1 Filed 11/20/13 In re Armando R. CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin)

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In re ARMANDO R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C070867

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. ARMANDO R., Defendant and Appellant. (Super. Ct. No. 69155)

In March 2012 a petition was filed purs uant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging the minor, Armando R., wa s in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610) and in possession of ammunition (P en. Code, § 29650), carrying a concealed weapon (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)), carryi ng a loaded firearm (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)), and committed a battery on school property (Pen. Code, § 243.2, subd. (a)). After denying the minor’s motio n to suppress eviden ce, the juvenile court sustained the petition and adjudged the minor a ward of the court. On appeal, the minor contends his2 suppression motion should ha ve been granted because th e juvenile court failed to
consider all the relevant circumstances and there was not substantial evidence supporting the finding that the search of the minor was consensual. We shall affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND In the late afternoon of March 15, 2012 , Officer Luis Talamantes was on a routine patrol near the area of Stribley Park in Stockton. Two days earlier, Talamantes had been working a “violent crime mission,” targeting areas of violent crime for increased patrols. Stribley Park is known as a “hang out” for Norteño gang members and is in a neighborhood well known for drug activity, s hootings, robberies, and violent crime. Talamantes conducted his patrol there in an effort to continue the goals of the violent
crime mission and determine if he could locat e any problems or gang members. He had not previously patrolled at Stribley Park as part of the violent crime mission and was not aware if any other officers were assigned to the park as part of the mission. At the park Talamantes saw three Hisp anic teenage males—the minor, his cousin Jose A., and their friend Miguel H.—sitting on a park bench. All three were wearing an article of red clothing. Because red usua lly symbolizes Norteño gang membership and most Norteños in Stockton are Hispanic, Talamantes drove over to speak with the teenagers. He parked in front of them, faci ng against traffic, and ta lked with them while remaining in his patrol car. He did not activ ate his emergency lights, turn on his siren, draw his weapon or handcuffs, and did not have a partner with him. Through the patrol car window, he asked the teenagers what they were doing and they answered they were waiting for a ride and hanging ou t, “ ‘chillin’.’ ” Talamantes joked with them, “ ‘chillin’ like a villain?’ ” He was smiling at the time a nd all three teenagers laughed in response. While in his car, he was at least 20 feet away from them. Talamantes noticed the minor appeared nervous and was looking around, so
Talamantes decided to talk to him further. For officer safety, he got out of the car and
walked over to the teen agers. He kept about six feet of distance between himself and the3 teenagers. He did not inform the teenagers that they did not have to speak with him if they did not want to or that they were free to leave. His initial conversation with them was “[j]ust regular conversation like, ‘Hey, ho w are you guys doing? What are you guys doing?’ ” He spoke to them about Norteños a nd that they are often Mexican, as was he, and explained he knew what it was like to gr ow up in the area. He asked the teenagers “simple questions like, . . . wh ere they lived, if th ey were gang members, why they were wearing red,” if they were Nort eños, and if any of them had ev er been arrested or were on parole or probation. He asked what school they went to and shared that he had graduated from the same high school. He also asked if they were “carrying any weapons or anything illegal on them.” They said they we re not. This conversation lasted about three or four minutes. Talamantes was speaking to them in a friendly tone of voice, trying to
be courteous and to make them feel as comfortable as possible. During the entire conversation, Talamantes was joking around with the teenagers, “trying to get their confidence, like, trying to make them feel co mfortable . . . joking with them. They all smiled and were laughing when I was joking with them.” Talamantes asked the teens, “ ‘Do you mi nd if I pat you guys down?’ ” All three answered they did not mind. All three started patting themselv es down. Jose and Miguel started looking toward the mi nor and the minor became ex tremely nervous, bouncing his knees and looking around as though he was going to flee. That nervous response to Talamantes’ question about weapons made Talamantes fearful for his safety and concerned that the minor had a weapon. Out of concern for his safety, Talamantes directed the minor to step off the bench, turn around, and place his hands behind his h ead. As the minor turned and raised his hands, his sweater lifted and Talamantes saw something protruding from the minor’s
waistband. Talamantes believed it was a wooden ha ndle for either a pistol grip or a knife. He grabbed both of the minor’s hands and patted him down. He felt a hard, metallic, heavy object that he believed could be a weapon and pulled it out; it was a revolver.4 Jose A. testified that Talamantes was out of the car before he asked them any questions, and his first questio n was, “ ‘Do you guys bang?’ ” to which the trio answered,
“ ‘No.’ ” He then asked if th ey were Norteños. Hi s hands were next to his baton, holding on to it, and he was speaking to them in a “d eep tone” of voice. Th e way Talamantes was looking at them made Jose feel Talama ntes was accusing them of something. Immediately after the teenager s answered, Talamantes told him he was going to search them. He told the minor to stand up and aske d if he had any weapons on him. He then began searching the minor. Miguel H. testified that as soon as Tala mantes pulled up, he asked how they were doing, whether they were staying out of tro uble, and whether they were gang members. They answered they we re just “ ‘chillin’,’ ” to which Ta lamantes responded, “ ‘Oh, you guys chillin’ like a villain?’ ” The teenagers answered they were “ ‘just kicking it.’ ” Initially, Talamantes remained inside the patrol car, about 20 feet away from the teenagers. He had his hands on his baton wh en he got out of the car and put it back on his belt. His hands were resting on his duty belt, near his waistline. He stopped about 15 feet away from the teenagers. He was talk ing to the teenagers for about five minutes when he told the minor, “ ‘I’m going to have to search you.’ ” When he started searching, he asked if the teenagers had any weapons on them. Upon searching the minor, Talamantes found the gun. Then he put the minor on the ground, arrested him, and drew his weapon. During the conversation, Talamantes’ tone was not angry or calm, more like curious. The questions about be ing a gang member made Miguel feel as though he was being accused of doing something wrong. Mi guel testified Talamantes did not ask for permission to search the teenagers. The minor testified that when he pulle d up and approached them, Talamantes looked curious. The minor recalled the patrol car was parked approximately five to seven feet away from the teenagers. Talamantes did not ask any questions while still in the vehicle. He got out of the car and put the ba ton in its place on his belt and started asking5 questions. During the questioning, Talamantes kept his hands near his hips, and near his weapons. At this point, Talamantes was about five to six feet away from the teenagers. Talamantes’ first question was whether they were gang memb ers. He then asked what they were doing and they told him they were just hanging out and having a good time. Although his friends and Talamantes were la ughing when Talamantes said they were “ ‘chillin’ like a villain,’ ” the minor was offended as he took it to mean Talamantes was implying they were “up to no good, a villain.” Talamantes asked if they were Norteños because they were Mexican. They asked why he was asking th em, and Talamantes responded, “ ‘Oh, because I’m Mexican myse lf, and usually every Mexican is like gang bangers.’ ” This made the minor feel as t hough the officer was trying to accuse him of something. Based on how Talamantes wa s behaving, and his asking questions about being a gang member, the minor did not feel he was free to leave. Talamantes then asked if they were on probation. The minor answ ered, “ ‘No.’ ” He felt like Talamantes was just doing his job but did not feel like he was free to leave. Talamantes then advised he was going to pat them down and said he was going to start with the minor. The minor did not feel as though he could refuse to be searched. He did not feel he had a choice whether to answer the questions. Talamant es questioned the teenagers for about five
minutes before the search. The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress, finding Talamantes approached the three teenagers and during the conversation remained five to six feet away from them, did not display his weapon, and did not touch the teenagers. The tone of the conversation was friendly, and the teenagers were not blocke d from leaving by either the patrol car or
the officer. The court found non e of the questions asked by the officer “rose to the nature of being accusatory.” The cour t also found “the ring of trut h” when Talamantes testified he asked the minors if they minded if he patted them down and all three teenagers, including the minor, gave Talamantes permis sion to search them. Finding the encounter6 remained consensual and the minor gave Ta lamantes permission to search him, the juvenile court denied the motion to suppress. After the motion to suppress was denied, the court held a contested jurisdictional hearing. The juvenile court sustained the petition, finding th e allegations that the minor possessed a firearm, possessed live ammunition, carried a loaded firearm, and committed a battery on school property true beyond a reasonable doubt. The court declared the minor a ward of the juvenile court, placed him on probation, and ordered him to serve 60 days in juvenile hall with credit for 29 days served. The juvenile court also ordered him to complete gang awareness and anger management classes.
DISCUSSION
The minor contends the trial court erre d in denying his motion to suppress. He claims that in deciding whet her the encounter between Tala mantes and the minor was a consensual encounter or a detention, the tria l court did not consider the totality of the circumstances, and there were several add itional factors tending to show a reasonable teenager under the circumstan ces would not have felt he had a choice to leave. Specifically, the minor argues the trial court did not consider that the encounter took place at a park “in a ghetto setting” that had re cently been targeted by law enforcement as part of a “ ‘violent crime mission,’ ” and did not consider the age of the minors. The minor also contends the finding that he c onsented to the search is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. “Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the mo st intrusive: consensual en counters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever ; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual’s liberty. [Cita tions.] Our present inquiry concerns the
distinction between consensual encounters and detentions. Consensual encounters do not7 trigger Fourth Amendment sc rutiny. [Citation.].” ( In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821 ( Manuel G .).) An officer’s simply approa ching an individual and asking a few questions does not constitute a detention and will not trigger Fo urth Amendment scruti ny unless it loses its consensual nature. ( Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [115 L.Ed.2d 389, 398] ( Bostick ).) An encounter remains consensual as long as a reasonabl e person would feel free “ ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’ ” ( Id . at p. 434 [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 398].) A consensual encounter transforms into a detention when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty. ( Ibid. ) To determine whether a particular encount er constitutes a detention, courts must consider all the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer’s requests or to te rminate the encounter. ( Bostick, supra , 501 U.S. at p. 439 [115 L.Ed.2d at pp. 401-402].) This test assesses the coercive effect of the police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation. ( Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 573 [100 L. Ed.2d 565, 572].) Factors that might indicate an unlawful detention has take n place include (1) the presence of several police officers, (2) an officer’s display of a weapon, (3) some phy sical touching of the person, or (4) the use of langua ge or a tone of voice indica ting that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. ( United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554-555 [64 L.Ed .2d 497, 509]; Manuel G. , supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) The officer’s
uncommunicated state of mind an d the individual citizen’s subj ective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred. ( In re Christopher B . (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460.) In evaluating whether the contact be tween the minor and Talamantes was consensual or a detention, “we view the reco rd in the light most favorable to the trial8 court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, wh ether express or implied, if they are supported by substan tial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as
a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure.” ( People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App. 4th 917, 922; accord, People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Initially we note, absent evid ence to the contrary, “[t]he general rule is that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.]” ( People v. Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489 , 496.) Although the juvenile court did not explicitly note the location of the park or the minor’s age in its statement of decision, a
silent record is not an indication that a trial court failed to consider the relevant circumstances. The court expressly indicate d it was applying the correct standard and was required to examine “all of the circumst ances surrounding the encounter and whether police conduct communicated to the individuals th at they were not free to leave.” In this case, the applicable law includes consider ation of the age of the teenagers and the
location of the encounter. Noth ing in this record suggests, let alone demonstrates, that the juvenile court failed to apply that standard. “[T]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient for the proo f of any fact.” ( People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1030-1031 .) Talamantes testified he did not activate his lights or siren when he appro ached the teenagers. Upon exiting the patrol car, he placed his baton in his duty belt and du ring the encounter rest ed his hands near the belt, but he did not disp lay or draw a weapon or handcuffs . No other officers participated in the conversation with the teenagers. The encounter took place in a public setting, and the teenagers were not directed to move to a different location. 1 During the conversation,

1 Contrary to the minor’s cl aim, it is not clear from the record that the park was the subject of the “proactively aggressive” assert ion of officers’ “collective and individual9 Talamantes did not touch any of the teenager s, neither the patrol car nor his body was blocking them, and he remained five to six feet away from them. The encounter lasted only three to four minutes, and was convers ational and friendly in tone. Eventually, Talamantes asked for permission to search the teenagers and they consented to be
searched. The teenagers gave a slightly different ac count, primarily in the characterization of the tone of the conversation and in denyin g they consented to being searched. In assessing whether the trial court’s findings of historical fact are supported by substantial evidence, we do not resolve either credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts. The
resolution of those conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence is reserved exclusively to the trier of fact. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 11 81.) If the circumstances reasonably justify the juvenile court’s findings, we cannot reverse merely because the circumstances also might sup port a contrary finding. ( People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 214.) Applying these standards, we find Talamantes’ testimony furnished
substantial evidence that the encounter was consensual and the minor consented to the search. ( Manuel G ., supra , 16 Cal.4th at p. 823.)
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
RAYE , P. J.

We concur:
BLEASE , J.
BUTZ , J.

authority” over the park. Talamantes had no t patrolled there and was unsure whether any other officers had. Much of the minor’s argu ment on this point rests on facts not found in the record. Accord ingly, we do not consider them.