RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5702-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

IN THE INTEREST OF T.D.

____________________________

Argued October 15, 2018 – Decided October 30, 2018

Before Judges Messano and Fasciale.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, 

Docket No. FJ-18-0301-17.

Stephanie P. Tettemer argued the cause for appellant 

T.D. 

Paul H. Heinzel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause 

for respondent State of New Jersey (Michael H. 

Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Paul 

H. Heinzel, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

After pleading guilty, T.D. – who was almost seventeen years old at the 

time of the incidents – appeals from three juvenile adjudications for acts that, if 

committed as an adult, would constitute first-degree aggravated sexual assault, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1). We 

affirm. 

The plea agreement contemplated that T.D. would register under Megan's 

Law.1 At the dispositional hearing, the judge followed the agreement and 

imposed that requirement. T.D. then underwent a psychological evaluation to 

perform a risk assessment and develop a treatment plan. After the disposition, 

T.D's counsel received the doctor's report. The doctor opined that T.D. was at 

a low-risk to reoffend, recommended a treatment plan, and concluded T.D.'s 

prognosis was good. 

T.D. then filed a motion before the judge seeking reconsideration of the 

requirement that he register under Megan's Law. As part of that motion, T.D.'s 

counsel certified that the doctor offered new evidence, and urged the judge to 

eliminate the registration requirement of the sentence. The judge correctly 

declined to hear the motion because of this pending appeal. We then denied 

T.D.'s request for a stay. 

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT I

JUVENILE JUSTICE CODE MEGAN'S LAW 

PROVISIONS VIOLATE THE LEGISLATIVE 

INTENT OF REHABILITATION AS THE PRIMARY 

 

1

 N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23.
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PURPOSE OF THE NEW JERSEY JUVENILE

JUSTICE CODE.

POINT II

MANDATORY LIFETIME REGISTRATION 

REQUIREMENTS FOR JUVENILES BASED UPON 

AGE ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

POINT III

THE DENIAL TO T.D. OF ANY OPPORTUNITY 

FOR A HEARING AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS OF 

SUPERVISION, PRIOR TO BEING REQUIRED TO 

REGISTER FOR LIFE AND BE SUPERVISED OR 

SANCTIONED FOR NON-COMPLIANCE, IS 

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN 

VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE 

CONSTITUTIONS.

POINT IV

THE DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT 

IMPOSED DENIES THIS JUVENILE PROPER 

CONSIDERATION OF ITS YOUTH AND 

ATTENDANT CONSIDERATIONS.

The crux of these contentions challenges the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 

2C:7-2(g)'s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as 

applied to juvenile offenders. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g) provides:

A person required to register under this section who has 

been convicted of, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted 

by reason of insanity for more than one sex offense as 

defined in subsection b. of this section or who has been 

convicted of, adjudicated delinquent, or acquitted by 

reason of insanity for aggravated sexual assault 

pursuant to subsection a. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-2 or 

sexual assault pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection 
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c. of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-2 is not eligible under subsection 

f. of this section to make application to the Superior 

Court of this State to terminate the registration 

obligation.

Since the filing of T.D.'s appeal, our Supreme Court issued its decision in In re 

State ex rel. C.K., 233 N.J. 44 (2018). In C.K., the Court concluded that 

"subsection (g)'s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied 

to juveniles violate the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 

1 of the New Jersey Constitution." Id. at 48. 

The parties agree that C.K. renders T.D.'s argument as to subsection (g)

moot. T.D. acknowledges, as the Court stated in C.K., that under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-

2(f), he is not entitled to release from his registration and notification 

requirements unless a Superior Court judge is "persuaded that he has been 

offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year lookback period." C.K., 233 N.J. at 48. Therefore, the parties concede that T.D. has 

an opportunity in the future to seek termination of the Megan's Law 

requirements under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).

T.D. however, urges us to consider the reconsideration motion that the 

judge declined to hear. He maintains that the doctor's report provides new 

evidence that should relieve him now of his Megan's Law obligations. T.D. 

contends that Megan's Law is otherwise unconstitutional "on the basis of its 
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punitive aspects." We decline to adjudicate his motion in the first instance. C.K.

resolves T.D.'s appeal to us. As for his reconsideration motion, he may renew 

his arguments before the Law Division judge.

Affirmed.