F PB99-916303

NTSB/RAR-99/03

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT

COLLISION OF NORTHERN INDIANA COMMUTER

TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT TRAIN 102

WITH A TRACTOR-TRAILER

PORTAGE, INDIANA

JUNE 18, 1998

7055B
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation,

raiload, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is

mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation

accidents, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies

involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports,

safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews.

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available publications may also be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, East, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National

Technical Information Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB99-916303 from:

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(800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000

National Transportation Safety Board. 1999. Collision of Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District Train 102 With a Tractor-Trailer, Portage, Indiana, June 18, 1998. Railroad Accident Report

NTSB/RAR-99/03. Washington, DC.

Abstract: About 4:31 a.m. on June 18, 1998, a westbound Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District two-car passenger train struck the second semitrailer of a long combination vehicle consisting of a

tractor pulling two flatbed semitrailers loaded with steel coils at a highway-rail grade crossing near Portage,

Indiana. When the vehicles collided, the second semitrailer broke away and was dragged by the train, while

a chain securing a steel coil to the second semitrailer broke. The released coil entered the train’s lead car

through the front bulkhead and moved into the passenger compartment. Three fatalities and five minor

injuries resulted. 

The safety issues discussed in this report are safety at private grade crossings, the design of the National

Steel Corporation’s Midwest Steel grade crossing, the conspicuity of the long combination vehicle

semitrailer, and the crashworthiness of the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District railcars.

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued recommendations to the

U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Highway

Administration, the Indiana Department of Transportation, the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District, the National Steel Corporation (Midwest Steel Division), and the Norfolk Southern Corporation.

The Safety Board also reiterated one safety recommendation to the U.S. Department of Transportation.
Railroad Accident Report

Collision of Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District Train 102

With a Tractor-Trailer

Portage, Indiana

June 18, 1998

NTSB/RAR-99/03

PB99-916303 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7055B 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted July 26, 1999 Washington, D.C. 20594

E P LUR IBUS UNUM

N AT I O N A L T R A S PO R TA T IO N

B O A R D

SA F E T Y

N

iii Railroad Accident Report

Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Factual Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Long Combination Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

NICTD Train 102 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Conrail Train 201. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Emergency Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

NICTD Train 102 Crew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Medical Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Training and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Truckdriver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Training and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Accident Trip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Train . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Mechanical. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Train Consist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

NICTD Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Truck Position and Roadway Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Load and Load Securement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Vehicle Conspicuity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

NICTD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Conrail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Grade Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Location, Configuration, and Traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Crossing Geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Grade-Crossing Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Highway-Rail Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Grade-Crossing Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Toxicological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Survival Aspects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

NICTD Carbody Structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Crashworthiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Postaccident Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Rail Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Contents iv Railroad Accident Report

Postaccident Testing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Visibility and Stopping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Crossing Signal Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Laboratory Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Other Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

State Truck Size and Weight Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Postaccident Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Operator Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Train 102 Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Truckdriver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Grade Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Crossing Geometry and Storage Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Grade Crossing Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Long Combination Vehicle Conspicuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Train Car Crashworthiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Collision Post. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Emergency Lighting and Public Address Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Probable Cause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

B: Selections from the Indiana State Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

C: Visibility and Stopping Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

D: Highway-Rail Grade-Crossing Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
v Railroad Accident Report

Executive Summary

About 4:31 a.m. central daylight time on June 18, 1998, a westbound Northern

Indiana Commuter Transportation District two-car passenger train struck the second

semitrailer of a long combination vehicle that consisted of a tractor pulling two flatbed

semitrailers loaded with steel coils at a highway-rail grade crossing near Portage, Indiana.

When the vehicles collided, the second semitrailer broke away from the first semitrailer

and was dragged by the front of the train, while the single chain securing a steel coil to the

second semitrailer broke. The released steel coil, weighing about 19 tons, entered the train

through the front bulkhead of the lead car and moved into the passenger compartment.

Three fatalities and five minor injuries resulted from the accident. Damages were

estimated to total $886,000.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of

the collision between Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District train 102 and a

long combination vehicle (truck) at the National Steel Corporation’s Midwest Steel grade

crossing was ineffective action by Federal, State, and private agencies to permanently

resolve safety problems at the Midwest Steel grade crossing, which they knew to be a

hazardous crossing.

The major safety issues addressed in this report are

• Safety at private grade crossings,

• Design of the Midwest Steel grade crossing,

• Conspicuity of the long combination vehicle semitrailer, and

• Crashworthiness of the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation 

District railcars.

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board makes safety

recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Railroad

Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Indiana Department of

Transportation, the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, the National Steel

Corporation (Midwest Steel Division), and the Norfolk Southern Corporation. The Safety

Board also reiterates one safety recommendation to the U.S. Department of

Transportation.

1 Railroad Accident Report

Factual Information

Accident Narrative

About 4:31 a.m. central daylight time1 on Thursday, June 18, 1998, Northern

Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD) train 102, a two-car passenger train,

collided with the right side of a long combination vehicle (LCV)2

 owned by Richard Pluta

Trucking at the Midwest Division of the National Steel Corporation’s (Midwest Steel’s)

grade crossing near Portage, Indiana.3 (See figure 1 for a map of the region.) At this grade

crossing, a private road leads north from U.S. Route 12 (US 12), intersects NICTD and

Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail)4 railroad tracks, and continues to the Midwest

Steel facility and other businesses. The collision occurred on the westward NICTD track.

(See figure 2 for a diagram of the various vehicles and the accident scene.)

Shortly before the collision, while the LCV was traversing the NICTD tracks, the

approach of the westbound Conrail train 201 had activated the flashing light signals and

automatic gates at the Conrail crossing. The truckdriver stopped the LCV before the

Conrail crossing’s south gate. The vehicle’s second semitrailer was resting on the westward NICTD track. At this time, NICTD train 102, traveling westbound about 68 mph,

was approaching the Midwest Steel grade crossing. 

About 542 feet east of the crossing, the train 102 crew noticed the LCV’s second

semitrailer, which carried a steel coil (weighing about 19 tons) covered by a black tarp, on

the crossing. The engineer said that he placed the train in emergency braking; then, followed by the conductor, he exited the control compartment and ran toward the rear of the

passenger compartment. The crew alerted passengers in that area about the impending collision and told them to evacuate. 

As the collision occurred, the LCV’s second semitrailer broke away from the first

semitrailer and was dragged by the front of the NICTD train, while the single chain securing a steel coil to the second semitrailer broke. The released steel coil entered the lead car

of the train through the front bulkhead. The coil moved through the car until it came to rest

about 34 feet into the passenger compartment. (See figures 3, 4, 5, and 6.) Three fatalities

and five minor injuries among the passengers resulted.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all times are in central daylight time. 

2 The LCV comprised a tractor and two semitrailers bearing three steel coils. 

3 All train movements and locations are within Indiana unless otherwise specified.

4 At the time of the accident, Conrail operated the northern portion of the Midwest Steel crossing. As of

June 1, 1999, the Conrail operation in this area was taken over by the Norfolk Southern Corporation. To

avoid confusion, this report will continue to refer to the “Conrail” tracks for the remainder of the report.
Factual Information 2 Railroad Accident Report

Long Combination Vehicle

The LCV had been traveling from Detroit, Michigan, to Portage, Indiana, with a

load of three coils of steel. The truckdriver arrived at the Midwest Steel grade crossing

about 4:29 a.m., after traveling northbound on State Route 249 and turning eastbound on

US 12. The driver stated that he drove in the rightmost of the two left turn lanes. He said

he stopped and waited for the traffic signal to turn green (with an arrow); when it did, he

began to turn northward toward the Midwest Steel facility. The driver’s destination was

PreCoat Metals, a company located next to the National Steel Corporation’s Midwest

Division facility. 

Figure 1. Map of accident area
Factual Information 3 Railroad Accident Report

The truckdriver said that while he was making the turn into the Midwest Steel

crossing, he did not see any approaching trains and the crossing gates and lights were not

activated. According to the truckdriver, as he entered the area between the two sets of

tracks (NICTD and Conrail), the Conrail gates and lights activated, and he stopped the

LCV short of the descending inner gate. The second semitrailer of the 82-foot-long LCV

remained on the NICTD westward track, clear of the descending southern outer NICTD

gate. The northern inner NICTD gate remained in the “up” position. 

As Conrail train 201 passed through the crossing, the truckdriver looked out his

left door-mounted rearview mirror and saw the northern inner NICTD gate descending

and the lights flashing. He said this indicated to him that a train was approaching on the

NICTD tracks. According to the driver, he attempted to turn his vehicle to the left to pull

the semitrailer off the tracks, but he did not have enough room or time. The commuter

Figure 2. Scene of collision at Midwest Steel grade crossing
Factual Information 4 Railroad Accident Report

Figure 3. East (undamaged) end of NICTD car 11

Figure 4. West (damaged) end of NICTD car 11
Factual Information 5 Railroad Accident Report

Figure 5. Steel coil inside NICTD car 11

Figure 6. Steel coil outside NICTD car 11
Factual Information 6 Railroad Accident Report

train struck the rear semitrailer, shearing off the kingpin and separating it from the first

semitrailer of the LCV. 

The truckdriver was not injured in the collision, and he remained with his vehicle

until emergency response personnel arrived.

NICTD Train 102

The two-person crew (a conductor and an engineer) on NICTD train 102 had

reported for duty at 3:57 a.m. in Michigan City, Indiana. Train 102 was a regularly scheduled westbound passenger train traveling from Michigan City to Chicago, Illinois, and

consisting of two multiple-unit (MU) cars. The crew made the required predeparture

inspections and reviewed the general orders. Finding no anomalies, the crew began the

trip at 4:02 a.m. 

After making a scheduled stop at the Michigan City Station, train 102 departed at

4:07 a.m. and proceeded on its route, making stops at the Tamarack and Dune Park

Stations. Train 102 departed Dune Park at 4:22 a.m., heading toward its next scheduled

stop at the Ogden Dunes Station. The conductor joined the engineer in the control compartment of the first car.

The train 102 engineer said that between milepost (MP) 48.0 and 50.0, he

attempted to accelerate to the authorized speed of 79 mph. According to event recorder

information, the train reached 78 mph for about 20 seconds before the engineer changed

the throttle to a coasting position for the reduced speed limit at MP 50.0. As train 102

approached the Midwest Steel grade crossing (MP 49.77), the engineer observed a white

tractor at the crossing. The engineer said that as train 102 neared the Midwest Steel grade

crossing, conditions were dark with a light fog and it was difficult to see, so he asked the

conductor to help him determine what was at the crossing. Both crewmembers believed

that the tractor became visible about six pole lengths5

 (1,020 feet) from the crossing. The

engineer said that when train 102 was about five pole lengths (850 feet) east of the crossing, he saw a semitrailer on the crossing and put the braking control into the emergency

position. The conductor and engineer then left the control compartment and ran toward the

rear of the car to warn the passengers of the impending collision.

One passenger, who was a NICTD employee, left his seat on the north side of the

first car (near the control compartment) and followed behind the crewmembers. He did not

reach a safe location before the steel coil moving through the railcar overtook him. The

steel coil also overtook two passengers who were riding on the south side of the first car

while they were at or near their seats. The railroad employee and the two other passengers

received fatal injuries from the moving coil of steel. (See figure 7, passenger car diagram.)

The cars remained coupled during the accident, and neither car derailed. No fire occurred

in either car. 

5 The NICTD train crewmembers referred to distances in “pole lengths,” in reference to the distance

between the catenary poles running along the track. The distance between the catenary poles east of the

Midwest Steel grade crossing was 170 feet. 
Figure 7. View of a typical NICTD Nippon Sharyo passenger railcar (Source: NICTD Running M

and Troubleshooting Manual, September 1982 edition, as modified by the Safety Boa
Factual Information 8 Railroad Accident Report

After the impact with the LCV, all the lights went off in train 102’s first car, and

the engineer observed that the front of the train was “just collapsed, like it was folding.”

Lights remained on in the second car. The engineer said he ran into the second car and

remained there until the train came to a complete stop. He then moved to the operating cab

in the rear of the second car and radioed the dispatcher to inform him that “we had hit a

truck at the Midwest rail crossing and for him to get emergency personnel out as quickly

as possible.” 

The engineer said he then returned to the first car to attempt to help the injured

passengers. On the way, he met the conductor, who was going to the second car. The engineer took the conductor’s flashlight and continued into the first car, where he saw the

injured NICTD employee. The engineer said he shone his flashlight toward the front of the

car, where he knew two passengers had been. He did not see anyone, and he did not hear

anything. He went back to the second car and called the dispatcher again to let him know

that the conductor was safe. He also advised the dispatcher that the coil had come into the

car.

The 13 remaining passengers and the 2 members of the crew exited through the

last door on the south side of the second car. By the time they had exited the train, emergency personnel (police) were arriving, and the engineer told them where to find the

injured passengers. He said he tried to open the center door of the first car by using the

emergency pull, but the door was jammed. The engineer then went to the north side of the

first car and opened the emergency exit there. 

Conrail Train 201

The crewmembers on Conrail train 201, which was a freight train, could not recall

whether they had seen a truck at the Midwest Steel crossing. As Conrail train 201 passed

the crossing, its conductor saw a “blue flash” in the rearview mirror on the left side of the

locomotive cab. The conductor commented on the flash to the Conrail engineer, who also

looked back. 

They estimated that their train’s speed was about 45 mph when passing the crossing. At the Midwest Steel crossing for Conrail trains, freight trains were allowed to travel

60 or 50 mph, depending on the type of train. The Conrail engineer said he was intentionally operating at a reduced speed because a train ahead of train 201 had to stop and switch

cars.

Emergency Response

The accident site was under the incident command of the Portage Fire Department

(PFD) of Porter County, Indiana. A Midwest Steel representative notified the Portage

Police Department (PPD) dispatcher of the accident at 4:35 a.m. The PPD dispatcher dispatched Portage police, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel at

4:36 a.m. The PFD chief arrived on the scene at 4:44 a.m. and was advised that a steel coil

was halfway into the first NICTD car and had pinned two people. At 4:49 a.m., the fire

chief established incident and medical command and became the incident commander. 
Factual Information 9 Railroad Accident Report

The fire chief requested that off-duty PFD and EMS personnel report to the station

and called for mutual aid from the Ogden Dunes Volunteer Fire Department and the South

Haven Fire Department, as well as an additional ambulance from the Porter Memorial

Hospital EMS. At this time, the incident commander was advised that three people were

inside the first NICTD car and that two were dead and one was alive but severely injured

and pinned under the steel coil. 

The PFD chief immediately requested a crane from Midwest Steel or the Port of

Indiana to raise the coil. The assistant PFD chief asked the PPD dispatcher to request a

University of Chicago Aeromedical Network helicopter and additional assistance. The

assistant chief also contacted the Methodist Hospital, Northlake campus, to request a surgeon. While the additional help was being sought, a paramedic firefighter tried to communicate with, administer oxygen to, and monitor the cardiac status of the severely injured

person pinned under the coil.

About 5:14 a.m., the incident commander was told that the injured person had lost

all vital signs. The request for the helicopter was canceled, and all personnel left the

NICTD train. The PFD chief released all units from the scene at 11:39 a.m.; he remained

on the scene until the train was removed by NICTD.

Five people with minor injuries were transported or transported themselves to hospitals. All were treated and released the same day. A total of 22 emergency response personnel, 2 fire engines, and 2 ambulances responded from the PFD for this accident.

Injuries 

Table 1. Injuries

*Based on the injury criteria of 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 830.2 of the International Civil

Aviation Organization, which the Safety Board uses in accident reports for all transportation modes.

Type* Train Crew Railroad 

Personnel Truckdriver Passengers TOTAL

Fatal 0 1 0 23

Serious 

Injuries 0 0 0 00

Minor 

Injuries 0 0 0 55

No 

Injuries 2 0 1 8 11

Total 2 1 1 15 19
Factual Information 10 Railroad Accident Report

Damage6

NICTD Train 102 Crew

NICTD records showed that each crewmember was qualified on the physical characteristics of the territory and the operating rules for trains over the NICTD system. The

engineer and conductor typically worked together. 

The engineer said that on the morning of the accident, he had awoken at 2:45 a.m.

feeling rested. He had not worked on June 17 and had gone to bed that night at 9:30 p.m.

and fell asleep about 10:30 p.m. On June 16, he had been woken up at 8:00 a.m. by a dispatcher who requested that he work that day (normally his day off). He departed for work

at 9:45 a.m. and went off duty at 6:45 p.m.

The conductor said that on the morning of the accident, he had awoken at 2:45 a.m.

feeling rested. He had had June 17 off and had gone to sleep at 8:15 p.m. that night. On

June 16, which was normally his day off, he had worked with the engineer. That night, he

went to bed at 10:30 p.m. and awoke about 7:00 a.m. on June 17.

On June 18, both the engineer and conductor had reported for duty at 3:57 a.m.

Their train departed from the home terminal in Michigan City, Indiana, about 4:02 a.m.

NICTD had scheduled them to finish work that day at 7:47 a.m. Both were compliant with

the Federal Hours of Service Law.

Medical Factors

Both the engineer and conductor had received company physicals within the last

2 years and were in good health and qualified for service. Neither reported having taken

any prescription or nonprescription medications on the day of the accident. 

Training and Experience

The engineer, 33, had been working for NICTD as an engineer for about 9 years.

He started with the railroad in May 1985 and had worked in the transportation department

since January 1986. He had been working over the territory between Michigan City and

Chicago since 1986, first as a collector and, since 1989, as an engineer.

Truck semitrailers $11,000

Train car 11 750,000

Train car 45 75,000

Signal 50,000

Total $886,000

6 The truck semitrailer damage information was provided by Richard Pluta, the trailer owner. NICTD

provided the rail damage information. 
Factual Information 11 Railroad Accident Report

In accordance with Federal regulations covering the certification of locomotive

engineers (49 CFR Part 240), NICTD records showed that the engineer’s certification was

current. The records included his motor vehicle driving record, as well as the findings of

his physical exams, operational rules tests, and on-board performance checks.

The conductor, 41, had worked for NICTD for almost 20 years. He was hired on

August 21, 1978, and became a conductor on August 23, 1980. He had operated between

Michigan City and Chicago for about 20 years.

Truckdriver

Training and Experience

The truckdriver, 39, had been working as a truckdriver since 1985. He held a valid

Michigan Class A commercial driver’s license (CDL) with an endorsement for double and

triple semitrailers. His license had no restrictions. He had a valid medical card, and his

most recent medical examination had been on January 8, 1998. The driver said he was in

good health and not under a doctor’s care.

The truckdriver’s driving history showed the following incidents:

3/09/92 Improper class/endorsement on CDL

5/21/92 Speeding

10/08/93 Speeding

9/11/95 Traffic collision, no injury (property damage only) 

1/23/98 Speeding

At the time of the collision, the truckdriver was driving a vehicle owned by Richard Pluta Trucking. The vehicle and driver were on a long-term lease to Eastern Express,

Inc., of Griffith, Indiana. The lease included a provision that allowed the driver to trip

lease7 with other carriers when Eastern Express did not have work for him.

Eastern Express officials said that the truckdriver had been working for them since

January 1995. He had undergone pre-employment drug and alcohol testing, as well as

three random drug and alcohol tests while employed by Eastern Express, and the results

had all been negative. (The last random drug test had taken place on February 3, 1998.)

The driver had also passed a company background check.

Company officials said they were satisfied with the driver’s work, but they had not

heard from him since May 20, 1998. If a driver did not report for 30 days, company policy

was to terminate that driver’s employment. Eastern Express said it had been preparing to

terminate this driver’s employment but had not yet done so when the accident occurred.

7 A short-term lease under which a driver and vehicle are contracted to haul goods for a single trip

(usually one way). Trip leases are commonly used by carriers needing additional drivers and vehicles. 
Factual Information 12 Railroad Accident Report

The truckdriver had used the Midwest Steel grade crossing regularly between 1985

and 1993. He estimated that he traveled over the crossing twice a week during this period.

Nearly all these crossings were made in vehicles with double semitrailer configurations.

Since 1995, when he began working for Eastern Express, up to and including the accident

trip, he estimated that he had used the Midwest Steel crossing two or three times. 

Accident Trip

On June 15, 1998, the truckdriver entered into a trip-lease agreement with Top

Line Express of Lima, Ohio. He was to pick up steel coils from Bethlehem Steel in Burns

Harbor, Indiana, and deliver them to Flat Rock Metals in Flat Rock, Michigan, and Michigan Steel Processing in New Boston, Michigan. According to the driver’s logbook, he

picked up the load at Bethlehem Steel about 4:00 p.m. on June 15 and began to drive about

7:45 p.m. The truck had a mechanical failure en route, so he stopped at a truck stop in New

Buffalo, Michigan, disconnected the semitrailers, and went home to nearby Niles, Michigan. He went to bed about 2:15 a.m. 

On June 16, he woke at noon and drove the tractor to Be-Right Truck Repair in

Gary, Indiana. (Be-Right Truck Repair is co-owned by the accident truck owner.) He spent

the day at a restaurant and the repair shop. The vehicle was repaired about 4:00 p.m., and

the driver drove the tractor home. He ate dinner, watched television, and went to bed about

9:00 p.m. He woke about 12:30 a.m. on June 17 and began his delivery trip about 1:30

a.m.

The truckdriver’s log indicates that he made his first delivery to Flat Rock Metals

about 5:30 a.m. and departed about 7:45 a.m. Security logs at Flat Rock Metals showed

that he arrived at 5:50 a.m. and departed at 8:40 a.m. His log indicates that he then drove

to Michigan Steel Processing, about 7 miles away. 

The truckdriver contacted Top Line Express’s agent about 2:15 p.m. to ask whether

the agent had a return load for him. He was told to go to Thyssen Steel in Detroit and pick

up three steel coils for delivery to PreCoat Metals, Inc., in Burns Harbor, Indiana. He did

not obtain a signed copy of the trip lease or the required weight permit for Indiana.

The truckdriver arrived at Thyssen Steel between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m. According to

the bill of lading, loading was completed at 4:19 p.m. The driver went to a truck stop in

Detroit, where he rested in the truck’s sleeper berth from 5:00 p.m. to about 11:00 p.m. He

said he got up feeling rested. He then drove to Burns Harbor to make the delivery, arriving

about 4:29 a.m. Table 2 lists the reported activities of the truckdriver during the 3 days

preceding the accident in chart form. (Some times provided in table 2 are estimated.)
Factual Information 13 Railroad Accident Report

Table 2. Truckdriver’s activities between June 15 and June 18, 1998

Date and Time Driver’s Actions

June 15 12:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. Slept.

9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. Woke up and ate.

0:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Worked around house.

3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Called Top Line Express.

4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Picked up steel at Bethlehem Steel, Burns Harbor, 

Indiana.

8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. Drove to New Buffalo, Michigan. Truck broke down.

9:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Logged off duty. Watched TV and ate.

June 16 12:00 a.m. to 2:15 a.m. Logged off duty. Watched TV and ate.

2:15 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Slept, woke about 12:00 p.m. Dressed.

1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Drove to Gary, Indiana, to have tractor repaired.

2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Waited for repair.

4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Drove to New Buffalo, Michigan.

5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. Watched TV and ate.

9:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m. Slept.

June 17 12:30 a.m. to 1:30 a.m. Woke up. Prepared for trip.

1:30 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. Drove to Flat Rock Metals in Flat Rock, Michigan.

6:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. Delivered steel to Flat Rock Metals, drove to Michigan 

Steel Products.

9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. Off-loaded steel at Michigan Steel Products.

11:00 a.m. to 2:15 p.m. Ate lunch (no log entries).

2:15 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Called Top Line Express agent and drove to Thyssen 

Steel in Detroit, Michigan.

3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Was at Thyssen Steel.

5:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. Ate dinner and rested in sleeper berth.

11:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. Departed for PreCoat Metals.

June 18 12:00 a.m. to 4:29 a.m. Drove to Midwest Steel crossing.

4:31 a.m. Collision at Midwest Steel crossing.
Factual Information 14 Railroad Accident Report

Train

Mechanical

The Safety Board reviewed the inspection records for NICTD train 102. The

records indicated the train had been mechanically inspected at 11:00 p.m., June 17, 1998.

No defects were reported.

Train Consist

The MU lightweight stainless steel passenger railcars that NICTD operates in revenue service are self-propelled electric cars. Each 85-foot-long, 118,000-pound car operates on 1,500 volts DC supplied by overhead catenary wire. The operator controls are in

control compartments at both ends of each car, allowing individual unit operation. NICTD

operates its trains in consists of up to eight cars. Each car generally has a 93-passenger

seating capacity and is fitted with bench seats that accommodate 2 passengers each. 

NICTD car 11 (the lead car) was built in 1982. It was designed to generate 640 hp

and was equipped with schedule 26B1 brake equipment. NICTD records show that car 11

passed an annual inspection on May 11, 1998. It could seat 93 passengers. 

NICTD car 45 (the trailing car) was built in 1992. It was also designed to generate

640 hp and was equipped with schedule 26B1 brake equipment. NICTD records show that

car 45 passed an annual inspection on June 15, 1998. It could seat 110 passengers. Both

cars on NICTD train 102 were equipped with model 1260 event recorders from Peerless

Instrument Company, Inc. Event recorder data indicated the train had been traveling at

68 mph when the emergency brakes were applied. 

NICTD Operations 

NICTD was established in 1977 by an act of the Indiana General Assembly and is an

agency of the State of Indiana. NICTD provides passenger service between the Michiana

Regional Airport in South Bend, Indiana, and Randolph Street Station in Chicago, Illinois.

The line is about 90 miles long. 

The rules for the NICTD railroad are set forth in an operating rulebook8 and are

supplemented and modified by timetable. Daily bulletins are used to show changes to the

rules. If necessary, train orders are issued to immediately implement an operating rule or

modify an existing rule. The permanent track speeds for NICTD trains are designated in

the timetable, and temporary speed restrictions are issued by track bulletin. 

NICTD uses wayside block signals. This automatic block signal system is primarily activated by conditions in the field, such as the presence of other railroad equipment

8 The rulebook is the Chicago South Shore and South Bend Railroad and Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District, Rules and Regulations for the Government of the Operating Department. It became

effective September 1, 1986, and contains revisions added in April 1990. 
Factual Information 15 Railroad Accident Report

or disruptions in the electrical circuit running through the rail from one block signal to the

next. The majority of the signals cannot be controlled by a train dispatcher.

NICTD train 102 is a scheduled passenger train and, according to NICTD officials,

carries about 200 passengers daily. 

The NICTD railroad uses an efficiency testing program under which a supervisor

had observed both the engineer and conductor performing their duties. In 1997, the engineer had been observed 28 times and the conductor 36 times. No exceptions were

reported. Some of these observations occurred without the employees’ knowledge.

Results indicated that both employees routinely performed appropriately at grade

crossings. 

Truck

The LCV was a conventional truck tractor in combination with two heavy semitrailers; such a unit is commonly referred to as a “Michigan Train.”9

 (See figures 8 and 9

for a photo of a Michigan Train as well as a diagram of the Michigan Train involved in

this accident.) The vehicle was 82 feet long, and it had a gross vehicle weight (GVW) of

153,115 pounds.10

The truck tractor was a 1996 white GMC, model WIA64TES, three-axle conventional tractor with a sleeper cab. It was equipped with a model 3406E six-cylinder

Caterpillar diesel engine, an Eaton-Fuller model RTX-16709B nine-speed transmission,

and two Eaton model DS402 (3:90 ratio) rear-drive axles. The tractor was equipped with

S-cam airbrakes. 

The first semitrailer was a 1973 ASM five-axle flatbed trailer with a fifth wheel

hitch. The semitrailer was equipped with type 30 S-cam airbrakes on all five axles. The

trailer bed was 28 feet long. The total semitrailer length to the rear of the frame, which

extended about 10 feet beyond the trailer bed, was 38 feet. 

The second semitrailer was a 1969 Fruehauf three-axle flatbed trailer. The semitrailer was equipped with type 30 S-cam airbrakes on all three axles and was 28 feet,

6 inches, long. 

9 A Michigan Train is a three-axle truck tractor in combination with a five-axle primary trailer equipped

with a fifth wheel and trailed by a three-axle semitrailer. Michigan Trains generally have a total of 11 axles.

Although these combination units are normally prohibited in Indiana, by using special designated routes and

weight permits, they may transport goods, often steel, from Michigan to industrial locations in northern

Indiana. 

10 The maximum GVW permitted in Indiana is 80,000 pounds. With a special weight permit, Michigan

Trains may haul up to 134,000 pounds in Indiana over specified routes. 
Figure 8. A Michigan Train at the Midwest Steel grade crossing
Figure 9. Diagram of the Michigan Train involved in this accident (Safety Board)
Factual Information 18 Railroad Accident Report

Truck Position and Roadway Evidence 

Police reported that when they arrived at the scene soon after the accident, the

front of the tractor was about 6 feet south of the southernmost Conrail gate, and the rear of

the first semitrailer was about 7.5 feet north of the northernmost NICTD rail. 

Tiremarks from the second semitrailer’s three axles were found. The tiremark from

the first axle was about 53 feet long, running east to west and generally parallel to the

north edge of the northernmost NICTD rail. The tiremark from the second axle was about

1 foot long and lay between the NICTD double tracks, about 3 feet from the southernmost

rail for the westward mainline. The tiremark from the third axle was about 13 feet long. It

lay between the NICTD double tracks and began about 8 feet from the southernmost rail

for the westward mainline. All three tiremarks began about 15 to 20 feet from the east

edge of the crossing pavement.

Load and Load Securement

The truckdriver had picked up the load of three steel coils at Thyssen Steel Group

in Detroit, Michigan. According to the bill of lading, the motor carrier was Top Line

Express, and the coils were to be delivered to PreCoat Metals, Inc., in Portage, Indiana.

The (gross) weight of the three coils was listed as 1) 38,030 pounds, 2) 30,137 pounds,

and 3) 30,468 pounds. The coils were loaded in reverse order, with the first coil placed on

the rear semitrailer and the second and third coils on the lead semitrailer. The coil placed

on the rear semitrailer was 72 inches in outside diameter, 41 inches wide, and had an open

center (“eye”).

After the accident, an Indiana State trooper found the two coils secured to the lead

semitrailer by a chain over each coil. “Bump chains”11 were also found. All the chains

were 3/8-inch grade 7 chains with 6,600-pound working load limits (WLLs). 

The truckdriver told the Safety Board that the coil on the rear semitrailer had been

held by three chains. The driver said that to fix the position of the coil he had used one

bump chain, one “over-the-top” chain, and one chain to keep the coil from moving backwards. During postaccident inspection of the semitrailers and NICTD car 11, investigators

found one broken chain; it was also a 3/8-inch grade 7 chain. Title 49 CFR 393.102 (b),

“Securement Systems,” states that “the aggregate WLL of the tiedown assemblies used to

secure an article against movement in any direction must be at least 1/2 times the weight

of the article.” The 38,030-pound steel coil would have required three 3/8-inch grade 7

chains with a cumulative WLL of 19,800 pounds, or 52 percent of the weight of the coil,

to secure it according to regulation. Neither the bump chain nor the one used to keep the

coil from moving rearward can be used in calculating the number of chains needed to

secure the load. The three chains required by the securement regulation have to go “over

the top” of the coil or “through the eye.”12

11 A bump chain is fastened over a wood block and in front of the steel coil. The bump chain keeps the

steel coil from moving forward during a forceful brake application. 

12 49 CFR 393.100 (iii) (a) (1), (2), and (3). 
Factual Information 19 Railroad Accident Report

The executive director of the National Association of Chain Manufacturers told

the Safety Board that too many variables exist to effectively calculate how many chains

would have been needed to keep the coil secured to the rear semitrailer after the impact

with the train, but three chains would probably not have kept the coil from breaking loose

from the semitrailer. The Safety Board analyzed the load securement configuration as

specified by Federal regulations (using three chains) for steel coil transport. The Board’s

computations showed that the rigging of three chains would have failed by a factor of

about eight in this accident. 

Vehicle Conspicuity

The second semitrailer had three amber lens lights, each about 2.5 inches in diameter, installed on both sides at a frame rail height of about 50 inches. The rear of the semitrailer had two tail lights and two combination brake and turn signal lights. The front

corners of the semitrailer had one amber light each. Additionally, the semitrailer had

round lens-style reflectors on the front corners, sides, and rear. Postaccident examination

of the bulbs and electrical testing of the second semitrailer revealed that the lights had

been on at the time of the accident. 

Neither semitrailer was equipped with retroreflective tape. The Federal Conspicuity Systems law (49 CFR 571.108) mandates that all trailers manufactured after December

1, 1993, with a GVW rating in excess of 10,000 pounds and a width of at least 80 inches

have retroreflective sheeting tape along both sides and the rear. Both semitrailers had been

manufactured before December 1, 1993. 

Track

NICTD

NICTD owns, inspects, and maintains its track structures. As Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA) class 4 track, both the NICTD eastward and westward main tracks

(from south to north) have a maximum allowable operating speed of 79 mph for passenger

trains and 35 mph for freight trains. 

An electrically energized catenary wire is situated over the approximate centerline

of each NICTD track. The wire is supported by a series of wayside catenary support poles

situated outboard of the track roadbed along the right of way. 

Investigators found no abnormalities during the postaccident inspection of the

track. A visual inspection of the rail did not reveal any fractures that may have interrupted

signal circuitry. In addition to inspecting the track physically, the Safety Board reviewed

NICTD track inspection records from May 19, 1998, to June 18, 1998. The inspection

frequency for both main tracks met FRA requirements, and remedial corrective actions

were taken when track defects were noted. No deficiencies were noted at the Midwest

Steel grade crossing. All NICTD track inspections were conducted by designated individuals qualified under 49 CFR 213.7. 
Factual Information 20 Railroad Accident Report

NICTD had conducted the most recent internal rail inspection in the area of the

Midwest Steel grade crossing on November 6, 1997. During a visual inspection, investigators found no fractures that could have interrupted signal circuitry within the Midwest

Steel grade-crossing area.

Conrail

The Conrail track consists of main track No. 2 and main track No. 1 (from south to

north), which are tangent and about level in this vicinity. All train operations were remotely

controlled by the Conrail train dispatchers in Dearborn, Michigan, and a traffic control signal system.13 Besides Conrail trains, CP Rail System, Indiana Harbor Belt, CSX Transportation, and Amtrak trains operate over the Conrail tracks at the Midwest Steel grade

crossing. 

Grade Crossing

The FRA considers the intersections of the Midwest Steel private road with the

Conrail and NICTD tracks to be two separate grade crossings. The FRA considers both

intersections to be private crossings.

Location, Configuration, and Traffic

Location and Configuration. The highway portion of the Midwest Steel grade

crossing is about 60 feet wide, accommodates two lanes of traffic in each direction, and

intersects the railroad tracks at a right angle. The crossing is used primarily by the Midwest Division of the National Steel Corporation, including its employees, suppliers, visitors, and others having business at the plant. PreCoat Metals and other adjacent businesses

also use the crossing.

In this area of Porter County, the Conrail and NICTD tracks parallel each other.

Traveling from east to west, the tracks begin to parallel each other at the Burns Harbor

Yard near Conrail MP 486 and NICTD MP 48.5. At the time of the accident, this stretch of

track contained five grade crossings. All five crossings, with the exception of the fivetrack Conrail crossing at Old Wilson Road,were protected by gates, lights, and bells. (The

Conrail crossing at Old Wilson Road had only flashing lights.) From east to west, the following crossings were in this area of parallel tracks:

13 The tracks are signaled in both directions. Signal indication provides the authority for a train to

operate in either direction on the same track. 

Common Name Conrail MP NICTD MP Primary Use Ownership

Old Wilson Road MP 486.71 MP 49.2 Commercial (now closed) private

Midwest Steel MP 487.29 MP 49.77 Commercial private

Continental Can MP 488 MP 50.51 Inactive private

Hillcrest Road MP 488.3 MP 50.8 Residential public

County Line Road MP 490.1 MP 52.6 Residential/Recreation public
Factual Information 21 Railroad Accident Report

Traffic. Based on a postaccident traffic count by Midwest Steel, vehicles go

through the crossing about 4,300 times per day. Of these crossings, about 2,500 are made

by light vehicles (cars, pickup trucks, and so forth) and 1,800 by heavy trucks. These figures represent the traffic in both directions, so about 2,150 vehicles use the crossing daily.

The Midwest Steel crossing serves as the primary entrance and exit to the area. 

An average of about 132 trains use the Midwest Steel crossing daily. A Conrail

dispatcher in Dearborn, Michigan, conducted an inventory and found that an average of

100 trains from various railroads, including about 14 Amtrak passenger trains, pass over

the Conrail portion of the Midwest crossing daily. Most of these trains (about 86), are

freight trains. On the NICTD side of the crossing, about 26 NICTD passenger trains use

the crossing daily, as do an average of 6 freight trains. 

Crossing Geometry

The Conrail and NICTD sections of the crossing are separated by 86 feet and

9 3/4 inches of paved asphalt from the southernmost Conrail rail to the northernmost

NICTD rail. The NICTD north gate and the Conrail south gate are 58 feet apart.

(See figure 10 for representations of these distances at the crossing.)

Grade-Crossing Obligations

History. According to NICTD officials, around 1908, an ice company owned a

tract of land north of the tracks near the present-day Midwest Steel property. At the time,

the ice company purchased a right of way to this property from the Chicago Lake Shore

Railroad. The ice company retained the right to a private grade crossing and access to its

property until the National Steel Corporation purchased the property.

NICTD officials told the Safety Board that, in July 1959, the National Steel Corporation requested the establishment of what eventually became the NICTD portion of the

crossing. Gates and flashers were put in service in August 1959. 

Responsibility. Four organizations have direct involvement with the Midwest Steel

grade crossing—Midwest Steel (that is, the National Steel Corporation), NICTD, Conrail,

and the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT). Several other businesses and

agencies have less significant involvement with the crossing.

The engineering firm Cole Associates, Inc., conducted a property survey at the

Midwest Steel grade crossing in 1997. Based on this survey, NICTD owns 120.58 feet of

land between a monument located near US 12 and a north point near the crossing gate arm

at the Conrail No. 2 main track. From the northern NICTD property line, Conrail owns

100.07 feet of property to its northern boundary line. 

NICTD’s agreement with the National Steel Corporation, dated August 1, 1968,

for the construction, maintenance, and use of the private road crossing14 requires that the

National Steel Corporation, at its own expense, construct and maintain the Midwest Steel

crossing in compliance with statutory regulations. All work must meet the approval of

NICTD’s chief engineer or his authorized agent. The agreement stipulates that the
Factual Information 22 Railroad Accident Report

crossing is to be protected at all times by automatic gates and flashing lights and such

safety devices as may be required by NICTD. The agreement also stipulates that the crossing is to be used only by “Midwest Steel’s agents and servants and by persons having business with Midwest Steel.” In addition to the agreement, the railroads and the National

Steel Corporation have issued permission to Sequa Coating Corporation (PreCoat Metals)

and Portside Energy Corporation to use, under defined terms, the crossing.15

Conrail has a similar agreement with the National Steel Corporation, dated April

1995. Like the agreement with NICTD, Conrail’s agreement states that the crossing shall

be protected with flashing lights and gates. These warning devices must be installed and

maintained by Conrail at the National Steel Corporation’s expense.

14 The contract was first made with the Chicago SouthShore and South Bend Railroad; it now applies to

NICTD. 

Figure 10. Distances at the crossing
Factual Information 23 Railroad Accident Report

US 12 runs parallel to and about 45 feet south of the NICTD right of way. US 12 is

maintained and operated by INDOT. INDOT does not exercise jurisdiction over the Midwest Steel crossing. INDOT is responsible for maintaining the highway traffic signals for

the crossing and for managing traffic access to and from US 12 at the intersection adjacent

to the crossing. 

According to the NICTD general manager, INDOT has safety and crossing oversight responsibilities with respect to NICTD to the same extent as it has for other railroads

within Indiana. According to the chief of the INDOT division of Intermodal Transportation, INDOT has a regulatory role over public grade crossings as defined in State statute,

and no jurisdiction over private grade crossings. This official also stated that INDOT has

oversight obligations arising from NICTD’s enabling legislation such that INDOT provides funds to offset NICTD operating and capital costs, including the local matching

funds associated with Federal grants.

According to testimony provided by INDOT representatives during depositions

conducted by the Safety Board on October 28 and 29, 1998, in Merrillville, Indiana,

INDOT has neither performed nor knows of any risk assessments performed on gradecrossing limitations regarding storage area lengths in this geographic region. During these

proceedings, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and INDOT representatives also

stated that neither the FHWA nor INDOT has the responsibility or authority to fund or

otherwise oversee improvements at private crossings.

Highway-Rail Signals

NICTD Grade-Crossing Warning System. The NICTD grade-crossing warning

system uses two signal masts, each equipped with a gate and located so that they will

come down across each direction of highway traffic. The system uses 12 round 8-inchdiameter flashing lights and a bell, all mounted on the signal masts to provide warning for

all directions of highway traffic. Track circuits monitor trains approaching the crossing

from both directions. The amount of warning time provided is determined by the length of

the approach track circuit and the speed of the approaching train. 

The westbound track has both a west and an east approach track circuit. The west

approach track circuit extends about 934 feet from the crossing. Trains approaching the

crossing from the west are restricted to 20 mph. This configuration results in a minimum

warning time of 31.8 seconds; slower trains receive a longer warning time. The east

approach track circuit extends about 3,087 feet from the crossing. The maximum

15 NICTD and PreCoat Metals had a formal agreement as to the latter’s responsibilities for the Midwest

Steel grade crossing. Under this agreement, PreCoat Metals agreed to meet all obligations (fiduciary in

nature) that the National Steel Corporation had for this crossing should the National Steel Corporation not

meet its obligations. Also, under this agreement, PreCoat Metals will incur all “reasonable costs,” defined as

those costs necessary and appropriate to the safe and prudent use and maintenance of the crossings as

determined by mutual agreement or per industry, statutory, or regulatory standards, “as promulgated by the

Association of American Railroads, the American Railway Engineering Association, State or Federal

agencies, or the District’s Chief Operation officer or his designee.” 
Factual Information 24 Railroad Accident Report

authorized speed for trains approaching the crossing from the east is 79 mph.16 This configuration results in a minimum warning time of 26 seconds. 

The eastbound track also has west and east approach track circuits. The west

approach track circuit extends about 3,480 feet from the crossing. The maximum authorized speed for trains approaching the crossing from the west is 79 mph; this results in a

minimum warning time of 33 seconds. The east approach track circuit extends about 3,087

feet from the crossing. Trains approaching the crossing from the east are restricted to 20

mph; this results in a minimum warning time of 105 seconds. Slower trains approaching

the crossing from either direction receive a longer warning time.

Conrail Grade-Crossing Warning System. The Conrail grade-crossing warning

system uses two signal masts, each equipped with a gate and located so that they will

come down across each direction of highway traffic. The warning system uses eight round

8-inch-diameter flashing lights and a bell, all mounted on the signal masts to provide

warning for all directions of highway traffic. The west approach for track No. 1 and track

No. 2 are configured similarly; the east approach for track Nos. 1 and 2 are the same. 

The west approach circuit extends about 4,980 feet from the crossing. A gradecrossing microprocessor monitors the approach circuit and calculates the speed of an

approaching train and the time the train will take to arrive at the crossing. The microprocessor then activates the warning devices at a predetermined warning time. The microprocessor provides a relatively uniform warning time, but the time will fluctuate

somewhat due to changing ballast and track conditions. The maximum authorized speed

for trains approaching the crossing from the west is 79 mph. This configuration results in a

minimum warning time of 43 seconds for all train speeds up to 79 mph. 

The east approach consists of two circuits that extend a total of about 5,480 feet.

The maximum authorized speed for trains approaching the crossing from the east is

79 mph. This configuration results in a minimum warning time of 46 seconds; slower

trains receive a longer warning time. The east approach circuits also check the wayside

railroad signal. If the wayside signal is red, the crossing will not be activated. This prevents the crossing warning devices from activating and blocking highway traffic while a

train approaching the crossing from the east is stopped on the east approach circuit waiting

for a permissive wayside signal. 

INDOT Highway Traffic Signal System. The highway signal system is programmed to monitor traffic in four directions: (1) eastbound traffic on US 12,

(2) westbound traffic on US 12, (3) eastbound US 12 traffic turning left onto the Midwest

Steel entrance road, and (4) southbound traffic exiting the Midwest Steel facilities. The

intersection is equipped with solid-state monitoring equipment and a video detection

16 The signals on the NICTD signal system are arranged on the two tracks for movement with the current

of traffic; trains traveling west are routed on the westbound track, while the eastbound track handles trains

traveling east. Trains traveling east on the westward track are moving against the current of traffic and are

restricted to 20 mph. Trains traveling west on the eastward track are moving against the current of traffic and

are restricted to 20 mph. 
Factual Information 25 Railroad Accident Report

system, which is used as a motion detector to notify the monitoring equipment of traffic

waiting for a green light. The traffic signals are standard round 12-inch-diameter traffic

lights and operate on a commercial power supply.

Highway-Rail Signal Interaction. The Midwest Steel entrance road is a northsouth, two-way, double-lane roadway, intersected by four railroad tracks (two Conrail

tracks on the north end and two NICTD tracks on the south end). Because of the proximity

of the two railroad crossings, the Conrail and NICTD crossing warning devices are interconnected such that operation of the warning devices from one railroad activates the warning devices on the other railroad. 

The two crossing warning devices are also interconnected with the highway traffic

signals. Activation of either railroad crossing warning system causes the highway traffic

signals to begin a railroad “preemption”17 sequence. The signal preempt sequence is

designed to provide a green signal for southbound traffic leaving the Midwest Steel facility. (See tables 3 and 4.)

Grade-Crossing Oversight

The FHWA. The FHWA does not have jurisdiction over private grade crossings.

The funds it provides are not available for use at private crossings, including the accident

crossing.

The FHWA regulates aspects of public grade crossings that affect highway safety.

FHWA publications provide guidelines and standards for the correct design of grade

crossings, the assessment of safety at grade crossings, and the appropriate placement of

traffic control devices at and on the approaches to grade crossings. The FHWA also

administers several Federal funding sources available to States for improving grade crossings. Title 23 United States Code section 130 designates specific funds for grade-crossing

safety. Fifty percent of the section 130 funds must be spent on improving signs and pavement markings. Funds for hazard elimination (not specific to grade crossings) are designated in 23 United States Code section 152. According to the FHWA, “hazard elimination

funds may also be used for highway-rail grade-crossing safety if the State has identified it

on the priority list”18 as a hazardous crossing. There is also an optional category of funds,

a portion of which may be used either for grade-crossing improvements or for more general hazard elimination. In fiscal year 1997, Indiana received $4.96 million in section 130

funds, $3.84 million in hazard elimination funds, and $7.88 million in optional safety

funds, for a total of $16.68 million. That year, Indiana obligated $6.21 million of Federal

funds for specific grade-crossing projects. 

17 Preemption is the transfer of normal operation of traffic signals to a special control mode. It may

involve using unique phase combinations, shortening interval times, or extinguishing certain indications and

using visibility-limited signal indications.

18 Transcript of 1998 deposition proceedings for FHWA Office of Motor Carriers representative Fred

Small, p. 116.
Factual Information 26 Railroad Accident Report

The FRA. The FRA defines a private crossing as “a highway-rail crossing which is

not a public crossing.” It defines a public crossing as “the location where railroad tracks

intersect a roadway which is under the jurisdiction of and maintained by a public authority

and open to public travel.”19

The FRA regulates the aspects of grade-crossing safety pertaining to railroads,

including track safety, active signals, and train safety and conspicuity. For example, the

agency’s regulations specify the type of lighting to be placed on a locomotive (49 CFR

229.125); the audibility of the train horns (49 CFR 229.129); and the inspection, testing,

and maintenance standards for grade-crossing signal system safety (49 CFR Part 234).

The FRA also conducts research on safety at grade crossings. 

In addition to grade-crossing oversight, the FRA is responsible for three specific

areas of railroad operational oversight, as codified in 49 CFR Parts 217, 219, and 240. Part

217 requires railroads to file operating rules with the FRA and to test their employees on

Table 3. Order of events when a westbound Conrail train approaches crossing

NICTD CONRAIL INDOT

Event/Time Gates Flashing 

Lights Gates Flashing Lights

Highway Traffic 

Signals

Conrail train 

detected on 

approach circuit.

Flashing lights 

on the south 

crossing signal 

activate.

Both north 

and south 

crossing 

signal lights 

activate.

Railroad preempt 

sequence begins.

3 seconds after 

activation.

South gate 

begins to 

descend.

Both gates 

begin to 

descend.

*9 seconds after 

activation.

US 12 traffic signals 

move to red. 

Southbound traffic 

receives green 

interval.

15 seconds later. Southbound traffic 

signals move to red.

5 seconds later. East/west US 12 

traffic receives green 

interval; interval stays 

green until crossing 

deactivates.

* This is the maximum time required to move the signals to red. Time may be less, depdending on which traffic 

phase the lights are in when preemption occurs.

19 Federal Railroad Administration, National Highway-Rail Crossing Inventory Instructions and

Procedures Manual (Washington: U.S. Department of Transportation, 1996), pp. 1-7.
Factual Information 27 Railroad Accident Report

those rules “to determine the extent of compliance.” Part 219 regulates the circumstances,

conditions, and requirements concerning drug and alcohol testing. Part 240 describes the

locomotive engineer certification process. (NICTD’s records showed that the engineer

involved in this accident had been properly certified.)

The FRA has eight geographic regions in which it places its regional field offices,

and each of these regions is assigned a grade-crossing safety manager. Portage is in

Region 4, which is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. Before the accident, the FRA

Region 4 crossing manager, having received a December 2, 1997, letter from NICTD

regarding the potential hazard posed by the use of Michigan Train LCVs at the Midwest

Steel crossing, had called for meetings between the railroads using the crossing, Midwest

Steel, INDOT, the Port of Indiana, and the FRA. Representatives of these organizations

and several other interested agencies met in January 1998. In spring 1998, the parties

agreed to retain American Consulting Engineers, Inc., to provide alternative improvement

options. 

American Consulting Engineers, Inc., completed its study on October 7, 1998. The

study offered six “grade separation”20 alternatives, all involving the construction of new

Table 4. Order of events when a westbound NICTD train approaches crossing

NICTD CONRAIL INDOT

Event/Time Gates Flashing 

Lights Gates Flashing Lights

Highway Traffic 

Signals

Conrail train 

detected on 

approach circuit.

Both north and 

south crossing 

signal flashing 

lights activate.

North 

crossing 

signal lights 

activate.

Railroad preempt 

sequence begins.

3 seconds after 

activation.

Both gates 

begin to 

descend.

North gate 

begins to 

descend.

*9 seconds after 

activation.

US 12 traffic signals 

move to red. 

Southbound traffic 

receives green 

interval.

15 seconds later. Southbound traffic 

signals move to red.

5 seconds later. East/west US 12 

traffic receives green 

interval; interval stays 

green until crossing 

deactivates.

* This is the maximum time required to move the signals to red. Time may be less, depdending on which traffic 

phase the lights are in when preemption occurs.
Factual Information 28 Railroad Accident Report

bridges or additions to the Port of Indiana bridge. They ranged in cost between $5 million

and $10 million. The firm recommended an option costing $5.1 million, indicating that

this proposal was the most economical, had the simplest geometrics, and eliminated intermixing with Port of Indiana traffic. In November 1998, National Steel Corporation representatives presented the study to INDOT, the Indiana Department of Commerce, and the

Governor of Indiana. 

In August 1998, the FRA crossing manager arranged for a safety alert to be posted

on the Internet for American Trucking Associations truckdrivers. This safety alert briefly

described the Portage accident, provided some grade-crossing accident statistics, and

listed “lifesaving tips for the professional driver” concerning locations where roadways

cross railroad tracks.

State of Indiana. The State of Indiana, through INDOT, is also involved with the

safety of grade crossings. INDOT declares its mission to be providing “customers the best

transportation system that enhances mobility, stimulates economic growth, and integrates

safety, efficiency, and environmental sensitivity.”21 In addition, one of INDOT’s strategic

goals is to “create, promote, and maintain a safe transportation system and a safe work

environment” through reducing the number and severity of accidents.22 As a part of its

effort to fulfill its mission and meet its strategic goal, INDOT maintains an inventory of

Indiana’s public grade crossings, assesses the relative risk at each one, and allocates Federal and other funds to improve those it considers most dangerous. However, the State of

Indiana does not have jurisdiction over, and does not inventory or upgrade, private

crossings.

Under the Indiana State Code, INDOT adopted rules for the operation of LCVs on

heavy duty highways. The code specifies the routes to be used by the heavy duty vehicles.

(See appendix B for selections from the Indiana State Code.) Under Chapter 5, section 4,

the Code lists the highways designated as “extra heavy duty highways,” noting that “Highway 12, from one-fourth (1/4) mile west of the Midwest Steel entrance to Highway 249” is

such a highway. Chapter 5, section 6 of the Code states that 

[INDOT] shall implement procedures that, in cooperation with the State

police department and local police departments, enhance the safety of

citizens along and near extra heavy duty highways listed in section 4 of this

chapter.

INDOT does not have authority over permitted vehicles once they leave State

highways.

Private Crossings. In June 1994, the FRA, in conjunction with the FHWA, the

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Federal Transit Administration,

20 Grade separation occurs when a bridge or tunnel is built to vertically separate roadways from

railroads at a crossing site. 

21 INDOT strategic plan detailed at http://www.state.in.us/dot/sp. Viewed on May 25, 1999.

22 INDOT strategic plan.
Factual Information 29 Railroad Accident Report

published a report entitled Rail-Highway Crossing Safety Action Plan Support Proposals.

The report describes an action plan, consisting of numerous projects within six initiative

areas, intended to reduce the number of grade-crossing accidents and casualties without

adversely affecting the economic potential of the rail and highway infrastructures. One of

the six initiatives was safety at private crossings; the report concluded that responsibilities

and standards for private crossings should be developed and defined. The report also

stated

The Department proposes to develop and provide national, minimum

safety standards for private crossings and to eliminate the potential

impediment to high speed rail operations posed by private crossings.

In July 1998, the Safety Board published a study on safety at passive grade crossings, based on investigations of 60 passive grade-crossing accidents.23 At that time, no

action had been taken on the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) proposals concerning responsibility at private grade crossings. In this study, the Safety Board made the

following safety recommendation to the DOT: 

H-98-32

Determine within 2 years, in conjunction with the States, governmental

oversight responsibility for safety at private highway-rail grade crossings

and ensure that traffic control on these crossings meets the standards within

the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. 

In a letter dated December 23, 1998, the DOT stated 

In 1993, the FRA circulated ‘Preliminary Guidelines: Safety of Private

Highway-Rail crossings.’ Our intent was to work with state and industry

officials to develop final guidelines. In the 1994 action plan, the

department made a commitment to develop and define responsibilities and

minimum safety standards (Guidelines) for private crossings. That

commitment still stands; however, severe staff resource limitations in [the]

FRA’s safety and legal offices have precluded the aggressive pursuit of this

goal. Our review in the 1993/1994 time frame indicated that federal

legislation might be necessary in order to resolve some of the issues and

controversies. The Department appreciates the increased emphasis this

recommendation provides and commits to initiating action on this issue

within 2 years, following completion of the statutory mandated whistle ban

proceedings. 

In a letter dated February 8, 1999, the Safety Board stated

The Safety Board notes in your response that the DOT remains committed

to initiating action on this issue within the next 2 years, following

completion of the FRA statutorily mandated whistle ban proceedings.

[Safety Recommendation] H-98-32 has been classified ‘Open-Acceptable

23 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety at Passive Grade Crossings, Volume I: Analysis, Safety

Study NTSB/SS-98/02 (Washington: National Transportation Safety Board, 1998).
Factual Information 30 Railroad Accident Report

Response’ pending completion by the DOT of the minimum safety

standards and clarification of governmental oversight responsibility for

private grade crossings.

The Safety Board also issued parallel Safety Recommendation H-98-35 to the

States. It stated:

H-98-35

Determine within 2 years, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of

Transportation, governmental oversight responsibility for safety at private

highway-rail grade crossings and ensure that traffic control on these

crossings meets the standards within the Manual on Uniform Traffic

Control Devices. 

To date, nine States (Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, Utah, Hawaii, Connecticut, New York, Nebraska, and Montana) have responded to Safety Recommendation

H-98-35.

Maryland’s September 9, 1998, response stated that 

We agree that governmental agencies have an oversight responsibility for

safety at private highway-rail grade crossings. Also, the State does

periodically evaluate all of the public crossings in Maryland. Many of the

passive crossings where a driver would have a problem detecting the

approach of a train have already had active devices installed. The few that

remain unsignalized are prioritized for improvement and active devices are

being installed, as funding becomes available.

New Mexico’s September 11, 1998, response stated that 

The Railroads and Utilities Section of the Department will communicate

and work closely with the FRA regarding the need to take action on this

issue. Any action taken will be predicated on what Federal law calls for and

the level of funding available. New Mexico law does not currently provide

for addressing safety issues at private grade crossings; such issues are

exclusively dealt with between the railroad and private property owner.

North Carolina’s September 11, 1998, response stated that 

The regulation of private crossings involves government in the private

matters of individual property owners. Such regulation runs counter to the

current push to make government less intrusive in private matters....

Utah’s September 21, 1998, response stated that “UDOT would be willing to work

with USDOT in making such a determination.”

Hawaii’s September 25, 1998, response stated that “the Hawaii Department of

Transportation will comply with your Safety Recommendations H-98-34 through -37.”

Connecticut’s October 5, 1998, response stated that
Factual Information 31 Railroad Accident Report

Under the authority of existing State statutes, in March of 1993 DOT

implemented a private crossing safety initiative to establish uniform

minimum standards for traffic control devices at private rail crossings.

Every private crossing in Connecticut that did not have active warning

devices was assigned a minimum traffic control device consisting of a

private crossing sign or a private crossing sign and a stop sign. Some

crossings were also assigned a painted stop bar. Enforcement of the

maintenance of the signage has proven to be somewhat difficult due to lack

of staff, but enforcement is currently sufficient.

New York’s October 20, 1998, response stated that 

New York State Law affords the Commissioner of Transportation broad

jurisdiction over private grade crossings along railroad routes where

passenger trains operate. Currently this law applies to all intercity

passenger routes.

Nebraska’s March 8, 1999, response stated that 

The Nebraska Department of Roads’ policy on private highway-rail grade

crossings conforms in large part to the recommendation of H-98-35. The

Nebraska Department of Roads, pursuant to LB 255 adopted in 1997 by the

Nebraska Legislature, is in the process of undertaking a safety analysis of

all 6,613 at-grade crossings in Nebraska, both public and private. Pursuant

to § 4 of LB 255, Nebraska has a measure of jurisdiction over all crossings,

regarding the construction, repair, and maintenance of such crossings.

Whether the Nebraska Department of Roads has the power to direct the

placement of traffic control devices at private crossings or at crossings not

part of the State Highway System has not been determined. In any case, a

determination of the power of the Department regarding such crossings by

a court of law will not be made until the Department has rules and

regulations in place and has attempted to force compliance of those rules.

Montana’s March 19, 1999, response stated that “State or local authorities should

not have any responsibility or oversight for private crossings. Private railroad crossings

are an issue to be addressed by the private party and the respective railroad company.”

Indiana has not responded to Safety Recommendation H-98-35. The Safety Board

is sending a second notification of the recommendation to the State of Indiana.

Meteorological Information

At 4:50 a.m., on June 18, 1998, the weather station at Gary, Indiana, 9 miles west

of Portage, reported the weather as mostly cloudy with 10-mile visibility, a temperature of

71.6° F, and 6-knot winds. The train 102 engineer described the weather at the time of the

accident as “dark and a light fog” and said it was not raining. 
Factual Information 32 Railroad Accident Report

Toxicological Information

After the accident, the operating crewmembers of NICTD train 102 submitted

urine samples for postaccident drug testing and were given breath tests for the presence of

alcohol. FRA regulations did not require that they take such tests. In this accident, exceptions to toxicological testing at 49 CFR 219.201 (b) applied:

Exceptions. No test shall be required in the case of a collision between

railroad rolling stock and a motor vehicle or other highway conveyance at a

rail/highway grade crossing. No test shall be required in the case of an

accident/incident the cause and severity of which are wholly attributable to

natural cause (e.g., flood, tornado or other natural disaster) or to vandalism

or trespasser(s), as determined on the basis of objective and documented

facts by the railroad representative responding to the scene. 

Breath tests were administered to the conductor and the engineer at 7:51 and

8:35 a.m., respectively. Urine samples were taken from the conductor and the engineer at

8:10 and 8:50 a.m., respectively, at LaPorte Hospital in LaPorte, Indiana. The urine samples were sent to the South Bend Medical Foundation, where they were analyzed. The

results for both drug and alcohol testing for the NICTD train 102 crew were negative. 

When the police arrived at the accident site, they did not observe any indication of

impaired behavior on the part of the truckdriver. They requested that the driver submit to

blood and urine tests, and he agreed. The Porter Memorial Hospital’s Northern Indiana

Occupational Medical Services clinic staff took blood and urine samples from the truckdriver at 7:30 a.m., about 3 hours after the accident. Samples were taken in accordance

with the sampling procedures set out in DOT regulations at 49 CFR Part 382.

The clinic sent the samples to a contract lab, Quest Diagnostics, Inc., of Wood

Dale, Illinois. The lab tested the samples using the DOT testing protocol. Under 49 CFR

Part 382, blood is used for alcohol testing, and urine is tested for five families of illicit

drugs.24 The truckdriver’s blood test results were negative for ethyl alcohol. The urine test

results were positive for cannabinoids (marijuana). The testing specified does not distinguish between tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the active substance in marijuana, and tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid (THC-COOH), an inactive metabolite of marijuana.

THC can impair behavior, depending on how much of the marijuana substance was used

and how recently it was used. THC-COOH is a product of the metabolism of THC and

does not measurably affect behavior. THC-COOH can remain in the body for several

weeks or months after marijuana use.

About 3 milliliters of the blood sample taken from the driver remained after the lab

had completed the alcohol testing. The Safety Board sought a portion of the remaining

blood sample for additional testing. Quest Diagnostics agreed to retain the sample pending

a subpoena. A subpoena was issued and forwarded to Quest Diagnostics, where it was

received on Wednesday, July 15, 1998. The subpoena called for the lab to send the blood

24 Marijuana, cocaine, opiates, phencyclidine, and amphetamines. 
Factual Information 33 Railroad Accident Report

sample to the Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) Toxicology and Accident Research

Laboratory in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for further testing. 

On Friday, July 17, Safety Board, CAMI, and Quest Diagnostics representatives

conducted phone discussions about forwarding the sample. Shipment of the sample on that

day would have resulted in a Saturday delivery to CAMI. Because CAMI did not have

staff working on Saturday, the sample, which was to be shipped in a container with ice and

kept cold, could warm over the weekend without care, potentially damaging it. They

agreed that the shipment should be delayed until the following Monday, July 20.

On July 23, the Quest Diagnostics director of laboratory operations notified the

Safety Board that the sample had not been forwarded but had been inadvertently disposed

of during the weekend of July 18 and 19. He reported that Quest Diagnostics had tagged

the sample to be kept, but it had apparently been stored with other samples for disposal

and had been discarded. Efforts to locate the discarded sample were unsuccessful.

Survival Aspects

NICTD Carbody Structure

Train 102 consisted of two self-propelled railcars;25 NICTD car 11 was in the lead

at the time of the accident with NICTD car 45 in trail. The self-propelled MU electric passenger railway cars that NICTD operates in revenue service are of similar design and were

manufactured by Nippon Sharyo Seizo Kaisha Ltd. of Toyokowa, Japan (Nippon

Sharyo).26 The body shells were constructed by Nippon Sharyo at its facility in Toyokowa

and then shipped to the Cleveland, Ohio, facility of the General Electric Apparatus Service Division for final assembly. The leading car (car 11) of train 102 was a 1EBU51

model (as designated by Nippon Sharyo’s internal order number), from a lot of 43 cars

delivered in 1982 and 1983. 

Crashworthiness

Collision posts fitted to MU passenger railcars are substantially constructed

I-beam-shaped structural members, located within the vestibule door frame at the end

bulkheads of each car. One collision post is installed on each side of the end bulkhead vestibule door frame, for a total of four collision posts per car. They are anchored to the carbody underframe and roof structure. By deforming on impact, they are intended to absorb

kinetic energy in a “centerline-to-centerline” type of collision, reducing the tendency of

car bodies to telescope (when one carbody intrudes longitudinally into another). This type

of intrusion has historically been disastrous to occupants of passenger compartments.27

25 Passenger-carrying railroad cars operated by NICTD, as described in this investigation, are

technically defined as “MU locomotives,” pursuant to the definition under the FRA locomotive safety

standards in 49 CFR 229.5. 

26 Nippon Sharyo Seizo Kaisha Ltd. is now operating under the name Nippon Sharyo Ltd. Also,

Sumitomo Corporation of America handled commercial arrangements for the transaction. 
Factual Information 34 Railroad Accident Report

The construction drawings28 for this car design showed that two collision posts,

consisting of modified I-beam members, were fitted to the vestibule door frames at the end

bulkheads of each car, as required by 49 CFR 229.141. The construction technical specification29 for this car design indicated that each collision post was a welded assembly, made

from steel plates and welded to the underframe end sill and roof structure. 

According to 49 CFR 229.141 (a) (4), MU railcar main vertical members (referred

to by the industry as “collision posts”) “shall have an ultimate shear value of not less than

300,000 pounds at a point even with the top of the underframe member to which it is

attached,” among other technical requirements.

Postaccident Inspection

Upon their arrival at the accident site, investigators found two catenary support

poles to the north side of the NICTD right of way dislodged and destroyed. The point of

impact was about the intersection of the westbound NICTD track and the northbound lane

of the grade crossing. The front of NICTD car 11 came to rest about 450 feet west of the

point of impact. The flatbed truck trailer was distorted into a crescent shape, and the wreckage had wrapped and wedged around the front of car 11 during the collision. The kingpin of

the struck trailer, which had connected it to the leading trailer, was sheared off. The leading

flatbed trailer remained attached to the truck tractor at the grade crossing and retained its

cargo. 

The cargo of the struck trailer was a 72-inch-diameter by 41-inch-wide opencenter coil of steel that reportedly weighed 38,030 pounds. It had reportedly been chained

to the approximate center of the flatbed trailer deck and covered with a tarp. The coil had

dislodged from the trailer on impact and penetrated the front bulkhead of NICTD car 11.

Investigators found the tarp wrapped around the front end of NICTD car 11. They found

the coil inside the forward passenger compartment area of car 11, it having traveled

inward almost to the center vestibule area, a distance of about 34 feet. The coil was recovered from the car at the grade-crossing site with a heavy-lift crane that operated through a

hole cut in the roof above the coil. 

The NICTD signal controller box adjacent to and immediately west of the crossing

on the north side of the track was off its foundation and demolished. The rails and track

roadbed between the point of impact and where the equipment came to rest were

27 National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Commuter Trains,

Chicago, Illinois, October 30, 1972, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-73/05 (Washington: National

Transportation Safety Board, 1973), and John H. White, Jr., The American Railroad Passenger Car: Vol. 1

(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 148. 

28 Nippon Sharyo engineering drawing ref. B0631B13680, originally dated April 23, 1981, revision B,

dated December 7, 1981, and related engineering drawings for this carbody series. 

29 Specifications of Electric Multiple Unit Commuter Cars for Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District (Chicago South Shore & South Bend Railroad) Spec. No. SP90034, 1983, [prepared

by] Nippon Sharyo Seizo Kaisha, Ltd., Japan. 
Factual Information 35 Railroad Accident Report

undamaged. An overhead streetlight on the southeast corner of the NICTD tracks was not

operational. 

Safety Board investigators examined the train 102 control positions at the NICTD

shop in Michigan City on June 19, 1998. Car 11’s operating controls were positioned in

the following manner: the reverser key was in the forward position; the master controller

handle was popped up; the brake valve cut-out was in the operating position and locked;

and the brake handle was in the extreme right quadrant in the emergency position. 

Rail Equipment

NICTD Car 11. The front bulkhead had sustained major impact damage, resulting

in a breach that opened into the front vestibule and passenger compartment and extended

from about the floorline to the ceiling and from the extreme left front corner post to the

left edge of the right collision post, contained within the front bulkhead. The damage severed the wiring and electrical conduits routed through the front bulkhead. Neither the interior emergency lights nor the public address system in the first car was operable following

the accident. A battery back-up arrangement supported these systems, but these circuits

were also rendered inoperable by the front bulkhead damage.

The front bulkhead panel assembly had been pressed inward in a crushing manner

and destroyed. Several structural and sheathing elements, including parts of the left front

sheathing panel and the door frame, had been displaced and bowed into a curved shape

toward the left sidewall. The ceiling and roof structural elements above the front bulkhead

and vestibule were pulled downward and inward. The inner partition wall of the front vestibule and the partition slider-door were also pressed inward with the elements compressed beneath and among the remains of the front bulkhead panel.

The left collision post had fractured into two pieces at a point about 39 inches

above its bottom end. The connections at its upper and lower ends were not completely

severed, and the top and bottom segments did not fully separate from their anchorage

points. (See figure 11 for a diagram showing the collision posts within the car structure.)

The front window in the operator’s cab area was fractured, and several wall panels had

been slightly displaced and distorted. 

The forward passenger compartment (behind the front vestibule) revealed scuffing

and gouges on the low ceiling area immediately aft of the vestibule slider door. The rows

of seats on the left side of the aisle, from the extreme front to the rearmost seat (adjacent to

the restroom door), had been crushed and pressed downward in an aft direction. The rows

of seats on the right side of the aisle in the forward passenger compartment were intact and

did not exhibit impact damage. Two lengths of heavy chain were on the floor, one length

of which had a hook-eye attached.30

30 Information on the chain appears in the “Laboratory Tests” section of the report. 
Factual Information 36 Railroad Accident Report

The floor area adjacent to the restroom, where the steel coil came to rest about

34 feet from the front of the train, had partially collapsed. The coil was oriented with its

parallel side faces about parallel to the exterior sidewalls.

A pronounced crescent-shaped gouge was found on the exterior aisle wall of the

restroom partition, aft of the leading corner of the restroom aisle wall partition, consistent

with the coil having traveled to the restroom partition wall before moving back toward the

front of the car, a distance of about 56 inches, to the point where it came to rest. 

Examination of the center vestibule area indicated no damage. Examination of the

aft passenger compartment, behind the center vestibule area, indicated that the seats were

fully intact and undamaged. Numerous seat cushions were dislodged.

With the exception of the breach in the front bulkhead, the exterior of car 11

received little damage. Minor nonstructural impact damage was observed at the right rear

step well. 

Figure 11. View of a typical NICTD Nippon Sharyo railcar, showing “collision post” locations within the car (Source: NICTD Running 

Maintenance and Troubleshooting Manual, September 1982 

edition, as modified by the Safety Board.)
Factual Information 37 Railroad Accident Report

NICTD Car 45. Investigators found no internal damage to the trailing car. Externally, it sustained minor penetration of its exterior shell due to electrical arcing from contact

with the dislodged (but energized) overhead catenary wire. The pantographs and related

electrical equipment on the roof were destroyed. 

Truck

On June 20 and 22, 1998, the Safety Board and the Indiana State police conducted

a joint inspection of the LCV. They found the following defects: 1) tire less than 2/32 inch

on #8 axle, first semitrailer, 2) exhaust leak in tractor, 3) leaking outer wheel seal on

#4 axle, 4) air leak at tractor secondary tank, 5) low air buzzer not functioning in tractor,

6) brake shoe partially missing at left #4 axle, 7) defective hose at main tank in first semitrailer, 8) combination vehicle overweight (153,115 pounds), and 9) brakes out of adjustment on axles #4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The Indiana State police issued citations for the following

out-of-service violations under the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance: logbook not kept

current, eight brakes out of adjustment, improper load securement, and failure to retain

previous 7 days of logbook pages.

Postaccident Testing

Visibility and Stopping 

On June 20, 1998, Safety Board investigators conducted visibility and stopping tests

with a two-car train similar to NICTD train 102 and a Michigan Train LCV similar to the

accident vehicle, except that it was equipped with reflective tape. To approximate accident

conditions, all tests were performed between 3:45 and 4:45 a.m. The weather was clear.

Test results appear in table 5. (See appendix C for more detailed test results.)

Table 5. Visibility and stopping test results

Test Action Result

Visibility Test 1 Parked tractor-trailer on grade crossing and moved 

train eastward until tractor was out of sight. 

Lost sight of tractortrailer 3,279 feet from 

grade crossing. 

Visibility Test 2 Same conditions as in test 1 except railcar interior 

lights were turned off.

Lost sight of tractortrailer 3,279 feet from 

grade crossing. 

Visibility Test 3 With tractor-trailer lights on and side marker lights and 

reflective tape covered, moved train westward until 

tractor came into view.

Tractor became visible 794 feet from the 

grade crossing. 

Visibility Test 4 With tractor-trailer lights on and side marker lights and 

reflective tape covered, moved train westward until 

semitrailer came into view. Test conducted at 4:28 a.m.

Semitrailer became 

visible 542 feet from 

the grade crossing.

Stopping Test With train moving westward at 68 mph, emergency 

braking was applied 542 feet east of grade crossing. 

Train stopped 1,675 

feet from brake application.
Factual Information 38 Railroad Accident Report

Crossing Signal Systems

Conrail signal and grade-crossing warning equipment did not sustain any damage

in the accident. INDOT reported that its highway signal equipment was not damaged.

NICTD signal equipment was damaged by a downed pole line. The catenary line was also

affected. The crossing warning equipment case was destroyed. 

NICTD Grade-Crossing Warning System. NICTD signal equipment was

destroyed during the collision and so was not available for testing. The underground

cables used to interconnect the NICTD signal case with the Conrail signal case and the

highway traffic signal case were identified, and their insulation resistance was tested. Test

results showed them to be clear of grounds and short circuits. The monthly record indicated that the crossing was in compliance, and the record noted no exceptions.

Highway Traffic Signal System. Safety Board staff reviewed the maintenance log

for the traffic equipment. It showed that an annual inspection and relamp (replacement of

bulbs) was performed on September 16, 1997. On March 2, 1998, the timing and preemption operation was verified. The most recent log entry, for March 19, 1998, listed no

equipment exceptions. 

INDOT personnel stated that, in 1995, INDOT began a program to check the functionality of all traffic signals subject to railroad preemption. The Midwest Steel crossing

preemption was inspected, and changes were made to the interconnection circuits. Before

December 1995, the preemption circuit used a normally open contact to monitor activation

of the warning devices. This was changed to a normally closed contact, which provided a

“fail-safe”31 circuit. 

Conrail and NICTD Interconnection. Safety Board investigators tested the interconnection between the two railroads after the equipment for each crossing had been individually tested. Investigators measured the delay between activation of the warning

devices from one railroad and the appropriate devices from the other railroad. The delay

was negligible. 

Railroad and Highway Interconnection. INDOT provided the Safety Board with

timing charts for the Midwest Steel traffic light preemption sequences. Investigators conducted tests to verify that the equipment was working as designed. 

When east and west highway traffic lights on US 12 signaled green, activation of

the crossing warning devices from either railroad on either main track caused the east and

west traffic lights to move to red in an average of 6 seconds. Southbound traffic lights then

displayed a green light (for track clearance) for an average of 14 seconds. After the southbound traffic lights moved to red, east and west traffic lights displayed a green light. They

remained green until the railroad crossing preemption terminated. Left turn arrows for east

US 12 traffic remained red while the railroad crossing devices activated. 

31 Term used to designate a railway signaling design principle, the object of which is to minimize the

hazardous effects of a component or system failure. Under a fail-safe system, if a break or failure occurs, the

signal activates to prevent traffic from entering the intersection.
Factual Information 39 Railroad Accident Report

When the left turn arrows for east US 12 traffic turning left onto Midwest Steel

Road displayed green, activation of the crossing warning devices from either railroad on

either main track caused the left turn arrows to move to red in an average of 4 seconds.

The southbound traffic lights then displayed a green light (for track clearance) for an average of 13 seconds. East and west US 12 traffic lights also displayed green lights. The

lights remained green until the railroad crossing preemption terminated. Left turn arrows

remained red while the railroad crossing devices activated.

Testing determined the traffic light preemption sequences to be in accordance with

the timing charts provided by INDOT. 

Railroad Signal Event Recorders. Postaccident data were downloaded from the

Diagnostic Log at the Conrail Computer Assisted Train Dispatching Facility in Dearborn,

Michigan. They indicated the following:

Time32 Event

05:16:48 Westbound signal is cleared by Conrail dispatcher for westbound 

Conrail train 201, track No. 1.

05:29:26 Crossing warning devices are activated for Conrail train 201 at the 

Midwest Steel crossing.

05:30:22 Crossing warning devices are activated for NICTD train 102 at the 

Midwest Steel crossing.

05:32:55 Crossing warning devices at the Midwest Steel crossing are deactivated 

for Conrail train 201.

Laboratory Tests

The chain that was used to secure the coil of steel to the second semitrailer was

sent to the Safety Board Materials Laboratory for analysis. The chain was in two pieces,

one of which had a hook-eye attached to the end. It was considerably worn near the hookeye. Hardness and cross-sectional area measurements were made on the links in the worn

and unworn areas. Theoretical calculations of the load-carrying capability of the chain,

based on these measurements, indicated that the unworn section would break at a load of

about 29,000 pounds. The worn section, which had a much smaller cross-sectional area,

would have broken at about 15,000 pounds. The chain had fractured in an unworn region.

The left collision post from the front of train car 11 was examined both on site and

in the laboratory. Examination revealed that the collision post had fractured in overstress

where its reinforcement ended, about 39 inches from the bottom. The collision post had

also partially separated from its attachment to the frame structure at the top and bottom.

The fracture at the top, where the collision post attached to the ceiling structure, was an

overstress separation. The fracture at the bottom, where the collision post was welded to

the end sill assembly under the floor of the car, occurred immediately adjacent to a weld.

32 Because the dispatcher was in Michigan, times were provided in eastern daylight time.
Factual Information 40 Railroad Accident Report

Investigators learned that NICTD car 11 had not been involved in any collision event prior

to the Portage accident that might have compromised the strength of the collision post.

Design documentation indicated that the collision post had met FRA design requirement

safety standards as specified in 49 CFR 229.141 (a) (4).

Investigators found two welds in the collision post attachment that were identified

for further examination. The first was the vertical inboard rear weld, which had been specified33 as a fillet weld. The weld was not readily visible due to the presence of a 6.7-inchlong threaded fastener at the joint. The fastener was 5/16-inch in diameter, rusted on the

surface, and it did not have a head. It appeared welded and/or wedged in place.

(See figure 12.) According to NICTD (Mechanical Department management), this

fastener is not a normal component of the collision post. Comments were offered that it

could have functioned as a shim or filler material during welding, although a positive

determination could not be made.34

The second weld that was further examined was the vertical inboard front weld.

This weld was specified35 as a single-bevel groove weld and was required to have

100-percent penetration by the NICTD specification.36 The front of the collision post had

separated from the sill at this joint, with nearly all of the weld filler material remaining on

the end sill side of the fracture. 

33 Nippon Sharyo drawing B0631B13680, revision B, “Arrangement of Collision Post and Corner Post,”

dated April 23, 1981.

34 When asked, Nippon Sharyo did not provide an explanation of the purpose of this element.

35 Nippon Sharyo drawing B0631B13680.

Figure 12. Arrow indicates threaded fastener at the joint welded 

and/or wedged in place
Factual Information 41 Railroad Accident Report

Six metallographic sections were taken through the end sill side of the joint, such

as the one shown in the lower portion of figure 13. Only one of the six sections showed

100-percent penetration, with the amount of penetration varying in the other five sections.

All six sections showed areas of lack of fusion between the weld and the collision post

material, as evidenced by the joint failing not through the weld or the collision post material, but at the interface between the two. 

The incomplete penetration, the lack of fusion, and the presence of the fastener

indicated a failure on the part of Nippon Sharyo to employ adequate welding quality

assurance when manufacturing the car. The Safety Board contacted Nippon Sharyo to

determine whether any documentation existed regarding inspection or testing of the welds

in question. Nippon Sharyo responded that neither the NICTD contract, industry practice

and standards, nor the quality control and assurance program at the manufacturer’s assembly plant required the preparation of written reports confirming weld inspection. No such

inspection documentation was prepared or existed. Nippon Sharyo further indicated that

its quality control and assurance procedures were approved by NICTD and NICTD’s

expert consultant on railroad car design and that Nippon Sharyo used its experience in preparing manufacturing drawings in accordance with the production contract specifications. 

Nippon Sharyo indicated that it used only “certified” welders in the construction of

the cars and that its certified welders performed “self-inspections” of each weld. The car

manufacturer also indicated that NICTD and its expert consultant had the right and opportunity to inspect the welds to ensure that proper welding procedures and practices were

followed and that the welds met specifications. Nippon Sharyo reported that NICTD and

its representatives performed such inspections, and that Nippon Sharyo performed its own

inspections, each company adhering to its respective quality assurance procedures.

Other Information

State Truck Size and Weight Regulations

The Midwest Steel highway-railroad grade crossing was built in the 1950s, when

trucks were typically much shorter in length than those on today’s highways. As the need

for larger commercial vehicles grew, manufacturers began to build larger single vehicles,

and carriers increased the use of combination vehicles (tractors, semitrailers, and trailers). 

Traffic regulation is under the jurisdiction of the individual States. Each State has

truck size and weight regulations consistent with the design of its local roads. As interstate

truck traffic increased, the differences between the various States’ truck size and weight

regulations impeded interstate movement of goods. Whenever a truck crossed the State

line from a less restrictive to a more restrictive State, the truckdriver would be required to

36 Specification of Electric Multiple Unit Commuter Cars for Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District, Specification number SP90034, section S3.03(c), which states that “End

underframe shall be assembled by arc welding in accordance with S12.10, using 100-percent penetration

welds.”
Factual Information 42 Railroad Accident Report

reduce his vehicle’s length or be subject to citation or prohibition from travel (or both) in

that State. 

The trucking industry petitioned the U.S. Congress to enact legislation to standardize size and weight regulations among the States. In 1982, Congress passed the Surface

Transportation Assistance Act. It contains a provision that essentially permits unlimited

overall truck lengths on designated routes, which include the National System of Interstate

and Defense Highways; on the Federal-aid primary system of highways qualified by the

Secretary of Transportation; and on routes designated by local (State) authorities. 

Thus two sets of vehicle length regulations apply in each State. The State’s own

regulations restrict the length of combination commercial vehicles operating on highways

other than designated routes, and the Federal law allows combination commercial vehicles

Figure 13. Top graphic shows an illustration of a full penetration weld between

two pieces of metal; bottom graphic shows a photograph of the weld

found at the base of the collision post, where less than full

penetration is indicated by the gaps on the left side and at the bottom
Factual Information 43 Railroad Accident Report

of unlimited lengths (with minor restrictions) to operate on designated highways. The

minor restrictions are

(1) The length of the semitrailer in exclusive combination with a truck

tractor does not exceed 48 feet. A semitrailer not more than 53 feet in

length shall satisfy this requirement when configured with two or more rear

axles, the rearmost of which is located 40 feet or less from the kingpin or

when configured with a single axle which is located 38 feet or less from the

kingpin. For purposes of this paragraph, a motortruck used in combination

with a semitrailer, when that combination of vehicles is engaged solely in

the transportation of motor vehicles or boats, is considered to be a truck

tractor. (2) Neither the length of the semitrailer nor the length of the trailer

when simultaneously in combination with a truck tractor exceeds 28 feet, 6

inches.37

The Portage accident vehicle was 82 feet long overall, and the two semitrailers

measured 28 feet and 28 feet, 6 inches, respectively. In Michigan, if this vehicle had been

operated on nondesignated highways, the maximum permissible overall length of the tractor and two semitrailers would have been 59 feet. In Indiana, if this vehicle had been operated on nondesignated routes, the maximum permissible overall length would have been

65 feet. Because this vehicle was operated on designated routes in both Michigan and

Indiana, its 82-foot length was lawful under the Federal unlimited vehicle length exemption. 

The Surface Transportation Assistance Act did not address the issue of truck

weight. State legislatures continue to enact weight restrictions consistent with their State’s

roadway and bridge designs. The maximum GVW for a commercial vehicle is 80,000

pounds in all but 10 States. Twenty-seven States have some provision for heavier vehicle

weight limits when specific combinations of vehicles are used. All States have programs

in place under which the State may, via a permit purchased by the carrier, allow specified

vehicles using specified routes to carry specified (up to unlimited) weights. Such loads are

known as “permit loads.”

In Michigan, the maximum vehicle weight is 80,000 pounds when the vehicle is

equipped with 5 axles. A vehicle may legally weigh up to 161,000 (plus) pounds when

equipped with up to 11 axles. In Indiana, the maximum vehicle weight is normally 80,000

pounds, but a maximum weight of 134,000 pounds is allowed when the vehicle has a

permit. Indiana also restricts these permitted loads to specific routes. 

The accident vehicle had a GVW38 of about 153,115 pounds. The truckdriver did

not obtain an overweight permit for the State of Indiana nor would a permit have been

issued for a vehicle with a GVW greater than the 134,000-pound limit. According to the

37 California Vehicle Code: Division 15, “Size, Weight, and Load,” and Chapter 4, “Length,” Section

35401.5.

38 The weight was determined by the Indiana State police by weighing the vehicle, minus the rear trailer

and load, and then adding the weight of the coil and the unladen weight of the semitrailer. 
Factual Information 44 Railroad Accident Report

driver’s account of the routes he traveled from Detroit, Michigan, to Burns Harbor,

Indiana, he used routes specified for heavier vehicles.

The LCV was not inspected at the Indiana-Michigan border. Neither Indiana nor

Michigan has a “port-of-entry”39 system for monitoring commercial vehicle traffic entering its State. Enforcement of the size and weight regulations is a function of the State and

local law agencies and is conducted at fixed facilities and by mobile enforcement units.

Postaccident Actions

NICTD. After the accident, NICTD officials met with FRA representatives and

instituted a slow-speed restriction at the Midwest Steel crossing. NICTD also reduced its

operating speeds for passenger trains to 50 mph on this crossing. Since the Portage accident, NICTD has given two Operation Lifesaver education programs at the Midwest Steel

grade crossing, during which NICTD representatives provided truckers with Operation

Lifesaver materials about the dangers of highway-rail grade crossings. 

National Steel Corporation’s Midwest Division. According to Midwest Steel

officials, they have instituted a number of changes since the accident. They have

• Installed new signs40 that describe the relationship between the two sets of

tracks and the safe distance between them. 

• Conducted communications campaigns involving carriers, vendors, and drivers

making deliveries to their plant. 

• Participated with the FRA in two safety blitzes during which plant personnel

spoke to drivers about the crossing and its dangers. 

• Improved visibility at the crossing, at the recommendation of the FRA, by

installing a 75-foot light tower with 12,000 watts of lighting. 

• Completely repaved the crossing. 

• Developed procedures to keep trucks from waiting along the highway. 

• Issued frequent-delivering carriers pre-scale tickets to avoid unnecessary stops

at gate 1, roughly 100 feet north of the crossing. 

• Issued carriers blank pre-scale tickets.

• Posted a traffic controller at the crossing.

39 A port-of-entry system requires the establishment of truck inspection terminals on the major highway

routes entering a State. Commercial vehicles entering the State are examined for weight, registration, fuel

tax, and other documentation necessary to operate in the State. States not having a port of entry system rely

on road enforcement or a series of inspection sites in the State for commercial vehicle enforcement, or both. 

40 Three signs were posted, in July 1998, in a cluster, providing information as follows: (1) DANGER:

Trucks, Do Not Stop On or Between Tracks (white background, black lettering with red around the word

“DANGER”), (2) a 30- by 30-inch (approximate) yellow sign with black lettering showing two sets of

railroad tracks and arrows indicating the distance between the tracks as 55 feet, and (3) a 30- by 30-inch

(approximate) circular sign with a white background showing a truck between the tracks with the truck’s

trailer fouling them. The sign has a red circle with a slash, indicating that such positioning is prohibited.
Factual Information 45 Railroad Accident Report

Incidents Since the Portage Accident. On July 16, 1998, at 6:34 a.m., the engineer of the eastbound Conrail train MAIL8M, traveling at 60 mph on the Conrail No. 2

(inside) track, put the train into emergency braking because he was concerned that a southbound flatbed trailer was extending onto the No. 2 track. According to the engineer, he

could not tell whether the trailer was on the track or simply in close proximity. The engineer said that he was about an “engine length” away when the truck moved forward and a

collision was avoided. 

About 3:00 p.m., on August 19, 1998, the engineer of the eastbound Amtrak train

352, the Lake Cities, put the train into emergency braking because he saw a truck on or

near the Conrail tracks. 

On January 21, 1999, an eastbound Conrail train went into emergency braking at

11:02 a.m. because of a truck extending onto the tracks.

All three incidents involved tractors with single semitrailers exiting the Midwest

Steel plant area during daylight hours. The Safety Board has learned of other incidents

since June 18, 1998, at the Midwest Steel crossing involving trucks striking the gates in

attempts to avoid oncoming trains. One incident was witnessed by a Conrail police officer,

another by an independent truckdriver (who notified the Safety Board), and a third by a

Safety Board investigator. Additional gate contact incidents have been reported to

NICTD.

FRA Safety Standards. On May 12, 1999, the FRA issued comprehensive Federal safety standards for railroad passenger equipment,41 entitled “Passenger Equipment

Safety Standards; Final Rule,” to become effective July 12, 1999. Included in the standards are new strength requirements for collision post structures of MU locomotives and

cab car equipment, which are cited under 49 CFR 238.211. Strength requirements for collision post structures of MU locomotives and cab car equipment were previously cited

under 49 CFR 229.141, which applies to the NICTD equipment in this investigation. 

41 Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 91, May 12, 1999, “Rules and Regulations,” pp. 25539-25705.
46 Railroad Accident Report

Analysis

Exclusions

The weather was dry with a light fog at the time of the accident. The weather,

including the fog, did not significantly impair visibility or the stopping capabilities of any

of the vehicles involved. 

The NICTD track approaching the accident site is straight and provides an unimpeded view of the Midwest Steel grade crossing. No obstructions were found to impair

sight of the crossing for westbound trains. 

A review of track inspection records and an inspection of the track and its geometry revealed no anomalies, and the NICTD train 102 engineer took no exception to the

track. 

A review of the maintenance records and inspections both before and after the

accident revealed that neither of the two NICTD passenger cars had any mechanical problems. 

Investigators found that the LCV had numerous mechanical violations that, if they

had been discovered during a roadside inspection, would have caused it to have been

placed out of service. However, the truckdriver did not indicate that he had any difficulty

(mechanical or otherwise) with the operation of his vehicle, and none of the violations

appear to have had any effect on this accident.

Investigators considered the current railroad operational instructions and rules, the

supervision of the operational personnel, the overall operation of the trains, and the performance of the employees involved with the accident. Regarding these factors, the Safety

Board investigators discovered no deficiencies during the NICTD operations investigation.

Based on the foregoing information, the Safety Board concludes that neither the

weather, the track, the mechanical condition of the train, the mechanical condition of the

LCV, nor railroad operations caused or contributed to the collision. 

The train 102 engineer was experienced in operating the commuter passenger train

over the territory and had been observing the appropriate rules and procedures, in accordance with NICTD practices, while operating the train. His past efficiency and safety

audits showed that he routinely complied with NICTD rules. Similarly, the conductor was

experienced and was compliant with NICTD rules. 

The night before the accident, both the engineer and conductor had less sleep than

the amount typically needed to achieve adequate rest, about 8 hours of uninterrupted

sleep. People who receive less than adequate sleep are subject to fatigue-impaired perfor-
Analysis 47 Railroad Accident Report

mance. Nevertheless, the Safety Board found no performance deficiencies on the part of

the crewmembers in their efforts to stop the train, avoid the collision with the tractortrailer, or respond to the accident. 

No evidence indicates that either crewmember had been taking prescription or

nonprescription medications or illicit drugs that could have affected their performance. No

evidence indicates they were under the influence of alcohol. Both men were in good health

and had normal vision (or were wearing corrective lenses) and hearing. 

The Safety Board concludes that the train engineer and conductor were qualified to

perform their duties and showed no evidence of impairment from drugs, alcohol, or

fatigue. 

The emergency response personnel arrived at the accident site within about

10 minutes and, despite the problems posed by the size of the steel coil, tried to free the

injured person trapped under it. Although he succumbed to his injuries, their efforts were

appropriate under the circumstances and involved a number of agencies that might reasonably have been expected to provide suitable assistance. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the emergency response was timely and effective. 

The remainder of the analysis is divided into four main sections. In the first, the

Safety Board reviews the accident. In the second section, the Board considers the behavior

of the train 102 engineer and the LCV truckdriver. The third section of the analysis considers the major safety issues identified in this investigation: the safety at private grade crossings and the design of the Midwest Steel grade crossing. Finally, the Safety Board

considers the other safety issues that emerged during this investigation, including the conspicuity of the LCV semitrailer and the crashworthiness of the NICTD railcars.

Accident

About 4:31 a.m. on Thursday, June 18, 1998, NICTD train 102 collided with the

right side of an LCV at the Midwest Steel grade crossing near Portage, Indiana. At this

grade crossing, a private road leads north from US 12, intersects the NICTD and Conrail

railroad tracks, and continues to the Midwest Steel facility and other businesses. 

Shortly before the collision, while the LCV was traversing the NICTD tracks, the

approach of the westbound Conrail train 201 had activated the flashing light signals and

automatic gates at the Conrail crossing. The truckdriver had stopped the LCV before

reaching the Conrail crossing’s south gate with the vehicle’s second semitrailer resting on

the westward NICTD track. At this time, NICTD train 102, traveling westbound about

68 mph, was approaching the Midwest Steel grade crossing. 

About 542 feet east of the crossing, the train 102 crew noticed the LCV’s second

semitrailer, which carried a steel coil covered by a black tarp, on the crossing. The engineer said that he placed the train in emergency braking; then, followed by the conductor,

he exited the control compartment and ran toward the rear of the passenger compartment.
Analysis 48 Railroad Accident Report

The crew alerted passengers in that area about the impending collision and told them to

evacuate. 

As the collision occurred, the LCV’s second semitrailer broke away from the first

semitrailer and was dragged by the front of the NICTD train; at the same time, the single

chain securing the steel coil to the second semitrailer broke. The released steel coil entered

the first train car through the front bulkhead. The coil moved through the car until it came

to rest about 34 feet into the passenger compartment. Three fatalities and five minor injuries resulted.

Operator Actions

Train 102 Engineer

The train 102 engineer estimated that he first saw the tractor when the train was

about 6 pole lengths (1,020 feet) from the crossing and then detected the semitrailer and

made the brake application when the train was about five pole lengths (850 feet) from the

crossing. According to the Board’s accident reconstruction, the engineer could have seen

the truck tractor when train 102 was about 794 feet from the crossing, and the semitrailer

(blocking the crossing) when the train was about 542 feet from the crossing.42 The train

102 engineer would have needed very little time (about 1 second) to recognize the danger

and put the train into emergency braking. 

Safety Board stopping tests showed that at a speed of 68 mph, train 102 required

about 1,675 feet in which to stop. Visibility test results showed that the engineer could not

have seen any part of the truck until the train was about 800 feet from the crossing,

roughly half the distance necessary to stop the train. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that, if the train 102 engineer had detected the truck as soon as it became visible

and immediately put the train into emergency braking, train 102 could still not have been

stopped in time to avoid the collision. 

Truckdriver

Actions Preceding the Accident Period. The Safety Board found numerous

indications of inadequate performance on the part of the truckdriver before he reached the

Midwest Steel grade crossing. Postaccident examination of the vehicle indicated, for

example, that the driver had not adequately maintained his logbook and that his vehicle

had been overweight for travel in Indiana. The securement of the coil to the trailer, for

which the truckdriver was responsible, was also not adequately performed. 

According to the truckdriver, the 38,030-pound steel coil on the LCV’s second

semitrailer was secured by three chains. Two of the three chains kept the coil from moving

42 Although the Safety Board tried to replicate visibility and other conditions during the accident

reconstruction, at the time of the accident, the visibility of the LCV would have been additionally

diminished by the presence of Conrail train 201, which blocked the artificial light coming from the Midwest

Steel and PreCoat Metals facilities from reaching the LCV.
Analysis 49 Railroad Accident Report

forward or rearward. Only one 3/8-inch grade 7 chain, which was very worn in areas and

had a 6,600-pound WLL, went over top of the coil to secure it to the trailer bed. 

Federal regulations require that such a steel coil be secured to a semitrailer by a

minimum of three 3/8-inch grade 7 tiedown assemblies (chains). The regulations also

require that the chains used to keep the coil from moving forward or rearward not be

included when calculating the number of chains needed to secure the load. In other words,

use of three “over the top” or “through the eye” chains would have been necessary to meet

Federal requirements for securing the coil to the trailer bed, and the truckdriver used only

one such chain.

While the truckdriver did not correctly apply Federal regulations regarding load

securement, the impact with train 102 brought tremendous force to bear on the semitrailer

and placed enormous stress upon the chain that secured the coil. All available evidence

indicates that, given the force of the accident and the weight of the coil that broke loose

from the second semitrailer, the coil still would have broken loose from the semitrailer

even had it been secured according to Federal regulations. 

Actions at the Midwest Steel Crossing. When the truckdriver arrived at the

Midwest Steel grade crossing, no trains were visible, and no warning devices were active.

As he crossed the NICTD tracks, the lights and gates activated for the approaching Conrail

train 201. In response to these signals, the truckdriver stopped the LCV about 6 feet before

it reached the gate separating it from the Conrail tracks. When he stopped for the Conrail

gate, the truckdriver knew that the second semitrailer of his LCV was blocking a portion

of the NICTD tracks. 

The truckdriver had three primary options by which he could have actively

addressed the situation. He could have tried to 1) back the LCV completely out of the

crossing and onto the highway, 2) turn the LCV so it would fit safely between the NICTD

and Conrail tracks, or 3) move the LCV forward and closer to the lowered Conrail gate.

All these options had drawbacks. In backing the LCV off the crossing, the truckdriver

would have been backing a large, multi-segment vehicle onto a highway, where traffic

might be present. Because the vehicle was so long and the space between the tracks was

limited, maneuvering it to fit safely between the tracks would have required the truckdriver to first back up the LCV and then to make minute and indeterminate positioning

adjustments within a confined space. Moving the 82-foot LCV forward the 6 feet remaining between it and the lowered Conrail crossing gate would still have left a portion of the

second trailer overhanging the NICTD track.

Absent the imminent danger of an approaching train on the NICTD tracks, the

driver may have felt no special urgency to take any of these options, all of which were, for

different reasons, unsatisfactory. Once the driver saw, however, that the crossing warning

devices for the opposite lane of traffic had been activated, he knew that a train was

approaching on the NICTD tracks, which was an imminent danger. At this point, the

truckdriver should have known that some action on his part was necessary to avoid a collision. Given that the NICTD signal activated some 26 seconds before NICTD train 102

would arrive at the crossing, the driver had less than 26 seconds in which to act. 
Analysis 50 Railroad Accident Report

After the accident, investigators found that the truck’s wheels had been turned to

the left, consistent with the driver’s statement that he had begun to turn the LCV to position it between the two sets of tracks. Based on the truckdriver’s statement that he had

tried to reposition the LCV between the tracks but lacked sufficient room and time, and

the position of the LCV’s wheels after the accident, it appears the truckdriver began but

did not successfully complete the maneuver before the NICTD train reached the crossing.

(Because the truck was not equipped with an event recorder, the Safety Board cannot be

sure of the truckdriver’s actions and must rely on physical evidence and testimony.)

The Safety Board considers that, although the truckdriver could have taken more

effective action earlier to prevent the accident, the prompting of the traffic and rail signals

introduced him into a situation in which his vehicle created a grade-crossing hazard. 

The Safety Board conducted a study, published in 1995, entitled Factors That

Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck Accidents.

43 The study identified critical measures that predict fatigue-related accidents. The duration of the most recent sleep period and the amount

of sleep in the past 24 hours are the leading critical measures. 

By examining the driver’s (incomplete) logbook and conducting postaccident

interviews, investigators learned the truckdriver slept only about 6 hours in his truck

sleeper berth (between 5:00 and 11:00 p.m. on June 17) in his most recent sleep period and

that this was the total amount of his sleep for the 27 hours preceding the accident. This

quantity of sleep is 2 hours less than the 8 hours the average person needs to function normally. In addition, this driver worked a somewhat irregular schedule; he was awake at the

time of the accident (4:30 a.m.) the day before, but slept during that time 2 days earlier.

Irregular schedule was another predictor examined in the fatigue study.

Consequently, the potential existed for the truckdriver to have been fatigued. As

previously stated, however, the Board found that the driver’s actions at the Midwest Steel

grade crossing were generally consistent with reasonable driver behavior under the given

circumstances. 

To determine whether drugs and alcohol caused or contributed to this accident, the

truckdriver’s postaccident toxicological samples were taken and tested in a timely manner.

The results of the blood alcohol test were negative. The results of the urine drug test were

positive for the presence of marijuana or marijuana metabolites, raising the possibility that

the driver might have been impaired by marijuana. To resolve the issue, the Safety Board

sought to conduct further blood tests that would distinguish between THC (the active substance in marijuana) and THC-COOH (the inactive metabolite of marijuana). Unfortunately, the testing lab discarded the blood sample before further tests could be conducted. 

The Safety Board had to consider other evidence to determine whether the truckdriver might have been impaired by drug use at the time of the accident. For instance, in

their postaccident observations, the police did not detect any signs of behavior impairment

43 National Transportation Safety Board, Factors that Affect Fatigue in Heavy Truck Accidents, Safety

Study NTSB/SS-95/02 (Washington: National Transportation Safety Board, 1995).
Analysis 51 Railroad Accident Report

on the part of the truckdriver. Also, as noted above, the truckdriver’s conduct at the crossing represented reasonable driver behavior, and his responses were essentially those that

would have been expected of an unimpaired driver. 

Therefore, based on the foregoing evidence concerning the truckdriver’s actions,

decision-making, and behavior both before and during the accident, the Safety Board concludes that, despite vehicle overloading, logbook discrepancies, inadequate load securement, and the potential for impairment due to fatigue and marijuana use, these factors

concerning the truckdriver’s actions did not contribute to the collision. 

Grade Crossing

Crossing Geometry and Storage Area

The crossing area of the Midwest Steel compound grade crossing consisted of two

sets of double tracks, one set owned by Conrail and one by NICTD, separated by 86 feet

and 9 3/4 inches of paved asphalt (from the southernmost Conrail rail to the northernmost

NICTD rail). A 58-foot space lay between the southernmost Conrail gate and the northernmost NICTD gate. Thus, the maximum storage area for the grade crossing was about

58 feet.

The accident LCV was 82 feet long, 24 feet longer than the 58-foot storage distance. Nevertheless, nothing in law or practice prevented the 82-foot-long LCV from

using this crossing. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that, as currently configured,

the Midwest Steel grade-crossing storage area cannot safely accommodate all vehicles

that are allowed to use it. 

Since the Portage accident in late June 1998, several additional incidents and nearmisses have taken place at the Midwest Steel grade crossing. The Safety Board understands that, even before this accident occurred, the National Steel Corporation, NICTD,

INDOT, the Port of Indiana, and the FRA had agreed that the safety issues raised by the

crossing should be addressed. The Safety Board has long advocated total grade separation

as the best means of ensuring grade-crossing safety.44 Because of the continuing danger

posed by this crossing, the Safety Board believes that the FRA, the FHWA, INDOT, the

National Steel Corporation, Norfolk Southern Corporation,45 and NICTD should work

together to make, within 2 years, permanent engineering changes to the Midwest Steel

highway-rail grade crossing that will minimize or eliminate safety hazards at this crossing.

Signals

Conrail Traffic Control Signal System. Postaccident examination showed that

the traffic control signals were displaying the proper signal sequence for Conrail train

44 Safety at Passive Grade Crossings, Volume I: Analysis, Safety Study NTSB/SS-98/02, p. 64.

45 On June 1, 1999, the Conrail operation through this crossing became part of Norfolk Southern

Corporation.
Analysis 52 Railroad Accident Report

movements on both tracks. Signal inspection records indicated no deficiencies that would

have prevented proper operation of the system. 

NICTD Automatic Block Signal System. Similarly, postaccident signal examination and inspection records did not show any deficiencies that would have prevented

proper operation of the automatic block signal system. The train crew said that NICTD

train 102 was operating on a clear signal indication and that the visibility of the wayside

signals was adequate for proper train handling.

Conrail/Midwest Steel Grade-Crossing Warning System. Statements from the

LCV truckdriver indicated that the crossing warning devices were clearly visible, which

allowed the truckdriver to stop his vehicle when the Conrail train activated the gates and

flashing lights. With the Conrail signal correctly lined, the overlay circuit on the westbound approach would activate the crossing as soon as a train was detected46 on the circuit. In this instance, the interconnection between the Conrail and NICTD systems

activated the proper lights and gates for both railroads without observable delay. 

NICTD/Midwest Steel Grade-Crossing Warning System. Because the signal

case was destroyed during the collision, no grade-crossing signal equipment was available

for testing. A routine maintenance inspection of the grade-crossing warning equipment

performed the day before the accident showed no deficiencies that would have prevented

the warning devices from operating properly. The inspection report listed no anomalies in

the functionality of the warning devices. 

Furthermore, the LCV truckdriver said that he saw the NICTD north gate and

flashing light units for southbound traffic activate shortly before the accident occurred.

The NICTD preemption circuit that sent the signal to the highway traffic controller was

functioning properly and, along with the railroad interconnect circuit, would preempt the

highway traffic signals whenever either railroad warning device was activated.

The LCV truckdriver stated that he saw the Conrail warning system activate and

he stopped his vehicle. The Conrail warning system was designed to provide a minimum

of 45 seconds warning before an approaching train occupied the crossing. Conrail

train 201 was not traveling at the maximum authorized speed so the actual time provided

was 56 seconds (according to event recorder data). The LCV truckdriver also stated that

while he was stopped, he saw the NICTD north flashing lights and gate activate. The

NICTD warning system was designed to provide a minimum of 26 seconds of warning

before an approaching train occupied the crossing. NICTD train 102 was traveling close to

the maximum authorized speed but went into emergency braking about 542 feet from the

crossing. Therefore, it appears that about 82 seconds elapsed between the time the Conrail

train entered the circuit and the collision. 

US 12/Midwest Steel Traffic Signal System. The investigation determined that

the preemption circuit between the highway traffic controller and the NICTD signal case

was functioning as designed. Activation of the grade-crossing warning system from either

46 The equipment takes 2 to 3 seconds to recognize a shunt on the track circuit. 
Analysis 53 Railroad Accident Report

railroad would have triggered the highway traffic signals to begin their railroad preemption sequence. 

The preemption sequence was designed to run through the traffic signal phases to

provide southbound traffic with a green interval adequate to clear any vehicles that might

be on, or close to, the track in an area exposed to railroad traffic. The preemption was also

designed to prevent traffic on US 12 from receiving a green left turn arrow interval after

the NICTD south gate and flashing light units were activated and while the traffic signal

controller was in the railroad preemption sequence. The traffic preemption sequence was

not designed to affect northbound highway traffic coming from the east or west and moving into the Midwest Steel facility. 

By design, therefore, eastbound US 12 traffic turning left could receive a green

turn arrow and start across the railroad tracks but be unable to clear both sets of tracks

before being stopped by the activation of the Conrail railroad crossing warning devices.

On the basis of the preceding information, the Safety Board concludes that the signal systems operating at the Midwest Steel grade crossing functioned as designed, and no signal

operation failures caused or contributed to the accident. 

Interconnected Signals. Under the current signal configuration, the interconnected railroad crossing warning devices “simultaneously preempt”47 the highway traffic

signals. Because of this design, the left turn arrow that signaled the LCV truckdriver was

green and did not move to red until after the railroad crossing warning devices activated. If

the highway traffic signal preemption had been designed to account for both directions of

traffic on the Midwest Steel Road, the highway traffic signals would have flushed out any

traffic stopped on the crossings exiting the Midwest Steel facility and would not have displayed a green light for traffic approaching the facility. This design feature would have

prevented traffic from beginning to cross the two sets of tracks and then being stopped

before safely clearing them.

The railroad warning system is currently designed to simultaneously activate the

gates and lights of the occupied track and the single set of outside gates and lights for the

opposite set of tracks. This activation makes the exit gate and signals for the opposite set

of tracks inactive, permitting traffic to exit the storage area. In this accident, when the

Conrail train entered the approach circuit, both Conrail gates and the outside NICTD gate

(for northbound traffic entering the plant) activated simultaneously. The inside NICTD

gate (for southbound traffic exiting the plant) did not activate until the NICTD train

entered the east approach circuit. The Safety Board therefore concludes that the Midwest

Steel grade-crossing signal system did not prevent vehicles from being trapped in the storage area between the NICTD and Conrail tracks. 

Cognizant that the signal system at the Midwest Steel grade crossing was not keeping vehicles from becoming trapped within the storage area, on August 12, 1998, the

Safety Board issued four urgent Safety Recommendations (R-98-44 through -47) that

47 Simultaneous preemption occurs when the “notification of an approaching train is forwarded to the

highway traffic controller unit or assembly and railroad active warning devices at the same time.” 
Analysis 54 Railroad Accident Report

asked the FRA, the FHWA, INDOT, and the National Steel Corporation to institute immediate measures to ensure safe passage for traffic across the Midwest Steel grade crossing

until a more permanent solution could be implemented. The recommendations called for

the organizations to work together to

Take immediate steps to provide traffic controllers to supervise and

coordinate the safe movement of highway and railroad traffic at the

Midwest Steel and Wilson Road grade crossings.48 Ensure that the traffic

controllers are able to communicate directly with highway and railroad

traffic, and keep the controllers assigned to this duty until permanent

engineering changes to these grade crossings can be identified and

implemented. [Footnote added.]

The Safety Board received responses from the FRA, the FHWA, INDOT, and the

National Steel Corporation. The responses indicated that a traffic controller has been

posted to coordinate the safe movement of traffic through the Midwest Steel grade crossing until a more permanent solution, such as grade separation, can be developed. The

Safety Board classified Safety Recommendations R-98-44 through -47 “Open—Acceptable Response.” The Safety Board urges the recipients to continue to work to improve

safety at the Midwest Steel grade crossing.

Grade Crossing Safety

Oversight and Jurisdiction. The various entities involved at the Midwest Steel

grade crossing were aware that the crossing posed unusual hazards. The relatively high

rate of vehicle and train traffic, as well as the number of LCVs using the crossing, were

hazard factors noted by NICTD and the other organizations connected with the crossing.

Despite their consciousness of the dangers posed by the crossing, they took no effective

permanent corrective action to ensure its safety. This lack of action in the face of known

safety hazards raises serious concerns about the distribution of responsibilities for ensuring safety at a private grade crossing, such as the Midwest Steel grade crossing. 

The primary difference between public and private grade crossings is roadway

ownership, which affects the obligations and indemnification of the parties involved in the

crossing activity. At a private crossing, roadway design and maintenance are usually the

responsibility of the private entity that owns the roadway. The private entity may enter

into a contractual agreement with the railroad(s) regarding the liability for any casualty

incurred at the crossing due to any lack of specified maintenance.49

In the case of the Midwest Steel grade crossing, the National Steel Corporation had

contractual agreements with NICTD and Conrail specifying the National Steel Corporation’s

48 The Wilson Road grade crossing was closed on December 29, 1998. This crossing is now opened only

when the Port of Indiana advises that a cargo vehicle cannot use the Port of Indiana overpass because of size

or weight restrictions. At such times, Port of Indiana supervisory personnel direct and control the rail and

vehicle traffic.

49 Not all private crossings are covered by contractual agreements. In many cases, the owner of the

private roadway is unknown.
Analysis 55 Railroad Accident Report

responsibility50 to maintain the crossing signal lights, the gates, and the road surface. This

agreement is fiduciary in nature, calling for the National Steel Corporation to furnish the

funding for the maintenance of the roadway surface and any crossing signal lights and

gates as specified by the respective railroad’s division engineer. Should deficiencies in any

of these identified areas cause an accident, the National Steel Corporation would be liable.

But the contracts do not state that the National Steel Corporation is responsible for the

overall safety of the crossing. Contracts governing private crossings often do not specify

responsibility for all factors that could affect crossing safety. Because of the distribution of

safety responsibilities for private crossings, some important safety factors are not

addressed by any agency.

The FRA is responsible for railroad track, train, and signals safety at all grade

crossings, whether private or public. The FRA’s jurisdiction applies to rail operations only.

The FRA oversees the gates, crossing lights, and track gauges for both public and private

crossings, ensuring that they meet Federal standards. On the other hand, the FHWA and

INDOT have far fewer responsibilities for private crossings than for public crossings.

Because it is a private crossing, neither the FHWA nor INDOT has jurisdiction over the

highway component of the Midwest Steel crossing. 

Consequently, key factors affecting the crossing’s safety, such as what types of

vehicles may use the crossing, the appropriate configuration of the storage area, and necessary signal timing considerations, are not overseen by any agency. Not only are significant safety elements not addressed by any private or government entity, but the complex

interactions between rail and highway operations are not adequately coordinated. 

To summarize, no single entity—not the crossing owner, or a railroad, or a Federal

or State regulatory agency—was responsible for the safety of the entire Midwest Steel private grade crossing. (See appendix D for a table detailing the responsibilities of the entities involved in this situation.) Therefore, the safety-related developments that affected the

Midwest Steel crossing over time, such as changes in vehicles using the crossing and in

train and vehicle traffic levels, were not reviewed by a single entity, and effective steps

were not taken to resolve these recognized safety problems. Several organizations

involved in the crossing, including Midwest Steel, NICTD, and the FRA, were aware that

safety was being compromised at the Midwest Steel crossing, but no entity had or

assumed the responsibility to act to solve the problems. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the lack of clear delineation of oversight responsibility for the safety of the

Midwest Steel private grade crossing undermined its safety. 

The private classification of a crossing can affect still other important factors concerning its safety. For instance, funds distributed to the States by the FHWA for making

crossing improvements will not, in most States, be available to improve safety at a private

crossing. In addition, individual State policy establishes whether existing guidelines and

standards for safe crossing design must be applied to both public and private crossings. As

50 Depending on the contractual situation, PreCoat Metals, rather than the National Steel Corporation,

could be responsible. 
Analysis 56 Railroad Accident Report

noted, the State of Indiana does not have jurisdiction over private crossings; hence,

INDOT does not have clear authority to require the same level of design safety at both

public and private crossings. 

In Indiana and other States, Federal guidelines for the appropriate design and

placement of warning devices at grade crossings, as codified in the Manual on Uniform

Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), are required to be applied at public crossings.51

Because of many States’ (including Indiana) lack of jurisdiction, however, adherence to

the MUTCD guidelines cannot be required at private crossings. Consequently, private

crossings in Indiana are not required to meet any standards for signage, pavement markings, or other elements of traffic safety and control. 

Following the 1995 Fox River Grove accident,52 in which a school bus stopped at a

grade crossing extended into the path of a train, the Safety Board made the following

safety recommendation to the FHWA:

H-96-40

Develop guidelines and amend the MUTCD to provide methods to

delineate the area (zone) that a train, or its cargo, or both, may occupy on

the track or tracks of a railroad grade crossing so motorists have visual

reference points that enable them to ascertain whether their vehicle is

encroaching on the travel path of the train, or its cargo, or both. 

In a letter dated March 13, 1997, the FHWA stated

The Federal Highway Administration has begun developing delineation

and signing guidelines for the recommended zone at railroad grade

crossings. The FHWA has worked with the Illinois Department of

Transportation (IDOT) in determining a signing and delineation method

which will comply with the requirements of the MUTCD. The IDOT will

begin using the method in early 1997. The FHWA has assigned a number

and title to a[n] IDOT request for a change to the MUTCD for inclusion of

the proposed delineation and signing method; Request VIII-43 C—

Roadway Rail Pavement Marking and Signing Plan. The FHWA will

consider the IDOT method and other submitted methods and will request

public comments through the publication of a Notice of Proposed

Amendments to the MUTCD regarding recommended guidance which

may be included in the MUTCD as discussed in the above safety

recommendation.

In a letter dated May 21, 1997, the Safety Board stated

51 The MUTCD provides guidelines for sign, signal, and pavement marking design, as well as for

appropriate placement. MUTCD guidelines become State law when each State adopts them; all States are

required to adopt the MUTCD or a State manual that conforms to the MUTCD.

52 National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad

Corporation (METRA) Train and Transportation Joint Agreement School District 47/155 School Bus at

Railroad/Highway Grade Crossing in Fox River Grove, Illinois, on October 25, 1995, Highway/Railroad

Accident Report NTSB/HAR-96/02 (Washington: National Transportation Safety Board, 1996).
Analysis 57 Railroad Accident Report

The Safety Board understands that the FHWA has begun developing

delineation and signing guidelines for such zones at railroad grade

crossings. The FHWA has worked and will continue to work with the

Illinois Department of Transportation in determining a signing and

delineation method that will comply with the design requirements of the

MUTCD. Pending amendment of the MUTCD to meet the intent of this

recommendation, Safety Recommendation H-96-40 will be classified

‘Open—Acceptable Response.’

Recent contact with the FHWA indicates that a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

will be issued in December 1999 to amend the MUTCD to address this recommendation. 

Signage of the type specified in Safety Recommendation H-96-40 might have

warned the driver of an LCV of the special hazard the Midwest Steel crossing posed.

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the use of the MUTCD at private as well as

public crossings may help ensure that certain hazardous situations at private grade crossings receive appropriate attention before an accident occurs. 

Public Use of Private Crossings. Throughout the United States, roadway ownership establishes whether a grade crossing is classified as public or private. The classification does not take into account the impact each privately owned crossing may have on the

safety of the members of the general public who also use it. 

The Midwest Steel grade crossing involves more public presence than its designation as a private crossing would imply. About 4,300 public highway vehicles and 132

trains traverse the Midwest Steel grade crossing on an average day. Of the 132 trains,

about 14 are Amtrak and 26 are NICTD passenger trains, all carrying members of the public. In addition, during this investigation, the Safety Board found that the Midwest Steel

grade-crossing storage area is owned by NICTD (a public agency) and that the collision

occurred on publicly owned land.

The Midwest Steel crossing is not the only private grade crossing in the United

States with significant public involvement. Many private crossings provide access to public facilities, such as parks or municipal dumps. In addition, many crossings throughout

the Nation are traversed by the public riding on passenger trains. The members of the public using these private crossings are entitled to the same level of safety as is required on

public grade crossings. Nevertheless, because of differentiations in how private and public

crossings are overseen, funded, and regulated, a lower level of safety may be tolerated on

private crossings than on public crossings. The Safety Board concludes that the current

method of classifying grade crossings based solely on whether the roadway involved is

publicly or privately owned does not provide a uniform level of safety at all grade crossings. Therefore, to ensure that public and private crossings are provided a uniform level of

safety, the Safety Board believes the DOT should eliminate any differentiations between

private and public highway-rail grade crossings with regard to providing funding for, or

requiring the implementation of, safety improvements. 

One Level of Safety. While roadway ownership determines whether a crossing is

classified as private or public, the public rightly expects safe transport over all U.S. grade
Analysis 58 Railroad Accident Report

crossings, whether private or public. The Safety Board considers that the Nation’s motorists and rail passengers are entitled to the same high level of safety at both public and private grade crossings. This “one-level-of-safety” objective means that public and private

crossings throughout the United States should be equally safe for use and should meet the

same safety requirements. 

The Safety Board’s investigation of the Portage grade-crossing accident has shown

that some of the differences between public and private grade crossings have a negative

effect on the safety of some private grade crossings. Private grade crossings lack coordinated safety oversight, funding to make safety improvements, and established safety

guidelines and standards. Public grade crossings, however, have all of these benefits. 

The Safety Board considers that this situation causes disparity between the safety

levels required at public and private grade crossings. In effect, public grade crossings are

by their public nature provided greater potential to achieve and maintain a higher level of

safety than private grade crossings. But many private grade crossings involve the public,

either as railroad passengers or highway vehicle occupants. Therefore, the Safety Board

concludes that the current disparity in treatment between private and public grade crossings can place members of the public traveling on private grade crossings at increased

risk. 

Public safety demands that all grade crossings throughout the United States be

required to meet one level of safety. In its 1998 passive grade-crossing safety study, the

Safety Board found that a serious impediment to achieving one level of safety at all grade

crossings was public agencies’ lack of jurisdiction at private crossings. Accordingly, the

Safety Board made the following safety recommendations to the DOT and the States

(respectively):

H-98-32 and -35

Determine [in conjunction with each other] within 2 years, governmental

oversight responsibility for safety at private highway-rail grade crossings

and ensure that traffic control on these crossings meets the standards within

the MUTCD. 53

The DOT has stated that it intends to act on this issue within the proposed time

frame, and the recommendation is in “Open—Acceptable Response” status. The

responses from the States, however, have been limited (nine States have responded to

date) and not generally favorable. Only three States (Utah, Maryland, and Hawaii) appear

to fully accept this recommendation. Indiana has not yet replied to the recommendation.

Grade-Crossing Hazard Formula. At public grade crossings in Indiana, INDOT

uses a formula developed by the DOT to determine the relative likelihood of accidents

occurring at the grade crossing. Those public crossings found to be hazardous under this

53 Safety at Passive Grade Crossings, Volume I: Analysis, Safety Study NTSB/SS-98/02, p. 87.
Analysis 59 Railroad Accident Report

formula are listed and addressed, in priority order, as crossings requiring safety improvements.

INDOT does not use this hazard index formula to evaluate private crossings, so

INDOT never applied the formula to the Midwest Steel grade crossing. However, even if

INDOT had evaluated private grade crossings, the hazard index formula used would not

have included data on the special characteristics that make the Midwest Steel crossing particularly hazardous. 

The DOT-based index employed by INDOT basically considers the volume of

vehicular traffic using the crossing, the number of trains traversing the crossing, the types

of warning devices at the crossing, and the number of accidents that have taken place at

that location. The formula would not take into account the fact that about 30 percent of the

trains traversing the Midwest Steel grade crossing are passenger trains. (Systemwide,

NICTD reportedly carries 11,000 to 12,000 commuters each weekday.) Nor would the formula consider that, of the 4,300 motor vehicle crossings that take place daily, about 1,800

are made by heavy trucks. Despite the obvious safety problems identified during the Portage investigation, under the limited INDOT hazard criteria, the Midwest Steel crossing

would not have been classified as a particularly dangerous crossing, largely because it had

experienced only one accident in the past 5 years. The Safety Board therefore concludes

that an accurate evaluation of the accident risk at the Midwest Steel grade crossing could

not be made using the current hazard index formula because the formula does not reflect

the presence of passenger trains and the prevalence of tractor-semitrailers using the crossing. 

In its 1998 passive grade crossing safety study, the Safety Board issued the following safety recommendation to the DOT. 

H-98-33

Develop a standardized hazard index or a safety prediction formula that

will include all variables proven by research or experience to be useful in

evaluating highway-rail grade crossings, and require the States to use it.

In the same letter of December 23, 1998, in which the DOT responded to Safety

Recommendation H-98-32, the DOT failed to respond to Safety Recommendation

H-98-33. Therefore, in a letter dated February 8, 1999, the Safety Board stated

[Safety Recommendation] H-98-33 asked the DOT to develop a

standardized hazard index or a safety prediction formula that will include

all variables proven by research or experience to be useful in evaluating

highway-rail grade crossings, and require the States to use it. Because no

response was provided for [Safety Recommendation] H-98-33, the Board

has classified this recommendation ‘Open--Await Response.’

Therefore, to ensure that the hazard formula used to establish the relative danger

posed by a grade crossing is as accurate as possible, the Safety Board reiterates Safety

Recommendation H-98-33 to the DOT.
Analysis 60 Railroad Accident Report

Crossing Closure. The Safety Board has long held that the ultimate level of

safety for grade crossings is achieved by grade-crossing elimination through grade separation or closure. The FRA has made reducing the number of crossings throughout the

Nation an agency objective. In 1990, the FRA’s grade crossing inventory files recorded

292,839 public and private grade crossings. The FRA’s goal, announced in 1991, is a

25-percent reduction in the number of crossings (about 73,000 crossings) by the year

2001.54 As of May 31, 1999, the FRA recorded an inventory of 259,266 public and private

grade crossings, representing a reduction of about 11.5 percent (33,573 crossings) in the

number of crossings.

In recent years (1994 through 1998), more than 4,000 accidents, on average, have

occurred annually at U.S. grade crossings. This means about 11 accidents occur daily on

these crossings. In 1998, a total of 431 deaths resulted from grade-crossing accidents, or

more than 1 death per day.55

Grade-crossing elimination would improve safety for members of the public traveling in both trains and motor vehicles. Although the FRA is working to reduce the number of U.S. grade crossings, the agency’s stated goals are not being met. In fact, 8 years

into its 10-year plan, the FRA has achieved less than half of its goal. The Safety Board

therefore concludes that had the FRA grade-crossing closure program been more successful in eliminating grade crossings, fewer grade-crossing accidents might have occurred. 

Long Combination Vehicle Conspicuity

Two days after the accident, the Safety Board conducted sight and stopping distance testing with a train similar to NICTD train 102 and an LCV Michigan Train similar

to the one involved in the accident. Unlike the accident semitrailer, the test semitrailer was

marked with retroreflective tape. During the test, retroreflective tape on the test semitrailer

was visible to the test engineer at a distance of 3,279 feet. 

Had the LCV on the tracks on the morning of June 18 been marked with retroreflective tape like that on the test semitrailer, the engineer of train 102 would quite likely

have seen the LCV while the train was still more than 3,000 feet from the crossing.

Because the engineer required only about 1,675 feet in which to stop the train, he might

have been able to stop the train well before the crossing, thus avoiding the collision.

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the train 102 engineer might have seen the

LCV sooner and been able to stop the train in time to avoid the collision if the semitrailer

involved had been equipped with retroreflective tape. 

The Conspicuity Systems law that became effective December 1, 1993, did not

apply to trailers manufactured before that date. However, DOT rulemaking that would

54 Gilbert E. Carmichael, Highway–Rail Grade Crossings: The Unfinished Safety Agenda. In: The Job’s

Not Done: Proceedings, 1991 National Conference On Highway–Rail Safety, 1991 July 7–10 (Philadelphia,

PA. College Station, TX: TransCo, 1991), pp. 5–9.

55 Safety at Passive Grade Crossings, Volume I: Analysis, Safety Study NTSB/SS-98/02, p. vii.
Analysis 61 Railroad Accident Report

require all trailers manufactured before December 1, 1993, to be retrofitted with retroreflective tape went into effect on June 1, 1999.56 Motor carriers have 2 years to complete

the retrofitting. 

Train Car Crashworthiness

Collision Post

According to 49 CFR 229.141 (a) (4), a collision post “shall have an ultimate shear

value of not less than 300,000 pounds at a point even with the top of the underframe member to which it is attached.” The kinetic energy released by the impact of the coil upon its

collision with the front bulkhead of car 11 was approximately 2.36 million foot pounds. 

The collision post in car 11 was not designed to absorb the force of an object (such

as the coil) weighing 38,030 pounds at the speed at which the collision occurred. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the structural elements of the NICTD railcar 11 collision post that failed were overwhelmed by the force of the collision, and the post could

not have prevented penetration of the steel coil, given the train speed and the weight of the

coil. 

Nevertheless, the Safety Board is concerned about the lack of weld penetration and

fusion and the unexplained fastener found in the collision post welds of this railcar.

Although intrusion of the coil into the railcar was probably unavoidable in this accident,

collision posts should always be installed to ensure optimum strength and effectiveness.

The purpose of the collision posts provided within passenger cars is to prevent intrusion

into the car body. Passengers and crew depend on the collision posts to provide protection

in the event of an accident. The Safety Board therefore finds the existence of defective

welds in the area of the collision posts disturbing. Although the weld quality did not affect

the outcome of the Portage accident, the presence of defective welds can only serve to

weaken the structure of the car. If adjacent welds had demonstrated the same deficiencies

as those found by investigators, the strength of the collision post structure could have been

significantly compromised. 

The lack of joint penetration and lack of fusion found on the vertical inboard front

weld would have resulted in a weld that was weaker than the 100-percent penetration (and

fused) weld that was required. Because of the loading speed and the point of application in

this accident, the load path did not go through either the front or rear vertical inboard

welds. However, many other possible accident scenarios exist in which the strength of the

vertical inboard collision post welds would have been relied upon to prevent intrusion into

the car. The Safety Board concludes that, under some circumstances, the full strength of

the vertical inboard collision post welds may be necessary to protect passengers and crew. 

Railroad passenger and transit cars are purchased through contracts that cite

detailed technical specifications. The technical specifications typically dictate require56 FHWA final rule docket No. MC-94-1 (Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 61, March 31, 1999,

pp. 15587-15606). 
Analysis 62 Railroad Accident Report

ments intended to ensure the quality and performance of the vehicle, including workmanship standards. The NICTD specification is clear that “The contractor shall be responsible

for the quality of the welding and brazing done by himself and his subcontractors.”57 Nippon Sharyo indicated that it performed inspections in addition to those performed by

NICTD and its representatives, but the welding defects noted in the vertical inboard collision post welds were apparently not found during these inspections. No records of the

Nippon Sharyo weld inspections could be reviewed by the Safety Board, but based on the

presence of these weld defects, the Safety Board concludes that Nippon Sharyo did not

employ sufficient quality assurance procedures during the welding of the collision post

structures. 

The Safety Board considers that, because of Nippon Sharyo’s insufficient welding

quality assurance procedures, deficiencies such as the lack of joint penetration, the lack of

fusion, and the unexplained components found in the collision post welds of this car might

also be found in other Nippon Sharyo railcars in the NICTD fleet. Therefore, the Safety

Board believes that NICTD should inspect the collision post welds of all Nippon Sharyo

railcars in its fleet and repair any welds that are deficient.

The Safety Board is aware of another fleet of cars, virtually identical in design to

the NICTD cars, that was also manufactured by Nippon Sharyo.58 It is not known whether

these cars contain weld defects in the collision posts, such as the lack of penetration and

fusion noted here, or whether the same weld quality assurance procedures were used in

both cases. The Safety Board therefore believes that the FRA should determine the extent

of the weld quality assurance inadequacies demonstrated by Nippon Sharyo in its collision

post welds, and implement corrective action as necessary to ensure the strength of the collision posts. 

The Safety Board is aware of no Federal requirements for welding quality assurance in the attachment of collision posts. The FRA does require, however, that collision

posts be constructed to a certain strength specification and that “the attachment of these

members at bottom shall be sufficient to develop their full shear value.”59 Because of the

vital safety role played by the collision posts, the Safety Board considers that the attachment welds should be carefully inspected to ensure that they are of a sufficient quality to

fulfill the design requirements of the car. The Safety Board therefore believes that the

FRA should require 100-percent nonvisual inspection of all collision post attachment

welds made on MU locomotives and passenger cars during manufacture, and require that

inspection records be retained for the life of the car. 

57 Specification of Electric Multiple Unit Commuter Cars for Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District, Specification number SP90034, section S12.10(b), dated 1983.

58 National Transportation Safety Board, Collision and Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC

Train 286 and National Railroad Passenger Corporation AMTRAK Train 29 near Silver Spring, Maryland,

on February 16, 1996, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-97/02 (Washington: National Transportation

Safety Board, 1997).

59 49 CFR 229.141.
Analysis 63 Railroad Accident Report

Emergency Lighting and Public Address Systems

Following the collision, the emergency electrical system on the first car of train

102 immediately lost all power because damage to the front end severed the wiring and

electrical conduits routed through the front bulkhead of that car. Consequently, neither the

interior emergency lights nor the public address system in car 11 was operable. Circuits

for the backup battery were also made inoperable by the front bulkhead damage.

The failure of emergency electrical systems to provide power can be a serious

problem in situations such as collisions and derailments and has been addressed by the

Safety Board in other accident investigations.60 In this case, to provide emergency care

and extricate victims, the PFD furnished its own portable lighting. Passengers in the lead

railcar used illumination from the second car and a flashlight provided by one of the crewmembers for their emergency lighting, so the electrical failure did not hinder their evacuation. Crewmember statements indicated that, because of the train’s small size, they were

able to communicate readily with the passengers despite the nonfunctioning public

address system. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the failure of car 11’s emergency electrical systems did not affect the evacuation and emergency response efforts following the Portage accident.

60 National Transportation Safety Board, Collision and Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC

Train 286 and National Railroad Passenger Corporation AMTRAK Train 29 near Silver Spring, Maryland,

on February 16, 1996, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-97/02 (Washington: National Transportation

Safety Board, 1997); Amtrak Train 87 Derailment after Colliding with Intermodal Trailer from CSXT Train

176 Selma, North Carolina May 16, 1994, Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-95/02 (Washington:

National Transportation Safety Board, 1995); and Derailment of Amtrak Train No. 2 on the CSXT Big Bayou

Canot Bridge near Mobile, Alabama, September 22, 1993, Railroad-Marine Accident Report NTSB/RAR94/01 (Washington: National Transportation Safety Board, 1994). 
64 Railroad Accident Report

Conclusions

Findings

1. Neither the weather, the track, the mechanical condition of the train, the mechanical

condition of the long combination vehicle, nor railroad operations caused or

contributed to the collision. 

2. The train engineer and conductor were qualified to perform their duties and showed

no evidence of impairment from drugs, alcohol, or fatigue. 

3. The emergency response was timely and effective. 

4. If the train 102 engineer had detected the truck as soon as it became visible and

immediately put the train into emergency braking, train 102 could still not have been

stopped in time to avoid the collision. 

5. Despite vehicle overloading, logbook discrepancies, inadequate load securement,

and the potential for impairment due to fatigue and marijuana use, these factors

concerning the truckdriver’s actions did not contribute to the collision.

6. As currently configured, the Midwest Steel grade-crossing storage area cannot safely

accommodate all vehicles that are allowed to use it. 

7. The signal systems operating at the Midwest Steel grade crossing functioned as

designed, and no signal operation failures caused or contributed to the accident. 

8. The Midwest Steel grade-crossing signal system did not prevent vehicles from being

trapped in the storage area between the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District and Consolidated Rail Corporation tracks. 

9. The lack of clear delineation of oversight responsibility for the safety of the Midwest

Steel private grade crossing undermined its safety.

10. The use of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices at private as well as

public grade crossings may help ensure that certain hazardous conditions at private

grade crossings receive appropriate attention before an accident occurs. 

11. The current method of classifying grade crossings based solely on whether the

roadway involved is publicly or privately owned does not provide a uniform level of

safety at all grade crossings. 

12. The current disparity in treatment between private and public grade crossings can

place members of the public traveling on private grade crossings at increased risk.
Conclusions 65 Railroad Accident Report

13. An accurate evaluation of the accident risk at the Midwest Steel grade crossing could

not be made using the current hazard index formula because the formula does not

reflect the presence of passenger trains and the prevalence of tractor-semitrailers

using the crossing.

14. Had the Federal Railroad Administration grade-crossing closure program been more

successful in eliminating grade crossings, fewer grade-crossing accidents might have

occurred.

15. The train 102 engineer might have seen the long combination vehicle sooner and

been able to stop the train in time to avoid the collision if the semitrailer involved

had been equipped with retroreflective tape. 

16. The structural elements of the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District

railcar 11 collision post that failed were overwhelmed by the force of the collision,

and the post could not have prevented penetration of the steel coil, given the train

speed and the weight of the coil. 

17. Under some circumstances, the full strength of the vertical inboard collision post

welds may be necessary to protect passengers and crew.

18. Nippon Sharyo Ltd. did not employ sufficient quality assurance procedures during

the welding of the collision post structures. 

19. The failure of car 11’s emergency electrical systems did not affect the evacuation and

emergency response efforts following the Portage accident.

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the

collision between Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District train 102 and a long

combination vehicle (truck) at the National Steel Corporation’s Midwest Steel grade

crossing was ineffective action by Federal, State, and private agencies to permanently

resolve safety problems at the Midwest Steel grade crossing, which they knew to be a

hazardous crossing.
66 Railroad Accident Report

Recommendations 

As a result of this investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the

following safety recommendations:

to the U.S. Department of Transportation:

Eliminate any differentiations between private and public highway-rail

grade crossings with regard to providing funding for, or requiring the

implementation of, safety improvements. (I-99-02)

to the Federal Railroad Administration:

Work together with the Federal Highway Administration, the Indiana

Department of Transportation, the National Steel Corporation, the Norfolk

Southern Corporation, and the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District to make, within 2 years, permanent engineering changes to the

Midwest Steel highway-rail grade crossing that will minimize or eliminate

safety hazards at this crossing. (R-99-31) 

Determine the extent of the weld quality assurance inadequacies

demonstrated by Nippon Sharyo Ltd. in its collision post welds, and

implement corrective action as necessary to ensure the strength of the

collision posts. (R-99-32)

Require 100-percent nonvisual inspection of all collision post attachment

welds made on multiple-unit locomotives and passenger cars during

manufacture, and require that inspection records be retained for the life of

the car. (R-99-33)

to the Federal Highway Administration:

Work together with the Federal Railroad Administration, the Indiana

Department of Transportation, the National Steel Corporation, the Norfolk

Southern Corporation, and the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District to make, within 2 years, permanent engineering changes to the

Midwest Steel highway-rail grade crossing that will minimize or eliminate

safety hazards at this crossing. (H-99-27) 

to the Indiana Department of Transportation:

Work together with the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal

Highway Administration, the National Steel Corporation, the Norfolk
Recommendations 67 Railroad Accident Report

Southern Corporation, and the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District to make, within 2 years, permanent engineering changes to the

Midwest Steel highway-rail grade crossing that will minimize or eliminate

safety hazards at this crossing. (H-99-28) 

to the National Steel Corporation, Midwest Steel Division:

Work together with the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal

Highway Administration, the Indiana Department of Transportation, the

Norfolk Southern Corporation, and the Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District to make, within 2 years, permanent engineering

changes to the Midwest Steel highway-rail grade crossing that will

minimize or eliminate safety hazards at this crossing. (H-99-29) 

to the Norfolk Southern Corporation:

Work together with the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal

Highway Administration, the Indiana Department of Transportation, the

National Steel Corporation, and the Northern Indiana Commuter

Transportation District to make, within 2 years, permanent engineering

changes to the Midwest Steel highway-rail grade crossing that will

minimize or eliminate safety hazards at this crossing. (R-99-34) 

to the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District:

Work together with the Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal

Highway Administration, the Indiana Department of Transportation, the

National Steel Corporation, and the Norfolk Southern Corporation to

make, within 2 years, permanent engineering changes to the Midwest Steel

highway-rail grade crossing that will minimize or eliminate safety hazards

at this crossing. (R-99-35) 

Inspect the collision post welds of all Nippon Sharyo Ltd. railcars in your

fleet and repair any welds that are deficient. (R-99-36)

Also as a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the

following safety recommendation:

to the U.S. Department of Transportation:

Develop a standardized hazard index or a safety prediction formula that

will include all variables proven by research or experience to be useful in

evaluating highway-rail grade crossings, and require the States to use it.

(H-98-33) 
Recommendations 68 Railroad Accident Report

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

Adopted: July 26, 1999
69 Railroad Accident Report

Appendix A

Investigation 

The National Transportation Safety Board was notified about 8:00 a.m., eastern

daylight time, on June 18, 1998, that a Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation

District (NICTD) commuter train had collided with a tractor-trailer near Portage, Indiana.

The investigator-in-charge and other members of the Safety Board investigative team

were dispatched from the Washington, D.C., headquarters office and the Los Angeles,

California, Denver, Colorado, and Chicago, Illinois, regional offices. The investigative

groups studied rail operations, track and signals, mechanical and survival factors, human

performance, and highway operations and vehicles.

The Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Highway Administration,

NICTD, the United Transportation Union, the National Steel Corporation’s Midwest

Division, the Portage Fire Department, the Porter County Sheriff’s Office, the Indiana

State Police, and the Indiana Department of Transportation assisted in the Safety Board

investigation.

Safety Board staff conducted a deposition proceeding as part of its investigation on

October 28 and 29, 1998, in Merrillville, Indiana, during which 10 witnesses testified.
70 Railroad Accident Report

Appendix B

Selections from the Indiana State Code

IC 9-20-5, Chapter 5. Heavy Duty Highways and Extra Heavy Duty Highways:

IC 9-20-5-1:

Sec. 1. (a) The Indiana department of transportation may adopt rules under 

IC 4-22-2 to do the following:

(1) Establish and designate a highway as a heavy duty highway.

(2) Remove the designation of a highway or part of a highway as a heavy

duty highway.

(b) The Indiana department of transportation shall periodically publish a map

showing all highways designated by the department at the time as heavy duty

highways.

As added by P.L. 2-1991, SEC. 8.

IC 9-20-5-2:

Sec. 2. Whenever the Indiana department of transportation designates a heavy duty

highway, the department shall also fix the maximum weights of vehicles that

may be transported on the highway. The maximum weights may not exceed the

following limitations:

(1) A vehicle may not have a maximum wheel weight, unladen or with

load, in excess of eight hundred (800) pounds per inch width of tire,

measured between the flanges of the rim, or an axle weight in excess of

twenty-two thousand four hundred (22,400) pounds.

(2) The total weight concentrated on the roadway surface from any tandem

axle group may not exceed eighteen thousand (18,000) pounds for each

axle of the assembly.

(3) The total gross weight, with load, in pounds of a vehicle or

combination of vehicles may not exceed eighty thousand (80,000)

pounds.

As added by P.L. 2-1991, SEC. 8.
Appendix B 71 Railroad Accident Report

IC 9-20-5-3:

Sec. 3. The Indiana department of transportation may not designate an Indiana

highway as a heavy duty highway unless the department finds that the

highway is:

(1) so constructed and can be so maintained; or

(2) in such condition; that the use of the highway as a heavy duty highway

will not materially decrease or contribute materially to the decrease of

the ordinary useful life of the highway.

As added by P.L. 2-1991, SEC. 8.

IC 9-20-5-4:

Sec. 4. In addition to the highways established and designated as heavy duty

highways under section 1 of this chapter, the following highways are

designated as extra heavy duty highways:

(1) Highway 41, from 129th Street in Hammond to Highway 312.

(2) Highway 312, from Highway 41 to Highway 12.

(3) Highway 912, from Michigan Avenue in East Chicago to Highway 12. 

(4) Highway 12, from Highway 912 to Clark Road in Gary.

(5) Highway 20, from Clark Road in Gary to Highway 39.

(6) Highway 12, from one-fourth (1/4) mile west of the Midwest Steel

entrance to Highway 249.

(7) Highway 249, from Highway 12 to Highway 20.

(8) Highway 12, from one and one-half (1 1/2) miles east of the Bethlehem

Steel entrance to Highway 149. [Emphasis added.]

(9) Highway 149, from Highway 12 to a point thirty-six one-hundredths

(.36) of a mile south of Highway 20.

(10) Highway 39, from Highway 20 to the Michigan state line.

(11) Highway 20, from Highway 39 to Highway 2.

(12) Highway 2, from Highway 20 to Highway 31.

(13) Highway 31, from the Michigan state line to Highway 23.

(14) Highway 23, from Highway 31 to Olive Street in South Bend.

As added by P.L. 2-1991, SEC. 8. Amended by P.L. 12-1991, SEC. 4; P.L.

123-1993, SEC. 1; P.L. 124-1993, SEC. 1; P.L. 119-1995, SEC. 2.
Appendix B 72 Railroad Accident Report

IC 9-20-5-5:

Sec. 5. The maximum size and weight limits for vehicles operated with a special

weight permit on an extra heavy duty highway are as follows:

(1) A vehicle may not have a maximum wheel weight, unladen or with

load, in excess of eight hundred (800) pounds per inch width of tire,

measured between the flanges of the rim.

(2) A single axle weight may not exceed eighteen thousand (18,000)

pounds.

(3) An axle in an axle combination may not exceed thirteen thousand

(13,000) pounds per axle, with the exception of one (1) tandem group

that may weigh sixteen thousand (16,000) pounds per axle or a total of

thirty-two thousand (32,000) pounds.

(4) The total gross weight, with load, of any vehicle or combination of

vehicles may not exceed one hundred thirty-four thousand (134,000)

pounds.

(5) Axle spacings may not be less than three (3) feet, six (6) inches,

between each axle in an axle combination.

(6) Axle spacings may not be less than eight (8) feet between each axle or

axle combination.

As added by P.L. 2-1991, SEC. 8.

IC 9-20-5-6:

Sec. 6. The Indiana department of transportation shall implement procedures

that, in cooperation with the state police department and local police

departments, enhance the safety of citizens along and near extra heavy

duty highways listed in section 4 of this chapter. [Emphasis added.]

As added by P.L. 2-1991, SEC. 8.

IC 9-20-5-7:

Sec. 7. A vehicle or combination of vehicles having a total gross weight in excess

of eighty thousand (80,000) pounds but less than one hundred thirty-four

thousand (134,000) pounds must obtain a special weight permit to travel on an

extra heavy duty highway.

As added by P.L. 2-1991, SEC. 8. Amended by P.L. 122-1993, SEC. 2.
Appendix B 73 Railroad Accident Report

IC 9-20-5-8:

Sec. 8. The Indiana department of transportation may not issue a permit under this

chapter for the operation of a vehicle if any of the following conditions apply:

(1) The owner or operator of the vehicle has not complied with 

IC 8-2.1-24.

(2) The owner or operator of the vehicle has not provided the Indiana

department of transportation with the owner's or operator's Social

Security number or federal identification number.

(3) The owner or operator of the vehicle has not registered the vehicle with

the bureau, if the vehicle is required to be registered under IC 9-18.

As added by P.L. 122-1993, SEC. 3. Amended by P.L. 110-1995, SEC. 30.
74 Railroad Accident Report

Appendix C

Visibility and Stopping Tests

Safety Board investigators conducted visibility and stopping tests with a two-car

train similar to NICTD train 102 on June 20, 1998. To approximate accident conditions,

all tests were performed between 3:45 and 4:45 a.m. The weather was clear. 

Visibility test 1.—A Michigan Train LCV similar to the accident vehicle, except

that it was equipped with reflective tape, was parked with its semitrailer on the NICTD

westward track at the crossing. The train, with headlights illuminated, was backed from

the crossing until the tractor-trailer could not be seen. It could not be seen beyond 3,279

feet.

Visibility test 2.—Same conditions as test 1, but the interior lights on the train

were extinguished. This factor made no discernible difference in the tractor-trailer’s

visibility. Results were identical to test 1.

Visibility test 3.—While the semitrailer’s lights were on and its side marker lights

and reflective tape were covered (making the test semitrailer indistinguishable from the

accident semitrailer), the train was slowly brought toward the crossing until the white

tractor of the LCV could be seen. The tractor could be seen when the train was 794 feet

from the crossing.

Visibility test 4.—The train was moved further toward the crossing until the

semitrailer could be seen. It was discernable 542 feet from the crossing. This test was

performed at 4:28 a.m.

Stopping distance.—Two torpedoes (explosive caps fastened to the top of the rail

and exploded by the pressure of a rolling wheel to give an audible indication of conditions

on the track ahead) were placed on the rail 542 feet to the east of the crossing. The

semitrailer was removed from the crossing. The train was moved eastward sufficiently to

allow it to accelerate to 68 mph. As the test train approached the crossing at 68 mph and

reached the spot 542 feet from the crossing, the torpedoes exploded, which gave the test

engineer an audible stimulus to place the train into emergency braking, which he did. The

train then slowed and stopped. With the train in emergency braking, it passed through the

crossing at 43 mph, stopping 1,133 feet beyond the crossing. The total stopping distance

was 1,675 feet.

Air brake test.—Investigators inspected the braking systems on cars 11 and 45 in

the NICTD Michigan City, Indiana, shop on June 19, 1998. Both units were equipped with

Sabe/Knise tread brake units. The braking system on each car functioned as intended

during application and release, and the electronic monitoring system indicated the proper

corresponding condition.
75 Railroad Accident Report

Appendix D

Highway-Rail Grade-Crossing Obligations 

ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

General For Public Crossings For Private Crossings

FRA Regulates the aspects of 

grade-crossing safety 

pertaining to railroads 

(track safety, active 

signals, and train safety 

and conspicuity).

Limited to operations on 

the railroad rights of way 

for railroad track, train, 

and signal safety. No 

responsibility for highway 

components.

Limited to operations on 

the railroad rights of way 

for railroad track, train, 

and signal safety. No 

responsibility for highway 

components.

FHWA Regulates the aspects of 

grade-crossing safety 

pertaining to highway 

safety (crossing design, 

safety assessments, traffic 

control devices, and 

funding improvements).

Regulates truck size on 

“designated” highways. 

Regulates aspects of 

grade crossings that affect 

highway safety and funds 

improvements for public 

crossings, including 

MUTCD warning device 

standards

Has no authority to 

regulate passive crossings 

on private roads.

INDOT Owns U.S. Route 12. Is 

responsible for 

maintaining the highway 

traffic signals that can be 

preempted and are 

interconnected with the 

railroad signals.

Regulates truck weight on 

designated highways and 

truck size and weight on 

“nondesignated” 

highways.

Maintains the public 

roadways and highway 

signal systems next to 

private crossings. 

Maintains an inventory of 

public crossings, assesses 

the relative risk at each 

crossing, and allocates 

funds for improvements. 

No jurisdiction. No 

inventory. No funding for 

improvements. No 

authority over private 

crossings or roads.

NICTD Owns, maintains, and 

inspects the NICTD tracks. 

Maintains the railroad 

automatic block signal 

system and the 

preemption circuit 

between the highway 

traffic controller and the 

NICTD signal case. 

Maintains the 

interconnection between 

the two railroads.

No responsibility for the 

roadway or crossing.

Through contractual 

agreement, maintains the 

crossing signal lights and 

gates for private crossing 

owner (Midwest Steel). No 

responsibility for the 

roadway or crossing.

Conrail Owns, maintains, and 

inspects the Conrail 

tracks. Conrail dispatchers 

control all trains on this 

track via a train control 

signal system. 

Maintains the crossing 

signal lights and gates.

Through contractual 

agreement, maintains the 

crossing signal lights and 

gates for private crossing 

owner (Midwest Steel). No 

responsibility for the 

roadway or crossing.

National Steel 

Corporation’s 

Midwest Steel 

Division

Owns the roadway 

intersecting the railroad 

tracks and the storage 

area. 

N/A Through contractual 

agreements with NICTD 

and Conrail, constructs 

and maintains the crossing 

signal lights, gates, and 

roadway surface.
76 Railroad Accident Report

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAMI Civil Aeromedical Institute

CDL commercial driver’s license

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

Conrail Consolidated Rail Corporation

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

EMS emergency medical services

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FRA Federal Railroad Administration

GVW gross vehicle weight

IDOT Illinois Department of Transportation

INDOT Indiana Department of Transportation

LCV long combination vehicle

Midwest Steel Midwest Division of the National Steel Corporation

MP milepost

MU multiple-unit

MUTCD Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices

NICTD Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District

Nippon Sharyo Nippon Sharyo Ltd.

PFD Portage Fire Department

PPD Portage Police Department

THC tetrahydrocannabinol

THC-COOH tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid

US 12 U.S. Route 12

WLL working load limit