No. 84-329 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MON'TANA 

1985 

ELIZABETH L. POND, 

Plaintiff and Petitioner, 

NORTH AMERICAN LIFE AND CASUALTY 

COMPANY, a corporation, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING : 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Petitioner: 

Cure, Borer & Davis; Gregory J. Hatley argued, 

Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver; Jack L. 

Lewis argued, Great Falls, Montana 

Submitted: March 14, 1985 

Decided: April 11, 1985 

Clerk 
Mr. Justice Will-iam E. Hunt, Sr., del ivered the Opinion of 

t-he Court. 

This is a declaratory judgment action upon certification 

by the United States District Court, District of Montana, 

Great Falls Division, Honorable Paul G. Ratfield, that the 

question upon which adjudication is sought is controlling in 

federal litigation. This case originated in federal court as 

a dispute between an insurer and the beneficiary of an 

insured concerning whether the insured died in such a manner 

as to require coverage. 

We find that coverage is required. 

The respondent, North American Life and Casualty 

Company, is the insurer in a group pol-icy made available to 

members of the National Rifle Association. The policy in 

issue here provided coverage for injuries "resulting directly 

and independently of all other causes" and excluded coverage 

for losses "caused by or resulting from disease of any kind." 

The petitioner, Elizabeth L. Pond, is the designated 

beneficiary of the deceased insured, Frank Pond. 

While wallcing on a sidewalk in Logan, Utah, in 

September, 1981, the insured, Frank Pond, suddenly lost 

consciousness and fell. The back of his head struclc the 

concrete sidewalk and he died as a result. An a-utopsy report 

listed his loss of consciousness as "a seizure/syncope of 

uncertain etiology." Cause of death was listed as 

ncraniocerebral injuries." Frank Pond had a physical 

condition involving a propensity for consciousness. 

This was caused by several years of excessive indulgence in 

alcohol. Evidence at trial showed that the insured's 
physical condition that caused his loss of consciousness 

would not have, in itself, caused this death. 

The petitioner argues that coverage is required in this 

instance because an accident within policy coverage was the 

prime cause of death. It is argued that this case is within 

the ruling in Life Insurance Company of North America v. 

Evans (19811) , 195 Mont. 242, 247, 637 P.2d 806, 808-809, in 

which this Court held, under a similar policy, recovery may 

be had even though a disease appears to have actually 

contributed to the cause of death as long as the accident 

sets in motion the chain of events leading to death, or if it 

is the prime or moving cause. Petitioner interprets this 

ruling as requiring coverage if an accident is the prime 

cause of death. 

The respondent argues that no coverage can exist here 

hecause a pre-existing physical condition, the years of 

excessj-ve indulgence in alcohol, caused the unconsciousness 

which set in motion the events that led to death. Respondent 

argues that Evans, 637 P.2d at 808-809, focuses on the 

triggering event--if the triggering event is accidental 

coverage is required. 

Here, the insured was a policy holder of an insurance 

policy that would cover accidental injury including death. 

We find that the injury suffered by Frank Pond was an 

accidental injury within that meaning in the policy. The 

pre-existinq condition that Frank Pond had--the propensity 

for losinq consciousness--would not in itself have caused 

death. Death was caused by the insured's head hitting the 

concrete sidewalk. This accidental death was an injury 

within the meaning of the policy and is covered by the 

policy. 
We hold that coverage is requi 

We Concur: 

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Chief Justice 

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