COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Annunziata and Bumgardner 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DONNA MAE VINT 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1458-99-3 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 MARCH 21, 2000 

ALLEGHANY REGIONAL HOSPITAL 

 AND CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 William A. Parks, Jr., for appellant. 

 Mark K. Cathey (Robert M. McAdam; Jones & 

Glenn, P.L.C., on brief), for appellees. 

 Donna Mae Vint appeals the Workers' Compensation 

Commission's denial of her claim for benefits. She contends the 

commission erred in finding that she did not suffer an injury 

arising out of her employment. To prevail on appeal, the 

claimant must establish that as a matter of law her injury arose 

out of the employment. See Tomko v. Michael's Plastering, 210 

Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970). We affirm the denial 

of benefits because the evidence fails to establish, as a matter 

of law, that the injury arose out of the employment. 

 On March 16, 1998, the claimant was employed as a 

housekeeper for Alleghany Regional Hospital when she injured her 

back. Her duties required her to clean patients' rooms 

including emptying trash cans. The claimant bent down to get a 
plastic liner from a trash can. When she had the liner in her 

hand, but before picking it up, she felt a sudden pain in her 

lower back. The claimant let go of the liner and held her back. 

The intense pain took her breath away. Although she had trouble 

walking, the claimant completed her shift that evening. 

 The commission found that the claimant failed to establish 

that her injury arose out of her employment and reversed the 

deputy's award of benefits. The commission relied on Plumb Rite 

Plumbing Serv. v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 482, 382 S.E.2d 305 

(1989), and distinguished Bassett-Walker, Inc. v. Wyatt, 26 Va. 

App. 87, 493 S.E.2d 384 (1997) (en banc), in reaching its 

decision. 

The claimant's injury was sustained during the course of 

her employment. In order to be compensable, however, the injury 

"must also arise out of the employment; the injury must be 

caused by the conditions of the workplace." Barbour, 8 Va. App. 

at 483, 382 S.E.2d at 305. The claimant must "prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the accident 'arose out of 

and in the course of his employment,' and the words cannot be 

liberalized by judicial interpretation for the purpose of 

allowing compensation on every claim asserted." Conner v. 

Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 208, 123 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1962). 

Virginia employs the actual risk test. See County of 

Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 376 S.E.2d 73 (1989) (no 

evidence that "actual risk" of employment caused injury). A 

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claimant's injury arises out of the employment if the manner in 

which the employer requires the work to be performed is causally 

related to the resulting injury. See Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 

170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684, 686 (1938). An injury does not 

arise out of the employment when it "cannot fairly be traced to 

the employment as a contributing proximate cause and . . . comes 

from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally 

exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be 

peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood." Id.

(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 

The claimant relies on Wyatt, 26 Va. App. 87, 493 S.E.2d 

384. Wyatt, a knitting machine operator, was required to 

replace empty creels of yarn located 2 inches off the ground on 

her machine. She repeated this task, which required her to do 

deep-knee bends, approximately 200 times per 12-hour shift. 

While replacing the yarn, she heard a pop, and was unable to 

straighten her leg. This Court ruled that the injury was 

compensable because the employment required an unusual, 

repetitive movement. The "unique demands of operating the . . . 

machine provided the 'critical link' between claimant's 

employment and her injury." Id. at 93, 493 S.E.2d at 387. 

Wyatt's risk of injury was directly associated with her 

employment, the risk directly contributed to cause the injury, 

and the risk far exceeded the general public's exposure. See

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id. at 94-95, 493 S.E.2d at 388; Bradshaw, 170 Va. at 335, 196 

S.E. at 686. 

Wyatt is distinguishable on the facts. Here, the claimant 

was merely bending over when she felt a sudden pain in her back. 

She did not twist or turn, nor was she required to twist or turn 

incidental to the bending or lifting. Cf. First Federal Savings 

& Loan Ass'n v. Gryder, 9 Va. App. 60, 65, 383 S.E.2d 755, 

758-59 (1989) (injury arose out of employment when Gryder jerked 

or twisted in attempt to answer phone in order to avoid falling 

off stool when her shoe heel got stuck in its rim). The 

claimant did not lift anything. Nor was there anything peculiar 

about the act of bending over to retrieve a trash bag which made 

her injury compensable. No evidence proved anything unique 

about the height of the trash can or that the claimant was 

subjected to repetitive bending. There was no work-related 

condition that caused the injury to claimant's back. 

The risk of injury must be peculiar to the job and not one 

to which the general public is equally exposed. The commission 

relied on Barbour in which a plumber was denied benefits when he 

bent over to pick up a piece of plastic pipe and felt a sudden 

pain in his back before touching or picking up the pipe. 

Barbour is analogous to the present situation. In Barbour, this 

Court held that "[t]he mere happening of an accident at the 

workplace, not caused by any work related risk or significant 

work related exertion, is not compensable." 8 Va. App. at 484, 

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382 S.E.2d at 306. An injury resulting from merely bending over 

to do something does not arise out of the employment. 

In Johnson, 237 Va. at 183-84, 376 S.E.2d at 74, a water 

plant operator was walking up stairs when he realized he forgot 

to check a meter. He turned to go down the stairs and his knee 

gave way resulting in his injury. The stairs were not defective 

and claimant did not fall, nor did he injure himself by climbing 

or descending the stairs. The Supreme Court held that an injury 

resulting from turning was not compensable, even though the 

claimant was on the mission of his employer, because the work 

environment did not cause the injury. 

In United Parcel Service v. Fetterman, 230 Va. 257, 336 

S.E.2d 892 (1985), a deliveryman injured his back when he raised 

his foot onto the back of his truck and bent to tie his shoe. 

The Supreme Court held that there was no causal connection 

between his injury and the conditions under which the work was 

to be performed. An injury which "comes from a hazard to which 

the employee would have been exposed equally apart from the 

employment," is not compensable. Id. at 258, 336 S.E.2d at 893. 

Because everyone with laced shoes must bend down to tie them, 

the claimant's injury was not peculiar to the requirements of 

his employment. 

 We recognize that the claimant was performing her 

employment duties when she was injured. However, that issue 

alone is not dispositive. See id. There must exist a causative 

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danger peculiar to the claimant's work. See Bradshaw, 170 Va. 

at 335, 196 S.E. at 686. Moreover, the act of merely bending 

over is a risk to which the general public is equally exposed. 

See id.; Barbour, 8 Va. App. at 484, 382 S.E.2d at 306.

 Because we conclude that the claimant's injury did not 

arise out of her employment, we do not address the issue of 

whether she failed to market her residual earning capacity. 

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the claim. 

Affirmed.

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