[Cite as In re J.C., 2023-Ohio-4400.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

IN RE: J.C. C.A. No. 30759

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE No. DN 21-12-1015

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 6, 2023

HENSAL, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Appellant, R.C. (“Father”), appeals from a judgment of the Summit County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated his parental rights and placed his minor child 

in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB”). This Court 

affirms. 

I.

{¶2} Father is the biological father of J.C., born December 21, 2021. The child’s mother 

(“Mother”) did not appeal from the trial court’s judgment.

{¶3} Shortly after J.C.’s birth, CSB filed a complaint, alleging that J.C. was abused, 

neglected, and dependent for numerous reasons, including Mother’s prenatal drug use and 

resulting medical problems with this child; the family’s lack of stable housing; and an ongoing 

abuse, neglect, and dependency case with Mother’s older child, who is not Father’s child, which 

was based on Mother’s drug problems and Father’s sexual abuse of that child. 
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{¶4} CSB later amended the complaint in this case to add that J.C. was still experiencing 

symptoms of drug withdrawal and Father had been criminally charged with sexual offenses against 

J.C.’s older sibling. Both parents waived their rights to adjudicatory and dispositional hearings 

and agreed that J.C. would be adjudicated a dependent child, placed in the temporary custody of 

CSB, and that the trial court would adopt CSB’s original case plan as an order of the court. The 

dependency adjudication was explicitly based on allegations in the amended complaint, which 

included Mother’s history of drug abuse and refusal to cooperate with CSB, the child’s lack of 

stable housing, and Father’s substantiated sexual abuse of J.C.’s sibling.

{¶5} Because Father was only alleged to be J.C.’s father at that time, the original case 

plan required him to establish paternity, which he did approximately one month later. After Father 

established his paternity, he was informed at a review hearing that CSB would be amending the 

case plan to include specific reunification goals for him, including a mental health and basic needs 

component. Father had reported past mental health symptoms and multiple mental health 

diagnoses, including schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, and that he had already been taking 

psychiatric medication. The CSB caseworker made a referral for Father to a mental health 

provider. 

{¶6} Approximately two weeks later, CSB filed the amended case plan. The trial court 

adopted it ten days later, because no one filed a timely objection or request for a hearing. See R.C. 

2151.412(F)(2)(b). The amended case plan required that Father engage in consistent mental health 

treatment and demonstrate that he was emotionally stable and able to provide protective 

capabilities in his role as a parent. The basic needs component of the case plan required, among 

other things, that Father demonstrate that he had clean, safe, and stable housing with functioning 

utilities and that he could otherwise meet the basic daily needs of J.C. on a consistent basis.
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{¶7} During July 2022, the sibling’s juvenile case concluded with that child being placed 

in the permanent custody of CSB. On August 31, 2022, Father entered a guilty plea and was 

convicted of two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor under Section 2907.04 of the 

Revised Code. Approximately three months later, CSB moved for permanent custody of J.C. CSB 

raised numerous grounds for permanent custody against Mother, including that J.C. could not or 

should not be returned to her custody because her parental rights with respect to a sibling of J.C. 

had been involuntarily terminated and she had failed to prove that, notwithstanding the prior 

termination, she was able to provide J.C. with a suitable home. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); R.C. 

2151.414(E)(11). 

{¶8} Pertaining to Father, CSB alleged that permanent custody was in the best interest 

of J.C. and that the child could not or should not be placed in Father’s custody because he had 

failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the child’s continued placement outside 

his custody and that he had chronic mental health conditions that prevented him from providing 

J.C. with a stable home. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (2). Father 

alternatively moved for legal custody to the paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”).

{¶9} Less than one week after CSB moved for permanent custody, Father was sentenced 

to 21 months’ incarceration on his sex offense convictions, but it is unclear from the record when 

he began serving his sentence. By the time the case went to the final dispositional hearing, Father 

was serving his sentence and would remain incarcerated for more than another year. Father did 

not appear at the final hearing, but he was represented by counsel. Father’s only argument at the 

hearing was that J.C. should have been placed in the legal custody of Grandmother rather than in 

the permanent custody of CSB.
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{¶10} Following the hearing, the trial court terminated parental rights and placed J.C. in 

the permanent custody of CSB. Father appeals and raises one assignment of error.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE [ERROR] WHEN IT 

TERMINATED FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS AS THE DECISION WAS 

NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WAS 

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

{¶11} Father’s sole assignment of error is that the trial court’s permanent custody decision 

was not supported by the evidence. Notably, he does not challenge the trial court’s decision to 

deny his motion for J.C. to be placed in Grandmother’s legal custody. Therefore, this Court will 

not address that aspect of the trial court’s judgment but will review only whether the trial court 

properly found that CSB had established grounds for permanent custody. 

{¶12} Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody 

of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs 

of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary 

custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another 

child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that 

the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under Section 2151.414(E); 

and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based 

on an analysis under Section 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also

In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). Clear and convincing evidence is that which 

will “produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to 

be established.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 

368 (1985), quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. 
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{¶13} In considering whether the juvenile court’s judgment is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence, this Court “weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder 

of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] 

must be reversed and a new [hearing] ordered.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) 

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. When weighing the evidence, 

this Court “must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21.

{¶14} The trial court found that the first prong of the permanent custody test was satisfied 

because J.C. could not be returned to Father’s custody under Section 2151.414(B)(1)(a) because 

Father had failed to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the removal of J.S. from the 

home. R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). Father asserts that he did not have a sufficient opportunity to remedy 

the conditions that caused J.C. to be placed outside the home because: he was not given adequate 

notice of what conditions he needed to resolve; the original and amended case plans were not 

properly prepared or amended; CSB did not provide him with reasonable reunification efforts; and 

he did not have sufficient time or opportunity to comply with the reunification goals of the case 

plan. 

{¶15} Father did not raise any argument about a lack of reasonable reunification efforts 

at the permanent custody hearing and has failed to demonstrate that CSB was required to prove 

that it made reasonable efforts at that stage of the proceedings. Section 2151.419(A) specifically 

required CSB to establish reasonable efforts toward reunification or to prevent the continued 

removal of J.C. from the home:

at any hearing held pursuant to section 2151.28 [shelter care], division (E) of 

section 2151.31 [ex parte emergency temporary custody], or section 2151.314 

[shelter care placement], 2151.33 [pre-adjudication temporary placement], or 

2151.353 [disposition following adjudication] of the Revised Code at which the 
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court removes a child from the child's home or continues the removal of a child 

from the child’s home[.]

R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). See also In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 43. Father does 

not argue that the trial court failed to make the requisite findings at those prior hearings or that the 

findings were not proper.

{¶16} Regarding Father’s arguments about deficiencies in the case plans, Father did not 

raise these issues at the permanent custody hearing or at any other point during the trial court 

proceedings. Father was represented by counsel throughout these proceedings. If he believed that 

the case plans were not sufficient, his trial counsel could have objected to the original or first 

amended case plan, or filed proposed case plan amendments, but he did not. See R.C. 

2151.412(F)(2). 

{¶17} On the merits of the trial court’s finding that Father failed to remedy the conditions 

that caused the child to be placed outside the home, Father argues that the only requirement for 

him on the case plan was to engage in mental health services and that he had no opportunity to do 

so. The evidence before the trial court demonstrated that Father had been referred to mental health 

services before he was incarcerated, but he did not engage in those services. 

{¶18} Moreover, the first amended case plan also required Father to demonstrate that he 

had stable housing and could otherwise provide for J.C.’s basic needs in an appropriate 

environment. By the time of the hearing, Father was incarcerated and would remain incarcerated 

for more than another year. Father implicitly argues that the mere fact of his incarceration did not 

establish that he lacked the ability or desire to provide his child with appropriate care. His 

argument is unpersuasive, as it relies on case law that analyzed entirely different facts and/or 

subsections of Section 2151.414(E). 
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{¶19} The first amended case plan explicitly required Father to demonstrate that he could 

provide J.C. with “clean and safe housing” because he had moved out of Grandmother’s home. A 

child’s “home” is generally understood to mean where the child’s family resides. In re M.G., 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 29596, 2020-Ohio-3872, ¶ 11. The evidence was not disputed that Father was 

unable to meet J.C.’s basic needs for a home at the time of the hearing or in the foreseeable future. 

Father was incarcerated and would be for at least another year. An adult penal institution obviously 

was not an appropriate home in which a young child could reside. Given that a lack of stable 

housing was one of the reasons that J.C. was removed from her parents’ custody, Father has failed 

to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s finding that he had failed to substantially remedy the 

conditions that had caused the ongoing placement of J.C. outside her parents’ custody. R.C. 

2151.414(E)(1). 

{¶20} Next, the trial court was required to determine that permanent custody was in the 

best interest of the child. Although Father has not challenged this aspect of the permanent custody 

judgment, in the interest of justice, this Court will review the best interest finding. This Court’s 

best interest review focuses primarily on the best interest factors set forth in Section 2151.414(D). 

In re M.S., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 30506 and 30515, 2023-Ohio-1558, ¶ 25. In making its best 

interest determination, the trial court was required to consider the statutory best interest factors, 

which include: the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the child, the 

custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence and whether that can be achieved 

without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in Section 
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2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply.1 R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see also In re R.G., 9th Dist. Summit 

Nos. 24834 and 24850, 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11.

{¶21} Father apparently had no interaction with J.C. during the first five or six months of 

the child’s life. After Father established his paternity, he attended 18 of 20 scheduled weekly, onehour supervised visits with J.C. prior to his incarceration. While incarcerated, he did not visit the 

young child and would be unavailable to see J.C. for at least another year. 

{¶22} J.C. was too young to express her wishes, so the guardian ad litem spoke on the 

child’s behalf. She opined that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest because she was 

doing well in the foster home where she had lived her entire life. The guardian ad litem gave no 

specific testimony about Father. When Father’s counsel cross-examined her, he questioned only 

whether it was in the child’s best interest to be placed in the legal custody of Grandmother. 

{¶23} J.C. had spent her entire short life outside her parents’ custody and in a temporary 

placement. Neither parent was able to provide her with a suitable home at that time or in the 

foreseeable future. CSB also had been unable to find an appropriate relative to take legal custody 

of the child. Although Grandmother had expressed an interest in legal custody, she had failed to 

establish a bond with J.C. More significantly, there was substantial evidence before the court to 

support its conclusion that Grandmother did not appreciate the significance of Father’s crimes 

against J.C.’s older sibling, as Grandmother had blamed the incidents on Mother and/or the child 

seducing Father. For that reason, the trial court expressed concern that Grandmother may not be 

willing or able to adequately protect J.C. from similar abuse by Father. 

1 CSB did not specifically allege, and the trial court did not find, that any of those 

provisions applied to the facts of this case. 
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{¶24} The evidence before the trial court supported its conclusion that a legally secure 

permanent placement would be achieved by placing J.C. in the permanent custody of CSB. Father 

has failed to demonstrate that the trial court lost its way by terminating his parental rights and 

placing J.C. in the permanent custody of CSB. See Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 20. Father’s 

assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶25} Father’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

JENNIFER HENSAL

FOR THE COURT
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CARR, J.

STEVENSON, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

NEIL P. AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.

BRIAN ASHTON, Attorney at law, for Appellee.

CAROLYN COLEMAN, Guardian ad Litem.