal to hardcore combatants. 

Many militants in the DRC, for example, remained 

armed despite lengthy DDR efforts. Years of DDR targeting the Hutu-led Forces Démocratique de Liberation du 

Rwanda (FDLR) gradually drew thousands of fighters 

from the bush to disarm, but as the FDLR shrank so 

did DDR progress. Many senior FDLR fighters profit 

from the exploitation of valuable mineral reserves in 

the DRC and face prosecution for their involvement 

in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, so they are unlikely to 

disarm through DDR. Likewise, despite the demobilization of roughly 25,000 combatants from other militant 

groups in the DRC’s Ituri region, which had been a focal 

point of conflict from the mid-1990s until 2003, some 

militias remained active and resistant to DDR. Indeed, 

Ituri experienced a spike in militia attacks and killings 

in 2012. Other methods, including military operations, 

legal and diplomatic pressure, and measures to combat 

illicit revenue generation are needed to deal with hardcore combatants.

A third subset of combatants exists between self-demobilizers and the hardcore. They are hesitant to disarm, 

fearing that they will be exposed and vulnerable amid 

an insecure, uncertain, and volatile environment. They 

lack suitable income-earning alternatives, so may worry 

that disarmament would result in diminished well being. 

However, they have little motive or interest in remaining 

a combatant. They are fence-sitters who need inducements and viable, gradual pathways to reject militancy. 

It is with this third subset of combatants that DDR 

programs can have their biggest impact. By providing 

adequate opportunities to safely disarm, financial and 

psychological support to transition to civilian life, and 

sufficient training and opportunities to sustain themselves, DDR can draw such swing combatants away 

from militancy. This also indirectly weakens remaining 

hardcore combatants by depleting the number of their 

militias have again taken up arms, heightening instability. DDR remains a priority in Guinea-Bissau, but has 

been delayed for years. And new DDR challenges lay on 

the horizon. In Mali, following a 2012 rebellion launched 

by northern separatists and the subsequent seizure of several key cities by heavily armed Islamist groups, disarmament and demobilization will be crucial to reversing an 

increasingly militarized situation. As an African Union 

peace operation continues to make progress stabilizing 

Somalia, estimates indicate that at least 53,000 militants 

there will ultimately need to be disarmed.

Despite the growing need for DDR, previous campaigns in Africa have encountered many difficulties and 

yielded mixed results. A decade-long DDR program in 

Africa’s Great Lakes region cost nearly $500 million 

and disarmed and demobilized 300,000 combatants in 7 

countries. However, heavy fighting regularly flares in the 

region and a resurgent rebellion in eastern Democratic 

Republic of the Congo (DRC) driven by formerly demobilized forces has resulted in hundreds of deaths, a surge 

in militia recruitment and mobilization, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Dissatisfaction 

and backsliding among ex-combatants remain common 

in many DDR campaigns. 

THE COMBATANT’S VIEW

Combatants in postconflict settings can be roughly 

divided into three subsets. Frequently, a significant proportion of armed actors will voluntarily self-demobilize 

once a viable peace framework seems to be in place. In 

Burundi, many combatants harbored no deep commitment to a career as a militant and eagerly participated 

in DDR.1 In many DDR campaigns, up to 20 percent 

of combatants who complete demobilization claim no 

subsequent transitional or reintegration benefits.2 In 

Sierra Leone and Liberia, surveys indicated that 10-15 

percent of ex-combatants opted not to participate in 

DDR at all.3 For self-demobilizers, the availability and 
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supporters. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the DRC, this 

group was mostly young, lacked extensive training or 

education, and had few familial or kinship connections 

that could draw them back to their home communities 

or serve as a support network and social outlet. 

While fence-sitting combatants are core constituents of DDR, past campaigns have encountered shortcomings in addressing their needs and interests. The first 

two components of DDR, disarmament and demobilization, are usually not the problem. Some politically sensitive matters are involved, but they are usually short-lived 

and pose primarily technical challenges. Assembly sites 

for disarmament must be situated near areas of militant 

activity but secured so that arriving combatants do not 

feel vulnerable. Combatants must be registered, arms 

must be collected and either secured or destroyed, and 

cantonment sites for the demobilized must be built. Communication is critical so that prospective participants are 

aware of the process, its duration, and do not have inflated expectations about its outcomes, which can result 

in later frustration. However, with proper planning, the 

disarmament and demobilization steps can be effectively 

managed and implemented. 

Reintegration, by contrast, is far more complex and 

lengthy. Reintegration involves skills training, loans, job 

placement, and assistance to resocialize ex-combatants 

and facilitate their relocation to permanent homes. It 

is also the stage at which backsliding is most common. 

In Liberia, ex-combatants who completed disarmament 

and demobilization demonstrated limited abilities to 

reintegrate politically, socially, and economically.4 Those 

who completed disarmament and demobilization in Burundi but then endured long reintegration delays became 

frustrated and distrustful of DDR. In general, delays in 

reintegration are linked to escalations in tensions and 

relapses into armed violence. Incomplete or ineffective 

reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life, in turn, 

risks the greater likelihood of armed criminality.5

In many DDR campaigns, momentum ebbs sharply 

during reintegration. Only half of those who had been 

demobilized received reintegration assistance in the DRC 

(see table). Assistance typically included some combination of a stipend paid in installments, vocational and 

skills training, kits with basic tools and provisions for 

agricultural or other productive purposes, and some psychological and resocialization assistance. Unfortunately, 

the assistance was of limited use and duration. Kits were 

often sold rather than used for their intended purposes. 

Due to inadequate infrastructure, delivering promised 

stipends to ex-combatants at regular intervals proved 

challenging, diminishing trust in the DDR process. The 

training received was often poorly suited to labor market 

needs. Two of the most popular sectors in which Congolese ex-combatants worked were transportation and 

artisanal mining, yet almost no training or assistance 

were provided for these fields.6 Many ex-combatants had 

some experience in fishing, agriculture, trading, and other 

sectors prior to joining a militia, but these preexisting 

skills were often ignored rather than reinforced during 

reintegration. Surveys of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone 

suggested that DDR programs needed to more clearly 

understand participants’ various incentives—formed 

through their wartime experiences, their social connections and roots, and their existing wealth and skills—to 

break their ties with armed groups and integrate into 

civilian communities.7 In general, mismatches between 

reintegration plans and the opportunities, skills, preferences, and expectations of ex-combatants are common 

in many DDR campaigns. 

Communities where ex-combatants were relocated 

were also often uninformed, suspicious, or even resistant 

to reintegration and DDR more generally. For some 

communities, the stipends, training, and other assistance 

given to ex-combatants appeared to be a reward for militancy. Assistance also sometimes created socioeconomic 

imbalances tilted toward ex-combatants within poor 

villages and towns. Moreover, given the grave human 

rights abuses that may have been committed during a 

conflict, resentment toward ex-combatants could be 

acute. Lack of consultation and engagement with communities, therefore, could exacerbate these tensions. 

POLITICAL REALITIES AND INTRUSIONS

Continued bouts of insecurity in the DRC have delayed and reversed DDR gains. Even a clash in an isolated 

area or across a national border can cause ripple effects 

into comparatively more stable regions. For example, 

though they are separated by several hundred kilometers, 

the emergence in 2012 of the Rwandan-supported M23 

“incomplete or ineffective 

reintegration of ex-combatants into 

civilian life, in turn, risks the greater 

likelihood of armed criminality”
4

rebel group in North Kivu province motivated comparatively quiet militias in the DRC’s Ituri region to make 

new advances and alliances. The DRC government also 

moved troops previously deployed in Ituri to North Kivu, 

leaving a vacuum. Other militia groups subsequently began recruiting and demanding that they be given senior 

positions in the military and authority over the resourcerich Ituri region as a condition to their participation in 

DDR.8 These shifts have forced indefinite delays in a 

final phase of DDR in Ituri. Many combatants scheduled 

to participate and others already demobilized have since 

joined new militias, reversing previous gains. 

DDR in the DRC exhibited other counterproductive features. Ex-combatants in the DRC were offered 

two options during demobilization: reintegration into civilian life or integration into the newly established police 

or military, les Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The choice was more or less 

up to the combatant without consideration of the policy 

implications. Though nearly 200,000 combatants in the 

DRC were processed during the first round of national 

DDR, roughly half were effectively remobilized.9 This 

approach simultaneously served another objective. The 

DRC essentially had no security services when a transitional government was established in 2003. Assembling 

a military and police force from already armed actors 

seemed a logical expedient. Moreover, it was thought 

that the option to integrate into the armed forces might 

Sources: These figures are based on various estimates from multiple United Nations and World Bank documents, commissioned 

studies, and news reports. Some residual DDR activities continue in countries where past programs have formally ended. Civilian 

disarmament campaigns in Uganda, South Sudan, Kenya, and elsewhere were omitted because they contain no demobilization or 

reintegration components. 

Country Duration Estimated 

Combatants Number Demobilized Number Reintegrated Budget (millions of US$)

Namibia 1989-1999 Unavailable 57,000 11,950 Unavailable

Mozambique 1992-1994 100,000 92,000 Unavailable Unavailable

Chad

1992-1996 (Phase I)

1996-1997 (Phase II)

1999 (Reintegration 

pilot program)

27,179 27,179 Discontinued 12

2005-2010 9,000 Never implemented Never implemented 10

South Africa 1995-2001 22,000 7,081 4,758 50 

Rwanda 1997-2001 (Phase I)

2001-2008 (Phase II) 57,000 29,794 43,891 68

Sierra Leone

1998 (Phase I)

1999-2000 (Phase II)

2002-2004 (Phase III)

84,200 71,043 54,000 45

Ethiopia 2000-2003 148,000 148,000 148,000 174

Uganda 2000- 50,000 26,288 5,335 8

Guinea-Bissau

2001-2006 12,595 12,129 4,261 13

2008- 3,120 Delayed Delayed Unavailable

Angola 2002-2008 105,000 97,390 92,297 246

Somalia 2003-2007 53,000 1,500 505 3

Liberia 2003-2008 103,019 101,495 59,831 110

Côte d'Ivoire

2003-2007 (Phase I) 

2007-2010 (Phase II) 48,000 17,601 0 40

2011- 100,000 Yet to commence Yet to commence Unavailable

Central African Rep. 2004-2007 7,565 7,556 7,556 13

2009- 19,100 6,431 Yet to commence Unavailable

Burundi 2004-2008 35,000 26,283 21,012 84

DRC 2004-2010 240,000 159,670 77,780 275 

Rep. of Congo 2005-2008 30,000 Unavailable 15,179 25

Niger 2006-2007 3,160 3,160 3,160 2

Sudan (Darfur) 2008- 4,700 5,363 303 Unavailable

South Sudan 2009-2011 (Phase I)

2012-2017 (Phase II) 150,000 12,523 8,307 165

Nigeria 2009-2014 30,000 26,358 6,549 63

Libya 2011- 150,000 Yet to commence Yet to commence Unavailable

SNAPSHOT OF DDR INITIATIVES IN AFRICA SINCE 1990
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allay the apprehensions of combatants and militia commanders about the sacrifice of security and influence that 

disarmament entailed. 

As appealing as this was, the approach disregarded 

the realities of the transition in the DRC. The fragmentation of the militias was extensive, severely impeding the 

ability to unify the nearly 100,000 militants who elected 

integration into a single military force. For example, combatants led by prominent Congolese militia commander 

Kakule Sekuli LaFontaine were first demobilized, later 

opted for integration into the armed forces, and eventually deserted after claiming that other militias had been 

provided more favorable concessions. They regrouped 

under LaFontaine in the eastern DRC in 2012 and 

launched several attacks against government forces to 

seize weapons. A group of another 150 militants, likewise, 

deserted the FARDC after learning they were receiving 

less favorable military ranks and subsequently looted villages and raped dozens of women and children.10 Over 

the course of two weeks in June 2011 four ex-combatant 

senior officers who had previously integrated into the 

armed forces and police separately deserted with several 

hundred supporters.11 

The DRC government resorted to other short-term 

expedients. According to the DDR plan, ex-combatants 

that chose to integrate with the military were to be thoroughly assessed, appropriately retrained, and separated 

from their militia command-and-control structures before integrating into the military. However, an “accelerated integration” program was created so that forces could 

be more quickly utilized. Eventually, tens of thousands of 

ex-combatants were deployed with little to no training or 

vetting.12 Many deserted, reintroducing numerous armed 

actors into a still volatile region. Many that remained 

within the FARDC have been ineffective, notorious for 

human rights abuses, and loyal to their former militia 

leaders rather than the FARDC chain of command. 

The case of the M23 rebellion in the eastern DRC 

is highly illustrative. Many M23 members served in the 

Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma 

(RCD-Goma) militant faction during the 1999-2003 

war. In the ensuing DDR effort that commenced in 2006, 

many of the former RCD-Goma troops refused to participate. Those that agreed to integrate into the FARDC 

continued to operate under the RCD-Goma hierarchy. 

In January 2009, many of these units attended so-called 

accelerated integration while retaining their commandand-control structure and control over mineral-rich territories. In 2012, many of these combatants re-formed 

as the M23 rebellion and launched new attacks against 

the FARDC. 

The option to integrate into the military may have 

enhanced the appeal of and participation in DDR, but it 

neglected the inevitable hurdles of achieving the genuine 

integration of so many militants, particularly given the 

likelihood that pockets of ongoing conflict would compel 

the deployment of an unprepared force of questionable 

loyalty. This set back previous gains and undermined 

the DDR mission. Meanwhile, support for reintegration 

among the DRC’s national leadership was also muted. 

Extending assistance to combatants—many of whom 

were erstwhile enemies—appeared to be deprioritized 

once combatants were disempowered and attention 

shifted elsewhere.

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

A DDR campaign’s viability is also frequently shaped 

by preexisting conditions that are independent from 

the campaign’s implementation or participants. How 

conflicts end, for instance, has significant implications 

for subsequent disarmament. Increasingly, conflicts in 

Africa end through negotiated settlements, and resulting 

peace agreements typically include provisions for DDR. 

Some agreements, however, are more detailed than others. Following the conflict in the DRC, for example, 

the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in 

the DRC of 2002 provided few specifics on DDR aims 

and processes. The agreement mentioned disarmament 

just twice and left the details to be shaped by a Defence 

Council that was never convened. Essentially, signatories 

committed to DDR without agreeing to what it entailed. 

Subsequent DDR was often delayed as individual militias 

withheld their participation to negotiate better benefits 

for themselves.

By contrast, the peace arrangements in neighboring 

Burundi included timetables, technical plans, the compo-

“the option to integrate into the 

military may have enhanced the 

appeal of and participation in DDR, 

but it neglected the inevitable hurdles 

of achieving the genuine integration 

of so many militants”
6

sition of the reformed security forces including a balanced 

representation of senior officers and ethnic groups, and a 

commitment by authorities to satisfy basic provisions for 

the disarmed and to work toward longer-term reintegration. In Liberia, the peace agreement specified the role 

of peacekeeping forces in DDR and established that all 

signatories and various international organizations would 

be included in a national DDR commission to oversee 

the process. While subsequent DDR in Liberia and Burundi were far from problem-free, they were arguably 

more effective than the program in the DRC. The clarity 

of the DDR framework in the negotiated settlement was 

an important head start.

 Prevailing economic, labor market, and development conditions also have a significant impact on DDR’s 

progress. The commitment of many ex-combatants to 

DDR is greatly influenced by the availability of alternative livelihoods and jobs. These, in turn, are shaped by 

broader economic, development, and postconflict recovery programs. DDR programs can provide skills training, 

credit schemes, and other support to ex-combatants as 

they search for new income-earning opportunities, but if 

the broader economic recovery is sluggish and opportunities few, DDR alone cannot sustainably change this situation. In northern Uganda, for instance, ex-combatants 

were often unable to apply newly developed skills due to 

lack of demand and depressed market conditions.13 This 

may, in part, explain high rates of criminality among excombatants, who make up 42 percent of the inmates in 

prisons in northern Uganda.14

The dynamics and scale of previous violence can 

also have significant implications for DDR. In Sierra 

Leone, for example, whether ex-combatants served in 

more violent or abusive armed factions was among the 

strongest determinants of successful acceptance and reintegration into communities.15 Moreover, the number 

and composition of groups to be disarmed greatly affects 

a DDR program. Many of Africa’s lengthy conflicts are 

characterized by a proliferation of armed groups, poorly 

organized combatants, and shifting loyalties. Such dynamics have unfolded in Darfur, the Central African 

Republic, and elsewhere, making it more difficult to 

identify, communicate with, and assemble combatants.

REFINING DDR TOOLS

DDR campaigns in Africa have made significant 

achievements. Tens of thousands of former combatants have transitioned into civilian life through various 

DDR efforts. Many have resettled into communities and 

alternative livelihoods, thereby reducing the number of 

armed actors and potential violence and criminality in 

postconflict and unstable contexts. 

However, DDR is no panacea for instability. It is 

not designed to directly address many conflict drivers, 

such as political and economic power imbalances that 

fuel grievances, illicit trafficking that empowers or motivates violent actors, or governance weaknesses that 

tempt spoilers and prompt communities to turn to self 

defense. Conflict can persist and even surge due to factors unrelated to DDR. Without a viable development 

strategy to advance a postconflict economic recovery, 

even the best managed DDR campaigns will struggle to 

reintegrate ex-combatants into a productive civilian life. 

While many combatants willingly participate in DDR, 

there are always holdouts. Combatants with stronger incentives to remain mobilized must be addressed through 

other stabilization and postconflict responses, whether 

diplomatic, political, judicial, or military. 

Conversely, DDR programs should not be envisioned or expanded as a means to address larger postconflict economic recovery, institution building, or stabilization challenges. Such overreach is counterproductive. 

The success of a DDR program may be contingent upon 

the progress of a peace settlement, a political transition, 

or a security sector reform effort, but this does not mean 

that DDR should be designed to directly achieve these 

ends or compensate for their shortcomings. An overly expansive DDR program could actually undermine DDR’s 

prospects and traction by neglecting the needs and interests of DDR’s core constituency—ex-combatants. What 

DDR can do is help smooth a transition and mitigate the 

impact of setbacks and other obstacles as part of a broader 

stabilization effort.

DDR efforts also need to be better analyzed and 

assessed. There are few assessments of past DDR campaigns in which goals are rigorously and systematically 

compared against actual outcomes through surveys and 

collection of data from DDR participants. For instance, 

though both DDR campaigns in Liberia and Burundi 

ran concurrently, reintegration stipends in Liberia were 

roughly half the rate of those provided to ex-combatants 

in Burundi and distributed less frequently. How these and 

other differences affected DDR participation or success, 

however, has not been assessed. So as to more clearly 

identify and transfer such DDR lessons, campaigns must 
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collect better baseline information on the diversity of 

backgrounds, needs, and expectations of ex-combatants 

and cross-reference these with findings following the 

implementation of the campaign. From this, valuable 

insights can be derived regarding elements of DDR that 

were most successful, groups that were more likely to 

abandon DDR, or those programs that had little noticeable impact.

There are various opportunities to sharpen and 

strengthen DDR efforts in Africa. A key prerequisite is 

a well-organized, inclusive, and clearly communicated 

framework for DDR. Directly and thoroughly identifying 

DDR processes, including when and where disarmament 

and demobilization will take place, eligibility criteria, 

how security will be assured and by whom, what body 

will oversee DDR and who will participate in it, and firm 

commitments to reintegration services should be central 

goals of peace negotiation efforts.16 Though it may be 

tempting to postpone these discussions should they become contentious and seem to delay the completion of 

a negotiation process, if they cannot be resolved, then 

they will linger as serious obstacles to stability and peace. 

Communication is a critical component prior to and 

throughout disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. A campaign’s process, accessibility, and benefits 

must be made widely known, often through low-tech 

mass media such as radio. Additionally, given the expanding use of mobile telephony on the continent, mass 

SMS can facilitate more interaction between DDR participants, implementers, and communities and should be 

fully exploited. Moreover, combatants and communities 

will be far more likely to participate and commit to DDR 

if the parameters and benefits of DDR are clearly communicated and they have the means to lodge complaints, 

clarify procedures, request assistance, or otherwise stay 

connected with DDR administrators. 

One promising DDR innovation in recent years was 

initiated by ex-combatants themselves. In the DRC, the 

Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, many ex-combatants, lacking support from 

formal DDR programs, created their own professional and 

social associations.17 These small networks of up to a few 

dozen individuals served as a way to pool funds and other 

resources, as a means to share information on employment opportunities, and as a support network during 

periods of unemployment. As importantly, they provided 

a sense of inclusion, purpose, and resilience, particularly 

for fence-sitting ex-combatants whose lack of familial or 

kinship connections presented major reintegration challenges. In the DRC, many of these associations elected 

counselors to manage group dynamics and mitigate and 

resolve disputes.18 Many of these groups were also crucial 

in building trust and cooperative relationships as excombatants resettled into communities. DDR campaigns 

could benefit from encouraging these groups at an early 

stage, using them to more efficiently assess ex-combatant 

needs and skills, and as a resocialization mechanism. 

Ex-combatants will also often cast a wide net in 

their search for work, so reintegration assistance should 

be broadly focused so as not to overlook livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants, including in low-skilled 

or informal sectors. Nor should reintegration be shaped 

only to respond to ex-combatant interests and incentives. 

Resettlement communities need to be willing supporters 

of DDR to ensure success. “Community-based reintegration” should be designed to provide interlinked benefits 

for both ex-combatants and communities. Short-term 

projects to rehabilitate or build infrastructure identified as 

a priority by communities could employ ex-combatants, 

who would have to participate in order to receive stipend 

disbursements.19 Such mutually beneficial scenarios can 

foster deeper linkages and support subsequent DDR. 

Political leadership at the national level must also 

prioritize DDR. Following a devastating civil war in the 

1990s, the new government of Sierra Leone worked 

quickly and thoroughly from 2000 to 2001 to establish a 

functioning financial management and procurement unit 

to advance demobilization implementation. Similarly, 

a strategic planning committee worked closely with a 

statistical unit to better understand the socioeconomic 

settings into which ex-combatants were transitioning. 

Despite severe resource constraints, the government also 

funded 10 percent of the entire program from its own 

budget.20 However, in Sierra Leone and elsewhere, DDR 

momentum is rarely adequately sustained through the 

critical reintegration phase. In the DRC, government attention and focus shifted away from ex-combatants once 

they had been disarmed or as new security and political 

challenges emerged. Incomplete DDR leaves a large pool 

of latent instability, as recurring instances of desertions 

and defections from the security services to militia groups 

in various African contexts attest. 

“[DDR] is not designed to directly 

address many conflict drivers...”
8

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Furthermore, DDR initiatives should emphasize 

that combatants transition into civilian life, not the 

security services. In the DRC, the decision to allow tens 

of thousands of militants to integrate into the newly 

reestablished military and police contributed to a bloated 

and highly undisciplined and unprofessional security 

sector. Following the end of Liberia’s lengthy conflict 

in 2003, no former militants or soldiers were readmitted 

into the streamlined military that ultimately emerged 

there. The 2,000 restructured and retrained members of 

the Armed Forces of Liberia were only first deployed in 

2012, after years of training. In the DRC, the mobilization of tens of thousands of militants fed or created a host 

of security, human rights, illicit trafficking, and resource 

management challenges with minimal improvements to 

stability in the east. Governments should be intensely 

circumspect when considering the viability of militants 

and ex-combatants as potential security providers.

NOTES

1 Peter Ulvin, Ex-Combatants in Burundi: Why They 

Joined, Why They Left, How They Fared, Working Paper No. 3 

(Washington, DC: World Bank, October 2007), 11.

2 MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements 

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), 24.

3 James Pugel, “What the Fighters Say: A Survey of ExCombatants in Liberia February-March 2006,” United Nations 

Development Programme, April 2007. Macartan Humphreys 

and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Demobilization and Reintegration,” 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 4 (2007): 549.

4 Pugel, 66.

5 Nelson Alusala, Reintegrating Ex-Combatants in the Great 

Lakes Region: Lessons Learned (Pretoria: Institute for Security 

Studies, 2011), 96.

6 Guy Lamb, Nelson Alusala, Gregory Mthembu-Salter, 

and Jean-Marie Gasana, Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War: 

Assessment of the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life 

in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri Democratic Republic of Congo

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 17-20.

7 Humphreys and Weinstein, 563.

8 Henning Tamm, “Coalitions and Defections in a Context 

of Uncertainty – A Report from Ituri (Part I & II),” Congo 

Siasa, August 27, 2012, available at <http://congosiasa.blogspot.

com/2012/08/coalitions-and-defections-in-context-of_27.html>.

9 Henri Boshoff, “Completing the Demobilisation, 

Disarmament, and Reintegration Process of Armed Groups in 

the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Link to Security 

Sector Reform of FARDC: Mission Difficult!” Institute for 

Security Studies, 23 November 2010, 3.

10 Lamb, Alusala, Mthembu-Salter, and Gasana, 9.

11 “Troubles in the Integration of Armed Groups,” Congo 

Siasa, June 14, 2011, available at <http://congosiasa.blogspot.

com/2011/06/troubles-in-integration-of-armed-groups.html>.

12 “DDR in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Program 

Update,” World Bank, September 2009. 

13 Anthony Finn, “The Drivers of Reporter Reintegration 

in Northern Uganda,” World Bank, January 2012, 2, 17, and 20.

14 “Lack of Funding Stalls Ex-Combatants’ Reintegration,” 

IRIN, June 18, 2012.

15 Humphreys and Weinstein, 547-548.

16 Ibid.

17 Guy Lamb, Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 

in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies: The Case of 

the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and 

South Sudan (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 60. Alusala, 

2011, 9.

18 Natacha Lemasle, “From Conflict to Resilience: ExCombatant Trade Associations in Post Conflict,” World Bank, 

January 2012.

19 Lamb, 2012, 27.

20 Severine Rugumamu and Osman Gbla, “Studies in 

Reconstruction and Capacity Building in Postconflict Countries 

in Africa: Some Lessons from Sierra Leone,” The African 

Capacity Building Foundation, May 2004.