[Cite as Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Sheriff, 2012-Ohio-1768.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HOCKING COUNTY 

MELANIE A. OGLE, : 

 : 

 Petitioner-Appellant, : Case No: 11AP13 

 : 

 v. : 

 : DECISION AND

HOCKING COUNTY SHERIFF AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY

HOCKING COUNTY PROSECUTING : 

ATTORNEY, : 

 : 

 Respondents-Appellees. : Filed: April 17, 2012 

APPEARANCES:

Melanie A. Ogle, Rockbridge, Ohio, pro se Appellant. 

Laina Fetherolf, Hocking County Prosecutor, and William L. Archer, Jr., Hocking County 

Assistant Prosecutor, Logan, Ohio, for Appellees. 

Kline, J.: 

{¶1} Melanie A. Ogle (hereinafter “Ogle”) appeals the judgment of the Hocking 

County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed her petition for a writ of mandamus. 

On appeal, Ogle contends that the trial court erred for various reasons. Because Ogle’s 

petition does not meet the requirements for mandamus relief, we disagree. As a result, 

we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Ogle’s petition, and 

we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

I. 

{¶2} Ogle was charged with several crimes before she filed her petition for a writ of 

mandamus. In one Hocking County Municipal Court case, Ogle was charged with 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 2 

resisting arrest, a first-degree misdemeanor. In another Hocking County Municipal 

Court case, Ogle was charged with obstructing official business, a second-degree 

misdemeanor. And finally, in a Hocking County Common Pleas Court case, Ogle was 

charged with assault, a fourth-degree felony under R.C. 2903.12(A)&(C)(3). (Ogle’s two 

misdemeanor cases were dismissed without prejudice. According to the Hocking 

County Municipal Court’s website, both misdemeanor charges were to be handled with 

Ogle’s felony case in the common pleas court. See Hart v. Hudson, Pickaway App. No. 

10CA19, 2010-Ohio-5954, at ¶26 (stating that “a court of appeals may take judicial 

notice of findings and judgments as rendered in other Ohio cases”) (internal quotation 

omitted).) 

{¶3} On October 22 and 25, 2010, Ogle requested several documents related to 

her various criminal cases. Ogle made these requests under R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public 

Records Act. Specifically, Ogle requested the following documents from the Hocking 

County Sheriff’s Department: (1) the Investigator Notes of Sergeant Kevin Groves for 

incident number 09-2855 00 (we will refer to this request as the “Investigator’s Notes”); 

(2) the voluntary statement of Randale G. Thompson that was filed with Ohio Uniform 

Incident Report number 09-2203 00 (we will refer to this request as the “Thompson 

Statement”); and (3) Ohio Uniform Incident Report Number 09-2203 00 (we will refer to 

this request as the “Incident Report”). 

{¶4} Neither the Hocking County Sheriff nor the Hocking County Prosecuting 

Attorney provided Ogle with the requested documents. And in an October 26, 2010 

letter to Ogle’s attorney, Hocking County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney William L. 

Archer (hereinafter “Archer”) explained why Ogle’s requests were denied. In part, the 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 3 

letter states the following: “Your client has sent the Hocking County Sheriff’s Office two 

(2) new public records requests. These requests cover documents in the criminal case. 

* * * You were provided with these documents in discovery. If your client desires these 

documents, then you need to provide them to her. But more importantly, you need to 

advise your client that any future requests for documents must be made through 

discovery requests in her pending cases.” 

{¶5} On November 2, 2010, Ogle filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the 

Hocking County Court of Common Pleas. In her petition, Ogle requested “a Writ of 

Mandamus, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 149.43 C(1) [sic], to the Hocking County 

Sheriff and Hocking County Prosecuting Attorney, to make available to Melanie A. Ogle 

two certified copies each of the specific public records previously requested by her on 

October 22 and 25, 2010[.]” 

{¶6} On November 4, 2010, the Hocking County Sheriff’s Office and the Hocking 

County Prosecutor’s Office filed a motion to dismiss Ogle’s petition for a writ of 

mandamus. 

{¶7} On December 7, 2010, Ogle filed the first amendment to her petition for a writ 

of mandamus. In this amendment, Ogle requested “[c]opies of any and all 

correspondence or record of correspondence with the Ohio Attorney General Bureau of 

Criminal Identification and Investigation, solely in regard to referring my September 26, 

2010 request for investigation of [four individuals] for perjury to the BCI as stated [in the 

October 26, 2010 letter from Archer to Ogle’s attorney]: 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 4 

{¶8} ‘Mrs. Ogle’s request for an investigation into alleged perjury claims was 

referred to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) Office of the Ohio Attorney 

General’s Office several weeks ago.’” (Emphasis sic.) 

{¶9} Hocking County Officials did not file a response to the first amendment to 

Ogle’s mandamus petition. 

{¶10} On December 13, 2010, Ogle filed a second amendment to her mandamus 

petition. Claiming to be a victim of alleged perjury, Ogle requested “a Victim’s Rights 

Pamphlet, pursuant to The Ohio Constitution [section] 1.10a, Ohio Revised Code 

chapter 2930 and Ohio Revised Code 109.42.” Hocking County Officials did not file a 

response to this amendment, either. 

{¶11} The trial court did not hold a hearing on Ogle’s petition for a writ of 

mandamus. Instead, the trial court dismissed her petition in an April 21, 2011 entry. 

{¶12} Ogle appeals and asserts the following thirteen assignments of error: I. “THE 

TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

MANDAMUS AND AMENDMENTS TO APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

MANDAMUS, TO THE APPELLANTS’ [sic] PREJUDICE.” II. “THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACTS STATED IN APPELLANT’S PLEADINGS OF 

RECORD, TO THE APPELLANTS’ [sic] PREJUDICE.” III. “THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED IN ITS DISMISSAL ENTRY, MISSTATING THAT ‘THE DOCUMENTS 

SOUGHT INVOLVED A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION WHICH LED TO AN 

INDICTMENT FOR AN ALLEGED ASSAULT ON A POLICE OFFICER BEING FILED 

AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER’ AND ‘THE PROSECUTOR ARGUES THAT 

SINCE THE CRIMINAL CASE INVOLVING THESE DOCUMENTS IS STILL PENDING’, 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 5 

ACCEPTING APPELLEES’ UNSUPPORTED PLEADINGS AS FACT, AND 

DISREGARDING APPELLANT’S SUPPORTING REFERENCES PRESENTED IN 

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM CONTRA RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, TO THE APPELLANT’S PREJUDICE.” IV. 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ‘THE PROSECUTOR FURTHER 

ARGUES THAT SINCE THE CRIMINAL CASE INVOLVING THESE DOCUMENTS IS 

STILL PENDING THAT IT WOULD BE UNETHICAL FOR THE PROSECUTOR TO 

HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PETITIONER’, EVEN THOUGH THE TRIAL 

COURT WAS AWARE THAT PETITIONER’S PUBLIC RECORDS REQUESTED IN 

HER ORIGINAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS WERE NOT TO THE 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, TO THE APPELLANT’S PREJUDICE.” V. 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON APPELLEES’ UNSUPPORTED 

STATEMENTS, STATING THAT ‘THESE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY PETITIONER 

HAVE ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT’S RETAINED ATTORNEY 

THROUGH DISCOVERY UNDER CRIMINAL RULE 16.’, [sic] TO THE APPELLANTS’ 

[sic] PREJUDICE.” VI. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE FACT THAT 

EVEN IF APPELLEES COULD PROVE THAT THE DOCUMENTS REQUESTED BY 

APPELLANT HAD ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED TO DEFENDANT’S RETAINED 

ATTORNEY THROUGH DISCOVERY UNDER CRIMINAL RULE 16, APPELLANT 

COULD NOT PERSONALLY USE ANY SUCH UNREDACTED COPIES FOR ANY 

OTHER PURPOSE, TO THE APPELLANTS’ [sic] PREJUDICE.” VII. “THE TRIAL 

COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DOCUMENTS SOUGHT BY THE 

APPELLANT ARE EXCEPTED FROM THE PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST UNDER 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 6 

OHIO REVISED CODE 149.43(a)(i)(g) [sic], TO THE APPELLANTS’ [sic] PREJUDICE.” 

VIII. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ‘THE REQUESTED RECORDS 

ARE TRIAL PREPARATION RECORDS, OR CONFIDENTIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 

RECORDS INVOLVING A PENDING CRIMINAL PROCEEDING’, TO THE 

APPELLANTS’ [sic] PREJUDICE.” IX. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING 

STATE EX REL. STECKMAN VS. JACKSON (1994) 70 OH ST 3RD, 420, 639 N.E. 2ND

83 TO APPELLANT’S PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST TO DISMISS PETITIONER’S 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, TO THE APPELLANTS’ [sic] PREJUDICE.” X. 

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT PETITIONER ‘IS NOT THE VICTIM 

OF ANY CRIMINAL CHARGES PENDING AGAINST ANY OTHER PERSON’, EVEN 

THOUGH JUDGE LUSE PERSONALLY WAS AWARE OF AFFIDAVITS OF CRIMINAL 

CHARGES, PURSUANT TO ORC 2935.09, FILED BY APPELLANT AGAINST JASON 

STACY AND KEVIN T. GROVES IN THE HOCKING COUNTY COMMON PLEAS 

COURT UNDER INVESTIGATION BY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR APPOINTED BY 

JUDGE THOMAS H. GERKEN, AND THAT SUCH CHARGES WERE SCHEDULED 

BEFORE THE GRAND JURY FOR MAY 12, 2011, (RESCHEDULED TO AUGUST 17, 

2011), TO THE APPELLANTS’ [sic] PREJUDICE.” XI. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 

WHEN IT DID NOT HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON APPELLEES’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND APPELLANT’S MEMORANDUM CONTRA TO APPELLEES’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS, TO APPELLANT’S PREJUDICE.” XII. “THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT HEAR THE APPELLANTS’ [sic] MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT, TO APPELLANT’S PREJUDICE.” And, XIII. “THE TRIAL COURT 

ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT HEAR THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO VACATE 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 7 

JOURNAL ENTRY (DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS) AND FOR 

ORAL HEARING ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE AND PLAINTIFF’S 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, TO APPELLANT’S PREJUDICE.” 

II. 

{¶13} We will address Ogle’s thirteen assignments of error together. For various 

reasons, Ogle contends that the trial court should have granted her petition for a writ of 

mandamus. But here, we find that Ogle’s petition does not meet the requirements for 

mandamus relief. 

{¶14} “‘Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with R.C. 

149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.’” State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca Cty. Bd. 

of Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, at ¶17, quoting State ex rel. 

Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 

Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903, at ¶6; R.C. 149.43(C). “We review a trial court’s denial 

of a writ of mandamus under the abuse of discretion standard.” Athens Cty. Commrs. v. 

Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, Athens App. No. 06CA49, 2007-Ohio-6895 at 

¶45, citing Truman v. Village of Clay Center, 160 Ohio App.3d 78, 83, 2005-Ohio-1385. 

An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error of judgment; it implies that the 

court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore

(1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. 

{¶15} “In order to be entitled to a writ for mandamus, appellant must establish (1) a 

clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty to perform these acts on 

the part of [the appellees], and (3) the lack of a plain and adequate remedy in the 

ordinary course of law.” State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan, 75 Ohio St.3d 12, 16, 1996-Ohio-
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 8 

231, citing State ex rel. Carter v. Wilkinson, 70 Ohio St.3d 65, 1994-Ohio-245. 

However, “the requirement of the lack of an adequate legal remedy does not apply to 

public-records cases.” State ex rel. Gaydosh v. Twinsburg, 93 Ohio St.3d 576, 580, 

2001-Ohio-1613, citing State ex rel. Dist. 1199, Health Care & Soc. Serv. Union, SEIU, 

AFL-CIO v. Lawrence Cty. Gen. Hosp., 83 Ohio St.3d 351, 354, 1998-Ohio-49. 

Furthermore,“[w]e construe R.C. 149.43 liberally in favor of broad access and resolve 

any doubt in favor of public records.” State ex rel. Toledo Blade Company at ¶17, citing 

State ex rel. Carr v. Akron, 112 Ohio St.3d 351, 2006-Ohio-6714, at ¶29. 

i. The Investigator’s Notes, Thompson’s Statement, and the Incident Report 

{¶16} As it relates to (1) the Investigator’s Notes, (2) Thompson’s Statement, and 

(3) the Incident Report, we find that Ogle does not have a clear legal right to the 

requested relief. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “a defendant may use only 

Crim.R. 16 to obtain discovery.” State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (1994), 70 Ohio 

St.3d 420, 429. And here, (1) the Investigator’s Notes, (2) Thompson’s Statement, and 

(3) the Incident Report are all part of criminal prosecutions against Ogle. Therefore, 

because Ogle could have obtained these items only under Crim.R. 16, she does not 

have a clear legal right to relief. 

{¶17} According to Hocking County Officials, Ogle received (1) the Investigator’s 

Notes, (2) Thompson’s Statement, and (3) the Incident Report through the normal 

discovery process. In the proceedings below, Ogle did not dispute receiving either 

Thompson’s Statement or the Incident Report. But Ogle claimed that she did not 

receive the Investigator’s Notes. Regardless of whether Ogle actually received the 

Investigator’s Notes, we find that mandamus relief would be improper. Again, the 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 9 

Investigator’s Notes are part of a criminal prosecution against Ogle. Therefore, 

assuming that she received the Investigator’s Notes through discovery, Ogle does not 

have a clear legal right to obtain them again in a mandamus action. See State ex rel. 

Steckman at 429. Now, let us assume that Ogle never received the Investigator’s Notes 

during the criminal proceedings. If the Investigator’s Notes are subject to discovery, she 

may use only Crim.R. 16 to obtain them. And if the Investigator’s Notes are not subject 

to discovery, they are “not subject to release as a public record pursuant to R.C. 149.43 

and [are] specifically exempt from release as a trial preparation record in accordance 

with R.C. 149.43(A)(4).” State ex rel. Steckman at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

Therefore, regardless of whether Ogle actually received the Investigator’s Notes, she 

does not have a clear legal right to the requested relief. 

{¶18} Accordingly, as it relates to (1) the Investigator’s Notes, (2) Thompson’s 

Statement, and (3) the Incident Report, we find that Ogle’s petition does not meet the 

requirements for mandamus relief. 

ii. Correspondence Related to the Perjury Investigation 

{¶19} Regarding any correspondence related to the perjury investigation, we find 

that Ogle does not have a clear legal right to the requested relief. Under R.C. 

149.43(A)(1)(g), “‘Public record’ does not mean * * * [t]rial preparation records[.]” The 

Revised Code defines a “trial preparation record” as “any record that contains 

information that is specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or in defense of, a 

civil or criminal action or proceeding, including the independent thought processes and 

personal trial preparation of an attorney.” R.C. 149.43(A)(4). In his October 26, 2010 

letter to Ogle’s attorney, Archer stated that “Mrs. Ogle’s request for an investigation into 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 10 

alleged perjury claims was referred to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) Office 

of the Ohio Attorney General’s Office several weeks ago.” (Emphasis removed.) As a 

result, any correspondence between Hocking County Officials and BCI would 

necessarily contain information that was specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation 

of a perjury prosecution. Therefore, this correspondence is not subject to disclosure 

under the Ohio Public Records Act. 

{¶20} Accordingly, as it relates to the requested correspondence, we find that 

Ogle’s petition does not meet the requirements for mandamus relief. 

iii. The Victims’ Rights Pamphlet 

{¶21} As it relates to the Victims’ Rights Pamphlet, we find that Ogle does not have 

a clear legal right to the requested relief. Here, Ogle has not demonstrated that she is 

the “victim” of any crime. Ogle claims to be the victim of perjury. But as far as we can 

tell, perjury charges have not been filed against the individuals named in the first 

amendment to Ogle’s mandamus petition. See R.C. 2930.01(H). Therefore, Ogle 

cannot demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the Victims’ Rights Pamphlet. 

See R.C. 109.42(B). 

{¶22} Accordingly, as it relates to the Victims’ Rights Pamphlet, we find that Ogle’s 

petition does not meet the requirements for mandamus relief. 

III. 

{¶23} Because Ogle’s petition does not meet the requirements for mandamus relief, 

we find that denying Ogle’s petition was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. As a 

result, we need not address all of Ogle’s arguments on appeal. Our mandamus findings 

have rendered these additional arguments moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 11 

{¶24} Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Hocking App. No. 11AP13 12 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay the costs 

herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions. 

Abele, P.J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion. 

McFarland, J: Concurs in Judgment Only as to Parts I and III. 

 Dissents as to Part II. 

For the Court 

 

 

 BY:_____________________________ 

 Roger L. Kline, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing 

with the clerk.