Relerer) ce

Herringbone Cloak GI Dagger

Marines of the OSS

by

Major Robert E. Mattingly

United States Marine Corps

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1989

ç4v

Herringbone Cloak-GI Dagger
 

Marines of the ass
 

by
 

Major Robert E. Mattingly
 

United States Marine Corps
 

Occasional Paper 

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
 

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
 

WASHINGTON, D.C.
 

1989 
The device reproduced on the front cover is

the oldest military insignia in continuous use

in the United States It first appeared, as

shown here, on Manne Corps buttons adopted in 1804 With the stars changed to five

points this device has continued on Manne

Corps buttons to the present day.
Herringbone Cloak GI Dagger

Marines of the OSS

by

Major Robert E. Mattingly

United States Marine Corps

Occasional Paper

HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION

HEADQUARIERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1989
Other Publications in the Occasional Papers Series

Vietnam Histones Workshop Plenary Session Jack Shulimson, editor 9 May

1983 31 pp

Vietnam Revisited Conversation with William D Broyles, Jr ColoneiJohn

G Miller, USMC, editor 11 December 1984 48 pp

Bibliography on Khe Sanb USMC Participation Commander Ray W

Strubbe, CHC, USNR (Ret), compiler April 1985 54 pp

Alligators, Buffaloes, and Bushmasters The History of the Development

ofthe LVT Through World War II Ma)or Alfred Dunlop Bailey, USMC (Ret)

1986 272 pp

Leadership Lessons and Remembrances from Vietnam Lieutenant General

Herman Nickerson, Ji, USMC (Ret) 1988 93 pp

The Problems of US Manne Corps Pnsoners of War in Korea James Angus

MacDonald, Jr 1988 295 pp

John Archer Lejeune, 1869-1942, Register ofHis PersonalPapers Lieutenant

Colonel Merrill L Bartlett, USMC (Ret) 1988 123 pp

To Wake Island and Beyond Reminiscences Brigadier General Woodrow

M Kessler, USMC (Ret) 1988 145 pp

Thomas Holcomb, 1879-1965, Register of His Personal Papers Gibson B

Smith 1988 229 pp

Curriculum Evolution, Manne Corps Command and Staff Cbllege,

1920-1988 Lieutenant Colonel Donald F Bittner, USMCR 1988 112 pp

© Robert E Mattingly, 1979
Foreword

The History and Museums Division has undertaken the publication for limited distribution

of various studies, theses, compilations, bibliographies, and monographs, as well as proceedings

of selected workshops, seminars, symposia, and similar colloquia, which it considers to be of significant value to audiences interested in Marine Corps history These "Occasional Papers," which

are chosen for their intrinsic worth, must reflect structured research, present a contnbution to

historical knowledge not readily available in published sources, and represent origmal content

on the part of the author, compiler, or editor It is the intent of the division that these occasional

papers be distnbuted to selected institutions, such as service schools, official Department of Defense

historical agencies, and directly concerned Marine Corps organizations, so the information contained therein will be available for study and exploitation

This story of the Marines of the Office of Stategrc Services (055) in the European Theater in

World War lits unique in its breadth of coverage, its detail concerning individuals, its documentation, and its readability The product of an Individual Research Project during the 1978-1979

- academic year at the Marine Corps' Command and Staff College, "Herringbone Cloak GI Dagger" won the school's Clifton B Cates Award for Research We are particularly pleased that it

was prompted in part by messages about OSS Marines in Europe that occurred in the POW appendix to the final volume of our official history of World War II, Victory and Occupation

Robert E Mattingly enlisted in the Manne Corps in 1959, was chosen after service in the 2d

Marine Division and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing for a fleet candidate NROTC scholarship, and was

commissioned when he graduated from Columbia University in 1965 He retired as a lieutenant

colonel in 1983 A tank officer and intelligence sub-specialist, the author's FMF assignments took

him to all three active-duty Marine divisions and the 2d Wing During 1966-68 he spent 20 months

in Vietnam serving with the Tank, Reconnaissance, and Headquarters Battalions, 3d Marine Division and as a liaison officer to the Vietnamese Army's ist Division Other overseas tours included duty as a regional Marine officer in Beirut and with the United Nations CommandJ-3 in Korea

Lieutenant Colonel Mattingly served twice at Headquarters Marine Corps, attended professional

schools, and was on NROTC duty at the University of Southern California He was involved in

intelligence activities conducted by the Special Operations Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, during

the Iran Hostage Crisis His final active-duty assignment was as Assistant National Intelligence

Officer for Near East and South Asian Affairs

This paper is reproduced just as it was submitted at Quantico in 1979 This means there are

typographical errors, some of which were corrected in ink by then-Major Mattingly None of these

stylistic errors change in any way the content of the study Where there are errors of fact, they

are the author's honest mistakes given his level of knowledge at the time he wrote his story Since

that story is a pioneer effort of surpassing value overall, we wanted it published just as it was

submitted, as a contnbution to a fascinating and very little-known episode in our history

The opinions and facts presented in this publication are those of the author and do not necessanly represent those of the Manne Corps or the Department of the Navy Lieutenant Colonel

Mattingly has copynghted his paper and retains ßill proprietary nghts to it In the pursuit of

accuracy and objectivity, the History and Museums Division welcomes comments on this publication from interested individuals and activities

EDWIN H SIMMONS

Brigadier General, U S Marine Corps (Retired)

Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
STUDENT

RESEARCH AND WRITING

A

1978-79

MARINE CORPS-COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

EDUCATION CENTER

MARINE CORPS DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

'III

P;a LLP1' t$1

ei ii IIloii

' ,i!9.

;: 1

flqlI! III IbtMI

TITLE: HERRINGBONE CLOAK - CI DAGGER: MARINES OF THE 055

AUTHOR: MAJOR ROBERT E. MATTINGLY, U. S. MARINE CORPS

COPY NO. ORIGINALOF COPIES
This is an official document of the Marine

Corps Command and Staff College. Quotation

from, Abstraction from, or Reproduction of

all or any part of this document is NOT

AUTHORIZED without specific permission of

the Director of the Marine Corps Command

and Staff College.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein

are those of the individual student author

and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Marine Corps Command and Staff

College or any other governmental agency.

References to this study should include the

foregoing statement. - The Marine Corps Command and Staff College

Quantico, Va.
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: MATTINGLY, Robert E., Major, USMC

TITLE: "Herringbone Cloak - iLl. Dagger"

Marines-of the 055

PUBLISHER: Marine Corps Command and Staff College

DATE: 10 May 1979

Before 1941 the United States had no intelligence service

worthy of the name. While each military department had its own

parochial tactical intelligence apparatus and the State Department

maintained a haphazard collection of 'country files' there was

no American equivalent to the 400-year-old British espionage

establishment or the German Abwehr. No one in Washington was

charged with putting the jigsaw puzzle of fact, rumor, and

foreign inuendo together to see what pictures might develop

or what portions might be missing. Even those matters of vital

interest to policy makers remained uncoordinated, unevaluated,

uninterpreted, and frequently in the wrong hands. That was in

1941.

Four years later the scene was forever altered. The organization

which achieved this dramatic turnabout was the Office of Strategic

Services, better known by its initials: OSS. Headed by William

J. Donovan, a World War 1 hero, Republican politican, and millionaire

lawyer, the 055 infiltrated agents into every country of

occupied Europe and rasied guerillas armies in most. This paper

examines the small but representative role played by Marines

assigned to this country's first central intelligence agency.

In so doing, it provides the first serious attempt to chronicle

a totally forgotten chapter of Marine Corps history.

(NOTE: Clifton B. Cates Award winning paper for research

during 1978-79 Academic Year)
MARINE CORES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA

"HERRINGBONE CLOAK - CI DAGGER"

MARINES OF TUE OSS

AN INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PROJECT

BY

MAJOR ROBERT E. MATTINGLY

U. S. MARINE CORPS

Copyright 1979 by

Robert E. Mattingly
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface vi

Acknowledgements ix

Chapter

I "THE WORST SLAP IN THE FACE"

II "ONE OF A KIND, UNIQUE" 22

III "FOR EXCELLENT PERSONAL REASONS" 40

IV "A PUNGENT COLLECTION" 48

V "ZDRAVO, PURVI AMERICANEC" 65

VI "DID YOU PLAY FOOTBALL IN COLLEGE?" 80

VII "I'M GOING TO BLOW THIS BRIDGE AND I'LL DO THE

SAME TO YOU IF NECESSARY" 95

VIII "EXIGENCIES OF THE SITUATION" 105

IX "WHO KNEW NOT FEAR" 114

X "FIRST JED TO KILL A BOCHE" 132

XI "HOW THE HELL DID A MARINE GET HERE?" 147

XII "ONE MARINE.... ELEVEN HUNDRED GERMANS" 162

XIII "MAN, YOU MUST BE LOST OR SOMETHING" 183

Epilogue - 200

End Notes 202

Appendices (Introduction) 233

A A brief biography of William J. Donovan 234

B Documentary Exhibits 236

11
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Appendix

B Document Description

Memorandum to the President; Donovan to Roosevelt

22 December 1941 236

Memorandum, COMINCH to Major General Commandant,

8 January 1942, 1Jse of Commandos" 237

Letter, Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR to Major

General Commandant, 13 January 1942, "Development

of U. S. Marine Corps Comandos' 238

Letter, Holcomb to I-i. M. Smith, 14 January 1942,

"Appointment of Donovan to Brigadier General, U. S.

Marine Corps Reserve" 245

Letter, COMINCH to CNO, 16 January 1942, "Commando

Training, U. S. Marine Corps" 246

Letter, Price to 1-lolcomb, 16 January 1942, "Appointment of Donovan to Brigadier General, USMCR 247

Letter, (personal), Price to Holcomb, same date

and subject 249

Letter, H. M. Smith to Holcomb, 16 January 1942,

"Appointment of Donovan to Brigadier General, USMCR 252

Letter, (personal) Holcomb to Mr. Samuel Meek,

19 January 1942, "Donovan appointment as 'worst

slap in the face'." 254

Letter, CINCPAC to 2nd JTF, 1 February 1942,

"Organization of Commando Units" 255

Letter, CG 2nd JTF to CG 2nd MarDiv, 4 February 1942,

"Organization of Commando Units" 257

Memorandum, Major General Commandant to COMINCH,

4 February 1942, "Training of Mphibious Raiding

Units of 'Commando-type'." 259

Memorandum, COMINCH to CNO/CMC, 5 February 1942,

"Commando Training of U. S. Marines in England" 262

111
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cant)

Appendix

B Document Description

Letter, CNO to CMC, 9 February 1942, "Commando

Training of U. S. Marines in England" 263

Message, COMINCH to CMC, 9 February 1942,

"Organization and Training of Commandos" 264

Letter, CMC to Vogel, lO February 1942,

"Comandos and Donovan" 265

Letter, CMC to H. M. Smith, 11 February 1942,

same subject but different text 269

Letter, H. M. Smith to CMC, 9 February 1942,

"Recommended organization of APO Battalion" 273

Letter, Donovan to Holcomb, 16 February 1942,

"Assignment of personnel to COI" 275

Letter, (Personal), Holcomb to Fegan, 9 March

1942, "What to do about Donovan " 277

Letter, Mountbatten to Stark, 22 July 1942,

"Performance of ii. S. Marines at Commando

Training Center, Archnacarry (Scotland) 278

C Examples of Reports Declassified by Central

Intelligence Agency and provided to author 280

"Memorandum for Generai Donovan" Captain Peter

J. Ortiz, USMCR, 15 May 1943. Ortiz' 'after

action report' for North Africa.

"The GERMINAL Mission", Log Book of Captain

William F. Grell, USMCR, France, 1944 291

Annotated Bibliography 302

Reprise: Marines of the OSS 313

iv
Illustrations

The Comando Proponents - Evans Canson and James

Roosevelt shortly before the Makin Island Raid ff p. 18

Over There - William A. Eddy as a Captain in

France, 1918 f p. 23

Certificate to Accompany Award of the Order of

the White Eagle with Swords to Captain Walter

R. Mansfield, USMCR for service in Yugoslavia ft p. 78

Actor turned OSS Marine - Private Sterling

Hayden as a Marine Boot, Parris Island ft p. 84

UNION II - the surviving members of Major

Peter Ortiz' second mission behind the lines

in France p. 119

Hero of the Haute Savoie - Major Ortiz receiving his second Navy Cross from Colonel

Harry "the Horse" Liversedge ff p. 130

Codename KANSUL - Lieutenant Colonel Horace

Fuller before the statute of Foch during ceremonies

marking the liberation of Tarbes, France ff p. 145

For Valor - Certificate to Accompany Award of

the Silver Medal of Valor by the Italian Government

to ist Lieutenant George Hearn, USMCR ff p. 172

The 'almost' Marine Brigadier - William J. Donovan

in later years on an inspection tour of Marine

aviation units in Korea ff p. 234

y
i

PREFACE

Four distinct events led to the composition of this paper.

The first occurred in Seoul, Korea during 1972. On a visit to

the Vongsan Post Library, I discovered a recently published book

entitled OSS- The Secret History of Americats First Central

Intelligence Organization. As an intelligence officer I was intrigued

by the title and became fascinated by the contents. As a Marine,

I was doubly interested in the occasional references to OSS

men who were identified as U. S. Marines. But, after some perfunctory

searches through the standard popular Marine Òorps histories

yielded nothing about Marines and the 055, I simply forgot about

the subject.

When I was offered the opportunity to write an Individual

Research Paper at Command and Staff College, I began thinking about

a subject. Major Don Bittner, the military historian, challenged

me to find a topic which would contribute somethingnew and

involve in-depth research utilizing primary source material. Little

did I realize that, like most sailors setting forth for uncharted

waters, my academic voyage would be quite so lengthy.

At about the same time, I happened to be glancing through Volume

5 of the History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II. In one

of the closing chapters I noticed several pages concerning Marine

Prisoners of War in Europe. My interest piqued, I read the section in detail

vi
and discovered the names of several OSS Marines who had been

captured while on missions behind enemy lines in France.

Preliminary scouting in the Command and Staff College Library

yielded a few more tidbits tucked away in yellowing copies of

the Marine Corps Gazette. Then, I contacted Mr. Benis Frank,

the Oral Historian at the Marine Corps Historical Center in

Washington and co-author of the previously mentioned Volume 5.

It was Ben Frank who sold me on the idea of trying to document

Marine Corps participation in 055 and offered to guide my

research.

America, alone among the great powers, entered World War

II without a real intelligence service worthy of the name.

By the time Hitler's 'Thousand Year Reich' collapsed in a sea

of rubble and Japan's 'Rising Sun' was eclipsed, the United States

had developed a large and amazingly competent apparatus for

both strategic and tactical intelligence. This organization

began as the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) and

later was renamed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The

current Central Intelligence Agency is lineal successor to their

traditions.

OSS was by nature a secret organization. The majority of

its operational history still remains to be told. Of greater

difficulty even than the problem of classification was the

identification of Marines who were a part of the story. I began

with exactly 6 names of Marine officers.

vii
In a sense this paper is only a beginning. Despite approximately

1,000 hours of research and writing it inevitably falls short of recounting the full tale. Much of the research effort was done via the

mails because primary sources were located in areas not readily

accessible to an officer who was also a fulitime student. As late

a mid-April I was still uncovering new OSS Marines and compiling

dossiers. The rough draft deadline was, by then, a month behind me. The result was a conscious be regretful decision to limit the

scope of my writing to 055 activities in North Africa and Europe.

Perhaps one day I will be able to fill.-in-the-blanks for those Marines

who served in India, Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, and China.

Throuhgout my approach has been to present the Marines of 055

as people - to tell something of their backgrounds as well as their

wartime exploits. The reader will quickly discern that they form

an unusual group. Most were highly educated and successful civilians

whose talents met the test of unique operational challenges. Diversity

was a singular characteristic of 055 recruits and diverse indeed was

the small but distinguished group which served in Marine green.

This is a story which can be found in no book yet published.

Its subject is thirty years old but the archival cobwebs and outdated

security classifications do not tarnish the patina. The Marines who

populate these pages shared many of the dangers of their counterparts in

the Pacific but until now they have been almost completely ignored or forgotten. I have concentrated on Marine involvement in OSS operations

viii
at the expense of more fully discussing analytical or administrative

functions. This fact is not intended to detract from the very

real accomplishments of those who served in such capacities but

simply to make the narrative more interesting. When I showed a

few chapters of the draft to one of my fellow students, he read

them carefully and e4dl.a'inlgd: "This is amazing stuff but its too

interesting to be a Command and Staff Research Paper". I hope

every reader feels something of that enthusiasm.

In a sense, this paper will be a night drop behind the lines

of conventional Marine Corps history. The "green light" goes on

in Chapter One.

ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper consumed the better part of my stay at the

Command and Staff College in Quantico. While the words and

interpretations herein are solely mine, they would have never

reached paper without the help, friendship, and wise counsel of

a number of people.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson USMC,

author of The Armies of Ignorance; James Ladd, author of

Commandos and Ranqers of World War II; and Joseph E. Persico,

author of Piercing the Reich assited me with valuable advice

and documentary support from their own files.

Major Don Bittner of the Command and Staff College and

Dr. John Gordon of the College's Adjunct Faculty assisted me

with suggestions on sources and research methodology. Dr.

Gordon also provided much key material on the Raider Battalions

and the role of the enigmatic Evans Carlson. My classmates

Major Barry Banks, USMC, Major Bob Kirkpatrick, USMC, and Major

Ty Tisdale, USA read parts of the manucript and offered constructive

criticism on content, style, and grammar.

Tne majority of my research was done at the Marine Corps

Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard. I found this to be an

extremely easy place to work largely because of the highly

professional and helpful staff. While virtually every member

of the 'team' there assisted me when I requested help or

advice, one person deserves special note. Mr. Benis M. Frank,

the Oral Historian, loaned me not only office space but also

proved a veritible treasure trove of anecdotes, analyses,

and just plain good advice. I could not have written the paper

in its present form without him.

Mssrs. Owen and Schafer of the Information and Privacy Activity

at CIA are also due considerable thanks. Although swamped with

Freedom of Information Act requests, they provided me with several

valuable OSS documents which have never seen public distribution.

Finally, my wife Heike and my daughter AUx supported me

throughout the project. Only their understanding and commitment;

enabled the idea to become the written word. One day perhaps

AUx will be able to read this and know why "Daddy always disappears"

X

ti

i!
CHAPTER I

"THE WORST SLAP IN THE FACE. .."

Early on the evening of 22 December 1941, a man carrying a

locked briefcase emerged from the large neoclassical building at 25th

and "E" Streets in Northwest Washington. Buttoning his overcoat against

the winter chill, he passed quickly between the fading Ionic columns and

headed for the shelter of a waiting car.

Had the messenger glanced westward, he might still have enjoyed

a dim view of the Lincoln Memorial, otherwise, the neighborhood was

uninviting. The building itself had until recently been occupied by

the National Institute of Health. Now it was a down-at-the-heels

companion to a seedy skating rink, some dilapidated warehouses, and a

can-strewn vacant lot.

Little of this made an impression on the man with the briefcase.

He was on his way to the White House with a personal memorandum for the

President of the United States.

Author of the single page document was Colonel William J.

Donovan. For the past four months, Donovan had spent a good deal of

time at 25th and "E" - headquarters of the recently established Office

of the Coordinator of Information which he headed. The nondescript

location was a perfect 'cover' for America's first attempt at a

civilian strategic intelligence organization.
2 Donovan's message, classified Top Secret, had been written with

a politician's inbred instinct for timing. The first major face-to-face

meetings between British and American military planners were just getting

* underway. - This conference would decide the initial course of allied

strategy in the war against the Axis. Donovan - whose appointment as

civilian coordinator of "all information and data which may bear upon

our national security" had been greeted with blatant hostility by the

Army, Navy, and J. Edgar Hoover - wanted his views represented)

The Coordinator of Information was undeterred by such

opposition. At fifty-eight, William Donovan had seen his share of

physical and political scrapping. He was a short, muscular man, fifteen

pounds heavier than when he had quarterbacked the Columbia varsity

against Yale, but not a whit less aggressive. Behind his emotive eyes

and Cayneyesque brows lay a mind which 'could see an acorn and

visualize an oak'. And he had guts.

In 1917, Dwight Eisenhower had been inv6lved in training duties.

No shot had ever been fired in his direction. Omar Bradley spent the

Great War in Arizona and Illinois. Lucien Truscott served in Arkansas.

But William J. Donovan had seen plenty of Germans and, judging from his

three wounds, more than one had seen him. As commander of the 165th

Infantry - formerly the 'Fighting 69th New York' - Donovan won the

Medal of Honor and six other personal decorations from three governments. He came home to practice law with the descriptive and

unshakeable nickname 'Wild Bill' as well as a collection of ribbons

second only to Ùouglas MacArthur.

*

Codenanie ARCADIA
3

A life-long Republican, Donovan vigorously supported Herbert

Hoover in 1928 and, for a time, seemed to be a 'shoo-in' for Attorney

* General. He had run unsuccessfully for the New York governorship in

1932, a bad time to be a Republican candidate for any elective office.

Later, as a private citizen, Donovan travelled to a number of the

world's trouble spots. During the 30's he turned up to watch

Mussolini dismember Ethiopia and saw Hitler's Condor Legion smash

Spanish towns. More recently he had undertaken two major quasi-official

missions abroad for his former law school classmate Franklin Roosevelt.

Known personally by nearly every member of the Cabinet - and

familiar to millions of Miericans as "Roosevelt's mystery man" -

Donovan established direct contact with important leaders in Britain

and the Balkans.

Most important of these was First Sea Lord Winston Churchill

whose influence allowed Donovan access to the inner workings of British

intelligence. It was Donovan's appointment as COI in July, 1941 which

enabled Churchill to begin passing super secret ULTRA signals intercepts to the United States Government.2

Thus, by the time the position of Coordinator of Information

was established, Donovan had made a considerable impression on his

fellow New Yorker at the White House.3 Roosevelt, who admired and

1rusted him, once remarked to Navy Secretary Frank Knox that:

VLÌFrankly I should like to have him (Donovan) in the Cabinet, not only

own ability but also in a sense to repair the very great

;Uijutice done him by Hoover".4

Donovan's appointment was blocked by party archconservatives

iOEwaflted no part of the Irish Catholic community represented in 'their'

ttting line-up.
4

But Donovan was not a member of the Cabinet. Nor was he a

participant in the ARCADIA discussions. He had begun the job of

fashioning his intelligence organization with determination and

zeal. Now, he was proposing a step which seemed necessary for a

nation at war: creation of an instrument for clandestine military

action against the enemy.

Specifically Donovan's memorandum recomended:

"1. That as an essential part of any strategic plan,

there be recognized the need of sewing the dragon's teeth

in thosé territories from which we must withdraw and in

which the enemy will place his army; for example the

Azores and North Africa. That the aid of native chiefs

be obtained, the loyalty of the local inhabitants

cultivated; Fifth columnists organized and placed,

demolition material cached; and guerilla bands of bold

and daring men organized and installed.

2. That there be organized now, in the United States,

a querilla corps, independent and separate from the Army

and Navy, and imbued with a maximum spirit of the offensive.

This force should, of course, be created along disciplined

5

military lines, analgous to the British Commando principle..."

For a nation two weeks into a major wáF,T Donovan's ideas probab

made some stragetic sense. Practically however, the proposed 'guerilla

corps' was on shaky ground. In the first place, the entire tone smacked of 'combat fever'. With American forces in no shape to fight anythi

but a world-wide delaying action, the memorandum sought to further

dilute U. S. arms by organizing and equipping a highly specialized

unit which would take only top-quality men.

The comando concept also contravened Donovan's personal

notions about how secret intelligence operations should be conducted by

proposing creation of an instrument to conduct partisan operations

before the groundwork could possibly be laid overseas.
5

Finally, "strictly from a bureaucratic point of view, the memo

was fatally flawed in calling for a querilla corps independent of the

Army and Navy. For Donovan to think, even with FDR's endorsement,

that such an organization could be brought to pass in the face of the

military's obvious objections, was, charitably, an act of lunacy.6

Across the Potomac the December wind whistled around the new

Arlington Navy Annex building. Most of the complex - which resembled

a large straight comb from the air - was dark. But in Room 2004, office

of the Major General Commandant of the Marine Corps, light still

seeped around the hastily installed blackout curtains. Thomas Holcomb

was working late.

Balding and bespectacled, Holcomb had just begun his fifth

year at the helm of the Corps. He was an energetic, practical man,

well respected both within military circles and on Capitol Hill. "As

one of Lejeune's bright young captains of 1916, 'Tommy' Holcomb had

won the friendship of then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin

Roosevelt. In later years, President Roosevelt would frequently open

a remark to Holcomb with the phrase, 'we Marines'."7

That night Holcomb - who like Donovan was not directly involved

Hn'ARCADIA - was absorbed in the reports from his dwindling defense

'force on Wake Island. Soon he would face a very different sort of

chSllenge; one which would require all of his store of presidential

to repel. For Donovan's memorandum had proposed that his

çfo4niniandos be separate from the Army and Navy and Holcomb's Marines fit

ft4'ò?uirement to a 'tee'.

:L.Meanwhile, at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, the President and Knox

rejçrchatting amiably with a distinguished houseguest. Cigar smoke
'I ti

ti

Li

It

it

eddied around the frosty windowpanes and the sound of carollers

floated- from beyond the national Christmas tree. The visitor was

Prime Minister Churchill himself and the topic: grand strategy.

Churchill had arrived earlier the same day after crossing the

Atlantic aboard ElMS Duke of York. During the voyage he had spent

considerable time drafting his personal views on joint U. S. - British

action against Germany and Japan. Now, he was listening attentively

to Roosevelt's revelation of the Donovan proposal.

There can be little doubt that the Prime Minister approved of

the commando concept, if not in the creation of the specific instrument

for its implementation. Furthermore, he too was focusing on the Azore

and North Africa. Part of his written notes for the strategic

discussions read: "we ought to try hard to win over French North

Africa, and now is the moment to use every inducement and form of

pressure at our disposal upon the Government of Vichy...

,,8 Yet,

despite his strong desire to orient maximum power toward the F4editerra

nean, Churchill tentatively agreed to considey postponing immediate

action there in favor of Knox's ideas concerning "a highly dubious

action calling for cowntando raids on Japanese-held islands which

would be launched from bases in California".9

As the brandy snifters clinked, the commando question seemed t

be only a matter of administrative and organizational wrinkle smoothin

Knox controlled the naval establishment and Roosevelt was the Commande

in Chief. Unknown to Holcomb was the fact that his outfit was being

considered as the source of manpower, but not necessarily command. Fo

the Major General Commandant, it was to be a Christmas present only

slightly more desirable than a case of Institutional hemorrhoids.
7 President Roosevelt formally answered Donovan's memorandum the

following day. In noncommital language he indicated that the proposed

commando service had some merit and that he would see to it that the

idea was fully considered.'° The question of where the notional

organization should be placed within the defense structure was not

addressed; however, there were a number of circumstances which pointed

straight toward the Marine Corps.

"Throughout the decade of the Thirties, the Marines experimented with the concept of raider-type forces, generally as elements of

larger exercises. The continuing interest in such units was demonstrated by the formation of Provisional Rubber Boat Companies from Companies

"A", "E", and "I" of the Seventh Marines during Fleet Exercise - J in

February, 1941.1111 The Tentative Landing Manual of 1935 had also

discussed raiding operations, albeit in limited detail. But these

factors were undoubtedly secondary to more personal ones

James Roosevelt, the President's son, was fresh from a six-

- month stint as Donovan's military aide at COI. A Marine Reserve Captain,

'Jintijie' Roosevelt had connections which placed his hands squarely in

a position to stir the comando pot. More importantly, in the person

di'.gaunt, jut-jawed Major Evans F. Carlson, the Marine Corps possessed

guerilla warfare zealot with unique practical experience.

Son of a New England Congregationalist minister, Carlson was an

jtigMtic figure who had served seven years as an army officer before

lisingas a Marine private in April, 1922. His first choices of

.dy144tbeen: "the Legation Guard at Peking, or a chance at Officer's

dhoOjirÇ-the order mentioned")2
h

t It

8

Carlson's Marine career was a succession of virtuoso

performances - save only for a flat note when he was bounced from

flight training for aeronautic inaptitude. He won the Navy Cross in

Nicaraugua and later served as Executive Officer of the Marine Guard

at Roosevelt's Warsprings, Georgia retreat. There, he too became

personally acquainted with FDR and won the admiration, confidence,

and trust of his son. James Roosevelt's decision to become a Marine

officer stemmed in great measure from his association with thenCaptain Canson.

Evans Canson was "an Old China Hand par excellence. In 1937,

he pulled off a feat which impressed Edgar Snow, Joseph Stilwell, and

just about everybody else who knew anything about China".13

Departing from Shanghai in mid-November, Carl son travelled by

rickshaw, boat, railway, and horseback to reach the Yenan Province

headquarters of Mao Tse Tung's Eighth Route Army. ¿[he first foreigne

to join the elusive Chinese communist military, Carlson remained with

Mao and his lieutenants for several months. Not only did he particip

in patrols and observe the fighting against Japanese troops, he also

built a profound respect for the Eighth Route Army's leadership. Bac

in Shanghai, Canson wrote a detailed and glowing rport)4 By the

time his tour ended in November, 1938 he had already begun a book

about his experiences.

In China, Carlson had been far from the bureaucratic arm of

Navy Department officialdom. Once in the United States however, his

enthusiasm for closer ties with Chinese other than Chiang-Kai-Shek ca

under careful scrutiny. Pressured to restrain his praise and submit

any manuscript for official review prior to publication, he resigned
9

in a fit of righteous indignation. As of 30 April 1939, Carlson's

Marine service temporarily ended. His contacts with both Roosevelts

did not)5

Canson lectured, attended some University classes, and

returned to China during the next two years. But as war loomed closer,

he heeded various urgings to return to the Marine Corps. In May, 1941

* his book published and largely ignored, Carlson was back in harness

but no longer as a Regular.

As the gray days of 1941 dwindled toward an equally bleakappearing New Year, Major General Holcomb found himself arrayed

against a powerful coalition of military romantics bent on utilizing

his outfit as a convenient niche for the derring-do 'guerilla corps'.

Moreover, the prospect loomed that he would get the irrascible Donovan

as well, neatly gift wrapped as an instant Brigadier in the Marine

Reserve.

16

The commando idea appeared to be riding a Hegelian wave.

Churchill liked it; Roosevelt concurred in principle and was interested,

Knox was actively involved. The popular press was full of praise for

British commando exploits. James Roosevelt attached a clipping from

the San Diego Union to a six page personal plan calling for "development

ithin the Marine Corps of a unit for purposes similar to the British

Çç)nmandos and the Chinese i3uerillas".17 This scheme proposed that

rMr than piddling with Japanese bases, the Marines should go right

âfter lhe enemy home islands!

*Twin Stars Over China published in 1940 by Dodd, Mead and

OrnØny, New York.
lo

In preliminary discussions with Secretary Knox, Holcomb

attempted to side-step formation of a special unit by pointing out

that the Marines had already sent observers to view commando training

ir England and by emphasizing that small raiding forces had participated

in Fleet maneuvers)8 If this ploy was designed to short-circuit the

Donovan appointment, it failed. Instead, Holcomb received a lett?r

* from Admiral King, Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet, asking for

substantive details and noting that "the President is much interested

in the development and use of the equivalent of British 'commandos'')9

Just to ensure that the Commandant had gotten his meaning

'loud and clear', King dispatched a second reminder the very next day

which read: - "Will you please have your people follow-up and follow throughon the equipment and ammunition (for training) of "Commando"

troops - with f ijt priority for units on the West Coast

(Pacific Fleet).t'-'

While mulling over just what "commando'"troops Admiral King had

in mind, Holcomb received an information copy of yet another message.

This one emanated from U. S. Naval Headquarters in London and was

addressed to COMINCH. It proposed that "a troop of 7 officers and 100

enlisted men, U. S. Marine Corps, be assigned to temporary duty with

the British Commandos for training at the Commando Special Training

Center and that this troop participate with the British Commandos in

combined operations against enêmy shores".21

*abbreviated COMINCH
11 This suggestion set alarm bells clanging within Marine Corps

Headquarters. General Holcomb imediately drafted a response directly

to King. In it he pointed out that Marines of both the 'Destroyer

* Transport Battalion' and the Parachute Battalion were already receiving

such training. He further argued that no further separate units should

be organized while the Corps remained below its authorized strength.

As a counter-proposal, the Major General Commandant offQred to send a

"small group of officers and non-commissioned officers to England"!2

At this point, Holcomb was probably beginning to feel like the

** falcon in Yeat's "Second Coming't. Outgunned and badgere4 on the

flanks, the Major General Commandant called for reinforcements. On

Monday, 14 January, heset the stage for a personal counterattack.

Classified letters left Marine headquarters that day addressed

to Major General Holland M. Smith, USMC, at Quantico and Major General

Charles F. B. Price, USMC, in San Diego - these being the senior

Marine officers in the Atlantic and Pacfic fleets respectively.

The two letters were identical and began:

"1. Suggestion has been made that Colonel William J. Donovan

be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose of taking

charge of the Commando Project."

*properly designated First Separate Battalion, Amphibious

Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

**Turning and turning in the widening gyre

The falcon cannot hear the falconer

Things fall apart; the center cannot hold

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, ..."

William Butler Yeats

"The Second Coming"
12

Holcomb went on to briefly outline Donovan's achievements and requested

both addressees to provide "a frank expression of opinion.. .as to the

advisability of accepting this suggestion".23

Major General Smith reacted with predictable hostility. Obviousl

the entire question raised 'Howling Mad's' hackles. Never one to mince

words, Smith responded:

"The appointment of Colonel Donovan to brigadier general could

be compared to that of Lord Mountbatten in Great Britain -

both are "royal" and have easy access to their own inmiediate

superiors. The appointment would be considered by many

senjor officers of the Corps as political, unfair, and a

publicity stunt. It is the unanimous opinion of the staff

of this headquarters that commando raids by the British

have been of little strategical value. We have not reached

the stage where our men are so highly trained and restless

for action that they must be employed in commando raids.

I recommend against the appointment."24

Not only was the Donovan appointment opposed on the grounds that "the

Marine Corps should not have to go outside its ranks to secure leaders"

but the whole 'commando' idea was viewed as tainted bait. Clearly

something larger than an usurping Brigadier was uppermost in both men's

minds.

Throughout the previous twenty years the Marine Corps had

painstakingly built a vehicle - the large amphibious operation - which

its leaders considered the surest path to institutional survival. Now

it seemed that an Irish lawyer who had the President's ear might run

that concept into shoal water. General Smith noted that "all

Amphibious Force Marines are considered commandos" and that there were

already enough 'by-products' in the still-building 1st Marine Division.

Price's reply, on the other hand, began on the note of benign

heresy. After prudently disclaiming any "personal observation and
13

contact", Price stated: "the undersigned is inclined to judge that

Colonel Donovan is well qualified by natural bent and experience for

the assignment contemplated and probably more so than any General

Officer of the Marine Corps at present available for such assignment".

(Hol comb was doubtless 'in orbit' at this point.)

Then however the reservations began. These revolved principally

about the more mundane question of where the 'commandos' should be

recruited. "If the personnel to conduct this new activity", Price

wrote, "can be recruited almost entirely from new resources it would be

the judgment of the undersigned that the entire spirit and plan of

employment of the Commando Groups is directly in line with the aggressiveness and traditions of the Marine Corps...".

In short, General Price had nothing against either Donovan or

his commandos so long as the structure of the 'real' Marine Corps was not

adversely effected. Otherwise, he opined, the grave personnel

problems already faced by the Corps (particularly in NCO's) would be

aggravated beyond reason if it became necessary to launch a new

regimental-size unit.25

Price followed-up his official response with a second 'personal'

written the same day. In it he expressed further grave misgivings at

the prospect ¿f taking on any additional tasks while the Marine Corps

was engaged in f1eshing-out its newly authorized structure. Of even

greater private importance to Price was the danger that "this sort of

thing will develop into a tail which will eventually wag the dog".26

Holcomb used these replie to buttress his arguments with

Agrniral King and Secrètary Knox. But for several weeks the situation

-égarding Donovan's appointment remained clouded. Conjecture and
14

correspondence regarding 'U. S. Marine Commandos' continued.

The first bright spot appeared on the same day Smith and

Price were drafting their rejoinders. In a Secret letter to the C

of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, King recommended disapproval o

London proposal and adoption of the plan outlined by Holcomb in hi

10 January letter. King went on to specifically state: "It is fu

recomended that the participation in active operations of the U. 

Marine Corps group sent for Commando training not be approved"Y7

Admiral King was a longtime friend of both Holcomb and the

Marine Corps. Yet, his disapproval of the plan which would have

eventually resulted in Marines serving under the British Combined

Operations staff, was hardly a major victory for the Commandant.

Three days later, his mood as dingy as the remnants of the previo

week's snow fall, Holcomb wrote a personal letter to his trusted c

II

i H extraordinary piece of correspond:nce viyjdly illustrates the stak

Holcomb perceived to be involved:

"The Donovan affair is still uppermost in mind. I am

terrified that I may be forced to take this man. I feel it

would be the worst slap in the face the Marine Corps ever was

given because it involves bringing an outsider into the Marine

Corps as a leader in our own specialty that is, amphibious

operations. Because commando work is simply one form of

amphibious operation. It will be bitterly resented by our

personnel both officer and enlisted, and I am afraid that it 

may serve to materially reduce my usefulness in this office...

fidant Samuel Meek, of Time Incorporated in New York. The tone of 

*Obviously, Holcomb and Meek had discussed this matter bef

How many such conversations of what was essentially a highly volat

proposition with national security implications occurred cannot be

determined. What is plain however is that politics in 1942 was no

more respectful of 'classification' than it is today.
Is- The fact that the United States Government was involved in

some sort of 'commando' project could not indefinitely escape notice

by the press. On the same day Holcomb wrote Meek of his concerns,

* Newsweek told its readers: 'Officials are seeking a name for American

units corresponding to the British commandos, eventually to be used in

continental raids from England."29

This sort of publicity probably strengthened General Holcomb's

hand. From the outset, both King and Stark had been interested in

the organization of a force which might prove a useful adjunct to

naval operations. The recurring theme of "British" and Conovan's

largely European orientation began giving pause for reflection. Could

this have an impact on Navy plans and resources for the Pacific?

Whatever the cause, by late January, subtle changes began to

appear in the Admirals' correspondence. The term 'commando' was

replaced by the more generalized and nonspecific 'commando-type' -

usually hyphenated and always italicized as if to show there was

nothing magical in the appellation after all.

Of more direct importance, three Atlantic Fleet high speed

attack transports were ordered to weight anchor and proceed to San

Dego. These were precisely the same ships which would be required

for the sort of amphibious raiding implied in the commando idea.

Commandant Holcomb heaved a sigh of relief and fell smoothly

into step. On 24 January he received a copy of COMINCH despatch 231940

This item aroused great reader interest. For the next

-%everal issues, Newsweek's 'letters' column carried recommendations

-fornames. One of these was "Rangers".
16

which directed Admiral Nimitz, then flying his flag in U. S. S.

Pennsylvania, to:

"Develop organization and training of Marines and Naval

Units of "Commando-type" for use in connection with

expeditions of raid character for demolition and other

destruction of shore installations in enemy held islands

and bases. Employaient of some small units embarked in

submarines appears practicable by use of rubber boats."

Nimitz in turn passed the problem on to Brigadier General

Clayton Vogel of the Joint Training Force noting "it appears that fou

such units may be organized within an infantry battalion without

appreciably altering present organization.. ».30

To support Vogel and Nimitz, the War Plans Section of

Headquarters Marine Corps drafted a message to the Commander of the

Atlantic Fleet for Admiral King's signature. This highlighted the

paucity of specialized personnel on the West Coast and directed

transfer of infantry, machine gun, and mortar troops from the First

Separate Battalion to San Diego. These woUld form

the nucleus of the Pacific Fleet "commando-type" unit. On 5 February

King signed this message and also approved trimming the proposed 107

Marines for training in Scotland to "two officers and twenty enlisted

men". The subject of future employment was pointedly omitted.31

The pattern of events was now unmistakably plain. The

President and Secretary Knox wanted commandos. Prime Minister Church

had endorsed raids on the Japanese. Donovan seemed to be primarily

oriented toward Europe. Very well, the Marine Corps would indeed

estbish commando-type organizations but their primary area of

employment would be in the Pacific - the Navy's ballpark.
17

There was another major reason for getting the whole panoply

of problems associated with the original proposal put swiftly in order.

On 23 January, the U. S. Service Chiefs had conducted their first full

scale meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff. But while the urbane

Englishmen spoke with a concerted voice, the Americans still tended to

view problems from their individual service perspectives. Clearly such

would not do and General Marshall finally decided that the U. S. Chiefs

would have to get together beforehand and resolve differences in private.

This led to the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and resulted

in a decreased ability for the Navy to promulgate independent positions.

Since Donovan considered his cooniando force as merely an adjunct to

intelligence operations, it is reasonable to infer that Admiral King

wanted to head-off any discussions of the proposal in an arena where

he might be outvoted by his contemporaries.32

Holcomb was far too shrewd to expect that unless he made some

concrete alternative available to both King and Knox chances remained

high that he would get both commandos and Donovan. He said as much

in a lengthy "Dear Barney" letter to Vogel on lO February. This

filled-in some of the blanks in the Donovan case and indicated that

the matter was not yet put to rest. In fact, Holcomb noted that "it

turned up again today, but indications are that it has again quieted

down". The Commandant went on:

"I fear, however, that the idea is too strongly imbedded to

remain dormant very long unless we move promptly to broaden

our amphibious training in such a way as to head off any

-outside interference."

After giving some of the reasons for opposing Donovan

Perrsonally (most of which have already been covered by a synthesis
Es of previously cited letters and memoranda) the newly promoted Lieutenan

General of Marines went on:

we must act and act quickly. We must prepare ourselves

particularly for one of our most important missions, viz: the

execution of amphibious raids."33

The following day, Holcomb sent a similar letter to Smith. In it he directed that "the highest priority" be given to getting the

recently emasculated 1st Separate Battalion back up to strength.

Smith was also told to plan for the possibility of forming a

regimental-size unit for similar purposes.

In closing, the Comandant finally placed the semantical issue

squarely in the open: "Incidentally", he wrote, "I don't like the term

"Commando"; we are looking for a better term -- one more fitting for

the Marines. Havy any suggestions?"34 To underline the confidential

nature and urgency of these matters, both letters wer.e hand-carried by

commissioned officer couriers.

Now that he was convinced that strategy had reached its limits

and tactics were required, Holcomb took another calculated step. On 16

February, he redesignated the 1st Separate Battalion to 1st Marine

Raider Battalion. Similarly, the newly activated 2nd Separate Battalion

became the 2nd Marine Raider Battalion. This took care of the name

* 'commando' once and for all.

Then the Commandant played one of his personal 'hold' cards.

The 2nd Raider Battalion was to be commanded by Evans Carlson. His

executive officer - none other than Jimmie Roosevelt. Since this was

* How the name "Raider" was arrived at is unclear. Smith

recommended that the units be called "Shock Battalions".

19

the unit most likely to be utilized in any initial test of the concept,

Holcomb's choice of leadership neatly placed the two most visible Marine

Corps proponents in a position to fish or cut bait'.

Gradually the crisis atmosphere at Marine headquarters subsided.

Knox's advocacy of the Donovan appointment apparently moderated and the

Navy was left to develop plans for employing the new Raider

Battalions. Interest in the project did not disappear however since

the very high authority was still discussing the matter with his

opposite number in Britain.

On 4 March 1942, Churchill sent his Most Secret personal message

#37 to Roosevelt. This discussed a wide range of strategic matters

including the nagging problem of launching offensive operations in

North Africa - then known as Operation GYMNAST - while the situation

in the Pacific remained critical. With this in mind, the Prime

Minister wrote:

Permit me to refer to the theme I opened to you when we were

together. Japan is spreading itself over a very large number

of vulnerable points or trying to link them together by air

and sea protection. The enemy are becoming ever more widely

spread and we know this is causing anxiety in Tokyo. Nothing

can be done on a large scale except by long preparation of

the technical and tactical apparatus. When you told me about

your intention to form commando forces on a large scale on

the California shore I felt that you had the key. Once

several good outfits ara prepared, any one can attack a

Japanese-held base or island and beat the life out of the

garrison, all their islands will become hostages to fortune.

Even this year, 1942, some severe examples might be made

causing perturbation and drawing furth upon Japanese

resources to strengthen other points.'

This suggestion reignited the smoldering embers of controversy.

---'Admiral King discussed the matter with Holcomb to ensure that the spirit

dfthe President's desires were being carried out. This caused some
20

discomfiture for the Commandant who reported in a personal letter to

Brigadier General Fegan: "I thought the "D" case was all settled but

have just learned that another memo has gone to the Big Boss in the

matter. He is still trying to get the job that we thought we had

headed off. Is there anything that you can do?"36

This second "scare" was short-lived. Donovan never became a

Marine of any rank. Carlson, on the other hand, nearly joined OSS and

Holcomb's son, Franklin, was already indirectly working for the man his

father so stoutly resisted.*

It would be a fundamental error to view the "Donovan Affair" as

more than one facet of COl's effort to establish a single viable

strategic intelligence organization. Contrary to Holcomb's comments,

there is no available documentary evidence that Donovan personally sough

either a Marine commission or direct command of his proposed 'guerilla

corps'. Thus, the philosophical issues raised by his projected

appointment were much less acutely felt outside the Department of the

Navy.

In hindsight, the Commandant's "strong and utter-disapproval"

and the initial notion that the commandos should be separate from the

Army and Navy probably made the idea untenable from the outset.

Activation of the highly visible 'Raiders' firmly barred the door.

Early 1942 was a time in which a variety of plans and programs

were discussed, evaluated, and either implemented or discarded. With

the formation of the JCS, Donovan realized that his organization could

not function without substantial assets which could only be made

of Carlson's and Holcomb's part in the story of OSS

appear in subsequent chapters of this paper.

fi

I I
21

available through that forum. Consequently, he merely shifted hi

requests. As early as 2 March, he wrote to General Marshall asking

for 2000 grades and ratings for the purpose of "building up an

organization of military personnel for subversive activities in

various countries"

This task was already underway and Marines would play a small

but interesting role in clandestine operations throughout the world.

This paper tells some of their story.
CHAPTER II

11ONE OF A KIND, UNIQUE..."

"In 1941, long months before Eisenhower's and Mark Clark's men

starting piling ashore on the Moroccan and Algerian beaches, the quality

of the U. S. commercial agents in North Africa underwent a sea change

that might have perplexed even such a connoisseur of pixies as

Ilßarnabyls* fairy godfather.'1 These fellows were indeed a strange lot.

All appeared to be in middle-age and despite their business suits, there

was a faintly military air about them. One in particular was a tall,

lean, soft-spoken gent who wal ked with a noticeabl e limp and could

chatter away in Arabic as well as any foreigner in the Maqhreb. There

were twelve of these men altogether, apostles not of commerce but of

intelligence. The gimpy-legged linguist was coordinator of their

activities. His friends called him "Bill" but he signed his official

correspondence: William A. Eddy, Lieutenant Colonel,USMCR (Ret).

Eddy was no stranger to either intellig'ênce gathering or the

Mid-East. Born in Ottoman Syria of Presbyterian missionary parents,

he spent his early boyhood near Sidon in what is today Lebanon.

In 1908, young William was sent to Wooster, Ohio for an

American education. Following secondary school, he entered Wooster

College in 1913, remained there for two years of varsity football and

*"Barnabyll was a small boy whose adventures appeared in a

syndicated comic strip published by the New York newspaper P.M. from

1941-1962. His fairy godfather was Mr. O'Malley.

22
23

basketball, then transferred to Princeton. Graduating in 1917 with

a Bachelor's degree in literature, Eddy applied for a commission in

the Marine Corps Reserve.

Wartime pressure had reduced Marine officer training to the

bare essentials. On 31 October 1917, scarcely 4 months after donning

his gold Second Lieutenant's bars; Eddy was in France. As intelligence

officer for the 6th Marines, Lieutenant Eddy sought his information

firsthand. When reconnaissance patrols were necessary, he frequently

led them himself.

On the night of 4 June 1918, Eddy and two enlisted Marines

were the first to find and report German movements in the Belleau Wood

area.2 Crawling well behind enemy lines, the little group brought back

information which conclusively located the axis of the German advance

toward Paris. I-lis work that night earned him the Distinguished Service

Cross.

Six days later Eddy was back on his belly in no-man's land

* in companywith Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas. American maneuver had been

restricted by poor maps and thick woods as well as German Mausers.

Eddy climbed a tree and noted the effects of allied artillery. Despite

being chased down by snipers on several occasions, the Lieutenant stuck

it out. His patrol report is a classic for brevity, clarity, and

accuracy.3 The results were highly satisfactory. The Germans got a

rain of several hundred tons of U. S. and French artillery shells; the

Marines, Belleau Wood; and Eddy, the first of three Silver Stars.3 A

year before he had barely left the quadrangles of 'Old Nassau' now he

Was a well-decorated veteran of whom even such a hardened campaigner as

*Thomas later became a Marine General

24

Albertus Catlin wrote: "Eddy's conduct was distinguished to a degree

by unerring judgment, immediate action, and a remarkable sangfroid."4

Wounded in action for the first time on 25 June, Eddy continued

to serve in the front lines. He won the Navy Cross at St. Mihiel but

in his weak physical condition, contracted a near-fatal case of

pneumonia. Invalided back to the United States, he was placed on the

retired list as a Captain having been designated "unfit for active

service".

Following a slow recovery, Eddy re-entered Princeton earning

his M. A. in 1921 and a Ph.D. the following year. But adventure was in 

blood so in 1923 he accepted a post as Chairman of the English Department at the American University in Cairo. Although his childhood

Arabic was rusty at first, by the time he returned to the U. S. in

* 1928, Eddy was fully fluent and taught classes in both languages.

Eddy next took-up residence at Dartmouth CoJ]ege in New Hampshir

as Professor of English. A specialist in 18th century literature, he

wrote the definitive essay on Gulliver's Travels and was chosen as

editor for the Oxford University Press Standard Edition of Swift

published in l935. In 1936 he became president of Hobart College in

New York, a post he held until June 1941.6

Eddy the educator never quite lost touch with the Marine Corps.

In 1936 he proved sufficiently vital to be promoted to Major on the

retired list.

*A further footnote in the biography of this remarkable man was the fact that he is credited with introducing basketball to the Middle

East; organized a league which was still active forty years later; and,

translated the current American rule book into Arabic.
25

During December, 1940, Eddy and Major General Holcomb apparently

met by chance at a Washington social function. The subject of their

conversation as well as its location remains unrecorded. What is clear

is that Eddy, concerned about the events in Europe and the Mideast,

offered to resign as President of Hobart and return to active duty in

the Corps if his services could be profitably utilized.

Holcomb was usually not keen on such arrangements, particularly

in view of the professor's obvious physical condition, but it was a

time of crisis in the Naval intelligence community and Eddy certainly

* possessed impressive credentials. Experienced Arabists did not grow on

trees. Within the next few weeks, the Major General Commandant

discussed Eddy's proposal with Rear Admiral Anderson, the Director of

Naval Intelligence. On 28 January 1941, he despatched a short personal

note which began: "I am writing to find out how quickly you can report

for duty, should your services be required, which I am inclined to

think will be the case."7

During the next several months, a series of letters and cables

went back and forth between the two men as Eddy sought his release

from the college trustees and Holcomb attempted to pin down if ONT

really wanted his retired Major. The upshot of all this correspondence

*Neither the President nor Knox were satisfied with military

intelligence efforts during the period. The Battle of Britain was in

-'full tilt and shipping losses in the Atlantic were rising. No one

seemed to be able to provide well analyzed information on whether

England could survive and Ñnbassador Kennedy in London was providing

-little encouragement. In Fact, Kennedy's retreat for a winter vacation

--ip. Florida prompted the London News Chronicle to the following bon voyaqe

coniuentary: "Joe Kennedy deceives many people, his suave monotonous

-sty1e, his nine overphotographed children, and his hail-fellow-well met

parmner conceal a hard-boiled businessman's eagerness to do a profitable

Isiness deal with the dictators.uö
26

was a set of orders to active duty effective in June, 194l. Scarcely

two months later, Eddy was on his way back to Cairo as Naval Attache

wearing the silver oak leaves of a Lieutenant Colonel.

Cairo was a natural assignment for Eddy as well as a homecoming

of sorts. As Naval Attache he was in a position to observe the fighting between British forces and the Italians and to report on the balance

of seapower in the eastern Mediterranean. As a scholar and Arabist,

he was doubly useful because of his previous contacts with all levels

of Egyptian society. Such a man could not, and did not, escape the

notice of Donovan.

In October, 1941 COI had gained presidential approval to expand

its overseas operations. North Africa, a recurring theme in the

organization's history, was pinpointed for "a concrete illustration of

what can be done". Since much of the area was wide-open to German

and Italian penetration because of the status of occupied France, North

Africa "presented a unique opportunity for the United States in the

field of intelligence, fifth column, subversion, and related activities.

Until COI was organized, however, there was no agency prepared to exploit

- the situation and no unified plan for future action there")1

* Tangier , sitting directly opposite the British bastion at

Gibraltar, was considered the most important listening post in French

*Tangier (often mistakenly spelled Tangiers) was one of the

first "international cities" in the world. About 1/3 the size of London,

it had changed hands numerous times. Once it was a British possession

but its usual masters have been the Spanish and Portugese. During the

19th century it became headquarters of the international business and

diplomatic community. Thus, when France took virtual control of most

of Morocco, Tangier already had a peculiar historical identity. This

was recognized by the Conference of Algeciras in 1906 and by further

agreements in 1912, 1923, and 1924. In 1942, it was surrounded by the

Spanish zone on the landward sides but remained nominally neutral territory.
27

Morocco. Its location drew spies and rumor peddlers by the score.

Donovan arranged for Eddy to be returned to Washington, thoroughly

briefed regarding COI plans, and assigned there as his personal

* representative.

The twelve 'control officers' who had been operating as

accredited commercial "vice consuls" were to be placed under Eddy's

leadership, thus freeing Robert D. Murphy, a State Department officer

also working under cover for COI, for high level liaison with the GYMNAST planners. Eddy's appointment was considered significant enough

to warrant mention in a personal memorandum from Donovan to the

President.12

Eddy's job was a ticklish one for several reasons. First,

there was the obvious Axis presence which made security a vital and

frequently dangerous aspect of his work. Second, the British were

also deeply concerned and involved in both Morocco and Algeria.

Before despatching his personal representative, Donovan was careful

to coordinate with William Stephenson - codename INTREPID - the

** British Security Coordinator in America.

COI specifically recruited several civilians to beef-up the

Tangier operation, one of whom was the noted anthropologist Carlton

Coon. Eddy also took with him an assistant, young Second Lieutenant

Franklin P. Holcomb USMCR, the Commandant's son.

*

- Eddy's transfer from Cairo was opposed by both the ambassador

an.d OUI; however, a personal plea by Donovan to Knox overrode all

objections. **

t Stephenson was very active in advising both Donovan and the

Presicjen on intelligence matters. In the context of Eddy's assignment,

The was frank in pointing out the rivalry between SIS (British Secret

-intelligence) and SOE (Special Operations Executive - the "Operators").

L-Itwas.in large measure such briefings which convinced Donovan not to

?!rate these functions in his organization.
li

j!

it

iii

nr

jr

rrpnLI

If

28

Frank Holcomb had recently graduated from the School of Foreign

Service at Georgetown University. Like Eddy, 1-lolcomb too walked with a

limp, his right knee having been badly mangled in a college days auto

accident. It is quite doubtful that Hol comb would have become a Marine

officer under normal circumstances but with letters of recommendation

from the likes of Generals Smith, Price, et. al. a Board of officers

decided that he might be commissioned for specialist duty with DNI.

Within a month of reporting for active duty, Frank Holcomb was angling

for an assignment as Eddy's 'number two' in Cairo - a request which his

boss, Lieutenant Commander Bode, promptly torpedoed with the following

cornent:

"While Lieutenant Holcomb's performance of duty in this section

has been of a conspicuously high standard and highly satisfactory,

he does not possess the requirements desirable unr present

circumstances as Assistant Naval Attache, Cairo."

Yet, when Eddy boarded the East-bound Pan Mi Clipper on 3 January

1942, Holcomb occupied an adjoining seat. The machinations involved in

secLring this appointment remain obscure but they are likely linked to

those which resulted in Franklin's initial commission; having the senior

U. S. Marine on active duty as one's father was surely an advantage.

Eddy and Holcomb arrived in Tangier and set to work organizing

a system of intelligence reporting. This included use of the diplomatic

pouch and was supplemented by a clandestine radio net. Utilizing transmitters supplied by SIS, the new attache and his assistant began operati

of a base station - codename MIDWAY - which was linked to LINCOLN (Casablanca), FRANKLIN (Oran), PILGRIM (Tunis), and YANKEE (Algiers). Eddy

also kept in touch with the British in Gilbralter. His formal reports

went straight to Donovan)4

j liii i
29

In March, the JCS issued their first directive to COI. This

involved initial guidance for support to proposed plans for an invasion

of the Azores. This directive "had a significance wholly apart from

its subject matter. In March the general reorganization of information

agencies in Washington was pending. It was also in that month that the

JCS proposed to the President, with Donovan's concurrence, that COI be

made a supporting agency to the JCS."15 Thus, the quality of work

done by 'Eddy and Company' would impact directly on whether the agency

survived.

During the Spring of 1942, Eddy travelled extensively throughout

his area of responsibility. Holcoinb remained largely in Tangier and

Casablanca. Dressed in civilian clothes, he flitted back and forth

between the Spanish and International Zones, playing the spy game to

its hilt. Looking back on this period after the war, he recalled:

"It was a strange time. I knew the German, Italian, and Spanish

agents, and a great many of them knew me. This was particularly true

of the attaches. We all knew each other and, I should say there was

sort of a working agreement not to get in each other's hair too

obviously. On the other hand, it was necessary not to tip one's hand

in front of the opposition."16

In May, the radio net paid a first big dividend. The British

* were extremely concerned with what was left of the French fleet . With

tbe Laval government cuddling-up to Hitler, it was vital that the French

Pfltleship Jean Bart which was anchored at Casablanca, be closely

-mQnitored. Since Eddy was away in Lisbon, it fell to Holcomb to

*

- *The majority of the French fleet had been sunk by the Britisj'ì

Jfl July, 1940 at Hers el Kebjr or was swinging helplessly at anchor in

"Foulon.
30

coordinate the "watch". The young lieutenant performed this job so

effectively that on 9 May, a cable arrived from the Royal Navy stating

"Congratulations to all concerned for the efficient working

and speed of the Casablanca News Service. It is of the utmost

value."

Holcomb received what amounted to a 'mention in despatches' for this

piece of work. 18

Collecting naval intelligence was only part of the Tangier

operation. Eddy, Holcomb, Coon and the others were also up to their

necks in projects to solicit support for the Allies from the always

rebellious Riffs whose charismatic leader Abd-el-Krim was then in the

15th year of an enforced 'vacation' on the island of Reunion. There

were plans for a "hit list" of Gestapo officers and agents and for

bribery of Vichy officials. More importantly, Eddy sought to secure

arms, in massive quantity, for French colonial troops many of whom wer

patently anti-German. This request began a! tug of war between Tangier

and Washington. Donovan was not in favor of placing so many chips

on one 'horse'.

Eddy and Murphy responded to COl's misgivings with the warning

that "we will not find such leaders elsewhere, and dare not lose them

now.. .the least we can do is help supply them on their own terms which

are generous and gallant"»9 When Washington failed to budge, Eddy

petulently messaged: "If Murphy and I cannot be trusted with a few

millions francs in an emergency then I should be called back and some

who can be trusted sent.. .We are desperately hoping and waiting."2°

The tenor of these comments aroused COI headquarters but the

Joint Chiefs, who would have to supply the arms, were wary. Fearing

that any military supplies delivered might fall into Axis hands and
*Giraud escaped from a German maximum security prison by climbing

down a thin rope smuggled to him inside a wine bottle. He made his way

into unoccupied France and was contacted there by Murphy's net.

31

recognizing - far better than Donovan - the logistical difficulties

involved, they flatly rejected the proposal. Donovan was disappointed,

but to bolster Eddy's morale, he wrote back: "If we are right, it will

all work out..." Tangier got a little money but no guns.21

The resistance plan did not die however. When General Henri

Giraud escaped from captivity, his person was briefly seen as a

* rallying point for all anti-Nazi Frenchmen. While Murphy worked

this angle, Eddy attempted to revive the plan for supporting Riff

leaders in Spanish Morocco. To emphasize the need for some sort of

action, the Naval Attache returned to Washington to personally argue

the respective alternatives. At the time, he estimated Carlton Coon

and Gordon Browne - a former Boston insurance executive - could summon

more than 10,000 Riffs to the Allied banner.

Unfortunately, as Eddy would point out in a 10 June briefing

to JCS, the two plans were by nature mutually exclusive. Giraud had

been a key figure in bagging Abd-el-Krim and no pied noire in his right

mind would welcome an armed insurrection by the same natives France had

been fighting for 80 years. The Riffs, on the other hand, would not be

keen on spending blood without some sort of promise that their efforts

would lead to independence.

Eventually it was decided to play the Giraud 'card' first while

organizational plans proceeded for a Moorish uprising. Meanwhile, two

parallel links were established to Riff leaders - codenamed TASSELS and

STRINGS - who were unaware of each other's connections to COI.
32

Both had substantial intelligence collecting capabilities since th

followers moved freely throughout the entire area, undeterred by b

and unnoticed by either the French or Spanish. "These men knew ho

handle arms and conduct guerilla warfare in difficult terrain".22

Sensing that something was brewing in Morocco, the Laval

Government began a heavy crackdown on pro-allied sympathizers. Th

hampered Eddy's activities and heightened his concern that the mom

for opening North Africa to a near bloodless expeditionary force l

might be rapidly slipping away. Consequently, he flew to London 

solicit British support.

Franklin Holcomb was also busy. On 9 July, he and a date 

cornered in a local nightclub (shades of Bogart's Casablanca) by a 

of Italians. The ensuing episode was later reported to the Comman

in the following terms by Admiral Kirk.

"The Ities here (Tangier) are not so clever. As a matter of

fact, ten of them one night tried to pick a fight with the

assistant naval attache who was alone except for a lady. The

Italian consul himself, Duke Badoglio led the gang..

1-lolcomb's fists proved adequate to the challenge and Kirk

went on to say that "the whole affair helped us a lot with the Spa

and hurt the Wops. The lieutenant did not go unrewarded. Wh

of the brawl somehow reached the attention of the President, Roose

responded by directing an immediate promotion to Captain.24

In England, Eddy's mission took a quick U-turn. Instead 

talking with the British he found himself face-to-face with Eisenh

Patton, Doolittle, and General Strong, the Army's G-2.

July, 1942 was a watershed for American involvement in No

Africa. The month began with the JCS firmly fixed on a cross-chan
33

invasion of France (Operation SLEDGEHAMMER) as the best means of supporting the Russians. Churchill's government, reeling from criticism of

losses in the Western Desert, faced a vote of 'no confidence' in the

Commons. President Roosevelt, agonized by what a change of leadership

in Britain might mean, received a message from the Prime Minister on

8 July, which strongly urged that GYMNAST be implemented quickly.

In it, Churchill pleaded

"I am sure that French North Africa is by far the best chance

for effecting relief to the Russian Front in 1942... Here is

the safest and most effective stroke which can be delivered

this autumn

It must be clearly understood that we cannot count upon

an invitation or a quarantee from Vichy. But any resistance

would not be comparable to that which would be offered by

the German army in the Pas de Calais... This is a political

more than a military issue. It seems to me that we ought

not to throw away the sole great strategic stroke open to

us in the western theater during this cardinal year."25

American opposition to GYMNAST centered in the dispute between

Marshall and King over whether the Atlantic or Pacific should get

priority in naval planning. Roosevelt, a confirmed advocate of "Europe

first finally settled the argument by sending both of these, along with

his most trusted personal advisor, Harry Hopkins, to London with marching

orders to get the problem solved. After a series of acrimonious meetings

and a spate of personal messages it was determined that SLEDGEHAMMER

was not feasible and North Africa would be the target. Roosevelt called

it: "a turning point in the whole war".26

It was while this delegation - referred to by the President as

the 'three musketeers' - was in London, that Eddy arrived. Buttonibled by Colonel Edward Buxton, Donovan's Executive Officer, he agreed

:to dinner at Claridge's Hotel on 24 July. Other guests were to be
pli

J When Eddy appeared for dinner he was, uncharacteristically,

it dressed in full uniform. Five rows of ribbons neatly traced his

left breast pocket. "Do you know Bill Eddy?" Buxton asked George

ti

'J

Patton.

34

Doolittle, Strong and Patton. "If Eddy could convince this group

of hard-nosed military men of the value of his plan, he would have

a direct line to the War Department."27

His gaze riveted on the Marine's chest, 'Old Blood and Guts'

responded: "Never saw him before in my life but the son of a bitch's

been shot at enough hasrYt he?"28

Thus began a conversation which carried through until the

small hours of the next morning. Even Strong - a bitter enemy of

Donovan and his organization - came away impressed. Later that afternoon, Eddy met General Eisenhower for the first time.

And so, in that final week of July 1942, three things were

settled: The United States would invade North Africa before year's

end; Eisenhower would command the operation; and the new codename would

be TORCH. Eddy's intelligence outfit would prepare to strike the match

The newspapers were full of Midway and the Russian front. "Fierce

Fighting 80 Miles from Stalingrad", the Baltimore Sun headlined, but

help was on the way.29

Eddy flew to Tangier and within a week was back to London.

At 0930 on 2 August, he delivered a detailed briefing to Eisenhower,

carefully covering the situation in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

Eddy's insight and grasp of what would be required in the proposed

multi-division amphibious assault so impressed Ike that the new comman

drafted a long "eyes only" message to General Marshall which ended:
35

"Colonel Eddy of the U. S. Marines will arrive in Washington this week.

He possesses much information which will be valuable to the Chiefs of

Staff. It is recommended that he return, through here, to his post in

Tangiers [sic] at earliest possible moment."3°

In the States, Eddy and Donovan went over plans for all

subversive and intelligence activities designed to support TORCH.

Money was no longer an obstacle - "Wild Bill" cheerfully approved a

tentative two million dollar budget for the operation. On 11 September,

Eddy briefed the assembled LJCS on his plans. Most of these were

approved "with the prdviso that control of all secret activities should

be vested in the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower."3' This caveat

would soon raise a minor tempest.

Murphy too was soon in Washington. His political evaluation

impressed Donovan who immediately trotted his star diplomat off to

see the President. Roosevelt listened to Murphy's report with interest

and decided, on-the-spot, to give him Ambassadorial rank. Between

a retired Lieutenant Colonel and an Ambassador there now yawned a

protocol gap as wide as the Grand Canyon. Murphy became Donovan's

'top man' in North Africa. Eddy remained titular head in Morocco but

took his political orders from Murphy in Algiers.

While Patton trained his Morocco assault force in the same

Solomon's Island (Maryland) exercise area recently evacuated by the

1st Marine Division

I ports and airfields

urveyed, and known

*

* Eddy's apparatus swung into action. Data on

were collected, the Atlantic beaches clandestinely

agents carefully watched. Unfortunately, much of

'Howling Mad' Smith was Patton's amphibious assault tutor.
36

the intelligence was little better than a travelogue, The best effor

to secure reliable hydrographic information on the three proposed land

beaches and the Sebu River channel leading to Port Lyautey were provin

to be dismally inadequate.

In an attempt to solve this extremely serious deflciency,

Eddy concocted a daring plan - approved by Patton without recourse

to any other authority - to smuggle two experienced local watermen

out of Casablanca. These would be flown to the United States and then

accompany the invasion fleet back across the Atlantic. One of the

two men scheduled for this voluntary 'snatch' was the chief pilot

of Port Lyautey whose name was Malverne. Eddy gave control of the

mission to his resident in Casablanca, David King. But it was Frank

L-lolcomb and Gordon Browne who were tasked with the actual rascality.

Holcornb was directed to drive the nearly two hundred miles

from Tangier to Casablanca in his old black Chevy. Behind this, as

usual, he pulled a small open-topped trailer.

Dragging a trailer was something most prudent drivers did

in 1942 Morocco. Gasoline was sometimes hard to find and it was

advisable to take one's own on long trips. Therefore, the sight of

some fuel drums would not elicit special interest. Or so was the

hoped, for wedged behind the drums, covered with a carpet and some

burlap was Malverne.

Moroccan nights can be clammy, frigid affairs in winter but

Holcomb and Brown were most concerned about their passenger's ability

to take the pounding of the drums and the carbon monoxide which

billowed from the car's exhaust. Driving as fast as they could

(consistent with their 'cargo's' survival) they passed through the fi
37

of six separate checkpoints without incident. The second was likewise

routinely negotiated. The next few would not be simple.

At checkpost #3, a coughing, wheezing sound began emanating

from the trailer. Browne got out and walked casually around, kicking

the tires and shaking the drums while 1-lolcomb spoke with the guards.

They were waved through.

As the coast road wound closer to Tangier, traffic thickened.

More and more Arab villages dotted the roadside, their mud brick

buildings encircled by thorn bush barriers against both wind and

prying eyes. Soon Holcomb and Browne's progress had been reduced

to a crawl. The Spanish border police were notoriously slow and that

night was to be no exception. The coughing began once more. This

time it was a good deal more persistent.

Finally the car drew up to a barber-striped wooden barrier.

Holcomb hurried into the customs shed with the passports while Browne

nervously eyed the guards in their German-style coal scuttle helmets.

One began to circle the car. Browne got out.

After peering into the back seat, the guard paused to light a

cigarette and then continued toward the trailer. Browne winced as

another cough came from beneath the carpet. But the sentry, who must

have been stone deaf, merely poked at the burlap bags and continued

his inspection. The Spaniard may have noticed nothing, but his dog

t not so careless. As Holcomb emerged with the stamped passports,

the animal posed in the classic 'point' - leg lifted, tail

-51taight, nose directed toward Malverne's hiding place.

- "There was only one thing for me to do" he later recalled.

"US in the front seat I had a big Virginia ham - something that had
38

been sent from home and that J had been saving for weeks. I took

one look at the big, curious eyes of the dog, and I threw the ham

at him."32

The gate swung open. Holcomb, Browne, and their still-gagging

passenger, lurched forward, narrowly missing a parked truck. A final

rear-view reflection of the Customs Post revealed a puzzled set of

sentries, a yapping mutt, and Holcomb's prize ham lying in the dusty

Morrocan roadway. The final two checkpoints were a snap.

On the morning of 8 November 1942, 83,000 Americans and more

than 15,000 British soldiers, sailors, and airmen landed in Oran,

Algiers, and across the Atlantic beaches near Casablanca. The French

Navy and some ground troops, particularly the colonial infantry - who

wore an anchor on their hats and called themselves Marines - briefly

fought back. But within four days, Eisenhower had his North African

bases. A week later, he and Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham struck a

bargain of convenience with French Admiral Darlan which ensured the

loyalty of the 105,000 Vichy troops outside metropolitan France. Then

his rear secured, Ike turned eastward toward Rommel.

OSS was to play a largely analytic and political role in the

rest of the North African operations although there was some ground

combat activity by the first 'Operational Group' personnel.

*

*Malverne eventually reached the United States and later perfo

his piloting chores with such dexterity that he was awarded the Navy

Cross. General Marshall however was not amused. In a personal messag

to Eisenhower (who knew nothing of the scheme) the Chief of taff dec

the entire affair citing the risks involved in its execution .3 Certai

had Holcomb and Browne been apprehended, the landing sites might have

been totally compromised.
39

Franklin Holcomb would later transfer to 055, rise to Major

and direct counter-intelligence operations in France. Eddy was

promoted to Colonel on the personal reconuïìendations of both Donovan and

Eisenhower.34 He had an important part in intelligence organization

and planning for the invasion of Sicily and would serve as Roosevelt's

personal interpreter at the Cairo conference. On 12 August 1944, he

was released from active duty to accept appointment as the first

American Minister to Saudi Arabia.35

Of Eddy's service in those muddled months before TORCH, when

the United States seemed everywhere at bay, Ambassador Murphy would

write: . . .no American knew more about Arabs or about power politics

in Africa. He was one of a kind, unique; we could have used a hundred

like him."36
CHAPTER III

FOR EXCELLENT PERSONAL REASONS'

Five weeks after the North African invasion began, a U. S.

Marine Captain turned north from London's Brook Street, passed

through a series of concertina wire barricades, and entered the

offices of United States Naval Forces, Europe at 20 Grosvenor

Square.

The young officer wore the then-unfamiliar silver wings of

a parachutist centered above a row of ribbons which bore no resembl

to any normally seen in an American officer's mess. There was an 

of confidence about him, something which bespoke a maturity beyond 

years or rank. Tall, husky, and dark-eyed, he had the manner of a

veteran soldier.

The harried yQaman to whom he presented his orders sensed

none of this. Drawing a large rubber stamp from his desk, the cler

placed a blurred imprint on the papers, initialed them in the presc

black ink, and handed them back to the wai'ting officer. Within 15

minutes, his business complete, Captain Peter J. Ortiz, USMCR, was 

beneath the wind-stripped limbs of Grosvenor Square's trees. He t

did not waste much time. There was another aircraft to catch. Or

was going back to Morocco.1

Peter J. Ortiz was 29 years old. Born in New York City du

a violent electrical storm, he grew up in La Jolla, a picturesque

seaside village in Southern California. After elementary school,

40
41 Peter's father - longtime Parisian publisher Philippe G. J. Ortiz -

insisted that his son be educated in Europe.

Peter dutifully attended the Lyc&e de Pau and Bayonne. Later

he spent a year at the College du P4ontcel in Versailles. But school

bored Ortiz. He was more interested in rugby and mountain climbing

than literature or mathematics. In 1932 he quit the classroom and

traded his school books for the white kepi of a Private in the Foreign

Legion.

The Legion proved to be more hard work than adventure but he

was young, strong, and intelligent. The desert and discipline made

him tough as well. For five years, Ortiz served in North Africa,

learning to fight the sand and sun more often than the Riff Berbers.

He was a model soldier and advanced steadily in rank; took parachute

training with the 7th Regiment at Meknes; became a Sergeant. Near the

end of his enlistment, Ortiz was NCO-In-Charge of an armored car

squadron. "Sign on again", the Colonel said, "and you'll be an officer."

It was a tempting offer and Ortiz almost took it. Yet, he had

not seen America for a decade and was anxious to try his hand at

something new. Discharged from the Second Regiment in 1938, he

returned to California and sought work in the film industry as a

téchnical advisor on war movies.

When the Germans attacked Poland the next year, Ortiz smelled

action. Failing to find a place aboard a merchantman leaving New York

for France, he travelled to Canada where the problems of an American

citizen looking to get into the war were simplified. Ortiz caught his

Ship. Unfortunately so did a U-Boat. Luckily he was a good swimmer.

October 1939, found Ortiz back in the uniform of the Legion's

.l1th Regiment where he rose swiftly to First Lieutenant. The Legion
42

fought well during the battles of May-dune 1940 but in the end it w

overwhelmed. Lieutenant Ortíz did not walk into captivity with the

masses of sullen French soldiery. Instead, he went to a POW camp o

a stretcher with a Mauser slug in his back.

German doctors saved his life. By way of repayment, he imm

ly attempted to escape.

For the next year, Ortiz toured occupied Europe - Germany, 

finally Austria - always as guest of the Wehrmacht's Stalag system.

He was labelled a 'troublemaker' and 'dangerous'. Finally, in October 

he made a clean break, eluded the clutches ol' the Gestapo,

and slipped safely into neutral Portugal. From there it was a ship

back to New York. America was still a peace when Ortiz left Lisbon

half-way across the Atlantic the sun rose on December 7th.

During his stay in Portugal, Ortiz was contacted by both th

British and Free French military representatives who offered him

commissions. This time, however, he cast his lot with the United

States. In dune, 1942, his back healed, Ortiz of the Legion became

a Private in the United States Marines.2

It was a time of strange recruits at Parris Island, yet ver

few sported a row of decorations and French parachutist insignia on

their graduation uniforms. In recommending Ortiz for imediate co

his commanding officer wrote: 'We spotted him shortly after his ar

From appearances, the Marine Corps would be unbeatable if all our m

were like him."3

While the rest of his recruit platoon went on to further tr

Ortiz waited for his commission. Soon after pinning on his gold ba

he was transferred to New River, N. C. for service with a Marine
43

Parachute Battalion. It was a good assignment in terms of previous

experience. Ortiz already had well over loo jumps.

Instead of becoming a platoon commander he was instantly

promoted to temporary Captain (a not uncommon practice for officers

going on special assignments where specific ranks were required)

and assigned to the Office of Strategic Services for duty as Assistant

Naval Attache and Marine Corps Observer, Algiers.

Recognition of the 055 contribution to the success of TORCH,

had prompted calls for more of the sanie in Tunisia. In early 1943,

General Mark Clark, commanding the Fifth Army, requested direct support

operations and a small group of 055 men was directed to establish an

operating base at Oujda, Algeria.

Clark had arrived in December, 1942 with instructions not only

to prosecute the war in North Africa but also to begin long-range

planning for an eventual move into continental Europe. Mindful of the

uncertain status of Spain, he was also designated as the primary

commander for a contingency plan - Operation BACKBONE - targeted

against Spanish Morocco. OSS was requested to support both the shooting

war in Tunisia and the intelligence collection requirements for BACKBONE.

So critical was the concern over what Franco might do, that a considerable supply of arms and ammunition destined for the Patton's Second

Army was diverted to dumps located nearer to Spanish territory.4

In order to gain experience in the "fighting" portion of this

new assignment, Colonel Eddy arranged for a few Americans - all military

members of OSS - to join the 50Es mission (Codename BRANDON) which

was cooperating with the British First Army. "Participation in this

ßritish operation constituted the first OSS experience in sabotage and
44

combat intelligence teams in front areas and behind enemy lines. Tha

the jobs actually done by the handful of OSS men who joined in the 50

Tunisian campaign were not typical of future activity was due as much

to the exigencies of the battle situation as to the misunderstanding

of their function by the British and American Army officers whom they

served."5 Rather than intelligence collectors, the members of BRANDON

were simply reconnaissance troops whose instructions were to find

Germans and kill them.

Peter Ortiz had flown from London to Gibraltar, then on to

H

Y Casablanca. On 13 January, he reported to Tangier and Captain

Holcomb. Holcomb directed the newly arrived "observer" to spend a

few days in Morocco and then contact Eddy in Oran.

J Ortiz' orders were extraordinarily general. He was simply to

go to North Africa and observe the fighting in any fashion which

seemed appropriate. This latitude presented a situation which, for

Ortiz, made combat inevitable. He struck out immediately for the

headquarters of the U. S. Second Corps, near Tebessa. Once there,

he secured further authorization to roam about virtually at will and

attach himself to any unit that struck his fancy. In his 'after-acti

report, Captain Ortiz wrote:

"I was, for excellent personal reasons and as a representative

of the Marine Corps, particularly desirous of seeing and

taking prt in action against the Germans. I happened to be

in Gafsa when the evacuation order was received. Although

later claimed by the press as a perfect example of an orderly

and well-planned retreat, J thought it characterized by

confusion and an alarming cantagion of panic. Dozens of

* near Kasserine Pass
45

vehicles were damaged or abandoned and a number of American

soldiers and local civilians run over through inadequate

traffic control. Bridges were prematurely blown-up,

stranding our men on the wrong side.6

During the ensuing battles, Ortiz first joined an armored recon

unit from the British Derbyshire Yeomanry; next caught on with a

Foreign Legion outfit for a week; and ended-up with the U. S. ist

Armored Division. He was bombed, mortared, strafed, and participated

in one tank action where he witnessed the terrifying effectiveness

of the German 88mm dual purpose gun.

On 3 March, Ortiz reported back to Colonel Eddy, made his

report, and requested more 'combat time'. Eddy was reluctant to

continue giving his Captain such free rein but during the course of

their converstaion, the subject of heavy casualties being suffered

by BRANDON surfaced. Naturally this opened new vistas for Ortiz who

promptly volunteered to serve as a replacement for another Marine,

Captain Elmer Harris, who had been wounded by a mine that morning.7

Finally, perhaps recalling his own personal activities at Belleau

Wood, Eddy agreed. Ortiz was off again.

On 8 March, he left Algiers for Guelmna where he reported

to the commander of BRANDON. The British Colonel sent Ortiz forward

to the operational base at Le Kouif, which was supporting the 2nd

Corps' tactical area. There he was given a squad of five anti-Franco

Spaniards and a British radio operator. Their mission was to link-up

with another similar group commanded by an SOE Captain and "do some

mischief with the derries".8

The SOE groups were now concentrating their effc9'ts to the

south of Bir-el-Hatig as a means of detecting any movement by the 21st

Panzer Division, elements of which were thought to be at Matleg, 50
46

miles away. Ortiz and his English counterpart decided to conduct a

series of foot patrols toward the Matlag Pass in hope p-f gaining both

intelligence and a chance for a fight.

On the night of 18 March, Ortiz' squad pushed-off in a

pouring rain. Three days later, they were well beyond the allied lin

and moving across the rough cross-compartments Northwest of the pass.

It was still raining. At 2300, Ortiz called a halt. Leaving his

assistant, a Spaniard named Amando, in charge he struck out alone for

the main roadway far below.

Crossing a valley in which he constantly sank ta his knees

in mud, Ortiz finally reached the highway and began cautiously lookin

for tank tracks. It was pitch black and the downpour blotted out any

sound.

Moving slowly in and out of the shallow wadis which cut acros

the roadbed, Ortiz spent nearly two hours on his personal reconnaissa

Then, just before turning back, the enemy he was seèking found him.

Ortiz was hìt by the first burst of tire. One bullet shatter

his right hand and another grazed his left leg. Rolling to this left

he saw the flashes o-f a machine gun 30 yards to his front. Rising

to one knee he began throwing Retard anti-tank grenades lefthanded.

The first fell short but the second scored a direct hit, exploding

with "a terrific blast that stopped all automatic fire".9

With rifle shots still singing around him from another positi

further to the right, Ortiz crawled away. Despite loss of blood and 

effecfs of shock, he managed to reach his men who carried and dragged

him all the way back to friendly lines.'0
47

After a series of hospitals and a successful operation on his

hand, Ortiz reported back to Eddy for further assignment. He asked

for more combat duty. This time however the Colonel was adamant.

Ortiz was an enfant terrible who needed a rest before he resumed his

one-man mission against everything teutonic. Eddy ordered him

evacuated. Much to his chagrin, Captain Ortiz was placed on the

first available aircraft destined for the long trans-Atlantic flight

home. He arrived in Washington on 27 April and characteristically,

reported directly to Headquarters Marine Corps the next day.

Ortiz immediately began preparing a detailed report of hìs

activities for Donovan. In it he recounted not only his personal

experiences but also observations of British and American tactics,

weapons, and equipment. His practiced eye and thoughtful conclusions

obviously impressed "Wild Bill" who scribbled across the top: "Very

interesting, please re-employ this man as soon as possible."

Captain Ortiz' war was far from over.

A few days after Ortiz was wounded, the remaining OSS

personnel with BRANDON were withdrawn to Algiers. This marked the end

of an experiment which was "inevitable wasteful of talented and trained

men".2 055 would not repeat the same mistakes in Italy or France.

BRANDON was a 'learning experience' which paid dividends by demonstrating

to the Army the need for better reconnaissance units and removing 055

from the business of providing them.
CHAPTER IV

"A PUNGENT COLLECTION..

Before COI came into existence, America had no coordinated

intelligence organization worthy of the name. If one wanted a

Michelin Guide of the Haute Savoie, information on religious custom

in Lebanon, or a list of key labor leaders in occupied Europe, chan

were ten-to-one that none could be found without extensive research

Britain had her Secret Intelligence Service, Germany the Abwehr, bu

all the United States possessed was a set of parochial military

intelligence sections and a woefully inadequate collection of

threadbare diplomats. Donovan changed all that.

COI was a beginning, but only that. After the establishmen

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it became apparent that the normal sc

of service intelligence activities - and the expertise to carry the

out on a global scale - was sadly lacking. As Donovan needed the

Armed Forces, so they needed him and his intellectuals. In the end

it was a 'shotgun wedding' with Franklin Roosevelt fingering the

trigger. On 13 June 1942, by Presidential Executive Order, the Off

of the Coordinator of Information was abolished and the Office of

Strategic Services created. Under the heading of "Military Order"

was given two broad missions:

"The Office of Strategic Services shall perform the following

duties:

48
49

Collect and analyze such strategic information as

may be required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Plan and operate such special services as may be

directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff." 1 William J. Donovan was appointed Director of OSS.

Interestingly, the appointment was announced while Director

Donovan was in London. Less surprising was his travelling companion,

British Security Coordinator William Stephenson. That such news

should reach this pair in the capital city of the English-speaking

peoples was a fitting footnote to the new partnership between Great

Britain's four hundred-year-old intelligence tradition and America's

infant counterpart. "The war produced many examples of good AngloAmerican relations, even if there were also some bad ones. None can

have been more varied and at the same time more intimate and

confidential than those which existed between 'Little Bill' Stephenson

and 'Big Bill' Donovan and their respective organizations."2

OSS eventually comprised a recruitment and training organization,

administrators, communicators and the usual retinue of clerks, codernen,

and supply personnel found in any large military formation. But it

took its character from quite a different breed. "It was a pungent

collection of thugs, postdebutantes, millionaires, professors,

corporation lawyers, military professionals, and misfits, all operating

under high tension and in whispers."3 The 'thugs' aside, all of these

categories would be represented by men in the uniform of the United

States Marines.

This paper is not the place for a detailed description of the

OSS structure. Nor is it intended as an institutional history. But

to place the story of Marines and OSS in its proper framework, one must
50

understand the main components of what Dr. Goebbels referred to as

"Donovan's Monkey House".4

* A wiring diagram of 055 would show six major branches but

major intelligence and clandestine operations were centered in fiv

functional areas:

-Research and Analysis (R & A)

-Special Operations (SO)

-Morale Operations (MO)

-Secret Intelligence (SI)

-Counter-espionage (X-2)

Research and Analysis Branch handled the'bulk of detailed 

in geographic, scientific, economic, political and of course milit

studies. To staff it, Donovan recruited the "best academic and

analytical brains that he could beg, borrow or steal from the

universities,-laboratories, and museums' both at home and abroad.5

"R&A was the first concerted efforton the part of any wor

power to apply the talents of its academic coninunity to official a

of foreign affairs."6 Research and Analysis was headed by Dr. Wil

Langer, a noted Harvard historian who would later organize CIA s B

of National Estimates. Langer's personal assistant was Marine Fir

Lieutenant William Applebaum, a transplanted Russian Jew who spoke 

languages and was described by Donovan as "a brilliant organizer".

* Central Adrnin and Technical; Intelligence Service; Psycho

Warfare Operations; Training; Services; New York and West Coast Of
51 Applebaum (whose original name was Wolf) immigrated to the

United States at age 14. He attended the University of Minnesota

earning both his AB and MA in geography. But business was his specialty.

Bill Applebaum became one of the first men in America to apply marketing

research techniques to the retail supermarket industry. He joined DSS

in June, 1942 and was immediately given the task ot bringing order.to the

chaotic organizational situation in Donovan's 'brain trust'.

Applebaum initially attempted to secure a commission in the

Army but was rejected because of dental problems. He then turned to

Langer who suggested he try the Marine Corps, which was surprisingly

cooperative in granting direct appointments in specialist categories.

Dr. Langer endorsed Applebaum's application with high praise and

pointed out that his aide was frequently required to travel abroad.

"He will' the endorsement stated, 'be distinctly handicapped unless

he appears in uniform.IS On 15 July 1943, Applebaum was commissioned

a First Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve with the specialty

code MSS - Strategic Services.

Applebaum did indeed travel abroad. During his tenure with

OSS, he would conduct 'trouble-shooting' trips to England, France,

Italy, Egypt, India, Burma, and China. While in Washington, he

served as secretary to the R&A Executive Committee, top-policy making

body within the organization. In that capacity, Applebauni was privy

to the inner-most workings of Amerjcan intelligence during World War

*

II. Bad teeth or no, he was, in the words of Colonel David Bruce

"an outstanding officer of unparalleled organizational ability."9

*Bruce later became U. 5. Ambassador to France (1948-49),

Germany (1957-59) and Britain (1961-69).
52

Other Marines who served in R&A included First Lieutenant Gord

Craig, Captain George H. Owen, Captain Richard Gard, Captain Joseph

Charles, and Colonel James McHugh.

Craig was born in Scotland and educated at Princeton and Oxfor

(Rhodes Scholar 1936-38). A Phi Beta Kappa in history, he was deeply

involved in planning U. S. military resupply routes through West Afric

during the early days of the war. Later he served with the Departmen

of State and with Marine combat forces in the Pacific. The author of

several books, he is perhaps best known to military history students

for his contributions to Makers of Modern Strategy, which although

published in 1943, remains a standard text.'0

Captain Gard arrived in 055 by rather circuitous routing. Bo

in Vancouver, he studied Japanese literature at the University of Wash

ton and received his MA in Oriental Studies from the University of Haw

Commissioned for intelligence duty in June, 1941, Gard was a Second

Lieutenant at Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked

During the first several years of the war, Gard served in the

South Pacific. He saw action at Guadalcanal and New Georgia before b

shipped home to the Japanese interpreter school in Colorado. In 1944

weakened by constant bouts of malaria, Gard dropped out of language sc

and was assigned the demanding task of managing the Hostess House and 

elor Officer Quarters at Marine Barracks, Klamath Falls, Oregon. 'S 

cued Gard from this sinecure in December, 1944 and brought him to Wash

ton as a member of the task force studying the planned invasion of the

* Japanese homeland. Gard's knowledge of the Asian Buddhist community

*Before entering the Marine Corps, Gard won a scholarship fro

the Buddhist Council of Japan and had spent a year studying the Zen

sect in a Japanese monastary.
53

proved particularly helpful in laying the groundwork for policies of the

occupation government. He was awaiting transportation to the OSS

station at Kunming, China when the war ended)1

Captain George H. Owen provides a somewhat typical profile of

the lawyer turned 055 intelligence officer. Born in Germany before

World War I, he grew'up in Europe and was educated largely in France.

Before returning to the United States for college and subsequently law

school, Owen had mastered German, French and Spanish.

From 1939 until early 1942, Captain Owen taught International

Law and Diplomatic History at Fordham University in New York. In April, 1942 he moved to the Department of the Treasury's Foreign Funds

Control Division. Here his main task was detailed investigation of

Sterling Products Company, a subsidiary of I. G. Farben, which had

extensive business interests in Latin America. Owen's skill in the

Sterling investigation and in a later related examination of foreign

banking operations, prompted his recruitment by the Special War Policies

Unit of the Justice Department.12

The Special War Policies Unit was an ad hoc task force established to support the Inter-American Committee for Political Defense, a

hemisphere-wide group with headquarters in Montvideo. Owen was head

of the section charged with monitoring subversive activities of Axis

firms in South America. Working under State Department cover, he

was the chief point of contact for a host of intelligence agencies

including the FBI, Army Intelligence, British Censorship, and the like.

As draft pressure mounted, Owen sought a commission in the

Marine Corps. As a personal friend of Major General Henry L. Larsen,

USMC this posed scant problem and he was appointed a First Lieutenant in

January, 1943.13
54

Despite what appeared to be a perfect background for OSS, Owen's

first choice of duty was flight training. He had proven to be a capable

lawyer and scholar but as an aeronaut these skills proved to be of

little value. His gangly build (6'l" - 134 lbs.) was compounded by an

amazing lack of coordination. Never having been much interested in

athletics, he was at a distinct disadvantage in the rigorous physical

fitness environment of pre-flight training. Lieutenant Owen 'bilged out

of Naval Aviation and into the Research and Analysis branch of 055.

In December 1943, he was assigned as Targets Officer in Algiers,

the major operating base for 055 in the Mediterranean Theater. Owen's

responsibilities revolved around the analysis of reports coming from

agents in occupied France. He also produced 'finished' intelligence

products for use in the planning of Operation ANVIL, the allied

landings in southern France during August, 1944.14

Joseph Charles, like Bill Applebaum, became a Marine Officer by

accident. A University of Illinois Phi Beta Kappa, Charles received his

MA and PhD. from Harvard. He remained in Cambridge as an Assistant Professor of History following graduation in 1936. Charles' area of special

ization was Jeffersonian democracy. He joined 05$ in December, 1942 and

after a brief sojourn in Washington, was ordered to the R&A office in Lon

Local draft boards were not impressed with able-bodied men who

stated that they engaged in 'vital civilian war work' but gave no

details. Since Charles was classified 1-A, he took steps to become an

officer in the United States Navy.* When his application for a Navy

* Those 05$ civilians who failed to apply for commissions were

usually drafted. The most apparent example is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Schlesinger was also a member of R&A in London... as a Private First

Class. By the time the allies had liberated Paris, he had displayed

sufficient merit to be promoted to Corporal..
SS

commission reached OSS, someone in R&A decided that he would make a

better Marine (perhaps the Navy already had their quote of 'spooks'

for that month). In any case, Joseph Charles became a Captain in

the Marine Corps Reserve in June, 1943.15

Charles spent most of the war in London working with British

SIS on government problems associated with the occupation of Europe.

He resigned from the Corps in September, 1945 to accept a position

with the State Department.

R&A personnel did not usually become involved in "secret

missions". One exception to that generalization was First Lieutenant

Edward T. Dickinson, Jr. USMCR.

Dickinson was a 32year-old Yale man who had started for the

'Old Blue' varsity football team in 1932. Prior to joining 055,

Dickinson served as Executive Director of the Planning Commission of

the War Production Board. He was an expert on factories - how to

build them and naturally enough how to destroy them.

Commissioned a First Lieutenant on 4 October 1943, Dickinson

was first sent to Cairo. After only a month there, he was ordered to

R&A London for assignment to Special Operations Branch. His job:

"technical appreciation of methods to be used in sabotaging French

industry". Ed Dickinson was to coordinate all plans for bringing

French factories engaged in war-related work to a standstill.16

Dickinson's undercover work involved a "dangerous and unusual

mission to Sweden".17 During the spring of 1944 one of the major

Allied targets for strategic bombing was the German ball bearing industry.

Despite an OSS plan to buy most of the ball bearings produced by the

SKF Company in Gotteborg, about 7% were being sent to Germany.
56

Dickinson travelled into the neutral country and played a role in

determining just how many bearings were going to Hitler - a Swedish

State secret. Armed with this information, the U. S. Economic Warf

Mission was able to stop all shipments.'8

"Prior to ft-Day, Lieutenant Dickinson was in charge of all

American target planning for strategic sabotage operations in occup

Europe, including not only selection of the targets based on econom

analyses but also the technical aspects of the actual sabotage

operations.

From D-Day until the liberation of France he was active in

planning tactical and strategic operations for the French Maquis

in support of Allied military advances.19

For his role in this operation and subsequent appreciations

of industrial damage in France, Lieutenant Dickinson was awarded

the Bronze Star. Later he would serve as a member of the Strategic

* Bombing Section of the OSS Mission to Germany.

Most members of the 055 eagerly volunteered for the agency,

nearly all bonsidered it a passport to either adventure or personal

challenge. Very few indeed were long-service career military

professionals. Colonel James Marshall McHugh, USMC, was a regular

in a reserve outfit. Service with OSS was, in many ways a personal

purgatory. For if James McHugh was not damned, he was plainly in

'outer darkness'. The man who cast him there was none other than

General George C. Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*After the war Dickinson held several important public post

These included: Commissioner of Commerce for the State of New York

Deputy Secretary of the Air Force for Installations; and, Vice-Chai

of the U. S. National Security Resources Board.
57

The story of how McHugh came to OSS is inextricably bound to

the American experience in China. McHugh was, even more than Evans

Canson, an 'Old China Hand'. Therein lay the roots of his undoing.

'Jimmie' McHugh was born three days before the 20th century

began. He grew up in Marshfield, Missouri, won an appointment to

the U. S. Naval Academy and graduated with the Class of 1922.

After Basic School , young Lieutenant McHugh was ordered to the Marine

Detachment, American Legation, Peking. With the exception of a

short tour at Headquarters in the early '30's and the obligatory

pilgrimage to Quantico for Junior School in 1937, McHugh spent the

next twenty years in China. He loved the land and the people, became

proficient in several dialects and spoke Mandarin flawlessly. Few

jobs escaped his purview. Guard Officer, Public Relations Officer,

Company Commander, PX Officer, Signal Officer, Property Officer,

McHugh became the institutional memory of Peking and Shanghai. And

throughout the tapestry of jobs and titles there ran a recurrent

thread - Intelligence Officer. On 30 October 1937, Major James M.

McHugh was designated Assistant Naval Attache to a China which was

already at war with Japan.20

The job of an attache is to keep his eyes open, make contacts,

and report. McHugh had been doing this for years and had been

frequently coniiiended for his work, He became a close friend of both

Generalisimo Chiang Kai Shek and the ubiquitous Madame Chiang as well

as Chiang's political advisor W. H. Donald. "As an intimate in the

palace circle, he served as Ambassador Johnson's eyes and ears, much

to the irritation of his fellow attache at the time, Colonel (Joseph)

Stilwell, who saw McHugh always bustling with private knowledge and

whispering to the Ambassador.'21
58

In August, 1940, Major McHugh returned to the United States 

a tour at the Senior School at Quantico. He barely had time to set

in when a call carne from Major General Holcomb. McHugh was to retu

to China and "carry out personal and confidential instructions from 

Secretary of the Navy". Following three days of confidential brief

at Naval Intelligence in Washington, McHugh caught a flight for the

West Coast and made connection with the Pan Mi clipper for Hong Kon

Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel shortly after the United Sta

entered the war, McHugh was now the Naval Attache to the Chinese

government in Chungking. "McHugh had always been fearless in makin

reports whenever he felt the good of the United States was concerned

But as allied forces were pushed back through Burma now-Major

General Stilwell began to truly live-up to his nickname: 'Vinegar

doe'. Stiiweli was a largely apolitical professional soldier.

Colorful, salty, and angered by incompetence, corruption and footdragging, he labored with missionary zeal in a forgotten arena. As

a combat commander, Stilwell had few peers but when it came to deal

with the arrogant, suspicious and overly-sensitive Chinese he was o

of his element. Not that he did any better with the British for wh

he reserved even higher plateaus of scorn.

In late 1942, Chiang began lobbying for a change in the

China-Burma-India command structure. His champion was General Clai

Chennault, boss of the famous 'Flying Tigers'. McHugh reported the

machinations directly to Knox, adding some of his personal observat

about Stilwell's inability to 'get along' with the Chinese governme

In October, Chennault drafted a letter to President Roosevelt (whic

was handed carried by Wendell Wilikie) claiming that air power could 
59

the war in Asia and that only Stiiweil stood in the path of full

cooperation between the United States and China.

It seemed that Vinegar Joe's days were numbered but the axe

fell instead on the neck of the messenger.

"Chiang Kai Shek and Madame summoned McHugh to lunch and

emphasised the benefits to the Allied cause of replacing

Stilwell with Chennault. McHugh heartily endorsed the

suggestion in a report to Secretary Knox in which he

stated that Stilwell's insistence on the recapture of

Burma was a personal ambition resulting from his defeat

there....

Secretary Knox passed the report on to Secretary

(of War) Stimson who showed it to (General) Marshall

who was infuriated." 24

McHugh was due to return to the United States for consultations.

Marshall demanded that he not be allowed to return to Chungking or

anywhere else in China.., ever.

McHugh's tour in limbo began. He reported to the Director of

Naval Intelligence in December, 1942. In February he was transferred

to an Engineer Battalion at Camp Lejeune. May found him with orders

to Quantico. Meanwhile, General Donovan entered the picture. After

some exploratory discussions, OSS requested that McHugh (who had

since been again transferred - this time to the Navy's Logistics

Planning department) be assigned to R&A.25

When this request reached Headquarters Marine Corps, it

went straight to Commandant Holcomb. Unfortunately, the enclosure

to 055' request contained the 'verboten' word 'China' in the same

paragraph as 'overseas'.

Holcomb called Knox. Knox called Donovan. Views were exchanged.

Two days later, the Secretary of the Navy wrote a personal memorandum

to Lieutenant General Holcomb.
60

"With reference to our conversation concerning Colonel

Mchugh, who is on duty with the Navy, I have talked further

with General Donovan and have been advised that there is no

intention of sending him to foreign duty, and that his

services are desired by General Donovan here.

Under these circumstances, I should like to have McHugh

relieved and proper orders issued to have him report to

General Donovan. "26

What Donovan had in mind for Mchugh was eventual elevation t

a fairly senior position in either R&A or SO. Whether this became

known to Headquarters or was further discussed with Secretary Knox

is unclear. Whatever the stimulus may have been, the response is

plain. After only a few months at 055, Mchugh was again transferred

this time to Hawaii. His odyssey was not over yet.

Now stuck in the Service Battalion of Fifth Panphibious Corps

Mchugh wrote to Donovan stating that he wanted to return to OSS.

Donovan replied that he 'would be glad to have him'.27 Meanwhile,

StiIweil had been detached from his duties in China thus leaving the

way somewhat more open for Mchugh's renewed employment there.

Assistant Director of 055, Charles Cheston, became the

intermediary in an attempt to resecure Mchugh. On 12 December 1944

Mchugh's transfer was once again requested in writing.28 Soon afte

he was back in the 'cloak and dagger' fold, this time as assistant t

Brigadier General John Magruder, Deputy 055 Director of Intelligence

It was a convenient arrangement, as Magruder happened to be Mchugh'

brother-in-law.

29

James Mchugh's story does not have a happy ending. As late

as the spring of 1945, he was still trying to return to the China wh

he had spent virtually his entire adult life. On 15 February, McHu

called on Stilwell in Washington and "expressed regret over certain
f

61

passages in the report concerning him" . . .stilwell told him to 'forget

it.30 A few weeks later, The Foreign Economic Administration

invited McHugh to become their special representative with Ambassador

Hurley's staff in Chungking. On 7 March 1945, Hurley personally

approved this arrangement subject to concurrence by General Vandegrift.

The Commandant also gave his qualified blessing to the arrangement and

sought approval by the Secretary of the Navy based on McHugh's strenuous

assertion that the "appointment would be directly to F. E. A. and in no

sense a loan or 'plant' by the Approval was not forthcoming,

General Marshall was as powerful in March, 1945 as he had been in

December, 1942.

On 1 October 1945, 055 was officially disbanded and its

personnel shifted to either the War or State Departments. A total of

52 Marine officers who were still on 055 roll s received a blanket

Marine Corps Special Order covering their administrative transfer

to one of the new custodians of U. S. strategic intelligence.32

Senior man on the list was Colonel James M. McHugh, the highest

ranking regular Marine to serve with Donovan's Dreamers. A few

months later, McHugh retired.

Another 055 China analyst's story has a happier ending.

Major C. D. Gower was a University of Chicago, PhD. who had been

teaching anthropology at Lingnan University in Canton when World

War IT began. After the Japanese occupied Canton, Gower had

moved to Hong Kong. There 'the professor' went into captivity

during December, 1941. All of this comprises part of the unique

story of Marines with OSS but of greater interest is the fact that

Gower's first name was Charlotte and she was the only known distaff

leatherneck on Donovan's staff.
62

Charlotte Cower was nearly forty years old the day she entered

the Marine Corps recruiting station in Kanakee, Illinois. A stout

lady with graying hair and glasses, she hardly appeared to be the

ideal candidate for commissioning in the Armed Forces. But Charlotte

Cower was the type of person who belied looks and could be counted

upon to do a job and do it correctly.

Born and raised in Illinois, she had attended Smith College

and later earned her advanced degrees at Chicago. A woman of wide

experience, she spent two years in France working on prehistoric

archaeological digs for Yale and later was appointed Director of the

American School of Prehistoric Research.

Between 1928-30, Cower carried out an intensive study of

peasant life in a Sicilian comunity near Palermo. During this

research, she demonstrated an outstanding ability to collect, analyze,

and present material of a technical nature.33 Upon her return to

America, Cower became Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the

University of Wisconsin.

In 1938, Charlotte Cower was recruited by Lingnan. There she

served as head of the Anthropology Department and as Dean of Women.

After her capture in Hong Kong, she spent some months in a Japanese

internment camp and was repatriated along with other U. S. civilians

in 1942. In his letter of recommendation to Headquarters Marine Corps

Dr. Robert Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, called

her "an exceptionally capable and brilliant woman".34 The Marine Corp

soon concurred fully with that assessment.

Commissioned a Captain in the Marine Corps Women's Reserve on

29 January 1943, Cower reported directly to Headquarters for duty.
63

Without benefit of any particular military training, she was immediately

assigned to a series of recruiting trips designed to secure applicants

for Woman Marine officer screening.

"Major Gower (then a Captain) was one of the oMginal

staff of the Corps1 Woments Reserve. She was selected by

the Director of Reserve to organize and supervise all of

the training for Marine women with particular emphasis on

specialist recruitment and training. The excellence of the

results of her work is attested to by the highly satisfactory

accomplishments of Marine Women throughout the various

activities to which they are assigned.

On 17 November 1943, in addition to her other duties,

Major Gower became the Officer-in-Charge of the Women's

Reserve Section. In this capacity she had supervision

of the entire activities of the Women's Reserve. She

also headed the board which selected all Women candidates

for officer training."35

The early days of the Women's Reserve program were complicated

by the fact that much of the training was done in Navy schools and Navy

recruiters frequently were used to select candidates. This naturally

led to a situation where the Marine Corps got what amounted to

leftovers. Major Gower completely reversed this trend)utilizin9 a

fine mix of diplomacy and firmness. By March, 1944 she had a smoothly

running system which could be turned over to the M-5 Section of

Headquarter's Plans and Policies Division.

Charlotte Gower did not have much time to search for a new

challenge. On 17 April 1944, her services were specifically requested

by OSS. The qualifications were obvious. Not only did Major Gower

speak Chinese, she also spoke French and Italian. More importantly,

she had spent considerable time overseas and had seen the Japanese

operate firsthand. The Division of Reserve "very reluctantly

relinquished her services".36
64

On 1 June 1944, Major Gower reported to 055 for duty. She

finished the war as an analyst with R&A and wa demobilized late in

1945. One of the first 8 women officers to claim the title 'Marine"

was also one of the last to be demobilized. After the war, Charlott

Gower went back to teaching but she retained a strong interest in

the Marine Corps and remained active in the Reserves. She retired

as a Lieutenant Colonel, without pay, in the early 1960's.

Today there are a number of Woman Marines - both officer and

enlisted - in the intelligence profession. Charlotte Gower of OSS

was the first.37
CHAPTER V

"ZDRAVO, PURVI AMERICANEC'

The black Halifax from RAE Bomber Command thundered across

the Albanian mountains toward Yugoslavia. Inside its belly were

three tons of ammunition, small arms, radios and a single passenger.

All were fitted and rigged for a parachute drop.

Flying at 8,000 feet, the pilot and crew members scanned the

sea of darkness below looking for a prearranged signal: five fires

in the shape of a cross. It was nearly midnight, 19 August 1943.

Suddenly a red light glowed within the aircraft. Ahead and

slightly to the left were five dancing fires. Nearby a sixth light

blinked in rhythmic Morse. As the port side gunner answered with

his Aldus lamp, the passenger checked his chute and removed a

rectangular section from the floor of the bomber. Cold air streamed

into the plane. Gingerly the man balanced his body with one foot

on either side of the makeshift exit. Above his head the red glow

flashed to green. An instant later he was gone.

The chute blossomed and the man found himself swinging gently

in a silent world. Captain Walter R. Mansfield USMCR was only seconds

from becoming the first American to set foot in Yugoslavia since the

Belgrade Consultate had locked its doors more than two years ago.'

Captain Mansfields canopy caught a gust of wind. He drifted

away from the signal fires. Then the ground rushed up and he tumbled

to earth in a pile of boulders.

65
66

III got out of my harness, hid my chute, drew my .45 and waited

in the cold. Within ten minutes I heard voices, yelling out

in Serbian. "Zdravo! Zdravot Piatelj (Greetings!

Greetings! Friendl) I answered and was soon surrounded

by a small group of weird ragged-looking men, most of whom

had black beards and hats bearing a skull and bones emblem.

I told Lt. Perich, their leader that I was an American,

whereupon they all began to whoop, holler, and kiss nie

(black beards and all) shouting 'Zdravo, Purvi Americanec'

(Greetings, first American. I mustered up my Serbian to

reply, 'Zdravo Chetnicfl' - The first American had

landed. «2

The drop zone a few hundred yards up the mountain was bustli

with activity. Several dozen guerillas were busy tending the fires

while others formed a rough perimeter defense or waited for the supp

drop. Moments after Mansfield reached this scene, the Halifax roare

over again spewing 15 bundles in its wake. These were quickly

gathered-up and the 'first American' met his British counterparts:

Colonel 3iléy and Major Greenless both members of the 50E mission

which had parachuted into Montenegro on ChristmasDay 1942. Bai1e

a former mining engineer, had worked in Serbia before the war and

spoke the language fluently.3

After several hours of hiking, the guerillas reached their

base camp. There P4anfield was introduced to the man to whom his

mission was directed, General Draga Mihailovic, the 'Robin Hood of

Serbia'.

Yugoslavia has been called a country with seven frontiers,

six Republics, four languages, three religions, and two alphabets

all in search of one boss. Its name literally means 'the land of th

Southern Slays' and as late as 1918 it was not a country at all.

When Germany attacked Yugoslavia in April 1941, the national army

was quickly subdued and the reigning monarch, 18 year old King Peter
67

fled into exile. But within the rugged mountains and deep forests

resistance to the Nazi's and their puppet troops, the listase, grew.

Two men would lead the fighting. One of these was Mihailovic, the

other was Josip Broz, better known by his nom de querre: Tito.

Mihailovic commanded the loyalty of the largely Serbian

*

Chetniks. The Chetnik organization had its origins in veterans

groups and was pro-royalist. "It had a central command with a chief

and local organizations in a large number of places throughout the

country but principally in Serbia. For many members, Chetnik work

was a full-time activity, even in peacetime."4

When the order for surrender of Yugoslav forces became official

on 16April 1941, Mihailovic refused to obey it. He told his commanding

officer: "You may lay down your arms, but I am going to continue the

struggle in the Chetnik way, together with those who are brave enough

to follow me."5

Three weeks later, t4ihailovic reached his intended headquarters

site, the high plateau of Ravna Gora in Western Serbia. With him were

seven officers and 24 soldiers. Around these he planned to mold a

guerilla army.

Mihailovic was in his late forties. Of medium-build, his most

impressive feature was a wildly tangled black beard streaked with gray.

His face was broad, and behind a pair of round steel-rimmed glasses

lurked dark, wild eyes. He was every inch a soldier. By the time

Mansfield arrived near the Mountain of Cemerno, thousands of Serbians

had rallied to the Chetnik banner.6

*The tern Chetnik is derived from the Serbian word ceta

meaning armed company.
68

While Mihailovic was building his army, another Yugoslav of

very different character was waiting in history's wings. Josip Broz,

General Secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Part* was a Croatian. Born

in what was then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, Broz served in th

Carpathian campaigns of early World War I. Wounded and captured by the

Tsarist Russians, he escaped from his POW camp just in time for the

Bolshevik Revolution. "He stayed on in Russia and became a Communist

Party member in 1919, returned to Yugoslavia with a Russian wife in

1920, and in 1924 was elected to a local post in the illegal CPY."7

During the next fifteen years he would adopt the name lito and see

the inside of more than a few jails. And he would rise in the Party

for his allegiance to Moscow never wavered. On the eve of the war,

Tito became General Secretary.

The German invasion posed a significant dilemma for Tito and

the communists. On one hand, the reactionary monarchy against which

they had struggled was cast aside,but since Germany and the Soviet

Union were still allies nothing could be done to openly antagonize the

new regime. This problem did not long persist. When Hitler attaéked

Russia, open warfare seemed in order. Yet, in calling for aid to the

Mecca of Marxism, the Commintern issued a statement which may have

begun Tito's disaffection with Moscow:

"Take into consideration that at this stage your task is

the liberation from Fascist oppression and not Socialist

revolution. "8

On July 4th, the Yugoslav Politburo met secretly in a nondescri

house on the outskirts of Belgrade. The members, all veterans of

clandestine political conflict, called for the raising of a national
69

community army. At the time, the party probably numbered about 10,000

and included many members who had fought with the Republican forces

* in Spain. So the call went out and the tPartisan' movement began:

Initially the partis4ns were amazingly successful. Within a

few weeks lito made mince meat of two fully-equ'pped but abysmally-led

Italian divisions in Montenegro. Large quantities of arms and

ammunition fell into Partisan hands. On September 18th, lito himself

took control of all military operations, making his field headquarters

near Valjevo in the Serbian hills.

Throughout the war, Communist party members formed a minority

of the Partisan movement but lito ensured that from the very outset

his supporters were in most command positions. Thus it is not

surprising that when he met Mihailovic on neutral ground half-way

between his headquarters and the Ravna Gora both sides were suspicious.

Their first parlay ended inconclusively but a second was agreed

upon. This took place on 27 October 1941 at Brajici. By this time,

Mihailovic had been designated Minister of War by King Peter's

Government-in-Exile and the first allied liaison officer, British

Captain D. T. Hudson, had already arrived to coordinate SOE assistance

** to the Chetniks.

"This second conference ended with some measure of agreement.

Mihailovic was to obtain half of the production of the Partisan-held

Uzice ammunition and-rifle factory. In return, Mihailovic promised

*The 4th of July is now a major Yugoslavian holiday known

as Dan Borca - the day of the fighter.

**Hudson was another mining engineer who had worked in

Yugoslavia before the war. He was landed by submaine on the Montenegran

coast along with 3 Yugoslavs on 20 September 1941.
70

Tito a share of whatever parachute draps he might obtain from the

British."10 This deal did not last a fortnight.

Mihailovic rightly believed that Tito would never accept a

return of the monarchy. Grossly underestimating the organizational

skill and numbers of the Partisan movement, he decided to occupy

Uzice himself. On the night of 2 November, Chetnik forces attacked

Uzice and were soundly trounced by Tito's men. After that Yugoslav

was a three-way war: Chetniks, Partisans, and Germans*

The break could not have corne at a worse time. The Germans

were in the midst of an all-out drive to 'pacify' those areas under

guerilla control and1one by one, the 'liberated' population centers

fell back under Axis control.

Almost nothing of this internecine feuding revealed itself

to the ciutside world. In both London and Washington the issue of'

aid to Yugoslavia was split along ethnic lines. Both capitals

attracted lobbyists from the various natioriâlities who championed

their own causes at the expense of the others. Serbians pointed to

Mihailovic and Peter as legitimate symbols of Yugoslav resistance.

Croatians and connunists championed the Partisans without mentioning

their leadership... if indeed they knew who was in charge. Tito's

name did not surface in the West for several more months. Meanwhil

both the British and American governments dealt with Peter and his

Anibassador in 4ashington, Constantin Frotic.

The Partisans and Chetniks diagreed as much in begy as

they did in politics. German retaliation fell most heavily upon the

more numerous Serbs and threatened to weaken Mihailovic's recruitin

base. Consequently, he adopted a 'hide in the hills and develop the

army' philosophy which saved casualties but failed to hurt .
t.-

71

Tito, on the other hand, exerted every ounce of his energy to attacking

German lines of conununication whatever the cost.

"The Partisans were revolu tionaries, the Chetniks were for

restoration of the status quo. The Partisans appealed to

the broad masses of Yugoslavia, the Chetniks... with minor

exceptions to the Serbs. The Partisan movement was an

organization of young people.... They were clean shaven -

Tito never missed a day shaving even during the most

difficult battles. While the Chetniks were an older group,

they looked more so because they let their beards grow

in the old Serbian tradition. The Partisans were a

highly disciplined centrally directed organization, the

Chetniks much less so. Woman played an important re

in the Partisan movement, none among the Chetniks."

These then were fundamentally different organizations. In fact, their

only two points of similarity were a desire to free Yugoslavia of foreign

rule and a continuing search for outside support.

As news of the fighting in Yugoslavia's mountains trickled

out, it gradually became apparent that Mihailovic was not the only

guerilla leader. Hudson's reports of a far greater level of activity

by the Partisans (he never mentioned Tito by name) spurred the

British to send new emissaries in search of more information»3

Colonel Bailey was the first of these. In addition to his liaison

and fact-find role, it was hoped that Bailey could induce greater

levels of violence against the Germans since the war in North Africa

was then reaching a critical stage.*

In April, 1943 SUE dropped two all-Yugoslav teams (codenames

** HOATLEY I and FUNGUS) into Croatia and Bosnia. These were the vanguard.

*Bailey jumped into Mihailovic's area on the same day

Captain Ortiz left for Morocco.

**Both of these teams flew from a captured Italian air base

at Derna, Libya - the site of Presley O'Bannon's exploits in the Barbary

Liars. Mansfield also left from Derna but he was unaware of the

historical connection with the Marine Corps)4
72

Both went in 'blind' since no one seemed to know where Partisan

headquarters might be. Luckily, FUNGUS landed close to Tito's

subordinate headquarters at Brinje and was hospitably received.

Soon SOE's Cairo base was preparing to send in its first British

officers. A three-man mission commanded by Major William D. Jone

was infiltrated by sea "slowly and comfortably drifting to the mo

light turfs of Croatia")5 This team immediately determined that 

chief Partisan stronghold was not in Brinje but they did arrange 

a direct para-drop to Titos command post on Mount Durmitor near

Zabl ijak.

On 28 May 1948, 50E launched the TYPICAL mission which

* consisted of British Captain F. W. Deakin, Canadian Captain Will

F. Stuart, and four NCO's. All were parachuted into the Monteneg

mountains and soon were established at Tito's secret headquarters

50E now had direct liaison teams with bojh major Yugoslav resistan

organizations and OSS was anxious to get in on the act.

This was easier to contemplate than to accomplish "Plan

to land 055 men on the Yugoslav coast were consistently blocked b

the Royal Navy which at SOE instigation 'requisitioned' every sma

vessel that OSS requested. It finally required General Donovan's

personal intervention in London to clear the way for 035 Yugoslav

missions. ,,l6

A number of officers were initially primed for the first

Yugoslav insertions. Among these were Army Captains M. O. Benson

*Deakin was a personal friend of Winston Churchill havin

served as primary research assistant during the writing of Church

biography of his famous forebearer the Duke of Marlborough.
73

and George Selvig. Two additional officers were sent from Washington

and confusion reigned as to exactly which officers should be dropped

and to which group. In the midst of several cancellations imposed

* by bad weather, Major Huot, head of Special Operations branch for

OSS Cairo, visited London. There he met Captain Mansfield for the

first time.

Walter R. Mansfield had just celebrated his 32nd birthday.

Born in Boston he was educated at Roxbury Latin School and Harvard,

receiving his AB in 1932 and a law degree in 1935. Before the war,

Mansfield was a practicing member of Donovan's law firm and later

served as Assistant U. S. Attorney for South New York.

After joining OSS as a civilian, Mansfield applied for a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve. He attended the Reserve Officer

Candidate Class in 1942 and was subsequently ordered to the Marine

Parachute Training School at New River on Donovan's personal request)7

In June, 1943 Mansfield flew to London to serve as a staff member at

055's own parachute training center which was then beginning to prepare

agents for clandestine entry into Europe. He had been in England only

a few weeks when he met and favorably impressed Huot.

As soon as Mansfield arrived in Chetnik territory he began

receiving briefings from Mihailovic and his principal staff officers.

Since the General spoke no English and the Captain little Serbian,

conversations were carried on in French)8 Mansfield kept in touch

with OSS Cairo by coded radio messages. From the outset, 'the first

American' was impressed.

*Huot was a business associate of Frank Knox and had been

a newspaperman in France before the war.
74

"For two years they (Chetniks) had been living off the land

and sleeping in the mountains. They received no pay and

little clothing, relying on the generosity of the peasants

for food. Despite this, each guerilla followed orders

without question, cheerfully carrying out long marches

over the steepest mountains, always ready to risk his

life for his commander."19

One morning, the Germans launched a battalion-size surprise

attack on the headquarters. Aided by a thick fog they succeeded in

slipping past the outposts and were nearly into the camp before being

spotted. A sharp fight followed with each side losing about 20 killed

Mansfield saw his first action that morning. He also witnessed the

character of Vugoslav guerilla warfare when Mihailovic's men rounded

up S prisoners. After a short period of interrogation, all were shot

on the spot.

Their position totally compromised, the Chetniks promptly

moved deeper into the hills. For 15 straight hours more than 500 men

and pack animals force marched through a driving rai-n storm. It was

not until well past midnight that Mihailovic tleemed it safe to re-estab

lish his camp.

Mansfield was amazed at the conditioning of the ragged troops

but he had still to see them in offensive action. This situation was

remedied when he and Hudson were allowed to accompany a mission to

disrupt the main railway from Belgrade to Dubrovnik.

The site chosen for interdiction was a bridge and tunnel compl

Manfield and Hudson decided to wreck a train inside the tunnel and th

blow the bridge to block any repair crews from the nearest town. Thre

hundred Chetniks would be involved in the operation.

Hudson's experience as an engineer fitted this task to perfect

He took the bridge. Captain Mansfield, who had also been trained to u
75

demolitions, got the tunnel. Since the evening train normally passed

the selected area at about 1730, it was decided to lay the charges

one hour before. This would diminish the liklihood of their discovery

by enemy patrols.

"After our reconnaissance party reported that the coast was

clear, I entered the tunnel with five men, leaving one group

at either end. The track rested on very short ties, supported by rock and cinders. We walked about 200 feet before

my eyes became accustomed to the darkness and I could see

the other entrance about 300 feet away. I put two halfpound blocks of TNT under the rail, connected up the

primacord and snapped jhe fog signal detonator on the

track - a simple job.CO

Then the unexpected occurred: the 1730 train came chugging

around a bend. Mansfield and his men ran for their lives, barely

clearing one end of the tunnel as the engine steamed in the other.

A muffled bang followed, then a squealing of brakes. Out puffed the

engine.

A thunderous crash reverberated through the hills. Hudson had

laid 100 pounds of ring-mained charges at each end of the bridge.

When his sentries heard the train, he yanked both igniters and headed

for the forest. Two minute later 100 feet of bridge and large chunks

of concrece piling dropped into the river below.

Mansfield's TNT had taken out 6 feet of track but somehow

failed to derail the train. Nevertheless, it was now stuck. The

Chetniks swarmed out of the hills, captured the passengers and did what

damage they could to the engine without further explosives. As the first

German patrols arrived, the raiding party withdrew behind a screen of

ambushes.
76

During the following months, Mansfield and Hudson would see

* more action. In September, Army Lieutenant Colonel Albert Seltz

had been parachuted to Mihailovic's camp becoming the senior 035

representative to the Chetniks. Meanwhile, both the British and

Americans had dropped liaison teams to Tito. Major Huot led the

U. S. contingent while the 50E group was headed by Brigadier Fitzroy

**

Maclean. Clearly the Partisans were beginning to be viewed as the

predominant active guerilla army. British aid to the Chetniks slowed

to a trickle.21

Seitz had arrived in Chetnik territory as part of an SUE

mission coauiianded by British Brigadier C. D. Armstrong. Unlike

Maclean, Armstrong was blatantly anti-033 Seitz would later describe

him as "the rare type of Englishman who sneers at anything American

and dislikes having Americans close to him."22 It was certainly far

from an ideal situation and one which could only worsen in the days

to come.

In early October, Mihailovic decided to give the allies anothe

example of what his forces could do if properly supplied. He chose

as his target the railway complex at Visegrad and the bridge spanning

the Drina River. If successful, this operation could cut German lines

of conmunication between Bosnia and Serbia.

* Seitz was a West Point drop-out who had served in the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police. After the war he was involved in the disast

attempts to infiltrate CIA teams into Albania (these were betrayed by

Kim Philby,the KGB agent operating inside British Intelligence).

**Maclean was another personal friend of Churchill and vetera

SOE operative. He had served as a Conservative MP and also as an

intelligence officer in Moscow.
77

On the night of 2 October 1943, Chetnik forces began moving

into position and at dawn, two days later, they struck. More than

2000 bearded Serbs threw everything they had at the 800-man Nazi

garrison. After fierce fighting, the Chetniks captured the town;

destroyed the bridge; and continued to harass the Germans as they

withdrew. This pursuit carried Mihailovic's men into Partisan

territory.23

Immediately a worthwhile anti-German operation was converted

into civil war. Rather than supporting the Chetniks, Tito attacked

them. His forces allowed the Nazi's to escape and concentrated on

driving Mihailovic's guerillas back into the hills. Partisans

occupied Visegrad and their Radio Free Yugoslavia announced to the

world that the entire operation had been Tito's. The BBC parroted

this claim.24

Mihailovic was enraged at London's niggardly support and

resentful of BBC Serbian-language broadcasts which portrayed Tito as

a heroic figure. Ignoring further advice from Armstrong, he invited

Sietz and Mansfield to conduct a tour of all Chetnik-held territory

in order that they might draw their own conclusions. On 6 November,

they set-out on horseback to do just that.

It was an extremely enlightening trip. The Chetniks virtually

controlled large sections of Serbia and the party moved easily in many

areas. Only when it became necessary to cross major rivers did problems

arise. In one case Mansfield,,disguised as a Serb, walked straight

through a German checkpoint and across the Drina River Bridge at

Gorazde.25 Eventually the two men split-up. But wherever they went,

support for Mihailovic seemed overwhelming.
78

Of course this passage did not totally escape notice by the

-German intelligence system. Soon there were more and more brushes with

security troops. Finally, the way back to Mihailovic barred by

increased counter-guerilla operations, it was decided to attempt an

escape to allied territory in Italy. Mansfield, Bailey, and Yugoslav

Captain Tudorovic were able to establish radio contact with 055, Cairo.

Arrangements were made for a seaborne exfiltration by the Royal Navy.

On 15 February 1944, the 'first American' and his companions were picked-up near Cavtat on the Dalmatian coast. Seitz and his party

crossed into Partisan-held territory and were flown out the next

26

month.

Based on the reports of Mansfield and Seltz, Donovan tried

to continue American support to both the Chetniks and Partisans.

IÌUnder Donovan's arrangement, Yugoslavia would be broken into two

separate zones. Tito would control the western sector and Mihailovic

the eastern region. Both guerilla armies would be responsible to

the allied connand in Italy."27 President Roosevelt accepted this

idea but thurchill was vehemently opposed to splitting Anglo-British

efforts. Donovan, with characteristic flair, offered to personally

parachute into Yugoslavia to negotiate an end to the rivalry.28

At the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt was gradually won-over to

the British position. Aid to Mihailovic dwindled to nothing.

Desperately, the Chetniks negotiated a modus vivendi with local German

commanders but Mihailovic himself remained firmly pro-American.

Mansfield, Seitz and other OSS operatives who had had direct contact

with the Chetniks were bitterly disillusioned by this stance. But

when Roosevelt proposed new 055 missions to Serbia, the British violentl

opposed them and the idea was withdrawn.29
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After Tehran, Churchill told King Peter that all aid would go

to Tito. In the end, the Royal Government disavowed Mihailovic in a

vain hope that the Partisans might accept Peter as a postwar figurehead monarch.

When the Russians entered Yugoslavia in late 1944, Mihailovic

offered to cooperate with them. This idea was accepted long enough

for the Red Army to disarm the Chetniks and begin turning them over

to the Partisans. By December, 1944, "naked, barefoot, and hungry

remanents of Mihailovic's forces were retreating through the Bosnian

mountains.., appealing for entry into any Allied Army."3°

"Mihailovic did in East Europe what the Gaullist organization

was ordered to do In West Europe: It lay low to keep an army in

being for the day of an allied landing... The only Allied troops to

arrive were the Russians, Tito's forces hunted down Mihailovic and

captured him in the Spring of 1946, months after World War II had

ended. ,,31In July, 1946 Mihailovic fought his last battle. When he

entered the courtroom in Belgrade, he was old, tired and defeated.

Greeted by jeers, hisses, and cries of "hang him" Mihailovic listened

impassively as the charges against him were read. They took eight

hours.

Not only was Mihailovic on trial but every allied liaison

officer who had been with him was also denounced. In his address to

the court, Mihailovic said: "I wanted nothing for myself."32

The verdict was a foregone conclusion. At dawn on 17 July, the

'Robin Hood of Serbia' was shot to death on the golf course at Topcider,

once a favorite resort of the Diplomatic Corps.
CHAPTER VI

"DID YOU PLAY FOOTBALL IN COLLEGE?"

"He stood six foot five in his leather jumping boots and

weighed close to two hundred and thirty pounds. A British parachu

emblem and a small American flag were neatly stitched to the sleev

of his combat jacket. There was also the conventional military

insignia, and a .357 Magnum revolver strapped to his thigh. His

name was John Hamilton and he was a Second Lieutenant in the Unite

States Marine Corps (Reserve)."1 The big blond man who wrote thes

words was describing himself. At twenty-seven he had already seen

a lifetime of adventure. His physical description is accurate eno

but the name John Hamilton while technically correct, is misleadin

The lieutenant was much better known as Sterling Hayden - sailor,

author, actor, and now a Marine with OSS.

Sterling Walter Hayden was born in Montclair, New Jersey o

26 March 1916. At seventeen, he quit school and went to sea aboar

the sailing schooner Puritan out of New London. For the next ni

years, Hayden followed the wind and waves. He began as a common

seaman and ended as ship's master.2

In the late 1930's Hayden's good looks and cocky attitude

earned him a Hollywood screen test. He became an overnight sensat

But celluloid action could not compare with what he had already ta

Although he was engaged to beautiful starlet Madeleine Carrol, Hay

80
81

jumped at a cryptic invitation from COI Director Donovan to test his

mettle at the British Commando School.*

In November 1941, Hayden sailed to Scotland with a British convoy.

When he reported to the American Embassy in London, no one seemed to know

what to do with him. After a week of cooling his heels1 howeve5 Hayden

received orders to report to the Commando Training Center at Archnarry.

Once again his reception was muted. The Commanding Officer,

Colonel Young, found Hayden's story that his acting ability might pay

off as a spy somewhat dubious. But he was big and lean and tough.

"So they told him to train and he trained - a pale tall figure

in British battledress, minus insignia, wearing American

hunting boots and no hat - all wrapped up in a Hollywood

trenchcoat. He trained with Dutchmen and Poles and Belgians,

and French and Danes and Norwegians, all of whom had been in

combat. All were fighters, with rank and military bearing

and the confidence of men who know their job.. .After a

day's work in driving rain, this group would assemble in

a dark beamed room, warmed by a small coal fire, for the

ration of whiskey - two per man - and to learn the news.

First the national anthem, and then the announcer's voice:

"Good evening. This is the Home and Forces program of the

BBC. Here is the news.. ." And it was always bleak."3

Hayden was a civilian novice among military experts, but he did

well. After passing through the initial rigors of Commando life., Hayden

was sent to the Parachute School near Manchester. He made ten jumps

without incident. But in March, 1942 his luck ran out. Hayden landed

in a stone quarry. When the ground crew found him, he had a broken

ankle, dislocated knee, and spinal injuries. No more commando work now,

only a trip back to the V. S. and his marriage to Miss Carroll.

* Hayden had met Donovan through the latter's son who was also

a sailing b uff.
82

While his injuries healed, Hayden brooded. Donovan urged him

to apply for a coninission in the Navy. But the Navy was not looking fo

torpedo boat skippers with bad legs and dubious backs. Hayden was

politely rejected. So he took a schooner and sailed her to the West

Indies. There at the Shell Oil reservation on Curacao he got rip-snorti

drunk with six Marines from the security detachment. They ended-up at

the Americano Hotel. When the manager told Hayden he could remain but

the Marines had to go, the former actor mustered up all his commando

skills and threw the manager into the street. For that he went to jail

Bailed out by his agent, Hayden sold his boat. Flying back to 

York he made his decision. After breakfast the next day he telephoned t

nearest Marine Corps Recruiting Station. Within hours Hayden was on a

train bound for Yamesee, South Carolina - railhead for the Recruit Depo

at Parris Island. That evening's New York Daily News carried a photograph of Hayden enlisting as a Private in the United States Marines.5

It did not take Private Hayden long todiscern a certain

difference between commanding one's own schooner and taking orders

from a drill instructor. He had passed Commando training and he

passed Marine boot camp too. Singled-out for officer's training he

was irimediately assigned back to OSS at Donovan4s request.6

Following a short period of indoctrination in Washington,

Second Lieutenant Hayden received orders to proceed to Cairo.

"Cairo, like Algiers in the Western Mediterranean, had by then

become an intelligence service Capital. The war itself had mainly

long passed it by."7 The Americans were not very comfortable there.

"The city was somehow connected in their minds with Imperialism,

Kipling, and all that.
83

Even among the British there was much evident friction. This

was particularly true of the 'secret' organizations which competed among

themselves with an ardor only slightly diminished from that reserved

for the Germans. 'The entire Britih clandestine bureaucracy was torn

by bitter factionalism; fervent champions of competing Balkan resistance

groups were united only in their equal distaste for emissaries of the

Foreign Office.

Donovan had displayed great early interest in the Middle East.

In late 1942, he had sanctioned organization of a working group known

as "Project 90" under the leadership of Eddy's cousin, Army Colonel

Harold Hoskins. The precept of Hoskin's outfit was a somewhat naive

belief that the United States could be the most effective agent in

the area because it was untainted by the pecuniary interests of

imperial Britain»°

Predictably, His Majesty's servants took considerable exception

to this view and 'Project 90' fizzled. But there was a lingering bad

taste in the mouth of the British lion when the first OSS contingent

arrived to set-up shop in an ornate Egyptian villas which "looked like

a bastard Taj Mahal." It was to this atmosphere that Hayden reported.

Standing at rigid attention before the Commanding Officer, cap

and orders beneath his left arm, Hayden must have been a martial

spectacle to behold. The Colonel looked him over and asked: "Haven't

I seen you somewhere before?"

"I don't know sir."

"Your face is familiar, did you play football in college?"

"No sir, I never went to college."12
84

This line of questioning exhausted, Hayden was told to read all

available reports regarding the situation in Greece. For the next

few days he did little else. Finally, with no meaningful job in view,

he requisitioned a jeep. Hayden drove down to the Alexandria waterfront, talked himself into the Royal Egyptian Yacht Club, and went

sailing.

Hayden had been told that he was to skipper one of a number of

Greek fishing boats which OSS proposed to run into German occupied

territory. Instead, he was transferred to Monopoli, a small Italian

port south of Bai. "With the aid of 400 Partisans, and using a fleet

of fourteen schooners (supplied by the Wrigley's Chewing Gum executive

who commanded the OSS Maritime Unit), Hayden's group ran supplies

through the German Adriatic blockade to the Partisan-held island of

Vis."13 The average cruising speed of his flotilla was seven knots.

The Germans had 35 knot "E" boats and aircraft. Butthe convoy

system worked.

In early January, 1944, Hayden took a 45-foot boat across the

80 miles of hostile water between Monopoli and Vis. Moving at night

and putting into one of the thousands of Dalmatian coves, Hayden

avoided detection. I-le reached Vis safely, dropped his supplies and

started back. The water pump quit and his engine froze.

Accompanied by his assistant, Gunnery Sergeant John Harnicker

USMC, Hayden and the rest of the crew paddled to the mainland.

"We hooked up with about thirty of the toughest bastards

on earth. None of them had had a bath in years. All had

been in the thick of the fighting and marching all up

and down Bosnia and Croatia. They would only take one 14

cigarette at a time, which they passed around in circles."

85

This Yugoslav version of the "Wild Bunch" soon learned that

a German patrol boat was weatherbound a short distance away. Without

a word it was clear that the vessel must be attacked. When the

shooting started, Hayden had difficulty pulling the trigger on what

appeared to be a crew of German naval cadets. Harnicker had no such

qualms. He was "just as cool as you please, which is what you get

for being a regular Marine."15 The boat soon surrendered and was

commandeered by the Partisans. Wounded Germans were given what

medical treatment could be provided by the guerilla corpsman who

turned out to be a French surgeon. Since there was no anesthetic

available, the doctor used a field expedient. After preparing the

wound, he simply smashed each patient in the temple with his pistol

butt. Then he operated.

Shortly thereafter Hayden took the "prize" patrol boat back

to Vis.

Lieutenant Hayden (Hamilton) was also involved in the savage

fighting which raged around Vis and the neighboring islands of Hvar,

Brac, and Solta. These operations were directed against the crack

German 118th Jaeger Division. In addition to the Partisans there

were British troops from '2", "43" and "40" Commandos - the latter

two being Royal Marine outfits.'6

He was bombed by Stukas, chased by patrol boats, ambushed

ashore and afloat. Hayden took his boats into Albania, the Adriatic

islands, and mainlain Yugoslavia. He was at it for a full year.

During these days he developed "a tremendously close feeling"for Titos

men. Sent to the Yugoslav interior as part of a rescue team for

downed allied airman, he remembered that "the crews of planes would
86

leave their shoes, anything they could spare with the Partisans...

We knew they were Communists, we knew they had commissars, but the

was very little discussion of that.''7

"Most 055 officers who worked with Tito's guerillas were n

political ideologues. They saw Tito's troops only as courageous

and dedicated fighters against a common enemy. Other Americans,

like Seitz and Mansfield had taken a similar view of the Chetniks.

When Hayden returned to the United States in November, 194

he wore the red, white, and blue striped ribbon of the Silver Star

Medal. His marriage was 'on the rocks' but his war was not yet ov

Within the next few months he would dine with Eleanor Roosevelt, e

a thirty-day leave, and make first contacts with the Communist Par

of the United States.19

By February, 1945, Hayden was back in Europe, this time as

* a member of the OSS section attached to the First Army in France.

During the spring of 1944, Lieutenant Hayden had been invo

in the rescue of 26 Americans (including eleven nurses) whose plan

had been forced down by engine trouble over Albania. This craggy,

small country - wedged uncomfortably between Yugoslavia, Greece, a

the Adriatic - offered a guerilla warrior's paradise. Unfortunate

it also provided the normal Balkan resistance situation: Germans,

royalists, and communists.

The Albanians, regardless of their political ilk, were a n

lot Known for cupidity, courage, cruelty, and blood feud, they s

*The remainder of Hayden's Marine career will be discussed 

a later chapter of this paper.
87

a language known as Shqip and referred to themselves as Shqípetars,

which means roughly 'sons of the eagle. Anthropologists tell us that

a nation's character is often vividly expressed in its folk music.

One popular Albanian ballad began: "Let us fight, as is our custom".

Another, Inlell mother that her son got married; and if she asks what

kind of bride, tell her he got three bullets in the chest."20

Before the war, Albania was nominally ruled by King Zog the

First (and last). The King fled when the Italians invaded, leaving

the country ripe for civil war. Because resistance groups spent most

of their time and effort fighting each other, (J. S. policy was to limit

the supply of weapons and ammunition provided to any one faction. By

November 1943, the Communist National Liberation Front (FNC) controlled

most of the country and was the only effective force known to the

Allies. Led by Enver Hoxha, "a fat, pudgy, self-indulgent fellow with

a white face", the Communists were to be backed by OSS because they

appeared to be 'the best of a very bad lot'.21

The first 055 mission to Albania was codenamed TANK This was

a three man team landed by British motor torpedo boat on the night of

17 November 1943. TANK's radio operator was Gunnery Sergeant Nick R.

Cooky USMC. "The British S0E mission to Albania nad refused to cooperate

witn OSS agents, unless they accepted British Command and used British

communications. The three men therefore, with FNC support, established

themselves independently in a cave by the sea."22 From there, Cooky

began sending a series of intelligence reports to the Cairo-based SI

Balkan Section headed by ist Lieutenant Harry Harper, USMCR.

Despite some initial success the TANK mission encountered

problems with both their health and the enemy. In February, 1944
88

the team was forced to evacuate when the Germans began a systematic

campaign to clean-out guerilla units in the nearby Shushica Valley.

Another 055 team was infiltrated the next month and in July,

Cooky, now a 2nd Lieutenant USMCR, was parachuted back into the Albanian

mountains.23 During the next five months, he would see plenty of action

as the Communist guerillas cooperated with the Red Army's drive toward

Tirana, the capital city. From SeDtember onward, Cooky commanded a

field unit, supplying some of the best hard intelligence to come from

a thoroughly confusing situation. He proved to be "uniformly successful

in maintaining amicable relations with the Albanians and was equally

adroit in culling factual information from the welter of rumor and

24 half-truth that surrounded any Balkan situation.

Tirana, a city of mud wall, mosques, muezzins, and minarets

was light years away fromCooky'honietown of Dilles Bottom, Ohio.

For the former miner and truck driver Serving as the United States

intelligence officer in such an alien setting it proved a challenge.

But Lieutenant Cooky met it. His commander would later write of his

service: "In more than a year of service in the field, some of it

under extremely hazardous and difficult conditions, Lt. Cooky has an

unexcel led record. 25

Comrade 1-loxha delayed for some time the permanent establishment

of a complete "city team". Finally in February, 1945, the Communists

permitted 055 to set-up an eleven man unit. "An interesting move by

the Provisional Government was the refusal to accept U. S. civilians.

This order effectively prohibited the entry of the principal 055 expert

on Albania (until he later joined the Consular Staff)."26
89

Until official State Department representatives arrived in

June, OSS provided the only link between the Government of Albania and

the United States. The Tirana team remained in Albania until October,

1945. Lieutenant Cooky was among the last to leave. On 28 september

in a brief, simple ceremony Captain Thomas E. Stefan, Field Artillery

and Second Lieutenant Nick R. Cooky, USMCR were decorated with the

Partisan Star by Albanian Foreign Minister Omer Nishani.

Cooky later received the Bronze Star Medal from the United

States. For previous service behind the lines in Italy, he was awarded

the Merit Cross of War and the Order of the Crown.27

First Lieutenant Harper, the Balkan SI Chief, was also

involved in the liberation of an exotic capital. His was Sofia.

Harry Harper was 34 years old in 1944. Born in Chicago,

Harper attended public schools and later graduated from Yale. In 1934 he went to work as an editor for Reader's Diciest. Soon after

the war began, Harper enlisted in the Army and was assigned to a

Tank Lighter Company at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts. In November 1942,

he was transferred to Fort Ord in California. When OSS began recruiting volunteers for 'dangerous and secret operations' Harper volunteered.

He became a member of the outfit in August, 1943.28

As an Army Specialist 4th Class, Harper suffered an endemic

problem for OSS enlisted men. His skills outdistanced his 'horsepower'.

Consequently, he applied for a direct commission in the Marine Corps

"for service with the Office of Strategic Services". Harper became

and 'instant Marine Officer' on 21 January 1944.His assignment was waiting. The next month he was sent to Cairo where he was directed

to become an 'expert on Bulgaria'.
90

The Bulgarians are a glum and unlucky race. "Through no desire

of their own... they have had their national name attached to the

Bogomil heresy which taught that Satan was Christ's brother, and to

the ugly sin of buggery (bulgary). All of their neighbors detest

them."29 Just about every misfortune which can befall a people has

been inflicted on the Bulgars. During World War II, they naturally

picked the wrong side and ended-up losing their always shaky

independence.

In late August, 1944, OSS dropped a two man team to Greek

guerilla forces which were harrassing the German and Bulgarian troops

withdrawing from Thessalonika. This team was to accompany the

advancing Greek forces toward Sofia.

The German rearguard fought a skillful and deliberate delaying

action. This combined with a series of riotous welcomes in nearly

every town to seriously impede the allied advance.

OSS was anxious to reach Sofia in order to safeguard and

expedite removal of more than 300 POW's - most of whom were American

flyers. Lieutenant Harper was directed to head a four man team which

would drive by civilian car from Istanbul straight to the capital city.

Once there he was to negotiate with the Bulgarian government for

immediate custody of the prisoners.3° Incredibly, this 'cut and

paste' approach succeeded. On 7 September, having bluffed his way

right through an enemy country, a Marine lieutenant calmly set down

to negotiate with the Bulgarian General Staff.

It turned-out that the Bulgarians had 342 allied POW's at a

camp near Shumen. Harper demanded their immediate release and transport

to safety. On 9 September, a special train was despatched to Shumen with

orders to bring the airmen to Sofia.
91

The situation was confused and complicated by the fact that

Harper's four men constituted the sole allied 'occupation force'.

While the train was steaming toward Sofia, the lieutenant learned that

a heavy German bombing raid was scheduled to hit the main rail yard.

Although he spoke little Bulgarian, Harper managed to locate the express

and have it sidetracked at Goma Orekovista, some thirty miles away.

The air attack arrived on schedule and plastered the Sofia station...

minus the train. The next day, Harper telegraphed Istanbul and arranged

for the POW's to enter neutral Turkey. For his audacious and diplomatic

coup, First Lieutenant Harry H. Harper, USMCR received the Legion of

Merit.31

After the Red Army occupied Sofia, Harper returned to Cairo.

He was transferred to 055 headquarters at Caserta, Italy in February,

1945 and subsequently was involved in OSS activities in Austria

following the German collapse.

Since Marine Officers were involved in Yugoslavia, Albania,

and Bulgaria, only Rumania was without proper sea soldier representation.

Captain William L. Cary, USMCR filled that slot.

Bill Cary, like Harper, was a Yale Man (AB '31, LLB '34).

Not content with a total 'Old Blue' image, he also attended Harvard

Business School, graduating Maqna Cuni Laude in 1938.

Before the war, Cary practiced law in Cleveland, served with

the Securities and Exchange Commission in Seattle and in 1940 became

Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. In February 1942, he began a stint as legal specialist on the staff of the

Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in Rio de .Janero.32
92

Cary applied for a Marine Corps commission in late November,

1942 and was brought onboard as a First Lieutenant Public Affairs

officer in January, 1943. After completing the Reserve Officer

Indoctrination Course, he became Public Relations Officer of MCAS

Cherry Point. This mundane job did not satisfy Cary's urge for more

important and stimulating assignments. In December, 1943 he volunteered

for OSS.33

In the Spring of the year, having finished his indoctrination

to Donovan's world, Cary was assigned to SI Branch for service in

the Mediterranean Theater. He initally flew to Algiers and moved

from there to Caserta, Italy with the rest of the 2677th 055 Regiment.

At Calerta, Cary was designated Executive Officer for the 055

team scheduled to participate in the liberation of Bucharest. Cary's

C. O. was Commander Frank G. Wisner, USNR another lawyer who later

* became Deputy Director of CIA.

The "Czar of Russia once sneered: 'Rumania i not a country,

it's a profession'. In the days prior to World War II, Rumania was

a striking testimonial to the old Balkan proverb: 'The fish stinks

from the head first. The government was lazy, crooked, unreliable and

unbelievably avaricious.

Yet the Rumanians were good soldiers. After their country

joined the Axis, they fought well against the Russians, thereby earning

a special spot on the Red Army's 'Most Wanted' list. When that passle 

avenging angels began to approach their borders, the Rumanians promptly

deposed immoral, selfish, and stupid King Carol; replaced him with his

*Wisner committed suicide in 1965.
93

son Michael, and declared for the Allies. A week later, the first

* OSS team - 21 men in a B-17 - flew directly to Ploesti airfield.

Nearby were POW compounds housing over 1,000 American flyers, most

of whom had been downed in the great air offensive against the nearby

refineries.

Wisner and Cary's mission flew into Bucharest directly from

Italy. It was early September and the Red Army was nearing the

outskirts of the city. Cary later remembered:

'1We went over in a bomber while the Germans still occupied

the Vugoslav coastal area but their anti-aircraft fire was

rather ineffective. I handled all sorts of administrative

problems and intelligence activities in conjunction with

the late Henry Roberts, later Professor of History at

Columbia. Our prinicpal job was political intelligence

until the United States Mission arrived in late December,

but we also handled a lot of problems involvin9 pilots

who had been shot down when bombing Ploesti.30

055 gained quite a haul in Rumania. Particularly significant

were the complete State Records of the previous administration and

"some ten thousand dossiers from the Nazi Party... From these sources

and from sixty former Axis agents (some of them acting as doubles)

055 X-2 identified over 4,000 Nazi intelligence officials and agents,

more than one hundred subversive organizations, and some 200

commerical firmsused as cover for espionage activities."37

Captain Cary remained in Bucharest until January, 1945. He

then returned to Italy for a new assignment. Predictably it involved

another Balkan capital: Belgrade.

*Nearly all of the POW's were flown-out in B-175 of the 15th

Air Force. Transport aircraft were unavailable because of their

concentration for the upcoming Arnhem operation in Holland.
94

By the autumn of 1944, 055 had fifteen separate teams attached

to Tito's partisans. The senior American officer was Major Charles W.

Thayer, a "witty, pipe-smoking officer... with one major political

prejudice - a strong anti-Soviet bias, acquired during years of

diplomatic service in Stalin's Moscow." Cary flew to Belgrade to

become Thayer's Exec.38

Unlike Bucharest, the Vugoslav capital yielded little good

intelligence on the Germans. Partisan cooperation with the AngloAmerican allies began decreasing as the Soviets approached. "Political

coverage", which was Cary's field, "was somewhat better. 055 maintained

contacts both in the various ministries and with the more or less

silent opposition groups. Since the State Department did not arrive

for several months, these reports formed the only U. S. coverage of

Yugoslav political developments.

Cary's war ended in Belgrade but his 055 service did not.

When the mission was withdrawn in July, he proceeded to Paris

and subsequently to Frankfurt where he worked on the massive evidentiary

* collection effort aimed at German war criminals.

055 was directly involved in the liberation and initial American

representation in four Balkan nations. Marine Officers played a part

in each.

* Cary was Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission

during the Kennedy Administration. i-le currently teaches law at

Columbia, the alma mater of both Franklin D. Roosevelt and William

Donovan.
CHAPTER VII

"I'M GOING TO BLOW THIS BRIDGE, AND I'LL DO THE

SAME TO YOU IF NECESSARY"

"All the different kinds of leaders were grouping and re-grouping,

forming alliances and breaking them up with threats of assassination: the

klephts, the primates, the bishops, the islanders, Greeks from abroad,

and the British." Those words, were written to describe the situation

in Greece during the winter of 1821 but could serve equally well -

with the inclusion of the Americans - as a synopsis of the same season

in 1943.

Greece was then occupied not by the Turks, but rather by

Germans, Bulgars, and a few Italians. To make the scene complete

there were competing guerilla forces which owed allegiance to either

the non-resident monarch, King George,,or to the Greek Communist party.

British SOE was having great difficulty sorting-out exactly who was

loyal to whom, under what circumstances, and for what price. When

OSS opened its Cairo station in 1943, it stepped squarely into the

political dung heap.

Exiled Prime Minister George Papandreou summed up the atmosphere

accurately: "The country is an inferno. The Germans are killing.

The Bulgarians are killing. The Security Battalions are killing.

The guerillas too are killing. Everyone is killing and burning. What

is going to be left of our unhappy country?"2

Several Marines would soon find out.

95
96

Captain Gerald F. Else, USMCR was born in Redfield, South

Dakota in July, 1908. Else entered the University of Nebraska in

1924 but transferred to Harvard where he graduated summa cum laude in

1929. A scholar of classical Greek and Latin, Else remained in Cambridge

completing his M. A. in 1932, and receiving his PhD. in 1934. He then

took a teaching job in the Department of Greek and Latin, until he was

recruited into COI as a civilian.3

By January 1943, it was apparent that Greece was a target of

increasingly high intelligence priority. Similarly, it was clear that

those 053 personnel not in uniform as officers would soon find themselve

draftees. Else therefore applied for a direct commission in the Marine

Corps Reserve and 035 endorsed his request with a plea for retention

within the intelligence agency.

Although The was over-age and color blind, Else was finally

commissioned in August 1943, under Special Program 28-42 and assigned

straight back toOSS as a Captain.4

Captain Else continued to work in the Greek Section of SI's

Washington headquarters until late summer 1943. Then he shipped out

for Egypt via Brazil and Nigeria.

"I was delayed enroute by problems unspecified (I realized

later that the reason with the Cairo and Tehran Conferences,

which must have produced an acute shortage of air transport)

It amuses me to recall that I was originally recruited

for OSS because of my knowing Greek - ancient Greek - and

that knowledge was one of the chief obstacles to learning

the modern language which I tried to do after reaching

Cairo. "

Else arrived in Cairo during November 1943, and set to work

developing a network of agents who could be infiltrated into

predetermined target areas.
97

The biggest problem faced by 055 in the Middle East was not

recruitment or training but rather transportation. Parachute training

(usually conducted in British Palestine) was inevitably followed by

excruciating delays in aircraft availability. The British, who controlled all air assets for operations in Greece and the Balkans,

carefully placed American requests for support at the bottom of the

list. "The question of a small air unit under 055 control was

unsuccessfully raised. Motor Torpedo boats were requested repeatedly

but never arrived. Of all means available, Greek caiques, which usually

transported agents in about one and a half months, proved to be the

fastest. 6

Caiques were small vessels used for fishing or limited cargo

hauling. Varying in size from two to eighty tons, these were manned

by crews ranging up to six or seven men. Few could make more than

4 knots. Ofcourse all were virtually defenseless.

Eventually 055 put together a fleet of 36 such craft, most of

* which were leased by British SIS. The port of Alexandria was the

normal 'jumping off' spot. From there the boats usually proceeded

to one of several small harbors in Cyprus. Here agents went aboard

still smaller caiques which ran into a clandestine base at Kusadasi,

Turkey, transferred to even more flimsy (and usually wind-powered)

versions; and in these made the final stage of their trip to occupied

Greece J

Merely sailing the Aegean Sea was a tricky business. Although

men had been doing it for thousands of years, they had done so by

*SIS was only too glad to help anyone having problems with SUE.
98

choosing their season and waiting for the weather. The Aegean has no

tide and the winds blow north only during the summer. In the winter

storms come up from any direction and the shallow bottom makes for

dangerous waves. Of course there are hundreds of rocks to run upon

as well.8 But the OSS 'navy' proved equal to the task and Else's

section put more than 80 agents - primarily Greeks - ashore during

*

1944.

Else remained in Cairo until the Fall of that year serving as

assistant to Rodney Young, a former archeologist who had spent years

in Greece and spoke the language fluently. As the Germans began

slowly to retreat northward, 055 set about organizing the usual 'capital

liberation team'. Young was to command with Else as his Executive

Officer. On 12 October, they and two other members of the Cairo

staff flew directly into Athens, arriving there days before the

transport rich British could get in. Soon afterward, Young resigned

and Captain Else became Commander of the Athens mission.9

Civil war broke out in Greece on 3 December 1944 with the

British backing the EDES guerilla army (royalist) against the ELAS

(communist) irregulars. OSS personnel termed this 'the unpleasantness'

and attempted to carry on as neutrals. This was not easy since

fighting raged in Athens proper. As one agent put it:

*The Germans mercilessly hounded any team which was unlucky

enough to be compromised. The taking of hostages, summary executions,

and torture were routine.
99

"During the first week the combination office-billet was

situated a half-block from the front lines. With a

British machine gun firing day and night from next door,

a Greek military barracks down the street, and ELAS

mortar shells falling all about, there were few periods

quiet enough to concentrate on long reports."1°

In January, Else left Athens for Caserta to head the Greek SI

desk for the entire European Theater. Within a month of his arrival,

the situation became so befuddled by conflicting State Department

directives that he was recalled to Washington. After a short mission

to Liberia he was demobilized in December 1945.

While Captain Else was providing some of the 'brains' behind

055 operations in Greece, Gunnery Sergeant (later Warrant Officer)

Thomas L. Curtis, USMC was supplying the brawn.

Curtis, unlike many Marines in OSS, was a career man. Born

in Massachusetts, he enlisted in 1935, served in Hawaii until 1939

and was discharged. The next year Curtis joined-up again. Soon he

was hard at work in the Reconnaissance Section of Amphibious Corps,

Atlantic, teaching rubber boat handling to mmbers of what became

the ist Raider Battalion)1 When OSS began to become involved in

paramilitary training, Curtis was one of the first Marines to be

transferred to the new organization. It was not much of a transfer.

Headquarters of the Amphibious Corps in those days was at Quantico.

So was the OS' training camp.

Sergeant Curtis taught new recruits the fundamentals of

clandestine entry, patrolling, submarine exiting procedures, and

hand-to-hand combat. He was a big, tough, beefy man and he knew his

trade. In October 1943, now a Gunnery Sergeant, Curtis was tapped for

an operational mission.'2
loo

Curtis arrived in Cairo after a stop at Oran, Algeria.

Immediately, he was made a member of the team being put together for

an important sabotage job in German-occupied Greece.

The commander of Curtis' mission was Army Air Corps Major

Jim Kellis, an unusual recruit in an unusual outfit. Most men joined

055 based on vague promises of 'dangerous work behind enemy lines'.

Kellis actually proposed his own project to Army G-2 as part of a

comprehensive plan for clandestine warfare to be conducted in his

ancestral homeland and site of his own college education. This, in

brief, is how a Marine Gunnery Sergeant found himself aboard the caique

St. John several hundred yards off a swampy area of northeastern

Thrace in early May 1944.13

Kellis and two Navy enlisted men were already in Greece having

infiltrated by foot across the Turkish border in December. It was

their radio message to the secret base at Kusadasi which initiated the

second phase of the EVROS mission. When the St. John cautiously worked

her way toward the landing area it was nearly midnight. Everything

was quiet and the beach seemed deserted. But Kellis was waiting.

'One of my guerillas who had contacts in the vicinity had

lined up some fishing boats which we needed to get through

the swamp, and also to unload the caique, which couldn't

come in very close because of the shoal water. The rest

of us lay low in the cane... In gathering the boats, my

men were observed by some fishermen. So our presence

would not be leaked to the Germans, we took into custody

everyone who saw us. By nightfall we had sixty boats

and 120 fishermen under guard. That night J rowed out

to meet the St. John. The plan was for me to flash an

"O" when I saw her, and they would reply with an "M".

We had to be pretty careful, for German 'E Boats'

patrolled the areas; moreover there were coastal batteries

and searchlights on the hills; and a division and a half

of German and Bulgarian troops were stationed at Alexandroupolis, a few miles from our pinpoint.
101

At eleven-thirty I spotted the schooner. She kept moving

around slowly, and I was not sure of her identity, having

never seen her before. Finally after half an hour, I decided

to chance it and flashed my recognition signal. It was

returned immediately. "14

Quickly Kellis gave the go-ahead for unloading and his armada

of requisitioned lighters sallied from the swamp. In less than an

hour, the entire EVROS team was ashore with Thompsons, grenades, and

enough explosives to do the job for which they had been sent. At that

moment, several important Greek bridges were doomed.

The EVROS team had been launched into action in accordance not

only with Kellis' ideas but upon formal request of the JCS. German

steel production was a concern to the stragetic planners and a key

ingredient in the process was chrome ore. Much of this came from

neutral Turkey. 055 was directed to cut that supply.15 The Research

and Analysis branch in Washington had information that most of the

ore was carried into Nazi controlled territory by two rail lines.

Both of these wound through the eastern mountains of Bulgaria and

Greece, crossing several major gorges atop modern bridges. Dropping

these would at least partially solve the problem.

Kellis had hoped to blow the huge 'International Bridge' which

connected Greece and Turkey at the Evros River border. "This was a

huge structure and although a difficult operation its destruction would

have stopped literally all rail traffic into Greece. The State Department

vetoed this plan for fear of Turkish reaction... ,,16 Instead, the two

spans picked by R&A were targeted.

The first of these was the Alexandroupolis Bridge in Greece,

the second Svilengrad Bridge in Bulgaria. Kellis took Svilengrad, a
102

long (210 foot) low affair which would require over a thousand pounds of

plastic explosive. Curtis drew Alexandroupolis, tottering on fifty

foot piers in the center of a deep ravine. This one would need only

about 550 pounds of demolitions since its height would magnify any

damage and make repair much more complicated.

There were more than 300 Greek guerillas involved in training

for the mission. Of these, 30 were specially selected members of the

elite 'Black Squad'. Only they were told of the exact targets.

Thei supplies supplemented by clandestine parachute drops,

the team practiced for several weeks before Kellis decided the time was

right. On 27 May 1944, both sabotage units moved into positions near

the respective targets. Meanwhile, a third unit was sent in the

opposite direction and directed to launch diversionary attacks to

mask the true purpose the burgeoning resistance battalion.'7

Curtis' group of 50 men (including 15 Black Squa.d experts)

soon determined that their bridge was guarded by-a screen of German

patrols with thirty Greek policemen actually stationed on both ends of

the span. After a hair-raising near ambush by one German reconnaissance

party, all of the raiders managed to slip inside the roving cordon.

Below them was the target, codenamed .JOLIET. Curtis started down.

Packing a Thompson, two .45's, and an assortment of charges and

detonators, Curtis walked straight up to the nearest policeman, shoved

his submachine gun into the man's stomach and calmly announced in

fractured Greek: "I'm going to blow this bridge and I'll do the same

to you if necessary". The Greek and some of his contingent decided

instead of resisting to help. The less willing were tied to trees and

work proceeded.18
103

Suddenly rifle shots began ricocheting off the steel girders.

A German patrol had arrived. While the Greek guerilla security element

fought a short but savage engagement with the intruders, Curtis

hurried with the charges. When everything was set, he cut the time

delay from nine minutes to three and pushed the plunger. Then the

greatest middle distance sprint in Greek history got underway.

"The Gunny had done his work well. An explosion shook the

wooded hills, and the huge bridge went skyward as one unit,

lifting and twisting high in the air. The flame of the

exploding charges was visible 20 miles away, and a shower

of debris rained down for several minutes after it was

19 over. Hemingway would have gnawed his béard with envy."

After several brushes with Germans and Bulgarians rushing to

the respective scenes of carnage, both attack groups made it safely

back to their operating base. Word of the missionts complete success

was flashed to Cairo and the goat-skin wine bladders were passed around.

It took several months before either bridge could be put back into even a shadow of its former capacity.2°

Six weeks later, the EVROS mission was withdrawn from Greece

by caique, returning to Egypt through Turkey. Kellis received the

Legion of Merit and Curtis the Bronze Star. Both men would later serve

with OSS-trained guerillas in China and both would win the Silver Star

there. For his performance in Greece, Gunnery Sergeant Curtis was

meritoriously promoted to Warrant Officer. 21 Captain Else and Gunny Curtis provide an interesting duet in

the libretto of Marines with OSS. One a scholarly organizer, observer,

and analyst, the other a burly operator. Curtis retired as a Captain in

the early 1960's. Else returned to acadaemia and became Director of the
104

Center for Coordination of Ancient and Modern Studies at the University

of Michigan. He never did fully master modern Greek.
CHAPTER VIII

"EXIGENCIES OF THE SITUATION..."

The officers and men of 05$ came from everywhere, friends chose

friends - especially in the early days - and Donovan was alleged to

have told one man who expressed an interest in joining-up: 'Write me

a memorandum saying how you can be of service to this organization, and

if I agree, you're hired. In the beginning, it was said you could

get a direct commission just by being a good lawyer. During the boom

season, all you had to do was know one)

055 had more than its share of rich men, polo players, football

stars, and professors but it also numbered cowboys, communists, crusaders

and just plain crazies. Once recruited, all of these had to be evaluated

and trained before they could be employed against the Axis.

Although ideas popped from Donovan's brain faster than airborne

soap suds from Lawrence Welk's bubble machine, organization was not

'Wild Bill's' long suit. "While all wartime agencies operated in

disarray, 055 had its own unique brand of administrative confusion.

Young officers recruited under the most secret conditions would report

for duty to a well-guarded Washington headquarters only to be asked,

"Do you have any idea what 055 might have hired you for?'2

Even if the recruit knew the answer, the problem of determining

whether he was suited to perform the intended task remained. 055

missions - particularly those of the operational branches - placed

105
106

special (and in some cases unique) demands on the personnel assigned.

"By late 1943, the organization, then hardly a year old, was busily

and somewhat haphazardly recruiting men without benefit of any

professional or uniform screening process."3

In October, 1943 it was proposed that 055 create a unit of

psychologists and psychiatrists to evaluate the mental and emotional

fitness of incoming personnel. This suggestion was enthusiastically

received by both the Training and Planning Staffs since both had

already experienced the headaches associated with preparing men for

overseas duty who simply could not 'cut the mustard'.

'The locus of the undertaking was a Fairfax County country

estate forty minutes outside Washington, a farm with rolling meadowland and self-respecting shade trees, massive barn and satellite

sheds... which provided ample space for setting-up all sorts of

stressful situations, indoors and outdoors."4 The official name for

the installation was Station "S", but most people simple referred to

it as '5' school. There were only a few 'faculty' in the beginning1

but from the outset one of them was a Marine: First Lieutenant John W.

Gardner, USMCR.

Gardner was 31 years old in 1943. Born and raised in California,

he attended Stanford University where he excelled not only in the

classroom but also garnered 'All-American honors as a varsity swimmer.

Graduating with 'great distinction' in 1935, he went on to earn his

Masters Degree the following year and a Ph.D. from the University of

California in 1938.

From 1939 to 1942, Gardner taught psychology, first at

Connecticut College and later at Mount 1-lolyoke. Shortly after the war
107

began, he joined the staff of the Federal Communications Commission

as a propaganda analyst. It was from the FCC that John Gardner was

recruited by

Gardner applied for a Marine Corps commission in August 1943

and was appointed a First Lieutenant on 15 September. Like many such

'direct' commissionees, he did not get around to attending Marine

Officer training until early 1944.

The task confronting the Assessment Staff was that of developing a system of procedures which would reveal the personality of an

055 recruit. This, it was hoped, would shed significant light on a

man's adaptability and serve as a reliable prediction of how he might

fare on some special mission behind enemy lines. The chief overall

purpose was to eliminate the unfit. This proved no small undertaking

since by its very nature OSS performed an astonishing variety of

functions in a host of remote climes.., all without the coveted 'job

description' which traditional evaluators found so indispensible.

This paper is not the forum to discuss in detail how the

assessment staff functioned. That is covered in splendid detail by

their Assessment of Men published shortly after the war. But any

Marine Officer who harkens back to his OCS days will recall evaluations

corresponding to 'the construction situation', 'the bridge building

situation', 'the stress situation', or the 'high wall situation'. All

of these had both their philosophic and practical genesis at Station 'S'.

OSS mounted a major effort in the Balkans during 1943 and in

Italy and France in 1943-44. Even as the D-Day operations commenced,

plans were already being made against the day when the focus of clandestine

warfare activity would shift to Asia. In June, 1944 Gardner was
108

transferred from Fairfax to the pleasant Southern California environs

of Capistrano Beach Club, near San Clemente. Here he and other staff

members established Station 'WS', a facility similar to t51 which was

designed to serve the needs not only of West Coast OSS recruits but

also to. reassess European veterans on their way to the Orient.

Eventually, assessment centers would also be located overseas at

Kandy, Ceylon (Camp 'K') and Kunming, China.6

If the R&A branch produced the world's first really scholarly

approach to analyzing strategic intelligence, so the Assessment Staff

can legitimately lay claim to pioneering applied psychology as it

related to occupational selection. Of itself this was no mean achievement.

No systematic effort had previously been undertaken in the

United States which aimed at determining an individual's total

personality. "The psychologists and psychiatrists who handled the

program for 055 later used the techniques developed under the stress

of war to establish centers for the Veterans Administration and

several leading universities."7

John Gardner left the Marine Corps as a Captain. He would

later become president of the Carnegie Corporation; serve as a

consultant to both the U. S. Air Force and the United Nations; and

author several books. From 1965-68 he was Secretary of Health,

Education and Welfare and today heads the consumer advocate group

'Common Cause'.

Like assessment, the problem of training OSS recruits was a

complex one. "There was no precedent in America for such an operation

and it was necessary at first to piece together various fragments of

seemingly relevant knowledge from other agencies of the Government,
10g

to borrow instructional techniques from the British, and to adapt

certain technical aspects of orthodox military-training to the conditions

approximating those under which guerilla units and resistance organizers

might operate»'8 Since the paramilitary part of these requirements

could best be handled by active personnel of the armed forces, Donovan

began seeking instructors almost as soon as the war began. One of

his first recruits was Lieutenant Colonel Philip G. Strong, USMCR.

Philip Grandin Strong was a banker by profession and a Marine

by avocation. Born in Englewood, New Jersey in 1901, Strong grew up

in the comfortable circumstances associated with life among New York

society. His father, Benjamin Strong, was Governor of the Federal

Reserve Bank of New York, and young Philip was educated at the Hill

School. After missing World War I, Strong enterecFPrinceton in

1919 but left after two years to take up banking himself. In early

1926, he joined the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve as a Second Lieutenant.

A crack shot, Strong was active in the Reserve markmanship

program during the late 1920's and early 30's. In both 1935 and '36,

he captained the USMCR Rifle Team at the National Matches.

During this period it was unusual for a Reserve officer to

attend formal Marine schools since orders to such courses were at the

individual's personal expense. But Captain Philip Strong was an

exception. In 1936, he graduated from the Junior School 'with distinction' , ranking 7th in a class made up almost entirely of regulars.

In August 1940, Strong was promoted to Major and ordered to

active duty as Assistant to the Director of the Marine Corps Reserve. By

December he had a new job: Marine Corps Representative to the Strategic

Information Section of the Navy's Foreign Intelligence Branch.9
110

It was in this job that Major Strong caught the eye of William J.

Donovan.

On 16 January 1942, Donovan wrote to Secretary Knox requesting

Strong's transfer to COI)° This query was passed to Major General

Holcomb who opposed it. So did Admiral King who in a reply directly

to Donovan cited the recent transfer of Colonel Eddy as an example

of 'poaching' by the Coordinator's office.11 As usual, 'Wild Bill'

was not intinidated. After a second personal memorandum to Knox,

the issue was settled. Strong was ordered to report to Donovan's

headquarters on 18 February.'2 He was there for less than a week.

On 23 February, Strong and several others reported to the

British SOE sabotage school in Canada. He returned to Washington

in late March and was appointed Chief Instructor and Executive

Officer of 055 Training Branch. By May, Strong was off again,

this time to observe coninando and paramilitary training in Britain

and Scotland.13

It was during this period that OSS set-up its initial training

program. Strong and his Commanding Officer, Colonel Preston Goodfello

an Army Reserve Officer, were the chief architects. The concept was

simple. Basic training normally required about 3 weeks to complete.

It was largely military in nature stressing such subjects as map and

compass reading, small arms firing, demolitions, and camouflage

techniques. Following this introduction, recruits received more

specialized instruction and field work designed to prepare them for

branch assignments.

The JCS was always concerned with Donovan's ability to train

the personnel which he frequently recruited straight from civilian life
ill

In July, 1942 Walter Bedell Smith, then-Secretary to the Joint Chiefs,

requested a report from COI which detailed not only the administrative

functioning of the organization but also its operational programs and

training methods.14

Donovan's staff prepared a 30 page reply which provides the

best early synopsis of the general functions, organizational outline,

and projected employtient of C0I/OSS. This document was forwarded to

the Joint Chiefs on 17 August 1942.15 In it, training was extensively

discussed. Goodfellow and Strong recommended that the program be

structured to include:

Preliminary School (2 weeks)

Basic School (2-3 weeks)

Advanced Training School (2 weeks)

d, Parachute Course (1 week)

Maritime Training School (1 week)

Industrial Sabotage Course (3-4 weeks)

Localized Social School (3 weeks)

To accomplish the training objectives, qualified military

and civilian instructors were being assembled. The bulk of these were

to be drawn from the armed forces and thus JCS support was deemed

essential.

Obviously any ambitious training program such as that outlined

by Goodfellow and Strong required considerable chunks of terrain. By

July 1942, COI had secured four major operating areas. All were within

easy reach of Washington.

Areas "A" and "C" were located adjacent to the Marine Corps

base at Quantico on land formerly utilized by the Civilian Conservation
112

Corps. Comprising nearly 9000 acres these were used for basic military

and communications training. Today most of Areas "A" and "C" form the

Prince William Forest Park.

Area "B" was of similar size. It spread over the vicinity of

Catoctin Mountain in Maryland, currently the site of Camp David, the

presidential retreat. Area "B" was for advanced training.

RTU-ll (the 'Farm') was located in Maryland, about 20 miles from

downtown Washington. This was the location for intelligence training.

Later in the war, 055 would acquire and open several more

training areas including Area "E" across the Potomac from Quantico

and Area "F" at the Congressional Country Club in suburban Maryland.

In 1944, a West Coast facility was briefly established at Camp

Pendleton. Later, this was shifted to Catalina Island opposite San Pedro

Strong was not involved in 055 training programs when these

developments occurred. During August 1942, considerable friction

developed between the military members of COI training and the

headquarters staff which was still largely civilian. Disgusted with

what he viewed as 'meddling' and anxious not to spend his war in

Washington, Strong requested a transfer to combat duty. After a

short tour at the Headquarters of I Amphibious Corps, he fought the

remainder of the war with a Navy Battleship Division in the Pacific as

Fleet Marine Officer.

Lieutenant Colonel Strong participated in 19 major operations

and was awarded the Legion of Merit for his work as advisor and

intelligence officer with Battleship Squadrons Six and Two.16 He was

promoted to Colonel in 1948 and retired from the Marine Corps Reserve

as a Brigadier General in 1957.
113

Throughout the war, 055 never fully implemented a comprehensive

training policy. Some personnel were sent overseas without any

particular indoctrination because it was assumed that their roles would

be primarily administrative. "In some instances where the exigencies

of the situation in the field made it necessary for them to be transferred to more active duties, the lack of training constituted a handicap."17 On balance, given the chaos which surrounded 053 throughout

its organizational life, the initial plans laid-out by Strong and

Goodfellow worked remarkably well. When the Allies launched their

major European offensives in Italy and France, graduates of 033

schooling proved equal to the operational challenge.
L

CHAPTER IX

"WHO KNEW NOT FEAR...."

In Southeastern France lies a rugged region called the Haute

Savoie. Today the area is largely known for the imposing Cathedral of

Notre Dame at Grenoble and the chic ski resort of Val d'Isere. But

during the long dark night of German occupation, Frenchmen came to the

Haute Savoie not to pray or ski, but to fight. There, on a high

plateau surrounded by mountains, a melancholy drama was played out

during 1943-44.

Vercors plateau is thirty miles long and about twelve miles wide.

A forboding natural fortress, 3,000 feet above sea level, it is covered

by one of the largest forests in all France. On its windswept top

live 5,000 small farmers and a few of Western Europe's last surviving

wild bear.

Vercors was of special interest to General de Gaulle as well

as the clandestine warfare planners of SUE and 055, for in addition

to the bears, 3,000 Free French maquisards were lying low there. "A

vast plan was being worked out to turn Vercors into a redoubt against

which enemy attacks would beat in vain and which, by its example,

would summon the entire Alpine resistance to the colours. From it

raiding parties would descend into the plain and it would perhaps even

form a corner of liberated France, the 'Vercors Republic'."1

114
115

Contacting and arming this group would be difficult but it

was deemed a vital task. Special men were required and 50E decided

to form an inter-allied team: British, French, and American. The

mission was to be called UNION. The job of organizing it fell to

* SUE's 'Section RF' headed by Sir Colin Gubbins, the real "M" of

British secret operations.

RF was located in London's Dorset Street quite near the offices

of Free France at Dorset and Wigniore. It was there that the three men

chosen for UNION assembled. The British member was l-I. H. A. Thackwaite,

a pre-war schoolmaster who had become a clandestine warrior by way of

St. Paul's and Corpus Christi, Oxford. As radio operator, the French

supplied 'Monnier' one of the best in the business. The American was

Marine Captain Peter J. Ortiz, last seen in North Africa. It was to be

a 'first team' effort in point of quality as well as chronology.

UNION had a singular task: determine the military capabilities

of maquis units reported active in Savoie, Isere, and Drome. Its

ordre de mission emphasized that the leaders of such units should be

impressed with the fact that "organization for guerilla warfare

activity, especially after 0-Day, is now their more important duty".2

On the moonless night of 6 January 1944, five months before

OVERLORD, a Briton, a Frenchman, and a U. S. Marine jumped from a RAF

bomber in their own personal invasion of 1Fortress Europe'.

*Jarnes Bond afficianados will recognize the fictional "M" as

OO's boss.
116

The members of UNION followed the standard 50E practice of

parachuting in civilian clothes. This time however, each carried his

military uniform. Once they linked-up with the maquis reception

committee at the drop zone, Thackwaite made it clear that they were

military men on a military mission. The small band thus became "the

first allied officers to appear in uniform in France since 1940".

In this regard, Thackwaite was later to write: "Ortiz, who knew not

fear, did not hesitate to wear his U. S. Marine Captain's uniform in

town and country alike; this cheered the French but alerted the

Germans, and the mission was constantly on the move."3

UNION found several very large groups of maquisards itching

to fight, however, only about 500 had weapons and it would take

considerable time to arrange for clandestine arms drops and training.

Thackwaite, Ortiz, and Monnier took the time, maintaining a running

contact with London by radio.

It might reasonably be supposed that the team remained hidden

in the high country but this was simply not the case. Ortiz in

particular was fond of going straight into the German-occupied towns.

On one occasion, he strolled into a cafe dressed in a long cape.

Several Germans were drinking and cursing the maquis. One mentioned

the fate which would befall the 'filthy hmerican swine' when he was

caught. This proved a great mistak. Captain.Ortiz threw back the

cape revealing his Marine uniform. In each hand he held a .45 automatic.

When the shooting stopped, there were fewer Nazi's to plan his capture

and Ortiz was gone into the night.4

When he was not emptying bars and training partisans, Captain

Ortiz displayed yet another remarkable talent - stealing Gestapo vehicles
117

from local motor pools. The citation from King George VI which made

him a member of the Most 1-lonourable Order of the British Empire reads

in part:

"For four months this officer assisted in the organization

of the Maquis in a most difficult department, where members

were in constant danger of attack.. .he ran great risks in

looking after four RAF officers who had been brought

down in the neighborhood, and accompanied them to the

Spanish border.

In the course of his efforts to obtain the release of

these officers, he raided a German military garage and

took ten Gestapo motors which he used frequently....

he procured a Gestapo pass for his own use in spite of

the fact that he was well known to the enemy...

UNION found an extremely confused situation in its operational

area. "Lack of transportation and money were serious problems and

security at the regional and departmental levels was poor. UNION used

its influence to coordinate several resistance organizations with

divergent political views and loyalties. The maquis threat to German

occupation forces grew proportionately."6 Clashes became more frequent

as the resistance forces appeared in areas formerly thought 'safe' by

the Nazis.

Despite the winter weather, 3 Panzer Grenadier battalions

attacked Vercors in February, 1944. Ill-equipped though they were,

the French fought back with such skill and determination that the

Germans eventually were forced to employ two full divisions in

sealing off the plateau.

While the maquis were brave, they continued to lack not only

heavy weapons but also blankets, field equipment, mess gear, uniforms,

amunition, and radios. They could fight hit-and-run actions but their

increasingly defensive posture did not bode well for long term survival.
118

In late May, UNION was withdrawn by Lysander utility aircraft.

Within two weeks however, two new missions - JUSTINE and EUCALYPTUS -

were dropped into the same area.

By July a general mobilization of all Vercors was in progress

and so were German countermeasures. As the French well knew these would be

heavy. La Chapelle en Vercors was heavily bombed on 12 and 13 July.

The following day - to celebrate France's greatest national holiday,

Bastille Day - American B-li's parachuted nearly 1,500 canisters of

arms and ammunition into the fields near Vassieux.

"The inhabitants ran out in the streets shouting and waving

to the fliers as the Fortresses circled over the roofs.

Thirty minutes later the Germans began bombing and strafing

the town. This continued from morning to evening and prevented the men from collecting the containers. Only at

night was it possible to gather 200 of them. The Germans

also started the destruction of La Chapelle en Vercors.

The town was ablaze and fighters machine-gunned people

endeavoring to save their belongings from their homes."

On 19 July, the Germans launched a glider-borne assault directly

into Vassieux. Two companies of Waffen SS siezed the town and held it

against four violent maquis counterattacks. During the bitter fighting,

the SS lost nearly 60% of their strength but the French, lacking

artillery, could not dig the survivors out of the town which was

almost completely destroyed. Those civilians who had not fled were

rounded-up by German relief forces and executed on the spot.

Thus, while the Allies were breaking out of the Normandy

beachhead, in the Haute Savoie action was going largely in favor of

the occupation forces. It was into this deteriorating situation that

Ortiz' second UNION mission parachuted.
119

UNION II was one of a new type 055 mission: the Operational

Group. 013's were1 heavilyarmed contingents whose mission was 'direct

action' against the Germans. The most militarized of 055 units, their

jobs involved not only sabotage but also seizing key installations to

prevent the retreating Germans from destroying them. Members always

operated in uniform.

UNION II took off from Knettershall Airfield in England aboard

B-l7's of the USAAF's 388th Heavy Bomb Group. With Ortiz, who was carrying one million francs for the resistance, were Air Corps Captain John

Coolidge, Gunnery Sergeant Robert La Salle, and Sergeants Charles Perry,

John Bodnar, Fred Brunner, and Jack Risler, all U. S. Marines. Another

member of the mission was a Free French officer, Joseph Arcelin (codename

'Jo-Jo') who carried false papers identifying him as Sergeant George

Andrews, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.8

The mission began badly. It was a daylight drop into a good

zone near the town of Beaufort_,but despite ideal conditions tragedy

struck the team at once. Sergeant Perry's steel parachute cable

snapped six inches from the drogue. UNION II jumped with British-style

chutes - backpacks with no reserve. Perry was dead on the drop zone.9

In addition to the men of UNION II, the 388th dropped 864

containers to the French 'Bulle Battalion' which was operating in the

Col d'Arecle. While the supplies were being gathered, Ortiz and

Captain Bulle began working out plans to attack German security forces

in hopes of taking some pressure from the Vercors.

During the next week, UNION II was busy instructing the members

of the Bulle Battalion on the functioning and maintenance of the weapons

which had been parachuted to them. Then they began a series of patrols

120

designed to link-up with other resistance groups believed to be operatin

around Beaufort.

"On 14 August we prgceeded to Beaufort where we made contact

with other F. F. I. companies and from there went on to

Montgirod where we were told there were heavy concentrations

of Germans. We were able to enter the town but had no

sooner done so than we were heavily shelled by German

batteries located in the hills around the city. We were

forced to retire and hid out in the mountains near

Montgirod with the Bulle Battalion. The Germans quickly

surrounded the area."1°

As soon as the mission left Montgirod, strong German security

forces entered the town. They found two wounded maquisards in the

parish church, shot them, and burned the building to the ground.

Then they took hostages.

Meanwhile, UNION II came under heavy fire and was forced to

retreat deeper into the hills. The Germans cleverly manuevered Ortiz

and his men into an unfamiliar area of steep ravines and blind canyons.

By mid-day UNION was surrounded.

Ortiz had been in tight spots before and, after conferring with

Cooledge, Bulle, and F.F.I. Captain Escande, he decided to make an

attempt at sneaking through the German cordon. As the sun sank below

the surrounding mountain peaks, the trapped party crawled past the

enemy and got cleanly away.

Crossing the Isere River at Centron, the party moved along the

wooded southeast slope of the Isere Valley and by the next morning

was well hidden in rocky ground about a thousand meters from the

*Forces Francaises de l'Interieur
121

small village of Longefoy. Leaving Coolidge in charge, Major Ortiz

set out on another one man reconnaissance mission.

Carefully working his way into the village, Ortiz noted there

were no Germans about. Feeling a bit more at ease, he next learned that

Operation ANVIL - the invastion of Southern France - had begun and that

German forces had passed through earlier heading northeast toward Aime.

"I contacted the Mayor and requested food; he was understandably nervous at first, but as his confidence returned he and

others became very hospitable. Food and drink were brought

to us at our hideout. I found an excellent O. P. and spent

much of the afternoon observing enemy movement in the valley.

At nightfall, UNION entered ongefoy and was comfortably

lodged by the inhabitants nl

It was to be the last good night's sleep for Ortiz and several others

for months to come.

The team was now far from its operational headquarters and everyone was anxious to return there as quickly as possible in order to

coordinate operations in support of ANVIL. Ortiz explained it would

be risky to move during daylight but all agreed that time was vital.

On 16 August 1944, UNION II moved slowly back across the Valley,

crossed the same bridge at Centron and proceeded into the town. Coming

out the other side, disaster struck.

As the group ascended a ramp leading to the máin highway, a

German convoy roared round the corner. Spotting the Americans, who were

armed and uniformed, the German trucks screeched to a halt and soldiers

tumbled out firing. Brunner later recalled:

"Major Ortiz, Sergeant Bodnar and Sergeant Risler withdrew into

the southwest section of the town; Major Coolidge, 'Jo-Jo' and

I took the southeast. We retaliated as best we could, working

our way under fire toward the east. I called out to 'Jo-Jo'

to follow us but he remained in the town.
f''

122

At this time Captain Coolidge received a bullet in the

right leg but he kept going. By then we had reached the

bank of the Isere, I dived in and swam across under fire.

I had some difficulty as the current was very swift.

It was then that I became separated from Coolidge and

did not see him again until we met at the Col d'Arecle

on 18 August."12

Ortiz, Risler and Bodnar were receiving the bulk of the German

attention. As they retreated from house to house, French civilians

implored them to give up in order to avoid reprisals. Ortiz ordered

the two Sergeants to get out while they could but neither would go

without him. As the enemy fire increased, Ortiz remembered the

hostages from Montgi rod and the massacre at Vassieaux.

"Since the activities of Mission Union and its previous work

were well known to the Gestapo, there was no reason to hope

that we would be treated as ordinary prisoners of war.

For me personally the decision to surrender was not too

difficult. I had been involved in dangerous activities

for many years and was mentally prep ared for my number

to turn up. Sergeant Bodnar was next to me and Iexplained the situation to him and what I intended to do.

He looked me in the eye and replied, 'Major, we are

Marines, what you think is right goes for me too"."13

Ortiz began shouting to the enemy - he tried English, French,

and German - but the fire did not slacken. Finally a brief lull

developed and he yelled again, saying he was coming out. As he stepped

into the street, an old Frenchwoman, ran to him and tried to cover his

body with her own. Disengaging himself from this human shield, he

walked calmly toward the German lines, machine gun bullets kicking up

dust around him. Finally the firing ceased.

The German commander was suspicious but agreed to Ortiz' proposa

that his men would surrender if the townspeople were not harmed. When

only two more Marines emerged however, the enemy Major became agitated
123

and demanded to know where 'the rest of the Company' was. It took a

half-hour's search before the Germans were satisfied that three men

had been holding off an entire battalion.

Bodnar and Risler were quickly disarmed but before they could

say much, Ortiz called them to attention and directed that they give no

information other than that required by the Geneva Convention. This

greatly impressed the Germans who began treating them all with marked

respect. A few hours later, Arcel in was caught in a nearby field.

The four prisoners were taken to the main enemy headquarters at

Bourg St. Maurice. Ortiz told his men to claim they were paratroopers

from the ANVIL operation and that Arcelin should hold to the story

that he was a U. S. Marine of French ancestry. This ruse worked well,

despite the fact that 'Jo-Jo' could not speak a word of English.

Later in the afternoon, while being transferred to Moutiers,

Ortiz worked his cigarette lighter from his pocket and tried to set

the back seat of the staff car on fire, hoping to escape in the

resulting confusion. The attempt succeeded only in infuriating the

Germans and ruining some velour. But it was a portent of thing to come.

At the Kommandantur, Ortiz was searched and relieved of his

identification card, some papers, and 35,000 francs. He managed to

conceal another 65,000 francs however and demanded loudly to be treated

with the same respect due a German field grade officer. Soon he met

Major Kolb, his new guardian, who was tasked with delivering the

'prize catch' to Albertville. Progress on the road was slow. The

enemy now so feared the maquis that a Company of motor cycle troops

was employed to escort Ortiz' car. Ortiz was pleased to note that the

little column stopped at every possible ambush site and sent out patrols.
124

Kolb, a veteran soldier who had won the Iron Cross in both

World Wars, treated Ortiz like an indulgent father.

"11e quickly proved that he knew a great deal about me.

In great detail and accurately he described our air

operation, the burial ceremony for Sergeant Perry, various

engagements and the manner and position of our movements

since leaving Montgirod. These, he said, had been reported

by a sheprd who was one of his field agents."14

The maquis of the Savoie had learned the lesson of Vercors well

The task of the guerilla is to delay, to disorganize, and to panic,

not to defend in place. As Ortiz and the rest of UNION were moved

progressively eastward, they had the satisfaction of watching their

captors struggle with a succession of ambushes. It took the 157th

Division three full days to move 40 miles through an area which they

allegedly controlled.

On one occasion, Ortiz found himself in a small village which

the retreating troops were systematically looting. Townspeople, seeing

him surrounded by German officers and wearing an unfamiliar uniform,

ignored his captors and begged him to discipline the unruly soldiers.

On 21 August, Ortiz was in Chambery. Sensing that the situatio

was becoming increasingly critical, he asked for an opportunity to see

the local Coninanding General. Surprisingly the request was granted and

the Marine Major marched in, saluted, and proposed that the 157th

surrender to UNION! Unfortunately, General Flaum was not about to do

any such thing. At least it had been worth a try.

By early September, Ortiz, Bodnar, Risler, and Arcelin were in

the northern Italian city of Bussolono. Here they received their first

really professional search.
125

"They examined e'ery body hair, every orifice, and found

the 65,000 Francs I had concealed as well as my map and

compass. On or about 3 september, Germans escorted us

to the Kommandantur and locked us in an office for a few

minutes while the guards were being detailed to take us

to Torino. I rapidly searched the office and pocketed

several useful maps."15

At Turin (Torino), the members of UNION were thrown into a

stinking civilian prison which already housed 25 u. s. Army officers and

men from a chemical battalion. After a week in this pesthole, the

entire group was moved to a German POW transit camp near Manatova. On

the way, Ortiz tried to persuade the Army officers to join him in rushing the guards and commandeering the bus. They turned him down flat

saying that the war was almost over and it was not worth the risk.

From Manatova, the journey continued by rail. The POW's

now numbered several hundred - British, French and Americans - most

of whom had been captured in Italy. Crammed into boxcars of the famous

French 40 hommes/8 chevaux variety the prisoners began a 3 day trip

to southern Germany via the Brenner Pass. On the way, Ortiz attempted

to escape by twisting open a barbed wire barrier rigged along the

boxcar's sliding door. He had almost completed his task when the train

unexpectedly stopped and an alert guard found his handywork. For that,

the Major received a beating and promises of future 'special treatment'.

Finally, on 29 September, Ortiz and the other members of UNION

reached their final stop: the Naval POW camp Marlag/Milag Nord located

in the small German village of Westertimke outside Bremen. Happily,

this was one of the best Stalags in all of Germany. Except for periodic

searches and thrice daily roll calls, the Germans were content to merely

guard their 'guests'.
*For Taylor's earlier adventures see Chapter XII

126

Marlag O, the officers camp, contained about 400 men. Countin

Ortiz, only three were Americans. The senior Allied officer was a

Royal Navy Captain who made it plain to the new arrival that escapes

'were out'. Ortiz promptly proclaimed himself 'senior American POW'

and announced he would set his own rules. On 18 December 1944, he mad

his first try accompanied by Navy Lieutenant (jg) Hiram Harris.

Ortiz spent more than a hour cutting away at a series of wire

fences and managed to reach an open field beyond the camp. Harris

however was caught by a roving patrol and the alarm sounded.

Searchlights picked-up Ortiz and both men were kicked around a bit

before being thrown into solitary confinement. Since getting caught

was nothing new for Ortiz, he merely bided his time waiting for the

right moment to try again.

By February 1945, the small American contingent at Westertimke

had grown. One new arrival was just the sort of man to work with

* Ortiz: Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, USF1CR.

Walt Taylor had participated in 055 operations in Corsica.

In August 1944, he joined the Strategic Services Section attached to

the U. S. 7th Army for ANVIL. On D+4 (19 August 1944) Taylor reported

to the headquarters of the 36th 'Texas' Division along with Captain

Justine L. Greene USA - a noted New York psychiatrist - and Corporal

James S. Sweeney USMC.

The 36th was the right flank division in General Alexander

Patch's drive northward. Greene, Taylor, and Sweeney were directed

to determine the extent of German defenses near Grasse, an area which

had been bypassed.
127

Leaving the American lines, the little reconnaissance party

drove to Mons, an ideal observation post perched on a hill about

twenty miles from Grasse. There they were welcomed by the local maquis

who offered to provide an agent for infiltration of the German-held

city. 1 6 The next day, Taylor and a Frenchman drove out of Mons in a

'liberated' Citroen. The plan was simple. Taylor would take the agent

as far as the last maquis outpost, drop him there and await his return.

"The agent had been leading the resistance fighting ever since

our landing and was absolutely exhausted, falling asleep time

and time again while I briefed him... I headed for the town

of Saint Cezaire, which was declared to be in the hands of

the Resistance... However, during the night what evidently

was a Company of Germans had taken up positions in Saint

Cezaire. On approaching the dead still town by a steep

and winding road, we ran into a roadblock of land mines;

we both thought it was the Resistance and the agent took

my carbine and jumped out of the car to walk toward the

lines of mines. He lasted just about 10 feet beyond the

car and died with a bullet through the head."17

Taylor still thought it might be a trigger-happy maquis ambush

but then he spotted what appeared to be a German forage cap. Backing

up as fast as he could, the Lieutenant slammed into the roadside coping.

Rifle fire began perforating the Citroen.

Just as Taylor reached for the right door handle, a German

leaped from a nearby ditch and flipped a 'potato masher' grenade under

the car. It exploded with a roar, blasting Taylor out into the road

unconscious. When he came too, he was looking up at the stoney faces

of his ambushers. Grenade fragments had chopped-up his left leg and

mangled his left hand.
128

After being strafed by American planes during the trip, Taylor

and his escort arrived in Grasse. On the way, the Lieutenant managed

to shred an incriminating document and stuff it behind the car seat.

At Grasse, Taylor was "subjected to intensive interrogation which

ended when he vomited on the uniform of his inquisitor")8

During the same period that Ortiz and the members of UNION were

being shunted about, Taylor experienced a similar odyssey. He passed

through six different hospitals before finally reaching the medical

prison at Freising near Munich. A month later Taylor was shifted to

Moosberg. In January, 1945 his wounds were considered sufficiently

healed to allow confinement at Marlag Nord.

Despite the pleas of some of their fellow POW's, both Taylor

and Ortiz were perversely impenitent. They inti,ediately began planning

another escape attempt.

With allied forces drawing closer each day, the pair began

collecting civilian clothes, maps, food, and other items which they

could obtain through the well organized blackmarket system operating

in and around the camp. But suddenly, on lO April, the Commandant

ordered all prisoners to prepare to move within three hours. Their

destination was the port city of Lubeck - a journey of at least 8

days on foot.

The column left with such haste that many POW's were simply

left behind. Ortiz however was singled out for special observation and

his plan to hide in Westertimke was immediately foiled. About three

hours after leaving Marlag Nord, opportunity beckoned in the form of

marauding RAE Spitfires.
129

As the planes roared in low to shoot-up the motley mass streaming

north, Ortiz, Taylor, Air Corps Lieutenant Donald McNaughton, and Royal

Marines Warrant Officer Stancombe made for a nearby wood. Panic

reigned.The four escapees worked themselves deeper into the trees and

waited. As the aircraft disappeared, the column moved on, leaving

them behind unnoticed.

Ortiz expected Allied troops to pass through the region within

a day or two but the progress of fighting was much slower than that.

"We spent ten days hiding, roving at night, blundering into

enemy positions, hoping to find our way into British lines.

luck was with us, once we were discovered but managed to

get away, and several other times we narrowly escaped

detection. Fortunately, most Germans seemed to have a

bad cough.

By the seventh night we had returned near our camp.

I made a reconnaissance of Marlag O... There seemed to be

only a token guard and prisoners of war appeared to have

assumed virtual control of the compounds."9

The little band was now in bad physical shape. A combination

of little food and drinking swamp water had made McNaughton and Stancombe

ill. Taylor was covered with boils and Ortiz was very weak. On the

tenth day, disgusted at the slow advance of the British Army, the four

men decided it might be better to live in their old huts than starve

to death outside. With Ortiz in the lead, they merely walked back

into the camp. No commotion was raised by the guards and the remaining

POW's gave them a rousing welcome. Miong the reception committee were

Arcelin, Bodnar, and Risler, all of whom had hidden when the evacuation

commenced.

At last on 27 April, the battle reached Westertimke. German

troops were still stoutly resisting the advance of the British 7th
130

Guards1 Armored Division and much of the small village was destroyed.

Knowing that the Allied forces would not fire on the POW camp, an

SS unit parked several self-propelled guns there. The prisoners dug

in. Soon the fighting was all around the compound and Arcelin was

wounded by flying shrapnel.

On 29 April, Marlag Nord was liberated. Most POW's were only

too happy to board trucks for the rear... but not Ortiz.

Along with Bodnar, Risler, and Taylor, he presented himself

to Lieutenant Webb, a Navy radar officer who was attached to a Royal

Marine comando battalion operating with the Armored Division. Ortiz

later explained, "we Marines wanted to join this unit in order to bag

a few more Germans before hunting season closed."20 The offer was

rejected by the POW repatriation officer and all went to staging areas

behind the front.

Ortiz was evacuated to Brussels where he immediately reported

to the OSS officer-in-charge and requested assignment to further combat

duty. When the war ended, he was in California being briefed for a

mission to Indo-China.

Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, Commander of the Twelfth Fleet, recommended Major Ortiz for a second Navy Cross. The citation reads, in part:

"On 16 August 1944, during the conduct of a speical mission

designed to immobilize enemy reinforcements, Major Ortiz and

his team were attacked and surrounded. Disregarding the

possibility of escape, which course of action would have

certainly caused severe repraisals to be taken upon the

villagers, Major Ortiz surrendered and the townspeople

were thereby spared.

The story of the self-sacrifice of Major Ortiz and his

Marines has become a brilliant legend in that section of

France where acts of bravery were considered commonplace.

Subsequently imprisoned and subjected to numerous

interrogations, he divulged nothing... "21

131

In 1946, when Ortiz returned to civilian life and the film

industry, he was the most decorated Marine Officer to serve with 055.

In addition to the Navy Cross with gold star, he had also

received the Legion of Merit and Purple Heart from the United States,

Britain had made him a member of the Military Division, Order of the

British Empire. But it was France which recognized the 'hero of the

Haute Savoie' most prolifically. Ortiz was made a Member of the

Legion of Honor and awarded the Croix de Guerre (two palms, gold star,

silver star, and five citations), the Croix de Combattants, the

Ouissam Alouite, and the Medaille Coloniale.
CHAPTER X

"FIRST JED TO KILL A BOCHE..."

In August 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and their advisors met

at the Quebec Conference. The Allied invasion of Sicily had begun

the previous month and during the conference, plans for a subsequent

attack on Italy proper were discussed and approved.

Up until that time Marshall and the American Joint-Chiefs had

been willing to consider such other limited operations as the seizure

of Corsica and Sardinia; increased aid to the Balkan partisans,

bombing central Europe from Africa; and even limited landings in the

south of France. 'But by the time 'Quebec' actually arrived, Marshall

had reordered his priorities, and he was firm in insisting that the

cross-channel attack, now known as Operation OVERLORD, take precedence....

Marshall wanted to make sure that any involvement in the Mediterranean

Theater would not lead to a postponement of OVERLORD, plans for which

had already identified 1 May 1944 as a likely target date)

With France established as the priority target, OSS moved

to secure an equal voice in continental intelligence operations which

were then an exclusively British preserve. In May 1943, David Bruce,

Donovan's man in London, had begun a series of negotiations with Sir

Stewart Menzies (known as "C") aimed at securing just such a status.

Menzies, head of NI-6, eventually accepted the American proposals and

soon afterward, Operation SUSSEX was begun as a joint Anglo-American

effort.

132
133

SUSSEX, a plan to infiltrate 50 two-man teams into France was plagued with problems from the outset. Not only were the British

resentful of OSS's new role but U. S. Army G-2 did its level best to

J

ensure that recruitment of SUSSEX personnel would be hamstrung.

Donovan himself eventually became directly involved in the intraAmerican squabble.

"At a confrontation in the office of General Jake Devers, the

American Theater commander in London, the Army intelligence man left

no doubt that he trusted neither Donovan or his ideas. Donovan replied

in a low voice without any inflection or emotion: "Unless the general

apologizes at once, I shall tear him to pieces physically and throw

his remains through these windows into Grosvenor Square"."2 The

apologies were both immediate and prolix.

SUSSEX was an intelligence collection operation conducted

jointly by OSS SI branch and British SIS. The paramilitary and

sabotage aspects of clandestine warfare were assigned to OSS SO

Branch and British SOE. The counterpart of SUSSEX in this respect was

Operation IJEDBURGH. To coordinate this rising tempo of planning, a

joint Anglo-American enterprise designated Special Force Headquarters

was established. SFHQ would organize all underground resistance in

France to support the coming invasion. Fifty JEDBURGH teams were

initially envisioned. Each to be composed of one American, one French,

and one British officer. These would be dropped, in uniform, to rally

and advise the maquis. In Belgium and Holland, respective officers of

those nations would take the place of the French officer in each team.

Milton Hall, an Elizabethan manor house about lOO miles north

of London was chosen as the JEDBURGH training and assessment center.
F.'

134

"It was one of those enormous private houses which dot the English

countryside and put American millionaires to shame. Almost without

effort, Milton Hall swallowed the 240 men of the Jedburgh Operation,

together with what the British called the 'permanent party', the

instructors, batmen, cooks, and drivers, who had been collected

together to run the operation and to serve it."3 There amid

Cromwelliam armor and oak-beamed hallways, the JEDBURGs learned the

fine points of the sabotage trade.

"Paratrooper boots thudded from a training harness into neat

lawns and men practiced silent killing in the sunken gardens. From

the croquet pitch came the crackle of small arms.... and the acrid

sm&l of burnt powder blended with the traditional odor of boxwood

and roses."4

dedburgh field training was conducted at several other locations

and it was from one of these, the royal burgh on Scotland's Jed River,

that the operational name was derived. "Each man was to be handpicked

both for his high intelligence, his skills as a partisan, his personal

courage, his ability to command respect, and his fairness - for a

'Jed', as they were known for short, was expected to be captain, judge,

confessor, and quartermaster - to say nothing of demolitions expert,

gunsmith, linguist, marksman, poacher, and doctor."5

SUSSEX and JEDBURGH were part of a vast Allied plan to deceive

Hitler as to the location and timing of the main assault against

France. Codenamed BODYGUARD, this operation extended to virtually ever

theater of the war and was the greatest deception ever attempted.

JEDBURGH's major goal was to tie down potential enemy reinforcements by employing guerilla warfare and sabotage. Since Britanny
135

contained sizeable numbers of German troops which could strike at the

flank of the actual OVERLORD landing area, it was given special

attention by the Special Forces Headquarters.

Troop concentrations in the south of France were also considered. OVERLORD's smaller brother - OPERATION ANVIL - was an integral

part of the strategic offensive. But shipping, air support, and other

logisitical considerations precluded launching ANVIL until at least

8 weeks after the Normandy attack. Consequently it was determined that

resistance forces of the FF1 would bear the burden of creating havoc

there until the Mediterranean landings took place, and thereafter

supporting the drive northward.

To coordinate Special Force operations in the south, a Special

Operations Center (SPOC) was established in Algiers and both IJEDBURGH

and 0G teams were staged there. One of these was Uedburgh Team

BUGGATI commanded by Major Horace W. Fuller, USMCR, codename: KANSUL.

With him were French Army Captain Guy de la loche, British Major Hiram

Crosby and French Lieutenant Marcel Guillemont. BUGATTI's target was

Jarbes, the 'adopted ancestral home' of the de la Roche family.6

Provincial capital of the Haute Pyrennes, Jarbes was a market

town. Farmers brought their corn and tobacco there. But despite its

relatively small population (about 25,000 in 1944) it also boasted some

industry. Of particular importance to the Germans - and thus to OSS -

/ e was Hispano-Suiza plant which produced aircraft engines and the Arsenal

National, fabricator of 150mm and 250mm guns. There was also a railway

yard with facilities for repair and refurbishing of rolling stock.

Nearby was the oil refinery at Peyrouzet. Several regiments of Germans

garrisoned the area.
136

SUE had been active in the Tarbes area since January, 1943 when

Maurice Southgate (codename HECTUR) had been parachuted into the area

along with a courier, Jacqueline Nearne. HECTOR's mission had been to

determine the status of resistance forces in the Pyrennes foothills

and along the Spanish border. These proved to be sound; "they

numbered nearly a hundred and all had passed the same stiff initial

test: escape from a prisoner-of-war camp in Germany. Some serious

immediate sabotage was attempted in Tarbes arsenal at midsummer but

only a day's delay was caused..

As D-Day approached, SUE stepped-up its own activities in the

Haute Pyrennes and it was to the resistance forces of the British

WHEELWRIGHT circuit that BUGATTI was specifically directed.8

'Hod' Fuller came to his command by an unusual route. Born

and raised in Massachusetts he was educated at Milton Academy and

Harvard. During his undergraduate days, Fuller played varsity football

and ice hockey. He was also one of the founding fathers of the Harvard

Flying Club. Upon graduation in l93U, Fuller entered the Harvard

Business School.

A year later his love for adventure led him to secure a

comercial pilot's license and a job with East Coast Aircraft Corporation,

a small company based at Boston Airport. By that time Pmerica was in

the depths of the Great Depression. In 1932, East Coast Air folded

and Fuller was out of a job.

Rather than returning to Harvard, Fuller instead wangled a

position as engineer on the 85' diesel auxiliary yacht "Pilgrim".

Within weeks he was off on a round-the-world cruise during which he

worked not only on the main engine but also taught himself to handle
137

all of the electrical and refrigeration work. "Pilgrim's" voyage

lasted 23 months.

In 1934, his wanderlust partially slaked, Fuller went to work

as an engineer at the Bethlehem Steel plant in Quincy. Eventually

he became head of the department which tested diesel and gasoline

engine designs. Fuller was at the Fore River factory when Germany

attacked Poland... but not for long.

"As soon as the Nazis attacked, I joined a group of

Americans and went to France to volunteer my services.

I was attached to the 19th Transport Regiment, 10th Division,

10th French Army Corps and served at the Front all through

the battles for Flanders and on the Somme. When the

Armistice came I was demobilized, a heartbreaking experience

since I had just received an appointment for the next

officer's course and a posting to the Foreign Legion."

Soon after returning to the United States, Fuller wrote to

Marine Corps headquarters requesting an application for training and

commissioning as a Motor Transport Officer. His interests and

motivation toward service as a Marine had by then already been well

demonstrated since he had served as a volunteer reserve enlisted man

during his Harvard days and was carried on the inactive roles as a

Corporal until 1935.10

On 13 May 1941, Horace Fuller was appointed a First Lieutenant

in the Marine Corps Reserve and directed to report to Quantico for

duty with the Motor Transport School. Within two weeks he became the

chief diesel engine instructor in the Corps.

After several months of teaching, Fuller wrote the Major General

Commandant seeking a place at the formal Reserve Officer's Refresher

Course. In it he pointed out that:
138

"Having served from January until July, 1940 in the line

of the French Army with the 19th Regiment, 10th Division,

commanded by General Georges, as a driver and small unit

leader of tanks, armored cars, and ambulances, and have been

engaged with the enemy covering the withdrawal of French

units from Dunkirk through Flanders (where I received the

Croix de Guerre on 8 June 1940), it is my desire to better

fit myself as an Officer of Marines and to better acquaint

myself with current Marine Corps methods. I hope to serve

in Marine Corps armored units in the line."''

Fuller got his school and a set of orders to one of the Marine

Corp's newest units: the First Amphibian Tractor Battalion at Dunedin,

Florida. There, Fuller was given command of Company "C' and directed

to inspect the new [VT's as they came off the Food Machinery Company's

Lakeland assembly lines. Following several months of training,

Company "C" entrained with its vehicles and moved to the 1st Marine

Division's base camp at New River, North Carolina.

By May, 1942 Fuller had been promoted to Captain and was holding

down the post of Battalion Executive Officer. I-le still had the job

when the 1st Division sailed for New Zealand on 10 June. In Wellington,

new officers and equipment reached the battalion and Fuller was given

another Company to command. When the Marines landed at Guadalcanal

on 7 August 1942, Hod Fuller's LVT's were among the first to hit the

beach.

During the following weeks, the Division engaed in a series

of operations which relegated the LVT's to a largely logistical role.

But that did not spare Captain Fuller. On 3 October he was inside a

bunker which suffered a direct hit during a Japanese air attack. A

collapsing timber smashed his leg and proved to be a ticket home.

At first the leg seemed to heal well but by February, 1943

Fuller had developed a noticeable limp and was in constant pain.
139

Detached from his temporary job as Assistant G-2 of Amphibious Force

Pacific, he was promoted to Major and shipped East to the Naval Hospital

at Chelsea, Massachusetts.

Five weeks later, an operation having repaired his battle

damage, Fuller left Chelsea for Quantico. There he was assigned to

the tactics section of the Reserve Officer Training School. But

despite being elevated to Battalion Commander, Fuller was not content

with watchin« the war go by from the shores of the Potomac. He had,

infact, already laid the groundwork for a transfer to Europe. In a

letter to Major Andrew Wylie, Fuller pointed out:

"While sailing on various small yachts and making voyages

on French and Italian sailing vessels in the Mediterranean,

I have spent considerable time on the southern coast of

France as well as in Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Sicily, and

Elba."12

Wylie was in a position to help. Scion of a wealthy Washington

family, he was head of OMIs East European desk and had direct contacts

with OSS. On 1 September 1943, Hod Fuller received orders to report

to Donovan.

New Year's Day 1944 found Fuller in England awaiting assignment

to the OSS Parachute Training Unit, then commanded by another Marine,

Major Bruce B. Cheever, USMC.'3 Shortly thereafter, he was tapped for

duty as a 'Jed'.

Team BUGATTI left Buda, near A1giers early in the evening of

28 June 1944. A single black B-24 flew the mission. After an unremarkable five hour flight, the drop zone was spotted and Fuller, Crosby,

de la Roche, and Guillemont 'hit the silk'.
140

On the ground things worked equally smoothly. A resistance

reception comittee was on hand to greet the Jedburghs and gather their

equipment. By 0200 on the 29th, BUGATTI was safe1' stashed in a

farmhouse some 6 kilometers from the small town of Montrejeau. The

next day, Fuller left early for a rendevous with George R. Starr

(codename: HILAIRE) one of 50Es most daring organizers in the south

* of France and architect of WHEELWRIGHT. Accompanying him was Anne

Marie Walters (codename COLLETTE) Starr's courier.

Since the area was swarming with Germans, Fuller travelled in

civilian clothes. This was not accepted practice for 'deds' because

capture would automatically result in execution as a spy. But COLLETTE

convinced the members of BUGATTI that there was little chance of

avoiding Germans and that uniforms would result in instant combat.

The wisdom of her rationale became immediately apparent. Soon after

Fuller departed, a company of SS troops was spotted moving toward the

farmhouse. Only a quick exit from the second story saved detection.

"We were then taken at night to the maquis camp near Arbon.

Here all attempts to reach Algiers were most unsatisfactory

as our B-2 (radio) set had been damaged in the drop. Although

I brought another B-2 back from HILAIREs headquarters, our first meassages were always reported as indecipherable. The

maquis consisted of about lOO men, all of whom were poorly

armed, but with their remaining store of plastique, we

immediately blew up four pylons on the 150,000 kilowatt

power line through the Arbon Valley. This supplied power

to the aircraft factory in Toulouse."14

*Starrls exploits in France are worthy of a complete book.

Ftsurvived the war and was highly decorated by both the British and French
141

After a fortnight of frustration caused by faulty radios,

BUGATTI finally managed to raise Algiers. Then began a series of

pleas for arms and ammunition:

"Guns and ammo needed urgently.... send petrol and generator

as soon as possible.... Area unsafe for free movement. Bren

guns needed quickly.'

"No arms and Boche everywhere. Am sabotaging power and rail

lines continually. Need supplies."

"Daylight dropping impossible. Boche patrols make movement

dangerous. All vehicles forbidden to move and shot at on

sight. Immediate strength at least 3,000 maquisards but no

arms." 15

By 10 July, stili without supplies, Fuller decided on a risky

move. A new radio and some previously delivered weapons were cached

in the village of Lannemezan. Unfortunately, the town was garrisoned

by 1,200 German soldiers. Captain de la Roche and a four man team

volunteered to try to retrieve these desperately needed items. Moving

at night in a purloined truck, they succeeded not only in getting

the equipment but also returning with it to the Arbon hideout. With

the new radio, BUGATTI was finally able to regain contact with the

SPOC and on the night of 16 July, a lone plane dropped containers to

the maquis. Though many of these broke open before reaching the ground,

the resupply proved a godsend for the next day, 600 Germans began to

systematically invest the farm area.

Fuller pulled his men back to an open hillside with a wooded

area protecting the flanks. De la Roche and a special contingent

armd themselves with British Gammon grenades in case the enemy brought

up tanks.
t

142

At about 1730, the Germans began slowly advancing toward the

maquis positions. Taken under fire, they brought mortars and heavy

machine guns into play. Eventually the maquis withdrew into the fore

leaving 16 dead Germans on the field and having suffered no casualtie

themselves.

Fuller immediately shifted his headquarters deeper into the

Pyrennes, this time to the vicinity of St. Bertrand des Comminges

about 16 miles to the west. While oh the move, he learned that the

Arbon farm had been compromised by an Italian who lived in Montrejeau

Fuller ordered the resistance to deal with him.

"Several days later one of our patrols shot him in Montrejeau

and he was taken to hospital wounded. We then sent a visitor

to the hospital who slit his throat during the night."6

BUGATTI's main camp now contained about 35 men, all of whom

were well armed but had little ammunition and few explosives. Anothe

maquis unit at Arbas was better equipped and they- began a systematic

campaign of sabotage directed at railway lines or.d power stations.

Fuller radioed a report of the fighting which ended with the sanguine

phrase: "Hope I'm first Jed to kill a Boche."17

on 20 July, Fuller determined that the situation could best b

handled by splitting his team into two separate parts. Captain de la

Roche was directed to take charge of the Tarbes area while Fuller

directed the maquis in the valleys of Nistos, Luchron, and as far eas

as Saint Gaudens.

Both of these groups were busy. On one occasion, de la Roche

was ambused while riding a motorcycle. He lay in a ditch while the

Germans unsuccessfully searched all around him and had the traumatic
143

experience of watching his companion captured,tortured , and executed

on the spot.

In addition to the enemy, Fuller and de la Roche were also

forced to address the ticklish problem of internal rivalries in the

resistance. Their position in this regard was decidedly hampered by

a continuing inability to produce either weapons or money. During the

entire course of BUGATTI's operation, only a single supply drop was

received. The air of suspicion and mutual antagonism which surrounded

* ** the communist FTP, the MUR, and the Franc Pommes was never fully

overcome but de la Roche, in particular, succeeded in bringing about

an uneasy accommodation. The open internecine warfare which characterized all of the East European guerilla movements was thereby avoided.

By 20 duly, BUGATTI had hit all its designated targets and was

busy blowing railroads faster than the Germans could repair them.

One of the biggest successes was complete interdiction of the line

which ran south into Spain. This blocked 50,000 tons of iron ore at

the frontier.

BUGATTI had also been ordered to destroy the oil refinery at

Peyrouzet. Fuller was loath to undertake this mission because of the

potential impact on the area's power economy. Happily, M. la Chaux,

the manager, was a confirmed patriot of the reisstance and had participated

in several stiff firefights as a maquis commander. La Chaux proposed a

simple but effective plan for eliminating production without sabotaging

the equipment.

* FTP: Francs Tireurs et Partisans

**MUR: Mouvement Unis de Resistance
144

The refinery required large amounts of water. Under the

manager's supervision, it's irrigation canals were systematically bled

dry. The Germans, unable to locate the control vah'es,were powerless

to resume operations. Two days after they pulled-out, la Chaux was

producing enough gasoline for the entire Toulouse area.

With the ANVIL landings about to commence, General DeGaulle

issued orders for a full-scale rising in southern France. When the

coded message was broadcast by the B.B.C. on 14 August, Fuller and hi

team were still desperately short of explosives and ammunition.

Nevertheless, actions were initiated throughout the entire Haute

Pyrennes which literally paralyzed German road movement. Every road

which could be covered was allocated to various ambush parties. Soon

havoc was the norm.

On 18 August, Fuller received word that the commanding general

in Tarbes was attempting to flee. The Germans assembled a column of

trucks and civilian autos and were preparing to withdraw toward

Montrejau along the Route Nationale. Every available maquisard was

directed to stop this movement.

Obviously, the Germans were now in a state of confusion.

Truscott's VI U. S. Corps was driving north from its Riviera beaches

spearheaded by a mechanized brigade. The Free French II Corps had

forced the enemy back into Toulon and was pushing westward toward

Marseilles. With the prospect of crumbling defenses along the Rhone

Valley, the possibility loomed that all German forces between the

Mediterranean and the Bay of Biscay would soon be faced with either

surrender or encirclement.
145

Major General Mayr in Jarbes found neither of these options

paljtable. Within minutes of leaving the village both became more

inviting. The evacuation column was immediately attacked by the maquis.

Mayr and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Kountze, were both hit in the

initial fussilade of Sten and Bren Gun fire. A bad situation soon

became a rout. Cars and trucks were set alight and German soldiers

seemed to rush aimlessly about in the maelstrom. Twenty were killed,

35 wounded and the rest taken prisoner. Tarbes was liberated.

A few days later Fuller jubilently messaged Algiers:

"What a show. Our maquis liberated Jarbes and Loubon. Boche

fleeing into Spain. Prisoners, arms captured... Have Boche

general and staff prisoner here. Want large heavy arms drop

to attack Boche division at

BIJGATTI's headquarters now became the Hôtel Moderne but Fuller

and de la Roche did not spend much time there. For the next three weeks

both were involved in a series of actions which culminated in an

organized maquis force of nearly 5,000 men. While the bulk of these

forces drove northward toward Bordeaux, a series of ambushes was strung

out along the Franco-Spanish frontier. Patrols in this sector captured

more than 400 Germans, bringing BUGATTI's haul to approximately 1,000.

Operations were now going so successfully that Fuller was no

longer content to wait in vain for request air support from Algiers.

Having overrun several airfields and being a pilot, he simply organized

his own air force. Although hampered by lack of fuses for the German

bombs, the planes did pay dividens in reconnaissance and liaison roles.

Jhe SPOC, while praising this innovation, firmly refused Fuller's

request to send a flight back to North Africa.
Lieutenant Colonel Horace W. Fuller, USMCR (front row,

third from right) Commanding Officer, Jedburgh Team BUGATTI at ceremonies marking the liberation of Tarbes, Haute

Pyrennes, France, 1g44.

(Photo courtesy Captain Francois de la Roche, USMCR)
E L

j

146

As the enemy was driven from French soil, the enmity of the

various factions within the maquis resurfaced.

"We saw the whole situation was becoming one of politics

with the different groups within the FF1 starting to fight

among themselves for power and, as the mission which had

been given us was a military one, we carefully avoided

anything to do with politics.... We therefore began demobilizing our men. All weapons were taken and stored

in a caserne at Tarbes and all military affairs in our region handed over to the FFI."l9

For their work in France, Fuller and de la Roche were awarded

the Silver Star and Çix de Guerre. Fuller was also mentioned in

despatches by SOE and made a Knight of the Legion of Honor by France.

He finished the war with a Chinese commando battalion having been

promoted to Lieutenant Colonel while in the Pyrennes. Demobilized

in December, 1945 he worked for a succession of airlines both in the

United States and abroad. Fuller was later promoted to Colonel in th

Marine Corps Reserve and retired as a Brigadier General in 1957. He

died in 1971.20
CHAPTER XI

"HOW THE HELL DID A MARINE GET HERE?"

The story of Marines with the OSS is full of occupational

transitions. Few of these are more startlin9 than that of Captain

William Francois Angetique Grell, USMCR.

Grell was born in Antwerp, Belgium on 22 February 1899, the

son of a prominent grain broker. When World War I began, the Grell

family moved to London. As soon as he was old enough, Bill Grell

enlisted as a Private in the Belgian Army. In April, 1916 he began

his military career by digging gun emplacements for the 104th Battery,

6th Artillery.

"Successively I became a signal corps man, field telephone

operator, lineman, despatch writer, forward observer, and

member of a-gun crew. Promoted to Corporal I took charge

of a 75mm gun. I was actually two and a half years in front

line duty for which I received four chevrons."t

In May 1917, Grell was selected for officer training and after

a probationary period was commissioned in April, 1918. The following

month he was wounded, but returned to his regiment in time to witness

the German capitulation. By then he was a decorated veteran with four

personal decorations and two Mentions in Despatches.

Following World War I, Grell and his brother Leon went into the

grain business in Antwerp. This proved lucrative enough until the

depression struck. In 1930, Grell left Belgium for the United States

147
148

with plans to open another grain brokerage. But America was no more

immune to the economic slump than was Europe. Instead Grell found a

job at New York's Hotel St. Moritz. In 1934, Arthur Herssens, a

prominent importer of brewing malt, offered Grell a position with his

firm. For the next five years, business boomed. When World War II

cut off European suppliers, Grell went back to being a hostelier.

In December, 1942, having been turned-down by both the Army

and Navy, Grell applied for a commission in the Marine Cot'ps.

Surprisingly, he was accepted. The reason soon became apparent. The

Corps was critically short of mess officers and Grell was then manager

of the Drake Hotel, one of New York's best. Ordered to Camp Elliott,

Grell became Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Officer's Club.

This was not Bill Grell's idea of war. He requested a transfe

to intelligence. The application was promptly denied. Then, "in May,

1943 a chance meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Hall, OSS representative

on the West Coast, allowed him to talk his way out. Without going int

details, Hall promised Grell an intelligence job and also some action

"On reporting to Washington, Grell was subjected to the spythriller conceits of rear-echelon security officers. He arrived in hi

Marine uniform and was told to buy himself a civilian suit, to cut all

the labels out of it, then to wait at his room in the Statler Hotel

for a phone call."3 Grell gamely tolerated this and further equally

simple-minded instructions.

Following his 055 training, Grell flew to London where he

became part of the first American group assigned to work with SOE. Hi

initial assignment involved ¿oorcfination of supply drops to France...

flights in which he frequently participated. "We were working with an
149

unusual type of individual", Grell later recalled,"many had natures

that fed on danger and excitement. It was not unusual to find a good

measure of temper thrown in."4

By late August, 1944 the situation in northern France had

developed to the point where most of the 055 and 50E teams were being

overrun by the advancing allied armies. But in the southwest, much

remained to be done. Grell, who spoke fluent French as well as Flemish

and Gernian1was ordered to fly to Limoges and take charge of operations

against the considerable enemy forces which remained there. For while

Limoges itself was in Free French hands, the countryside was not.

"On the north bank of the River Garonne, between Bordeaux

and Point de Grave, there were between 25,000 and 40,000 Nazi

troops. Another 20,000 were moving through the AngouliemePoitiers area, trying vainly to escape northwest. Twentyfive thousand more still occupied La Rochelle and Saint

Nazaire and other scattered groups of an estimated total

strength of between 5,000 and 10,000 remained in Puy de

Dome and Allier."5

Grell's mission was given the codename GERMINAL. With him were

Army Lieutenants Harry E. Griffiths and Robert Cutting. Two other

members, Captain Reeve Schley Jr. and Sergeant Philip Potter, were

already in the Limoges area having been flown-in a few days earlier.

GERMINAL's written orders were to make contact with the organizers of

the 50/50E "F' circuit and place those circuits at the disposal of

U. S. forces when they entered the maquis' operational zone. Additionally, Grell was directed to make a complete report of the political

situation in the Zone Sud, to reallocate agents of the "F" circuit as

necessary, and to return certain designated members of "F" to London.

This was expected to be a far from simple task, one which would require

tact and diplomacy as well as possible physical courage. Grell as
150

enjoined not to gloss-over problems. Perhaps to heighten his awareness of this last point, he was assigned the nom de guerre of

GRUMBLER.6

Mission GERMINAL launched from Tempsford Aerodrome in Englan

on the morning of 9 September 1944. The Hudson bomber covered the

route with no difficulty and landed at Limoges before noon.

Immediately upon deplaning, Grell linked-up with the other members

of his group and proceeded to a temporary headquarters which had

been established in the former Gestapo building.

After a day of administrative work, Grell and his team

set about locating missing members of circuit "F". This task was

complicated by the thousands of German soldiers who were still armed

and active in the countryside, not to mention the maquis who had a

propensity to ambush anything that moved. In his log of the mission

Grell wrote:

(11 and 12 September 1944).... This morning we travelled

from Limoges to Montlucon via Gueret. Enroute, we observed

thirty-one enemy vehicles which had been ambushed by the

FF1. The vehicles were completely destroyed or rendered

useless. It may be assumed that a large percentage of the

personnel were killed in the ambushes. A small number of

men were captured, but few prisoners are taken by the

F. F. I. German columns retreating to the North in hope

of using Belfort Gap lost heavily in men and equipment."7

In the afternoon, GERMINAL arrived at the maquis' command po

north of Cerilly. Here they met a number of F. F. I. guerillas wit

whom Captain Schely had been working. The Frenchmen invited Grell 

his group to come along on a night ambush which they had already

organized in the vicinity of the village of Sancoins. Accepting th

'call to arms' with alacrity, Grell, Schley, Griffiths, and Navy 2/
151

Petty Officer Roger Faucher* all followed the maquis motorized patrcn

as it headed toward Sancoins.

The maquis were anxious for action. Rumors were spreading that

the Germans were negotiating a surrender to the U. S. Third Army.

This suspicion irritated the F. F. I. because it not only insulted

French national pride but also promised to curb their successful

retaliation program.

'The German Major General who was attempting to evacuate

troops from this territory had realized that eventual escape

through the Americans was impossible and that continued

movement eastward would mean the loss of a great many men

and a good deal of equipment since they were hemed-in and

harassed by the Maquis along the entire route. They did

not dare surrender to the Maquis as they felt there was

no limit to the retributions that might be inflicted upon

them.

The F. F. I. would accede to terms only grudgingly

since they wanted the weapons the enemy would surrender."8

Grell and the rest of the ambush party arrived in Sancoins early

in the evening. There they were invited to dine with the local maquis

before the ambush was set.

Although the Wenrmacht had taken a stiff pounding from allied

aircraft as well as the French guerillas, its intelligence apparatus

was still functioning. No sooner had GERMINAL settled into Sancoins

then a German major came in under a flag of truce seeking 'a word with

the American Captain who has just arrived' . Grell received this

emissary in company with his men, their French counterparts, and

Marine Second Lieutenant William B. Macomber, Jr.

*Faucher, codename FRANCOIS, was the radio operator for OSS

Mission FREELANCE which was parachuted into the Puy de Dome region on

18 July 1944. Another member of FREELANCE was the noted political

commentator and writer Joe Al sop.
LI F

152

William Butts Macomber was a 23-year-old Yale man who had

enlisted in the Class III Marine Corps Reserve during March, 1942.

Although only of medium height, Macamber was constructed along the

lines of a #10 woodscrew. During his college days, Bill Macamber

played varsity football, lacrosse, and captained the Eli wrestling

squad. During one summer vacation, he had sailed with several North

Atlantic convoys as an engine room wiper.

Bill Macomber came from the sort of background which Donovan

seemed to most prize. His great grandfather, I. W. Butts had been a

newspaper publisher, businessman and politician in upstate New York.

His grandfather, Francis Macomber, an eminent jurist and Justice of

the New York State Supreme Court. Young Maconiber had come to Yale by

way of Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts where he excelled

in sports and was president of the debating society.9

Macomber wanted to be a Marine officer. He took extra course

work in his pre-law program in order to graduate before his class.

Then, upon reaching Parris Island, he was disqualified because of poor

eyesight. But any6ne with the combative nature of a wrestler was not

about to be deterred by such a setback. Macomber petitioned for a

waiver and this request was duly granted.'°

Commissioned a Second Lieutenant on 1 December 1943, he was

already slated for duty with OSS. After initial training in the U. S

Macomber flew to England. Assigned to the SO Branch, Macamber was

iniiiediately tapped for the role of weapons instructor with a team of

reinforcements for the 50/50E FREELANCE circuit which was operating in

the vicinity of Puy de Dome, Cantal. This was the same circuit to whi
153

Petty Officer Faucher belonged. FREELANCE was headed by an experienc

British Officer, Captain John Farmer who had been in France since

30 April.1' There were four other officers in Macomber's party:

Major Edwin Lord, AUS, Second Lieutenant Richard Duval, AUS, Second

Lieutenant Michel Block, AUS, and Canadian Captain Pierre Meunier.

After a false start on 25 August, the FREELANCE augmentees

climbed aboard an RAF Halifax early in the evening of the 28th.

The aircraft flew to the proposed drop zone and by 0100 the next

morning was circling over what was supposed to be the designated area.

While the team checked their chutes and prepared to jump, the pilot

scanned the darkened landscape for a maquis signal. But no flashing

lights appeared. Despite Lord's request to drop the mission 'blind'

the aircraft commander wheeled his bomber to the north and returned

to base with the OSE men still onboard.

RAE Bomber Command was unable to produce an aircraft for a

third try at infiltrating Lord and company so the job was turned over

* to the U. S. Eighth Air Force's 492nd Bomb Group (Heavy). At 2200,

31 August 1944 the team was ready for another try. Before departing,

Lord requested that the OES representative at Harrington Field instruct

the pilot to drop the mission "with or without ground signals".12 The

aircraft, aging and rust-pitted Liberators, were usually painted black

*The 492nd was specifically tasked with carrying out Operation

CARPETBAGGER, the aerial support of resistance groups in France.

The Group was formed from squadrons of 8-24's which had originally

been part of the 479th Antisubmarine Group. In November, 1943

these were attached to the 482nd Bomb Group (Pathfinder). Early in

August, 1944 the 492nd was officially 'blessed' with the CARPETBAGGER

role and its squadrons were redesignated 856, 857, 858, and 859.
154

glossy black (the better it was thought to reflect enemy searchlights).

Their ball turrets were removed and the resulting space covered with

a sliding panel. When removed, this panel provided 'the hole' through

which agents parachuted. "Carpetbaggers flew alone at altitudes as low

as five hundred feet, as slowly as 120 miles an hour over the drop zone.

Navigation for the solitary aircraft was the difference between

depositing an agent accurately and safely or leaving him hopelessly

lost. The lone plar&on a dropping mission risked the treacherous

hazards of low-level navigation, particularly as it wove through

mountain passes. A heavy bomber, flaps down, running in to drop an

agent was a pigeon for enemy fighters.°13 And there was always the

weather. On the night of FREELANCE's departure, that too was bad.

A storm was sweeping down from the Hebrides, bringing with it

heavy rain and stiff winds. For a time it was uncertain whether the

mission would be allowed to proceed but finally the Liberator's

engines sprang to life and the big black bird lumbered into the night

sky. The plane missed most of the storm. It was the pilot and

navigator who missed the drop zone.

"At shortly after midnight, the pilot asked me over the

intercom if we still wanted to jump blind and if I were

sure all our men would jump. I replied in the affirmative

to both questions and told him I was jumping first....

When the 'hole' was opened we found we were so crowded

that we could not take the proper jump positions and all

of us got a number of tangles in our suspension lines

when we dropped. It had stopped raining and the wind had

died down but we were not certain if we were jumping "blind"

or not, although I had been unable to see any ground lights

through the hole.

We jumped at 0110 hours the morning of 1 September at

600 feet. In order to locate my group on the ground I checked the chutes in the air to determine the direction of

descent, and could only count three chutes besides my own."14
155

Bill Macomber jumped fourth. He and Lieutenant Block landed

in a plowed field near a small road. Major Lord came down in another

field a few hundred yards away. Lieutenant Duval split the difference

and ended up in a tree. The Canadian Captain was nowhere to be seen.

As the drone of the bomber's engines fided, the four men

cautiously whistled to each other. They were obviously in the wrong

place, behind enemy lines, and with no idea of their exact location.

Suddenly Lord heard voices.

Out of the night four more shadows appeared. They were armed

men, wearing civilian clothes.., and they spoke French. One of the

shadows began to quietly whistle the Marseillaise. Lord replied with

'Tipperary'. Silence. The rain began to fall again.

Lord plucked up his courage and called softly: "Americans".

The shadows answered: "Francaises". Contact was established.

It was immediately determined that the four maquisards had seen

the four parachutes descending and come to investigate. All were

teenagers. They told the OSS men that their company headquarters

was located near the village of Lurcy-.Levy, only a few kilometers

distant. Macomber checked his map. FREELANCE was more than 15 miles

from its designated drop zone.'5

After several hours of searching in vain for Captain Meunier,

the eight men moved cross country to the maquis command post. There

they were greeted by an excited group of guerillas who hung an American

flag on the wall of their farmhouse hideout. Backs were slapped, hands

shaken, and promises of help in finding the missing Captain made. At

first light, tlacomber and Block set out with a maquis escort to find

him.
J!

F F

156

Carefully skirting the village, the patrol finally found their

companion. Meunier's exit from the Liberator had been delayed when a

static line from one of the previous jumpers wrapped round his leg.

By the time he could untangle himself and drop clear of the aircraft,

he was several miles from the others. He had spent the night hiding i

the woods. By noon, the en-tire group was reunited at a small chateau

near Fragne, the headquarters of Captain Denis Rake a British SOE

officer.

Each member of the newly arrived team was given a specific

local mission. Macomber drew that of advisor and weapons instructor

for a company of 150 maquisards commanded by Captain Henri Tardivat.

"The first major job this company had after I joined

them was the occupation of Vichy. It seemed that although

the city had been 'officially' liberated a little over a

week before, it was still under control of many of the

same people that had flourished under the Petain regime.

Thus, my company and one other were sent to take over.

This was accomplished with little diffculty, a few arrests

were made, and the situation seemed fairly well under

control. The only disquieting element lay in the fact

that the other company which came down with us was FTP

* (comunist). This caused certain alarm in some quarters. 16

Following three days in Vichy, Macomber's maquis went back to

ambushing German convoys. It was then that the rumors of a possible

surrender began to spread.

Macomber and Block, with their respective companies, took up

positions near the main road leading eastward from Sancoin. Here they

*Lt. Duval who had parachuted in with Lord and Macomber was

the advisor for this company. This arrangement served to ease the

situation somewhat.
157 * were contacted by Colonel Roussel, commander of the French ist Regiment.

Roussel was as much 1in the dark' as everyone else regarding the

possible armistice negotiations, but indicated that his sketchy

information indicated that the preliminary discussions had allegedly

been conducted between the U. S. Third Army and German forces somewhere

west of Vichy. Several German officers in Sancoin had requested that

they too should be covered by any such agreement. Would Macomber and

Block assist the maquis in negotiations, Roussel asked.

Immediately agreeing, the two young lieutenants left their

outfits and proceeded toward Sancoin. At a prearranged spot, they

were met by several German officers. Talks got underway in which

several points immediately became clear. First, the Germans did not

want to surrender to the maquis but rather to be granted safe conduct

to the American lines. Second, they refused to be disarmed until they

had successfully cleared the guerillas' operating areas. Finally, their

commander desired that any convoy moving to the actual surrender point

be led by an American officer, in uniform.

Macomber and Block stalled. They had no orders to engage in

such discussions and no authority to accept or offer terms. The,j best

they could do was relay the German proposals to their superior officer

for decision. The parlay ended on this note and both returned to their

headquarters.

While Duval set off to look for Major Lord, Macomber entered

Sancoin proper. There he found a tense situation. In one part of the

* er The l Regiment had been disbanded in 1940. when the Allies

invaded France, Roussel had recalled it to active service under FF1

command.
158

town were six thousand fully armed German combat troops. Facing them

were one company of the 1st Regiment and a motlty assortment of FF1

guerillas.

Now Macomber was the only American present - a long Marine

Second Lieutenant in the midst of a potential major battle. More

negotiations commenced, this time in the Town Hall. Once again the

Germans repeated their demands, still Macomber fudged. He would, he

said, have to consult his conrnander. But to keep the parties talking

rather than shooting, Macomber volunteered to lead the surrender convoy

westward toward Orleans. At about this time, Captain Grell and the

members of GERMINAL entered the picture.

Grell and Macomber agreed to meet the German commander, Colonel

Brucker, the next morning at 1100. Having so informed the German

courier, the OSS and FF1 officers pondered the situation. They had

perhaps 300 armed maquisards and two companies of the 1st Regiment

immediately available should shooting break out. Brucker, on the other

hand, had the best part of 5 battalions, many of his men were combat

veterans. The concensus was that a possible trap was being laid. The ke

question was, "where was the third Army?4. Grell decided to find out.

The former hotel manager, his wrestler assistant, and four

Frenchmen armed themselves to the teeth with submachine guns, carbines

and grenades. Then, they commandeered two civilian cars and headed

for Bourges, some 60 kilometers away. After careening down blacked-out

country roads, Grell's party reached their destination only to learn

that the city was in the hands of the FTP and that the closest American

units were thought to be at least 100 kilometers distant. Recalling

his midnight ride, Grell later wrote.
1 59 "We were tired. It was two o'clock in the morning and I

had an eleven o' clock appointment with a Nazi Colonel. While

trying to find a place to sleep, we learned that an 'American

Colonel' had passed through Bourges a few hours earlier

headed south. We concluded from this that an official surrender offer had been tendered through other channels and that this

(American) Colonel was some sort of envoy."17

The group headed back toward Sancoin. The return trip was only slightly

less harrowing since the FTP was notoriously trigger happy and no one

except Germans moved upon the roads. Grell and Macomber missed the

partisans but ran instead into a small convoy of enemy officers moving

in the same direction under maquis escort. One of the Germans was

Colonel Brucke'. Together, the two groups proceeded toward the headquarters of German Major General Elsar. Everywhere they saw signs of

maquisard activity: dead horses, rotting corpses, abandoned or

burned-out vehicles.

Elsar had ensconsed himself in a large chateau near Arcay.

As Grell, tired, somewhat bedraggled, but in uniform stepped from his

car, an American Army officer leaned from an upstairs window and

exclaimed by way, of greeting: "How the hell did a Marine get here?"8

And so, on the warm autumn morning of 12 September 1944, a

total of 19,000 Germans surrendered. In his mission report, Lieutenant

Macomber wrote of this amazing capitulation:

"To my mind it is one of the outstanding events in the

overall story of the Maquis resistance in France. Of course

Elsar's 19,000 were not militarily defeated by the Maquis

which surrounded them. They were actually Overcome by the

joining of the American Third and Seventh Armies, for this

destroyed their escape route and, ended forever any chance

of their getting back to Germany. Nevertheless they were

19,000 troops - well equipped with plenty of ammunition

and food. Furthermore, the majority were not occupational

but frontline combat soldiers. The nearest American

regular troops that could be brought against them were
160

those of the Third Army north of the Loire, and every bridge

across the Loire was blown. If they had chosen to fight

it out, it would have meant the diversion of sizeable forces

and considerable cost in time, manpower, and materiel. Had

there been no Maquis active, the Germans would almost certainly

have followed this course. It is highly significant that the

Maquis so completely destroyed their nerves by continual

sniping and ambush and by killing every prisoner which fell

into their hands."19

The mysterious 'American Colonel proved to be a personal re

sentative of General Macon, Comander of the Third Army. Appropria

his name was "French".

Macomber and the rest of the FREELANCE mission busied thems

with the final details for enforcing the armistice. The next day, 

made preparations for terminating their mission to the Maquis, and,

on 15 September, Lord, Duval, Block, Macomber, and Petty Officer

Faucher headed north toward Paris in two civilian cars. Along the 

they passed thousands of German soldiers, well dressed, cleanly sha

and still armed, plodding slowly to their rendevous with a POW camp

Some of them were singing marching songs. Lord said they looked fa

from beaten. But beaten or not, they were out of the war.

Captain GRELL and the members of GERMINAL remained in France

for three more weeks tracking down members of "F" circuit and issuin

orders for the integration of maquis units into the FF1. GERMINAL

was declared complete on 8 October 1944.

Lieutenant Macomber was almost immediately transferred to th

Far East. After reporting to 055 Station "K" at Kandy, Ceylon, he

joined Colonel William R. Peers' 055 Detachment 101 in Burma.

As a member of "101" Macomber participated in combat operations alo
161

* the Burma-Thai border. Bill Grell immediately went to work on a

different target: Germany itself.

By early December, 1944 Allied armies were approaching the

borders of Hitler's Reich. But enemy resistance was stiffening and

Anglo-American supply lines were in chaos What lay in wait beyond

the Rhine? Despite massive technical intelligence efforts, no one

could be certain.

Of particular concern to Eisenhower and the rest of the SHAEF

upper command echelon were increasingly frequent references to a

"national redoubt' in the Bavarian Alps. No amount of aerial

photographs or signals intercepts could determine whether the alpine

fortress was a citadel or a chimera.

055 was directed to find out. Meanwhile, the Allied Armies

in Italy were slowly slugging their way northward toward the Swiss

and Austrian borders. Germany was hemmed-in on all sides but

her troops were still fighting.

Following the war, Macomber returned to Law School and upon

graduation, joined the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency. He

later transferred to the Department of State as Special Assistant to

John Foster Dulles. Macomber was U. S. Ambassador to Jordan (1961-64);

Assistant Administrator of AID (1964-67). He subsequently served as a

Deputy Under Secretary of State and as U. S. Ambassador to Turkey.
CHAPTER XII

"ONE MARINE .... ELEVEN HUNDRED GERMANS"

The tall freckl!faced American strolled casually into the

elegant hotel room as though he owned the entire premises. Twelve

German offic°rs were seated at a polished table; outside hundreds

of heavily armed enemy troops were busy turning the Italian town

into a fortress. The Mierican eyed the Germans and said: "I've

come to offer you a chance to surrender before we start our air

bombardment and ground attack."1 First Lieutenant George M. Hearn,

USMCR was about to accomplish one of the most dramatic coups of

any 055 officer in World War II.

Lieutenant Hearn was dirty and unarmed but hemade an immediate

impression nonetheless. Over six-feet-tall and heavily muscled, he look

like a football player and spoke with the authority of a commander.

Both descriptions were accurate, although his command was hardly one

to strike fear into the assembled enemy. What was highly inaccurate

was his assertion that the city of Chioggia was marked for imminent

attack. Hearn's airplanes did not exist and his ground troops amounted

to a handful of guerillas and six Italian Marines.

George Hearn had entered the Marine Corps in 1943 following

graduation from San Jose State College in California. Commissioned on

1 December, he immediately volunteered for duty with OSS and was so

detailed once his basic Marine training had been completed.

Hearn was initially assigned to the operating base at Algiers.

Later he became a member of the Maritime Unit operating in the Adriatic

162
163

His first job involved the training and conduct of clandestine

agent.)and sabotage infiltrations by cabin cruiser and rubber boat

along the northern Italian coastline.

By mid-1944, the allied drive in Italy had been stymied by

Field Marshall Kesselring's Gothic Une. All attempts to batter

through the mountain defenses brought heavy casualties to the

British Eighth and U. S. Fifth Armies. Clearly flanking attacks from

the sea were called for. But Anzio and Salerno had been costly

near-failures and the bulk of Allied shiiping was tiedup in

supporting the 'mains fronts in Normandy and southern France.

Raids, on the other hand, might bring such chaos to the German

rear area that any penetration of the Gothic Line would unhinge

the whole system. To accomplish just this task, OSS began a series

of supply runs to the Italian partisans operating north of the

Po River.

In northern Italy, six principal anti-Fascist parties had banded

together to form the Comitato di Liberazione per l'Alta Italia,

commonly referred to as CLNAI. Headquarters of the resistance was

centered in the industrial city of Milano. In November 1944, several

top CUlAI leaders, including future premier Ferruccio Parri, were

smuggled out of Italy through neutral Switzerland by the 055. "On

7 December 1944 an agreement was signed by SACMED authority whereby

055 and SUE would each allocate 80 million lire per month to support

CLNAI. This money would be repaid to the British and American

Governments after the war.

In the summer, fall and winter of 1944, 055 was instrumental

in harnessing resistance groups throughout North Italy and forging
164

them into a weapon that could create a major diversion

of German effort on the Italian front. In the interior,

partisan bands were equipped and trained and their operations

coordinated for maximum effectiveness. 2 Lieutenant }-learn and his associates were concerned lest major

partisan operations begin too soon. The Po Delta area was a major

agricultural region. Three hundred years before, the Venetians

had begun building a vast system of dams, dikes, and bypasses which

resulted in changing the entire course of the Po. Napoleon had

also conducted extensive engineering projects in the vicinity.

If the Germans destroyed the dams and pumping stations, not

only would the Po become a nightmare for the Italians but it

would also present the advancing Allied armies with a water

barrier as formidible as the mountains.

It was a ticklish situation and when the British and American

advance began in earnest in early 1945, the partisans grew increasi

restive. By mid-April Bologna had been liberated and the guerillas

were itching to commence operations. OSS operatives who continued

urging restraint were greeted with mal occhio - the evil eye.

Just south of the mouth of the Po is a large island, the

Isola Donzella. 055 planned to use this as a main supply base but

the Germans struckfirst. On 20 April, they attacked the island whic

was defended by several companies of poorly armed irregulars. For

two days a series of short but bitter fights erupted up and down

Donzella. The guerillas had one importantadvantage - they knew the

island's terrain backward and forward. Eventually the Germans

decided to cut their losses. On 22 April, most retreated back to
165

the mainland, blowing the only connecting bridge on their way

out and killing all farm animals upon which they laid eyes.

That morning, OSS headquarters in Ravenna asked for a volunteer

to join the partisans on Isola Donzella. Lieutenant I-learn jumped

at the opportunity. Accompanied by Corporaj Peter Rago - an

Mierican GI from Staten Island - and six members of the San Marco Marine

Regiment, Royal Italian Navy, I-learn boarded a Chriscraft and set

course northward. Seldom had the Maritime Unit operated in

daylight (I-learn had done 29 previous missions at night) but the

Luftwaffe had been gradually expunged from the Italian sky and

the little motor yacht made the passage without incident.

Once ashore, Hearn learned that some enemy troops still

occupied the northeastern tip of the isiand and were holed-up in

the small village of Ca Tiepolo. Therewere now about 300 guerillas

on hand, all of whom were anxious for F-learn to lead them.

Moving toward Ca Tiepolo, Hearn and his motley force came under

sporadic rifle and machine gun tire. Soon German artillery began

accurate fires from the mainland as well. The Italians wavered.

Sensing that the position was too strong to attack. Hearn

and his San Marco Marines set about establishing a rough defensive

line. This proved a wise precaution. Soon after sundown the enemy

made a bid to rout the gueriilas by a surprise attack.
166

"Amidst the crack of the shells, the chatter of mach

guns, the crump of mortars, and glowing red star cluste

he, his San Marco Marines, and his one Corporal were ti

desperate figures running up and down the frontline

partisan positions. Hearn and his men encouraged them

to fight, too stand their ground, not to flee before

the violent German pressure..., the advance was checked

The next morning, Hearn took stock of the situation.

Although the enemy had not been crushed, he continued to

control most of the portion of Donzella which overlooked

the mouth of the Po. This ruled-out any German retreat acros

the river on the mainland. But seven miles up-river was a m

ferry point. Hearn wanted to block that route as well but

first he needed to eliminate any possibility of further

action on the island. The only solution was to launch anothe

attack.

Taking the only bazooka in the guerillas' small arsenal,

Hearn crawled to within a hundred yards of the main German

position. Two quick rockets sent sandbags flying. Then, thre

of his Marines rushed the bunker. Heartened, the guerillas

followed this lead and within 90 minutes the island was thei

Twenty Germans surrendered, the rest were either killed or

managed to escape to the mainland.

His rear secure, Hearn sent a patrol of twenty guerill

and one Italian Marine FICO across to the mainland. Six hours

later, this little group returned with the news that the

Germans were pulling-out northward; good ambush sites were available;and the populace was waiting for 'liberation'.
167

Emboldened by the patrol report, Hearn picked 40 men and

headed for the ferry.

After a three hour march, the ambush party reached their

harbor site. Hearn's men were now several miles inland and

well over a hundred miles ahead of the advancing British

Eighth Army. They set up their two mortars, laid-out fields

of fire for the pair of machine guns, and waited.

Within an hour two German trucks appeared. Both were

loaded with troops. I-learn calculated the range and dropped

a 60mm mortar bomb dead center on the first truck. The machine

guns opened fire. It was over in two minutes. Dead soldiers

littered the road and the living had their hands skyward.

The guerillas cleared the road , pdsted a guard on the

prisoners and resumed their firing positions. Forty-five

minutes later the same scene was reenacted.

For most of the day, Eêarn's group kept to this script.

The ferry was out of earshot and worked so slowly that only

two or three truckloads could be moved across at one time.

Proceeding piecemeal, the convoy was methodically chopped

to pieces without a single friendly casualty. Just before

dusk, I-learn withdrew back to the island and radioed the

day's results to Ravenna: thus far he had knocked-out a dozen

vehicles, killed nearly a hundred Germans, and had a growing

bag of POUls. In response to this news, OSS despatched two

resupply drops and pr6mised reinforcements.
i,

168

During the night, the planes came over and parachuted

additional arms and ammunition to Donzella. Then Hearn got

his first sleep in more than 3 days.

At ten o'clock the next morning, several landing craft

flying the White Ensign of Britain's Royal Navy growled into

the Po estuary. On board were 60 windburned veterans of

the Long Range Desert Group's "Special Demolition Squadron

Number 1" better known as Popski's Private Army. With them

they brought six more San Marco Marines, additional weapons

and supplies, and their own favorite mode of transport:

20 jeeps each mounting a .50 caliber machine gun.4

PopskVs men had orders to sweep inland and roar about

the countryside in their accustomed fashion shooting-up everythi

German that moved. Hearn was to facilitate their operations

by going back to the mainland himself and organizing guerilla

support for both the PPA and the advancing allied ground troops.

Fifteen miles to the North was the Adige River. Beyond

that lay the Brenta River which empties in the Lagoon of Venice.

The principal defensive terrain in the region was occupied

by the town of Chioggia, an old fortress. The Germans were

concentrating their forces there. Hearn organized a 35-man

patrol and moved out.

After five hours of steady but cautious advance, they

reached the Adige. No Germans had been seen so Hearn commandeere

two small fishing boats and crossed the river. The Brenta was

three miles further.., still no resistance. Just as dusk was

settling on the mountains to the west, the first contact occurred
169

A strong German outpost on the south side of the Brenta

opened fire on the patrol's advance guard. Hearn immediately

posted his his men in front of the blocking position and

taking the remainder circled around to the right. Soon he

had the enemy caught with the river to their backs and a

turned flank. Forty-five more sets of hands were raised.

That night, dozens of refugees from Chioggia filtered

through Hearn's perimeter. One told an interesting story.

"The Germans" , he said, "are evacuating. By tomorrow there

will only be twenty or thirty left in the city." This news

prompted the Lieutenant to enter the town proper.

Before dawn, Hearn and Corporal Rago set out toward

Chioggia with a small party of Marines and guerillas. Soon

they met an Italian fisherman who was headed into the city.

With Rago interpreting, Hearn asked the man if he had heard

anything about the German's leaving or wanting to surrender.

The fisherman replied that he had indeed heard such rumors.

Hearn told him to go and find a German officer and tell him

that the ¡imerican Army was advancing and that an American

officer wanted to parl y.

Within fifteen minutes, three Germans carrying a white

flag appeared. Hearn told them he had been sent to accept

the surrender of Chioggia. They eyed him suspiciously and

said they needed to discuss this with their commander, perhaps

the Ñnerican would like to accompany them? Hearn instantly

started to sweat. How many commanders could thirty troops have?
r t'

170

Turning to Rago, the only Other American within a hundred miles, Hearn said: "Go back to our men and tell the

to hold their fire until I return". In a few minutes Rago

was back (it did not take long to 'pass the word' to 35

men) and the two OSS men headed for town with the German

officers.

"In ten minutes we were in the town proper. One

glance at the streets and I knew my worst fears were justified. For the first time a sharp sense of personal

fear hit me. Hundreds of heavily armed German troops

were milling around; every second one had an automatic

weapon slung over his shoulder. Barbed wire and sand

bagged buildings were everywhere. Surrender? If ever a place looked ready for a fight this was it."

Hearn and Rago were escorted to the main hoteLwhich

doubled as the Komandatur. There the Lieutenant met his

twelve Germans. The senior officer, a Kriegsmarine Captain

signalled for him to take a seat. Hearn began: "I am Lieutenant George Hearn of the United States Army. I am

in command of the forward scouting unit of my regiment...." 

In graphic detail, the Lieutenant explained that the

Air Corps was about to launch a devastating raid on Chioggi

and that only an immediate surrender could prevent further

bloodshed. The Germans glanced at each other and whispered

back and forth. Finally the Captain asked: "If I agree to

surrender can you call off the air attack immediately?"

Now was the time for 'poker nerves' and Hearn had them.
171

"I will call off the Air Force as soon as I return to my

unit", he said. "And by the way,"Hearn continued, exactly

how many men will you be surrendering?"

"Eleven hundred", came the reply. Eleven hundred Hearn's

mind reeled. He had barely enough food for his own men. How

in the devil was he going to cope with over a thousand

POWs? While he did some fast calculating, the Lieutenant's

blue eyes never wavered. He explained that he would be back

a two o'clock to work out the final details. The Germans seemed

anxious to get it over with, so why not accomodate them?

Hearn rose, saluted, and marched out. Then he and Rago

climbed into a waiting horse-drawn cart and drove slowly

out of the city. Back at his guerilla. command post, Hearn

immediately sent men in every direction to search for the

PPA. Atleast they looked like an advance guard.

It was one-thirty when a jeep carrying Lieutenant Harold

S. C. Wallbridge of Popski's 'R' Patrol came roaring into view.

Steve Wallbridge listened incredulously to Hearn's story. He

had gotten the message that-something was brewing at Chioggia

but that was all. Wallbridge's arrival raised the 'allied'

strength to six jeeps and 50 men. w ith two Second Lieutenants

now on the scene, the German position was suiy hopeless

While the PPA jeeps swung ciownriver to find a bridée,

Hearn and Wallbridge requisitioned two bicycles and pedaled

furiously back into the town. Arriving at the Kommandatur,

Hearn announced that the air attack had indeed been cancelled
1 72 and that the 'main allied force' would bypass the city to

avoid any incidents. Soon additional reconnaissance troops

would arrive. The Germans accepted it all as gospel.

That night, German and British soldiers jointly patroll

the streets of Chioggia. The majority of the garrison was

directed to stack its arms and withdraw to the coastal defen

positions overlooking the Adriatic approaches to Venice.

The German comander turned over all of his files, including

a complete chart of the barrier mine field. In addition to

the bag of prisoners, Hearn and Walibridge inventoried eigh

batteries of 88m dual purpose guns and a battery of coast

artillery. It took two days for the first regular army unit

to reach the area and relieve the lieutenants of their

charges. Ironically, the division assigned to this duty wa

Italian and had never before liberated a town.

tieut-enant 1-learn received the Bronze Star for his dari

coup at Chioggia. Today it seems a small reward. The Italian

Government was more grateful. Hearn was one of only a handfu

of OSS officers to receive the Silver Medal for Military

Valor. His citation reads in part:

assigned to duty with the Saboteur Unit of the

San Marco Marine Regiment, Royal Italian Navy, he took p

in 30 operations behind enemy lines. During a series of

bold and successful actions carried out with saboteur sq

and partisan groups, Lieutenant 1-learn participated in th

liberation of a large area of the national territory,

alone he captured the city of Chioggia, together with

1400 prisoners...".
d S,a46AS cÄin,a' f94C á/,n - - Sc7,rtata&. JMÓAtd.M4 naaetl4C.Sd.CpsZ4t ALSh aa-atnroa..at sAO a«aJ n,As(î &tee.st4S«,j 4« ifcsv. a --- -Ma.' ac.wa .c,ao.nLrast._.,..t. m.fjiq0a,g
173

Lieutenant I-learn celebrated the final victory in Italy

in Venice. During his debriefing, ¿e wondered what the Corps

would think of an officer who passed himself off as an Army

lieutenant. Musing, Hearn said: "They'll probably just say

one Marine should be able to take those eleven hundred Germans

prisoner."

Like many members of 055 who served behind the lines in

Europe, Hearn was quickly transferred to the Far East. He

was in China when Japan capitulated. After the war, he

returned to his native North Carolina and became an autoiñobile

dealer.

Hearn's mission was one of the last in a long series of

055 operations in Italy. While a number of Marines were involved

there, the activities of two are especially worthy of

mention.

Captain Elmer Harris was the Marine Officer whose

wounds in North Africa provided Peter Ortiz' entra into

the 50E BRANDON operation. Born in Ketchikan, Alaska Territory,

Harris was a regular officer. Commissioned on 28 March 1942,

he completed the three month Basic School course at Marine

Barracks, Philadelphia and upon graduation was assigned to

the newly formed Ninth Marines in San Diego.

Having had pre-war experience with boats as marine representative

for General Petroleum Corporation, Harris was one of the first

Marine officers recruited as an 055 instructor. During August 1942,
174

Harris was sent to the secret 50E training school at Oshawa,

Canada. Upon completion of the clandestine warfare course,

Harris was assigned to the 055 parachute training unit

at Area 'A' near Quantico as an instructor.

In late December 1942, Harris was selected for the initial

055 Operation Group contingent in North Africa. Under the

usual cover of "Marine Corps Observer", Harris reported to

Colonel Eddy in Tangier. Shortly thereafter he was wounded

near Sbeitla, Algeria.

His wounds healed, Harris continued to work with the OSS

staff attached to Allied Headquarters in Algiers. On the

night of 8 September 1943, when the government of Italy

surrendered and declared for the allies, maquis groups all

* over the island of Corsica rose in revolt. Siezing the

main radio station, the guerillas began broadcasting appeals

to the U. S. command in North Africa for assistance.

"French headquarters hastily prepared the Battalion

de Choc and several units of Moroccan and Algerian

troops, as a skeleton Expeditionary Force to aid in

the liberation of the isalnd. AFHQ requested 055 to

supply troops as a token Allied force to accompany the

French. t,

Donovan lected one Operational Group (0G) of two1

officers and thirty men to carry out the mission...".

One of them was First Lieutenant Harris.

*The word "maquis" which was adopted to describe all

active resistance groups in France is of Corsican derivation.

Its literal meaning is a scrubby, tough, native bush.
175

The North African ports were in turmoil as French warships

embarked the rag-tag brigade. Luckily for the Allies, the German

signal intercept service had been badly decimated in the retreat

of RommeUs Afrika Korps, and few of the frantic operational

messages which flashed back and forth among the invasion force

were picked-up, il

On 17 September, Harris and the other 0G personnel landed

unopposed at Ajaccio, the principal Corsican city.* They found

the situation to be thoroughly confused and as complicated as the

recent helter skelter embarkation scene on the Algerian docks.

Corsica is almost 120 miles long and as much as 50 miles wide in

certain places. Mountains are everywhere with more than a few rising

better than 6,000 feet above the sea. While there were plenty of

willing maquisards, there were also some 80,000 Italian troops

and a few battlions of Germans. The majority of these were in

no mood to seek combat and were rather attempting to escape to

nearby Sardinia across the Bonifacio Strait.

The Operational Group moved northward with the French combat

troops hoping to block the Axis withdrawal. But going cross-country

in Corsica is a task suited better to mountain goats than men. Progress

was agonizingly slow and the natives proved far more interested in

rounding-up Italians -. whom they have hated for centuries- than in

fighting Germans. The French commander reproved the maquis for this

attitude and was promptly labelled a typical metropolitan snob.

The entire operation degenerated into name calling and while Corsica was freed

*In addition to being the Corsican capital, Ajacci& prides itself

more properly on being the birthplace of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Lt

176

most of the Germans got away.

By mid-October, 1943 the Corsican campaign was over. 05$

immediately established a base there for operations against

occupied France and those parts of Italy still controlled

by the German Army. Harris returned to Algiers and then

proceeded to Brindisi where as a member of the Fifth Army's

055 detachment he was directed to establish a program for

training agents to parachute into North Italy and France.

In April 1944, Harrisbegaf) to suffer acute abdominal

pains. His condition soon became so severe that he was evacuated

to Bethesda Naval Hospital. When initial diagnosis failed to

reveal the elxact nature of his medical problem, Harris

was placed on "light duty" at 05$ Headquarters. Obviously

a different perception of that term existed in 1944 than

is comonly held today. Harris' assignment was to proceed to - Guantanamo Bay and carry out UDT operations designed to rid

the anchorage of outmoded anti-submarine nets. Ha'ing

accomplished this, he was posted to the 055 Underwater Swimmer

School a Catalina Island as an instructor.

In November 1944, the abdominal pains came back. Hospitalized

once again he underwent surgery for intestinal ulcers. In December

he was released back to full duty and finished the war as Commanding

Officer of the 055 Air Operations Unit and Parachute School in China

For his service there, Harris was awarded the Legion of Merit.12
*See Chapter IX of this paper.

177

Another OSS Marine who cut his combat teeth in Italy

was Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, the officer who

* joined Ortiz's escape party from Westertimke's forced march.

Taylor was a tall, lean Harvard PhD. who also happened

to be a neighbor of General Donovan on New York's elegant

Sutton Place. Twenty-nine years old, Taylor had graduated from

Yale in 1935 and continued his education in Cambridge at

Harvard. Like Charlotte Gower, he was an anthuopologist.

He spoke fluent Spanish - which he learned as a boy in South

Texas - and also some French. Tar/or was commissioned in 1943

and ordered to Camp Lejeune. He spent only a few months there

before volunteering for 055.

"On 20 September 1943 I was directed to report to OSS

in Washington. Upon arrival I was told to go to the Interior

Control Board at the Main Navy Building. This proved to

be a mistake but before that fact was realized, I had

been interviewed by American and Chinese officers and

was accepted for some kind of duty. When the error

was discovered, I reported to "Q" Building - the OSS

processing station - but the Interior Control Board

wanted me back. This was not congenial to OSS. I was

assigned to the Special Operation Branch and sent off

to a two week sabotage school." 13

Taylor was anxious to put his new knowledge to work, but

instead was told to do a 'staff study' of the communications

system of southern France. He escaped from what loomed as an

extensive project by requesting an immediate transfer to the

Training Branch SO school in Algiers as an instructor.
1 78 His assignment approved, Taylor flew to North Africa

in December 1943, where he was immediately involved in

preparing SO agents for missions into France and Italy.

After graduating from the SO parachute course, Taylor

left Algiers in March 1944 for Corsica. There he became a

member of the SI team whose mission was the infiltration

of agents and radio operators into enemy territory.

Between March and July, Taylor particpated in twenty

operations. Since these were limited to periods of no moon,

the pace was frantic. Taylor was frequently running an

operation every night for 8-10 days at a time. While the

locales were varied, each mission had several basic similarities.

Launching and pick-up were accomplished with PT boats and rubber

dinghies. Taylor would do the initial map study and briefing;

plan the loading of the boats; locate the drop-off point;

and then go ashore himself to conduct a brief personal reconnaissan

of the area. It sounds simple enough but there was a very

decided 'catch',., the Germans patrolled the infiltration areas

both on land and at sea. Agents who were caught could expect no

mercy.

On the night of 22 June 1944, Taylor found himself rocking

gently to and fro in a rubber boat about 300 yards off the

Italian coast. Nearby was a second dinghy. All told there were

five men spread between the boats: two British dinghynien, two

Italian agents, and one Marine Second Lieutenant. The shoreline

was dark and everything appeared to indicate a routine insertion.
179

The missiOn, codenamed MONREAL/LOCUST was proceeding normally.

Taylor planned to land the party, ensure that the area was deserted

and then return to the waiting Air Rescue Boat which had brought

the party from Corsica.

"When the dingies were about 150 yards from shore, the

motors of the ARB were suddenly started and immediately

a red flar lit up the coast; gunfire began at once and the

ARB raced out to sea. In the dingies, I gave the order

to "freeze" while the flares were alight and only to

row when they extinguished. Since the area was

almost continuous illuminated for the following fiftèen

minutes, little progress was made. However, the light did

provide amply opportunity for study of the coastline and

it was learned that the pinpoint did not lie directly

ahead. When the flares and gunfire stopped, the dingies

were directed North. After proceeding but a little way

it was realized that we were going in the wrong direction

but since the enemy had been alerted, I decided to look

for a new landing spot, which had been indicated in a

previous study of aerial photographs." 14

The ARB was gone but Taylor continued the mission. Soon

the dinghies were beached and theagents unloaded. The landing

had been made at the base of a sheer cliff. Cautiously Taylor

explored the area and found a small trail leading away from

the little cove. After a hushed conversation and final

'good luck's' the agent began moving inland. Taylor and his

two British counterparts were now faced with the problem of

being on a hostule shore some hundred miles behind the enemy

lines. One rubber boat had been punctured in the landing and

the radio was dead.
180

It was now nearly 0200 and Taylor made the decision to

return seaward in the single good rubber boat in hopes that

the MB would return to the area. After twenty minutes of

hard paddling, the rescue ship was spotted. Unfortunately

the Germans found the MB at almost precisely the same time.

Tracers began zinging through the night sky and a German

patrol boat swepti into view.

Once again the ARB's engines roared to life and the

craft headed out to sea. Flare light bathed the area and only

the shadow of the waves presented Taylor's little group troni

being discovered. The German patrol boat passed so close

to the men huddled in the dinghy that the voices of the crew

and the thud of their shoes on the metal deck could be

clearly heard.

When the gunfire and flares had ceased, Taylor decided

that the chance of a pick-up that night were gone. Fifty miles

away was the largely uninhabited island of Gorgona. The

decision was made to try and row there. The men had only a

box of emergency rations and no water. Dawn was but a few hours

away.

At 0530, as first light began to break in the East,

the wind picked up. Naturally it was blowing in the wron3 directi

At 0600 rain squalls developed and the little dinghy was pitched

about like a cork. It was not until four or five hours later

that the wind shifted to the Southwest. By that time, despite
181

continuous rowing, little headway had been made. Three men in

a rubber boat were sitting a few miles off the Italian coast

in broad daylight. Taylor had few options, Gorgona was now

out of the question and the water would only last for

a day and a half at the outside. Consequently it was

determined that the only course of action was to remain

in the immediate vicinity, pray that no German ships or

aircraft passed, and trust to the Corsica operations staff.

All that day the three men took turns rowing the boat

in one direction and having the wind push it back again.

When night fell, they were dog tired but uìdetected. Taylor

took the dinghy back to within 1000 yards of the pinpoint

and waited.

At about midnight an enemy convoy passed with much flashing

of signal lights. Thirty minutes later, Taylor began signalling

to seaward with his red flashlight. A few more minutes passed

and suddenly the sound of engines rumbled across the water.

Taylor signalled again. No response.

Out of the darkness loomed the ARR. It was moving slowly toward

shore. More signals with the flashlight yielded no recognition.

Summoning their last ounce of strength, the men began rowing

after the ARR, flashing the light and whistling. The power

boat disappeared.

Now in a panic, Taylor removed the red filter from his

light and began sweeping it around the area. This was guaranteed

to get results from the shore but it paid off. As the first
182

rounds began falling into the water around them, the ARB hove to

Taylor and the two dingymen scrambled aboard. This time the

flares and tracers were left permanently behind. For his

coolness in continuing the mission and his leadership in

enemy territory, Second Lieutenant Taylor was awarded the Bronz

Star. His citation reads in part:

"Under fire on three occasions during two successive

nights southeast of Genoa, and constantly in peril in

enemy waters and ashore far from our lines, Second Lieutena

Taylor condud himself with coolness and heroism to

successfully carry out an important mission."

George Hearn left the Marine Corps in 1946 and returned

to his home state of North Carolina where he opened his own

automobile dealership. Elmer Harris helped pioneer the

Alaskan wilderness as part of a group of businessmen involved

in local aircraft companies. Walter Taylor was flown back

to the United States upon his POW camp's liberation. He

remained active in the Marine Corps Reserve until the mid-l950'

when he moved to Mexico as part of his job with the University

of New Mexico'santhropol.y program.

Before the Salerno landings, OSS had very limited experien

in tying together the full range of activities associated with

both clandestine operations and intelligence gathering function

The lessons learned there stood the Allies in good stead during

both OVERLORD and ANVIL. But all of these 'essons were necessa

in order to crack the toughest nut of them all: Germany itself
CHAPTER XIII

"MAN, YOU MUST BE LOST OR SOMETHING"

On New Year's Day, 1945 a stocky officer reported to the

headquarters of the Seventh U. S. Army's Strategic Services Section.

While Marines were no common sight in eastern France, the Battle

of the Bulge was still echoing through the Ardennes and Second

Lieutenant Peter Viertel's arrival occassioned less comment than

normal.

The Seventh Army SSS was only one of several such units attached

to major commands, but it was surely the most successful. "Largely

ineffectual detachments served with the Third and Ninth Armies.

The First Army had thrown its detachment out shortly after D-.Day...

Only the 055 unit attached to the Seventh enjoyed a genuine standing

in the field, a reputation won largely though meticulous planning

and inventory of Nazi defenses in advance of the invasion of

southern France."1 Viertel would do nothing to tarnish that lustre.

Boss of the SI section was Henry Hyde, an acid-tongued civilian

master of the dobbleentendre. Viertel became one of his star pupils.

Only a few months past his twnelty-fourth birthday, Peter Viertel

had nonetheless already seen plenty of life. Born in Dresden,

Germany he had come to Rmerica as a boy and grew up in the babylonian

Hollywood of the 1930's where his father worked as a motion picture

director.

Viertel was himself a talented writer. Before he could vot

183
t

184

Viertel had authored the screen plays for Alfred Hitchcock's

"Saboteur" and Warner Brother's "The Hard Way". His short stories

appeared in national magazines and he had a full-length novel

to his publishing credit. Viertel's intelligence was matched

by good looks, a pleasant personality, and a devastating tennis

backhand. The first two qualities would be of direct assistance

during his OSS service.2

In July 1942, Peter Viertel enlisted in the Marine Corps.

Of this decision, Frank Morely, his publisher at Harcourt-Brace

would later write:

.-from the beginning he had an unserving devotion toward the

Marines. He had, I believe, easier opportunities for obtaining

a commission elsewhere, but he far preferred to enlist as a

Private in the Corps. In that, and in every other way, he has

always shown the proper spirit." 3

A year went by during which Viertel's time was largely confined

to pounding a typewriter in San Diego. Not wanting to spend the

ehtire war as a 'Remington Raider', Viertel applied for Officer

Candidate School. He was screened, accepted, and commissioned a

Second Lieutenant in August, 1944. 055 was desperately searching

for German-speaking recruits. Viertel fitted that key requirement.

Alexander Patch, Commanding General of the Seventh Army, was

pushing Hyde's s,Cetion for detailed agent reports. But the

Frenchmen who had proved so valuable in their own country were

totally unsuitable for missions beyond the rapidly approaching

Rhine. Hyde needed native Germans who knew not only the language
185

but also the day-to-day inner workings of life under the Nazi

regime. One source of such men was immediately apparent.

But there was a significant catch: all were former members of

Hitler's armed forces.

"Using POWs as agents was then expressly forbidden by

SHAEF, and the prohibition against recruiting German soldiers

had been rigorously respected by the British. Canvassing for

potential spies among POWs was questionable as well under

the Geneva Convention.

Patch was nothing if not practical. He told Hyde to

go ahead and use the prisoners. Hyde reminded him of the

SHAEF prohibition. Patch asked who was the key to evading

this obstacle. "General Donovan", Hyde informed him.

Hyde flew to London to meet Donovan and to perform the

kind of Jesuitry which was second nature to him. Before his

departure, Patch had said, restraining a wink, that if Hyde

could not follow orders, then he was finished with the Seventh

Army. General Donovan conveniently agreed that Hyde had no

other choice but to follow his field commander's orders;

therefore, Donovan's hands were clean. The SHAEF prohibition

was thus quietly sidestepped. On his return, Hyde informed

his people that their objective now lay across the Rhine.

Recruiting began immediately." 4

Hyde organized his men and outlined their mission. One of three

officers chosen to evaluate potential agents was Peter Viertel.

Another was newly arrived Marine First Lieutenant Charles A. (Carl)

Muecke, a William and Mary Phi Beta Kappa of German descent.

To round-out the group, Hyde picked the unit's paymaster, Army

Lieutenant Peter Sichel, a British-educated German Jew who was

heir to the famous Sichel wine importing empire.

Seventh Army G-2 set about identifying likely prospects. Once

given à few leads, Viertel, Sichel, and Muecke took over. Potential

recruits were first assigned to routine working parties. Then each
186

man was casually detailed to a job which took him to an area out

of sight and sound of the others. Once isolated, the 'target'

was picked-up by a member of the assessment team and individually

grilled. If a man passed this initial interview, he was observed

for a few days and then routed to Hyde for the final 'hard sell'.

Those found completely suitable and appropriately motivated were

blindfolded and taken to a safehouse for indoctrination, training,

and assimilation of a cover story.

Lieutenant F4uecke also performed the vital function of

acquiring genuine documents for use by agents inside the Reich.

Those which could be so had were collected from other POWs.

"Muecke had once gone into a cage to collect documents.

He stood on a jeep before ten thousand prisoners and spoke

to them through a loudspeaker. He told the prisoners to

turn-in their leave papers, hospital passes, travel permits,

and ration coupons. One soldier objected. 'Under the Geneva

Convention we don't have to give these things to you.' A

dozen others leaped to their feet and shouted the man down. 'Be

quiet. Can't you see an officer is speaking'." 6

Teutonic respect for authority was thus one of OSS's most valuable

recruiting aids.

The Geneva Convention was frequently stretched if not downright

ignored. Those POWs who were recruited simply disappeared from

camp rosters. Since there were several hundred thousand German

prisoners, the disappearance of a man here and there could be, and

was, laid to administrative oversight and his physical absence to

routine transfer.
187

Initially Hyde attempted to infiltrate his agents in the

same manner utilized in France, namely through the frontlines

on foot or by jeep. But the U. S. Army's combat soldiers were often little more cooperative than was the enemy. Ground troops

frequently refused to participate in what they viewed as an insane scheme to send Nazis home to Hitler with American assistance.

After taking heavy casualties, Viertel proposed that further

infiltrations be performed by short-range paradrop. This idea

resulted in a series of highly successful operations

which were euphemistically dubbed "tourist mission".Unfortunately

for the early 'tourists' there was little time for parachute

training. Some made their first jump directly into clandestine combat.

The 'tour' consisted of an agent moving along a predetermined

route inside Germany. Specific instructions on what to look

for and remember were hammered into the recruit. The German proclivity

for methodical attention to detail made this task easier. Agents

were as well prepared as possible. Instead of a mere 'dogtag', each

was equipped with a complete and frequently totally authentic

batch of papers, passes, forms, and the like. Documents which could

not be gleaned from Muecke's periodic sweeps through the camps

were manufactured. Initially most came from OSS magnificent London

forging center. Later, a rubber stamp factory and printing firm

in Strasbourg were doing top quality work as well. "An ex-German

clerk assisted in the draftsmanship of Soldebuecher, Wehrpassen,

etc., and a former Austrian of the Gebirgs-daeger Regiment advised on
188

travel procedures and executed endorsements."

During January and February 1945, twenty of the thirty-one

agents who were dropped by parachute successfully completed their

assignments and returned through the Seventh Army's lines. During

the same period, footbound infiltration attempts suffered more

than 60% casualties.

Women offered even greater potential than male POWs. Even if

they spoke German with a slight accent, their presence within the

Reich could be laid to all sorts of exigencies of war. Viertel

came up with three prize recuits in particular: Nana, Emily, and

Ada.

Maria came from the rough mining area south of Strasbourg in

the Alsace. Viertel found her coèling her heels in a detention

camp for Nazi collaborators. During the previous three years,

Maria had been the loving mistress of a local Qestapo officer.

Now, with the outcome of the war a forgone conclusion, she wanted

to perform some act which would wipe away the stain of her

error and put her back in the good graces of her neighbors.

A cover story was concocted which portrayed Maria as a German

Army nurse. Meanwhile she completed a very basic parachute training

course and learned how to spot information of military significance

Maria did not completely change her ways however. She was accustome

to being around soldiers and never claimed to possess the highest

of moral standards. While at the SSS training areas, she ingratiate

herself to agent and ally alike in a random and physical fashion.
189

On 3 February 1945, Maria was transferred to the airfield at

Lyon to await the plane which would drop her near Stuttgart.

"Just before takeoff, Maria informed Peter Viertel that

she had a novel problem. She was, the stunned Marine learned,

pregnant. Why now? Why had she waited so long to tell him?

Maria made it clear that she had no intention of frustrating the

mission. But she wanted to strike a bargain. She expected to be

gone less than two weeks. After she ha1thus performed her

part of the agreement, she wanted the Miericans to-arrange an 8 abortion."

Viertel was uncertain of his options but finally decided to

go ahead. Maria was dropped as planned carried out her mission

brilliantlyand was subsequently overrun by advancing Mierican

units. The OSS kept its side of the deal. Lieutenant Sichel took

Maria to the local French hospital and described her as a modern

day Joan of Arc who had given 'everything but her life' for

the resistance. There were no problems with the doctor.

Emily and Ada did not work out as well. Ada was an Italain

acrobat. To her parachuting was child's play. She hated the Germans

and wanted nothing more than to hurt them. But despite five

separate flights over the crumbling Fatherland, she was never

able to match-up with a navigator who could locate the proper

drop zone.

Emily was recommended by French intellignece. She too proved

an apt pupil and was anxious to operate behind German lines. It

seemed too good to be true and it was. After a successful drop,
190

Emily removed the crystals from her radio and replaced them with

a set provided by the Deuxieme Bureau. Thereafter she operated

solely for France.

Meanwhile, other Marines were serving with 055 field army

detachments. Captain John Hamilton (Hayden) had the ill-fortune

to be assigned to the First Army. From the beginning the ¿3-2

had main it plain that he wanted as little to do with Donovan's

special warriors as possible. After August 1944, there was only

a token OSS force attached to the command and when Hayden arrived

in early January 1945, the situationnias unimproved.

"The jeep was driven by a man who was far from home.

"Captain", he said, "if you don't object to the question,

haven't r seen you somewhere before?"

"Not that I can recall", said the officer. It was cold,

colder than Maine. Maybe, he thought, when I get near combat

my circulation slows down. "Captain", if you don't object to

the question, is that there a German soldier suit you got on?"

"I'm a Marine

The driver whistled. "A United States Marine? Man, you

must be lost or something."

Hayden spent the remiander of the war with the First Army. It

was a far cry from his experiences in the Adriatic. There was littl

for the OSS detachment to do and eventually he found a job working

with the political section of the G-2. Hayden's ass superior was

24-year-old blue blood, Stuyvesant Wainwright II, a wealthy

conservative who later served two terms in Congress. Wainwright

delighted in taunting Hayden about his passionate support for Tito
Igl

and his avowedly left-wing politics. Hayden responded with unidigital

salutations and saluted with the communist clenched fist.

The Third Army also had its Marine: Second Lieutenant John

Wallendahl Mowinckel, USMCR. Mowinckel was born in Genoa, Italy

in July, 1920. His father, John A. Mowinckel was head of European

operations for the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. The Mowinckel's

were a distinguished Norwegian family - one of young John's

uncles had been Prime Minister - and it showed in the Lieutenant's

features. Tall, blond, and fair-skinned, he spokesix languages:

Norwegian, French, German, Italian, Spanish and English. 10

Mowinckel was an excellent skier and ice hockey player.

Eductaed in Switzerland and at St. Paul's in Concord, New Hampshire,

he entered Princeton in 1939 as a modern languages major. While

at Old Nassau, Mowinckel joined the Marine Corps Reserve as a Private. Commissioned in October 1943, he graduated from the

38th Reserve Officer Class and was detailed to OSS for duty.

Following the normal cloak and dagger training, Mowinckel

was shipped-off to England where he joined the Third Army's 055

detachment. Dunn9 the drive through France he won the Bronze

Star and Crois de Guerre for fighting his way out of a German

ambush while on an agent drop fiften kilometers beyond the

front)1

As has already been noted, the Third Army detachment did not

shine so brightly as did that of the Seventh. By Lieutenant Mowinckel

could not be blamed for the lacklus%iW record. In early May 1945,
192

he won the Silver Star less than a week before hostilities ceased.

The Third Army was then sweeping southeast through austria toward

the Red Army forces from the opposite direction.

"On 3 May 1945, Lieutenant Mowinckel courageously

volunteered to infiltrate through enemy lines to establish

contact with Soviet forces thought to be in the vicinity

of Perg, Austria. Accompanied by two intelligence agents,

he fearlessly proceeded far beyond the front. Although

halted and interrogated by German SS personnel, Lieutenant

Mowinckel succeeded in talking his way out and proceeded 12

with his vital mission."

The activities of men like Viertel, Hayden, Mowinckel, and

Muecke all resulted in the intelligence penetration of Hitler's

Reich. But in general the rewards were less dramatic than those

achieved by the longrange missions dropped from London.

An essential element of all successful intelligence collection

operations is the ability to transmit information to those who can

analyze and distribute it. "As the final battle against Germany

began, the Reich presented problems which lar/gely nullified

all previous agent communiciations techniques. OSS solved these

through the development and use of a device known as Joan-Eleanor

(J-E)."

13

Joan-Eleanor was the codename for a remarkably compact two-way

radio. Operating on a line-of-sight basis at very high freqeuncy,

the J-E's signal was virtually impossible to detect through

the normal direction finding procedures. The set itself was

less than six inches long and weighed only four pounds. Since it

was battery powered there was no requirement for external elec'trici

J-E did have one important drawback and that was range.
193

Since the system was developed to allow agents to operate amid

the mainstream of German civilian life - far from the front - a relay was necessary. The answer to this was a small group of

Mosquito bombers. The Mosquito could speed across the German

sky at 30,000 feet. In its reconfigured tail section was the

J-E operator who spoke to the agent on the ground. Conversation

was in plain language and all transmissions were recorded.

This procedure allowed the same amount of information to be passed

in a short message that had previously required up to an hour.

Joan-Eleanor was the brainchild of Navy Reserve Lieutenant

Commander Stephen H. Simpson, Jr., a thirty-seven-year-old

electrical engineer. "Before the war, Simpson had been an RCA

scientist with a long interest in radio-transmission technology

dating back to 1928. As a young man, Simpson worked on a pioneer

RCA project to rebroadcast the Christmas tolling of Big Ben

via shortwave from London to New York's radio station WJZ.

Sixteen years later, Simpson found himself assigned to OSS London,

still probing the potentialities of radio wave propagation." 14

While J-E was Simpson's idea, the man who changed concept

to capability was DeWitt Goddard, another former RCA scientist.

Simpson had Goddard yanked from his job at Riverhead Labs in

New York, commissioned in the Navy, and flown immediately to

England. The new officer was put into the field with such speed

that he did not even own a uniform.
194

Once the OSS communicators* were satisfied with Joan-Eleanor's

potential, the system was field tested by an agent parachuted into

Holland. Soon the results were in - J-E was cleared for use inside

Germany. The men chQsen for the first missions deep into the

Reich were almost exclusively anti-Nazi expatriates. Most of

them were former trade unionists with strong socialist of

communist political backgrounds.

Then yet another problem loomed. The Mosquito, while

extremely fast, was limited in range. The planes had been stripped

of every nonessential item to accomodate the added weight of the

J-E operator (including the 1FF gear). Adding agents and .jumpmasters

would diminish the combat radius of the aircraft still more.

Additionally, the Mosquito was a British airplane with no set logistical

support system in the Merican Army Air Corps.

OSS wanted a plane which could fly at roughly the same speed

and altitude as the Mosquito but had the 'legs' necessary to

carry agents as far east as Berlin. The result was utilization of

the new Douglas A-2G, a twin-engine attack bomber which could

outrun many of tIe Luftwaffe's night fighters and possessed a 1400

mile range. Two of these aircraft were wheedled from the Air Corps.

The A-26 would thus carry the agent and the Mosquito the J-E

equipment and operator.

All seemed ready, then yet another hitch developed. The stalling

*ft

is worthy of note that one of 055's most important communicatio

officers was Marine Reserve Major Frederick Willis. Willis was in his

late 40's when he was commissioned to act as Executive Officer for the

Communications Branch. A World War I Army combat veteran, he was the only

Marine Corps Reserve Officer appointed directly to Field rank for duty

with 055.
195

speed of the A-26 was more than 150 knots. 055 was used to dropping

agents at much more liesurely paces. To ensure that the "26" could

safely disgorge its human cargo, Simpon requested a series of

test jumps. The results gave immediate cause for concern.

The first two dummies dropped from 'the hole' splattered

off the bulbous underside turret. Longer static lines were

rigged and the tests continued. After a few more tries, the

dummies began to clear. Now human jumpers were required. The

first man to successfully exit was Marine Gunnery Sergeant Larry

Elder, a member of the Special Force parachute training detachment)5

Right behind him was Sergeant George Usher of the RAF. Joan-Eleanor

and the A-26 were alerted for a visit to the German capital.

In addition to the trade union men, OSS had recruited a number

of Belgian agents. These were primarily targett'ed against the

elusive National Redoubt. Soon after his return from GERM'JiNAL,

Captain William Grell was placed in charge of handling these

operations. As head of the OSS Belgian desk, Grell brought not

only operational experience of his own but also his credentials

as a native

Grell's brother, Leon, was also involved in this work.

Leon Grell became a Marine officer in much the same way that DeWitt

Goddard had 'joined' the Navy. Without benefit of any formal

Marine Corps training or»even Mierican citizenship, Leon Grell

was assigned the task of preparing agents for infiltrating the

Bavarian mountains. His duty title was 'conducting officer'.

Leon would meet the agents at a nondescript location in London.

He would check their clothing (provided by a highly competent
Fi

¿t 196

055 'custom tailoring' service) and escort them to RAF Harrington.

There another security check was conducted to ensure that no

shred of evidence existed which could ink the agent to England.

When Grell was satisifed, a second security man took over and

did the entire thing yet a third time. All personal papers and

valuables were collected and held for the agent's return. Then

the false identification items were handed out.

'Grell went over their papers, ID cards, ratior card,

census card, birth certificate. He opened the suitcse which he

had brought from London and began distributing items. "Wear

this money belt around your waist. Keep your big money

in it. Remember, you're a conscript laborer, Live like one.

Grell gave each man a set of pills. The blue pill was

bensedrine sulfate to overcome fatigue. The white pills

were knockout drops which would put someone out for six hcjrs.

The third was the cyanide-laden "L" pill. The capsule was

encased in rubber. To kill himself, the agent would have to

bite into it. The rubber casing would otherwise allow the pill

to be swallowed harmlessly. 1

Ttie13re11 would issue each man a pistol and his jumping coveralls. The weapons were of U. S. manufacture and were supposed to be

buried along with the jumpsuit. This obvious precaution was usually

ignored because there is something intrinsically comforting about

having a Smith and Wesson in one's pocket. Agent jumpsuits were

specially fabricated models with a mustard and green camouglage

gattm'rt A long zipper ran from neck to crotch, allowing the agent

to get out quickly after hitting the ground. With these preliminarie

accomplished, the agent would don his helmet and chute, receive

a final safety check, and board the A-26.

Deep drops were astonishingly successful. 055 parachuted more

than two hundred agents into the Third Reich and nearly all of the
197

longrange missions were from Harrinyton. But there were casualties.

One was Sergeant Fred Brunner, the member of Ortiz' ill-fated

UNION II who had escaped by swimming the Isere under fire.

Brunner had been awarded the Silver Star for his work in

France. When the mission was withdrawn he continued to servce

with 055 in England. In mi-March 1945, Brunner was detailed to

act as .jumpmaster for the CHISEL mission, a longrange penetration

to Hanuii, Germany.

CHISEL revolved around a communist coal miner turned intellectual

named Karl Macht. The drop date was set for 19 March. Lieutenant

Commander Simpson was having trouble with the Air Corps, but his

difficulties appeared to be waning.* Or so it seemed until he

learned that the plane scheduled to fly CHISEL was badly in need

of repair and carried a faulty radio.

Usually OSS was placed in the position of asking the Air Corps

to fly deep missions but on this occasion the roles were reversed.

Simpson wanted the flight scrubbed but the Air Corps opted to

'get it over with'. The aircraft was A-26 #524. This plane

had carried out the OSS HAMMER mission to Berlin some days earlier.

Now it was sitting on the tarmac at Harrington with both engines

torn down. Additionally, a storm was brewing and weather all

the way to the target was forecast to be marginal.

The crew assigned to fly CHISEL had never worked together.

*The problems with the Air Corps were largely those of coordination.

The 492nd Bomb Group had thought it would be given a chance to fly

regular bombing sorties after it had finished supporting the maquis

in France. Agent dropping was both dangerous and ungalmorous.
198

Lieutenant Emmel, the pilot, was not fully 'checked-out' in

the A-25. Nevertheless, a desk-bound colonel decreed that the

mission would go.

At 2230 on the night of 19 March 1945, the glossy black

bomber roared into the rainy sky and turned east. Its motors

quickly droned into the blackness and in a few moments all

that was left was the sweep of the wind and the splattering of

rain drops on the oil-soaked parking stands. There were four

crew members and the agent aboard. None was ever heard from again. 

Peter Viertel returnedto writing after the war. Today he

is married to screen star Deborah Kerr and lives in Klosters,

Switzerland)8 Carl Muecke returred to the the United States

and worked as a newpaper reporter in Arizona while studying the

law. He now sits on the bench of the U.S. Circuit Court in

Phoenix)9 John Mowinckel also followed the journalistic

profession as a reporter and economic analyst for U. S. News and

World Report. He later joined the U. S. Information Agency and

served as various posts in Europe, Africa, and Latin America.

From 1971-75, Mowinckel was Deputy Chief of Mission at the

American Embassy in Vienna. Today he lives in Paris and is

associated with the International Energy Agency.2° Sterling

Hayden resigned his Marine commission in 1947 stating that his

wartime experiences had taught hin that land combat was not his

metier. Hayden wrote the Commandant that in any future conflict he

would prefer to serve strictly at sea as a Coast Guard or Navy
199

officer.21 No longer active in motion pictures, Hayden lives

on Cape Cod and devotes his time to writing. William Grell

remained in the Marine Corps Reserve and retired as a Lieutenant

Colonel in the early 1960's. He too returned to his civilian

occupation of hotel manager and lived for many years in the

Belgian Congo. Now eighty years old, he has settled in New

England.
EPILOGUE

The duties of the Office of Strategic Services were to collect

and analyze information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

to plan, organize, and employ Special Forces at their direction.

In a sense, the 055 was viewed as a purely wartime expedient

which should be liquidated as soon as the immediate conflict

ceased. Certainly President Truman saw it that way. The Office

was terminated on 1 October 1945 by Executive Order. As of that

date, the United States was in precisely the same condition

1 vis-a-vis intelligence as it had been in June, 1941.

A goodly number of governmental officials and private citizens

liked it that way. J. Edgar Hoover was particularly satisfied.

He already had grandiose plans to co-opt the foreign intelligence

mission for his FBI. The State Department, which under Truman's

Order absorbed the Research and Analysis Branch of OSS, heaved

an institutional sigh of relief and rapidly dismantled most of

the analytic apparatus. Scholars were out.. .diplomats were in.

The War Department received the remaining personnel and

assets of the Secret Intelligence and Counter-espionage Branches.

Special Operations - the paramilitary branch which had done

such yoeman service behind enemy lines - was simply scrapped.

It would be several years before the nation fully realized

that its role as a legitimate Great Power made 'business as usual'

impossible. The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the

National Security Act of 1947, was a belated attempt to reconstruc

and refine the organization which Donovan had built during World

War II. By then, most of the Marines who served with OSS were

civilians once more.

Today it is tempting to wonder whether those men (and woman)

were really 'Marines' at all. Any schoolboy knows that the U. S.

Marines captured Guadalcanal, stormed Saipan, and raised the

flag on Mount Surabachi. The Marine Corps' official histories

of the war rightly concentrate on these achievements in the

Pacific. Similarly, most popular historical writing focuses

on the great amphibious operations to the exclusion of everything

else.

Nowhere is the Donovan controversy discussed in any detail.

Only Updegraph and Ladd even allude to his role in the establishme

of the Raider Battalions. Not one Marine officer in a hundred has

200
201

ever heard of Peter Ortiz, Walter Mansfield, Hod Fuller, or

George Hearn. But they were Marines in every sense of the word

and thought of themselves as such.

Charles Henry Fenn, an expatriate Englishman, who served

as a Marine Captain in Burma and China and was later deprived

of his U. S. citizenship for failing to maintain continuous

residence in Mierica summed it up well:

"I served with the Office of Strategic Services for a

total of 23 months overseas, partly in India and the Hukong

Valley of Burma but mostly in South China. I was far from

the normal Marine Corps, but I never forgot that I was

a U. S. Marine Officer. I was awarded the Bronze Star

for establishing the intelligence network in French IndoChina and the Soldier's Medal as leader of the POW rescue

mission to Canton. Now my citizenship has been taken from

me. I am, indeed, most regretful to be dropped from the

Marine Corps' rolls, but I realize this is inevitable for

one who has been deprived of his citizenship. I reaffirm

my gratitude for the lasting benefits which I received through

my association with the Corps. Semper Fidelis." 2 Marines take pride in having 'fought in every clime and

place'. During World War II, some of those places were: Albania, Algeria,

Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Corsica, France, Greece, India,

Italy, Malaya, Germany, Rumania, and Yugoslavia.

Today, inside the entrance to Central Intelligence Agency

Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, the following words are

enscrlbed:"Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make

you tree." Someday perhaps the full truth regarding the

limited butimportant role of Marines with the OSS will be fully

recounted. In the meantime, this paper is a beginning.
NOTES

CHAPTER I - "THE WORST SLAP IN THE FACE..."

1Contemporary accounts of opposition to Donovan's appointment 

Hoover referred to it as "Roosevelt's folly" - are plentiful. A

representative example is "Job for Donovan" Newsweek (July 21, 1941

pp. 15-16. The best concise description of the entire appointment

process and its ramifications is found in William R. Corson, The

Armies of Ignorance (New York: Dial Press/James Wade, 1977)

Chpt. 3.

short biographical summary of Donovan's career comprises

Annex A to this paper. A more extensive popular biography is

Corry Ford, Donovan of 085 (Boston: Little Brown, 1970)

See also Corson, pp. 119-128 and F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra

Secret (London: Harper & Row, 1974) p. 199 for details on what

was probably the most significant allied intelligence source

during World War II.

3For details of Donovan's charter as COI see Kermit Roosevelt

War Report of the OSS (New York: Walker, 1976) pp. 5-8. It should

be noted that this comprises the first of two published volumes of

the official wartime history of the Office of StraQetic Services

and its forerunner the Officeç of Coordinator of Information.

The original report was prepared during 1946-47 under the aegis of

the Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of

War. Kermit Roosevelt was the Chief Historian. Originally

classified Top Secret, the report was "sanitized" by C A and

released to the National Archives in 1975 (in this case, "sanitized"

means that most names of American personnel and certain details of

financial transactions with other intelligence services have been

deleted). The published versions are exact duplicates of the

National Archives copy with the major exception that they do not

contain the primary 'exhibits'. Hereafter, all reference to the

War Report relate to the published version unless otherwise noted.

4Elliott Roosevelt, ed., The Roosevelt Letters (New York:

Random House, 1952) Vol. III, p. 297. See also H. M. Hyde, Room

3603: The Story of the British Intelligence Center in New York

During World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1962), p. 34.
203

5Top Secret Memorandum, William J. Donovan to The President

of the United States, dated 22 December 1941. A facsimile is lodged

in Annex B of this paper. (Copy in National Archives copy of War

Report).

6Corson, Armies of Ignorance, p. 177.

7Robert D. Heini, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea (Annapolis:

Naval Institute Press, 1962) p. 306.

8Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston:

Houghton, Mifflin, 1954) Vol. III, p. 648.

9Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, Manfred Jones,

ed.,.Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence

(London: Barrie, Jenkins, 1976) p. 85. Hereafter referred to as

Wartime Correspondence.

10War Report, Vol. I., p. 16.

Char1es L. Updegraph, Jr., Special Marine Corps Units

of World War II (Washington: History and Museums Division,

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1972) p. 1. See also James

Ladd, Commandos and Ranqers of World War II (London: MacDonald

and Jane's, 1978) pp. 95-96 and John W. Gordon, "The U. S. Marines

and an Experiment in Military ElitFsm: A Reassessment of the

Special Warfare Impetus 1937-43" (n.p.) pp. 1-5. Copy provided

by the author.

12Michael Blankfort, The Big Yankee (Boston: Little, Brown,

1947) p. 123.

13Gordon, "Experiment in Elitism", p. 7. 14Captain Evans F. Canson, USMC, "A Report on the Military

Activities in Northwest China with Special Regard to the Organization

and Tactics of the Eighth Route Army (Ex-conimunist)" dated 23 March

1938. This report, originally classified 'Confidential' is 4o4ged

in the Library of the United States Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, Pa. (Copy provided by Dr. Gordon).

'5U. S. Department of the Navy, Oral History Transcript of

Major General Oscar F. Peatross, USMC (Ret), (Washington: History

and Museums Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1975)

pp. 70-76. See also Blankfort, pp. 264-288.
204

'6udegraph, Ladd, and Gordon all discuss the Donovan appointm

Detailed documentation of the developing Marine Corps position foll

in subsequent notations. Facsimiles of most primary documents are

lodged in Annex B of this paper.

'7Confidential letter, Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR to

The Major General Commandant dated 13 January 1942. (Classified

Raider File, Marine Corps Records, National Archives, Washington;

hereafter referred to as Raider File). A copy is loeated in

Annex B to this paper. For an interesting comment on Roosevelt's

plan to attack Japan proper see: U. S. Department of the Navy,

Oral History Transcript of Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer, USMC

(Ret), (Washington: History and Museums Division, Headquarters,

U. S. Marine Corps, 1974) pp. 195-96. So far as publicity for

the British commandos in the American press was concerned,

see Evelyn Waugh, "Commando Raid on Bardia", Life (November 17,

1941) as a representative but more elegantly written example

of the genre

18

Ladd, Commandos and Ranqers, p. 95.

e 19Secret Memorandum, Admiral E. J. King, USN to Major General

Holcomb dated 8 January 1942. (Original lodged in Classified

Central Files, Marine Corps Records, National Archives, Washington;

hereafter referred to as Classified Central Files) See Annex

B for complete facsimile.

20This message is quoted verbatim in Confidential Letter,

Major General Holcomb to Major General Clayton B. Vogel , USMC

dated lO February 1942. (Copy lodged in Classified Central Files).

A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper.

21Secret message, SPENAVO London to COMINCH #091421 January

1942. (Copy lodged in Classified Central Files). The substance

of this message is repeated in Secret Letter, COMINCH to CNO

dated 16 January 1942, a copy of which is provided in Annex B

to this paper.

22Secret Letter, Major General Commandant to COMINCH dated

lO January 1942. (Copy thdged in Classified Central Files).

23Confidential letter, Major General Commandant to Major

General H. M. Smith, USMC dated 14 January 1942. (Copy lo4ged in

Classified Central Files). The letter to Major General Price was

identical in every detail to the one sent Smith. A facsimile is

ltete&in Annex B to this paper. Apparently, another copy went

to Major General C. B. Vogel USMC as well.
205

24Confidential Letter, Major General H. M. Smith, USMC to

Major General Commandant dated 16 January 1942. (Original lodged

in Classified Central Files). A copy of Smith's complete and

acidic reply is 146aed in Annex B to this paper.

25Confidential Letter, Major General Price to Major General

Holcomb dated 16 January 1942 (Original lodged in Classified Central

Files). A complete facsimile is l-eeete&in Annex B to this paper.

See also Updegraph, pp. 2-3.

26Personal Letter, Major General Price to Major General

Holcomb dated 16 January 1942. (Original lodged in the Thomas

Holcomb collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington

Navy Yard; hereafter referred to as Holcomb Papers). A complete

facsimile is 14eeted in Annex B to this paper.

27Secret Letter, COMINCH (King) to CNO (Stark) dated 16

January 1942. (Copy l-e4qecl in Raider File). A complete facsimile

is 1.oeu&ed in Annex B to this paper.

28personal Letter, Major General Holcomb to Mr. Samuel Meek

dated 19 January 1942. (Copy lodged in Holcomb Papers). A

complete facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper.

29Newsweek, (January 19, 1942) p. 9. 30Secret Letter, CINCPACFLT (Nimitz) to CG 2ndJTF (Vogel)

dated 24 January 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File).

31Secret Memorandum, Holcomb to COMINCH (King), Subject:

"Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of "Commando-type", dated

4 February 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File). A complete facsimile

is located at Annex B to this paper. See also, Secret despatch,

COMINCH to CINCLANTFLT dated 5 February 1942, Ibid.

32For details of the Navy's official perception of the entire

period, see U. S. Navy Department, Report to the Senate Committee

on Naval Affairs (1st Session, 79th Congress, October 22, 1945)

pp. 55-62. This document is commonly referred to as the "Eberstadt

Report". The Records of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group

218, National Archives (Washington) are an additional source. These

contain primary documentation of the complete spectrum of JCS

activities including later dealings with 055; hereafter referred to

as JCS Report.

33Con-ñclential letter, Lieutenant General Holcomb to Major

General Vogel dated lO February 1942. (Copy lodged in Raider File).

A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper.
206

34Confidential letter, Lieutenant General Holcomb to Major

General H. M. Smith dated 11 February 1942, (Copy lodged in Raider

File). A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper. The

reader is cautioned that the letter to Smith is identical to that

written to Vogel (see note 33 above) for the first page only.

Both of these comprise an important synopsis of Marine Corps

positions relative to the Donovan appointment and the means to

counter it.

35me complete text of this message is reproduced in Wartime

Correspondence pp. 184-86.

36Personal letter, Lieutenant General Holcomb to Brigadier

General Fegan dated 9 March 1942. (Copy lodged in Holcomb Papers).

A facsimile is located in Annex B to this paper. As for what

Fegan "could do" about the Donovan matter, it should be noted that

as Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Division, both Carlson and

James Roosevelt came under his authority. It is impossible to

detarinrine whether this personal link to the President was utilized.

However, James Roosevelt in particular was no great respecter of

military rank when it came to expressing opinions or getting his

way. For an interesting example see the previously cited Pfeiffer

Transcript.

37Secret memorandum, Coordinator of Information to Joint

Chiefs of Staff dated 2 March 1942. (Copy lodged in JCS Files).

See also Alfred D. Chandler, ed., The Papers of Dwight David

Eisenhower, The War Years (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins, 1910)

Vol. I, pp. 253-54.

CHAPTER II - "ONE OF A KIND, UNIQUE..."

1John Chamberlain, "055, Life (November 19, 1945) p. 119.

2Robert B. Asprey, At Belleau Wood (New York: Putnam, 1965)

p. 165. For more detailed information regarding Eddy's 4-5 June

patrol, see U. S. Army, Records of the Second Division (Regular)

(Washington: The Army War College, 1927) Vol. 8. This work, hereaft

referred to as Second Division Records is comprised of 10 large

volumes. Pagination is not present in those utilized by this writer.

3Second Division Records, Operational Reports and War Diaries,

Marine Brigade, 1918, Vol. 7. (n.p. as previously noted) See also

Jane Blackeney, Heroes, U. S. Marine Corps 1861-1955 (Washington:

Gutherie, 1957) p. 147.
207

4Brigadier General Albertus W. Catlin, USMC, With the Help

of God and a Few Marines (New York: Doubleday and Page, 1919)

p. 424.

5Who Was Who in America, (Chicago: Marquis Press, 1968)

p. 278.

S. Marine Corps, Biographical Summary W. A. Eddy

(Washington: circa 1943) n.p. This is a very rough MS apparently

prepared for the Public Relations Branch of Headquarters Marine

Corps. (Copy lodged in Biographical Files, Marine Corps Historical

Center, Washington Navy Yard, hereafter referred to as Biographical

Files). See also Ford, Donovan of OSS, p. 135 and R. Harris Smith,

OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence

Aqency (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1972)

pp. 41-42.

7personal letter, Major General Holcomb to Major W. A. Eddy

dated 28 January 1941. (Copy lodged in Holcomb Papers).

8For the best concise account of this period - which saw

another important Donovan Ìlmystery man" trip - see Corson,

pp. 110-l2D. The quotation from the London News Chronicle is

repeated in Newsweek (December 16, 1940) p. 16.

'°War Report, p. 93.

p. 94. See also, Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among

Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964) pp. 90-93.

12Top Secret Memorandum, William J. Donovan to President

Roosevelt, dated 3 January 1942. (Copy lodged in National Archives

edition of War Report). A complete facsimile is located in Annex C

to this paper.

'3Memorandum endorsement, OP-l6-F, Office of Naval Intelligence

to 2nd Lieut. Holcomb, F. P., Request for duty as Assistant Naval

Attache, Cairo, dated 23 June 1941. (Copy lodged in Marine Corps

Files, Federal Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri; hereafter

referred to as FRC Files).

14War Report, p. 94.

p. 95.
208

16Major Guy Richards, IJSMCR, "The Damnedest Assignments",

an unpublished rough MS, apparently written for Public Relations

Branch, Headquarters, Marine Corps, in 1948, p. 442. (Partial

copy lodged in Holcomb Papers; hereafter referred to as Richards

MS).

'7For a detailed account of the action alluded to in the not

see Warren Tute, The Deadly Stroke (New York: Coward, McCann, 197

t8Letter, U. S. Naval Attache, Tangier to Director of Naval

Intelligence, dated May 20th, 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

A facsimile is located in Annex C to this paper.

19William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Norton, 1947)

p. 239.

20Secret Message, Naval Attache, Tangier to Coordinator of

Information, dated 14 April 1942. (Copy lodged in Millard Goodfel

Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; hereafter

referred to as Goodfellow Papers).

21Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 244.

22War Report, Vol. II, p. 14.

23Quoted in, Personal letter, Rear Admiral A. G. Kirk, USN

to Lieutenant General Holcomb dated 8 August 1942. (Copy lodged i

Holcomb Papers).

24News of this promotion was relayed to the Commandant by

Captain McCrea, the President's naval aide. See Memorandum for th

Record dated 27 1July1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

25Most Secret Personal message #107, Churchill to Roosevelt

dated July 8, 1942, reproduced in Wartime Correspondence, p. 222.

Secret and Personal message, Roosevelt to Churchill

dated 27 July 1942, Ibid. p. 227. For details of the entire affai

see the excellent concise account in Warren Tute, The North Africa

War (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1976) pp. 62-71.

p. 51

28Quoted in Stewart Alsop and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa-the OS

and Mierican Espionaqe (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948) p. 

A similar account is given by Smith. For details of Eddy's writte

approach to JCS which was similar to his midnight briefing of Stro

Patton, and Doolittle, see his Memorandum to JCS dated 10 June 194

(Copy lodged in Goodfellow Papers).
3Smith, p. 56.

32Richards MS, pp. 442-445. Alsop and Braden also relate this

story in essentially the same terms; however the ham incident is not

mentioned.

33Secret message, Marshall to Eisenhower, dated 2 October 1942.

(Copy lodged in Eisenhower Papers).

209

29(from Associated Press) Fierce Fighting 80 Miles From

Stalingrad", Baltimore Sun (30 duly 1942) p. 1.

30Secret, "Eyes Only" message, Eisenhower to George C. Marshall

(#1027) dated August lO, 1942. (Copy lodged in Eisenhower Papers).

34See series of correspondence lodged in FRC Files. Eisenhower

also recommended that Eddy be made Senior U. S. military attache in

North Africa.

35Who Was Who in America, p. 278.

36Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 92. Eddy left the State

Department in October, 1947 to become political advisor to the

Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Interesting during the 1958

Lebanon crisis, the American diplomat sent to resolve the situation

was Robert D. Murphy. Upon his arrival, Murphy learned that the

Ii. S. Marine forces were being advised on political matters by a retired Colonel: William A. Eddy. Colonel Eddy died in Beirut

on 3 May 1962 and is buried near his Sidon birthplace.

CHAPTER III tFOR EXCELLENT PERSONAL REASONS"

Special Order, Commandant of the Marine Corps to Captain

Peter J. ORTIZ, USMCR, 012779 dated 23 December 1942. (Copy lodged

in FRC Files.)

2The account of Ortiz' early life and service with the Foreign

Legion is from an unpublished MS prepared by Headquarters Marine Corps

in 1952 - apparently for submission to the Reader's Digest. Check of

that publication reveals no evidence that the story was ever

considered for publication. The author of the MS is unknown; however

there are a number of direct quotations from Ortiz which suggest

that he cooperated with the writer. The style is very similar to - that of the previously cited Richard's MS. A complete-copy of

the rough document is located in the Biographical Files, Marine Corps
5lbid.

6Secret Memorandum, Captain Peter J. Ortiz, USMCR to Major Gene

William J. Donovan dated 15 May 1943. (Copy declassified and provi

to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.) This document

constitutes Ortiz' after action report" for his assignment in

North Africa. It and several other still-Secret appendices are

located in the classified archives of the Marine Corps Historical

Center.

7The injury to "a Marine Officer" is mentioned in the War Repor

Volume II, p. 21. As usual, no name is provided. However, a casual

list for members of the OSS Naval Command dated 16 September 1945

which was provided by CIA reveals: "Harris, Elmer, Captain, USMCR

WIA land mine, Tunisia, 3 March 1943". For mor&on Captain Harris

see a later chapter of this paper.

8Secret Memorandum, Ortiz to Donovan, op.cit. (n.p.)

9lbid.

10Ibid. The handwritten note from Donovan to his Executive

Officer, Colonel Buxton, is written across the top of the first

page.

Digest MS, p. 5.

12War Report, Vol II. p. 21.

CHAPTER IV "A PUNGENT COLLECTION..."

1Military Order, "Office of Strategic Services", The White Hou

June 13, 1942, ¡sI Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander-in-Chief.

(Copy lodged in National Archives Copy of War Report, Volume I,

p. 282.) A facsimile is located in Annex C to this paper.

210

Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard; hereafter referred to as

Diiqest MS.

3e

Ibid. p. 4.

4

War Report, Vol. II., p. 19.
211

2Hyde, Room 3603, p. 174.

3dohn Paton Davies Jr., Dragon By The Tail (New York: J. W.

Norton, 1972) p. 287.

4Ford, Donovan of 055, p. 122. The 'monkey house' description

was actually based on fact. When COI occupied the National Health

Institute building, the top tloor was still being used as a laboratory

containing a variety of animals - goats, guinea pigs, and monkeys.

In order to secure the space for his offices, Donovan complained that

an infected monkey had gotten loose and bitten a stenographer. The

lab was forced to move out and COI gained use of the entire structure.

5Speech, Allen Dulles to Eire County Bar Association, "William

J. Donovan and National Security", (Buffalo, N. Y.) 4 May 1959.

6Smith, p. 13.

7Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps

dated 8 dune 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

8Letter, William L. Langer to Commandant of the Marine Corps

dated 21 dune 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

9Letter, Colonel David K. E. Bruce to William J. Donovan

dated 14 May 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files).

Who in America (1978), p. 710.

t1Gard's brief military biography is based on a synthesis

of letters, reports, and official orders lodged in FRC Files.

2Letter, George H. Owen to Commandant of the Marine Corps

dated 19 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Owen's

application of commission stated: "I have no hobbies other than

reading books on history and government. I 'get around' socially

and am familiar with foreigners, their mentality, mannerisms,

classes, and politics."

3Letter of Recommendation, Major General Henry L. Larsen, USMC

to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 8 December l43. (Copy

lodged in FRC Files.)

14Letter, 055, Allied Armies in Italy (R&A) to Dr. William

L. Langer, Washington, dated 18 April 1944. (Copy lodged in

Algiers Outpost File, Entry 73, Box 5, RG 226, National Archives.)
212

15Charles' military biography and the background of his

'administrative convenience' commissioning in the Marine Corps

Reserve is documented in a number of letters, memoranda, and

applications lodged in FRC Files. Apparently, he merely went out

and bought a set of Marine uniforms without benefit of any officer

training. Charles died in 1952 and was buried at Arlington with

appropriate Marine Corps participation.

16Confidential Letter, Head, Planning and Operations Staff,

055, London to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 20 February 194

(Copy lodged in FRC Files.) See also Letter, Brigadier E. MocklerFerryman, British Army (SQE) to 055, London dated 19 October 1944.

(Ibid.)

7Letter, R&A London to Director of Stragetic Services

dated 12 May 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

18War Report, Vol. II, p. 262.

9Memorandum, OSS London to Head, SO Branch, Washington

dated 19 August 1944. (Copy lddged in FRC Files.)

'0Transcript of Record, Lieutenant Colonel James Marshall McI-

U. S. Marine Corps, dated 2 June 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

This is an unusual three page record of McHugh's entire Marine

career up until 1943. Precisely why it was prepared is unclear

although the author appears to be McHugh himself.

2Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell And The American Experience in

China 1917-45 (New York: Macmillan, 1971) p. 338.

'2Vice Admiral Milton E. Miles, USN (Ret), A Different Kind

of War (New York: Doubleday, 1967) p. 335.

23luchnian, Stilwell And The American Experience in China, p. 

'4Ibid. See also, Charles F. Romanns and Riley Sunderland,

United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater,

Stilwell's Mission to China (Washington: Office of the Chief of

Military History, Department of the Army, 1953) pp. 248-254.

25Letter, Commanding Officer, Naval Command, ass to Commanda

of the Marine Corps dated 11 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FEW F
213

26Memorandum, Secretary of the Navy to Lt. Gen. Thomas Holcomb,

USMC dated 13 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) A

facsimile is provided in Appendix C to this paper.

27Memorandum, Major General Peck to Commandant of the Marine

Corps (Vandegrift), Subject: Telephone Conversation between Peck

and Mr. (Charles) Cheston (of 055), dated 9 December 1944. (Copy

lodged in FRC Files.) Vandegrift was no stranger to either McHugh

or China having served himself at the Peking legation during the

mid-thirties in company of such Marines as Canson, McHugh, and

Samuel Griffith. In the record of conversation, Cheston stated

that he "personally felt McHugh's proper place was as naval attache

there."

28Letter, Commanding Officer, Naval Command (055) to

Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 12 December 1944. (Copy

lodged in FRC Files.)

29Miles, A Different Kind of War, p. 20. Magruder became head

of the residue of OSS after Donovan left in late September, 1945.

Unable to convince President Truman of the need to keep the painfully

constructed intelligence appartus intact, he eventually resigned in

disgust.

30Letter, Colonel J. M. McHugh, USMC to Vice Admiral R. S.

Edwards, USN, (CNO) dated 12 March 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

See also handwritten memorandum, McHugh to Vandegrift of same

date. (Ibid.)

3hbid.

32Marine Corps Special Order, 2445-4O/DFA-9O4-acj dated 1 October

1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) This order is a major source for

identifying Marine officers who were attached to 05$. Although by no

means a complete list (it only addresses those who were still attached

on the date of issue) it proved a 'goldmine' for the author.

33Letter, Dr. Robert Hutchins to Director, Division of Reserve,

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, dated 6 January 1943. (Copy lodged

in FRC Files.)

34Ibid.

35Private and Official Letter, Colonel Clark W. Thompson, USMC

(Director, Marine Corps Reserve) to Commandant of the Marine Corps,

dated 31 May 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Thompson recommended

Major Gower for a personal decoration in recognition of her outstanding

service to the Corps. She subsequently became one of the first Woman

Marines to receive the avy Letter of Commendation - now the Navy

Commendation Medal.
214

36Letter, Commanding Officer, Naval Command, 055 to Commandant

of the Marine Corps dated 17 April 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

37For the definitive study of the Women's Reserve see: Lt. Col

Pat Meld's Marine Corps Historical Pamphlet "Marine Corps Women1s

Reserve in World War II" published by Historical Branch, G-3

Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., 1968.

Major Gower is mentioned in several places.

CHAPTER V "ZDRAVO PURVI AMERICANEC"

1Walter R. Mansfield, "Marine With The Chetniks", Marine Corp

Gazette (january-February, 1946) p. 3.

2lbid p. 4.

3Walter R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic And The Allies (Rahway,

N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1973) p. 70.

4Constantin Fotic, The War We Lost (New York: Viking, 1948)

p. 146. See also Fitzroy Haclean, The Heretic (New York: Harper

Brothers, 1967) pp. 108-113.

5Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic And The Allies, p. 20.

6For a good account of Mihailovic's early career and the

organization of his Chetnik guerilla army see: Albert Seitz,

Mihailovic, Hoax or Hero:, (Columbus, Ohio: Leigh House, 1953).

7Roberts, p. 23.

8Vladimir Dedijer, Tito (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1953)

p. 174. This work is an abridged translation of Josip Broz Tito -

Prilozi za Bioqrafiju (Belgrade: Kultura, 1953).

9Maclean, The Heretic, p. 114.

°Phyl1is Auty, Tito (London: Longmans, 19/O) p. 191. See al

Roberts, p. 34.

11The Chetniks later claimed to Hudson that the attack on

tizice was a repraisal for Partisan skirmishes initiated against

them in another area. Roberts, probably the authoritative source available in English, discounts the reciprocity charge.
2Roberts, pp. 49-50.

13lnitially, all news coverage of the shadow war in Yugoslavia

praised Mihailovic. Even the Daily Worker made the mistake of naming

him as leader of the Partisan movement. I-or a good example see

The New York Times Maqazine (1 February 1942) article by Middle East

correspondent Ray Brock. This situation changed drastically when

respected Balkan-watcher Louis Adamic published a remarkable accurate

assessment of the situation in the Saturday Evening Post (19 December

1942). Thereafter it seemed to be 'choose a chmapion' and the TitoMihailovic controversy fueled the always simmering fud between

hyphenated Pmericans of Yugoslav ancestry.

14

Letter, The Honorable Walter R. Mansfield to author, dated

18 January 1979.

15

Michael Howard, Grand Strate9y (London: I-1. M. Stationary

Office, 1956) discusses this period in some detail. The direct

quote is from William Jones, Twelve Months With Tito (Bedford (U.K.)

Bedford Press, 1946) p. 2.

16

Smith, p. 134-35.

l7

Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps

dated February 5, 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

18

Mansfield, "Marine With The Chetniks", p. 5.

19

Ibid. p. 6.

20

Ibid. p. 8.

21

Seitz, Mihailovic, Hoax or Hero?, p. 13-14. Seitz discusses

Anglo-Mierican relations and antagonism at some length. Mansfield

is more diplomatic. Roberts, once again, is the best neutral observer.

22

Roberts, p. 129-35

215

23

24

Roberts, p. 153.

25"Marine With The Chetniks", (Part II) p. 18.

Mansfield, 'Marine With The Chetniks, (Part II), p. 17.
216

26

Roberts, p. 156. Captain Mansfield was awarded the Bronze S

Medal for his work in Yugoslavia. The Royal Government-in-Exile

also decorated him with the Order of the White Eagle with Swords.

Manfield would later win the Legion of Merit in China.

27

Smith, p. 142.

28

Walter R. Mansfield, "IS There A Case for Mihailovic?"

Mierican Mercury (June, 1946) pp. 716ff.

29

Most Secret Message, Churchill to Roosevelt dated 1 Septembe

1944. (A facsimile appears in Wartime Correspondence, p. 568. In

this message, Churchill chided Roosevelt for allowing Donovan

the initiative to even prepare groundwork for additional support

missions to the Chetniks. The President meekly replied two days

later: "I am directly Donovan to withdraw any plans for such an

operation".

30

"Where is Mihailovic?", Newsweek (December 25, 1944) p. 47.

31

C. L. Sulzberger, A Lonq Row of Candles (New York;

MacMillan, 1969) p. 237.

32

Maclean, The Heretic, p. 284.

CHAPTER VI "DID YOU PLAY FOOTBALL IN COLLEGE?1'

1 Sterling W. Hayden, Wanderer (Toronto: G. J. McLeod, 1963)

p. 312.

2A brief biography of Hayden (Hamilton) is located in the

Bio9raphic Files, Marine Corps Histroical Center, Washington Navy

Yard. Apparently prepared as a press release in 1946, it bears no

author or pagination.

3

Hayden, Wanderer, p. 301.

4

Ibid. p. 306.
Ibid.

16

Ladd, Comnandos and Ranqers of World War II, p. 156.

17

U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-Miericafl

Activities, "Hearings on the Communist Influence and Infiltration

of the Hollywood Motion Picture Industry" (Washington: Government

Printing Office, 1951) p. 132.

18

Smith, p. 147.

19

Hayden, p. 328.

20

Sulzberger, p. 45-7.

217

5

°New Marine", New York Daily News (27 October 1942) p. 3.

6

Letter, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of the

Marine Corps dated 12 March 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

7 Sulzberger, p. 238.

8

Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War (London: Macmillan, 1947)

p. 527.

9

Smith, p. 124.

10

Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular (London:

Methuen, 1965) p. 137.

11

Hayden, p. 310.

12

Ibid.

13

Smith, p. 146.

14

Hayden, pp. 316-17.

15
218

21

Ibid. p. 479.

22

War Report, Vol. II, p. 125.

23

Restricted Memorandum, Commandant of the Marine Corps to

Secretary of the Navy dated 4 July 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

The sense of this document is that Cooky's commissioning should not

be delayed simply because he is unable to provide evidence of

a Navy physical examination. The writer points out - probably

tongue-in-cheek - that there are no facilities available since

Cooky is "carrying out secret operations behind enemy lines't.

24 - Restricted Letter, H. T. Fultz, 2677th Regiment (Provisional)

055, to lstLt Harry Harper, USMCR, Chief Balkan SI Section, dated

10 April 1945. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

25

Ibid. Fuitz was the Ñnerican civilian who the Albanian

Government initially refused to accept. He eventually became the

first acting American Ambassador to the Tirana regime.

26

War Report, Vol. II., p. 126.

27

Restricted Letter # 95, American Mission to Albania to

The Honorable Secretary of State, Washington, dated 6 October 1945.

(Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Lieutenant Cooky was one of only

four Americans decorated by the Albanian communist resistance.

28

Letter, Specialist 4/c Harry H. Harper, AUS, to Commandant

of the Marine Corps dated 23 November 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files

29

Sulzberger, p. 63.

30

War Report, Vol. II., p. 333.

31

Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces Mid-East (Cairo), Citation

to accompany award of the Legion of Merit to First Lieutenant

Harry H. Harper, USMCR dated 8 November 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC File
219

32

Who's Who in Pmerica (1978), p. 526.

33

Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps

dated 18 December 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) This is the

standard form letter from 055 to HQMC requesting detail of an

active duty officer to the Director of Strategic Services. These

invariably state that the officer in question is needed and qualified

for a special overseas assignment.

34

Sulzberger, p. 79.

35War Report, Vol. II., p. 331.

36Personal letter, Dr. William L. Cary to author dated December

20, 1978.

37War Report, Vol. II., p. 332

38Cary letter of 20 December 1978 briefly discusses this

period. The direct quote is from Smith, P. 154.

39War Report, Vol. II., p. 337.

CHAPTER VII "PM GOING TO BLOW THIS BRIDGE, AND I'LL DO THE SAME TO YOU

IF NECESSARY"

1David Howarth, The Greek Adventure (New York: Atheneum, 1976)

p. 77.

2Sulzberger, p. 240.

3Who's Who in Mierica (1978), p. 921.

4Letter, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of the

Marine Corps dated 24 June 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

5Personal Letter, Dr. Gerald F. Else to author dated

30 November 1978.

6War Report, Vol. II, p. 120.

7lbid.
220

8Howarth, The Greek Adventure, p. 39.

9Else letter of 30 November 1978. See also War Report,

Vol. II, p. 329.

10War Report, Vol. II, p. 330.

T/Sgt. Arthur E. Mielke, "Gunny Curtis", Leatherneck

(January, 1946) p. 22.

2Letter, Director of Strategic Services to Commandant of

the Marine Corps dated 19 Septpmber 1943 and other miscellaneous

correspondence concerning orders and transportation lodged in

FRC Files.

'3LCdr. Richard M. Kelly, USNR, "Mission to Greece", Bluebo

(November, 1946) pp. 76-78. Kelly was Commanding Officer of the

055 Maritime Unit in the Adriatic during 1943-45. He wrote a ser

of articles on Mierican exploits behind enemy lines for Bluebook

during 1946-47 based on insider information and personal intervie

with the participants. Mr. Walter Pforzheimer, former Chief Coun

of the CIA, claims that the Kelly series contains the most accura

writing on OSS operations published prior to the War Report.

Pforzheimer should know. He possesses what is probably the best

personal collection of intefligenbe literature in the world.

p. 82.

15War Report, Vol. II, p. 122. The JCS directive is

Memorandum #816 (Copy lodged in JCS Files, National Archives).

16

Kelly, "Mission to Greece", p. 83.

17

Rqport of Mission Evros, OSS Historical File # 215, p. 3.

(Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central

Intelligence Agency.)

18

"Mission to Greece", p. 85.

19

Mie.jlke, "Gunny Curtis", p. 22.

20War Report, Vol. II., p. 123
221

21

Correspondence relating to Curtis' award of the Bronze Star

for service with the Evros mission in Greece and his later award of

the Silver Star in China is located in FRC Files. As was often the

case in OSS-originated awards, the citiations provide few details.

CHAPTER VIII "EXIGENCIES OF THE SITUATION..."

'Alsop and Braden, Sub Rosa, p. 22-23.

2Smith, p.5. See also William Morgan, The 0.S.S. and I

(New York; Norton, 1957) pp. 16-17.

3OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men (New York: Rhinehart,

1948) p. 4.

4lbid. p. 5

5Who's Who in Mierica (1978) p. 1099. See also, Personal

History Questionnaire, Office of Public Relations, Marine Barracks,

Quantico, Va. case of ist Lt. John William Gardner, USMCR, dated

17 February 1944. (Copy lodged in Biographical Files, Marine Corps

Historical Center, Washington Navy 'Yard.)

6Assessment of Men, pp. 316-349.

7War Report, Vol. I, p. 240.

8lbid. p. 231.

9Transcript of Military Service of Colonel Philip W. Strong,

04030, USMCR, Records Branch, Personnel Department, Headquarters,

U. S. Marine Xorps, 9 August 1955. This document along with a

variety of correspondence located in FRC Files provides the basis

for Strong's brief biography.

10Letter, Coordinator of Information to Secretary of the Navy

dated 16 January 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

1Letter, Jajor General Commandant to Chief of Naval Operations

dated 21 January 1942, and Letter, Chief of Naval Operations to

Coordinator of Information dated 22 January 1942. (Copies of both

lodged in FRC Files.)
Li

222

2Letter, William J. Donovan to Secretary of the Navy dated

li February 1942 and Memorandum, Secretary of the Navy to Chief of

Naval Operations dated 18 February 1942. (Copies lodged in FRC Files

13lranscript of Military Service, op. cit.

'4Letter, Secretary of the Joint Staff to Coordinator of

Information dated 9 July 1942. (Copy lodged in JSC Files.)

ISMemorandum William J. Qonovan to Brigadier General W. B.

Smith dated 17 August 1942. (Copy lodged in National Archives copy

of War Report, pp. 296-329.

6Confidential Letter, Coninander Battleship Squadron TWO

to Secretary of the Navy dated 16 March 1945. (Copy lodged in

FRC Files.)

'7War Report, Vol. I, p. 240.

CHAPTER IX "WHO KNEW NOT FEAR"

'Henri Michel, The Shadow War (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)

p. 325.

2M. R. D. Foote, SOE in France, p. 357.

3lbid. See also Smith, p. 174. It should be noted that Smith

while calling Ortiz "the first full-fledged OSS member" into France

is two weeks in error on the date of UNION's drop.

4Diqest MS, p. 6.

5A copy of the complete citation is lodged in FRC Files.

6War Report, Vol. II, p. 194.

7lbid. p. 195.

8Activity Report of Sergeant Frederick J. Brunner USMC,

OSS (SO) W. E. Section dated 4 October 1944. (Copy provided to

author by Central Intelligence Agency.) Hereafter referred to as

Brunner Repof-t.
223

9Sergeant Perry was buried in the Catholic cemetary on the

Col de Saisies. I-lis time of death is listed as 1445, 1 August

1944 in 055 records.

°Brunner Report, p. 2.

1Major Peter J. Ortis, USMCR, "Chronological Report of the

Capture and Subsequent Captivity of Members of Mission Union",

dated 12 May 1945. (Copy provided by Central Intelligency Agency.)

Hereafter referred to as Ortiz Report. Both the Brunner and Ortiz

reports were classified 'Secret1 until released by CIA.

12ßrunner Report, p. 4.

'3Ortiz Report, p. 2.

14Ibid. p. 3.

15Ibid. p. 5.

'6Lieutenant Commander Richard M. Kelly USNR, "Spy Work Ahead",

Bluebook (August, 1947) pp. 90-92. Captain Greene also became a POW.

In late October, 1944 he and Army Lieutenant Jack Hemmingway (Ernest

Hemmingway's son) were wounded and captured during a mission beyond

the Rmerican lines near Vosges. Corporal Sweeney was unluckier still.

He was Killed In Action near Mannheim, Germany on 29 March 1945.

7Letter, Walter W. Taylor to Head, Historical Branch,

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, dated 31 May 1966. (Copy lodged

in Marine Corps Historical Center Archives, Washington Navy Yard.)

18Benis M. Frank and Henry I Shaw, History of Marine Corps

Operations in World War II (Historical Branch, G-3 Division,

Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1968) Vol. V, p. 748.

'9ortiz Report, p. 13.

p. 15.

21A copy of the complete citation is lodged in FRC Files.

See also, Diqest MS p. 6. Interestingly, the story of Peter Ortiz

is difficult to find in Marine Corps history. Frank and Shaw give

it the best albeit limited treatment in their section on Marine POW's.

Ueinl's Soldiers of the Sea does not mention Ortiz' name and Moskin's

U. S. Marine Corps Story has only a few lines 'cribbed' from the

official history.
224

CHAPTER X "FIRST LIED TO KILL A BOCHE..."

Wartime Correspondence, p. 31.

2Smith, p. 174. The direct quote comes from a speech by

Mibassador Bruce to the annual dinner meeting of the Veterans of

055, Washington, D. C. 26 May 1971.

3Alsop and Braden, p. 141.

4Ford, p. 233.

5Anthony C. Brown; Bodyguard of Lies(New York: Harper, Row,

1975), p. 577.

6Letter, Captain Francois de la Roche, USMCR to Brigadier

General E. H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) dated 10 January 1979. (Copy

provided to author by Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington

Navy Yard). This letter - although erroneous in spots - gives

some interesting aspects of the BUGATTI mission from the recollection

of Captain de la Roche's father Guy, a member of the Jedburgh Team.

Hereafter referred to as de la Roche letter.

7Foote, pp. 283-84.

8OQerational Synopsis, "Team Buggati" June-September 1944,

7 pp. Ihis document contains the Ordre de mission for BUGATTI

and a literal rendering of all significant message traffic between

the team in France and the SPOC in Algiers. (Copy declassified and

provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency).

9Letter, Horace W. Fuller to Lieutenant Colonel F. S.

Robillard, USMC dated 7 May 1941. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

10Chronolosical Record of Service, FULLER, Horace Williams,

USMCR 7 pp. Copy o'ge. in ' i es.)

Letter, First Lieutenant Horace W. Fuller, USMCR to

Major General Commandant, dated lO September 1941. (Copy lodged

in FRC Files.)
225

T2Letter, Major Horace W. Fuller, USMCR to Major Andrew Wylie,

USMCR dated 5 March 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Wylie himself

is an interesting and star-crossed figure. A slightly built officer

who sported a 'very military' mustache1 Wylie spent most of World

War II as the Navy's Soviet expert. He was one of very few Americans

to visit Moscow (March-June 1944) and established links with the

Russian Naval Attache in Washington, Commodore Tegorichev.

In June, 1945, Wylie was selected to become the first post war Naval

Attache to Poland - an extremely unusual posting for a Reserve Officer.

Especially promoted for this assignment, he reached Warsaw in September.

On 26 December 1945, Wylie and his driver were proceeding for Gydnia

toward Szczecin. Because of fog and darkness they missed a detour

sign and arrived at a series of anti-tank barriers. Wylie left the

car and began walking slowly in front while the driver zig-zagged

through the barbed wire and concrete obstacles. Suddenly there

was a scream and a splash. The chauffer heard cries in English and

ran toward the sound. It was then that he realized that he was on

one section of a demolished bridge over the Oder River. Panicking,

the driver ran to the nearest town (about 2 kilometers away) and

brought back some members of the local security police. These were

later joined by Russian soldiers. A nightiong search was conducted

without result, ßn 30 June 1946, a barge captain discovered a badly

decomposed body lying in the weeds near Stettin. The corpse was

dressed in a tattered green uniform with American buttons. In the

trouser pocket was a United States diplomatic passport with the name

Andrew Wylie still legible.

3Official Orders, SO Branch, 055 London to Major Horace

W. Fuller, USMCR dated 10 January 1944. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

See also Headquarters, Parachute Unit, OSS, London Special Order

2-44 in same location.

4Serial #14, "Bugatti Mission Report" (undated but apparently

written by Fuller during October, 1944). No pagination is present on

the original but the complete document is 6 pages long and will be

referred to in terms of first page, second page, etc. (Copy

declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence

Agency). Hereafter referred to as BUGATTI Mission Report.

15

Operational Synopsis, p. 2. Message from BUGATTI to SPOC

of 10 JuTy 1944; 12 duly 1944; and 13 July 1944 respectively.

16

BUGATTI Mission Report, 2nd page.

17

perational Synopsis, p. 3. Message from BUGATTI to SPOC

of 21 July 1944.
226

18Ibid. p. 3. BUGATTI message to SPOC of 23 August 1944.

19

"BUGATTI Mission Report", 5th page.

20

Letter, Commanding Officer, 055 Detachment EUTOUSA (Bruce)

to Commander, Naval Forces Europe (Stark) containing proposed

citiation for award of the Silver Star to Lieutenant Colonel

Fuller and dated 20 March 1945; Certificate of "Mention in

Despatches" (3 palms for separate awards) dated 5 September 1947;

and other miscellaneous documents lodged in FRC Files.

CHAPTER XI "HOW THE HELL DID A MARINE GET HERE?"

1Letter, William F. Grell to Comandant of the Marine Corps

dated lO December 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

2

William F. Grell, "A Marine With OSS", Marine Corps Gazette

(December, 1945) p. 15.

3

Joseph E. Persico, Piercinq the Reich (New York: Viking, 197

p. 188.

4

"Marine With 055", p. 16.

5

Ibid.

6

Activity Report, Captain William F. Grell, USMCR, OSS, (SO)

W.E. Section, dated 5 November 1944, p. 4. (Copy declassified and

provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.)

7

Mission Log, The GERMINAL Mission, OSS (SO), W. E. Section,

undated, pp. 1-2. (Copy declassified and provided to author by

U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.) This is an unusual 12 page

document which provides a day-by-day synopsis of GERMINAL's

activity. It was written and signed by Grell and Lt. Griffiths.

The log describes GERMINAL from the time the members departed

London for Tempsford aerodrome until the mission was terminated

in Paris on 8 October 1944.
'O

Memorandum, Officer Procurement Division, Headquarters,

U. S. Marine Corps, to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 2

September 1943; and, Letter, Director of Strategic Services to

Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 3 September 1943. (Copies

of both lodged in FRC Files.)

11

17

Foote, p. 365.

12

Activity Report, Major Edwin Lord, AUS, p. 3.

13

Persico, p. 158. See also, Wesley F. Craven and James

L. Cate, Army Air Forces in World War 1k (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1951) Vol. III, pp. 500-509.

14Lord Activity Report, p. 4.

15

Activity Report, Second Lieutenant William B. Macomber, Jr.,

USMCR, Circuit: FREELANCE, 055 (SO) W.E. Section, dated 28 September

1944. (Copy declassified and provided to author by U. S. Central

Intelligence Agency.) A nine page document which traces Macomber's

participation in FREELANCE from his infiltration drop on 31 August

1944 until his return to London on 19 Setpember 1944.

16

Ibid. p. 3.

227

8Activity Report, Major Edwin Lord, AUS, Codename: Leonce;

Circuit: FREELANCE, dated 4 October 1944, p. 19. (Copy declassified

and provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.) This

is a well written and extremely detailed summary of FREELANCE

a mission which was dropped near Montlucon in the Department of

the Allier on 31 August 1944. Second Lieutenant William B. Macomber, Jr.,

USMCR (codename: Mederic) was the weapons officer for FREELANCE.

9 Letter, Edward G. Miner to Major General Commandant dated

14 February 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

"Marine With OSS", p. 17.

18Ibid p. 18.
19

Macomber Report, p. 5. For

mechanism of surrender by a German

of 2ndLt Michel G. Block, AUS, 055

October 1944. (A copy declassified

the author's possession.)

228

CHAPTER XII " ONE MARINE.. .ELEVEN HUNDRED GERMANS"

1 Lieuten ant Commander Richard M. Kelly, USNR, "One Against

A Thousand", Bluebook (Feburary, 1947) p. 14.

2War Report, Vol. II, p. 110.

3

Kelly, "One Against A Thousand", p. 17.

4

For the complete story of Popski's Private Army, see the

personal memoir of its commander: Vladimir Peniakoff, Private Army

(London: Johnathan Cape, 1950). Chapter VII deals with PPA

activities in Northern Italy but i-learn is not mentioned and

Popski takes credit for Chioggia.

5 "One Against A Thousand", p. 23.

6

Ibid.

7 Decree of the Naval Ministry of Italy with citation to

accompany award of the Medaglia d'argento al Valore Militare

(Silver Medal of Military Valor) to First Lieutenant George Hearn,

USMCR, 2677th Regiment (Provisional) 055. dated 4 January 1946.

(Copy and facsimile certificate lodged in FRC Files.

8

"One Against A Thousand", p. 25. For a more detailed discussi

of the San Marco Marines, see: Conunander Marc Antonio Bragadin,

The Italian Navy in World War II (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,

1957), and War Report, Volume II, Part III. Lieutenant Heran and

the San Marco Sabotage Unit are also mentioned in Kelly's

"Bionda Mission" Bluebook (April, 1947) pp. 74 ff. As has been

previously noted, Kelly was Commanding Officer of the OSS Maritime

a detailed account of the actual

battalion, see Activity Report

(SO) W.E. Section, dated 2

and released by CIA is in
229

Unit in the Adricatic. Interestingly, the first MU commander

was Marine Corps Major Russell Duncan. Duncan's service with 055

was abbreviated by a set of orders to Senior School (December, 1943).

Previously he had the distinction of being one of the token

"two officers and twenty enlisted Marines" sent to England for

Commando training at the height of the Donovan affair discussed

in Cahpter i of this paper.

9

Letter, William J. Donovan to Commandant of the Marine Corps

dated 4 January 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Fules.)

10

War Report, Vol. II, p. 60.

il

For an excellent account of German signal intelligence activities duing the war, see: Wilhelm F. Flicke, War Secrets in the Ether,

(Office of Training Services, National Security Agency, 1953) This

is a translation of the original MS entitled Krieqsheimnisse im

Aether, which Flicke wrote shortly after the war and which was

confiscated on security grounds by Army intelligence.

12

Headquarters, U. S. Forces, China Theater, General Order

# 250 dated 29 November 1945, Citation to accompany award of the

Legion of Merit to Captain Elmer Harris, USMC. (Copy lodged in

FRC Files.)

13

Restricted Letter, Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, Jr.,

IJSMCR to Comandant of the Marine Corps, undated but apparently

written in July, 1945. This is a four page synopsis of Taylor's

service with OSS from September 1943 until his return to the

United States in June, 1945. Taylor states that the purpose of

the letter is to describe his activities as a Marine Officer

since there was apparently no record in his OQR at Headquarters,

Marine Corps.

14

Activity Report, Second Lieutenant Walter W. Taylor, Jr.,

USMCR, SI Operations Officer, Detachment "C", 2677th Regiment

(Provisional) OSS, dated 25 June 1944. This document describes the

LOCUST and MONTREAL missions from Corsica. (Copy declassified and

provided to author by U. S. Central Intelligence Agency.)
8Persico, p. 264.

9

Hayden, Wanderer, p. 329.

10

Letter, Captain John A. Cade, USN, (Ret) to Commandant of 

Marine Corps, dated 12 April 1942. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Se

also: Who's Who in America (1978), p. 2329.

il

Headquarters, U. S. Forces, European Theater, General Orde

#310 dated 16 November 1945. Citatation to accompany award of the

the Bronze Star Medal to 2ndLt John W. Mowinckél, U. S. Marine Co

Reserve. See also: Liste des Officiers Americains De l'OSS avant

obtenu la Croix de Guerre Francaise, Decision # 531, 17 Mars 1945

(Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.)

230

CHAPTER XIII "MAN, YOU MUST BE LOST OR SOMETHING'

1 Persico, p. 107.

2Letter, Sidney Biddell to Commandant of the Marine Corps

dated 21 December 1943. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.) Biddell was

associate producer to Cecil B. deMille at Paramount Pictures.

3Letter, Frank V. Morley to Commandant of the Marine Corps,

dated 31 December 1943. See also: Letter, Harry M. Warner to

CMC dated 6 January 1944. (Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.)

Harry Warner was President of Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc.

4

Persico, p. 109. See also: War Report, Vol. II, p. 294.

5Who's Who in Pmerica (1978), p. 2332.

6Persico, p. 111.

7War Report, Vol. II, p. 295.
12

Headquarters, Third United States Army, General Order

# 251 dated 15 September 1945. Citation to accompany award of

the Silver Star Medal to Second Lieutenant John W. Mowinckel,

U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, for gallantry in action in

Austria. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

13

War Report, Vol. II, p. 287.

14

Persico, p. 161. For more details on the interesting

career of Major Willis prior to his commissioning in the Marine

Corps Reserve, see his personal letter to CMC dated 28 May 1943,

and Request for Assignment of Personnel, Director of Strategic

Services to Commandant of the Marine Corps dated 4 June 1943.

(Copies of both lodged in FRC Files.) Donovan wanted Willis - who was thee Vice President of Thompson Automatic Arms Corporation

and its subsidiary Auto-Ordnance Corporation - sb badly that he personally signed the usual bureaucratic form

15

Ibid. p. 172

16

Ibid. p. 209.

17

Muster Roll, Marine Barracks, London, England, report of

1 April 1945. (Microfilm copy located in Muster Roll Collection,

Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard.) This

document lists Sergeant Brunner as MIA as from 20 March 1945 and

gives the aircraft type and tail number. Persico gives a good

account of the CHISEL mission in Piercing the Reich but does

not mention Brunner's name. However, a telephone conversation

with him on 22 February 1979 confirmed that Brunner is listed

as "liaison NCO/jumpmaster" on the OSS mission report, a copy

of which was declassified and provided to Persico by CIA under a

Freedom of Information action.

18

Fonecon, author and Persico, 22 February 1979.

19

Who's Who in America (1978), p. 2332.

231

p. 2329.
21

Letter, Captain John Hamilton, USMCR to Commandant of

the Marine Corps dated 24 July 1947. (Copy lodged in FRC Files

EPILOGUE

1 Executive Order 9621, "Termination of the Office of

Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions", The Whit

House, Washington, D. C., September 20, 1945. (Copy lodged in

Record Group 226, National Archives.)

2

Letter, Charles Henry Finn to Conunandant of the Marine

Corps dated 8 January 1954. (Copy lodged in FRC Files.)

232
APPENDICES

The research and writing of "Herringbone Cloak- GI Dagger"

yielded much documentary material which has never been published

or even alluded to in secondary sources. My original intent

was to include this type of material in the appendices. Once

I began to uncover new sources however it became apparent that

simply dupicating every interesting letter, memorandum, citation

or mission report would result in a 1000 page paper. Consequently

I have limited the 'exhibits' to those items which are themselves

of singular importance or which can serve as exemplars. Since

the initial chapter regarding the "Donovan Affair" is of

particular importance to the story I have included most of the

previously classified material relating to that period of Marine

Corps history. Nearly all of the footnoted documents are in my possession and the interested reader is welcome to contact

me should he desire a copy.

Major Robert E. Mattingly (JSMC

12006 Skipjack Court

Woodbridge, Va. 22192

233
ii A Brief Biography of William J. Donovan

"Wild Bill" Donovan was born in Buffalo, New York on New Year's

Day of 1883. He was educated in that Up-State city and entered

Columbia College, Columbia University in 1901. While at Columbia,

Donovan played quarterback on the varsity football team. Graduating

in 1905, he immediately enrolled in Columbia Law School where he

was a classmate of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

In 1907, Donovan began a law, practice in Buffalo. Five years

later he was instrumental in founding a cavalry troop of the New

York National Guard in his hometown. When the cavalry was called-out

for operations along the Mexican border, Donovan left his law

books. By the outbreak of World War I he was a Major.

Donovan earned his nickname in France as a battalion commander

and later as regimental C. 0. of the 165th Infantry - popularly

then known as the 'Fighting 69th New York. He was wounded three time

and received a number of combat decorations including the Distinguis

Service Cross and the Medal or Honor for gallantry in action at

Landre-et St. Georges during the Meuse Argonne offensice.

Following the war, Donovan served as an unofficial U. S.

military observer in Asia and then resumed his law practice. He

was U. S. District Attorney for Western New York 1921-24 and

Assistant U. S. Attorney General for the same area in 1925.

During this period, Donovan became extremely active in Republican

Party politics. From 1925-29 he was Assisant to the Attorney

General of the United States and was also a member of several

international organizations including the Red Cross and the Rio

Grande Compact Commission which he chaired.

In 1928, Donovan was presumed heir-apparent to the Attorney

Generalship of the United StaVes but his appointment was opposed

by party conservatives largely because of his Irish-Catholic

background. President Hoover instead offered him the post of

Governor of the Philippines which Donovan declined.

Donovan returned to private law practice and, in 1932,

ran unsuccessfully for the governorship of New York State.

Subsequently he was involved in a number of personal fact-finding

trips to world trouble spots including Spain and Ethippia.

When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Donovan's expertise in

European affairs and his friendship with political rival FDR

resulted in a series of quasi-offical visits to England and

the Balkans.

284

235

Donovan was psychologically prepared for the shock of a new

European war. By then he was 57-years-old and had a proven track

record in observing international affairs. Additionally he was

a millionaire, a sophisticated patriot-nationalist, and best

of all - so far as the President was concerned - ant ardent

interventionist. Moreover he was a close friend of Knox, the

Republican Vice-Presidential nominee in 1936, whom Roosevelt

had brought into the Cabinet as a symbol of national harmony.

Not only did Knox recogøliize Donovan's talents but so

did Churchill's dapper Canadian emissary, William Stephenson,

the now famous 'Man Called Intrepid'. Together, Stephenson

and Knox were instrumental in securing for Donovan his appointment

as Coordinator of Information, a title which he held from July,

1941 until COI was redesignated as 055 the following year.

Largely because of military opposition to the new central

intelligence service, initial attempts to impart legitimacy

to the organization by giving Donovan general officer rank

were rebuffed. After the success of 055 operations in North

Africa however, Donovan was appointed a Brigadier in April 1943.

He became a Major General in November, 1944.

After President Truman dissolved 055 in October, 1945, Donovan

briefly served as aide to Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief

prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. He returned to

private practice in 1946 but continued to actively support the

lobbying effort which eventually resulted in the formation of

the CIA. President Eisenhower appointed him American Ambassador

to Thailand in 1953.

Donovan died on 8 February 1959 in Washington.
ji

Top Secre!

FROM. William J. Donovan

Permit me respectfully to submit the following:

I have not been advised of the particular proposais our government is to ma

for consideration as a joint strategic plan for the winnmg of the war I fear, howeve

that there may be no suggestion that an integrai and vita part of such plan would 

the preparation and conditioning of those peoplé and those territories where the Issu

istobefought.

Based on my observations of wars during the past five years, I believe it wou

be a senous error to ignore or neglect such preparation and such conditioning.

On the offensive, this ldnd of operation is necessary in order to disintegra

the resistance. On the defensive, it is necessary in order to harass the enemy as loc

conditions may permit.

We can consider this under two types of guerrilla warfare: L Setting up of small groups working as bands under definite leaders. 2 The establishment of guerrilla forces military in nature, in order to secu

cohesion and successfully can-y out a plan of campaigm

It is unnecessary to stress that modem large-sized armies are greatly depen

ent on roads, iailways, and signal communications, and the creation of supply a

munitions dumps, to keep themselves supplied snth food, munitions and gasolin

without which they cannot operate These communications constitute a desirab

target both of the military and sabotag type.

The principle laid down is that the whole art of guernfla warfare lies in stri

ing the enemy where he least expects it asid yet where he is most vulnerable

Specifically, I suggest the following:

L That as an essential part of any strategic plan, there be recognized t

need of sewing the dragon's teeth in those te.ritones from which we must withdraw a

in which the enemy wilt place his army; for example, the Azores or North Africa. Th

the aid oi matite chiefs be obtained, the loyalty of the inhabitants be cultivated; Fi

columnists organized and placed, demolition matenal cached; and guerrilla bands 

boid ad dasing "e o"gar»'d ond ii-istallnd. 2 That there be organized now, in the United States, a guerrilla corps 

dependent and separate from the Army and Navy, and imbued with a maxirnuni of t

offensive and imaginative spint This force should, of course, be created along d

cipuined militai-y lines, analogous10 the British Commando pnnciple, a statement 

which I sent you reàêntly. " 

Top Secret

236

No 94

December 22, 1941

6 P. M

MEMORAÌ1DOM TO THE PRESIDE1T

W-2
Coznucg Ñtz

A16-3/( 0012)

From:

To :

LM0RANDUM: --

u;c1ASSFE

UNITED STATES FLEET

OFFICE or THE CoMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAYr DE?AICMERT, WASHINGTON, J) C.

January 8, 1942

- C-,---c ¿Ii/ni

/L4- JL/cC

237

Coramander in Chief, United States Fleet.

lvlajor General Comirandant, U.S. Narine Corps.

Subject: Use of ttCorandosIt in Pacific Fleet Area.

The Secretary told rae that the Presidnt

is natch interested in the development and use of the

equivalent of British l&cornmaridosfl.

The Secretary told the President that you

have such groups in training.

The President proposed the use of 1cotnndos"

as essential parts of raiding expeditions which attack

(destroy) enemy advanced (seaplane) bases in the Pacific

Fleet area.

Please let me have your views - and proposals -

as to such use.

Iç.

'1183tì

BECEIV Ei) rt Jst'?k

p .j-t c.rPt

Ac

ir

T7

,rç_.w
fl/33-chb

4

CøNQ ENTIA L

From:

To:

Via:

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

HEADQUARTERS. SECOND JOINT TRAININC FORCE

Camp Elliott, San Diego, Calif.

«Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR.

The Major General Commandant, Headquarters,

U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C.

The Commanding General, Second Joint Training Force.

Subject: Development within the Marine Corps of a unit for

purposes similar to the British Commandos and

the Chinese Guerrillas.

Enclosures: (A) Proposed organization.

Notes on proposed training and character 01'

employment.

Nèwspaper clipping "The Commandos".

The complete domination in force of the Western

coasts of continental Europe has resulted in the f ormatiori by the

British of a force popularly known as HThe Commandos". The

purpose of this group of esnecially trained and equipped fighters

is to inflict on the enemy surprise and swiftly moving blows.

The tactic is similar to the jab in boxing, the aim being to

destroy comfidence, disruot well laid plans, create panic, fear

and uncertainty, destroy or demolish key concentrations, arid in

general impede the eneniy1 s attack and prepare the way for your

own offensive action. These Commandos have proven of great value

in situations such as have existed in Europe, Egypt and Africa,

there the British could not go on the offensive. Similarly the

Eighth Route Army in China has proven an invaluable obstacle to

any continued Japanese offensive in the North China, or Border,

District. The Japanese have not found it possible to withstand

for any long period the pressure placed by these groups as soon

as the Japanese line of supply became extended. Similar successful action is reported now being used in Northern Malaya and.

Indo-China.

It is submitted that the posItion of our forces in

the Pacific would be greatly aided by similar action on Japanese

positions in the l4andated :slands, and perhans later the PhIlippIne

by units based to the South; even more devastating action frontally

by landing on Japan proper from luto north to Aomori would certain

demoralize the enemy.

238

-1 -

13 January, 1942.
J (i

i9uFJ.QgT(!fL

- Subject: Development within the Marine Corps of a unit

purposes similar to-the British Commandos and ¿-fl.

the Chinese Guerriflos.

Transportation by submarine, and landings by rubber boats, would

teem practicable. No discussion is made here of similar Atlantic

situations which, however, do or will exist.

A review of Narine Corps history indicates that our

country does not need to go outside of this organization for a

body of men capable or executing such missione. There are many

officers and men with experience in Nicaragua who have had simila

experience. A study of modern British experience would, of cours

be helpful. This is now available in written form in the Office

of the Coordinator of Information. For purposes of discussion

there are 'attached hereto kopendices A and B showing proposed

tables or organization, requirements of men and materiel and type

of training. It is especially important that each unit down to,

and including, the squad should be able to operate independently

or the higher units.

The matter is especially urged as it is believed

it fits the entire tradition of action and boldness held by the

Marine Corps, and there is reason to believe that other branches

of the armed forces are considering doing the job. -L

Frorn Cor o

To OV::cu:' S' t"

C -

'94e r': 9

-J l3/25-rpb COVI ist Endorsenent : - January 1Ç, 19t2

HQ, 2d Joint TreiningForce,Oamp Elliott, San Diegos, Call-f.

From: The Com±andingGenerai. - To: The Major General Commañdeht.

flCC Cf _- - 3)

1. Forwarded. )ß '_\n 4i C,.,,tt

2. The thought expreaeã i te bacio letter is concurred in, insoler as the velue of' 'süch en organizetton iE

concerned. It is believed, however, thet the Ì4srine Djflgions 

should complete their organIzation and train units nov' -------

authorized prior to the formation of any such new organizatIons.

,4/yí{

CXLTO1. B. VC&r.

239

JMIES ROOSEVELT.

cV .

'-'y.- i

RECEl V

IAt', Ly

L4A FIÍ
«

R'

t

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF MOBILE COLUMNS (COMMANDOS).

(To be called "Rangers" or some other

appropriate name.)

Introduction: In order to be effective these units must be

highly mobile, well integrated, and yet possessing

flexibility. The psychological attitude of the

members is extremely important for success will

depend on harmony of action, keen judgement and

unhesitatirg willingness to sacrifice themselves

to the accomplishment of the t&sk. The appeal of

adventure or the liete for glory are inadequate

stimuli. These men must be indoctrinated with

the conviction that their efforts and sacrifices

are providing a vital contribution to the preservation cf freedom in all its forms. Hence the

desirability for leadership that is essentially

psychological; hence, also, the need for a higher

percentage of leaders to the number of fighters,

and for a closer relationship between leaders

and fighters than is customary in orthodox

military organizations.

ORGANIZATION:

COLUMN (approximating a battalion): 4 companies.

COMPANY: 3 sections.

SECTION: 2 squads.

SQUAD: lO men (1 leader and 9 others).

For simplification members of the column will be

known as either LEADERS or FIGHTERS, the leader

of the column being entitled Commander.

COMMAND and STAFF:

COLUMN: 1 Leader

1 Aset. Leader

3 Staff Leaders

1 to perform functions of Adjutant,

Operations and Intelligence.

1 for supply.

1 for communicatIons.

2 Medical Officers

4 Radio 0perators

1 Clerk

3 Cooks

3 Others

2 Corpsmen

Total: 20 C&S.

-1-

240

APPENDIX "A"

r,
gUIPNENT:

Haversack Small racho, walkIe-talkie type

Canteen (i per Squad) Belt, pistol* Nap case

Belt, rirle* De-hydrated rations*

Belt, TSiíG' Boots, lace, three-quarter lengt

Carrier, grenade moccasin toe, composition (no

Compass, prIsmatic slip) sole.

Wire cutters Pistol, .45 cal., automatic*

Thompson SMG* Rifle, Springfield or Ganindw

rl - Demolitions*

* Character of mIssion to determine which of

these items 'dill be carried.

241

'CONFÌDENTRL

COMPANY:

Leader

Met Leader

Radio Opèrators

Medical Officer

2 Corpsmen

3 Others

Total: 10

SECTION: 1 Leader

1 Asst Leader

J. Radio Operator

J. Corpsman

3 Others

Total: 7 C&S

SQUAD: 1 Leader

1 Aest Leader

Total: 2

RECAPITULATION:

Squad Section

(2 Squad)

Compan

(3 Sec

o olumn

(4 Ccc)

Leaders 2 6 20 82

Staff 3

Fighters 8 16 48 192

Medical Officers 1 6

Corpsmen 1 5 22

Radi omen 1 5 24

Cooks 3

Clerk 1

Others 3 12 51

To t al 10 2? 91 384
APPENDIX "B" 2)ï,

CONFIDENT'

TES ON TRAINING, TYPES OF HISSIONS, and

I , QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL.

MI8SIÒÙS:

pare men

242

It is believed that training should be designed to proto execute the following missions:

(a) Landing on foreign shore for the destruction of

munitions plants, magazines, aircraft centers,

shipping, industrial plains, or other vital production or transportation installations.

Landing on foreign shore for the purpose infiltrating

into the rear of enemy positions and operating in

oonjuction with landings in force at other points.

Landing on foreign shore for purpose of conducting

ground reconnaissance and/or gathering information

(capturing personnel and documents).

(d) Employment on land as foot scouting patrols for

secret penetration of the enemy position.

TRAINING:

Training for these missions should be conducted wlth

moderate secrecy, especially of those stages involving

landing operations and, the execution of sabotage missions.

The length of the training teriod should be not less

than three months. The following subjects should be

covered:

Physical. drill, with frequent conditioning hikes,

Duties of the Scout-sniper,

Scouting, individual conduct by day and by night,

Map and aerial photograph reading,

Orientation,

Simple sketching,

Panoramic sketching,

Visual signalling,

Military intelligence,

Care and preservption of equipment,

Marksmanship, Rifle, TSMG, Pistol,

Grenades, hand and rifle,

Demolitions, care and use of,

Individual cooking,

First Aid and Hygiene,

Individual conduct and maintenance In bivouacs

and camps,

March conduct, I

SecurIty, '. I

Boats, rubber and sailing, - Night operations, Tactical exercises,

Simple Japanese phrases.
'tQPffIDENT)ÂI 243

QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL:

Selectees should ba above the average in intelligence,

strong of physiqu3, and possess at least a modicum

of idealism.

Training should seek to assure that individuals

(including leader 3, administrative personnel and

medica], men) pos3ess a thorough knowledge of the

weapons to be used, develop a physical hardiness

that win enable them to accomplish marches or from

30 to 50 miles in 24 hours, understand how to guard

against the usually prevalent diseases, be able to

subsist on native food, possess a comprehensive knowledge of the employment of demolitions, develop initiat

and resourcefulness as well as a readiness to subordinate self to harmonious team-work, and the creation

of a deep convict±on of the value of the democratic

way of lire, together with a deep-rooted determination

to accomplish the missions which will contribute to

its preservation. - Leaders must be men of' recognized ability who lead

by virtue of' merit and who share without reservation

all material conditions to which the group may be

subjected, arrogating to themselves no privileges

or perquisites. They must possess the ability to

plan and to execute, and their judgement must be

adequate to meet successfully all problems. Above all

they must be able to adapt themselves quickly to unexpected situations, readjusting group action to the

accomplishment of the mission in the light of condition

actually encountered.

Discipline should be based on reason and designed to

create and foster individual volition.

Equipment should be sufficiently light to insure

mobility, and yet sufficiently complete to enable the

group to accomplish its mission.

K;,

u'j-;! 1JL1
ti

244

'V't."fl !' rttr -V,rp1.--t'-'- C The Commandos

NOTHING IS MORE terrifying than a fear

of the unknown and um ecu enemy that strikes

without \sarning and where least expected.

The British seem to unTerstand this fear and

they have acted to spread it with devastating

effect ìn widely separated parts of the world

against their axis enemi ,s.

Last w eek they were in Norway, raiding

and destroyine German basas and fortificatians So suzftly and silently did they move

that their enemies ;' c o unas are of their

precnce unta too late to resist them This

week they have struck again, thus time in

Malaya, far back of the Japanese lines, So

swiftly and so efficiently did they stiike here

that a convoy was destroyed and a column

demoralized before the siup±ised Japs iealized

what was taking place

Such incidents w ill not, of course, win a

war But they help Repeated often enough

they can cleate an une,isiness and a terror

in the minds and hearts of the enemy that

much of their self-assurance can be destroyed

Once an army becomes jittery ,and feaiful

of an enemy it cannot see and whose presence

it cannot detect, its usefulness is impaired.

Soldiers, no matter how brave or foolhardy

they may be in the lace of danger they know

exists and wInch they cau locate piecisely,

have no less fear of the unknown, the unseen

surpnse attack than anyole else.

The Con.mardoi,, if they confini e their

blows, \%iIl lie accomplishing far moie than

the aize of their operations may inct:cate They

constitute a secret, sui prise weapon that the

Germans, the Italians and the Japs haven't

been able to match,

t fr

(-j2
W RLY1NO AOORS

ThE MAJOR GENERAI.COMMAKOAKT Ann RWER TO No.

AO-lll-hem

(oeBl442)

CONFIDENTIAL HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL 14 January 1942.

From: The Major General Commandant.

To: Major General H.M. Smith, U.S. Manne Corps,

Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia.

Subject: Appointment of Colonel William J. Donovan as

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Suggestion has been made that Colonel William

J. Donovan be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and

promoted immediately to the rank of Brigadier General for

the purpose or tcing charge of the "Commando Project11.

It will be recalled that Colonel Donovan

served with distinction in the 2?th Division during World

War I. He has since then observed practically all ware

that have taken place; and in particular has specialized

in Commando Operations (amphibious raids).

A frank expression of opinion is requested

from you as to the advisability or accepting this suggestion.

Replies will be Confidential and will be forwarded as promptly as possible direct to the Major General Commandant by air

mail where appropriate.

245

T. HOLO3MB.
Op-2242a

A16-3(4) 9Ji1J: 1- -'

&r1 (0025) c ¿

SECRET

UCLÄSSR

246

i iibìj L L'

From: The Cormnsnder-ln-Ohief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of havai Operations.

Sub ject - -Conmtando trainlng, U. S. Marine Corps.

-Reference: (a)Spenav-o, London, Secret Des. 091421 of Janunry

191j2.

(b)}ccc secret ltr. Serial 202942 of January 10,

191i2to Cominch.

Reference (a) proposed that a troop of 7 officers

and 100 enlist.ed men, U. 3. Marine Corps, be assigned to teupo-

- ra duty with British Con-isrdoz for training at the Pritish

Conwiando Special Trainnr: Conter end that this troop partiel-

- pate with the British Co'andos in combined operations against

enemy shores. Training similar, in part, to Conmiando training

is flow being given to the Destroyer Transport Battalion of the

Miphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, nd to parachute troops. It

is believed that no further separate units should be organized

for trainlnß as Cotandos until all organizations of the Marine

rivisions are filled to full strength. To carry out the sugges

tion of reference (a) would require the soparation of trained

personnel from the First Marine Uivi3ion which would be madvisabie at this time.

In lIeu of the suggestion contained in Reference

(a), lt is reconaended, as proposoci by the Ma1or General Corn-

- mandant in Reference (b), that a sr.-jall group ot selected office

and non-commissioned ofricers be sent to ingland for a period o

- ibout one month for Coriando training, such personnel to be use

as 5nstructors in the Fleet ìarine Force on return to the Unite

States. It is further rccomnended that the participation in

active operations of the U. S. Earine Corps group sent for 'Commando training be not approved.

CC: ¡ajor Gen'l Comdt. E. J. KING

RECET VED

R?sI )

WAR ri ts $ECTI9

MAiIWE (.OIWS

FILE
r

CON FIDENTIAL

CFBP-f er.

Serial 01008.

From:

'1' t .0

Subject:

f247

Camp Efliott, San Diego, Catitornia.

16 January, 1942.

Major General Oharles F. B. Price, Merine Corps.

The Major General Com'aendant,

A'pointment of Colonel Wuhan J. Donavan as

Brigadier General, U. S. ilarlac Corps Reserve.

Reference: (a) MGC ltr to Maj-Gen. Price 14Jan42,

- - A0-111-hem (08D1442) CCF±DE?1TIAL.

t. The undersigned knows Colonel William J. Donavan

only sllphtly and principally by reputtion and not from

personal observntion and, contact. Within these limitetions,

the undersigned is inclined to judge tht Colonel Donavan

is well qualified by netural bent and experience for the

assigncent centeraplated and probably more so than any

General officer of the regultr 1«arine Corps at present available for such assignment.

It consideration of the point at is°ue is exoanded

to include the advinbfllty of the :&'rine Corns assurtinz the

execution cf the "Cor:ndo Project In a.dition tc the ission to ;thich lt is alredy cotttted in it ncral Thnctton

in cup crt of the fleet, then ai1itonal qnçle2 of' the Drob

1cm becorne of' vital im,ort,nce end should be wberly conlderod

The trenendous cxonsion of the Corps cornred to

Its forer pee-t1nc stren'ith in ?crsonnel Ire reculzed in

spread1nc very thinly tl:' Iltited m'bor of o'f1cer; ;tnd noncom:ilsi:e-.j offic?rs rvii-tble i'ho ìre qu1lf1ed by protqesiond tucy, trinin' rnd x?erionce to i-ill t:-e e-:nt1El

cornd nd strí' 'osltiorsn in the i'cerpin' n"-±er of

hiùer t tic1 urjts r'urcd to ':et the. v:-r--tl'e dvtnnúa

on our flrt -rtne t'orcc. FOe- -r'd,Io of the e::csllencs of

the h 1'?fl ri c5r'i1 vnch i- joinin- the (Jorì Ftt t1s t --e,

their ;f cicicThs in t'-1:. Lr- aìcL c:ccrlcnce c?rmot be

qulc'iy 'Y?CI'O? :c cn-t ;ty tl' n,; Da i- (4' o ¿v.co into

these re:')On3ì)iuitjef u::tfl ti:/\h-e b#en cr"fnÇ,j by ccr--

sidertiie cxarlenoe. I f the'Jc'n'N,y tn thtz e-'er1eflCe ti'r i'C3j Ic re-s3n ro

e:::occ t. ; tll-5iS? ';r.Y-í :-z- -i'-r.::' n ::-o c"t1y

, N

-1- N,

"V,
co:;: n

248

-2-.

GONLIDENTIAk; SerialolOOS

Subject: Appointment of Colonel Wj11j J, Donavan an

Brigadier General, U. 8. 4arine Corps Reserve.

in the normal consequences of the trinì. and error method.

A careful husbanding of our resourcea in trained personnel

therefore becomes of parmcunt impoí'tance at this time.

4, Ir the personnel to conduct this new activity

can be recruit 3d aLnost entirely from new resources St trould

be the judgment of the undersined that the entire spirit

and plan cf employment of the Commando arouos is direoly in

line with the a7gressive stint and tradition of the Narine

Coros, that lt will add iaeasiirably to the feue and. oì'estig

of the Corps and must inevltbly attrect to our n'ats the

moat adventurous and able spirits of Amerlca's nicnhood.

5. It, on the otter hand, our very ii'ite resourc

iii trifled officers must b further dispersed and if the

best of the adventurous spirIts and 'gOrätter&' ainon our

men must be diverted from the Fleet ILìrine Force in meeting

the reGuirements of this dditiona]. activity, (Co:rtndo

Project) then the undersicr.,ed would nco-rend seriously

against assuming this adaitional cormit'ent.

('ZIA" t' t) t,nDrtj' jatt. g. J a2-;j.

-2-

N 't' @\

N<

N,'
U R? rI_Y.Nt

rrrp To ND

CF3P..-fcr.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

4

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

SECOND MARINE DIVISION FLEET -ARLNE FORCE

tU\SSIIFllEf tp Efliott, San Di ero,

16 Jrnuary, 1942.

I hrve sent mv formol reply to the question of

comIss&oninr Zencrrl Donovan end I realize thnt the odditloarl perarra3hc rhlch I aJded were Drobrbly foreign

to the issue inasmuch as I t'rfl not renueted to ex-oreas

en opinion in th:t res'ect, but I could not forego recordirr Tn3r rascivinrs pt the ororDect of takinc on anyt..ing rore for the Corps until t'e hrxe brourht some

Ce?ree of oxer out of the confusion which exists with

resoect to our' normal activities here.

There Is another thing' in thIs connection t:hich

I could not ver" well 'Dut in mv other letter end that is

txe :rave drnrer tart this sort of t::In nfl develoD into e tall v'hih will war the dog eventu1ly. I knot: in

tthrt ouerters the idea of rolsnn- this sche'ne upon the

i:erines ongin'ted and I opine that if it is developed

elonr the lines of a hobby in the hrndz of personnel other

than re-uler Mrine officers lt could very easily get frr

out of hand and out of control as well.

It e'nears pretty clear to ne that you are in r.

posItion or havIng to comply and tht nothing rn be done

about it so please accept my sympethy.

After talkin; with Joe Fegrn I r:' inclined to

arree i'ith hin that Biernn would Drobably be a rood man

to heed this service, or at least to hold a resoonsible

Dosition. Tse only î'an in my otrn accuaintance who I believe would have outstanding qualities for this type of

Thedersuip is Pelham D. Giaseford, former Br1radier Gencr 1,

U. S. ;.rny, now retired. You will probably renember hirn es

Director of Puolic Safety in Washin:-ton, D.C., at the time

of the Bonus Army trouble.
250

I©L1SII PuM

r ntter of fret, i: :.ns Co - nO Service

could be dlrctly recruIted i.n -t:;e ret in of footbrll

-layers ene. other athletes md fror the neberehips oÍ'

storte clubs throuhout the country, r very efffective

unit b'ould trcbably be forned. y only 2isriv1n is

:ht oxr-ovn house is not sufficiently in:orcer at this

nonent to undertrke this, roreover, our resources in

trziec. persoines ere clrercy strr Inca. to a drnrerous

point.

The activIties of our recruit deoot here in Cm-,

Elliott ers ropressinc nicely. tos'orro" nlvht tre trill

.irve P,500 zen under i,struction here en aCdit:onrl ones

vill coce .°Lcir- in t:eckly &etr ils. The act1viteiiìvolved

in sdusti.a ourselves to this olen are in themselves en

excellent ex-,erience for my youn nen and I anticiprte

rrer t benefit to the trriners es t'ell se tnoee bein

trpinea.

::re is p Little rv tter of terEonri interest to

ne waich I ':ould like to bring to your benevolent ettentic.

betty's huqpnd, Cn,t-in John B. Hendry, wee picked up on

cts pnnui 'nysîcel vith syrnvto2s of diabetes. He hs been

for ner-rly four nonthc not;, underoinr the epresirtr rctine of c'r censeless edicí1 eerv!ce; kept in solitery

c:nfinement zost of the tine, frect-ently on strvrticn ãtc

r subjected to rll hands cf vltless exeriflentctlons, kept i

i-norr-nce cf is true conuition rnc thrertencc vitn uit:T

rc:tlrea.t-flt involvIn peci-stmrvrtion for hln.seif criC hIc

frzily. he boy w in e oretty low stete of morFle even

before te vr broke; since then, of course, he le deed t

at the tros-ect of ben Ineffective at a tite then ever1

-

-, cood ciizei'. is doing hls bIt. He is before the retirinboard tais week and the report of his board t-:ill go fort;. n

vjth his request for retention on active duty if practiceb

,ç e-'' or return to linited actIve duty at once if the report of

the bo'-rd results in his retirement. Runertus is very

- anxious to heve him here at the Base, es)eeielly now thot

he has been directe-J. to reopen the sec school. Crtain

Hendry hr's just returned from a tour of duty et sea on the

U.S.S. HU1J5fl in the Asietc Fleet. He is aleo a graduat

of Sill rn-I a. field ertillery enert pnd should be very us

ful in thst cepecity. I suco-est no soecirl favor in this

cree but I '-ould ask fer the nost benevolent actIon t'hich

is coiici.ete:.t with the lev end the best interests of the

Corps.

-2-
FERSO;.L

I are both yell and eijyifl: Sen Diego

a lot. She joins e in best wishes to Hertrice pd to

you.

SineelY yours,

251

CHAS. F. B.ÍkRICE,

Mejor Gener1, UJS. Wrinea.

Major Generl Thonas Holcoiflb, U. S. Marines,

The MaJor cnerrì Corr.andoflt,

LT. S. Marine Corps,

i&hn:t3fl, D. C.

3-
01/101

un»QUArn'r.as, AMPHIBIOUS poricg, ATLANTIC flEET,

'INHDENTIAL MARINE BARRAC8, QJJANTICO, VIRGINIA.

0 0 N F I. E N T A !4

16 January, 1942.

From:

To : Subject:

Reference:

- 252

Major General H. iC Smith, USMC.

The ¡'lajas' Oene:,ai. Comwandant.

Appointment of Colonel Williaa J. Donovan as

Brigadier Ueneral, U. Z. Marine Corps fleservo.

(a) Yarn' lette:' A fll-tzent (03B1442), 14 Jan 42.

1. Aa requested in reference, the following opir4ons

are expressed:

£11 phibaoua D'aree Marines are conside'rd

as cozmandos and may be tríiined to a high degree under their

own officers Th this form of raiding.

The cppothtment of Colonel Donovan to brigadler general could be compared to that of Lord Qufltbattcn

in C-re9t ritain bath ore '1royol and have easy acceso to

the hi-best authority without reference to their OWA i;r.aediato

superiors.

(e) The a'pointient would he considered by wany

senior officers of the Corps as polItical, unfair, and a tuoliai» stunt.

(cl) Ari r-point!ent as briradi1n general, Clcrinea,

doubtiec would inr'Irte that he Is to forn coiandoe fro,

Hanno .c'1b1ous ¡cc. :he Ccngnjant;oulJ lose cnatr.ì

of that nu t. 'r of riaes T3 aJU aS L \fl 13Z. w

enouh "by productb flOW.

(e) Uo ct'c gre ctv' Ontt. 3

"

-1-
Subject:

' 253

Appointrnent of Colonel William J. Donovan as

Brigadier General, U. S. darine Corps nb serva

' ç'

has a reputation for fearle;sness but he baa never been a

Marino and, his anpointment would be accepted with reeentment

throuhout the Corps. It iwuld be stressed that the Marines

had to go outside their own service for leaders.

(r) It is the wusiicous opinion of the staff of

this headquarters that coenando raids by the hr1tish have

been of little stretegica]. value. I/ have not reached the stage

where our men ere so highly trained and restless for action

that they must be employed In coß1do raids.

(g) I recommend against the eppointment.
-'

J

Eno.

254

Mr. Samuel W. Meek

420 LexIngton Avenue

New îork, N. Y.

19 January 1942

Dear San:

I &m wrlting siith further reference to a nropoaecl

wtiele in LIFE about Earl Ellis. I resent gp Palmer's

attitude as exnressed in his letter to Adrjral 9t'rì-, a

comy of which Ï enclose, 6nd in his letter to Wr, Luce.

I cn see nothin' whetever to be g3lned by the 'u)ltet ion

of thIs e?ticle ana. X etin eee a re.t deal of hrr.

for publicIty, the 'ir.e Cois has fine clean, honorble

publicity and feels that for the time being at least it

needs no more. Mr. lalmer wishes publicity for the Navy.

Let hin get lt at their expense, not ours, I Lope that

Yr. Luco wIll be willing to srrreaa this story an that if thic "bIrd' goe eleewhere with his stuff thr'-t i wiE.

!-.e'.r cbc'u t I It va nne to have you both to dInner the other

nicht. 5rs. Eolcoub acì I both thoroughly enjoyed meeting

Fr. Luce. He lo certtinly one of the most interertIn ren

I have met ana I must thank you for the oprortunity or

seelr.s him. I bo'e th9t you can brIflg hi'2 to the hoae

:ln tOOr ana tht I ry Inve t1:e pleasure of 5ecin him

often.

Agaín let me siy that th? NAkCH Or' TIYE on Wake

was the beet job C Ito kini I h've ever snen. I am

wrIting offIcially to the &.rporat5.on tibout it.

The Donovan affalt' is stIll unernrnst in ny mind.

I am terrified tint I ry he force?i to tQkc this rin. I

feel tint it will be the worst sJa in the face the Marine

CorDs ever tías given bcuao lt involves 1winrir' an outsider into the arIne Corps an a lealer in our own specialty

that is, aphiblous operations. Because cmmander work is

sternly cae form of atthlbous operation. It will be bitter

resented by our personnel, both cortiesioned and enlisted,

and I atn afraid that lt may cervo to materially reduce my

usefulness in this office, 1f any, because I tu' exoected an

properly so to protect the ?artno Corps from intrusions of

this kind.

:1way5 sJ ncerely,

t noLcoq3.
s' - t t

Cinepac Fils No.

A16-3(l)/(3o)

3etict3. i t_lr t

'i

I rit

S-2$-C-H.. :..4 e__t

'g04

3ubjaat:

fleture*nco t

255

UNITED STATES PACiFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

is hotrt,nce (a) io quoted for infon-svicìn

"DtVTJOP fl}îflMt'¿.fl.i AD TR.IILC 01' iW,I; 4! n 1i;VAL ttna ci '1C;:fl;JO" ¶E111 'U c:d; 1H C »'r x:ti ;cx'3toL' r':r n" 1',.D .LxInc':3h rcI' 1,fl.. L1t'1O1 :cì .tI': .k' JW t".s.sI L,in £a,4 ,TIt 'Í'

''

t? t''''' r' ¿'''tr;'ç. V' Zfl'tj'fI' b'fl lA_dit S-'')' ¿'a,tt&i&:._, ? .1 ng ¿a .1_i ¿iJaZ._t._, /F l3'5,tj_ ii .a...Ja i'kZa;a jss,z.i..i .Z'Lì......./ t .lAa..i fi' a

U3E n» ;fct 3DtT,",

C, In order tn crr-j out tho torus oinp CIrca-Live, lt. is ders5.Dod tÌut thit,tliato $tapo i.a tt!:u La orrtatze w::ì ti'.itt fou,' t1OotvnOo" typo urdt In your toi'co. 1;etaflg nf nr-'n5.ta- tion, dov1onont0 K/sd t3n2inin/; re loft to 'our iccrodtn, subject t< tha

it la cons.dorcd that tho ioat au&tuòlo veu1a for tncta2ort,1n: (nwç.o untta oro C.,"t4. .nQttGZt hait l,ø;,n i;ado that four wtch vecala bo roturno1 to the ïacU'lc arid, 1f &o rattnioz, t;ioy 'vili Uc ta Sau Dic.ç-o for tra1nin tit'i th&

f1 stronpx at floh Cownt&ndo uni; ahould be ti:ch thr.t i & attn ha tranaportod on cm4 ¡sPi). It &p:enrTh Ut four euch uns u na'J wcqntoL d.thln isa 5.r'J'antry bnttj.jc,uj vitbout cq' 'ronaù17 CL4nrtn" proamtt artkflt?a- tian cixcet fox' (savc-ljn.' t'te r:crt o't tiJ1c eruotnol and titurJsj in ano brtttujiozi. Ey rotalz3in ç o'uxüt1an for tim four uni.ts, they etui ho tinS,st,cru tmd t;'z,iynd unCcn' ,yìo c,nÇpo11 tn, I;sd Lflc1 c.aT bu ICc UctIca11, &s iXsdifl(wA1 trnLvì or Sn cot:bintLi'21 tt1i

ov.alx other.

b (D

4 r'a -1- ' C'

ìUa 3

fi 9fl

ECEr VED

FEB 11942

WAR P1ANS %CTIe$

Aftr$ C(tlftI

(owJ1nthD-t1-Ch±ef1 United ZtU Lo j Pt.o Lf±t, :'leet. Consr.dinp2 Gonoral, Søco:td Joint Trainlrg l'aree.

flrgnizticin of Co4'jnndo" Units.

(a) Conthoh depatch 2a4iO of Jrau.ry 1s)42.

r. b1'/'Cfla)
256

binepac File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

A1G-3(l)/(CG)

Seril0-

3m

- V ,mrr

;'';n4j94

:4 n ' l)u\) 1).t_,.2r"(

4oct: Ox'j;anizattcm r 8Corcgtnd<" Units.

(e) Tiìs purpose of Corinando units its conceived as

being tn naka z'poo r nd curprira proacJì to a

li. del'ondec ti1and bese; to lanu hj teOElth and

without untiro or air stippo?t to tai:c rapid advance

on i'n-iortant Lrwt&ll&tlons, ouch sa vcdio ctaUons, fue]. ctnra, çuri battriec, lnflarr:aulo buildln;s,

etc.; to effect nxirium dostrtict1ion Dy tioans of bomba,

- grenauca, inoendiarica, unc any other oartc th.t y bu developed awl furnished to nach units; ami to make

- rapid wttli.irawal.

(â) Tho ntraonnel faz' such tn&ts shntld pì'ofctably

be volunteon &nd have qualifications 8i liar to thonG

roqulrc-d or narachuto troops.

-

- (e) Zq' rien &oulc5 bct esnectally tnined in sooutln

and pat'otlinr, both by day and by ni:-iit, no they y

ho 1LMOd, prolmhl7 at niht by rubber boats f ror faat

vessoi ox subnapinos, to conth&ct thd xìoctsz3ry rount

roo'nniaianance to detormine atremtth and dipottion of deîendlnn îorco3 nui the location of' rerntzncrative atttck ObJoctivea.

3. Thq Conns&idjrzr; General, Second Joint 'rathinc

?orce la uut}nrlzod and circotecì to i'emtcut tio ecrt'lt;ae of

- any poraotinol vcio '.ny be f'11i1iL1r wiLts tralnin'ç, orraniztîon,

and ncthods cl' £ovoiji Go'rtaudo unita.

- 4. Please keep the UorwianderinC'Uof, United 1tatee

Paeifc floot iui'oniod of the progrets rinde punuant to title

directive.

5. ?ransiasion via U.S. reciatered air ncil is

hereby tuthorlzod,

Copy tnt

Cct.tne3i

- Opnav

ttj,tt8fl.COMdt. ec of or

rtq t 'J. -o 4..L 3-..-'-'
3050-80 5/18-cn

00 0/0

:,Thì

SECRET: < From:

To:

Subject

Reference:

' 257

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

HEADQUARTERS SIZCONO JOINT TRAINING FORCE

4}: 2 Camp Elliott, San Diego, California.

4 February 1942.

The Commanding General.

The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division.

Organization of 'tCpmmando" Units.

(a) OincPac sècret ltr A3/A16-3(1)/(86) serial

019W, dated 24Jan42.

1. In compliance with reference (a) the 2d Marine

Division is hereby directed to organize immediately and train four

'Commando" type units.

2. The snecific miss'ions contemplated for these units

are as follows:

Raids on lightly defended island bases,with or without

air and gunfire support, to destroy enemy installations.

Landings, probably in rubber boats, for reconnaissance.

3. The following details of organization are specified:

Each unit should be organized so that it can be

transported in one (i) APD, considering also that

elements of units ey operate fro: submrines.

The four units will be administered and trained as

a battalion.v

The four units will be trained to act singly or as

a battalion.

The battalion will not be considered as part of any

co'bat team of the 2d Marine Divisthn.

The 'erzonnel will be volunteera having high physical

qualifications.

4. Training of units vili include the fol1aving but the

development and special training of the unite is left to your

discretion:

Demolition and destruction.

Day and niht scouting nid patrolling.

(o) Ooîabat tntelfl:'er!ee.

-1-
q

'I / 97 S

iI

258

,,t_ \a-1n s e,.

3050-50 4n

5/18-ova

SEOWT:

oôo75

Subject: Organization of 'Commandos Units.

i T' - RESI'LiICTEÏ)

Copy to: CinCPac,

Couìdt., US}40

-f

6. The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, is

directed to request, via this headquarters, the services of any

personnel who may be familiar zith training, organization and

methods of foreign Coa-nando units or whose services in any other

manner are desired.

6. Please keep the Comaonding General, 2d Joint Trainin

Force, informed of the progress made, by reDorts separate from

reports of state of trainin. o b units.

CLAYTON B. VOGEL.

r" f1 fz' ,;

L:

'Q ti

i I

I î

I RECEIVED

MAHI .t4cfl 'fr [?T,r -
IM REFLYINO ADDRESS WE MAJOR GENERALCOMMANDAI« AND REFER TO No. AO-283-nj

(oo3A344z

References:

259

HEADQUARTERS U.S. MARINE CORPS

WASHINGTON SE CRET

(Lck j)e

¿2 1»- t; )i_/_cL,J tm t. £ FEB 41942

.VH' JI í; ;,.J;,.....

%1 tz f

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES FLEET:

Subject: Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of

ftCommando« Type.

Ça) COMINCH DIspatch 231940 January 1942.

(b) CINOPAC Serial 019 to CG 2d. JTF, dated

24 January 1942e - In connection with the references, it is understood that three APD1a have been ordered from the Atlantic

Coast to the Pacific Coast in order to provide vessels for

training special duty units in the Second Marine Division.

Pending return of the Sixth Marines from Indigo,

the Second Marine Division bas only one regiment (Second Marine

as a basis for absorbing the 5,000 recruits to be assigned that

Division during the month of February. The assignment of one

battalion of that regiment to special duty at this time would

interfere seriously with the reorganization now in progress.

The First Separate Battalion, or .APD Battalion,

attached to the AmphibIous Force, Atlantic Fleet, has been in

existence for years and. has been undergoing intensive training

in the execution of small-scale amphibious raids and surprise

landings for the past year.

In view of the above, it is proposed to issue

orders increasing the strength of the First Separate Battalion

by sufficient personnel to permit the transfer by rail to the

West Coast of one experienced Infantry Company, Machine Gun

Platoon, and Simm Mortar Section, to serve as a nucleus for

the organization of the Second Separate Battalion in the Second

Joint Training Force, which may be used for the purpose indicat

in references (a) and (b).

I

s'rI '1 .L nCnr-irm'Q

l:Ç i c' t - .'... r' 

izaø jt.&Jt4i
i

Approved:

The above is the most rapid and efficient method

under present conditions, of carrying out the provisions of

references (a) and (b) and., at the same time, leave a similar

unit on the East Coast.

Approval of this plan is requested; 2

Cothmdftder-hief, U.S. Fleet.

ccC- rjt ii:

. e? L û , i-

-2-

t. WO&Co,s

t' r rr_a 

J q7b

260

o r rr rrr n_%fl JasJ,

(003AM42) p E C R E T

Subject: Training of Amphibious Raiding Units of

fcommandotl Type.
nrp ,t) r'\,.-N :c -, kH-:'

A0-]24-hçm

February 4, 1942.

Subsequent to receipt of the attached Memorandum by Colonel

Peck, he and I.had several telephone conversations relative

to modification thereof. The following dispatch proposed

by me was the one finally accepted as best fitted for the

purpose. Colonel Peck proposes to submit this dispatch

to COMINCI-itomorrow, February 5, for transmission if approved.

TRANSFER DETACHMENT SEVEN OF'i CERS AN D APPROXIi'ATELY

200 ENLISTED FROIC FIRST SEPARATE tCTTALION M' A? TO

COÌd"thNDANT MARCORPS FOR FURTHER TRAN3FER OVERLAND WEST

COAST AS NUCLEUS LFD BATTALIGN BEING ORGANIZED THERE

FOR USE IN A1'LPHIBIOUS RAIDS X ORGAiflZATION AND EQUIPìENT

OF DETACHMENT LS MAY BE DIRECTED BY COI'YusNDANT NARCORPS

TO CONGEN kF A? X REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL SHORTAGE FIRST

SEPARATE' BATTALION BE EFFECTED SOON

261

'L e$Á- '4c ? 6u_9t,_'

L- J 4 L

i *ra

4nsta -- r'

- /jac»ty

M6Tì RÇenr-a i. (t 4'

'4(aIjaev

L(:'-; /)cI)

Í'&I. »--,
u

11

J

doNn«u FILE FF1! pn 2J(0062f1'UT STATES FLEET

Serial (0062)

262 OJCLASS

OIFICE CF THE CoiiiD w QUEr

NAVY DEPARTMENt WASRINCTON, t) C

J

p

r' D'

February 5, 1942

The Commandor-in-Chieî, U, S. Float. The Chief of hava]. Operations. The Contnandant, U. S Marino Corps.

Subjoott Coinnando Training of U. S. Marino Corps personnel in Lngland.

Iteforencet (a) Spettavo London Secret despatch Ø213Ø1 of February, 1942. (b) Onilav Secret Despatch 191737 of anuary, - 1942.

1 The Connander-In-Chief aproves the an'cno- monts proposed in rofcronco (a) for a detachment of bwo (2) officers and tversty (20) cnlisted non to proceed to n1cnd

for a tuo-rionth perIod of Ooawndo training boginni-nz April 1, 1042.

2. The Chief of Nava]. Operations is r'aquestod to moico the necessary admini3trativo arranconents, and to notify the Conmandant, U. S. Iarine Corps, of the dato on which it is desired that this detachment roort to the Chief of Naval

Operations. Arrival of the dotachnont in Encland at ]ø ast one week prior to April 1, 1942 is desired.

¶ 3 The CoirnnancJant, U. S. Liarino Corps, is requested

tç Coni and oquip this clotachnont and to issue the necessary orders in confornity with the instructions of the Chief of

flval Operations..

y'

L. J. ri;c 1231

RECEIVED 1. -- r 't

ç. '-A?

AIqrLAMs ÀJttC (-"st

4 ir r r ;'i'";

// À11c, r GEOR3E'c. DYER,

Flag Secretary.

SE CRET

From:

To:
In .a'W reía Lo ¡mUais

sod N..

(se )Pll-1/KIc

Op-16-A-2-a

Serial 0133816

SECRET

From:

To t

r -ii--' /7 '/.)

263

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

rl-y. L.

FEB 9 1912

The Chief of l'avel Operations. Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Subject: Cox'anand.o Training of U. Z. Marine Corps personnel

in Thigland.

Reference: (a) Secret ltr. from co:uI::cu, FF1/Hi-i, Serial

0062, dated February 5, 19142.

In accordance with parasraph two of reference (a),

it is reconmended that the proposed debachnent of twenty men and

two officers be formed and equipped at the 1:arine Earrecics, ¿ashiugton,

D.C., in such time that departure may be effected not later than

March 1, 19142.

It is not considered essential that the officers

and men be ordered to report to the Chief of Naval Op3rations, but

it is requested chat the officers be given verbal instructions to

report to bite Intelligence Division of this office not later than

February i6, 19)42 for necessary procedures involved in desigmtion

as Special havai Observers.

The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, is further re- quested to submit a complete roster of this detachment to the Chief

of Naval Operations as soon as practicable.

It is assuned that the Quartermaster, U. S. Marine

Corps will arrange transportetion to the United Kingdom by surface

vessel scheduled to depart not later than Farcit 1, l9)2.

5.

passports.

The enlisted men will travel as troops without

vcLaSSFUED

j& 0k ),tL)rl) &f

tt ftc C.&) --f CflrJk l/ 9tc

s. ':T.1:r:-

BECFJ TFD

FEB 9194t

WfrR REFs Civ_1

M 'i N j'.-yt

'SF rç.\J 'V).J '1U

1
- 1' - -.- a.

264

OFFICE CF TRE COMMANDERIN CHIEF

UNITED STATES FLEET

M{ORAN DUX

/

9 February 1942.

From z AdmIral King

To: Lt. Gen. Goleonib

Will you please have your people follow up and

follow through on the equipment and emmunition

(for training) of "Cotrsndo" troops with first

priority for the units on the West Coast (Pacifie

Fleet) By Equipment is meant everything needed

to make the 0commando" units effective - to

include, for instance, demolItion, portabje radio,

rubber boats, special weapons, etc.

KIN G

.1 ._e -k - 

o
*0-134-hem

(09*4142)

r:

Lo

r arged (o nVC

CONFIDilTIAL

PAL

Dear Barney:

- b JA 9

C,-','trdo-V c265 t'ere Cxps - Cl t- S & C Fi,s. Di,,stoa

of Iacc cad ?oI4

c.znoat b

reCtcL.. houCones'

February loi 1942.

r

On 14 Jahuary I vrote&' ltter advising that

a suggestion had been irade that Colonel Wjlliaz J. Donovan

be appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and promoted ftmediately to the rank of Brigadier General for the purpose

of taKiruç charge of the "Comzando For obvious

reasons, I didn't mention in t27 letter that this euggeotion

was made by very high authority, and that my reactton was

one ot complete disapproval ot the idea. I purpocely retrained trou giving you any of the background or my reaction;

this, in order that I mIght get a frenk expression of opinion

from you relative to the sugestjon. I called on several

other General officers of the '/.rine Corps for their optn.ons

also.

I expreased to higher authority my utter disapproval of the Donovan angle and trie cuestion died down. It

turned up again today, but lr,dioattons are that it Las again

been culeted. I fear, however, that the idea is too atrorviy

imbedded to rernain dorr-iant very long unloso we iton prcnptl:r

to broaden our aohibious training in &uch way a to he&d oiT

any outsIde interfennce. In this connection i cuote a 2zOranthna, dated 9 Febnnt'y, just received trot CO.a.CH, which

affords us the oppartunity desired:

9'rom: Admirai King

To: Lt. Gen. Eojocb

Will you please tave your peonle follow up a'd

follets tcroch on tr.e z,cìut;-at &d azLuni.tisn

(for tr;lnlrr-j CZ ".zc nco v:th fs- t

priority rot' thr iaí'zs on c'c st Oc';t (ï:c: 13

Fleet). By 'tn, -''nt in

to re the Cctcj-» unjt$ ei;e.: - e ;' 1n1ude,/ \

for LAS tcj.oe, ion, t.ur;. ;ic rasto, -t.L: a / . boats, çccicuL ccis, ctc.' - /s/ King
r

266

Before stating the action we must take in this

matter I shall give you an outline of my reasons for objec

Ing to the appointment of Donovat.

From a morale standpoint alone, the introduction of a separate special corps within the Marine

Corps would be most undesirable. Moreover, the

assignment of an outoide officer over and above a

large number of regular, professional officers, who

by reason of long ans!. continuous active service and

experience are better cualified, would be considered

by the latter as a reflection on their ability, experience, training, Lnd courage.

I have great rnpeet for Colonel Donovants

World War record, for his accomplishments since the

World War, and for his fine peraonality; I have no

reason to cuestion his qualities as a leader. However, the vital facts are that he has had no Marine

Corps experience whatever, that he does not ha-ve the

indoctrination and b.ckground which makes the Narine

what he is, arid that he has not had the anrnhibious

experience winch most- Marine officers have had. If

it is borne in mind that the Marine COnDe throughout

its history has specialized. in bush warfare and amphibious operations; that particularly aines World

War I, it has conducted uninterrupted research in

the history of this type of' variare; that it has developed a special technique, both ir. ita schools

and during annual maneuvers of its forces; that it

is, so rar as known, the only oranflatLon in the

world which soeclalizes in all h zaca of awtihtous

warfare; then it must be realiLed that were an officer brought into the Corps to supervise

work it would be a completo ropudiatiori of our office

personnel, and tould ba ao re;ardcd. I know tha

tenper, the feelia;a, and the 1ua1s of our cUtest'

and cnitßted panonnel. I take into orsMeratton

the tine record I- rtne Corps unito made in ;orld ;;ar

I; the fine ;:ork they have done in ocr n:aìi ware

since that date; -r i Lne crcthtao C C ttt ba2 'L has

been cade in the pr2Jent wr. It t u' coie.ed

opincn, cmÌ th.t 211 tL ;f2!:z. aca..2 i

have dis cusa&i Ci's c-:eston 5,21 Fa.1, tir t to -n

Colonel. ;onovn L'rI 3?11c3r of ths hanno Cor', rsgarilceE of the rari,4, given hfln, to taie charge of rn,'- '-")' 't: a bi:' to 1 ----

of our Corpo, c--j trefcs . b1 0 " tcn-.i. -.Th:
fIDEÇITIAL

ri

-,

267

-

Although the infantry units of our Amphibious

Forces are essentially aCcmmandoM utUts, the disruption of

organizations in their formative period has precluded, to a

very large extent, the or:anization, eouipment, and training desired for this purpc'ae. Now, in view of GOhINCH'

memorandum, herein quoted, and as a meana of forestalling

the Donovan case, we must act and act quiefly. 14 must prepare ourselves part ioular]y for one of our important missions, viz: the exeoutlor of amphibious raids.

In compliance with Cinpao'o directive, you have

directed the organization of tour Comando' units, to be

administered and traine3 as a battalIon (your letter 3050-50

over 5/l8-ovs over 00010, 4 February 1942, just reaoeived).

Since that was written, you have received instructiono from

me to organize the 2d Separate Battalion; this, I assurae,

will comprise the units you already started in acQordanos

with above directive plus the reinforced corcpany which we

are sending to You fron tLe 1st Separate Batzalion from

Quantico. The organizaticn, equipaent and training of this

battalion is of i'irst priority. We must go beyond this,

which wIll be second priority, viz: the prenaration of an

infantry regiment for amphibious ousrations. In other words,

ve must get one battalion ready at the earliest practicable

date, followed as soon as possible by one regi2ent, even at

some sacrifice for the tbie being or the other units in the

matter of experiencperscnne1 aM ecuiptient.

I want to emohasize that I consider the go-called

Wommando Opera t tons ' only one feature of nc:&l ¡Urine Cons

work. In fact, the later ooer2tloruì of th Erith Ccc=w.doa

indicate that they are follotring nore aM aore oir rior$ìal

doctrine on landlr.ge. They have reprinted our ìrT2_l6?.

However, in vIew of the situation flow facing us,

lt is inruerative tri) t '.a 'et undert:a:z at once with j,reater

emphasis on tr-ln1n in nght o-ati;; suiore ar,.1 afloat,

patroll.lu:: hetcris fro. tite ACa, ¿îr 1-;i ,.Viy, rub.x i' coats,

raids from embers and dottroyers, p?trolitn troq suL.iari!es

and possboly sone adJit5.o:.i tÚttO(I to ini.trinl OO,2t2t.

Similar d!reefl:es are bsi:tg Sesuad to the À1phiblaus Force, 4tl:2tic 11CC . I am having trc»ared tj.bles of nec5.al cqt1).LOflt

considered essential for ti) ¿J. ¿eu&rate ¿3attlic.n arU lo'---- ' - - ,/ t- - i uJ. - _--.-.-- you ç'f t:o ';: : -

r -- -

,attalion, rsow sn n p rd oy «-st,a. ilcuz -.:; ¿.t J' L .0
C&IÛENTML

W102 268 L; ?Z)

Fleet. It has been proposed that we include in the Separate

Battalion a platoon of parachuttats; your radio comrient on

this proposal is requested.

According to the records in this office you now

have on hand 10 rubber bats; 40 will be ahiprea to you

from Akron, Ohio, this veek, 40 the week following, and. 20

the week following that.

From this long letter I am eure you cnd. all others

Qoneerned will anpreciate the importance Of getting this

project underway icimediately. It is really a matter or grave

Öoncern to rue, as it may have a very important influence on

Our future. - Please treat this subject, OES regards personalities,

a strictly Confidential. Msa please keep ¡ne fully nd

AL..4requently informed as to the progresa you are making in the

4rganization, equiixaent, ad training of the units in auenZion, as well as for the raainder of the Force. Intidentally,

don't like the tenu dCou!aandoff; WOE are looking for s. better - j --term - one more titti.ng to: the Narines. Have you any aug-

&a4estions?

' With all good witthes.

Sincez'ely,

T. HOLCO3.

- 1ajnr General Cltivton . Vol, U.$.L3.,

M-irine Corne esse,

San Dlcrjo, Cflitcrnla.

-4-

t p.s. ir you desire his serv&ces and ree], that he '-:ould be

- or :rLt9s'tal anciotanc jfl fuPthC'inT thIs troject,

f f, I will ¿ive rvorbe .:niî%erttoi to ordn'iag Lt.Col.

Edeon out to you for duty as Cinandtng OffIcer of

the 2d 3e'arate Ehtaltozi.

As I have afl'oìdy told Price, Calcad L.C. 2st'herd

will b2 -!íì to yo-i fo dUC? ,i'j Go ;aanìjnr?, ffir

of an Lafancry nvt&uent upon tia r3urn of Colonel

Wharton tren iiiDIOO.
AO-2S3-njp

(03A4242)

,-- ç-.

yP'wi:::T IAL

z,

F-0m: LO -

c1rtg

DEL- 46? -'

JAN

ot PuE$ end IL.US.

of C3

t. $tüIrìflD--

fj\ît; r/'r :;r '---- 2- 1h CthC3 o r" he yOc' ¶C&

r tt\ i y o e ccr:- d tAIS t

Dear Holland:

r

to t

e' c

t t

y

threc''

N t On 14 January I wrote you a letter advie1nj that a

suggestion had been made timt Colonel Wjijj J. Donoven be

-- appointed to the Marine Corps Reserve and proote-J izaedlately to the rank of Bri:adier General for the urpoee of takIns / ohare of the 0Cot'nando Project". For obvious reaocu, I dida t mentIon in ny letter that thin sutkeetlon was nade by

very hIgh authority, nd tiat my reactIon waE one of conDlcte disaaproval of the idta. purposely refraIned from giving

you any of the background or my reaction; this, in orde' tnat

I might get a frank expression of opinion from you relt-tIve to

the suggecton. I called un severi-i other General officers of

the Marine CorDs for their opinions also.

- i exprense4 to hie-her nutherity ny utter disq'n'o-nl

of the DOOO'Fan anne arzl the question died down. It tui-t,1i un

again yesterday, but indic tlons are tht lt flas apntn been

cuIetcd. I fear, hoi-evc-r, tn-*t the idea le too stron:ly ibedted to rcnain dorrtant very lone unleu9 we nove nr-»'totly to bro'den our c-rthSoious ;rkI:)ltLr In such way as to he'd off any outsIde interr?rence. In tuir COnN-OtIon I ouote s

randu-n, d;ted 9 'eru-ìry, just receIved frot2 ).:ÂCH, uich

cffonth ue tte onportunity de-'lred:

Atthtjral K1n1

Lt. C-ji riolcorrb

nil you plese tnve :TOUX' people foil cw u"--nÀ

fono - tLrou -i---on tc' ir-nt pna - ------attl 'n (nr tr-t1n1-) & tra2-')3--.- -n fir:t

Drlortt-f fer the uilt art thc r t Ca (:' :c

f1c nt). 3v enuj"-'rv ic rn- ant ev:'-' nee'i I to ike the °-cr:'i- unite ffct:v' --t ncluc:e,

for itìut,nc, dCOiiCkofl, u orbie r:ti&o, rtoc.'

cl-1 t. c-::, cta_U

Ir /

-cfcr st tU t-e -2t:en '.' tu-t t» ah!: I idC1 r-:_'Jt' :fOU V' of :j .''LCflß ¡c:' QLjJcLfl p?Oiat ient of : onovan.

I
'Sd

coTçl

C (0344242)

270

CONFIDENT IAL

From a moraTh standpoint alone, the Introduction

of a separate special corps within the Marine Corps

would be most undesIrable.' Moreover, the assignment

of an outside officer over and above a large number of

regular, professional officers, who by reason of long

and continuous active service and experience are better

qualified, would be considered by the latter as a

reflection on their sbility, experience, training, and

courage. - I have great respect for Colonel Donovant e 'orld

War record, for his acoornpl3.anraents since the 'dorld

War, and for his fine personality; I have no reason to

question his qualitien as a leader. However, the vital

facts are that he has had no Marine Corps experience

whatever, that he does flot have the indoctrinatlDn and

background which malten the Warme what lie is, n.3. that

he has not had the amphibious experience which moat Marine officers have had. If it is borne In mind that the Marine Coros throughout its history has specIalized in bush warfare and auphibious operations; that prticularly since World War I, lt han conducted unInterrupted

research in -the history of this type of warfare; that

it has developed a special technique, both in its schools

and during annual maneuvers of its forces; that it is

so far as known, the only organizntlon in the world

whIch specializes in all phases of aphIbious warfare;

then it must be realized that were an officer brought into the Corps to unervie. Cor,ando' work it uould be a complete repudlhtlon or our officer personnel, and would be co re;rded. I know the temper, the feelings, and the ideals of our officer rnd en1itoa perconnel. I take inta considcrqtlon the fine record MarIne coros units raade In 'Thcld Yar I; the fine work they ±ìve done

in our email wars nince that d'ttv; an the crrditcble

start whien han been tnde In tne orecent war, t Is

my considered opinIon, and that of all the officers s:ith t'-nom I have dlqcucsecl tee n:'ct1on In h'n-i, ttit

to -,poIrtt Colonel Jc'ovan n of bat' of th :,rine Corps, retrdless of tne rank iven ii a, to tute cnar e

of 'Coz:'nn'jo" work would be s c't ere uio'- to tn'-crue of cur Corpr, n: t'efore n blût: to ThtI-mal

-2-
t

271

Althouh the infantry units of our Amphibious Forces

are essentially Commando" units, the disruption of organizations in their formative period has precluded, to a very large

extent1 the organization, equipment, and training desired for

thispurpoee. Now, in view of QCMI.CH'a memorandum, herein

quoted1 and as a means of forestalling the Donovan case, we

must act and qct qulofly. We must prepare ourselves particularly for one of our important missions, viz.; the execution

of amphibious raids.

j You have the First Sepsrate Battalion, which has been

trained along the çeneral linea required for so called Coomandod

r T duty. It was necessary to detac,h anorox1ately one-tnlrd of

this unit to the Amphibious Pone, Pacific Fleet, in order to

óomply with a directive from CI'CPAC that four companies be

- organized immediately on the West Coast. The reorgantzation

of this reinforced company in the First Separate Battalion

p- should be given the hIghest priority.

However, we must go beyond this, which will be a

¡ second priority, viz.; the preparatIon of an infantry regiment

for a-mhibacus operatIons of this type. In other words, we

must get one battalion ready at the earliest practicable date,

followed as soon as practicable by prie reg1aent, even at some

sacrifice for the time being of the other units in tho matter

oÍ experienced personnel and equipuent.

I want ta emhqsize that I consider the no called

UCoçriando Ooeratlonc" only one feature of noital Marine Corns

work, In fact, tac later operations of tac Britten Comqndbs

indic9te that they are fcllowing more and more our noital

doctrine on lndinís. They have reprinted our YrP-16?.

However, in view of the situation now faciar us, it

1 Ir rntl7e that .e 1ntenify thIs tyDe o tralni g with p4'r-

- ticular ephneiz on nl7flt operationc asnore tini afloat, oatrolling beaclit frofl the se'i, air infnntry, ruLbcr bortts, rai/is

fron cruiperi 2r eStrflrn'2, ntroiflnt by wiLLs 1'n .d rr subnrineu, 4n possibly e a-LU.tiot&i atten;on to inìlvidual

oor1ht, in crJer thr.t a A:xt cf .ny uan 1je ande ready Qn

the snortest Doasible notcc for any so13. t such ntc

should oc trained 'md eounpc-d to cr'nduct deiolitions, sabotace,

and inte11icnce nisei/nts.

CoA4242) CONF! DENT IAL
(osA4242) CONPIDrNTIAL

The normal train.ng of parachute units should aleo

fit them for such special niesions. There will undoubtedly

arise many situations in active operations in which it is not

feasible to land parachu4 troops as such, and in such situations they should be availitbie for employ-inent in surface ships

in the execution of tasks Vor which they are specially qualified.

A similar direct&ve bas been issued to the Amphibious

Force, Pacific Fleet.

The Tables of Organization for the Separate Battalion

a prepared by Edson are under study, and they will be approved

with minor modifications. It is considered desirable to induJe

an 81mm Mortar Platoon in order that the 3attslion as a whole

--may be avaIlable for employment in the landing attack if no

appropriate special mission can be found. A copy cf the letter

transmttted with the propoted Table was sent to San Diego by

4 officer messenger last night.

H' I The next 90 rubber boats to be delivered ars being

t, sent to t)n Diego to equio the Jecond ieparate Battalion. Cteps

I I an bcThd taken to procure additionnl rubber boats as soon as

'prcticcole for use at Ueu River. In the meantIme, it is suggested a few tdeht be sent to IJew River from the 90 available

at Zuqntico. In this connection, also, an order is being

placed for several hundred 7-man rubber boats as it will be

difficult to embark the 10-man boats in nonna) transoort planee

or gliders.

Pleaie tren.t this subject, a regards personalities,

- as strIctly Confidential. Aleo please keep me fully tnd

frequently inforraed as to the progress you are making in the

organiz&tion, eui'tent, and tnlniug of tne units n questIon,

as well as for the re:;ainder or the force. IncIdentally, I

don't like tne term °C :rndo"; we ¿re 1ook!n for ì better

term--one more fittIng for the qrInes. }iave you nny sucestions?

::îth all Ecod wIshes.

3lnoerely,

;.

ajor vneral noilrmd <. ith, U.5-..C.,

- 2U1( Len

zfl hIfl1OU3 .crCc, L'tflbIC t.

-.4-.
273

288 ist Ñidorneraient. February 9, 1942, 02/106 Headquarters, Mphtbtous Force, Atlantic fleet,

062. MarIne Barraoka, Quantico, Va.

From: The Comrnandipg Generai, t - To $ The CommandAnt, U. S. )4n1'tne Corps.

Bubjeott Recrnended organization, for a battalion embarkea on destroyer transport.

1. Forwarded, concurring with the reoomznendttons set forth in the baste letter, with the foflotiing modificational

That al]. ptsto]A listed in the enclosed tables be replaced by sei-nutoutttc carbines as soon

as this weapon becomes available.

'ñiat the desir'n&tton or thIs battalion be changed to the 'lst Shock I3att3lIon.'

2. The organization and equipraent recom:'endect in the basic letter are cc.nridered to be narticularly weB. suited for aìtphibious coerations in AtlRntic Ocean theaters. It will bo

noted that this battalion requires cix (6) ADa and a anali amount of space on one (t) AX for cn'nlete enbarkatinn. Tha

orgRntz-'tion recoanended n'wnits the eabarktton of one (X)

rifle coznnny on epo}j of four t2Ds. In event thet an L?» j not availpble or is eimlnyed on n separ'te 'aisoiofl, it 18 stilt oosib1e to omDloy the remainder of the battalion as a unit without rearrangeient of the c,barked troops.

3. Studies which have been m'-de or vsrioug pocsible operntIn theter in the Atlantic Deem tine inv:'rihly indi- crted the dctrsbility of c1oyir a highly trotnd øhock unit frta licht, fast trznoox'ts as n )art of the ÀrnhIbtnu Force in conjunction 'th -ny i:in lentitnr 4üch ;:,t1ht be - n'e. Those rtimi' hrve plan intc-t»d t:pt thts battalirn, in order not to fl1t its ucofuino, nh-u1d be Drovied 'flth a

imount or crater trrnr'ortntinn. ThIs tranport'ti.n, with rear echelon oror.nl, c'-'n bn ethrrkd nfl cfl ¿tK z'nd join t:'13 battalion U7ifl arrivrl of the mrin force.

4, It -;Ilt r10 ha noted ti-ct 60.-rn nortr'rs h'-ve i'r-ntt inclwiod. in th-) troofl9 c»--r-ny, tn-;'nd of 8l-.r :;')Ctr1, with r. vie'-' to mncrevqini; ;hc, mobility of thnt crrmny. 13

subntitutt':n i o rìcrm to be n'ces'-rv n nrd"r O i

the bttrlItm to tvrnce -' (11't2ncg tnid. situtionc tt1ich fly he encount'rci on ncit jlniia In ti-il Pacific, or elce':hore, ttheretn , dr"fl rdVrrìce is not rcoo-r?Ct, it i; t11[»t th t tJo "?;'flfl2 COI )I £1 'titi he r-t1 )'í 'L C:. 6l-' -rt -r tn9t--J. of 2.. :ortnr'.
* 1 t

Copy tos 2d JTP

p274 - 'r

2385 02/105 06]. ist Enc1oriernent (Cont.) Februnry 9. 1942,

Subjecti Recommended, oranizntion for a battalion embarked

on destroyer transiort.

5. The designntien Wiat Shack Battalion," is 8ugrested

since it is believed that the -term is more deicriptive 01' the units probable type of operations than 1lct Separate Battal1nn

or 'ist Destroyer Battalion.'

R. M. 241TH

es /
275

COORDINATOR OF' INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

februa

::jcr üei1c'rj :ûot :cloonb, U. E. Yrine Corns 3-io :dlrters, 100:1 OÜL, hrlir&:ton Annex, r1itor, V.

t' 't LJ

R ECEIVED

FLB1819? WAR PLANS SFCTH3

MAWnt CÚ3tfl r 16, 19Á:

't"T}- 'r

er L-ener: -YJ1CO'2D:

iflinson rus for- arcec to me :. Cory of a

letter cf J?nu:ry 3i, 19L2 fro"t the Chief of the ;3uren of

:':z:uL, sr ¿ton, .;in a.or survey of officer -ers-nne1 ìv:.iizb1e fo u4-y at sea.

I auscnan Lrrar1 u1kanson tac c-ta cri our

ce:s to:.;-, iii: is ni1ab1c for se. of o:':'

:-y sir.c Ccr:s ffcers, i:' and uhen their reliefs

are su;':ìied. - :.s to these reliefs, I hofe very :tuch thzt cr?2u1

effort - ill -b: :ìne to selcet the right non, t.i: that I 'Ill.

have a' to exniine the rcccrc of any :ai: o

he is assi:ned here.

Thc t;-j-e of cric rer-uire nere cCls f:r s, £-C'r ',

w e of cfficer, ate Idi a scholastic a;: roach to robe' is

of war, teu;ereC by :mr cticl e:perierLee in t.ie Leid. 2ose

tho nuiL,at u_se tac oest officers comaanaixLg nen, or con ' .:nin; ships, night not be the- oe&t ten fo: our :ur c'sc-s.

- :cch of our lori; is, as you bnc' , cone for the :i:'ect
276

use of the naval and militaxy commanders of' the United States

rd I ar particularly nxious to hae the cttitude of the

Favy anC. Marine Corps properly represented in the :reparatior

and consunation of any such ork.

For that purruse not many ofncers are re.juirea, but

those thtt tre must be neu of the hi&hest intelligence, cpericnce, breadth of mind, and technical skill. A random

selection of Reserve or retired officers would, I am sure,

fall far short of our needs. 1t occurs to me that sorne nen

cf the tre te need might be found among those who, regardles

o±' their ::roflcieLcy as officers, bive been retirec. for

:vsicl re.ìsons.

I aior you 'ill understand wiw, from the poi:t of

vier o±' bei::; as useful as possible to the Nary and fäarine

Ccrps, I am anxious to secure the best men possible for assig

uent to this office as retflce.:ents for any wbo rnzy be detached.

Very truly yours,

V:llliam 3 Donovc.n

Genen:l ?hsy1:s iO1C3nb Feb. l6, 19'2
Dear Joe:

277

9 March 194?

LI

thought the D case was all settl&d

but have just learned that another meicorandum

has gone to the Rig Boss in the matter. He

is still trying to get the job th'.t we thought

We had headed off. Is there anything t]nt you

- can do? Your letter came too late to stoo

Updike's comflesion as I had finally apDroved

it. He is in much better shape than he was

and seems to have been doing useful work.

I left ou a southern tri:) last uesday

in my plc4ne and got back yestetty. Visited

Dunedin and saw the amphibian tractors, 2üami,

and Parris Island. Was much impressed by the

work they are doing at the latter place. The

Greybeard Plaoons are working hard and I think

the plan will be a big sucoes. I certainly

hope so. I was also treitendously interested

in the glider training at p. i. and had a ride

in one. It was really delightful.

I am going ott on another trip to

New River toward the end of the month and
aomet4sÍé,early iii' April wIlt try to get to -

the WOt Coast. If I go Beatrice will be

with me and we would be most pleased to

accept your invitation to stay with you if

you realty have room. Beatrice came back

from I4iaxni leaving there the same day I

did. Bile is very much better but had a bad

cold from all the rain and. cold weather thet

have been having there. You see, ehe put the

California climate on the bum last year and.

I had to go out and straighten it out. I

took the sunshine to Miami but it was too

late and she insisted on coming home. She - is going down to stay with Hazel Runt and

later with Edith Hill at New River about the

19th of March.

Best regards,

Very sincerely,

T. HOLOOI4B.

Brigadier General J. C. Pegan, USMO

Marine Corps Base

San Diego, Calif.
278

Copy

Combined Operations Headquarters,

«sr C'binet Office Annexe,

lA, Pichnond Terrace,

hitehall, S.W.l.

22nd July, 1942.

Dear A-drniral:

I am enclosing a copy of a report made by

the Cnr'mandant of the Cenr..ndo Depot on the

United States L:arine Corps detachment which

recently completed a course at the depot.

It is a great pleasure to read such a report,

and I would luce, prsonal]y, to offer my

congratulations to the officers and men concerned.

YourD sincerely,

¡s! Louis Mountbatten.

AWoiral N. R. Stark,

United States Navy,

20, Grosvenor bquare

London, %í.l.
279

REPORT ON UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS.

Length of Course - 8th June 1942 to 29th June 1942.

Programme of' Work Already submitted0

GENERAL REPORT.

The whole of the detachment were a credit to the United

States Marine Corps, from the start they were all keen and

entered into an arduous training with enthusiasm and cheerfniness

They have undergone an arduous Commando training with an

exceptionally unconquerable spirit which never wavered during

the course.

I am sure that they have very much benefited by the course

and are fit to take their place in a Commando.

Captain Roy J. Batterton proved himself to be a fearless and

efficient leader of his men. He would make an excellent Troop

Leader in a Commando.

Staff Sergeant George V Clarke, Sergeant Way Holland,

Sergeant George J. Huddock and Sergeant Curtis A Tatum

proved themselves excellent N.C.Os. and possess exceptionally

fine leadership qualities and could control their men under very

difficult conditions.

It was a pleasure to be associated with such an excellent

detachment.

/5/ L.E. Vaughan,

Lient -Colonel,

Commandant,

Commando Depot.

Achnacarry,

Spean Bridge,

Inverness-shire.

29th Jurie, 1942.
2J1 (« ,tV.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICESK 1t4/.ìatt

WaSHINGTON D C

$ (4$

Mey 15, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOE GENERAL J3ICVLN

FROM: Captain Peter J. Ortiz

SUBJECT: Chronologica report of my activities a&

U.S. Ass istazt Uaval Attache and Assistant

Naval Attach for Air at Tangier, Morocco,

and U.S. Marine Corps observer in North Africa

I arrived at London, England, on Decexaber 30, 194

I rer,orted to the Unites States Naval Attache olfice there I

was instructed to carry out my basic orders, to wit, to report in Tangier, Morocco, to Colonel Wilsiam R. Eddy, U. S.

Naval Attache. I reached Gibraltar by military airplane on

January 5 and leaned that the shipping schedule vas at that

time very irregular beteen Gibraltar and Tangier and decided

consetently to go on by phne to Oran, Algeria, ana then on

to Casabìznc, rrench Morocco, and finali; to T3ngier by tra

I 'PflTJ tv'c days in Orar an5 Argev; vherr I stuieci the "Torc

operL.tion landings that had been macle there na also contact

1

& naìcr o locally inf_uer4t ial French rci.cnts, 'r'usitary a

civilian, cone of them Jonr acruai,t ne vit:. nc'in I dis- o-CU& tre ecor1JAc, it:1 nc1 r' -dICi o the

1j1P'i r Cr --,-.,

-

'.1 J utLj f - i
281 -L; -2-

AngiricTinvaon of French North Africa hearing opinions

of interest to ONI and MI. rFlying to Casablanca I spent a fe

day there and at Fedabla and Rabat, much in the same manner

as Oran, ana then entrained for Tangier where in the absence

of Colonel W. A. Eddy, I reported on Janua 13 to Captain

F. ?. o1comb, USMCR, Assistant 13.8. Naval Attache and Assistan, Naval Attache for Air.

Leaving Tangier on January 15 I returmed to Casablanca and went on to Fez where I spent a few days observing

and participating in the training of a French parachute unit

and. thea vent on to Algiers via Oran reportdng to Colonel

1'. . lidy, USMC, on January 19. Colonel Eddy gave me full

L tuLe to carry out my instructions as I visheth Hoi'ever,

he sugoested, when I expressed my intention of immediately

goi..g u. to the forward zone, that I first spend a little time

in the Llgiers sector completing my documentation on the "Torche

oretion particularly as at the time there 'as little activity

at the front. During this period I was able to spend profitably

z fez thys with the 509 Parachute Battalion (Clonel E. Baff)

ta::n art in interesting maneuvers nd fire aroblems. I

personal friends in the 509th dnd I an convinced
r r 282

that it is a crack organization. The fact remains, however,

that it has not yet successfully completed a mejor mission.

It has teen greatly over-publicized, much to the discomfiture

of the few officers and. men who can still revieì its much

baflyhooed accomplishments dispassionately and objectively.

The press releases and radio broadcasts have led the majority

of its embers to believe that they are heroes covered with

glory and feel that they should return to the States to be

adulated by the grateful population. I mention this as an

xaple of the effect on Army military' organizations of uncontrolled publicity..

On February 8 I flew to Youks-les-Barns, made ¡ny

way to 2nd Corps Headquarters near Tebessa where I secured

authorization to roam about at will, attaching ryself to and

serving with units of my choice. I was for excellent persona

reasons and as a representative of the Marine Corps particula

desirous of seeing and taking part again in Ection against the

Germans. Through personal reconnaissance and Arab connection

I was in a position on one or two occasions to glve informati

of vaThe to unit commanders. I happened to 'e in Gafsa then

the -vacation order was received. Although later claimed
283

by the press as a perfect éxample of an orderly and well-planne

retreat, I thought it characterized by confusion and an alarming contagion of panic. There was no enemy pressure during

the entire night either in Gafsa or on the road north to Feriat

Yet dozens of vehicles were damaged and abandoned and a number

of soldiers and civilians run over throngh the inadequateness

of traffic control. A railway bridge was blown prematurely

and a train had to be lâft on the south side. The Derbyshire

Yeomanry, an aggressive British light armoured reconnaissance

regiment, was left to conduct the delaying actìcn. Actually

it was not necessary to do more than maintain contact with the

enemy as the German adnnce was sufficiently slow and cautious

to eliminate the necessity for delaying action combat. A few

Messerschrnitt' s and JV-88's came over at sunset completely destroying a few vehicles among which was a two-and-one-half-ton

truck in which I had placed my bedroll. This contained among

other things all the notes I had accumu]ated thus far. Leaving

the Derbyshire Yeomanry near Feriana I made my way to Kasserine

and on to Sbeitla, unofficially attaching myself to the 1st

Armoured Division. Finally after having been utilized piecemeal over more than a hundred miles of front and suffering
284

heavy losses through no fault of its commander, this division

'was able to concentrate its remaining armour east of Sbeitla,

A large-scale tank battle took place in. which the 77mm. higa

velocity German gun proved far superior to our own 75 mm. A

tank is only as good as its gun and its gua as good as ita sight

We spend tens of thousands of dollars to bcild an excellent

tari and then equip it with an inferior gin and a gun sight

worth 'a dollar or two. Our optical equipment nust be improvel.

Our tank crews fought well and bravely but frequently in their

eagerness they were enticed within range of cleverly placed

German 38mm, guns. Our tank destroyers which can fire only to

the frczat found this a severe handicap in a tinning retreating

battle. Our air support was negligible, in fact, non-existent;

the Gersians', well coordinated. In Kassefine ran into a Farei

Legion captain, an old friend, rushing reinforements to his

aliost completely encircled regiment near Fichen. An ex-Foreigr

Lezion.naire, I could not resist going up with nm. The regiment pzt up a remarkable fight, demonstratni'onclusivelY

that seasoned and determined troops can, abrit with very

inferir equipment and armament, hold out aainst a numerically

surier and better armed enemy. When finally the order to

tnara as given, the regiment exacted a higL rice Sr
285- 6 - -S :::uIJ:::I

for every inch of terrain conceded the enemy. I left the regiment when it was eventually ordered south of Tebessa for rest

and reorganization, thinking it advisable to report back to

Colonel Eddy.

Flying back to Algiers from Yonks-les-Bains on

March 2, I told the Colonel I wished with his permission to

go back to the front immediately. I had. always displayed

much interest in the Colonel's SUE operaticnalg'oups. Then

he rnentioned the officer casualties that they J4 recently

suffered, I jumped at the opportunity f asdng hint to allow

me to take command of a group. I wish to mAe it clear that

I did so entirely on my own initiative and assiaing full responsibility. Colonel Eddy was reluctant to give his consent

in view of ¡ny status as Assistant Naval Attache and Marine

COrDS observer but consent was finally wring from him. Leaving

Algiers March 8 I reported in the evening of the same day at

GueJ!a to Colonel Young, British commanding officer of the 80E

groups on the Tunisian fronts. The Colonel airected me to ¿o

ej

south to le Kouif reporting to Major G. Kuimiey, a Britisher

in charge of the operational groups working v.ith 2nd Corps.

Mar fuiríiney placed me in command of a groìp of five Spaniards

an a British radio operator instructing me to join forces

-T
.-286 ç. ---=ml rr - ti)'

with Captain Ròbii'U'Ii10 was operating with his' group suth of

Sheitla. After some difficulty I contacted Captain Robert

finding him at the Hequarters of a squadron of my old friends

in the Derbyshire Yeomrìry. Captain Robefl was as determined

as I to get a German tank or two ath we quickly became fast

friends. For a week we scouted the sector for enemy tanks and

vehicles, investigating all probable night harboring places0

On reports or even vague rtnors of enemy tanks within a radius

of fifty miles we would start out immediately, sometimes tracking them for hours at night, but were never lucky enough to

contact them. Our men were getting tired, so we went to SbeiL

cleared a house ol' booby traps, and rested for a day and night.

By mutual agreement Captain Robert and I decided to operate

separately, with probable enemy tank concentrations in the

vicinity of Paid and Matleg as our common objectives, he appros

ing from the northeast and I from the northwest, but without

attempting to maintain contact or coordinate our action.

.Invíng Sbeitla in the moming of March 17 with my group I

reached the Bir-el-Hatig at about 1000 where General Robinet

had just established Combat Command B Headc»arters. I presented myself to General Rotinet, placing myself and command

at his disposal. The General, after acuainting me with his

plan of battle, explaifled that his imminent southeast drive

fl°rqiq r- -

- ____________ 9

t - L

t
287

H

would leave his leítf1ikangeously exposed to enemy tank

action, if the German 21st Panzer Division, reportedly in the

Matleg area, chose to roll down the Sengdal Valley. He asked

me to reconnoitre the tatleg mountains northeast of the pass

and the pass itself to determine the enemy's armoured strength

(if any) and if possible his intentions. After arranging a

radio and communications schedule with his communications officer, I proceeded up the Valley to the Ganet-Hadid range, estatlishing an OP at 2000 on its northeast end overlooking the

Sidi-Bou--Sid--Maknassy road, the entire width of the Valley,

and the Djebel--Ksaira range on the east side. Leaving Made,

my second-in-command, in charge of the group, I went out on

reconnaissance crossing the Sidi-Bou-Sid road, skirting the

Djebel Ksaira and Djebel Rechaib mountains, crossing the Matleg road about two miles northwest of the pass, reaching the

immediate, vicinity of 'the probable harboring places of enemy

tank concentrations at about 2300 without having yet some

unmistakable signs of enemy presenca. It bao Leen raining

almost incessantly for three days. Crossinc tìe valiey, much

of which was under water, and sinkinw above mf knees in the

soft mud, it was quite a:arent to ne that it vould 'be impassable for any type cf vehicle for acnE' 3ay to come. Cor1-

aeuent1y the menace Cccbat Commanz. B's it flank was

obviated. However, I .hot it might eventually prove usefu
I

288 9'V3] g\(c _iI

to know the enay's position aziçi if possible, wished for

personal reasons to get within range to utilize one of the

very effective Petard grenades I was carryi'g. It was art extrecely dark night, still raining heavily, the visibility so

poor that I could scarcely qee bushes and trees a few yaz.s

away. Inching my way along I reconnoitred unany wadis for mor

than two hours without finding anything more than tank tracks

Suddenly near thé pass at very close range autornatic weapc.ns

to zy front and right opened fire on me. Before I could fall

to the ground a bullet had gone through my right hand and

another had grazed zny right leg. Rolling a few yards to my

left merely b reach rather inadequate cover I could make out

the dim siThouette of a vehicle some thirty yards to my front

I managed to throw in a Mills grenade but it fell short and

had little effect. I then got in a well-ained Potard grenade

It expled with a terrific blast and stopped the automatic

wea:on firefrom the front and I heard excited shouts and cri

of en in pain. Still under fire from my right I crawled

with extreme caution about 100 jards to the left rear then

got xi î feet, made my way with difficulty, due to the loss

of bioo± nd shock, back to the Ganet-Hadil -here I found

my zen, who had heard the firing at a distance, very much on

(I
29

j)

the alert. ?&y British radio operator, Mullins, had been trying to establish contact with CCB but probably due to the

mountains between us and their position had been unsuccessful.

In view of this communications failure I thonghi it preferable

to return to Combat Command B's Headquarters, reaching the

poattion at about 0800, March 18. General Robinet warmly expressed appreciation of our efforts, awarded me the purple

heart, requested his S-2, Major Morly, to send dispatches to

Major uifney and Colonel Dickson, G-2, 2nd Corps, commending

our action, and personally conducted inc to a well equipped

surgical unit where my hand was immediately and successfully

operated on. Coming out of the anaesthetic I learned somewhat

to my annoyance that the General had sent my group back to

Major\1inney who, folloïing the displacement of 2nd Corps

Hemijuarters, had just established his base camp near Feriana.

Under protest I was sent via several evacuation units to a

field hospital near Tebessa. The surgeon there cdshed to do

a little butcher work on my hand and also csualiy spoke of

months of hospitalization and convalescence in eran. Much

opp3ed o the program I sent a messaige -to a friend at the

airfield of Youks-les-Bains who came out, qlleLl; took me to

the f iei, and arrarged my air transportati'xi Algiers. j [ll
290

r1ncr

,JII: - -- JJ - u

I reported to Colonel !dñy, Mèrch 22, at 1600, then was &lmitte

to the 29 Station hospitäl where I received excellent medical

attention until uy departure froa A2«iers. To ny chagrin

Colonel Eddy insisted that I return to the United States as

soon as the medical officer would ällow me to travel. b' status as Assistant Naval Attache at Aigiers placed him and awseli

in a rather awkward position as it is not in accordance with

the erules« for a diplatic representative to participate

in action. However, he expressed his wish that I soon return

to North Africa officialii assigned to his organization. Following Colonel Eddy's instructions I reported in Tangier, reporting to Capt. T. P. flolcomb, USUCR, who ordered me back to

the United States2 Returning via ATC I reached Washington, D.

on April 27 and reported to Marine Corps Headquarters April 28,

at 0800.

I díùu[rthLJ
'ç It '- %%_ _, - tí:cuojii

291 058 (so) W E Section

THE GERMINAL MISSION

LOE Book FINAL

The following were the personnel of the GERMINAL Mission:

Captain William F. WELL, O-17860, TJSMCR Captain Reeve SCHISM, Jr., O-1031128, CAV

ist Lt. Robert F. CUTTING, O-460414, FA

ist Lt. Harry E. GRIFFITHS, o-lO9254, ThF Sgt. PhilIp B.t. P0TT, 11121960

9 Sentember 1944

Captain GRELL, Chief of GERMLNAL Mission d Lt. GRIFFITHS

left LONDON for T MPSFORD AIrport. At 0850 hours -these officers

with Lt. ASTETT left TENPSFORD on a Hudson bomber for LflAOGESe

Lt. ANSTETT was returning to his Jedburgh team now located at

CHAT EAUROtJX.

Arrived at the LIiÌIOGES airport at 1140 hours. The f1lowirg officers were present for the reception:

Major STAUNTON

Major DE GUELLIS Capt. FRAS Flight Lt. SIMON

2d Lt. RCEL

The Hudson bomber returned to LONDON, leaving LIM-ES at 1200 hours. Major STAUNTON, eight AllIed airmen, who had been stranded

in FRANCE, and three unknown bodies with secret orders returned to

ENGLAND.

Cur agents had taken over the former German Gestapo Headquarters in the city of LL'LOGES. This served as a temporary Headquarters for the GERLINAL Mission, - The foflowing officers and men were present at the Headquarters

.Maj or SHANNON

Jedburgh Team IFP

Jedburgh Team JAMES
-2-

Major FOSTER 292

Captain SOHLE!

Lt. CUTTING

Sgt. POTTER

GERMINAL vIsited ELLIPSE's office in the TIVOLI. ELLIPSE

being in PARIS for business reasons saw Cdt., VERMEULEN, DER Assistant. Further use of the LEE and JANES Jedburgh teams wag discussed. Cdt. VERMEULEN suggested retaining Jedburgh Team LEE for

the time being in LI1ñES. He further suggested the return of the

Jedburgh Team JANES to LONDON. Major REWEZ had returned to LONDON

in order to obtain jeeps for the purpose of building up a flying

column to hinder the Germans .retrating korthward.

10 Seotember 1944

The GERMINAL team met to discuss their future plana. It Was

their intention to contact all American agents operating in Southwestern Fránce. Agents whose missions had been completed would be

sent to PARIS.

Two Canadian soldiers, attached to the American Army and four

civilians were picked up in a stolen jeep. The two Canadian soldiers

were turned over to Captain FRASER pending orders from t roper Army

authorities. The four civilians were turned over to the DMR at

LIMOGES.

Contacted PERO! PINK atOOGNAC and requested officer in charge

to meet GERMINAL in LDJIOGES Wednesday, 13 September 1944.

Major LORD and 2d lit. DUVAL reported at LIME8. Their mission

had been completed and having reported to LIMOGES they were given

orders to return to PARIS.

il and 12 Seotember 1944

This morning we travélled from LIMOGES to }&ONTLUOON via GUERET.

En route we observed thirty one enemy vehicles whIch hd bcn -'tbuehodby the caqu±cfl.F.I.U_in this area. The vehicle were eonpietely destroyed in many instances and others rendered useless.

It may be assumed that a large percentage of the personnel were

killed in the ambushes. A scali number of -men were captured, but

few priconers were taken in the hit and run tactics used by the

F.F.I. unito. German columna retreating to the North in hope of

using the BELFORT GAP lost heavily in men and equipment.

While in MONTLUCON we visited "CASERNE DE RICHEMONTU. In

August the Gerr.ans were blockaded for five days within these for-
-.3.. 293

tifications with their water supply cut off. In spite of Etrong

F.F.1 resictance the German Gestapo added another page to their

book of ptrooities. The "BABBAUEB-NEUFS" of the "CASERNE DE

BIOHZMOWT' were burned to the ground. The blood coated walls and

floors of the torture chamber and the odor of stale blood gave

evidence of the tactics used by the Gestapo.

The GERILINAL team vicited "CHATEAU DE headquarters

of Captain FA&R and FANY WAKE. We contacted Petty Off leer Roger

FAUCHER, U.S.N. here and gave him his orders to report to PARI$1

Due to transportation difficulties lt is necessary to give our

agents ample time to reach a given destination.

Captain GRELL, Captain SCHLEY, Lt. GRIFFITHS, and Petty Office

FAUCHER visIted the maquis headquarters north of 0ITJY and had

dinner in the officerts mesa. Following a fine meal, a company of

F.F.I. with whom Captain 6OHLEY had been working, were ready to set

out on a large scale ribur.h. We accepted an invitation ta take

part in this encounter and followed their motor column to SANOCIES.

It Was here the mirsion became non-tactical and automobile lights

were lit. We lcarned of a German armistice which involved some

twentyfive hundred German troops in thic region. -

It was at SANCOINE that we located 2d Lt. ÌLACOUB who had bee

doing liaison work in th!e erea wIth the F.F.I. This Lieutenant

had agreed to lead the German column to American trocpe where they

would surrender. The big question was "Where were the Amerloansib

Pending completion of his mißsion Lt. MACOMER was ordered to report to PARIS.

In order to make the best of this opportunity and knowing of

the aggreseive spirit of the zaquis, we set out for BOURES at 2400

licurs in- hopes of finding the Aeriean forces. We had no information as to the sItuation between SANOOIITS and BOURGES. For two

hours we drove on g road littered with dead horses, e.bandoned Germa

vehicles and several road blocks.

We did not locate American troops in BOURGES but found the

town. in the hands of the F.F.I. and not the Germana.

The F.F.I. was able to show Oaotain GRELL a copy of an armistice signed the previous day by Major General MAKIIT, AUS and Genera

ELSAR of the German Army.

The armistice provided for the safe passege of the 19,000

Germans in this area. They were to proceed north, under arms, by

- 13 September to the south bk of the LOThE and there to surrender

unconditionally to the American Third Army.

This information had not yet reached the German forces sta-
-.4-. 294

tioned. near SANOOI}IS area, so we left at daybreak for SANCOINS in

order to report this situation. En route we met the German Colonel

in command of the SANCOINS area together with Colonel ROUSSEL,

?J.I. who were proceeding to enera1 ELSAR1s Headquarters. On 10

September, the day or the armistice, without knowledge thereof,

Colonel ROUSSEL had captured and disarmed 1100 Germans. He was

anxious to retain these arms for the F.F.I., although quite willing

to turn his prisoners over to the American forces. At Colonel

ROUSSEL's request and as maquis representatives, we accompanied

these officers to General ELSARTs Headquarters, located near ARCY.

At the.. German Headquarters we met Lt. c$ol. FRENCH, AUS, liaison

officer of the Third U.S. Army who btained an agreement from General

ELSAR permitting Colonel ROUSSEL to retain rms taken from 200

German S.S. troops who were not governed by the terms of the aridetice. Colonel RJSSEL was requested to be present at the meeting

to be held 16 September 1944 at ¡ where the distribution of arms

surrendered by the Germans would be settled. It was understood

that the F.F.I. would receive their proportionate share.

Returned to SA1'100118 where we lunched with Captain CARANDEA.0

who had been extremely active in this area. He vías responsible for

a number of successful ambushes. Another maquis leader worthy of

mention is Captain TABDIVA2 who was held -in high esteem by the

American liaison officers for bis fine leadershlp.

Visited CHATEAU DE ST. AUG-USTIIZ M. AULkNIER and the Comtesse

de ROLAND are extremely popular wit:ì the F.F.I. because of their

unselfish efforts during the war. Their Chateau v:as used as a

safe house and hospital for the F.F.I. M. AULAJ'ÏIER was able to keep

the arca well fed during the Germen occupation by felsifying the

production figures of the farmers.

13 Seotember 1944

Left dhateau AUGI.JSTIN for SANCOINS. Observed German columns

heading north toward the L0E for f Thai disposition by the American

Third Any. The Gerran columns were ragged but the German soldier

ras quite well dressed and well supplied wIth souvenirs and smokes.

Visited Ohateeu BEGUIN, Maquis Headquprters at LURCY LEVY.

The Americans operating in this area had done an excellent job

and consequently American liaison officers were extremely popular.

Proceeded to MO1ITLUCON in order to leave orders for Lt. ALSO?

to report t PIß on or before 20 September 1944.

Officers who operated in the area of the Headquarters at LURCY

LEVY were Major LORD, Captain FABÌLER and FAM fliC, Captain SCHLEY,
-.5-

295

Lt. ALSOP, Lt. MAOOUBER, Lt. DTPJAL and Lt. BLOCH.

Arrived at VICHY et 2400 hours and met Captain LCEUNI (Cana.-.

dian Army) of the F" Seotion.

14 Seotember 1944

VICHY had a decidedly unhealthy political atmosphere and there

existed a large minority of pro.-PETAIII French and much to our surprise, a few pro-LAVAL people still existed. Inclosed are some hIstorical documents which may be of interest to 0.5.6. (mcl #1)

Captain HALLOWS (British Army) was present and was able to

give us information of the following agents:

VIRGINIA HALL

2d Lt. RILEY

2d Lt. GOILLOT

This group was moving north to report la PARIS.

15 Sevternber 1944

Travelled to CLERIíONT-YERRAND where we contacted the following:

Col. GASPAR, Eaquis Chief of Staff for the AUVERGNE dIstrict

Lt. Col. ISOYENNE, DHR.

Major OTEUR

Major DE GUELLIS

Flight Lt. SIMON

IS0THERM had left for LONDON prior to our arrival.

We learned that POLYGONE, DM Zone Sud, wae in a hospital in

LYON as a result of strafing fire by the American AIr Force.

The group proceeded to LIMOGES reaching our Headquarters at

2030 hours,

A parachutage v'as scheduled for the LDáCGES Airport between

2330 hours and 0230 hours. Three planes were scheduled to come

but only one arrived. Twelve containers and seven paokages were

received. The general contents were f3od, boots, socks, and grenaaeø

The reception committee operated very smoothly. The following personnel were iii this committee:

Captain FRASER.

2d Lt. GURIET, Aide to the DIAR.

30 French Air Corps personnel. -
r

6-

16 Seoteniber 1944 296

Mejor GILDEE or. Jedburgh Team L4N reported at the LIMOGES

Headquarters and oroceeded directly to LONDON. Major STAUNTON

returned from LONDON in a Hudson bomber. The LINAL team visited

OPSDOUR SUR GLANE. It was here that the Germans annihilated with

few exceptions the conolete village and its population. For pic.-

tures of German atrocities, see the GERMINAL Mission "Atrocity File9.

1? Seotember 1944

Lt. MORGAN arrived at LIMOGES Headquarters. His mission was

compluted and he was ordered to report to PARIS.

Several American and British agents operating in this area

were awarded the CROIX DE GUERRE in a most impressive ceremony by

Colonel RIVIER. Copies of the citations are inclosed (mcl #2)

and th3 event was published in the local newsoaper (Incl #3 and

Inol #4). - 18 Seotember 1044

Received a telegram from LONDON which cancelled all future

Dakota Operations for the LIMOGES Airport and eubsituted the AIrport at LE BLA1IC.

19 Seotember 1944

- Received notFfication of the departure from MONTLUCON ror

PARIS of Captain DUSSAQJ and Lt. ALSOP.

Necessary repairs to our transportation were effected.

20 geotember 1944

The mission divided into two groups in order to work in different areas.

Group "A" (Coptain SOHLEY 2nd Lt. GRIYFITHS) went to MONTLUCON

to gather Information oi L:ILHAUD. Learned that UILHUD was captured

b the Gestapo i May 1944 while 000retlng in his safe house at 16

rue P.imard in CNTLUCON. He was immedicMely tzken to the CASERNE

in MONTLUCON and later moved to °n unknown Gostapo prison. Madame

L'HOSPITALIER who operated the se! e house vas also arrested but

later released. Madejne DERIOT who was in this house at the time of

the arrest was questlond end released. The above information was

given by Yadame RENARD, rue DANTON A DESERTINE, MONTLUCON and from

- 2d Lt. ROBERT L'HOSPITALIER of the British Army.

Drove to CHATEAU DE FRAYNE in order to pick up reports left

by Lieutenants FAUCHER and BLOCH and Lt. MAOO2ER. Contacted Captain

PABMER, Captain RAKE and FAMI WA! at the Chateau. This British e
'-7-- 297

team Was without contact with LONDON and without orders,

Group "B" (Captain GRELL, Lt.'OUT'TIl'JG and Sgt. POTTER) drove

to LE BLANC in order to mt4ce arremements for agents returning direc

ly to LONDON. Major SHANNON and Captain BRCVÏN left LE BLANC for

LONDON at 1530 hours.

Contactad Lt. McCARTHY and gave him instruct ions to proceed

to PARIS.

Continued to CHATEÀLTROUX and. contacted the HAÏLISH Jedburgh

team t the Hotel de le. Croix Blanche. This team was ordered to

report to PARIS Headquarters during the coming week.

21 Seotember 1944

Group "A" drove to CHERIWNT.SERRMID in order to trade automobiles and secure gesoline. The automobile was requisitioned by

Captain REi'TE, a friend with whom Captain SCHLEY worhed in the maquis

It was interesting to 'note that the maquis who were dressed in rags

only a few weeks before v'ere developing into a well dressed, well

disciplined military organization. - Group "B" visIted Lt. Col. MIRGUET, Chef of the F.F.I. in

the INDRE area. Group "B11 left OFATEAUBOLX at 11.30 hours for

LThiOOES where they arrived at 1800. The R1D:AL Mission received

a telezrS from Lt. Col. VAN DER STRICHT Instructing them to report

'in PARIS on or about lO Ccto'ber 1944.

Jedburgh Team FAMISH left by auto for PARIS at 1100 hours.

22 Seotember 1244

Group "A" left CLE3liONT-FEñRAiD for LI!0&ES. The two groups

met at the LBÁ0G'S Headquarters. A meeting was held in order to mak

plans for the future.

23 Sentember 1944

Caotain FRASER of the American Army and Captain BISSETT left

for PARIS by automobile.

All Aer loan agents in the LIMOGES area were given orders to

report either to LONDON or PARIS so arrangements were made to close

the LIMOGES Headquarters.

Visited Dr. ROUX

sur Issoire. Dr. ROUX'

erman occupation. He

period in this chepter

at his Chateau Mont Bas Gaoubert, Par Mezier

s Chateau was used as a safe house during the

did. commendable work during this difficult

of French history.
jr

8--

298

24 Sootember 1944 - At DM00 hours we set out for VIC}i via MONTLUOC'N. Dined at

210c hours and then continued to VICHY, arriving at 2330 hours. On

arrival we learned of the acoidentà]. death of Captain BSSETT

(British Army).

Captain BISSETT had been travelling to PARIS wIth Captain

FRASER. At 0100 hours they were prepering for their departure.

While loading their jeep a Marlin Submachine gun fell on the sid&-.

walk, became cocked as a result öf the llow on the cement and imme'- - diately fired one round. This single bullet struck Captain BISSEfl

in a vital spot and he died a few seconds after the accident. A

oomplete and detailed report was submitted by Captain WSER en

his arrival in PARIS.

A most fitting funeral and burial service was organized for

the Captain by the F.F.I. Captain FPASER and Captain ZU1JIER cf

the Canadian Army arranged for details such as contactIng Allied

Forces officers in the area and infnrming them r'f the tImes and

places where ceremonies would occur.

25 SeDtember 1944

At 0930 hours an F.Y.I. guard of honor was formed outside the

Hotel RadIo. Allied Forces officers who acted as honorary pall

bearers were:

Captain GRELL Major MACKENZfl

Catain SOHLEY Captain IUN.LiH

Lt. GRIFFITHS Captaint FRASER

Lt. CUTTING

Egt. POTTER

At 1015 hours the body was taken to the protestant chapel

where a brief service was held. The coffin was beautiful, covered

with Union Jack and surrounded by wreaths presented by various units

of the Allied Forces. The funeral procession was carried out in a

military manner with a Guard of Honor formed by the F.F.I.
t-9-

299

26 Seotember 1044

Captain BISSETT was burled at 1000 hours. The following

Americen and British officers were present:

Major E&CKENZIE

Major DE GUELLIS

Captain ANDRE SIMON

Captain GRELL

CaptaIn SCHLEY

Lt. GRIFFITHS

Lt. GUTTING

Sgt. POTTER

The F.F.I. again furnished a G-urd of Honor. The body WaS

interred in the Cimetiere de Vichy.

27 Seotember 1944

Left VICHY at c945 hours en route to TOULOUSE via CLEFLIONTFEAND, The group lunched at AURILLAC and had supper at GAILLAC,

Arrived at TOULOUSE at 2230 hours.

28 Scot ember 1944

Fs.INAL held a conference with Colonel BRICE, DIvE in TOULOUS

It was learned that PERCY PIUK ìad moved from TOULOUSE to UARSEIaES

in order to get plane raneoortation to LONDON. All Jedburgh teams

formerly in TOULOUSE had left for AVIGNON,

29 Seotember 1944

Left TOULOUSE at 1200 hours and arrived at MONTPELLIER at

1800 hours.

Contacted CLAUDE ARNAULT alias NERON. Havng completed his

mission he was or8ered to report to PARIS Headquarters.

In MONTPELLIER we found prices out of control and the black

market flourishing. Exanples of prices charzed for commodities are

- AmerIcan cigarettesl50 to 200 francs per peck.

Whiskey --110 to 150 francs per jigger.

A fair meal 400 francs upward.

The F.F.I. are systematically flchting these condItions and

are endeavorIng to combat the blwt aarket.

30 Seotember l?44

The GE?JCINÀL Lission visited adt. JACQUES, also known as

SULTAN, Assistant DL in MONTPELLIER.
lo300

We visited the German prison camp in this area. The F.F.I.

bed 2,500 German prisoners there. Most of these are used for the

purpose of cleLriilg rines on the coast. Many of the French officers

in charge of these prIsoners have served time in German concentration camps and are well qualified, and do provide treatment similar

to that which they received at the hands of the Germans. 77e left

Mo:TpEaIzR at 1530 hours and arrived at NflAES at 1800 hours.

1 October 1944

The EPLThAL team relaxed in NLS while the automobiles were

being repaired.

2 October 1944 $ Left Wfl!ES at 0930 hours and arrived at AVIGNON at 1030 hours.

Continued on to VALENCE arrivIng there at 1800 hours. On the road

from WILTS to VALENOE we passed miles of German wreckage; horsedrawn vehicles, trucks, cars, tanks, antiaircraft guns and other

wreckage all gave evidence of the defeated German columns trying to

rétreat North to the SELFORT GAP.

In this area a large percentage of v.11 railroad rolling stock

had been destroyed by the Air Forces.

3 October 1944

The GLMINAL Mission contacted Captain PLANAS, Service Sociale

F.F.I. and Captain OGSTES of the Deu.xieme Bureau in VALENCE in order

to secure information available on Major PETER ORTIZ of the U.S.

Marine Corps. The only informetion available was that he na arrested

while wearing civilian clothing. The arrest wa5 made by the Wehr.-

macht. Further information was expected within a week and a full

report was promised by the Deuxieme Bureau in VALEY!CE to be sent

to Captain GRELL of P.RIS Headquarters.

Visited LA CHAPETIW rN VERCORS. In this small town the Germans

destroyed all of the houses (Inni #7) because of the active aid

given the underground forces in the vicinIty. All unoccupied farm

houses in the area were cor.sidered to be owned by members of the

maquis and on that basis, destroyed.

Proceeded to GREì0BLE arriving there at 1730 hours. We con-.

tacted Major 00X who t'as in commpnd of the 0.G.'s from ALGIERS.

He h?d no pertinent infcrcatlon for the teem so we continued on to

MOThANS arriving there at 1900 hours.

4 October 1944

Continued cur drive northward arriving in LION at 1130 hours.
-11

301

There we visited Colonel POLYGONE a 1'Hopital Ste. Jeanne d'Arc

(see report-for 15 September for-cause ot hospitalization). Golone

POLIO-ONE, as a result of being wounded, is fit only for administra

tin duty. He had received orders to report to Headquarters in

PARIS.

Visited adt. CARRE, DLS in IXON. He informed us that Captain

JOHISON was at CEAL(PDOR Monday October.

All bridges on the RHONE that we Sa-W had been partially or

comletely destroyed by the Germans in their retreat. As a result,

in cities such as AVE-NON and LYON, we found North bound military

traffic bottlenecked. - - 5 October 1944

Contacted 2d Lt. MORPURGO and 2d Lt. NONNI in LYON. Their

missIon was completed and they were ordered to report, in PARIS on

or about lO October 1944.

6 October 1944

Due to illnes? in the GEBBINAL group, departure tor PARIS was

delayed one day.

7 October 1944

Left LYON at 1400 hours and arrived iii ÀTJXERRE at 20304

8 October 1944

Left ATJ)RRE at 1000 hours and repozted in at PARIS Headquarters at 79 Ohamos Elysees at 1500 hours.

¡el Wifliam F., Grell

WILLLkM F. GRELL

Captains IJEMOR

/9/ Harry L Griff iths

MARRY E. GRIFFITHS

ist Lt., litt.

A map showing the area covered 'by the GERLÍNAL mission is

attached (mcl #5).

Also attacked is a guide to the Photo File CInc]. #6).

INOLOStifiES

II)cl 1.-. Historical Documents lfd 2.- Citations by Col. RIVIER

Inol 3- 11Le Centre Libre", newspaper

mcl 4-. Eewspaer clipping of Citations by Col. RIfl

Dici 5.-. L:ap

mcl 6- Guide to Photo Puemcl 7 Newspaper clipping; destruction of LA CHAPELLE N

VERO ORS.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Primary Sources (Marine Corps)

Bioqraphical Files, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington

Navy Yard. These are a series of alphabetized folders dealing

with Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel who have

been the subject of historical research or public relations

press releases. There is little material on Marines who

served with 055 but a few names such as Carlson, Hoicomb, Ortiz,

Eddy, McHugh, and Gardner are listed.

Classified Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center,

Washington Navy Yard. These contain extensive information on

the formation of the Radier Battalions including much correspondence

between the principal Marine Corps commanders. There is also

a good file on Major Ortiz which was provided to Mr. Benis

M. Frank by the Central Intelligence Agency. The bulk of the

World War II material is subject to declassification upon request.

Combined Lineal List, U. S. Marine Corps (NAVMC 1005DP -

3rd Revision). 1945. The "Blue Book" which provides basic data

on all Marine Officers who were on active duty at the time

of issue. Unlike its modern version, the wartime edition lists

'specialty codes'. These generally equate to the current

Military Occupation Specialty (MUS). A line-by-line examination

of the 1945 edition reveals 39 officers with the specialty

code MSS: Strategic Services. These officers were commissioned

specifically for service with 055. While the lineal list

contains only officers and does not identify those Marines

who were not commissioned for 055 duty but nevertheless served

with the organization, it remains a most important primary

source document.

Manuscript Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center,

Washington Navy Yard. These contain a number of collected

personal papers, photographs, musical scores, art work, and

other historically valuable items which have been donated

by various individuals. The most important documents utilized

for this work come from the large (approximately S linear

feet) collection of General Thomas Holcomb's personal papers.

These are arranged in chronological order. There is no

index, but patient research provides substantial reward.

Oral History Archives, Marine Corps Historical Center,

Washinton Navy Yard. An extensive collection of tape recordings

302
303

and typewritten transcripts covering a wide range of Marine

Corps personalities of all ranks. The Oral Historian, Mr.

Benis M. Frank is a walking encyclopedia of Marine history

and can direct the researcher to primary source material

which might otherwise be overlooked. This paper could not

have been written without his aid and support.

B. Primary Sources (Official Records other than Marine Corps)

Central Intelligence Agency Archives, U. S. Central

Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C. 20505. The majority

of 055 operational records are in custody of the CIA. These

are not available for review by private researchers but

may be requested from the Agency's Information and Privacy

Coordinator in writing. Declassification of World War Ii

vintage material is currently in progress; however, the

work is very slow. To obtain documents from CIA's archives,

one must be able to provide substantial information on

the exact topic. This is largely because 05$ records are

not computerized. Each document requested by a private

individual must also be reviewed for national security

information and priavcy considerations. The author found

CIA to be most cooperative in declassifying documents

such as activity and mission reports. Unfortunately there

is but a very small staff to handle literally thousands

of enquiries. No historical work of any real merit can be

complete without reference to the CIA archives. They

form the basis for much of this paper.

Federal Record Center Archives, Federal Records Center,

St. Louis, Missouri. These contain thousands of linear feet

of documents relating to members of the Armed Forces. Access

to FRC Files is difficult and could only be accomplished

with the assistance of the Marine Corps Historical Center.

In order to remain within the spirit of the Privacy Act,

only that information of a non-derogatory or innocuous

nature was utilized in writing this paper. Most of the

basic biographical data on OSS Marines came from this

source. Of particular importance were copies of Marine

Corps Special Orders and duplicates of individual award

citations.

National Archives of the United States, Record Group

226, Modern Military Records, Washington, D. C. The National

Archives holds approximately 1,500 linear feet of records
304

from the Research and Analysis Branch of 05$. These are of

some value to the detailed researcher of organizational

history but are devoid of operational details. The magnitude

and complexity of this collection requires considerable

time and patience to fully exploit. Much of the material

has already appeared in print elsewhere. Record Group 226

also includes a complete copy of the sanitized War Report

of the 055; however, as pointed out in the footnotes to

this paper, the War Report is not comprehensive and provides

few names. The staff of Modern Military Records is most

helpful but much overworked. Researchers intending to utilize

the Archives must obtain a pass.

C. Interviews and Personal Correspondence Received

Dr. William L. Cary (055 operations in Rumania and Yugoslavia

Lt.Col. William R. Corson, USMC (Ret) (Political infighting

and background on the organizational structure of American

intelligence 1935-45. Lt.Col. Corson graciously provided me

with his copy of the unpublished documentary 'exhibits' from

the 055 War Report.

Dr. Harold Deutsch (Operations of R&A Branch, 055 London)

Dr. Gerald Else (05$ operations in the Mideast and Greece)

Dr. John Gordon (Marine Corps special warfare initiatives).

Dr. Gordon, a member of the Command and Staff College adjunct

faculty, encouraged me in my research and provided copies of

several key documents on Evans Carlson, James Roosevelt, and

the formation of the Raider Battalions.

Lt.Col. William F. Grell, tJSMCR (Ret) (055 Operations in

France and Germany).

James Ladd (Mr. Ladd is author of Commandos and Ranqers of

World War II. He provided a most interesting discussion of

Narine Corps relations with the British Commando School in

Scotland and offered to research British 50E records in London).

HOnorable Walter R. Mansfield (Operations in Yugoslavia

with Mihailovic's Chetnik guerillas)

Mr. George W. Owen (Correspondence and assistance in

locating and declassifying 055 mission reports in custody of CIA.
305

Mr. Joseph E. Persico (055 Operations in Germany). Mr.

Persico is author of Piercing the Reich, the most comprehensive

account of 055 missions insìde Nazi Germany. He too encouraged

me in this project and generously provided copies of some

documentary material which had previously been released to

him by CIA.

Captain François de la Roche USMCR (Jedburgh Mission BUGATTI)

Captain de la Roche provided valuable background material

for the chapter on BUGATTI ast well as a photograph taken

in Tarbes, France in September, 1944 which shows Lieutenant

Colonel Fuller, USMCR the BUGATTI mission commander.

D. Primary Sources (Private Collections and Published Material)

Goodfellow, Millard P., A collection of his personal

papers. Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The Goodfellow

collection is one of, if not the best, private source of 055

records. Goodfellow as Deputy Director of 055 during the war

and kept extensive files. The collection contains most of

his correspondence and memoranda as well as much collateral

material. It is frequently cited in scholarly works on

American intelligence. I was only able to mine this source

by mail and thus fell far short of realizing its true

potential. Any researcher who is within geographical range

of Palo Alto should find the Goodfellow papers a treasure

trove.

Loewenheim, Francis L., Harold D. Langley, and Manfred

Jonas, Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence

New York and London: Barrie, Jenkìns, 1975. ihis 800 page

volume contains an annotated commentary and facsimile reproduction

of hundreds of personal and 'eyes only' messages between the

President and Prime Minister. There is excellent documentary

material on the 'commando service' proposal and on 055 operations

in the Balkans as well as much discussion concerning war aims,

strategy and the like. A very valuable source, well indexed

and quite handy for checking the real words rather than someones

interpretation.

50E in France ,London: Her Masiesty's Stationary Office; 1966

This is the official history of the Special Operations Executive's
306

clandestine warfare accomplishments in France. While Captain

M.R.D. Foote ( a former SAS officer) is listed as author, the

work is really a succession of SOE operation orders and mission

reports strung loosely together.- Immensely detailed and

indexed, it is one of the five or six best references yet published on special operations. I include it as a primary

source because of the extensive footnoting and lack of

journalistic)i;ense by Captain Foote.

,A.Ya;íínt Roosevelt (Ed). War Report of the 055, New York:

Walker4"1976. 2 Volumes. The litar Reeort must be the beginning ofaWresearch concerning ass. Despite the fact that it -'>as censored by CIA prior to release, the report contains

the single most comprehensive coverage of 055 in print. Unfortunately it is unindexed and confusingly arranged. Furthermore, the published version does not include the documentary exhibits referred to in the text.These may be obtained from the National Archives but require a stiff

fee for reproduction. One of the requirements imposed by CIA

prior to release was the deletion of all but a handful of persona

names, still, I referred to and quoted from the War Report

throughout the research and composition of this paper.

L Secondary sources (Books)

Alsop, Stewart and Thomas Braden, Sub Rosa. Harcourt, Brace,

and World. 1964. One of the first books to deal with 055

operations. There is a good account of Holcomb's role in

the Port Lyautey pilot caper. No index, footnotes, or maps.

Good background and easy reading.

Barrett, David, Dixie Mission. Berkeley: Center for Chinese

Studies. 1970. Detailed discussion of the background and

accomplishments of the 055 mission to the Chinese communist

forces in Yenan.

Bird, Michael J., The Secret Battalion. New York: Holt,

Rhinehart & Winston. 1964. A short but detailed account of

maquis activities in one part of the Haute Savoie region

of France. Some of the narrative covers the time in which

missions Union I and Union II were active there. Written

from-the French perspective.

Corson, William R., The Armies of Iqnorance. New York: Dial Press, 1977. An extensive and scholarly study of the Mierican intelligence conimunity, chiefly in the period

1935-75. Excellent analysis of the in-fighting among the

various intelligence agencies. Outstanding documentation

and explanatory notes. A required source. Good glossary,

index, and bibliography.

Chandler, Alfred D., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970. A 5 volume

collection of the most important letters, messages, memoranda, etc. of the late President. Provides a very useful guide to
307

location of actual documents in the National Archives. A

particularly helpful section contains a daily recapitulation

of Eisenhower's activities from 23 June 1942 through 5 May

1945. Several 055 Marines are mentioned including Eddy,

Holcomb, and Mansfield. Well indexed and easy to use.

CUne, Ray S. , Secrets, Spies, and Scholars. Washington:

Acropolis, 1976. One of the better general treatments of

the U. S. intelligence establishment 1940-75. For background

material the first two chapters are a good concise account

of COl/OSS in the early days. While the skeleton of this - work is quite strong, the meat is largely left to others.

Disappointing footnotes.

Davies, John Paton, Dragon By The Tail New York: Norton. 1972.

A personal account of Davies' experiences in China and the

Soviet Union. Good background on China with some collateral

information on Evans Carlson. Extremely well written. Weak

bibi iography.

Erlich, Blake, Resistance: France 1940-45. Boston: Little,

Brown, 1965. A general history of the French resistance which

avoids polemics. Useful for sociological and political

aspects of the guerilla army. Little on OSS. Index.

Ford, Corry, Donovan of OSS. New York: Little, Brown, 1970.

A sympathetic biography of Donovan which focuses less on the

OSS than on the life of the titular subject. Little treatment

of organizational details and no mention of the "Commando

Service" controversy. Still, a good departure point for

research. Several OSS Marines are mentioned. Appendices and

index are useful.

Heilbrunn, Otto, Partisan Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1962.

A short philosophical treatise whose main value to 055 research

lies in the few pages contrasting the organizations of Tito

and Mihailovic.

Johnstone, Major J. H. USMC, An Annotated Bibliography of

the United States Marines in GueriliAnti-ueriila, and Small

Wars Action. Washington: Historical Branch (G-3),11QMC, l962.

A short and very incomplete review of the literature (including

some unpublished) relating to the title. Much outdated and

of limited value to begin with. Nothing on OSS but a few

references to Marines in China.
308

Hayden, Sterling. Wanderer. New York: Knopf, 1963. An

autobiography of the actor, author, sailor and 055 Marine

officer. Chapters 61 through 67 giQe an excellent and

historically accurate account of Hayden's experiences in

Yugoslavia and France as well as his training in the

British commando school.

Kirkpatrick, Lyman. The Real CIA. New York: Macmillan, 1968.

A source of some general value in tying OSS to its successor.

Well indexed and better written than most 'pro-Agency' works.

Langer, William. Our Vichy Gamble. New York: W. W. Norton,

1947. One of the first books to deal with the American political

and intelligence machinations in unoccupied France and North

Africa during the days before TORCH. Langer was later a key

member of-Donovan's staff. Excellent background for the COI

period especially when taken in tandem with Murphy's

Diplomat Amonq Warriors.

MacLean, Fitzroy. The Heretic. New York: Harper, Row, 1957.

An informed and tolerable detai fed view of wartime Yugoslavia

and thereafter woven around the life of Tito. The author, a

conservative Member of Parliament, was the senior AngloAmerican liaison officer with the partisans 1942.-45. See also

MacLean's earlier work Escape to Adventure.

MacMillan, Harold. The Blast of War. London: Macmillan, 1947.

The recollections of Britains postwar Prime Minister. Much

insider information on the secret bureaucratic battles between

SIS, SUE, and OSS.

Michel, H. and B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch. Les Idees Politiques

et Sociales de La Resistance. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 195

Reproduction and commentary of selected speeches, clandestine

broadsides and French language BBC broadcasts. Very useful

appendix of acronyms and abbreviations. Extensive bibliography

of French language writings on the maquis. Entirely in

French, dictionary advised.

Moran, John B. Creatin9 a Leqend. Chicago: Moran/Andrews, 1973

An exhaustive annotated bibliography of books, articles and film

by and about Marines. Despite its scope, sources on Marines in

035 are few. Grell, Curtis, and Mansfield do appear.

Murphy, Robert. Diplomat Among Warriors. New York: Doubleday,

1964. The memoirs of an American diplomat who served with and

for the 055 in Vichy and North Africa as well as the Balkans.

Good material throughout, especially regarding Eddy.
309

055 Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men. New York: Rhinehart,

1947. The definitive work on 055 selection and training.

Very detailed coverage and many interesting sidelights on

the organization and operational aspects of the organization

slip through. Good index and photos. Recommend any aSS

researcher take a hard look at this one.

Oblensky, Prince Serge, One Man In His Time. New York:

McDowell, 1958. This is a hard book to find but worth the

looking. Oblensky spends about half of the book getting

out of Russia and into his fortune but once World War II

commences he chronicles the typically 'untypical' life

of an 055 recruit and operative. Fascinating reading.

Persico, Joseph E. Piercing the Reich. New York: Viking, 1979.

The best book yet written on OSS operations against the German

homeland. Required and exciting reading. High style with

superb scholarship.

Peers, William and Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road

Boston: Little, Brown, 1963. A popular history of OSS Detachment

101 in Burma. Well written narrative with an outstanding

appendix listing every member of '101' including the Marines.

Unfortunately, like most books on 055 you must know the

service affiliation to find men like Macomber, Fenn, Owen,

and McDevitt.

Peniakoff, Vladimir. Popski's Private Army. New York:

Thomas Crowell, 1950. 0f some small value in scene-setting

for North Africa and Italy. No index or bibliography.

Roberts, Walter R. Tito, Mihailovic And The Allies, 1941/45

New Brunkswick, N. J.: Rutgersiiniversity Press, 1978. The

best account yet written on wartime Yugoslavia. Good detail

on allied missions to both sides in the guerilla war against

the Germans. Excellent index and some good photos. A work

of high scholarship.

Saunders, Hilary St. George. The Green Beret. London:

Michael Joseph, 1949. An excellent early account of the recruitment,

organization, training, and employment of the British commando

forces which Donovan so admired. First three or four chapters

are particularly good.

Shaw, Henry and Benis M. Frank, History of Marine Corps

perations in World War II. Washington: U. S. Government

Printing Office, 1968. Volume 5. This work contains a good

recapitualtion of the POW experiences of Major Ortiz and

Lieutenant Taylor.
310

Sulzberger, C. L. A. A Long Row of Candles. New York: Macmillan,

1969. An extraordinarily valuable background source on the Balkans.

Elegantly written and containing the diary entries of Mr. Sulzbergert

travels throughout the world both before and during the war. - One hundred pages of this is better general themeatic material

than 50 average books. Good sections on Greece and Yugoslavia.

Sweet-Escott, Bickham. Baker Street Irreqular. London:

Methuen, 1965. A personal remembrance of highjinks and spy

escapades with SOE. Quite readable and full of insider information.

Miong the best general works on clandestine operations published.

Updegraph, Charles L., J. Special Marine Corps Units of

World War II . Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, Marine

Corps, 1972. The best starting point for research into the

Raider Battalions. Only a glimmer of the Donovan connection but

enough smoke to recognize that more information exists. Updegraph's

work is the basis for James Ladd's chapter on the Raiders in

Commandos and Ranqers of World War II. Contains excellent documentary

leads.

The followinq book is of special import

Smith, R. Harris. 055: The Secret History of Anierica's First

Central Intelliqence Aqency. Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1972. If I were asked to name the single starting point

for OSS research it would be Smith's. Working entirely from

unclassified sources, he produced a tolerably accurate and

extraordinarily broad account of the agency from its inception

to its demise. The amount of research involved in this book

is staggering. While there are a few factual errors,in the

main the text is clear, elegantly written, and massively

documented. The bibliography is among the most extensive yet

compiled.

F. Secondary Sources (Newspapers and Magazines)

Chamberlain, John. "OSSI' Life (19 Novembe 1945) pp. 119-132

One of the first popular accounts of OSS activities. Pleasant

reading, little substance. Eddy is mentioned1 several times.
311

Case, Lynn. "The Maquis Republic of the Vercors", Infantry Journal

(ApriI, 1947) pp. 29ff. A short but w11 written article dealingwith the tragedy of Haute Savoie.

Donovan, William J. "Intelligence: Key to Defense", Life

(September 30, 1946) pp. 108ff. A brief summary of the OSS's role

in World War II coupled with a strong plea for retention of a

national central intelligence capability.

Funk, Arthur. "American Contacts with the Resistance in France",

Military Affairs (February, 1970) pp 9ff. An excellent scholarly

article covering much ground but done with considerable skill.

Grell, Captain William F., USMCR, "A Marine With OSS", Marine

Corps Gazette (December, 1945), pp. 14ff. Grell's personal account

of the GERMINAL mission as well as some of the preparator work.

Kelly, Richard M. "Mission to Greece", Bluebook, (-November, 1946)

pp 76ff. A very detailed and well written account of the 055

mission to blow the bridges between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria

in which Gunnery Sergeant Curtis was a key participant.

"One Against a Thousand", Bluebook (February,

1947), pp. l4ffTThe adventures of ist Lieutanent George Hearn USMCR

in Italy highlighting his part in the capture of Chioggia. Kelly

was a Navy Lieutènant Commander who commanded the 055 Maritime Unit

in the Adriatic. He published a series of articles in Bluebook

between 1946-48 which contain perhaps the best and most detailed

accounts of 055 operations available prior to publication of the

War Report. These are all available on microfilm at the Library

of Congress.

Krock, Arthur. "OSS Gets it Coming and Going", The New York Times

(31 July 1945). An editorial decrying the rush to begin dismantling

the 055 organization and shifting its assets to the Departments

of State and War.

MacLean, Fitzroy, "The Setting for Guerilla Warfare", Journal

of the Royal United Services Institution (August, 1963) pp. 206 ff.

Ihoughts of the highest ranking allied liaison officer to the

Yugoslav partisans. Nothing specifically on OSS but a good short

course in British reasoning behind recognizing Tito at the expense

of the Chetniks.

Mansfield, Captain Walter R., USMCR, "Marine With the Chetniks",

Marine Corps Gazette (January - February, 1946). A personal account

of Mansfield's mission to Mihailovic. Well written and a key source.

Much quoted in secondary reference material on OSS.
312

"Mthush in China", 4arine Corps Gazette (March,

1946) pp. 13 ff. Narrartive account of Mansfield's experiences

with a Chinese guerilla raiding force behind Japanese lines. Some

interesting biographical details in addition to the 'shoot-em-up'

portions.

Wager, Walter. "The Private War of Peter Ortiz", See (Ndvember,

1960) pp. 24ff. A somewhat fanciful account of Ortiz7jThiissions

Union I and II to the Haute Savoie. High melodrama, low accuracy.

In addition to the foregoing cited work, I found the

collected resources of the New York Times, Newsweek, Time

and Life magazines during the period 1940-45 to be a most useful

resource. The number of articles, many of which carried no' by-line

utilized in reading into the situation was very large. An additiona

excellent source was the OSS publication "The War This Week" which

appeared regularly throughout the conflict and included many

important newpaper clippings from the American press.
During the mid-1950's, Headquarters Marine Corps requested

that CIA provide a listing of those Marines who had served with 05$

during World War lit. The Agency replied that no such list existed.

The following roster is the first and only known attempt to

compile a roster of these men-and to identify the areas in which

they served. The result is almost certainly incomplete and

contains only the names of Marine officers. It will however

provide a beginning for future research into a fascinating and

nearly forgotten chapter of Marine Corps history.

COLONELS

William A. Eddy

James M. McHugh

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

Remsen J. Cole

Horace W. Fuller

Franklin P. Holcomb

Peter J. Ortiz

Carl B. Peters

Phillip G. Strong

George T. Van der Hoef

Frederick A. Willis

Andrew Wylie

MAJORS

Bruce B. Cheever

Richard A. Card

Charlotte D. Cower

William G. Hamilton

Albert F. Moe

James T. Patterson

CAPTAINS

William L. Cary

Joseph E. Charles

Gordon A. Craig

Gerald F. Else

MARINES OF THE 05$

313

North Africa

Washington

Washington

France, China

Morocco, Algiers, France

Tunisia, France

Washington, England

Washington

China

Washington

Washington

Engl and

Chin a

Washington

England, France

China, India

England, France

Rumania, Yugoslavia, Italy

England, France, Germany

West Africa, Algiers

Cairo, Greece, Liberia
Francis T. Farrell

Leon Grell

William F. A. Grell

John Hamilton (aka Sterling Hayden)

Elmer Harris

William A. Holmin

Emil M. Krieger

Robert P. Leonard

Walter R. Mansfield

C. L. A. Mathieu

George H. Owen

Sabastian Passanessi

Winthrop Rutherfurd, Jr.

Richard E. Sullivan

Leon l-I. Weaver

FIRST LIEUTENANTS

William Applebaum

Peter Benson

John C. Bradley

Joseph F. Campisi

John H. Cox

Edward T. Dicginson, Jr.

William E. Duggan

Charles H. Fenn

John W. Gardner

Harry H. Harper

George M. Hearn

William E. Jones

Rolfe Kingsley, Jr.

Clarence J. Lewis, Jr.

William B. Macomber

Alan K. Magary

Hugh A. McDevitt

John J. Meilly

John W. Mowinckel

Charles A. Muecke

Robert Rubin

John S. Russell, Jr.

George S. Seabury

Michael Shaughnessy

Lewis B. Walton, Jr.

Edward R. Weismiller

Richard D. Wylly

314

China

Engl and

England, France

Cairo, Italy, Yugoslavia,

Albania, France, Germany

Tunisia, Corsica, Italy,

China

Algiers, Italy

France, Germany

India, Burma

England, Yugoslavia, China

China

Algiers, Cairo, Burma

Algiers, Sardinia, Italy

Tunisia, France, Germany

Washington

China

Washington

China

China

London, Italy

Burma, China

London, Sweden, France

China

Burma, China

CON US

Cairo, Bulgaria

Italy

China

Cairo, Italy, Austria

India, China

France, Burma

London, France

Malaya, Burma, China

London

France, Germany, Austria

France, Germany

London

Washington

Cairo, Ceylon, Malaya, Burma

London

Chin a

France

France
SECOND LIEUTENANTS

Nick R. Cooky

Robert L. Hitt

William T. Jolly

Walter W. Taylor

Robert G. Scurrah

Peter Viertel

WARRANT OFFICERS

Thomas L. Curtis

John L. Richardson

315

Italy, Albania

China

Chi na

Corsica, Italy, France

Ch i n a France, Germany

Greece, China

CONUS, London, Ceylon

z US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1989-2 3 2 -5 7 8 ¡ 0 0 1 2 2