UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ LEWIS ROGER MOORE, Claimant - Appellant, and JESSE F. MONTEZ; DAVID BRYAN; GEORGE KARL; GILPIN EUGENE; JOHN ARMINTROUT; KENNETH GARCIA; RICHARD K. ALLEN; JIMMY R. BULGIER, as representatives of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v. JOHN HICKENLOOPER; FRANK GUNTER, Former Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections; BEN JOHNSON, Former Warden of Colorado Territorial Correctional Facility; CHERYL SMITH, Medical Administrator at CTCF; ARI ZAVARAS, Executive Director of Colorado Department of Corrections; BOB FURLONG, Warden of Limon Correctional Facility; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; BILL PRICE, Warden of the Arkansas Valley Correctional Center; R. MARK MCDUFF, Warden of the Arrowhead Correctional Center, the Four Mile Correctional Facility, the SkylineCorrectional Center, and the PreNo. 17-1115 (D.C. No. 1:92- CV-00870-CMAMEH) (D. Colo.) FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 22, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Release Correctional Center; GARY NEET, Warden of the Buena Vista Correctional Facility; WARREN DIESSLIN, Former Warden of the Buena Vista Correctional Facility; FRANK MILLER, Warden of the Centennial Correc tional Facility; DONICE NEAL, Warden of the Colorado State Pen itentiary; MARK WILLIAMS, Warden of the Colorado Women’s Facility; MARK MCKINNA, Warden of the Colorado Territorial Correctional Facility; J FRANK RICE, Warden of the Denver Reception and Diagnostic Center; LARRY EMBRY, Warden of the Fremont Correctional Facility; TOM COOPER, Former Warden of the Fremont Correctional Facility; BILL BOGGS, Warden of the Rifle Correctional Facility; BILL BOKROS, Warden of the Pueblo Minimum Center; DAVID HOLT, Medical Administrator; JEAN MOLTZ, Medical Administrator; RON JOHNSON, Medical Administrator; DON LAWSON, Administration Director; BOB MOORE, Medical Supervisor; RONALD G PIERCE; JOHN DOES, Current and Former Wardens of any correctional facility maintained, operated or co ntrolled by the Colorado Department of Corrections; JOHN ROES, Defendants - Appellees.3 __________________ _______________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

__________________ _______________ Before LUCERO , BACHARACH , and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ This appeal arises out of a class action, Montez v. Hickenlooper . This class action resulted in presentation of individual damage claims to a special master. One of these claims was decided twelve years ago. The claimant, Mr. L.R. Moore, obtained a monetary award, but he has never been paid. He complains not only of the nonpayment but also of the failure to replace a stolen wheel chair and the inab ility to participat e in settlement talks involving the class as a whole. The distri ct court denied relief, and we affirm in part and reverse in part. 1

I. Background In a 2003 remedial plan, the parties in the class actio n agreed that a special master would decide class members’ individual damage claims, subject to review by the district court. In a 2005 claim, Mr. Moore asserted claims for (1) replacement of a cust om-made wheelchair allegedly stolen

* This order and judgme nt does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cite d for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

1 Jurisdiction exists under the collateral order doctrine. See Montez v. Hickenlooper , 640 F.3d 1126, 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2011).4 by prison staff and (2) damages fo r diminished wheel chair access to a prison dining hall. The special master did not order the defendants to provide Mr. Moore with a new wheelchair, bu t the special master di d award Mr. Moore $50 for
diminished access to the dining hall. In 2008, Mr. Moore complain ed to the special master that the de fendants had not paid the $50 and ag ain raised an issue involving the wheelchair. But the special master declined to address these complaints. 2 In 2016, Mr. Moore again filed object ions in the district court, alleging nonpayment and fa ilure to provide a wheelchair equi valent to the one that was allegedly st olen. In these objections , Mr. Moore also sought to participate in the ongo ing negotiations involvin g class issues, insisting that his participation was necessary to protect the interests of himself and other class members. The district cour t overruled the objections and denied reconsideration in 2017, leading Mr. Moore to appeal.

2 And in 2010, Mr. Moore mentioned in a district court filing that the defendants had not paid his $50 damage award. But the district court did not address this issue.5 II. Enforcement of the $50 Award In part, Mr. Moore seeks enforcement of the $50 award. The defendants acknowledge that they ha ve not paid the award and do not question the enforceab ility of the award or the court’s authority to order payment. Instead, the defendants cont end that they can wait to pay until Mr. Moore completes an accurate W-9 tax form, wh ich he has not done. The district court agreed with the defend ants, and we engage in de novo review. See Woodruff v. Herrera , 623 F.3d 1103, 1109-10 (10th Cir. 2010) (de novo review on matters of law). In conducting this review, we conc lude that the district court erred. The W-9 is an IRS form submitted to a pay ee by an individu al or entity “who is required to file an informat ion return with the IRS.” R. Vol. II, at 147. But the defe ndants have no t identified any requi rement to file an information return for th e payment to Mr. Moore. Cf. IRS Pub. 583, Information for Bus iness Taxpayers , 1988 WL 485178, at *6 (rev. Nov. 1988) (stating circ umstances in wh ich an informat ion return is required).6 But let’s assume that an information return is required and that the payment is reportable. In these circumstances, th e Internal Revenue Code identifies steps that the payor can take in the absence of a W-9 form. These steps include actions su ch as adding backup w ithholding in certain circumstances. See 26 U.S.C. § 3406(a); see IRS Pub. 1281 (Rev. 3-2017), Backup Withholding for Missin g and Incorrect Name/TIN(s) , 2017 WL 4317150, at *3. Instead of taking these steps, however, the defendants unilaterally disobeye d the special master’s orde r without explaining the need for a W-9 form before paying th e award. In the ab sence of such an explanation, the district court erred in failing to order enforcement of the $50 award.
III. Replacement of the Wheelchair In the 2005 proceeding, Mr. Moore complained that his custom-made wheelchair had been stolen by prison staff and was never replaced with an equivalent model. The defe ndants responded that they were in the process of providing Mr. Moore with a new wheelchair, and the special master declined to or der relief on Mr. Moore’s comp laint about his wheelchair. The defendants pr ovided a wheel chair, but Mr. Moor e alleges that the replacement was inadequate. With the passage of twelve years, it is too late for Mr. Moore to appeal the special master’s 2005 orde r on the ground that it should have specified the type of whee lchair to be provided. See Order, filed Mar. 23,7 2010, ECF No. 4381 (setti ng April 16, 2010, as the deadli ne for “any pro

se compliance/enforcement claims for individual . . . injunctive or equitable relief” under the 2003 remedial plan). And he cannot obtain relief by enforcing the 2005 award because that award did not include relief on the claim involv ing the wheelchair. Thus, the district court did not err in sustaining the 2016 objection invo lving the wheelchair.
IV. Notice and an Opport unity to Participate in Settlement Talks The class action is ongoing, and th e district court is apparently conducting settlement talks on clas swide issues. Mr. Moore requested notice and an opportunity to participate, and the dist rict court denied this request. This ruling was not erroneous. 3 We have approved a protocol that prevents individual claimants from pursuing their own eq uitable claims relating to a class action while the class action is proceeding. McNeil v. Guthrie , 945 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 1991). Th e district court followed this approach here, preventing disruption of the class-wi de settlement discussions. This approach was not

erroneous.

3 We need not decide the standard of review on this claim. The claim fails under any standard.8 V. Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Mr. Moore requests leave to pro ceed without prepay ment of costs. This request is granted, though Mr. Moore remain s obligated to pay the filing and docketing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
VI. Deletion of Parties Mr. Moore also requests deletion of irrelevant parties. We deny this request because the appeal is part of the Montez class litigation. As a result, the other parties must be included in the caption.
VII. Redaction of Medical Records Mr. Moore asks us to remove the redactions on the medical records submitted by the defendants. These records proved imma terial for our analysis; thus, we deny Mr. Moore’s request.
VIII. Mr. Moore’s Amended Opening Brief and Addendum Mr. Moore has filed an unauthorized “Amended Opening Brief” and a separate “Addendum.” Both are stricken. After successfully requesting an extension of time, Mr. Moore filed his opening appeal brief on July 18, 2017, and the defendants re sponded on August 11, 2018. He then requested an extension of time for his optional reply brief based in part on alleged restrictio ns to law library access. We extended the deadline to September 8, 2017, fo r the reply brief. But the clerk’s office received nothing from Mr. Moore for over three months. Then, on December 28, 2017, the clerk’s o ffice received a9 document purporting to be an amende d opening brief. In this document, Mr. Moore stated that he was late in filing it becau se of restrictions on access to research books and word processors. This explanation is unconvincing. In the amended brief and his subsequent addendum, Mr. Moore purport s to add multiple claims based on numerous events post-dating the deadli ne for his reply brief. Allowing the amended brief and addendum would require the defendants to respond to the new allegations, creati ng even further delay. Mr. Moore knew that he needed to se ek an extension of time, as he has filed multiple motions for extensions. Indeed, in the last order granting an extension of time, the clerk’s office stated that “[n]o further extensions will be granted on th e Clerk’s authority.” Order (Aug. 21, 2017). Because an extension of time is unw arranted, we direct the clerk to strike the amended br ief and the addendum.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge