In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 24–0538

Submitted September 11, 2024—Filed October 4, 2024

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board,

Complainant,

vs.

Joel E. Fenton,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission.

The grievance commission recommends ninety-day suspension for ethical 

violations. License Suspended.

Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined.

Tara van Brederode, Allison A. Schmidt, and Robert A. Howard III, 

Des Moines, for complainant. 

Joel E. Fenton, Des Moines, pro se.
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Waterman, Justice. 

The Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Board in August 2023 charged 

attorney Joel E. Fenton with violating rules of professional conduct while he was 

under a deferral agreement entered after he served a sixty-day disciplinary 

suspension in 2020 for similar violations. Fenton is a sole practitioner who has 

struggled with depression and anxiety for many years. His recurring misconduct 

includes missing court hearings, neglect, and failure to communicate with 

clients. A panel of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission found Fenton 

violated multiple rules and recommended a ninety-day suspension. 

On our de novo review, we agree Fenton violated our ethical rules. We 

suspend his law license indefinitely with no possibility for reinstatement for 

ninety days. As recommended by the Board, we require that Fenton provide an 

evaluation by a licensed healthcare practitioner verifying his fitness to practice 

law as a condition for his reinstatement.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

We find the following facts as stipulated or otherwise established by the 

record. Fenton received his Iowa law license in 1996. In 2002, due to his “chronic 

difficulties with anxiety and depression,” our court placed Fenton on a disability 

suspension. Ten years later, Fenton’s law license was reinstated. He opened a

solo practice in Des Moines and began accepting court-appointed cases through 

the State Public Defender’s Office. Fenton works without any support staff, 

meaning he is responsible for administrative tasks, including ensuring deadlines 

and hearings are properly placed on his calendar. By his own admission, Fenton 

has not developed an effective calendaring system and has turned down 

suggestions that he hire support staff to assist him.
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In 2017, Fenton received a private admonishment based on his failure to 

communicate with his client over several months, his failure to attend a court 

hearing, and his failure to ensure his client appeared at that same hearing. 

A. Fenton’s Sixty-Day Consent Suspension. Fenton admittedly failed to 

adequately represent eight clients from 2018 through 2020. Specifically, Fenton 

failed to communicate with these clients and missed multiple court hearings. He 

repeatedly missed filing deadlines, and his failure to resist motions for summary 

judgment in two cases resulted in dismissal of his clients’ claims. The federal 

district court ordered monetary sanctions against Fenton in three cases for 

failing to comply with deadlines. Fenton did not timely pay the sanctions and 

paid belatedly only after the district court scheduled a show-cause contempt 

hearing. 

Fenton also failed to timely file appellate documents for other clients, 

resulting in thirty default penalties being assessed against him. Fenton 

consented to a sixty-day disciplinary suspension of his license in 2020. His 

license was reinstated in August of that year.

B. Deferral Agreement. Fenton’s problems persisted the following year. 

On June 8, 2021, Fenton agreed to represent Shanell Peavy in a federal workers’ 

compensation case. Peavy attempted to contact Fenton multiple times that 

summer, and eventually they exchanged signed documents in August. Fenton 

did not contact Peavy again despite her persistent efforts to reach him. Fenton

took no action on her case. The following February, Fenton withdrew from 

representing Peavy after she filed an ethics complaint against him.

In December, Fenton agreed to represent Paul Sanborn in a workers’ 

compensation case. Fenton took no action on the case and failed to communicate 

with Sanborn for over four months despite Sanborn’s email asking if he still 
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represented him. Fenton withdrew his representation in May when Sanborn filed 

an ethics complaint against him.

On September 13, 2022, based on the complaints of Peavy and Sanborn, 

the Board and Fenton entered into a one-year deferral agreement pursuant to 

Iowa Court Rule 35.14. Under this rule, the Board “may defer further 

proceedings [against an attorney] pending the attorney’s compliance with 

conditions the board imposes for supervision of the attorney for a specified period 

of time not to exceed one year unless the board extends the time prior to the 

conclusion of the specified period.” Iowa Ct. R. 35.14(1). The attorney must 

execute an affidavit admitting the conduct that the Board is investigating, 

agreeing on the conditions the Board will impose, and acknowledging that the 

Board may file a formal complaint against the attorney and use the attorney’s 

admissions in the affidavit as evidence if the attorney fails to comply with the 

conditions. Id. r. 35.14(3). 

Upon the attorney’s successful compliance with the conditions the 

disciplinary board imposed, the board must dismiss or close the 

investigations pending before it at the time it determined to defer 

further proceedings. The attorney will not be considered to have 

been disciplined, but the attorney’s admission of misconduct may 

be considered in imposing sanctions in a subsequent disciplinary 

matter not arising out of the same conduct.

Id. r. 35.14(5).

As part of the deferral agreement, Fenton acknowledged that he violated 

Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 and 32:1.4 by failing to communicate 

with his clients and neglecting their cases. Fenton agreed to: 

• Comply with all provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 

and the Iowa Court Rules.

• Cooperate with any investigation or inquiry by the Board.
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• Complete the “Attorney Self-Assessment” within the first three months 

of the deferral period.

• Comply with all deadlines and scheduled appearances. 

• Continue to monitor mental health, implement self-care practices, and 

comply with any mental health treatment recommendations from his 

primary care provider.

• Meet with his appointed supervisor monthly and certify to the Board 

that he has done so. 

• Certify written reports to the Board documenting his compliance with 

each condition. 

If he failed to meet any of the conditions, Fenton acknowledged that the Board 

may file a formal complaint against him. 

C. Violations of Deferral Agreement. During the term of the deferral 

agreement, Fenton violated its conditions in five different matters. The Board 

revoked the deferral agreement and filed its complaint.

1. Nicholl-Embree representation. On April 12, 2022, Stephen Robert 

Nicholl-Embree filed a pro se complaint in federal court alleging claims under 

42 U.S.C. section 1983. Several months later, the court appointed Fenton to 

represent him. A scheduling order entered that October set the dispositive 

motion deadline for February 28, 2023. Fenton failed to conduct any discovery 

or communicate with Nicholl-Embree. On March 24, 2023, Nicholl-Embree wrote 

to the court asking for new counsel, stating that Fenton had never 

communicated with him. The defendants moved for summary judgment on 

March 28. Fenton obtained several extensions without preparing a resistance, 

conducting any discovery, or communicating with his client. Fenton moved to 

withdraw on April 27 and to extend deadlines. On May 31, the district court 

granted Fenton’s motion to withdraw and faulted Fenton for not stating “why he 
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failed to conduct discovery on Plaintiff’s behalf or that he had any physical or 

mental impairment that prevented him from doing so prior to the dispositive 

motion deadline.” 

2. George representation. On September 9, 2022, Joshua George filed a 

pro se complaint in federal court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.

The court appointed Fenton to represent George. Fenton was to file an amended 

complaint by November 4 but failed to do so. The district court, on its own, 

extended the deadline to December 23. That deadline was extended another four 

times, either sua sponte or at Fenton’s request, with the final deadline on April 7, 

2023. On April 27, Fenton missed a status conference, moved for another 

extension (which the court denied), and moved to withdraw, which the court 

granted.

3. Andre representation. On September 19, 2022, Alan Andre filed a pro se 

complaint in federal court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Fenton 

was appointed to represent Andre on September 25. The court set November 21 

as the deadline for filing an amended complaint. Fenton missed that deadline, 

as well as another three extended deadlines. Fenton moved to withdraw and 

missed an April status conference, and the court declined to reschedule. The 

court granted his withdrawal, citing Fenton’s failure “to meet deadlines and 

appear at a status conference” in both Andre’s and George’s cases.

4. Sarceno Aguire representation. On March 1, 2023, Fenton was 

appointed to represent Manuel Antonio Sarceno Aguire in a Polk County criminal 

case. Fenton failed to appear at the pretrial conference, which had already been 

continued once at his request. The court removed Fenton from the case. 

5. Haynes representation. On March 20, 2023, Fenton entered his 

appearance as court-appointed counsel for Devon Haynes in a criminal case. The 

court granted Fenton’s request to continue a plea hearing to May 9. Fenton failed 
7

to appear at the hearing, which the court reset for May 16. He failed to appear 

again. The court removed Fenton from the case, noting his absence from two 

hearings and his failure to communicate with his client.

D. Disciplinary Proceeding. After revoking the deferral agreement, the 

Board charged Fenton with multiple rule violations in a two-count complaint. 

The parties submitted a partial stipulation but disagreed over mitigating and 

aggravating circumstances, one rule violation, and the appropriate sanction. The 

commission held a hearing on December 18. When asked whether any physical 

or mental impairment prevented him from properly representing his clients, 

Fenton testified, 

Well, that’s difficult to say because the frustrating thing about my 

experience is and my situation is how well I do in cases 95, 96, 97 

percent of the time. It’s the cases that I don’t that are the problems. 

And I can say in that period of time I would have been feeling pretty 

good. I would be getting things done.

At the same time, these federal cases that I accepted on top of 

my regular caseload, the problems I’ve had traditionally is a 

procrastination-type problem. And when you’re in the middle of 

everything and trying to get all this stuff done, it’s very easy to 

rationalize things to yourself and say, “I’ll get this done later. I’ll get 

this done this weekend. I’ll do this. I’ll do that.”

And it’s just something that didn’t get done, and it’s not 

because I don’t feel like these clients deserved quality, adequate 

representation even though they’re pro bono cases or they’re 

incarcerated people or whatever. I wouldn’t have taken these cases 

if I didn’t think I was going to be able to make a difference and do 

the right thing. 

And that’s the difficulty I have is understanding why I accept 

these matters and then with all good intentions in trying to do what 

needs to be done and then it just doesn’t get done because I’m so 

busy, and I’m dealing with the mental health issues and things that 

I do have. 

I do well sometimes. I have good and bad days. Therapy has 

helped, medication has helped, but I still have difficulties and I’m 

still working on those. So the only thing I can say to this is it’s 
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another example of where with the best of intentions I did not follow 

through. 

The parties filed post-hearing briefs. The Board argued for a ninety-day 

suspension; Fenton argued for a public reprimand.

The commission issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 

recommendations on April 1, 2024. The commission found that Fenton violated 

multiple rules. The commission found several mitigating factors: Fenton’s history 

of taking pro bono cases and serving marginalized communities, his service to 

the bar association, his court appointments, his mental health difficulties, his 

mother passing away in September 2023, and his acceptance of responsibility 

for his actions. 

The commission also found several aggravating factors: Fenton’s 

seventeen years of practice, his admission that “it was easy” to neglect his 

marginalized clients because of their status, his prior discipline for similar 

misconduct, the multiple rule violations with multiple clients, and his violation 

of his deferral agreement. The commission recommended a ninety-day 

suspension.

II. Standard of Review.

“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 2019). While we are 

not bound by the commission’s factual findings and recommendations, we give 

them respectful consideration. Id. “The Board must prove attorney misconduct 

by a convincing preponderance of the evidence, a burden greater than a 

preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Turner, 918 N.W.2d 130, 144 (Iowa 2018) 

(quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Morse, 887 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 

2016)). “Stipulations of fact are binding on the parties, but we are not bound by 
9

stipulations of violations or sanctions.” Id. “Instead, we review the stipulation 

and record to determine whether a violation occurred and what sanction is 

appropriate.” Id. If we find the Board proved misconduct, we may choose a 

sanction that is greater or lesser than what the commission recommended. Iowa 

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stoller, 879 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2016). 

III. Ethical Violations.

On our de novo review, we agree with the Board and commission that 

Fenton violated multiple rules. 

A. Count I—Peavy and Sanborn. The Board argues, and the commission 

found, that Fenton’s actions violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 

and 32:1.4(a)(4) as to Peavy and Sanborn. We agree. The Board further argues 

that Fenton’s actions violated rule 32:8.4(d) as to those clients, but the 

commission found that they did not. We agree with the commission.

1. Neglect. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 states, “A lawyer shall 

act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” “We have 

previously recognized that an attorney violates this rule when he or she neglects 

a client’s case.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weiland, 885 N.W.2d 198, 

208 (Iowa 2016). Neglect is “a consistent failure to perform those obligations that 

a lawyer has assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a lawyer 

owes to a client.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 

867 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 

683 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 2004)). An attorney violates this rule by “consistently 

failing to perform functions required of an attorney.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Conroy, 845 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 2014).

Fenton failed to act diligently in his representation of Peavy and Sanborn. 

He went months without communicating with either client. He filed nothing for 

either client. He withdrew from representing both clients after each filed an 
10

ethics complaint against him. We determine that Fenton violated rule 32:1.3. 

See Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65–66 (holding that an attorney violated rule 32:1.3 

when he only spoke with a client once during the year he represented him and 

filed nothing on his behalf). 

2. Communication. Rule 32:1.4(a)(4) states that a lawyer shall “promptly 

comply with reasonable requests for information” from a client. Iowa R. of Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.4(a)(4). “Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the 

client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.”

Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 1. “When a client makes a reasonable request for information,

[the rule] requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response 

is not feasible, that the lawyer . . . acknowledge receipt of the request and advise 

the client when a response may be expected.” Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 4. 

In a case with a one-year deadline to file an appeal, Fenton went over six 

months without responding to Peavy’s repeated attempts to contact him. He went 

over three months without communicating with Sanborn, even after Sanborn 

asked if Fenton still represented him. We agree with the Board and commission

that Fenton violated rule 32:1.4(a)(4). See id. r. 32:1.4(a)(4); Conroy, 845 N.W.2d 

at 65 (holding that the attorney violated the rule because he only communicated 

with his client once and did not respond to any requests for information or 

updates on the case). 

3. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 32:8.4(d) 

prohibits “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Iowa R. of 

Prof’l Conduct at 32:8.4(d). The rule is violated by acts that have “hampered the 

efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon which 

the courts rely.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 758 N.W.2d 227, 

230 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Borth, 728 N.W.2d 

205, 211 (Iowa 2007)). We have concluded that an attorney violates this rule 
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when they miss deadlines. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dolezal, 

796 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Iowa 2011) (concluding that the attorney violated the rule 

by failing to comply with appellate deadlines, resulting in administrative 

dismissals of two client appeals). And, “[w]e have consistently held an attorney 

violates rule 32:8.4(d) when the ‘misconduct results in additional court 

proceedings or causes court proceedings to be delayed or dismissed.’ ” Iowa Sup. 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 988 N.W.2d 399, 413 (Iowa 2023) (quoting 

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Noel, 933 N.W.2d 190, 204 (Iowa 2019)). 

Fenton was dilatory in representing Peavy and Sanborn but missed no 

deadlines and caused no dismissals or additional court proceedings in their 

workers’ compensation cases. The commission found that Fenton did not violate 

rule 32:8.4(d) as to those clients. We agree with the commission.

The Board argues that Fenton’s violation of his deferral agreement itself 

constitutes a violation of rule 32:8.4(d) as to Peavy and Sanborn. See Capotosto, 

927 N.W.2d at 589. We disagree with the Board as to that specific ground. 

Fenton’s mishandling of his representation of Peavy and Sanborn led to the 

deferral agreement, but he had withdrawn from representing each of them before 

entering the agreement. Fenton’s breach of the deferral agreement involved other 

clients, which we address below.

B. Count II—Misconduct During the Deferral Agreement. The Board 

argues, and the commission found, that Fenton’s actions while the deferral 

agreement was in place violate rules 32:1.3, 32:1.4(a)(2), 32:1.4(a)(3), 32:3.2, and 

32:8.4(d). We agree.

1. Neglect. As noted, rule 32:1.3 states that “[a] lawyer shall act with 

reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R. of Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.3. “A lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter 

can be handled competently.” Id. r. 32:1.3 cmt. 2. “When an attorney fails to 
12

appear at scheduled court proceedings, does not make the proper filings, or is 

slow to act on matters, he or she violates rule 32:1.3.” Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 

145 (quoting Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 208). In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board v. Turner, we held that the attorney violated rule 32:1.3 when 

he repeatedly failed to attend hearings, failed to tell his clients about the 

hearings, and missed deadlines on motions and briefs. Id. 

Fenton missed two plea hearings in his Haynes representation and a 

pretrial conference in his Sarceno Aguire representation. These failures violate 

rule 32:1.3. See Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 208 (concluding that “an attorney 

violate[s] rule 32:1.3 when he fail[s] to appear for a client’s pretrial conference”). 

During the six-month period he represented George, Fenton failed to file 

an amended complaint on behalf of his client—even though the district court 

extended the deadline five times—and failed to attend a status conference. 

During the seven-month period he represented Andre, Fenton again failed to file 

an amended complaint on behalf of his client—even though the district court 

extended the deadline four times—and failed to attend Andre’s status conference. 

This conduct also violates rule 32:1.3. See id.

Fenton also failed to perform any discovery on behalf of Nicholl-Embree 

during the eight-month period he represented him. This, too, violates 

rule 32:1.3. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. West, 901 N.W.2d 519, 

524 (Iowa 2017) (concluding that an attorney violates this rule when they do 

“little or nothing to advance the interests of a client after agreeing to represent 

the client” (quoting Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at 552)).

2. Communication. Rule 32:1.4(a)(2) states, “A lawyer shall . . . reasonably 

consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be 

accomplished.” Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(a)(2). And rule 32:1.4(a)(3) 

requires the lawyer to “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of 
13

the matter.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(3). The lawyer must inform the client about any 

“significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the 

representation.” Id. r. 32:1.4 cmt. 3.

Fenton failed to communicate with Nicholl-Embree from August 15 until 

his withdrawal on May 31, even though Nicholl-Embree repeatedly attempted to 

contact him. Thus, Fenton did not do what rule 32:1.4(a)(2) requires: consult 

with the client. Fenton also violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3) by failing to inform 

Nicholl-Embree about the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See 

Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65 (concluding that the attorney violated rule 32:1.4 by 

failing to communicate with six clients about the status of their appeals and only 

spoke to another client once in a year).

3. Expedite litigation. Rule 32:3.2 states, “A lawyer shall make reasonable 

efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Iowa R. 

of Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2. “An attorney violates this rule when he or she fails to 

timely ‘file documents, pursue appeals, and meet deadlines.’ ” Weiland, 

885 N.W.2d at 211 (quoting Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65). An attorney also violates 

this rule when he or she fails “to appear at hearings and participate in discovery.” 

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541, 548 (Iowa 

2012). 

Fenton did not conduct any discovery in the Nicholl-Embree matter. See 

id. Fenton did not appear at hearings or conferences in the George, Andre, 

Sarceno Aguire, and Haynes matters. See id. Fenton missed deadlines to file 

amended complaints in the Andre and George matters. See Weiland, 885 N.W.2d 

at 211. Fenton violated rule 32:3.2 many times over.

4. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. As noted, 

rule 32:8.4(d) states, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in 

conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . . .” Iowa R. of Prof’l 
14

Conduct 32:8.4(d). An attorney violates this rule by actions or inactions that

“hamper[] the efficient and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems 

upon which the courts rely.” Wright, 758 N.W.2d at 230 (quoting Borth, 

728 N.W.2d at 211).

Fenton missed numerous deadlines in the George and Andre matters. See 

Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 914 (Iowa 2011) (concluding that the attorney violated 

the rule by failing to comply with appellate deadlines, resulting in administrative 

dismissals of two client appeals). Fenton procrastinated in filing amended 

complaints on behalf of Andre and George, requiring the district court to 

continually grant extensions, which ultimately resulted in Fenton’s withdrawal. 

See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Iowa 

2012) (concluding that the attorney violated rule 32:8.4(d) because the attorney’s 

multi-year procrastination caused the district court to expend valuable judicial 

resources to issue orders, extend deadlines, and clean up the ongoing probate 

proceedings). Fenton did not conduct any discovery on behalf of Nicholl-Embree 

and never filed a resistance to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, 

requesting only extensions. See Johnson, 988 N.W.2d at 413–14; see also Iowa 

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 605 (Iowa 2011) 

(concluding that the attorney’s failure to do any work in a client matter 

“hampered the efficient operation of the courts” and “was not the type of conduct 

within the well-understood norms and conventions of the practice of law”). When 

Fenton failed to show up at the pretrial conference for Sarceno Aguire, the 

district court had to remove Fenton from representing him. See Johnson, 

988 N.W.2d at 413–14. Fenton’s repeated misconduct in these cases caused 

delays and additional court proceedings, thereby violating rule 32:8.4(d). See id.

at 413 (misconduct causing delays and additional court proceedings violates 

rule 32:8.4(d)). 
15

We agree with the Board that Fenton’s violations of the deferral agreement 

also violate rule 32:8.4(d) because “[t]he formation of the [Deferral] Agreement, 

as well as the Board and commission’s intervention, also constitute the use of 

judicial resources.” See Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d at 589.

IV. Sanction.

When determining an appropriate sanction, we give the commission’s 

recommendation respectful consideration but are not bound by it. Turner, 

918 N.W.2d at 144. We weigh several factors to determine an appropriate 

sanction. Id. at 152. The factors include: 

[T]he nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to continue in 

the practice of law, the protection of society from those unfit to 

practice law, the need to uphold public confidence in the justice 

system, deterrence, maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a 

whole, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Id. (quoting Morse, 887 N.W.2d at 143). “We strive for consistency with our 

precedents.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Daniels, 984 N.W.2d 757, 765 

(Iowa 2023).

The Board and commission recommended a ninety-day suspension. 

Fenton recommended a public reprimand but acknowledged in his brief before 

the commission that his misconduct “will almost certainly result in a 

suspension.” Based on the following factors and our court’s precedents, we 

conclude that a ninety-day suspension is warranted. 

A. Aggravating Factors. Fenton has practiced for seventeen years. This is 

an aggravating factor. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Parrish, 925 N.W.2d 

163, 181 (Iowa 2019) (concluding that the attorney’s seventeen years of practice 

is an aggravating factor). Of course, a lawyer at “any level of experience would 

understand that” missing court hearings is “deplorable” regardless of whoever 

the client is. Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 155 (concluding that the attorney’s 
16

inexperience was not a mitigating factor because any lawyer should know not to 

miss court hearings). 

Fenton has been disciplined previously for essentially the same 

misconduct. “Prior discipline is ‘an aggravating factor because an attorney did 

not learn from his or her prior misconduct.’ ” Daniels, 984 N.W.2d at 766 

(quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marzen, 949 N.W.2d 229, 244 

(Iowa 2020)). This factor is even stronger when the prior discipline was based on 

the same or similar conduct. Id. Fenton received a private admonition in 2017 

for failing to communicate with clients and missing a hearing. Fenton consented 

to a sixty-day suspension in 2020 and entered into a deferral agreement in 2022 

for failing to communicate with clients and missing hearings and court 

deadlines. Fenton then violated the deferral agreement by continuing to fail to 

communicate with clients and miss hearings and court deadlines. “These current 

violations demonstrate that [Fenton] has not learned from his previous 

disciplinary history.” Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 215. Instead, “it seems, neglect has 

become an unfortunate but recurrent theme.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 67.

Fenton’s multiple rule violations are an aggravating factor. Turner, 

918 N.W.2d at 154 (“[M]ultiple violations of disciplinary rules generally support 

enhanced sanctions.” (alteration in original) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Bartley, 860 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Iowa 2015))). Fenton’s “clear 

pattern of misconduct across several clients” is also an aggravating factor. Iowa 

Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Fisher, 965 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 2021). 

Lastly, Fenton violated his deferral agreement with the Board. In Iowa 

Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Capotosto, we held that the 

attorney’s failure to comply with the deferral agreement was an aggravating 

factor. 927 N.W.2d at 590. The attorney’s “inaction, at the very least, 

demonstrate[d] a disregard for the Board’s authority.” Id. More importantly, 
17

Fenton’s misconduct escalated—rather than diminished—after entering into the 

deferral agreement. This is a significant aggravating factor.

B. Mitigating Factors. Fenton reported that he has been under

psychiatric care. He states that he voluntarily ceased practicing law in 

mid-January 2024 and had withdrawn from over 150 cases, with the intention 

of withdrawing from all his cases by early February. He states that he does not 

intend to return to practicing law in 2024 or seek reinstatement without 

substantial progress in his ability to practice. At the commission hearing, Fenton 

testified that he was one of the few attorneys in the Southern District of Iowa 

willing to take prisoner rights cases. He also stated that he has been cooperative 

with the Board throughout this process. Fenton claimed that the actual harm 

from his misconduct caused to his clients was minimal. 

Fenton’s representation of clients in underserved and marginalized 

communities is a mitigating factor. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Heggen, 981 N.W.2d 701, 713 (Iowa 2022) (concluding that the attorney 

providing legal services to an “underserved and vulnerable population” was a 

mitigating factor). Fenton’s pro bono and reduced-fee casework is also a 

mitigating factor. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Leitner, 998 N.W.2d 

627, 647 (Iowa 2023) (concluding that the attorney’s history of pro bono and 

reduced-fee work was a mitigating factor).

The parties stipulated that Fenton’s depression contributed to the 

violations. “Personal illnesses, such as depression, do not excuse a lawyer’s 

misconduct but can be mitigating factors and influence our approach to 

discipline.” West, 901 N.W.2d at 527 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2009)). The illness must be related to 

the misconduct for it to be considered mitigating. Fisher, 965 N.W.2d at 474. 

“We also consider [the attorney’s] attempts to address his depression through 
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therapy and medication.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Frerichs, 

718 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Iowa 2006); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 661 (Iowa 2013) (“To be considered in mitigation, the 

alcoholism must have contributed to the ethical misconduct, and the lawyer 

must undertake rehabilitative efforts to control his addiction.”). We find that 

Fenton’s depression contributed to his misconduct, and his seeking treatment is 

a mitigating factor.

Fenton’s cooperation with the Board is a mitigating factor. Iowa Sup. Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sobel, 997 N.W.2d 421, 434 (Iowa 2023). But we expect 

and require cooperation with the Board, so cooperation “is not a significant 

mitigating circumstance.” Id. (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Dunahoo, 730 N.W.2d 202, 207 (Iowa 2007)).

Accepting responsibility and acknowledging wrongdoing is a mitigating 

factor, and Fenton has done so here. See Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 156. He 

stipulated to the facts, and he expressed remorse in the commission hearing. 

Fenton’s stress from his mother passing away is a mitigating factor but 

only “to the extent it adversely influenced his behavior or actions during the 

disciplinary case.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Mbanza, 996 N.W.2d 

711, 721 (Iowa 2023). His mother died after the Board had filed its complaint 

against him. His bereavement mitigates his tardiness during these disciplinary 

proceedings but does not excuse his underlying ethical violations.

Fenton’s voluntary cessation from the practice of law is a consideration 

“when evaluating whether our sanction will serve its purposes of deterring future 

misconduct and protecting the public.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Kingery, 871 N.W.2d 109, 124–25 (Iowa 2015). But the period that Fenton ceased 

practicing law is not credited against any suspension imposed. Id. 
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Fenton argues there was no significant client harm. Certainly, the clients 

suffered delays in their cases. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

McGinness, 844 N.W.2d 456, 467 (Iowa 2014) (holding that lack of client harm 

is a mitigating factor, “although the need to find successor counsel was certainly 

an inconvenience”). 

We agree with the Board that Fenton’s status as a solo practitioner, and 

the resulting financial hardship of a suspension, is not a significant mitigating 

factor. See Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 67 (declining “to give any significant weight” 

as a mitigating factor to attorney’s financial difficulties); see also, In re Neitlich, 

597 N.E.2d 425, 429–30 (Mass. 1992) (“[T]hat a term of suspension will disrupt 

the respondent’s solo practice cannot influence our decision, as ‘[w]e cannot 

sensibly have or apply a rule which excuses solo practitioners from warranted 

discipline’ ” while the discipline is imposed on “others who happen to be engaged 

in group practice.” (quoting In re Driscoll, 575 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Mass. 1991) 

(Greaney, J. dissenting))).

C. Appropriate Sanction. “When neglect of client matters is the principal 

violation in an attorney disciplinary case, the resulting discipline normally 

ranges from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 857 N.W.2d 195, 213 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Moorman, 

683 N.W.2d at 553). On the low end, if there is only one instance of neglect, a 

public reprimand may be appropriate. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Silich, 872 N.W.2d 181, 193 (Iowa 2015). But if there is a “recurring pattern of 

misconduct or multiple ethical violations,” a suspension is appropriate. Id. 

“Attorneys who engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice have received suspensions ranging from sixty days to eighteen months 

when . . . the conduct is ‘compounded by additional violations.’ ” Leitner, 
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998 N.W.2d at 647 (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Aeilts, 

974 N.W.2d 119, 129 (Iowa 2022)).

Fenton argues for a public reprimand. That sanction would be inadequate. 

See Dolezal, 796 N.W.2d at 922 (holding that a public reprimand would not be 

appropriate because such a sanction is appropriate in cases involving “only a 

single instance of misconduct”). Fenton’s pattern of repeated misconduct 

warrants a suspension. 

Next, we must determine the appropriate length of the suspension. In 

Capotosto, we suspended the attorney’s license for sixty days after finding the 

attorney neglected to rectify twelve delinquent cases, received prior discipline in 

the form of a public reprimand and a temporary suspension, and failed to comply 

with his deferral agreement. 927 N.W.2d at 589–90. We also found several 

mitigating factors, such as letters written on his behalf from a judge and a county 

attorney, his willingness to accept court-appointed work, and the fact that he 

had completed substantial work in the delinquent cases. Id. at 590–91.

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Cohrt, we imposed a 

ninety-day suspension on an attorney who neglected two client matters by failing 

to respond to discovery. 784 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Iowa 2010). The attorney also 

made a misrepresentation to his clients, had a history of neglect resulting in a 

private admonition, and did not acknowledge his neglect but insisted he acted

ethically. Id. 

We suspended an attorney’s license for ninety days in Iowa Supreme Court 

Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Humphrey, even though the attorney only 

neglected a single client matter, and the violations did not involve any fraud or 

dishonesty. 812 N.W.2d 659, 669 (Iowa 2012). We found that a significant 

aggravating factor was the attorney’s three previous violations resulting in a 

public reprimand, a sixty-day suspension, and an indefinite suspension with no 
21

possible reinstatement for three years. “[T]he earlier pattern of neglect and 

nonresponsiveness has reemerged,” so “a substantial suspension is appropriate 

to protect the public and uphold the integrity of the profession.” Id. A similar 

pattern of neglect, unresponsiveness, and escalating discipline is present here. 

In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Hedgecoth, we 

suspended an attorney’s license for ninety days based on a similar record of 

recurring neglect. 862 N.W.2d 354, 366 (Iowa 2015). There, the attorney missed 

deadlines in a postconviction-relief action and in a criminal appeal, and 

significantly delayed discovery in a civil case for a third client. Id. at 357–59. We 

found that the attorney’s prior discipline was an aggravating factor, especially

“[g]iven that some of these prior instances of discipline were imposed for conduct 

almost identical to the conduct at issue in this proceeding.” Id. at 364. 

On balance, we believe a ninety-day suspension is appropriate. Fenton 

neglected seven client matters. He has a history of neglect and lack of client 

communication—highlighted by his deferral agreement, his prior sixty-day 

suspension, and his prior admonition for similar misconduct.

Given Fenton’s lengthy mental health history, we agree with the Board’s 

recommendation that Fenton provide an evaluation by a licensed mental health 

professional verifying his fitness to practice law as a condition for reinstatement. 

See Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 158 (ordering respondent with mental health 

condition to provide an evaluation verifying fitness to practice law prior to 

reinstatement); see also Netti, 797 N.W.2d at 607 (same); Marks, 759 N.W.2d at 

333 (same).

V. Disposition.

We suspend Fenton’s license to practice law with no possibility of 

reinstatement for a minimum period of ninety days, effective ten days from the 

date of this opinion. This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. 
22

See Iowa Ct. R. 34.23(4). Fenton must comply with the notification and other 

requirements of Iowa Court Rule 34.23(2). As a condition for his reinstatement, 

Fenton must provide an evaluation from a licensed mental health professional 

verifying his fitness to practice law.

1 Costs of this action are taxed to Fenton 

under Iowa Court Rule 36.24(1).

License Suspended.

1This disciplinary suspension is separate from our recent orders suspending Fenton for 

his noncompliance with client security commission rules, see Iowa Ct. Rs. 39.5–39.11, and 

continuing legal education requirements, see id. r. 41.4. He must also fulfill his obligations under 

those rules as a condition of his reinstatement.